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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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Today’s Ukraine is often described as a testing ground for new military technologies, but it is important to stress that Ukrainians are active participants in this process who are in many instances leading the way with new innovations ranging from combat drones to artillery apps. This ethos is exemplified by initiatives such as BRAVE1, which was launched by the Ukrainian authorities in 2023 as a hub for cooperation between state, military, and private sector developers to address defense issues and create cutting-edge military technologies. BRAVE1 has dramatically cut down the amount of time and paperwork required for private sector tech companies to begin working directly with the military; according to Ukraine’s defense minister, this waiting period has been reduced from two years to just one-and-a-half months.

One example of Ukrainian tech innovation for the military is the Geographic Information System for Artillery (GIS Arta) tool developed in Ukraine in the years prior to Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion. This system, which some have dubbed the “Uber for artillery,” optimizes across variables like target type, position, and range to assign “fire missions” to available artillery units. Battlefield insights of this nature have helped Ukraine to compensate for its significant artillery hardware disadvantage. The effectiveness of tools like GIS Arta has caught the attention of Western military planners, with a senior Pentagon official saying Ukraine’s use of technology in the current war is a “wake-up call.”

Alongside intensifying cooperation with the state and the military, members of Ukraine’s tech sector are also taking a proactive approach on the digital front of the war with Russia. A decentralized IT army, consisting of over 250,000 IT volunteers at its peak, has been formed to counter Russian digital threats. Moreover, the country’s underground hacktivist groups have shown an impressive level of digital ingenuity. For example, Ukraine’s IT army claims to have targeted critical Russian infrastructure such as railways and the electricity grid.

Ukraine’s tech industry has been a major asset in the fightback against Russia’s invasion, providing a much-needed economic boost while strengthening the country’s cyber defenses and supplying the Ukrainian military with the innovative edge to counter Russia’s overwhelming advantages in manpower and military equipment.

This experience could also be critical to Ukraine’s coming postwar recovery. The Ukrainian tech industry looks set to emerge from the war stronger than ever with a significantly enhanced global reputation. Crucially, the unique experience gained by Ukrainian tech companies in the defense tech sector will likely position Ukraine as a potential industry leader, with countries around the world eager to learn from Ukrainian specialists and access Ukrainian military tech solutions. This could serve as a key driver of economic growth for many years to come, while also improving Ukrainian national security.

David Kirichenko is an editor at Euromaidan Press, an online English language media outlet in Ukraine. He tweets @DVKirichenko.

If Ukraine can breach the Russian defensive line of obstacles and minefields in two or three locations, it could provide multiple axes of advance to exploit and keep the Russians off balance, or allow the Ukrainians to at least feint in one or more spots and tie down Russian defenders. At the same time, Ukrainian tanks could rapidly move to exploit their success before the Russians recognize these advances, and could ideally penetrate the Russian rear area before they can deploy their reserves. This scenario would offer the Ukrainians the best chance they have had thus far in this war to liberate large swaths of occupied territory. But it would also in all likelihood be a long battle with significant casualties.

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It is unlikely that this counteroffensive will result in the liberation of Crimea. The narrow isthmus that connects the peninsula to the mainland of Ukraine makes it the most easily defensible piece of Russian-occupied territory. Because the Ukrainian military lacks an amphibious capability, the Russians can concentrate all their forces there, making any attempt at a southward advance extraordinarily deadly.

Yet the Ukrainians are savvy enough to realize that the actual value of Crimea to the Russians is the port of Sevastopol, despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claims of solidarity with the largely Russian-speaking population of the peninsula.

Ukraine has the ability to render the strategic value of Crimea moot and make Russia’s Black Sea Fleet pay a high price every time it attempts to leave the port of Sevastopol. Ukraine can achieve this by deploying advanced naval mines offensively as effectively as they did defensively close to the Ukrainian port city of Odesa; and by employing their Neptune anti-ship missiles as they have done to deadly effect in the past.

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Wagner attempts to draft gamers as UAV pilots

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The addition of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine’s arsenal will provide another weapon to strike Russia’s naval base in Sevastopol and is a welcome change in US policy. Although still a fourth-generation aircraft and susceptible to Russia’s S-400 surface-to-air missile system, the F-16 is superior to anything the Ukrainian Air Force currently operates as a fighter or an air-to-ground attack aircraft.

Unlike the MiG-29, Su-27, Su-24, and Su-25 of the Ukrainian Air Force, the F-16 can carry the entire range of US and NATO laser-guided and GPS-guided air-to-ground ordnance, which will be vital for striking Russian targets deep in occupied territory including Crimea while avoiding collateral damage and civilian casualties. Additionally, its superior radar and ability to employ the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and AIM-9X Sidewinder make it superior to Russia’s Mig-29 and Su-27 in aerial combat. But since it will take three to four months to transition Ukrainian pilots to the F-16, these fighters will not play a significant role in the current counteroffensive.

The Ukrainians have demonstrated their commitment to their cause through superior leadership, morale, and courage under fire. At the same time, Russia’s shift to prepared defenses may allow them to shore up the flagging confidence of their largely conscripted army. While the current Ukrainian counteroffensive is a welcome step toward victory in this war, it will be one of many campaigns over the course of what will likely be a long and arduous struggle.

Col. John B. Barranco (Ret.) was the 2021-22 US Marine Corps senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is currently executive vice president of Potomac International Partners.

Tracking narratives

Deripaska blames hackers after his website briefly takes credit for potential war crime

Rumors of alleged death of popular pro-Kremlin war correspondent gain traction on Twitter

Ukrainian counteroffensive sees advances in Zaporizhzhia and eastern Ukraine

On June 19, Ukrainian forces launched counteroffensive actions in at least three areas and appear to have made gains in Zaporizhzhia and eastern Ukraine. The Telegram channel of Russian military blogger WarGonzo reported that Ukrainian forces continued attacks northwest, northeast, and southwest of Bakhmut and advanced near Krasnopolivka. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar announced that over the past week Ukrainian troops advanced up to seven kilometers in the direction of Zaporizhzhia and retook 113 square kilometers of territory. Russian Telegram channels also reported that fighting was ongoing south and southwest of Orikhiv on June 19. Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk oblasts continue to be the most active areas of the frontline, as the Ukrainian army attempts to advance in the directions of Novodarivka, Pryutne, Makarivka, Rivnopil, Novodanylivka, and Robotyne.

On June 17, the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks west and south of Kreminna. It also stated that the Russian army had repelled Ukrainian attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk sector. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces continued operations around Velyka Novosilka near the border between Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

According to Ukrainian forces, Russian forces conducted offensive actions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The Ukrainian military reported forty-five combat engagements with Russian forces near Yampolivka, Torske, Hryhorivka, Spirne, Avdiyivka, Krasnohorivka, Marinka, Pobieda, Novomykhailivka, and Donetsk’s Dibrova and Orikhovo-Vasylivka. According to Ukraine, the Russian army continued to shell villages in the direction of Marinka, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Lyman, and Kupiansk. Ukraine also alleged that Russian forces launched Kalibr cruise missiles from a submarine in the Black Sea and Shahed drones from the eastern coast of the Sea of Azov.

On June 20, Kyrylo Budanov, chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence for the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, alleged that Russian troops mined the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant’s cooling pond, which is necessary for the safe operation of the plant. According to Budanov, if Russia triggers an explosion, there is a “high probability that there will be significant problems.” Budanov did not provide any evidence to support the allegation, and the statement cannot be independently verified at this time. If true, however, it would put the nuclear plant at greater risk of a significant accident. The power plant complex, Europe’s largest, has been under occupation since February 2022.

On January 22, the governor of Russian-occupied Crimea accused Ukraine of targeting a bridge that connects the peninsula to Kherson Oblast, near the village of Chonhar. In a Telegram post, Vladimir Sal’do alleged that Ukraine struck the bridge with “British Storm Shadow missiles,” creating a hole in the middle of the bridge.

As fierce hostilities continue in eastern and southern Ukraine, there are signs of a new wave of arrests in Russia, including of people with ties to Ukraine. On June 20, Russian state media outlet RIA Novosti announced that a woman of Ukrainian origin was detained in Saransk and charged with treason.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Wagner attempts to draft gamers as UAV pilots

A June 19 Telegram post from Russian opposition news outlet Verstka claimed that Wagner Group is encouraging gamers to apply to serve as unmanned aerial vehicle pilots in the war against Ukraine. The media outlet reported that no prior military experience was required to apply for the position. Posts from Wagner emerged on Vkontakte the same day, inviting gamers with experience in “manipulating joysticks in flight simulators” to enroll.

Wagner ad recruiting gamers as UAV pilots. (Source: VK)

Verstka, which contacted a Wagner recruiter as part of its reporting, stated that the campaign aims to recruit soldiers to pilot “copters and more serious machines.” In this particular context, “copters” (коптеры) is a reference to commercial drones that are sold to the public and have been widely used in the war against Ukraine. A May 19 investigation published by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project found that Chinese manufacturers have reportedly continued to provide Russian armed forces with DJI drones through third parties in Kazakhstan.

Verstka also noted that in 2022, the Russian defense ministry attempted to recruit gamers with a targeted ad campaign that invited them to play “with real rules, with no cheat codes or saves.”

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Deripaska blames hackers after his website briefly takes credit for potential war crime

The Russian-language website of Russian industrialist and US-sanctioned oligarch Oleg Deripaska briefly displayed an article appearing to take credit for deporting Ukrainian children to Russian-occupied Crimea in partnership with Kremlin official Maria Lvova-Belova, who is already facing an International Criminal Court arrest warrant for allegedly deporting children.

Yaroslav Trofimov, chief foreign affairs correspondent at the Wall Street Journal, noted the article’s appearance and disappearance in a June 15 tweet. Trofimov shared screengrabs of the article, which by that time had already been deleted from Deripaska’s Russian-language website, deripaska.ru. A complete copy of the article can be found at the Internet Archive.

Later in the article, it added, “Separately, the Fund and personally Oleg Vladimirovich [Deripaska] express their gratitude to Maria Lvova-Belova and her project ‘In Hands to Children,’ which not only provided methodological materials, but also found an opportunity to send employees for psychological work with affected babies.” In March 2023, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Lvova-Belova and Russian President Vladimir Putin, alleging they are responsible for unlawful deportation and transport of children from Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.

In a response to Russian independent news outlet Meduza, which also covered the incident, a team of representatives for Deripaska called the article a “gross fake press-release” and blamed hackers for the article’s appearance. “The team added that Deripaska ‘unequivocally condemns the separation of children from their parents’ and that he is ‘one of the very few prominent Russian industrialists who openly criticizes the fratricidal war and consistently advocates for peace in Ukraine, as well as a reduction in global military spending,’” Meduza noted.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Rumors of alleged death of popular pro-Kremlin war correspondent gain traction on Twitter

Rumors are spreading online that claim Ukrainian forces killed pro-Kremlin war correspondent Semyon Pegov, who operates an influential group of social media accounts under the name Wargonzo. The rumor first spread on Twitter on June 19 following the release of a graphic video from the 73rd Naval Center of Operations documenting how Ukrainian special forces unit had shot Russian soldiers in trenches. On June 19, Pegov’s Twitter account disregarded the allegations as fake. Wargonzo’s Telegram account has continued to operate as usual.

DFRLab analysis conducted with the social media monitoring software Meltwater Explore revealed that the most retweeted tweet came from the pro-Ukraine Twitter account @GloOouD, which stated, “LOOKS LIKE RUSSIAN TERRORISTS AND WAR REPORTER SEMEN PEGOV WAS KILLED BY UKRAINIAN SPECIAL FORCES.” The account shared a screenshot of a low-quality video frame depicting a red-bearded man that bears resemblance to Pegov.

Screenshot of @GloOouD’s tweet suggesting that Semyon Pegov was killed by Ukrainian special forces. (Source: @GloOouD/archive)

The DFRLab confirmed that the video frame depicting Pegov’s look-alike was extracted from the graphic video posted posted by the 73rd Naval Center of Operations. The video’s metadata indicates the clip was created on June 18, 2023, at 22:16:07 GMT+0300. However, the video shows events occurring in daylight.

Pegov’s most recent public appearance was on June 13 during a meeting between Putin and Russian war correspondents. The Kremlin-controlled Channel One Russia broadcast the meeting on June 18.

Comparison of the red-bearded man from the 73rd Naval Center of Operations’ video and Pegov talking at a press conference. (Source: @ukr_sof/archive, top; Perviy Kanal/archive, bottom)

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

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Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive will aim to keep the Russians guessing

Peter Dickinson — Wed, 07 Jun 2023 21:00:33 +0000

Is Ukraine’s hotly anticipated counteroffensive finally underway? That is the question dominating much of the international media this week following reports from both the Ukrainian and Russian sides of a significant upswing in activity along the front lines in southern and eastern Ukraine.

This speculation is understandable; after all, expectations have been mounting since early 2023 over an offensive that is being widely billed as a potential turning point in the sixteen-month war. It may be more helpful, however, to view Ukraine’s counteroffensive as a rolling series of local probes and thrusts rather than a single big push to penetrate Russian defenses and secure a decisive breakthrough.

Talk of a coming Ukrainian counteroffensive began following the liberation of Kherson from Russian occupation in late 2022. In the six months since that last major military success, Ukraine has sent tens of thousands of fresh troops for training in NATO countries and received unprecedented amounts of Western military aid including modern battle tanks, cruise missiles, armored personnel carriers, and enhanced air defense systems. With these newly trained and equipped formations now believed to be largely in position, observers have been watching for indications that the offensive is indeed underway. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy added to the sense of anticipation by declaring in a June 3 interview with the Wall Street Journal: “We are ready” for the counteroffensive.

Anyone expecting to witness major battles is set to be disappointed, at least for the time being. While the long lines of opposing trenches and emphasis on artillery duels has led many to compare the fighting in Ukraine to the horrors of World War I, few expect the Ukrainian military to begin its counteroffensive by going “over the top” and attempting to smash through Russian lines with their newly formed brigades. Instead, Ukrainian commanders will likely seek to test Russian defenses at a number of locations along the length of the 1,000-kilometer front in a bid to stretch Vladimir Putin’s invasion force and identify weak points to exploit.

A series of recent cross-border incursions into the Russian Federation conducted by Ukrainian-backed Russian militias may be part of these efforts. While militarily insignificant in terms of size or territorial gains, the raids have proved a major personal embarrassment for Putin and could force Moscow to reduce its military presence in Ukraine in order to bolster the badly exposed home front.

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As they look to advance, Ukraine’s troops will face formidable obstacles. Russia has not sat idly by during the past half-year; it has created a defense in depth in anticipation of Ukraine’s coming attack that includes several lines of trenches and other fortifications.

Russia appears to have provided an indication of its resolve early on June 6 by blowing up the Kakhovka dam and power plant on the Dnipro River in southern Ukraine. While Moscow officially denies destroying the dam, initial analysis points to Russian responsibility. A June 7 New York Times article referencing engineering and munitions experts concluded that a deliberate explosion inside the Russian-controlled dam “most likely caused its collapse.” The ensuing ecological disaster has flooded the surrounding area, virtually ruling out a Ukrainian thrust across the river toward Crimea.

Moscow’s preparations for the Ukrainian counteroffensive certainly look impressive, but questions remain over the morale of Russian troops, with a steady stream of video addresses posted to social media in recent months indicating widespread demoralization among mobilized Russian soldiers complaining of poor conditions, suicidal tactics, and heavy losses. In contrast, Ukrainian morale is believed to be high, despite the large numbers of casualties incurred during intense fighting over the winter and spring months around the eastern Ukrainian city of Bakhmut.

Crucially, Ukraine’s troops are defending their homes and have a clear vision of what they are fighting for, while Russia has struggled to articulate its war aims or define what a potential victory could look like. In the heat of the coming summer counteroffensive, this morale factor could play a critical role.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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Most commentators agree that the primary military objective of Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive is to cut the land bridge running across southern Ukraine that connects Russia itself and the occupied Donbas region with the Crimean peninsula. If this is achieved, it would isolate large numbers of Russian troops in Crimea and south Ukraine while dealing a painful blow to Russian prestige.

Ultimately, Ukraine’s stated goal remains the liberation of Crimea itself, which has been under Russian occupation since 2014. A successful advance toward Crimea would leave the peninsula exposed to Ukrainian airstrikes and could spark a political crisis inside Russia. The military failures of the past sixteen months have already led to significant infighting among different elements within the Russian establishment; if Crimea itself is threatened, the international community must brace for a major escalation in Putin’s nuclear threats as he attempts to ward off what would be a catastrophic defeat.

Many believe a showdown over the fate of Crimea will serve as the end game of the entire war. But before we approach that point, Ukraine must first deploy its fresh forces effectively and overcome Russia’s deeply entrenched army on the mainland. This will involve much maneuvering and diversionary attacks before any major advances are attempted.

Ukraine’s successful 2022 campaigns may offer the best indication of what to expect from the summer counteroffensive. In August 2022, Ukrainian officials loudly trumpeted a counteroffensive in the south to retake Kherson. When Russia duly dispatched many of its best units to meet the expected Ukrainian attack, Ukraine struck instead in the thinly defended east and liberated most of the Kharkiv region. With Russia still reeling from this defeat and scrambling to hold the line, the Ukrainian military then renewed its southern offensive and forced Russia to abandon Kherson.

This masterclass in the art of military deception rightfully won Ukraine considerable plaudits. Ukrainian commanders will be looking to spring some similar surprises in the months ahead. Their stated goal is the complete liberation of Ukrainian territory, but they will aim to keep the Russians guessing as to exactly how they plan to achieve this.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Alleged Ukrainian drones conduct attack in Moscow region

One week after the incursion in the Belgorod region allegedly orchestrated by Russian Volunteer Corps, Russia’s border has become more permeable to Ukrainian attacks. Nearly a month after the first attack against the Kremlin’s Senate building in Moscow, another drone attack was reported in the morning of May 30.

Reports posted on Telegram channel SHOT revealed footage taken by civilians showing drones and explosions in suburban Moscow. Throughout the day, Moscow Oblast Governor Andrey Vorobyov and Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin confirmed several drones had struck various locations, which resulted in evacuation of civilians. According to Russian media outlet Mediazona, drones hit residential buildings in three different parts of the city. Two civilians were reportedly injured, although their condition did not require them to be hospitalized; there were no reported fatalities.

Russian officials, including government spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, accused “the Kyiv regime” of orchestrating the attack as “retaliation for effective drone attacks against Kyiv’s decision-making centers on Sunday [May 29]”. This theory was also embraced by Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose comments also referenced the “effective work of the air defense systems.” Meduza reported that the Kremlin ordered Russian media to cover the drone attacks using specific talking points, though this has not been independently confirmed. In contrast, the Moscow Prosecutor’s Office recommended that bloggers and the media refrain from commenting on the incident, as unverified claims would be punishable by law. The Moscow Investigative Committee launched an investigation into the drone attacks as an act of “terrorism.”

Meduza additionally geolocated drones that appeared in open-source footage, and estimated that between five to seven UAVs were downed in the Moscow area. Other unconfirmed reports from the opposition Telegram channel Baza claimed twenty-five drones took part in the attack, while Telegram channel SHOT reported on thirty-two drones. These figures remain unconfirmed, however. There were also conflicting estimates on the number of drones successfully intercepted by Russian air defense systems; while Russia’s defense ministry claimed only eight drones were shot down, SHOT reported nineteen drones as intercepted and destroyed.

Although Ukraine has not claimed responsibility for the attack, one piece of footage points at an alleged UJ-22 airborne drone of Ukrainian fabrication. Despite circumstantial evidence which could indicate Ukraine’s direct involvement, presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak denied the allegations. Information posted by opposition media outlet Agentstvo quoting a tweet by Foreign Policy Research Institute Senior Fellow Rob Lee, indicated that the drones responsible for the May 30 attack appear to be the same ones that conducted another attack on May 26 in Russia’s Krasnodar region.

Meanwhile, a report posted by Mediazona quoting a list published by Russian MP Alexander Khinshtein regarding the alleged locations of the drone suggested they may have targeted the houses of oligarchs in Moscow’s wealthy Rublyovka neighborhood. While this has not been confirmed, a separate report posted by the Telegram channel Baza alluded to an orchestrated attack in the same area.

This is the second drone attack reported in the Russian capital city since the May 3 drone attack against the senate building of the Kremlin. The DFRLab reported on that incident and assessed that defense countermeasures, including a ban on flying commercial drones, would likely be enforced as a defensive measure. GPS interference data also indicated elevated levels of GPS interference on May 30 in the Moscow area. This information would be consistent with an assessment expressed by Russian businessman and former Roskosmos chief Dmitry Rogozin, who proposed suspending GPS across Russia.

Lastly, on June 1, multiple sources reported movements of the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Free Russia Legion in the villages Shebekino and Novaya Tavolzhaka in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast, adjacent to the Ukrainian border. The oblast’s governor reported shelling by Grad rockets and initiated an evacuation of the local population to Belgorod Arena stadium, in the region’s capital. The DFRLab will continue to monitor the situation.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Georgian prime minister blames NATO for Russia’s war in Ukraine

Speaking at the GLOBSEC forum in Bratislava, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili claimed that NATO enlargement was to blame for Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a long-standing Kremlin narrative used to justify Russia’s war in Ukraine.

“I think everybody knows the reason… one of the main reasons was NATO, NATO enlargement,” Garibashvili said, adding that “Ukraine’s determination” to become a NATO member state had its “consequences.” According to recent polling by IRI, 80 percent of Georgians support the country joining NATO.

Several Kremlin-owned and pro-Kremlin outlets quoted Garibashvili and used his remarks to reinforce pro-war narratives. The outlets also reported on additional comments made by the prime minister during GLOBSEC on how the Georgian government is “setting a good precedent by maintaining peace and stability in a turbulent environment.”

The DFRLab has previously covered how the Georgian Dream-led government and the Kremlin spread similar narratives blaming the West for orchestrating protests in Georgia.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

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Ukraine’s coming counteroffensive has a good chance of succeeding

Richard D. Hooker, Jr. — Tue, 23 May 2023 16:37:45 +0000

As the Ukrainian General Staff prepares for its much-heralded counteroffensive, retaking Crimea is at the top of the operational wish list. Some experts, including senior US officials, consider this an unrealistic aim. To be sure, there are many challenges. Attacking Crimea from the Kherson region would likely involve an opposed crossing of the Dnipro river, intense fighting to reach the narrow Perekop isthmus, and then essentially frontal attacks against heavily mined barriers to breach successive lines of Russian defenses, all in the face of strong Russian artillery. Ukraine will be hindered by its lack of air power and long-range fires, as well as an absence of amphibious or airborne platforms, making a frontal assault almost the only option.

Nevertheless, while daunting, the task is far from impossible. From the Huns and the Mongols to the British, the Bolsheviks, and the Germans, many invading armies have managed to conquer Crimea. Furthermore, Ukrainian morale, generalship, and combined arms capabilities all exceed Russia’s, while the fielding of up to eleven fresh brigades with excellent Western equipment has greatly strengthened Ukraine’s ground forces.

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What might a Crimean offensive look like? The Ukrainian military may well conduct sophisticated shaping operations using drones, artillery strikes, and special operations forces. A successful crossing of the Dnipro and advance to the isthmus would also shake the resolve and fighting spirit of Russian defenders.

There may, however, be a better way. Past invasions, while successful, often proved extremely costly. The British and French lost 165,000 men during the mid-nineteenth century Crimean War, for example. Given its high losses to date, Ukraine will seek to achieve its strategic objectives while preserving as much of its armed strength and physical infrastructure as possible. Bitter fighting on the Crimean peninsula would also take a heavy toll on civilians. Accordingly, cutting Crimea off from Russia and starving it of military support could achieve Ukrainian war aims at much lower cost.

This approach would see the bulk of Ukraine’s new mobile brigades massing near Dnipro, a major road and rail hub in southeastern Ukraine well outside Russian artillery range, before rupturing the front and driving for Zaporizhzhia. From there, the operational objective would be the capture of Melitopol and the severing of the land bridge from Russia to Crimea.

The open, flat terrain of southern Ukraine and the region’s relatively good road network create favorable conditions for mobile operations and logistical resupply. Supporting efforts would include maintaining pressure on Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine to hold Russian forces in place there.

If a thrust to sever Russia’s land bridge proved successful, two options could then be considered. One would be to wheel westward and isolate Russian troops in the Kherson region. Alternatively, Ukrainian forces could turn to the east and attempt to recover Mariupol, which has been occupied by Russia since May 2022.

In either case, seizing Melitopol would cause a crisis among Russian political and military leaders, as Russian forces in the south and east would be cut off from each other, rendering a coherent defense at the operational level impossible. This would dramatically undermine Russian morale and encourage further international support for Ukraine.

If mounted in June, Ukraine’s counteroffensive could potentially be concluded by summer’s end, leaving the Crimean Bridge as the only remaining option for ground resupply of Russian forces in Crimea. Campaign success, however, would bring Ukrainian long-range missiles within range of the bridge, which would also be vulnerable to drone attacks.

Meanwhile, resupply of Russian forces in Crimea by air and sea would become precarious, as ports and airfields would now be vulnerable to drone, missile, and rocket artillery strikes. In short, Crimea would be effectively isolated. Regained Ukrainian control of the North Crimean Canal, Crimea’s principal water supply, would only add to Russia’s logistical woes.

If Ukraine’s counteroffensive makes good progress in the south, the Russian Black Sea Fleet will likely find that it cannot remain in Crimea. With its home port of Sevastopol in range of Ukrainian rocket artillery, the fleet would be forced to withdraw to Novorossiysk on the Russian Black Sea coast, a much poorer anchorage with fewer facilities for naval units.

Putin would probably react to such unprecedented setbacks by reviving threats to respond with nuclear weapons, while simultaneously demanding international intervention in the form of diplomatic pressure on Kyiv for a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement that would leave him in possession of at least some Ukrainian territory. However, Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling has lost much of its impact through overuse, and because China has made it clear that nuclear weapons must be off the table.

As for salvation through diplomacy, major Ukrainian advances on the ground this summer could bring ultimate victory within sight and encourage Ukraine to carry on. If Ukrainian troops are making progress, the country’s leaders will not be in the mood to negotiate and throw away hard-won success at the conference table, however much pressure comes from outside. Allies and partners like the British, the Poles, the Nordics, and the Baltic nations can be counted on to offset other dissenting voices and to reinforce Ukrainian battlefield gains.

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Are the Ukrainian armed forces capable of bringing this off? A number of variables will come into play. Adequate quantities of fuel, spare parts, artillery, and air defense munitions along with other classes of supply must be available.

As with the Kharkiv offensive in September 2022, operational security and successful deception operations will be critical. The Ukrainian General Staff must be capable of true operational art. They must be able to sequence combined arms battles and engagements in time and space and across multiple domains to achieve decisive battlefield results. The Russians, too, must cooperate by continuing to demonstrate flawed generalship, low morale, and an inability to synchronize combat power at points of decision.

In war, of course, the future remains uncharted territory. But all signs point to a clear opportunity for the Ukrainian counteroffensive to succeed. In spite of heavy casualties, continuous combat, and an unending rain of missiles on its civilian infrastructure, Ukraine has managed to generate fresh, well-equipped, and well-trained reserves in large numbers. Talented commanders have come to the fore, vetted by years of experience fighting the Russians.

The Ukrainian General Staff is not likely to accept the risks inherent in major operations of this sort without confidence that its logistics are in place and its planning is sound. Furthermore, Ukrainian commanders must be encouraged by what they see across the front lines. Facing them are a shattered Russian army that has taken enormous losses in tanks, troops, and munitions; an ineffective Russian air force; and a Russian Black Sea Fleet that can do little but shelter in its anchorage. No outstanding Russian commanders have emerged from the carnage of the past 15 months. One must assume the Russians are currently waiting for Ukraine’s attack with low confidence and a sense of foreboding.

Subsequent phases of the campaign will seek, through diplomacy, continued sanctions, and military force, to liberate Ukraine entirely. Recent moves, such as the UK’s provision of Storm Shadow cruise missiles and other long-range munitions, are changing the military calculus. So, too, will the long-delayed decision to train Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 fighter jet. Putin is counting on support for Ukraine to degrade as allies and partners tire. In fact, Ukraine grows stronger while Russia increasingly turns to obsolete equipment and ever-more reluctant conscripts.

As we are often told, no plan survives contact with the enemy. There will likely be the occasional tactical miscue or operational hiccup during the coming counteroffensive, but a careful assessment suggests the odds are heavily in favor of Ukraine. More savage fighting lies ahead, but the end of the war may gradually be coming into view, and it looks very promising from Ukraine’s perspective.

Richard D. Hooker Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. He previously served as Dean of the NATO Defense College and as Special Assistant to the US President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia with the National Security Council.

At the same time, it is important not to underestimate the enemy. Russian army commanders recognize the increasing importance of defense tech and are working hard to close the gap in areas where Ukraine has established a lead. To stay ahead, it is vital to constantly innovate. This requires a systematic approach to the development of Ukraine’s defense tech sector.

Ukraine’s immediate goal is to create a fast track for defense tech innovation that can make a powerful contribution to the defeat of Russia’s invasion. We must create an environment where startups flourish and innovative products can move rapidly toward mass production. Creativity must be tailored to the specific needs of the military, with the necessary expertise and state support readily available to turn great ideas into military advantages.

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This was the thinking behind the Brave1 defense tech cluster, which was launched by Ukraine in late April. A joint initiative of Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation, Defense Ministry, General Staff, National Security and Defense Council, Ministry of Strategic Industries, and Economy Ministry, Brave1 is designed to serve as a hub for the country’s defense tech industry. It is a platform to optimize cooperation between individual defense tech companies, the state, the Ukrainian military, investors, and other potential partners.

The scope of Brave1 is necessarily broad. Ukraine is seeking to promote new developments in a wide range of defense-related tech segments including supply and logistics, unmanned aerial vehicles, cybersecurity, navigation, and medical care. We have designed the initiative relying on international experience, though in the end, we have quite a unique Ukrainian story. Brave1 includes partner accelerators and incubators, investor engagement opportunities, and educational courses.

The Brave1 Defense Innovation Council is headed by Mark Lennon. Mr. Lennon has held senior leadership positions at Apple, Gartner, and in the US government, and has also served for 24 years as a US Naval Officer. His background and credibility will enable Brave1 to become a powerful platform capable of generating war-winning technologies.

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The long-term objective is clear: Ukraine must become one of the world’s leading defense tech countries. This is entirely realistic. After all, Ukraine is already acquiring unique wartime experience on a daily basis and boasts a very large number of highly skilled IT professionals and engineers. Moscow’s full-scale invasion has turned Ukraine into a testing ground for new military technologies. It is also transforming the country into a defense tech superpower.

This process has the potential to profoundly impact Ukraine’s national security and the country’s economy. I am confident that in the coming years, we will witness the emergence of powerful Ukrainian defense tech companies worth billions of dollars. The growth of this sector will play a critical role in Ukrainian defense policy for decades to come and will remain a top national priority.

All that lies ahead. The task now is to defeat Russia. The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin is unlikely to end soon. Instead, it should be viewed as a marathon. Ukrainians must be ready for a long fight. We must play to our strengths as a tech-savvy nation of innovators, and must do everything to maximize effective cooperation between creative minds, state bodies, and the military. Ukrainians have already demonstrated to global audiences that they are some the bravest fighters on the planet. They must now confirm that are also among the smartest.

Mykhailo Fedorov is Ukraine’s Vice Prime Minister for Innovations, Development of Education, Science and Technologies, and Minister of Digital Transformation.

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Tuesday’s one-tank parade was the latest in a series of blows that had already cast a shadow over preparations for this year’s Victory Day celebrations. In the month preceding the holiday, more than twenty cities across Russia canceled plans to hold military parades. While security concerns were officially cited, these cancellations fueled speculation that Russia simply doesn’t have enough military equipment available to stage regional parades, with the vast majority of tanks and other vehicles having already been sent to Ukraine.

The complete cancellation of this year’s Immortal Regiment marches was an even bigger blow. This mass participation event, which sees members of the public marching through Russian towns and cities while displaying portraits of family members who served in the Red Army during World War II, has become an integral part of Russia’s Victory Day rituals over the past decade and has been endorsed by Putin himself. Nevertheless, the Kremlin decided to ban marches this year amid fears that family members of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine may seek to participate. With Russian officials still in denial over the disastrous consequences of the Ukraine invasion, the last thing the Kremlin wanted was for thousands of grieving relatives to gather in public and draw attention to the scale of the tragedy.

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The negative optics surrounding this year’s Victory Day celebrations are personally damaging for Vladimir Putin, who has been instrumental in placing the holiday at the very heart of modern Russia’s national identity. It is often assumed that Victory Day has always dominated the Russian calendar, but this is simply not true. In fact, during the 46-year period between the end of World War II and the fall of the USSR, the Soviet authorities held just three Victory Day military parades. Other holidays such as May Day and the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution were considered far more significant.

It was not until Putin came to power at the turn of the millennium that Victory Day began to assume its current position as Russia’s most important public holiday. Over the past two decades, Putin has transformed Victory Day into the centerpiece of a pseudo-religious victory cult complete with its own sacred symbols, feast days, saints, and dogmas. The hysteria surrounding the holiday has come to be known as “Pobedobesie” or “victory mania,” with anyone who dares question the Kremlin’s highly sanitized version of World War II likely to be treated with the kind of severity once reserved for medieval heretics.

The veneration of Russia’s role in the defeat of Nazi Germany has proven extremely politically profitable for Putin. It has helped him rebuild Russian national pride following the humiliation of the 1990s, and has paved the way for a return to authoritarianism in today’s Russia by rehabilitating Stalin and minimizing the crimes of the Soviet era. Putin has also revived the lexicon of World War II as a convenient way to attack his enemies, with domestic and foreign opponents routinely branded as “fascists.” Indeed, in modern Russia the term “Nazi” has lost all meaning and has come to indicate anyone viewed as “anti-Putin.”

This toxic trend is most immediately apparent in relation to Ukraine. Kremlin leaders have spent years demonizing Ukrainians as “Nazis,” despite the complete absence of any actual far-right politicians in the Ukrainian government. Predictably, when Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he declared the “de-Nazification” of the country to be his chief war aim. The Russian dictator returned to this theme again during Tuesday’s Victory Day address, directly comparing his unprovoked attack on Ukraine to the struggle against Nazi Germany.

Putin’s endless appeals to the memory World War II are clearly designed to mobilize the Russian public in support of the current war, but they cannot completely disguise the grim realities of his rapidly unraveling Ukraine invasion. What was initially envisaged as three-day campaign to overthrow the Ukrainian government and seize control of the country has become the bloodiest European conflict since the days of Hitler and Stalin. Over the past fifteen months, Russian military losses have been so heavy that senior US intelligence officials are now openly questioning whether Putin’s army still retains the capacity to “sustain even modest offensive operations.” With a major Ukrainian counteroffensive expected to begin in the coming weeks, there is little cause for optimism in Moscow.

It is in some ways poetic that developments surrounding this year’s Victory Day holiday have brought Russian audiences closer to the unpalatable truth. From the cancellation of regional parades and public marches to the lack of tanks on Red Square, it is now becoming painfully obvious to the average Russian that things are not going according to plan in Ukraine. An event conceived as a propaganda spectacle to project the strength of the Putin regime has instead served to underline Russia’s growing weakness. Putin is often accused of living in the past, but this is one Victory Day he will wish to forget.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Prigozhin threatens Wagner withdrawal from Bakhmut

In a Telegram video published on May 5, Yevgeny Prigozhin stood in front of a group of Wagner fighters and threatened to withdraw Wagner forces from Bakhmut on May 10. He added that they will “celebrate” Russia’s May 9 Victory Day “with the brilliance of Russian weapons” and then hand the positions over to the Russian defense ministry.

The withdrawal threat came on the heels of a May 4 post on the Telegram channel Kyepka Prigozhina (“Prigozhin’s Hat”) featuring a graphic video of Prigozhin furiously addressing Russia’s military leadership over an ammunition shortage. In the video footage, Prigozhin stands in front of dozens of dead bodies and identifies them as Wagner Group fighters killed in Ukraine. Shouting, Prigozhin addresses Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Armed Forces Chief Valery Gerasimov, “Shoigu! Gerasimov! Where the [expletive] is the ammunition?” Prigozhin says that Wagner is “lacking 70 percent of needed ammunition” and that those who are not providing them shells “will be in hell.” Continuing with more profanities, Prigozhin complains that Russian military leadership is sitting in their luxurious offices with their children living their best lives, while Wagner fighters are dying without ammunition in Ukraine.

Prigozhin has repeatedly complained about not receiving sufficient ammunition from the Russian defense ministry.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russia accuses Ukraine of conducting “terrorist attack” targeting Putin

On the night of May 3, CCTV footage showed two drones crashing into a flagpole located atop the Kremlin Senate Palace in Moscow. Later in the day, statements emerged from the Kremlin, alongside reporting from TASS and other pro-Kremlin outlets, referring to the action as a “terrorist attack” and “an attempt on the life of the president.”

The two drones crashed into the flagpole of the Kremlin’s presidential residence, located next to Moscow’s Red Square, which at the time was closed for preparations ahead of the annual May 9 Victory Day parade. The drones reportedly crashed within fifteen minutes of each other, the first coming from the south of Moscow, and the second came from the east.

Although the Kremlin brought forward no hard evidence to prove the incident was an assassination attempt, Russian politicians and media figures nonetheless called for retaliation. RT editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan tweeted, “Maybe now it will start for real?” Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev called for the elimination of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Pro-Russian Telegram channel BALTNEWS referenced a Ukrainian crowdfunding initiative to buy drones for Ukrainian forces, claiming that Ukraine is raising funds to launch new attacks on Russia. The initiative is connected to a Ukrainian drone manufacturer’s announcement offering a prize if someone could land a drone during Moscow’s May 9 Victory Day parade. Crowdfunding is not limited to the Ukrainian side; the Russian armed forces and Wagner Group also collect money for such drones using similar tactics. These allegations do not establish causality with the May 3 attack.

Although no party has officially claimed responsibility for the attack, Ukrainian drone strikes have intensified over the past two weeks, with several disruptive actions carried out targeting trains in the Bryansk region, as well as strikes against oil units in Sevastopol, Crimea and Illinski, Russia. Ukraine appears to have increased its offensive actions in trying to disrupt supply routes to Russian forces.

An investigative thread posted on Twitter by the open-source project GeoConfirmed raised the possibility of Ukrainian partisans having carried out the attack. However, as reported by Meduza, Russia uses effective GPS jamming systems in the area surrounding the Kremlin. This, in conjunction with the January 2023 deployment of defense systems next to President Putin’s offices and private residences, raises questions about the feasibility of such an attack. According to data from the map-based web project GPSJam, GPS jamming was enforced over the entire Moscow Oblast on May 2. In addition, the Guardian reported on the possibility of a false-flag operation led by Russia to excuse escalating violent measures against Ukraine.

As the rumored Ukrainian counteroffensive remains an open question, the Russian military is trying to replenish its reserve, causing unrest amongst the civilian population in Russia. A post from the Russian Telegram channel VChK-OPGU quoted an unnamed source who claimed that “’unprecedented’ safety measures will be introduced by the Moscow municipal authorities,” including “patrolling the area of objects, educational institutions, prefectures and administration [buildings] by staff of local institutions.” They added that staff members are asked to report any “suspicious flying object as well as people, check seals of basements and attics,” indicating the possibility of enhanced monitoring for dissent.

–Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Russia carries out attacks across Ukraine, attempting to break through Ukrainian defenses

Donetsk remains the most active sector of the frontline in eastern Ukraine, where the Russian army continues its attempts to break through Ukrainian defenses in the direction of Bakhmut and Marinka. Vuhledar is also a target of attacks, including an exchange of heavy artillery shelling between Ukrainian and Russian forces.

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine claimed it had repelled forty-one attacks from Russian forces on May 1. In addition, the Russian army tried to attack Severnoye and Pervomaiskoye in the direction of Avdiivka, and in the area of Bilohorivka and Novoselivka in the direction of Lyman. On May 3, Russian forces reportedly conducted more than forty offensive operations while attempting to advance near Bilohorivka, Bakhmut, Severnoye, Marinka, and Novomykhailivka. Between May 3 and the morning of May 4, the Russian army is believed to have carried out two missile strikes, sixty-eight airstrikes, and sixty-seven shellings with multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) across Ukraine.

On May 1, Russian forces launched a rocket attack on Kramatorsk, wounding one person and damaging a school, according to Ukrainian reports. Another rocket attack targeted Kramatorsk on May 4, damaging an educational institution and nearby residential buildings. There were no initial reports of casualties.

In Russia, local media reported fires at the Ilyinsky refinery in the Krasnodar region and the Novoshakhtinsky oil products plant in the Rostov region, allegedly due to drone strikes. On May 4, Russian occupation authorities in Crimea reported a drone was shot down near Belbek.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

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Iranian and Syrian factors shape Israeli response to Russia’s Ukraine invasion

Joseph Roche — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 19:55:35 +0000

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Israel has sought to minimize involvement in the war while attempting to maintain a neutral stance toward Russia. This posture reflects Israeli security priorities closer to home. However, strengthening ties between Russia and Iran along with pressure from the West may eventually force Israel to change its stance.

During the tenure of former Prime Minister Yair Lapid, Israel declined to join EU and US sanctions against Russia, opting instead to provide only humanitarian aid to Kyiv. The return of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in December 2022 did not significantly affect Israeli foreign policy toward Ukraine or Russia.

Israel’s reluctance to condemn Russia’s actions is first and foremost a strategic decision in order to avoid jeopardizing an unofficial agreement with Moscow that enables Israel to combat Iranian influence in Syria. Since its military intervention began in 2015, Russia has been among the dominant forces in Syria. Russia controls the Syrian sky and generally does not restrict Israeli fighter jets from conducting strikes on Iranian proxies. With this in mind, Israel does not want to risk alienating the Kremlin.

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Russia’s recent geopolitical isolation has complicated the situation further by pushing Moscow toward Tehran. This growing military cooperation between Russia and Iran has sparked alarm in Israel amid fears that it could have significant negative consequences for the country’s national security.

Firstly, by providing Russia with weapons including drones, Iran is gaining important battlefield experience and improving its drone technology, potentially increasing the threat to Israel in the long run. Secondly, some observers fear that if Russia reduces its Syrian presence due to the invasion of Ukraine, it would give Iran more room to operate freely in Syria.

Not everyone is convinced. Omer Dostri, a specialist at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, does not think a complete Russian withdrawal from Syria is currently likely. He argues that Russia remains a major world power and can simultaneously engage in the war in Ukraine while also remaining in Syria. However, if Russia does significantly decrease its military presence in Syria, he argues that Israel might acutally enjoy more freedom of action and air control.

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Israel’s greatest concern remains the possibility of Russia potentially helping Iran in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Yossi Melman, a senior analyst for the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, says Russia could do so either by lobbying for a relaxation of international restrictions or by directly providing nuclear material to Iran in exchange for weapons.

For now, Israel’s objective is to dissuade Russia and demonstrate that its aid to Iran is a waste of resources and finances. However, if Russia were to significantly increase its military and security assistance to Iran, particularly in the context of Iran’s presence in Syria, Israel would likely respond by rethinking its support for Ukraine and its approach to the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Potential Russian military aid to Iran could include ballistic missiles, fighter jets, and air defense systems. Additionally, recent reports indicate Moscow may be considering establishing production lines in Iran for certain Russian weapons.

Israel is also concerned that Russia could supply equipment to upgrade the Iranian nuclear program, although Moscow may be reluctant to do so due to its own strategic interests. Nevertheless, the prospect of such a scenario has caused considerable alarm in Israel, with experts acknowledging that it would be a game-changer for the country that would require a significant shift in its relations with Moscow.

The deepening partnership between Russia and Iran is likely to remain Israel’s key focus in the months ahead. If Russia suffers further military setbacks in Ukraine, there is a danger that Moscow’s increased reliance on Tehran could result in greater Iranian influence in Syria while also strengthening the country’s position during negotiations with the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, many in the West would like to see Israel play a larger role in efforts to support Ukraine. Although neither Russia nor Iran has crossed any red lines that would prompt a formal shift in Israel’s stance toward Ukraine, the longer the current war persists, the more Israel will be pressured by its Western allies to take an active role in opposing Russian aggression.

According to Dostri, the United States is already calling on Israel to support Ukraine more robustly. “At present, Israel is providing humanitarian and medical aid, as well as defensive support, such as helmets along with missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attack warning systems. Israel is also sharing intelligence related to the threat from Iran’s UAVs,“ he says. The US is reportedly urging Israel to take further steps, such as providing the Ukrainian army with anti-missile defense systems and potentially even attack drones.

With no end in sight to the Russian invasion, Israel will likely face further calls in the coming months to stand with the democratic world and back Ukraine. “Israel has to take a side and not sit on the fence because Israel’s main ally is the US, not Russia,“ notes Melman.

Joseph Roche is a journalist and former MENA junior analyst at Oxford Analytica. He holds a master’s degree in international history from The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva.

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Russian army presses on in Bakhmut despite losses

The General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces recorded fifty-eight attacks on Ukrainian troop positions on April 9 and 10. Of these attacks, more than thirty were in the direction of Bakhmut, and more than twenty were in the direction of Marinka and Avdiivka. Russian forces also attempted to advance toward Lyman, south of Dibrova.

Documented locations of fighting April 1-13, 2023; data gathered from open-source resources. (Source: Ukraine Control Map, with annotations by the DFRLab)

On April 10, Commander of the Eastern Group of Ukrainian Ground Forces Oleksandr Syrskyi said that Russian forces in Bakhmut increasingly rely on government special forces and paratroopers because Wagner units have suffered losses in the recent battles. Syrskyi visited Bakhmut on April 9 to inspect defense lines and troops deployed to the frontline. According to the United Kingdom’s April 10 military intelligence report, Russian troops are intensifying tank attacks on Marinka but are still struggling with minimal advances and heavy losses.

On April 13, Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of Ukrainian Forces Oleksiy Gromov said that Bakhmut remains the most challenging section on the frontline as Russian forces continue to storm the city center, trying to encircle it from the north and south through Ivanivske and Bohdanivka. According to Ukrainian estimates, during a two-week period, Russian army and Wagner Group losses in the battle for Bakhmut amounted to almost 4,500 people killed or wounded. To restore the offensive potential in Bakhmut, Russian units that were previously attacking in the direction of Avdiivka were transferred back to Bakhmut.

On April 8, Commander of the Ukrainian Air Forces Mykola Oleshchuk lobbied for Ukraine obtaining F-16 fighter jets. According to his statement, Ukrainian pilots are now “hostages of old technologies” that render all pilot missions “mortally dangerous.” Oleshchuk noted that American F-16 jets would help strengthen Ukraine’s air defense. Oleshchuk said that even with a proper number of aircraft and pilots, Ukrainian aviation, which is composed of Soviet aircraft and missiles, may be left without weapons at some point. He noted the F-16 has a huge arsenal of modern bombs and missiles. The commander also discussed the need for superiority in the air and control of the sea. Currently, Russian aviation is more technologically advanced and outnumbers Ukraine, meaning Ukraine cannot adequately protect its airspace. In order for the Ukrainian army to advance and re-capture territory occupied by Russia, it will require substantial deliveries of aviation and heavy equipment like tanks, howitzers, and shells.

April 10, Ukrainian forces reported they had spotted four Russian ships on combat duty in the Black Sea, including one armed with Kalibr missiles. Another Russian ship was spotted in the Sea of Azov, along with seven in the Mediterranean, including three Kalibr cruise missile carriers.

Meanwhile, according to Ukrainian military intelligence, Russia plans to produce Kh-50 cruise missiles in June. If confirmed, this could potentially lead to increased missile strikes against Ukraine in the fall. The Kh-50 missiles in the “715” configuration are intended to be universal, meaning they can be used by many Russian strategic bombers, including the Tu-22M3, Tu-95MS, and Tu-160.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia enacts “e-drafting” law

On April 11, the Russian State Duma approved a bill reading allowing for the online drafting of Russian citizens using the national social service portal Gosuslugi. One day later, the Russian Federal Council adopted the law. The new law enables military commissariats, or voenkomat, to send mobilization notices to anyone registered in the Gosuslugi portal. Contrary to the traditional in-person delivery of paper notices, the digital mobilization order will be enforced immediately upon being sent out to the user; ordinarily, men drafted for mobilization could dispute the reception of the notice during the twenty-one-day period after the notice was sent. As of 2020, 78 million users were reportedly registered in the Gosuslugi portal, nearly two-thirds of the Russian population.

Alongside the adoption of the digital mobilization notices are newly adopted restrictions regarding unresponsive citizens. Those who fail to appear at their local military commissariat in the twenty-day period following notice will be barred from leaving the country and banned from receiving new credit or driving a car. Of the 164 senators who took part in the vote, only one voted against the bill; Ludmila Narusova argued that the law had been adopted exceptionally hastily and that the punishments against “deviants” who do not respond to the notice are “inadequate.”

As explained by Riga-based Russian news outlet Meduza, the law also states that reserves could be populated with those who legally abstained from military service until the age of twenty-seven, due to an amendment in the bill that allows for personal data to be shared with the Russian defense ministry in order to establish “reasonable grounds” for mobilization notices to be sent out. Several institutions across the country will be subject to the data exchange, including the interior ministry, the federal tax office, the pension and social fund, local and federal institutions, and schools and universities.

–Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Drone imagery locates new burial site east of Soledar

Images released by Twitter user @externalPilot revealed a new burial site, located opposite a cemetery, in the village of Volodymyrivka, southeast of Soledar, Donetsk Oblast. The DFRLab collected aerial imagery and assessed that the burial site emerged during the last week of March and the first week of April. The city of Soledar has been under Russian control since mid-January. The burial site faces the Volodymyrivka town cemetery. Drone footage shows several tombs with no apparent orthodox crosses or ornaments. Analysis of the drone imagery indicates around seventy new graves have been dug on this site. A DFRLab assessment of satellite imagery estimates the surface area of the burial site amounts to around thirteen hectares.

Location of new burial site east of Soledar, Volodymyrivka, Donetsk Oblast. (Source: PlanetLab, with annotations by the DFRLab)

–Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Russian hackers target NATO websites and email addresses

On April 8, the pro-war Russian hacktivist movement Killnet announced they would target NATO in a hacking operation. On April 10, they said they had carried out the attack. The hacktivists claimed that “40% of NATO’s electronic infrastructure has been paralyzed.” They also claimed to have gained access to the e-mails of NATO staff and announced they had used the e-mails to create user accounts on LBGTQ+ dating sites for 150 NATO employees.

The hacktivists forwarded a Telegram post from the KillMilk channel showing screenshots of one NATO employee’s e-mail being used to register an account on the website GayFriendly.dating. The DFRLab searched the site for an account affiliated with the email but none was found.

Killnet also published a list of e-mails it claims to have hacked. The DFRLab cross-checked the e-mails against publicly available databases of compromised e-mails, like Have I been Pwned, Avast, Namescan, F-secure, and others. As of April 13, none of the e-mails had been linked to the Killnet hack, though this may change as the services update their datasets.

In addition, the DFRLab checked the downtime of the NATO websites that Killnet claims to have targeted with distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. According to IsItDownRightNow, eleven of the forty-four NATO-related websites (25 percent) were down at some point on April 10.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Resident Fellow, Riga, Latvia

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Putin cancels Victory Day parades as Ukraine invasion continues to unravel

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 13 Apr 2023 20:40:08 +0000

With Russia’s annual Victory Day celebrations less than one month away, the Kremlin has taken the highly unusual step of canceling a number of military parades in regional capitals. Scheduled parades to mark the World War II Soviet victory over Nazi Germany have been called off in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts, which both border Ukraine. Victory Day celebrations in Russian-occupied Crimea have also reportedly been scrapped.

The cancellations are officially due to security concerns related to the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, numerous commentators have speculated that Moscow is also increasingly short of tanks and is understandably eager to avoid highlighting the scale of the losses suffered by the Russian army in Ukraine. Whether the real reason is security issues or equipment shortages, the decision to cancel this year’s Victory Day parades represents a painful blow for Vladimir Putin that hints at the grim reality behind Moscow’s upbeat propaganda portrayals of his faltering Ukraine invasion.

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Russia’s annual Victory Day celebrations are closely associated with Putin personally. Throughout his reign, he has placed the Soviet World War II experience at the heart of efforts to rebuild Russian national pride following the perceived humiliations of the 1990s. Putin has transformed traditional Russian reverence for the Soviet war effort into a quasi-religious victory cult complete with its own dogmas, feast days, and heretics. Victory Day itself has become by far the biggest holiday of the year, with the defeat of Nazi Germany elevated above all other events and achievements as the defining moment in Russian history.

This victory cult has long set the tone in Russian politics and public life. Domestic and foreign opponents of the Putin regime are routinely attacked as “fascists,” with all manner of current affairs issues viewed through the polarizing prism of World War II. This trend is nowhere more evident than in the official Russian approach toward Ukraine. For years, the Ukrainian authorities have been groundlessly branded as “Nazis,” while the current invasion of the country is portrayed as a modern-day continuation of the fight against Adolf Hitler.

The significance of Victory Day for national identity in Putin’s Russia and the holiday’s close associations with the war in Ukraine make this year’s parade cancellations especially embarrassing. Other public celebrations could be postponed or abandoned without much fuss, but failure to mark Victory Day points to serious problems that are difficult to disguise even in Russia’s tightly controlled information environment. While Kremlin propagandists continue to insist the invasion of Ukraine is going according to plan, the apparent inability of the authorities to guarantee security inside Russia during this most important of national holidays would suggest otherwise.

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While traditional Victory Day events will not take place on May 9 in some Russian regional capitals, the country’s main holiday parade in Moscow is set to proceed as planned. However, Putin will likely have little to celebrate. In recent months, his invasion has met with a series of setbacks on both the military and diplomatic fronts that leave the prospect of victory more distant than ever.

In Ukraine, Russian efforts to launch a major offensive fell flat during the first three months of 2023, with the Russian military securing only nominal gains despite suffering catastrophic losses in both men and equipment. High casualty rates and a reliance on suicidal “human wave” attacks have led to plummeting morale among Putin’s invading army, with recently mobilized troops particularly prone to demoralization. Since the beginning of the year, dozens of videos have been posted to social media featuring groups of Russian soldiers addressing Putin and other state officials while complaining of poor conditions, cannon fodder tactics, and heavy losses. This is fueling doubts over the Russian army’s ability to mount major offensive operations.

Meanwhile, Russia’s winter bombing campaign against Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure appears to have ended in failure. Putin had hoped to destroy the Ukrainian energy grid and freeze Ukrainians into submission, but a combination of creativity and enhanced air defenses enabled Ukraine to keep the lights on. In a sign that the worst of the crisis is now over, Ukraine resumed electricity exports to neighboring European countries in early April.

Nor is there any indication that Western support for Ukraine is in danger of weakening. On the contrary, during the first three months of 2023, Ukraine’s partners expanded their military aid to include previously taboo items such as modern battle tanks and Soviet era fighter jets. Putin still hopes he can outlast the West in Ukraine, but international opposition to his invasion currently appears to be stronger than ever. Indeed, this continued Western resolve was the key message behind US President Joe Biden’s February visit to Kyiv.

There was further bad news in March when the International Criminal Court in The Hague charged Putin with war crimes over his role in the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. While the Russian dictator is not expected to appear in court anytime soon, the indictment is a serious blow to Putin’s prestige that undermines his status both domestically and on the international stage. Weeks later, Finland joined NATO in a move that more than doubled the length of Russia’s shared borders with the military alliance. Even Xi Jinping’s much-hyped visit to Moscow failed to lift the mood, with the Chinese leader offering plenty of platitudes but little in the way of concrete support.

These unfavorable circumstances will make Putin’s job all the more difficult as he attempts to strike the right note in this year’s Victory Day address. With little to look forward to, he is likely to seek inspiration from the glories of the past. However, comparisons between World War II and Russia’s present predicament may not prove very flattering. At the height of the Nazi advance in late 1941, Moscow famously staged the annual October Revolution parade on Red Square with the might of the invading German army located a mere few miles away. In contrast, Putin is evidently now unable to defend Russia against the far more modest threat posed by a country he expected to conquer in just three days. Throughout the Putin era, Victory Day has served to showcase Russia’s resurgent strength, but this year’s holiday may become a symbol of his regime’s growing weakness.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Tracking narratives

International response

European allies train Ukrainian forces on tank operation

DFRLab confirms aerial strikes on industrial plants north of Bakhmut

Russian armed forces continue their offensive inside the contested city of Bakhmut. At the time of writing, the western part of Bakhmut remained under Ukrainian control, with the Bakhmutka River acting as a buffer zone between the artillery and infantry forces deployed on either side of the waterway. Russian missile and aerial strikes targeted intermediary positions to push back Ukrainian armed forces, from Yahidne in the north towards Bakhmut industrial plants.

The DFRLab collected open-source satellite imagery dating back to the first two weeks of March to document missile strikes on an industrial plant in the north of Bakhmut. The imagery was collected from the European Space Agency’s Sentinel hub using images provided by satellite constellation Sentinel-2.

Analysis of the damage inflicted on buildings in the area reveals that potential missiles struck buildings belonging to two different industrial plants. The easternmost plant is the Bakhmut non-ferrous metals factory.

Satellite imagery showed the factory’s main building was destroyed, with a second building damaged. Traces of burns on the roof of the building can be seen from an explosion. This building belongs to the Makiivka metal construction plant.

Sentinel-2 satellite imagery north of Bakhmut released on March 4, 2023, annotated by the DFRLab. (Source: DFRLab via ESA/Sentinel-2, Ukraine Control Map)

Sentinel-2 satellite imagery north of Bakhmut released on March 14, 2023, with DFRLab annotations. Dark spots on the bottom show a damaged building belonging to the metal construction factory. Destroyed houses seen in the top left part of the image are where the non-ferrous metal factory once stood. (Source: DFRLab via ESA/Sentinel-2, Ukraine Control Map)

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Battle for Vuhledar highlights tensions between Wagner and Russian defense ministry

Eastern Ukraine continues to be a key arena for clashes as Russian forces attempt to advance in the directions of Vuhledar and Bakhmut. Ukrainian forces are using remote mining near Vuhledar, according to a March 16 report from UK defense intelligence. The remote anti-armor mine system (RAAMS) makes it possible to create an anti-tank minefield up to seventeen kilometers away from the firing unit. The United Kingdom reported that Ukraine was also firing the mines behind advancing Russian forces, leading to additional losses in the event of a retreat. The United Kingdom also reported that there is a “realistic possibility” that Russia’s push for Vuhledar is driven by the Russian defense ministry’s desire to produce better results than Wagner, who are driving Russia’s tactical progress towards Bakhmut.

The UK report supports the DFRLab’s analysis that the ongoing offensive operations in eastern Ukraine are provoking a competition between the different military units, particularly Wagner and the Russian defense ministry. In the direction of Bakhmut, Wagner’s forces continue to be the primary units fighting within the city. However, the combat has been difficult, and the urban environment makes progress challenging. In addition, Chechen forces in Bakhmut continue to fight alongside the Ukrainian army against Russian positions.

Russian forces are also having issues restoring tanks, according to a report published by Ukrainian outlet Defense Express. The 103rd armored repair plant in Russia has reportedly not been able to restore T-62 tanks under the terms originally contracted, which would have required the plant to restore twenty-two to twenty-three tanks per month. According to Defense Express, however, the real capacity of the plant is likely around seven tanks per month. On March 6, UK defense intelligence reported that Russia was deploying outdated T-62 tanks to the battlefield due to major losses in armored equipment.

Acts of sabotage against occupying Russian forces continue in the direction of Kherson. On March 11, the Telegram channel of the pro-Ukraine resistance movement Atesh reported that its members blew up a railway line in the Kherson region, between Radensk and Abrykosivka. This appears to be an attempt by Atesh partisans to impede logistics for the Russian troops deployed in the area.

Ukraine has also reported new arrests of alleged Russian infiltrators. On March 16, the Security Service of Ukraine reported the detention of two women accused of tracking the movement of Ukrainian equipment in the interest of Russian intelligence. The women also allegedly photographed the results of attacks on Ukrainian facilities. One of the women reportedly worked as a nurse in Ukraine’s territorial defense combat unit.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian channels amplify Quran desecration video

Footage emerged online on March 15 showing the burning of the Islamic holy book, the Quran. Russian social media channels shared the one minute and six second video, accusing Ukrainian soldiers of being behind the desecration. The video sparked a wave of reactions on social media, particularly on Twitter, where a TikTok version of the video went viral. The TikTok video has since been removed.

The video is difficult to analyze and cannot be verified. It does not show the faces of the alleged Ukrainian soldiers. The people in the video are speaking broken Ukrainian and use a Russian military knife, said Oleg Nikolenko, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s foreign ministry.

A screenshot of the video, published in the Readovka Telegram channel on March 15, shows a knife allegedly used by the Russian army. (Source: Readovkanews/archive)

The video was denounced as a provocation by Said Imagilov, Mufti of the Spiritual Administration of Ukraine’s Muslims, as well as the Ukrainian military and Ukrainian officials.

Ukraine’s army has Muslim soldiers in its ranks, and Imagilov is an active participant on the frontlines defending Kyiv. The Ukrainian army is also supported by several Chechen units, the most well-known of which are the two volunteer battalions, the Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion and the Sheikh Mansur Battalion. Chechens are among the most active defenders of Bakhmut, with their Adam special unit operating behind Russian army defense lines.

The provenance of the video remains unknown.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

European allies train Ukrainian forces on tank operation

Ukraine’s Western allies are continuing to help strengthen Kyiv’s defense against Russia by training Ukrainian troops on tank operation and trench warfare. Thierry Breton, European Commissioner for Internal Market, is visiting EU countries in a bid to shore up more ammunition for Ukraine. His first visit was to Bulgaria. This visit came as the Slovak news outlet Pravda published data on March 15 showing that, in the year since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Slovakia has doubled its ammunition production and plans to double it again from current levels.

Meanwhile, Greece and the United States agreed to a deal that will see the US transfer 300 M2 Bradley fighting vehicles to the Greek army as part of a modernization program, according to Greek media reports on March 10. Greece is expected to send Ukraine BMP-1 vehicles and M113 armored carriers in exchange for the purchase of the Bradleys.

On March 13, Spain’s Ministry of Defense announced that ten Ukrainian crews completed training in Spain on operating Leopard 2 tanks. Along with fifty-five servicemen, fifteen Ukrainian technicians also received training. According to El Periódico, “These fifty-five soldiers – some professionals and other reservists – were already on the front line, and their four-week training lasted twelve hours a day.”

In addition, the German army announced it was training Ukrainian troops on the Leopard 2 tanks in Germany. “Training on the weapon systems is not just about how to use it, but also about tactics so that the Ukrainians can achieve the greatest possible effect against their opponents,” said Colonel Heiko Diehl.

Ukrainian servicemen in the United Kingdom also completed training in conducting trench combat in realistic conditions. The program was led by the 5th Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment of the 1st Brigade of the Australian Defense Forces.

Earlier this week, Polish President Andrzej Duda announced that his country would send Ukraine thirty MiG 29 fighter jets. These are essential as Russia strives to achieve air dominance and has increased its aerial strikes throughout Ukraine. On March 14, a video emerged on Twitter showing Ukrainian soldiers taking part in trainings in the French military camp of Canjuers in the south of the country. The soldiers were reportedly training with the AMX-10RC armored personnel carriers. Minister of the Armed Forces of France Sebastien Lecornu confirmed during a defense commission hearing on March 15 that the carriers are already being delivered to Ukraine.

On March 15, the Israeli government approved licenses to export electronic warfare equipment to Ukraine that will help counter Iranian drones.

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

The post Russian War Report: DFRLab confirms aerial strikes on industrial plants north of Bakhmut appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukrainians will never surrender. How long can they count on the West?

Serhiy Prytula — Wed, 08 Mar 2023 23:09:44 +0000

No Ukrainian will ever forget the morning of February 24, 2022, when life as we knew it was shattered by the enormity of Russia’s full-scale invasion. I was awoken in Lviv that morning by a constant stream of phone calls from people asking for help. This was nothing new, as I had been supporting the Ukrainian military since the onset of Russia’s attack on Ukraine in 2014. However, it was immediately apparent that we were facing something on a different scale entirely; the largest European war since the days of Hitler and Stalin was underway in my homeland.

Despite the horror of the situation, Ukrainians did not panic. Many made their way to join the military or signed up for local territorial defense units. Others brought vital supplies including everything from food and medicines to bullets and bulletproof vests. People across the country begun fundraising via social media and other online platforms. Civil society support networks developed through Ukraine’s two people power revolutions and the past eight years of resistance to Russian aggression in Crimea and eastern Ukraine grew larger and stronger. Just hours after news of the Russian invasion had stunned the watching world, Ukrainians were already establishing logistical channels that would allow civilian volunteers to support the fightback.

I rushed to Kyiv while issuing a social media appeal for people to come and collect what supplies we had from our office, which had already been transformed into a volunteer hub. Within a couple of days, we had assembled an entire team to work on meeting the needs of Ukraine’s defenders. It soon became clear that nothing is impossible for Ukrainians. The entire nation united in defiance of Russia’s invasion. On the battlefield, Ukrainian troops out-thought and outfought the Russian invaders with a combination of innovative tactics and raw courage. Using a range of newly acquired Western arms along with older weapons largely inherited from the Soviet era, they were able to destroy entire columns of Russian tanks and inflict devastating casualties on Putin’s army.

Ukraine’s remarkable resilience would have a profound impact on global opinion and would go on to shape the international response to the Russian invasion. On the eve of Russia’s attack, many Western leaders believed Ukraine would fall within a matter of days and were deeply reluctant to provide weapons, partly as they feared their technology would soon be captured by the advancing Russians. However, when it became apparent that Ukrainians were both willing and able to resist the invasion, the democratic world soon warmed to the idea of supporting Ukraine in its fight for survival. A dramatic shift began to take place with more and more countries lining up to stand with Ukraine. Looking back, it is now clear that the strength of the Ukrainian nation in those momentous first days of war changed the course of world history.

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As the war unfolded during the spring months, so too did Ukraine’s volunteer efforts. Improvised initiatives to source supplies for volunteer fighters rapidly evolved into nationwide projects with the support of millions of private and corporate donors both in Ukraine and across Europe, North America, and beyond. By summer 2022, Ukrainians were crowdfunding sophisticated combat drones, armored vehicles, and a satellite. Since the first days of the invasion, Ukrainian social media has been full of posts showing the latest deliveries of drones, jeeps, radio equipment, and night vision goggles for the troops on the front lines. These efforts have made it easier for the government to concentrate its limited resources on acquiring big ticket items such as artillery, air defense, and missile systems.

Ukraine’s popular resistance has undoubtedly impressed the world. This is evident in the reactions I encounter while traveling to Western capitals. I sense a sincere respect for the Ukrainian people when speaking with government officials and members of the public alike; I can also see this respect in the countless Ukrainian flags on display throughout the Western world that serve as universal symbols of freedom and bravery. Most of all, the West has shown its support by providing Ukraine with billions of dollars in military aid. These Western weapons have had a major impact on the course of the war, enabling Ukraine to destroy advancing Russian forces, strike ammunition bases far behind the front lines, and protect Ukraine’s cities from Russian airstrikes.

While international support for Ukraine has been hugely effective, major challenges lie ahead. Following initial setbacks, Russia is now preparing for a long war. Putin has launched the country’s first mobilization since World War II and is attempting to place the Russian economy on a war footing. Meanwhile, Kremlin propaganda is warning the Russian public that they are locked in a fight for survival. Despite suffering catastrophic losses in both men and machines, the Russian dictator remains determined to pursue his goal of destroying the Ukrainian state and extinguishing Ukrainian identity. With no sign of any serious domestic opposition to the war inside Russia, he appears in a position to continue the current invasion indefinitely.

Is the West really prepared for the kind of long war that Putin clearly has in mind? Recent indications such as US President Joe Biden’s visit to Kyiv and the move to provide Ukraine with modern battle tanks indicate that the democratic world will not waver in its support for Ukraine. Indeed, this was the key message during Biden’s surprise trip to the Ukrainian capital. At the same time, the delays that preceded the recent decision to deliver Leopard 2 tanks sent an ominous signal to a country fighting for its life. Every lost day means hundreds of Ukrainian lives. As the death toll rises, so does frustration over the apparent lack of urgency among many of Ukraine’s partners.

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While Western leaders currently oppose any talk of appeasing Putin, there are concerns in Kyiv that the mood could change as the next round of election cycles approaches and domestic political priorities begin to shift in Western capitals. This uncertainty is extremely dangerous. It fuels Putin’s own belief that he can ultimately outlast the West, and encourages him to dig deeper in order to continue the invasion.

As the war enters its second year, it is now obvious that an even greater international commitment is required in order to defeat Putin. This enhanced commitment should include dramatically increased weapons supplies to Ukraine and far tougher sanctions measures imposed against Russia. If that does not happen, the war will drag on and calls will inevitably grow for Western leaders to pressure Ukraine into some kind of negotiated settlement to end the fighting.

Calls for a compromise peace with the Kremlin are delusional. The only way to secure a sustainable peace is through Ukrainian victory. Any other scenario would have dire consequences for the future of both Ukraine itself and the international security system as a whole.

If Russia is not stopped now, it will inevitably go further. In addition to Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and the Baltic states would all be at immediate risk of invasion. Elsewhere, other autocratic regimes would draw the logical conclusions from Russia’s success and adopt their own aggressive foreign policies. The entire world would be plunged into a dark new era of international instability and authoritarian aggression.

The Ukrainian people will fight on, even if they must fight alone. They are well aware of Russia’s genocidal intentions and recognize that they have no choice; either they defend themselves, or their country will cease to exist. So far, the international community has backed Ukraine admirably. Western leaders must now demonstrate in words and deeds that they are fully committed to standing with Ukraine for as long as it takes. They can begin by ramping up armament production at home and sending Ukraine the fighter jets Kyiv so desperately needs.

Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s invasion has in many ways reinvigorated the Western world and reminded international audiences of the core values that unite all democracies. However, unless Putin is decisively defeated, those same values will be fatally compromised. Ukrainians made their choice one year ago. It is now up to the West.

Serhiy Prytula is a Ukrainian volunteer and founder of the Prytula Charity Foundation.

Russian preparations for the current full-scale invasion of Ukraine have been underway for much of the past two decades and have focused on traditional military thinking with an emphasis on armor, artillery, and air power. In contrast, the rapidly modernizing Ukrainian military has achieved a technological leap in less than twelve months. Since the invasion began, Ukraine has demonstrated a readiness to innovate that the more conservative Russian military simply cannot match.

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Modern weapons supplied by Ukraine’s international partners have played a crucial role in the Ukrainian military’s battlefield victories during the first year of the war. Likewise, Western countries have also supported Ukraine with a range of tech solutions and assistance. At the same time, Ukrainians have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to develop and adapt new technologies suited to the specific circumstances of Russia’s ongoing invasion. Ukraine has used everthing from drones and satellite imagery to artificial intelligence and situational awareness tools in order to inflict maximum damage on Russian forces while preserving the lives of Ukrainian service personnel and civilians.

Drones deserve special attention as the greatest game-changers of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Thanks to the widespread and skillful use of air reconnaissance drones, the Ukrainian military has been able to monitor vast frontline areas and coordinate artillery. Meanwhile, strike drones have made it possible to hit enemy positions directly.

The critical role of drones on the battlefield has helped fuel a wartime boom in domestic production. Over the past six months, the number of Ukrainian companies producing UAVs has increased more than fivefold. This expansion will continue. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine is fast evolving into the world’s first war of robots. In order to win, Ukraine needs large quantities of drones in every conceivable category.

This helps to explain the thinking behind the decision to launch the Army of Drones initiative. This joint project within the framework of the UNITED24 fundraising platform involves the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the State Special Communications Service, and the Ministry of Digital Transformation. Within the space of six months, the Army of Drones initiative resulted in the acquisition of over 1,700 drones worth tens of millions of dollars. This was possible thanks to donations from individuals and businesses in 76 countries.

Ukraine is currently developing its own new types of drones to meet the challenges of the Russian invasion. For example, Ukraine is producing new kinds of naval drone to help the country guard against frequent missile attacks launched from Russian warships. Ukrainian tech innovators are making significant progress in the development of maritime drones that cost hundreds of thousands of dollars and can potentially target and deter or disable warships costing many millions.

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Ukrainian IT specialists are creating software products to enhance the wartime performance of the country’s armed forces. One good example is Delta, a comprehensive situational awareness system developed by the Innovation Center within Ukraine’s Defense Ministry. This tool could be best described as “Google maps for the military.” It provides real-time views of the battlefield in line with NATO standards by integrating data from a variety of sources including aerial reconnaissance, satellite images, and drone footage.

Such systems allow the Ukrainian military to become increasingly data-driven. This enables Ukrainian commanders to adapt rapidly to circumstances and change tactics as required. The system saves lives and ammunition while highlighting potential opportunities for Ukraine to exploit. This approach has already proven its effectiveness in the defense of Kyiv and during the successful counteroffensives to liberate Kharkiv Oblast and Kherson.

Ukraine has also launched a special chatbot that allows members of the public to report on the movements of enemy troops and military hardware. Integrated within the widely used Diia app, this tool has attracted over 460,000 Ukrainian users. The reports they provide have helped to destroy dozens of Russian military positions along with tanks and artillery.

In addition to developing its own military technologies, Ukraine has also proven extremely adept at taking existing tech solutions and adapting them to wartime conditions. One prominent example is Starlink, which has changed the course of the war and become part of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. Satellite communication is one of Ukraine’s competitive advantages, providing connections on the frontlines and throughout liberated regions of the country while also functioning during blackouts. Since the start of the Russian invasion, Ukraine has received over 30,000 Starlink terminals.

Ukraine’s effective use of military technologies has led some observers to suggest that the country could become a “second Israel.” This is a flattering comparison, but in reality, Ukraine has arguably even greater potential. Within the next few years, Ukraine is on track to become a nation with top tier military tech solutions.

Crucial decisions setting Ukraine on this trajectory have already been made. In 2023, efforts will focus on the development of a military tech ecosystem with a vibrant startup sector alongwide a strong research and development component. There are already clear indications of progress, such as the recent creation of strike drone battalions within the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The war unleashed by Russia in February 2022 has now entered its second year. Putin had expected an easy victory. Instead, his faltering invasion has highlighted Ukraine’s incredible bravery while also showcasing the country’s technological sophistication. Ukrainians have demonstrated their ability to defeat one of the world’s mightiest armies using a combination of raw courage and modern innovation. This remarkable success offers lessons for military strategy and security policy that will be studied for decades to come.

Mykhailo Fedorov is Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation.

What US adversaries are learning from the balloon and UFO saga

Jennifer A. Counter — Wed, 15 Feb 2023 11:06:41 +0000

Citizens are understandably concerned about the recent downing of a Chinese spy balloon and three other unidentified objects traveling over North American airspace. For countries in North America, long protected by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the thought—let alone an actual instance—of a foreign incursion is jarring. It is just not a part of our history. However, three things are even more concerning: the lack of US government clarity on what is happening, the possible threat to North America in the medium to long term from China or other actors, and how the reactions to these objects say more about “us” than “them.”

What is going on?

Conspiracy theories are a part of the human condition. We fill in gaps of knowledge with stories, suspicions, and fears to create a whole understanding of what is happening around us. The government’s delayed notification to the American public early this month about a large balloon, in some instances visible to the naked eye, and the lack of urgency to remove it from US airspace naturally led knowledgeable and unknowledgeable people to fill in the gaps. Perhaps the balloon was for weather observation (as the Chinese government proclaimed) or to collect signals intelligence or to collect imagery intelligence or just a test to see if the United States would identify its presence. All those theories were bandied about, but no one really knew—and US government spokespeople and leaders were unable or unwilling to provide clarity in a timely manner.

The shootdown of three additional flying objects only adds to the growing hysteria, especially since the US government is providing even less information. A basic tenet of the communications profession is to provide information in a timely and accurate manner and to answer questions honestly and as thoroughly as possible. Key US spokespeople’s answers to reasonable questions from journalists have lacked transparency, detail, and timeliness.

Those spokespeople have yet to address concerns about why these objects are suddenly being observed all of a sudden, outside of generic descriptions of turning up the sensitivity of radar systems. And they failed in their responsibility by not immediately and fully discrediting the notion that the three additional flying objects are UFOs made by alien life—allowing the belief to take flight among the public. For spokespeople not to emphasize a far more likely scenario of a foreign or commercial source for these objects is also telling and should be a concern. “What is going on here?” is a valid question and one the US government is obligated to answer.

What’s the threat?

The reality is that every single one of us is tracked as we make our way through daily life. Our mobile phones track our location and digital activities. Our vehicles send back a wide range of information to car manufacturers, including location and maintenance information. Closed-circuit television cameras capture our activities outside of the home. And yes, foreign countries have satellites above our heads that collect imagery, signals, and weather data, among other information. To be fair, the United States collects a vast amount of information on foreigners—far more than can ever be effectively used or analyzed—and it is something that those of us from the intelligence community (as I did during my time in government) use to inform policymakers on potential happenings abroad.

The balloon and three other objects feel different because they are different. Rather than unobtrusive collection that we can neither see nor easily conceptualize, balloons or large drones are something that we can envision over our local areas. We can see and feel the threat. The slow response by US and Canadian officials makes the public question their competence and commitment to keeping the homeland safe. If the balloon was able to go from China to the Montana area, linger for days, and then make its way to the Carolinas, what else is going on? The public is owed an explanation.

In the interim, the additional collection of information about US military facilities, US and Canadian communications, and general imagery of the United States and Canada informs intelligence professionals in China and potentially other adversary countries. After all, if the three yet-to-be-identified flying objects were of a commercial nature, the company that owns them would likely have obtained proper clearances to fly their drone or other object from a regulator such as the US Federal Aviation Administration. One can reasonably deduce that a foreign power is involved.

Is this about us?

So why use a balloon or large drone over North America that was undoubtedly going to be discovered? Because it allows an adversary to see how the United States will respond. Will it sit back and ignore a potential threat? This would provide an adversary some additional avenues for data collection or attack during a time of conflict. Will it simply shoot the items down to remove the threat? That would signal the strength of the US air-defense system and allow adversaries to gauge the response time for military decision-making. The US government response has shown that there may be gaps in airspace defense and intra-government coordination, and a disconnect between how Americans view foreign aircraft overhead versus how Washington may view the encroachment.

It also provides an adversary with insights on how the public will emotionally and politically react. Will politicians on opposite sides bicker and quarrel instead of establishing new requirements for a military response? Will the US president or Canadian prime minister take the issue seriously and implement a severe response on the diplomatic front? We still don’t have the entirety of the story around the three additional flying objects like we do about the surveillance balloon. However, we do know that there was a segment of the population that jumped to irrational conclusions, including that aliens are walking among us. This could be a wonderful conspiracy theory for adversaries to foster in order to divide some segments of North American society against their government and fellow citizens. From an influence or information operations perspective, a simple balloon with likely simple collection capabilities can provide benefits for years to come.

Jennifer A. Counter is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice and a vice president at Orbis Operations, where she advises friendly foreign governments on national-security matters. She previously served in the US State Department and as a US Air Force intelligence officer.

The post What US adversaries are learning from the balloon and UFO saga appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What to make of the strikes in Iran? Watch these three indicators.

Jonathan Panikoff — Thu, 02 Feb 2023 17:41:18 +0000

Iran’s official version of Saturday’s events is fairly straightforward. Three armed drones penetrated Iranian airspace seeking to attack a “workshop,” but one of the drones was “destroyed by Iranian air defense” systems and the other two caught by “defense traps.” The incident happened in Isfahan, the third most populous city in Iran, located approximately two hundred miles south of Tehran. All told, the result was minimal damage to the roof of the “workshop.” But Iran’s attempts to minimize the strike should not obscure its potentially large ramifications.

No one has yet claimed responsibility for the attack and there is a reasonable chance that no one will—publicly. But multiple media reports are highlighting previous suspected Israeli attacks on Iran, a reflection of the long shadow war between the two countries, and other reports are already explicitly identifying Israel as responsible.

It is quite possible the “workshop”—which is probably an Iranian defense ministry ammunition facility—was not the target. Next to the warehouse is the Iran Space Research Center, an agency that has cooperated previously with the country’s ballistic missile program—and is sanctioned by the United States. Israeli journalist Barak Ravid on Sunday reported that Iran’s “missile program” was the target and according to a source, “four different areas in the building were accurately targeted and the goal was achieved.”

The attack happened around the same time as Iranian television said that an oil refinery fire had broken out in Tabriz, about three hundred miles northwest of Tehran, and not far away a 5.9 magnitude earthquake shook the country’s far northwest province of West Azerbaijan. At least one report claimed the Tabriz facility may also have been attacked by drones.

As more details about the attack emerge, the biggest unknown is how Iran views the impact of this incident and how it will respond. In trying to begin to determine that, three indicators are worth watching.

First, will the attacks change Iranian plans related to their military facilities? This is among the most difficult assessments for various intelligence agencies. But just as Iran has done with much of its nuclear program, a decision by Iran to immediately harden its military production and storage facilities—or to increase the pace or scale, or alter the location of those currently being built—would indicate that the attacks had modified the thinking of Iranian defense leaders. Tehran may now believe that current facilities are insufficient and at greater risk for future attacks than it views as acceptable.

Second, Iran’s official media statements notwithstanding, did the attack in fact cause physical destruction that impacts the country’s development, production, or storage capabilities of ammunition or ballistic missiles? Ravid’s reported statement that the drone mission was achieved obviously runs counter to Iran’s claim of minimal damage. Which is true? That will be tough to ascertain without more details as to the specific target. But a clear decrease in the development, production, or transfer of critical military hardware by Iran would be an indicator that the attacks had a bigger impact than Iran is letting on. Conversely, if things are largely business as usual, it might suggest that the attacks were ultimately not as successful as Israel hoped in destroying or significantly disrupting whatever the ultimate targets.

Of course, the potential indicators related to both Iranian planning and the physical destruction do not discount an alternative possibility. The attacks may be less about specifically eliminating Iran’s facilities at Isfahan and more about testing the capacity to use drones against a target and Iran’s responses to such an attack. It is worth noting, for instance, that the explosion in Isfahan was relatively small. If this was in fact an Israeli test run, we should expect that at some point in the future—whether a few months or a few years—Israel will stage an operation with similar characteristics but in a different city and against a different type of target.

Finally, is Iran taking steps that suggest it plans to retailiate? While Iran often views responding to attacks as necessary to restore deterrence, it is notoriously patient. As a result, the absence of an immediate response cannot be, by default, read as Tehran viewing the incident as insignificant. Just a few weeks ago, for example, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi once again publicly promised to avenge the killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani that occurred over three years ago. But while Iran has lethal drones, a response by it should not be expected to look exactly the same as the attack. Iran’s asymmetric efforts go back decades as Tehran often looks to execute terrorist attacks globally against Israeli or Jewish targets. In June of last year, Turkish officials thwarted an Iranian plot to attack Israelis visiting Istanbul. In 2012, Iran sought to assassinate senior Israeli officials in India and Kenya. And Iran’s most infamous terrorist attack occurred almost three decades ago in 1994, when it bombed a Jewish community center in Argentina, killing eighty five and injuring more than three hundred people.

There are other methods of responding, as well. Iran’s cyber capabilities have greatly improved, for instance, and its 2020 cyberattack against Israel’s water system highlights a possible alternative. Regardless of method, Iran undertakes significant time and effort developing its attacks. Thus, if Tehran expends the energy to advance one in response to this incident, it also suggests that Iran considers this drone attack more damaging than it is letting on.

The truth is, it is too early to say exactly how Iran views this attack—or what exactly it was designed to do. But while it will take some patience, looking for the aforementioned indicators will start to help answer these questions.

Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and the former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East.

The views expressed in this publication are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the intelligence community, or any other US government agency.

The post What to make of the strikes in Iran? Watch these three indicators. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine struggles to repair power grid as Russian airstrikes continue

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti — Fri, 13 Jan 2023 21:53:26 +0000

Ukraine is struggling to keep its bombarded electricity system alive as Russia’s energy infrastructure airstrike campaign enters its fifth month. Despite undiminished Western goodwill and considerable support, Kyiv’s pleas for the electricity grid transformers that Ukraine desperately requires have yet to produce enough of the actual equipment most needed to keep the lights on across the country.

Vladimir Putin’s decision to target Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure has been one of the few effective strategies adopted during his otherwise disastrous invasion. Since September 2022, Russia has been systematically destroying Ukraine’s power infrastructure with regular waves of missiles and drones aimed at power stations, transmission lines, and other key infrastructure objects. The results have been devastating. Millions of Ukrainian civilians have been left without electricity, heating, or water for extended periods amid freezing winter conditions.

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Ukraine’s leadership and power sector companies have pledged to keep fixing the grid, even as Russia continues to attack it. Hundreds of technicians from Ukrenergo, Ukraine’s electrical grid operator, and DTEK, the country’s largest private power company, have been working around the clock since September to repair substations and transmission lines.

They face an uphill battle. Most of Ukraine’s power plants and substations have been attacked by Russia, sometimes more than once. In total, over 40% of Ukraine’s power system has been damaged. Despite electricity consumption being down by an average of 35% since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion due to the refugee exodus and massive destruction caused by Putin’s troops, Ukraine is unable to meet around 30% of current domestic demand.

The most pressing problem is damage to large, high-power transformers, a critical part of any power substation. A transformer is a machine that regulates the voltage of the electricity passing through transmission lines, and an autotransformer does so automatically. This is important because electricity is converted from high voltage during transmission to low voltage when it is distributed to consumers. Without transformers, the grid doesn’t function to supply households and other retail consumers of electricity.

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Ukraine needs thousands of small and mid-sized transformers to replace those destroyed or damaged by Russian attacks. So far, Ukraine’s Western partners have done a decent job of scouring warehouses and inventories to find them. Over 1000 small transformers had been sent to Ukraine by the end of 2022, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of which about 100 were automatic.

The real problem is the absence of large, high-power transformers. According to Ukrenergo, as of January 11, 2023, Ukraine needs 59 of these giant units that automatically step down high voltage transmission at substations. New transformers cost about $2 million and weigh hundreds of tons.

Lithuania is sending one. Other Western countries are looking into the issue. The US government has a task force focused on finding transformers and getting them to Ukraine. But the problems are myriad.

First, there is a major supply chain crunch and resulting shortage of large transformers globally, which has been true for a decade. The equipment is critical and expensive, so grid operators need to keep their own supplies in case of emergencies. In the US at least, attacks and unexplained “incidents” at substations are on the rise, making it more important to keep spares in reserve. It can take up to two years to purchase and receive a new unit.

Second, not all equipment is compatible with Ukraine’s Soviet era hardware. Exactly what is or is not compatible is a matter of contention. The US Department of Energy (DOE), which is nominally responsible for the US government’s effort on transformers for Ukraine, has been accused of inconsistency on the key issue of whether US transformers are compatible with the Ukrainian grid.

Ukrenergo and some US grid engineers insist US transformers could work with minor adaptations and have been urging the US to send even just one already retired unit so Ukraine can test it. Some involved in the effort claim DOE officals have not followed up on leads. Likewise, Ukrenergo claims its efforts to contact US and Canadian grid companies directly have gone unanswered. At this stage, there appears to be a lack of clarity and coordination.

Procuring and sending the transformers is another problem. Although the US Department of Defense is said to be ready and willing to cover logistics, these massive and extremely heavy machines are unlikely to fit in any available cargo aircraft. That leaves shipping by sea, which takes several months.

The effort to find replacement high-power autotransformers for Ukraine is dedicated and broad. The Ukrainian executives and technicians responsible for keeping their grid alive are valiantly struggling to do so. The US government officials trying to help are hardworking and sincere in their desire to support Ukraine. The EU and countries neighboring Ukraine are stakeholders in the safety and security of Ukraine’s energy and power situation, and are also clearly committed to helping.

Despite these advantages, problems remain. Obstacles include post-COVID supply chain bottlenecks, a global energy crisis, sanctions that hurt Russia but also make doing business difficult, bureaucratic processes, and the fog of war. As a consequence, it may yet be some time before current efforts pay off for Ukraine. While the authorities in Kyiv wait for the transformers they so desperately need, the Russian military will continue to destroy the country’s energy infrastructure in a bid to freeze Ukrainians into submission.

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

During the initial period of his presidency, Joe Biden is believed to have felt that the US should “park Russia” in order to concentrate on the far more serious foreign policy challenge posed by Beijing. Ukraine’s military success is now helping to remove this dilemma.

Defeat in Ukraine would relegate Russia from the ranks of the world’s military superpowers and leave Moscow facing years of rebuilding before it could once again menace the wider region. Crucially, by supporting Ukraine, the West is able to dramatically reduce Russia’s military potential without committing any of its own troops or sustaining casualties.

Backing Ukraine today makes a lot more strategic sense than allowing Putin to advance and facing a significantly strengthened Russian military at a later date. As former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates wrote recently in The Washington Post, “The way to avoid confrontation with Russia in the future is to help Ukraine push back the invader now. This is the lesson of history that should guide us, and it lends urgency to the actions that must be taken, before it is too late.”

If this lesson is ignored and Ukraine is defeated, Russia will almost certainly go further and attack NATO member countries such as the Baltic nations, Finland, or Poland. At that point, it will no longer be possible to avoid significant NATO casualties.

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The international response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also reshaped the geopolitical landscape far from the battlefield. Since February 2022, it has reinvigorated the West as a political force.

The war has given NATO renewed purpose and brought about the further enlargement of the military alliance in Scandinavia with the recent membership applications of Sweden and Finland. The EU is also more united than ever and has now overcome a prolonged crisis of confidence brought about by the rise of populist nationalist movements.

In the energy sector, Putin’s genocidal invasion has finally forced a deeply reluctant Europe to confront its debilitating dependency on Russian oil and gas. This has greatly improved European security and robbed the Kremlin of its ability to blackmail Europe with weaponized energy exports. It now looks likely that the era of corrupt energy sector collaboration with the Kremlin is now drawing to a close, in Europe at least.

Eurasia Center events

Russia admits losses in Makiivka attack, retaliates by striking empty Ukrainian ice rink

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Western support for Ukraine is bringing a variety of practical military gains. While Ukraine’s Western partners provide Ukraine with vital battlefield intelligence, Ukraine returns the favor by offering equally valuable intelligence on the quality and effectiveness of Russian troops, military equipment, and tactics. The events of the past ten months have confirmed that pre-war perceptions of the Russian army were wildly inaccurate. Thanks to Ukraine’s unique experience and insights, Western military planners now have a far more credible picture of Moscow’s true military capabilities.

Ukraine’s MacGyver-like ability to adapt and deploy NATO weapons using Soviet-era platforms could prove extremely useful to the alliance in future conflicts. Ukrainian troops have proven quick to learn how to use Western weapons, often requiring far shorter training periods than those allocated to Western troops.

The innovative use of digital technologies by the Ukrainian military also offers invaluable lessons for their Western counterparts. Ukraine’s widespread deployment of Elon Musk’s Starlink system in front line locations is unprecedented in modern warfare and offers rare insights for all NATO countries.

Similarly, the war in Ukraine is highlighting the increasingly critical role of drone technologies. This is building on the experience of the Second Karabakh War in 2020, when Israeli and Turkish drones played an important part in Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia.

Russia failed to invest sufficient resources into the development of military drones and has been forced to rely on relatively unsophisticated Iranian drones. In contrast, Ukraine enjoys a strong military partnership with Turkey that includes a deepening drone component. Turkey’s Bayraktar drones gained iconic status during the early stages of the Russian invasion. The company has since confirmed plans to build a manufacturing plant in Ukraine.

In addition to these Turkish drones, Ukraine’s powerful volunteer movement and tech-savvy military have created a myriad of drone solutions to address the challenges of today’s battlefield. Ukraine’s rapidly evolving drone technologies are extremely interesting to Western military planners and will be studied in great detail for years to come.

Ever since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, Ukrainian forces have fused courageous fighting spirit with advanced intelligence and innovative use of battle management software. “Tenacity, will, and harnessing the latest technology give the Ukrainians a decisive advantage,” noted General Mark Milley, the current US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The relationship between Ukraine and the country’s Western partners is very much a two-way street bringing significant benefits and strategic advantages to both sides. While Ukraine is receiving critical military and economic support, the Western world is benefiting from improved security along with important intelligence and unique battlefield experience. There is clearly a strong moral case for standing with Ukraine, but it is worth underlining that the strategic argument is equally convincing.

Taras Kuzio is professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the forthcoming “Russia’s War and Genocide Against Ukrainians.”

Russian War Report: Russian military bloggers criticize Putin’s Orthodox Christmas ceasefire announcement

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 06 Jan 2023 19:31:12 +0000

Security

Russian military bloggers criticize Putin’s Orthodox Christmas ceasefire announcement

Russia admits losses in Makiivka attack, retaliates by striking empty Ukrainian ice rink

Ukraine’s first days of 2023 saw Russian shelling of civilian infrastructure and Ukrainian precision attacks on Russian positions.

Just prior to the new year, Russian forces launched sixty-nine cruise missiles and twenty-three drones, of which Ukrainian air defenses reportedly shot down fifty-four missiles and at least eleven drones. The attacks primarily struck infrastructure facilities in Lviv, Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, and Donetsk, causing widespread disruptions to energy, heating, and water supplies. Russian forces also hit targets across Ukraine, including Sumy, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava, Dnipro, and Zaporizhzhia. The Ukrainian Air Force Command claimed that Russian forces launched sixteen Shahed-131 and -136 drones on the night of December 29.

On New Year’s Eve, Ukraine’s army attacked Russian army headquarters in the occupied village of Makiivka, Donetsk. In a rare admission of casualties, the Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed eighty-nine soldiers were killed in the strike. Ukrainian armed forces, in contrast, reported 400 killed and 300 wounded. Ukrainian forces also shared a graphic video showing the aftermath of the shelling. On the evening of January 1, pro-Russia military blogger Vladimir Romanov reported that Ukraine had struck nineteen vocational schools, which commanders had “compactly populated” with recruits mobilized from the Saratov region. Romanov claimed 200 soldiers died in the attacks. On January 4, the Russian defense ministry stated, “It is already obvious that the main reason for what happened was the inclusion and massive use, contrary to the ban, by personnel of mobile phones in the reach of enemy weapons.” British intelligence assessed that someone placed ammunition inside the building, the detonation of which led to destruction and deaths.

In the Donetsk region, the Russian military is fighting for the ground between Bakhmut and Soledar, with Russian forces positioned to possibly encircle Soledar. A Wagner Group unit remains heavily active in the fighting across the zone around the Bakhmut frontline. To the northeast of the city, their forces advanced along the Svitlodarsk-Sloviansk highway and reached the southern outskirts of Pidhorodne. Ukrainian officers and British military intelligence stated that Russia is no longer hitting Bakhmut with the same ferocity as it had during the previous month, instead repositioning armored vehicles and artillery fire toward the nearby town of Soledar. Meanwhile in Bakhmut, Russian sources claim that units including Wagner detachments are advancing simultaneously in several directions.

To curb the backlash after Ukraine’s strike on Makiivka, Russia claimed it had killed “many” soldiers and foreign mercenaries “from Ukraine and NATO” in a January 3 strike on an ice rink in Druzhkivka, Donetsk. A French journalist witnessed the attack during a live report. The Ice Hockey Federation of Ukraine later stated the facility “was completely empty.”

On January 2, the village of Vyazovoe in the Belgorod region of Russia came under fire. On January 4, the Ukrainian army targeted the military commandant’s building in Vasylivka, Zaporizhzhia, used by the Russian armed forces to house personnel. Five people were killed and fifteen injured, according to Yevgeny Balitsky, acting governor of the occupied territory.

Against this background, Russia is trying to fill the losses in its arsenal. According to Ukrainian intelligence, Russia can produce about thirty Kh-101 cruise missiles and about twenty Kalibr missiles per month. Russian stockpiles of these missiles are extremely depleted, so in subsequent strikes, the Russian military may try to combine attacks using precision cruise missiles, S-300 anti-aircraft missiles against ground targets, Iranian kamikaze drones, and Soviet Kh-22 missiles. According to some estimates, Russian forces have about 160 Kh-22 missiles, but their range is only 350 kilometers. Russia has already used about 660 of the 1,750 Shahed drones ordered from Iran, but Iran is expected to send another batch of 250 to 300 units, along with improved drones and ballistic missiles.

According to Ukrainian military intelligence, six sabotage actions against Russian railways caused logistical problems in the first four days of 2023. In 2022, there were about forty railway sabotage actions reported in Russia.

On January 4, a fire was reported in a tent camp for mobilized units in the Siberian region of Tomsk. The Russian army uses tents to accommodate mobilized soldiers in an area of Siberia where, at this time of year, the temperature is between -10 and -20 degrees Celsius. Many units use heaters that can be dangerous and unstable in such conditions.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian military bloggers criticize Putin’s Orthodox Christmas ceasefire announcement

On January 5, Russian President Vladimir Putin called for a thirty-six-hour ceasefire in Ukraine to observe Orthodox Christmas. Kyiv rejected Putin’s proposal, stating that Moscow’s aim was to stop Ukrainian advances in the Donbas. Putin’s ceasefire announcement was met with criticism from Russian military bloggers, with some even calling the proposal “madness.”

The pro-Kremlin Telegram channel Rybar called Putin’s suggestion “a beautiful political gesture” that “nobody cares about” and said that Russians want to rapidly end the war “with at least some logical conclusion.” Another military blog, Военный Осведомитель (“Military Informant”), called the decision “madness,” adding that Ukraine would not accept the offer.

Boris Rozhin, a pro-war military blogger, accused Russian officials of not learning any lessons from eight years of Minsk agreements “that nobody was fulfilling.” Rozhin added, “The decision is obviously unlikely to be very popular, even despite the efforts of official propaganda on this matter.” The post was amplified by multiple pro-war Telegram channels.

Igor Girkin, a former Russian Colonel turned ultranationalist, sarcastically stated on his Telegram channel that Putin took “a bold and decisive step towards defeat and surrender.” He added, “The Hague applauds and begins to prepare the camera.”

Criticism from pro-war military bloggers has increased in recent months in both scale and boldness. Military bloggers slammed the Kremlin for military failures, incompetence, and for rejoining the Ukraine grain deal.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Russian military bloggers criticize Putin’s Orthodox Christmas ceasefire announcement appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Fierce fighting in Donetsk despite the onset of winter

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 16 Dec 2022 19:13:09 +0000

Security

Fierce fighting in Donetsk despite the onset of winter

International Response

Support of Ukraine continues from the US, EU, and elsewhere

Fierce fighting in Donetsk despite the onset of winter

The situation in Donetsk continues to be among the most difficult on the frontlines in Ukraine. With the onset of winter in Ukraine and the first snowfalls in the area, the fighting becomes even more complicated and heavy for both sides. Ukrainian defenders in Bakhmut continue to resist regular Russian artillery attacks and attempts to breach the defensive line. Both sides have claimed the fighting will continue despite previous analysis suggesting that winter will see a temporary halting of clashes. The DFRLab previously discussed this scenario, as both Russia and Ukraine are pushing for gains on the frontlines.

Fighting and artillery shelling in greater Bakhmut are so intense that all buildings have been reportedly damaged in places like Ivanhrad and Opytne, south of the city. Given the fierceness of the fighting, the Ukrainian army is using all the resources it can spare on the Bakhmut front, including a self-made self-propelled gun created from an MT-LB armored fighting vehicle and an MT-12 Rapira anti-tank gun.

On the Russian side, the DPR’s 11th regiment infantry is continuing to fight in Pervomaiske, Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian forces remain stationed in the settlement. According to Russian sources, fighting has been difficult given the current strength of the Ukrainian army, which has equipped local basements to turn them into a series of ambush points. From Pervomaiske, Ukrainian artillery periodically fires at the positions of the infamous Somalia Battalion of DPR and the 11th regiment near the village of Pisky.

Readers should recall that fighters from the Wagner Group, supported by 1st and 2nd Army Corps, are almost entirely responsible for pushing the offensives in Donetsk, particularly around Bakhmut and the western parts of Donetsk. Wagner units remain active in Soledar as well, fighting Ukrainian forces with variable success. Meanwhile, a member of the unit reportedly deserted and returned to Russia, where he recorded a video message addressed to Russian President Vladimir Putin. In the video, he said the unit carried out extrajudicial executions, and the soldiers themselves were sent out to fight “with machine guns against tanks.” The deserter was reportedly arrested.

Internal criticism has not been limited to Wagner units. Telegram channels that gained enormous popularity alongside Russia’s involvement in the Syrian civil war and the invasion of Ukraine, have been particularly critical of the military elite. On December 13, Rybar, one of the most well-known military-linked channels, published a critique against so-called photo reports that attempted to show the bright side of the military, while problems inside the army remain unresolved.

While the front line in Donetsk presents a serious obstacle for the Russian army, Moscow appears to be building defensive lines in sensitive locations. The Russian army continues to strengthen positions along the border with Ukraine, in the Belgorod region, as well as in occupied Crimea. Russian forces are strengthening the coast near the village of Molochne, possibly fearing Ukrainian attacks in the area. They have also installed a network of mine barriers and trenches along the Crimean coast. Accordingly to local reports, Russian forces are even recruiting construction workers to dig trenches in Belgorod, Zaporizhzhia, and Luhansk, offering up to 250,000 rubles (around $3,900 USD) as payment. This hiring campaign coincides with recent reports regarding the construction of defensive lines in Crimea, Melitopol, and Belgorod.

Oleksiy Gromov, Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, said that Ukrainian soldiers advanced 1.5 kilometers near the village of Dibrova in the Luhansk Oblast, pressuring Russian forces in the area. Earlier, Gromov stated that Russian MiG-31K fighters capable of carrying Kinzhal missiles had returned to Belarus, along with an A-50U airborne early warning and control aircraft. This increases the capabilities of the Russian Aerospace Forces to carry out missile strikes against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure from the territory of Belarus.

Back in Russia, Telegram channels circulated a claim on December 11 that Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov may soon be replaced. The Kremlin denied Gerasimov’s resignation or replacement, and called the claims a Ukrainian “fake.”

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Support of Ukraine continues from the US, EU, and elsewhere

Five Russian citizens living in the United States were charged with illegally supplying electronics to the Russian armed forces, according to an FBI investigation. One of the accused, alleged FSB officer Vadim Konoshchenko, was detained in Estonia on December 6 and is awaiting extradition to the United States. The rest of the defendants in the case remain at large, the FBI said. If found guilty, the defendants face up to thirty years in prison.

Meanwhile, the EU agreed on its ninth sanctions package targeting the Russian economy. Sanctions include a ban on imports of drones to the Russian Federation, as well as other dual-use goods, stricter sanctions on banks, the mining and energy sector, and the banning of a number of propaganda channels. The European Parliament also recognize the Soviet-era Holodomor, in which Stalin starved the Ukrainian population, as genocide.

Poland recognized Russia as a sponsor of terrorism and also held Russia responsible for the 2010 crash of the presidential plane that killed Polish President Lech Kaczynski, as well as members of the government and the army.

Germany transferred more military aid to Ukraine, including Iris-T missiles, two armored recovery vehicles, 30,000 40mm shells, 5,000 155mm shells, four ambulances, and eight trucks with 8×8 drive. Germany is also building a new ammunition factory that, according to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, will produce ammunition for Gepard anti-aircraft guns, which will then be transferred to Ukraine.

The United States announced it will increase the number of its instructors for Ukraine’s soldiers undergoing training in Germany. In the near future, 600-800 fighters will be trained simultaneously, up from the current level of 300 trainees. The US is also considering the possibility of transferring to Ukraine JDAM systems, which turn an ordinary aerial bomb into a “smart bomb” with the help of GPS sensors and additional tail stabilizers.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine also reportedly received 120mm HE-843B mortar bombs from Sudan, despite Sudan’s recent relations with the Kremlin. This was reported by Ukraine Weapons Tracker analysts. Aircraft tracker Gerjon reported that two Ukraine International Airlines aircraft have made at least fifteen flights between Sudan and Poland’s Rzeszów.

Poland also hosted the Ukrainian-Israeli Innovation Summit 2022, where Israel shared its experience in building houses in special conditions. Ambassador of Ukraine to Israel Mikhail Brodsky emphasized that 200 Ukrainian specialists have already visited Israel and another 800 have attended online trainings.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

The post Russian War Report: Fierce fighting in Donetsk despite the onset of winter appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Ukrainians celebrate in Kherson as Russia evacuates the city

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 11 Nov 2022 15:55:59 +0000

Ukrainians celebrate as Russia evacuates Kherson

Footage across social media confirmed for the first time that Russia had abandoned the city of Kherson and were withdrawing southeast across the Dnipro River. In photos and video shared on Telegram, Twitter, and elsewhere, Ukrainians could be seen in the center of the city waving Ukrainian flags and celebrating the Russian withdrawal.

https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1591027173133008898

https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1591043695528542209

Russia’s abandonment of the city began earlier this week when General Sergei Surovikin, appointed last month to take charge of Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine, proposed a pullout from Kherson, which would effectively give up a strategic city north of annexed Crimea and the only Ukrainian provincial capital Russia had captured since the February 24 invasion. Surovikin proposed to Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu that Russia adopt new defensive lines. On November 9, Shoigu ordered troops to withdraw. While the overall status of the withdrawal remains in flux, today’s footage shows Russia is no longer in control of the central parts of Kherson.

Additionally, footage surfaced on November 9 showing the destruction of the Daryivskyi bridge in Kherson oblast, which would cut off Russian communications between Kherson and Nova Kakhovka. Subsequently, Telegram sources and Ukrainian media reported on the destruction of the Tyaginsky and Novovasilyevsky bridges, also in Kherson oblast. Ukrainian sources and Russian channels claimed the Russian army blew up the bridges in an attempt to slow down any Ukrainian offensive. The Daryivskyi bridge is behind Russian forces, so its destruction could be a signal for heavy entrenchment and preparation for defense. In the meantime, the Ukrainian army took over Snihurivka in Mykolaiv oblast and Kalynivske in Kherson oblast.

https://twitter.com/erranta2_andrij/status/1590626432816119808

Russia is making serious efforts to prepare defenses behind the current front lines in southeastern and southern Ukraine to prevent any rapid Ukrainian advance in the event of a breakthrough. Most recently, the Russian army began installing defensive structures around the villages of Nikolske and Staryi Krym, near Mariupol. Work is also reportedly under way on fortifications in the occupied areas of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Pro-Kremlin media amplify false story about NATO donating HIV-infected blood to Ukraine

On November 3, Mash, a popular pro-Kremlin Telegram channel, published a screenshot of a document allegedly retrieved from “the internal data system of the Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal’s office,” according to Kombatant Hack Group. The document was an alleged letter from Ukraine’s Ministry of Health to Ukraine’s prime minister that talked about Ukraine receiving 62,000 liters of blood from “NATO member states.” The letter alleged that the received blood was contaminated with HIV, as well as hepatitis C and B. This threatens the country with an epidemic of deadly diseases,” Mash asserted.

This, however, was false. Detektor Media, a Ukrainian fact-checking site, debunked the letter. “The letter does not meet the requirements for official documents in Ukraine,” it concluded, adding, “Ukraine has never turned to foreign partners for donor blood or its components, according to the Ministry of Health.”

The DFRLab has previously come across cases of forged letters being published on one-off fringe social media accounts and then picked up and amplified by other accounts to spread controversies about Western interests and unity.

Mash’s post was amplified by prominent Kremlin-approved media outlets like Lenta.ru, RIA FAN, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Rambler, Argumenty I Fakty, Life.ru, News Front, and others. It was also amplified in English via a YouTube video that garnered just 232 views, and an anonymous Twitter account named @Constanze2022 that garnered 355 retweets, 103 quote tweets and 1,019 likes for a post containing the forged letter.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Telegram post decries lack of communications between Russian soldiers and their families

A popular Russian military blogger on Telegram reported that relatives of Russian soldiers are asking about their loved ones sent to the Ukrainian front in the area of Svatove, Kreminna, and Makiivka, as they have not heard from them for some time. In a post that garnered nearly 300,000 views, journalist Anastasia Kashevarova wrote:

“Hundreds of letters come with full names given by fighters from their relatives. The fighters, many of whom are mobilized, do not get in touch. Whether they are dead or simply without communication, it is necessary to check. They must be sought.

Those who got in touch say that many were lost. Groups are abandoned without communication, without the necessary weapons, without medicines, naturally without artillery. No one knows who is on their right, who is on the left, who is in the rear. Enemy drones are constantly circling above them, you have to change positions very often. Constant artillery fire from the enemy, ours also begin to shoot and the men find themselves under crossfire.“

A response to Kashevarova’s post on the WarGonzo Telegram channel speculated that the problem lies in the lack of prepared personnel due to recent changes in commanding officers in the Central Military District.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Ukraine claims more Iranian drone shipments as new reports of Syrian fighters surface

Ukrainian military intelligence reportedly found information that Iranian drones were delivered to Russia after February 24, which would refute a statement from the Iranian Foreign Ministry that Tehran only provided a small number of drones months before Russia’s invasion. These claims have not been confirmed. According to the report, the Iranian Mohajer drone is assembled from parts produced in different countries. On November 9, Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev visited Iran and met President Ebrahim Raisi, reportedly to discuss security cooperation.

Iran is not the only Middle Eastern country helping Russian efforts in Ukraine. According to an investigation by Middle East Eye, Russia has deployed over 500 Syrian fighters to Ukraine in mostly non-combat roles. They have the main task of guarding facilities in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Middle East Eye cited regional intelligence sources in the Middle East, including a Syrian regime official. According to the report, Syrians might be serving under the Russian military contractor Shield, as well as Wagner’s far-right Rusich battalion.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

The post Russian War Report: Ukrainians celebrate in Kherson as Russia evacuates the city appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Russia escalates war by targeting cities across Ukraine

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 14 Oct 2022 18:53:15 +0000

Security

Russia escalates war by targeting cities across Ukraine

Tracking narratives

Russian deepfake attempt targeting Bayraktar drones CEO disrupted

Russia blames Ukrainian military intelligence for Kerch bridge explosion 

Bulgaria investigates claims of involvement in Kerch bridge blast

Media policy

Russia adds Meta to its ‘terrorist’ organizations list, blocks EUvsDisinfo website

Russia escalates war by targeting cities across Ukraine

Russia escalated its war against Ukraine this week with missile attacks and airstrikes on cities across the country, including the first serious attack in the capital Kyiv in months. The Russian army reportedly launched at least ten missile strikes, nineteen airstrikes, and ninety artillery attacks targeting more than thirty settlements across Ukraine, including Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Odesa, Sloviansk, Novobakhmutivka, Sieversk, Bilohorivka, Nikopol, and Blahodativka, according a Facebook post from the Ukrainian General Staff. Russia shelled twenty-five settlements in the direction of the Pivdennyi Buh river, across the frontline, they added. In the direction of Novopavlivka and Zaporizhzhia, the Russian army shelled twenty villages, including Vuhledar, Novopil, Shakhtarske, Mali Scherbaky, Velyka Novosilka, Malynivka, and Mala Tokmachka. As a direct result of the strikes, five regions were left without power for days, while elsewhere the power supply was partially damaged, according to the Ukrainian state emergency service. It specified that Lviv, Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Ternopil regions were completely deprived of electricity.

According to a United Nations assesment, “Explosions were reportedly heard, and missiles and drones were reportedly intercepted in the western Khmelnytskyi, Lviv, and Rivne regions, in the northern Kyiv region, and in the southern Mykolaiv and Odesa regions, as well as in the central Dnipropetrovsk region.”

In the central Vinnytsia region, the Ladyzhyn thermal power plant was reportedly hit with Iranian-made Shahed drones. Soon after, the Ukrainian energy ministry stated that it was halting its electricity exports in order to stabilize its energy systems. This halt has a significant impact on Moldova, which purchases approximately one-third of its electricity from Ukraine, including twenty percent from Ukrhydroenergo and ten percent from Energoatom.

According to Serhiy Bratchuk, spokesperson for the Odesa military administration, Russian forces brought Iranian instructors to Dzankoi in Crimea, as well as Zaliznyy and Lanivtsi in Kherson, to train Russian forces on how to use the Shahed-136 kamikaze drones. This claim has not been independently confirmed.

In yet another signal of a broader escalation by Russia, on October 8 the Ukrainian ambassador in Belarus received a note accusing Ukraine of “preparing an attack on Belarus.” The letter can be interpreted as providing a pretext for attacks on Ukraine from Belarusian territory. On October 10, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka announced Russia and Belarus had agreed to deploy a “joint regional group of forces.” This raises concerns about whether the northern fronts in the regions of Chernihiv and Kyiv would be reactivated.

Meanwhile, Moldova said Russian missiles that targeted Ukraine crossed Moldovan airspace, prompting the Foreign Ministry of Moldova to summon the Russian ambassador. Moldova also announced that it is considering the possibility of declaring a partial mobilization. Moldovan Minister of Defense Anatolie Nosatîi said that Moldova would have to close its airspace due to the launch of Russian missiles. Later in the day, however, the Moldovan Ministry of Defense denied that a Russian missile had entered the country’s airspace.

The Russian army continues to experience difficulties with new recruits and the mobilization process. According to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty journalist Mark Krutov, more than one hundred Russian conscripts from Bryansk allegedly refused to go to Ukraine, stating that they lacked training and new equipment. “One of the soldiers reached out to journalists with his complaints,” Krutov reported. “He says commanders told them they will be sent in a few days ‘to retake Lyman’, while only one man from the previous group of 100 mobilized soldiers sent to Ukraine returned.”

According to a report by Middle East Eye, “Money and menace are being used to recruit Muslims in the Caucasus….Parents in the deprived region are encouraging their sons to fight out of fear that local authorities could retaliate if they refuse.” The report stated that around one thousand Chechen fighters have lost their lives in Ukraine.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian deepfake attempt targeting Bayraktar drones CEO disrupted

The Ukrainian defense ministry’s intelligence department (GUR) has claimed that Russian operatives used deepfake technology in an attempt to discredit Ukraine’s partnership with Turkey.

According to a GUR Telegram post from October 9, Russian intelligence services attempted to use deepfake technology to call Haluk Bayraktar, CEO of of Baykar Defense, the Turkish defense company providing Bayraktar drones to Ukraine. The GUR claimed that Russian intelligence services tried to impersonate Ukraine’s Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal in the video call with Bayraktar. However, instead of speaking with the Bayraktar executive, GUR said the Russian intelligence service was connected to an “equally fake” individual impersonating a Bayraktar employee. The GUR added that the Russian intelligence service made pronunciation errors when speaking in the Ukrainian language. Specifically, the speaker used the Ukrainian expression babyne lito (бабине літо, “Grandmother’s summer” or “Indian summer”), but used the Russian pronunciation bab’ye lyeto (бабьє лєто) instead.

Footage of the deepfake incident, uploaded to YouTube by the GUR. (Source: Defense Intelligence of Ukraine/archive)

The GUR stated that the purpose of the operation was to discredit the cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey. “At the end of the conversation, the Russian operatives were informed that they had been exposed and would be prosecuted,” it said.

There have been several instances of deepfakes used since the beginning of the Russian invasion. In the early days of the war, Kremlin supporters circulated a deepfake of Zelenskyy urging the Ukrainian military to surrender. The latest incident demonstrates how pro-Russian deepfakes have moved beyond recorded footage to livestream deepfakes, in which a synthetic face can overlay an individual’s face in real time, creating an additional illusion of authenticity.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russia blames Ukrainian military intelligence for Kerch bridge explosion

Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed that a truck with explosive materials caused the detonation on the Kerch bridge on October 8, and accused Ukrainian military intelligence of carrying out what it called a “terrorist attack.” The blast resulted in two road spans partially collapsing and seven fuel tanks catching fire. The FSB said that four people were killed as a result of the explosion. On October 12, the FSB said it had detained eight people in connection with the incident, including five Russian citizens as well as three Ukrainian and Armenian nationals.

According to the FSB, explosives weighing 22.7 tons were camouflaged in plastic film rolls and sent from the Ukrainian port of Odesa to Bulgaria’s Ryse port in early August. They allege the cargo was sent to a Georgian port in Poti; from there it traveled to Yerevan and cleared customs at the Trans Alliance terminal. According to Russia’s version of events, the cargo left Yerevan on a Georgian registered DAF truck and crossed the Russia-Georgia border via the Upper Lars checkpoint on October 4. The FSB claimed that the truck was unloaded at the Armavir wholesale base in the Krasnodar region of Russia on October 6. The next day, the cargo was allegedly loaded on to a different vehicle, owned by a Russian citizen, and left for Simferpol. The explosion took place at 6:03am Moscow time on October 8.

Map illustrating the Russian FSB’s claim that the explosive cargo moved from Odesa to Crimea, via Bulgaria, Georgia and Armenia. The yellow lines do not mark the exact route. (Source: GGigitashvili_/DFRLab via Google Earth)

On October 12, Kremlin-controlled media outlet Ria Novosti published a CCTV video on Telegram allegedly depicting Russian police inspecting the truck. The Telegram post included x-ray style photos from the customs checkpoint showing the contents of the truck. However, the truck seen in the CCTV video has at least two elements that are not visible in the x-ray image. The truck in the CCTV video has two front wheels, whereas the truck in the x-ray image does not. In addition, the truck seen on the CCTV camera has a spare wheel, and while the x-ray photo shows a holder for a spare wheel, it appears to be empty. This indicates that the CCTV video and x-ray photo depict different trucks, which Ria Novosti did not acknowledge.

On October 12, the Russian Telegram channel Baza published two x-ray photos of a truck, alongside another photo showing the contents of the truck. The photos were reportedly taken in Armenia. The DFRLab used Google reverse image search and found that both photos were first published in an article by Armenpress, which stated that according to Armenian customs control, the truck went through the customs clearance procedure “duly and legally and no risk factors were detected.” The article contained photos taken during the inspection, stating that the x-ray examination of the truck “did not reveal any risk factors”. The x-ray photos published by Ria Novosti and Baza appear to be similar, based on the placement of plastic rolls inside the truck. It is possible that Ria Novosti’s photo is also from Armenian customs control.

Screenshots at the top are from Ria Novosti’s Telegram post. The red and green rectangles mark the differences in the two trucks. The screenshots at the bottom are from an Armenpress article and show a truck during a customs inspection in Armenia. (Sources: Telegram/archive, top left and right; Armenpress/archive, bottom left and right).

On October 10, the Baza Telegram channel also published a photo of a DAF truck with a Georgian license plate. The post claimed that the pictured truck was used to transport the explosives to Russia. On a same day, the Russian Telegram channel Mash Gor published another photo of a similar truck and claimed that Russian police were searching red DAF trucks with Georgian license plates and found the vehicle in Vladikavkaz, Russia. The post said there was no driver in the vehicle when police arrived, but soon after a driver appeared and was arrested. According to Armenpress, the arrested driver is Artur Terjanyan, a dual citizen of Armenia and Georgia.

Photos show a truck with a Georgian license plate, which Moscow claims was used to export explosives to Russia. (Sources: Telegram/archive, top left; Telegram/archive, top right; Daily Mail/archive, bottom).

Georgian and Bulgarian authorities have denied Russia’s accusation that the truck traveled through their territories.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Bulgaria investigates claims of involvement in Kerch bridge blast

Russian media outlets claimed that Bulgaria was complicit in the October 8 explosion targeting the Kerch bridge. While many details about the explosion are still unknown, and speculation is rife, pro-Kremlin media exploited the incident to spread rumors about the role of Bulgaria, a NATO member, in the attack. Bulgaria’s main intelligence agency DANS launched an investigation into Russian claims that the truck that blew up on the bridge came from Bulgaria. Investigations began immediately after the Kremlin released the claim, following an order by acting Prime Minister Galab Donev. The agency has also notified the Bulgarian prosecutor’s office.

Ukrainian analysts previously proposed three possible explanations for what happened, including mines detonating on the bridge, a truck bomb, or a rocket attack. While the cause of the blast has not been confirmed, a truck bomb is believed to be the most likely explanation.

In a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Alexander Bastrykin, head of the Russian Investigative Committee, announced that the route of the truck that allegedly blew up the Crimean bridge started in Bulgaria and then passed through Georgia, Armenia, North Ossetia, and Krasnodar. The European Commission spokesperson Peter Stano said Bastrykin’s words were unreliable. Kiril Petkov, former Bulgarian prime minister and leader of the We Continue the Change party, called on the caretaker government to reject the Kremlin’s suggestion that there was a Bulgarian connection to the bridge bombing. Meanwhile, Bulgaria’s pro-Russian political parties insisted on an investigation, prompting angry reactions in the media. This is not the first attempt by Russia to discredit Bulgaria.

Sofia is in a difficult position because of political differences over the provision of military aid to Ukraine; there is already evidence of Bulgarian weapons in Ukraine. However, the topic has become a major dividing line between political parties in the country, as pro-Kremlin politicians insist that Bulgaria should not be drawn into a war with Russia by providing weapons to Ukraine. In this context, the pro-Kremlin military channel Rybar alleged that Bulgaria had delivered a new shipment of weapons to Ukraine. The channel shared blurry photos, reportedly taken on October 9, of an Antonov An-124 aircraft at an airfield in the city of Burgas. Just one day earlier, the far-right Russian paramilitary group Rusich, which is accused of carrying out executions and war crimes in Ukraine, shared on its Telegram channel a photo of a Bulgarian and Polish passport with the text, “Different people, different countries, one goal.”

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia adds Meta to its ‘terrorist’ organizations list, blocks EUvsDisinfo website

On October 11, Russia added Meta, the parent company of Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, to its list of terrorist and extremist organizations. While Facebook and Instagram are blocked in Russia, WhatsApp remains available.

The latest designation by Russia’s financial monitoring agency means that Russian citizens and companies who buy advertisements on Facebook or Instagram could face imprisonment on charges of “sponsoring extremism” or “terrorism.” According to the pro-Kremlin outlet Interfax, Russian law requires banks to freeze funds and stop serving citizens and organizations on the list.

Russian human rights lawyer Pavel Chikov reported that a Russian prosecutor’s office is already sending letters to Facebook and Instagram users “threatening administrative and criminal liability for posting posts on social networks.”

Russia declared Meta an extremist organization in March 2022. Following the Kremlin’s crackdown on Western social media platforms, Russian citizens have been using virtual private networks (VPNs) to bypass official bans and access the platforms. In light of the latest designation, it is possible that Russian citizens could face criminal charges for accessing Meta’s products through a VPN.

In addition, on October 8, Russian internet censor Roskomnadzor blocked the website of EUvsDisinfo, a counter-disinformation project of the European Union. For years, EUvsDisinfo has exposed the Kremlin disinformation campaigns. Roskomnadzor’s move is a continuation of the Russian policy to restrict Western online media and social networks in an attempt to suppress factual information about Russia’s war in Ukraine.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Russia escalates war by targeting cities across Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Meet the Ukrainian TV star fundraising millions for the country’s war effort

Oleksii Antoniuk, Andrew D’Anieri — Thu, 13 Oct 2022 21:49:01 +0000

Editor’s Note: This article is part of the GENERATION UA series, which aims to introduce international audiences to the emerging generation of Ukrainian public figures and politicians.

It’s been a busy year for one of Ukraine’s most famous TV stars as he takes on a new wartime role. Serhiy Prytula’s crowdfunding efforts for the Ukrainian military have grown into a pillar of the country’s civil society and a symbol of Ukraine’s remarkable resistance to Vladimir Putin’s invasion.

Prytula first opened the eponymous Charity Foundation of Serhiy Prytula as an aid organization in 2020 in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. A longtime supporter of the Ukrainian military since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine first began in 2014 with the seizure of Crimea, Prytula mobilized his foundation to help coordinate the public response to Russia’s February 24 attack. The foundation has grown rapidly over the past eight months as it has provided military support to Ukrainian troops and humanitarian aid to civilians.

Public trust in the foundation was evident in early October when Prytula raised more than nine million dollars in just 24 hours to purchase kamikaze drones following a series of Russian airstrikes in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities. Prytula had earlier demonstrated his fundraising potential during summer 2022 when he led the “People’s Bayraktar” project, a crowdfunding effort to buy three Bayraktar drones for the Ukrainian military.

When Turkish defense company Baykar offered to send the drones for free, Prytula decided to use the funds raised to buy a satellite instead. His foundation contracted one of the most advanced commercial satellite providers to help the Ukrainian military get high-resolution images of Russian formations more quickly in daylight, at night, and through cloud cover.

Prytula tells UkraineAlert that the satellite decision reflected Ukraine’s military needs. “Bayraktar is a well-known brand here in Ukraine. Many people understand how well these drones work so we thought that we could raise money for them,” he says. Indeed, Bayraktar drones have proved highly effective against Russian armor, with Ukrainians even singing wartime songs in their honor. But when Baykar said they would provide the drones free of charge, Prytula turned to Ukraine’s Defense Ministry. “We had a meeting with Minister of Defense Oleksii Reznikov, who asked us to check on the possibility of buying a satellite. So we did.”

Ukraine’s frontline military units rely on small reconnaissance drones and satellite imagery to find and target Russian positions. But most drones are prone to Russian electrical jamming, while satellite image-sharing from Western countries often arrives too slowly to be of immediate use. According to Prytula, his foundation’s satellite can cut the image-sharing transfer time from two days to three or four hours, making it much more useful. Most importantly, the Ukrainian military controls the satellite now and can decide for itself where to look.

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While Prytula has been civically engaged since his university days, the 41-year-old spent much of his career as a TV presenter and comedian. He made his name as a Ukrainian-speaking comic on the stand-up show Comedy Club Ukraine, before hitting the big time with Ukraine’s Noviy Kanal (New Channel). Prytula earned a reputation as one of Ukraine’s most versatile comic presenters, hosting the nation’s favorite morning TV show “Wake up” and a number of game shows.

He tried his hand at politics in the 2019 parliamentary elections as a candidate for the pro-European Holos party. The elections yielded 20 seats for Holos, but at 30th on the party list, Prytula did not enter parliament. Instead, he ran for mayor of Kyiv in 2020 and came in third with eight percent of the vote. In 2021, Prytula left Holos and later announced that he would form a new political party.

When asked if he still has plans to create a political party of his own, Prytula’s tone hardens. “We have no politicians in Ukraine these days. You cannot be a politician when your country is under fire. I have no other plans now except to stay alive and do everything that I can for our victory.”

There is a certain logic to this position. Since February 24, Ukrainian politicians have largely avoided the pitched partisan battles that have often poisoned the country’s politics. Even so, wartime public opinion polling regularly shows Prytula among the country’s most well-known public figures. Meanwhile, his foundation ranks among the most recognizable charities in Ukraine.

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If he does go back into politics, Prytula has a good chance of rapidly establishing himself as one of Ukraine’s rising political forces. He has the name recognition to gain traction in the country’s personality-driven politics and also boasts humanitarian credentials that set him apart from many of Kyiv’s current elite.

The former showman is not convinced he will continue in his TV career. “I had a lot of different TV shows, but you can only be a good entertainer if you feel inside yourself that you have something to celebrate every day. But Russians have burned out this feeling inside of me,” he says. Instead, the last eight months have given Prytula a new calling. “I feel empowered now only to help the Ukrainian army, to unite people.”

Unity is central to the Prytula Foundation’s crowdfunding initiatives and to his vision for Ukraine’s future. The foundation has raised tens of millions of dollars since February 24 for military supplies alone, mostly in private donations. Funds have come in from Ukraine, Europe, and North America, often from Ukrainian diaspora communities.

The foundation is hoping to encourage more donations from Europeans by making a cost-saving argument. “Every dollar donated to the Armed Forces of Ukraine through the Serhiy Prytula Foundation saves ten dollars that would be spent on supporting Ukrainian refugees in Europe,” Prytula explains.

He believes this is a timely message and notes that donations have slowed in recent months. This could spell trouble for both Europe and Ukraine, warns Prytula. “The Ukrainian economy is in bad shape. Many people in Ukraine lost their jobs. That’s why we really need help with military aid and money, otherwise we could have millions more Ukrainian refugees.”

Prytula acknowledges that there will be huge issues to address at home once Russia’s invasion of Ukraine finally ends. Eventually he would like the millions of Ukrainians currently seeking safety abroad to return and help rebuild their country. Reconstruction itself will be a significant challenge, but Prytula has another task in mind for his compatriots. “I will be happy when our society develops new skills and learns to think more critically. I want Ukrainians to change the way they think, because we have paid a big price for our old way of thinking.”

Ukraine renewed many of its institutions and strengthened its sense of national identity in the years following the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. Many believe Russia’s 2022 invasion will serve as a catalyst for further societal development. Prytula hopes to be part of this process.

We ask Prytula if there’s anything else he thinks Western audiences should know about his work or about Ukraine. His press secretary chimes in off camera before he can answer. Prytula laughs, nods, and turns to us to translate. “Tell them that when we unite, we are invincible.”

Andrew D’Anieri is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He tweets @andrew_danieri. Oleksii Antoniuk is a third-year student at Yale University, born and raised in Ukraine. Find him on Twitter at @OleksiiAntoniuk.

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The scale of Russia’s aerial attacks on October 10-11 indicates weeks if not months of planning and preparations. Dozens of targets in towns and cities across Ukraine had to be identified and confirmed; missiles, bombers, warships, and drones had to deployed and prepared for action. These are not tasks that could realistically be accomplished in the two-day window between the Crimean Bridge attack and the launch of Russia’s airstrike escalation.

In addition to these obvious practical issues, the retaliation narrative also risks creating false equivalency between Russian international aggression and Ukraine’s justifiable efforts to defend itself. The Crimean Bridge was constructed by Russia to strengthen Moscow’s illegal occupation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. Furthermore, it has since been used as a key artery for the transportation of troops and military equipment from the Russian Federation to Crimea and Russian-occupied regions of southern Ukraine. In other words, the bridge plays a vital logistical role in the Russian invasion. As such, it clearly qualifies as a legitimate military target.

In contrast, Russia’s airstrikes deliberately targeted key civilian infrastructure such as power and heating stations that have no direct connection to the Ukrainian military or the ongoing war. Russia also launched missiles at a range of non-military targets in the heart of Kyiv that appeared to serve no purpose other than sowing panic and terror among the civilian population. These included a children’s playground, a pedestrian bridge, a university, and a busy downtown traffic intersection.

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The destructive objectives of Russia’s blitz are entirely in line with the genocidal intent underpinning Putin’s invasion. Time and again, the Russian dictator and his Kremlin colleagues have expressed their desire to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and erase Ukrainian national identity. The war crimes currently being committed by the Russian military in Ukraine are entirely in line with the chilling logic of these words. By systematically destroying essential Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, Russia hopes to maximize human suffering among the noncombatant population and make the country unlivable.

This raises some uncomfortable questions for media outlets that have chosen to portray the recent escalation in Russia’s air war as a response to an alleged Ukrainian attack rather than as a new phase in Putin’s genocidal invasion. Would they also frame the mass rape and murder of civilians in Bucha, Irpin, Izyum, and countless other Ukrainian towns as Russian revenge? What was Moscow retaliating for when it reduced Mariupol to rubble and killed tens of thousands of the Ukrainian port city’s civilian population? No doubt the Kremlin could provide far-fetched excuses, but should the international media really allow such claims to pass unchallenged?

Framing Russia’s airstrike escalation as retaliation is misleading and irresponsible journalism. It encourages audiences to blame the victim and clouds perceptions of what is the most blatant act of international aggression in Europe since World War II. Media portrayals that imply Ukraine is at fault for defending itself risk fueling Russian disinformation and prolonging the war. As US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated at the United Nations just weeks ago, “If Russia stops fighting, the war ends. If Ukraine stops fighting, Ukraine ends.”

Media coverage that fails to distinguish between Russian aggression and Ukraine’s defensive actions also serves to distort the debate over the need to provide Ukraine with more weapons. Critics argue that arming Ukraine merely provokes Russia and escalates the conflict. In reality, nothing could be more provocative to Putin than an isolated and defenseless Ukraine.

Almost eight months since the start of the Russian invasion, Moscow’s intentions should be crystal clear to all objective observers. Putin is aiming to destroy the Ukrainian state and is pursuing this goal in full public view. By suggesting that Russia’s actions are in some way retaliatory, international media outlets risk becoming inadvertent accessories in this crime.

Razom is a New York-based NGO.

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Ukrainian recaptures territory as Russia uses Iranian drone near Kyiv

The Ukrainian offensive continues to pressure Russian forces in southern and eastern Ukraine. On October 5, Ukrainian forces captured Hrekivka and Makiivka in Luhansk Oblast, approximately twenty kilometers southwest of Svatove. Fighting also continues in Kharkiv Oblast, where the Ukrainian military recently recaptured Hlushkivka. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command confirmed on October 4 that it had liberated Lyubimivka, Khreshchenivka, Zolta Balka, Bilyaivka, Ukrainka, Velyka Oleksandrivka, Mala Oleksandrivka, and Davydiv Brid. It appears that withdrawing Russian forces are destroying their own weapons reserves, likely to prevent Ukrainian forces from capturing equipment as they advance.

On October 5, the Russian army conducted another strike with an Iranian-made Shahed-136 drone in Bila Tserkva, Kyiv Oblast; this is the first strike in the Kyiv area since June. The strike resulted in the destruction of civilian buildings. This indicates that Russian forces are using advanced weaponry to target areas far from the active combat zones. The tactic of striking civilian infrastructure away from the frontlines has previously been used by Russia, presumably to add pressure on the civilian population and the Ukrainian administration. Ukrainian Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov said that Russian forces have used a total of eighty-six Iranian Shahed-136 drones, of which, Ukraine has destroyed 60 percent; this has not been independently confirmed. In addition, for the first time since August, Russian Tu-22 M3 bombers reportedly launched Kh-22 missiles from Belarusian airspace against the Khmelnytskyi region.

This week, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a decree transferring control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP) to the Russian state-controlled company Rosenergoatom. The Ukrainian army reported that Russian officials are coercing plant workers into obtaining Russian passports and signing employment contracts with Rosenergoatom.

In addition, Putin deferred mobilization for all students in Russia, including part-time and masters’ students. Putin’s motivations are not clear, but this could be the result of increasing domestic resistance to the mobilization. Putin criticized the defense ministry for difficulties with the mobilization’s roll-out.

Meanwhile, police in Russia’s major cities appear to be using surveillance software to search for men who have failed to report for military service. According to Astra Press, run by independent Russian journalists, on October 3 and 4, at least ten men suspected of “evading mobilization” were captured by surveillance cameras in Moscow. Four of them were detained by the police and sent to a military enlistment office.

Further, according to the United Nations, the humanitarian situation in Izium and Kupiansk “is extremely concerning following months of intense hostilities that have left behind a path of destruction.” In Izium, essential services have been decimated, leaving as many as 9,000 people in the town completely dependent on humanitarian aid. In Kupiansk, shelling and hostilities have forced more than 4,000 people to spend most of their time in bunkers and basements, with extremely limited access to vital items.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian-occupied Georgian region of Abkhazia announces call for military service

Following Putin’s recent announcement of a partial mobilization in Russia, citizens of the Russian-occupied Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia questioned whether they would be included in the mobilization order. On October 3, Aslan Bzhania, the de facto president of Abkhazia, signed a conscription decree approving urgent military service for citizens aged eighteen to twenty-seven.

On September 21, the day of Putin’s mobilization announcement, a statement quoting Russian Defense Minister Nikolai Pankov circulated in Abkhazian Telegram channels. It claimed that Abkhazia wouldn’t be able to avoid the mobilization. The Abkhazia Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the statement was “fake” and a “provocation” to harm Abkhazia-Russia relations. On September 24, independent media outlet Meduza cited a “source close to the Russian president’s administration” to report that the Kremlin was considering the mobilization of citizens from Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

In South Ossetia, the de facto defense ministry denied reports circulating on Telegram that claimed servicemen of the 4th Russian military base, stationed in the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali, were handing out draft mobilization notices.

On September 29, the South Ossetian defense ministry recommended that its staff, both military servicemen and civilian personnel, cross the Russian border using their South Ossetian passports. “Most citizens of the Republic of South Ossetia are also citizens of the Russian Federation. Thus, those registered on the territory of the Russian Federation, are subject to the partial mobilization and draft notices will be handed to them,” the statement said.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian court fines TikTok for ‘LGBT propaganda,’ Twitch for ‘fakes

A Russian court on Tuesday fined TikTok for not removing “LGBT propaganda” that violated Russian laws.

Kremlin-owned media outlet RIA reported that a court in Moscow fined TikTok three million rubles (USD $50,000) “for refusing to remove LGBT propaganda.” Russia’s internet censor Roskomnadzor also accused TikTok of “promoting non-traditional values, LGBT, feminism, and a distorted representation of traditional sexual values.”

Meanwhile, the livestreaming platform Twitch faces fines for publishing content about the war in Ukraine that Russia deems “fake.”

On October 18, the same court will examine two cases against Twitch, which is owned by Amazon. According to RIA, Twitch is accused of refusing to remove “fakes about the Russian army during a special operation in Ukraine.” The cases were initiated after Twitch hosted an interview with Oleksiy Arestovych, a military reporter and adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

The latest legal actions are a continuation of Russia’s assault on Western technology companies. In July, a Russian court fined Google 22 billion rubles (USD $360 million) for failing to remove unfavorable content about Russia’s war in Ukraine.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington, DC

Mass grave uncovered in Lyman as rocket attack hits Zaporizhzhia

A new mass grave was uncovered in the city of Lyman after it was recently liberated by Ukrainian forces. According to Ukrainian reports, the bodies have not all been identified, as they may have been left on the streets for a long period of time before burial.

In Zaporizhzhia, several people were killed in a rocket attack launched by the Russian army on October 6. Rescue operations continued throughout the day as people were believed to be buried under the wreckage.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian Telegram channels praise “pro-Russian” coup in Burkina Faso

For the second time in eight months, Burkina Faso was the scene of a military coup d’état. On September 30, Captain Ibrahim Traoré overthrew Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, who himself ousted the country’s democratically elected president in January after urging the then-president to hire Wagner Group to fight Islamist insurgents.

Celebrations of the coup saw Burkinabe citizens holding Russian flags and chanting “to hell with France.” Sergei Markov, a pro-government analyst in Moscow, said “our people” had assisted the coup. Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin also warmly congratulated Captain Traore. Prigozhin expressed similar sentiments following the January coup.

#BurkinaFaso hier soir à #Ougadougou un militaire putschiste avec de le drapeau de la #Russie sur un blindé aux couleur de l’#ONU. Tout un symbole pic.twitter.com/poTnK9S0RE
— Wassim Nasr (@SimNasr) October 2, 2022

Social media sites in Burkina Faso saw an uptick in pro-Russian messaging before both the most recent coup and the January coup.

On Telegram, Kremlin propaganda channels with hundreds of thousands of followers praised the “joining of Ibrahim Traore and the country of honest people to the anti-colonial alliance with Russia.” These Telegram channels also claimed that Russia had effectively taken control of three West African countries – Mali, the Central African Republic and now Burkina Faso – from the “French neocolonial empire.” Following the coup, protesters, some waving Russian flags, attacked the French embassy in Burkina Faso and vandalized a French cultural center.

Notably, many Telegram channels stated that “Niger and its uranium mines are next in line.” On September 19, a protest in the capital of Niger saw Nigerien citizens calling for France’s removal while carrying Russian flags.

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate

The post Russian War Report: Ukraine recaptures territory as Russia uses Iranian drone near Kyiv appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Is cutting-edge military tech really cheaper than manpower?

Daniel Vardiman — Tue, 20 Sep 2022 10:00:00 +0000

The excitement over artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and automation in support of military capabilities is growing inside policy circles. Industry is eager to develop new tools, and the US Department of Defense (DoD) is keen to operationalize new concepts. The mood suggests that we are on the cusp of the next military revolution.

The faith in these developments stems from the confidence that they will make warfare faster and safer, put fewer people in harm’s way—and, crucially, make future capabilities cheaper than traditional military hardware. On the surface, that’s a fair assumption: Service members are the most expensive single item on the annual budget, and any new system that improves proficiency and lowers the number of required personnel should lead to a more effective force and lower costs.

The reality might be more complicated. Take the highly successful MQ-1 Predator drone, for instance: It helped usher in the age of remote piloting and shaped concepts of military automation. When it first came on the scene in 1996, it was heralded as a replacement for the SR-71 and U-2 manned espionage planes to limit the risk to pilots. But really, the Predator did more to fill a gap in requirements than it did to replace a capability. The requirements for U-2s, for example, didn’t go away: The spy planes were designed to fly at high altitudes to avoid most threats and look far into enemy territory from a safe distance. In contrast, the Predator operates at lower altitudes and provides greater flexibility for surveillance operations inside threat windows.

Once the Predator capability was fully realized, demand skyrocketed. In terms of sheer cost, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) still pose a clear benefit. The Predator program was retired in 2018 to make way for newer MQ-9 platforms, which according to the latest DoD reimbursement rates cost $737 per hour to operate—compared to the U-2’s cost per hour of $22,397. Therefore, the cost savings for a UAV compared to a U-2 are compelling. But that raises a major question: Can automation help to reduce costs when the system behind it is labor-intensive?

An excellent example of the impact of automation on US Navy systems is the evolution of the five-inch gun. During World War II, the Sims and Fletcher class destroyers were the first to be outfitted with these guns, which would take between fifteen and twenty-seven sailors to operate. The complement for the Fletcher Class destroyer during that war was 329; today’s Arleigh Burke class destroyer takes only six sailors to operate its five-inch gun, which is part of a fully integrated weapons system, but its complement remains between three and four hundred personnel.

In reality, manpower savings were re-applied to facilitate the expansion of the destroyer’s mission areas, including anti-aircraft and -submarine warfare, ballistic-missile defense, and the operation of Tomahawk cruise missiles. In this case, greater automation in one area facilitated greater lethality in new weapons systems.

Implications for the future

While the promise of automation is indeed exciting, the lessons learned from the Predator program and the evolution of the five-inch gun suggest cost savings through automation depends on how much manpower remains in technical support roles. In other words: The reduction of manpower at the micro level on a specific system could lead to lower cost per system; but at the macro level, the manpower is simply shifted elsewhere. Where automation is most valuable is in streamlining processes to deliver information or capabilities faster and with less risk.

With that in mind, here are some key implications of automation on manpower in the military:

Actual cost savings for manpower will never materialize due to the demand to constantly innovate with new ideas, push the limits of every warfare system, and identify methods for improvement. This is manpower-intensive, no matter how much automation can streamline capabilities.
Automation tools need to be flexible enough to facilitate innovative concepts as operators mature and adapt to processes.
If automation increases in complexity, it puts greater demands on increased training for operators, thus increasing costs in time, training, and experience.

None of this should stop the incorporation of automation into systems. But these points should be closely considered when developing new systems that include automation. One principle for considering automation: Always strive for the greatest efficiency for both output and for the use of manpower. Achieving the highest level of output with the least amount of input needs to serve the users with easy-to-use interfaces while reducing the demand for technical support. The challenge is incorporating complex systems for easy human interface and consumption, as this will help reduce training requirements and make decision-making easier.

Additional research will help determine whether the evidence from the Predator and five-inch gun examples holds more broadly. Industry needs the ability to understand how capabilities will be incorporated into staffs in order to help provide greater efficiencies that can lead to cost savings for manpower. By partnering with DoD, industry can make even greater strides in automation that will lower the risk to personnel while preserving warfighting capability. Building the future force that incorporates efficiency-boosting automation to save on manpower won’t necessarily lower the military budget; but it will lead to increased readiness and a more effective force.

Daniel Vardiman was the 2021-22 senior US Navy fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of their parent service departments, the Department of Defense, or the US government.

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How Turkey can play a more constructive role in Russia’s war on Ukraine

Yevgeniya Gaber — Fri, 02 Sep 2022 18:50:01 +0000

During the early days of the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine, Turkey earned well-deserved praise from both Kyiv and its Western allies for supporting Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, providing armed drones, and closing the Turkish Straits for Russian warships. More recently, its diplomatic efforts to ease the Black Sea grain blockade have also been welcomed.

But as Russia’s invasion has evolved into a genocidal war against civilians, Ankara’s attempt to cast itself as a neutral power broker between the two sides has left many supporters of Turkey in Ukraine deeply disappointed. Ankara’s growing economic ties with Russian companies, Russia’s illegal trade in looted Ukrainian grain via Turkish ports, and Turkey’s alleged facilitation of sanctions evasion for Russian businesses have all fueled claims that Ankara is more interested in salvaging its relationship with Moscow than standing up for Ukraine.

While for Russia the benefits of such cooperation are obvious, it is difficult to say the same for Turkey. In case of further economic and political engagement with Moscow, Ankara could end up even more dependent on Russia—and therefore further estranged from the West.

Now, six months into the war, Russia—amid military losses in Ukraine—may be pushing its partner to talk Ukraine into a ceasefire. At least that seemed to be the motivation behind Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Lviv last month, where he met his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. Since Russia holds the key to Turkey’s own domestic and economic stability less than a year before Turkish presidential elections, there were few doubts that Vladimir Putin’s increasingly isolated regime would seize this opportunity.

Turkey’s leadership has been keen to capitalize on its previous diplomatic success with the grain deal by presenting that agreement as only the first step toward a permanent peace. Some Turkish officials even suggested that the Joint Coordination Center established in Istanbul could function as a confidence-building measure between Ukrainians and Russians. While this may be music to the ears of Turkish voters—73 percent of whom want their government to remain neutral—calls for peace with Putin’s regime evoke the same feelings in Ukrainians as calls for peace with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorist organization would among Turks. Zelenskyy himself perhaps said it best in Lviv: “They can’t actually want peace if they’re bombing our cities and killing our people.”

This is why Turkey’s efforts to push for peace talks will be nothing but counterproductive, at least until basic preconditions are secured. For any meaningful negotiations, Russia needs to be defeated on the battlefield (and in this regard Turkish Bayraktar drones have done more for peace in Ukraine than Ankara’s shuttle diplomacy between Kyiv and Moscow). Until peace is made possible, there is still plenty of space for Ankara to play a constructive role in the conflict to serve both Ukraine’s and its own interests. Here’s how:

Step up military assistance to Ukraine. Turkey’s arms supplies remain significant for Ukraine’s defensive capabilities. Turkish drones have played an important role in deterring Russian assault, and the recently delivered “Kirpi” mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles (MRAP) are crucial in maintaining control of terrain. Experts agree that supplying new batches of MRAPs, “Akinci” combat drones, and Turkish multi-launch rocket systems with heavy firepower capabilities (such as the TRG-230 Kaplan and TRG-300 Kasirga) will be of crucial assistance to the Ukrainian military. Additionally, much more could be done to train Ukrainian personnel. After all, Turkish contributions to Kyiv’s military are direct investments into Ankara’s own national and regional security, since Ukraine plays a critical role in deterring not only Russian aggression in the Black Sea but also its power projection to the Mediterranean.
Secure strict adherence to the Montreux Convention. Turkey has always paid special attention to full compliance with the 1936 convention, which guarantees free movement throughout the Turkish Straits for civilian vessels, and closed the area to Russian warships in the early days of the war to prevent further escalation. But there have been occasional reports of Russia’s violation of the Montreux provisions by using commercial vessels to supply logistics to its military operations in Syria and Ukraine. Most recently, the Turkish ambassador to Ukraine was summoned by the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to answer for the alleged transportation of S-300 missile systems from Syria to Russia via the Bosphorus Strait by a Russian Defense Ministry-chartered ship. Such cases not only undermine Turkey’s image as a country respecting international law but also create dangerous loopholes that can lead to the erosion of the Montreux regime in the future. Ankara must take all necessary measures to thoroughly inspect cargo on the Russian ships passing through the Straits and put an end to any violations.
Crack down on sanctions evasion. While Turkey hasn’t joined the Western sanctions regime against Russia, it should not allow itself to turn into a hub for Russian efforts to circumvent the measures, especially in sensitive and dual-purpose goods. The US Treasury has already warned Turkey’s largest business group, TUSIAD, and officials that the country will face secondary sanctions if its concerns are grounded in reality. Having $178.6 billion in trade with the European Union, Ankara’s largest trade partner, and only $35 billion with Russia, it is not a moral obligation but simple economic expedience that demands prioritizing economic ties with the West.
Help expand Ukrainian exports. While the Black Sea Grain Initiative has helped ease the food crisis, it has not fully restored freedom of navigation—which remains a cornerstone of international law (and of Turkey’s own interests in the region). The next tactical aim should be to gradually expand the scope of the grain deal to include other Ukrainian seaports, such as Mykolayiv and Kherson, and to other Ukrainian exports, such as critical raw materials and metals. At the same time, increasing Ukrainian military capacity to put an end to Russian blockades of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov shall remain a key strategic objective for Ukraine and its allies.
Cooperate with Ukraine on nuclear safety and security. Russian nuclear blackmailing at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant demands an adequate response. Turkey can play a constructive role in boosting diplomatic efforts to stop Russia’s shelling of the plant and facilitate greater continued access for international monitors. The hands-on experience in safety and security measures will be useful for Turkish specialists once the Russian state nuclear power company Rosatom completes construction of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, Akkuyu.
Mediate on humanitarian issues. Turkey should take the lead in facilitating exchanges of Ukrainian prisoners of war and the bodies of deceased soldiers. Here, it already has experience: Ankara successfully facilitated the release to Ukraine of Crimean Tatar political prisoners Akhtem Chiygoz and Ilmi Umerov in 2017. Its diplomatic efforts may be highly sought after as the Kremlin prepares its illegitimate tribunals of captured Ukrainian troops from Mariupol.
Take part in postwar reconstruction. Following up on its participation in the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Lugano, Switzerland, and the conclusion in Lviv of a memorandum of understanding on rebuilding Ukraine’s damaged or destroyed infrastructure, Turkey should seek a greater role in this process. The Ukrainian Presidential Office said it expects the Turkish government and businesses to develop “special recovery projects” and provide technical and consulting services as part of the deal. While its current financial situation may not allow Turkey to become a major donor to Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction on its own, it could pool its resources with those of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and World Bank, which would benefit all sides. By helping Ukraine restore its critical infrastructure, Turkey can boost its own economy in a more transparent way by relying on construction contracts rather than shady Russian money transfers.
Help ensure regional energy security. More broadly, Turkey should step up its efforts to diversify gas supplies to domestic and European markets. For its part, Europe should strengthen its cooperation with Turkey to increase Azerbaijani gas supplies via the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline and double down on diplomatic efforts to ease tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. It should also support Turkey’s bid to reduce reliance on fossil fuels from Russia by facilitating international loans for liquefied natural gas imports and the exploration of Turkey’s own Black Sea gas reserves. The Western policy of using sanctions as “a stick” against Ankara has hardly been an efficient way to decrease Turkish dependence on Russian “carrots.”

If there is any silver lining in the war, it is in Turkey’s opportunity to take a stronger stance on Russia and showcase its strategic autonomy—not by questioning the Western resolve to defeat the aggressor, but by taking a lead in the process. Erdogan’s decisive remarks at the Second Crimea Platform Summit denouncing the Russian annexation of Crimea as “illegal and illegitimate” and advocating for the “return of Crimea to Ukraine” show Turkey’s unwavering support to the full de-occupation of Ukraine. But it must follow up with sound policy.

Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and at the Center in Modern Turkish Studies, Carleton University. Follow her on Twitter @GaberYevgeniya.

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The Ukrainian military must reorganize to defeat Russia

Richard D. Hooker, Jr. — Tue, 30 Aug 2022 18:48:37 +0000

As Ukraine struggles to defend its sovereignty and retake Russian-occupied territory, modern weapon systems supplied by Western powers are badly needed but reorganizing Ukrainian ground forces is just as important.

Ukraine began the war with some 38 maneuver (infantry and tank) brigades and nine artillery brigades, organized on the Russian model. Each brigade numbers around 4000 soldiers commanded by a colonel. Unlike Western armies, Ukraine does not use the higher-level division and corps structures common to NATO, relying instead on “regional” commands. These lack true battle staffs that can integrate airspace, deep fires, logistics, intelligence, and higher-level command and control.

The current organization suffers from span-of-control problems and prevents Ukraine from conducting large-scale offensive operations. A better approach is to convert the regional commands into true corps headquarters commanded by a three-star lieutenant general with trained battle staffs, and to introduce divisions commanded by a two-star major general as an intermediate echelon of command. Both should include support formations (artillery, air defense, aviation, engineer, signal, logistics, intelligence, medical, and reconnaissance units) that are crucial to success in modern warfare. Standing up these structures in wartime will be challenging, but they could be fielded by 2023 with the right support.

This move would result in the creation of four regionally-oriented corps with anywhere from two-three divisions (including territorial defense forces) based on the terrain and threat. To transition to the offense and counter-attack, Ukraine also requires a fifth corps in general reserve composed of at least three tank and mechanized divisions. This would serve as an “armored fist” led by its most accomplished and successful commanders to conduct decisive operations to drive the Russian army from Ukrainian territory. To coordinate these corps, Ukraine should establish a four-star field army headquarters, to be led by the Commander, Ukrainian Ground Forces.

Many of the building blocks of these formations already exist in current force structure and standing headquarters, which need only to be converted or augmented for battlefield use. These staffs need not be particularly large as US and NATO staffs tend to be, and key staff positions can be filled at least partially by officers not available for front line service due to wounds or age.

Women are already present in the Ukrainian Armed Forces in large numbers and can play a key role here as well. Using a cadre of staff officers who have already received Western training at staff and war colleges, and with support from NATO and the EU, these staffs could be formed by the end of 2022 and could theoretically be mission-ready by late spring of 2023.

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As the war drags on with no end in sight, Ukraine faces an urgent need to replace losses on the battlefield with fresh recruits. Unlike Russia, Ukraine can draw on virtually its entire manpower pool in this national emergency. Commanders will be tempted to throw partially trained soldiers as individual replacements into the fight, an urge which must be resisted if Ukraine is to field combat capable forces.

A better approach is to withdraw damaged units temporarily for rest and reinforcement by fully trained replacements, who can then be “shown the ropes” by veterans in cohesive units. Units need not be manned at full peacetime strength as long as key weapons and combat vehicles are manned. Here, the selection and training of junior leaders, namely NCOs, lieutenants, and captains, is of paramount importance. The best should be assigned to combat units where the demands and complexities of the battlefield are highest.

More generally, careful use of human resources can maximize the performance of Ukrainian forces in the field. Initial reporting suggests problems here. Some recently retired officers are manning checkpoints, while at least one Sandhurst graduate was posted to the territorial forces. By carefully combing the civilian workforce, Ukraine can identify recruits with skills that translate into military specialties while taking care to preserve essential sectors of the economy and civil service. Here, performance in the field must be the key criterion for rapid advancement. Commanders who have proven themselves on the battlefield must be identified and promoted without regard to seniority and placed where they can provide decisive results.

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All of this requires institutional support and infrastructure to recruit, train, equip, and sustain forces in the field. Ukraine must also develop the capacity of the country’s defense industry to manufacture, repair, and replace combat systems and to produce the ammunition, spare parts, and other classes of supply that are essential for the war effort.

Building up these capabilities while at war will be difficult, particularly when Russian ballistic and cruise missiles regularly target industrial plants in rear areas. Reform of chaotic bureaucratic practices and increased efficiencies in production and distribution is also needed. Foreign assistance can be helpful here, but internal defense reform must be Ukrainian-led.

The effort to reorganize in the midst of an ongoing war will be wrenching. Nevertheless, it is necessary if Ukraine is to wrest back its national territory. One advantage is the crisis itself. After all, nothing removes obstacles or focuses action quite like an existential threat.

Time and again, Ukraine has shown it can adapt and transform under great pressure and stress. Reorganizing the Ukrainian military is no different. By following this road map, Ukraine can posture for success next year and end the conflict. This will ensure Ukraine’s own survival and will restore peace in Europe.

Other states have attempted to emulate this model, in most cases with untested results outside US coalition efforts. In Iraq, the US military’s attempt to build a drone fleet capable of taking over coalition intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions ended largely in failure. International regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime have historically limited the capabilities that the United States could apply to the war in Iraq, and what could be transferred could never be used effectively. Though early fears of drone diffusion focused on the US model becoming widespread and human targeting becoming more normalized, in practice few nations have adopted the US model for strategic airpower. Instead, most nations practice a more operational-level air-support-to-land operations model, for which a wholly different construct of drone warfare is emerging.

Drones in Ukraine exemplify this second model of air support to ground operations as a deep fight strike asset targeting tank columns, troop formations, and other military assets beyond the reach and visual range of ground forces. This builds on lessons learned from the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where the TB2 and other systems significantly shifted the balance of power in what had, to that point, been an indecisive conflict played out in several acts. Today these drones are increasingly backed by networked systems for resilience and battlefield capabilities, but their targets remain traditional military targets (equipment and formations) rather than precise leadership targets requiring an elaborate find-fix-finish engagement process.

The hider-finder game accelerates

Drones, loitering munitions, and long-range rocket-propelled artillery have proven invaluable in aiding the Ukrainian military in prosecuting the war against the vastly larger Russian military. Ukraine is effectively exploiting the seam between traditional “fast-mover” manned airpower and land-domain assets—slower, lower-altitude and short-range air assets such as helicopters. These weapons are potent operational force multipliers for modern militaries, and even for adaptive small units, from conventional military forces to terrorist entities. This seam is most likely a fleeting opportunity, as Russian counter-unmanned aerial system (UAS) capabilities have expanded and degraded the effectiveness of Ukrainian drones during the conflict.

Innovation, and war, begets counter innovation. This pattern has dominated air warfare from its inception. The bomber will always get through, until it is thwarted by radar and surface-to-air missiles. Stealth beats radar, so concealment and dispersal of targets, increased standoff missile ranges, and exploration of future counter stealth detection offsets fifth-generation advantages. Contrary to some early claims, Ukraine and other recent conflicts continue to demonstrate that the revolutionary potential of many of these technologies has been exaggerated. Rather than a situation where airpower dominates the deep fight, the friction of war at the airland seam has grown, even though the seam itself may be disappearing with new technology.

The fire support coordination line (FSCL) gets blurrier

For much of the Cold War and through the 1991 Gulf War, US soldiers and airmen faced sharp divisions over the meaning and interpretation of the FSCL. For airmen it was a demarcation line dividing areas of operations (AO) between air force targeting and army artillery targeting. The air component-controlled air interdiction and strategic attack, the land component controlled close air support, and the FSCL was the planning line that divided the air and land. For soldiers it merely represented the range of artillery and the limit of their internal fires deconfliction.

To a degree, the US Air Force and Army overcame doctrinal disagreements in the 1990s, with the Army recognizing that “deep battle” is not simply support for the close fight and the Air Force increasing its focus on air interdiction, but soldiers and airmen still retain different attitudes about this doctrinal shift. Many airmen saw the Army yielding to the Air Force vision in the 1990s, with the Air Force solely conceding the line did not explicitly serve as an AO boundary, but rather a measure to “facilitate the expeditious engagement of targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure.” A truce between the Army and Air Force over this issue has lasted largely because US operations since 1991 have largely occurred where only a close fight dynamic was required for counterinsurgency, leaving the Joint Task Force’s fire control element to manage virtually all targeting.

This works in conflicts largely without an FSCL, but in future fights the Air Force’s desire to be the central coordinating agent for the deep fight may reignite the 1990s’ debates. Even in the early transition to large-scale land occupation of Afghanistan in 2002, sharp divisions between the air and land components of the US military over planning and execution were abundant. The growth of multiservice drones, missiles, and rocket-propelled artillery, the historic pressure of ground commanders to extend the FSCL, and Air Force leaders’ contention that they can more efficiently and more economically execute long-range precision-strike missions than other components of the US military, are likely to pose challenges to future operations. A new force-employment model for the deep fight, beyond basic coordination measures between air and land/maritime components—one that accounts for drones, missiles, and rockets that fall in the seam of classic airland operations—should be a priority for Joint Doctrine moving forward.

Recommendations

The US Air Force prides itself in the knowledge that no US soldier has been lost to an enemy air attack since April 15, 1953. But in the era of small, low-altitude drones and increasingly potent standoff missiles and rockets, how relevant might that fact be in the future, and who ultimately bears responsibility for protecting ground forces from such threats? If the war in Ukraine thus far teaches anything, it is that the basic Cold War idea of AirLand Battle was largely correct—an integrated airland, modern system army could thwart a significantly larger nonmodern system for a period of time and set the terms of battle, dramatically slowing the advance and creating a window for reinforcement. The change since the 1980s is primarily the growth of long-range-fires capabilities, as well as the diminished signatures and support infrastructure required for longer-range missiles and tactical aircraft.

The US military and its allies must reimagine their deep-fight capabilities. The US Army today controls surface-to-air missiles, drones below group-five classification—similar in size and capability to the MQ-1 Predator or larger—and long-range fires. The Navy provides similar extended capabilities for the maritime environment. In future combat, the FSCL may well be a thing of the past, replaced by long-range fires and the Joint Fires Cell owning the targeting mission with the Air Operations Center wholly in a supporting air-management role. Embedded airmen training and operating regularly in these forces must be incentivized for airspace control and other related fields. New constructs for battle management moving away from service culture-specific dogmas must guide the planning, acquisitions, and joint doctrine development process. The alternative might be either making the US Army Air Corps great again with a combined anti-aircraft, combat aviation, and drone force under one unified command for the deep battle, or worse—the prospect adversaries will exploit the airland seam and end the US dominance of the close-air fight.

***

Michael P. Kreuzer is the Chair of the Department of International Security at the USAF Air Command and Staff College and a career US Air Force officer. He holds a PhD in Public and International Affairs from Princeton University. All views and opinions are his own and do not represent the US Department of Defense or the US Air Force.

Airpower after Ukraine: The future of air warfare

Airpower experts and practitioners examine interim lessons from the war in Ukraine and consider applications for twenty-first century air and space forces.

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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Air superiority in Ukraine: Be sensitive to Diagoras’s problem

David Pappalardo — Tue, 30 Aug 2022 13:00:00 +0000

In his bestseller, The Black Swan, The Impact of the Highly Improbable, Nasim Nicholas Taleb tells the story of Diagoras, “the Atheist” of Melos, a Greek lyric poet and sophist of the fifth century BC. When shown painted tablets of devotees who had prayed and survived a shipwreck, Diagoras went against the hasty conclusion that prayer had saved them. Instead, he wondered where the portraits were of those who had prayed but had died anyway.

As Western experts puzzle over the air war in Ukraine and its continued surprises, they should remain sensitive to Diagoras’s problem: what observers contemplate does not necessarily reflect what they do not see.

What did military planners see?

Although most observers expected the Russian aerospace forces (VKS) to quickly gain air superiority over Ukraine, the first weeks of the war offered a surprise: The VKS’s performance demonstrated significant limits on its capabilities and operations. As the British researcher Justin Bronk has argued, VKS has shown itself incapable of carrying out complex air operations, starting, first and foremost, with a failed suppression of enemy air-defense (SEAD) mission—a mission yet essential to gain and maintain air superiority.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Air Force (UAF) adopted an air-denial strategy, as Kelly Grieco and Maximilian K. Bremer explain, thanks to the preservation of a “fleet-in being” and harassment tactics. The Ukrainians have relied on well-integrated and highly mobile ground-to-air systems, which have imposed most of the attrition on the VKS. In addition, they developed a flexible and resilient basing strategy to mitigate the effects of Russian strikes. Put differently, the Ukrainians applied mutatis mutandis, the tenets of the American concept of Agile Combat Employment by randomly selecting several airfields of deployment to complicate targeting. Finally, the Ukrainians excelled in the use of drones, embodied mainly (but not exclusively) by the Turkish-made TB2. Ultimately, the UAF has succeeded in preserving a potential force and has stood ready to use it at selected moments to locally deny freedom of maneuver to the VKS through harassment and attrition.

In short, Russia started with substantial numerical and technological advantages in the air domain, but it has since lacked the ability to use those advantages as part of a coherent strategy, adapted to counter Ukraine air-denial strategy and tactics. Yet it would be wrong to conclude that the Ukrainians took the upper hand in the air domain: notwithstanding the attrition suffered, the VKS continues to act from the air wherever they seek to do so, be it on the front line or deep in Ukrainian territory. The Russians have also learned “under fire” and may emerge from this conflict as a more seasoned force, provided they can recover from their war effort.

What did observers not see (or unconsciously ignore)?

Aside from the mythical “ghost-of-Kiev” propaganda, military planners did not contemplate Beyond Visual Range air-to-air missions to sweep the “blue sky,” which is—by the Western standard—one of the prerequisites for any large-scale joint operation in a contested environment, along with SEAD missions. Cognizant of its inferiority, the UAF has indeed rarely sought a direct air-to-air confrontation with the VKS, instead using air-guerrilla tactics.

Yet, it would be a fallacy to conclude that, under the pretext that such combat has not occurred in the “blue sky,” air superiority will only be challenged tomorrow through the means and tactics observed in Ukraine. Diagoras would warn against confirmation and interpretation biases. Indeed, the absence of air-to-air combat missions in Ukraine does not necessarily reflect the challenges of future conflicts between symmetrical powers enjoying air-to-air capabilities and willing to use them. China and Russia both field modern aircraft featuring powerful sensors, datalinks, or electronic warfare systems, and these aircraft are capable of carrying heavy ordinance—very long-range air-to-air missiles. Notably, China has increased its air-to-air capabilities by developing and fielding a BVR missile (namely the PL-15), which allegedly outranges the US-made AIM-120C/D AMRAAM series. Therefore, the level of threat “in the blue sky” posed by these countries is unlikely to disappear. Russia and China will not necessarily play by Ukrainian standards, even if they can learn from them.

What are the initial lessons learned from the air war in Ukraine?

Keeping in mind the need to remain cognizant of Diagoras’s problem, five preliminary lessons can be drawn from the war in Ukraine:

Air superiority can only be local and temporary in a high-intensity conflict, and it will be more costly to achieve. Undoubtedly, the rise of denial strategies, which are now affordable even for regional powers, should be addressed. Those denial postures generally rely on two main dimensions: a defensive one, as epitomized by the various ranges of surface-to-air systems; and an offensive one embodied in the drone, rocket, artillery, and missile threats. These threats place infrastructures essential to the projection of air power constantly at risk. That said, the challenge will persist in the “blue sky,” and Western air forces need to be prepared for it.
To address these vulnerabilities, the Western air forces model must regain quantitative depth. Facing the risk of attrition, the number of “ready-for-combat” aircraft and crews will be decisive. Notably, the war in Ukraine cruelly reminds observers that ammunition consumption is very high in a conflict of this type. However, modern weapons are very expensive, and industries are not organized to keep up with such a high consumption rate to replenish forces. Even the United States faces this issue, as Major General Jason Armagost acknowledged recently, warning, “We don’t want to build an exquisite force that lasts 10 days in combat.”
Loitering munitions and tactical drones have become instrumental in modern conflicts, paving the way for new tactics. However, the real success of the TB2 should not be overestimated. These tactical drones remain vulnerable to the air- and ground-to-air threat, as shown by the thirty or so TB2s destroyed since the start of the war (they are now prevented from flying in the Donbas). In addition, the TB2 has tactical and technical limitations and cannot create the same military effects as a classical fighter (notably in terms of range and payload).
All-domain integration is as much a key factor for operational superiority in a highly contested environment as it is challenging to implement in practice on the battlefield. The Russian failures in Ukraine demonstrate that there is “many a slip ‘twixt the cup and the lips” before achieving actual integration in all domains and that such an ambition remains hampered by complexity, interservice rivalry, or lack of interoperability by design among them. In their effort to achieve all-domain integration, Western allies need to learn these lessons and constantly challenge their expectations.
Conducting a complex air maneuver requires maintaining a high level of training and proficiency for the forces. To date, Western air forces seem to have the upper hand, at least those that succeed in sustaining the right level of readiness, preparedness, and flying hours. They must not lower their guard and should even scale up to be prepared for a more demanding future. Training should also take into account real-world constraints, such as the number of munitions truly available and the “ready-for-combat” aircraft that can be effectively mobilized.

Conclusion

These initial lessons invite Western military planners to reflect on the need to adapt their air force structures, which must reconcile qualitative edge and quantitative depth. Cheaper, lighter, and less exquisite platforms will have to find their place in the force structure to support a new-generation fighter, which will remain essential to face the most demanding missions. The need to build up air and missile defense capabilities is also inescapable. Last, Justin Bronk writes, one “must learn from the failure of the Russian Air Force over Ukraine” and get serious about SEAD.

Ultimately, Western military leaders will need to challenge their initial assessment of the war in Ukraine, collectively and permanently, keeping the Diagoras problem in mind, so they do not prepare for the war they see today, but rather for the one they anticipate tomorrow.

***

David Pappalardo is a French officer currently serving as the air and space attaché in Washington, DC. He graduated from the French Air Force Academy and is a distinguished graduate of the US Air Command and Staff College.

Author’s note: This short essay is adapted from an article published in French at Le Rubicon. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Ministère Des Armées, or the French Government.

Airpower after Ukraine: The future of air warfare

Airpower experts and practitioners examine interim lessons from the war in Ukraine and consider applications for twenty-first century air and space forces.

The post Air superiority in Ukraine: Be sensitive to Diagoras’s problem appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Will robotized fire power replace manned air power?

Peter Wilson — Tue, 30 Aug 2022 13:00:00 +0000

Russia’s war in Ukraine entered the summer of 2022 with no clear military victor in sight. What began as a war of expected bold Russian maneuvers coupled with a paralyzing aerospace and cyber campaign has degenerated into a massive tube-and-rocket-artillery duel, a World War I-style battle of attrition on a battlefield largely confined to the eastern Donbas region and along the Ukrainian border north and west of Crimea.

Although it is important to exercise caution in drawing any major conclusions, some powerful signs about the future of warfare can be derived from this conflict.

Emergent robotized deep-strike operations

At the strategic and operational levels of war, the Russian aerospace campaign points to an ongoing trend toward the increased robotization of deep-strike systems. The extensive use of long-range precision-guided cruise and ballistic missiles gave Russia the ability to strike a wide range of high-value targets without the use of a fleet of Russian manned combat aircraft. In fact, the Russian strategic bomber fleet acted as a standoff launch platform for long-range cruise missile and occasional hypersonic weapons. Noteworthy is the extensive use of ground- and sea-launched long-range cruise missiles, as well as the launching of precision-guided short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to strike high-value targets.

This development is not unprecedented: The Islamic Republic of Iran used similar systems during the late summer of 2019 and conducted a precision SRBM bombardment of a US airfield in Iraq during January 2020. Meanwhile, the US Navy and Air Force have extensively leveraged long-range land attack cruise missiles (LACMs). This began with the NATO aerial campaign against Serbia in 1995. Now the diffusion of this robotized deep-strike capability has spread to major military actors in Eurasia and its periphery.

The development of next-generation long-range strike systems by the United States, China, and Russia—to include the rocket-propelled boost glide vehicle (BGV) and the hypersonic cruise missile (HCM)—demonstrates a far more damaging and sustained nonnuclear bombardment campaign.

Battlefield fires superiority vice air superiority

The character of the Russo-Ukrainian battlefield has revealed several interesting features. First, the mass diffusion of tactical anti-armor and anti-aircraft munitions has imposed very high attrition against ground and air forces that were not protected by a wide range of individual and collective countermeasures. This diffusion of guided anti-aircraft weapons had denied the Russian Aerospace Force the opportunity to gain operational and tactical air superiority over the battlefield.

Second, the war has witnessed the full operational emergence of Ukrainian and Russian reconnaissance fire complexes—the closed-looped systems that couple robotic aerial surveillance systems with tube and rocket artillery—which can use precision-guided munitions (PGMs). These new-generation artillery systems are now complemented by the employment of increasingly large numbers of loitering munitions that can simultaneously provide infantry with over-the-hill intelligence and a quick direct-strike capability. A further hint of this new feature of twenty-first century combined-arms warfare was the successful use of these systems by the Azerbaijani armed forces during their short 2020 war against the heavily entrenched and armored Armenian forces. This refined indirect fire system has largely replaced the use of combat aircraft armed with PGMs to provide close and direct air support to ground forces—a shift prompted by the presence of proliferated, mobile, and internetted air defense systems.

The Russo-Ukrainian war may answer the question of whether the employment of guided munitions and robotic fighting vehicles has returned disproportionate power to the tactical defense (not unlike the military circumstance the European armies faced in the summer of 1914). The tactical offensive must be reconstituted to respond to a battlefield wherein the main battle tank and its supporting cast of armored fighting vehicles are vulnerable to rapid discovery and destruction by robotic systems.

The answer might be revealed during the current Russo-Ukrainian war. This late summer, the Ukrainians could gain fire superiority over a very badly attritted Russian combined arms force—not unlike the Israeli defeat of the Egyptian Army in the Sinai during the Six Day War of 1967—thereby demonstrating that traditional armored forces have a major role in the future of combined arms operations. The design of future armored fighting vehicles could be radically altered with the widespread use of unmanned fighting vehicles to precede and compliment the offensive use of their larger and much more expensive manned systems. This concept is being vigorously explored by air forces in the form of developing increasingly autonomous combat aircraft to act as “loyal wingmen” for the piloted combat aircraft.

The Russian long-range missile bombardment campaign has been severely limited by its rather small prewar inventory and lack of industrial capacity to mass produce these weapons quickly. Overall, the Russian strategic bombardment campaign has not been decisive. On the other hand, NATO and the great powers of Asia will take note of the extreme vulnerability of their critical infrastructure to long-range PGM strikes. One of the pressing defense policy questions is how NATO and Washington’s Asian allies should respond to this clear and present danger. To make critical infrastructure resilient to precision bombardment, for example, the United States and its allies and partners should consider putting a portion of their military industrial production capacity, especially robotized instruments of war, underground to complement any major investment in homeland aerospace defense systems.

***

Peter A. Wilson is an adjunct senior national security researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and teaches courses on national security policy and the history of military technological innovation at the Osher Lifelong Learning Institute.

Airpower after Ukraine: The future of air warfare

Airpower experts and practitioners examine interim lessons from the war in Ukraine and consider applications for twenty-first century air and space forces.

The post Will robotized fire power replace manned air power? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine air war examined: A glimpse at the future of air warfare

Tyson Wetzel — Tue, 30 Aug 2022 13:00:00 +0000

Early on the morning of February 24, 2022, Russian forces streamed over the Russian and Belorussian border into Ukraine, initiating a large-scale invasion. Predictions in the West were dire; Russian forces could take the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv within days, perhaps forcing a Ukrainian capitulation in less than a week. Those predictions proved wildly off-base. Ukrainian forces fought bravely and effectively; Russia failed to establish air superiority, capture Kyiv, or take any major cities in northern Ukraine; and the Donbas campaign is locked in a virtual stalemate. Despite estimates that Russia would establish air superiority within seventy-two hours, Russian forces have failed to control the skies, and have suffered huge aircraft losses that have hindered their air support for the ground invasion.

This paper will examine the first six months of the air war, focusing on three main areas. First, it will evaluate both Ukrainian success and Russian failures, deriving initial lessons learned from the air campaign. Second, the paper will describe the changing character of air and space warfare—how a democratization of air, space, and intelligence capabilities via commercial and dual-use assets will allow adversaries to contest air and space control. Finally, the paper will provide actionable recommendations for the air and space forces of the United States and its allies and partners, to help ensure they are prepared to dominate air and space campaigns in the future.

Learning lessons from Russian failures and Ukrainian successes

The United States and its allies and partners need to be sure they do not dismiss the Ukraine air war simply as an example of Russian ineptitude, but instead examine Ukrainian successes and Russian tactical improvements over the course of the war and modify their warfighting concepts, doctrine, tactics, and training. Russia deployed an impressive air and air-defense force to the region prior to the invasion, including hundreds of advanced fighters, fighter-bombers, and attack aircraft, as well as modern short-, medium-, and long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Russia also employed long-range aviation bombers launching cruise missiles, and special mission aircraft designed to provide airborne command and control (C2) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Ukraine countered this impressive fleet with a small and aging force of fourth-generation fighters, and legacy but capable short- and medium-range SAMs. On paper, Russia held clear quantitative and qualitative advantages over the Ukraine Air Force.

Despite Russia’s clear advantages in both force size and capability, Russian forces failed to establish air superiority for a multitude of reasons. First, their initial strikes on February 24 were largely ineffective in landing an immediate knockout blow. The air and missile strikes were distributed across the country, preventing the concentration of effects, and those effects were not targeted against critical C2 nodes. Consequently, Ukrainian air and air-defense capabilities were not prohibited from conducting defensive operations. Second, Russia’s non-kinetic effects had limited impact and were poorly integrated with the kinetic strikes. Cyberattacks and electronic warfare, including counter-space attacks, were observed in the initial offensive, but their effects were severely limited. Third, Russia’s suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) plan was wholly inadequate. Russian air and missile strikes did not effectively target Ukraine’s integrated air-defense system (IADS). They failed to destroy mobile SAMs, and their targeting of Ukrainian military airfields was largely ineffective, as they did not crater runways nor destroy nearly enough combat aircraft on the ground to prevent effective Ukrainian defense. Fourth, Russian forces failed to integrate tactical or battlefield intelligence; they did not appear to know where high-value targets were, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, mobile SAMs, critical IADS nodes, and Ukrainian military command posts. Finally, Russia appeared to have no plan for countering Ukrainian uncrewed aerial systems (UASs) and drones, and those systems took a devastating toll on Russian ground forces. The air campaign appeared to have no overarching concept or unifying theme: Russian forces were unable to decapitate Ukrainian leadership, or blind and/or paralyze Ukrainian IADS. As such, Ukrainian air defenses were operating at or near full capability, and they were able to institute huge aircraft losses from the first day of the conflict.

The United States and its coalition partners have proven their ability to execute a devastating air campaign over the last thirty years, and to avoid many of the mistakes Russia has made. There are areas, however, in which the United States can and should learn from Ukraine’s heroic defense and Russia’s historically inept performance. First, the United States needs to put special focus on the finding and destroying of mobile air-defense systems. Ukraine’s mobile SAMs have moved frequently, and Russia has failed to eliminate them from the battlefield, even six months into the conflict. This subset of SEAD, finding and killing mobile SAMs—especially those with advanced, long-range capability—must be a focus of airpower doctrine, tactics, and training for the United States and its allies and partners. Second, even the United States and its closest allies have struggled to adequately integrate cyber effects into operational planning and tactical execution, instead keeping those capabilities as strategic or national-level weapons. The United States and its allies must overcome security hurdles and find a way to bring cyber effects to the warfighter—in this case, integrated into a tactical air campaign. Third, the United States and its allies and partners must examine the counter-UAS mission that will be discussed extensively below, and develop unique weapons, doctrine, tactics, and training tailored specifically to defeating small UASs and drones.

Preparing for the changing character of air and space warfare

Although the primary mission of air and space forces remains the same—to gain control of the skies and space, or air and space superiority—the character of air and space warfare is rapidly evolving. The primary driver of this change is the democratization of airpower and spacepower that will allow many nations to field potent air and space capabilities, potentially countering a numerically superior force in those domains. The barriers to fielding potent air, space, and intelligence capabilities are decreasing rapidly, and many nations—or even non-state entities—can procure and deploy large fleets of small, low-cost, expendable UASs and drones, making establishing air control extremely difficult and costly. Similarly, the space domain can also be contested through the use of commercial space assets and functions, which are rapidly becoming more affordable. Finally, robust intelligence capabilities can be developed with little investment in exquisite collection capabilities, instead relying on commercial imagery and open-source intelligence. A savvy adversary can contest air and space superiority via a thoughtful investment in critical air, space, and intelligence assets and capabilities.

The democratization of airpower

Air superiority is likely to be more difficult to achieve in future conflicts than in the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency fights of the early twenty-first century for two major reasons. First, the proliferation of mobile, advanced SAMs will increase the risk to air forces seeking to establish air control. The second reason, which will be the focus of this section, is the explosion of small commercial- and military-grade drones on aerial battlefields. The fight for control of the air will not only include dueling fighter jets, but the hunt for these small, low-cost, and expendable systems. Additionally, these systems can, and will, likely be armed to provide a relatively low-cost precision-strike capability, previously only available to the world’s largest and most advanced air forces. A resource-constrained air force can contest air superiority through the procurement and utilization of large fleets of these systems. The United States and its coalition air forces will need to allocate significant resources to find and destroy these systems.

The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), UASs, and drones is not new; the United States began using UAVs in large numbers as early as Operation Desert Storm in 1991. The MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper were symbols of air operations in the post-9/11 air campaigns. Similarly, the Turkish-built TB2 Bayraktar—which, like the MQ-1 and MQ-9, has potent ISR and strike capabilities—has become the most visible symbol of the Ukraine air war. Additionally, Ukraine received and quickly employed so-called “suicide drones,” such as the US-built Switchblade-300 and Phoenix Ghost, which were observed destroying Russian targets with their small onboard payloads. Ukraine’s success, at least initially, with these systems has led to questions about the future use of UASs in conflict. The Ukraine air war may be providing a glimpse into the future of air operations conducted almost exclusively remotely.

Whereas the counterterrorism conflicts of the early twenty-first century showed the efficacy of ISR and strike UAVs, the Ukraine air war has shown the promise of smaller, relatively cheap, abundant, and expendable UASs and drones. Small, expendable systems, deployed en masse, can have a decisive impact on the battlefield—identifying, disrupting, and even destroying large, armored columns; interdicting resupply convoys; and destroying critical or high-value targets. Large formations of UASs and/or drones will be extremely difficult to defend against in the future, requiring the use of sophisticated electronic-warfare tools, the expenditure of large numbers of expensive air-to-air or surface-to-air missiles, the deployment of directed-energy or high-powered microwave weapons, or some combination of all three categories of weapons. Future air-superiority fights may be defined by the more advanced military struggling to effectively and efficiently allocate resources to the counter-UAS mission, even at the expense of traditional air superiority missions of counter-air and SEAD.

The democratization of spacepower

As with the democratization of airpower capabilities, the shift toward more affordable space-based capabilities will expand the number of nations capable of operating in and contesting control of the space domain. The cost to develop a space program and put satellites into orbit used to be cost prohibitive for all but the wealthiest of nations. This is no longer the case, as evidenced by Ukraine’s use of commercial satellite imagery and satellite communications in this conflict. The rapidly declining cost of spacelift will give more nations the ability to build redundant satellite constellations that will enable critical components of warfighting.

The clearest example of the democratization of space capabilities in the Russia-Ukraine war has been Ukraine’s use of SpaceX’s Starlink services for satellite communications. Immediately prior to launching its ground invasion, Russia hacked Viasat, which Ukraine relied upon for its satellite communications. Two days later, Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation of Ukraine Mykhailo Fedorov asked Elon Musk via Twitter to provide Starlink equipment and services to Ukraine. Musk and SpaceX did just that, sending equipment to Ukraine and allowing it access to Starlink’s massive constellation of more than seven thousand satellites. Despite Russian efforts to jam the signal, Starlink provided Ukrainian forces with secure, redundant, and resilient communications that they have used to control UASs, target artillery strikes, and conduct a host of other military functions.
The Starlink example shows the power of industry in providing high-end, space-based capabilities, but also how nations will use relatively low-cost commercial space companies and capabilities to execute space-based warfighting missions. Ukraine was a unique case, and it is unlikely SpaceX would provide these types of services to an adversary of the United States free of charge. Nonetheless, this example gives a glimpse of how nations—potentially US adversaries or competitors—may take advantage of the changing economics of space operations and use commercial capabilities to execute and support wartime missions. In addition to satellite communications, a host of imagery, weather, and other space-based services are commercially available, and may be employed by the United States’ next adversary. Space will be a contested domain in future conflicts, with multiple combatants able to both operate in and counter their adversaries’ space operations. Space superiority is no longer guaranteed to the United States, its allies, and partners.

The democratization of intelligence

Building a potent intelligence apparatus is an extremely costly venture, usually made cost-prohibitive by the reliance on exquisite, yet extremely expensive, intelligence-collection systems and capabilities. The Ukraine air war, however, has shown that timely and accurate intelligence can be gathered through commercial and publicly available information. Both the buildup to Russia’s invasion and the war itself have shown that the “democratization” of intelligence via open-source intelligence (OSINT) and commercial satellite constellations is here. As with inexpensive UASs and drones, an under-resourced nation can develop a comprehensive and accurate picture of the battlespace through the use of OSINT and commercially available sources, at a fraction of the cost the United States and its friends invest for such a capability.

OSINT is not new, but its use in the Russia-Ukraine war easily surpassed what was seen in any previous conflict. As Russia began a massive military buildup along its border with Ukraine, Internet OSINT analysts were able to use commercial imagery and hand-held photographs and videos to show the buildup of forces and accurately predict the coming Russian invasion of Ukraine. On the first night of the conflict, one of the clear indicators of a coming invasion was traffic apps showing heavy traffic moving south from Bolgorod, Russia, into Ukraine in the early morning hours of February 24—clearly the invasion force moving to initiate its offensive. Throughout the conflict, battle-damage assessment, a mission that even the United States has struggled with mightily, was conducted via OSINT. Oryx, an Internet OSINT analyst, used confirmed and geolocated imagery and hand-held media to confirm the losses of Russian and Ukrainian military equipment, and provided a much more accurate picture of the war’s progress than the overinflated numbers being distributed by the Russian and Ukrainian Ministries of Defense, respectively.

The implication of this democratization of intelligence is stark; nearly any military force can develop a fairly comprehensive and accurate picture of the battlespace through the use of OSINT and the relatively low-cost procurement of commercial-satellite intelligence sources. The most pressing question for intelligence analysts is no longer how they will acquire intelligence sources to observe the adversary, but how to accurately correlate, fuse, and analyze that overwhelming amount of data and correctly analyze the actions taken by the adversary. The United States has traditionally relied on exquisite, but high-cost collection means and only used OSINT to augment the high-end capabilities. The United States and its allies and partners should learn from the conflict and shift their mindsets toward relying extensively on OSINT, and using the exquisite but expensive capabilities to augment publicly available information. A corollary to the democratization of intelligence is the increased emphasis on being able to deny the adversary the ability to accurately assess activity. Deception in war, vitally important since the days of Sun Tzu, will be even more important in the future, and should be a major focus for the United States and its allies and partners.

The democratization of air, space, and intelligence capabilities is not only a threat to the air superiority to which the United States and its allies and partners are accustomed, but also presents opportunities. The United States and its friends can, and should, embrace this trend and recapitalize their air and space forces to provide more capacity at less cost. Lower-cost systems such as UASs, drones, and commercial small satellites, should not replace high-end systems and capabilities such as the F-35 and B-21, but can augment those systems in a high/low mix of capabilities that will provide quantitative and qualitative superiority that should maintain the level of air superiority the United States and its allies and partners have come to expect since 1991.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Though the outcome of the war still hangs in the balance, there is already much to be learned by examining the progress of the air war thus far. The United States and its allies and partners need to use lessons from Russia’s botched air campaign, and they must modify their equipment, doctrine, tactics, and training to account for the democratization of air and space power, which may fundamentally change the character of air and space warfare. By more accurately predicting the future course of aerial combat and designing the force and capabilities to dominate the air and space campaigns of the future, the United States and its friends will be better postured than their strategic competitors to prevail in future high-intensity conflict.

***

Lt Col Tyson Wetzel, USAF is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Wetzel is the deputy director for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) for 7^th Air Force at Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea.

Airpower after Ukraine: The future of air warfare

Airpower experts and practitioners examine interim lessons from the war in Ukraine and consider applications for twenty-first century air and space forces.

The post Ukraine air war examined: A glimpse at the future of air warfare appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The role of electronic warfare, cyber, and space capabilities in the air littoral

Zachary Kallenborn — Tue, 30 Aug 2022 13:00:00 +0000

Air Force Colonel Gene Cirillo once said, “the US Army will never control the ground under the sky, if the US Air Force does not control the sky over the ground.” The Russia-Ukraine conflict shows that such control may no longer be possible. Months into the conflict, both sides continue to throw drones, loitering munitions (munitions that loiter around a target area then strike), and missiles into the sky to no avail. This contest between offensive weapons and countermeasures has given rise to a new focus on the air littoral, the airspace between ground forces and high-altitude fighters and bombers. The air littoral has been critical in the war as a space for conducting strikes, collecting intelligence to guide artillery strikes, and collecting and disseminating propaganda.

In contesting and realizing the larger effects of the air littoral, information warfare plays a critical role through attacking and defending command-and-control links, communications channels, the computers controlling air-littoral weapons, and the space-based services the weapons depend upon. According to the Congressional Research Service, “information warfare” has no official definition, but it is essentially “the use and management of information to pursue competitive advantage, including offensive and defensive operations.” For the air-littoral fight, electronic, cyber, and space warfare are critical to successful information operations. A competitor that is able to leverage electronic warfare, cyber, and space will gain an advantage in littoral airspace.

Countermeasures in the air littoral

Electronic warfare (EW): EW—which intercepts, jams, or disrupts signals through use of the electromagnetic spectrum or directed energy—is commonly used to target drones and, to an extent, loitering munitions. Jammers, which comprise 72 percent of counter-drone systems, sever the link between the drone and the operator or the global positioning system (GPS) signals that the drone relies on for navigation. Numerous other countermeasures fall under the broad definition of information warfare, including spoofing and dazzling, as well as employing lasers and high-powered microwaves. Microwave weapons like the US Air Force’s THOR hold particular promise: Aside from being low cost-per-shot, they also have the ability to hit many targets at once by emitting microwave radiation over a wide area. This capability should make them effective at countering future drone swarms. Likewise, Russia claims to have fielded a new laser weapon for downing drones, which offers the same low cost-per-shot ability. Although it is far from clear that jamming missiles is likely to have a big effect, missiles depend on a sensor-shooter relationship, which is vulnerable to jamming. Decoys could deceive those sensors, jammers might sever communication links between sensors and shooters, and artificial intelligence (AI)-created deepfakes could encourage missiles to fire on empty fields.

Cyberattacks: Drones and loitering munitions are essentially flying computers, thus they are vulnerable to cyberattacks. Such attacks could break links from controller and platform, code might be altered to cause screwups, or nefarious code could be injected to cause friendly drones to blow up friendly units or allow an adversary to control the drone entirely. The fact that Ukraine and Russia employ commercial drones make such attacks easier to implement because both sides can acquire their own versions of the commercial drone and analyze the code in flight controllers, motor controllers, and other critical systems for weaknesses. Moreover, cyberattacks on missiles are difficult but not impossible to achieve. Such attacks can target missile designs, alter software and hardware, or damage command-and-control systems.

Of course, whether (and how) cyberattacks can be launched on drones and loitering munitions during an active war is an open question. Finding an exploitable vulnerability in highly complex, well-guarded weapons code can be time-consuming; fifth-generation aircraft can have millions of lines of code. Likewise, launching an attack requires various support activities, such as identifying and developing mechanisms to exploit vulnerabilities, building specialized malware, and providing operational management and command and control during the attack. All this incurs opportunity costs: If an adversary’s systems can be manipulated, disrupted, or just blown up, why bother with cyberattacks when conventional attacks can be executed much faster? Plus, what if defenders have strong allies helping them to guard cyberspace?

Space warfare: Satellites provide air-littoral weapons with position, navigation, and timing support, as well as longer-range command and control. Drones and loitering munitions often depend on GPS coordinates for navigation and strike. Jamming GPS signals could prevent accurate targeting, while spoofing GPS signals might cause the weapons to blow up in an empty field. A clever adversary could spoof a GPS signal so that a friendly military base is at a target location’s GPS coordinates. Missiles’ GPS links could also be spoofed or jammed, but doing so is tough. Missiles also have other, non-GPS-based guidance systems, thus the end result is mostly degrading accuracy—relevant to precise, single strikes, but not necessarily applicable to hitting large targets such as airfields or concentrated forces. More broadly, attacks on satellite systems providing communication and navigation links could inhibit air-littoral munitions over a broad area along with any other space-dependent systems.

Drone developments in response

Drone and loitering-munitions technology is evolving, too, shifting—but not eliminating—information vulnerabilities. Drones are becoming increasingly autonomous. The TB2, for example, can take off, cruise, and land without human control. Likewise, Russia is seemingly using the Lancet-3 loitering munition in Ukraine, which is reportedly capable of autonomous target selection and engagement. If these systems do not require human input or GPS, then jammers are far less effective. Still, jammers are not necessarily irrelevant: new, jammable communications might be needed as drones integrate into larger swarms. Likewise, increased autonomy could create new information vulnerabilities: AI systems can be tricked, AI training data poisoned, and more complex computer systems mean more opportunities to cause harm and potentially new points of entry for a cyberattack (a larger digital “attack surface”). Plus, if autonomous features in the weapon system rely on GPS signals, the system is more vulnerable to GPS jamming or spoofing, as well as to cyber or physical attacks on GPS infrastructures.

The evolution of drones, loitering munitions, and countermeasures will affect the tactics and strategies needed to contest enemies in the air littoral. Jammers are often small, handheld devices, allowing them to be shared and used broadly by even dismounted infantry in austere terrain. In contrast, microwaves and laser weapons are often relatively big, bulky, and vehicle-mounted. Finding, fixing, and engaging such a vehicle is probably much easier than finding, fixing, and engaging a large number of small, dispersed soldiers. Plus, the vehicles are likely much more expensive than a handheld system; thus there will most likely be fewer of them, allowing the systems to be more readily tracked and either avoided or defeated. This dimension plays into how to fight in the air littoral: Should countermeasures be targeted and destroyed, or should countermeasures be monitored and avoided?

Readying the force

The biggest takeaway for the United States and allied nations is the need to integrate information warfare, air-littoral capabilities, and capabilities on both sides of the littoral (ground and air; or surface and air) to achieve the desired effects. Achieving this requires information sharing; mutual understanding about what each component can and cannot do; as well as established processes or methods for integration, training, and exercises to practice, and doctrine to formalize best practices and concepts. Formal efforts, such as a new NATO Centre of Excellence on the air littoral could explore these issues in greater detail. The United States and its allies should also launch a formal effort, such as a congressional commission, on information warfare. Such a commission could look broadly across the military services and the broad national community to identify and plug information warfare capability, organizational, and policy gaps. For example, the commission could identify opportunities to create new organizations bringing together the elements of information warfare or make big new investments in electronic warfare. New thought is needed to succeed in a new area of competition.

***

Zachary Kallenborn is a Policy Fellow at the Schar School of Policy and Government, a Research Affiliate with the Unconventional Weapons and Technology Division of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), an officially proclaimed US Army “Mad Scientist,” and a national security consultant.

Airpower after Ukraine: The future of air warfare

Airpower experts and practitioners examine interim lessons from the war in Ukraine and consider applications for twenty-first century air and space forces.

The post The role of electronic warfare, cyber, and space capabilities in the air littoral appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The TB2: The value of a cheap and “good enough” drone

Aaron Stein — Tue, 30 Aug 2022 13:00:00 +0000

The war in Ukraine has raised questions about the role of airpower in modern conflict and, specifically, whether cheap, attritable platforms can have game-changing effects on the battlefield. The Turkish Bayraktar TB2 has emerged as one of the most well-known drones in the world, after videos from its sensors have been spliced and uploaded to a bevy of social media platforms. The TB2 is an effective, low-cost platform that can be produced with commercial, off-the-shelf parts, which drives down cost and makes maintenance affordable for many countries. The drone is not some magic weapon and is susceptible to air and ground defenses, but its approximate export cost of $5 million makes it a valuable tactical weapon for the modern battlefield.

The drone is roughly equivalent to the American-made MQ-1B, the workhorse unmanned aerial vehicle in the two-decade long war on terrorism. Moreover, the TB2 is effective at striking targets in areas with a small number of air defenses and for spotting targets for artillery and standoff strikes from manned fighters. Viral videos of the TB2 are a perfect example of modern warfare in the TikTok era. That said, the TB2 has a mixed track record against Russian air defense systems, sparking a vigorous debate among military analysts about whether the TB2 represents the future of warfare, or is an overhyped product that has benefited from a savvy and slick public relations campaign.

The challenge in evaluating the TB2 stems from what scholars refer to as the “dependent variable problem,” wherein the drone’s success is derived from edited videos, purposefully released, showing successful strikes on Russian-origin equipment. The TB2, therefore, is deemed revolutionary because the videos that have been released only show successful strikes. In reality, the TB2 is vulnerable to Russian air defenses, as the wars in Libya and Syria have shown, and indirect evidence in Ukraine also suggests.

Survivability

Nonetheless, focusing solely on the drone’s survivability on a modern battlefield misses the point about its true value. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that TB2 operators can absorb high rates of attrition, but they can quickly replenish stockpiles of the drone to keep aircraft in the air. These aircraft can then be used to augment Ukrainian capabilities for certain missions and continue to pressure Russian forces (without risking the lives of Ukrainian pilots). The drone’s commercial components and low cost of production makes this possible: The TB2 is so inexpensive that an operator can suffer high rates of drone attrition and keep on fighting with models that roll off the assembly line.

At this stage of the conflict, and with the information available to outside analysts, it would be unwise to make any definitive, broad-sweeping conclusions about the future of airpower. However, the TB2’s performance across conflicts in Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and now in Ukraine allow for some basic conclusions. Owing to the TB2’s slow speed, the design of certain Russian radars, and when the drone is flown by savvy operators, it can sometimes avoid detection from Russian ground-based radar. This evasion allows the TB2 to penetrate lightly defended airspace and to strike surface-to-air launchers and radars. In aggregate, the losses of TB2s to ground-based missiles are mitigated because the drone has a favorable rate of exchange, especially compared to more modern air-defense weapons tasked to kill it.

Tactics

TB2s can also be flown in ways that confuse fighters devoted to shooting them down. In Ukraine, according to interviews with people familiar with the air picture, Ukrainian TB2 operators would fly at less than one thousand feet, in order to get lost in the ground clutter and hide from patrolling fighters. In areas where Russian ground forces and accompanying ground-based surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) were thinly dispersed, the TB2 would use terrain to hide from longer-range acquisitions radar and then pop up and strike targets of convenience. In areas where Russian defenses have been built up, the TB2 would fly out of range of Russian missiles and then support artillery strikes or scout for Ukrainian ground forces using its powerful optics to see far out on the battlefield. In certain instances, the TB2 could then be used to lure Russian fighters tasked with destroying them into the weapon-engagement zone of ground-based missiles, according to author interviews with American officials.

A mission-specific weapon

As the war has progressed, the TB2’s ability to operate in lightly defended airspace has decreased, as the war has shifted from Russia’s early operation, and Moscow has deployed heavier concentrations of low- and high-altitude radars and associated missiles. In the first few weeks of the war, Russian military officers chose to fight on multiple different axes, with lightly supported units. The TB2 feasted on this chaotic war plan. As Russia has recalibrated, shortened supply lines, and focused on Donetsk and Luhansk, the lack of propaganda videos released by Ukraine suggests that the TB2’s role has become more limited, perhaps it only serves as a scout for Ukrainian ground forces or to strike naval targets of opportunity in lightly defended airspace.

The challenge inherent in analyzing the TB2’s overall effectiveness is that the only available data for outside analysts is released by the Ukrainians themselves. Nonetheless, looking beyond the tactical vignettes, one lesson is to internalize how attrition would impact the US joint force. The TB2 is well suited for a war of attrition because it is inexpensive and, despite high rates of attrition in the conflicts where Russian SAMs are deployed, its producers have been able to rapidly make more, and Ukraine has been able to procure more to continue combat operations. This type of system, which is “good enough” for niche roles, has inherent value and packs a punch when an adversary gets lazy or makes a mistake. Thus, there does appear to be some value in producing commercially derived systems, or something equivalent, that can be rapidly fielded and used by ground forces. The concept appears similar to what the Marine Corps is currently experimenting with as part of the Force Design 2030 planning document. A cheap, mission-specific drone like the TB2 could be leveraged by smaller groups of soldiers for a bevy of missions, ranging from surveillance to strike, and could be used in nonpermissive areas to support evolving concepts to challenge great-power adversaries.

The TB2 is not a game-changer, nor does it represent some revolution of military affairs. It does, however, show how a well-built, commercially derived product can sustain attrition and keep on fighting. Such a capability is invaluable for all wars.

***

Aaron Stein is the chief content officer at Metamorphic Media and the author of The US War Against ISIS: How America and its Allies Defeated the Caliphate.

Airpower after Ukraine: The future of air warfare

Airpower experts and practitioners examine interim lessons from the war in Ukraine and consider applications for twenty-first century air and space forces.

The post The TB2: The value of a cheap and “good enough” drone appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Ukraine war and its impact on Russian development of autonomous weapons

Samuel Bendett — Tue, 30 Aug 2022 13:00:00 +0000

Today’s discussion of Russian military drone and robotics capabilities—the use of unmanned and autonomous aerial, ground, and maritime systems—is generally conducted against the backdrop of such technologies’ performance in the Russia-Ukraine war. The pre-February 2022 discussions and deliberations across the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD), its affiliated research and development institutions, and academies generally point to a common theme: such systems are supposed to safeguard soldiers’ lives and make military missions more effective. This reasoning led the Russian military to conceptualize the use of loitering munitions and aerial swarms, long-range combat and “loyal wingmen” drones that can operate autonomously, small aerial drones that can be launched from both piloted and uncrewed platforms, and other systems that target and overwhelm adversary weapons and defenses.

The Russian military and the country’s defense industry are also considering other concepts for Russia’s envisioned high-tech warfare—unmanned and autonomous ground vehicle (UGVs) that work together with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as well as numerous uncrewed maritime systems that work with ships and with other manned and unmanned assets. These research and development efforts paint a picture of a military seeking to combine legacy and modern systems in a networked environment, where artificial intelligence is not intended to replace humans just yet, but to make a human operator’s job more effective. Overall, the MOD envisioned this technology operating autonomously, where adversary tactics aim to negate the advantage and capabilities of such systems. The MOD’s plan to get to that point was and still is contingent on multiple factors, such as favorable economic-industrial conditions, continuous growth and development of domestic high-tech ecosystems, and a human-centric military that will be amenable to the introduction of such advanced technology in existing formations.

The war in Ukraine and Russia’s response

Despite Russia’s plans, the reality of the battlefield often defies expectations, rewrites assumptions, or reveals significant technological gaps in the preconceived notions of specific systems’ place in war and in combined arms operations. The above-mentioned robotic technologies, assuming they are fielded eventually, work well if they are integrated into existing formations over time, and with a good understating of an adversary’s countermeasures and capabilities.

Right up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Russian MOD maintained a relatively sizeable UAV fleet, with years-long technology training and integration into the force structure. Nonetheless, in February and March 2022, the Russian military seemed unable to meet its combat objectives as articulated by its leadership and government. The notable absence of aerial drones early on in the war raised questions about Russia’s ability to integrate modern high-tech equipment and lessons learned into an ongoing military operation. By July 2022, the Russian military improved its capabilities and started using relatively short-range, remote-controlled UAVs and UGVs, along with very few longer-ranged unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). The initial Russian inability to field large numbers of UCAVs and loitering munitions to target Ukrainian forces underscored a significant gap in the MOD’s force structure, even after years of reviewing the impact of this technology in recent conflicts. The question of the centrality of human soldiers to Russia’s current military operation will be debated long after this war concludes, given the MOD’s continued emphasis on sending soldiers on missions and operations that have ultimately resulted in heavy casualties.

Despite the MOD’s seemingly clear understanding of the advantages that autonomous and unmanned systems bring to the warfighter, significant tactical, on-the-ground gaps in this war are filled by crowdsourced and volunteer efforts, such as the continued delivery of civilian DJI Mavic drones to frontline Russian troops. Such remote-controlled systems are providing key data and intelligence for subsequent, follow-on attacks. These gaps taken together expose a much deeper need to reconcile current combat reality with a more realistic assessment of the technologies the Russian military actually needs today, rather than in the distant automation-enabled future.

At this point in the Ukraine war, the remote-piloted UAVs are widespread and pivotal to successful tactical operations. Russia’s relatively unsophisticated military drones and commercial short-range UAVs provide essential round-the-clock intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities for long-range artillery, as well as mortar and missile batteries. The MOD’s incremental use of Uran-6 and Prohod-1 demining UGVs is indicative of a military that wants to implement systems that replace dangerous human work, but at this point, Russian combat engineers still conduct the bulk of this work on foot. Combat UGVs will probably be slower to implement in this war, considering command, control and communications issues inherent in complex environments like Ukraine. The fielding of maritime autonomy would also depend on Russia’s understanding of where such a capability can be better used, given Ukraine’s targeting of Russian maritime assets in the Black Sea with its own heavy UAVs, as well as the impending acquisition of unmanned surface vessels by the Ukrainian military.

Lessons learned?

Going forward, as the Russian MOD ecosystem incorporates the lessons from this war, the current application of unmanned technology in Ukraine might lead to the discussion and mass-scale acquisition of combat UAVs, eventual use of swarms and groups that combine multiple UAV types, and the deployment of loitering munitions in sufficient numbers to degrade adversary defenses (especially with Iranian assistance). Still, sophisticated technology like military robotics does not by itself win wars. For all the praise such systems reaped from the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, with Azerbaijani drone and loitering munitions devastating Armenian defenses, the infantry bore the brunt of the fighting. This key lesson might drive Moscow to acquire a large number of Iranian drones, which presumably might include loitering munitions to strike Ukrainian high-value targets like HIMARS artillery systems. Any future Russian attempts at developing and integrating sophisticated technology such as combat UAVs or UGVs, loitering munitions, self-directing swarms, and UAV-UGV teams will require lengthy testing and evaluation periods. This is necessary for the manufacturers to work out the issues and problems, for end users to understand and familiarize themselves with new technologies, and for the command structure to develop new tactics and concepts that incorporate these new systems into the combined fighting force.

Prior to February 2022, the Russian military had the luxury of slow-rolling such technology in domestic drills and occasionally fielding such technology in Syria. Currently, with so many resources already committed to fighting Ukraine’s capable defenders, it remains to be seen whether the Russian military would be able to undertake the testing of these new systems directly in combat, or if it would delay such evaluation in favor of fielding imported technology. Even as the war rages on, the Russian MOD has no intention of abandoning its more futuristic plans for integrating autonomous and robotic technology, even if its vastly degraded force in Ukraine is using decades-old, less-than-sophisticated systems, relies on crowdsourcing of certain items key to frontline warfare, or may be dependent once again on imported drones to plug a key capability gap.

In the end, myriad factors—domestic politics, economic health, the state of a country’s military-industrial capacity, understanding the adversary intentions and plans, getting a good grasp of global technological developments and trends—play a role in shaping a country’s military planning. The current war in Ukraine and the resulting sanctions might delay some of Russia’s more ambitious plans for autonomous and unmanned technology, thereby giving the United States and its allies more time and opportunity to test and refine such concepts. However, as long as major military powers continue to integrate military autonomy into their force structures, Russia will “shadowbox” such developments with its own efforts, apparently ignoring the heavy toll that the current war can take on its industry and society. Eventually, the Russian military could approach the point where using a growing share of autonomous systems will become organic to its sprawling force structure. Whether that day comes in five, ten, or twenty years is less relevant than the desire of the Russian MOD to fight with greater impact, which is what robotic technologies are supposed to deliver. Russia still plans to successfully compete with high-tech adversaries like NATO. Its current performance in Ukraine could be a key, if very bloody, experience on its path to military strength underwritten by new technologies.

***

Samuel Bendett is an Analyst, Center for Naval Analysis Russia Studies Program and Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security Technology and National Security Program.

Airpower after Ukraine: The future of air warfare

Airpower experts and practitioners examine interim lessons from the war in Ukraine and consider applications for twenty-first century air and space forces.

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Air denial: The dangerous illusion of decisive air superiority

Maximillian K. Bremer and Kelly A. Grieco — Tue, 30 Aug 2022 13:00:00 +0000

Of all the surprises Ukraine had in store for Russia’s invading forces, perhaps the biggest is Ukraine’s denial of air superiority to a larger and more technologically sophisticated Russian air force. Given that the Russians have shown themselves incapable of conducting complex air operations, it is tempting to conclude that the air war in Ukraine holds few lessons for the United States and other Western air forces. They would surely do better than the Russians in a war like Ukraine. This is a comforting conclusion for Western defense analysts: If Russian failure is mainly self-inflicted, then the air war in Ukraine does not challenge existing doctrine and expensive modernization priorities. Although comforting, such confidence is misplaced.

The air war in Ukraine is a harbinger of air wars to come, when US adversaries will increasingly employ defense in vertical depth, layering the effects of cyber disruptions, electromagnetic jamming, air defenses, drones, and missiles in increasing degrees of strength, from higher to lower altitudes. Even if high-end fighters and bombers manage to gain air superiority in the “blue skies,” the airspace below them remains contested. The “air littoral”—that is, the airspace between ground forces and high-end fighters and bombers—then poses the more challenging and important contest for air control.

Denying manned aircraft—from the blues skies to the air littoral

Ukraine has successfully practiced a strategy of air denial, based on a defense-in-vertical-depth approach that employs multilayered and overlapping systems and integrates their effects across the domain, from the blue skies to the air littoral. As a result, Kyiv has managed to deny Russian manned aircraft freedom of movement over most of Ukraine while simultaneously operating its own, increasingly unmanned assets in the air littoral.

The outer layer of Ukrainian defenses consists of mobile surface-to-air missiles, dating back to the Cold War era, which cover approaches from the blue skies. Ukrainian defenders on the ground have used long-range S-300 series and medium-range Buk-M1 surface-to-air missiles to keep Russian aircraft at bay and under threat in the blue skies. Employing “shoot-and-scoot” tactics, Ukrainian air defense units fire their missiles and quickly turn off the radar and move away—making it difficult for the Russians to find and destroy them. During the 1991 Gulf War, the US-led coalition employed strike aircraft and special forces to hunt Iraq’s truck-mounted Scud missiles, but even with the benefit of air superiority, Iraq’s effective use of maneuver and high-fidelity decoys prevented the Air Force from claiming even a single confirmed kill. Russia’s hunt for Ukraine’s mobile surface-to-air missile defenses is even more challenging: its aircraft are “not only the hunter but also the hunted.” Russian pilots are therefore wary of entering Ukrainian airspace to conduct close-in strikes. As long as Ukraine maintains an active and credible threat against Russian warplanes—an air defense in being—its force is sufficient to deny Russia unfettered use of the blue skies over most of Ukraine.

Desperate to avoid these dangers, Russian warplanes have resorted to flying at low altitudes. Although this tactic allows these aircraft to evade radar detection by high-end surface-to-air missiles, it sends them right into the thick of Ukraine’s inner layer of air defenses—the air littoral. Flying at low altitude, Russian fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters are easy prey for Ukraine’s anti-aircraft artillery and thousands of shoulder-fired air defense systems, including some 1,400 American-supplied Stinger missiles. Ukraine has even reportedly used anti-tank missiles to shoot down low-flying Russian attack helicopters. The Ukraine case offers a glimpse of future wars, where the advantage will shift toward cheap mass and away from small numbers of expensive, exquisite manned aircraft.

Ukrainian defenders enjoy an inherent “home-court” advantage in the air littoral. “Ukraine has been effective in the sky because we operate on our own land,” according to Yuri Ihnat, a spokesman for the Ukrainian Air Force. He explained, “The enemy flying into our airspace is flying into the zone of our air defense systems.” The Ukrainians have intimate knowledge of the local topography, which they have exploited to lure Russian planes into their air defense traps. The compressed size of the air littoral not only restricts a pilot’s field of vision and makes it harder to detect incoming threats, but it also critically reduces the window for deploying evasive countermeasures. Taken together, these factors transform the air littoral into a robust and very lethal inner defensive layer.

Ukraine has also shown that defense in vertical depth is most effective when the defender exploits the interactions between the blue skies and the air littoral. Early in the war, Ukraine used Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones, operating in the air littoral, to strike Russian convoys and ground troops. Before the Russians had set up their air defenses on the battlefield, they had little choice but to use their high-end fighters to hunt these weapon systems. Ukraine might have used the TB2 as a “decoy” to draw these aircraft from the blue skies into the air littoral, where Ukrainian defenders were ready to shoot them down. Russia has now taken a page from the Ukrainian playbook, introducing more Russian S-400 air defense batteries and drones to keep Ukrainian pilots from regularly flying through the Donbas area. The result is a state of mutual air denial: neither Russia’s nor Ukraine’s manned aircraft can operate consistently or effectively near the front lines.

Fighting robotically in the air littoral

Although Ukraine has denied Russia—and Russia has denied Ukraine—the effective use of manned airpower, Ukrainian defenders have exploited cheap and easy robotic access to the air littoral. Since the advent of military aviation, only major powers have been able to mount the financial, organizational, technological, and scientific barriers to employing large and advanced air forces. Today, however, the democratization of technology—the diffusion of multi-use technologies, rapidly decreasing costs, and the Internet’s global reach—make cheap but effective robotic airpower available to most countries. The TB2 has placed reconnaissance precision strike capabilities in the hands of Ukraine for a fraction of the price of manned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike platforms. In addition to military drones, Ukrainian forces also reportedly operate more than 6,000 small commercial drones in a variety of ISR roles, including surveilling Russian movements, spotting for artillery, and inspecting buildings, as well as documenting Russian war crimes. This ability to maneuver in the air littoral adds a “spherical challenge,” with threats in both horizontal and vertical dimensions.

As the fighting has moved east to the Donbas region, both Russia and Ukraine have adapted their tactics. Russia has improved the density and organization of its ground-based air defenses, as well as its electronic warfare capabilities, and ramped up its use of military-grade and commercial drones to surveil the battlefield, retarget weapons, and drop explosives on Ukrainian positions. Ukraine has not stood idle, however; instead, it has adjusted its drone tactics. While Kyiv has had to scale back its use of TB2, reserving them largely for high-value strikes in other areas, it has turned to expendable “kamikaze drones,” or “loitering munitions” to strike Russian ground targets from the air littoral.

Increased jamming and a supposed lack of survivability has not rendered drones obsolete, however. Instead, the contested environment in eastern Ukraine has demonstrated the value of leveraging drones as cheap attritable mass. Whereas steep losses in manned aircraft quickly thinned Russia’s ranks of trained and experienced pilots, heavy Ukrainian drone losses are more sustainable—their operators live to fight another day, having gained wartime experience ready for immediate application. Gen. David Goldfein, the former chief of staff of the US Air Force, acknowledged that it takes a decade and between $6 and 10 million on average to train a fighter pilot. Russia may not have the same exacting standards, but the mounting death toll still limits its force generation and regeneration. The result has been to push the fight further down into the air littoral, where Russia has run short of armed reconnaissance drones and currently lacks the capacity to mass produce these cheap systems at scale.

Preparing for air denial

The United States and other Western air forces need to prepare for this future now. A strategy of air denial might be the smarter and more economical choice when trying to preserve the status quo on NATO’s eastern flank or across the Taiwan Strait. By employing sufficiently large numbers of smaller, cheaper, unmanned systems in a distributed way, the United States and its allies and partners would increase both the costs and uncertainty of Chinese or Russian efforts to quickly seize territory and present their conquest as a fait accompli. Such a strategy requires moving away from the capable but costly and numerically limited high-end fighters and bombers in favor of more unmanned and autonomous systems. It also requires moving away from penetration and precision strike with manned aircraft to swarming tactics of denial with thousands of cheap small-sized drones. Fighter pilots still capture the Western imagination—this year’s highest-grossing box office hit, Top Gun: Maverick, suggests that the mystique of the fighter pilot holds strong—but that kind of aerial combat is the exception to the rule. The future of air warfare is denial.

***

Maximilian K. Bremer is a US Air Force colonel and the director of the Special Programs Division at Air Mobility Command. The opinions expressed here are his own and do not reflect the views of the Department of Defense and/or the US Air Force.

Kelly A. Grieco is a resident senior fellow with the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Airpower after Ukraine: The future of air warfare

Airpower experts and practitioners examine interim lessons from the war in Ukraine and consider applications for twenty-first century air and space forces.

The post Air denial: The dangerous illusion of decisive air superiority appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Information warfare in the air littoral: Talking with the world

Zachary Kallenborn — Tue, 30 Aug 2022 13:00:00 +0000

In the early days of the ongoing war in Ukraine, Kyiv put out calls over Facebook for civilians to donate their drones or sign up to join drone units. Informal donation pages were set up, too, along with online efforts to bring civilian drones into the country. Russian volunteers caught on and tried to emulate the practice, although their attempts were less successful than the Ukrainians’ efforts. Nevertheless, the donation of drones supports both actors in generating and sustaining concentrated military power (or mass in military parlance)—a significant factor in the contest over the air littoral, the airspace between ground forces and high-altitude fighters and bombers.

The importance of mass in the air littoral

The systems that are employed to contest the air littoral—drones, loitering munitions, and low-flying missiles—are often cheap and disposable. Swarming attacks of numerous drones, loitering munitions, and missiles can overwhelm target defenses, but with high attrition rates. If stocks run out and cannot be replenished, the air littoral cannot be used for guiding artillery strikes or gathering and sharing propaganda. Global public-facing information warfare operations can encourage the building of mass, hinder adversary attempts to build mass, and reduce strategic effects of air littoral competition.

The role of information operations in generating mass

Information operations may encourage (or hinder) support from allies in generating mass. The United States provided Ukraine with hundreds of Switchblade loitering munitions. Though American national interest was certainly an influential factor, Ukraine’s success in garnering international sympathy for its unexpected combat prowess and capacity to fight the Russian army also played a big role. The Ukrainians have used memes of “Saint Javelin” and farmers towing away Russian tanks to crowdsource military and humanitarian donations. Lithuania provides the clearest example: the nation crowdfunded five million euros to buy Ukraine a new Bayraktar TB2 drone. Then Turkey gave the TB2 to Ukraine for free, suggesting the funds be used for humanitarian support. Ukraine also generated mass through an unconventional source: civilians. Although not an information operation itself, civilian engagement may support a larger narrative about how all of Ukrainian society is deeply committed to the war effort.

Of course, since early 2014, Russia has also launched its own information operations, often centered on weapons and defenses for contesting the air littoral. Russia continues to push disinformation regarding a fake Ukrainian chemical and biological weapons program to justify the invasion and discourage sympathy and support for Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Defense has even accused Ukraine of conducting a “drone chemical attack” against Russian forces. In addition, Russia has conducted information operations seemingly designed to degrade Ukraine’s ability to generate mass in the air littoral. For example, Russia claims to have fielded a new anti-drone laser, but the United States has pushed back on the report, with a Department of Defense official saying that he had not seen “anything to corroborate reports of lasers being used” in Ukraine. Although it is possible that the United States might have just not found the evidence, disinformation about fielding a fancy new countermeasure could be intended to discourage Western drone resupply and induce greater caution on Ukrainian drone deployments.

In addition, cyber warfare—another important aspect of information warfare more broadly—can help generate mass while attempting to disrupt the other side’s ability to do the same. For example, the hacking collective Anonymous, furious with Russian actions in Ukraine, claims to have hacked drone manufacturers, capturing various documents on planning and tactics (exactly how useful these documents are remains unclear). Such information could be used to design better countermeasures or improve Ukrainian systems. Alternatively, cyber espionage and attacks could be used to identify potential vulnerabilities—cyber, physical, or electronic—to sabotage supply chains, targeting critical part manufacturers when Russia has few (or no) alternative producers. More broadly, this example illustrates the importance adversaries place on the use of information operations to generate and sustain mass in the air littoral, and the growing importance of physical, electronic, and cyberattacks to interdict air-littoral weapon systems.

Information environment in the air littoral

An open question is how to best counter such efforts. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has seen significant use of Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks, which could be leveled against websites hosting drone recruitment messages, or local Internet providers. Alternatively, an adversary could, say, hack into the Facebook account hosting the message, or set up a fake effort to divert some of the drones. Taking down an entire channel would be difficult and would most likely produce only limited effects—the longest Facebook outage in history lasted 14 hours. Nevertheless, the open-source nature of social media websites could allow an adversary to collect useful intelligence. If an adversary knows the manufacturer and model of the drones being provided, they can also know operating parameters, potential vulnerabilities, and which countermeasures are most effective. They could also target supply chains, perhaps through information attacks.

A civilian’s drone-captured footage of Russian troop movements has little impact if the civilian cannot share the footage with those individuals capable of attacking the troops, emplacing obstacles to inhibit movement, avoiding the troops, or otherwise reacting to troop movements. Likewise, the civilian almost certainly will not know which unit to call. That means the military would require the capacity to find the video on the Internet, provide an alternative means for the civilian to upload the video, and relay the video to the appropriate units.

Of course, delays in information sharing can still have meaningful effects. A Ukrainian drone captured footage of a Russian soldier appearing to shoot a civilian who surrendered. If the operator had to wait weeks or months to share the video, the opportunity for it to have an impact could have been lost: states might have already decided whether to provide or withhold support. The video might go viral, stuck on the front page of world newspapers, but the conflict may be too far along for it to make a difference. Even more modest delays—days or just hours—might prevent action on particularly time-sensitive information. Direct attacks on popular information-sharing channels (Telegram, Twitter, Facebook) might have limited effects if a prolonged outage forces a sharing group to migrate to a new channel. However, because global companies with major information-technology capabilities operate those channels, extended outages are unlikely.

Preparing to wage information warfare in the air littoral

The information environment is compressing the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare, especially in the air littoral. Tactical victories and errors can go viral, spreading from Wellington to Timbuktu. Winning the information warfare contest can mean that the victor receives more missiles, intelligence information, and humanitarian support. Losing can result in cyberattacks from anarchic nonstate actors, and adversaries empowered with outside support. The United States and allied forces need to be prepared: they should hold wargames and exercises to explore how information operations interact with the air littoral; explore ways to use civilian engagement to support air-littoral stocks; ensure that information awareness is baked deeply into military organizations; and strengthen mechanisms for interagency collaboration on information operations. Today, an act of violence can echo throughout the world.

***

Zachary Kallenborn is a Policy Fellow at the Schar School of Policy and Government, a Research Affiliate with the Unconventional Weapons and Technology Division of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), an officially proclaimed US Army “Mad Scientist,” and national security consultant.

Airpower after Ukraine: The future of air warfare

Airpower experts and practitioners examine interim lessons from the war in Ukraine and consider applications for twenty-first century air and space forces.

The post Information warfare in the air littoral: Talking with the world appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What Ukraine needs to win the war

Richard D. Hooker, Jr. — Mon, 22 Aug 2022 01:45:01 +0000

In the six months since Russia invaded Ukraine, the Ukrainian military has conducted a stout and stirring defense, inflicting heavy casualties on Russian units and contesting every foot of ground. Against long odds, Ukraine managed to defend the capital, Kyiv, as well as its second largest city, Kharkiv. This has forced Russia to abandon its goal of a quick takeover of the country.

However, staving off defeat is not the same thing as victory. Russian forces today control about 20% of Ukrainian territory, including large tracts in the east and south. What does Ukraine need in order to win the war?

A first step must be to address the disparity in airpower. Success in modern, high-intensity warfare is almost impossible without at least parity in the air. Ukraine began the contest woefully behind the curve with perhaps 100 flyable jets compared to Russia’s more than 1,500. Where Russia has been able to conduct 100-200 sorties per day, the much smaller Ukrainian air force can manage around 10-20.

Accordingly, Ukraine has been generally unable to provide air support to its ground forces for fear of losing its small inventory of high-performance aircraft (mostly MIG-29 and SU-27 fighters and Su-24 and SU-25 ground attack aircraft). Instead, its approach has been to carefully husband its assets and use them only selectively.

On the other hand, Ukraine has been outstandingly successful in denying Russia air supremacy with extremely effective air defense and a strategy of “air denial.”

Though lacking the most advanced air defense systems such as the US Patriot or the Russian S-400, Ukraine’s use of older S-300 (high altitude), SA-11 (medium altitude) and SA-8 (short range) systems has been lethal to Russian airpower. The US has also provided small numbers of its NASAM short to medium-range air defense system, while Germany has promised to send decommissioned Gepard air defense vehicles, though ammunition shortages have delayed actual use.

Employed in concert with large numbers of US-supplied Stinger shoulder-fired missiles and using “shoot and scoot” tactics for survivability, Ukrainian air defense has downed dozens of Russian fixed and rotary-wing aircraft and largely sidelined Russian airpower. An adequate supply of air defense missiles for Ukrainian systems is essential here, and they must come from outside sources in quantity for Ukraine to prevail.

Ukraine has also used drones with devastating effect. The principal military platforms have been the Turkish Bayraktar TB2, which can deliver laser-guided bombs, and the US-supplied Phoenix Ghost drone as well as the Switchblade, a kamikaze drone with onboard explosives that can be flown into the target.

These military drones are supplemented with thousands of cheaper commercial drones used for artillery spotting and intelligence collection. Russian forces have adapted and the loss rate of Ukrainian drones is high, but low cost and ready availability mean that drones will continue to play an important role. When linked to nearby artillery units, drones enable quick target acquisition and precise fires, making the most of Ukraine’s limited artillery resources.

Ukrainian innovation and tactical agility have blunted much of Russia’s dominance in the air, but the ability to generate offensive airpower in the form of close air support and air interdiction will go far towards helping Ukraine prevail. Earlier in the war, Poland and other former Warsaw Pact nations suggested a transfer of Soviet-era jets to Ukraine, an offer blocked by US officials. If NATO is determined not to provide air cover, it is imperative that this block be removed and that partners be permitted to support the Ukrainian air force with platforms it can employ quickly to support air operations.

Backfilling these transfers with US fourth generation aircraft like the F-16 would also hasten the transition in Central Europe’s NATO member states from Soviet-era jets to more interoperable Western aircraft. Even 50 additional jets, with associated munitions and spare parts, could make a major difference in Ukraine. Without a boost in air support, a Ukrainian victory may still be possible if the strategy of air denial holds up, but it will come at higher costs to ground forces.

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Just as important as air support is artillery, which comes in three forms: tubed, rocket, and missile. Ukraine began the war with substantial but outdated tubed artillery from the Soviet era, complicated by a dearth of ammunition. With some 2000 artillery pieces to Ukraine’s 500, Russian artillery is far more numerous, modern, and powerful, with a daily consumption of artillery rounds some 10 times greater than Ukraine’s.

As with air defense, Ukraine has used its limited artillery intelligently, quickly relocating after fire missions to avoid counter-battery fire and relying on drones for precision targeting. The addition of towed 155mm howitzers from the US and smaller numbers of 155mm self-propelled systems from Germany, France and other countries has strengthened Ukraine’s tubed artillery holdings considerably, but Russia’s advantage is still strong.

Here the US can help with M109A6 155mm self-propelled howitzers, recently replaced by the newer M109A7 model and now in storage in quantity. The M109A6 is an armored, tracked vehicle, more survivable against counter-battery fire, quicker to displace, and with smaller crews. It is accurate, lethal, and rugged, making it well-suited to Ukraine’s terrain and operational environment. Approximately 320 of these systems would give Ukraine four additional artillery brigades (one for each of its four regional headquarters), plus an additional battalion in general support for each of Ukraine’s 12 or so division equivalents, leaving some 10% for training and spares.

The real artillery game changer is the multiple launch rocket system in wheeled (M142 HIMARS) and tracked (M270 MLRS) variants. Both are long ranged, precise, mobile, and very destructive. Small numbers have been provided to date and have rendered excellent service. While Ukraine does field older rocket artillery systems like the BM-21 Grad and BM-30 Smerch, HIMARS and MLRS are far superior in range and precision.

As a matter of policy, the Biden administration has withheld longer ranged ATACMS ammunition that can strike targets up to 300 miles away. To level the playing field and transition to the offense with some hope of success, Ukraine probably needs some 50 or so HIMARS or MLRS systems, and it needs the ATACMS round. These capabilities will enable Ukrainian forces to strike high value targets like command posts, airfields, logistics hubs, air defense complexes, and ballistic missile launchers. Given the mismatch in airpower, long range rocket artillery has the potential to turn the tide and put Ukraine on a path towards ultimate success. Without it, victory will remain elusive.

Stronger airpower and more modern rocket artillery will greatly improve the odds, but Ukraine’s tank forces must also be strengthened. When the war began, Ukraine’s standard tank was the T-64B, an older and underpowered Soviet-era design lacking the most modern explosive reactive armor, thermal sights, and modern ammunition. While Ukraine has inflicted heavy losses on Russian armor (often using hand-held anti-tank weapons), its own tank force has been depleted and offensive breakthroughs with tank-heavy forces have not been possible.

Poland has committed to providing 240 PT-91 main battle tanks along with small numbers of Czech T-72s. To equip the Ukrainian army for offensive operations in 2023, the US should consider providing a similar number of M1A1 tanks from its large reserve stocks. Though not the very latest model, the M1A1 is more than a match for most Russian tanks and is available in large numbers.

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To assist Ukraine, NATO should consider establishing a NATO Training Mission-Ukraine (NTM-U) based in Poland and developed on a scale similar to the robust training support organizations seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Led by a US three-star general with senior-level representation and staffing from the UK, France, Poland and Germany, NTM-U could provide the expertise, technical assistance, and “connective tissue” that is badly needed as Ukraine fights for its national existence. This organization can serve as the conduit back to the training bases and defense industries of contributing nations as well as the schoolhouse for Ukrainian commanders and staff officers.

Such full-blooded support, even without direct participation in the fighting, will undoubtedly draw Putin’s ire. Why should the US and its European partners risk a confrontation with a nuclear-armed Russia in this way? The clear answer is that a negotiated peace in Ukraine would be nothing of the sort. Any settlement that leaves Russia in control of occupied territory in exchange for a cessation of hostilities will reward Russia and encourage more aggression.

Western leaders can be sure that Russian success in Ukraine, even at high cost, will put NATO allies like the Baltic states squarely in Putin’s crosshairs. If anything, US and European reluctance to increase support for Ukraine will only reassure Putin that the West fears confrontation and will take pains to avoid it. This is not a recipe for deterring future aggression.

Nor should the West fear Russian rhetoric about the use of nuclear weapons. Distilled to its essence, this amounts to the threat of a nuclear exchange if Russia is not allowed to invade and occupy its neighbors. The nuclear deterrence regime that has been in place since the 1950s is surely strong enough to deter such wild adventurism.

Constant statements from Western leaders claiming “we cannot risk WWIII” only encourage Putin to believe that reckless threats about nuclear weapons are working. While a nuclear event cannot be ruled out entirely (Russia might stage a low-yield tactical nuclear detonation in a remote area, for example, to frighten and intimidate the West), the use of nuclear weapons in combat when the existence of the Russian state is not at risk is extremely unlikely.

The outcome of the conflict in Ukraine will have consequences far beyond Europe. China is watching carefully and will weigh the West’s commitment to its friends and partners carefully as it considers the military conquest of Taiwan, especially after the US and NATO’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan. So will Iran and North Korea.

For the most part, Russian aggression in Georgia, Crimea, the Donbas, and more broadly in Ukraine has not been met with confidence and firm resolve. Instead, the Western response has consisted of sanctions, rhetoric, and a pronounced unwillingness to risk confrontation. We should not fool ourselves here. Much is at stake.

As the war grinds on, Ukraine has advantages it can leverage. These include an educated and highly motivated military and citizenry, a well-run and efficient railway system, a good understanding of modern technology, and an adaptive and innovative approach to the problems of modern, high-intensity warfare.

An intimate knowledge of the terrain and interior lines has enabled tactical success throughout the campaign. Ukrainian leadership, both civil and military, has on the whole been markedly superior to Russia’s. Above all, the Ukrainian soldier has proven to be tough, resourceful and determined, a fighter who “knows what he fights for and loves what he knows.”

Nevertheless, Ukraine is outmatched and must have stronger outside help to avoid dismemberment and continued occupation. The US and Europe do not need to introduce ground troops in order to ensure Ukraine’s success. Magnificent Ukrainian resistance has badly hurt the Russian military, which is almost totally committed in Ukraine. An opportunity now exists to end further Russian aggression in the European security space for a generation, and perhaps forever.

Ukraine can win the war but victory depends on Western support that goes well beyond the current level. We cannot ignore that Ukraine, too, has suffered painful losses in troops and materiel. Ukraine has been consistent and clear about its needs. Peace in Europe, and perhaps the world, depends on meeting them.

Atlantic Council — Mon, 08 Aug 2022 19:09:00 +0000

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Akhtar quoted in Pakistan Today: PTI seeks clarification over Pakistan’s possible role in Zawahiri killing

Atlantic Council — Sat, 06 Aug 2022 20:07:00 +0000

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Ukraine grain deal: World must still confront Putin’s Black Sea blackmail

Oleksiy Goncharenko — Thu, 04 Aug 2022 13:22:25 +0000

This week saw the first cargo ship sail from Odesa across the Black Sea following the July 22 signing of a landmark deal to allow the export of Ukrainian grain. This agreement, jointly brokered by Turkey and the United Nations and signed by Russia and Ukraine, aims to end a five-month Russian blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports that has brought the world to the brink of a global food crisis.

While the departure of Ukraine’s first grain shipment since February is good news, it is still far too early to celebrate. Crucially, the Kremlin’s record of disregard for treaty commitments and international law during its war in Ukraine raises grave doubts over Russia’s reliability as a partner in the grain deal.

The Kremlin’s lack of credibility has already been underlined. Just hours after the agreement was signed in Istanbul, Russian forces launched a missile attack on Odesa Port which Moscow initially denied but later acknowledged. Similar attacks on port facilities or merchant shipping would come as no surprise and would quickly render the fragile grain agreement unworkable. In light of these concerns, further steps are clearly needed in order to guarantee global food security and put a stop to Vladimir Putin’s Black Sea blackmail.

The role played by Ukrainian agricultural produce in international food security should not be underestimated. Long known as the breadbasket of Europe, Ukraine has in recent years become a global garden. On the eve of the Russian invasion, it was estimated that Ukraine was providing food for as many as 400 million people around the world. Ukrainian officials stated in early 2022 that this figure would rise to a billion by 2030, representing around one in nine people on the planet.

The resumption of Ukrainian agri-food shipments is no less important for Ukraine itself. Agriculture is the engine of the Ukrainian economy representing over 40% of the country’s total exports. The bulk of Ukraine’s agricultural riches reaches global markets via the country’s Black Sea ports. Given this reliance on the farming industry, Russia’s Black Sea blockade has proved economically devastating and has contributed to a collapse in Ukrainian GDP.

The effectiveness of Russia’s blockade and its importance in Moscow’s wider campaign to extinguish Ukrainian statehood makes it unlikely that Putin will be prepared to abandon this strategy altogether. Instead, many observers remain cautious and anticipate that Russia will engineer reasons to disrupt the current grain deal. While grain ships may continue to leave Odesa, the most likely scenario would involve limited export volumes that will reduce the diplomatic pressure on Moscow without easing Ukraine’s economic woes or solving global food shortages.

Putin certainly has no qualms about weaponizing global hunger in his war against Ukraine. While Moscow officially seeks to blame Ukraine and the collective West for food shortages and rising commodities prices, senior regime representatives have openly discussed Kremlin plans to starve the world into submission. Speaking at the high-profile Saint Petersburg International Economic forum in June, the Chief Editor of Kremlin media platform RT, Margarita Simonyan, declared, “All our hope is in famine.”

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If the international community wishes to secure Ukrainian agricultural exports, it cannot rely on Russia’s word alone. While the current grain deal is a step in the right direction, Russia retains military control over Black Sea maritime routes and can still unilaterally end export shipments from Odesa and other Ukrainian ports.

While diplomatic dialogue with the Kremlin has helped achieve the recent breakthrough, the only language Putin truly understands is the language of strength. Indeed, it is no coincidence that the grain agreement signed in late July came following a series of significant military setbacks suffered by Russia in the Black Sea zone of the Russo-Ukrainian War.

When the Russian invasion began on February 24, the Black Sea blockade was already in place under the guise of naval exercises. Putin sought to supplement this naval blockade by invading southern Ukraine from Crimea and seizing Odesa. The ultimate goal was the occupation of Ukraine’s entire Black Sea coastline. However, things did not go according to plan. During the first weeks of the invasion, Putin’s troops ran into unexpectedly tough opposition and were forced to retreat from Mykolaiv, a key city in southern Ukraine which was to serve as the gateway for Russia’s Odesa offensive.

In April, plans for an amphibious assault on Odesa were dealt a crushing blow when Ukraine sank Russia’s Black Sea Fleet flagship, the Moskva. Russian forces suffered a further Black Sea setback in early July when they abandoned the strategically vital Snake Island after suffering days of Ukrainian bombardment. Embarrassed Kremlin officials attempted to spare Putin’s blushes by rebranding the retreat as a “goodwill gesture.”

These defeats on land and sea helped persuade Putin to sign the new grain deal and relax his blockade. Further strong measures are now needed in order to make sure Ukraine’s ports remain open and secure the sea lanes that serve as vital arteries for global food security.

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From a military perspective, the best way to safeguard Ukrainian grain shipments would be to form an international naval coalition that would take on the task of policing maritime routes across the Black Sea. However, this would create significant risk of direct military confrontation between participating countries and the Russian navy. Past experience indicates that Western leaders have no appetite for such risks.

One creative option would be to place Odesa under United Nations control as a neutral port. This could be justified based on the key role Odesa plays in global grain exports. UN officials would oversee port operations and provide assurances that ships were not delivering weapons to Ukraine, but the problem of safeguarding merchant shipping would remain along the challenges of avoiding potential clashes with Russian warships.

Arming Ukraine remains by far the most practical and realistic solution. Providing the country with enhanced anti-ship and anti-submarine capabilities would dramatically change the balance of power in the northern Black Sea zone. The Ukrainian military has already demonstrated its ability to sink Russian warships and has forced the Russian navy to retreat from the country’s southern shores. Indeed, Ukrainian officials boasted recently that the Russian Black Sea Fleet had cancelled this year’s Navy Day celebrations in late July rather than risk exposing itself to Ukrainian attack.

If Russia is made aware that further attempts to blackmail the world will result in the destruction of the country’s Black Sea Fleet, there is every reason to believe that Putin will back down. Like all bullies, the Russian dictator is a coward at heart who withdraws whenever he encounters resolute opposition. Ukraine is ready to demonstrate this resolve but must receive the tools to do so.

Russia’s five-month Black Sea blockade has underlined the crucial contribution of Ukrainian agricultural exports to the fight against world hunger. Diplomatic deals to resume Ukrainian grain shipments are welcome but can hardly be regarded as reliable when one of the signatories is Russia. Instead, the international community must seek more credible ways of safeguarding global food security. That means arming Ukraine to keep vital sea lanes open.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a Ukrainian member of parliament with the European Solidarity party.

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The skills Ukraine’s civil society activists can offer are particularly applicable to today’s often extreme environment. While the international community seeks to keep Ukraine militarily well-supplied with sophisticated weapons, the experience of the country’s civil society sector can help make sure that surges in military capacity take place smoothly and core needs are met.

It is important to understand that Ukrainian civil society has evolved into an unrivalled platform that offers direct access to fighting units and other aspects of the country’s military. This includes the ability to compile accurate information about the most immediate and pressing needs of frontline forces.

Activists are also highly adept at acting on this information. Given the right resources, they can often reduce lead times to days or even hours. In addition to the obvious practical advantages of such efficiency, rapid response times also provide frontline troops with a massive morale boost and strengthen the bonds between the military and the country’s civilian volunteers. In this time of grave national danger, such ties are priceless.

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As somebody who has witnessed the evolving frontline role of Ukrainian civil society over the past eight years, I am confident that greater cooperation with Ukraine’s international partners would pay dividends. Ukraine would be able to fully utilize the informal but extensive networks that are already in place while also making the most of the experience built up over years of diverse wartime activity. Indeed, combining enhanced Western resources with the unique aptitudes of Ukrainian civil society could have a significant impact on the future course of the entire conflict.

There is long history of successful international engagement with civil society in Central and Eastern Europe. During the post-Soviet era, Ukraine’s own civil society has often led the way in terms of international cooperation and has consistently been at the forefront of the country’s gradual transition from authoritarianism toward a more recognizably democratic society.

In today’s wartime environment, the contributions being made by Ukrainian civil society are immediately apparent. In addition to the important role they play in support of the military, volunteer groups also often lead the way when it comes to providing humanitarian support to Ukrainians who find themselves displaced or traumatized by the conflict. This is another area where much closer cooperation at the governmental and international levels is not only possible but desirable.

Ukraine’s civil society sector is a key force for positive change with a proven record of achieving results. It is an asset that should be far more actively supported by the country’s international partners. This support could take the form of financial grants, aid partnerships, training initiatives, distribution cooperation and much more.

With no immediate end in sight to the war, the international community must plan for an open-ended commitment to supporting Ukraine. This will necessarily involve ongoing arms supplies and financial backing. Looking ahead, Western support will go a lot further if Ukraine’s partners take advantage of the remarkable civil society infrastructure that is already in place.

Jonas Oehman is head of the NGO Blue/Yellow in Lithuania which has been supporting the Ukrainian Armed Forces since 2014.

Atlantic Council — Sun, 17 Jul 2022 14:24:00 +0000

original text

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Trotti in Inside Unmanned Systems on autonomous systems

Atlantic Council — Wed, 06 Jul 2022 13:50:00 +0000

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On July 6, Forward Defense assistant director Christian Trotti was interviewed by Inside Unmanned Systems. Trotti answered questions on how uncrewed systems are impacting the traditional paradigm for warfare.

Former staff

Christian Trotti

Defense Industry Defense Policy

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‘Killer robots’ are coming. Is the US ready for the consequences?

Tyson Wetzel — Fri, 17 Jun 2022 17:28:34 +0000

The battlefields of the future will be dominated by those who can best harness intelligence to rapidly and precisely maneuver against opponents. The current war in Ukraine is a stark example: While defending their nation against Russia’s invasion, the outnumbered and outgunned Ukrainians have used battlefield intelligence and pinpoint firepower to negate the numerical and qualitative advantages of the invading force. During a recent disastrous Russian river crossing in the Donbas region, for instance, Kyiv’s forces were able use intelligence sources to identify, trap, and destroy an entire battalion.

Warfare is evolving, and the evidence is mounting that a smarter, more agile force can decisively defeat a stronger adversary through the precise application of new technologies. Central to this fast-evolving domain are autonomous combat systems, officially known as lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS)—or, colloquially, “killer robots.” These uncrewed systems use artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) algorithms to autonomously identify and destroy a target.

The United States and its allies and partners—in addition to their strategic competitors and adversaries—are researching and developing unmanned aerial systems and drones, as well as ground and underwater vehicles. While most are still being tested, some are already in operation (such as in Libya in 2020). The killer robot age may have already dawned with barely a ripple of public recognition, and now, the United States must make some tough decisions: on its willingness to field LAWS, as well as the circumstances under which it will empower those systems to use lethal force.

Deadly—but delicate—tech

The allure of LAWS is clear: They reduce the risk to forces and are easier to support logistically, since the requirements of keeping an operator safe can be complicated and costly. They can also provide the speed of action that has been shown to be so critical on the ground in Ukraine, identifying a target and making a near-instantaneous execution decision without needing to send the information to a commander then wait for approval. This speed can be the difference between destroying a high-value target and watching it safely flee while awaiting a fire order.

Finally, LAWS are calm, calculating, unemotional, and unbiased in their decision making. For example, imagine an autonomous drone that identifies a Russian multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) preparing to fire dozens of rockets into a residential area. A search of its internal database could mark the vehicle as a Russian MLRS system, a perimeter search could rule out the risk of collateral damage, and a preprogrammed rule of engagement algorithm could confirm the target was valid. A pre-authorized shot (if the target met certain parameters) could be executed without delay, and the detection-to-destruction timeline could be seconds—as opposed to the tens of minutes it might take for those discrete actions to be taken off-board.

But despite the many benefits of LAWS, there is also an important moral component that must be addressed. Are national decision makers and operational commanders willing to allow an autonomous vehicle to take a life—perhaps many lives? Are we, as a society, comfortable with empowering killer robots to do our military’s bidding? How much risk of error is an individual commander willing to accept? War, after all, is a messy business. LAWS will make mistakes; killer robots will inevitably take the lives of innocent civilians, they will cause collateral damage and carnage, and they are likely to inadvertently cause the death of friendly forces.

All of this is no longer science fiction and must be addressed soon. The time to legally empower LAWS to employ lethal force is prior to a conflict, not in the heat of battle. At the institutional level, the Department of Defense (and its counterparts in US-allied nations) must craft an operational framework for LAWS, as well as offer strategic guidance, to ensure their ethical application in the future. Autonomous systems must be tested thoroughly in the most demanding of scenarios, the results must be evaluated at the granular level, and an expected error rate must be calculated. As a baseline, LAWS should pose less risk of error than a human operator.

Prior to the beginning of an engagement, the tactical decision for using lethal force needs to be made either by a theater commander or his or her delegated representative. That commander must evaluate the guidance provided by national decision makers, the operational environment, and the critical nature of individual targets on a tactical battlefield. The commander must provide clear guidance that can be written into an algorithm used throughout a particular conflict that will eventually make a decision to take a human life autonomously (or direct the LAWS to request further guidance or authorization if the scenario is unclear).

The commander must also be prepared to justify his or her decision if and when the LAWS is wrong. As with the application of force by manned platforms, the commander assumes risk on behalf of his or her subordinates. In this case, a narrow, extensively tested algorithm with an extremely high level of certainly (for example, 99 percent or higher) should meet the threshold for a justified strike and absolve the commander of criminal accountability.

Lastly, LAWS must also be tested extensively in the most demanding possible training and exercise scenarios. The methods they use to make their lethal decisions—from identifying a target and confirming its identity to mitigating the risk of collateral damage—must be publicly released (along with statistics backing up their accuracy). Transparency is crucial to building public trust in LAWS, and confidence in their capabilities can only be built by proving their reliability through rigorous and extensive testing and analysis.

The decision to employ killer robots should not be feared, but it must be well thought-out and meticulously debated. While the future offers unprecedented opportunity, it also comes with unprecedented challenges for which the United States and its allies and partners must prepare.

Tyson Wetzel is the 2021-22 senior US Air Force fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. The positions expressed do not reflect the official position of the United States Air Force or the Department of Defense.

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Eye to eye in AI: Developing artificial intelligence for national security and defense

Tate Nurkin, Margarita Konaev — Wed, 25 May 2022 17:29:12 +0000

As artificial intelligence (AI) transforms national security and defense, it is imperative for the Department of Defense (DoD), Congress, and the private sector to closely collaborate in order to advance major AI development priorities.

However, key barriers remain. Bureaucracy, acquisition processes, and organizational culture continue to inhibit the military’s ability to bring in external innovation and move more rapidly toward AI integration and adoption. As China—and, to a lesser extent, Russia—develop their own capabilities, the stakes of the military AI competition are high, and time is short.

It is now well past time to see eye to eye in AI. Therefore, Forward Defense’s latest report, generously supported by Accrete AI, addresses these key issues and more.

Executive summary

Introduction

Defining AI

Military competition in AI innovation and adoption

Overview of US military progress in AI

Accelerating DoD AI adoption

Key takeaways & recommendations

Conclusion

Acknowledgements

About the authors

Watch the launch event

Executive summary

Over the past several years, militaries around the world have increased interest and investment in the development of artificial intelligence (AI) to support a diverse set of defense and national security goals. However, general comprehension of what AI is, how it factors into the strategic competition between the United States and China, and how to optimize the defense-industrial base for this new era of deployed military AI is still lacking. It is now well past time to see eye to eye in AI, to establish a shared understanding of modern AI between the policy community and the technical community, and to align perspectives and priorities between the Department of Defense (DoD) and its industry partners. Accordingly, this paper addresses the following core questions.

What is AI and why should national security policymakers care?

AI-enabled capabilities hold the potential to deliver game-changing advantages for US national security and defense, including

greatly accelerated and improved decision-making;
enhanced military readiness and operational competence;
heightened human cognitive and physical performance;
new methods of design, manufacture, and sustainment of military systems;
novel capabilities that can upset delicate military balances; and
the ability to create and detect strategic cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and influence operations.

Recognition of the indispensable nature of AI as a horizontal enabler of the critical capabilities necessary to deter and win the future fight has gained traction within the DoD, which has made notable investments in AI over the past five years.

But, policymakers beyond the Pentagon—as well as the general public and the firms that are developing AI technologies—require a better understanding of the capabilities and limitations of today’s AI, and a clear sense of both the positive and the potentially destabilizing implications of AI for national security.

Why is AI essential to strategic competition?

The Pentagon’s interest in AI must also be seen through the lens of intensifying strategic competition with China—and, to a lesser extent, Russia—with a growing comprehension that falling behind on AI and related emerging technologies could compromise the strategic, technological, and operational advantages retained by the US military since the end of the Cold War. Some defense leaders even argue that the United States has already lost the military-technological competition to China.¹

While this paper does not subscribe to such a fatalist perspective, it argues that the stakes of the military AI competition are high—and that time is short.

What are the obstacles to DoD AI adoption?

The infamous Pentagon bureaucracy, an antiquated acquisition and contracting system, and a risk-averse organizational culture continue to inhibit the DoD’s ability to bring in external innovation and move more rapidly toward widespread AI integration and adoption. Solving systemic problems of this caliber is a tall order. But, important changes are already under way to facilitate DoD engagement with the commercial technology sector and innovative startups, and there seems to be a shared sense of urgency to solidify these public-private partnerships in order to ensure sustained US technological and military advantage. Still, much remains to be done in aligning the DoD’s and its industry partners’ perspectives about the most impactful areas for AI development, as well as articulating and implementing common technical standards and testing mechanisms for trustworthy and responsible AI.

Key takeaways and recommendations

The DoD must move quickly to transition from a broad recognition of AI’s importance to the creation of pathways, processes, practices, and principles that will accelerate adoption of the capabilities enabled by AI technologies. Without intentional, coordinated, and immediate action, the United States risks falling behind competitors in the ability to harness game-winning technologies that will dominate the kinetic and non-kinetic battlefield of the future. This report identifies three courses of action for the DoD that can help ensure the US military retains its global leadership in AI by
catalyzing the internal changes necessary for more rapid AI adoption and capitalizing on the vibrant and diverse US innovation ecosystem, including

prioritizing safe, secure, trusted, and responsible AI development and deployment;
aligning key priorities for AI development and strengthening coordination between the DoD and industry partners to help close AI capability gaps; and
promoting coordination between leading defense-technology companies and nontraditional vendors to accelerate DoD AI adoption.

This report is published at a time that is both opportune and uncertain in terms of the future trajectory of the DoD’s AI adoption efforts and global geopolitics. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has placed in stark relief the importance of constraining authoritarian impulses to control territory, populations, standards, and narratives,
and the role that alliances committed to maintaining long-standing norms of international behavior can play in this effort. As a result, the authors urge the DoD to engage and integrate the United States’ allies and trusted partners at governmental and, where possible, industry levels to better implement the three main recommendations of this paper.

Introduction

AI embodies a significant opportunity for defense policymakers. The ability of AI to process and fuse information, and to distill data into insights that augment decision-making, can lift the “fog of war” in a chaotic, contested environment in which speed is king. AI can also unlock the possibility of new types of attritable and single-use uncrewed systems that can enhance deterrence.² It can help safeguard the lives of US service members, for example, by powering the navigation software that guides autonomous resupply trucks in conflict zones.³ While humans remain in charge of making the final decision on targeting, AI algorithms are increasingly playing a role in helping intelligence professionals identify and track malicious actors, with the aim
of “shortening the kill chain and accelerating the speed of decision-making.”⁴

AI development and integration are also imperative due to the broader geostrategic context in which the United States operates—particularly the strategic competition with China.⁵ The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) budget for AI seems to match that of the US military, and the PLA is developing AI technology for a similarly broad set of applications and capabilities, including training and simulation, swarming autonomous systems, and information operations—among many others—all of which could abrogate the US military-technological advantage.⁶

As US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin noted in July 2021, “China’s leaders have made clear they intend to be globally dominant in AI by the year 2030. Beijing already talks about using AI for a range of missions, from surveillance to cyberattacks to autonomous weapons.”⁷ The United States cannot afford to fall behind China or other competitors.

To accelerate AI adoption, the Pentagon must confront its demons: a siloed bureaucracy that frustrates efficient data-management efforts and thwarts the technical infrastructure needed to leverage DoD data at scale; antiquated acquisition and contracting processes that inhibit the DoD’s ability to bring in external innovation and transition successful AI technology prototypes to production and deployment; and a risk-averse culture at odds with the type of openness, experimentation, and tolerance for failure known to fuel innovation.⁸

Several efforts are under way to tackle some of these problems. Reporting directly to the under secretary of defense, the chief data and artificial intelligence officer (CDAO) role was recently announced to consolidate the office of the chief data officer, the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC), and the Defense Digital Service (DDS). This reorganization brings the DoD’s data and AI efforts under one roof to deconflict overlapping authorities that have made it difficult to plan and execute AI projects.⁹ Expanding use of alternative acquisition methods, organizations like the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) and the Air Force’s AFWERX are bridging the gap with the commercial technology sector, particularly startups and nontraditional vendors. Still, some tech leaders believe these efforts are falling short, warning that “time is running out.”¹⁰

As the DoD shifts toward adoption of AI at scale, this report seeks to provide insights into outstanding questions regarding the nature of modern AI, summarize key advances in China’s race toward military AI development, and highlight some of the most compelling AI use cases across the DoD. It also offers a brief assessment of the incongruencies between the DoD and its industry partners, which continue to stymie the Pentagon’s access to the game-changing technologies the US military will need to deter adversary aggression and dominate future battlefields.

The urgency of competition, however, must not overshadow the commitment to the moral code that guides the US military as it enters the age of deployed AI. As such, the report reiterates the need to effectively translate the DoD’s ethical AI guidelines into common technical standards and evaluation metrics for assessing trustworthiness, and to enhance cooperation and coordination with the DoD’s industry partners—especially startups and nontraditional vendors across these critical issues.

We conclude this report with a number of considerations for policymakers and other AI stakeholders across the national security ecosystem. Specifically, we urge the DoD to prioritize safe, secure, trusted, and responsible AI development and deployment, align key priorities for AI development between the DoD and industry to help close the DoD’s AI capability gaps, and promote coordination between leading defense technology companies and nontraditional vendors to accelerate the DoD’s AI adoption efforts.

Defining AI

Artificial intelligence, machine learning, and big-data analytics

The term “artificial intelligence” encompasses an array of research approaches, techniques, and technologies spread across a wide range of fields, from computer science and engineering to medicine and philosophy.

The 2018 DoD AI Strategy defined AI as “the ability of machines to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence—for example, recognizing patterns, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making predictions, or taking action.”¹¹ This ability to execute tasks traditionally thought to be only possible by humans is central to many definitions of AI, although others are less proscriptive. The National Artificial Intelligence Act of 2020 merely describes AI as machine-based systems that can “make predictions, recommendations or decisions” for a given set of human-defined objectives.¹² Others have emphasized rationality, rather than fidelity to human performance, in their definitions of artificial intelligence.¹³

As the list of tasks that computers can perform at human or near-human levels continues to grow, the bar for what is considered “intelligent” rises, and the definition of AI evolves accordingly.¹⁴ The task of optical character recognition (OCR), for instance, once stood at the leading edge of AI research, but implementations of this technology, such as automated check processing, have long since become routine, and most experts would no longer consider such a system an example of artificial intelligence. This constant evolution of the definition is, in part, responsible for the confusion surrounding modern AI.¹⁵

This report adopts the Defense Innovation Board’s (DIB) definition by considering AI as “a variety of information processing techniques and technologies used to perform a goal-oriented task and the means to reason in the pursuit of that task.”¹⁶ These techniques, as the DIB explains, can include, but are not limited to, symbolic logic, expert systems, machine learning (ML), and hybrid systems. We use the term “AI” when referring to the broad range of relevant techniques and technologies, and “ML” when dealing with this subset of systems more specifically. For alternative conceptualizations, the 2019 RAND study on the DoD’s posture for AI offers a useful sample of relevant definitions put forth by federal, academic, and technical sources.¹⁷

Much of the progress made in AI over the past decade has come from ML, a modern AI paradigm that differs fundamentally from the human-driven expert systems that dominated in the past. Rather than following a traditional software-development process, in which programs are designed and then coded by human engineers, “machine learning systems use computing power to execute algorithms that learn from data.”¹⁸

Figure 1. The progression from, and variance among, big-data analytics, predictive big-data analytics, and
machine learning, three terms that are occasionally conflated in discussions of AI. Source: authors.

Three elements—algorithms, data, and computing power—are foundational to modern AI technologies, although their relative importance changes depending on particular methods used and, inherently, the trajectory of technological development.

Given that the availability of very large data sets has been critical to the development of ML and AI, it is worth noting that, while the fields of big-data analytics and AI are closely related, there are important differences between the two. Big-data analytics look for patterns, define and structure large sets of data, and attempt to gain insights, but are an essentially descriptive technique unable to make predictions or act on results. Predictive data analytics go a step further, and use collected data to make predictions based on historical information. Such predictive insights have been extremely useful in commercial settings such as marketing or business analytics, but the practice is nonetheless reliant on the assumption that future patterns will follow past trends, and depends on human data analysts to create and test assumptions, query the data, and validate patterns. Machine-learning systems, on the other hand, are able to autonomously generate assumptions, test those assumptions, and learn from them.¹⁹

ML is, therefore, a subset of AI techniques that have allowed researchers to tackle many problems previously considered impossible, with numerous promising applications across national security and defense, as discussed later in the report.

Limitations of AI

There are, however, important limitations and drawbacks to AI systems—particularly in operational environments—in large part, because of their brittleness. These systems perform well in stable simulation and training settings, but they can struggle to function reliably or correctly if the data inputs change, or if they encounter uncertain or novel situations.

ML systems are also particularly vulnerable to adversarial attacks aimed at the algorithms or data upon which the system relies. Even small changes to data sets or algorithms can cause the system to malfunction, reach wrong conclusions, or fail in other unpredictable ways.²⁰

Another challenge is that AI/ML systems do not typically have the capacity to explain their own reasoning, or the processes by which they reach certain conclusions, provide recommendations, and take action, in a way that is evident or understandable to humans. Explainability—or what some have referred to as interpretability—is critical for building trust in human-AI teams, and is especially important as advances in AI enable
greater autonomy in weapons, which raises serious ethical and legal concerns about human control, responsibility, and accountability for decisions related to the use of lethal force.

A related set of challenges includes transparency, traceability, and integrity of the data sources, as well as the prevention or detection of adversary attacks on the algorithms of AI-based systems. Having visibility into who trains these systems, what data are used in training, and what goes into an algorithm’s recommendations can mitigate unwanted bias and ensure these systems are used appropriately, responsibly, and ethically. All these challenges are inherently linked to the question of trust explored later in the report.

Figure 2. Understanding AI limitations. Source: Authors. Lower right icon created by Ranah Pixel Studio.

Military competition in AI innovation and adoption

Much of the urgency driving the DoD’s AI development and adoption efforts stems from the need to ensure the United States and its allies outpace China in the military-technological competition that has come to dominate the relationship between the two nations. Russia’s technological capabilities are far less developed,
but its aggression undermines global security and threatens US and NATO interests.

China

China has prioritized investment in AI for both defense and national security as part of its efforts to become a “world class military” and to gain advantage in future “intelligentized” warfare—in which AI (alongside other emerging technologies) is more completely integrated into military systems and operations through “networked, intelligent, and autonomous systems and equipment.”²¹

While the full scope of China’s AI-related activities is not widely known, an October 2021 review of three hundred and forty-three AI-related Chinese military contracts by the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) estimates that PLA “spends more than $1.6 billion each year on AI-related systems and equipment.”²² The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence’s (NSCAI) final report assessed that “China’s plans, resources, and progress should concern all Americans. It is an AI peer in many areas and an AI leader in some applications.”²³

CSET’s review and other open-source assessments reveal that China’s focus areas for AI development, like those of the United States, are broad, and include²⁴

intelligent and autonomous vehicles, with a particular focus on swarming technologies;
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR);
predictive maintenance and logistics;
information, cyber, and electronic warfare;
simulation and training (to include wargaming);
command and control (C2); and
automated target recognition.

Progress in each of these areas constitutes a challenge to the United States’ capacity to keep pace in a military-technological competition with China. However, it is worth examining China’s advancing capabilities in two areas that could have a particularly potent effect on the military balance.

Integration

First, AI can help the PLA bridge gaps in operational readiness by artificially enhancing military integration and cross-domain operations. Many observers have pointed to the PLA’s lack of operational experience in conflict as a critical vulnerability. As impressive as China’s advancing military modernization has been from a technological perspective, none of the PLA’s personnel have been tested under fire in a high-end conflict in the same ways as the US military over the last twenty years. The PLA’s continuing efforts to increase its “jointness” from an organizational and doctrinal standpoint is also nascent and untested.

The use of AI to improve the quality, fidelity, and complexity of simulations and wargames is one way the PLA is redressing this area of concern. A 2019 report by the Center for a New American Security observed that “[for] Chinese military strategists, among the lessons learned from AlphaGo’s victory was the fact that an AI could create tactics and stratagems superior to those of a human player in a game that can be compared to a wargame” that can more arduously test PLA decision-makers and improve upon command decision-making.²⁵ In fact, the CSET report found that six percent of the three hundred and forty-three contracts surveyed were for the use of AI in simulation and training, including use of AI systems to wargame a Taiwan contingency.²⁶

During the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DAPRA)’s AlphaDogfight Trials, an operational F-16 pilot flies in a virtual reality simulator against the champion F-16 AI agent developed by Heron Systems. The Heron AI agent defeated the human pilot in five straight dogfights to conclude the trials. Source: DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2020-08-26.

The focus on AI integration to reduce perceived vulnerabilities in experience also applies to operational and tactical training. In July 2021, the Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece publication Global Times reported that the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has started to deploy AI as simulated opponents in pilots’ aerial combat training to “hone their decision-making and combat skills against fast- calculating computers.”²⁷

Alongside virtual simulations, China is also aiming to use AI to support pilot training in real-world aircraft. In a China Central Television (CCTV) program that aired in November 2020, Zhang Hong, the chief designer of China’s L-15 trainer, noted that AI onboard training aircraft can “identify different habits each pilot has in flying. By managing them, we will let the pilots grow more safely and gain more combat capabilities in the future.”²⁸

Notably, the PLAAF’s July 2021 AI–human dogfight was similar to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) September 2020 AlphaDogFight Challenge in which an AI agent defeated a human pilot in a series of five simulated dogfights.²⁹ Similarly, the United States announced in September 2021 the award of a contract to training-and-simulation company Red 6 to integrate the company’s Airborne Tactical Augmented Reality System (ATARS)—which allows a pilot flying a real- world plane to train against AI-generated virtual aircraft using an augmented-reality headset—into the T-38 Talon trainer with plans to eventually install the system in fourth-generation aircraft.³⁰ AI-enabled training and simulation are, therefore, key areas in which the US military is in a direct competition with the PLA. As the Chinese military is leveraging AI to enhance readiness, the DoD cannot afford to fall behind.

Autonomy

A second area of focus for Chinese AI development is in autonomous systems, especially swarming technologies, in which several systems will operate independently or in conjunction with one another to confuse and overwhelm opponent defensive systems. China’s interests in, and capacity for, developing swarm technologies has been well demonstrated, including the then record-setting launch of one hundred and eighteen small drones in a connected swarm in June 2017.³¹

In September 2020, China Academy of Electronics and Information Technology (CAEIT) reportedly launched a swarm of two hundred fixed-wing CH- 901 loitering munitions from a modified Dongfeng Mengshi light tactical vehicle.³² A survey of the Unmanned Exhibition 2022 show in Abu Dhabi in February 2022 revealed not only a strong Chinese presence—both China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) and China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) had large pavilions—but also a focus on “collaborative” operations and intelligent swarming.³³

An example of collaborative swarming drones on display at the UMEX 2022 exhibition in Abu Dhabi in February. Source: Tate Nurkin.

This interest in swarming is not limited to uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs). China is also developing the ability to deploy swarms of autonomous uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs) to “intercept, besiege and expel invasive targets,” according to the Global Times.³⁴ In November 2021, Chinese company Yunzhou Tech—which in 2018 carried out a demonstration of a swarm of fifty-six USVs— released a video showing six USVs engaging in a “cooperative confrontation” as part of an effort to remove a crewed vessel from Chinese waters.³⁵

It is not difficult to imagine how such cooperative confrontation could be deployed against US or allied naval vessels, or even commercial ships, to develop or maintain sea control. This capability is especially powerful in a gray-zone contingency in which escalation concerns may limit response options.

Russia

Russia lags behind the United States and China in terms of investments and capabilities in AI. The sanctions imposed over the war in Ukraine are also likely to take a massive toll on Russia’s science and technology sector. That said, US national decision-makers should not discount Russia’s potential to use AI-enabled technologies in asymmetric ways to undermine US and NATO interests. The Russian
Ministry of Defense has numerous autonomy and AI-related programs at different stages of development and experimentation related to military robotics, unmanned systems, swarming technology, early-warning and air-defense systems, ISR, C2, logistics, electronic warfare, and information operations.³⁶

Russian military strategists see immense potential in greater autonomy and AI on future battlefields to speed up information processing, augment decision-making, enhance situational awareness, and safeguard the lives of Russian military personnel. The development and use of autonomous and AI-enabled systems are also discussed within the broader context of Russia’s military doctrine. Its doctrinal focus is on employing these technologies to disrupt and destroy the adversary’s command-and-control systems and communication capabilities, and use non-military means to establish information superiority during the initial period of war, which, from Russia’s perspective, encompasses periods of non-kinetic conflict with adversaries like the United States and NATO.³⁷

The trajectory of Russia’s AI development is uncertain. But, with continued sanctions, it is likely Russia will become increasingly dependent on China for microelectronics and fall further behind in the technological competition with the United States.

Overview of US military progress in AI

The Pentagon’s interest and urgency related to AI is due both to the accelerating pace of development of technology and, increasingly, the transformative capabilities it can enable. Indeed, AI is poised to fundamentally alter how militaries think about, prepare for, carry out, and sustain operations. Drawing on a previous Atlantic Council report outline, the “Five Revolutions” framework for classifying the potential impact of AI across five broad capability areas, Figure 3 below illustrates the different ways in which AI could augment human cognitive and physical capabilities, fuse networks and systems for optimal efficiency and performance, and usher in a new era of cyber conflict and chaos in the information space, among other effects.³⁸

The DoD currently has more than six hundred AI-related efforts in progress, with a vision to integrate AI into every element of the DoD’s mission—from warfighting operations to support and sustainment functions to the business operations and processes that undergird the vast DoD enterprise.³⁹ A February 2022 report by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found that the DoD is pursuing AI capabilities for warfighting that predominantly focus on “(1) recognizing targets through intelligence and surveillance analysis, (2) providing recommendations to operators on the battlefield (such as where to move troops or which weapon is best positioned to respond to a threat), and (3) increasing the autonomy of uncrewed systems.”⁴⁰ Most of the DoD’s AI capabilities, especially the efforts related to warfighting, are still in development, and not yet aligned with or integrated into specific systems. And, despite notable progress in experimentation and some experience with deploying AI-enabled capabilities in combat operations, there are still significant challenges ahead for wide-scale adoption.

In September 2021, the Air Force’s first chief software officer, Nicolas Chaillan, resigned in protest of the bureaucratic and cultural challenges that have slowed technology adoption and hindered the DoD from moving fast enough to effectively compete with China. In Chaillan’s view, in twenty years, the United States and its allies “will have no chance competing in a world where China has the drastic advantage in population.”⁴¹ Later, he added that China has essentially already won, saying, “Right now, it’s already a done deal.”⁴² Chaillan’s assessment of the United States engaged in a futile competition with China is certainly not shared across the DoD, but it reflects what many see as a lack of urgency within the risk-averse and ponderous culture of the department.

Lt. General Michael Groen, the head of the JAIC, agreed that “inside the department, there is a cultural change that has to occur.”⁴³ However, he also touted the innovative capacity of the United States and highlighted the establishment of an AI accelerator and the finalization of a Joint Common Foundation (JCF) for AI development, testing, and sharing of AI tools across DoD entities.⁴⁴ The cloud-enabled JCF is an important step forward that will allow for AI development based on common standards and architectures. This should help encourage sharing between the military services and DoD components and, according to the JAIC, ensure that “progress by one DoD AI initiative will build momentum across the entire DoD enterprise.”⁴⁵

Toward perfect situational awareness: Perception, processing, and cognition

Speeding up processing, integration, and visualization of large and complex datasets to improve situational awareness and
decision-making
Predictive analysis to anticipate likely contingencies or crises or pandemic outbreaks

Hyper-enabled platforms and people: Human and machine performance enhancement

Improving and making training more accessible and less costly and also improving the complexity and fidelity of simulations
and wargaming
Enhancing cognitive and physical capacities of humans
Human-machine teaming and symbiosis, including brain-computer interfaces and AI agents performing mundane tasks to allow humans to focus on mission management

The impending design age: Manufacturing, supply chain, and logistics

Enabling digital engineering, advanced manufacturing, and new supply chain management tools to speed up and reduce costs associated with defense production
Predictive maintenance to enhance platform and system readiness and increase efficiency of sustainment

Connectivity, lethality, and flexibility: Communication, navigation, targeting, and strike

Cognitive sensing, spectrum management, threat detection and categorization, cognitive electronic warfare
Autonomous systems
AI enabled or supported targeting
Swarms

Monitoring, manipulation, and weaponization: Cyber and information operations

Detecting and defending against cyber attacks and disinformation campaigns
Offensive cyber and information operations

While progress should be commended, obstacles remain that are slowing the adoption of AI capabilities critical to deterring threats in the near future, and to meeting China’s competitive challenges in this decade and beyond.

The three case studies below provide examples of the technological, bureaucratic, and adoption advancements that have occurred in DoD AI efforts. These cases also highlight the enduring issues hindering the United States’ ability to bring its national innovation ecosystem fully to bear in the intensifying military-technological competition with China and, to a lesser extent, Russia.

Figure 4: The stages of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center’s (JAIC’s) AI adoption journey. Source: JAIC, https://www.ai.mil/.

Use case 1: The irreversible momentum, grand ambition, and integration challenges of JADC2

Among the Pentagon’s most important modernization priorities is the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) program, described as a “concept to connect sensors from all the military services…into a single network.”⁴⁶ According to the Congressional Research Service, “JADC2 intends to enable commanders to make better decisions by collecting data from numerous sensors, processing the data using AI algorithms to identify targets, then recommending the optimal weapon—both kinetic and non-kinetic—to engage the target.”⁴⁷ If successful, JADC2 holds the potential to eliminate silos between service C2 networks that previously slowed the transfer of relevant information across the force and, as a result, generate more comprehensive situational awareness upon which commanders can make better and faster decisions.

Figure 5. The JADC2 Placemat reflects the complexity and ambition associated with the Department of Defense’s JADC2 Implementation Plan. Source: US Department of Defense.

AI is essential to this effort, and the DoD is exploring how best to safely integrate it into the JADC2 program.⁴⁸ In December 2021, reports emerged that the JADC2 cross-functional team (CTF) would start up an “AI for C2” working group, which will examine how to leverage responsible AI to enhance and accelerate command and control, reinforcing the centrality of responsible AI to the project.⁴⁹

In March 2022, the DoD released an unclassified version of its JADC2 Implementation Plan, a move that represented, in the words of General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “irreversible momentum toward implementing” JADC2.⁵⁰

However, observers have highlighted several persistent challenges to implementing JADC2 along the urgent timelines required to maintain (or regain) advantage in perception, processing, and cognition, especially vis-à-vis China.

Data security and cybersecurity, data-governance and sharing issues, interoperability with allies, and issues associated with integrating the service’s networks have all been cited as challenges with recognizing the ambitious promise of JADC2’s approach. Some have also highlighted that all- encompassing ambition as a challenge as well.
The Hudson Institute’s Bryan Clark and Dan Patt argue that “the urgency of today’s threats and the opportunities emerging from new technologies demand that Pentagon leaders flip JADC2’s focus from what the US military services want to what warfighters need.”⁵¹

To be sure, grand ambition is not necessarily something to be avoided in AI development and integration programs. However, pathways to adoption will need to balance difficult-to-achieve, bureaucratically entrenched, time-consuming, and expensive objectives with developing systems that can deliver capability and advantage along the more immediate threat timelines facing US forces.

Use case 2: Brittle AI and the ethics and safety challenges of integrating AI into targeting

Demonstrating that the age of deployed AI is indeed here, in September 2021 Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall announced that the Air Force had “deployed AI algorithms for the first time to a live operational kill chain.”⁵² According to Kendall, the objective of incorporating AI into the targeting process is to “significantly reduce the manpower-intensive tasks of manually identifying targets— shortening the kill chain and accelerating the speed of decision-making.”⁵³ The successful use of AI to support targeting constitutes a milestone for AI development, though there remain ethical, safety, and technical challenges to more complete adoption of AI in this role.

For example, a 2021 DoD test highlighted the problem of brittle AI. According to reporting from Defense One, the AI-enabled targeting used in the test was accurate only about 25 percent of the time in environments in which the AI had to decipher data from different angles—though it believed it was accurate 90 percent of the time—revealing a lack of ability “to adapt to conditions outside of a narrow set of assumptions.”⁵⁴ These results illustrate the limitations of today’s AI technology in security-critical settings, and reinforce the need for aggressive and extensive real-world and digital-world testing and evaluation of AI under a range of conditions.

The ethics and safety of AI targeting could also constitute a challenge to further adoption, especially as confidence in AI algorithms grows. The Air Force operation involved automated target recognition in a supporting role, assisting “intelligence professionals”—i.e., human decision-makers.⁵⁵ Of course, DoD has a rigorous targeting procedure in place, of which AI-enabled targeting algorithms would be a part, and that, thinking further ahead, autonomous systems would have to go through. Still, even as they are part of this process and designed to support human decisions, a high error rate combined with a high level of confidence in AI outputs could potentially lead to undesirable or grave outcomes.

Use case 3: The limits of AI adoption in the information domain

Intensifying competition with China and Russia is increasingly playing out in the information and cyber domains with real, enduring, and disruptive implications for US security, as well as the US economy, society, and polity.

For cyber and information operations, AI technologies and techniques are central to the future of both offensive and defensive operations, highlighting both the peril and promise of AI in the information domain.

Concern is growing about the threat of smart bots, synthetic media such as deepfakes—realistic video or audio productions that depict events or statements that did not take place—and large- language models that can create convincing prose and text.⁵⁶ And, these are just the emerging AI-enabled disinformation weapons that can be conceived of today. While disinformation is a challenge that requires a societal and whole-of-government response, DoD will undoubtably play a key role in managing and responding to this threat— due to its prominence in US politics and society, the nature of its functional role, and the impact of its ongoing activities.

AI is at the forefront of Pentagon and other US government efforts to detect bots and synthetic media. DARPA’s MediaForensics (MediFor) program is using AI algorithms to “automatically quantify the integrity of an image or video,” for example.⁵⁷

Still, there is concern about the pace at which this detection happens, given the speed of diffusion of synthetic media via social media. As Lt. General Dennis Crall, the Joint Staff’s chief information officer, observed, “the speed at which machines and AI won some of these information campaigns changes the game for us…digital transformation, predictive analytics, ML, AI, they are changing the game…and if we don’t match that speed, we will make it to the right answer and that the right answer will be completely irrelevant.”⁵⁸

Accelerating DoD AI adoption

As the discussion above illustrates, the DoD has a broad set of AI-related initiatives across different stages of development and experimentation, building on the successful deployment of AI-enabled information-management and decision-support tools. As the focus shifts toward integration and scaling, accelerating these adoption efforts is critical for maintaining US advantage in the strategic competition against China, as well as effectively containing Russia.

In this section, the paper highlights some of the incongruencies in the relationship between the DoD and its industry partners that may cause lost opportunities for innovative and impactful AI projects, the positive impact of expanding the use of alternative acquisition methods, and the growing urgency to align processes and timelines to ensure that the US military has access to high- caliber technological capabilities for future warfare. Additionally, this section discusses the DoD’s approach to implementing ethical AI principles, and issues related to standards and testing of trusted and responsible systems.

DoD and industry partnerships: Aligning perspectives, processes, and timelines

Although the DoD has issued a number of high-level documents outlining priority areas for AI development and deployment, the market’s ability to meet, or even understand, these needs is far from perfect. A recent IBM survey of two hundred and fifty technology leaders from global defense organizations reveals some important differences in how defense-technology leaders and the DoD view the value of AI for the organization and the mission.⁵⁹ For instance, only about one-third of the technology leaders surveyed said they see significant potential value in AI for military logistics, medical and health services, and information operations and deepfakes. When asked about the potential value of AI-enabled solutions to business and other noncombat applications, less than one-third mentioned maintenance, procurement, and human resources.⁶⁰

These views are somewhat incongruent with the DoD’s goals in AI. For example, military logistics and sustainment functions that encompass equipment maintenance and procurement are among the top DoD priorities for implementing AI. Leidos’ work with the Department of Veterans Affairs also illustrates the potential of AI in medical and health services.⁶¹ Finally, with the use of AI in disinformation campaigns already under way, and as the discussion in the previous section highlights, there is an urgent need to develop technical measures and AI-enabled tools for detecting and countering AI-powered information operations.⁶²

The DoD and its industry partners have different priorities and incentives based on their respective problem sets and missions. But, divergent perspectives on valuable and critical areas for AI development could result in lost opportunities for impactful AI projects. That said, even when the Pentagon and its industry partners see eye to eye on AI, effective collaboration is often thwarted by a clumsy bureaucracy that is too often tethered to legacy processes, structures, and cultures.

The DoD’s budget planning, procurement, acquisition, and contracting processes are, by and large, not designed for buying software. These institutional barriers, coupled with the complex and protracted software-development and compliance regulations, are particularly hard on small startups and nontraditional vendors that lack the resources, personnel, and prior knowledge required to navigate the system in the same way that defense primes do.⁶³

The DoD is well aware of these challenges. Since 2015, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military services have set up several entities—such as DIU, AFWERX, NavalX, and Army Applications Laboratory—to interface with the commercial technology sector, especially startups and nontraditional vendors, with the aim of accelerating the delivery of best-in-class technology solutions. Concurrently, the DoD has taken other notable steps to promote the use of alternative authorities for acquisition and contracting, which provide greater flexibility to structure and execute agreements than traditional procurement.⁶⁴ These include “other transaction authorities, middle-tier acquisitions, rapid prototyping and rapid fielding, and specialized pathways for software acquisition.”⁶⁵

The DIU has been at the forefront of using some of these alternative acquisition pathways to source AI solutions from the commercial technology sector. The Air Force’s AFWERX has also partnered with the Air Force Research Lab and the National Security Innovation Network to make innovative use of the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) funding to “increase the efficiency, effectiveness, and transition rate” of programs.⁶⁶ In June 2021, for instance, the USAF SBIR/STTR AI Pitch Day awarded more than $18 million to proposals on the topic of “trusted artificial intelligence, which indicates systems are safe, secure, robust, capable, and effective.”⁶⁷

These are steps in the right direction, and it has indeed become easier to receive DoD funding for research, development, and prototyping. Securing timely funding for production, however, remains a major challenge. This “valley of death” problem—the gap between the research-and-development phase and an established, funded program of record—is particularly severe for nontraditional defense firms, because of the disparity between venture-capital funding cycles for startups and how long it takes to get a program into the DoD budget.⁶⁸

The Pentagon understands that bridging the “valley of death” is crucial for advancing and scaling innovation, and has recently launched the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve to deal with these issues.⁶⁹ Still, the systematic changes necessary to align budget planning, acquisition, and contracting processes with the pace of private capital require congressional action and could take years to implement. Delays in implementing such reforms are undermining the DoD’s ability to access cutting-edge technology that could prove essential on future battlefields.

Building trusted and responsible AI systems

Ensuring that the US military can field safe and reliable AI-enabled and autonomous systems and use them in accordance with international humanitarian law will help the United States maintain its competitive advantage against authoritarian countries, such as China and Russia, that are less committed to ethical use of AI. An emphasis on trustworthy AI is also crucial because the majority of the DoD’s AI programs entails elements of human-machine teaming and collaboration, and their successful implementation depends, in large part, on operators trusting the system enough to use it. Finally, closer coordination between DoD and industry partners on shared standards and testing requirements for trustworthy and responsible AI is critical for moving forward with DoD AI adoption.

Alongside the DoD’s existing weapons-review and targeting procedures, including protocols for autonomous weapons systems, the department is also looking to address the ethical, legal, and policy ambiguities and risks raised more specifically by AI.⁷⁰ In February 2020, the Pentagon adopted five ethical principles to guide the development and use of AI, calling for AI that is responsible, equitable, traceable, reliable, and governable. Looking to put these principles into practice, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks issued a memorandum directing a “holistic, integrated, and disciplined approach” for integrating responsible AI (RAI) across six tenets: governance, warfighter trust, product-and-acquisition lifecycle, requirements validation, responsible AI ecosystem, and AI workforce.⁷¹ While JAIC was tasked with the implementation of the RAI strategy, it is unclear how this effort will unfold now that it has been integrated into the new CDAO office.

Meanwhile, in November 2021, the DIU released its responsible-AI guidelines, responding to the memo’s call for “tools, policies, processes, systems, and guidance” that integrate the ethical AI principles into the department’s acquisition policies.⁷² These guidelines are a tangible step toward operationalizing and implementing ethics in DoD AI programs, building on DIU’s experience working on AI solutions in areas such as predictive health, underwater autonomy, predictive maintenance, and supply-chain analysis. They are meant to be actionable, adaptive, and useful while ensuring that AI vendors, DoD stakeholders, and DIU program managers take fairness, accountability, and transparency into account during the planning, development, and deployment phases of the AI system lifecycle.⁷³

The success of the DoD’s AI programs will depend, in large part, on ensuring that humans develop and maintain the appropriate level of trust in their intelligent-machine teammates. The DoD’s emphasis on trusted AI is, therefore, increasingly echoed throughout some of its flagship AI projects. In August 2020, for instance, DARPA’s Air Combat Evolution (ACE) program attracted a great deal of attention when an AI system beat one of the Air Force’s top F-16 fighter pilots in a simulated aerial dogfight contest.⁷⁴ Rather than pitting humans against machines, a key question for ACE is “how to get the pilots to trust the AI enough to use it.”⁷⁵ ACE selected the dogfight scenario, in large part, because this type of air-to-air combat encompasses many of the basic flight maneuvers necessary for becoming a trusted wing-mate within the fighter-pilot community. Getting the AI to master the basic flight maneuvers that serve as the foundation to more complex tasks, such as suppression of enemy air defenses or escorting friendly aircraft, is only one part of the equation.⁷⁶ The AlphaDogfight Trials, according to the ACE program manager, are “all about increasing trust in AI.”⁷⁷

AI development is moving fast, making it difficult to design and implement a regulatory structure that is sufficiently flexible to remain relevant without being so restrictive that it stifles innovation. Companies working with the DoD are seeking guidelines for the development, deployment, use, and maintenance of AI systems compliant with the department’s ethical principles for AI. Many of these industry partners have adopted their own frameworks for trusted and responsible AI solutions, highlighting attributes such as safety, security, robustness, resilience, accountability, transparency, traceability, auditability, explainability, fairness, and other related qualities.⁷⁸ That said, there are important divergences in risk- management approaches, organizational policies, bureaucratic processes, performance benchmarks, and standards for integrating trustworthiness considerations across the AI system lifecycle.

Currently, there are no shared technical standards for what constitutes ethical or trustworthy AI systems, which can make it difficult for nontraditional AI vendors to set expectations and

navigate the bureaucracy. The DoD is not directly responsible for setting standards. Rather, the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) expanded the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) mission “to include advancing collaborative frameworks, standards, guidelines for AI, supporting the development of a risk mitigation framework for AI systems, and supporting the development of technical standards and guidelines to promote trustworthy AI systems.”⁷⁹ In July 2021, the NIST issued a request for information from stakeholders as it develops its AI Risk Management Framework, meant to help organizations “incorporate trustworthiness considerations into the design, development, use, and evaluation of AI products, services, and systems.”⁸⁰

A US Army soldier uses the tactical robotic controller to control the expeditionary modular autonomous vehicle as a practice exercise in preparation for Project Convergence at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, on October 19, 2021. During Project Convergence 21, soldiers experimented with using this vehicle for semi-autonomous reconnaissance and re-supply. Both on and beyond the battlefield, trust in AI-enabled capabilities like autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles is crucial to success. Source: US Army photo by Sgt. Marita Schwab, US Army flickr. https://www.flickr.com/photos/35703177@ N00/51690959553/

There are no easy solutions to this challenge. But, a collaborative process that engages stakeholders across government, industry, academia, and civil society could help prevent AI development from going down the path of social media, where public policy failed to anticipate and was slow to respond to the risks and damages caused by disinformation and other malicious activity on these platforms.

Related to standards are the challenges linked to testing, evaluation, verification, and validation (TEVV). Testing and verification processes are meant to “help decision-makers and operators understand and manage the risks of developing, producing, operating, and sustaining AI-enabling systems,” and are essential for building trust
in AI.⁸¹ The DoD’s current TEVV protocols and infrastructure are meant primarily for major defense acquisition programs like ships, airplanes, or tanks; it is linear, sequential, and, ultimately, finite once the program transitions to production and deployment. With AI systems, however, “development is never really finished, so neither is testing.”⁸² Adaptive, continuously learning emerging technologies like AI, therefore, require a more agile and iterative development-and-testing approach—one that, as the NSCAI recommended, “integrates testing as a continuous part of requirements specification, development, deployment, training, and maintenance and includes run-time monitoring of operational behavior.”⁸³

An integrated and automated approach to development and testing, which builds upon the commercial best practice of development, security, and operations (DevSecOps), is much better suited for AI/ML systems. While the JAIC’s JCF has the potential to enable a true AI DevSecOps approach, scaling such efforts across the DoD is a major challenge because it requires significant changes to the current testing infrastructure, as well as more resources such as bandwidth, computing support, and technical personnel. That said, failing to develop new testing methods better suited to AI, and not adapting the current testing infrastructure to support iterative testing, will stymie efforts to integrate and adopt trusted and responsible AI at scale.

The above discussion of standards and TEVV encapsulates the unique challenges modern AI systems pose to existing DoD frameworks and processes, as well as the divergent approaches commercial technology companies and the DoD take to AI development, deployment, use, and maintenance. To accelerate AI adoption, the DoD and its industry partners need to better align on concrete, realistic, operationally relevant standards and performance requirements, testing processes, and evaluation metrics that incorporate ethical AI principles. A defense-technology ecosystem oriented around trusted and responsible AI could promote the cross-pollination of best practices and lower the bureaucratic and procedural barriers faced by nontraditional vendors and startups.

Key takeaways and recommendations

Fully exploiting AI’s capacity to drive efficiencies in cost and time, support human decision-makers, and enable autonomy will require more than technological advancement or development of novel operational concepts. Below, we outline three key areas of prioritized effort necessary to more successfully integrate AI across the DoD enterprise and ensure the United States is able to deter threats and maintain a strategic, operational, and tactical advantage over its competitors and potential adversaries.

Prioritize safe, secure, trusted, and responsible AI development and deployment

The intensifying strategic competition with China, the promise of exquisite technological and operational capabilities, and repeated comparisons to the rapid pace of technology development and integration in the private sector are all putting pressure on the DoD to move faster toward fielding AI systems. There is much to gain from encouraging greater risk tolerance in AI development to enable progress toward adopting AI at scale. But, rushing to field AI-enabled systems that are vulnerable to
a range of adversary attacks, and likely to fail in an operational environment, simply to “one-up” China will prove counterproductive.

The ethical code that guides the US military reflects a fundamental commitment to abiding with the laws of war at a time when authoritarian countries like China and Russia show little regard for human rights and humanitarian principles. Concurrently, the DoD’s rigorous approach to testing and assurance of new capabilities is designed to ensure that new weapons are used responsibly and appropriately, and to minimize the risk from accidents, misuse, and abuse of systems and capabilities that can have dangerous, or even catastrophic, effects. These values and principles that the United States shares with many of its allies and partners are a strategic asset in the competition against authoritarian countries as they field AI-enabled military systems. To cement the DoD’s advantage in this arena, we recommend the following steps.

The DoD should integrate DIU’s Responsible AI Guidelines into relevant requests for proposals, solicitations, and other materials that require contractors to demonstrate how their AI products and solutions implement the DoD’s AI ethical principles. This will set a common and clear set of expectations, helping nontraditional AI vendors and startups navigate the Pentagon’s proposal process. There is recent precedent of the DoD developing acquisition categories for programs that required industry to pivot its development process to meet evolving DoD standards. In September 2020, for example, the US Air Force developed the e-series acquisition designation for all procurement efforts that required vendors to use digital engineering practices—rather than building prototypes—as part of their bid to incentivize industry to embrace digital engineering.⁸⁴
DoD industry partners, especially nontraditional AI vendors, should actively engage with NIST as the institute continues its efforts to develop standards and guidelines to promote trustworthy AI systems, to ensure their perspectives inform subsequent frameworks.
Among the challenges to effective AI adoption referenced in this paper were brittle AI and the potential for adversary cyberattacks designed to corrupt the data on which AI algorithms are based. Overcoming these challenges will require a continued commitment within the DoD to increase the speed, variety, and capability of test and evaluation of DoD AI systems to ensure that these AI systems function as intended under a broader range of different environments. Some of this testing will need to take place in real-world environments, but advances in model-based simulations can allow for an increasing amount of validation of AI system performance in the digital/virtual world, reducing the costs and timelines associated with this testing.
Moreover, the DoD should also leverage the under secretary of defense for research and engineering’s (USDR&E) testing practices and priorities to ensure planned and deployed AI systems are hardened against adversary attacks, including data pollution and algorithm corruption.
The DoD should leverage allies and foreign partners to develop, deploy, and adopt trusted AI. Engagement of this nature is vital for coordination on common norms for AI development and use that contain and counter China and Russia’s authoritarian technology models. Pathways for expanding existing cooperation modes and building new partnerships can include the following.

Enhancing an emphasis on ethical, safe, and responsible AI as part of the JAIC’s Partnership for Defense, through an assessment of commonalities and differences in the members’ approaches to identify concrete opportunities for future joint projects and cooperation.
Cross-sharing and implementing joint ethics programs with Five Eyes, NATO, and AUKUS partners.⁸⁵ In addition to supporting interoperability, this will add a diversity of perspectives and experiences, as well as help to ensure that AI development efforts limit various forms of bias. As one former general officer interviewed for this project noted, “diversity is how we ensure reliability. It is essential.”⁸⁶
Broadening outreach to allies and partners of varying capabilities and geographies, including India, South Africa, Vietnam, and Taiwan, to explore opportunities for bilateral and multilateral research-and-development efforts and technology-sharing programs that address the technical attributes of trusted and responsible AI.⁸⁷

Align key priorities for AI development and strengthen coordination between the DoD and industry partners to help close DoD AI capability gaps.

The DoD will not be able to fulfill its ambitions in AI and compete effectively with the Chinese model of sourcing technology innovation through military- civil fusion without close partnerships with a broad range of technology companies. This includes defense-industry leaders with long-standing ties to the Pentagon, technology giants at the forefront of global innovation, commercial technology players seeking to expand their government portfolio, and startups at the cutting edge of AI development. But, the DoD’s budget-planning, procurement, acquisition, contracting, and compliance processes will likely need to be fundamentally restructured to effectively engage with the entirety of this vibrant and diverse technology ecosystem.

Systemic change is a slow, arduous process. But, delaying this transition risks the US military falling behind on exploiting the advantages AI promises to deliver, from operational speed to decision dominance. In the meantime, the following actions could help improve coordination with industry partners to accelerate the DoD’s AI adoption efforts.

The DoD should assess its communications and outreach strategy to clarify and streamline messaging around the department’s priorities in AI.
The DoD should partner with technology companies to reexamine their assessments regarding the potential value of AI solutions in certain categories, including, but not limited to, logistics, medical and health services, and information operations.
The DoD should implement the NSCAI’s recommendation to accelerate efforts to train acquisition professionals on the full range of available options for acquisition and contracting, and incentivize their use for AI and digital technologies.”⁸⁸ Moreover, such acquisition- workforce training initiatives should ensure that acquisition professionals have a sufficient understanding of the DoD’s ethical principles for AI and the technical dimensions of trusted and responsible AI. The DIU’s ethical guidelines can serve as the foundation for this training.

The DoD should implement the NSCAI’s recommendation to accelerate efforts to train acquisition professionals on the full range of available options for acquisition and contracting, and incentivize their use for AI and digital technologies.”88 Moreover, such acquisition- workforce training initiatives should ensure that acquisition professionals have a sufficient understanding of the DoD’s ethical principles for AI and the technical dimensions of trusted and responsible AI. The DIU’s ethical guidelines can serve as the foundation for this training.

Promote coordination between leading defense technology companies and nontraditional vendors to accelerate DoD AI adoption.

Rather than building entirely new AI-enabled systems, in the short to medium term, the DoD will be integrating AI into a range of existing software and hardware systems—from cyberdefense architectures to fighter jets to C2. Progress toward implementing AI will, therefore, also depend upon streamlining collaboration between the startups and nontraditional AI vendors that the DoD has been courting for their innovative and cutting-edge technologies and the defense primes responsible for integrating new capabilities into legacy systems.

The NSCAI recommends identifying “new opportunities for defense primes to team with non-traditional firms to adopt AI capabilities more quickly across existing platforms.”⁸⁹ We echo this recommendation: improved coordination between defense primes and nontraditional firms can help ensure AI solutions are robust, resilient, and operationally relevant, as well as usher promising prototypes through the “valley of death.”

Without a doubt, moving from concept to practice can be tricky. This paper’s research revealed a significant disconnect in perspectives on where the main challenges to moving innovative new technologies from the lab to adoption in programs of record reside. Startups tend to view system integrators as resistant to engaging, while startups may be viewed as lacking understanding of the
acquisition process and of developing technologies that are difficult to integrate into, or scale for, programs of record.⁹⁰

Bridging this gap will require new government approaches to resolving concerns of nontraditional suppliers around intellectual property. Most are reticent to give ownership of sensitive technologies that are sold largely to customers outside the defense market. It will also involve the DoD helping small businesses navigate the federal acquisition process through steps such as speeding up cyber certification and the Authority To Operate (ATO) process, as well as helping interesting companies develop use cases for different components of the DoD. Such proactive facilitation will help nontraditional suppliers that have worked with DoD through research-and-development grants come to a partnership with systems integrators more prepared.

Most importantly, optimizing the benefits of both large systems integrators and smaller innovators will require the DoD to play a more active interlocutor role in connecting small companies with those that are running programs of record. There is currently some understandable hesitancy for the DoD to demand that companies work together, largely for fear of running afoul of Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). But, as one industry expert interviewed for this project argued, the DoD could be more aggressive in understanding what is permissible under the FAR and helping companies connect, especially to meet a specific acquisition priority or program.

Conclusion

Over the last several years, interest and investment in AI have gained momentum. This is especially true in the national security and defense community, as strategists, policymakers, and executives seek decisive advantages amid rising geostrategic competition and prepare for future operating environments characterized by complexity, uncertainty, and, most importantly, speed. AI is now at the center of military-technological competition between the United States and China, and both countries, as well as other militaries throughout the world, are already deploying AI-enabled systems with the goal of dominating the battlefield of the future.

The United States cannot risk falling behind China— not in AI innovation, not in AI adoption, and not in the full-scale integration of AI across the national defense enterprise. Urgency is required in addressing the range of technical and bureaucratic processes, and cultural issues that have, to date, dampened the pace of AI adoption within the DoD. Specifically, the DoD should prioritize the following.

Building trust in AI: Rather than replacing humans, DoD AI efforts are primarily centered on technologies that augment human understanding, decision-making, and performance. Building trust and confidence between humans and their intelligent-machine teammates is, therefore, a critical aspect of the successful development and deployment of military AI.
Developing and implementing standards for trusted and responsible AI: Currently, there are no commonly held standards or system- performance requirements for what constitutes trusted and responsible AI. The Pentagon and its industry partners must, therefore, work collaboratively with bodies like NIST to develop and implement operationally relevant standards, testing processes, and evaluation metrics that incorporate ethical, trustworthy, and responsible AI principles. This will help advance successful AI research prototypes into production-ready solutions.
Facilitating the optimization of the US innovation ecosystem and defense industrial base: Bringing cutting-edge AI technologies into the DoD also requires the Pentagon to reduce the bureaucratic challenges frequently associated with the DoD acquisition process, especially for innovative companies that are outside the traditional defense-industrial base. Developing new means of supporting and incentivizing engagement of these companies and promoting intra-industry partnerships between leading defense-technology companies and startups and nontraditional suppliers will be crucial.
Engaging allies and partners: As noted at the outset of this paper, the war in Ukraine has reinforced the importance of allies and partners in enforcing geopolitical norms and standards. The same is likely to be true of the future of AI development and adoption. The DoD will benefit not only from collaboration across industry and the national security community, but also with allies and foreign partners to ensure establishment and promulgation of norms and standards that will enable trusted, responsible, and interoperable AI development and deployment.

Acknowledgments

This report is the culmination of an eight-month research project on the national security and defense implications of AI, conducted under the supervision of FD Deputy Director Clementine Starling and Assistant Director Christian Trotti, and enabled by research and editing support from FD Young Global Professionals Timothy Trevor and Caroline Steel. It is made possible through the generous support of Accrete AI.

To produce this report, the authors conducted a number of interviews and consultations. They list alphabetically below, with gratitude, some of the individuals consulted and whose insights informed this report. The analysis and recommendations presented in this report are those of the authors alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of the individuals consulted. Moreover, the named individuals participated in a personal, not institutional, capacity.

Mr. Prashant Bhuyan, Founder and CEO, Accrete AI
Gen James Cartwright, USMC (Ret.), Board Director, Atlantic Council; Former Vice Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff; Former Commander, US Strategic Command
Mr. Jonathan Doyle, Partner, Axion Partners
Mr. Brian Drake, Federal Chief Technology Officer, Accrete AI
Ms. Evanna Hu, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Mr. Ron Keesing, Senior Vice President for Technology Integration, Leidos
Mr. Stephen Rodriguez, Senior Advisor, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

The authors would also like to thank the following individuals for their peer review of various drafts of this report, listed below in alphabetical order. The analysis and recommendations presented in this report are those of the authors alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of the peer reviewers. Moreover, the named individuals participated in a personal, not institutional, capacity.

Gen James Cartwright, USMC (Ret.), Board Director, Atlantic Council; Former Vice Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff; Former Commander, US Strategic Command
Mr. Jonathan Doyle, Partner, Axion Partners
Mr. Brian Drake, Federal Chief Technology Officer, Accrete AI
Ms. Evanna Hu, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Mr. Justin Lynch, Director, Research and Analysis, Special Competitive Studies Project
Ms. Kelley Sayler, Analyst, Advanced Technology and Global Security, Congressional Research Service

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1 Katrina Manson, “US Has Already Lost AI Fight to China, Says Ex-Pentagon Software Chief,” Financial Times, October 10, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/f939db9a-40af-4bd1-b67d-10492535f8e0.

2 2 Yuna Huh Wong, et al., Deterrence in the Age of Thinking Machines, RAND, 2020, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2700/RR2797/RAND_RR2797.pdf

3 Maureen Thompson, “Utilizing Semi-Autonomous Resupply to Mitigate Risks to Soldiers on the Battlefield,” Army Futures Command, October 26, 2021, https://www.army.mil/article/251476/utilizing_semi_autonomous_resupply_to_mitigate_risks_to_soldiers_on_the_battlefield.

4 Amy Hudson, “AI Efforts Gain Momentum as US, Allies and Partners Look to Counter China,” Air Force Magazine, July 13, 2021, https://www.airforcemag.com/dods-artificial-intelligence-efforts-gain-momentum-as-us-allies-and-partners-look-to-counter-china.

5 On AI and the strategic competition, see: Michael C. Horowitz, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power,” Texas National Security Review 1, 3 (May 2018), https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/65638/TNSR-Vol-1-Iss-3_Horowitz.pdf; Michael C. Horowitz, et al., “Strategic Competition in an Era of Artificial Intelligence,” Center for National Security, July 2018, http://files.cnas.org.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/CNAS-Strategic-Competition-in-an-Era-of-AI-July-2018_v2.pdf.

6 Ryan Fedasiuk, Jennifer Melot, and Ben Murphy, “Harnessed Lightning: How the Chinese Military is Adopting Artificial Intelligence,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University, October 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/harnessed-lightning.

7 C. Todd Lopez, “Ethics Key to AI Development, Austin Says,” DOD News, July 14, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/ Article/2692297/ethics-key-to-ai-development-austin-says/.

8 Danielle C. Tarraf, et al., The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence: Assessment and Recommendations, RAND, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4229.html.

9 Brian Drake, “A To-Do List for the Pentagon’s New AI Chief,” Defense One, December 14, 2021, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/12/list- pentagons-new-ai-chief/359757.

10 Valerie Insinna, “Silicon Valley Warns the Pentagon: ‘Time Is Running Out,’” Breaking Defense, December 21, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/12/silicon-valley-warns-the-pentagon-time-is-running-out.

11 11. “Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy: Harnessing AI to Advance Our Security and Prosperity,” US Department of Defense, 2018, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDF.

12 “12. Artificial Intelligence,” US Department of State, accessed May 4, 2022, https://www.state.gov/artificial-intelligence.

13 13. Stuart J. Russell and Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, Fourth Edition (Hoboken, NJ: Pearson, 2021), 1. For further definitions of AI, see, for example: Nils J. Nilsson, The Quest for Artificial Intelligence: A History of Ideas and Achievements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Shane Legg and Marcus Hutter, “A Collection of Definitions of Intelligence,” Dalle Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence, June 15, 2007, https://arxiv.org/pdf/0706.3639.pdf.

14 14. Robert W. Button, Artificial Intelligence and the Military, RAND, September 7, 2017, https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/09/artificial-intelligence-and- the-military.html.

15 15. Ibid.

16 16. “AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use of Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense,” Defense Innovation Board, October 2019, https://admin.govexec.com/media/dib_ai_principles_-supporting_document-embargoed_copy(oct_2019).pdf.

17 17. Danielle C. Tarraf, William Shelton, Edward Parker, Brien Alkire, Diana Gehlhaus, Justin Grana, Alexis Levedahl, Jasmin Léveillé, Jared Mondschein, James Ryseff, et al., The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence, RAND, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4229.html

18 18. Ben Buchanan, “The AI Triad and What It Means for National Security Strategy,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University, August 2020, iii, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/the-ai-triad-and-what-it-means-for-national-security-strategy.

19 19. Ibid.

20 20. Alexey Kurakin, Ian Goodfellow, and Samy Bengio, “Adversarial Machine Learning at Scale,” Arxiv, Cornell University, February 2017, https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.01236.

21 21. Fedasiuk, Melot, and Murphy, “Harnessed Lightning,” 4.

22 22. Ibid., iv.

23 23. “Final Report,” National Security Commission on AI, 2021, https://www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf.

24 24. Fedasiuk, Melot, and Murphy, “Harnessed Lightning,” 13.

25 25. Elsa Kania, “Learning Without Fighting: New Developments in PLA Artificial Intelligence War-Gaming,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, 19, 7 (2019), https://jamestown.org/program/learning-without-fighting-new-developments-in-pla-artificial-intelligence-war-gaming.

26 26. Fedasiuk, Melot, and Murphy, “Harnessed Lightning,” 22–23.

27 27. Liu Xuanzun, “PLA Deploys AI in Mock Warplane Battles, ‘Trains Both Pilots and Ais,’” Global Times, June 14, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/ page/202106/1226131.shtml.

28 28. Liu Xuanzun, “China’s Future Fighter Trainer Could Feature AI to Boost Pilot’s Combat Capability: Top Designer,” Global Times, November 16, 2020, http://en.people.cn/n3/2020/1116/c90000-9780437.html.

29 29. Joseph Trevithick, “Chinese Pilots Are Also Dueling With AI Opponents in Simulated Dogfights and Losing: Report,” Drive, June 18, 2021, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/41152/chinese-pilots-are-also-dueling-with-ai-opponents-in-simulated-dogfights-and-losing-report.

30 30. “Red 6 to Continue Support ATARS Integration into USAF T-38 Talon,” Air Force Technology, February 3, 2022, https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/red-6-atars-integration.

31 31. Xiang Bo, “China Launches Record Breaking Drone Swarm,” XinhuaNet, June 11, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017- 06/11/c_136356850.htm.

32 32. David Hambling, “China Releases Video Of New Barrage Swarm Drone Launcher,” Forbes, October 14, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2020/10/14/china-releases-video-of-new-barrage-swarm-drone-launcher/?sh=29b76fa12ad7.

33 33. An author of this paper attended the exhibition.

34 Cao Siqi, “Unmanned High-Speed Vessel Achieves Breakthrough in Dynamic Cooperative Confrontation Technology: Developer,” Global Times, November 28, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202111/1240135.shtml.

35 35. Ibid.

36 36. Jeffrey Edmonds, et al., “Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy in Russa,” CNA, May 2021, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/centers/CNA/sppp/rsp/ russia-ai/Russia-Artificial-Intelligence-Autonomy-Putin-Military.pdf.

37 37. “Advanced Military Technology in Russia,” Chatham House, September 2021, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/advanced-military- technology-russia/06-military-applications-artificial-intelligence.

38 38. Tate Nurkin, The Five Revolutions: Examining Defense Innovation in the Indo-Pacific, Atlantic Council, November 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-five-revolutions-examining-defense-innovation-in-the-indo-pacific-region.

39 39. Hudson, “AI Efforts Gain Momentum as US, Allies and Partners Look to Counter China.”

40 40. “Artificial Intelligence: Status of Developing and Acquiring,” US Government Accountability Office, February 2022, 17, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104765.pdf.

41 41. Nicolas Chaillan, “Its Time to Say Goodbye,” LinkedIn, September 2, 2021, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/time-say-goodbye-nicolas-m-chaillan.

42 42. Manson, “US Has Already Lost AI Fight to China, Says Ex-Pentagon Software Chief.”

43 43. Patrick Tucker, “Pentagon AI Chief Responds to USAF Software Leader Who Quit in Frustration,” Defense One, October 26, 2021, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2021/10/pentagon-ai-chief-responds-usaf-software-leader-who-quit-frustration/186368.

44 44. Ibid.

45 45. “AI Adoption Journey,” Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, https://www.ai.mil/#:~:text=The%20JAIC’s%20Joint%20Common%20Foundation%20
%28JCF%29%20is%20a,will%20build%20momentum%20across%20the%20entire%20DoD%20enterprise.

46 46. Jackson Bennett, “2021 in Review: JADC2 Has Irreversible Momentum, but What Does That Mean?” FedScoop, December 29, 2021, https://www.fedscoop.com/2021-in-review-jadc2-has-irreversible-momentum.

47 47. “Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) In Focus Briefing,” Congressional Research Service, January 21, 2022.

48 48. Ibid.

49 49. Jackson Bennett, “JADC2 Cross Functional Team to Stand Up AI-Focused Working Group,” FedScoop, December 16, 2021, https://www.fedscoop.com/jadc2-cft-stands-up-ai-working-group.

50 50. “DoD Announces Release of JADC2 Implementation Plan,” US Department of Defense, press release, March 17, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2970094/dod-announces-release-of-jadc2-implementation-plan.

51 51. Bryan Clark and Dan Patt, “The Pentagon Should Focus JADC2 on Warfighters, Not Service Equities,” Breaking Defense, March 30, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/the-pentagon-should-focus-jadc2-on-warfighters-not-service-equities.

52 52. Amanda Miller, “AI Algorithms Deployed in Kill Chain Target Recognition,” Air Force Magazine, September 21, 2021, https://www.airforcemag.com/ai-algorithms-deployed-in-kill-chain-target-recognition.

53 53. Ibid.

54 54. Patrick Tucker, “Air Force Targeting AI Thought It Had a 90% Success Rate. It Was More Like 25%,” Defense One, December 9, 2021, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2021/12/air-force-targeting-ai-thought-it-had-90-success-rate-it-was-more-25/187437.

55 55. Miller, “AI Algorithms Deployed in Kill Chain Target Recognition.”

56 56. Alex Tamkin and Deep Ganguli, “How Large Language Models Will Transform Science, Society, and AI”, Stanford University Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence, February 21, 2021, https://hai.stanford.edu/news/how-large-language-models-will-transform-science-society-and-ai.

57 57. Matt Turek, “Media Forensics (MediFor),” Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, accessed May 4, 2022, https://www.darpa.mil/program/media-forensics.

58 58. Patrick Tucker, “Joint Chiefs’ Information Officer: US is Behind on Information Warfare. AI Can Help,” Defense One, November 5, 2021, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2021/11/joint-chiefs-information-officer-us-behind-information-warfare-ai-can-help/186670.

59 59. “Deploying AI in Defense Organizations: The Value, Trends, and Opportunities,” IBM, May 2021, https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/ EJBREOMX.

60 60. Ibid.

61 61. Authors’ interview with a defense technology industry executive.

62 62 Katerina Sedova, et al., “AI and the Future of Disinformation Campaigns, Part 1: The RICHDATA Framework,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University, December 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/ai-and-the-future-of-disinformation-campaigns/; Katerina Sedova et.al, “AI and the Future of Disinformation Campaigns, Part 2: A Threat Model, Center for Security and Emerging Technology,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University, December 2021, 1, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-AI-and-the-Future-of-Disinformation-Campaigns-Part-2.pdf; Ben Buchanan, et al., “Truth, Lies, and Automation: How Language Models Could Change Disinformation,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University, May 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/truth-lies-and-automation.

63 63. Daniel K. Lim, “Startups and the Defense Department’s Compliance Labyrinth,” War on the Rocks, January 3, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/01/startups-and-the-defense-departments-compliance-labyrinth.

64 64. Moshe Schwarz and Heidi M. Peters, “Department of Defense Use of Other Transaction Authority: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, February 22, 2019, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R45521.pdf.

65 65. “Final Report.”

66 66. “SBIR Open Topic,” US Department of the Air Force, Air Force Research Laboratory, https://afwerx.com/sbirsttr.

67 67. “Trusted AI at Scale,” Griffiss Institute, July 26, 2021, https://www.griffissinstitute.org/about-us/events/ev-detail/trusted-ai-at-scale-1.

68 68. Insinna, “Silicon Valley Warns the Pentagon: ‘Time is Running Out.’”

69 69. Jory Heckman, “DoD Seeks to Develop New Career Paths to Stay Ahead of AI Competition,” Federal News Network, July 13, 2021, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/artificial-intelligence/2021/07/dod-seeks-to-develop-new-career-paths-to-stay-ahead-of-ai-competition.

70 70. “DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence,” US Department of Defense, February 24, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/News/ Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-adopts-ethical-principles-for-artificial-intelligence/.

71 70. “DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence,” US Department of Defense, February 24, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-adopts-ethical-principles-for-artificial-intelligence/.

72 72. Ibid.

73 73. Jared Dunnmon, et al., “Responsible AI Guidelines in Practice,” Defense Innovation Unit, https://assets.ctfassets.net/3nanhbfkr0pc/acoo1Fj5uungnGNPJ3QWy/3a1dafd64f22efcf8f27380aafae9789/2021_RAI_Report-v3.pdf.

74 74. Margarita Konaev and Husanjot Chahal, “Building Trust in Human-Machine Teams,” Brookings, February 18, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/building-trust-in-human-machine-teams/ ; Theresa Hitchens, “AI Slays Top F-16 Pilot in DARPA Dogfight Simulation,” Breaking Defense, August 20, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/08/ai-slays-top-f-16-pilot-in-darpa-dogfight-simulation.

75 75. Sue Halpern, “The Rise of A.I. Fighter Pilots,” New Yorker, January 17, 2022, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/01/24/the-rise-of-ai- fighter-pilots.

76 76. Adrian P. Pope, et al., “Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning for Air-to-Air Combat,” Lockheed Martin, June 11, 2021, https://arxiv.org/pdf/2105.00990.pdf.

77 77. “AlphaDogfight Trials Go Virtual for Final Event,” Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, July 2020, https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2020-08-07.

78 78. A recent IBM survey of two hundred and fifty technology leaders from global defense organizations revealed that about 42 percent have a framework for deploying AI ethically and safely; notably, formalized plans for the ethical application of AI are more common in organizations whose mission functions include combat and fighting arms than organizations with non-combat missions. These leaders surveyed represent organizations from a broad range of mission functions, including combat and fighting arms (18 percent), combat support (44 percent), and combat service-support (37 percent) organizations. “Deploying AI in Defense Organizations,” 4, https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/EJBREOMX; “Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence: Ensuring Data-Driven Decisions,” C4ISR, January 2021, https://hub.c4isrnet.com/ebooks/ai-autonomy-2020; “How Effective and Ethical Artificial Intelligence Will Enable JADC2,” Breaking Defense, December 2, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/12/how-effective-and-ethical-artificial-intelligence-will-enable-jadc2.

79 79. Pub. L. 116-283, William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, 134 Stat. 3388 (2021), https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ283/PLAW-116publ283.pdf.

80 80. “Summary Analysis of Responses to the NIST Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF)—Request for Information (RFI),” National Institute of Standards and Technology, October 15, 2021, https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2021/10/15/AI%20RMF_RFI%20Summary%20Report.pdf.

81 81 Michele A. Flournoy, Avril Haines, and Gabrielle Chefitz, “Building Trust through Testing: Adapting DOD’s Test & Evaluation, Validation & Verification (TEVV) Enterprise for Machine Learning Systems, including Deep Learning Systems,” WestExec, October 2020, 3–4, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Building-Trust-Through-Testing.pdf.

82 82. Flournoy, Haines, and Chefitz, “Building Trust through Testing,” 3.

83 83. “Final Report,” 384.

84 84. “Air Force Acquisition Executive Unveils Next E-Plane, Publishes Digital Engineering Guidebook,” US Department of the Air Force, January 19, 2021, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2476500/air-force-acquisition-executive-unveils-next-e-plane-publishes-digital-engineer.

85 85. Zoe Stanley-Lockman, “Responsible and Ethical Military AI: Allies and Allied Perspectives,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University, August 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-Responsible-and-Ethical-Military-AI.pdf.

86 86. Authors’ interview with a former US military general.

87 87. Zoe Stanley-Lockman, “Military AI Cooperation Toolbox: Modernizing Defense Science and Technology Partnerships for the Digital Age,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University, August 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/military-ai-cooperation-toolbox/.

88 88. “Final Report,” 65.

89 89. Ibid., 305.

90 90. Authors’ interview with a defense technology executive.

The post Eye to eye in AI: Developing artificial intelligence for national security and defense appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Trotti in the National Interest on drones

Atlantic Council — Tue, 17 May 2022 15:29:00 +0000

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On May 16, Forward Defense assistant director Christian Trotti authored an op-ed published in the National Interest titled “Swarming to Victory: Drones and the Future of Great Power Competition.” Trotti recommends that the US military heavily invest in drones as an affordable yet effective solution to gain the advantage in the Indo-Pacific.

Drone casualties will never be as consequential as human casualties, but if drones are to have any deterrent effect through their presence alone, they need to be backed by greater implicit resolve.
Christian Trotti

Former staff

Christian Trotti

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Public Event Tue, May 17, 2022 • 8:45 am ET

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What does the future of autonomous warfare look like? Four critical questions, answered.

Forward Defense experts — Fri, 13 May 2022 18:26:20 +0000

As warfare is increasingly dictated by machines, critical questions around strategy, technology, and morality arise at every turn. But there’s one thing we know for sure: There’s no reversing the rise of autonomous systems.

The upcoming NEXUS 22 symposium, hosted by Applied Intuition in collaboration with the Atlantic Council, will bring together senior leaders to discuss the complex issues at the intersection of national security, defense, and autonomous systems. Ahead of the gathering, experts from the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice addressed the most important questions about these systems and how they will shape the future of warfare.

1. Trade-offs and trading up: What opportunities do autonomous systems create for defense planners?

While the nature of war is timeless, the character of warfare is always changing. Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, and quantum computing bear vast implications for the conduct and deterrence of military conflict in the future. When effectively deployed together, these technologies will likely precipitate a revolution in military affairs, with the potential to reshape the global balance of power.

However, new technologies by themselves do not change warfare—new applications and concepts for using those technologies do. Throughout history, emerging technologies are often first used to incrementally improve existing procedures (i.e., evolutionary change) before they are deployed in transformative ways (i.e., revolutionary change). The threshold between evolutionary and revolutionary change is often human imagination.

Today, autonomous systems and other AI-enabled technologies reside at a similar inflection point. To maximize the utility of these systems and shape development pathways accordingly, it is essential to creatively consider the key opportunities that autonomous systems can create, as well as the barriers to the achievement of those opportunities.

First, these systems can save both hard and opportunity costs. Military personnel spending accounts for a major portion of the overall defense budget, and it has accelerated since 9/11. By performing a variety of mission sets ranging from analyzing data to piloting vessels, autonomous systems can replace human operators. While it is unlikely that the size of the force will decrease as a result, these systems can free up military personnel to tackle other missions—creating a more cost-effective force at a time when the real purchasing power of the US defense budget is decreasing. However, current military command structures are not equipped to realize this opportunity. In the case of remotely piloted aircraft, the principle of “human in the loop” guarantees that too many service members are tied down to review and make decisions for robots. To capitalize on the promise of these emerging technologies, command structures and norms must adapt to trust these systems to act with increasing autonomy.

Second, autonomous systems can ameliorate longstanding defense tradeoffs. In particular, defense planners have struggled to strike the right balance between “quality” and “quantity”—i.e., less numerous and more sophisticated warfighting capabilities to counter great-power adversaries versus more numerous and less sophisticated platforms to expand US global presence and deter smaller acts of aggression. In the future, drone swarms may be the solution to this tradeoff. Maneuverable and “attritable” (i.e., cheaper and relatively expendable) enough to fulfill key missions in wartime, and deployed in sufficient numbers to ensure greater presence in peacetime, autonomous systems can be the crux of a new US force posture.

The barriers to realizing this opportunity are both structural and psychological. Structurally, the Department of Defense (DoD) needs to adapt its acquisition approach to develop a high-low combination of autonomous systems that can serve different mission sets, thereby “competing by cost” in addition to “competing by differentiation.” Psychologically, the White House needs to establish clearer diplomatic messaging about the value of autonomous systems relative to human life to ensure that these systems can adequately deter adversaries.

When it comes to emerging technologies, defense planners should always look to “trade up,” or they will risk falling behind competitors. However, if autonomy is to radically change the future of warfare in ways that are advantageous to the United States, defense planners must imagine both the opportunities that autonomous systems can create and a pathway toward making them a reality.

—Christian Trotti, assistant director of Forward Defense at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

2. Laying down the law on LAWS: What level of risk are US commanders willing to accept in deploying autonomous systems?

Twenty-first century battles are characterized by speed and precision. Whoever—or whatever—can rapidly make sense of a battlefield and execute the kill chain (i.e., the structure and steps of an attack) fastest comes out ahead. As computing power, AI, and next-generation communications revolutionize future conflicts, lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) can decipher and act on more data, more quickly, than humans can. The United States, its allies, and its competitors are already pouring billions of dollars into autonomous weapons research and development; and last year, a United Nations report detailed the first known combat use of LAWS in Libya. Though many have condemned so-called killer robots, commanders also see LAWS as an opportunity to improve battlefield decision making and minimize unnecessary loss of life through:

Lower risk to friendly forces: LAWS are uncrewed.
Greater accuracy: LAWS can process exponentially more data from more sensors.
Increased speed: Targets can be found, identified, and destroyed from a single platform in the blink of an eye without off-boarding data and waiting for an engagement decision from afar.
Simplified logistics: Machines require only fuel and repair.
Improved strategic decision making: By making tactical calls, LAWS allow commanders to focus on higher-level decisions.

LAWS have some serious drawbacks, however. Military leaders will have to accept risk and responsibility on behalf of machines—especially when taking human lives. The military already employs a five-step methodology to estimate collateral damage before engaging with targets—but the fog and friction of war ensure that almost no decision to take lethal action is without risk of fratricide or collateral damage. As the world begins to consider the implications of fully autonomous warfare, the United States must begin to lay the groundwork for implementing LAWS ethically and effectively by confronting core questions:

What is the acceptable collateral damage risk for LAWS? Is it more or less acceptable than the risk for a human operator?
Who decides when, where, and how often LAWS are deployed?
Who is responsible for the actions of LAWS: the operator, commander, or programmer who writes the targeting algorithm?
How are decisions evaluated “right of boom” (i.e., in the wake of an attack)? What degree of AI explainability should be required?

For each question, there is no one right answer. To prepare for the proliferation of LAWS in future conflicts, DoD must begin to consider clear rules of engagement and predetermined risk protocols before the first bomb is dropped, round is fired, or torpedo is launched.

—Lt Col Tyson Wetzel, senior US Air Force fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, with contributions from Caroline Steel, young global professional in the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice. The positions expressed by Lt Col Wetzel do not reflect the official position of the United States Air Force or Department of Defense.

3. Science fiction vs. reality: How does autonomy feature in the DoD’s broader integration of AI-enabled technologies?

The discussion of developing AI for the defense and security communities is frequently framed in the public discourse as an effort to develop autonomous systems and science fiction-type capabilities such as drone swarms when, in reality, the discussion is both more nuanced and broader. Fully autonomous systems are not imminent, as a National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence report articulates, which means that the mid-term future of conflict includes humans and narrowly autonomous machines (i.e., systems that require certain degrees of human involvement) operating together. Moreover, the applications for AI in defense (in conjunction with other emerging technologies) are more expansive than autonomous robots, with relevance for most if not all DoD operational missions and functions.

Most notably, AI-enabled processing of intelligence is improving and speeding up human decision making, a crucial outcome if human operators are to keep up with the accelerating pace of operations and the growing amount of accessible data.

Training is another useful example. The combination of AI and virtual and augmented reality can greatly reduce training costs and timelines while increasing effectiveness. AI’s ability to speed up and reduce costs associated with engineering and manufacturing, maintenance and logistics, and detecting cyber and disinformation attacks are also central to DoD efforts to develop and deploy AI-enabled capabilities.

To realize these expansive benefits, DoD must balance a need for increased urgency in AI development and adoption with a laser-like focus on ensuring the safe development, extensive testing, and ethical use of these transformative capabilities across the defense enterprise. Autonomous systems are one of many useful AI applications in defense that may become operational on different timelines, and defense planners must therefore pursue a clear and coherent modernization strategy that maximizes the promise of these emerging technologies over short-, medium-, and long-term horizons.

—Tate Nurkin, nonresident senior fellow with the Forward Defense practice area at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

4. Keeping up with conflict: How should international law be adapted to the realities of autonomous systems and other emerging technologies on the modern battlefield?

As emerging technologies like AI and autonomous systems become increasingly operational and effective, there is a clear need for an updated version of the Geneva Convention to account for human rights, privacy, and attribution. When the Geneva Convention was created in 1949, digital methods of disseminating content were limited to radio and TV broadcasts, and computing power was in its infancy. Since then, not only has boots-on-the-ground warfare expanded to the Internet through cyberattacks and social-media propaganda, but information warfare has been normalized and robots are an increasingly important force on the battlefield. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war is a perfect example of how nonkinetic applications of autonomy and AI, particularly through cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns, are used in tandem with kinetic weapons like Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2 drone and Russia’s hypersonic weapons.

Yet, despite the looming threats of further invasion by Vladimir Putin, coercion by China, regional aggression by Iran and North Korea, and the erosion of the rules-based international order, an updated version of the Geneva Convention does not exist. International law must provide a new framework:

It starts with definitions and terminology. Global actors have not agreed on definitions of peace and war. Is it war when Russia hacks into the Ukrainian power grids in the dead of winter or into government systems to disrupt command-and-control mechanisms? Or when Iran shoots down a US drone? Is it peace if citizens of another country are under the onslaught of foreign disinformation that clouds what’s real or not? Is psychological pain worse than bodily harm? Is an autonomous drone worth a human life?
The framework must also include guidelines outlining data privacy, ethics of lethal autonomous weapons and nonlethal AI algorithms, and an agreed-upon attribution process. For example Clearview AI’s facial recognition technology was lauded for its wartime use by the Ukrainian government to identify dead Russian soldiers, while the neighboring European Union, enjoying peace, bans its member states from such use. International law should be able to guide the use of such technology in the spectrum between war and peace.
The final component is accountability and enforceability. When algorithms behind the autonomous systems miscalculate or the human in the loop makes a judgment mistake and civilians are accidentally killed, who is responsible? How do we hold algorithms or machines responsible when they are inanimate objects? Do we instead punish the engineers behind the system or is there a third way? Furthermore, how do officials attribute an attack, such as cyberespionage, when AI can be used to cloak the origin of the action? The framework must establish a process of attribution in the age of autonomy, and when this new framework is violated, the perpetrating actor must be identified and punished accordingly.

Like the Syrian Civil War before it, the Russia-Ukraine War is demonstrating a real urgency and need for a new Geneva Convention governing applications of critical technology areas such as AI and autonomy. While several existing initiatives can act as precedents, such as the Ethical Principles in AI adopted by the US Department of Defense in 2018 (which I helped consult on) and the Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, there is significant work to be done. It is time for a new code of conduct.

—Evanna Hu, nonresident senior fellow with the Forward Defense practice area at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

For more insights on the future of autonomy in national security and defense, register for the May 17 NEXUS 22 symposium of May 17, featuring distinguished experts such as former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy, investor Marc Andreessen, Defense Innovation Unit Director Mike Brown, and Rebellion Defense Chief Executive Officer Chris Lynch.

NEXUS 22: A symposium at the intersection of defense, national security, and autonomy

Nexus 22 is a symposium by Applied Intuition, in collaboration with the Atlantic Council, which brings together senior leaders such as Michèle Flournoy, Marc Andreessen, Chris Lynch, and Mike Brown to discuss issues at the intersection of national security, defense, and autonomy.

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Russian War Report: Competing narratives about the sinking of Russia’s Moskva warship

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 15 Apr 2022 17:22:55 +0000

Security

Russia denies missile cruiser Moskva’s sinking was because of Ukrainian attack

Tracking narratives

Russian state media suggests Ukraine is using drones to spray poisonous chemicals

“Security service” of Russian-occupied Luhansk claims Ukraine and foreign intelligence services are planning a “terrorist act”

Media policy

TikTok inconsistently implemented upload ban in Russia, allowing pro-war content to proliferate, report finds

Russia denies missile cruiser Moskva’s sinking was because of Ukrainian attack

On the night of April 13, multiple Ukrainian officials announced that Neptune missiles had struck Russia’s Moskva warship anchored off the coast of Odesa. Reports soon emerged of fires and severe damage on the ship.

Within a few hours of Ukraine’s announcement, Russian media published their own version of events, provided by the Ministry of Defense, claiming that a fire on board had caused ammunition to detonate. The ministry said the ship was damaged, and the crew evacuated.

In the hours after the announcement, when it was still unclear what had happened, speculation and misinformation began to appear online, including videos that purportedly showed an explosion on the Moskva. One video, in particular, was shared hundreds of times on Twitter; the footage was from a 2013 Norwegian missile test. At the time of writing, there were no confirmed videos depicting the incident.

This is the Norwegian Navy blowing up one of their own ships in an exercise from 2013, not the Russian vessel that was hit overnight https://t.co/lOgA33dEXK https://t.co/KKLZjytNqx
— Eliot Higgins (@EliotHiggins) April 14, 2022

Tweet from Bellingcat founder Eliot Higgins identifying a viral video allegedly of the Moskva explosion as actually that of a Norwegian Navy ship being hit with a missile as a part of a 2013 drill. (Source: @eliothiggins/archive)

On April 14, the Pentagon confirmed that the ship sustained significant damage after an explosion but could not provide definitive answers about the cause of the blast. Officials said that the ship was likely being brought to Sevastopol for repairs. They also noted that a number of Russian vessels, also located in the Black Sea, had begun moving south, away from Ukraine, after the Moskva explosion.

Roman Tsymbaliuk, a journalist with the Ukrainian Independent Information Agency, reported that fourteen crewmembers from the Moskva had arrived in Sevastopol in a speedboat and were picked up by ambulances. However, this report has yet to be confirmed by other sources.

Eventually, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that the Moskva sank due to a storm while being towed to receive repairs. They said the explosion—caused by their own ammunition—had damaged the hull, and stormy seas caused the ship to lose stability and sink. Weather on the Black Sea on April 14 appears to have been rough, with winds up to 25 knots and waves ranging between five to seven feet from midnight to noon.

Screenshot of the weather over the Black Sea on April 14, 2022. (Source: Buoyweather)

The Moskva was involved in the viral “Russian warship, go fuck yourself” incident that became a symbol of Ukrainian resistance at the beginning of the war. (That incident was itself the subject of significant online noise, with initial reports indicating that the military personnel on the island had subsequently been killed by the warship. Later reports, along with statements from the Ukrainian government, indicated that the personnel were still alive.) According to Ukraine’s estimates, the sinking of the Moskva amounts to a $750 million loss for Russia.

—Ingrid Dickinson, Young Global Professional, Washington, DC

Russian state media suggests Ukraine is using drones to spray poisonous chemicals

On April 13, Russian state media outlet RT released a video suggesting that Ukraine was planning to use drones to spray toxic chemicals on Russian troops and Ukrainian civilians. In the video, a Russian soldier says drones equipped with 30-liter containers were found on an abandoned Ukrainian base. “These UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] could potentially be used for spraying poisonous chemicals that would be harmful to the Russian military, civilians, and farmland,” said the soldier.

The soldier claimed that the Russian forces also discovered coordinates of areas marked for spraying, which included Russian positions and residential Ukrainian neighborhoods.

Drones with liquid tanks & sprayers discovered in abandoned Ukrainian base pic.twitter.com/b2vGBMA6GP
— RT (@RT_com) April 13, 2022

Tweet by Russian state-owned outlet RT including a video with claims that the Ukrainian military intends to use drones for a chemical attack on Russian troops and Ukrainian civilians. (Source: @RT_com/archive)

The story was widely shared on Twitter by pro-Kremlin accounts, many of which were anonymous accounts with unusual Twitter handles and low numbers of followers.

On April 11, Ukrainian forces accused Russia of using poisonous substances against Ukrainian soldiers in Mariupol.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

“Security service” of Russian-occupied Luhansk claims Ukraine and foreign intelligence services are planning a “terrorist act”

In a possible false flag accusation, the “State Security Service” of the so-called “Luhansk People’s Republic” (“LNR”) issued a statement claiming, without evidence, that the special services of Ukraine are recruiting public participation in a political rally in the center of the region’s capital city, Luhansk, which it would then supposedly attack as a “terrorist act.”

The statement alleges that the central government of Ukraine is conducting information and psychological operations on social networks in accordance with “instructions received from foreign intelligence services.” The statement additionally claimed that users on messenger apps are being contacted en masse by cell numbers of Ukraine’s “federal operator Vodafon Ukraine” – Vodafon Ukraine is a privately held company – with “provocative texts” calling on the recipients to join an “unsanctioned rally” on April 16 at Luhansk’s Theater Square. “We also received information regarding the intention of foreign intelligence services to carry out a terrorist act at the time of the alleged mass gathering in the center of the capital of the Luhansk People’s Republic,” the statement continued.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

TikTok inconsistently implemented upload ban in Russia, allowing pro-war content to proliferate, report finds

On April 13, European nonprofit organization Tracking Exposed published a report that found that TikTok has inconsistently implemented its ban on users in Russia uploading content.

The report suggested that, despite TikTok announcing on March 6 that it would suspend livestreams and new uploads from Russia, the platform’s ban contained a loophole that allowed a coordinated network of accounts to continue posting new content promoting pro-war narratives. The loophole was reportedly available between March 6 to 23.

“One loophole allowed you to post content from a web browser, switching a VPN back and forth,” said the report. During this period, the number of pro-war hashtags posted from Russia increased significantly. “During the 17-day period that TikTok didn’t comprehensively implement the ban, new content uploads related to the war were overwhelmingly pro-war,” said the Tracking Exposed report.

In addition, TikTok removed the restriction on new uploads from March 23 to 25, allowing any user in Russia to upload new content. The report found that TikTok began implementing the ban again on March 26. The report’s authors believe that TikTok’s inconsistent implementation of the ban was most likely associated with a technical glitch rather than the deliberate creation of a backdoor.

The report also suggested that anti-war activists may not have known of the loophole in TikTok’s ban as significantly less anti-war content was uploaded while the bans were in effect. “Before the ban was announced, the balance of pro-war and anti-war content was roughly equal. After, 93.5 percent of war-related content was pro-war, while only 6.5 percent was anti-war.”

On April 12, TikTok released a statement that, between February 24 and March 31, the company had removed more than 320,000 fake accounts in Russia and 46,000 fake accounts in Ukraine, resulting in the removal of at least 343,000 videos. TikTok has not addressed the inconsistent implementation of its upload ban.

—Givi Gigitashvili, DFRLab Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

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#BritainDebrief – How will the war in Ukraine end? A Debrief from Rob Lee

Ben Judah — Thu, 17 Mar 2022 21:05:39 +0000

How will the war in Ukraine end?

As the Russian military advance continues to stall, Senior Fellow Ben Judah interviewed Rob Lee, FPRI Senior Fellow, for #BritainDebrief. How have lethal British military aid, like anti-tank MLAWs, performed so far? Can Ukraine continue to hold out against Russia? How real is the threat of Russian chemical weapon attacks in Ukraine?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

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Azodi quoted in Deustche Welle on the cyber dimensions of conflict between Iran and Istael

Atlantic Council — Thu, 17 Mar 2022 18:33:00 +0000

The post Azodi quoted in Deustche Welle on the cyber dimensions of conflict between Iran and Istael appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Techno-geopolitics and the Turkish way of drone warfare

Dr. Can Kasapoğlu — Fri, 04 Mar 2022 16:42:20 +0000

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Contrary to the African proverb “speak softly but carry a big stick,” Turkish strategic culture tends to speak loudly, carry a big stick—and sometimes use that very big stick after a brief talk. With Turkey’s burgeoning drone-warfare edge, enabled by the nation’s rising defense industries, unmanned aerial systems have become a very big stick for the Turkish military. From a realpolitik viewpoint, at present, Turkey’s new drone edge has amplified the Turkish elite’s abovementioned strategic thinking by rendering the “military guidebook” less casualty prone, more surgical, less burdensome on defense economics, and less reliant on foreign assistance. Militarily, winning contemporary wars is about winning the battle networks, and this is the underlying reason behind the Turkish Armed Forces’ UAS success. In the eyes of Turkish defense planners, drones are not merely targeted killing or “war on terror” assets, but crucial components within a network-centric architecture. This paradigm extends to a wide range of tasks, from anti-armor salvos to the suppression of enemy air defenses.

At present, Turkey’s military capabilities can be matched by those of only a few NATO militaries and, notably, only by the United States for drone-warfare capacity. Although a large number of articles have focused on the technical aspects of Turkey’s rapid dronization, few, if any, have correctly touched upon the geopolitical ramifications of this robotic-warfare breakthrough. While these assets are not magical wands to address all threats across the spectrum, the Turkish way of drone warfare has introduced various innovative concepts of operations, which have visibly paid off in a broad frontier including Libya, Syria, and Karabakh. Of particular importance to NATO, and resembling the Arab-Israeli wars of the Cold War era, Turkey’s robotic-warfare solutions have proven to be effective against Soviet-Russian weaponry. The unfolding Russo – Ukrainian War, at the time of writing, comes as the latest case.

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How to make a Russian invasion of Ukraine prohibitively expensive

Andriy Zagorodnyuk — Sun, 09 Jan 2022 12:51:03 +0000

Russian President Vladimir Putin has recently attempted to seize the initiative in his diplomatic duel with the West by presenting a comprehensive list of security demands while massing a formidable invasion force on the Ukrainian border. This thinly veiled threat has created the impression that Western leaders must either make sweeping concessions to the Kremlin or face the prospect of the largest European conflict since WWII.

However, there is a third option. The best way to prevent a full-scale invasion of Ukraine may be by increasing the military costs Putin would be likely to face if he chooses to roll the dice and launch a major new offensive.

Before exploring how to enhance Ukraine’s defensive capabilities, it is vital to underline the folly of continuing to appease Putin. Ever since Russia first attacked Ukraine in spring 2014, many within the democratic world have advocated policies of appeasement. Far from deescalating the situation, this has only made matters worse.

Eight years on, Russian aggression against Ukraine continues with no end in sight to the simmering conflict in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. Meanwhile, an evidently emboldened Putin is now seeking to dismantle the entire post-Cold War European security architecture and reestablish a Russian sphere of influence over Eastern and Central Europe.

At this point, any further accommodations would be extremely dangerous. If NATO leaders bow to Russian demands and agree to withdraw from the region or limit future cooperation with Ukraine, this will not have a calming effect on the Kremlin. On the contrary, Moscow would become even more convinced that negotiations at gunpoint should continue. This would make a major war in Ukraine far more likely, while also paving the way for additional acts of Russian aggression from the Baltic to the Balkans.

Rather than appeasing the Kremlin, the West must seek to make any further escalations prohibitively expensive. The unprecedented sanctions measures that are currently on the table in the event of a new Russian offensive against Ukraine are certainly a step in the right direction, but it is far from clear whether economic measures alone will be sufficient to deter Putin.

Russia has built up its international reserves to record levels in recent years and is currently well positioned to weather a severe sanctions storm. Indeed, Putin may regard the economic pain of Western sanctions as a price worth paying for the decisive geopolitical gains he envisages from a successful Ukrainian campaign.

In order to be effective, economic measures must be deployed alongside a convincing military deterrent. At present, Western military planners are primarily focused on Russia’s overwhelming advantages in terms of missiles, aviation, and naval capabilities. This has helped to convince many that a full-scale invasion of Ukraine is a realistic military objective because of its apparently high chance of success.

With the threat of invasion imminent, there is not much that the US or Ukraine’s other international partners can do to rapidly reduce the existing capability gap between Russia and Ukraine. Complex air or naval defense systems would take years to become fully operational, and would cost billions to acquire and sustain.

Other sophisticated weapons systems have similar limitations and would require extensive training before they could be deployed. Instead, Ukraine and the country’s partners should seek asymmetric answers to the formidable military challenges posed by Putin’s Russia.

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If Putin launches a full-scale operation, Russian forces will face a combined Ukrainian military of around 500,000 personnel including a considerable reserve contingent. However, if Ukrainian troops operate in large formations, they will become easy targets for Russian airstrikes. Indeed, any Russian offensive would likely begin with a devastating air and missile campaign designed to wipe out Ukrainian armored units, fighter jets, and key elements of the country’s military infrastructure.

In such circumstances, it is likely that the Russian military will be able to advance deep into Ukrainian territory. However, holding this territory will be a different matter entirely.

Russian occupation forces will face highly motivated opponents fighting in familiar surroundings. By combining serving military units with combat veterans, reservists, territorial defense units, and large numbers of volunteers, Ukraine can create tens of thousands of small and highly mobile groups capable of attacking Russian forces. This will make it virtually impossible for the Kremlin to establish any kind of administration over occupied areas or secure its lines of supply.

The readiness of Ukrainians to defend their country should not be any doubt. Thousands joined impromptu volunteer battalions in spring 2014 when Ukraine was on the verge of being overrun by Kremlin forces. In recent weeks, a poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology indicated that as many as one in three Ukrainians would be ready to participate in armed resistance to a Russian occupation.

The same poll found that a further 20% of Ukrainians would be prepared to engage in civil resistance efforts. Indeed, everything from opinion surveys to election results points to the fact that a Russian invasion would be deeply unpopular and Kremlin forces would find themselves operating in a hostile environment ideal for asymmetric warfare.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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An asymmetric approach to countering a possible Russian invasion does not imply a loss of overall military coordination. Ukraine’s regular armed forces would remain at the heart of the resistance movement and would retain command and control structures even while operating in smaller units in a seemingly decentralized manner.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces (SOF) would play a crucial leadership role in guerrilla warfare efforts, and would be able to call upon the invaluable training and considerable investments made in recent years.

Ukraine already has the tools and the personnel in place for an asymmetric campaign against any potential invaders. However, the country’s partners can also make a significant contribution to further enhancing this deterrence factor by bolstering Ukraine’s ability to wage an effective insurgency.

While there is no time to supply Ukraine with complex weapons systems, there is a shopping list of items that could significantly raise the cost of a Russian invasion. The most expensive items on Ukraine’s short-term wish-list include portable air defense systems, anti-tank missiles, anti-ship missiles, and counter-battery radars. Drones of all kinds would be most welcome. Sniper rifles and anti-sniper equipment would also be extremely useful, as would large deliveries of night vision goggles, encrypted radio communication devices, and satellite communication devices.

The Ukrainian armed forces are battle-hardened and highly motivated. After eight years of undeclared war with Russia, the country as a whole is perhaps more psychologically prepared to defend itself than any other nation in today’s Europe.

Given the right equipment and tactics, Ukraine can dramatically reduce the chances of a successful invasion. A Russian offensive would be likely to make impressive initial progress, but could quickly unravel as occupation forces encountered relentless opposition from mobile units operating on home turf.

Ever the amateur historian, Putin is acutely aware of the damage caused to Soviet society by the invasion of Afghanistan. He no doubt recognizes the potential dangers of becoming bogged down in a brutal occupation of his own in Ukraine.

Recent polls indicate very little appetite among the Russian public for a major war against Ukraine. This absence of enthusiasm could soon turn to outright opposition if large numbers of coffins began returning to Russia from Ukraine.

Despite the risks involved, the Russian leader wishes to continue diplomatic negotiations while holding a gun to Ukraine’s head. He clearly expects the Western world to blink first. Putin needs to be reminded that Ukraine is not a helpless hostage and will fight back. The consequences of such a campaign for his own regime are entirely unpredictable and could end up being very costly indeed.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk is chairman of the Center for Defence Strategies. He is a former Minister of Defense of Ukraine (2019–2020) and was the head of the MOD Reforms Project Office (2015–2018).

But in reality, Turkish-Russian relations are complex and characterized by both competition and cooperation across multiple theaters and dimensions. Looming in the background are centuries of diplomatic antagonism and military conflict often centered on the Black Sea region—a balancing act that’s playing out again now. Despite Turkey’s shared economic interests with Russia in energy, tourism, construction, and agricultural exports, Ankara joined its NATO allies in rejecting Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and reaffirming Ukraine’s territorial integrity. That stance, which has hardened over time, was partially explained by its historical anger over ethnically Turkic Crimean Tatars falling under Russian rule again.

Even more compelling is Turkey’s growing concern over an expansionist (and revanchist) Russia near its borders in the Black Sea and South Caucasus regions. Ankara has responded to Moscow’s aggression by becoming one of the strongest proponents of enlarging NATO membership to include both Ukraine and Georgia—even while offering to mediate the conflict in Ukraine. Ankara has simultaneously pursued a strategic partnership with Kyiv based largely on defense industry cooperation, which apart from drones also includes the sales of naval ships with stealth capabilities and the joint development of a jet engine for military aircraft.

But Turkey’s drone sale, which came five years after Israel balked at selling its own models to Ukraine for fear of antagonizing Russia, is particularly significant.

Having witnessed the devastating impact of Turkey’s innovative drone-based tactics— combining the UAV’s battlefield intelligence and precision rocket strikes with closely coordinated standoff artillery assaults aimed at neutralizing defenses and capitalizing on air superiority—Russia has plenty of reason to worry. Such attacks fought Russian and Syrian government forces to a standstill in Syria’s Idlib province in March 2020 and prompted Russia to recommit to its previous agreement with Turkey to protect Idlib as a “safe zone.” Just months later, Turkey reversed an offensive by Russian mercenaries and Libyan fighters that had already reached the outskirts of Tripoli.

And during last year’s Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the Azerbaijani military—another early purchaser of Turkish drones—employed the same tactical approach to neutralize Armenia’s advanced Russian weaponry, including air defense systems and armor, with startling precision and speed.

That’s why Russia has signaled its concern about Turkish UAVs on numerous occasions, most recently when Russian President Vladimir Putin warned his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, during a December 3 phone call that the drones helped enable “destructive” behavior by Ukraine. Ankara responded the next day by affirming that drone deliveries to Ukraine would continue—then, days later, sought to restore the diplomatic balance by offering its mediation efforts. Though Moscow did not take up this offer, it has been careful to avoid incendiary rhetoric toward Ankara.

Turkey’s combination of military firmness and diplomatic sobriety offers important capabilities for NATO as it struggles to deter further Russian aggression against Ukraine. As scholar Francis Fukuyama recently observed, Ukraine’s use of Turkish UAVs could be a “complete game-changer,” while analysts at the Royal United Services Institute think tank believe Turkey’s massed drone and artillery strikes could even render the battle tank obsolete.

Moscow, for its part, has also been careful not to alienate Ankara—perhaps because of mutual economic interests, or because it simply wants to deepen the wedge between Ankara and its NATO allies. Whatever the Kremlin’s motivation, the United States and NATO would be wise to make use of the assets which the Alliance’s second-largest military brings to the table—especially the diplomatic wisdom gained from managing centuries of conflict and cooperation with Russia.

Matthew Bryza is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, Eurasia Center, and Atlantic Council IN TURKEY program. He served as a US diplomat for more than two decades, including as US ambassador to Azerbaijan, deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, and director for Europe and Eurasia on the National Security Council staff. He is also the CEO of Lamor Turkey, a Finnish-Turkish joint venture providing environmental solutions, and a board member of Turcas Petrol, a publicly traded Turkish energy company.

Grady Wilson is assistant director at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Experts react: The key takeaways from the Erdoğan-Putin meeting

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin met in-person in Sochi, Russia for the first time since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. Atlantic Council experts give their take on the outcome.

Conflict Defense Industry

TURKEYSource Jun 29, 2021

Biden-Erdoğan icebreaker could set the stage for a bilateral thaw

By Grady Wilson

Biden and Erdogan emerged from a long meeting on the sidelines of the June 14 NATO summit upbeat and positive, setting the stage for dialogue and progress in bilateral relations. Turkey and the United States share an expansive list of disagreements and tensions points as well as mutual interests and opportunities. Both sides are unanimous on the importance of bilateral relations but it remains to be seen how the two countries will manage their current challenges.

Conflict International Organizations

TURKEYSource Mar 18, 2021

How to end the US-Turkey dialogue of the deaf

By Matthew Bryza

With Trump and his special affinity for Erdoğan gone, one would predict that the US-Turkey bilateral relationship would become more complicated. But rather than hunkering down for more confrontation, Erdoğan has opened the door for a reset of US-Turkey relations.

Economy & Business Oil and Gas

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Missile defense: The end of the interim solution

Patrick O’Reilly — Tue, 14 Dec 2021 05:00:00 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

ISSUE BRIEF RELEASE

Since the 1980s, the United States has sought missile defenses that are effective against modern threats, are survivable themselves, and are cost effective on the margins. Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow and former US Missile Defense Agency Director Patrick O’Reilly argues that current US missile defenses constitute an “interim solution” because they do not meet this bar. To correct this shortcoming, this issue brief advises the US Department of Defense to invest in directed energy missiles defenses.

Missile defenses ought to follow the Nitze criteria, being effective against modern threats, survivable, and cost effective on the margin

Reagan administration arms control advisor Paul Nitze proposed that missile defenses should be pursued if they are effective against modern threats, survivable, and cost effective on the margin. Kinetic missile defense interceptors fall short against these characteristics.

Contemporary missile developments threaten to render kinetic missile defenses ineffective by the end of the decade. Adversary nations—and even nonstate actors—can increasingly use missile salvos to overwhelm missile defenses. Unpredictable attack trajectories (from maneuvering warheads, submarine and cargo ship launchers, and even fractional orbital systems) can avoid sensors and defenses. Moreover, current missile defenses rely on fixed infrastructure that are vulnerable to missile attacks or special operations forces. Finally, the cost of kinetic missile interceptors can be an order of magnitude greater than the cost of the incoming missile threats.

Directed energy missile defenses—including lasers and high-powered microwave—are an attractive potential solution to this problem. Directed energy defenses have the potential to:

Travel at the speed of light, and thus be less easily frustrated by maneuvering warheads;
Execute near-simultaneous target engagements, and so defeat large salvos of threat missiles;
Be mounted on mobile platforms and have a nearly unlimited amount of “ammunition,” making self-defense less of a challenge; and
Have a cost-per-shot of pennies or dollars, as opposed to millions for a kinetic missile interceptor.

Key recommendations

Kinetic missile defense interceptors have served as an interim solution to the United States’ missile defense needs, but the time is drawing near for the end of the interim solution

The US Department of Defense (DoD) should comprehensively analyze the relative advantages of directed energy missile defenses over kinetic interceptors.
DoD should reprioritize its investments in kinetic interceptor systems to accelerate the development of directed energy systems.

[A]n investment strategy to accelerate the development of directed energy systems to a pace to counter the emerging threats before current US missile defense systems are deemed ineffective by potential US adversaries is warranted.

Patrick O’Reilly

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Cole in War on the Rocks on the US need for an algorithmic warfare group

Atlantic Council — Thu, 09 Dec 2021 20:14:00 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On December 9, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow August Cole published an article in War on the Rocks titled “Left of beep: The United States needs an algorithmic warfare group.” In the article, Cole argues that the United States risks being left behind in the competition to field artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in the future battlespace, and that a dedicated Algorithmic Warfare Group is needed to get AI technology into the hands of the services.

“…there is an underappreciated risk that now this building wave of knowledge and innovation won’t actually filter down in time to shape the tactics of frontline U.S. units.”

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Guerrilla tactics offer Ukraine’s best deterrent against Putin’s invasion force

T. X. Hammes — Mon, 06 Dec 2021 23:40:50 +0000

While there is no consensus concerning what current Russian military activity near Ukraine means, it has led to strong statements from US officials. On December 3, the Washington Post reported that US intelligence has found the Kremlin is planning a multi-front offensive as soon as early next year involving up to 175,000 troops.

The Washington Post and other sources speculate the timing of the offensive will be based on the weather. It must turn cold long enough to harden the muddy terrain of eastern Ukraine to allow armored forces to maneuver. Thus the campaign will not start until January or February 2022.

US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has warned Russia that such action will result in severe consequences including high-impact economic sanctions. However, he has not given any indication the United States will commit forces to stop or reverse a Russian invasion.

Clearly, the United States hopes a combination of diplomatic messaging, the threat of sanctions, and providing a limited number of weapons and training to Ukraine will deter Russia. Since 2014, the United States has provided USD 2.5 billion to support Ukrainian forces and pledged USD 400 million for 2021 alone. The program includes counterbattery radars and Javelin anti-tank missiles. While this aid is important, it appears it will ultimately be up to Ukraine itself to provide the military deterrent to Russian aggression.

The Javelin system provided by the US is a very effective anti-tank weapon but due to its relatively short range (maximum of 4500 meters), personnel must be massed fairly close to the enemy’s axis of advance. Further, the high cost means USD 40 million provided only 10 firing units and 150 missiles in 2019. In short, while useful, such weapons will not alter the tactical situation enough to deter the Kremlin.

Deterrence can be achieved by denial or punishment of the aggressor. Unfortunately, it is highly unlikely Ukraine can deny Russian invasion forces at or near its border. Therefore, Ukraine’s best chance of deterring the Russians is to threaten to punish them once they cross the border.

Ukraine can raise the cost to Russia by preparing for a long war complete with significant guerrilla activity behind Russian lines. Russian leaders are acutely aware of the price Afghan guerrillas extracted for the occupation of their country. Preparation for this kind of war requires recruiting and training personnel as well as establishing weapons caches quickly. Such efforts are already underway and will likely intensify in the weeks ahead.

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The short timeline before a potential Russian invasion precludes the purchase and deployment of complex weapons systems. Instead, Ukraine needs relatively simple and inexpensive weapons to increase its defensive capabilities. Some existing weapons might be fielded and employed at short notice.

Mines remain one of the most effective weapons for slowing an invading force and both sides have employed them extensively around the Russian-occupied enclaves in eastern Ukraine. One assumes Ukraine owns more mines and will employ them to defend the much broader stretch of its frontier currently threatened by Russian forces.

However, given the very open nature of the terrain in eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainian military cannot possibly place enough mines to stop a Russian attack. Fortunately, mines can be augmented by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of the type used against allied forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. These weapons can be used by regular forces to inflict casualties and slow the Russian advance. However, as with land mines, the nature of Ukrainian terrain will limit the effectiveness of these weapons against armored forces moving across open country.

IEDs can be used effectively by guerrilla forces to attack a major Kremlin weakness, the Russian military’s generally road-bound logistics trains. IEDs are both inexpensive and difficult to identify. In recent conflicts, insurgents have hidden these devices in everything from water cans to animal carcasses. They can vary in size from small anti-personnel devices to a shipping container or small building filled with ammonium nitrate.

Given the plentiful supply of ammonium nitrate, a 20 metric ton IED is not out of the question. Such a device would certainly disrupt an armored attack and devastate a logistics convoy. Like US forces in Iraq, Russia would have to dedicate considerable troops and resources to keeping lines of communications open.

The key will be to train Ukrainian active, reserve, and any militia or proposed guerrilla forces in the techniques necessary to build, position, and detonate these devices. Insurgents have shown remarkable ingenuity in developing both victim-activated and remote triggers using garage door openers, cell phones, garden hoses, and other simple devices to close electric circuits. The one element not widely available to civilians is the detonator or blasting cap. The Ukrainian government needs to produce and preposition these devices.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Ukrainian forces have a good deal of experience using small, off-the-shelf drones for ISR and limited strike operations. They have shown considerable creativity in deployment and should continue to push commercial procurement and domestic production with a focus on use by irregular forces.

At the same time, Ukraine is clearly ready to move up to military-grade drones. An Australian company, DefendTex, has produced the Drone40. A small and inexpensive drone costing up to USD 1,000, it can be launched by hand. With a maximum range of 20 kilometers, it provides dismounted infantrymen or guerrillas a way to interdict lines of communication without having to operate close to them. The small warhead is sufficient to kill a wheeled vehicle, disable an artillery piece, or cause a secondary detonation on a rocket pod. The system is currently in use by US and UK forces. To prevent attacks on their supply lines, Russian forces would have to clear all roads of Ukrainian personnel to a distance of 20 kilometers.

Ukraine has already purchased a number of Turkey’s Bayrakter 2 drones, which have proven highly successful in several theaters including the recent Nagorno Karabakh conflict. These weapons will be useful but, once again, will be limited in number due to cost.

The Israeli Harop, Hero, and Spike family of drones could provide cheaper alternatives. For less that the cost of two Javelin missiles, the autonomous Harop can loiter for six hours and deliver ordnance up to 20 kilograms to a range of 1,000 kilometers. It also makes a somewhat terrifying whine during its terminal dive. The Hero and Spike families provide a range of capabilities that are useful to either regulars or guerrillas. However, it will take considerable diplomatic effort to convince Israel to reverse its current refusal to sell drones to Ukraine.

If that fails, Raytheon produces the Coyote drone. Initially designed as an anti-drone weapon, this drone is now under development as a strike weapon. Unfortunately at USD 20,000 each, they are relatively expensive. However, they have a range of 80 kilometers and can fly in very adverse weather, which makes them attractive for a campaign in the depths of the Ukrainian winter.

Each of these drones has much greater range than standard anti-vehicle systems. Each can be vehicle-mounted to provide exceptional tactical flexibility. However, as the Russians will have air superiority, Ukrainians should mount them in widely used commercial vehicles to increase their survivability.

Of course, Ukrainian leaders are acutely aware of Russia’s historically bloody methods for suppressing insurgencies. They face a difficult choice in deciding whether to equip their people for this kind of effort. The human costs of an insurgency campaign against Putin’s invasion force would likely be devastating. Nevertheless, Ukrainians who have already been defending their country against Russian aggression for more than seven years are unlikely to accept any attempt to occupy more Ukrainian land.

T.X. Hammes is a Distinguished Research Fellow at the US National Defense University. He served 30 years in the US Marine Corps and holds a doctorate in Modern History from Oxford University. The views expressed here are strictly his own and do not reflect those of the US government.

Ukraine and Turkey are on the same page regarding the Russian occupation of Crimea, with both nations committed to policies of non-recognition. Ankara is one of Kyiv’s most important partners in the recently initiated Crimea Platform, a new international format launched in August 2021 that aims to counter the security, economic, environmental, cultural, and human rights threats emanating from the Russian occupation of the Ukrainian peninsula, and to ultimately bring this occupation to an end.

It is clear that the Russian militarization of occupied Crimea has significantly undermined the security situation in the wider Black Sea region. This is not only a Ukrainian problem. On the contrary, it creates major security challenges with regional and global implications.

According to current estimates, Russia has increased its military presence in Crimea threefold since 2014. Moscow has flooded the occupied peninsula with military hardware, including highly sophisticated weapons systems that pose a threat to countries throughout the Black Sea region and deep into Central Europe. The Kremlin also uses Crimea as a bridgehead for its expanding military activities in the Middle East and Africa.

Russia exploits the occupation of Crimea to interfere with international maritime trade while threatening cornerstones of maritime law including freedom of navigation. Ukraine is currently working on holding Russia accountable in the international courts for violating these principles.

Meanwhile, there is credible evidence that Russia is also engaged in violating the nuclear-free status of Crimea by refurbishing the long-concealed Soviet-era nuclear facilities of Feodosia-13 and deploying nuclear carriers to the peninsula. If confirmed, this would make the ongoing militarization of Crimea a truly global threat.

Taking all these security factors into account, the Ukrainian authorities believe there is a strong argument to be made for enhanced maritime cooperation between NATO and Ukraine in the Black Sea. These concerns also help to explain why Turkey is willing to strengthen its naval posture in the region and is currently engaged in enhancing security cooperation with Ukraine.

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Ukraine and Turkey are already working closely together to ensure security and stability in the Black Sea region. This partnership makes strategic sense for both parties. As two large nations dominating the northern and southern shores of the Black Sea, Ukraine and Turkey are natural regional partners in the security sphere.

Ukraine and Turkey have a long and rich history of bilateral relations that stretches back for many centuries. During the Cossack epoch, Ukrainians often entered into military and diplomatic alliances with the Ottoman Empire, while also frequently finding themselves on opposing sides.

Recent years have seen the strategic partnership between Ukraine and Turkey reach the highest level in the three decades since Ukraine restored its independence in 1991. These strengthening ties owe much to the excellent personal relations between presidents Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Another important cornerstone of today’s deepening partnership is the presence of strong Crimean Tatar communities in both Ukraine and Turkey. We commend President Erdogan for his personal involvement in freeing a number of Ukrainian political prisoners, Crimean Tatars, from Russian captivity.

Ukraine and Turkey are truly friends in need. When Turkey fought devastating wildfires in summer 2021, Ukraine immediately decided to offer help. Kyiv dispatched two large firefighting Antonov aircraft and a number of specialized helicopters to Turkey. Ukrainian firefighters worked night and day to extinguish fires and keep them away from tourist areas.

Our Turkish friends were very impressed with the capabilities of Ukraine’s firefighting Antonov planes. During the most recent meeting with my Turkish counterpart Mevlut Cavusoglu in Lviv in October 2021, he expressed Turkey’s interest in Antonov aircraft. Ukraine welcomes this interest and is ready to explore the possibilities for joint Antonov plane production and international export.

With the climate crisis escalating, the threat of wildfires in Turkey and dozens of other countries around the globe looks like it is here to stay, along with increased demand for firefighting aviation. This makes the proposed aviation industry cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine strategically appealing. We plan to discuss this topic in more depth during our next Quadriga meeting of foreign and defense ministers, which will take place in December 2021 in Ankara.

Next year, Ukraine and Turkey will celebrate 30 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. To mark this occasion, we plan to hold the next session of the Strategic Council between Ukraine and Turkey under the co-chairmanship of both presidents.

A number of agreements and documents are currently being prepared ahead of next year’s Strategic Council. Both sides see the February 2022 meeting as an opportunity to finally sign a long-awaited Turkish-Ukrainian free trade agreement following years of negotiations.

Once in force, this free trade deal will significantly boost already strong trade ties between the two Black Sea nations and facilitate the establishment of new business links. With bilateral trade steadily growing, we also plan to hold a joint intergovernmental trade and economic commission in the near future.

Needless to say, Turkey and Ukraine have much more in common than burgeoning trade, growing cooperation in the military and technical spheres, and a shared commitment to ending the Russian occupation of Crimea.

As my recent talks with Mevlut Cavusoglu demonstrated, there is a lot of room for facilitating people-to-people contacts and deepening cultural and academic ties. With this in mind, we have agreed to establish a joint commission on historical research under the auspices of the Turkish and Ukrainian foreign ministries.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Southern influences have always played a prominent role in the shaping of Ukrainian foreign policy, and this remains very much the case today. In summer 2021, President Zelenskyy initiated the adoption of a National Foreign Policy Strategy, the first such high-level strategy document in the thirty years since Ukraine regained its independence.

This newly adopted document clearly defines Turkey as one of Ukraine’s most important strategic partners. It identifies a number of key focuses in the relationship such as free trade, military and technological partnership, and cooperation on large infrastructure projects.

Priority areas in the deepening strategic partnership between Ukraine and Turkey include strengthening security cooperation in the Black Sea region (with potentially heightened NATO involvement), Turkey’s ongoing engagement in the development of the Crimea Platform, and further joint efforts to protect the rights of the Crimean Tatars.

Ukraine and Turkey are developing a clear vision for the future security of the Black Sea region. It is time for NATO to begin viewing this Ukrainian-Turkish partnership as a valuable supplementary force that can help provide security and stability in the region.

Only the joint efforts of NATO allies including Turkey, together with the Associated Trio nations of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, will make it possible to prevent the Black Sea from falling under Russian dominance and becoming subject to Moscow’s destabilizing activities.

The earlier we send a clear signal to the Kremlin regarding our resolve and unity, the better. Nobody needs a conflict in the Black Sea. Indeed, the only power willing to provoke any fresh confrontations in the region is Russia. In the current security environment, projecting strength is the best way to deter Moscow and avoid any new escalations.

An increased NATO presence in the Black Sea neighborhood will significantly lower tensions and stabilize the region, not vice versa. Ukraine has been dealing with the Russians for a long time and understands their reasoning very well. The Russian leadership escalates only when they sense weakness. There is nothing more inviting from a Russian perspective than the indecisiveness of their adversaries.

At the same time, Russia respects strength and will not risk an escalation when they are confident of the other side’s resolve. This is exactly why Ukraine is calling for a greater NATO presence in the Black Sea region and expanding cooperation between NATO and non-NATO allies. The Turkish-Ukrainian strategic partnership is a good example that such cooperation is not only feasible, but also highly efficient and mutually beneficial.

Dmytro Kuleba is Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.

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Preble in the Washington Examiner: The US drone program has psychological costs

Atlantic Council — Fri, 24 Sep 2021 16:33:12 +0000

Former Co-Director, New American Engagement Initiative

On September 21, Christopher Preble was quoted in a Washington Examiner article on lawmakers reactions to the 10 civilian deaths caused by a US drone strike on August 29 in Kabul.

“There’s obviously cost paid by the people on the ground,” Preble said. “And there’s a psychological effect on the American servicemen and women who are involved in these operations when one of these incidents goes bad.”

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Slavin joined VOA Russian to discuss the latest US strikes in Syria and Iraq

Atlantic Council — Tue, 29 Jun 2021 15:44:00 +0000

Original Source

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Grieco in International Politics: Can drones coerce?

Atlantic Council — Mon, 14 Jun 2021 18:56:00 +0000

Former Co-Director, New American Engagement Initiative

On June 14, Grieco was featured in International Politics, in which she coauthored an article with J. Wesley Hutto analyzing the coercive effect of remote warfare.

“While drone technologies can effectively degrade organizational capabilities and impose significant costs, they complicate the tasks of signaling clear and credible threats and assurances of restraint. Persistent surveillance combined with lethal and low-risk strikes render armed drones highly effective at altering the cost–benefit calculations of terrorists. Yet these same technological attributes cause them to be less effective in terms of clear communication, credibility, and assurance—the other key factors necessary for coercion success. Overall, armed drones are poor instruments of coercion in counterterrorism.”

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Cole’s “Burn In” named to best sci-fi of 2020 list by Polyon

Atlantic Council — Sun, 10 Jan 2021 15:20:50 +0000

Polygon, a video game publication, named Burn In, co-authored by Forward Defense non-resident senior fellow August Cole, to its top sci-fi and fantasy books of 2020. Burn In is a thriller at the intersection of robotics, artificial intelligence, and security.

ORIGINAL SOURCE

Singer and Cole come from the policy and think tank worlds, and look at not only the potential threats that our current technological lives bring, but how the growing white nationalist movement seems poised to take advantage of those problems.

Andrew Liptak, Polygon

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Nurkin in Defense News on loyal wingman technology

Atlantic Council — Mon, 21 Dec 2020 17:35:00 +0000

original Source

Forward Defense non-resident senior fellow Tate Nurkin writes in Defense News on the importance of advancing loyal wingman technology. Loyal wingman technology is the use of artificial intelligence (AI) to have unmanned aerial vehicles fight alongside human-piloted aircraft.

[Loyal wingmen] serve as powerful force multipliers that will both amplify and optimize the advanced capabilities of crewed aircraft

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The West, China, and AI surveillance

Kaan Sahin (Guest Author) — Fri, 18 Dec 2020 15:09:42 +0000

Risks and opportunities

It is the year 2027: China has been continually perfecting its full-fledged nationwide surveillance architecture in form of smart and secure cities as well as the social credit system. The results cannot be denied: thanks to artificial intelligence (AI), surveillance systems throughout the streets plaster the faces of jaywalkers on billboards and drivers of speeding cars are immediately informed that they are fined, leading to a new record low of traffic accidents.

At the same time, however, the government has employed AI surveillance systems as big-brother-type instruments of repression. For instance, AI tools have been honed to the degree that they can automatically grade—be it online or offline—the degree of comments critical of government and discipline their citizens according to their statements. The punishments might range from the reduction of social benefits up to forced work in detention camps. For non-nationals, entry bans have also already been applied preemptively. Civil society groups observe that these AI surveillance applications consolidate the robustness of authoritarian regimes, lead to anticipatory change in people’s behavior in favor of the government’s positions, and compromise heavily the human dignity of their citizens.

Western governments are in a tricky situation: the effectiveness and sophistication of these systems are convincing. On the downside, authoritarian states use AI surveillance to track and control the movements of their citizens and non-nationals, collect data about their faces and gaits, and reuse the information for repressive purposes. Meanwhile, Chinese companies, which are at the forefront in developing and employing these systems, have already been busy striking deals with several countries to export and install their smart city packages. Due to the lack of internal consolidation in Western states and cooperation between them, as well as the absence of a separate approach towards AI surveillance, containing the spread of these systems and their destructive side effects has not been successful.

Given the current state of AI surveillance as well as the speed of development, the above scenario is not an unrealistic Orwellian dystopia, but rather a potential continuation of current international trends. AI surveillance tools in various forms are spreading globally, from facial recognition and early outbreak detection to predictive policing and gait recognition. Despite different legal restrictions, authoritarian and democratic states alike are increasingly employing these instruments to track, surveil, anticipate, and even grade the behavior of their own citizens.

The application of these AI surveillance tools is a very important cornerstone of an emerging trend towards digital authoritarianism: the collection and application of information by states using digital tools to achieve repressive levels of societal control. These tools serve as exponential accelerants of preexistent surveillance practices, and state regimes might achieve unprecedentedly effective authoritarian rule. They could also strengthen the attractiveness of digitally driven, authoritarian practices for fragile democracies.

Because of its high technological ambitions and authoritarian outlook, China is at the leading edge of these trends and is confronted with the allegation of exporting ‘authoritarian tech’ to other states in order to expand its political and economic influence and advertise a governance model opposed to democratic notions. Against this backdrop, Western actors like the United States, which possesses the innovation edge in most technologies, as well as the European Union (EU) and its member states, face a difficult challenge: balancing the development, use, and export of AI surveillance systems while not abandoning democratic norms like their authoritarian counterparts.

The difficulty of this task, namely the effective use of technology on the one hand and preserving the privacy, human rights, and dignity of individuals on the other, is particularly apparent in the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Whereas some authoritarian states are using AI- and data-driven tracking systems to mitigate the crisis in an unrestricted fashion, a debate slowly rages in the West about state authorities’ using the crisis to inch towards a potential surveillance state.

Without a doubt, the pandemic has revealed the risks of AI surveillance tools and has the potential to further accelerate the use of technologies for social control—especially in light of an ever-more data-intensive economy and society. Thus, the crisis presents an opportunity to kick-off an international debate on how to set boundaries and use technology benevolently.

Western governments must find a way to address this growing trend of AI surveillance, especially since it will be difficult to persuade and halt authoritarian regimes such as China from refraining from using AI surveillance—the presumed advantages are all too tempting. Here, the United States, the EU, and other liked-minded states should seize the opportunity of the increase of AI surveillance in the midst of the pandemic and must adopt a multi-layered approach: Western states have to first figure out for themselves the right balance between the effective use of AI surveillance systems and preserving the privacy, human rights, and dignity of their own citizens. Building on that, the West should present an alternative model to digital authoritarianism that comprises the use of AI surveillance tools for democratic ends. And last, a nuanced approach towards China and other authoritarian states employing these systems has to be developed and should encompasses the will to cooperate where possible and collectively sanction if necessary.

In order to shine light on the international trends in AI surveillance, the article will first describe the associated developments with a particular focus on China, the United States, and the EU, and second, it will connect these trends to the ongoing pandemic. Last, it presents recommendations for enhancing an international approach to AI surveillance.

Defining AI surveillance

The AI Global Surveillance (AIGS) Index outlines three pivotal AI surveillance tools: smart/safe city platforms, facial recognition systems, and smart policing. These tools appear in different forms and are technically sophisticated and continuously evolving. For instance, along with facial recognition are speech and gait recognition. Irrespective of their fields of use, the advantages of these systems in the eyes of state authorities are manifold: cost efficiency, reduced reliance on human workers, precise data analyses, and, more broadly, unprecedented possibilities for societal control.

Three aspects concerning the characteristics of AI surveillance are noteworthy in that context: first, these surveillance tools per se are not unlawful, and their deployment always depends on their specific application as well as their societal context. For instance, AI surveillance tools can be used both on the battlefield and for wildlife preservation.

Second, while AI surveillance is one of the key elements of a growing digital authoritarianism trend, other digital instruments also fuel this globally spreading development, including Internet censorship and firewalls, government-made spyware, state-supported disinformation campaigns, and other forms of surveillance via drones or GPS tracking.

And third, there are diverging views concerning the ways in which and to what extent these tools should be used and deployed, illustrated in their development and application in the Chinese, US, and European contexts.

China

There are several reasons that China is globally at the forefront of the development, use, and export of these AI surveillance systems. First, in light of Beijing’s “A Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan” and its general push for technological supremacy, the country is home to several cutting-edge AI surveillance companies and so-called unicorns (start-ups with a current valuation of $1 billion USD or more). Large companies such as Huawei, Hikvision, Dahua, and ZTE are developing these technologies in various forms, from AI-based video surveillance to full-fledged smart city packages. AI startups such as SenseTime (valued at $7.5 billion), Megvii ($4 billion), CloudWalk, and Yitu (both $2 billion) are the leading global players in facial recognition technology. In general, Chinese surveillance companies are in a dominant position, and according to estimates, they “will have 44.59 % of the global facial recognition market share by 2023.”

Second, Chinese state authorities are striving to establish a social credit system— “a big-data-fueled mechanism, to become a powerful tool for enforcement of laws, regulations or other party-state targets […] The idea is to centralize data on natural persons and legal entities under a single identity (the Unified Social Credit Number), then rate them on the basis of that data, and treat them differently according to their behavior.” The system is neither completed nor nationwide yet. However, it is due to expand with the adoption of AI surveillance tools. The concept of collecting information about citizens in a centralized way is actually not that new, even among Western societies. The United States has criminal records and credit scores, and Member States of the EU have healthcare histories. What is new is that China is tracking and using types of data that most Western countries would refrain from. AI helps automate and scale surveillance, potentially enough to realize the worst and best tendencies. China’s strong AI-related industrial and technological sectors, authoritarian tendencies, government involvement in production and research, lax data privacy laws, enormous population, and even a certain degree of societal acceptance of state practices all create the perfect environment for AI surveillance development and deployment.

In that context, the current focal point of the international criticism of China’s AI surveillance usage is the Xinjiang region, which has become “an unfettered surveillance laboratory for surveillance giants to hone their skills and their technology platforms without the usual constraints.” The combination of the suppression of Uighur and other minorities on the one hand and the testing and deploying of cutting-edge technology on the other is one of the most striking examples of digital authoritarianism. Recent revelations in this context showed that Huawei has allegedly developed and tested a so-called “Uighur alarm”, an AI-based face-scanning camera system that can detect persons of the Muslim minority group and alert Chinese authorities in Xinjiang. According to the reports, Huawei has developed these AI surveillance tools in cooperation with several domestic security firms.

Third, Chinese companies lead the way in exporting AI surveillance technologies internationally to sixty-three recipient countries, with Huawei at the forefront of supplying at least fifty. Uganda, for example, acquired a nationwide system of surveillance cameras with facial recognition capabilities from Huawei in August 2019, and from 2018 onwards, state authorities in Zimbabwe have acquired facial recognition technologies from Hikivision and Cloud Walk for border security and mass surveillance. The gathered data will also be sent back to the Chinese companies’ headquarters, “allowing the company to fine-tune its software’s ability to recognize dark-skinned faces, which have previously proved tricky for its algorithms.” Other countries that have received technologies from Chinese companies include Eritrea, Kenya, Serbia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela. Even though China leads in the global export of these technologies, opinions on whether Beijing has an intentional strategy for spreading digital authoritarianism as a new ideological blueprint vary. Regardless, experts fear that China will provide these technologies to other countries in the context of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in order to conduct state espionage.

Chinese technology companies such as ZTE, Dahua, and China Telecom are eager to sway international standards bodies such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) for several AI surveillance forms, including facial recognition, video monitoring, and city and vehicle surveillance. The standards proposed by Chinese companies include broad application possibilities and rights for state authorities, like vast storage requirements for personal information and proposed application fields like cognition technology, from “the examination of people in public spaces by the police [to the] confirmation of employee attendance at work.

Irrespective of whether or not China is intentionally promoting digital authoritarianism via its export of AI surveillance tools, it is providing mechanisms for unprecedented societal control all over the world. Moreover, its domestic deployment of these tools and the notions it has presented to international standard bodies differ from the practices and ideals of liberal democracies.

The United States

The blatant use and export of AI surveillance systems by Beijing has become an issue in the US-Chinese tech confrontation. In January 2020, the then-US Defense Secretary Mark Esper said that China is becoming “a 21st century surveillance state with unprecedented abilities to censor speech and infringe upon basic human rights. Now, it is exporting its facial recognition software and systems abroad.” This opinion was echoed by members of Congress from both parties, including House Intelligence Committee Chairman Representative Adam Schiff and Senator Marco Rubio. Democratic Senator Brian Schatz even proposed to issue the “End Support of Digital Authoritarianism Act” in the summer of 2019. It would have barred companies from countries with a bad human rights record from participating in the Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) held by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), known as the gold standard for measuring consistency of facial recognition software.

The most salient reaction by US authorities occurred in July 2019, when the Commerce Department put eight Chinese companies and twenty Chinese government agencies on the entity list. Those companies and agencies are accused of “human rights violations and abuses in the implementation of China’s campaign of repression, mass arbitrary detention, and high-technology surveillance against Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other members of Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang.” It is now prohibited for US companies to export high-tech equipment to the Chinese agencies and firms, among them the three facial recognition start-up unicorns SenseTime, Megvii, and Yitu, as well as the world-class surveillance camera manufacturers Dahua and Hikvision. However, some of these blacklisted companies have achieved to circumvent the sanctions and still export its products to Western countries.

However, the United States itself is confronted with accusations of hypocrisy: in the aftermath of the September 11 terror attacks, US intelligence services massively expanded their surveillance practices, which became apparent due to the Snowden revelations in 2013. Major US-based tech companies have also exported AI surveillance technologies all over the world. Surveillance systems have also been used by federal or state authorities beyond intelligence gathering—or instance, on the US-Mexico border, where “an array of high-tech companies purvey advanced surveillance equipment.” However, it would be misleading to draw parallels between the Chinese and US approaches: there are no signs that US authorities will deploy a similarly all-encompassing system to publicly surveil or even grade its citizens. Furthermore, companies headquartered in the United States are characterized by a largely transparent corporate structure within a rule-of-law framework as opposed to the Chinese model.

In general, federal and state authorities in the United States are at the very beginning of considering the regulation of AI surveillance deployments, especially facial recognition. When it comes to existing stipulations in those areas, there are varying degrees of restrictions and controls in cities and states in the United States, leading to a patchwork of regulation across the country. In San Francisco, San Diego, and Oakland, city agencies are banned from using facial recognition technologies, while other cities such as Detroit allow a restrained use of facial recognition by their police departments. Recently, the Portland City Council prohibited the public and private use of facial recognition technology.

In light of the absence of nation-wide regulations, federal lawmakers have embarked on passing national legislation on facial recognition technology. For instance, the “Ethical Use of Facial Recognition Act” was proposed by Senator Jeff Merkley, which would “forbid the use of the tech by federal law enforcement without a court-issued warrant until Congress comes up with better regulation.” It would also establish a commission to further assess facial recognition technology and propose guidelines. Discussion of regulating facial recognition technology has gained traction in Congressional hearings over the last year.

In light of George Floyd’s murder and the subsequent protests against racism and police brutality all over the country in early June 2020, IBM was the first company to announce in a letter addressed to lawmakers that it will cease to sell, develop, or research general-purpose facial recognition technology. Microsoft and Amazon followed to some extent and announced their pause the sale of such technologies to police forces. Both tech giants publicly state that they wouldn’t offer facial-recognition technology to state and local police departments until proper national laws with respect of human rights are enacted, and both companies have already called on lawmakers for such regulation.

In sum, the United States has recently increased its attention to and activity around these issues at home and abroad. However, a value-based approach addressing the trend of digital authoritarianism has played a comparatively minor role in the context of the current technological rivalry with China. Further, the regulatory landscape of AI surveillance, in particular facial recognition technology, is still a patchwork across states and cities, and comprehensive national legislation is absent as of now.

The European Union

In terms of artificial intelligence and the digital realm in general, the European Union has been following a ‘human-centered approach,’ which it is eager to promote as a global and unique selling point. In the previous European Commission under President Jean-Claude Juncker (2014-2019), the High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence issued the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence, promoting the idea that so-called trustworthy AI should be lawful, ethical, and robust. These guidelines already point to the necessity of “differentiating between the identification of an individual vs the tracing and tracking of an individual, and between targeted surveillance and mass surveillance”.

The new Commission under Ursula von der Leyen (2019-2024) has signaled that this human-centered approach will be further developed. In terms of AI surveillance, the leak of the first draft of the EC’s white paper on AI in January 2020 made headlines for the document’s envisioned five-year ban on the use of facial recognition systems in public areas. However, the official version issued one month later had watered down language with no mention of a potential ban. The document rather adopts a risk-based and sector-specific approach to set boundaries for AI systems, including facial recognition software. It says that the “gathering and use of biometric data of remote identification purposes, for instance through deployment of facial recognition in public areas, carries specific risks for fundamental rights.” In order to identify these risks and potential areas for regulation concerning remote biometric identification, “the Commission will launch a broad European debate on the specific circumstances, if any, which might justify such use, and common safeguards.” In that context, the white paper also puts particular emphasis on the existing data protection rules, for instance given by the EU GDPR (EU’s General Data Protection Regulation), since they only allow the processing of biometric data in very specific cases. Concrete EU legislative proposals on how to regulate AI applications are planned in the first half of 2021.

The white paper on AI and the EU in general falls short of addressing the global trend of digital authoritarianism. The EU follows an inward-looking approach but has still not displayed any grand aspirations to directly tackle the global element of the AI surveillance challenge. Against this backdrop, EU officials and high-ranking politicians from member states have been ratherhesitant to criticize China´s social credit system or the repressive use of AI surveillance in Xinjiang.

The balancing act between an outright ban and the restrained use of these technologies is seen in their implementation. A German case illustrates the difficulty of the trade-off between effective crime control and data privacy concerns. After the Federal Ministry of the Interior tested facial recognition cameras at the Berlin-Südkreuz train station, it wanted to deploy these systems to one hundred and thirty-four railway stations and fourteen airports all over Germany. However, after lawmakers from the opposition and even coalition partners and civil society protested these plans, they were put on hold.

The approach of French state authorities is less restrained. In October 2019, the Ministry of Interior announced its plans to use facial recognition technology in the framework of its national digital identification program, named Alicem. This would make France the first EU Member State to use the technologies for digital identity. However, the plans have provoked criticism from civil society, and questions have been raised about whether the deployment is in conformity with GDPR regulation. In another case, French regulators ruled against the use of facial recognition technology in high schools. In order to provide overall legal clarification, the French government announced in January 2020 that a legal framework for developing facial recognition for security and surveillance would be established soon. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the latest terror attacks in Nice in October 2020, several high-raking French politicians have called for the installment of AI surveillance tools in public spaces to tackle terrorism.

As with the situation in the United States, Europe is at the beginning of regulation and finding balance. However, with the AI white paper’s risk-based and sector-specific approach and GDPR, the EU has predetermined a potential framing for promoting its notions in the international debate.

COVID-19 and tech surveillance: A mixed blessing

The deployment of AI by several countries to monitor, track, and surveil individuals during the ongoing pandemic is controversial. As the country with the first COVID-19 cases, China has been at the forefront of using AI surveillance systems to monitor whether individuals are adhering to social distancing measures and to track the contacts of suspected or confirmed infected persons. Chinese facial recognition start-ups such as Megvii, Hanwang, and Sensetime modified their systems to identify those not wearing facemasks in public and detect fevers. Digital platforms and mobile networks are also used to track the radius of movement and to process this data in AI-driven systems. Baidu, one of the Chinse tech giants, has installed infrared and facial-recognition technology, which is capable of automatically taking pictures of each person’s face and checking more than two hundred people per minute at the Qinghe railway station in Beijing. In addition, “Chinese authorities are deploying drones to patrol public places, conduct thermal imaging, or to track people violating quarantine rules.”

Moreover, state authorities have introduced the method of ‘risk scoring,’ which allocates “a color code—green, yellow, or red—that determine[s]…ability to take transit or enter buildings in China’s megacities.” The Chinese government has dubbed the extensive use of its surveillance technology for crisis mitigation as “an all-out people’s war on coronavirus.” Thus, it is no surprise that some tracing apps were developed by the joint work of commercial enterprises, state authorities, and law enforcement agencies.

Other authoritarian states are also deploying similar measures, though not usually to such an extent. For instance, AI data crunching apps for contract tracing have been frequently used by the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the political and economic alliance of all Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Russia, considered one of the main global drivers and implementers of AI surveillance alongside China, is using the pandemic to test its newly developed systems, too. In Moscow, for instance, a large-scale surveillance network of more than 100,000 cameras with facial recognition technology scours the city to determine whether people are violating the rules of their quarantine restrictions.

These cases show that already-installed AI surveillance technology in predominantly authoritarian states can be repurposed to mitigate the crisis. However, at the same time, there is concern among civil society that the COVID-19 crisis will be exploited to solidify surveillance states. Even some democracies—mostly in South Asia—relied on similar tools early in the crisis. The reason, however, that states such as Taiwan or South Korea are more willing to deploy these tools is that East Asian societies tend to be more collectivist than Western ones, particularly regarding issues of privacy. Yet, they clearly illustrate the dilemma for democracies: deciding between effectively managing a crisis and the potential reduction of privacy and human rights.

Recommendations for starting the international debate

The COVID-19 pandemic is an important moment in the global use and potential containment of AI surveillance. As put by Nicolas Wright, a recognized tech-surveillance expert at the University College London (UCL): “Just as the September 11 attacks ushered in new surveillance practices in the United States, the coronavirus pandemic might do the same for many nations around the world. […] But neither the United States nor European countries have used the widespread and intrusive surveillance methods applied in East Asia.”

Therefore, the COVID-19 crisis and the recent global awareness of these issues should be taken as reason for the West to find a consolidated approach towards AI surveillance. The fact that globally operating US tech giants have also stopped or restricted their involvement in facial recognition technology might add momentum to the discussion.

Therefore, Western countries have to adapt a threefold approach: first, as seen with the domestic situation in the United States and the EU, Western governments and institutions must first find the right approach to regulate the application of AI surveillance systems domestically before engaging on the international level successfully. The AI legislative proposals expected from the European Commission will be important to set clear positions against the undemocratic use of AI surveillance tools. In the best case, these proposals will have imitation effects for other like-minded states. The US Congress should answer the calls of great tech companies and the civil society and push for federal legislation to overcome the current domestic patchwork of AI rules. However, this will be not a one-time exercise for EU and US authorities since the fast-paced developments of AI applications will need permanent and quick adaptions.

Second, Western states need to possess and present an alternative, human and democracy friendly model of AI surveillance to the trend of digital authoritarianism so that other governments will have an alternative. Here, potential disagreements between the EU and United States concerning AI have to be resolved. It is well-known that both actors have different notions about the degree of AI regulation since the latter prefers a more ‘laissez-faire’ approach. However, there are indications that especially for AI surveillance, the disagreements are not too great. For instance, the recently adopted Statement on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights from the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC), of which the United States and several EU states are members, notes the importance of the preservation of human rights in light of AI developments.

In general, international collaboration on restricting the areas for AI surveillance is therefore critical, and the increase of AI surveillance tools in the midst of the pandemic is a unique opportunity to further drive the conversation in international fora. Public leaders might begin this discussion by building on the already existing work of other organizations and countries—for example the “Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence” by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Other blueprints or references are the EU’s white paper on AI and the UN Roadmap for Digital Cooperation which foresees the “multi-stakeholder efforts on global AI cooperation […] and use of AI in a manner that is trustworthy, human rights-based, safe and sustainable, and promotes peace.”

According to the study of the German think-tank Stiftung Neue Verantwortung, however, the current situation is rather characterized by a “complex web of stakeholders that shape the international debate on AI ethics [and by] outputs that are often limited to non-binding, soft AI principles.” Besides expert groups on the EU level, there is, for example, the Ad Hoc Committee on Artificial Intelligence (CAHAI) of the Council of Europe in the wider European context, the two expert groups at OECD level (comprising European states and the United States), and the Ad Hoc Expert Group for the Recommendation on the Ethics of AI at the UNESCO. In none of the mentioned fora, are all three actors—the EU, the United States, and China—common members. Therefore, finding the right way for a dialogue and developing consensus on these issues will be an enormous challenge due to the different approaches among the countries and the emerging triad of digital autocrats, fragile democracies or ‘digital deciders’, and liberal democrats.

However, with signals from from the incoming Biden administration pointing to more engagement in multilateralism, the EU and other like-minded states should at least for themselves agree on the basic principles surrounding AI surveillance in order to convince others to adhere to their notions. Regarding the mentioned international fora, the OECD seems to be the best suited one due to its current work regarding its AI principles and observatory as well as the membership situation. Furthermore, similar to cyber consultations in which states are exchanging views on opportunities and threats in the context of cyber space, ‘strategic AI consultations’ between foreign ministries of like-minded states can help to better grapple with the challenge of AI surveillance.

Even though the international debate on AI surveillance is occupied with the dangers it poses to human rights, there are positive examples worth mentioning. AI surveillance tools are used for taming wildfires, and AI recognition tools developed by Microsoft have been repeatedly used to detect and protect endangered species. Another field is the use of AI for medical applications. However, these positive examples have to be expanded since the scale of their impact is limited compared to digital authoritarian implementations, including the envisaged public mass surveillance of 1.5 billion people by the Chinese government. In a common effort, several ‘tech for good’ areas can be jointly developed, which would also help mature and ‘enshrine’ an alternative to ‘authoritarian tech.’

Concerning AI and data privacy, state governments, private companies, and NGOs should further develop collaboration, standards, and international awareness for privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs). According to the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), PETs refer to “software and hardware solutions, i.e. systems encompassing technical processes, methods or knowledge to achieve specific privacy or data protection functionality or to protect against risks of privacy of an individual or a group of natural persons.” The deployment of PETs, if well-conceived and properly executed, could strike a balance between using AI surveillance for effective crisis management on the one hand and protecting privacy on the other. This privacy-by-design approach has been repeatedly called for by Margrethe Vestager, the Executive Vice-President of the European Commission for a Europe fit for the Digital Age (Competition), and is one of the suggested principles outlined in the EU GDPR. In the United States, Senator Kirsten Gillibrand’s recently envisaged Data Protection Act contains the same themes. Similar to PETs, standards for these purposes could ease many data protection concerns (even though this will have limited effect for facial recognition).

Third, an approach towards China and other troubling users of AI surveillance tech has to be nuanced: cooperate where possible, but impose restrictive measures such as sanctions if needed.
The discussion in international fora should include China, which has its own notion of AI ethics and regulation (Beijing AI Principles), as well as other authoritarian states. Besides international collaboration, however, governments should further scrutinize companies exporting AI surveillance tools used in human rights abuses. In light of the US-Chinese tech confrontation, companies such as Huawei and ZTE and their supply of surveillance technology as an instrument of political repression have provoked criticism from governments and civil society groups alike. In light of the growing interrelationship between technological advances and possibilities for political repression, public leaders should consider international sanctions and clearly state that punitive actions will be imposed on companies and states in response to human rights abuses, and not for reasons of economic and military competition.

Unequivocally, the private sector must be part of the debate as the endeavor requires a multi-stakeholder approach. Companies should contribute their expertise in developing and handling these technologies and clearly show the benefits and challenges in applying AI surveillance tools. In that context, private leaders can commit themselves to supplying technology only for lawful use, as has already happened to some degree with American tech leaders. In that context, IBM has recently even called on the US Department of Commerce to develop new export rules about “the type of facial recognition system most likely to be used in mass surveillance systems, racial profiling or other human rights violations.”

For like-minded Western countries, finding areas of cooperation with authoritarian states, especially China, will be of great importance. At the same time, however, certain practices that run contrary to the values of human rights and rule of law must be clearly addressed. With the Biden administration at the helm, a more cooperative spirit in the transatlantic relationship and beyond is expected. Further, the preservation and promotion of democratic values will most probably receive more attention. AI surveillance must come to the fore in the dispute between democracy and authoritarianism. Otherwise, the dystopian scenario proposed at the beginning of this article is only a matter of time.

Kaan Sahin is a Research Fellow in Technology and Foreign Policy at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).

Smart Partnerships Series

Mar 14, 2020

Europe’s third way

By Julian Mueller-Kaler

The Atlantic Council’s endeavor to evaluate the implications of modern technologies for society and politics continued in Brussels, where the event was co-hosted by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS).

Americas China

Smart Partnerships Series

Mar 14, 2020

The price of great power politics

By Julian Mueller-Kaler

Unlike previous gatherings where a majority of participants represented government institutions, the roundtable in Germany brought together business- and private-sector representatives. Together with policy experts, they discussed the emergence of new technologies, the rise of China, and the implications of a global AI race.

Americas China

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Embracing underseas robots: a US strategy to maintain underseas superiority in an age of unmanned systems

Erich Frandrup — Tue, 03 Nov 2020 21:18:13 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

REPORT RELEASE

Commanding Officer, Naval Diving and Salvage Training Center

US defense globally relies heavily on US presence and superiority at sea. The strength, versatility, and vastness of the US submarine force underpins US underseas superiority, which is key to US naval dominance globally. While submarines remain a staple of underseas superiority, unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) will be crucial to maintaining the US military advantage in this domain in the decades to come.

What is “underseas superiority”?

Underseas superiority refers to US military dominance over any opposing force within the underseas domain, permitting the United States to conduct underseas operations at any given time and place without prohibitive interference by adversaries.

From an emerging military technology to a critical capability…

While submarine precision-strike capabilities, covertness, and energy efficiency have proven increasingly essential to naval success since the American Revolution, the future of warfare is progressing towards automation. The US Navy is just beginning to realize the advantages unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) offer in underseas warfare. Currently, naval UUVs are primarily used for data gathering and counter-measure operations.

As the United States harnesses the power of UUVs in a warfighting context, robust operating concepts will prove essential to building effective capabilities. As the future of warfare becomes more multi-regional, multi-vectored, and multi-domain, it is imperative that operating concepts apply across all domains and military services. Once developed, UUVs could create global underseas transparency, similar to how satellite imagery has slowly created global transparency of Earth’s surface. This would revolutionize underseas warfare, undermining submarine stealth strike capabilities.

A global operating context…

As emerging undersea capabilities develop, the United States will have opportunities to expand existing military partnerships and establish new ones. The United States can engage in military and non-military partnerships, including cooperation in the global marine mining market. However, the growth of underseas technologies also threatens US military advantage as great-power competitors China and Russia develop formidable submarine forces and innovative underseas concepts of their own. It will be imperative that the United States, with its allies and partners, develop counter-UUV capabilities to avoid technological or strategic surprise.

In Forward Defense’s latest report Embracing Underseas Robots: US Strategy to Maintain Underseas Superiority in an Age of Unmanned Systems, CDR Erich Frandrup, USN assesses how the United States can maintain underseas superiority in an age of unmanned systems. This strategy paper argues for prioritizing offensive capabilities, leveraging existing technologies, and taking a “crawl-walk-run” approach to fully operationalizing underseas concepts.

The strategy focuses on four major elements:

Developing foresight on the promise that unmanned undersea vehicles (UUV) possess and the threats that they pose.
Transitioning to manned/unmanned system joint operating concepts.
Smartly and comprehensively developing the capabilities required within underseas operating concepts.
Considering military and non-military opportunities to engage US partners and allies with unmanned systems.

About the author

Former fellow

Erich Frandrup

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Drones Iraq

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Fontenrose quoted in CNBC on Iran’s weapons capability

hbarzani — Mon, 19 Oct 2020 20:18:00 +0000

Original Source

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Potential trouble ahead: predictions from 2010 now are real in 2020

David Bray — Thu, 20 Aug 2020 02:15:00 +0000

In 2010, the Dr. David Bray provided an unclassified briefing to the U.S. national security and defense communities on “Why Future Policy Leaders Will Need to Know Science, Technology, Global Business, and National Security”. Now, 10 years later, it is worth revisiting those slides – especially in light that those slides raised concerns about the use of small commercial drones and do-it-yourself drones back then and recently we have seen elevated concerns about what these could do to commercial airplanes in flight.

Below are images from the original 2010 “Trouble Ahead” set of predictions.

The concerns raised in 2010 opened with:

Worlds are colliding: Science + Technology + Business + National Security

Looking at the last decade, as well as current projected trends, these world continue to collide. The reason why the GeoTech Center exists is to explore how to ensure that data and tech efforts benefit people, prosperity, and peace and ideally do not harm.

The concerns and predictions continue with:

Science and technology advances + Greater global information sharing
= Cheaper commercial products + Challenges with maintaining national security

Which also proves to have been true for the last decade and what seems to be continued projected trends as well. The good news is data and technologies are becoming democratized and widespread. Yet this is also bad news because now such capabilities can be used for purposes that are less than benevolent in the world. This underscores even more the mission of the GeoTech Center to encourage what we call: #GoodTechChoices

The slides and predictions from 2010 continue with predictions for the next five years, to include:

Consumers increasingly will have their space-time movements tracked, and consumers will love the “ease” of the accessing the “free” things they get in return, not realizing privacy loss

Which also appears to have matched what happened, as well as recognizing that about the middle of the last decade there was a bit of a “techlash” where some become concerned about privacy loss and did not want to become a surveillance state. The question for 2020, especially given the current COVID-19 reality where so many people are working online, is whether people who are working remotely recognize the potential privacy concerns of such work? Do remote works prefer ease and free at the loss of agency over personal data?

At the GeoTech Center, we firmly believe that the United States and other open societies face data coordination challenges. This is why Data Trusts (also known as Data Cooperatives) need to be pursued. Without these we won’t find a way to involve people in data – to “do data with people” instead of to people. We must find a way for great public participation with the choices associated with data at community and larger population scales.

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The ‘Digital Ocean’ as a model for innovation in the perfect storm

Keit Pentus-Rosimannus and Michael D. Brasseur — Wed, 19 Aug 2020 13:08:09 +0000

Megatrends that shape the current century point to a future in which our security and environment are inextricably linked. Population changes, exponential technological growth, climate change, and scarcity of resources, both natural and financial, set against rising global insecurity create a situation in which our international institutions must innovate or risk becoming irrelevant and financially unsustainable.

NATO is positioned to lead in this era of risk and innovation. By capitalizing on opportunities such as the ‘Digital Ocean’ NATO can help provide solutions to the megatrends that will define this century, while fulfilling its core mission of providing security to its nearly one billion citizens.

The perfect storm of challenges

The asymmetric demographic change we are already witnessing will shrink the Western working age population remarkably. By mid-century every fourth person in Europe will be over sixty-five years old and by 2080 there will be less than two working age persons per each elderly person in Europe. We know now, decades in advance, that there will be fewer taxpayers. Falling working age population brings shrinking budgets, while the need for resources and workers in numerous sectors are increasing.

Climate change will impact virtually every aspect of society. More frequent severe weather events will bring high economic costs—heat waves, forest fires, storms, and floods that will test the health of all species. Food and water shortages will accelerate tensions in already fragile regions. Currently, we’re in a hunger crisis with 260 million people predicted to be without enough food by the end of the year. Rising temperatures and extreme events will further harm livestock and diminish crop yields, driving starvation. Around 1.5 billion people live in river basins where the demand of fresh water exceeds the natural recharge level and by 2030 the global water demand will exceed current sustainable supplies by 40 percent. Although 70 percent of the earth is covered with water, only 2.5% of it is freshwater. Ironically, while our freshwater reserves are falling, our oceans are rising as icebergs melt into the sea and eat away at our coastlines, displacing millions of people. Water scarcity, extreme weather events, rising water levels, food shortages, and other climate change calamities will make parts of our world simply unlivable, causing migration pressure and increasing the risk of further cultural tensions and conflicts.

Rapidly developing technologies have already changed the ways people communicate and do business, governments serve their citizens, and societies protect their interests. Exponential growth in technology, computing power, and artificial intelligence has and will be felt by every state and every sector.

These megatrends have emerged amid an increasingly more complex security environment in which a resurgent Russia aggressively promotes misinformation and engages provocative behavior to create instability around the globe. Further, China is in a race to become the global leader in technology, trade, and both digital and physical infrastructure. This security situation is of course further exacerbated by the global pandemic currently ravaging our health care systems and economies.

Granted the challenges are many, but so too are the opportunities to launch a new era of institutional and technological innovation unrivaled in history.

How NATO can harness the ‘Digital Ocean’ revolution

NATO is well-positioned to lead this new era of innovation. With its thirty Allies and over one trillion dollars in annual defense expenditures dedicated to the collective defense of their nearly one billion citizens, NATO is the largest and most powerful military alliance on the planet. The Alliance is uniquely situated at this nexus of security and environment.

Perhaps the best illustration of this nexus is NATO’s maritime domain. The seas remain essential for global trade, with 90 percent of the world’s trade conducted by sea. And additional trade routes are opening in the Artic due to climate change and exposing NATO’s northern flank to Russian and Chinese fleets. Furthermore, the global digital economy runs on cables on the ocean’s floor. It is the sea that connects us all, powers the global economy, and is primed for innovation.

NATO could lead this innovation, by bringing together key stakeholders across government, academia, and industry to create a ‘digital ocean’ and exploit enormous swaths of data with artificial intelligence-enhanced tools to predict weather patterns, get early warning of appearing changes and risks, ensure the free flow of trade, and keep a close eye on migration patterns and a potential adversary’s ships and submarines. And it could be done in a sustainable carbon-neutral manner by leveraging the “Blue Tech” revolution currently underway. Innovators across Europe and North America continue to design and build a diverse array of maritime surface and subsurface drones. Many of these maritime drones are propelled by wind, wave, and solar energy and carry sensors that can collect data critical to unlocking the yet untapped potential of the ocean.

If NATO Allies could stich these drones together in a secure digital network, it could essentially create an ‘Internet of Things’ for the ocean, a ‘digital ocean’ spanning from seafloor to satellite that stretches across millions of square miles. It is clear no single nation could undertake such an effort on their own, nor would they achieve the synergistic network effects an alliance like NATO offers, when such an effort is undertaken in a coherent manner. There are significant fiscal benefits as well, as maritime drones greatly enhance the capabilities of ships, submarines, and other platforms at a fraction of the cost. These savings would be magnified by the fact that the digital ocean would be powered by free and sustainable energy sources like wind, wave, and solar. The digital ocean will drive the ocean economy which is now $2.5 trillion a year. It has the potential to bring in new solutions and to use the tech change megatrend for the benefit of all—to create a more sustainable planet as well as robust economic driver through applications such as offshore wind, sustainable aquaculture, and carbon sequestration through growing food crops like seaweed.

Charting a new course

This type of sustainable innovation needs to occur across all domains and in all our international institutions if we are to meet the challenges of the coming decades. Population trends, technology shifts, climate change, and scarcity of resources make an already complex security situation that much more daunting. But we are not powerless in this face of the ‘Perfect Storm’ when megatrends collide; we have the ability to invent our own future.

Why act now? Because the technological shift is making it is possible to get the data from every specific part of the ocean and use the gathered data to interpolate. We must take bold innovative action now and chart the new course, to ensure the health of our planet and the security of our citizens for generations to come.

Keit Pentus-Rosimannus is a Member of the Estonian Parliament, vice-chairwoman of the biggest parliament party Reform Party. She was the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Estonia from 2014 to 2015 having previously been the Minister of the Environment from 2011 to 2014.

Michael D. Brasseur is the co-founder and first Director of NATO’s Maritime Unmanned Systems Innovation and Coordination Cell (MUSIC^2). He is a former captain of two US Navy warships and has sailed the world’s oceans partnering with friends and Allies. The views presented here are his own, and not that of NATO or the US Navy.

NATO’s progress on burden sharing remains strong

By Bradley Hazen

While movement towards the two percent may seem slow, it is clear that NATO allies are making significant changes to their defense spending.

Europe & Eurasia NATO

In-Depth Research & Reports Aug 4, 2020

Alliance power for cybersecurity

By Kenneth Geers

There is only one internet, and cybersecurity is therefore an inherently international challenge that countries cannot tackle alone. Alliances like NATO and the EU give democratic countries a cyber edge over their authoritarian challengers.

Cybersecurity Europe & Eurasia

New Atlanticist Jun 5, 2020

Increase NATO’s operational reach: Expanding the NATO SOF network

By Thang Q. Tran

NATO cannot safeguard the coalition’s interests unilaterally. Strategic investments in NATO Special Operations Forces (SOF) to expand the NATO SOF Network will provide political and military leaders the full range of options in response to emerging threats—both hybrid and conventional—through strong partnerships within the Alliance and with partners.

Defense Policy NATO

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Emerging technologies: new challenges to global stability

Robert A. Manning — Tue, 07 Jul 2020 14:07:18 +0000

The world may be fast approaching the perfect storm, with the intersection of two major global trends. At a moment of historic transition, when the post-WWII and post-Cold War international order is eroding amid competing visions of world order and renewed geopolitical rivalries, the world is also in the early stages of an unprecedented technological transformation. It promises to be a period of exponential change, the second—and far more disruptive—chapter of the digital revolution that began with the Internet in the 1990s. Historically, technology usually races ahead of institutions, rules, and norms. The extraordinary magnitude of change at a time of global institutional fraying and disorder, however, portends a particularly dangerous gap in global governance impacting economies, societies, and the future of war.

Substantially more technology-driven change will take place during the coming two decades than in the first ICT (information and communications technology)-based revolution, with profound social, economic, and geopolitical ramifications. This new wave is a convergence of technologies, a digital synergy of artificial intelligence (AI), big data (the cloud), robotics, biotech/biosciences, three-dimensional (3D) printing, advanced manufacturing, new materials, fifth-generation (5G) powering the Internet of Things (IoT), nanoengineering and nanomanufacturing, and, over the horizon, quantum computing. It is a still thickening merger of the digital and physical economies (called “online-to-offline,” or O2O), transforming business models, transport, healthcare, finance, manufacturing, agriculture, warfare, and the very nature of work itself.

As a practical matter, as these technologies are deployed over the coming decades, they will bring about accelerating economic and geopolitical change beginning in the 2020s. For example, using AI powered by superfast 5G technology (up to one hundred times faster than the current 4G), the Internet of Things (IoT) will monitor and manage farms, factories, and smart cities. The increased productivity of ICT-connected sensors will warn of factory equipment needing maintenance; monitor energy use in buildings; give farmers real-time information on soil conditions; maintain and operate driverless vehicles; optimize energy-grid performance; and monitor remotely and diagnose individuals’ health, with gene editing, engineering the demise of malaria-carrying mosquitos, and perhaps erasing hereditary DNA to eliminate horrific diseases. In the national security realm, AI, 5G, and the IoT portend radical changes in missions from logistics and inventory management to surveillance and reconnaissance with air and undersea drones of all sizes and with autonomous capabilities.

The full text of the paper is split across the various articles linked below. Readers can browse in any order. To download a PDF version, use the button below.

Issue Brief

I. The emerging tech revolution

By Robert A. Manning

Technological advancements in fields ranging from AI to biotech are already rapidly changing existing economic, social and geopolitical arrangements. How well nations are able to innovate and adapt will play a large role in determining their standing in the decades ahead.

Issue Brief

Will AI and robots kill jobs?

By Robert A. Manning

New technologies are being rolled out across the world at a pace that outstrips our ability to comprehend their implications. Concerns over the death of jobs may be overblown, but the need to understand and mitigate the risks presented by emerging technologies remains.

Issue Brief

National security impact

By Robert A. Manning

Technological change throughout history shaped and reshaped the strategy, tactics, and the character of war. Today’s emerging technologies have the potential to revolutionize warfighting, while also posing new challenges to strategic stability across increasingly contested global commons—air, sea, cyber, and space.

Issue Brief

II. The governance conundrum

By Robert A. Manning

As the challenges posed by emerging disruptive technologies become clear, so too does the troubling deficit of global governance. The fraying of existing institutions and the resurgence of major-power competition only exacerbate this governance challenge.

Issue Brief

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

AI: preventing the coming storm

By Robert A. Manning

Developing ethical principles, standards, and norms governing AI is perhaps the most imperative governance challenge for the coming decade. In particular, the risks posed by AI and autonomous weapons require a rethinking of what constitutes a durable framework for strategic stability.

About the author

Former fellow

Robert A. Manning

Former Senior Fellow

China Energy Markets & Governance

Drone attacks against critical infrastructure: A real and present threat

Dr. Scott Crino and Conrad "Andy" Dreby — Mon, 04 May 2020 12:00:00 +0000

Digital Forensic Research Lab

The use of drones as weapons in the Middle East and North Africa has grown rapidly in recent years, especially as non-state actors from the Houthis in Yemen to militants in Syria seek to level the playing field. Often powered by widely available commercial technology, these systems present a real and present security challenge. What should policymakers do to adapt to this new threat? How can they best structure defenses and leverage available technology to protect key assets?

“Drone Attacks Against Critical Infrastructure,” by Dr. Scott Crino and Conrad “Andy” Dreby, addresses these questions and more. Crino is founder and CEO and Dreby is director of red-teaming at Red Six Solutions, LLC.

The authors analyze developments in the use of weaponized drones in the Middle East and beyond, exploring how regional policymakers can adapt to mitigate this threat.

A discussion with the authors about this issue brief, including a demonstration of several drones, was held on Wednesday, May 27, 2020. Watch the discussion here.

IranSource Sep 20, 2019

After Aramco attacks, China’s Middle East interests are at stake

By Jonathan Fulton

The attack on Saudi Arabia could be another factor that leads to a more robust approach to China protecting its Middle East interests.

China Iran

New Atlanticist Mar 31, 2020

Gulf partners could give Iran and the US a way out of their collision course

By Kirsten Fontenrose

With interests on both sides of the conflict and much to lose if it worsens, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is the one organization that could be a hero here, kickstarting a chain reaction that arrives at de-escalation without any party losing face.

Conflict Iran

New Atlanticist Sep 14, 2019

After Houthi drone attack, everyone should take a deep breath

By Kirsten Fontenrose

The ten-drone attack on Aramco’s Abqaiq facility in Saudi Arabia on September 14 is a sign that the Houthis suffer from false confidence. Snubbing talks and launching attacks is not a way to garner sympathy from the United States or the international community.

Geopolitics & Energy Security Saudi Arabia

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Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

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Storming the sauna: a ceasefire violation in the Donbas

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Tue, 24 Mar 2020 14:28:15 +0000

The video stills were taken from а camera reportedly under the control of Ukrainian forces that had been set up to observe the point itself and the surrounding area. On February 27, Telegram user Andriy Tsaplienko posted a video from the same camera, also recorded on February 18, showing as many as 13 armed soldiers approaching the point, opening fire on the point directly before capturing it, and subsequently firing outward at Ukrainian positions retreating from it. There are also several explosions throughout the video hitting the immediate area. Satellite imagery of the area from weeks prior to the incident was not clear enough to make out details on the ground, but the aerial image appears to show scorched earth, numerous craters, and scattered earth consistent with an explosion — all of which were indicators that Banya was an active military position.

Ceasefire violations along the line of contact are regularly reported by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (OSCE SMM) through the organization’s daily updates; however, video footage of artillery fire or destruction to property can offer a more detailed look at how these cases unfolded on the ground. This case was unique, as there was clear video evidence of Russian-backed separatist forces advancing on a position with the presumed intention of securing a territorial capture.

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Lukas Andriukaitis

Nonresident Fellow

Disinformation Eastern Europe

Former staff

Michael J. Sheldon

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A candle in the dark: US national security strategy for artificial intelligence

Tate Nurkin; Stephen Rodriguez — Tue, 10 Dec 2019 20:30:27 +0000

Commanding Officer, Naval Diving and Salvage Training Center

AI is expected to have a transformational impact on the future of geopolitics, defense, and security. The emerging geopolitical and security context influencing the future of AI technology development has been driven by the erosion of traditional geopolitical frameworks, increased conflict between liberalism and authoritarianism, the pervasiveness of social media use and 4IR-driven digitization of industries, as well as the ability of more actors to affect strategic and operational environments. However, the future of AI will depend on the decisions of great power competitors—the US, China and Russia—global trends development, and the management of uncertainties associated with emerging technologies. In this fluctuating environment, where the US is engaged in a high-stakes competition with is near-peer adversaries, and AI is enabling paradigm-shifting changes in public and private sector operations, how should the US respond?

In this new Atlantic Council Strategy Paper, A Candle in the Dark: US National Security Strategy for Artificial Intelligence, Tate Nurkin and Stephen Rodriguez provide an integrated strategy to respond to this key issue. According to Former US Secretary of Defense Dr. Ashton B. Carter, author of the foreword, this paper “effectively articulates the current technological landscape and offers a coherent strategic framework for the United States and its allies to harness AI’s upside potential, while mitigating downside risks and defending against emerging threats.” In a world full of uncertainties, this paper provides a holistic way forward for the US to leverage the full potential of AI while maintaining America’s technological competitiveness.

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Frandrup in Defense One: Time for undersea offensive drones

Atlantic Council — Tue, 26 Nov 2019 16:05:00 +0000

original Source

Though autonomous systems promise to bring to the undersea domain the kind of new capabilities and offensive punch that the aerial drone has brought to land warfare, the Navy has yet to fully tap their potential.

Erich Frandrup

Former fellow

Erich Frandrup

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Drones Iraq

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Over the horizon: NATO joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in the Baltic Sea region

Thu, 14 Nov 2019 19:00:00 +0000

Since the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014, NATO threat perceptions have significantly intensified, particularly with regard to the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania that today face the most direct threat of any of NATO’s allies. To deter aggression in the Baltic region, NATO must deploy a credible and effective defense, grounded in a comprehensive understanding of adversary capabilities, actions and intent.

A critical element of deterrence and defense is NATO Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance a networked system of sensors, collectors and analysts fielded by the Alliance and its member states to provide situational awareness, early warning and if necessary, decision support for combat operations. Put simply JISR is about getting the right information to the right person, at the right time in the right format. But if a crisis erupted in the Baltic Sea region, is NATO equipped to gather and process the information necessary to give commanders on the ground a clear operating picture? What improvements, if any, could be made to the way NATO and NATO allies collect and process intelligence?

To answer these and other questions, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security assembled a task force of leading regional security experts, led by co-chairs ADM Mark E. Ferguson, III, USN (Ret.) and AM Sir Christopher Harper, RAF (Ret.) and project director Dr. Richard D. Hooker, Jr, that examined NATO’s JISR posture in the Baltic Sea region and offers a series of recommendations to improve both collection and processing of vital intelligence so that NATO is ready to meet any challenge that may be waiting over the horizon.

Click the link above to download the full report.

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US-Iran tensions reignite following another drone incident

David A. Wemer — Fri, 19 Jul 2019 22:12:10 +0000

The United States claims a US navy vessel destroyed an Iranian drone on July 18, continuing the escalatory spiral between Iran and the United States in the Persian Gulf.

US President Donald J. Trump announced before a press conference with Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte that the USS Boxer “took defensive action against an Iranian drone,” which had come within 1,000 yards of the US ship. Trump said the drone ignored “multiple calls to stand down and was threatening the safety of the ship and the ship’s crew,” before it was “immediately destroyed.” According to CNN Pentagon correspondent Barbara Starr, the drone was “brought down by electronic warfare jamming.”

Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister, denied the drone was Iranian, suggesting that “the USS Boxer has shot down their own [drone] by mistake!” Barbara Slavin, director of the Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative, explained that “whatever the truth, the claims and counter-claims dramatize the rising tensions in the narrow waters of the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf.”

There have been multiple incidents between Iran and the United States and its allies since Iranian officials announced in May that they would reduce their compliance with the terms of the 2015 nuclear agreement—known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—following the United States’ withdrawal from the pact in 2018. Slavin argued that “the tensions are the direct result of the US decision to unilaterally quit the Iranian nuclear deal and impose an embargo on the sale of Iranian oil—despite the fact that Iran was in full compliance with the agreement.”

The dangerous encounter on July 18 occurred near the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway for international trade and energy connecting the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Trump described the incident as “the latest of many provocative and hostile actions by Iran against vessels operating in international waters.” In May, oil tankers from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were sabotaged and a Saudi oil pipeline was attacked by drones, incidents which Washington blamed on Tehran. In June, Japanese and Norwegian oil tankers were also attacked. Nearly one month ago, Iranian forces shot down a US drone which Tehran claimed had entered Iranian airspace. Trump described Tehran’s decision to destroy the drone as a “very big mistake!”

On July 10, Iranian boats attempted to seize a British oil tanker but were warned off by a British navy vessel that had been on patrol protecting ships in the Strait. On July 14, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed that they had seized a “foreign vessel,” which was allegedly attempting to smuggle one million liters of fuel under a Panamanian flag.

William Wechsler, director of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, argued that these incidents are part of Iran’s “new strategy to respond to the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and the imposition of unilateral sanctions. By raising tensions, they seek to inflict economic pain on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, further divide the United States and Europe, secure partial relief from sanctions, and more generally to force negotiations on their terms.”

Trump defended the USS Boxer’s decision to destroy the Iranian drone on July 18, saying that “the United States reserves the right to defend our personnel, our facilities, and interests.” He advised “all nations to condemn Iran’s attempts to disrupt freedom of navigation and global commerce,” and called on “other nations to protect their ships as they go through the Strait and to work with us in the future.”

Through these incidents in the Strait of Hormuz, Wechsler explained, Tehran is “carefully probing through military action, methodically and incrementally, to discover what level of violence will be implicitly deemed acceptable and what will trigger US retaliation.” He warned, however, that the “danger of this strategy is obvious, as it is easy to imagine war emerging quickly through trial and error—as it almost did last month—especially since neither the Iranian regime nor the US administration truly understands the other’s escalation ladder.”

This danger of slipping into full military conflict means that the United States needs to focus its efforts on a diplomatic solution, Slavin argued. “The United States should appoint a special envoy with a proven track record of dealing successfully with Iran to de-escalate tensions and find a peaceful way forward,” she said.

As the number of attacks and close calls continues to climb in the volatile region, risks of wider conflict are mounting and soon could be difficult for all sides to control.

David A. Wemer is assistant director, editorial at the Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter @DavidAWemer.

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The Melians’ revenge

Dr. T.X. Hammes — Thu, 27 Jun 2019 13:00:42 +0000

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Russia’s military modernization and aggressive behavior continues to threaten the security of NATO’s frontline Allies, the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Russia’s proximity to these states and their distance from other NATO Allies presents the Alliance with a fundamental problem: if a crisis were to erupt with little warning in the Baltic States, NATO reinforcements may not be able to arrive quickly enough to stop a rapid Russian advance. At the same time, the Baltic States’ small size and relatively small budgets limit the level of defense investments they can make. How then, can the Baltic States put their resources to best use to defend their territory and deter Russia?

In “The Melians’ revenge” Dr. T.X. Hammes advocates for a novel approach to defense investment in the Baltic States, harnessing emerging , high-tech, low cost systems to present Russia with a complex defense of inexpensive autonomous drones, missiles, and ubiquitous improvised explosive devices. When supported by other NATO nations’ forward-deployed units, cruise missiles, and long-range autonomous drones, this defense can present the Russian bear with an indigestible porcupine.

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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Iran’s attack on US drone escalates tensions in the Gulf

David A. Wemer — Thu, 20 Jun 2019 20:12:19 +0000

If the United States decides to strike back at Iran for its shooting down of a US drone on June 20, “the escalatory spiral” in the region “will only continue with potential disastrous consequences, according to Barbara Slavin, director of the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) reportedly shot down a US Navy RQ-4A Global Hawk surveillance drone after the unmanned vehicle “violated” Iran’s airspace, Iranian officials said. US officials maintain that the drone was still in international airspace at the time of the attack. US President Donald J. Trump tweeted in response to the attack that “Iran has made a very big mistake!”

The downing of the drone comes shortly after two commercial tankers were damaged in the Strait of Hormuz on June 12, which US officials believe was the work of Tehran. The United States also blamed Tehran for similar attacks on four oil tankers off the port of Fujairah earlier in May. On June 17, an Iranian official announced that Tehran would soon breach a limit on its low-enriched uranium production set by the 2015 Iran nuclear deal—known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The United States withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 over concerns that it did not effectively curb the Iranian nuclear program or Tehran’s malign influence in the Middle East. The United States has since slapped several series of sanctions on Iran, including attempts to cut off all of Iran’s oil exports.

According to Slavin, the sporadic attacks between Iran and the United States and its allies in the Persian Gulf is new. “There had been no such incidents for years until the United States essentially declared economic war on Iran.”

Holly Dagres, a nonresident fellow with the Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and editor of the Council’s IranSource blog, argued that now “the international community needs to step in and ensure this doesn’t escalate beyond the firing of statements or a retaliatory strike that could lead to an escalation of hostilities.

Trump indicated that he does not view the attack on June 20 as an intentional provocation of the United States by Tehran. “I find it hard to believe it was intentional,” he told reporters in the Oval Office. “Probably Iran made a mistake. I would imagine it was a general or somebody who made a mistake in shooting that drone down.”

Slavin believes the string of incidents over the last several weeks means “it is time for diplomats to meet to discuss ways of getting out of this mess.” The Trump administration’s policy of “maximum pressure” on Tehran “has been a maximum failure,” she argued. “If the Trump administration truly wants a better deal” than the JCPOA, “and not another failed state in the Middle East, the president should name an envoy with a proven track record of working with Iran to resolve regional conflicts,” she added.

Matthew Kroenig, deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security disagreed, saying the attack on the US drone “shows that the US maximum pressure strategy is working. The Iranian regime is being squeezed and it is engaging in increasingly reckless behavior in a desperate—but I believe ultimately futile—attempt to frighten the United States into backing down.”

One thing for certain was clear, Slavin said: “the situation now is extremely perilous.”

David A. Wemer is assistant director, editorial, at the Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter @DavidAWemer.

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Omega

Amir Husain and August Cole — Mon, 25 Mar 2019 11:45:53 +0000

Editor’s note: This short story describes a hypothetical future war in Europe between Russian and NATO forces using advanced technology.

22 KILOMETERS NORTH OF KYIV / UKRAINE

“Incoming!” shouted Piotr Nowak, a master sergeant in Poland’s Jednostka Wojskowa Komandosów special operations unit. Dropping to the ground, he clawed aside a veil of brittle green moss to wedge himself into a gap beneath a downed tree. He hoped the five other members of his military advisory team, crouched around the fist-shaped rock formation behind him, heard his shouts. To further reinforce Ukraine’s armed forces against increasingly brazen Russian military support for separatists in the eastern part of the country, Poland’s government had been quietly supplying military trainers. A pro-Russian military coup in Belarus two weeks earlier only served to raise tensions in the region – and the stakes for the JWK on the ground.

An instant later incoming Russian Grad rocket artillery announced itself with a shrill shriek. Then a rapid succession of sharp explosive pops as the dozen rockets burst overhead. Nowak quickly realized these weren’t ordinary fires. There was no spray of airburst shrapnel or the lung-busting concussion of a thermobaric munition. Instead, it sounded like summer fireworks – the explosive separation of the 122mm rocket artillery casing. Once split open, each weapon’s payload deployed an air brake to slow its approach.

During that momentary silence, Nowak edged out slightly from under the log to look up at the sky. He saw the drifting circular payload extend four arms and then, suddenly, it came to life as it sprang free of its parachute harness. With a whine from its electric motors, the quadcopter darted out of sight.

That sound built and built over the next minute as eleven more of these battery-powered Russian autonomous drones darted menacingly in a loose formation through the forest above the Polish special operations commandos. Nowak cursed the low-profile nature of their mission: The Polish soldiers had not yet received the latest compact American counter-UAS electronic-warfare systems that could actually fit in their civilian Skoda Kodiaq SUVs.

Nowak held his airplane-mode mobile phone out from under the log to film the drones, using his arm like a selfie-stick. Nowak needed to report in what he was seeing – this was proof Russian forces had turned their new AI battle management system online inside Ukraine. But he also knew that doing so would be a death sentence, whether he texted the video on the country’s abominably slow mobile networks or used his secure NATO comms. These Russian drones could detect either type of transmission in an instant. Once the drones cued to his transmission he would be targeted by their onboard anti-personnel munitions or a follow-on strike by conventional artillery.

This was no mere variation on the practice of using Leer-3 drones for electronic warfare and to spot for Russian artillery. It marked the first-ever deployment of an entirely new Russian AI battle system complex, Omega. Nowak had heard about the Russians firing entire drone swarms from inexpensive Grad rocket-artillery rounds once before in Syria while deployed with a US task force. But they had never done so in Ukraine, at least not that he knew about. Most observers chalked up Russia’s Syrian experimentations with battlefield robots and drone swarms to clumsy failures. Clearly something had changed.

With his phone, Nowak recorded how the drones appeared to be coordinating their search activities as if they were a single hive intelligence. They divided the dense forest into cells they searched cooperatively. Within seconds, they climbed and dove from treetop height looking for anyone or anything hiding below.

Nowak signaled with his hands to the two members of his team that he could see that they should stay where they were.

Then one of the drones flew a cloverleaf pattern around the trees above him, before disappearing out of sight behind the leafy canopy.

That was a close one, Nowak thought.

He took off his ballistic glasses to wipe them of sweat, and glanced back at his teammates with a look of clear relief on his face.

It was a mistake to place any hope in that moment of calm.

At that very instant, the drone’s computer vision algorithms detected Novak’s team. Each and every one of them. Within seconds, six of the aggressively maneuvering drones revealed themselves in a disjointed dive down from the treetops and zoomed in on the JWK fighters’ positions.

In the moment between realization and action, Novak’s mind raced. The soldier wondered if they were detected by their thermal signature. Or perhaps the onboard machine vision identified the outlines of human bodies against the natural background? What Novak did not know was that the JWK team was being tracked for the past eight hours, all the way back to their safe house. There was no one tell that revealed them in this moment. It was an AI-driven compounding of data and pattern recognition that drew together myriad sources, from Russian IMSI-catchers intercepting mobile phone traffic to real-time satellite imagery.

Then it was the moment to fight. Nobody needed to be told what to do. The team raised their weapons and fired short bursts at the Russian drones. One shattered like a clay pigeon. But two more buzzed into view to take its place. Another drone went down to a shotgun-fired SkyNet round. Then the entire drone formation shifted its flight patterns, dodging and maneuvering even more erratically, making it nearly impossible to shoot the rest down. The machines learned from the loss of one of their own, Nowak realized. Would his superiors do the same for him?

Nowak emptied his magazine with a series of quick bursts, but rather than reload he put his weapon aside and rolled out from under the log. Fully exposed and clutching the phone with shaking hands, he hastily removed one of his gloves with his teeth. Then he switched the device on. Network connected. He scrolled to the video of the drones. Send! Send! Send!

Eleven seconds later, Novak’s entire Polish JWK special forces team lay dead on the forest floor.

PATCH BARRACKS / STUTTGART VAIHINGEN / GERMANY

“That what I think it is?” said US Army General Richard Neville, the head of European Command for the last eight months. “Omega’s online? In Ukraine!”

“The footage is verified by the Polish defense ministry,” said the Defense Intelligence Agency civilian analyst, no older than 25. Neville had never seen him before, which meant somebody sent him into the office to deliver some very bad news. This kid was somebody’s cannon fodder, Neville thought, and another reminder he needed to repair his relationship with the J2 Directorate.

Neville furrowed his brow even more and stared intently at the wall screen as he considered the ramifications of the briefing’s footage. The shaky images and accompanying description of the drone attack on the JWK forces sent chills down his spine.

As a long-time Army special operator whose Middle East deployments started when the intelligence analyst was in kindergarten, Neville was the vanguard of officers who were supposed to bring asymmetrical thinking to one of the US military’s most prestigious and, in the current chaotic European and American political era of the early 2020s, highly constrained combatant commands.

“How much time do we have before they deploy this capability more broadly?”

“Estimating 24 hours, sir. The Russians are already moving to fully use the system to cover all the territory they hold in the Ukraine,” replied the briefing officer. “And likely into the rest of the country. While Russian forces themselves may not move any further than Ukraine, the Omega system will be able to hold at risk targets in Poland, the Baltics, and we expect out to Kaliningrad. It will also may cover all the way up to the Kola Peninsula.”

“What’s the latest out of Western Ukraine?”

“Right now, Russian proxies – East Ukrainian groups along with Russian Spetsnaz – are continuing their drive into western parts of Ukraine to stop what they continue to call ‘ethnic cleansing’. Russian armor and attack helicopters are providing support. We see Omega’s influence on these otherwise conventional operations; targeting is extremely precise. NATO still has not offered a formal statement or a response. Poland’s sending more military trainers, mostly SOF. UK MOD is leading a push to move a BCT into Poland as a backstop, but there’s no political appetite for the risk. Once Omega is fully online with expanded coverage Russia will extend its Tu-160 bombers sorties into Western Ukraine right up to the Polish borders. And it will be impossible to move NATO forces into Europe by air without significant risk of catastrophic losses.”

“How could we possibly be finding this out only now? Anybody we know pick the wrong time to go on goddamned extended leave?” Neville said. “This has to have been right there in front of us all along.”

“Sir, as I explained, this type of technology is really hard to detect. We’ve been focused on watching their hardware for decades. But this isn’t about hardware. Omega’s just … software. It’s code. The Russians have assembled a host of existing systems… what’s tying them together is the software… the AI… bits don’t show up in NGA’s satellite imagery… You just saw the attack on the JWK but if you just focus on those drones… you’re going to miss the big picture here on how Omega works…”

The analyst kept stalling in his explanation, trying to find the simplest way of explaining the situation. Given Neville’s operational background, as well as his 6’5” height and physical presence that earned him the nickname “The Terminator,” analysts usually tried to dumb down a brief. This only served to anger him, and further flustered the briefers. It was a vicious cycle, and one that he was known to enjoy for the show of it. But the seriousness of the moment did not afford him any levity. He went to the heart of the issue and stood up behind his desk, talking with his hands.

“Let me get this straight… you’re telling me Omega… is a Russian autonomous joint force in a goddamned ready-to-deploy box… that the area-denial bubble projected by their new S-600s extends all the way to the exo-sphere, and Omega covers the entirety of the ground, sea and cyber domains… that the system is ready to be deployed… and it’s invisible? That’s bullshit we miss this coming online, especially with all that’s going on right now at home.”

Neville picked up his iPhone off the desk and thrust it in the analyst’s face. “We have these, don’t we? Everybody knows you don’t plug a copper line into the wall to talk to somebody. None of this should be a mystery. We’re smarter than that.”

He tossed the iPhone onto his desk.

“Or maybe not. Maybe the truth of it is we’re always going to be a flip-phone force.”

The intelligence analyst winced.

“Sir, I understand your frustration. It’s entirely justified. But I was asked by Director Shah to brief you immediately and share everything we know. He knows your teams are …”

“Anything from Germany’s leadership yet?”

“No, sir.”

“That’s to be expected. Did Director Shah say the President’s been briefed on Omega?”

“They’re trying, sir. The White House has indicated he’s staying over after a political rally in Wisconsin and that he has declined to speak with the Joint Chiefs, the NSC, or Director Shah until Tuesday.”

“So, our window to preempt it already closed?”

“Yes, sir. There’s nothing indicated from the Joint Chiefs, either, at this time,” said the analyst. “

Then get comfortable and have a seat,” said Neville. “I need you to run through everything DIA is sending up to Joint Chiefs and NSC. And maybe I can make a few suggestions to capture their attention…”

The analyst looked uncomfortable, but Neville gave him a reassuring nod, the one that had worked on everybody from street-level Iraqi sources in Basra back in the day to his own superiors at Joint Special Operations Command. Yet Neville wasn’t interested in making a more persuasive argument to ramp up the threat; he wanted to do something to neutralize it, and fast. He needed time to think and listening to a droning briefing often led to inspiration, in the same way lying in the dentist’s chair or taking a shower had in the past.

“Sure. Sure, sir. We can do that. I’ll give you the full version, then,” the analyst said.

Neville sat down heavily in his chair and leaned back, motioning for the analyst to continue.

—————-

“Artificial intelligence is the future not only of Russia but of all of mankind … Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.”
Russian President Vladimir Putin, September 2, 2017.

At the end of the Cold War the crumbling Russian economy had placed what was left of the former Soviet armed services at a major disadvantage. There was a massive reduction in the number of troops, scientists employed by the military complex went without jobs and many left the country. Military research and development efforts that had allowed the former USSR to challenge the US and NATO appeared to vanish. Billions of dollars of investments in advanced bombers, ships, aircraft carriers, submarines, armor and ICBMs soon amounted to very little. Maintenance budgets collapsed and the systems themselves fell into disrepair. But after many years of humiliation a revisionist, nationalist president had risen to power in Moscow, supported by billionaire oligarchs who rallied round him to restore national honor. Slowly, they began a concerted effort to rebuild military capabilities that could have the greatest impact.

But this new government knew it could not afford to make the mistakes that the old Communist Party ruling the USSR had. Russia’s economic potential was nowhere near the United States and thus, going down the path of maintaining military parity in the old sense of the term was a fool’s errand. Both sides knew that whatever military maneuvering they did would be under the dark shade of the nuclear umbrella their respective ICBM arsenals extended over the world. The real question was how could the new Russia be more assertive in regional conflicts. The new president knew that being seen as a great power and gaining favor and leverage with the various nations of the world was critical. Many states sought partnerships with great powers that could alter the “strategic balance” and somehow revert the world to a multi-polar order. But building a military able to project power is not cheap. In looking for a balance between cost and influence, the Russian military complex identified technology as the great leveler. They recognized that Russia could never compete broadly across every area of technological research, but they deemed such broad parity unnecessary for their strategic objectives. Certain lines of research were identified, and resources were efficiently allocated.

The first investment resulted from the realization that in an interconnected world high-velocity information had become as all-encompassing and omni-present as the very molecules of air we breathe into our lungs. Influencing data streams, shaping them and transforming them, was elemental. Information warfare had long been regarded as an area of great importance for generals and military planners. The 21st century made information a primary domain of battle, control of which could dictate whether or not war occurred and if it did, influence who became seen as the victor. If war was “indecisive” — which so many US military campaigns tended to be – then controlling the flow of information in ways that allowed perceptions of the war’s outcome to be molded allowed something novel, a narrative of decisive victory.

During the Cold War, Soviet military planners had already determined that they could not compete with NATO or the United States in terms of the sophistication of their air forces. Soviet aircraft designed by the legendary Mikoyan and Gurevich, Tupolev and Sukhoi design bureaus focused on exceptional aerodynamic performance, robustness and high production volume. They lacked greatly in electronic sophistication, arguably the most important aspect of military aircraft in modern times. Realizing these shortcomings, the Soviets made major investments to deny NATO aircraft the use of airspace via the development of increasingly sophisticated surface-to-air missiles. These could be deployed in numbers, would be quick to intercept incoming fighters and could be fielded at a fraction of the cost of the fighter aircraft they were designed to counter. If the purpose was not to mount an offensive campaign on enemy soil, but to deny the enemy the use of one’s own airspace, sophisticated SAMs were a great investment.

The new Russian government doubled down on their focus on these missile systems. The premier institution charged with this work was the Almaz-Antey design bureau. The president took a personal interest in ensuring that the best university graduates saw Almaz as a career path, and that funds were made available to the organization on a priority basis. The care and feeding of this important institution had indeed paid dividends in many ways. Four key systems were designed and manufactured by Almaz. The older, Soviet-era S-300, the considerably more capable S-400, the newest S-500 available only to Russian forces, and the under-development S-600.

The S-300 system was quite capable of dealing with a variety of fourth- generation aircraft. The Russian government used it both as a source of revenue and as a way to bolster allies. Iran and China had both received these systems. Since S-300 was not the latest SAM system, the Russians were quite liberal in allowing technology transfer. The Iranian Bavar and Chinese HQ-9 systems both drew from S-300 design and technology.

The S-400 was a different beast. As of the late 20-teens it was the most sophisticated surface-to-air missile system available. The US Patriot air-defense system, which achieved some notoriety during the first Gulf War, couldn’t hold a candle to the S-400’s capabilities. The Russian system came with nearly half a dozen different missile interceptors designed to cover high-altitude, long-range threats, as well as low-altitude and close-range threats. Many radars were part of the S-400 complex providing monitoring of hundreds of real-time aircraft tracks. The processing systems could manage and guide 90 simultaneous interceptors. The entire system was mobile and could fire and move to a new location to protect itself. Its cutting-edge radar technology was rumored to be capable of detecting stealth aircraft – the US Air Force’s ace in the hole. The S-400 soon emerged as the first area-denial system that allowed its operators to feel a degree of immunity from the deadly capabilities of US air power. Prosperous regional powers such as Turkey and India lined up to purchase the system. So great was the S-400’s appeal that the Turkish government even risked the loss of considerable investment and removal from the multinational F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, in which they were a major partner. The Indians campaigned vociferously to be allowed to purchase the S-400 and not face threatened US sanctions as a consequence. Even the Qataris offered to pay billions for access to the platform.

The Russians had a blockbuster air-defense capability on their hands.

And they knew it… and they quickly saw how emerging AI technologies could enable far more.

The reaction to these cutting-edge S-series systems, not just from a technology perspective, but more importantly, from a geostrategic point of view, emboldened Russian planners and the top echelons of leadership. Here was the only practical and affordable counter to a top-end air threat. Smaller regional powers could never develop air forces to rival the US and NATO, and so the S-400 was the only defensive game in town.

Despite being the world’s pre-eminent developer of anti-air systems, Russia itself would continue to push the envelope. Buoyed by funds from arms sales, the Almaz bureau was tasked with developing new systems that would protect Russia from even more distant threats, such as even stealthier aircraft and hypersonic missiles that adversaries had on the drawing board. The S-500 and S-600 anti-air and missile defense complexes were the result of these new research efforts. Newer, higher speed interceptor missiles allowed engagement envelopes beyond what the S-400 could manage.

When these long-range S-series weapons combined with shorter-range air-defense systems like the Pantsir, Russian military planners saw the potential for an unprecedented capability. But any weapon is only as good as the information that guides it to a target and the narrative that develops around the weapon’s effects. The answer to this problem came from a series of successive software and hardware breakthroughs. Researchers had been experimenting inside Russia employing AI to stitch together not only what distributed radars detected but other forms of electronic and signals intelligence collection. Crimea offered the perfect proving ground with rapid iterations of a harmonized approach to electronic warfare, drones, and conventional fires. as embodied by tThe increasing reach and sophistication of unmanned systems such as the Russian Leer-3 unmanned aircraft continued to grow. What Russian researchers quickly confirmed was that these such upgrades together allowed for AI-guided effective tracking of threats, prioritization, and target selection well beyond what was initially envisioned. This fusion of technology opened their eyes to an entirely new possibility… an ultimate weapon: Omega.

—————-

General Neville held up his hand, and offered the analyst a bottle of water from a refrigerator off to the side of his desk.

“Hydrate,” he said.

The analyst nodded and gulped down half the bottle. “That’s good origin-story stuff but I think you’re not going cutting through all this history to tell me why this all really matters. What can you tell me about Omega itself?”

—————-

Omega is not any one specific weapon, rather it is made up of a menagerie of Russian weapons, large and small. It’s as if you fused information warfare, SAMs, fires, drones, tactical autonomous bots… There’s everything from S-600 batteries to cheap Katyusha-style rocket artillery to Uran-9 and -13 tanks. But it is what controls the hardware that makes Omega truly unique: AI. At its core, it’s an artificial intelligence system fusing data from thousands of sensors, processed information, and found patterns that human eyes and minds cannot fathom. The system’s AI is not only developing a comprehensive real-time picture, it’s also developing probabilities and possible courses of enemy action. It can coordinate thousands of “shooters”, from surface-to-air missiles, to specialized rocket artillery deploying autonomous tactical drones like the ones that killed the JWK team, to UGVs like the latest Uran-13 autonomous tracked units.

The developers of the Omega system incorporated technologies such as software-defined radio, which uses universal receivers that could listen in to a broad array of frequencies. Thousands of these bands are monitored with machine learning algorithms to spot insurgent radio stations, spy on the locations of Ukrainian military and police, and even determining if a certain frequency is being used to remotely control explosives or other military equipment. When a threat is discovered, the system will dispatch drones to observe the triangulated location of the source. If the threat needs to be neutralized a variety of kinetic systems – from guided artillery shells to loitering munitions and autonomous drones – can be dispatched for the kill.

—————-

18 HOURS LATER / NEAR THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE BORDER

The four US Army Green Berets drove their dark blue Mercedes-Benz panel truck, stolen that morning from a Ukrainian telecom-equipment repair company, out of the driving rain and into the rotting barn. The driver shut off the engine and they waited. The barn smelled of wet wood and fertilizer.

Then the driver tapped on his smartphone screen and Tweeted a GIF of a goal-scoring Swedish handball player from last month’s European men’s championship game. It was a message hiding in plain sight that confirmed they were in place and would soon begin their mission.

Without a word, the three men and one woman pulled boxes out of the truck and began stacking them along one wall. Surrounded by muddy wheat fields, the farm was in a relatively isolated area 35 kilometers west of the Russia-Ukraine border. For the past year it functioned as a safe house for the Ukrainian intelligence services, who turned it over to the Americans at the request of the CIA station chief in Kyiv.

Given the time pressure on the team, this farm was the best the team could do. As members of European Command’s own special operations detachment, General Neville gave the Army soldiers a simple but urgent mission: tap into a nearby underground data network cable in an attempt to learn more about how Omega managed to transmit so much data using just Russian networks. DIA suspected the Russian military currently lacked adequate bandwidth for such a rapid expansion of the Omega system. This might lead to an interim reliance on commercial networks inside countries covered by Omega – and perhaps a tactical opportunity for disruption.

It seemed a valid theory, as the US military relied heavily on commercial data providers to carry mission-critical data traffic. General Neville had a similar hunch, that this could be a vulnerability in the Russian system that the US could – and should — exploit. After all, it was a technological liability he regularly worried about himself for his own forces. But any vulnerability was only useful until it was exploited, and Neville knew that time was running short. The White House, caught in the most fraught domestic political crisis since 1860, had yet to take any action or even register that Omega’s game-changing revelation would up-end the strategic balance.

In the spirit of shaping the operational environment and executing his commander’s authority, he deployed 20 soldiers from EUCOM’s Commander’s In-Extremis Force to five different locations inside Ukraine. Three of the five teams would be in range of the Grad rocket artillery now deployed in Eastern Ukraine. Their overall objective was to gather as much information as possible about how Omega moved massive amounts of real-time data and other information.

Two hours later, the team stood dressed in dirty grey work coveralls, reflective orange stripes along the sleeves and pant legs tucked into brand new cheap rubber work boots. The brown boots were filled with a sprinkling of pink fish tank gravel, a painful countermeasure to the gait analysis that Russian forces were believed to conduct by drone in the area. They wore dirty orange watch caps that smelled like old sponges. Master Sergeant Tim Perkins stood before the three other soldiers. He was a slim, deeply tanned man of average height in his mid 30s whose bushy brown mustache and eager bloodshot eyes gave him the look of a poker player about to push his good luck just one more time.

“You know the deal. We dig, tap the cable, take whatever hardware we can, and get out. We’ll be at the target site in 30 minutes, and then we’ll have one hour of daylight to get it done. Ukrainian SOF on standby for QRF. Questions?”

“How’s your Russian, Hammer?” said one of the soldiers.

“Good enough to ask which way to Tampa. Anything else?”

The soldiers shook their heads.

“OK, good. Phones?”

One by one the soldiers pulled out their locally-registered iPhones and held them up, screen facing the senior enlisted soldier.

“Confirmed on.”

“On.”

“Good.” Then he held up his own burner phone to show them that his too was still powered on. This was yet another essential form of subterfuge if the Special Forces soldiers were to keep their cover for as long as possible. “Roll out.”

Then Perkins opened the barn doors, enjoying the tang of the earthy air as he drew a deep breath. For a moment, it smelled like home.

He waved the truck out. Then he gradually slowed his movement until he stood frozen with a hunter’s willful stillness. Then he was all action: Motioning for the truck to get out, shouting “Go! Go! Go!”

He listened as he ran alongside. It was a sound unlike any other, but one he knew well: incoming rocket artillery, getting closer by the second.

Amir Husain is an author and inventor. He is the founder and CEO of SparkCognition, a leading U.S. artificial intelligence company. August Cole is an author and futurist who works on creative foresight at SparkCognition. He is also a nonresident senior fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council.

The post Omega appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Watts and Trotti on stealthier tanks in Defense One

Atlantic Council — Mon, 06 Aug 2018 16:00:00 +0000

Original Source

[A] cluster of technological trends may be converging to produce a potentially transformative battlefield capability: ‘stealth tanks.’

John Watts and Christian Trotti

Fellow

John T. Watts