Disinformation - Atlantic Council

Russian War Report: Wagner is still in business in Africa

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 20 Jul 2023 20:22:35 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Ukrainian attack damages Kerch Bridge

Russia accused Ukraine of conducting a drone strike against the Kerch Strait Bridge on July 17. The bridge, also known as the Crimean Bridge, connects Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula with Russia’s Krasnodar region. The bridge is used for civilian movement and as an essential logistical route for the Russian army.

Explosions were reported at around 3:00 a.m. local time. Footage of the aftermath indicates that a span of the bridge’s road had collapsed while another suffered damage but remained intact. Traffic reportedly resumed several hours after the explosion, but in the interim, occupation authorities asked civilians to consider alternate evacuation routes. Russian Telegram channels reported extensive traffic jams in Crimea’s Dzhankoi area and in the occupied Kherson region towards Melitopol.

Ukraine defense intelligence spokesperson Andrii Yusov told Suspilne News that damage to the bridge could create logistical difficulties for Russian forces, but said Kyiv would not comment on the cause of the explosion. CNN, citing a source in the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), reported that the attack on the bridge was a joint operation of the SBU and Ukrainian naval forces. Ukrainian media outlet LIGA also reported that the SBU and Ukrainian naval forces were responsible for the attack, citing sources in the SBU. LIGA also noted that the strike was likely conducted with surface drones. The SBU said that information about the incident would only be revealed once the war ended. Some Russian military bloggers, including former Russian officer and pro-war nationalist Igor Girkin, stated that Russian authorities had focused too heavily on road security and not enough on maritime security. Alexander Kots, another prominent blogger and Kremlin-appointed Russian Human Rights Council member, also blamed Russian authorities for focusing too much on land security.

Natalia Humeniuk, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command, speculated without evidence that the attack may have been a provocation by Russia amid talks on prolonging the Black Sea Grain Initiative. The grain deal, brokered by Turkey and the United Nations in July 2022, has been essential for stemming a global surge in food prices. The agreement, necessitated after the Russian navy blocked all Ukrainian ports, permits Ukraine to export products. It has has been prolonged several times, with the last extension expiring on July 17. The Kremlin announced on July 17 that it had suspended its participation in the initiative but claimed that the decision was unrelated to the bridge attack.

Meanwhile, about twenty-four hours after the attack on the Kerch Bridge, explosions were heard in Odesa in southern Ukraine. Unconfirmed reports claimed the explosions were a response from Russia. The attack on Odesa continued for a second night on July 19, described by Ukrainian officials as “hellish.” Odesa is an essential port for Ukrainian exports and was allowed to remain open under the conditions of the grain deal.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Wagner moves soldiers to Belarus following apparent disbandment in Russia

The Wagner Group appears to have disbanded its operations in Russia and relocated to Belarus, according to footage reviewed by the DFRLab documenting the movements of Wagner military columns in the days following the mutiny through July 18. Additionally, satellite imagery captured the entry of troops and equipment at the Tsel military camp, located near the Belarusian town of Asipovichy.

On July 17, a video shared on Telegram depicted Wagner soldiers taking down the Russian flag and the Wagner flag at the group’s original military base in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, Russia. In another video published on July 19, Prigozhin addressed Wagner fighters as they left the Molkino base, describing the situation on the front as “a shame.” In addition, he declared that the group is relocating to Belarus and will focus on its activities in Africa. For the time being, he said, Wagner soldiers are no longer participating in Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, although they “will perhaps return to the special military operation at the moment when [they] are sure [they] will not be forced to shame ourselves.”

Russian "military correspondent" published a video of the flags taken down in a Wagner PMC camp in Molkino, Ryazan region.

The base is now officially closed. pic.twitter.com/d3tqVXzqr0
— Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) July 17, 2023

Shortly after the mutiny ended, Russian authorities conducted raids on Wagner’s accounting divisions in Saint Petersburg, according to information purportedly shared by the wives and mothers of Wagner fighters in an online forum. Additional raids took place on Prigozhin’s residence. The movements of Prigozhin’s private jet also indicate frequent travel to Belarus over the past three weeks.

An investigation by Belarusian opposition media outlet Motolko.help revealed a photograph of a man resembling Prigozhin in his undergarments allegedly at the Tsel military base, where he reportedly spent the night on July 12. According to flight data posted on the online portal Radarbox, Prigozhin’s personal Embraer Legacy 600 jet, registration number RA-02795, completed four round-trip flights between Belarus’ Machulishchy air base and Russia.

Radar imagery acquired on July 17 also shows the tents where Wagner fighters appear to be housed and several places for vehicles parked inside the military base.

SAR imagery of Tsel military camp in Belarus, taken on July 17, 2023. (Source: DFRLab via Capella Space)

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Wagner vehicle columns are seen driving from Voronezh to Belarus

On July 16, several videos emerged on Telegram documenting Wagner vehicles departing Voronezh Oblast along Russia’s M-4 Don highway. Utilizing social media footage, the DFRLab determined the location of the vehicles and identified forty registration plates. At least two-thirds of these vehicles displayed military registration plates from the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic. However, the Belarusian monitoring project Belaruski Hajun reported that many other vehicles used tape to cover their registration plates.

The columns are composed of various buses and trucks, of which only a few could transfer construction equipment. Most of the convoys consist of UAZ Patriot pickup trucks, Ural vans, and Lada cars. No heavy military equipment was observed at the time of writing.

Screenshots show a UAZ Patriot pickup truck (top) and a Mitsubishi pickup truck (bottom) bearing military registration plates from the Luhansk People’s Republic. A police car escorted the trucks one hundred kilometers south of Voronezh on July 14, 2023. (Source: Telegram/archive)

Another video shared on the Russian Telegram channel VChK-OPGU revealed a Wagner convoy of soldiers entering Belarusian territory. According to a post by Belaruski Hajun, at least sixty vehicles entered Belarus through Mogilev Oblast in the early hours of June 15 using the R-43 and M-5 roads. A photograph on Telegram showed the Russian and Wagner Group flags flying at a border outpost.

According to Belaruski Hajun, since July 14, nine distinct military convoys have entered Belarusian territory. They are likely located at the Tsel military camp near Asipovichy. The camp is home to military unit 61732 and was previously identified by Verstka Media as a potential site to accommodate Wagner soldiers. Further, the Belarusian military TV channel VoyenTV posted a video on July 14 showing Wagner soldiers arriving in Belarus and training local forces. According to updated estimates from Belaruski Hajun, as many as 2,500 Wagner members may have relocated to the Tsel military camp since last week.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Russian officials and state media change their tune about the Kerch Bridge attack after Kremlin announces terror investigation

In the immediate aftermath of the July 17 attack on the Kerch Bridge, Russian officials and state media were relatively mild in their initial language addressing the incident, referring to it as an “emergency.” However, once Kremlin agencies began referring to the attack as a “terror act,” state media and officials began changing their language to follow the Kremlin.

“Traffic was stopped on the Crimean bridge: an emergency occurred in the area of the 145th support from the Krasnodar territory,” Sergei Aksenov, the Russian-installed head of occupied Crimea, wrote on his Telegram channel at 4:21 a.m. local time. Notably, Aksenov did not use the words “explosion,” “attack,” or “terror” to describe the destruction of the bridge. Two subsequent posts, made at 5:03 a.m. and 6:59 a.m., also avoided these terms. It wasn’t until 1:51 p.m. that Aksenov used the phrase “terror act” to describe the attack.

In between Aksenov’s posts, Russia’s National Antiterrorism Committee reported at 10:04 a.m. that they had assessed the Kerch Bridge explosion as a “terror act,” according to Kremlin-owned news agency TASS. Several minutes later at 10:07 a.m., Russia’s Investigative Committee announced that it would open a criminal case investigating the “terror act” on the Kerch Bridge.

Several Kremlin-owned Russian media outlets, including RIA Novosti and TASS, also used the term “emergency” (“чрезвычайное прошествие” or ЧП) to first describe the bridge explosion before later pivoting to using “terror act.” Neither outlet referred to the destruction of the Kerch Bridge as a “terror act” prior to the official announcements from the Investigative Committee and Antiterrorism Committee. In the case of RIA Novosti, they published a story using the word “emergency” in the headline at 11:41 a.m., more than ninety minutes after the terror investigation announcement, while TASS used the term as late as 7:31 p.m., even though it had already published a report on the investigation. Similarly, many other Kremlin-controlled media outlets, like Komsomolskaya Pravda, Gazeta.ru, RBC, Lenta.ru, and Izvestiya used both “emergency” and “terror act” in their publications throughout the day interchangeably.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

FSB colonel alleged to be behind popular Telegram channel detained for extortion

According to Russian media outlet RBC, former Federal Security Service (FSB) Colonel Mikhail Polyakov, the purported administrator of the Telegram channel Kremlevskaya Prachka (“Kremlin Laundress”), was detained for suspected extortion. The press office for the Moscow court released a statement that said Polyakov is “suspected of extorting 40 million rubles [around $440,000] from JSC Lanit, the leader of the Russian industry of information technology.”

“According to the prosecution, from 2020 to 2023, Polyakov received a large sum of money from a group of IT companies for not publishing information (the so-called ‘negative block’) that could cause significant harm to the rights and legitimate interests of Lanit JSC and the management of Lanit JSC,” the Moscow court continued. The “negative block” is a guarantee that a channel will not mention a particular person or a company in a negative light in exchange for money; this is reportedly a popular practice among Russian Telegram channels.

The independent Russian media outlet Vazhnyye Istorii (“Important Stories”), citing a source close to Russian intelligence services, reported that Polyakov was behind the Kremlevskaya Prachka Telegram channel. According to the outlet, Polyakov supervised an unnamed service at the FSB’s Office for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. In addition, he reportedly oversaw pro-government Telegram channels and was engaged in promoting the Kremlin’s agenda via media and social networks. According to Important Stories, he worked in coordination with Vladimir Putin’s deputy chief of staff, Sergey Kiriyenko.

Important Stories noted that the Telegram channel 112 also named Polyakov as Kremlevskaya Prachka’s administrator, along with the Telegram channels Siloviki, Nezigar, and Brief, which are not as staunchly pro-govern cited by Kremlin propagandists and proxies.

Kremlevskaya Prachka has not posted since the evening of July 13, corresponding with the reported detainment of Polyakov.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Wagner continues to advertise its services in Africa

On July 16, the Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel REVERSE SIDE OF THE MEDAL posted an advertisement offering Wagner’s services to African states. The post included an image from the Prigozhin-funded film, Granite, as well as an email address, seemingly for interested African countries to communicate with Wagner.

In French, the advertisement reads: “PMC Wagner offers its services to ensure the sovereignty of states and protect the people of African from militants and terrorists.” The fine print emphasizes that “various forms of cooperation are possible,” as long as the cooperation does not “contradict Russia’s interests.” Russia’s interests are not specified.

While the Telegram channel claimed the advertisement was replicated on African social media channels, the DFRLab has not found additional evidence to support this claim.

Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel shared an advertisement for Wagner’s services in Africa, claiming it was widely circulated on the continent. (Source: rsotmdivision)

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Wagner troops arrive in Central African Republic ahead of critical referendum

Alexander Ivanov, director of the Officer’s Union for International Security (COSI), released a statement on COSI’s Telegram channel regarding the recent arrival of dozens of Wagner operatives in Central African Republic. According to US authorities, COSI is a front company for the Wagner Group in Central African Republic.

In the statement, Ivanov confirmed the Wagner troop rotation while stressing that the new personnel have no contract with Russia’s Ministry of Defense. He reiterated that both in CAR and across the continent, “security work is carried out by private companies that enter into contracts directly with the governments of sovereign states,” and that these private companies have nothing to do with official Russian state entities. Ivanov also indicated that this staff rotation should not impact the activities of Russia in Ukraine, and he claimed to have been in contact with Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Notably, Ivanov stated that despite the recent changes in the structure of Wagner’s “African business,” Prigozhin “intends not to curtail, but to expand his presence in Africa.” This is somehow consistent with what some analysts are observing: Wagner appears to be trying to expand its presence in West African coastal states increasingly threatened by a spillover of the jihadist insurgency from the Sahel, or possibly taking advantage of upcoming elections in several fragile African countries.

Although Ivanov has often remarked on Wagner activities in CAR and Africa in the past, this statement, coupled with other recent comments, suggest that the COSI director might be now exercising a wider role as spokesman for all Wagner activity in Africa, as Wagner reorganizes its structure in the wake of last month’s failed mutiny.

The statement comes as a U-turn in recent communications over Wagner’s presence in CAR. In past weeks both CAR and Russian officials stated that the African republic had an agreement with Russia and not with a private military company. Ivanov seems to be returning to earlier narratives in which Wagner claimed that the CAR government signed an agreement with the PMC and not the Russian government. This narrative seems to confirm DFRLab reporting in the June 30 edition of the Russian War Report, in which we noted that denying direct links to Wagner’s actions in Africa has become more difficult for the Kremlin after recent events damaged the principle of plausible deniability, which had previously been a key aspect of Wagner’s success in Africa. However, Russia does not want to waste the network of influence built by its state proxy forces and is now attempting to reorganize, rebrand and develop a new narrative around Wagner and the Kremlin’s ability to conduct hybrid warfare.

The arrival of dozens of troops from Russia’s Wagner in CAR comes at a critical time as the country prepares to hold a constitutional referendum on July 30 that would eliminate presidential term limits and allow President Faustin-Archange Touadéra to extend his term. The CAR government stated earlier this month that Wagner operatives will help in securing the referendum. This could be seen as a strong signal from Moscow to reiterate the strategic importance of its influence in CAR and reassure local partners of its continued support, while sending a message of continuity and strength to other countries in the region where Wagner operates.

—Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

Lavrov to replace Putin at BRICS summit

The Office of South Africa’s Presidency announced on July 19 that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov would replace President Vladimir Putin at the upcoming Summit of BRICS Nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) “by mutual agreement.”

In Russian media, pro-Kremlin and opposition news outlets alike posted articles claiming that Russia had refused South Africa’s proposal to send Lavrov as head of the country’s delegation on July 14. Quoting an interview with South Africa’s deputy president, the Russian pro-Kremlin news outlet RTVI suggested that “negotiations are still ongoing.”

Putin is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged war crimes committed during Russia’s war in Ukraine. A warrant for the arrest of both the Russian president and Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova alleges that they were involved in organizing and participating in the deportation of Ukrainian children. As a signatory to the Rome Statute, which established the ICC, South Africa would have been obligated to arrest Putin had he attended the BRICS Summit in August.

South Africa’s largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, took to court in a petition to force the government to arrest Putin if he did attend. In a responding affidavit, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa stated that Russia would view South Africa arresting Putin as a “declaration of war.”

The Kremlin denied claims that Moscow had threatened South African authorities. However, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said on July 19 that “it is clear to everyone in the world what an attempt to encroach on the head of the Russian Federation means.”

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate, London, United Kingdom and Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

The post Russian War Report: Wagner is still in business in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was never about NATO

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 18 Jul 2023 22:01:29 +0000

Sweden is poised to become the thirty-second member of the NATO Alliance and Russia does not appear to be at all concerned by the prospect. The breakthrough moment for the Swedes came ahead of last week’s NATO summit in Vilnius, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan agreed to end months of opposition and back the Scandinavian nation’s bid to join the Alliance. Russia’s response to Sweden’s imminent NATO accession has been muted to say the least, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov limiting himself to promises of “appropriate measures” and Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov warning about unspecified “negative consequences.”

This apparent lack of concern mirrors the Kremlin position over Finland’s NATO membership, which was confirmed in April 2023. On that occasion, Russia also downplayed the significance of the news while making vague commitments to strengthen its own military posture in the region. Indeed, in the fourteen months since the two Nordic nations first announced their intention to join the Alliance, Moscow has done almost nothing to protest or obstruct this process, despite having a vast array of military, cyber, economic, informational, and diplomatic tools at its disposal. If Putin genuinely believed the NATO Alliance posed a security threat to the Russian Federation, he would at the very least have increased the Russian military presence close to the Finnish border. Instead, Russia reportedly reduced its troop deployments in the region by approximately 80%. These are obviously not the actions of a nation under siege.

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Russia’s remarkably relaxed reaction to the NATO accession of Finland and Sweden stands in stark contrast to the hysteria over Ukraine’s far less substantial ties to the military alliance. In the months leading up to Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin and other Kremlin leaders told the world that the escalating crisis was due to years of provocative NATO expansion, while warning that deepening ties between the Alliance and Ukraine represented a red line. In reality, however, Ukraine in early 2022 was not even remotely close to joining NATO. Far from pursuing Ukraine, the Alliance had repeatedly sidestepped appeals from Kyiv for a Membership Action Plan, refusing to offer even a clear signal regarding future accession. On the eve of Russia’s invasion, the most optimistic forecasts indicated that Ukraine’s dream of joining NATO was still decades away.

It is hard to see any military logic behind the dramatically different Russian reactions to NATO’s Nordic enlargement and the Alliance’s involvement in Ukraine. After all, while a theoretical future NATO presence inside Ukraine could pose a range of major headaches for military planners in Moscow, the recent accession of Finland has already doubled the length of Russia’s shared border with the Alliance overnight. Swedish membership will arguably be even more consequential for Russia, transforming the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake. If Russia is so apparently unconcerned by these very real military challenges, why was Putin prepared to launch the biggest European war since World War II over the far more distant prospect of Ukrainian NATO membership?

It is clear from Putin’s own actions that he understands perfectly well NATO will never attack Russia. This should come as no surprise. Indeed, the entire notion of NATO invading Russia is recognized as absurd by all but the terminally swivel-eyed. This does not mean Russian objections to NATO’s post-1991 enlargement are entirely insincere; on the contrary, the growing presence of the Alliance in the former Eastern Bloc over the past thirty years is perhaps the leading source of geopolitical bitterness and resentment throughout the Russian establishment. However, it is critical to clarify that this indignation has nothing to do with legitimate security concerns. NATO is not a threat to Russian security; NATO is a threat to Russian foreign policy because it prevents Russia from bullying its neighbors. In other words, NATO enlargement is no more or less provocative than a burglar alarm is to a thief.

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None of this has prevented Putin from using the NATO issue as a smokescreen for his imperial ambitions. For years, he has skillfully exploited anti-Western sentiment and widespread international suspicion of US foreign policy to distract from Russia’s own acts of international aggression. This tactic has proved remarkably successful; in the seventeen months since Russian troops began the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a wide range of academics, commentators, and politicians around the world have all echoed Putin in blaming NATO for provoking the war. They have continued to do so even as Putin himself has compared his invasion to the imperial conquests of eighteenth-century Russian Czar Peter the Great.

The fact that so many prominent personalities remain ready to accept Russia’s dishonest NATO narrative is evidence of fundamental misconceptions regarding the role of the Alliance and the nature of its post-Cold War enlargement. NATO is routinely depicted by critics as an expansionist military institution seeking to impose Western dominance, but this is entirely at odds with the growth of the Alliance over the past three decades. Nobody has ever been forced to join NATO; instead, every single new member since 1991 has asked for membership and has been obliged to meet a series of strict standards in order to qualify. Indeed, the loaded term “NATO expansion” may itself be misleading, as unlike Russia, the Alliance only ever expands on a voluntary basis. It is also worth underlining that while Putin plays the victim card and complains of being encircled, fear of Russian aggression has been by far the leading cause of all new membership applications.

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine now approaching the one-and-a-half-year mark, it is time to retire the NATO narrative. Putin has demonstrated that he is not at all threatened by the growing presence of the Alliance on Russia’s northwestern border, and is increasingly open about his imperial agenda in Ukraine. It is this Russian imperialism that poses a grave threat to international security, not the defensive guarantees offered by NATO.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Russian misconceptions about Ukraine are in part due to the simplistic notion that ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine, as well as those who express an affinity for Russian culture or share Russia’s antagonism toward the EU, NATO, and the West in general, all fall within the same “pro-Russian” category. Likewise, Many Russians have been all too ready to assume that any Ukrainian expressing nostalgia for the Soviet era is waiting to be “liberated” by Moscow. These misconceptions have been echoed by numerous commentators in the West, who have similarly treated evidence of favorable Ukrainian attitudes toward modern Russia or the Soviet past as indications of a desire for some form of Russian reunion.

In reality, being “pro-Russian” is understood one way in Ukrainian cities like Donetsk, Kramatorsk, or Mariupol, and quite differently in Moscow, Omsk, or Tomsk. During the initial stages of Russian aggression against Ukraine in April 2014, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology conducted a wide-ranging poll in the eight southeastern Ukrainian provinces (excluding Crimea) targeted by the Kremlin. This revealed that 70 percent of respondents were against separation from Ukraine and unification with Russia, while just 15 percent were in favor.

If separation from Ukraine was not on their wish list, what did they in fact want? A relative majority of 45 percent preferred the decentralization of power and greater rights for their region; another 25 percent favored a federated Ukraine, while only 19 percent were happy with the existing relationship with Kyiv. Other surveys conducted at around the same time yielded similar findings.

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Unsurprisingly, Russia’s full-scale invasion has further shaped Ukrainian attitudes toward issues of national identity. Today, the people of Ukraine are more consolidated as a political nation than at any time since regaining independence more than thirty years ago. According to the Razumkov Centre, 94 percent of respondents in a May 2023 survey expressed pride in their Ukrainian citizenship; 74 percent expressed feelings of patriotism and love for their country; and 71 percent were ready to come to its defense, either with weapons in hand or as participants in volunteer support groups.

Meanwhile, negative attitudes toward Russia and Russian citizens have skyrocketed. At the end of 2019, only 20 percent of Ukrainians held negative attitudes toward Russians; six months after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in September 2022, 80 percent of respondents asserted that they would not allow Russians into Ukraine. In terms of attitudes toward Russia, the turnaround has been even more drastic. In early February 2022, about a week before the Russian invasion, 34 percent of Ukrainians held positive views of Russia. That number dropped to just two percent three months later, with 92 percent saying they viewed the country in a negative light.

With the war clearly going badly for the Kremlin, there could now be a glimmer of hope for some reality-based adjustments to Russian illusions about Ukraine. Russian MP Konstanin Zatulin, who is well known for championing the plight of Russian “compatriots” abroad and promoting aggressive policies toward Ukraine, has recently questioned the wisdom of denying Ukrainian identity. “I would be happy if there was no Ukraine, but if we continue to constantly repeat that there is no Ukraine and no Ukrainians,” this will only strengthen their resistance on the battlefield, he noted at a June 2023 forum in Moscow.

Zatulin’s comments hint at growing recognition in Russia that widely held beliefs about Ukraine’s indivisibility from Russia are both inaccurate and unhelpful. However, resistance to the entire notion of Ukrainian statehood is so deeply ingrained in Russian society that it may take generations before the attitudes underpinning the current war are no longer dominant.

Roman Solchanyk is author of “Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition” (2001). He has previously served as a senior analyst at the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute and the RAND Corporation.

Putin’s apparent readiness to compromise has created the impression of a vulnerable dictator who lacks both the support and the military strength to follow through on his earlier vow to “crush” the mutiny. This has led to widespread speculation that the Wagner revolt may now inspire other anti-regime uprisings. In a 9 July interview with ABC News, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy suggested the Wagner mutiny might serve as a catalyst for further domestic destabilization in Russia. “There is a signal that there might be another mutiny in Russia, a revolution,” he noted. “More than that, there are many people who might support such a mutiny.”

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Who could lead the next uprising? One obvious candidate is Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. Like Wagner chief Prigozhin, Kadyrov enjoys a high degree of autonomy and has large numbers of troops under his personal command. With the Kremlin’s blessing, he rules Chechnya as his personal fiefdom. He also has a long history of clashes with Russian governmental institutions and has joined Prigozhin in criticizing the conduct of the war in Ukraine. However, Kadyrov was ultimately one of the few prominent figures to publicly back Putin during the Wagner mutiny, and also sent Chechen fighters to Rostov-on-Don.

Kadyrov’s eagerness to support Putin was telling. While he might have the manpower and independence to take action challenging Putin’s power, it is not clear that he sees any advantage in doing so. Secure in his autonomy, Kadyrov may have calculated that it would be more beneficial to preserve his place in the current system than to back a risky rebellion with uncertain prospects.

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A more substantial challenge to the Putin regime may yet emerge from within the ranks of Russia’s increasingly disgruntled military. The Kremlin’s meek response to the Wagner mutiny has exacerbated already declining morale among Russian troops and commanders currently serving in Ukraine.

For more than half a year, a steady stream of video addresses posted to social media by Russian soldiers complaining of suicidal orders and catastrophic losses have pointed to growing demoralization. Meanwhile, recent developments indicate that dissatisfaction with the Kremlin has now reached the level of senior commanders. A July 13 report in the Wall Street Journal claimed that numerous high-ranking officers including top Russian general Sergei Surovikin had been detained in the wake of the Wagner revolt. Surovikin, who formerly commanded the Russian invasion of Ukraine, is reportedly still being held and interrogated in Moscow over possible links to the mutiny.

In a further sign of mounting tension within Putin’s military, a senior Russian commander in charge of forces based in southern Ukraine claimed on July 12 that he had been suddenly dismissed from his post after raising the alarm over the mismanagement of the invasion. In a recorded audio statement, General Ivan Popov accused Russia’s military leadership of “treacherously and vilely decapitating the army at the most difficult and tense moment.”

Popov’s explosive accusations suggest that many in the Kremlin prefer to silence critics within the Russian military rather than address uncomfortable truths about the war in Ukraine. Unless this problematic approach is abandoned, it is likely to fuel further anger among front line commanders and troops as casualties continue to mount amid Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive.

If disgruntled officers and demoralized soldiers from the regular Russian army do turn against the Putin regime, they may be joined by thousands of former Wagner fighters along with members of Russia’s many other private military companies. These mercenary formations typically enjoy a significant degree of operational independence from the Kremlin and will have noted with interest the precedent set by the apparent lack of negative consequences following the Wagner mutiny.

For more than two decades, Vladimir Putin has ruthlessly suppressed any potential sources of domestic opposition to his rule. With the Russian media muzzled and his political opponents imprisoned, exiled, or dead, the force most capable of mounting a serious challenge to the regime is the Russian military. Putin has been careful to keep loyalists in top positions, but as the invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel, there are growing indications of disaffection among both commanders and troops. With Russian generals now reportedly being detained and dismissed, the scale of the threat should not be underestimated. In the months ahead, this may lead to fresh challenges to Putin’s rule that will dwarf the Wagner mutiny.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Russian missile strike in Lviv kills ten civilians, injures dozens

At least ten people were killed and thirty-seven injured in Russia’s July 6 attack on Lviv, in western Ukraine. Regional Governor Maksym Kozytskyy said that a Russian missile struck a residential building in the city, destroying more than fifty apartments.

Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to launch offensive actions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Ukrainian forces reported thirty-eight combat engagements against Russian troops near Novoselivske, Novohryhorivka, Berkhivka, Bohdanivka, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka. In the direction of Lyman, Russian forces shelled Nevske, Bilohorivka, Torske, Verkhnokamyanske, and Rozdolivka in Donetsk. Russian aviation conducted an airstrike in Bilohorivka. Russia also attacked villages in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts, including Levadne, Olhivske, Malynivka, Huliaipole, and Bilohirka. On July 6, Russian troops shelled Chervonohryhorivka and Nikopol, damaging civilian infrastructure.

On July 5, reports from Russian military bloggers suggested that Ukrainian forces had advanced southwest of Berkhivka, west of Yahidne, and southwest of Bakhmut. The Ukrainian army said it conducted offensive operations south and north of Bakhmut and is moving on Bakhmut’s southern flank. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that the Ukrainian army conducted offensive operations near Lyman, Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka front, on the border between Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk, and in western Zaporizhzhia.

The Ukrainian army appears to have launched a coordinated attack on Russian army logistical and communications hubs. On July 4, Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an ammunition depot in occupied Makiivka, Donetsk. Russian sources claimed without evidence that Ukraine had struck a hospital. Former Russian army commander Igor Strelkov, also known as Igor Girkin, said the attack demonstrates how Ukraine regularly launches missile strikes against Russian rear targets. Other unconfirmed reports from July 5 indicate Ukraine may have struck Russian positions near Debaltseve. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces hit Russian positions near Yakymivka in the Melitopol area and attempted to strike Berdyansk in the Zaporizhzhia region.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

New narrative accuses US and Ukraine of planning false flag attack on Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

Ahead of next week’s NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, allegations that the United States and Ukraine will launch a false flag operation on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant are spreading on various platforms, including Twitter, 4chan, and Instagram. The allegations seemingly aim to create panic and, in the event of a future attack on the plant, establish a narrative the West and Ukraine are to blame.

On July 3, a post appeared on 4chan from an anonymous user who introduced himself as a US Marine Corps veteran now working for the government in electronic espionage. The user claimed that the Ukrainian and US governments are working together to bomb the Zaporizhzhia power plant. According to the conspiracy theory, after the false flag operation, the United States will be able to use “nuclear warheads” against Russia. At the time of writing, the post had been deleted from 4chan. However, similar posts remain on the platform.

Screencap of an anonymous 4chan post claiming the US and Ukraine are planning a false flag attack. (Source: 4chan)

However, the false flag claims did not originate on 4chan. Russian Twitter accounts posted similar claims building the false flag narrative. After the 4chan post, the claim circulated again on Twitter.

A similar narrative was also shared by Renat Karchaa, an adviser to Rosenergoatom, a subsidiary of the Russian state nuclear agency Rosatom. Karchaa claimed on Russian state television channel Russia-24 that on the night of July 5, the Ukrainian army would attempt an attack on the Zaporizhzhia plant. Without evidence, he accused the United States and the West of planning a false flag incident to damage Russia’s reputation. The claims were further amplified by Russian state media outlets.

The allegations escalated on social media after July 4, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy repeated Ukraine’s concerns about the status of the nuclear power plant. In an address, Zelenskyy restated that Russia plans to attack the plant and that Russian troops have placed explosive-like objects on the building’s roof. In June, Ukrainian military intelligence made similar claims when it reported that the plant’s cooling pond had been mined by Russian troops.

On July 5, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that it was aware of reports that mines and other explosives had been placed around the plant. The IAEA said their experts inspected parts of the facility and did not observe any visible indications of mines or explosives. IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi added, “The IAEA experts requested additional access that is necessary to confirm the absence of mines or explosives at the site.” On July 7, the IAEA announced that Russia had granted its experts further access, “without – so far – observing any visible indications of mines or explosives.”

—Sayyara Mammadova, research assistant, Warsaw, Poland

Former employees share details about Prigozhin’s media group and troll farms

Several independent Russian media outlets published stories this week interviewing former employees of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Patriot Media Group, which dissolved on June 30.

In a video published on Telegram, Yevgeny Zubarev, director of Patriot Media Group’s RIA FAN, said the goal was to “work against the opposition, such as Alexei Navalny and others who wanted to destroy our country.” Zubarev confirmed key details previously reported by independent Russian journalists at Novaya Gazeta in 2013 and the now-Kremlin-controlled RBC in 2017 about the existence of paid commentators and the creation of Prigozhin-affiliated media outlets. Zubarev added that, after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2018 re-election, the group hired “foreign affairs observers.” The timing corresponds with attempts by Prigozhin’s Internet Research Agency to meddle in the 2020 US presidential election.

Further, independent Russian media outlets Sever.Realii, Bumaga, and Novaya Gazeta interviewed former employees of Prigozhin’s media group. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, the former employees confirmed that Prigozhin’s “troll factory” and “media factory” conducted coordinated information attacks on opposition leaders, published fabricated or purchased news “exclusives,” praised Putin, and deliberately ignored particular individuals who criticized Wagner Group. Bumaga and Sever.Realii described a smear campaign against Saint Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov. In 2019, Prigozhin’s media group supported and promoted Beglov, but in 2021, Prigozhin reportedly launched a smear campaign, as Beglov allegedly prevented him from developing a waste collection business in the city. Novaya Gazeta’s report also provided evidence that Prigozhin’s troll farm activities extended beyond Russia, with employees portraying skinheads and fascists in the Baltic region, specifically in Lithuania.

In recent years, additional revelations about Prigozhin’s media group have come to light. For example, Bumaga reported that prospective hires had to pass a “lie detector test” in which “security service specialists” asked candidates about their attitudes toward the opposition and Alexei Navalny in particular. Once hired, employees were closely surveilled. One former employee Bumaga interviewed characterized the atmosphere as being in a “closed military company.” Both Bumaga and Novaya Gazeta’s interviewees said that most of the employees did not believe in the mission. In one example, an employee left after refusing to launch a smear campaign against Ivan Golunov, a journalist at the independent news outlet Meduza who was detained in 2019 under false pretenses. Bumaga, citing an unnamed former employee, also reported that at one point an employee had hacked the system, erased a database, and fled to Poland. The same interviewee claimed they employed two Telegram administrators who also administered pro-Ukraine channels.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

Kremlin-owned RT offers jobs to former employees of Prigozhin’s troll factory

RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan offered to hire employees of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Patriot Media Group, which reportedly housed his troll factories. In the latest episode of the program Keosayan Daily, Simonyan praised the work of “Wagner’s media empire.” She said their work “was super professional” and that anyone left without a job can join “them,” referring to Russian propaganda outlets. She added, “We know you as professional colleagues of ours.”

The fate of Patriot’s former employees is being actively discussed in Russia. According to Russian outlet Novie Izverstia, Pavel Gusev, editor-in-chief of the pro-Kremlin outlet MK.ru, volunteered to help find jobs for former employees of Patriot. In addition, the chairman of the Saint Petersburg branch of the Union of Journalists of Russia stated that the union would contact the heads of media outlets to help find opportunities for dismissed employees and would provide additional informational support.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Russian conspiracy alleges false flag at Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wagner fallout: Time to begin preparing for a post-Putin Russia

Oleksiy Goncharenko — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 20:48:03 +0000

The recent revolt by Russia’s Wagner Group was a short-lived affair but the repercussions continue to be felt throughout the Russian Federation and beyond. Perhaps the biggest single lesson from the aborted coup is the fragility of the Putin regime. For many years, the Kremlin has sought to present Vladimir Putin as a powerful and popular ruler exercising complete control over a loyal and disciplined power vertical. The Wagner uprising has now shattered this myth of Putin the strongman.

Ever since coming to power at the turn of the millennium, Putin has sought to portray himself as an uncompromising and macho leader. He has frequently employed vulgar slang when promising to dispatch his opponents, and has notoriously engaged in a series of PR stunts including posing topless on horseback and scuba-diving to “discover” ancient Greek urns. However, there was little sign of this tough guy persona during the early stages of the Wagner revolt in late June. As Wagner troops captured Rostov-on-Don and began to march on Moscow, the Russian dictator was nowhere to be seen. He did not appear until the second day of the mutiny, when he delivered a brief video address.

The Kremlin appears to recognize the seriousness of the situation, and has since embarked on an intensive post-putsch PR offensive designed to repair public perceptions of Putin. In the days following the Wagner drama, the Russian dictator has made a flurry of carefully choreographed appearances emphasizing national unity and regime stability. However, this sudden burst of activity has only served to highlight the damage done by Putin’s earlier absence. In a little over twenty-four hours, the Putin regime was exposed as significantly weaker than almost anybody had previously imagined. Despite the best efforts of the Kremlin propaganda machine, this fact is plain as day to both the international community and the Russian elite.

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Nobody will have failed to notice that while Putin has continued to talk tough, he failed to crush the Wagner uprising and instead struck some kind of deal with Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his mutinous troops. Putin demonstrated a readiness to compromise despite the fact that Wagner fighters reportedly shot down a number of Russian aircraft and killed numerous Russian airmen. This indicated an apparent lack of concern for the lives of Russian servicemen at a time when tens of thousands of Russian soldiers have already been killed as a result of Putin’s fateful decision to invade Ukraine.

The brief Wagner uprising also revealed a remarkable shortage of Russian military strength and fighting spirit on the home front. Wagner troops were able to seize one of Russia’s largest cities, Rostov-on-Don, without a fight. Perhaps even more significantly, they were cheered and supported by crowds of locals. Wagner forces then advanced to within 200 kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed before choosing to turn back.

Meanwhile, there was no surge in street-level or elite support for Putin. Instead, pro-war propagandists fell largely silent as rumors swirled of establishment figures fleeing Moscow. For a brief period, Russia looked to be leaderless and defenseless. The immediate danger has now passed, but these stunning developments have changed attitudes toward Putin and his regime in fundamental ways.

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It would appear that history repeats itself. Just as in 1990 very few foresaw the looming collapse of the USSR, Russia now once again looks suddenly fragile. Unsurprisingly, this is regarded as good news in Ukraine, where any sign of Russian instability is welcomed. Attitudes elsewhere are not so clear-cut. Many international observers are openly alarmed by the potential demise of the Russian Federation in its current form. They worry about the fate of Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal, and also question the legitimacy of the many new states that could potentially emerge from the wreckage of Putin’s Russia.

These concerns mirror attitudes during the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union. Indeed, it is often forgotten that US President George Bush H. W. Bush came to Kyiv in the weeks before Ukraine’s August 1991 declaration of independence to argue against such a move in his “Chicken Kiev” speech. Many of today’s leaders share these fears over the potential disintegration of Russia. Nevertheless, the Wagner revolt has demonstrated that the Putin regime may well collapse due to its own internal weaknesses, regardless of the Western world’s wishes.

Elements of the international community, including in the West, also cling to the idea of reaching some kind of compromise and returning to business as usual with Russia. While it is obvious to almost everyone in Ukraine and in nearby countries including Poland and the Baltic states that Russia will only stop when it is decisively defeated, there are still many observers elsewhere who believe they can turn back the clock to 2021 or even 2013. They fondly recall a time when Vladimir Putin was the respected leader of a economically strong nation at the heart of global affairs, and dream of returning to this state of affairs. Such thinking is dangerously delusional.

In reality, there can be no way back to international respectability for Putin. As a result of the disastrous invasion of Ukraine, he will be an enemy of the entire Western world for as long as he remains in power. Crucially for the future of his regime, Putin is also clearly no longer able to guarantee domestic security or protect the interests of the Russian elite on the international stage.

As the international community assesses the fallout from the Wagner revolt, it no longer makes sense to be afraid of a new Russian collapse. On the contrary, the time has come to begin preparing for the possibility of a post-Putin Russia. Western policymakers should now be thinking seriously about how to make any future transition as smooth as possible. This means preparing for the emergence of a democratic Russia, and also exploring what a breakup of the current Russian Federation into a number of smaller states would mean for international security.

When similar processes were underway in the early 1990s, the international community prioritized stability above all else, paving the way for the eventual rise of a revisionist Russia under Putin. This time, a new Russian collapse should be managed in order to bring about a sustainable shift toward democracy. The experience of the past three decades has demonstrated that this is the only way to secure a durable peace. Today’s Western leaders must learn from the mistakes of their predecessors in order to avoid repeating them.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a member of the Ukrainian parliament with the European Solidarity party.

Wagner putsch is symptomatic of Russia’s ongoing imperial decline

Richard Cashman, Lesia Ogryzko — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 20:14:43 +0000

The attempted putsch by Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his Wagner troops in late June is perhaps best understood as a symptom of Russia’s ongoing imperial decline. Much like the invasion of Ukraine itself, it is part of a broader historical process that can be traced back to 1989 and the fall of the Soviet incarnation of the Russian Empire in Central and Eastern Europe.

Anyone looking to make sense of recent events in Russia should begin by noting that Prigozhin’s dramatic actions were not aimed at ending the war in Ukraine or steering Russia away from its increasingly totalitarian course. On the contrary, he sought to correct mistakes in the conduct of the invasion by effecting changes in the country’s military leadership.

This should come as no surprise. The vast majority of Prigozhin’s public statements about the invasion of Ukraine align him with prominent ultranationalists, which in the Russian context translates into imperial reactionaries. This group is demanding a fuller commitment to the war against Ukraine which, with Belarus, it sees as the core of Russia’s imperial heartlands. Ideally, this group wants to see full mobilization of Russia’s citizens and the country’s productive capacity for the war effort.

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Prigozhin is not generally regarded as a member of Putin’s inner circle, but he is believed to have supporters within the Kremlin elite, some of whom may have backed or sympathized with his uprising. This support reflects widespread demands among members of the Russian establishment for national leadership that can arrest and reverse the process of imperial retreat which began in 1989.

It is also clear that Prigozhin enjoyed significant backing from ordinary Russians and, probably, ordinary soldiers. Support for Prigozhin amongst the Russian public is rooted in anger over the mismanagement of the invasion and endemic state corruption along with dissatisfaction over the prospect of increasing costs without identifiable gains in Ukraine.

The scale of public sympathy for the putsch could be seen in videos of Rostov-on-Don residents congratulating Wagner troops on capturing the city while bringing them food and water. It was also striking that Rostov-on-Don and its Southern Military District headquarters were seized without a fight, while Wagner troops were able to advance to within two hundred kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed, despite passing close to numerous Russian army bases. Prigozhin’s tough rhetoric and hawkish attacks on Russia’s military leadership clearly resonate widely among large numbers of ordinary Russians.

Prigozhin’s abruptly abandoned putsch reinforces the lesson that coups are relatively common in Russia, whereas genuine revolutions are not. Vladimir Putin and the clan which took control of Russia at the turn of the millennium in many ways see themselves as the heirs to the 1991 coup plotters who attempted but failed to prevent the unravelling of the USSR. Their own vulnerability to being overthrown in similar fashion has now been laid bare before the Russian public and the wider world.

The course of the war to date, including cross-border incursions by Ukrainian-backed Russian militias into Russia’s Belgorod and Bryansk regions, had already fractured the facade of monolithic strength so carefully projected by the Kremlin throughout Putin’s twenty-three-year reign. Prigozhin’s putsch has further exposed the brittleness of the regime and of the Russian state. It has highlighted the very real possibility of turmoil and transformation within the country, which so many observers previously thought impossible.

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Policymakers around the world must now prepare for a range of dramatic scenarios in Putin’s Russia. This planning should involve studying the more than 100 nationalities within the Russian Federation, their cultures and political aspirations, as well as possible fracture lines between regional and business interests.

More specifically, governments must begin to plan for a post-Putin Russia. Putin’s elderly clan represents the last of the Soviet-era elites and their distinct embrace of Russia’s imperial consciousness. That imperial identity will not disappear overnight, but Putin’s obvious overreach in Ukraine and events like Prigozhin’s putsch are likely to engender a less certain sense of imperial destiny.

Putin has emerged from the Wagner putsch a significantly weakened figure, especially among members of the Russian establishment who once saw him as a guarantor of stability. He has also been embarrassed internationally and now looks a far less reliable partner for countries such as China, India, and Brazil that have so far sought to remain neutral over the invasion of Ukraine.

Moving forward, there will be considerable paranoia within the Russian establishment as suspicion swirls regarding potentially shifting loyalties. Rumors continue to circulate regarding measures targeting military and security service personnel who failed to oppose the Wagner uprising. The invasion of Ukraine has already seriously eroded trust within Russian society; Prigozhin’s actions and Putin’s timid response will intensify this negative trend.

Ukraine’s partners cannot control the processes set in train by the Wagner episode, but they can surge military support for Ukraine and embrace bolder policies that reflect the revealed weakness of the Putin regime. The fact that Putin was apparently prepared to strike a deal with Prigozhin further demonstrates that the Russian dictator is inclined to back down rather than escalate when confronted by a resolute opponent or faced with the prospect of possible defeat.

Prigozhin’s putsch was a brief but revealing event in modern Russian history. It hinted at deep-seated dissatisfaction among both the elite and the Russian public over the country’s inability to reclaim what it perceives as its imperial heartlands, and served as a reminder that the imperial Russian state is still collapsing.

The Russian decline that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall is ongoing, with Putin and his clan seeking but failing to reverse the settlement of 1991. This path has led to a war based on imperial fantasies that may now hasten the real end of empire. The Wagner putsch did not bring down Putin’s regime which seeks to maintain empire, but it may come to be seen as the beginning of its end.

Richard Cashman and Lesia Ogryzko are fellows at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

Russian War Report: Kremlin denies that it targeted civilians in a missile attack on a pizza restaurant

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 30 Jun 2023 19:00:00 +0000

Security

Military camps for Wagner reportedly under construction in Belarus

Tracking narratives

Pro-Kremlin sources spreading disinformation to justify missile strike in Kramatorsk

Kremlin blames Colombian victims for the injuries they sustained in the Kramatorsk attack

Media policy

Prigozhin’s online assets reportedly blocked in Russia

International Response

Questions abound over the future of Wagner contracts and Prigozhin-linked businesses in Africa

Analysis: With Wagner mutiny, Russia’s loses plausible deniability about its involvement in Africa

Investigation sheds light on how Putin’s childhood friends allegedly evade sanctions

Military camps for Wagner reportedly under construction in Belarus

Russian independent outlet Verstka reported on the construction of camps for Wagner forces near Asipovichi, Mogilev Oblast, located in Belarus approximately two hundred kilometers from the Ukraine border. According to Verstka’s local forestry source, the area will cover 2.4 hectares (5.9 acres) and accommodate eight thousand Wagner fighters. The source also claimed that there will be additional camps constructed. Family members of Wagner fighters also confirmed to Verstka that they were deploying to Belarus.

Radio Svaboda, the Belarusian-language edition of Radio Liberty, reviewed satellite imagery from Planet Labs that suggested signs of expansion at the Unit 61732 military camp adjacent to the village of Tsel, twenty kilometers northwest of Asipovichi. The outlet interviewed Ukrainian military analyst Oleg Zhdanov, who suggested it was “too early to tell” as to whether the military camp’s expansion is specifically for Wagner forces. “Very little time has passed to start building a camp specifically for the Wagnerites—it’s unreal,” Zhdanov told Radio Svaboda.

Location of possible construction at the Unit 61732 military camp in Tsel, Belarus. (Source: Planet Labs)

On June 27, in his first speech after the Wagner mutiny, Russian President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed the deal that ended the rebellion on June 24 in which Yevgeniy Prigozhin would relocate to Belarus. Putin praised those Wagner fighters who did not participate in the revolt and said they could sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense of other services. He added that other mercenaries who do not want to join could go either home or follow Prigozhin to Belarus.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Pro-Kremlin sources spreading disinformation to justify missile strike in Kramatorsk

Pro-Kremlin sources denied Russia targeted civilians when a missile struck a crowded pizza restaurant in Kramatorsk, killing at least twelve civilians and injuring more than fifty others. According to this narrative, RIA Pizza was actually a military base hosting US and Ukrainian soldiers. To support the claims, pictures taken after the strike were published on Telegram and Twitter.

To support the claim that soldiers of 101st Airborne Division were located at the pizza “military base,” pro-Kremlin sources circulated grisly footage of the attack aftermath recorded by freelance journalist Arnaud De Decker. The clip shows a man wearing a morale patch of a US flag with the words “Always Be Ready: 5.11 Tactical.” 5.11 Tactical is a military apparel company that sells branded merchandise, including morale patches, worn to offer support to various causes and slogans but not used official unit patches. Various types of 5.11 Tactical’s “Always Be Ready” patches are readily available for purchase online.

Top: A 5.11 Tactical morale patch for sale on its website. Bottom: Image taken during the aftermath of the Kramatorsk attack showing a man wearing the same morale patch on his helmet. (Source: 5.11 Tactical/archive, top; @arnaud.dedecker/archive, bottom)

Similarly, another post from Aleksandr Simonov’s Telegram channel that a man wearing an 101^st Airborne t-shirt was a member of the US Army division. These t-shirts are also readily available from online retailers.

Montage of three screenshots from online retail websites selling 101^st Airborne t-shirts. (Sources: top left, Etsy/archive; bottom left, Predathor/archive; right, Allegro/archive)

Montage of three screenshots from online retail websites selling 101st Airborne t-shirts. (Sources: top left, Etsy/archive; bottom left, Predathor/archive; right, Allegro)

—Sayyara Mammadova, research assistant, Warsaw, Poland

Kremlin blames Colombian victims for the injuries they sustained in the Kramatorsk attack

In addition to pro-Kremlin accusations that the Kramatorsk attack targeted a base housing US Army soldiers, Kremlin influencers also targeted citizens of Colombia, three of whom were injured in the attack, for being at the site of the incident. Colombian President Gustavo Petro said the attack targeted “three defenseless Colombian civilians” in violation of the protocols of war and called for the Colombian Foreign Ministry to submit a note of diplomatic protest to Russia. While the Kremlin acknowledged launching the attack, it insisted the assault struck military personnel rather than civilians.

The three Colombian citizens injured in the attack include acclaimed Colombian writer Hector Abad Faciolince; Sergio Jaramillo Caro, who previously led Colombia’s peace negotiations with FARC rebels; and Ukrainian-based journalist Catalina Gomez. According to the New York Times, Abad and Jaramillo were in Kramatorsk “collecting material” in support of their initiative, ¡Aguanta Ucrania! (“Hang On Ukraine!”), which seeks to garner support for Ukraine in Latin America.

Following the attack, Colombian influencers and officials criticized the attack through media outlets and social media accounts in Spanish. Danilo Rueda, Colombia’s current high commissioner for peace, issued a statement expressing support for the victims without mentioning Russia, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its “strongest condemnation of the unacceptable attack by Russian forces on a civilian target.”

Gomez, who was injured in the attack, broadcast a video for France 24 from the site of the explosion. Meanwhile, Abad and Jaramillo conducted interviews with Colombian media outlets such as El Tiempo in which they described the incident.

Actualidad RT, a Russian media outlets with enormous reach in the Spanish-speaking world, insisted that the victims of the attack were mercenaries and instructors of NATO and Ukraine rather than civilians. Actualidad RT quoted statements from Igor Konashenkov, spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Defense, and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov, who said the attack struck “military targets” and that “Russia does not attack civilian infrastructure.” Actualidad RT promoted its claims via Twitter and Facebook multiple times on June 28.

Colombian radio station WRadio interviewed Kremlin foreign policy spokesperson Maria Zakharova on the morning of June 28. Zakharova stated that the restaurant was a Russian military target and called for an investigation into Victoria Amelina, a Ukrainian writer who was gravely injured while purportedly hosting the Colombians at the restaurant, claiming without evidence that Amelina had prior knowledge that the restaurant was a military target. Zakharova reiterated this statement after a WRadio journalist asked her to confirm the accusation. In contrast, Abad stated that it was Gomez who suggested they visit the restaurant, and that she apologized for doing so after the attack.

The Russian embassy in Colombia amplified Zakharova’s narrative later that same afternoon and evening. On Twitter, the embassy insisted that the city was “an operational and logistical-military hub, not a suitable place to enjoy Ukrainian cuisine dishes.” It also seemed to celebrate that the “reckless trip [of the Colombians] did not turn into an irreparable tragedy.”

—Daniel Suárez Pére z, research associate, Bogota, Colombia

Prigozhin’s online assets reportedly blocked in Russia

Over the course of the thirty-six-hour Wagner mutiny, the Kremlin attempted to limit information about Yevgeniy Prigozin on Russian social media and search engines, eventually blocking websites affiliated with Prigozhin. On June 24, the Telegram channel of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet RT reported that several Prigozhin-controlled media outlets including RIA FAN, People’s News, and Patriot Media Group were no longer accessible in parts of Russia. RT added that the reason for their disappearance was unknown. Similar reports appeared in Mediazona and several Telegram channels.

The DFRLab used the Internet censorship measurement platform OONI to verify the claim and check the accessibility of RIA FAN within Russia. OONI detected signs that riafan.ru was blocked in the country.

Internet censorship measurement platform OONI detected the apparent blocking of Prigozhin-owned media outlet RIA FAN. (Source: OONI)

On June 29, independent Russian outlet The Bell claimed the Kremlin was searching for a new owner for Patriot Media Group, which includes media assets associated with Prigozhin. The following day, multiple Russian outlets reported that Prigozhin had dissolved Patriot Media Group.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Questions abound over the future of Wagner contracts and Prigozhin-linked businesses in Africa

For years, Wagner has acted as Russia’s primary form of influence in Africa—spreading disinformation and propaganda, securing military contracts, and exporting natural resources to support Putin’s war effort. Following Prigozhin’s attempted mutiny, the future of Wagner’s operations on the continent has come into question. While it is highly unlikely the Kremlin would willingly abandon its influence in Africa, if Wagner is retired or its troops absorbed into the Ministry of Defense, it is uncertain who would maintain the group’s operations on the continent.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov confirmed that Russia’s work in Africa will continue. In a TV interview with Russia Today, Lavrov said, “In addition to relations with this PMC the governments of CAR and Mali have official contacts with our leadership. At their request, several hundred soldiers are working in CAR as instructors.”

A top advisor to Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadéra appeared unconcerned about the weekend’s events. Speaking of Wagner’s military instructors, Fidèle Gouandjika said, “If Moscow decides to withdraw them and send us the Beethovens or the Mozarts rather than Wagners, we will have them.” In a statement released to its Telegram channel, the Officer’s Union for International Security—a US-sanctioned Wagner front company operating in CAR—claimed CAR’s defense minister had apologized for Gouandjika’s remarks. It quoted Defense Minister Claude Rameaux Bireau as saying, “The people of the CAR are grateful to the Russian instructors of Wagner, ask any Central African on the streets of Bangui or in the village of the CAR—he will confirm my words.”

In Mali, where Wagner forces have taken over responsibility for pushing back jihadists after the departure of French forces, the online outlet Mali Actu reported that the situation could dramatically impact Mali. “This situation raises major concerns about the security, stability and sovereignty of Mali, as well as the impact on the local population and counter-terrorism efforts,” it wrote.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Analysis: With Wagner mutiny, Russia loses plausible deniability about its involvement in Africa

While Wagner’s future in Africa remains uncertain, it is important to consider that the Wagner Group not just a paramilitary force. It is also a conglomerate of companies active in different sectors, from mining and logistics to political warfare and moviemaking, able to travel the spectrum between private entrepreneurism to state proxy. This flexibility has previously allowed Moscow to deploy Wagner to act as a force multiplier in Africa while simultaneously denying Russia’s direct presence on the continent. In Africa, Russia has used Wagner multiple times as part of a strategy to help authoritarian leaders stay in power and gain a pro-Russian military presence on the ground, all while maintaining plausible deniability. Until now, the positive outcomes of this strategy have far exceeded the costs for the Kremlin, as Russia has built a strong network of African influence with relatively little effort, securing concessions in strategic extractive industries, and expanding military-to-military relations on the continent.

However, this principle of plausible deniability, which made Wagner so successful and so useful for Moscow as an extension of its foreign policy and influence, is now damaged. As previously noted, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, as well as Putin, publicly confirmed direct links between Wagner and the Russian state apparatus.

Africa is intimately linked to Wagner: In the wake of Wagner’s involvement in Syria, Africa became the scene of the group’s expansion. Engaging in Sudan, the Central African Republic, Libya, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Mali, Wagner employed an opportunistic strategy of supplying security while taking concessions to mine natural resources. While its forces were in most cases invited to stabilize fragile states, its actions actively invited further instability, creating more opportunities and a greater demand signal for its services, ultimately granting renewing opportunities to Moscow to reinforce its footprint in the continent.

While denying direct links to Wagner’s actions in Africa might have become more difficult for the Kremlin, Russia is unlikely to waste the network of influence built by the group in recent years. Instead, Moscow will likely continue to deploy hybrid tools such as Wagner, although organized in different shapes and forms, so Russia can continue displacing Western influence, exploiting natural resources, and evading sanctions through dozens of front companies.

—Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

Investigation sheds light on how Putin’s childhood friends allegedly evade sanctions

On June 20, the Organized Crime and Corruption reporting project (OCCRP) published a series of investigations titled “The Rotenberg Files” that shed light on the business dealings and alleged sanctions evasion attempts of Boris and Arkady Rotenberg, close friends of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The report is based on fifty thousand leaked emails and documents, examined by journalists from seventeen outlets. The OCCRP said the leak came from a source who worked for the brothers at a Russian management firm. The OCCRP investigation was conducted in partnership with the Times of London, Le Monde, and Forbes, among others.

Boris and Arkady Rotenberg are childhood friends of Putin. The billionaire brothers faced Western sanctions amid Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, but their lavish lifestyles do not appear to have been impacted.

According to the OCCRP, the leaked documents demonstrate how the Rotenberg brothers allegedly used Western lawyers, bankers, corporate service providers, and proxies to evade sanctions.

One of the report’s findings also alleges the brothers maintain business links to Prince Michael of Kent, a cousin of the late Queen Elizabeth II who was previously accused by the Sunday Times and Channel 4 of profiting off close access to the Kremlin. According to the latest investigation, “Prince Michael distanced himself from earlier ties to the Putin regime in the wake of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. But leaked emails and corporate records show he co-owns a company with two Russian businessmen who helped billionaire oligarch and Putin ally Boris Rotenberg dodge Western sanctions.”

Another investigation from the Rotenberg files reported that Putin’s eldest daughter regularly visited a holiday property financed by Arkady Rotenberg in an exclusive Austrian skiing destination. Documents reviewed by the OCCRP suggest that the house was purchased by a Cypriot company in 2013 with a loan from a bank then owned by Arkady, using funds invested by another company he owned. Other records suggested that the former romantic partner of Putin’s daughter is connected to the company that owns the Austrian property. Residents claim to have seen Putin himself at the Kitzbühel residence, though this has not been confirmed.

The Rotenberg brothers and Prince Michael declined to comment to the OCCRP investigative consortium.

—Ani Mejlumyan, research assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

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The disinformation landscape in West Africa and beyond

Tessa Knight, Jean le Roux — Thu, 29 Jun 2023 09:00:00 +0000

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Introduction

The prominence of West Africa, and Africa as a whole, within the global disinformation ecosystem cannot be ignored. A report by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies released in April 2022 identified twenty-three disinformation campaigns targeting African countries dating back to 2014. Of these campaigns, sixteen are linked to Russia.

The listed disinformation campaigns—nine of which were identified by the DFRLab—reveal two key points. First, there has been a marked increase in the number of publicly identified disinformation campaigns in recent years. Whether this is due to an increase in the scrutiny, analytical capacity, or efforts on the part of bad actors is unclear. Second, the characteristics of each of these influence operations are distinct—these operations target a wide variety of issues, such as elections, the war in Ukraine, commercial interests, and domestic and international politics.

Further, relations between France and francophone West Africa have, following years of amicable relations built on the back of military cooperation, seen a marked erosion that was underscored by the exit of the last of the French troops from Mali in August 2022. Anti-France and pro-Russia sentiments have surged contemporaneously, with overlapping narratives positioning Russia as a viable alternative to Western aid. When French forces began their departure from Mali in June 2022, Russian private military companies (PMCs) such as the Wagner Group stood ready to fill the void.

This report examines several influence operation case studies from the West African region, with a particular emphasis on Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Niger. The narratives, actors, and contexts supporting these influence operations are summarized alongside their impact on regional stability. Russian influence plays a significant role in these case studies, an unsurprising fact considering the geopolitical history of this region.

This report also includes case studies from outside the Sahel region, consisting of thematically distinct but strategically noteworthy influence campaigns from elsewhere on the continent. For example, the Nigerian government used social media influencers to suppress citizen participation in the #EndSARS movement. Elsewhere, the Ethiopian diaspora used innovative click-to-tweet campaigns to spread international awareness of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. In South Africa, the rise in violent xenophobic demonstrations was precipitated by a popular social media campaign that normalized prejudice against foreign nationals.

The plethora of actors, targets, strategies, and tactics make a blanket approach to studying African disinformation networks difficult. The depth and breadth of these campaigns shows that Africa is facing the same challenges as the rest of the world insofar as disinformation is concerned. Moreover, the interest shown by foreign governments attests to the region’s geopolitical significance. This combination of geopolitical importance and a vulnerability to influence campaigns makes Africa a notable case study.

Background

Africa’s information environment is not monolithic Analog channels such as radio and film are used in conjunction with digital efforts to reach audiences, but Internet penetration rates and the accompanying reli- ance on analog media differ significantly from country to country For example, as of January 2022, Morocco, the Seychelles, and Egypt maintained Internet penetration rates of higher than 70 percent, nearly ten times the rate of the country with the lowest penetration rate, the Central African Republic (7 percent).

In the countries mentioned in the table above, Facebook and Instagram maintain a leading position insofar as social media penetration is concerned This can be partly ascribed to Facebook’s Free Basics service that “zero-rates” data (including Facebook and Instagram data) on participating mobile networks. These mobile networks can then bundle Facebook and Instagram data into a consumer’s service plan without the consumer having to pay extra for that data use Considering that mobile connections outstrip desktop connections, and that mo- bile data is more expensive than fixed broadband, it is clear why this has been effective to expand Facebook and Instagram’s footprint Meta shuttered the Free Basics program in some regions at the end of 2022 as the program’s spiritual successor – Meta Discover – was being rolled out The impact this will have on the information environment remains to be seen.

Social media and internet penetration rates in some of the African countries referenced in this report

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The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) has operationalized the study of disinformation by exposing falsehoods and fake news, documenting human rights abuses, and building digital resilience worldwide.

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Wagner drama drags Belarus deeper into Russia’s wartime turbulence

Hanna Liubakova — Wed, 28 Jun 2023 22:06:15 +0000

Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka appears eager to take full credit for his role in countering Russia’s short-lived but hugely significant recent Wagner rebellion. Speaking on June 27 just days after the uprising came to an abrupt end, Lukashenka provided a detailed and highly flattering account of negotiations with Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin that contrasted his own strong leadership with Russian ruler Vladimir Putin’s apparent indecisiveness.

This was a bold move by Lukashenka, who has been heavily dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival ever since Russia intervened to prop up his regime during a wave of Belarusian pro-democracy protests in the second half of 2020. Clearly, Lukashenka feels emboldened by Putin’s apparent weakness and sees the Wagner affair as an opportunity to burnish his own credentials as both a wise ruler and a skilled negotiator.

Lukashenka’s version of events is certainly convenient but may not be entirely accurate. In reality, he is more likely to have served as a messenger for Putin. The Russian dictator had good reason to avoid any direct talks with rebel leader Prigozhin, who he had publicly branded as a traitor. It is also probably no coincidence that Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rather than Lukashenka announced news of Prigozhin’s subsequent departure for Belarus. This has reinforced perceptions of Belarus as a vassal state of Russia that serves as a place of exile for disgraced members of the Kremlin elite. Indeed, Putin himself went even further and offered thousands of Wagner troops who participated in the rebellion the choice of relocating to Belarus if they wish.

It is not yet clear whether significant numbers of Wagner fighters will accept Putin’s invitation and move to Belarus. For now, Lukashenka claims to have offered Wagner the use of an abandoned military base. He has hinted that Wagner troops may serve in a training capacity for his own military, praising their performance in Ukraine and hailing them as “the most prepared unit in the Russian army.”

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Many ordinary Belarusians do not share Lukashenka’s enthusiasm and worry that the potential arrival of Wagner fighters will drag Belarus further into the turmoil engulfing Putin’s Russia. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, research has consistently found that the overwhelming majority of Belarusians oppose any involvement in the war. Belarusian railway workers and other activists have sabotaged the movement of Russian troops and military equipment across the country, while Belarusian military volunteers have joined the fight against Russia inside Ukraine.

News that Belarus may now serve as a place of exile for large numbers of Wagner fighters is certain to deepen existing concerns over the country’s role as a junior partner in Russia’s faltering invasion of Ukraine. Lukashenka granted Putin permission to use Belarus as a springboard for an attempt to seize Kyiv during the initial stages of the war in early 2022. He continues to supply Russia with military equipment and ammunition, while also allowing Russian troops to train at Belarusian bases. Most recently, Belarus has reportedly begun the process of receiving Russian nuclear weapons.

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The delivery of Russian nukes and the proposal to host Wagner forces underscore the significance of Belarus in Putin’s regional strategy. The continued presence of Lukashenka in Minsk gives Moscow options in its confrontation with the West and enables the Kremlin to enhance its influence in the wider region. This appears to suit Lukashenka, who knows the Kremlin is unlikely to abandon him as long as he remains indispensable to the Russian war effort.

The outlook for Belarus as a whole is less promising. If large numbers of Wagner troops begin arriving in the country, this will dramatically increase Russia’s overall military presence and spark renewed speculation over a possible fresh Russian offensive from Belarusian territory to capture the Ukrainian capital. This would force Ukraine to strengthen its defenses along the country’s northern border and could potentially make Belarus a target.

The stationing of Wagner units in Belarus would also cause alarm bells to ring in nearby European Union and NATO member states such as Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Many of these countries have already taken steps to increase border security with Belarus. The arrival of Russia’s most effective and battle-hardened military units in the country would likely lead to a new iron curtain and the further isolation of the Belarusian population from their European neighbors.

In all likelihood, Lukashenka probably had very little say in the decision to use Belarus as a place of exile for mutinous Wagner forces. At the same time, he may view these troops as a means of protecting himself against any form of domestic opposition. Lukashenka remains vulnerable to the kind of widespread anti-regime protests that swept the country in 2020, and is well aware that his decision to involve Belarus in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is deeply unpopular. Having thousands of Wagner fighters on hand might be the perfect insurance against an uprising aiming to topple his regime.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. She tweets @HannaLiubakova.

In the final months of 2022, the Ukrainian military stunned the watching world by liberating large areas of the country from Russian occupation. A lightning September offensive saw most of northeastern Ukraine’s Kharkiv region de-occupied, while a more methodical push in the south eventually resulted in the liberation of Kherson. These successes encouraged many to expect similarly rapid progress during the current campaign. In reality, Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive represents a far greater challenge in almost every sense.

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Ukraine must overcome a vast Russian invasion force strengthened by 300,000 mobilized troops that is dug in behind successive lines of sophisticated defensive fortifications stretching for over one thousand kilometers. They must do so without air superiority and while outgunned by Russian artillery at many points along the front. Nor can they count on the element of surprise. This incredibly ambitious task would challenge the world’s most powerful militaries. Understandably, Ukrainian commanders are adopting a methodical approach to the campaign.

Progress so far has been very slow but steady. During the first few weeks of the counteroffensive, Ukraine claims to have liberated at least eight settlements. While most represent sparsely populated frontline villages with little strategic value, the sight of the Ukrainian flag raised in liberated communities provides all Ukrainians with a massive morale boost. Meanwhile, the big battles still lie ahead.

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For now, the Ukrainian military is focusing on probing attacks at numerous points along the front in order to identify weaknesses and thin out Russian defenses. Ukraine is also carrying out a comprehensive campaign of airstrikes against Russian military and logistical targets deep inside occupied territory. Britain’s May 2023 decision to provide Ukraine with long-range Storm Shadow cruise missiles is playing an important role in these air attacks, making it possible to hit targets virtually anywhere in occupied Ukraine. For example, Storm Shadow missiles are believed to have been used in the June 22 attack on a strategically important bridge connecting Crimea with Russian-occupied southern Ukraine.

These tactics are reminiscent of the early stages of last year’s ultimately triumphant Ukrainian campaign to liberate Kherson. At the beginning of August 2022, Ukraine very publicly signaled the start of a counteroffensive to free the southern port city and surrounding region. Progress was initially slow, leading to widespread criticism and pessimistic forecasts. However, Ukraine’s strategy of systematically targeting key bridges across the Dnipro River which Russian troops relied upon for resupply eventually paid off. Hemmed in and cut off, Russian commanders ordered a humiliating retreat in early November.

While the Kherson counteroffensive was on a far smaller scale than the current operation, it offers perhaps the best guide to Ukraine’s current objectives and envisioned timeline. The campaign to liberate Kherson involved tens of thousands of troops and took approximately three months to complete. Today’s counteroffensive involves hundreds of thousands of troops on both sides, with an area equal to a medium-sized European country at stake. It may be months before Ukraine’s commanders feel the conditions are right to attempt a major push to achieve a comprehensive breakthrough.

Ukraine’s international partners seem to appreciate the need for patience and are now emphasizing a long-term commitment to Ukraine that goes far beyond the current counteroffensive. At the Ukraine Recovery Conference in London on June 21, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak reiterated his promise to “stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes.” Other Western leaders have made similar pledges in recent weeks.

These statements are particularly important at a time when Russian hopes of rescuing their faltering invasion increasingly hinge on a weakening of Western resolve and a reduction in support for Ukraine. Despite the many setbacks of the past sixteen months, Putin and other senior regime figures in Moscow are apparently still convinced they can ultimately outlast the democratic world in Ukraine. European and American leaders are attempting to dampen such expectations by signaling the strength of their commitment to Ukrainian victory.

As international anxiety grows over the perceived lack of progress in Ukraine’s big summer counteroffensive, it is vital that this message of Western unity and resolution remains clear and unambiguous. The campaign to defeat Russia’s invasion is a marathon not a blitzkrieg, but it has every chance of success as long as Ukraine and the country’s partners are unwavering in their commitment.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Putin’s nuclear threats will escalate as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds

Diane Francis — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 00:15:34 +0000

Ukraine’s counteroffensive is still in its early stages but concerns are already mounting that Russia may eventually resort to desperate measures in order to stave off defeat. At present, fears are focused primarily on Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling, which is expected to escalate as the counteroffensive unfolds.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has recently warned that Moscow may intend to blow up the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in southern Ukraine. Meanwhile, US President Joe Biden acknowledged on June 19 that the threat of Putin using nuclear weapons is “real.” Days later, Ukrainian military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov accused Russia of mining the cooling pond used to control temperatures at the Zaporizhzhia plant’s reactors. Clearly, an occupied nuclear plant that is blown up becomes a nuclear weapon.

Preventing this from happening should be an international priority. The fallout from a detonation at the plant would spread across many countries in a matter of hours. In addition to Ukraine itself, Belarus, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Russia would all be at serious risk, according to analysis by Ukraine’s Hydrometerological Institute.

Russia has occupied Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia plant since the first weeks of the invasion. Last summer, the Kremlin allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor its operational safety remotely. But in April 2023, IAEA officials began warning of growing risks and calling for additional measures to protect the plant. With Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive now underway, alarm is mounting.

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Zelenskyy’s claims that the Kremlin is planning to orchestrate a nuclear disaster in Ukraine are not at all far-fetched, given how Putin’s forces have been purposely laying waste to the country for the past sixteen months. The invading Russian army has planted landmines across an area the size of Switzerland, displaced more than ten million people, and destroyed dozens of Ukrainian towns and cities. Countless residential apartment buildings, schools, and hospitals have been reduced to ruins. A comprehensive and methodical nationwide bombing campaign has targeted the country’s civilian infrastructure.

In recent weeks, Russia is suspected of having blown up the Khakovka dam in southern Ukraine, causing an ecological catastrophe. However, even this unprecedented act of ecocide failed to stop Ukraine’s counteroffensive. With Russia’s military predicament expected to become increasingly grim in the weeks and months ahead, the likelihood of further extreme measures will grow. “They constantly need destabilization here. They want the world to put pressure on Ukraine to stop the war,” commented Zelenskyy.

Putin has been making nuclear threats since the very first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion. During the initial stages of the war, he very publicly placed his nuclear forces on high alert. With the invasion in danger of unravelling in September 2022, he again hinted at a possible nuclear response while warning, “I’m not bluffing.”

Not everyone is convinced. Former Russian diplomat Boris Bondarev, who resigned after last year’s invasion, told Newsweek in early 2023: “today [Putin is] bluffing and we know that he has bluffed about nuclear threats. Ukrainians recovered some parts of their territory, and there was no nuclear retaliation. If you’re afraid of Putin using nukes, then you already lose the war against him and he wins.”

Others warn against possible complacency. The recent destruction of Kakhovka dam has caused many observers to reassess their earlier skepticism over Russia’s readiness to go nuclear in Ukraine. Putin has also crossed another red line by vowing to place nukes in Belarus. The Russian dictator is currently holding all Europeans hostage with the threat of a deadly explosion at the continent’s largest nuclear plant, and is moving nuclear weapons closer to the heart of Europe.

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The world must heed Ukraine’s warnings before it is too late. Zelenskyy first raised the alarm about the Kakhovka dam in October 2022 but the international community failed to react. Since the destruction of the dam, the relatively weak and ineffective international response has fuelled fears that Russia will read this as a green light to go further.

For now, most international attention appears to be focused on Putin’s placement of nukes in Belarus. “I absolutely believe that moving weapons to Belarus demands an unequivocal response from NATO,” Polish President Andrzej Duda said recently before meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Significantly, Russia’s decision to deploy nukes to Belarus even drew a critical response from Chinese officials, who renewed calls for de-escalation and reminded Russia that its leaders had reaffirmed their opposition to nuclear war at their March 2023 summit with China in Moscow.

Ultimately, there is no way of knowing whether Russia’s nuclear threats are genuine or not, but Western leaders cannot afford to let Putin’s nuclear blackmail tactics succeed. If the Russian dictator’s nuclear saber-rattling enables him to rescue the faltering invasion of Ukraine, he will do it again and others will follow. To prevent this nightmare scenario, the West must respond forcefully by escalating support for Ukraine militarily, diplomatically, and economically. The only sensible answer to Russia’s reckless nuclear intimidation is a heightened international commitment to Ukrainian victory.

In parallel to increased support for Ukraine, international watchdogs must be dispatched to monitor the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and other Ukrainian infrastructure sites that Russia could potentially target. Strong pressure must also be placed on China and India to condemn Russia’s nuclear threats. The invasion of Ukraine has already transformed the international security climate; Putin must not be allowed to normalize nuclear blackmail.

Diane Francis is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, editor-at-large with the National Post in Canada, author of ten books, and author of a newsletter on America.

Tracking narratives

Narrative targeting Ukraine’s counteroffensive fails to gain traction on Twitter

Deadly Russian barrage targets residential building in Kryvyi Rih as fighting continues in south and east

On June 13, Russia attacked a residential building in Kryvyi Rih, killing at least twelve people and injuring at least thirty-four. Rescue operations continued the morning of June 14.

Elsewhere, the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine said at least three people were killed and thirteen wounded after Russia launched Kalibr cruise missiles against Odesa on the night of June 13. The air force said it shot down three of four Kalibr cruise missiles and nine of ten Shahed drones. In addition, shelling in Karyerne, in Kherson Oblast, killed a nine-year-old girl, according to the Prosecutor General’s Office.

Further, a Donbas Telegram channel citing Governor Pavlo Kyrylenko reported at least two people killed and two others wounded after Russian missile strikes in Kramatorsk. In the Dnipropetrovsk region, Governor Serhiy Lysak said three Shahed drones were shot down, while in Svitlovodsk, Kirovohrad Oblast, a Shahed drone reportedly struck an unnamed “infrastructure object.” Russian Tu-22M3 bombers also launched Kh-22 missiles against targets in Donetsk Oblast. Meanwhile, shelling was reported in Russia’s Kursk region, targeting Glushkovo, Korovyakovka, Tetkino, and Popovo-Lezhachi. A police station in Glushkovo was reportedly damaged.

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported on June 13 twenty-eight clashes between its forces and the Russian army. Near Bakhmut, Russian forces attempted to carry out attacks in the areas of Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Ivanivske, and Bila Hora. Attacks were also reported in the direction of Lyman near Vesele and Rozdolivka.

The office of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that evacuations are planned in Armyansk, a Russian-occupied town in north Crimea, prompted by the collapse of the Nova Kakhovka dam. Operations at the Titan titanium dioxide plant in Armyansk were critically disrupted as a result of the dam collapse. The presidential office said an attack against the Titan plant could release up to two hundred tons of ammonia into the air, posing a significant threat to north Crimea and south Kherson Oblast. Flooding is also silting up the North Crimean Canal; Reuters noted that the canal has traditionally supplied 85 percent of Crimea’s water.

Ukrainian volunteer Roman Donik reported on June 13 that the 47th Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, known as Magura, is advancing through continuous minefields. Ukraine’s current de-mining equipment is reportedly insufficient for handling the density of the minefields. Despite the risks, the soldiers of the brigade are moving forward on foot. The following day, Speaker of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Andriy Kovalev announced that Ukrainian forces had advanced in various areas in the direction of Berdyansk at a distance of 200 to 1,400 meters. Currently, the main battles are taking place in Makarivka, Novodanylivka, and Novopokrovka.

The investigative unit of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Ukraine service reported that satellite imagery shows Russia transferred twenty helicopters to the Berdyansk airfield after the launch of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the direction of Zaporizhzhia. Currently, there are at least twenty-seven Russian military helicopters at the occupied airfield, as well as five Ka-52 units, nine Mi-8 or Mi-24 units, and thirteen Ka-29 units. According to the report, these aircraft are designed to support Russian ground forces with the operational transfer of troops or equipment closer to the battlefield, in addition to possible evacuation operations.

According to Mykola Kolesnyk, a Ukrainian paramilitary leader, a Russian ammunition depot was hit in occupied Staromlynivka by the aerial reconnaissance unit of the 129th Territorial Defense Forces Brigade and the artillery unit of the 55th Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Footage from the 53rd Brigade of Ukraine’s Armed Forces shows strikes against Russian equipment, warehouses, and bases.

Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced a new military assistance package for Ukraine, which will include additional munitions for national advanced surface-to-air missile systems (NASAMS), Stinger anti-aircraft systems, missiles for high mobility artillery rocket systems (HIMARS), 155mm and 105mm artillery shells, fifteen Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, ten Stryker armored personnel carriers, Javelin anti-armor systems, and more than 22 million rounds of small arms ammunitions and grenades, in addition to demining and communications systems. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom announced a new $116 million aid package for Ukraine, which will include a radar system to track Russian missiles, artillery, and ammunition.

Lastly, Danish military instructors will train Ukrainian crews on German Leopard 1A5 tanks, according to a Danish media. Denmark is scheduled to send Ukraine eighty restored Leopard 1A5DK tanks this month. The machines were bought by the private German company FFG after they were withdrawn from the Danish army in 2005. Denmark and Germany allocated $3.2 million to repair and modernize the tanks. In early February, the German company Krauss-Maffei Wegmann began preparing the tanks for delivery to Ukraine.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Putin confirms Russian conscripts are protecting Belgorod Oblast against raids

In a June 13 address, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke about the situation in Russian regions bordering Ukraine. Since May 22, Belgorod Oblast has been the target of two incursions allegedly led by the Russian Volunteer Corps, an anti-Putin military unit made of Russian pro-Ukrainian partisans. In a meeting with Russian military bloggers and war correspondents, Putin reportedly said, “If this continues, then we will need to examine the question—and I say this carefully—of creating on Ukraine’s territory a sanitary zone at such a distance from where it could be impossible to reach our territory.” While this appears to be the first time the term “sanitary zone” has been used in reference to the war in Ukraine, the Russian president is likely referring to the creation of a demilitarized buffer zone in Ukraine.

In sharing an anecdote about a battalion commander in Belgorod Oblast, Putin confirmed Russian conscripts had been deployed to the region. When asked how many mobilized soldiers and conscripts were under his command, the commander reportedly replied, “They’re all conscripts,” adding, “None of them shivered!”

Russia’s spring conscription kicked off on March 30, 2023, with future recruits called to undergo military preparation. Although Putin declared in March 2022 that no conscript would fight in the war, suspicions were raised following the reported death of three conscripts after a June 1 attack against Belgorod. The three soldiers served in the 43rd Railway Brigade. In a VKontakte post, a Russian official said the conscripted soldiers had been relocated from the Sverdlovsk region to Belgorod. According to pro-Russian media outlet Lenta, Russian MP Leonid Slutsky reportedly proposed a legal mechanism so that “conscripts, fighting the enemy in the Belgorod Oblast, could be recognized as participants of combat operations and receive all the payments due under the law.”

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Narrative targeting Ukraine’s counteroffensive fails to gain traction on Twitter

A small number of influential Twitter accounts are spreading a narrative that frames the Ukrainian counteroffensive as unsuccessful. The DFRLab conducted a query using the social media analysis platform Meltwater Explore to identify tweets that mention the Ukrainian counteroffensive. It returned 352,000 results from 118,000 users, which averages almost three tweets per user. The results indicate organic traffic.

Chart comparing the sentiment of tweets about Ukraine’s counter-offense, determined by number of tweets, average number of retweets, and total retweets of top 100 most retweeted posts. (Source: @nikaaleksejeva/DFRLab via Meltwater Explore)

Three of the five most-retweeted tweets claimed the counteroffensive was unsuccessful. All three tweets came from @KimDotcom, a controversial hacker, entrepreneur, and activist currently based in New Zealand. In his tweets, he suggested that sanctions against Russia do not work, implied that Ukrainian soldiers are suffering enormous casualties, and amplified a tweet from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs allegedly showing destroyed Western military vehicles. The second most-active account declaring the counteroffensive a failure was the anonymous account @WarMonitors, which shared allegedly destroyed Western military equipment and praised Russian equipment.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

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Why Ukrainian NATO membership would actually be good for Russia

Leonid Gozman — Wed, 14 Jun 2023 07:42:05 +0000

Vladimir Putin claims one of the main goals of his Ukraine invasion is to prevent the country joining NATO. This objective may at first glance appear broadly reasonable, but on closer inspection, it actually goes directly against Russia’s own national interests.

The idea that Ukrainian NATO membership would pose a security threat to Russia ranks among Putin’s most enduring myths. In reality, however, no NATO member has ever threatened to attack Russia. On the contrary, Russia’s shared borders with NATO have always been strikingly calm and secure. Notably, this was also the case throughout the Soviet era and stands in contrast to some other Russian borders. If Ukraine joins NATO, it would significantly increase Russia’s own border security.

The interests of the Russian people are best served by a sustainable and lasting peace rather than wars of conquest. Ukraine’s NATO accession would strengthen the alliance and improve its ability to resist Russian aggression. This would greatly reduce the risk of a new war in Ukraine, as not even Putin is ready to enter into an open war with NATO. Instead, the Russian population would be much likelier to live peaceful lives.

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Crucially, Ukrainian NATO membership would mean an end to dreams of restoring the Russian Empire. This would be good news for all Russians, who have no need of an empire. In today’s world, imperial ambitions bring crushing economic and moral burdens that hamper the development of a country and lead to stagnation.

It is also inaccurate to assume, as many currently do, that a majority of Russians share the same imperial aspirations promoted by Putin himself. In fact, during the years of the Soviet collapse, there were literally zero rallies calling on Moscow to prevent the various Soviet republics from securing independence, despite the fact that protests were possible at that time. Indeed, following the tragic events of January 1991 in Vilnius, when Soviet troops killed 13 Lithuanians, around a million people attended a massive rally in central Moscow demanding recognition of Lithuanian independence. These people took to the streets not in defense of empire but in support of freedom.

Back then, nobody saw the fall of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” as Putin would later state. According to polling data, the Russian public only began showing signs of “imperial nostalgia” some 15 years later in the mid-2000s. This change in mood was due to official propaganda rather than any deep-seated notions of imperial identity.

Far from marking a regrettable retreat from empire, the collapse of the Soviet Union was an undeniably positive development for Russia. Similarly, the current revival of imperialism in Russia poses an existential threat to the country’s future. Ukrainian NATO membership would be a big step toward abandoning the idea of empire entirely, and that would be a positive development for all Russians.

It is clearly in Russia’s interests to have stable, predictable, and non-aggressive neighbors. NATO member states represent exactly this kind of neighbor. If Ukraine joins the alliance, this would go a long way to allaying fears within Russia over possible future Ukrainian revenge after the current war ends.

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Ukrainian accession to NATO would help raise living standards in the country by obliging the Ukrainian authorities to implement vital reforms. This would be particularly good news for Russia. Like any other country, Russia has an interest in the prosperity of neighboring states and stands to benefit from improved trade and other economic ties if Ukraine achieves a higher standard of living.

Joining NATO would also strengthen Ukraine’s democratic institutions. This would help demonstrate to the Russian public that democracy can thrive in the post-Soviet space. Russians are just as interested in personal freedoms and democratic values as anyone else, but they are bombarded with propaganda from the Kremlin convincing them that freedom and democracy are only possible in the West and will never take root inside Russia.

The Putin regime supports this incompatibility argument by pointing to various aspects of Russian society that allegedly make the country unsuitable for democracy, such as Russia’s dominant Slavic Orthodox culture. However, as a fellow predominantly Slavic Orthodox nation that many Russians view as extremely similar to their own country, Ukraine can debunk such arguments. Indeed, this is a key reason why the Kremlin views Ukrainian democracy as such a threat.

Unless Ukraine joins NATO, even the complete liberation of the country will not bring sustainable peace. Putin will not accept defeat and will inevitably attack again. This is exactly what Hitler would have done if the allies had not destroyed his criminal regime along with his war machine. Just as lasting peace was only possible after World War II due to the removal of the Nazi system, future peace in Eastern Europe will depend on the end of the Putin regime. This is clearly in the interests of the Russian people, and will be much more likely if Ukraine joins NATO. Membership of the alliance would provide Ukraine with long-term security, but the benefits to Russia itself would be no less profound.

Leonid Gozman is a Russian politician and commentator.

Even in regions of Ukraine where the Russian language remained dominant in everyday life following the Soviet collapse, and where cultural connections to post-Soviet Russia appeared strongest, there has also been significant exposure to Ukrainian culture, language, and national identity since the 1990s. For many years, everything from TV advertising to movies have been broadcast in Ukrainian, while education has predominantly been in Ukrainian as the official state language. An entire generation of Russian-speaking Ukrainians grew up and reached adulthood with an awareness of their Ukrainian identity prior to the initial Russian invasion of 2014.

Policymakers in the Kremlin appear to have bet that historic ties to Russia would trump any emerging sense of Ukrainian identity. This confidence was no doubt reinforced by Russia’s prominence in Ukrainian popular culture, with Russian pop singers, film stars, comedians, and literary figures all enjoying widespread popularity. However, the rapid decline since 2014 of Russian cultural influence in parts of Ukraine not subject to direct Kremlin control has illustrated the fragility of Russia’s informal empire.

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Since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, Ukraine has consistently stated that it will settle for nothing less than the liberation of the entire country within the international borders recognized in 1991. This is a massive military undertaking that will involve defeating a Russian invasion force numbering in excess of 300,000 soldiers. Beyond that, Ukraine must also reintegrate perhaps five million people who have spent an extended period living under Russian occupation.

While millions of Ukrainians fled Russia’s initial invasion in 2014 and the subsequent full-scale invasion of 2022, many more remained behind. They have been fed a diet of Kremlin propaganda portraying Ukraine as both a Nazi state and a puppet of the West. Russia has focused particular attention on indoctrinating young Ukrainians to convince them that their future lies with Moscow.

Despite these challenges, there is reason to believe that Russia’s efforts will ultimately fail. Ukrainians as a whole have been subjected to many decades of russification but have demonstrated in recent years that they are not convinced by the Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian messaging. Indeed, the past nine years of Russian aggression have sparked a sharp rise in Ukrainian patriotism across the country, particularly in regions previously regarded as being highly russified. The shared sense of Ukrainian identity forged since 1991 has proven far stronger than the Kremlin had anticipated, while Russian aggression has had a powerful unifying impact on Ukrainian society.

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Crucially, none of the Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine has been fully cut off from the rest of Ukraine since 2014. Until the launch of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, regular interaction across the front lines in Crimea and eastern Ukraine was the norm. Even the intensification of hostilities over the past 16 months has not led to a complete breakdown in communication.

Victims of Russian aggression will have a key role to play in the reintegration process. In every region liberated from Russian occupation, Ukrainian officials have uncovered evidence of widespread war crimes including summary executions, torture, sexual violence, abductions, and mass deportations. It is vital that survivors share their experiences with their wider communities to underline the horrors of the Russian occupation. Local residents will be seen as far more credible than government officials.

It will also be important to communicate in Russian as well as Ukrainian. While growing numbers of Ukrainians are embracing the Ukrainian language, many communities in southern and eastern Ukraine remain predominantly Russian-speaking and have been cut off from the Ukrainian language by Russia’s invasion. They will likely be far more receptive to Russian-language messaging, especially during the initial period following de-occupation, regardless of their personal attitudes toward issues of national identity.

It goes without saying that Ukraine’s top priority is to win the war. At the same time, military victories will prove hollow if the Kyiv authorities are unable to successfully reintegrate millions of Ukrainian citizens who have spent extended periods living under Russian occupation. In order to win hearts and minds, it is vital to underline to liberated communities that they are coming home to a nation that values and embraces them.

Lesia Dubenko is a Ukrainian analyst and journalist. Her articles have appeared in the Financial Times, Politico Europe, New Eastern Europe, and the Atlantic Council.

There are additional concerns over a potential nuclear disaster as the reservoir behind the collapsed dam supplies the cooling water for the nearby Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest in Europe. Floodwaters are also thought to have dislodged significant numbers of mines, creating further potential for civilian casualties.

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While the Kremlin has denied blowing up the dam and has instead accused Ukraine, initial analysis strongly suggests Russian responsibility. A New York Times article citing engineering and munitions experts concluded that a “deliberate explosion” inside the Russian-controlled dam “most likely caused it to collapse.” Only Russian forces could have carried out such an explosion.

Many have also questioned the credibility of Moscow’s counterclaims suggesting the dam was destroyed by Ukrainian missile or artillery fire. Independent experts have confirmed that the Cold War era dam, which was built to withstand a nuclear attack, would be extremely difficult to destroy via external bombardment, according to The Times.

Russia also has a clear military motive and a long record of attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. At the time of the dam collapse, Russian forces were preparing to face a long anticipated Ukrainian summer counteroffensive. The widespread flooding produced by the disaster effectively ruled out the possibility of Ukrainian troops attempting a river crossing along an entire section of the 1000-kilometer front. Meanwhile, Russia spent much of the winter and spring seasons conducting a methodical nationwide bombing campaign designed to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and freeze the country into submission. While the destruction of a major dam would mark an escalation in this campaign, it would clearly not be unprecedented.

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Despite the likelihood that Russia is responsible for the dam collapse, in legal terms it is still too early to hold anyone directly accountable. First, there would need to be incontrovertible proof that this was actually an attack rather than some kind of horrible accident, miscommunication, or mistake made amid the “fog of war.” Then, the issue of attribution would have to be dealt with. This means that Russia’s responsibility for the attack would need to proven beyond doubt.

If it can be established that Russia intentionally carried out an attack on the dam, there are many potential pathways to justice. For example, Ukraine could pursue accountability through its own domestic courts; international actors could establish a regional tribunal; the International Criminal Court could investigate and potentially indict a responsible individual; or countries could choose to exercise universal jurisdiction in order to prosecute Russia for its actions.

Unfortunately, there are many obstacles to overcome in pursuing accountability through these mechanisms. History has shown that the wheels of justice are excruciatingly slow in international war crimes cases. Prosecutors and Ukrainians alike would have to show extraordinary patience in waiting for these approaches to pay dividends. It would also be difficult to prove who ordered the attack and get that person in the dock, barring unlikely regime change within Russia itself. These are neither fair nor easy circumstances for Ukrainians to accept in the face of such trauma.

Furthermore, there are still huge information gaps. There would need to be a committed fact-finding effort, starting in the immediate present, to fill these gaps for a case that might not be prosecuted for many years or even decades. Ukrainians have shown an unprecedented ability to document abuses in real time throughout the current war. The onus would be on them to identify the individual Russian units and commanders responsible for blowing up the dam.

The challenges are even greater if Ukraine or the international community wants to pursue specific accountability for ecocide. Although there has been a lot of momentum in this direction, ecocide is not yet codified as a crime under international law (although it is under Ukrainian law). Even if this were to be accomplished in the near future and ecocide came to fall under the Rome Statute that established the ICC, there would still be enough ambiguity and lack of legal precedent to potentially deter prosecutors from pursuing the charge of ecocide in the Kakhovka dam case. There would also need to be an extensive investigation, which would not be easy given bureaucratic and financial barriers along with the fact that many affected areas remain under Russian control or are heavily mined.

In light of these obstacles, what can be done in the short-term to help hold Russia accountable for the destruction of the Kakhovka dam and its devastating consequences? First, the international community needs to broaden its view of what might constitute justice beyond the courtroom. This means listening to and supporting local civil society in Ukraine. It also means investing in Ukraine not only in the short-term, but in sustainable ways that bolster the country’s longer-term recovery and reconstruction, quite possibly by using frozen Russian assets to finance it. This requires helping the Ukrainian authorities combat corruption and build the capacity of the country’s own judicial system to pursue accountability.

In the pursuit of justice for Ukraine, the most meaningful steps are those that ensure Russia’s decisive defeat. Accountability will be much more difficult to achieve if the conflict becomes protracted or frozen. In such circumstances, it is highly unlikely that anyone will ever face prosecution over the destruction of Kakhovka dam. Ultimately, the only way to achieve a just and durable peace is through Ukrainian victory.

Danielle Johnson holds a PhD in Politics from Oxford University and is currently a Senior Ukraine Analyst at ACAPS.

Kakhovka dam collapse threatens Europe’s largest nuclear plant

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti — Thu, 08 Jun 2023 20:06:08 +0000

The blowing up of the Kakhovka dam in Russian-occupied southern Ukraine in the early hours of June 6 has produced a range of catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences. The resultant draining of the Kakhovka reservoir also creates significant risks for the nearby Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. The plant, which is the largest in Europe, is not believed to be in any immediate danger, but rapidly dropping water levels in the reservoir will make it difficult to access the water necessary to cool the plant’s six reactors.

Nuclear power plants work by splitting atoms to create tremendous heat, which turns turbines to generate electricity. The heat created is so extreme that advanced cooling systems are required to keep temperature levels under control and prevent a meltdown. The Fukushima disaster was the result of a cooling system failure when a tsunami caused by a major earthquake disabled the Japanese nuclear power plant’s cooling system and three reactors melted down from their own heat. By contrast, the 1986 Chornobyl disaster in Soviet Ukraine was due to human error that caused the graphite reactor cores to burn.

The Zaporizhzhia plant features VVER-1000 pressurized light water reactors. This means that a Chornobyl-style meltdown is not possible as there is no graphite to burn, but the risk of a cooling system failure is a grave concern. The plant has been carefully monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since it was first captured by Russian troops in March 2022 during the early weeks of the full-scale Russian invasion.

Since then, Russia has repeatedly struck the transmission lines that power the plant’s cooling systems, necessitating the use of back-up generators to keep the cooling system operational. Despite regular alarms over the close proximity of combat operations and the deployment of Russian troops at the plant, the risk of a nuclear disaster has been seen as present but never pressing due to numerous residual safety features. For example, the plant can run on its own power for short periods of time if power grid access and generators simultaneously fail. So far, this hasn’t happened.

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The Kakhovka dam collapse has now increased the risk of disaster. In addition to electricity, the plant needs large quantities of water to run its cooling system. The plant was built in the 1980s, decades after the Kakhovka dam was constructed, and features a design that relies on reservoir water for its cooling system. And although the plant’s six reactors have been turned off for more than eight months to reduce the likelihood of wartime nuclear accidents, it will still be a decade before the reactor fuel rods are cool enough to be moved into dry storage.

Water levels in the reservoir have plummeted since the blast on Tuesday morning. At this stage, nobody can say with any certainty how far the water levels will eventually drop before leveling out. The IAEA commented on June 7 that if water levels fall below 12.7 meters, the lowest level at which water can be pumped upstream to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, there are alternative options that can be used to source cooling system water. One day later, this point was reportedly reached. With the Kakhovka dam beyond repair and no clear way to stop it hemorrhaging water from the reservoir, it seems likely that external water sources will be necessary.

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At present, IAEA officials say there is “no immediate risk” to the plant, while officials from Ukraine’s nuclear operator Energoatom have stated that water supplies stored close to the facility are sufficient for the next few months. However, others have noted that summer heat could speed evaporation and exhaust existing reserves far sooner.

The destruction of Kakhovka dam is widely viewed as the latest and most reckless in a series of attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure carried out by Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began almost sixteen months ago. While Moscow has officially denied destroying the dam, initial analysis points to Russian responsibility. A New York Times article citing engineering and munitions experts concluded that a “deliberate explosion” inside the Russian-controlled dam “most likely caused its collapse.” Meanwhile, independent experts have confirmed that the Cold War era dam, which was built to withstand a nuclear attack, would be extremely difficult to destroy via external bombardment, according to The Times.

In addition to the heightened risk to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the destruction of the dam has also unleashed an ecological disaster throughout the region. Tens of thousands of local residents whose homes have been flooded are in urgent need of care and shelter. Significant quantities of oil and chemicals have poured into the Dnipro River and must be contained, along with munitions. These are the most immediate challenges facing the Ukrainian authorities.

The risks posed to Europe’s largest nuclear power plant by the loss of access to reservoir water must also be addressed without delay before the situation becomes critical. Beyond this pressing logistical issue, the blowing up of the Kakhovka dam is also fueling speculation over whether Russia may be prepared to adopt similarly drastic measures at the Zaporizhzhia plant itself. With this in mind, the international community must send a clear message to Moscow that it will be held accountable for any further attempts to intimidate the world with the threat of nuclear disaster.

Suriya Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

The European Commission’s Rita Wezenbeek on what comes next in implementing the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act

Atlantic Council — Thu, 08 Jun 2023 19:19:36 +0000

Activists and experts assemble in Costa Rica to protect human rights in the digital age

By Digital Forensic Research Lab

Our Digital Forensic Research Lab is convening top tech thinkers and human-rights defenders at RightsCon to collaborate on an agenda for advancing rights globally.

Cybersecurity Disinformation

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speaker

Rita Wezenbeek
Director, Platforms, DG CNECT, European Commission

RITA WEZENBEEK: My name is Rita Wezenbeek, and I am the director in charge of the implementation of the new legislation in the European Union concerning tech platforms, so this is the Digital Services Act—the DSA—and the Digital Markets Act—the DMA.

So the Digital Services Act addresses a wide range of potential societal harms on online platforms, ranging from the sale of illegal goods to disinformation, from child pornography to terrorists’ online content.

Providers of online platforms will be subject to democratically adopted rules, which set a comprehensive accountability and transparency framework. The first obligations on this Digital Services Act already started to apply in February this year and on [April 25], the commission designated seventeen very large online platforms and two very large online search engines that reach at least forty-five million active users on a monthly basis in the European Union, which is an equivalent to more than 10 percent of the EU’s population. These [very large online platforms and search engines] fall under the direct supervision of the European Commission.

The effects of these rules will be felt soon. Designated [very large online platforms and search engines] will have to provide the EU with risk assessments at the end of August and the beginning of September. In addition to that, under the Digital Markets Act, which is much more an act on market contestability, the designations under this act will follow the latest by the beginning of September.

For both sets of regulation, the commission will become the regulator for the large platforms and search engines. The commission will supervise under the DSA that the online platforms put into place systems to tackle illegal content and disinformation that uphold users’ rights and also protect users’ health and well-being and in order to do so the commission is equipped with wide-ranging investigatory and supervising powers, including the power to impose sanctions and remedies.

That being said, making the implementation of the DSA work in practice is something that the commission is not going to do alone. Many actors will contribute to the success of this regulation and we would, of course, stand ready to share our first regulatory experiences. We have to act decisively to safeguard the universal principles and we do it in a way that does not exclude adopting a global approach to platform regulation. So our platform rules optimize fundamental rights protections by giving agency back to society, which leads to an informed and effective choice for safety and contestability.

Now, also other rules are relevant in this context. For instance, the UNESCO draft guidelines for platform regulation reflect a similar architecture. And it involves proportionate, risk-based, all-of-society approaches. Under such a global approach, it is important to exchange on standards for key building blocks of human rights-based platform regulation through risk assessments for systemic platforms, also through auditing cycles, and through data access for researchers.

This means that in the EU, we need input from stakeholders around the world to make the most of this opportunity. We need to set out, for instance, how platforms should conduct such a risk assessment. Also, how they can give access to data to researchers in a secure and privacy-preserving manner. And also how third-party auditors should be involved. If we achieve a degree of consistency in implementing these systems globally, we will mutually be more resilient.

We need auditors that are truly independent of online platforms and that have sufficient expertise to have full awareness of civil society’s understanding of the systemic risks and their drivers. In addition to these procedural questions, we need a global debate about what are our priority research questions regarding systemic risks that are caused by online platforms. We can already link our global academic teams to investigate different priority risks. And we can set coherent standards for vetting these researchers, so that they are both independent and able to secure funding. We also need to identify proportionate and effective risk mitigation measures.

Now, you can make your voice heard. State of the art research, as well as technology, will shape our collective responses. Both directly, for instance, in implementing moves, and indirectly, for instance, because auditors look at your evidence. We’re currently seeking feedback on a number of rules. First on how to organize data access for researchers in a user-friendly, yet safe, manner. A short consultation has already ended on the [May 31], but there will be a new consultation on a draft-delegated act that will probably be at the beginning of 2024. We’re also consulting on a draft delegated act of independent audits. And that delegated act, the consultation, will expire on [June 2].

And finally, there will be a big, multistakeholder event in Brussels on [June 22], when many issues addressed by the Digital Services Act will be discussed. You’re welcome to join online, and you can follow the information on this event on our website. Then lastly, our European Center for Algorithmic Transparency is setting up a global network of researchers. And also there, you are welcome to express your interest. Now, other need for guidance may follow as the necessity arises.

On the Digital Markets Act, the legislation concerning contestability of markets, we already had four workshops involving competitors, consumers, and regulators. And more will follow in the future. And these are crucial meeting points where all specialist actors can publicly discuss and challenge the gatekeepers’ proposed remedies with respect to how to address compliance, including regarding technical methods such as end-to-end encryption and interoperability obligations.

These workshops reflect that both the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act make platforms actually regulated entities, similar to systemic banks under the supervision of the European Central Bank. Compliance with these rules has to occur on an ongoing basis. And it will be adapted. In a way, relative to today, the tables will be turned. Platforms have to proactively propose mitigation measures and remedies that need to be proven to work in practice. This proof of concept should come from a broader stakeholder community. So you need to be involved on an ongoing basis too.

Let my key message to you today, therefore, be that your involvement is not a one-off request, such as today. We will need to collectively drive solutions that represent the state of the art in optimizing the protection of all fundamental rights online.

And this also goes to the question of how do we define success under the new legislation. Success will be a consistent implementation of the rules on the one hand and their use by society on the other hand.

So let me end by saying that I hope I can rely on your support and participation. Thank you very much.

The post The European Commission’s Rita Wezenbeek on what comes next in implementing the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Mapping the last decade of Russia’s disinformation and influence campaign in Ukraine

Atlantic Council — Thu, 08 Jun 2023 15:43:53 +0000

Activists and experts assemble in Costa Rica to protect human rights in the digital age

By Digital Forensic Research Lab

Our Digital Forensic Research Lab is convening top tech thinkers and human-rights defenders at RightsCon to collaborate on an agenda for advancing rights globally.

Cybersecurity Disinformation

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speakers

Andy Carvin
Senior Resident Fellow, Managing Director, DFRLab, Atlantic Council

Ksenia Iliuk
Co-founder, LetsData

Roman Osadchuk
Research Associate, DFRLab, Atlantic Council

ANDY CARVIN: I’m really excited to have all of you here today. Sorry if there was a bit of an echo there for a moment. Today I’m honored to have Ksenia Iliuk joining us. She is co-founder of LetsData, a Ukrainian research company that uses AI to detect and monitor influence operations. Previously, she was head of Detector Media. We’re also joined today by one of my colleagues from the DFRLab, Roman Osadchuk, a research associate who focuses on Ukraine.

So today we’re getting together to discuss the case study of Russian disinformation and influence operations in Ukraine. We’re now about fifteen or sixteen months since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, but of course it goes back much further than that with Russia annexing Crimea and invading eastern Ukraine 2014. And in the years in between 2014 and the reinvasion last year, we saw countless instances of Russian media, Russian influencers, Kremlin politicians, painting Ukraine as aggressors, painting them as Nazis, presenting Ukraine as a country that needs to be stopped.

And in the months leading up to February of last year, despite the fact that there was an enormous amount of mounting evidence that Russia was moving troops and armaments into place to conduct an invasion, Russia continued to amplify these narratives. And basically, trying to justify a war of aggression, while at the same time denying any responsibility of what was about to happen. After the invasion, of course, Russian information operations have continued in a variety of forms, not only targeting Ukraine but targeting Russian citizens to secure and maintain support for the war domestically. Information operations targeting countries and regions all over the world to undermine support for Ukraine and undermine Ukraine’s morale.

And to some extent, Russia has had successes, but they’ve also had a lot of duds. They’ve also had a number of instances where these campaigns clearly have not worked. And so today we’re going to take a look at Russia’s efforts to undermine Ukraine since the invasion started, but also before that as well. And I’d love to start by giving the floor to Ksenia to talk a bit about her work and some of her findings.

Ksenia, the floor is yours.

KSENIA ILIUK: Thank you so much for having me today. So we’ll start by saying within all of these years of analyzing malign information campaigns, and with the start of post their invasion, what became very clear for me as an analyst in this field, as well as Ukrainian myself, and fellow Ukrainians, that malign information campaigns is not something, you know, far away from us. It’s not just about politics. This is something that can literally kill. This very, very tough realization, it actually went upon a lot of Ukrainians. And as of now, according to different studies conducted by Detector Media and other Ukrainian nongovernmental organizations, over 80 percent of Ukrainians consider disinformation as a threat. And that is all because people saw how these threats can be facilitated in their everyday lives.

We see that—how through all of these years, before the first invasion and then the annexation in Crimea, then the full-scale invasion, all of this year Russia has been using its information influence activities to reach any kind of geopolitical and military goals. And so, you know, it’s hard to kind of admit, but all of this—all of the years of the analysis, they showed that Russia has been preparing from the information perspective different audiences in different countries to the full-scale invasion.

And I would focus a bit more on actually the start of the full-scale invasion and the time since the start and how Russia has been targeting with this—with their malign influence different countries worldwide. And I will start by saying that here we have data. We’ve been analyzing information space around Ukraine in forty countries from Brazil to Japan, and we have noticed some quite interesting things that helps us to better understand how malign information influence operates, what are their strong sides and what are their weak sides and how we can resist as democratic countries and build a way to resist actually that is based on democratic principles.

So the first thing that we saw quite visually is that the farther geographically the countries are from Ukraine, the more intense there was Russian malign information campaigns, meaning that with the first wave of Russian malign information campaigns with the start of the full-scale invasion Russia has been specifically in Europe, US, Canada, and partly Australia.

So we’ve seen different polls showing that the support for Ukraine in terms of wider audience population of the countries is quite high. So what we’ve seen is that—and also on the other side most of the things that were done in terms of the regulations like banning [Russia Today] and different social media platforms’ regulations they were mostly done with a focus on Europe—Europe, North America. That is why we see Russia acting across the world differently.

So what they are doing there they are continuing developing their information infrastructure that has remained actually untouched since the start of the full-scale invasion. So, for example, what we reported is that about 20 percent of media publications concerning Ukraine were using as a primary source of information Russian state-affiliated media, the exact same media that were publishing the articles with open genocidal rhetoric with open calls to basically slaughter Ukrainians and doing justification for that.

So we have this part, so we see the information infrastructure. And unfortunately, in that regard Russia remains quite strong, especially the more to the Global South we go where RT is functioning as if nothing happened, continuing pushing its open lies because it’s not—no longer even, you know, the subtle malign influence where they just manipulate a bit with the context. Still until today most of the content of RT is just—outrageously just portraying the reality in a completely different way.

And here when we look into details, we have on one side this is how Russia uses its information infrastructure and making it to the discourse—to the discourse of the media, and on the other side we have social media. And what we see here in terms of topics and how Russian malign influence is using it is that they actually go very hyperlocal.

What they are good at is in actually exploiting the historical background of the countries—basically, the pains of different countries—and attacking it. So, for example, in most parts of South America, Russia is exploiting the anti-US sentiment. So they build numerous conspiracy theories to kind of create this image that the war—the Russian war against Ukraine is allegedly started by the US.

And it’s very interesting because they tailor different messaging to different audiences within the countries. They claim that, for instance—for one audience, they would claim that, oh, US wants to dominate the world again, and with their hands on Ukraine they want to destroy Russia. Well, the other audience they would push that the US elites are just profiting from the war allegedly and that’s kind of the main reason for the war. So they would start, like, constantly, constantly bringing these various conspiracies that are based on this general anti-US sentiment that is, in reality, quite present and widespread in this region.

The other thing quite interesting was from—as well, from most countries in Latin America, particularly in Argentina and Brazil that we noted, that Russia is heavily pushing the topic of corruption. Because, again, the topic of corruption is something that the people in these countries know, they’ve faced. They consider it, as well, as a big threat on their way to prosperity and developing. So what they are doing is that they are trying to make any case of small, minor corruption, invent different cases of corruption, and promote them for this audience. But what they are doing is that the way they distort the reality, they will take one case and they will try to pin it to the very big conspiracy blaming like, oh, you see, here is the level of corruption of Ukraine; that means that Ukraine is a failed state, it cannot exist… They are leading it to the way, so it cannot exist, so why should they fight? They better—they better just give up. They better, like, go to Russia; they are not a country anyway. And these are kind of different, different speculations that are being pushed over there.

However, here, on the other side, this is also rather a positive thing from the perspective that when there are monitorings and media in Brazil, for instance, all of the analytical materials, different pieces about how Ukraine is actually fighting corruption, how Ukraine is fighting corruption in the middle of, of course, an invasion, where very much they got lots of traction in these countries. So thus we see how—you know, how you could shape this, how you could frame it. And unfortunately, Russian malign actors are framing it in a—with a very bad, ill intent to distort the reality and bring these, you know, very simplified conclusions to what should be done about Ukraine.

So, overall, we will—we will talk more about, like, what are the tools how we could resist it. But I would say that what we see so far, especially in the Global South, is that Russian information infrastructure remained untouched. Moreover, they are spreading it and they are developing it even [farther]. We see some very, very concerning developments in terms of the usage of Telegram, the anonymous Telegram channels and how they were—are being replicated in different countries with different models by malign actors. And we see in terms of the content this great orientation on the lack of context, which means combining these two things makes it very, very dangerous for different audiences out there.

Thank you.

ANDY CARVIN: Thanks. Thanks, Ksenia. I really appreciate it.

Roman, let’s turn it over to you now.

ROMAN OSADCHUK: Thank you, Andy. It’s a great pleasure to be here with all of you today.

So I will stomp on a few things that we, the DFRLab, did in—also a long time ago. So we presented two big reports that look at the whole year after the invasion. So one of the reports were called “Narrative Warfare.” Sorry. So it was investigating the rhetoric in pro-Kremlin media in three months after the initial invasion. So what we found there, they were, like, amplifying the messages of the officials, Russian officials; amplifying some negative rhetoric… kind of bringing up this, like, negative intent and perception of Ukrainians, as well. They also amplified multiple false-flag operations, because Russia were, like, in desperate search of casus belli. They didn’t find any, but they tried a lot. So, like, different operations, different disinformation campaigns trying to portray Ukraine as an aggressor when, in reality, we all, as of now, know that Russia is the main aggressor who actually started the invasion and actually annexed Crimea, and were in eastern Ukraine 2014.

So what we found was that there was no actual evidence that there was some, per se, coordination, right? When the media published some messages citing some specific official, it doesn’t mean that they, like, coordinated on that. It’s just because they’re amplifying their officials. But because they were using more escalatory rhetoric, that’s why it became more evident that there is something, truly.

And what is even more interesting is that many of those disinformation narratives that started while back in 2014, get amplified during the winter of 2021, 2022. Many of them ended up being in Putin’s speech. So basically all of those things that media actually vocalized and amplified for their audiences in Russia, they ended up being in those speeches. And the whole world’s seen them. And this is really interesting, that those things were the basis of the speech itself.

The second report is Undermining Ukraine, a slightly different one, because it looked at the different tactics that Kremlin and pro-Kremlin actors did all over the world, so including Russia, Ukraine, Europe, South America, Africa, and et cetera. So what we found is that, first of all, Russians did not abandon their previous old tactics and toolkit. For instance, overinflation of information space, the same thing that they did during the March 2017 Skripal poisoning, they continue doing it now, right? When there is some evidence of war crimes by Russians, they will try to come up with so many explanations of what’s happening that could you possibly imagine, so that people who are not closely following they would see that the truth is contested. So that’s why they will not be actually making final decision or, like, understanding what’s going on. So that’s the main thing that Russia aims for.

The second thing, usage of conspiracies, right? So these different conspiracy leading that. Actually, gaining tractions in some parts of the world in some conspiracy-leaning audiences, like that some parts of the war were, like, filmed in some film studio, which is—actually, it’s not true, but those things gaining traction. They’re being amplified, and they’re being equally consumed by some audiences.

Now, on atrocities. I kind of already said that, but it’s a clear pattern that Russia is trying to avoid any responsibility and deny us basically anything that their troops done on Ukrainian soil, ranging from bombing the maternity hospitals, mass killings, killings of civilians, and this list goes on and on, unfortunately. But what are they trying to do? They always try to avoid this by shifting the attention to either something else or trying to shift the blame to Ukrainians.

Also, another thing is the usage, as Ksenia said, right? So RT and Sputnik might not be that active in Europe, but they are still pretty active in other parts of the world. And they’re still working there. They still have their audiences. Moreover, in some places what we’ve found is that even if the Sputnik is—or, RT are banned, some actors and some smaller channels are actually reappearing and rebroadcasting what those channels are trying to promote and show their audiences.

But also, there are some new tricks, right? So the false fact-checking, the notorious war on facts that actually uses fact-checker toolbox to falsify truth, to promote propaganda, and many things like that, is actually broadcasting—or, not broadcasting—but it’s a website in multiple languages. So and they are being shared quite a lot by Russian embassies, for instance, and Russian ministry of defense.

Another thing is what they are doing is that sometimes they are inventing some things. Put this, as it is, information campaign that Ukrainians launched and marketed, but in reality it didn’t exist. Also, they’ve hacked media websites to get credibility. So Ukrainian media websites were hacked, with at least one evidence when they planted a story, archived it, and then used it as evidence that, look, Ukrainians also have the same conclusions that we did. But in reality, those story were not published by Ukrainians. They were because their website was breached.

Another thing is multistep approach. So there are narratives being told for months, some of them even for years, in order to be used again and again and be sharper, put in the more solid basis to them, so that they are becoming more serious in the view of a person who sees them for the first time or for the second time. Another thing—so, and this build up on the previous messages—creates this illusion that this is well-developed topic, when in reality it isn’t and it’s based on the bogus claims. But when you see, like, fourteen different links to different stories, people might perceive that there might be something behind it. But in the final turn, they’re all—they’re all not that credible. But it’s hard to check it.

And the main idea here, the main topic that we found, the main success probably, is that they aim to reach mainstream media elsewhere, right? So not in Russia, but in other audiences. So to reach even more population in those targeted countries. Because they cannot reach everybody, but the mainstream media in our respected target countries could, and that’s one of their objectives. Another thing that we’ve seen is the identity they have of well-known Western media. So they steal the identity and visuals of BBC, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Al Jazeera, to promote their conspiracy stories and videos using the identities and visuals of those of West. In reality, those materials were not being prepared at all, forgeries.

Russians post everything from military plans to some dark web pictures supposedly that Ukraine is supposedly selling Western-donated weapons, when in reality it wasn’t the case… And as Ksenia said, right, they are using regional-specific approach. They are crafting their messages for specific audiences in specific countries. And, again, whataboutism, this is the widespread thing, right?

So they’re always trying to put the blame on somebody else and claiming we’re not the first one who’ve done that. So that’s why we should avoid any responsibility. And that’s their thing. They are trying to find some useful actors on the ground to be their kind of foot soldiers, in the meaning that they would start some narratives so that they could use it further. So they’re looking for some local actors who would actually spread the initial claim, or just amplify their messages for those specifically targeted audiences.

And it continues now. So what I wanted to say is that it doesn’t end with our reports. We’re continuing our work, as many other researchers. And there is many more different campaigns that are ongoing at the moment. So, as of now, they’re actively trying to undermine trust of Ukrainians towards military leadership and political leadership so that Ukrainians will stop actually supporting the government and being discouraged to fight and to resist.

Another thing is that they are trying to undermine support towards Ukraine. They’re launching ads on Facebook that surprisingly, with some caricatures and links to some websites that are actually copycats of the initial and real websites of those media, claiming that you should not help. I’ve seen it two days ago a threat on Israel. So there was, like, ads targeting Israel. And similar ads I’ve seen in Ukraine, targeting Ukrainians. So there is, like, definitely a pattern there.

They also amplified futility of Ukrainian resistance, claiming that you shouldn’t be doing that, any fights would be futile against Russian army, so you should give up. And again, coverage of the war crimes continues, unfortunately. Usually it’s been covered up, like, cui bono—so, who benefits from this? And for any horrible thing that ends up on media, they would create up to, like, twenty different stories claiming who would benefit from it. It’s not beneficial for Russians to commit atrocities in Bucha, or bomb maternity hospital. So probably it might be staged. When the reality actually is far different, and the reality actually—like, actually tells otherwise.

So there will be more campaign in the future, so we need to keep an eye because Russians are playing long game. So my main, I don’t know, idea is that we need to continue doing that, and we need to keep a closer look at what they will do in the nearest future as well.

Thank you.

ANDY CARVIN: Thank you, Roman.

So both of you discussed how Russia weaponizes information in different ways around the world. I’ve sometimes heard media pundits discuss the information war taking place between Russian and Ukraine, as if there’s a singular argument between the two countries and a single—and a singular group of narratives targeting each other. But it seems like what we’re really talking about are, like, theaters of operations around the world where different types of information warfare is taking place. So in Western Europe, you might see examples that are attempting to have people living in the EU or NATO member states to see it as economically detrimental to support Ukraine; while, as Ksenia mentioned, in South America anti-imperialism and America’s history in Latin America is often used to frame the debate; and we’ve seen the same thing in West Africa, as well, targeting French support for Ukraine.

So there really isn’t a single information war there. They’re really tailoring it globally. How do you combat that?

KSENIA ILIUK: That’s a million-dollar question, I would say.

So, first of all, I think the very important thing that is very much lacking from all of those different geographies that we analyzed is actually threat awareness, threat awareness and readiness to facilitate it. I mean, it sounds a bit, you know, like, oh, but we do acknowledge that Russia is doing malign information campaigns. No, the threat awareness—the true threat awareness should be among different decision-makers in the country, I mean from the state institutions to everyday citizens, to everyday life of everyday citizens, because the modern information space we each live in with the development of technologies and sampling requires everyone to be aware of those things, everyone to have the skillsets—different types of skillsets—to navigate through it.

And I think that’s kind of like, when we look at this, this is what’s lacking. Because, for example, when we look at the media, Roman mentioned that Russians are trying to go to mainstream media as much as possible. And how they are managing it? Usually because there is a very low threat awareness from the journalistic community, that think that RT is, oh, just a media outlet. I am even very cautious of using the word “media” when talking about RT, you know, because any analysis of any researches worldwide shows that it has nothing to do with journalism and media. But the threat awareness is so low that, like, people co-opt it. People consider it as a credible source. The RT is not banned. Russia is managing to have their manipulations around, like, oh, that’s a freedom of speech, we just want to express our opinions, and other things. This all comes from the lack of threat awareness and readiness to facilitate it.

So I think that should be, like, the very first building block of everything, because after that we go into details on many—on many tools. There are various tools of, actually, building this resilience to malign information campaigns, starting with developing different policies with advertisements—with advertisers that—to create some different regulation, self-regulation spaces because—Roman mentioned Facebook. There were also numerous cases when Russian-affiliated malign actors, they were just buying—you know the Google ads on different websites, just banners? They were just buying the banner spaces and just, like, putting all—the notorious lies just out there. So this is one of the tools that we have—educational tools. We have free banking and so many different tools out there. But none of the [tools] would work just within itself. We need to combine all these [tools]. But the very first step should be within acknowledging the threat, facilitating it, and starting different discussions on different levels—OK, what should we do about it.

ROMAN OSADCHUK: Yeah. I would maybe start from saying that information is actually the essence of life in a way that actually influences any decisions that we’re making and it’s definitely, like, information warfare. It’s not like one fight is going on. There’s, like, multitude of different things happening simultaneously and it’s incredibly hard to control all of the things simultaneously.

But as Ksenia said, indeed, there should be more done in a way that’s raising awareness that those things exist. Another thing, there should be more skills for journalists and actually wider audiences because media literacy becomes a needed skill. It’s, basically, essential skill in our time like reading, I don’t know, a few centuries ago.

So it becomes more and more needed to people to understand what type of information they are consuming and how to work with that. And I would echo Ksenia’s point that actually some journalists would also need to understand that the equivalence and the balance of two points is not always the right way to promote because if one side does not base their claims on truth and on pure fantasies or disinformation equalizing them is not a way of going.

And the final thing that I would say is that it’s based, actually, on our colleague Jakub Kalenský’s four line of defense, is that it should be harder for disinformers to do their—to do their job, right? So something should be regulated, as Ksenia said, maybe like advertising industry.

Actors should be named and shamed so that, like, their way of how they promote information, what they are writing about, how—what tools they are using audience need to be actually informed on that, know about this, and that’s why this effect might—their effect might be lesser.

But also another problem is that if we do not see the immediate effect of those things they are working slowly. The information builds up slowly step by step because the repetition works, as some research shows of different studies.

So even if you see that there is not much of the audience of RT in the particular country it doesn’t mean that it will not build up and not make this, even this small part of the country, really eager fans of the pro-Kremlin narratives and messages.

ANDY CARVIN: So throughout the war and preceding it as well it’s often felt like the Kremlin is trying to throw every idea they have at the wall like spaghetti to see what sticks and what doesn’t, and certain narratives resonate and take on a life of their own and spread and others don’t.

What factors do you think cause certain narratives to spread and be successful versus ones that don’t? Are there any particular patterns you’ve noticed?

ROMAN OSADCHUK: I could start. So I think the main issue here is whether they are hitting the nerve of a specific audience so if they’re, like, actually hitting the cleavage between some polarized audiences, let’s say, or some groups. So if they are actually with their messaging actually hitting the, I don’t know, side guys or the actual problem that this specific group cares about, then it would work out.

So, for instance, let’s take this—there is a group of people who are seeing the conspiracy that [the] West is, I don’t know, preparing a plot for the worldwide government or something like that. So this audience would be extremely receptive for the conspiracies that the war was induced by the West. It’s not the war between Ukraine and Russia. It’s war because—it’s the war between West and Russia. So this is just, like, slightly explaining the technology here. If it coincides with interest of a specific group then it would probably work. And if—another thing. If it actually involved, again, things that people care about.

So, for instance, in Ukraine some disinformation—when there were, like, a lot of blackouts after the Russian attacks on energy infrastructure, many people lived without electricity for hours, some of them for a few days, and Russians injected messages that actually those energy blackouts are not because there was some shelling but because Ukraine is selling electricity to other places and to other cities.

And it is extremely emotional. You could just imagine, right, because people were definitely desperate and they’re, like, in not the best position and those messages they resonated, not because they were, like, fantastically crafted or something because most of them were just hitting the nerve of the people and the exact situation at the moment.

ANDY CARVIN: Ksenia, anything you want to add to that?

KSENIA ILIUK: Very much agree with Roman on that. I will just add that it’s also important to understand when we look at the narratives of Russian malign influence is that a lot of them and different messages that fuel the narratives itself, they are not always there to kind of stick. They are very often there to completely disorient the audience. And this—and also sometimes, you know, that is varied. Here I’m talking about the more sophisticated Russian malign influence, not the ones that [claim] that Ukraine has biological biting mosquitoes but more elaborated ones.

They are very often—they can promote the narratives that are from the first sight are not beneficial to them and that is what makes it very hard for different audiences to spot them because when you see them you’re, like, oh, but that doesn’t look like this is something that would be beneficial for Russia to promote, you know.

But that’s a part of the strategy because when they are sending any kind of piece of malign information, whether it’s faith, whether it’s manipulation, whether it’s a bigger message, you know, a bigger story they’re spitting out, each of them has its goal and very often this goal is not about actually making sure that these are the narratives that are—that people believe in and that impact their decision making but to distract, to disorient, sometimes to completely focus attention on a different thing.

In Ukraine, for instance, with the start of the full-scale invasion there was numerous fakes that Russia was spreading to, basically, all the—to shift the attention of all of the Ukrainian volunteers that were working and were actually doing the stuff that was very productive—not productive Russia, obviously. So they were trying to sway them into doing other things, useless but, like, to make sure that they do it.

So this is also very important. When we see any piece of information, just ask ourselves, OK, what do we feel about it? Who can benefit from it?… Because sometimes they’re just there to distract.

ANDY CARVIN: So we have a number of questions coming in from the audience, from attendees at RightsCon. So I want to start with a question from Mais, and I’m hoping I’m pronouncing that right. Mais writes: There are striking similarities with the tactics Russia employed in Syria, from amplifying disinformation to vilifying rescue workers responding to war crimes and appealing to anti-West sentiments. What crucial lessons can be learned from Russia’s playbook in Syria to develop more effective resilience against information warfare in Ukraine?

Now, I know neither of you are necessarily Syria experts. But I think it’s fair to say that this isn’t the first time Russia has deployed these techniques in a conflict or just to undermine its adversaries. So I guess I would ask do you see similarities with other aspects in Russian history or going further back in Soviet history of how they’ve weaponized information?

KSENIA ILIUK: I would definitely say that there is nothing new under the sun when we see all of the—when we look at the essence, not of the shape, the format of malign influence but the essence, that the essence is the same.

About Syria what I would like to note that there is, indeed, a lot of strikingly similar or even the same patterns being applied and I think the biggest thing that we kind of failed as democratic societies worldwide to learn from Syria is actually the fact of actually analyzing the situation and learning.

I would personally say that the situation of Syria is much more complicated. Information-wise, with the situation in Ukraine… there is a very clear unity between lots of efforts in civil society, state institutions. So in this regard in Syria, the situation is much more complex.

But I think we actually failed from learning that. We failed because we again say that, oh, these techniques, oh, we already knew them before. So if we knew them before, why haven’t we [prevented] them from spreading again? And with most of malign information campaigns happening right now, they are—they are not the same, but most of them could be easily anticipated and prevented. And here we have a very strong tool of preventing when we can actually inform in advance about the tactics, about the manipulation that will be used. And I think in this regard, in the context of Syria, we just, unfortunately, very much failed to do that.

ROMAN OSADCHUK: I would echo that we kind of failed, probably, on learning on the tactics. They are definitely not new. If you read about the active measures, there is a wonderful book with the same name that actually describes different operations that took place in the twentieth century. So it’s all over—all over there. You could also look at some defectors—Soviet defectors to United States who also acknowledged what they had done in the—in different parts of KGB, and how, and what they spread to different audiences. So it’s definitely not new.

But we, indeed, failed to learn more on the—on the example, Syria. But at the same time, I would say it was slightly different because of the sheer amount of footage and the files that we could actually document. So now this war is probably more captured and—I don’t know—captured meaning on photo, video. There’s so much evidence of basically anything that happens. So that’s why in a sense it’s easier to collect all of this data. So hopefully this time it will be easier to prove involvement of some specific troops in some particular war crimes, or what actually happened on the ground, because having those materials is actually more beneficial.

But again, I completely agree that it’s not new and it’s actually—Russians are using similar tactics again and again.

ANDY CARVIN: We have another question, from Andrew, who writes: Although RT and Sputnik are banned in most Western countries now, Russia has recruited a notable amount of so-called citizen journalists and whistleblowers. Tara Reade’s defection to Russia recently made the news, but she’d previously been using pro-Russian talking points online since at least 2018. Could you provide some perspective on how these disinformation actors are cultivated and amplified by the Russian state?

Do we have any insight on that? And not necessarily her specifically? I mean, it’s—just more broadly, how does Russia exploit outside actors to promote their ideas?

KSENIA ILIUK: We have just finished, actually, the quite interesting analysis of information space of countries of Eastern Partnership plus Georgia and Armenia. And it was—one of the things that we saw that Russia more and more started focusing, as you’ve mentioned, on these kind of amplifiers—these independent people, independent journalists that, like, actually echo the rhetoric completely. And what we see very interesting in there that, especially in these countries, a lot of them are moving to Telegram, heavily going to Telegram, creating Telegram channels. Some of them already have, like, over a million of subscribers or so. They are—most of them that we discovered during this research are focusing on the Russian-speaking population, but again we see more and more of a tendency on doing the same recipe, the same playbook in the national languages of the countries. And here we see, especially concerning, that not only they go to Telegram, because of Telegram it’s very—it’s understandable why they go there, because there is fear of content moderation. So they’re very open in their thoughts and everything. Like, the expressions are just very, very sharp. They usually do not write on—even if they have the Twitter page, that on Twitter that they allow themselves to write on Telegram. And we also see a tendency of them going to TikTok, and we see—even just, like, the other day we uncovered one of the—of such influencer… we don’t know what category to put them—that was targeting [the] Ukrainian audience. And he was—his videos on TikTok also had almost [a] million of views, each.

And he was doing it in such a sophisticated way, so it’s, like, from the—it took us quite some time to follow him to understand that he actually echoing Russian line narratives. But what was most striking is that actually the advertisement that Roman mentioned today, on Facebook, they were using how he kind of understood that he is a part of the network. They were using his profiles as one of the things against this kind of advertisement. So this is indeed something. Again, there was already an infrastructure for that. A lot of them already existed way before… but we’ve seen more new faces popping up.

ROMAN OSADCHUK: I would add that there are, like, quite a lot of actors. There were quite a few—a surge of Russian darlings or amplifiers in Europe since the annexation of Crimea and invasion of 2014. So… I agree that now there are more actors. And I think we could roughly divide them into a few groups. So some of them are, like, maybe beneath four layers.

So at the beginning of the invasion, there were, like, some information campaigns against Ukrainian refugees, let’s say, in Moldova. And it were mostly TikToks. So those campaigns were kind of factchecked by local factchecking organizations. They were being reported on. And when people spotted them, at some point they could just delete that. And they seemed that they went by the same kind of script, which was there was no direct link with Russia, but the same campaign took place in Russia one week before. So that’s why it kind of coincided.

Another interesting thing is that there are a lot of think tanks that are already partnering with Russian ones. So in for—in pillars of Russian disinformation—it’s the Global Engagement Center well-known report—there are actually identified quite a few platforms… that they are amplifying Russian messages through local actors and partners all over Europe, at least, and not only even Europe.

And finally, there are some people who are either sympathizers towards the Russian cause, or whatever, or just hardcore anti-West, anti—I don’t know, anti-Western imperialism folks, right? So those people, they would share something that goes in line that Russia will inject. So I could provide an example of I made one of the investigation. There was a French politician, just French user on Twitter, who published the news about the Howitzers, that French Howitzers were being acquired by Russians intact so that they could reverse engineer them, something like this. But what’s interesting, when people ask him what was his source, he claimed FSB.

And then this thing was used by Russian media again and again a lot of the time. So then the story lead up to some other publications as well. But how it started is that there was some person abroad writing something on the basis of some message of FSB. So, yeah, there are definitely a lot of people who are actually being used by Russian disinformation machine and propaganda machine.

ANDY CARVIN: So we have a pair of questions that complement each other, one from Jonah and one from Marti, that I’ll read.

First, from Jonah: Does Ukraine and its allies have any means of replicating Russia’s tactics within Russia, and perhaps other authoritarian states? To elaborate, is it feasible to reach ordinary Russians and expose propaganda on social media, for example? Or the Russian state’s control of information space is in constructing—or, is Russia’s state control of information spaces too powerful?

And Marti writes: Do you know of any efforts to counter Russian disinformation campaigns by replying to each post and comment? It seems like the West has accepted that employing AI and troll armies is something Russia does, but why does the US, Ukraine not use the same tools in order to respond with the truth?

So, first of all, are there any efforts that we’re aware of, of direct responses trying to counter campaigns, or these messages in real time? And I guess I’d ask, the next level is, why aren’t we replicating or why isn’t Ukraine or the US replicating Russian strategies? Would it—do you think it would be in Ukraine’s interest to do so, to essentially participate in actively spreading disinformation as well? Or would that be counterproductive?

ROMAN OSADCHUK: I could start. I think it would be slightly immoral to do that. So we should be better than the Russians, because many of these tactics they are, quite frankly, are extremely in a dark area. We look at the ethics side of things. So we should not be replicating. We should find more clever ways how to fight it. If answering on the question whether people try to reach out to Russians, many Ukrainians at the beginning of the invasion—early invasion, right, they started reaching out to Russians, even relatives, families.

Family members reached to their parents who lived in Russia. And many people understood that those attempts were futile, because there were quite a few examples—you could find them in the media—when people talked to their parents, and their parents told them: Don’t worry. Russian Army is only aiming at military facilities. We will de-Nazify you and you will be totally fine. They are not shelling at the residential areas. When literally the person shows the videos of residential areas nearby being shelled.

So those attempts were there, but they definitely didn’t work out as intended. And if you look at some interviews, you know, on the Russian—like, Russians inside Russia, who tried to poll people and ask them about whether they know what’s happening, it seems that they actually know what’s happening. So intentions of many Ukrainians was that, like, when the Russians realized what’s happening they would go and try to do something and be against this war. But in reality, it didn’t actually happen.

There were protests at the beginning, but they quickly stopped. And actually, that’s a big problem. So another thing that I wanted to raise is that at least Telegram is available in Russia. And it means that even opposition platforms, like literally any media that is on Telegram, is available in Russia. So they could read—they could see what’s happening. It’s not that they’re living behind an iron curtain, they cannot reach, like, Western media. They get it. Thank you.

KSENIA ILIUK: Really agree with Roman that we have to be aware of the fact that they actually have the access to information. And that’s the choice they make, whether to go—to see or not to see. And a lot of them are choosing not to because, you know, it’s just the realization of the fact that they are—all of them are responsible for all the atrocity happening in Ukraine by their action or inaction. This is something that they should not do, you know? They choose better to live in the world of Russian propaganda that says that they are this great nation that is saving the world…

So I think this is one very important point to understand. The second, about their tactics, like should we or not? I think we definitely shouldn’t use the same tools. Again, just the principles and values we operate, or at least striving to operate, are very different from the ones that authoritarian regimes are operating. So I would definitely say that it’s not a way for us to go, because—and on the other hand, I believe that we have various tools that are based on the principles of democracy and democratic values that could be applied. And there’s no restriction from doing that.

And in terms of whether there are groups, of course there are some groups that are—some organizations, there are even some initiatives from states trying to reach so-called average Russians in Russia. But I don’t know that many of them are successful. As you see, not so much progress is happening in terms of their resistance. And definitely we can share the information, we can spread, but I don’t think this should be our target priority as of now because it seems that the people are clearly making their own choice.

ANDY CARVIN: So we have about five minutes left, which might be enough for one or two more questions before we begin to wrap up.

We have a question from Levisa, who asks: With the maturity and accessibility of AI tools, what do you recommend we do to identify disinfo created by these tools? Would showing provenance of the content be useful? Is there anything out there that you feel like is allowing people to detect AI-generated content yet? And, arguably, it would say, that for real content the entire open-source community is providing provenance by researching things in real time.

KSENIA ILIUK: Yeah, I would start saying here, because I’m a big supporter of using AI for that, because we use that for our everyday analytics, and it helps us to analyze on average basis—on a daily basis a few millions of publications in multiple languages, and to be much more efficient into spotting things, the Russian malign information campaigns, at the very beginning, you know, when we are able to actually, to some extent, you know, kill them before they gain the momentum. So in that regard, sure.

In terms of using AI tools to verify the contents themselves, the one that was created by AI, I think here it’s—again, there are a lot of tools out there. I think the bigger question would be, what would be the overall policy of doing that? Because we see right now that people are not going and checking the information. You know, it’s media literacy 101. You have to go and check in these sources. People are not doing that. And they are not going to do that because everyone has family, a dog, you know, a job, and everything. Like, we can’t do that. We don’t have time for that. So if we actually are AI and it’s something that any text, any video, any picture could be generated, and we want people to go and check, even if they are told of this… I don’t think people are going to go and do that.

So that’s the question to the policy. Like, are we forcing social-media platforms to apply these kind of tools? Or, for example, are we enforcing some kind of a culture—a few—there are a few startups, actually, that are doing digital signature for the content. Like, for example, if you post a video, you could put its invisible digital signature on it to ensure that this is the content with me, with my presence, and this is not deep fake, whatever. So I think the key question here would be, like, on more of a broader policy level and the regulation level.

ROMAN OSADCHUK: I would agree. It’s a highly complicated issue. If we talk about the—like, facts being generated by AI in some, I don’t know, bot farms or something, extremely hard to spot. And even if you’re using AI tools to identify whether it’s being AI-generated, there is always AI tools to rewrite what’s being generated so that you cannot spot it. It’s a constant game. I guess, like, with the disinformation field at whole, right, so there is always some malign tool being prepared by some malign actors, and then fact-checkers need to understand how to—how to work with that, how to identify there was something happen. So we are still in this space when we understand how it could be used against us, right, and societies, democratic institutions. So we are about to guess and find out how to effectively use AI against those informations…

Maybe there are some other venues. Maybe with some detection, but we’ll see.

ANDY CARVIN: So we have barely a minute left, so if you guys could summarize in maybe twenty seconds or so: What big lessons or takeaways should the rest of the world have regarding Ukraine’s resilience to disinformation?

KSENIA ILIUK: … The thing that I was telling today, threat awareness. What the Ukrainians realize because of their firsthand experience is that malign information influence is actually killing people, that it has enormous capacity to influence our everyday lives—the lives of business, companies… Governments are suffering. Democratic regimes are suffering. So I think the first key and most important to any other step which they are taking is actually acknowledging and facilitating threat on a different level…

ROMAN OSADCHUK: Yeah. I would say that there is no such thing as win or lose in information war. So it will always be with us, information will be with us, and will still be essence of our decision-making process. So, actually, critically evaluate any piece of information that you receive. It might be hard. It’s painful. It’s not extremely pleasant to do so. But try to analyze everything because there is so much manipulation could be coming your way. The ones that we already know, AI brings many more. But we just should be vigilant and continue our fight against those malign influences against democratic institutions.

ANDY CARVIN: Well, on behalf of RightsCon and the DFRLab, I’d like to thank both of you for joining us. I wish we could continue talking because this has been an absolutely fascinating conversation barely scratching the surface on some of these issues. But sincerely, Roman and Ksenia, I do appreciate you taking the time to talk with us today and join everyone virtually at the conference. Thank you.

Thanks, everyone. Enjoy the rest of your event.

The post Mapping the last decade of Russia’s disinformation and influence campaign in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The international community must protect women politicians from abuse online. Here’s how.

Atlantic Council — Thu, 08 Jun 2023 15:41:08 +0000

Activists and experts assemble in Costa Rica to protect human rights in the digital age

By Digital Forensic Research Lab

Our Digital Forensic Research Lab is convening top tech thinkers and human-rights defenders at RightsCon to collaborate on an agenda for advancing rights globally.

Cybersecurity Disinformation

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speakers

Tracy Chou
Chief Executive Officer, Block Party

Julie Inman Grant
eSafety Commissioner, Australian Government

Neema Lugangira
Member of Parliament, Tanzania

Fernanda Martins
Director, Internet Lab

Moira Whelan
Director, Democracy and Technology, National Democratic Institute

MOIRA WHELAN: Hi, everybody, and thanks for joining us [for] a conversation about women’s political participation and the consequences of harassment. And before we get started today and I introduce our fantastic panelists, I just wanted to express my thanks to Access Now but especially also to DFRLab, who is cosponsoring this panel in particular. And what we’re going to do today is we’re going to walk through a short introduction, I’ll open the conversation to our participants, and then we’re happy to take your questions online.

So just to get us started, I first wanted to acknowledge that this panel is really a representation of a lot of the incredible work that’s been going on in our community for a really long time. And I would point to organizations that we’ve worked with such as DanishChurchAid, Internews, Policy, and many, many others. Here at RightsCon, there are more than thirty sessions happening to address these issues of online violence against women in politics.

And you know, so first acknowledging that others are doing the work. And then, saying that, some of the organizations that we work with—and I think an expectation we now have—is that if we’re doing this work, we face that harassment and that abuse as a community and as an organization, and that goes along with including the organizations that have helped organize this panel.

So first I want to say a little bit about NDI and how we came to this work. NDI is a democracy organization that trains women around the world to help them run for office, help them prepare for their life in civil society and the public sphere. And this issue has become blinking red for us. The number of women who are self-censoring, who are pulling out of politics, who are deciding another path is probably the biggest threat to democracy that we face today.

So we really started down the path of using our traditional models of working on information—on the information space and bringing actors together to address this issue. But we also believe it’s a solvable problem and I want to note that part of what we’re talking about today and the reason we’ve talked about building the community we want to build with our guests is because we want to talk about solutions but also some of the setbacks.

So without further ado, our panelists are Julie Inman Grant, who is the eSafety commissioner of Australia; and also Tracy Chou, who is the founder of Block Party and also an entrepreneur and is—we’re really thrilled to have her; as well as Fernanda Martins, who is the director at Internet Lab; and, finally, Neema Lugangira, who is a member of parliament from Tanzania.

So welcome, all of you, and, Neema, I want to start with you. The thing that we have noticed in doing this work is that it’s very rare for active female politicians to speak up because you don’t want to make, to use your words, this is not the agenda, right. You have other issues as a parliamentarian you want to address.

So I wonder if you can walk us through your personal experience of being so outspoken on the harassment you face and also what that’s done for your political experience.

NEEMA LUGANGIRA: Thank you very much. I, first, want to sincerely thank yourself, Moira, and NDI Tech for facilitating and enabling me to be here at RightsCon. So thank you, once again.

As you rightly said, that being a female in politics, unfortunately, the more outspoken you are, the more popular you are and well known the more abuse you get, and oftentimes you find on social media platforms the abuse that we tend to get it’s a group of people who want to disqualify you, discredit you, belittle you.

So instead of focusing on the issue that you’re presenting, instead of focusing on their agenda, they shift the issue and start focusing on the gender and, unfortunately, being a female politician what they do is they sexualize the issue. So they will sexualize everything that you’ve presented. If it’s a photo they’ll sexualize that. If you happen to take a photo with a guy in a meeting they’ll probably change the backgrounds so just to shift the narrative and to kind of belittle you and kind of shut you up.

And what that has done is, unfortunately, in Africa—and I believe it’s probably the same even in the Global North—is that the number of women in politics or female members of parliament who are active online is very, very minimal.

For example, in Tanzania we have about 146 female MPs and probably less than 5 percent active on social media, using social media for their work, and what that does—what that does very quickly it has a huge detrimental effect because, one, it limits our own visibility and if you’re not visible as a politician it limits your own reelection.

But it also takes a step back. You know, organizations like NDI are making strides to increase the number of women in politics but young women, aspiring women, they see us women in politics who are supposedly in power but we are being abused and we’re helpless and nobody comes to the defense of women in politics.

Like, I’ve seen it over and over again when a female in politics is being abused nobody comes to their defense. Actually, more people mob attack. It’s almost it comes—it comes kind of with the territory.

And just to sum up, I decided that since we’re a group that nobody speaks for us so I’m going to speak for members of parliament. I’m going to speak for women in politics, and as a result of that, yes, it brings about more abuse but then some of us have to go through it so that we can address this issue because I want to see more women in politics visible so that we can strengthen their visibility because we are doing a lot of incredible work and it needs to be seen.

MOIRA WHELAN: I couldn’t agree with you more and I think, quickly, I want to shift to you, Julie, because, you know, there is that issue of full participation and it’s something you’ve really focused on at eSafety in Australia and getting to sort of moving us from the research that we’ve worked on to the solutions.

I wonder if you can walk everyone through here this sort of example of addressing some of the concerns that Neema has raised in Australia.

JULIE INMAN GRANT: [For those] who don’t know what an eSafety commissioner is, we’re the first national independent regulator for online harms and online safety. And we were established in 2015, and so there is an Online Safety Act that enables me to take action when Australians report all forms of abuse to social media platforms, gaming sites, dating sites, you name it, and it isn’t taken down. So we serve as that safety net to advocate on behalf of our citizens when things go wrong online. We know tons fall through the cracks. And so we can bridge that inherent power balance that exists.

So I deal with everything from child sexual exploitation to image-based abuse, the non-consensual sharing of intimate images and videos. And I can say that recently we’ve been getting reports of deepfake videos of female politicians and other prominent women. We have a cyberbullying scheme for youth, and an adult cyber abuse scheme, which is at a much higher threshold to make sure that freedom of expression isn’t undermined. But we all realize here that targeted misogynistic abuse is designed to silence voices. And, as you say, women will self-censor.

Now, we—beyond these laws, we focus on prevention, in the first instance. Protection, through these regulatory schemes. And then what I call proactive change. So part of that has to do with putting responsibility back on the platforms themselves through initiatives like Safety by Design. You know, AI is a perfect use case as to how these—the collective brilliance of the technology industry should be used to tackling this at scale and preventing hateful, and misogynistic, and homophobic content from being shared.

So on the prevention side, well, first of all, I should say all of these forms of abuse are gendered. Ninety-six percent of the child sexual abuse material we look at—which happens, sorry to say, at toddler age—96 percent are of girls. Eighty-five percent of our image-based abuse are from women and girls. And then when you get more to the pointy end, we know that 99 percent of women experiencing domestic and family violence are also experiencing an extension of that, be it through technology-facilitated abuse, in 99.3 percent of cases.

So 89 percent of our adult cyber abuse cases are from women, and many of whom are either being cyber-stalked and doxed as [an] extension of domestic and family violence, or by perpetrators who specifically target women. And as Neema said, the way that online abuse against women manifests is different versus men. It’s sexualized. It’s violent. It talks about rape, fertility, supposed virtue, and appearance. It just manifests in very, very different ways. So I’ve had so many politicians say to me, you know, their male counterparts will say: Well, just toughen up, sweetheart, this is politics. Well, it is different.

So I actually tried to start a program called Women in the Spotlight to provide social media self-defense to women politicians, to journalists, to anyone in the public eye. And I was told by a previous government, we can’t fund that. That’s protecting privileged women. So I set up the program anyway, and started to do the training. And we can’t keep up with demand for social media self-defense training. And I don’t need to tell any of you that if being a woman receiving misogynistic abuse isn’t enough, if you’re from a—you have a disability, you end up—you identify as LGBTQI+, or you’re from a diverse background, that kind of abuse is compounded.

So again, I think we’ll continue to persevere. We need these prevention programs. We also know that the average professional woman in Australia is receiving online abuse. So one in three women. And 25 percent of them won’t take a job opportunity or a promotion if it requires them to be online. So we’re starting to see normalization of this kind of abuse across the population. And that’s why I’m trying to use my powers much more strongly to send a message that you cannot abuse people with total impunity. And this also involves penalties and fines for perpetrators, as well as the platforms themselves that refuse to remove content. We always try and work informally first, but I have used my formal powers. And if the platforms don’t comply, I can take them to court and to fine them as well.

MOIRA WHELAN: Well, and we are going to wing our way to Silicon Valley when we get to Tracy, but I wanted to stop in Brazil first and give Fernanda a chance. Because I think one of the things you said, Julie, was really about the intersectional issues as well that are linked to this. But also, the successes that you’ve had as civil society at Internet Lab, first having to prove to governments that this is a problem; second, getting them to pay attention and to work through the process. And I’m wondering if you can tell us a little bit about your involvement working with the government of Brazil.

FERNANDA MARTINS: Yeah, sure. Thank you, Moira, for this question. And thank you, DFRLab, for organize it.

I think Internet Lab, we have been working to improve the way that political gender-based violence is treated by governments independent of the government at the moment. So at this moment also it’s different because we have a progressive government, but at the same time we have parliamentaries that is not defenders of human rights. So the context is our fragile democracy, yet so we have these challenge to understand how we can contribute to this issue in Brazil.

So at this moment we have the fake news bill to trying to address the problems related to platforms, but it is important to mention that in the bill don’t have any mention to gender, any mention to LGBTQAI+ community, and a brief note about the law, political violence law and racism law in Brazil. But it’s like we are running in parallel avenues. It’s not connected. So we are trying to talk to government, talk to private sector, and understand how we can mix different social sectors to address the problem. And I think we have the law approved in 2021 addressing political violence, but we started the enforcement of the law in the last election and it was really weak. We need to just expand more the comprehension and not focus only on banal answers. We need education and other things in this context.

MOIRA WHELAN: Well, and I think that’s really important, especially as Julie was talking about so much the value of implementation and needing to see that it’s not just legal frameworks that are going to get us there.

But all of you have talked about the platforms. All of you have talked about tech. And I want to turn to Tracy now because I do have to tell you a story. Tracy was with us when DFRLab hosted us in Brussels to really introduce this issue and to really put it on the center stage, literally. And we’re big fans of Block Party. But, Tracy, we have a different panel here today. So we were here celebrating the success of Block Party, but I think you should maybe tell us about the current status.

TRACY CHOU: Yes. So, hi, everyone. I’m Tracy. I’m the founder and CEO of Block Party. We build technology to fight harassment online and make the internet safe for everyone. Until last week, our flagship product was available on Twitter to combat harassment, and it is now sadly on hiatus thanks to platform changes.

Before we get to that, maybe some context. I started my career as an early engineer at social media companies that are now very big platforms—at Facebook, Pinterest, and Quora—so I kind of understand how platforms are built and what are their incentives not just at the high levels for the companies, but also for individual people working at those companies.

And separately, I became an activist for diversity, equity, and inclusion in the tech industry, seeing how the people that are in the room really matter for the product that we’re building. That led to me getting a lot of harassment, and so I set out to solve that problem blending together the different parts of my experience…

So what we built on top of Twitter was something to solve my own problem, essentially a sort of spam folder where you can choose who you want to hear from. Everything gets filtered into that folder that you don’t—you might not want to see. You can review it later and take action later, involve your community for help. And it works really well. Like, it was great for me.

Silicon Valley talks about “dogfooding” your own products, building things that you use yourself. And it was great for me to experience the mental health impact of not having to see all of that terrible stuff. It’s not just me. It’s a lot of other folks that we’ve already heard from on this panel, people who are working in politics, people who are activists, academics. It’s been really sad to see that we’ve had to shut down—or, hopefully just put in hiatus. We’re really hopeful that we can bring it back in some capacity in the future. We’re already seeing the outpouring of folks who are who are using our product on Twitter really sad to see it go. There are people who are tweeting every day now saying, like, I miss Block Party, literally every day, because I’m now getting all this harassment that is no longer filtered. So lots more to share on that. That is the current status.

MOIRA WHELAN: Well, Tracy, I’m not going to—I’m going to stay with you for a second, because you should know that here in this room, I have heard repeatedly people saying they miss Block Party. We wish you could be here with us so that you could feel it directly, but we’re sending it to you virtually, because we need products like this. And I think the other aspect of this story that we would love if you could—if you could share it, if you can channel your rage into helping this room help you. You’re an entrepreneur. You’ve been building.

And yet—and it should be very obvious to all of us the business case for creating safe spaces for all people to fully participate online. And yet, your experience in Silicon Valley had been decidedly different. And I wonder if you can just kind of give us an insight into the experience of going with your fundraising rounds, and when you walked into rooms with funders. Because I think people here need to know just how challenging the environment is from beginning to end. It’s not just about fixing the existing giant platforms. We have a fundamental challenge here.

TRACY CHOU: Yeah. First, I might back up a little bit and talk about the decision to create Block Party as a for-profit entity. And that was because I believe that there is a business case, and that also that in order to align the incentives going for a capitalist approach, which is building solutions for people who pay for the value that they’re getting, is the best way. In order to build really compelling technology as well, be able to hire the best people in technology for a design and product engineering, also requires being able to pay those salaries. And so VC money, venture capital money, made the most sense to me, as aligning all of those things together. There’s a big opportunity there. And we need that initial capital to get going to build the technology.

So when I went out to raise I felt like, so I have, like, a pretty good shot at making this case. I’m a technical founder, with deep experience in top companies. I have two engineering degrees from Stanford, where I graduated with top honors. Like, this is a good resume that Silicon Valley typically likes. I’m solving my own problem, which they also talk about as a great thing. Like, if you know the problem intimately, because you experience it then you’re very motivated to solve it, and you know all the ins and outs of it. Again, usually something that’s very positive.

I did not have a good experience. There were a lot of people who were skeptical. You might imagine the typical demographic of VC, very white, very male. People were dubious that there was a market. So I was told that this was very niche, and also that it’s already a solved problem, and it will be solved by machine learning, the platform’s already addressing it, so, like, no issue anymore. I suspect some of this has to do with the fact that there’s a lack of diversity in the VC industry and even though our products are for everyone, they do disproportionately serve women and people from marginalized communities, who are more targeted by abuse.

I think there’s also the latent sexism in there, where even the people who thought that there might be a market here told me that they didn’t think that I could solve it, which is very frustrating. By comparison, I saw a number of men trying to tackle the same problem. Fewer credentials, building poor copycats of my product, raise exorbitant sums of money. In some cases, ten times as much. I talked with some of these founders and they would say things like, oh, well, just because, like, I used to work at Google and so, you know, I had the credibility. And I would just have to call myself and say, well, I worked at Google, and Facebook, and Pinterest, and Quora, and also have engineering degrees. But I guess that doesn’t matter when I’m a woman.

So very frustrating experience. Had to power through that. Ultimately did raise money. So very glad that I was able to raise the seed round last year and can actually hire people to keep tackling these problems. But I guess to the point that Moira’s trying to draw out here, there are really systemic issues. If we want to be able to solve these problems, we also need the funding to be able to do so. And when there’s systemic biases in the funders and they don’t believe that there is a problem here, we’re going to have additional challenges in trying to create these solutions.

MOIRA WHELAN: Well, thank you for that, Tracy. And I can’t say, again, you know, when we talk about the thing we’ve all been told of putting on a thicker skin, really, does it get any thicker than Tracy’s, having walked through that?

And Julie, I want to talk about these systemic issues, right? We actually had a question come in on Slido, so please all participate. But it gets to the next question I wanted to ask you, which was around the barriers. And is one of the barriers freedom of expression and where we allow freedom of expression and what is abuse? And I think, you know, you’re at the forefront of, like, how we define the digital experience for people, and I wonder if you can talk a little bit about: Is that a barrier? And then my second part is: Why aren’t more countries doing what Australia’s doing, and how do we help them?

JULIE INMAN GRANT: No, that’s—thank you so much.

And I want to thank Tracy for her perseverance. I’ve been watching her journey from afar, all this stuff about funding and tech bros. And this just shows you how gender inequality can manifest in so many different ways and at so many different levels, and we have to support technologists and entrepreneurs like Tracy to create, building these incredible products. Because I can say, having worked at Microsoft and Twitter and Adobe, that not enough is doing—being done inside and safety is always an afterthought. I mean, even if you look at the patterns of layoffs happening at companies like Twitter and Meta and Microsoft, the trust and safety people go first.

But I guess one thing that we have learned is that we’ll never regulate or wrest our way out of online harms with the speed, the scale, and the volume of content online. It’s always going to be a game of Whac-a-Mole, I guess, or Whac-a-Troll if you will.

But we are also talking about fundamental human behavior and societal ills that work underneath. And that was my experience at Twitter. I joined right after the Arab Spring with the belief that it was going to be a great leveler and people would be able to speak truth to power, but what I started to see very clearly is that women and those from marginalized communities were being silenced. So if you don’t draw a line about what constitutes online hate and online harm and you allow it to fester, then you’re actually suppressing freedom of expression. So it’s a—it’s a difficult line to tread.

Our parliament in Australia, online safety is very bipartisan. And there are different approaches that, of course, different parties would want to take, but collectively the government decided that they wanted to draw a line; and if online speech turns into online invective and is designed with a serious intent to harm, to menace, or harass, that we would draw a line and that we would have an investigative process, that there’d be lots of transparency and accountability, and multiple ways to challenge any decision I make. That’s the right thing. Never been challenged by any decision. And we’re actually helping to remediate harm of individuals.

So the good news is there are more countries coming onboard with online harms regulators. Ireland and Fiji both have online safety commissioners now. Of course, the online safety bill in the U.K. is pending, but that again is a much more polarized debate. Canada’s looking at this. I’m not sure where we’ll get to in the United States.

But we do want tech companies to start stepping up and protecting, empowering, and supporting people online. And that’s why five years ago we started the Safety by Design Initiative with industry to ask them to start providing the tools to do just that—to think about the design process, the deployment, the development process, the maintenance and the refresh process rather than retrofitting safety protections after the damage has been done. There will always be room for specialist tools like Block Party and [Privacy] Party, and we want to facilitate that—you know, let thousands of innovative flowers bloom so that we can all have safer, more positive experiences online.

We also have to keep an eye out in the future. I’m very concerned about the power of generative AI and these large language models and, you know, conversational models with the ability to manipulate—to manipulate young people for extortion, for grooming, for, you know, deep fakes and misinformation and disinformation. We need to think about immersive technologies and the Metaverse.

When we’re, you know, in high-sensory, hyper-realistic environments, the online harassment we’re feeling now will be much more extreme and much more visceral. Think about with haptics and headsets that are picking up, you know, your retinal scans and flushing, what that technology can tell these major companies about you. Neuro technology—you bring that into a toxic mix.

If we don’t start putting the onus back on these technology companies to be thinking about the risks and how their technologies can be misused and have them doing this at the forefront we’re never going to be able to get ahead of this.

So I do hope that more governments come on board. We’ve just established a global online safety regulators network with members who are independent statutory authorities who can demonstrate a track record on human rights and independence. But we’re also making room for observers for governments and other organizations that want to consider best practice in terms of setting up online harms regulators.

And with the DSA and other developments, I expect in the next five or ten years we will have a network of online harms regulators and we will no longer in Australia feeling like we’re at the head of the peloton going up [a mountain] with no one drafting behind us.

I think governments need to get together with the civil society sector and start to counter the stealth, the wealth, and the power of the technology industry. It’s the only way we’re going to get ahead this.

MOIRA WHELAN: Well, and I couldn’t agree more and I should say I think we all want to live in Julia Inman Grant’s internet. You know, that’s definitely the space we want to go.

I’d also point to the global partnership that Australia, the United States, and others have founded to address online abuse that NDI is very happy to support and we like the direction it’s going. But I think you made one really important point and that was the really clear leadership of civil society in both identifying this issue, making it a global issue instead of a personal issue that each politician is facing.

And you had, Fernanda, talked a little bit about the barriers you were facing. So you talked about tech versus government and I wonder if you can expand on that a little bit and tell us, like, where do you spend your time. How do you prioritize both of those needs and who needs to change first? Who needs to change in what way to—you know, this is what civil society does. You put yourself in the middle and you change it.

Please tell us a little bit more about how you’re doing that in Brazil.

FERNANDA MARTINS: Yeah. Sure. It was great to hear from Julie because I was thinking in similar things here and we know—we live at this moment a shift of violence concept and in less years ago when you talk to platforms about gender-based violence online we are talking mainly about dissemination of [non-consented materials].

And now when we try to talk about political violence it’s like we are tension the relationship between freedom of expression and the limit that needs to exist. So it’s interesting to note that when we look at the Brazilian context, in the legislative context we have some laws directed to domestic violence. And when we talk to platforms, they told us about the necessity to protect women related to these issues and violence that is targeted by ex-partners, for example.

But it’s difficult. It is a challenge made—government made platforms and everyone involved in this issue—that we are in public is fair. And not just women; we are talking to marginalized groups in general. So our effort at this moment is to demonstrate that, OK, we demonstrated before that the violence exists, so now what we can do inclusively when we talk about difference what needs to be excluded in platforms, what to be—have flagged that there is content here, it is an insult; but we have—we have, too, platforms that have the policy that public figures need to be more tolerant to attacks and insults, as Meta’s platform. So how we can educate society in general if the example on platforms is, say, women candidate could be attacked, the other could be attacked—women, LGBTQI+ community.

So we need to change the policies, and we need to—we need strong—make strong our laws and their relationship globally. So I think it is a little what we’re trying to do.

MOIRA WHELAN: And I think it’s an excellent point. When you were working with NDI on our program to identify interventions, we identified twenty-six. We have colleagues at Web Foundation, at CG, at other places that were coming up with theirs. We just did an inventory, and we have, like, 450 identified opportunities for changes.

But I want to turn us to Neema, because it all comes back to politics, right? A lot of those changes weren’t just with platforms. They weren’t just with governments. They were also within political parties. How media outlets, you know, cover it. Because even though we’re talking about these major global issues, as a politician that’s still a very personal experience and it’s still very—you know, it’s hard to look at fixing the whole tech system when you’re going through this every day. And I wonder if you can talk about—bring us a little closer to home, and what we need to do, and what are the barriers getting in the way of fixing it, for your own political experience?

NEEMA LUGANGIRA: Thank you. I think one of the things—there are different moving blocks. The first one is the social media platforms. And exactly like what she just said, in the sense is that it is expected because we’re in politics we should have thick skin. But why should I have thick skin? Why should I tolerate abuse? If you’re not able to abuse me online, why should you abuse—if you’re not able to abuse me offline, why should you abuse me online? So the challenges on the social media platforms is although Julie said a positive feedback on AI, at the same time artificial intelligence also has an issue.

In the sense that we have—myself, and my colleagues—we have reported on a number of times, you report on abuse, and it’s written in Kiswahili, for example, or the local language, and you try to even go further and translate it. But still, someone replies and says: This doesn’t violate our rules. And you’re thinking, what rules? This violates every kind of rule. So on the social media platforms, there’s a lot of work that needs to be done. And I think one of the things through organizations like NDI is to give us the opportunity also as the women in politics to be in the same room with the decisionmakers at the social media platforms. Because we need to tell them these issues, and they need to hear these issues from us. Not from someone else, but they need to hear these issues from us.

Secondly, when it comes to media, in a lot of countries, unfortunately, media—the way the media do the gender profiling of women in politics also results into abuse. You may find that maybe you’ve been in a meeting. There were several pictures that they were taken—that a particular media took of you. And they decide to use the picture that shows some parts of the body accidentally. You know, maybe your dress went a little bit down, so your shoulder is showing, or the cleavage is showing. And they would use that picture and say: Maybe Honorable Neema said such and such, such a brilliant thing. But because the image they chose to use, it totally shifts the issue and it results into abuse. So sometimes the gender profiling is also an issue.

But the other thing that I’m currently working on in Tanzania is to try and see—there are a lot of laws that are existing that talk about bits and pieces of online abuse. But none are more, like, specific for women in politics. So I’m trying right now in Tanzania to push that we should have a regulatory reform on our political parties act and election acts, so that these two acts recognize online abuse as an offense. Because there’s a number of offenses in political parties acts whereby if you can be proven—let’s say you’re a male, and you have—you’re vying for a position. If it can be proven you’ve done a GBV offense, you can be taken off the candidates list.

So I’m trying to push that online abuse should also be recognized for women in politics, because a lot of the abuse that we get is also related to politics. So that can also reduce a certain group, a group of people, at least those who are aspiring to get into politics. And it can give us the power to now start documenting this. And if you hear, maybe, I don’t know, Gregory has been nominated for something, you can go and use that particular law and say: This person has been abusing women online, kind of thing. So trying to push the political parties act and the election act to do so.

But at the same time, I set up an NGO called Omuka Hub. And what we are trying to do is to strengthen online visibility of women in politics and continentally we are trying to do that through the African Parliamentary Network on Internet Governance, again, to strengthen the visibility of women in politics. But to do that, organizations that have funding or that are talking about digital development, digital gender gaps. Oftentimes they don’t remember that there’s a group of women in politics. So I would like to stress that whenever we are having interventions, we should have funding also allocated to support the training and the capacity, exactly like what Julie said. A lot of us are online, but we don’t know how to protect ourselves.

Very recently, I experienced the most horrific abuse through WhatsApp. Like, I have—I have experienced it a lot on other platforms, but it was the first time experiencing it in WhatsApp. So these are people I know in an WhatsApp group. And it went on for, like, four days. I didn’t want to leave the group, because I didn’t want to be seen like I’m running away, but it didn’t want to be seeing them. And you can’t help it, because they’re there. And I actually got to learn that you can archive the group, so you don’t see it. I just learned this, like, two weeks ago. So I can tell you.

But that was about, like, three or four days of excruciating, like, emotional rage. And you can’t do anything about it. You want to respond, but people are calling you, you know, you’re an MP. Don’t respond. So you’re keeping quiet. At the same time, you have to show up in Parliament, do your contributions. You have to show face and do all of that. But why should I be doing that? Why should I have to do that, you know?

MOIRA WHELAN: Absolutely. I want to back up to one thing. We’re going to go to two things. We have, like, less than five minutes, and I want us to do two things. One, we got a question from online. And I think one of the things we really tried to do here was show the completely different environments that we’re dealing with, right? We have Australia, we have Brazil, we have Tanzania.

And we got a question asking, we’ve all cited social media regulation as an opportunity here, but that’s a challenge, right? How do you regulate social media from all different perspectives and from all different countries, recognizing cultural challenges, recognizing the responsibilities they have to localize platforms? So I don’t know who wants it—who wants to pick up on the—on the regulation. Maybe Julie and Neema, quickly.

And then after that, what we’re going to do is you have a captive audience. We have the entire digital rights community here. We need to send them out with something to do. We’re all good at that. We’re going to give them a job. So be thinking quickly about what your job is for everyone in this room. But, Neema, and then Julie, and then we can kind of go around.

NEEMA LUGANGIRA: So very quickly, in terms of the regulation, I think one is we cannot avoid regulating social media, but the issue is how to regulate because we still want the environment—you don’t want it to be stringent. And we can learn from other countries who have done it. But the bottom line is, especially for Global South countries who don’t have that muscle that Global North have, what I would like to say is when Global North are negotiating with social media companies, getting into agreements, they should insert requirements that the same behavior they do in their bloc—in the EU or the US, Canada, Australia—they should also behave the same way in Africa. We’re seeing the same thing with data protection. They are doing a great job in the EU, horrible job in Africa.

MOIRA WHELAN: That’s a good point.

We’re going to flip it over really quick to Julie and then, Tracy, you’re up with your pitch. So go ahead, Julie, if you want to jump in on that one.

JULIE INMAN GRANT: I was just going to say, you know, the challenge is that laws are national and local and the internet is global.

Moira, you’re aware that we just issued a number of mandatory codes and are working on standards that will apply to eight different sectors of the technology industry. This has to do with illegal and harmful content, specifically child sexual abuse material and terrorist and violent extremist content. But it isn’t very easy for these global technology companies to sort of quarantine their activities just to Australia, and that applies to safety as well. So the hope is as—you know, and like the European Commission deploying the Digital Services Act and possibly the AI Act, as we’ve seen with GDPR there should be systemic changes and reforms that happen.

But again, the really important thing in bringing different countries together with different needs, different levels of resourcing and funding, and even different political systems and approaches to regulation is going to be challenging. And one of the reasons we set up this global network is to prevent a splinternet so that countries coming onboard can learn from what is best practice.

You know, we did not have a playbook. We had to write it as we went along, and we’re happy to share those learnings. And there will be others who will engage and will try to something different that will be successful. So, again, it has to be a whole-of-society approach to tackling this.

MOIRA WHELAN: Absolutely.

So, Tracy, you have, ironically, like a tweet level because we have less than a minute and we’re going to try to get around. So Tracy, then Fernanda: What’s the pitch for everybody here?

TRACY CHOU: I actually want to comment on the regulation side, which is that regulation can also create the space for more solutions. So it doesn’t just have to be about the content or behaviors that are happening. The reason why Block Party had to shut down our classic product on Twitter was that there was no openness in the APIs, these programming interfaces. And what regulation can do here is require that openness such that we can have these consumer solutions. There’s a bill in the New York State Senate introduced this legislative session, S.6686, which introduces this concept. So just want to put that pitch out there for on the regulation side what we can do.

The other one-line pitch is Block Party has a new product called Privacy Party, and this is making it so that we are teaching people what they should do to be safe online and also helping to automate that. So we have automated playbooks for you to lock down your social media settings. Check it out. Give us feedback. And we want to keep building these tools to help keep people safe.

MOIRA WHELAN: Thank you so much, Tracy.

And Fernanda, last word.

FERNANDA MARTINS: I think the next step is to change the way that we are looking at indigenous, women, Black people, and LGBTQAI+ community because we are—we have been seen as a problem to solve, but we are part of the solution. So we need to be included. The digital rights field need to be include these people, these communities to solve the problem together.

MOIRA WHELAN: Absolutely. And I would also say none of us have mentioned it, but we need more male allies. So any of you are out there, we need men in all of these companies, in government, in civil society joining us in this conversation. So we hope to see—that’s a mantle I would take.

So thank you all for joining us today. Have a great RightsCon. Really appreciate everyone being so brave to share your individual stories.

FERNANDA MARTINS: Thank you.

JULIE INMAN GRANT: Thank you.

TRACY CHOU: Thank you.

NEEMA LUGANGIRA: Thank you.

The post The international community must protect women politicians from abuse online. Here’s how. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Satellite imagery analysis captures flood threat after dam’s destruction

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 08 Jun 2023 12:00:00 +0000

Security

Nova Kakhovka dam rupture floods acres of civilian settlements in Kherson Oblast

Fighting between Russian volunteers and Russian army escalates in Belgorod Oblast

Interference on satellite imagery points to enhanced military activity on the border between Belgorod and Kharkiv prior to saboteur raid

Tracking narratives

Pro-Kremlin sources contradict each other in laying blame for Nova Kakhovka dam destruction

Deepfake impersonating Putin ‘declares’ martial law in Russian regions bordering Ukraine

Russia recycles false narrative that Ukraine plans to use a ‘dirty bomb’

Nova Kakhovka dam rupture floods acres of civilian settlements in Kherson Oblast

On June 6, satellite imagery published by Maxar confirmed the collapse of the Nova Kakhovka dam in Ukraine. The dam is located downstream of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, and upstream of the city of Kherson, in southeast Ukraine. Ukraine and Russia continue to blame each other for its destruction.

For months, Russian and Ukrainian armed forces have been facing each other on either side of the riverbank, as Ukraine retook the city of Kherson after Russia claimed to have evacuated the city as “a gesture of good will.” The contents of the Kakhovka reservoir have been flowing downstream into the Kherson region ever since the dam’s rupture, resulting in the flooding of acres of civilian settlements stretching from near the dam down to the mouth of the river along the Black Sea.

The DFRLab collected data from MapZen using Sentinel’s EOBrowser platform. The imagery notably contains a digital elevation model enabling the DFRLab to model high risk areas subject to floods. Using geographic analysis relying on raster calculations, a technique for mapping individual pixels to altitude data, the DFRLab assessed two scenarios of potential flooding downstream of Nova Kakhovka. This information was cross-referenced with other data posted by Russian opposition Telegram channel Agentstvo to assess the extent of the flood.

An animated map showing potential locations subjected to flooding hazards as a result of the rupture of the Nova Kakhovka dam. (Source: MapZen via ESA/Sentinel EOBrowser, annotations: DFRLab)

Agentstvo geolocated footage taken by civilians on either side of the river. The DFRLab added these locations to the above map in an attempt to compare the modeled area to the actual reported locations of flooding. As of June 6, the mapped locations are consistent with areas that would flood if the river rose by just two meters. Footage shows parts of Kherson also subjected to inundation.

Additionally, security concerns are growing as mines located on both sides of the riverbank are at risk of exploding as a result of the rising water level. The Ukrainian Independent Information Agency reported that some Russian mines had already detonated. Villagers and inhabitants on alluvial islands and in Kherson were forced to leave their homes. Furthermore, Russia and Ukraine are blaming one another for the destruction of the dam. While Ukrainian officials accused Russia of bombing the Kakhovka dam to undermine Ukraine’s counteroffensive efforts, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said Ukraine committed a “terrorist attack” to “prevent a Russian attack.”

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, security, Brussels, Belgium

Fighting between Russian volunteers and Russian army escalates in Belgorod Oblast

The fighting continues in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast, a short distance from Ukraine’s northeastern border, but details about the situation remain murky. The Russian Volunteer Corps, an anti-Putin military unit made of Russian pro-Ukrainian partisans, and the Freedom of Russia Legion said they carried out a number of attacks in the region, while Moscow claims to have repelled several attacks.

The Freedom of Russia Legion announced it had destroyed two Russian army tanks, one BMP infantry fighting vehicle, and one BRDM armored vehicle near the Shebekino border crossing in Belgorod on the night of June 4. The veracity of the claim has not been independently verified, however. On June 4, another unconfirmed report appeared on the Telegram channel of Ukrainian journalist Andrii Tsaplienko, citing an unnamed military officer, claiming the Russian army shelled a settlement in the Belgorod region. There have been signs of fighters from the Russian Volunteer Corps being active in Belgorod, so shelling the region could signal an escalation. In addition, the Russian Telegram channel Brief reported that the Ukrainian army shelled Novaya Tavolzhanka in Belgorod Oblast on June 5; this too has not been confirmed. Another Russian Telegram channel reported explosions in Grayvoron, Belgorod Oblast that same day.

One day earlier, the Russian Volunteer Corps said on Telegram that a Polish volunteer unit has been fighting “shoulder-to-shoulder for the freedom and independence of Ukraine for several months.” According to the statement, Russian and Polish fighters jointly carried out “a number of operations” in the areas of Orikhiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Bakhmut. The Polish unit, known as the Polish Volunteer Corps (Polski Korpus Ochotniczy), has published videos of its operations in Bakhmut and Zaporizhzhia on their Telegram channel, which was created in February 2023. According to the Russian Volunteer Corps, the Polish fighters are providing military and medical logistics only within the state borders of Ukraine. The information published by the two military units on Telegram have not been verified independently.

The Polish government has denied it has any involvement with Polish volunteer units. Stanisław Żaryn, the secretary of state for the chancellery of the prime minister of Poland, said on Twitter that the Polish Volunteer Corps are “in no way associated with the Polish Armed Forces or any Polish institution.” According to Polish media outlet Defence 24, the Polish Volunteer Corps was created in February 2023 and operates as part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The Polish Volunteer Corps reportedly posted on its Telegram channel that they participated in the combat mission in Belgorod alongside the Russian Volunteer Corps. The Telegram post reportedly argued that “all returned from the mission safely. The task was completed successfully.” However, it appears that the post was later removed, as there are currently no posts in the Telegram channel containing information about the participation of Polish units in the Belgorod raid.

Russian Volunteer Corps fighters also claimed to be holding captive Russian soldiers who were handed over to Ukrainian forces because authorities in Belgorod had shown no desire to retrieve them. At the 1:26 mark in a video posted on June 4 to the Telegram channel of the Russian Volunteer Corps, a dozen men in Russian uniforms are seen. It is possible the men were captured during fighting between the militants and the Russian army in the village of Novaya Tavolzhanka in Belgorod Oblast, though this is unconfirmed. According to The New Voice of Ukraine, the volunteer fighters reached out to Belgorod Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov with an offer to return the captured soldiers as a goodwill gesture. In return, they asked for a private audience with the governor to discuss the present state of the region. The governor has reportedly not responded to the request. Previously, Gladkov described the fighters as “those fascists,” and said they were responsible for “daily civilian deaths.” The Freedom of Russia Legion also claimed to be holding Russian soldiers captive in a video published on their Telegram channel on June 5.

Meanwhile, the Armed Forces of Ukraine stated that Russian forces on June 4 and 5 conducted offensive actions in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, with the Ukrainian military fighting the Russian army near Novoselivske and Bilohorivka in Luhansk and Ivanivske and Marinka in Donetsk. Ukrainian forces also alleged that a Russian saboteur group attempted to infiltrate the border near Zelene in Kharkiv Oblast. Ukraine added that settlements in Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson were shelled by Russia, including a building belonging to Kherson State University.

Meanwhile, Sky News obtained a purported arms contract detailing a purchase agreement between Russia and Iran. According to the contract, Iran supplies Russia with tank and artillery ammunition, as well as barrels for T-72 tanks and howitzers. The sixteen-page document, which has not been independently verified, is dated September 14, 2022, and presents samples of variously sized artillery and tank shells and rockets worth just more than one million dollars.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

—Givi Gigitashivili, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

Interference on satellite imagery points to enhanced military activity on the border between Belgorod and Kharkiv prior to saboteur raid

A map showing interference patterns caught on SAR Imagery by Sentinel-1 on May 18, 2023 (Source: ESA/Sentinel-1, annotations: DFRLab)

Satellite Aperture Radar (SAR) imagery from May 18 released by the European Space Agency’s Sentinel-1 satellite shows massive levels of interference in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast. The DFRLab previously reported on similar interference patterns observed in the Black Sea and in Belgorod throughout April 2023. The May 18 imagery indicates that more prominent interference activity took place in Belgorod Oblast, with patterns stretching several hundred kilometers. The imagery was obtained just after midnight local time that morning as the satellite was flying over the border with Kharkiv.

Simultaneously, consistent reports of aerial activity in Belgorod, including missile launches, emerged on Telegram. These patterns were observed nearly one week prior to the Russian Volunteer Corps’ raids in Russia’s border outposts of Shebekino and Grayvoron.

Several smaller interference patterns also stretch east of Kharkiv in Ukraine. These could also be consistent with reports from the Telegram channel Kharkiv Live which indicated Russian aviation raids and artillery rocket launches between 11:58 pm and 12:31 am local time. Local authorities issued an air raid alert between 12:31 and 1:01 am.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Pro-Kremlin sources contradict each other in laying blame for Nova Kakhovka dam destruction

Pro-Russian Telegram channels, sometimes referred to as “Z channels,” began reporting on the Nova Kakhovka dam around 3:00 am Moscow time, stating that the shelling of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant occurred at 2:35 am. Initially, Vladimir Leontev, the Russian-installed mayor of occupied Novaya Kahovka, denied any explosion, shelling, or damage to the dam. In an interview with Kremlin-owned RIA Novosti, Leontev said, “That’s bullshit! Everything is fine, everything is fine everywhere; I just got on the [police] radio. Everywhere everything is normal in the city; everything is quiet and calm.” Further, Kremlin-owned TASS quoted an unnamed source from the Russian authorities as saying, “It was quiet at night. There was no shelling. The dam could not stand, one support collapsed, and flooding began.”

Later, the narrative changed. In a video, Leontev said, “At about 2:00 am there was shelling on Kahovka dam and its valves were destroyed.” RIA Novosti blamed the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the damage that caused the “unregulated discharge of water.” The pro-Kremlin Telegram channel Swodki commented, “Russian positions are located on the lower Dnipro riverbank. The flow of water can erode the line of [Russian] defense on the coast and prevent and repel a potential boat landing of an aircraft of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.” In addition, former Russian commander Igor “Strelkov” Girkin, who played a crucial role in forming the separatist movement in the Donbas, suggested that the dam’s destruction helped Ukrainian forces advance militarily.

The exact cause of its destruction remains unknown. The New York Times reported that some experts believe it was “probably breached” by an “internal blast,” but acknowledged this assessment should be treated “cautiously.” Pro-Ukraine social media pointed fingers at Russia causing the breach, but at times the debate was muddled due to sharing of old footage capturing the explosion of a bridge adjacent to the facility in November 2022.

Meanwhile, some social media posts from pro-Kremlin fighters suggested the dam’s destruction benefits Russia. For example, Russian solider Yegor Guzenko suggested on his Telegram channel Separ13_13 that the destruction of the dam was in Russia’s favor. In one video, he said, “Whoever did it, it is good if no Russian Army soldier suffers. Then it does not matter who did it even if it were [Ukrainians] themselves.” Later, he posted about why the destruction might have been in Ukraine’s favor.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

Deepfake impersonating Putin ‘declares’ martial law in Russian regions bordering Ukraine

On June 5, Russian television and radio stations broadcast a clip featuring a deepfake of President Vladimir Putin. In the fabricated “emergency address,” the impersonated Russian president reportedly declared, “Ukrainian troops, armed by the NATO bloc with the consent and support of Washington, invaded the territories of the Kursk, Belgorod, and Bryansk regions.” The Putin deepfake then “announced” martial law in these regions and said that he plans to sign an executive order declaring a general mobilization throughout the country.

The incident was reported in the Russian oblasts of Voronezh, Bryansk, and Belgorod. These regions sit along the border with Ukraine, where frequent drone attacks are reported and armed group incursions forced some to evacuate in May. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov declared that Putin did not address the nation and confirmed that “a hack occurred in several regions.” According to Peskov and information posted on the Telegram channel Ukraine Informer, radio stations also broadcast the same message.

Russian State Duma members of parliament have set out to draft a law enforcing the labeling of content created by neural networks.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Russia recycles false narrative that Ukraine plans to use a ‘dirty bomb’

On June 6, the same day the Novo Kakhovka dam was destroyed, Russia shared a new iteration of its narrative that accuses Ukraine of planning to use a “dirty bomb” against Russia.

Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) published a statement in which the agency claimed to have “received additional information on the involvement of the Ukrainian special services in the planning and preparation of acts of international terrorism.” The FSB claimed that Ukraine created an air unit to supply “sabotage and reconnaissance groups on Russian territory” with “dirty bombs.” The statement alleged that Ukraine planned to place dirty bombs in various places, detonate them simultaneously, and “make areas [in Russia] unsuitable for human habitation.”

The DFRLab has previously covered Russian attempts to spread similar disinformation in order to prime audiences for the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and justify the war. Since then, the DFRLab have observed multiple instances of Russian officials accusing Kyiv of plotting to use a “dirty bomb.”

— Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Satellite imagery analysis captures flood threat after dam’s destruction appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Activists and experts assemble in Costa Rica to protect human rights in the digital age

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Wed, 07 Jun 2023 20:21:18 +0000

Will the world’s human-rights defenders be able to match the pace of quickly moving technological challenges arising from artificial intelligence, information wars, and more?

Rights activists, tech leaders, and other stakeholders are meeting at RightsCon Costa Rica on June 5-8 to collectively set an agenda for advancing human rights in this digital age.

Our experts at the Digital Forensic Research Lab are coordinating part of that effort, with a slate of RightsCon events as part of their 360/Open Summit: Around the World global programming. Below are highlights from the events at RightsCon, which cover digital frameworks in Africa, disinformation in Ukraine, online harassment of women globally, and more.

The latest from San José

Rethinking transparency reporting

Human rights must be central in the African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy

Day two wraps with a warning about dangerous threats, from militant accelerationism to violence toward women

What’s behind today’s militant accelerationism?

The digital ecosystem’s impact on women’s political participation

Day one wraps with recommendations for Africa’s digital transformation, Venezuela’s digital connectivity, and an inclusionary web

What does a trustworthy web look like?

Mapping—and addressing—Venezuela’s information desert

Where open-source intelligence meets human-rights advocacy

Rethinking transparency reporting

On Day 3 of RightsCon Costa Rica, Rose Jackson, director of the DFRLab’s Democracy & Tech Initiative, joined panelists Frederike Kaltheuner, director for technology and human rights at Human Rights Watch, and David Green, civil liberties director at Electronic Frontier Foundation, for a panel on rethinking transparency reporting. The discussion was led and moderated by Gemma Shields, Online Safety Policy Lead at the United Kingdom’s Office of Communications (Ofcom).

Shields opened the session by describing the online safety bill currently making its way through the UK parliament and the role of Ofcom in its implementation. The bill will give new powers to Ofcom to test mandatory platform transparency reporting requirements. Through these efforts, Ofcom hopes that “good, effective meaningful transparency reporting might encourage proactive action from the platforms,” Shields explained.

During the discussion, the panelists discussed what will be central to implementation of the online safety bill, including what effective transparency reporting looks like. Kaltheuner emphasized the complexity of defining meaningful transparency when the use cases vary across end users, regulators, civil society, journalists, and academics. Green underscored the importance of centering user needs in the conversation and the need to tailor reporting mandates to specific platforms.

Jackson noted that it is a strategic imperative for the UK government to consult experts from the global majority and consider how regulations and norms could be potentially used for harm by non-democratic actors. As Jackson put it, “what happens in the most unprotected spaces is the beta test for what will show up in your backyard.” She also highlighted the importance of global civil society engaging with the UK Online Safety Bill and European transparency regulations, such as the Digital Services Act, because these policies are first movers in codifying more regulation, and future policies will refer back to these efforts.

Human rights must be central in the African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy

The DFRLab gathered stakeholders from the policy-making, democracy, rights, and tech communities across the African continent to discuss the African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy. Participants compared notes and identified opportunities for increasing the strategy’s human-rights focus as it approaches its mid-mandate review. Participants also agreed that trusted conveners, such as watchdog agencies within national governments, can play a critical facilitating role in ensuring effective communication between experts, users, and civil society on one hand and policymakers and elected officials on the other. Discussion of particular concerns with the Strategy or recommendations to increasingly center human rights in it will be continued in future gatherings.

Day two wraps with a warning about dangerous threats, from militant accelerationism to violence toward women

The DFRLab kicked off day two at RightsCon with a conversation on how Russian information operations, deployed ahead of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, were used to build false justifications for the war, deny responsibility for the war of aggression, and mask Russia’s military build-up. The panel also highlighted two DFRLab reports, released in February 2023, that examine Russia’s justifications for the war and Russia’s attempts to undermine Ukraine’s resistance and support from the international community.

Transcript

Jun 8, 2023

Mapping the last decade of Russia’s disinformation and influence campaign in Ukraine

By Atlantic Council

Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has continued its information operations, targeting more than just Ukraine, say speakers at a RightsCon event hosted by the Digital Forensic Research Lab.

Disinformation Russia

While at RightsCon, the DFRLab participated in a discussion on militant accelerationism, its impact on minority communities, and how bad actors can be held accountable. The event, hosted by the United Kingdom’s Office of Communications and Slovakia’s Council of Media Services, featured panelists who discussed the ways in which policy can hold all voices, including those of the powerful, accountable. During the panel, DFRLab Research Fellow Meghan Conroy discussed how such violent narratives have become increasingly commonplace in some American ideologies and how extremist individuals and groups sympathetic to these narratives have been mobilized.

To close out the day, the DFRLab and the National Democratic Institute co-hosted a panel featuring global experts from civil society, government, and industry on how the threat of violence and harassment online has impacted the potential for women to participate in politics. As noted by the panelists, abuse suffered online is meant to strictly intimidate and silence those who want to get involved, and it is, therefore, all the more important that these very women, and those already established, stand up and speak out so as to serve as role models and protect diversity and equity in politics, tech, and beyond.

What’s behind today’s militant accelerationism?

By Meghan Conroy

While at RightsCon, I—a DFRLab research fellow and co-founder of the Accelerationism Research Consortium—joined an event hosted by the UK Office of Communications and Slovakia’s Council of Media Services on militant accelerationism.

My co-panelists and I provided an overview of militant accelerationism and an explanation of the marginalized groups that have been targets of militant accelerationist violence. I discussed accelerationist narratives that have not only permeated mainstream discourse but have also mobilized extremists to violence. Hannah Rose, research fellow and PhD candidate at King’s College London’s International Centre for the Study of Radicalization, zeroed in on the role of conspiracy theories in enabling the propagation of these extreme worldviews.

Stanislav Matějka, head of the Analytical Department at the Slovakian Council of Media Services, delved into the October 2022 attack in Bratislava. He flagged the role of larger, more mainstream platforms as well as filesharing services in enabling the spread of harmful content preceding the attack. Murtaza Shaikh, principal at the UK Office of Communications for illegal harms and hate and terrorism, highlighted the office’s work on the May 2022 attack in Buffalo, New York. He raised that these attacks result, in part, from majority populations framing themselves as under threat by minority populations, and then taking up arms against those minority populations.

Attendees then broke into groups to discuss regulatory solutions and highlight obstacles that may stand in the way of those solutions’ implementation or effectiveness. Key takeaways included the following:

Powerful voices need to be held to account. Politicians, influencers, and large platforms have played an outsized role in enabling the mainstreaming and broad reach of these worldviews.
Bad actors will accuse platforms and regulators of censorship, regardless of the extent to which content is moderated. As aforementioned, they’ll often position themselves as victims of oppression, and doing so in the context of content moderation policies is no different—even if the accusations are not rooted in reality.
Regulators must capitalize on existing expertise. Ahost of experts who monitor these actors, groups, and narratives across platforms, as well as their offline activities, can help regulators and platforms craft creative, adaptive, and effective policies to tackle the nebulous set of problems linked to militant accelerationism.

This conversation spurred some initial ideas that are geared toward generating more substantial discussion. Introducing those unfamiliar with understudied and misunderstood concepts, like militant accelerationism, is of the utmost importance to permit more effective combatting of online harms and their offline manifestations—especially those that have proven deadly.

Meghan Conroy is a US research fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

The digital ecosystem’s impact on women’s political participation

By Abigail Wollam

The DFRLab and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) co-hosted a panel that brought together four global experts from civil society, government, and industry to discuss a shared and prevalent issue: The threat of digital violence and harassment that women face online, and the impact that it has on women’s participation in political life.

The panel was facilitated by Moira Whelan, director for democracy and technology at NDI; she opened the conversation by highlighting how critical these conversations are, outlining the threat to democracy posed by digital violence. She noted that as online harassment towards women becomes more prevalent, women are self-censoring and removing themselves from online spaces. “Targeted misogynistic abuse is designed to silence voices,” added panelist Julia Inman Grant, the eSafety commissioner of Australia.

Both Neema Lugangira (chairperson for the African Parliamentary Network on Internet Governance and member of parliament in Tanzania) and Tracy Chou (founder and chief executive officer of Block Party) spoke about their experiences with online harassment and how those experiences spurred their actions in the space. Lugangira found, through her experience as a female politician in Tanzania, that the more outspoken or visible a woman is, the more abuse she gets. She observed that women might be less inspired to participate in political life because they see the abuse other women face—and the lack of defense or support these women get from other people. “I decided that since we’re a group that nobody speaks for… I’m going to speak for women in politics,” said Lugangira.

Chou said that she faced online harassment when she became an activist for diversity, equity, and inclusion in the tech community. She wanted to address the problem that she was facing herself and founded Block Party, a company that builds tools to combat online harassment.

Despite these challenges, the panelists discussed potential solutions and ways forward. Australia is leading by example with its eSafety commissioner and Online Safety Act, which provide Australians with an avenue through which to report online abuses and receive assistance. Fernanda Martins, director of InternetLab, discussed the need to change how marginalized communities that face gendered abuse are seen and talked about; instead of talking about the community as a problem, it’s important to see them as part of the solution and bring them into the discussions.

Abigail Wollam is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab

Transcript

Jun 8, 2023

The international community must protect women politicians from abuse online. Here’s how.

By Atlantic Council

At RightsCon, human-rights advocates and tech leaders who have faced harassment online detail their experiences—and ways the international community can support women moving forward.

Disinformation Resilience & Society

.@rightscon Day 2 in the books! Stay tuned, still more to come with @DFRLab #360OS. pic.twitter.com/V8KapT1PVb
— DFRLab (@DFRLab) June 7, 2023

Day one wraps with recommendations for Africa’s digital transformation, Venezuela’s digital connectivity, and an inclusionary web

This year at RightsCon Costa Rica, the DFRLab previewed its forthcoming Task Force for a Trustworthy Future Web report and gathered human-rights defenders and tech leaders to talk about digital frameworks in Africa, disinformation in Latin America and Ukraine, and the impact online harassment has on women in political life, and what’s to come with the European Union’s Digital Services Act.

Transcript

Jun 8, 2023

The European Commission’s Rita Wezenbeek on what comes next in implementing the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act

By Atlantic Council

At a DFRLab RightsCon event, Wezenbeek spoke about the need to get everyone involved in the implementation of the DSA and DMA.

Disinformation European Union

The programming kicked off on June 5 with the Digital Sherlocks training program in San José, which marked the first time the session was conducted in both English and Spanish. The workshop aimed to provide human-rights defenders with the tools and skills they need to build movements that are resilient to disinformation.

On June 6, the programming opened with a meeting on centering human rights in the African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy. The DFRLab gathered stakeholders from democracy, rights, and tech communities across the African continent to discuss the African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy. Participants compared notes and identified opportunities for impact as the strategy approaches its mid-mandate review.

Next, the DFRLab, Venezuela Inteligente, and Access Now hosted a session on strengthening Venezuela’s digital information ecosystem, a coalition-building meeting with twenty organizations. The discussion drew from a DFRLab analysis of Venezuela’s needs and capabilities related to the country’s media ecosystems and digital security, literacy, and connectivity. The speakers emphasized ways to serve vulnerable groups.

Following these discussions, the DFRLab participated a dialogue previewing findings from the Task Force for a Trustworthy Future Web. The DFRLab’s Task Force is convening a broad cross-section of industry, civil-society, and government leaders to set a clear and action-oriented agenda for future online ecosystems. As the Task Force wraps up its report, members discussed one of the group’s major findings: the importance of inclusionary design in product, policy, and regulatory development. To close out the first day of DFRLab programming at RightsCon Costa Rica, the task force notified the audience that it will be launching its report in the coming weeks.

What does a trustworthy web look like?

By Jacqueline Malaret and Abigail Wollam

The DFRLab’s Task Force for a Trustworthy Future Web is charting a clear and action-oriented roadmap for future online ecosystems to protect users’ rights, support innovation, and center trust and safety principles. As the Task Force is wrapping up its report, members joined Task Force Director Kat Duffy to discuss one of the Task Force’s major findings—the importance of inclusionary design in product, policy, and regulatory development—on the first day of RightsCon Costa Rica.

In just eight weeks, Elon Musk took over Twitter, the cryptocurrency market crashed, ChatGPT launched, and major steps have been made in the development of augmented reality and virtual reality, fundamentally shifting the landscape of how we engage with technology. Framing the panel, Duffy highlighted how not only has technology changed at a breakneck pace, but the development and professionalization of the trust and safety industry have unfolded rapidly in tandem, bringing risks, harms, and opportunities to make the digital world safer for all.

Task Force for a Trustworthy Future Web

The Task Force for a Trustworthy Future Web will chart a clear and action-oriented roadmap for future online ecosystems to protect users’ rights, support innovation, and center trust and safety principles.

The three panelists—Agustina del Campo, director of the Center for Studies on Freedom of Expression; Nighat Dad, executive director of the Digital Rights Foundation; and Victoire Rio, a digital-rights advocate—agreed that the biggest risk, which could yield the greatest harm, is shaping industry practices through a Western-centric lens, without allowing space for the global majority. Excluding populations from the conversation around tech only solidifies the mistakes of the past and risks creating a knowledge gap. Additionally, the conversation touched on the risk of losing sight of the role of government, entrenching self-regulation as an industry norm, and absolving both companies and the state for harms that can occur because of the adoption of these technologies.

Where there is risk, there is also an opportunity to build safer and rights-respecting technologies. Panelists said that they found promise in the professionalization and organization of industry, which can create a space for dialogue and for civil society to engage and innovate in the field. They are also encouraged that more and more industry engagements are taking place within the structures of international law and universal human rights. The speakers were encouraged by new opportunities to shape regulation in a way that coalesces action around systemic and forward-looking solutions.

But how can industry, philanthropy, and civil society maximize these opportunities? There is an inherent need to support civil society that is already deeply engaged in this work and to help develop this field, particularly in the global majority. There is also a need to pursue research that can shift the narrative to incentivize investment in trust and safety teams and articulate a clear case for the existence of this work.

Jacqueline Malaret is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab

Abigail Wollam is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab

Mapping—and addressing—Venezuela’s information desert

By Iria Puyosa and Daniel Suárez Pérez

On June 6, the DFRLab, Venezuela Inteligente, and Access Now (which runs RightsCon) hosted a coalition-building meeting with twenty organizations that are currently working on strengthening Venezuela’s digital information ecosystem. The discussion was built on an analysis, conducted by the DFRLab, of the country’s media ecosystems and digital security, literacy, and connectivity; the speakers focused on ways to serve vulnerable groups such as grassroots activists, human-rights defenders, border populations, and populations in regions afflicted by irregular armed groups.

The idea of developing a pilot project in an information desert combining four dimensions—connectivity, relevant information, security, and literacy—was discussed. Participants agreed that projects should combine technical solutions to increase access to connectivity and generate relevant information for communities, with a human-rights focus. In addition, projects should include a digital- and media-literacy component and continuous support for digital security.

Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab

Daniel Suárez Pérez is a research associate for Latin America at the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab

What a great first day for @DFRLab’s #360OS at @rightscon Costa Rica! We’ll be in San José all week so stay tuned for more great content. pic.twitter.com/JGzIzp4sKD
— DFRLab (@DFRLab) June 5, 2023

Where open-source intelligence meets human-rights advocacy

By Ana Arriagada

On June 5, the DFRLab hosted a Digital Sherlocks workshop on strengthening human-rights advocacy through open-source intelligence (OSINT) and countering disinformation.

Learn more about the Digital Sherlocks program

The Digital Sherlocks program convenes a global community of researchers to build resilience against disinformation. Each semester, the program offers more than thirty free online trainings, ranging from basic to advanced levels, to cohorts drawn from universities, civil society, journalism, and academia. Through the Digital Sherlocks program, the DFRLab has trained at least 2,300 people in over 130 countries.

I co-led the workshop with DFRLab Associate Researchers Jean le Roux, Daniel Suárez Pérez, and Esteban Ponce de León.

In the session, attendees discussed the worrying rise of antidemocratic governments in Latin America—such as in Nicaragua and Guatemala—who are using open-source tools for digital surveillance and are criminalizing the work of journalists and human-rights defenders. When faced with these challenges, it becomes imperative for civil-society organizations to acquire and use investigative skills to produce well-documented reports and investigations.

During the workshop, DFRLab researchers shared their experiences investigating paid campaigns that spread disinformation or promote violence or online harassment. They recounted having used an array of tools to analyze the origin and behavior of these paid advertisements.

DFRLab researchers also discussed tools that helped them detect suspicious activity on platforms such as YouTube, where, for example, some gamer channels spread videos related to disinformation campaigns or political violence. The workshop attendees also discussed how policy changes at Twitter have made the platform increasingly challenging to investigate, but they added that open-source researchers are still investigating, thanks to the help of available tools and the researchers’ creative methodologies.

The workshop also showcased the DFRLab’s work with the Action Coalition on Meaningful Transparency (ACT). Attendees received a preview of ACT’s upcoming portal launch, for which the DFRLab has been offering guidance. The new resource will offer access to a repository of transparency reporting, policy documents, and analysis from companies, governments, and civil society. It will also include a registry of relevant actors and initiatives, and it will allow users to establish links between entries to see the connections between organizations, the initiatives they are involved in, and the reports they have published.

The workshop ended with the DFRLab explaining that social network analysis— the study of social relationships and structures using graph theory—is important because it allows for investigating suspicious activity or unnatural behavior exhibited by users on social media platforms.

Ana Arriagada is an assistant director for Latin America at the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab

The post Activists and experts assemble in Costa Rica to protect human rights in the digital age appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Moscow is on edge after the latest drone attack

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 01 Jun 2023 13:53:17 +0000

Security

Alleged Ukrainian drones conduct attack in Moscow region

International response

Georgian prime minister blames NATO for Russia’s war in Ukraine

Alleged Ukrainian drones conduct attack in Moscow region

One week after the incursion in the Belgorod region allegedly orchestrated by Russian Volunteer Corps, Russia’s border has become more permeable to Ukrainian attacks. Nearly a month after the first attack against the Kremlin’s Senate building in Moscow, another drone attack was reported in the morning of May 30.

Reports posted on Telegram channel SHOT revealed footage taken by civilians showing drones and explosions in suburban Moscow. Throughout the day, Moscow Oblast Governor Andrey Vorobyov and Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin confirmed several drones had struck various locations, which resulted in evacuation of civilians. According to Russian media outlet Mediazona, drones hit residential buildings in three different parts of the city. Two civilians were reportedly injured, although their condition did not require them to be hospitalized; there were no reported fatalities.

Russian officials, including government spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, accused “the Kyiv regime” of orchestrating the attack as “retaliation for effective drone attacks against Kyiv’s decision-making centers on Sunday [May 29]”. This theory was also embraced by Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose comments also referenced the “effective work of the air defense systems.” Meduza reported that the Kremlin ordered Russian media to cover the drone attacks using specific talking points, though this has not been independently confirmed. In contrast, the Moscow Prosecutor’s Office recommended that bloggers and the media refrain from commenting on the incident, as unverified claims would be punishable by law. The Moscow Investigative Committee launched an investigation into the drone attacks as an act of “terrorism.”

Meduza additionally geolocated drones that appeared in open-source footage, and estimated that between five to seven UAVs were downed in the Moscow area. Other unconfirmed reports from the opposition Telegram channel Baza claimed twenty-five drones took part in the attack, while Telegram channel SHOT reported on thirty-two drones. These figures remain unconfirmed, however. There were also conflicting estimates on the number of drones successfully intercepted by Russian air defense systems; while Russia’s defense ministry claimed only eight drones were shot down, SHOT reported nineteen drones as intercepted and destroyed.

Although Ukraine has not claimed responsibility for the attack, one piece of footage points at an alleged UJ-22 airborne drone of Ukrainian fabrication. Despite circumstantial evidence which could indicate Ukraine’s direct involvement, presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak denied the allegations. Information posted by opposition media outlet Agentstvo quoting a tweet by Foreign Policy Research Institute Senior Fellow Rob Lee, indicated that the drones responsible for the May 30 attack appear to be the same ones that conducted another attack on May 26 in Russia’s Krasnodar region.

Meanwhile, a report posted by Mediazona quoting a list published by Russian MP Alexander Khinshtein regarding the alleged locations of the drone suggested they may have targeted the houses of oligarchs in Moscow’s wealthy Rublyovka neighborhood. While this has not been confirmed, a separate report posted by the Telegram channel Baza alluded to an orchestrated attack in the same area.

This is the second drone attack reported in the Russian capital city since the May 3 drone attack against the senate building of the Kremlin. The DFRLab reported on that incident and assessed that defense countermeasures, including a ban on flying commercial drones, would likely be enforced as a defensive measure. GPS interference data also indicated elevated levels of GPS interference on May 30 in the Moscow area. This information would be consistent with an assessment expressed by Russian businessman and former Roskosmos chief Dmitry Rogozin, who proposed suspending GPS across Russia.

Lastly, on June 1, multiple sources reported movements of the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Free Russia Legion in the villages Shebekino and Novaya Tavolzhaka in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast, adjacent to the Ukrainian border. The oblast’s governor reported shelling by Grad rockets and initiated an evacuation of the local population to Belgorod Arena stadium, in the region’s capital. The DFRLab will continue to monitor the situation.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Georgian prime minister blames NATO for Russia’s war in Ukraine

Speaking at the GLOBSEC forum in Bratislava, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili claimed that NATO enlargement was to blame for Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a long-standing Kremlin narrative used to justify Russia’s war in Ukraine.

“I think everybody knows the reason… one of the main reasons was NATO, NATO enlargement,” Garibashvili said, adding that “Ukraine’s determination” to become a NATO member state had its “consequences.” According to recent polling by IRI, 80 percent of Georgians support the country joining NATO.

Several Kremlin-owned and pro-Kremlin outlets quoted Garibashvili and used his remarks to reinforce pro-war narratives. The outlets also reported on additional comments made by the prime minister during GLOBSEC on how the Georgian government is “setting a good precedent by maintaining peace and stability in a turbulent environment.”

The DFRLab has previously covered how the Georgian Dream-led government and the Kremlin spread similar narratives blaming the West for orchestrating protests in Georgia.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Moscow is on edge after the latest drone attack appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s new reality: Less Peter the Great, more Putin the Pariah

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 30 May 2023 20:40:09 +0000

Will Vladimir Putin dare to visit the BRICS summit in South Africa this August? In previous years, his attendance would have been taken for granted, but war crimes charges brought by the International Criminal Court in March 2023 are fueling speculation that he could face arrest if he decides to risk the trip. As a signatory to the Rome Statute that established the ICC, South Africa is technically obliged to arrest Putin.

Reports this week suggest the South African government may be seeking to bypass its obligations to the ICC by granting all summit participants diplomatic immunity, but officials also stressed that immunity “does not override any warrant that may have been issued by any international tribunal against any attendee of the conference.” Even if Putin receives assurances that he will not be detained in Cape Town itself, traveling to the summit would involve considerable uncertainty due to the potential for emergency landings in numerous other jurisdictions where apprehension would be possible.

Many commentators still regard the entire notion of arresting Vladimir Putin as somewhat far-fetched. Nevertheless, the fact that his travel plans are now being shaped by the likelihood of detention speaks volumes about the Russian dictator’s dramatic fall from grace. Ten years ago, Putin was a member of the elite G8 group of world leaders and a permanent fixture at the top table of international affairs. Today, he is a wanted war crimes suspect who cannot leave his own country without first checking that he will not end up in jail.

On the rare occasions when Putin has traveled abroad since launching the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, his interactions with other heads of state have tended to underline his reduced status. For years, Putin was notorious for making world leaders such as Angela Merkel, Donald Trump, and Pope Francis wait while he arrived hours after the appointed time. With his position seriously undermined by the disastrous war in Ukraine, Putin is now the one doing the waiting. During a September 2022 conference in Uzbekistan, the leaders of Turkey, Azerbaijan, India, and Kyrgyzstan all left Putin standing as they arrived fashionably late for bilateral meetings.

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Putin’s geopolitical isolation looks even uglier when compared to the remarkable recent international ascent of his nemesis, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. In recent weeks, Zelenskyy has been lionized during high-profile visits to Rome, Berlin, Paris, and London; he has grabbed the headlines at the Arab League summit in Saudi Arabia and was the center of attention at the G7 summit in Japan. While everyone apparently wants to be seen alongside the Ukrainian leader, very few appear eager to stand with Putin.

This is not just a problem for Putin alone. Indeed, the toxicity engulfing his personal reputation has also led to Russia’s international ostracism. When the owner of popular dating apps Tinder and Hinge announced its departure from the Russian market in May 2023, company officials made clear that they could not afford the reputational damage of association with Vladimir Putin. “It’s not a good look for a trusted brand to be continuing operations in a nation where the head of state has been indicted by the International Criminal Court,” commented Match Group executive director Jeff Perkins.

Dating apps are only the tip of the iceberg, of course. A long list of global brands including McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, Nike, and Starbucks have exited or begun the process of leaving Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. European countries have pivoted away from Russian energy imports, leading to an historic loss of market share for the Kremlin. Russia is also finding it increasingly difficult to source the spare parts it needs to keep its war machine rolling due to chronic shortages caused by the unprecedented sanctions imposed by the West over the attack on Ukraine.

None of this was anticipated by Putin when he first gave the order to invade Ukraine early last year. Based on his prior experience of Western weakness following the 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 seizure of Crimea, Putin fully expected the democratic world to respond to his latest act of international aggression with vocal protests and symbolic sanctions before getting back to business as usual. This was an extremely costly miscalculation that has left Russia more isolated than at any time since the immediate aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution one hundred years ago.

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As something of an amateur historian, Putin must be painfully aware that he has brought his own country to one of its lowest points in centuries. He has long been preoccupied with his place in Russian history and has authored a number of lengthy historical essays that have been carefully crafted to justify his own deeply revisionist worldview. This obsession with the past has defined Putin’s entire reign and lies at the heart of his fateful decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Since coming to power at the turn of the millennium, Putin has consistently expressed his bitterness over the perceived historical injustice of the Soviet collapse. This has fed a vicious contempt for Ukrainian statehood, which he has come to view as the primary obstacle to his sacred mission of reuniting “historical Russia.” Putin is notorious for claiming Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), and has called Ukraine “an inalienable part of Russia’s own history, culture, and spiritual space.” In February 2022, he resolved to settle the matter once and for all.

From the very beginning of Russia’s invasion, the baleful influence of Putin’s historical baggage has been abundantly clear. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov acknowledged this on day one of the war, when he reportedly quipped that Putin only has three advisors: “Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and Catherine the Great.” Speaking months later in summer 2022, Putin confirmed the accuracy of Lavrov’s observation by publicly comparing his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Czar Peter.

With the war now in its sixteenth month, it is fair to say things have not gone according to plan for the would-be conqueror. Putin originally envisioned a blitzkrieg campaign that would rapidly extinguish Ukrainian independence and mark the dawn of a new Russian Empire. Instead, his soldiers have suffered a string of humiliating defeats that have shattered Russia’s reputation as a military superpower, and stand accused of sickening war crimes that have horrified the watching world.

For now, Putin remains defiant and insists his war aims will eventually be achieved, but it is difficult to see how Russia can hope to repair the damage done to its international standing. Instead, the decision to invade Ukraine looks set to be remembered as one of the greatest geopolitical blunders of the modern era. It has left Russia shunned and greatly diminished on the world stage, while earning Putin himself a place in infamy alongside history’s greatest criminals. He dreamed of emulating Peter the Great, but he has become Putin the Pariah.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Mackinder’s ideas have long held a fascination for those inclined to deterministic and reductive interpretations of international history. For most serious historians and foreign policy practitioners, however, his ideas are far too simplistic and doctrinaire to explain the full gamut of reasons for events in the past, or to facilitate realistic policy formulation in the present.

Mackinder’s arguments were very much of their time, especially in respect of the early twentieth century’s pervasive imperial thinking. His conclusions also reflect the military technologies then available. Attitudes toward imperialism have radically altered since Mackinder was writing, and technological development has generally acted to undermine many of his core assumptions.

Moreover, with the establishment of the Warsaw Pact following World War II, Moscow did establish control over Mackinder’s Heartland, which it then enjoyed for several decades. However, this in no way enabled the Kremlin to dominate the rest of the world.

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Far from being a story of Euro-Atlantic sea power moving to dominate the Heartland, NATO enlargement since 1997 has overwhelmingly been a response to dynamic lobbying by former Warsaw Pact members. Some, such as Poland, immediately sought sanctuary without waiting to see what sort of country the new Russian Federation might become. Others made applications once Putin and the clan which captured the Russian state at the turn of the millennium revealed their intention to reverse rather than manage Russia’s imperial decline.

In most cases, applications were met with initial skepticism by existing NATO members. Yet Patrushev ignores this and wholly removes agency from what he terms as the small states of Eastern Europe when he implies that NATO membership was imposed on them.

Overtures toward Moscow at the end of the Cold War that might have been read as condoning a sphere of influence were made in the expectation that the Russian Federation would develop into a democratic and rule of law-based society. Indeed, many of the applications to join NATO by former Warsaw Pact nations would not have been made if Russia had evolved meaningfully in that direction. Instead, Russia’s unreconstructed imperial mindset has been instrumental in persuading countries in Central and Eastern Europe that NATO membership is the only way to guarantee their national security.

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Patrushev promotes a conspiracy-driven view of the world that is all-too-common in today’s Russia. In reality, strong international support for Ukraine derives not from outdated geopolitical dogmas or anti-Russian agendas, but from a principled and realistic assessment of what is at stake for democratic, rule of law-based societies around the world should Russia prevail in its aggression. In other words, it is the gallantry of Ukrainians in defending the principles they have chosen, not the space Ukraine occupies on the map, which begets such broad support.

Patrushev’s interview contained a number of other idiosyncratic and occasionally lunatic assertions, which any countries engaging with Russia would do well to take note of when deciding how to calibrate their relations with Russia and Ukraine. His arguments may often appear absurd, but similar claims are regularly repeated by other Russian officials when addressing both domestic and international audiences.

Broad-based support for Ukraine and its Euro-Atlantic integration is far more about ideas and values than about early twentieth century geopolitical abstractions or other obscure theories. Indeed, it is Ukraine’s adoption and defense of core democratic principles which lie at the heart of Moscow’s fear and loathing.

Richard Cashman is an Adjunct Fellow at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

Russian media spins Australian solidarity rally for Julian Assange as an anti-NATO event

International response

US sanctions Armenian company for helping Russia evade sanctions

Belgorod raid sparks trolling activity on social media

Drone imagery from a burning border control outpost in the Russian region of Belgorod sparked a frenzy on social media this week. According to Riga-based Russian news outlet Meduza, members of the Russian Volunteer Corps and other Russian nationals crossed from Ukraine into Belgorod Oblast and attacked a border outpost in Grayvoron. The Russian Volunteer Corps, an anti-Putin military unit made of Russian pro-Ukrainian partisans, claimed responsibility for the attack; the Free Russia Legion also claimed responsibility.

An assessment by Russian news outlet RBC regarding the broader situation in Belgorod indicated an armed incursion, with shelling and artillery fire reported. On the evening of May 22, Russian government declared a state of counterterrorist emergency in Belgorod Oblast. Although the governor of the oblast did not officially issue an order to evacuate the civilian population immediately, footage and photographs posted on social media indicated that at least some residents evacuated to other areas in the region. Meduza also reported several drone strikes on the city of Belgorod itself.

Conflicting reports emerged on May 23 after Russian officials lifted the counterterrorist alert. While the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to have “liquidated” around seventy “saboteurs,” reporting from the news outlet Mash indicated the deployment of additional Russian law enforcement in nearby Bryansk Oblast. In an effort to support their assertions of having eliminated the insurgency, Russian news outlets also released photos of military-class vehicles allegedly used by the insurgents stuck in the mud; some open-source analysts, however, questioned the authenticity of the photos. Russian media chased these reports with claims of destroyed Ukrainian tanks, while the Russian Volunteer Corps posted footage to Telegram seemingly showing intact military equipment.

Shortly after the news broke out, footage of a drone attack on the local Russian border outpost, APP Grayvoron, appeared on the outpost’s Google Maps profile, though it was later deleted. At the time of writing, it had been replaced with footage showing a convoy of vehicles, one flying the flag of the Russian Volunteer Corps.

The Google Maps profile for a Russian border outpost in Belgorod featured a video of a mechanized convoy flying the flag of the Russian Volunteer Corps. (Source: Google Maps/archive)

Simultaneously, trolling reviews appeared on the border outpost’s Google Maps profile, calling the border guards “friendly” and the facilities “understaffed.” These too have been deleted, though not before they were documented by the Saint Javelin Twitter account and other Twitter users.

Trolls post mocking reviews of Russia’s Belgorod border post. (Source: @SaintJavelin/archive)

Other trolls took to Twitter, where members of the NAFO meme movement, a pro-NATO and pro-Ukrainian community on the platform, renamed their account to “Government of The Bilhorod’s Peoples Republic” as a joking reference to the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples Republics. “Bilhorod” is the Ukrainian name for Belgorod.

NAFO meme account @nitro19820 changes its Twitter name and bio to joke that it now represented a new “People’s Republic” in Belgorod. (Source: @nitro19820/archive)

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Russian pro-war military bloggers criticize the handling of Belgorod incursion

Following the apparent border incursion into Belgorod Oblast and subsequent attacks on the region, pro-war military bloggers condemned Moscow’s handling of the war in Ukraine, including its border defenses.

Telegram channel Vоенкор Котенок Z (“Milblogger Kitten Z”) criticized the Kremlin for being late in declaring a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod and not knowing how to fight “for real.” “There is a war, and in Russia … they are afraid to call the war a war,” stated the Telegram post.

The channel ДШРГ Русич (“DShRG Rusich”) questioned “commanders of all levels” on how the incursion happened. It also blamed Russia’s intelligence services for failing to reveal “plans of an enemy.” The channel added that as long as there is no photographic evidence of corpses or burned equipment, “the enemy has no losses, and the [Russian] propagandists crapped themselves a little, saying that everything is fine.”

The Kotsnews Telegram channel addressed pro-Kremlin pundits who dismissed military blogger concerns as “hysteria” by insisting that the threat to Russian territory is real and that there are uncomfortable questions around Russia’s defensive capabilities that nobody wants to ask. “What is happening with our technical equipment at the border, surveillance systems, tracking, motion detection?” the channel asked. “What about the mining of potentially dangerous areas? What about anti-tank weapons? Why did the enemy armored group calmly penetrate deep into our territory?”

As Russia’s war against Ukraine has dragged on, the frequency and intensity of pro-war military bloggers’ criticism have increased and become bolder. The DFRLab has previously covered how Russian military bloggers criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Ministry of Defense.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian media spins Australian solidarity rally for Julian Assange as an anti-NATO event

On May 20, a series of so-called “World Wide Freedom Rallies” took place in many cities around the world. The Telegram account for Simeon Boikov, a pro-Kremlin activist and blogger in Australia, claimed to have organized the Sydney edition of the rally, part of a decentralized movement that originated in 2021 to express dissatisfaction with COVID security measures. Boikov promoted a poster for the event on April 6, a day before the event announcement on the movement’s official Telegram channel.

The rally ostensibly focused on demanding the release of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, who is currently being held in London facing potential extradition to the United States. After the event, however, Boikov highlighted a speech by Assange’s father, John Shipton, in a video showing scenes from the rally and emphasized that Shipton was wearing a “double headed eagle and St George’s ribbons,” both of which are Russian symbols. Additional videos and images from the rally showed many people carrying Russian flags and wearing pro-Kremlin symbols.

Kremlin-controlled media outlets emphasized in their headlines not just the pro-Russia nature of the event, but also claims of anti-NATO sentiment, which appear to have been exaggerated. Reviewing footage from the event, the DFRLab identified only one instance of someone sporting anti-NATO messaging. Nonetheless, Russian media embraced the event as specifically anti-NATO, including state outlets Gazeta.ru, TASS, RIA Novosti, and Komsomolyskaya Pravda, and pro-Kremlin media such as News Front, Inforeactor, Ekonomika Segodnya. Additionally, The Eastern Herald, an Indian media outlet, and Belarus state-controlled television both framed the event as anti-NATO in their English-language publications.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

US sanctions Armenian company for helping Russia evade sanctions

On May 22, the US Department of Commerce announced that it had amended its list of sanctioned entities and individuals by adding seventy-one entities that the US government had determined to be acting “contrary to [US] national security or foreign policy interests.” Alongside Russian companies, one Kyrgyz company, Tro.Ya LLC, and one Armenian company, Medisar LLC, were included in the amended list. According to the Department of Commerce, both companies engaged in conduct that “prevented the successful accomplishment of an end-use check.” In other words, the Department of Commerce suspected that the final destination for the products was Russia but the companies themselves had obfuscated this information.

Medisar LLC, which was registered in Armenia in 2001, is an importer of chemicals and laboratory equipment. The company is one of the thousand largest taxpayers in Armenia, paying about one million dollars in taxes in 2022. It also has a longstanding trade history with Russian companies. On its website, Medisar indicates that one of its trading partners, dating back to 2011, is Russian company Minimed.

Screenshot from the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project’s (OCCRP) Aleph database, made available through Friends of OCCRP access, about Medisar’s trade. The third and fourth companies on the list are both OOO Minimed, a Russian company with a long-term trading relationship with Medisar. (Source: DFRLab via OCCRP)

On May 20, Armenian investigative website Hetq reported that data obtained from the country’s customs service showed that in 2022, Medisar exported equipment from Armenia to Russia, including electronic integrated circuits, diodes, transistors, and similar semiconductor devices.

A company executive who did not want to be identified acknowledged to RFE/RL that Medisar imported chemicals and laboratory equipment from the United States and the European Union and re-exported them to Russia.

Medisar is the second-largest company registered in Armenia to be sanctioned by the United States. The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the other firm, TAKO, in April. The company is in the wholesale of electronic and telecommunications equipment and parts. TAKO, spelled TACO in Armenia’s legal entities register, was registered in May 2022 in Armenia and is fully owned by a Russian citizen, according to public registry records.

On April 18, the New York Times reported that in 2022, Armenia imported 515 percent more chips and processors from the United States and 212 percent more from the European Union than in 2021, and that Armenia exported 97 percent of those same products to Russia.

During a May 22 press conference, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that despite Armenia’s “strategic” relationship with Russia and membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, the country “cannot afford to come under Western sanctions.” Pashinyan underscored that if Armenia faced sanctions, “it wouldn’t be good for any of our allies, while we would ruin our relations with our Western partners.”

A joint “compliance note” issued on March 2 by the US Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and Commerce, titled “Cracking Down on Third-Party Intermediaries Used to Evade Russia-Related Sanctions and Export Controls,” mentioned Armenia, along with China, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, as “transshipment points commonly used to illegally redirect restricted items to Russia or Belarus.”

According to the Statistical Committee of the Republic of Armenia, Russian-Armenian trade soared in 2022, including exports to Russia, which nearly tripled to $2.4 billion.

—Ani Mejlumyan, research assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

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Belgorod raid sparks border alarm for Russia ahead of Ukrainian offensive

Peter Dickinson — Wed, 24 May 2023 00:48:53 +0000

Ukrainians woke up on Monday morning to the unexpected news of an unfolding military operation across the border in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast. The incursion was reportedly the work of two Ukraine-based Russian opposition militias, the Free Russia Legion and the Russian Volunteer Corps, who claimed the attack marked the start of a campaign to “liberate Russia.”

Further details remain confused, with conflicting information still circulating on Tuesday evening regarding the fate of the Russian militias. However, the mere fact of the incursion is itself noteworthy and may be part of Ukrainian shaping operations ahead of a widely anticipated counteroffensive. By exposing the weakness of Russia’s largely undefended borders, Ukraine could succeed in forcing Putin to reluctantly pull troops out of Ukraine in order to defend his own country.

At the official level, Ukraine has denied any involvement in the Belgorod border raid. However, while Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak declared that Ukraine “has nothing to do with it,” he could not resist mocking the Kremlin. “As you know, tanks are sold at any Russian military store, and underground guerrilla groups are composed of Russian citizens,” he tweeted in an obvious reference to the transparent lies employed by Vladimir Putin during the 2014 Russian military seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. These tongue-in-cheek comments were widely interpreted as confirmation that Ukraine was now using Russia’s own hybrid war playbook against the Putin regime.

Podolyak was not the only Ukrainian to revel in what many saw as Russia receiving a long overdue taste of its own medicine. As news of the Belgorod incursion spread, Ukrainian social media was flooded with memes proclaiming the establishment of the “Belgorod People’s Republic,” playing on earlier Kremlin disinformation about a “Ukrainian civil war,” and favorably comparing the speed of the Belgorod advance with the Russian army’s own glacial progress in eastern Ukraine.

Predictably, few in Russia saw the funny side. Instead, reactions ranged from anger and indignation on Kremlin TV to alarm over the apparent ease with which the Ukrainian-backed Russian militias were able to penetrate the border and enter the Russian federation. The outspoken leader of Russia’s mercenary Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, used the incident to launch another of his regular attacks on the Russian military establishment. “As far as I know, the military is not bothering with the strengthening of our borders,” he commented.

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While the Belgorod incursion has undoubtedly lifted Ukrainian spirits and plunged Russia into a minor panic, this was not just an example of Ukraine’s world-class trolling skills. The attack has very real implications for Russian national security and is a huge personal embarrassment for Vladimir Putin, who prides himself on his strongman image. After all, what kind of strongman ruler cannot even secure the borders of his own realm?

It is too early to predict the exact nature of the Russian response to events in Belgorod Oblast, but it seems inevitable that any reaction must necessarily include a strengthening of the entire Russia-Ukraine border. To achieve this, Moscow must find the additional soldiers and weapons systems to reinforce a frontier stretching for approximately one thousand kilometers beyond the front lines of the current military conflict.

At a time when the vast majority of the Russian military’s available forces have already been deployed in Ukraine, this will be no easy task. Indeed, British Defense Minister Ben Wallace claimed in February that 97% of the Russian army is already in Ukraine. Any efforts to bolster defenses along the Russian border with Ukraine will likely mean reducing this presence.

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Russia’s military equipment shortages were recently laid bare by the country’s exceptionally modest Victory Day celebrations, with traditional parades canceled in a string of cities and a solitary tank taking part in the flagship event on Moscow’s Red Square. The manpower situation in the Russian army is unlikely to be much better. Russian losses during the first six months of the Ukraine invasion were so severe that Putin was forced to launch the country’s first mobilization since World War II in September 2022. However, many of the 300,000 extra troops mobilized late last year have already become casualties, with US officials estimating Russian losses since December at 100,000.

This poorly prepared, badly mauled, and increasingly demoralized Russian invasion force is currently bracing to face a major Ukrainian counteroffensive that has been under preparation for the past half year. Tens of thousands of fresh Ukrainian soldiers have undergone training in NATO countries, while Ukraine has received a wide array of new equipment including modern battle tanks, armored vehicles, and long-range cruise missiles. The last thing Russian commanders would want to do at this critical point in the invasion is withdraw soldiers from the front lines, but that is exactly what may now happen.

As Ukraine continues to set the stage for the coming offensive, shaping operations could include further border incursions designed to embarrass the Kremlin and force Russia to thin the ranks of its invasion army. Any attempts to penetrate deep inside Russia or establish bridgeheads on Russian territory would probably be frowned upon by Ukraine’s Western partners, but there is unlikely to be much opposition to additional destabilizing border raids.

This week’s Belgorod incident remains shrouded in mystery but it may come to be seen as a symbolically significant moment in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. For the past fifteen months, Russia has attacked Ukraine with impunity while assuming Ukraine would never dare to strike back inside Russia. That complacency has now been very publicly shattered, creating a serious security headache for the Kremlin. Leaving Russia’s borders largely undefended is no longer an option, but reinforcing them will inevitably weaken Putin’s army in Ukraine. Ukraine’s commanders may have just outsmarted their Russian counterparts yet again.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Wagner chief’s rants highlight Russian infighting ahead of Ukraine offensive

Olivia Yanchik — Mon, 15 May 2023 13:51:14 +0000

The head of Russia’s Wagner mercenary group has launched a series of outspoken attacks on the country’s military leadership in recent weeks that point to mounting internal divisions within Putin’s invading army as it prepares to face a potentially decisive Ukrainian counteroffensive.

In one of his most recent rants, Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin mocked Russian Defense Ministry claims of a “redeployment to defensive positions” near to the hotly contested city of Bakhmut and warned that in reality, the front was in danger of collapsing. “The Defense Ministry’s attempts to cover up the situation will lead to a global tragedy for Russia,” he stated on May 12. “They must stop lying immediately.”

This was the latest in a series of public statements by Prigozhin accusing the Russian army and defense ministry of failing to provide his Wagner troops with sufficient front line support. He had earlier threatened to withdraw his forces from Bakhmut altogether due to alleged ammunition shortages.

In his many video addresses, Prigozhin has sought to burnish his own credentials as a straight-talking military man while attacking members of the Russian military establishment. Speaking in the wake of recent Russian retreats from the flanks around Bakhmut, he declared: “Soldiers should not die because of the absolute stupidity of their leadership.”

He also raised eyebrows last week by referring mockingly to a “happy grandpa,” which many assumed was a reference to Putin himself. This was clearly too much even for Prigozhin, who quickly released a new statement clarifying that the “grandpa” in question may have been a number of military leaders including chief of the Russian general staff Valery Gerasimov, but was most certainly not Putin.

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Prigozhin’s public attacks on Russia’s military leadership reflect his rising profile and growing swagger. The Wagner mercenary group he leads first came into being nine years ago during the initial stages of Russia’s military invasion of eastern Ukraine, at a time when the Kremlin was eager to maintain a degree of plausible deniability. Subsequent roles in Syria and Africa allowed Wagner to expand significantly, but it was the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 that transformed the fortunes of the mercenary force and thrust it into the international limelight.

Over the past fifteen months of the Ukraine invasion, Wagner has emerged as the only group within the Russian military to meet or surpass expectations. While units of the regular army have been decimated and forced into a series of humiliating retreats, Wagner has achieved numerous grinding advances in eastern Ukraine. This has given Prigozhin the confidence and the clout to name and shame his superiors for their alleged shortcomings. Such attacks have only added to his popularity among Russian audiences.

Prigozhin’s criticisms are in a sense hypocritical, given the notoriously high casualty rates among his own soldiers. Indeed, the brutal tactics adopted by Wagner forces in the Battle of Bakhmut have led many to describe the battle as a “meat grinder.” According to US officials, around half of the estimated 20,000 Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine since December 2022 have been Wagner troops fighting in and around Bakhmut.

Ukrainian sources have also questioned the credibility of Prigozhin’s efforts to praise the valor of his Wagner forces while accusing regular Russian troops of abandoning their positions. “The first soldiers to flee were Wagner,” a Ukrainian commander who took part in early May engagements near Bakhmut told CNN. This and other similar accounts may indicate that Prigozhin is lashing out at the army high command from a position of weakness as Wagner’s earlier exploits risk being overshadowed by more recent setbacks.

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Why has Putin not intervened to end the increasingly bitter public feud between Prigozhin and Russia’s military leadership? Some see it as a sign of the Russian dictator’s own growing weakness, while others argue that it may be a deliberate ploy to position the likes of Defense Minister Shoigu and army chief Gerasimov as scapegoats for a coming defeat. At the very least, Prigozhin’s attacks on military commanders serve to deflect the blame for the failing invasion away from Putin himself.

While Prigozhin’s headline-grabbing rants may help to protect Putin from criticism on the domestic front, they also risk further undermining morale among Russian forces in Ukraine. The issue of demoralization is already posing major challenges for Russian commanders, with more cases of desertion recorded in Russian military courts in the first four months of the current year than during the whole of 2022. Recent months have also seen a sharp rise in video addresses posted to social media by Russian soldiers complaining of suicidal “human wave” tactics and catastrophic battlefield losses.

With Ukraine expected to launch a major counteroffensive in the coming weeks, Russian military morale will likely soon face its stiffest test since the invasion began in February 2022. Major question marks remain over the ability of Russian troops to stand their ground, particularly given the Kremlin’s growing reliance on poorly trained conscripts drafted into the military late last year as part of Russia’s first mobilization since World War II.

These mobilized troops proved highly ineffective during Russia’s failed winter offensive, suffering high casualties while making almost no progress. They must now prepare for defensive operations against a Ukrainian force that has been training for the coming offensive for the past six months. Russia has also been digging in and preparing sophisticated defenses, but morale will be a huge factor during what many observers predict will be some of the most intense battles of the entire war. Prigozhin’s frequent public criticism of Russian troops and commanders is unlikely to boost fighting spirit at this critical moment for Putin’s invasion.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Tuesday’s one-tank parade was the latest in a series of blows that had already cast a shadow over preparations for this year’s Victory Day celebrations. In the month preceding the holiday, more than twenty cities across Russia canceled plans to hold military parades. While security concerns were officially cited, these cancellations fueled speculation that Russia simply doesn’t have enough military equipment available to stage regional parades, with the vast majority of tanks and other vehicles having already been sent to Ukraine.

The complete cancellation of this year’s Immortal Regiment marches was an even bigger blow. This mass participation event, which sees members of the public marching through Russian towns and cities while displaying portraits of family members who served in the Red Army during World War II, has become an integral part of Russia’s Victory Day rituals over the past decade and has been endorsed by Putin himself. Nevertheless, the Kremlin decided to ban marches this year amid fears that family members of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine may seek to participate. With Russian officials still in denial over the disastrous consequences of the Ukraine invasion, the last thing the Kremlin wanted was for thousands of grieving relatives to gather in public and draw attention to the scale of the tragedy.

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The negative optics surrounding this year’s Victory Day celebrations are personally damaging for Vladimir Putin, who has been instrumental in placing the holiday at the very heart of modern Russia’s national identity. It is often assumed that Victory Day has always dominated the Russian calendar, but this is simply not true. In fact, during the 46-year period between the end of World War II and the fall of the USSR, the Soviet authorities held just three Victory Day military parades. Other holidays such as May Day and the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution were considered far more significant.

It was not until Putin came to power at the turn of the millennium that Victory Day began to assume its current position as Russia’s most important public holiday. Over the past two decades, Putin has transformed Victory Day into the centerpiece of a pseudo-religious victory cult complete with its own sacred symbols, feast days, saints, and dogmas. The hysteria surrounding the holiday has come to be known as “Pobedobesie” or “victory mania,” with anyone who dares question the Kremlin’s highly sanitized version of World War II likely to be treated with the kind of severity once reserved for medieval heretics.

The veneration of Russia’s role in the defeat of Nazi Germany has proven extremely politically profitable for Putin. It has helped him rebuild Russian national pride following the humiliation of the 1990s, and has paved the way for a return to authoritarianism in today’s Russia by rehabilitating Stalin and minimizing the crimes of the Soviet era. Putin has also revived the lexicon of World War II as a convenient way to attack his enemies, with domestic and foreign opponents routinely branded as “fascists.” Indeed, in modern Russia the term “Nazi” has lost all meaning and has come to indicate anyone viewed as “anti-Putin.”

This toxic trend is most immediately apparent in relation to Ukraine. Kremlin leaders have spent years demonizing Ukrainians as “Nazis,” despite the complete absence of any actual far-right politicians in the Ukrainian government. Predictably, when Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he declared the “de-Nazification” of the country to be his chief war aim. The Russian dictator returned to this theme again during Tuesday’s Victory Day address, directly comparing his unprovoked attack on Ukraine to the struggle against Nazi Germany.

Putin’s endless appeals to the memory World War II are clearly designed to mobilize the Russian public in support of the current war, but they cannot completely disguise the grim realities of his rapidly unraveling Ukraine invasion. What was initially envisaged as three-day campaign to overthrow the Ukrainian government and seize control of the country has become the bloodiest European conflict since the days of Hitler and Stalin. Over the past fifteen months, Russian military losses have been so heavy that senior US intelligence officials are now openly questioning whether Putin’s army still retains the capacity to “sustain even modest offensive operations.” With a major Ukrainian counteroffensive expected to begin in the coming weeks, there is little cause for optimism in Moscow.

It is in some ways poetic that developments surrounding this year’s Victory Day holiday have brought Russian audiences closer to the unpalatable truth. From the cancellation of regional parades and public marches to the lack of tanks on Red Square, it is now becoming painfully obvious to the average Russian that things are not going according to plan in Ukraine. An event conceived as a propaganda spectacle to project the strength of the Putin regime has instead served to underline Russia’s growing weakness. Putin is often accused of living in the past, but this is one Victory Day he will wish to forget.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Russia carries out attacks across Ukraine, attempting to break through Ukrainian defenses

Prigozhin threatens Wagner withdrawal from Bakhmut

In a Telegram video published on May 5, Yevgeny Prigozhin stood in front of a group of Wagner fighters and threatened to withdraw Wagner forces from Bakhmut on May 10. He added that they will “celebrate” Russia’s May 9 Victory Day “with the brilliance of Russian weapons” and then hand the positions over to the Russian defense ministry.

The withdrawal threat came on the heels of a May 4 post on the Telegram channel Kyepka Prigozhina (“Prigozhin’s Hat”) featuring a graphic video of Prigozhin furiously addressing Russia’s military leadership over an ammunition shortage. In the video footage, Prigozhin stands in front of dozens of dead bodies and identifies them as Wagner Group fighters killed in Ukraine. Shouting, Prigozhin addresses Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Armed Forces Chief Valery Gerasimov, “Shoigu! Gerasimov! Where the [expletive] is the ammunition?” Prigozhin says that Wagner is “lacking 70 percent of needed ammunition” and that those who are not providing them shells “will be in hell.” Continuing with more profanities, Prigozhin complains that Russian military leadership is sitting in their luxurious offices with their children living their best lives, while Wagner fighters are dying without ammunition in Ukraine.

Prigozhin has repeatedly complained about not receiving sufficient ammunition from the Russian defense ministry.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russia accuses Ukraine of conducting “terrorist attack” targeting Putin

On the night of May 3, CCTV footage showed two drones crashing into a flagpole located atop the Kremlin Senate Palace in Moscow. Later in the day, statements emerged from the Kremlin, alongside reporting from TASS and other pro-Kremlin outlets, referring to the action as a “terrorist attack” and “an attempt on the life of the president.”

The two drones crashed into the flagpole of the Kremlin’s presidential residence, located next to Moscow’s Red Square, which at the time was closed for preparations ahead of the annual May 9 Victory Day parade. The drones reportedly crashed within fifteen minutes of each other, the first coming from the south of Moscow, and the second came from the east.

Although the Kremlin brought forward no hard evidence to prove the incident was an assassination attempt, Russian politicians and media figures nonetheless called for retaliation. RT editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan tweeted, “Maybe now it will start for real?” Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev called for the elimination of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Pro-Russian Telegram channel BALTNEWS referenced a Ukrainian crowdfunding initiative to buy drones for Ukrainian forces, claiming that Ukraine is raising funds to launch new attacks on Russia. The initiative is connected to a Ukrainian drone manufacturer’s announcement offering a prize if someone could land a drone during Moscow’s May 9 Victory Day parade. Crowdfunding is not limited to the Ukrainian side; the Russian armed forces and Wagner Group also collect money for such drones using similar tactics. These allegations do not establish causality with the May 3 attack.

Although no party has officially claimed responsibility for the attack, Ukrainian drone strikes have intensified over the past two weeks, with several disruptive actions carried out targeting trains in the Bryansk region, as well as strikes against oil units in Sevastopol, Crimea and Illinski, Russia. Ukraine appears to have increased its offensive actions in trying to disrupt supply routes to Russian forces.

An investigative thread posted on Twitter by the open-source project GeoConfirmed raised the possibility of Ukrainian partisans having carried out the attack. However, as reported by Meduza, Russia uses effective GPS jamming systems in the area surrounding the Kremlin. This, in conjunction with the January 2023 deployment of defense systems next to President Putin’s offices and private residences, raises questions about the feasibility of such an attack. According to data from the map-based web project GPSJam, GPS jamming was enforced over the entire Moscow Oblast on May 2. In addition, the Guardian reported on the possibility of a false-flag operation led by Russia to excuse escalating violent measures against Ukraine.

As the rumored Ukrainian counteroffensive remains an open question, the Russian military is trying to replenish its reserve, causing unrest amongst the civilian population in Russia. A post from the Russian Telegram channel VChK-OPGU quoted an unnamed source who claimed that “’unprecedented’ safety measures will be introduced by the Moscow municipal authorities,” including “patrolling the area of objects, educational institutions, prefectures and administration [buildings] by staff of local institutions.” They added that staff members are asked to report any “suspicious flying object as well as people, check seals of basements and attics,” indicating the possibility of enhanced monitoring for dissent.

–Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Russia carries out attacks across Ukraine, attempting to break through Ukrainian defenses

Donetsk remains the most active sector of the frontline in eastern Ukraine, where the Russian army continues its attempts to break through Ukrainian defenses in the direction of Bakhmut and Marinka. Vuhledar is also a target of attacks, including an exchange of heavy artillery shelling between Ukrainian and Russian forces.

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine claimed it had repelled forty-one attacks from Russian forces on May 1. In addition, the Russian army tried to attack Severnoye and Pervomaiskoye in the direction of Avdiivka, and in the area of Bilohorivka and Novoselivka in the direction of Lyman. On May 3, Russian forces reportedly conducted more than forty offensive operations while attempting to advance near Bilohorivka, Bakhmut, Severnoye, Marinka, and Novomykhailivka. Between May 3 and the morning of May 4, the Russian army is believed to have carried out two missile strikes, sixty-eight airstrikes, and sixty-seven shellings with multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) across Ukraine.

On May 1, Russian forces launched a rocket attack on Kramatorsk, wounding one person and damaging a school, according to Ukrainian reports. Another rocket attack targeted Kramatorsk on May 4, damaging an educational institution and nearby residential buildings. There were no initial reports of casualties.

In Russia, local media reported fires at the Ilyinsky refinery in the Krasnodar region and the Novoshakhtinsky oil products plant in the Rostov region, allegedly due to drone strikes. On May 4, Russian occupation authorities in Crimea reported a drone was shot down near Belbek.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

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How strong is Russian public support for the invasion of Ukraine?

Sviatoslav Hnizdovskyi — Tue, 02 May 2023 18:56:56 +0000

Ever since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, the Kremlin has worked hard to create the impression of enthusiastic support for the war among the Russian population. However, many continue to question the true scale of this public backing. In order to get a sense of Russian attitudes toward the invasion, we need to go beyond official statements and explore everything from online activity and fundraising initiatives to psychological factors that may be shaping opinion in Putin’s Russia.

Polling data remains the most commonly cited evidence of widespread Russian support for the invasion of Ukraine. However, such indicators must be treated with a high degree of skepticism due to the obvious risks inherent in expressing anti-regime opinions in an authoritarian state such as modern Russia. Over the past year, various polls have identified strong levels of public support ranging from 55% to 75%, with relatively little fluctuation. The Levada Center, which is regarded by many international observers as Russia’s only legitimate independent pollster, has conducted monthly polls since the beginning of the invasion that have consistently indicated public backing of over 70%.

While opinion polls indicating pro-war sentiment must be treated with caution, there is very little evidence of any active opposition to the invasion within Russian society. In the weeks following the outbreak of hostilities, relatively small protests took place in a number of Russian cities, but this trend failed to gain momentum. Despite awareness of the atrocities taking place in Ukraine and the Russian military’s unprecedented losses, there remains no real anti-war protest movement in Russia.

This absence of anti-war activity is perhaps unsurprising. The Kremlin has adopted a series of draconian laws in the wake of the invasion that criminalize any criticism while outlawing use of the word “war” in favor of the euphemistic “Special Military Operation.” As a result of these legislative changes, numerous high-profile opposition figures have been given long prison sentences for their anti-war stances. At the same time, it is important to note that although more than one million Russians have fled the country in response to the invasion of Ukraine, very few have taken advantage of their newfound freedoms to stage anti-war rallies outside Russia.

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Public support for the invasion can be seen in the many examples of ordinary Russians mobilizing to back the war effort. Across the country, large numbers of fundraising initiatives have emerged to help supply Russian soldiers with everything from drones and radios to food and warm clothing. These grassroots efforts are entirely voluntary and point to high levels of public sympathy for the Russian soldiers currently serving in Ukraine.

A further indication of pro-war sentiment within Russia is the revival of Stalin-era denunciations targeting anyone seen as critical of the war. There have been numerous high-profile instances of colleagues, teachers, and even family members reporting people to the authorities for voicing anti-war opinions. During the first half of 2022 alone, Russian media and information space regulator Roskomnadzor reportedly received 144,835 individual denunciations.

Social media remains comparatively free in today’s Russia and provides important insights into the public mood. Young supporters of the war have largely congregated on TikTok, where they often form pro-war groups and post messages celebrating the Russian army.

Telegram has emerged as a key platform for Russian audiences seeking to follow the invasion. There are a substantial number of military-themed accounts offering some of the most credible coverage of the war, often including remarkably frank criticism of the Russian establishment. These pro-war accounts have gained considerably in status since February 2022 and have attracted millions of followers.

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Research conducted by Ukraine’s Open Minds Institute has identified widespread pro-war sentiment on Russian social media. While it is important to acknowledge that the Kremlin is believed to invest heavily in bot farms and troll armies, the vast majority of the accounts studied by the Open Minds think tank appear to represent real people with their own wide-ranging interests and long histories of posting on different topics.

Support for the war on Russian social media tends to be expressed in abstract terms relating to national pride rather than any concrete benefits deriving from the invasion. Accounts based in Moscow demonstrate the lowest levels of interest in the war, while regions closest to Ukraine are the most negative. Meanwhile, areas of Russia furthest from the conflict tend to be more positive. Posts and comments closely mirror changing events on the ground and typically reflect the latest developments in Ukraine, indicating high levels of awareness regarding the current status of the invasion.

While it is impossible to determine exact levels of pro-war sentiment within Russian society, it is clear that the invasion of Ukraine enjoys considerable backing. What is fueling these positive attitudes toward a war that has horrified global audiences?

A combination of factors have shaped Russian public opinion in favor of the invasion. Propaganda has played a central role in this process, with Russian audiences subjected to years of relentless messaging throughout the Kremlin-controlled mainstream media preparing the population for war with Ukraine.

Many Russians appear to be driven by feelings of faith and obedience toward the authorities. Other factors include notions of national identity rooted in the imperial past and a strong desire to belong. Many Russians may be choosing to adopt pro-war positions in order to associate with like-minded people and demonstrate their own patriotism. Others may be motivated primarily by a desire to avoid accusations of disloyalty.

Unfortunately, such conformity often comes at the expense of critical thinking or moral constraints. This has made it possible for millions of otherwise unremarkable people to support the largest European war of aggression since the days of Hitler and Stalin. Some observers speculate that much of this support is insincere and would soon evaporate if circumstances within Russia changed. Nevertheless, the currently available evidence indicates overwhelming acceptance of the invasion, at the very least.

Sviatoslav Hnizdovskyi is founder and CEO of the Kyiv-based Open Minds Institute.

Over the past three decades, relations between Russia and its former Soviet vassals have varied greatly, with some welcoming continued strong ties and others seeking to turn away from Moscow. Putin has made no secret of his desire to revive Russian influence throughout his country’s former imperial domains, and has publicly lamented the fall of the USSR as the “disintegration of historical Russia under the name of the Soviet Union.”

The Kremlin has employed a mixture of carrot and stick tactics in order to retain and strengthen its influence across the former USSR. Measures have ranged from elite enrichment, customs unions, and security cooperation to trade wars, military interventions, and the creation of “frozen conflicts.”

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The 2014 invasion of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and Donbas region was a major landmark in Russia’s post-Soviet empire-rebuilding efforts, but the full-scale invasion of Ukraine eight years later was to prove the biggest turning point of all. Since February 24, 2022, countries throughout the former Soviet Empire have rallied in support of Ukraine and have sought to distance themselves from an increasingly isolated and humbled Russia.

Throughout the war, the three Baltic states have supplied large amounts of defense, financial, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine while welcoming thousands of Ukrainian refugees. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have also been very supportive of Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership bids. During a recent Kyiv visit, Estonian PM Kaja Kallas underlined this backing, commenting, “For peace in Europe, we need Ukraine in the EU and NATO. The way to lasting peace is to end grey areas in European security.”

In the South Caucasus region, Russia’s status has clearly been diminished by the invasion of Ukraine and the embarrassing failures of Putin’s once-vaunted military. The Kremlin has long served as peacekeeper and arbiter between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the region, maintaining a significant military presence in Armenia. However, the war in Ukraine has prevented Russia from fulfilling its commitments, with Moscow unable to stop renewed fighting. This has encouraged the Armenians to reconsider their relations with Russia.

With Russian influence in decline, the Armenian government has deepened cooperation with both the United States and the European Union, including the opening of a new EU Mission in Yerevan. Armenia has also begun to distance itself from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Russia-led military bloc bringing together six former Soviet republics.

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In Central Asia, the invasion of Ukraine has amplified existing distrust of Russia. This is most apparent in the region’s largest nation, Kazakhstan. Like Ukraine, Kazakhstan has a significant ethnic Russian population, leading to concerns that the country could become the next target of Russian imperial aggression. These fears have been further fueled by Kremlin propagandists, who have warned that Kazakhstan will pay a high price for the country’s alleged disloyalty to Moscow. Kazakh officials appear unmoved by these threats, and have recently canceled Victory Day celebrations for the second consecutive year in what many see as a direct snub to Putin.

Since the invasion of Ukraine began, Kazakhstan has attempted to strengthen ties with China, Turkey, the EU, and the US, while questioning its relationship with Russia and the CSTO. This geopolitical shift was perhaps most immediately obvious in summer 2022, when Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev made international headlines by rejecting recognition of Russian territorial claims against Ukraine while standing alongside Putin at a flagship economic forum in Saint Petersburg.

Over the past fifteen months of the invasion, Kazakhstan has demonstrated its support for Ukraine via the donation of considerable quantities of humanitarian aid. Other countries throughout the former Soviet world have done likewise. Azerbaijan has sent nearly €20 million in humanitarian and medical assistance. Turkmenistan has dispatched a cargo plane filled with medicines and medical supplies. Uzbekistan sent several tons of humanitarian aid. Given continued Russian leverage in the region and Moscow’s traditional expectations of loyalty, these relatively innocuous moves should be seen as bold gestures that reflect a changing geopolitical climate.

The invasion of Ukraine has exposed the extent of Kremlin control over Belarus, with Russia using its neighbor as a platform for airstrikes against Ukraine and the failed Kyiv offensive of early 2022. However, Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has so far resisted pressure to directly enter the war, despite being heavily dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival. With the Belarusian public and military both believed to be strongly against any direct participation in the invasion, Lukashenka finds himself in a difficult position. He understands that if he were to involve Belarusian forces in the war, this would likely lead to a strong and unpredictable domestic backlash.

Putin saw the invasion of Ukraine as a key step toward rebuilding the Russian Empire. Instead, it has forced countries across the former Soviet Union to distance themselves from the Kremlin. These countries feel able to do so in part due to the poor performance of the Russian army in Ukraine, which has made a mockery Moscow’s claims to military superpower status while reducing Russia’s ability to intimidate its neighbors. The invasion of Ukraine is still far from over, but the damage done to Russia’s regional influence and to Putin’s own imperial ambitions is already impossible to ignore.

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He can be found on Twitter @MTemnycky.

Russia’s invasion highlights the need to invest more in Ukrainian studies

Oleksandra Gaidai — Tue, 25 Apr 2023 16:44:06 +0000

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the need for greater international investment in Ukrainian studies. However, this discussion does not always take into account the realities of wartime Ukraine.

While Russia’s invasion has generated unprecedented international interest in Ukrainian studies, it has also had a profound and overwhelmingly negative impact on the academic community in Ukraine itself. This must be taken into account. After all, the international development of Ukrainian studies depends largely on the state of academia in Ukraine. As Andriy Zayarnyuk wrote last year, “the center of Ukrainian studies is now in Ukraine.”

A recent report evaluating the current state of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar studies identified more than 160 study centers located mainly in North America and Europe. Ukrainian studies centers are mostly placed within Slavic studies departments, with courses tending to focus on Ukrainian culture, language, and literature rather than politics and economics.

Europe has the most centers primarily concentrated in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Poland. Notably, Ukrainian studies remains virtually nonexistent in some neighborhood countries such as Romania and Turkey. This absence became particularly evident following Russia’s full-scale invasion, with a recent survey of Ukrainian studies professionals identifying increased demand for expert commentary.

Even in countries with Ukrainian studies programs, the focus is often limited. Universities typically employ individual lecturers who offer courses on Ukrainian topics which can change from semester to semester. Factors leading to the closure of Ukrainian studies centers include lack of funding, lack of student interest, weak institutionalization, and reliance on the activities of individual researchers.

A more comprehensive approach to Ukrainian studies is clearly needed. This should include the establishment of Ukrainian professorships to make studies an integral part of the academic environment and less exposed to changes in political preferences.

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Growing international interest in Ukraine as a result of Russia’s invasion has already boosted the field of Ukrainian studies. Universities have been able to bypass bureaucracy to host more people from Ukraine, with a diverse range of Ukrainian academics fleeing the war and arriving in the West over the past fifteen months. Among students, interest in Ukrainian studies has never been higher. The challenge is to ensure this does not become a mere passing fad.

To make Ukrainian studies more resilient in the long run, Ukrainian topics need to be integrated into existing classes on subjects such as Soviet or Russian imperial history, or even European studies, contemporary politics, and international relations. The goal should be to make Ukraine part of the conversation on different issues.

At the same time, much will depend on parallel progress in Ukraine. Key objectives include translating source materials, integrating Western academic practices, and improving English skills among the academic community.

Wartime realities in Ukraine have created new possibilities for Ukrainian academia but have also deepened many of the problems that existed before the invasion. Much of the country’s educational infrastructure has been destroyed, but the impact on human capital has been even more devastating. In short, Ukraine is currently losing many of its best people including significant numbers of irreplaceable academic professionals.

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Ukraine’s universities are currently in survival mode but reform is also on the agenda. Just one day before the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, the Ukrainian government adopted a new two-year development strategy for the country’s higher education system. The Ministry of Education has since announced that it will use this strategy as a road map for the reconstruction and continuation of reforms in the post-war period. However, the strategy was designed before the war and does not target the specific problems caused by Russia’s invasion.

Last month, Oksen Lisovyi was appointed as Ukraine’s new Minister of Education. It is not yet clear whether he intends to implement radical reform with long-term goals or keep the existing higher education system largely in place. While support for change is widespread, many within the academic community and education industry also appear to favor a more conservative approach.

Ukraine may not have the luxury of time for an extended debate. Funding for education has been severely cut as a result of the Russian invasion, with academics struggling to survive on inadequate salaries. This is forcing many to consider a career change. Others have left their university positions to serve in the army. It is not clear how many will return to academia, or whether they will have jobs to return to.

Students also find themselves confronted by harsh realities. With no end in sight to the Russian invasion, today’s Ukrainian high school graduates face a choice between an uncertain fate in their homeland or exploring the wide range of study options currently available at European and North American universities.

Ukraine’s universities have responded to the challenges of the invasion with ingenuity, utilizing tools developed during the Covid pandemic to switch to distance learning. However, uncertainty over the future looms large.

Some Ukrainian universities still maintain cooperation with Western institutions, but these relationships typically depend on prewar ties and offer one-sided academic mobility enabling Ukrainian scholars and students to study abroad. It would be good to see European and North American universities launch more nonresident fellowships for Ukrainians who are unwilling or unable to leave the country.

It may also be time to consider establishing new platforms and institutions for collaboration between Ukrainian scholars and their international colleagues. Ukraine can offer opportunities for Western academics focused on the Soviet and Russian empires who are no longer able to access Russian archives. Ukraine’s State Archive Service has been digitizing materials for some time and has introduced a united search system of Ukrainian archives.

The past year of war has sparked unprecedented interest in Ukrainian studies while creating both huge challenges and exciting opportunities. Ukrainian studies is now widely recognized as an important field that requires far more international attention. Looking ahead, the discussion must address both institutional and practical issues. The most important task at this stage is to prevent the further erosion of Ukraine’s academic potential and create the conditions for sustainable post-war development.

Oleksandra Gaidai is a Department of History postdoctoral fellow at American University.

Russian War Report: Russia cancels Victory Day parades and moves “Immortal Regiment” marches online

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 21 Apr 2023 18:33:06 +0000

Security

Russia escalates Avdiivka, Marinka front lines; Belgorod accidentally bombed by a Russian jet

Russia’s Bashkir battalions form a new motor rifle regiment as more are sent to Ukraine to replenish Russian forces

Russian mobilized soldiers report signs of coercion to join Wagner in support of Bakhmut offensive

Russia cancels Victory Day parades and moves “Immortal Regiment” marches online

Tracking narratives

Pro-Kremlin experts use false story to claim military upper hand over Ukraine and NATO

Documenting dissent

Wagner members claim killing of Ukrainian civilians

International response

US investigates ex-Navy officer allegedly behind notorious pro-Russia social media accounts

Russia escalates Avdiivka, Marinka front lines; Belgorod accidentally bombed by a Russian jet

The offensive actions of the Russian army in Eastern Ukraine continue, as well as the defensive efforts of the Ukrainian forces. In recent days, there has been an escalation of attacks on Ukrainian positions in the direction of Marinka, Avdiivka, and Bakhmut.

On April 17, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported that more than seventy attacks by the Russian army were repulsed during the day. The most difficult areas to defend remain Bakhmut and Marinka. Offensive actions were registered in the direction of Avdiivka, with separate attacks carried out in the Kupiansk and Lyman areas. The Russian forces continued the assaults on Bakhmut and Marinka on April 18 and April 19 on par with offensive operations in the Avdiivka area, where Ukrainian forces repulsed attacks in the areas of six settlements. Between April 18-19, the Ukrainian army recorded more than sixty Russian attacks.

According to British intelligence’s April 18 assessment, even though heavy fighting continued in the directions of Avdiivka and Marinka, the Russian command still gave priority to the Bakhmut front. The front line there has become relatively stable, running along the railway line, as Ukraine’s soldiers are effectively resisting attempts by Russia to encircle the town. The question of sending reinforcements to Bakhmut is acute for both sides, since the Ukrainian command wants to attract as many units as possible for a future offensive, while the Russian army wants to form an operational reserve. On April 20, Russian forces reportedly attempted to advance near Kreminna and Serebryanske Forest, as well as Khromove, Vodyane, Pervomaiske, Pobieda, and Vuhledar.

On the night of April 20, the Russian army attacked the south and east of Ukraine with Shahed attack drones. Ten out of eleven drones were shot down, the Ukrainian East Air Command reported. Sirens for Russian attacks were reported in Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kyiv, Odessa, Rivne, Sumy, Poltava, and other regions of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, Telegram users reported an explosion in Belgorod, Russia, near the Ukraine border, on the night of April 20-21. Images shared online show an explosion crater near a residential area of the city. There were reports moments before the explosion of Russian bombers launching a guided bomb in the direction of Kharkiv. At first, it was unclear whether the explosion was the result of a failed Russian attack that hit Belgorod instead of Kharkiv, or whether it was a drone attack from the Ukrainian side. Later, a Russian Ministry of Defense statement that was re-shared by Ukrainian sources said, “On the evening of April 20, during the flight of a Su-34 aircraft over the city of Belgorod, an abnormal derailment of aviation ammunition occurred.” The explosion was apparently large and caused material damage.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia’s Bashkir battalions form a new motor rifle regiment as more are sent to Ukraine to replenish Russian forces

Radiy Khabirov, head of the Republic of Bashkortostan, announced on April 10 that the republic’s volunteer formations would undergo reformation as part of the creation of a new motor rifle regiment. Like many ethnic regions of Russia, the Republic of Bashkorstostan has been subjected to targeted military recruitment. These volunteers, alongside contract soldiers and mobilized military personnel of the Russian reserve, are constantly sent to Ukraine to replenish the regular Russian forces.

According to the federal media outlet FedPress, the idea was suggested by the commanders of the two national battalions, “Northern Amurs” and “Dayan Murzin,” created in Bashkortostan at the beginning of March. The newest regiment would comprise several motor rifle divisions and an artillery division, totaling between 900 to 1,500 men. Moreover, Bashkortostan has recently been pushing for more servicemen to be deployed to Ukraine. During an April 12 ceremony in the regional capital city of Ufa, Bashkirs celebrated the creation of yet another volunteer formation before it was deployed to Ukraine. The new volunteer formation, “Vatan,” Bashkir for “Fatherland,” was created at the beginning of 2023; estimates indicate it could comprise around 720 men. This would bring the number of volunteer formations in the republic to six, including four volunteer formations named after war heroes and local figures, and two volunteer battalions like “Vatan” and “Northern Amurs.”

As the Russian State Duma recently approved a new e-drafting bill and is planning to conduct testing in Moscow and Saint Petersburg during its annual spring conscription, replenishment of military forces has become a top priority for the Kremlin. The DFRLab previously reported on regional ad campaigns targeting national minorities, including the Udmurt population. A new Bashkortostan-hosted recruitment website called BashBat – short for “Bashkir Battalion” – launched on April 17. The domain’s WHOIS record directly points to the Bashkir Ministry for Digital Transformation. Like the Udmurt portal Delomuzhchin.rf (деломужчин.рф), BashBat was advertised in the press using the local Udmurt language, as well as on the Russian federal resource portal for recruitment, Ob’yesnyayem, in both Russian and Bashkir.

–Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Russian mobilized soldiers report signs of coercion to join Wagner in support of Bakhmut offensive

An April 14 article posted by independent Russian-language media outlet Astra reported that hundreds of Russian mobilized soldiers had re-enlisted with Wagner Group. News outlets inside Russia described the situation as “volunteer enrolment.” However, information posted by Twitter user @Tatarigami_UA and subsequent reporting indicate that these episodes might have occurred forcibly. The report by Astra pointed at a video where a mobilized soldier declared that Wagner had been training mobilized personnel. Satellite imagery released by that same account points at a military training facility in Kursk, where instructors are reportedly “experienced Wagner soldiers.”

Later reports indicated one hundred soldiers disappeared after being sent into Ukraine’s Luhansk Oblast and refusing to sign Wagner contracts. Astra’s leaked texts indicate the soldiers were forced to give up their phones and threatened by thirty Wagner representatives with rifles at the Stakhanov railway station. Other signs of coercion were brought to the attention of the Russian MoD after six mobilized soldiers from Yakutia informed their families they had been forcibly recruited by another PMC. In an April 19 post, Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin denied these accusations.

Although user @Tatarigami_UA reports that the instructors are said to be part of a PMC called Volk (“Wolf”), the DFRLab could not confirm this. However, job ads analyzed in a previous DFRLab report mentioned instructors as “participants of the special military operation.” In their accusations of coerced re-enlistment, mobilized soldiers from the Sakha Republic also pointed to yet another subsidiary of the Wagner Group, called PMC Veteran.

–Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Russia cancels Victory Day parades and moves “Immortal Regiment” marches online

Russia’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) canceled May 9 Victory Day parades in annexed Ukrainian territory and adjacent Russian territory because of security concerns. “Immortal Regiment” marches were moved from their usual offline space to online. Previously, Victory Day celebrations and parades have traditionally been a significant event in Russia.

Citing the Russia-installed head of annexed Sevastopol city Mikhail Razvozhaev, TASS reported on April 20 that it was the MoD’s decision to cancel the parade. Earlier, on April 12, Russia-installed head of Crimea Sergey Aksenov stated that parades were cancelled across annexed Crimea “due to security concerns.” Victory Day parades were also canceled in Ukraine-neighboring Russian regions of Kursk and Belgorod. In Krasnodar Krai the parade will only be held in the city of Novorossiysk. According to the governor of the Belgorod region, such a measure was necessary in order “not to provoke the enemy with a large accumulation of equipment and military personnel.”

UkraineAlert has named equipment shortages as one of the possible reasons behind the Kremlin’s decision to cancel parades. According to the report, “[N]umerous commentators have speculated that Moscow is increasingly short of tanks and is understandably eager to avoid highlighting the scale of the losses suffered by the Russian army in Ukraine.”

Similarly there will be no traditional organized march of the “Immortal Regiment” this year. The organizers have moved the march online, which previously happened twice during COVID pandemic years in 2020 and 2021. They told RBC that Russian regions will be posting “portraits of heroes” in interactive online formats.

Citing Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Meduza reported that military parades are planned to be held in twenty-eight Russian cities, including Moscow, where “more than 10,000 military personnel are planned to participate,” with enhanced security measures.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Pro-Kremlin experts use false story to claim military upper hand over Ukraine and NATO

Pro-Kremlin media continue to amplify a false story about the Russian army allegedly destroying a bunker in Lviv occupied by NATO officers with a Kinzhal supersonic missile. Snopes, the US fact-checking outlet, debunked the story as early as April 3, labeling it as “a lazy piece of obvious propaganda.” Russia previously attacked Ukraine with Kinzhal missiles on March 9 and hit two residential building in Lviv, according to Ukrainian fact-checking outlet StopFake, which debunked the story on April 19. There is no evidence of any underground NATO command center in Lviv. Both fact-checking outlets argued that it did not make sense to have such command center in Lviv, which around one hundred kilometers from Poland, a NATO member state.

The first mention of the rumor was a March 1 report published by “Cossack Colonel Yuri Kominyenko” on the fringe website Cairns News. According to Snopes, the Greek outlet Pronews made the claim “regain virality” starting on March 12. From April 14 to April 18 pro-Kremlin media outlets resurfaced the story by citing pro-Kremlin experts who voiced contradicting numbers of NATO’s alleged casualties. For instance, TopNews and Sibnet.ru cited Nikolay Sorokin, a pro-Kremlin political expert saying that “Kinzhal destroyed 300 officers from NATO countries.”

Ekonomika Segodnya, ZOV Kherson, Lenta.ru, and Tsargrad cited Viktor Baranets, an author on Komsomolyskaya Pravda, who asserted, “Kinzhal destroyed secret bunker with 200 NATO and Ukrainian Armed Forces’ officers.” Baranets also claimed with no evidence that the US embassy called the representatives of Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces to “reprimand” them for “poor control center security” and that “capitals of NATO countries are silent about the incident because they are ashamed to admit this biting slap from Moscow.”

Pravda.ru and RG.ru cited Anatoly Matveychuk, a military expert who declared, “Kinzhal destroyed 160 NATO and Ukrainian Armed Forces’ officers in Ukrainian bunker in Lviv.” Matveychuk reportedly suggested this led to Ukraine to cancel its plans for a spring counteroffensive.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Resident Fellow, Riga, Latvia

Wagner members claim killing of Ukrainian civilians

On April 17, a Russian human rights project released testimonies of two Russian former prisoners, Azamat Uldarov and Alexei Savichev, who allegedly fought in Ukraine within the ranks of Wagner Group. In a conversation with Gulagu.net, Savichev and Uldarov reported the killing of Ukrainian civilians, including children, allegedly on personal orders from Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin. The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office launched an investigation into Uldarov and Savichev’s confessions.

Savichev argued that Wagner mercenaries in Bakhmut received an order to kill everyone over fifteen years old; he admitted killing at least ten teenagers and more than twenty unarmed Ukrainians in February 2023. In addition, Savichev claimed that he personally witnessed the killing of about seventy Russian former prisoners who served in Wagner and refused to comply with orders. He also asserted that he blew up a pit full of bodies of dead and wounded citizens of Russia and Ukraine then subsequently set fire to the remnants of dead people to hide traces of the crime. Uldarov, meanwhile, said that he killed minors in Bakhmut and Soledar and admitted that one of his victims was a girl who was “five or six” years old.

Gulagu.net also published documents allegedly proving that Azamat Uldarov and Alexei Savichev were previously pardoned by presidential decree in September 2022 then sent to the front line in Ukraine. The founder of the Gulagu.net project, Vladimir Osechkin, argued that both of them are currently located on the territory of Russia and that they gave their testimony voluntarily.

Following the publication of these claims, Yevgeny Prigozhin publicly addressed Alexei Savichev on April 28 and stated that he had been searching for him over the previous twenty-four hours. Prigozhin demanded that Savichev contact Wagner and explain “why he spoke falsehoods, who was behind it, how he was blackmailed.” Prigozhin promised that Savichev will be “left alive and unharmed” if he is willing to explain in person what took place. The events discussed by the ex-prisoners have not been verified independently.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

US investigates ex-Navy officer allegedly behind notorious pro-Russia social media accounts

The Wall Street Journal identified the individual allegedly behind the pro-Russian social media persona “Donbas Devushka” as Sarah Bils, a thirty-seven-year-old US Navy veteran from New Jersey who served as an aviation electronics technician at Whitby Island in Washington state. The US Department of Justice is currently investigating her for allegedly disseminating leaked classified documents.

Donbas Devushka allegedly presented herself to her followers as a Russian Jew from occupied Luhansk. Their Twitter and Telegram accounts largely grew after Russia invaded Ukraine in February of last year. The accounts continuously spread Kremlin propaganda, with their Telegram channel amplifying graphic content of possible war crimes by Wagner Group.

According a Bellingcat investigation, Donbas Devushka’s Telegram account was found to be the first to have shared leaked intelligence currently under investigation by the Justice Department and Pentagon. According to the Wall Street Journal, Bils played a key role in spreading the leaked documents, though she has denied these claims. Bils admitted she was the administrator of Donbas Devushka, however; she also said that there were fourteen other people involved in running the network but refused to name them.

Bils also ran a tropical fish business, which in part led to her discovery. During her stint in the US Navy, Bils imported tropical fish from Poland. According to Malcontent News, she appeared in a video from the Aquarium Co-op podcast; Malcontent and the pro-Ukrainian group North Atlantic Fella Organization (NAFO) then matched her voice and home décor with footage from the Donbas Devushka account.

—Ani Mejlumyan, Research Assistant, Armenia

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Russia’s Ukraine invasion is the latest stage in the unfinished Soviet collapse

Richard Cashman — Tue, 18 Apr 2023 17:43:46 +0000

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began just over one year ago, growing numbers of international commentators and policymakers have reached the conclusion that the invasion is an act of old-fashioned imperialism. Until recently, such characterizations of Putin’s Russia had been restricted to the fringes of the international debate, but they are now firmly established in the mainstream.

One reason for the erstwhile reluctance to describe Russian behavior as imperial was the implication that despite the fall of the USSR, the Russian Federation itself was still fundamentally an empire in terms of structure and mentality. This creates obvious policy and diplomatic complications for Western leaders seeking to engage with Moscow and integrate Russia into a common European security architecture. Added to this is the understandable fear of playing into Kremlin narratives about the West seeking to break up Russia.

It is perhaps for these reasons that recent use of the imperial label has most often been in the context of Moscow “re-acquiring” an imperial mindset under Vladimir Putin’s leadership. In reality, however, it makes more sense to view today’s Russia within the context of ongoing imperial decline.

This process of imperial retreat began in 1989 with the loss of the outer empire in Central and Eastern Europe, and has since led to violent efforts in Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine to preserve what Russia views as its inner empire. Recognizing modern Russia’s imperial identity will not make policy and diplomacy any easier, but it should lead to fewer illusions.

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When addressing today’s Russian Federation, the concept of “de-imperialization” probably has wider utility than “decolonization,” as it focuses on the core imperial issue of power without the need for agonized debate about the exact nature of a colony.

In respect of institutions and imperial organization, much about Russia has remained constant since the initial phase of decline in 1989-91. Within the Russian Federation, elected regional governors were short-lived phenomena and economic flows have continued to move overwhelmingly from the peripheries to the metropole. In the military sphere in Ukraine, which the Kremlin sees as integral to the core of its empire, ethnic minorities from the peripheries of the Russian Federation have been disproportionately mobilized in order to preserve favorable sentiment in major cities like Moscow and Saint Petersburg.

Beyond the Russian Federation, many imperial linkages have also remained. The Commonwealth of Independent States was swiftly established in 1991, while the non-Russian former Soviet republics became known as the “near abroad,” indicating Russian perceptions of partial sovereignty. Tellingly, Russia’s new internal security service, the FSB, was given the remit for these former Soviet republics rather than the Kremlin’s external service, the SVR.

While the 1989 revolutions in Central Europe and the 1991 Soviet collapse entailed an acknowledged loss of prestige, imperial attitudes in Russia’s metropolitan political, academic, cultural, and information spaces have remained largely devoid of self-examination. This has become abundantly clear from the bilious propaganda targeting Ukrainians (along with Kazakhs, Baltic peoples, and Georgians) over the last year.

Crucially, Russia did not suffer a decisive military defeat in the 1989-1991 period in the fashion that ended the other land-based European empires of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Ottoman Turkey. Even with strategic defeat in Ukraine, Russia is not going to be occupied and have a post-imperial reality imposed on it. And so, ultimately, it is only Russians who can carry themselves to that reality, as the maritime empires of Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal have substantially, though not entirely, managed to do following their respective military failures to sustain empire.

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Despite the genuine security complications entailed by a contiguous imperial core and peripheries, a conscious process of de-imperialization still seems, in principle, a route open to Russia. It need not entail further territorial losses from Russia’s recognized 1991 borders, but should involve Russian federal institutions being reformed and the independence of neighbors being respected. This should include their right to join an alliance like NATO without threats of invasion, just as Finland and Norway have been able to do.

Indeed, this has latterly been the message from Russian opposition figures including Gary Kasparov, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and Alexei Navalny, who have outlined policies for continuing Russia’s process of de-imperialization. This does not necessarily have to be a hard sell to the Russian people. The metropoles of Europe’s maritime empires initially feared that the loss of empire would make them poorer; in fact, it made them richer.

In contrast, Putin and the clan which assumed power in Moscow at the turn of the millennium have coordinated all policy with the aim of reversing rather than managing Russia’s imperial decline. This has meant denial of the long-known problem of Russian chauvinism and further concealing rather than confronting of Russian and Soviet crimes committed in the name of empire.

The International Criminal Court’s issuing of an arrest warrant for Putin for war crimes means the process of delegitimizing his leadership is now underway. The logical concomitant policy step is building relationships with alternative Russian elites who already or might in future support further de-imperialization.

In addition to realistic policy-making at the state level, Western academics and journalists can contribute to “decolonizing” Russian, Eurasian, and Slavonic studies and associated cultural spaces, drawing on similar approaches to European and North American history.

Western governments and their cultural emanations can prioritize engaging with countries of the global south to debunk the absurd but successful Kremlin narrative portraying Russia as an anti-imperial center of power, both historically and still today. This might include developing university programs and organizing academic conferences and exchanges, but also via objective news, cinema, television, and social media. Facilitating messages from countries like Ukraine, as a former imperial subject, might also modify policy-making in these countries.

The process begun in 1989 certainly did not culminate in 1991. Renewed awareness of its ongoing nature is to be welcomed, but from that should flow realistic policy that supports rather than compromises Russia’s former imperial subjects, and empowers Russians working toward a post-imperial future.

Richard Cashman is an Adjunct Fellow at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

Vladimir Kara-Murza’s 25-year sentence is a verdict against all Russians

Arseniy Yatsenyuk — Tue, 18 Apr 2023 11:17:16 +0000

The Kremlin has sentenced Russian opposition activist Vladimir Kara-Murza to 25 years in jail for speaking the truth about the invasion of Ukraine. This is not the first long prison sentence handed out by the Kremlin authorities to opponents of the war, but it is by far the harshest act of retribution so far. The sentence represents another significant milestone in Russia’s retreat into Stalinism.

I know Vladimir Kara-Murza personally. He is a man of remarkable courage. He stood up against the criminal invasion of Ukraine knowing that his principled position would inevitably have grave consequences. At a time when the absence of anti-war protests in Russia shames the country, Vladimir Kara-Murza chose a different path.

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The verdict and sentencing of Vladimir Kara-Murza was not unexpected. On the contrary, modern Russia has been heading steadily in the direction of totalitarianism for many years. The list of regime victims is long and stretches back more than two decades to the very beginning of Putin’s reign. Some are familiar names whose deaths led to public outcry. Others are forgotten. Russia’s descent continued regardless.

The Russian people have now reached a new point in this grim journey. Almost seventy years since the death of the Soviet dictator, Stalinism has returned to Russia. The ruthless attacks on today’s political opponents and dissidents offer chilling echoes of the purges and show trials of the totalitarian Stalin era.

Even in this increasingly lawless climate, the 25-year sentence handed down to Kara-Murza stands out. It is a very deliberate and very public demonstration of the Kremlin’s determination to crush any sign of domestic dissent. The Putin regime is sending an unambiguous message to every single person in Russia that nobody and nothing is safe. From now on, the Kremlin will tear its opponents apart without any sense of restraint whatsoever.

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By condemning Vladimir Kara-Murza to a quarter of a century in jail, the Kremlin has made clear that it no longer feels constrained and will freely trample on the last surviving vestiges of individual rights. Kara-Murza’s sentence is a verdict against all Russians.

There are virtually no anti-war protests in today’s Russia, despite widespread awareness of the monstrous crimes being committed in Ukraine. Everyone in Russia has seen the destruction of Mariupol, Bakhmut, and dozens of other Ukrainian cities, albeit through the distorting lens of Kremlin propaganda. They all know their president has been charged with war crimes by the International Criminal Court in The Hague. And yet only a relative handful of brave souls like Vladimir Kara-Murza dare to speak out.

With the sentencing of Kara-Murza, the Kremlin is now informing every single person in Russia that they are nothing. The Putin regime loves to spread fear among Russians. It wants more blood. I have no illusions that the Russian people will stand up for their freedoms. But they must now understand that unless they rise up to oppose the Kremlin, they will pay for it for the rest of their lives.

Arseniy Yatsenyuk is the former Prime Minister of Ukraine (2014-16). He currently serves as Chairman of the Kyiv Security Forum.

Clementine Starling and Stephen Rodriguez write op-ed in Defense News on the Atlantic Council Commission Defense Innovation Adoption’s interim report

Atlantic Council — Mon, 17 Apr 2023 13:56:00 +0000

Forward Defense Director Clementine Starling and FD Senior Advisor Stephen Rodriguez emphasize that the United States does not have an innovation adoption, but the US Department of Defense has an innovation adoption problem. To address this, they discuss in this Defense News piece the findings and key recommendations of the Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption’s interim report. They argue that in order to accelerate adoption of critical technologies at the Pentagon, Congress and DoD will need to work hand-in-hand to provide greater flexibility to defense procurement.

ORIGINAL sOURCE

Innovation is a defining characteristic and competitive advantage of the United States — both of the vaunted private sector as well as the rich history of the U.S. military. Yet increasingly, our men and women in uniform are going to war with technology that lags behind not only Russia and China, but their civilian peers.
Quoted from Defense News

Read the Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption’s interim report.

Staff

Clementine G. Starling

Director, Forward Defense

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Fellow

Stephen Rodriguez

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The post Clementine Starling and Stephen Rodriguez write op-ed in Defense News on the Atlantic Council Commission Defense Innovation Adoption’s interim report appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Russian army presses on in Bakhmut despite losses

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 14 Apr 2023 17:34:44 +0000

Security

Russian army presses on in Bakhmut despite losses

Russia enacts “e-drafting” law

Drone imagery locates new burial site east of Soledar

Russian hackers target NATO websites and email addresses

Russian army presses on in Bakhmut despite losses

The General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces recorded fifty-eight attacks on Ukrainian troop positions on April 9 and 10. Of these attacks, more than thirty were in the direction of Bakhmut, and more than twenty were in the direction of Marinka and Avdiivka. Russian forces also attempted to advance toward Lyman, south of Dibrova.

Documented locations of fighting April 1-13, 2023; data gathered from open-source resources. (Source: Ukraine Control Map, with annotations by the DFRLab)

On April 10, Commander of the Eastern Group of Ukrainian Ground Forces Oleksandr Syrskyi said that Russian forces in Bakhmut increasingly rely on government special forces and paratroopers because Wagner units have suffered losses in the recent battles. Syrskyi visited Bakhmut on April 9 to inspect defense lines and troops deployed to the frontline. According to the United Kingdom’s April 10 military intelligence report, Russian troops are intensifying tank attacks on Marinka but are still struggling with minimal advances and heavy losses.

On April 13, Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of Ukrainian Forces Oleksiy Gromov said that Bakhmut remains the most challenging section on the frontline as Russian forces continue to storm the city center, trying to encircle it from the north and south through Ivanivske and Bohdanivka. According to Ukrainian estimates, during a two-week period, Russian army and Wagner Group losses in the battle for Bakhmut amounted to almost 4,500 people killed or wounded. To restore the offensive potential in Bakhmut, Russian units that were previously attacking in the direction of Avdiivka were transferred back to Bakhmut.

On April 8, Commander of the Ukrainian Air Forces Mykola Oleshchuk lobbied for Ukraine obtaining F-16 fighter jets. According to his statement, Ukrainian pilots are now “hostages of old technologies” that render all pilot missions “mortally dangerous.” Oleshchuk noted that American F-16 jets would help strengthen Ukraine’s air defense. Oleshchuk said that even with a proper number of aircraft and pilots, Ukrainian aviation, which is composed of Soviet aircraft and missiles, may be left without weapons at some point. He noted the F-16 has a huge arsenal of modern bombs and missiles. The commander also discussed the need for superiority in the air and control of the sea. Currently, Russian aviation is more technologically advanced and outnumbers Ukraine, meaning Ukraine cannot adequately protect its airspace. In order for the Ukrainian army to advance and re-capture territory occupied by Russia, it will require substantial deliveries of aviation and heavy equipment like tanks, howitzers, and shells.

April 10, Ukrainian forces reported they had spotted four Russian ships on combat duty in the Black Sea, including one armed with Kalibr missiles. Another Russian ship was spotted in the Sea of Azov, along with seven in the Mediterranean, including three Kalibr cruise missile carriers.

Meanwhile, according to Ukrainian military intelligence, Russia plans to produce Kh-50 cruise missiles in June. If confirmed, this could potentially lead to increased missile strikes against Ukraine in the fall. The Kh-50 missiles in the “715” configuration are intended to be universal, meaning they can be used by many Russian strategic bombers, including the Tu-22M3, Tu-95MS, and Tu-160.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia enacts “e-drafting” law

On April 11, the Russian State Duma approved a bill reading allowing for the online drafting of Russian citizens using the national social service portal Gosuslugi. One day later, the Russian Federal Council adopted the law. The new law enables military commissariats, or voenkomat, to send mobilization notices to anyone registered in the Gosuslugi portal. Contrary to the traditional in-person delivery of paper notices, the digital mobilization order will be enforced immediately upon being sent out to the user; ordinarily, men drafted for mobilization could dispute the reception of the notice during the twenty-one-day period after the notice was sent. As of 2020, 78 million users were reportedly registered in the Gosuslugi portal, nearly two-thirds of the Russian population.

Alongside the adoption of the digital mobilization notices are newly adopted restrictions regarding unresponsive citizens. Those who fail to appear at their local military commissariat in the twenty-day period following notice will be barred from leaving the country and banned from receiving new credit or driving a car. Of the 164 senators who took part in the vote, only one voted against the bill; Ludmila Narusova argued that the law had been adopted exceptionally hastily and that the punishments against “deviants” who do not respond to the notice are “inadequate.”

As explained by Riga-based Russian news outlet Meduza, the law also states that reserves could be populated with those who legally abstained from military service until the age of twenty-seven, due to an amendment in the bill that allows for personal data to be shared with the Russian defense ministry in order to establish “reasonable grounds” for mobilization notices to be sent out. Several institutions across the country will be subject to the data exchange, including the interior ministry, the federal tax office, the pension and social fund, local and federal institutions, and schools and universities.

–Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Drone imagery locates new burial site east of Soledar

Images released by Twitter user @externalPilot revealed a new burial site, located opposite a cemetery, in the village of Volodymyrivka, southeast of Soledar, Donetsk Oblast. The DFRLab collected aerial imagery and assessed that the burial site emerged during the last week of March and the first week of April. The city of Soledar has been under Russian control since mid-January. The burial site faces the Volodymyrivka town cemetery. Drone footage shows several tombs with no apparent orthodox crosses or ornaments. Analysis of the drone imagery indicates around seventy new graves have been dug on this site. A DFRLab assessment of satellite imagery estimates the surface area of the burial site amounts to around thirteen hectares.

Location of new burial site east of Soledar, Volodymyrivka, Donetsk Oblast. (Source: PlanetLab, with annotations by the DFRLab)

–Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Russian hackers target NATO websites and email addresses

On April 8, the pro-war Russian hacktivist movement Killnet announced they would target NATO in a hacking operation. On April 10, they said they had carried out the attack. The hacktivists claimed that “40% of NATO’s electronic infrastructure has been paralyzed.” They also claimed to have gained access to the e-mails of NATO staff and announced they had used the e-mails to create user accounts on LBGTQ+ dating sites for 150 NATO employees.

The hacktivists forwarded a Telegram post from the KillMilk channel showing screenshots of one NATO employee’s e-mail being used to register an account on the website GayFriendly.dating. The DFRLab searched the site for an account affiliated with the email but none was found.

Killnet also published a list of e-mails it claims to have hacked. The DFRLab cross-checked the e-mails against publicly available databases of compromised e-mails, like Have I been Pwned, Avast, Namescan, F-secure, and others. As of April 13, none of the e-mails had been linked to the Killnet hack, though this may change as the services update their datasets.

In addition, the DFRLab checked the downtime of the NATO websites that Killnet claims to have targeted with distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. According to IsItDownRightNow, eleven of the forty-four NATO-related websites (25 percent) were down at some point on April 10.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Resident Fellow, Riga, Latvia

The post Russian War Report: Russian army presses on in Bakhmut despite losses appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin cancels Victory Day parades as Ukraine invasion continues to unravel

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 13 Apr 2023 20:40:08 +0000

With Russia’s annual Victory Day celebrations less than one month away, the Kremlin has taken the highly unusual step of canceling a number of military parades in regional capitals. Scheduled parades to mark the World War II Soviet victory over Nazi Germany have been called off in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts, which both border Ukraine. Victory Day celebrations in Russian-occupied Crimea have also reportedly been scrapped.

The cancellations are officially due to security concerns related to the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, numerous commentators have speculated that Moscow is also increasingly short of tanks and is understandably eager to avoid highlighting the scale of the losses suffered by the Russian army in Ukraine. Whether the real reason is security issues or equipment shortages, the decision to cancel this year’s Victory Day parades represents a painful blow for Vladimir Putin that hints at the grim reality behind Moscow’s upbeat propaganda portrayals of his faltering Ukraine invasion.

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Russia’s annual Victory Day celebrations are closely associated with Putin personally. Throughout his reign, he has placed the Soviet World War II experience at the heart of efforts to rebuild Russian national pride following the perceived humiliations of the 1990s. Putin has transformed traditional Russian reverence for the Soviet war effort into a quasi-religious victory cult complete with its own dogmas, feast days, and heretics. Victory Day itself has become by far the biggest holiday of the year, with the defeat of Nazi Germany elevated above all other events and achievements as the defining moment in Russian history.

This victory cult has long set the tone in Russian politics and public life. Domestic and foreign opponents of the Putin regime are routinely attacked as “fascists,” with all manner of current affairs issues viewed through the polarizing prism of World War II. This trend is nowhere more evident than in the official Russian approach toward Ukraine. For years, the Ukrainian authorities have been groundlessly branded as “Nazis,” while the current invasion of the country is portrayed as a modern-day continuation of the fight against Adolf Hitler.

The significance of Victory Day for national identity in Putin’s Russia and the holiday’s close associations with the war in Ukraine make this year’s parade cancellations especially embarrassing. Other public celebrations could be postponed or abandoned without much fuss, but failure to mark Victory Day points to serious problems that are difficult to disguise even in Russia’s tightly controlled information environment. While Kremlin propagandists continue to insist the invasion of Ukraine is going according to plan, the apparent inability of the authorities to guarantee security inside Russia during this most important of national holidays would suggest otherwise.

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While traditional Victory Day events will not take place on May 9 in some Russian regional capitals, the country’s main holiday parade in Moscow is set to proceed as planned. However, Putin will likely have little to celebrate. In recent months, his invasion has met with a series of setbacks on both the military and diplomatic fronts that leave the prospect of victory more distant than ever.

In Ukraine, Russian efforts to launch a major offensive fell flat during the first three months of 2023, with the Russian military securing only nominal gains despite suffering catastrophic losses in both men and equipment. High casualty rates and a reliance on suicidal “human wave” attacks have led to plummeting morale among Putin’s invading army, with recently mobilized troops particularly prone to demoralization. Since the beginning of the year, dozens of videos have been posted to social media featuring groups of Russian soldiers addressing Putin and other state officials while complaining of poor conditions, cannon fodder tactics, and heavy losses. This is fueling doubts over the Russian army’s ability to mount major offensive operations.

Meanwhile, Russia’s winter bombing campaign against Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure appears to have ended in failure. Putin had hoped to destroy the Ukrainian energy grid and freeze Ukrainians into submission, but a combination of creativity and enhanced air defenses enabled Ukraine to keep the lights on. In a sign that the worst of the crisis is now over, Ukraine resumed electricity exports to neighboring European countries in early April.

Nor is there any indication that Western support for Ukraine is in danger of weakening. On the contrary, during the first three months of 2023, Ukraine’s partners expanded their military aid to include previously taboo items such as modern battle tanks and Soviet era fighter jets. Putin still hopes he can outlast the West in Ukraine, but international opposition to his invasion currently appears to be stronger than ever. Indeed, this continued Western resolve was the key message behind US President Joe Biden’s February visit to Kyiv.

There was further bad news in March when the International Criminal Court in The Hague charged Putin with war crimes over his role in the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. While the Russian dictator is not expected to appear in court anytime soon, the indictment is a serious blow to Putin’s prestige that undermines his status both domestically and on the international stage. Weeks later, Finland joined NATO in a move that more than doubled the length of Russia’s shared borders with the military alliance. Even Xi Jinping’s much-hyped visit to Moscow failed to lift the mood, with the Chinese leader offering plenty of platitudes but little in the way of concrete support.

These unfavorable circumstances will make Putin’s job all the more difficult as he attempts to strike the right note in this year’s Victory Day address. With little to look forward to, he is likely to seek inspiration from the glories of the past. However, comparisons between World War II and Russia’s present predicament may not prove very flattering. At the height of the Nazi advance in late 1941, Moscow famously staged the annual October Revolution parade on Red Square with the might of the invading German army located a mere few miles away. In contrast, Putin is evidently now unable to defend Russia against the far more modest threat posed by a country he expected to conquer in just three days. Throughout the Putin era, Victory Day has served to showcase Russia’s resurgent strength, but this year’s holiday may become a symbol of his regime’s growing weakness.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Human wave tactics are demoralizing the Russian army in Ukraine

Olivia Yanchik — Sat, 08 Apr 2023 20:41:38 +0000

It is no secret that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has not gone according to plan. Nevertheless, with the conflict now in its second year, Vladimir Putin still hopes to break Ukrainian resistance in a long war of attrition.

This may be easier said than done. While Russia enjoys significant demographic, industrial, and economic advantages over Ukraine, questions remain over the ability of the once-vaunted Russian military to achieve the Kremlin’s goals. Crucially, an apparent reliance on human wave tactics during Russia’s recent winter offensive has led to catastrophic losses which threaten to undermine morale within the ranks of Putin’s invading army.

There is currently no confirmed data regarding losses on either side of the Russo-Ukrainian War. At the same time, most independent sources agree that fighting in recent months has resulted in some of the worst carnage of the entire war. In mid-February, Britain’s Ministry of Defence reported that during the previous two weeks, Russia had likely suffered its highest rate of casualties since the initial stages of the invasion almost one year earlier.

Russia’s heaviest losses in recent months are believed to have occurred in battles for control over strategic towns in eastern Ukraine such as Bakhmut and Vuhledar, with Ukraine claiming to have killed or wounded tens of thousands of Russian soldiers. While unconfirmed, these figures are supported by extensive battlefield footage, much of which appears to show Russian troops engaged in reckless frontal assaults on entrenched defensive positions.

The human wave tactics on display in eastern Ukraine reflect Russia’s narrowing military options following a year of embarrassing battlefield setbacks. The Russian military entered the current war with a reputation as the world’s number two army, but has performed remarkably poorly in Ukraine. With many of his most experienced units and elite regiments decimated, Putin now hopes to grind down Ukraine’s resources and outlast the country’s Western backers by relying on superior numbers. In the final months of 2022, he bolstered his invasion force with an additional 300,000 troops via Russia’s first mobilization since World War II.

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Human wave tactics are not new and typically involve soldiers conducting direct attacks in large numbers with the objective of overwhelming an opposing force. Such troops are often regarded as “single-use soldiers,” with each wave suffering heavy casualties as it attempts to move the front lines further forward. This is not the first time Russian troops have been called upon to conduct such attacks. During WWII, Soviet commanders often ordered Red Army soldiers into frontal assaults that resulted in exceptionally high death tolls.

In the present war against Ukraine, the Kremlin may see human wave tactics as an effective way of overcoming determined Ukrainian resistance. It allows Russia to wear down Ukraine’s numerically fewer but battle-hardened troops, and can be implemented using a combination of easily replaced forces including recently mobilized soldiers and former convicts serving in the Wagner private military company.

This approach allows Russia’s more experienced soldiers to be held in reserve and used to exploit emerging weak points in the Ukrainian defenses. So-called “blocking units” are also reportedly being deployed behind the front lines to ensure Russian troops do not try to flee. According to numerous battlefield accounts, any Russian soldier who attempts to retreat from a human wave attack faces the prospect of being shot by their own side.

Although grisly, Russia’s human wave tactics are producing results. However, any advances during the past three months in Bakhmut and at other points along the 600-mile front line have been modest in scale and have come at a high cost. In an interview with Current Time on the front lines of Bakhmut, one Ukrainian soldier described the horrors of Russia’s frontal assaults. “The Russian soldiers face certain death in these attacks, but they are not retreating,” he commented. “You can shoot his head off, but his comrade will keep coming. Their own commanders will kill them if they don’t attack.”

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The brutality of Russia’s human wave attacks is leading to growing signs of demoralization among front line troops. Since the beginning of 2023, dozens of video appeals have been posted to social media featuring Russian soldiers in Ukraine complaining to Putin or other state officials about human wave tactics and high death tolls. Russian media outlet Verstka reported that since early February, Russian soldiers from at least 16 different regions of the country have recorded video messages in which they criticize their military commanders for using them as cannon fodder.

Footage has also emerged of Russian soldiers refusing to follow orders after suffering heavy losses during the recent winter offensive in eastern Ukraine. While details remain unconfirmed, most of these incidents appear to have involved recently mobilized Russian troops who found themselves rushed into battle, often after having received minimal training.

In a further worrying sign for the Kremlin, Ukrainian officials have reported a record number of calls in March 2023 to the country’s “I Want to Live” initiative, which helps Russian troops surrender to the Ukrainian military. All this points to the conclusion that human wave attacks could be compounding Russian morale issues and further accelerating the buckling of front line offensives.

At this stage, there appears to be little prospect of a sudden collapse throughout the Russian military comparable to the disintegration of Afghanistan’s security forces during the 2021 US withdrawal. While the demoralization issues facing the Russian army appear significant, recent steps to introduce draconian penalties for Russian soldiers found guilty of disobedience, desertion, or surrender represent a powerful deterrent. The continued domestic strength of the Putin regime and its control over the information space also serve to hold Russia’s army together in Ukraine.

The Kremlin may now have recognized that it must address widespread anger and alarm over the military’s use of human waves. In early April, Russian General Rustam Muradov was reportedly dismissed from his post as commander of the Eastern Group of Forces in Ukraine following his disastrous handling of the recent failed assault on Vuhledar, which resulted in “exceptionally heavy casualties.” Muradov had been widely criticized by his own troops along with many members of Russia’s vocal pro-war blogger community, making him an unofficial symbol of the army’s human wave tactics.

If confirmed, Muradov’s departure may indicate a coming change in tactics. This would arguably be long overdue. If Russia is hoping to outlast Ukraine in a war of attrition, Putin’s generals will need to move beyond a reliance on costly human waves and demoralizing frontal assaults.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Documenting dissent

Individuals linked to Russian army form ‘angry patriots club’

Tracking narratives

Russian propaganda reaches Ukrainian users via Facebook ads

International response

Poland and Ukraine sign cooperation deal for production of tank shells

Belarus accuses Ukraine of plotting terrorist attack against Russian consulate

On April 4, Belarusian state-controlled TV channel ONT aired a documentary titled “Loud failures of the Ukrainian special services in Belarus. Gaspar did not get in touch.” Reports from Belarus’ State Security Committee (KGB) informed much of the program, which asserted that, under the leadership of Ukrainian special services, a network of Russian and Belarusian citizens planned several terrorist attacks in the Belarusian city of Grodno. The alleged perpetrators reportedly planned to target several facilities, including the Consulate General of Russia, a military enlistment office opposite Zhiliber Park, a military unit in southern Grodno, and two oil depots.

The KGB claimed that Vyacheslav Rozum, an alleged employee of the Main Directorate of Intelligence in the Ukrainian defense ministry, planned the attacks. Ukrainian authorities had not commented on the accusations at the time of writing. According to the documentary, Rozum asked Russian citizen Daniil Krinari, known as Kovalevsky, to form a network of people to carry out terrorist acts. Krinari was reportedly arrested in Grodno in December 2022 and extradited to Russia at the request of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). He was charged in Russia for cooperating with Ukraine and acting in the interests of Ukraine. The Belarusian KGB asserted that, before his extradition, Krinari managed to recruit at least two people, Russian citizen Alexei Kulikov and Belarusian citizen Vadim Patsenko. Kulikov had allegedly fled Russia in 2022 to avoid conscription and moved to Belarus.

The ONT documentary includes interviews with Kulikov and Patsenko, who argue that Rozum asked them to take photos and videos of the target facilities in Grodno. Moreover, Patsenko argued that Vyacheslav tasked him with blowing up an oil depot with a drone. The program claims Ukrainian special services promised Kulikov and Patsenko $10,000 each. While Patsenko and Kulikov allege that Ukrainian security services were involved in the operation, the ONT program does not include concrete evidence to prove this claim.

The documentary also contains an interview with Nikolai Shvets, the main suspect behind a February 26, 2023, attack on an AWACS A-50 Russian military aircraft at Machulishchy airfield in Belarus. Shvets is reported to be a Russian-Ukrainian dual citizen and served in the Ukrainian army. In the ONT interview, he claimed he was working with a person from the Ukrainian security service while planning the sabotage. The Belarusian independent media outlet Nasha Niva reported that Maxim Lopatin, one of arrested suspects in the Machulishchy attack, had a broken jaw when he filmed the ONT doumentary. Nasha Niva suggested that he was possibly beaten by Belarusian law enforcement authorities. Belarus arrested more than twenty people in connection to the February aircraft incident and announced on April 3 that the suspects were charged with committing an act of terrorism, for which the maximum sentence is capital punishment. However, the ONT program again provides no concrete evidence linking Shvets to Ukrainian security services.

In addition, the ONT documentary aired on the same day that Alyaksandr Lukashenka met Sergey Naryshkin, the head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, in Minsk to discuss joint counterterrorism measures undertaken by Belarus and Russia.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Identifying potential host sites for Russian tactical nuclear weapons

On March 28, Belarus confirmed it would accept Russian tactical nuclear weapons. The announcement came after Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on March 25 plans to store tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, promising to build a nuclear weapons storage facility in the country. Putin made the comments after the United Kingdom said it would supply Ukraine with ammunition containing depleted uranium. “The heavy metal is used in weapons because it can penetrate tanks and armour more easily due to its density, amongst other properties,” Reutersreported. On April 4, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu reported the transfer of Iskander-M tactical missiles, which are nuclear capable and have been utilized by the Russian military against Ukraine.

Two days after the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, on February 26, 2022, Belarus approved via referendum constitutional amendments to remove the country’s non-nuclear status. The constitutional change allows Belarus to host nuclear weapons for foreign states.

Amidst the speculation surrounding Russia’s nuclear deployment to Belarus, the most pressing questions concern the potential location of airfields capable of nuclear deployment and which type of equipment is nuclear capable in terms of maintenance and modernization efforts.

Along with the confirmed transfer of the Iskander-M missiles (a mobile, short-range ballistic missile system with a range of up to 500 kilometers), Sukhoi Su-25 fighter jets are also a top contender in the Russian and Belarusian aviation arsenals. This aircraft is capable of carrying two nuclear bombs, which the Russian military categorizes as “special aviation bombs.” In June 2022, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka personally called on Putin to help upgrade and retrofit the Belarusian Su-25 fleet to be nuclear-capable. This resulted in a long-term project to enable Belarusian nuclear capabilities, legalize hosting Russian nuclear technology and nuclear-capable craft, enable joint-training programs for aviation sorties, and direct training for Belarusian pilots.

In conjunction with the Su-25’s capabilities against Ukraine’s current air defence networks and Russia’s non-strategic nuclear policy, Belarus’ acceptance of Russian tactical nuclear weapons can be viewed as escalatory. Video footage showed the Su-25’s capacity to evade Ukraine’s man-portable air defence system (MANPAD).

https://twitter.com/ua_ridna_vilna/status/1569048817110077445

Video footage from the cockpit of a SU-25 aircraft demonstrating its maneuverability and evasion of MANPAD systems. (Source: ua_ridna_vilna/archive)

On April 2, the Russian envoy to Minsk announced that the nuclear weapons deployment would occur along Belarus’ western border. The exact location has not been specified, but Belarus has a number of bases along its western border, including Osovtsy, Ross, and Bereza. However, Lida is a primary staging base for the Belarusian fleet of SU-25s, and open-source researchers have confirmed a large presence of the aircraft on the base. Currently, Osovtsy is not one of the highly utilized bases in Belarus, but its proximity to the western border, especially in terms of proximity to Poland and the northern border of Ukraine, makes it a primary location to watch for potential signs of development, land-clearing operations, and heightened military activity.

Map showing Belarus’ western border and highlighting the locations of the Lida, Ross, and Osovtsy airbases. (Source: DFRLab via Google Maps)

—Kateryna Halstead, Research Assistant, Bologna, Italy

Individuals linked to Russian army form ‘angry patriots club’

On April 1, former Russian army commander Igor Strelkov (also known as Igor Girkin) published a video announcing the formation of the “angry patriots club” (Клуб рассерженных патриотов). According to Strelkov, the club aims “to help Russian armed forces” and “meet the stormy wind that will soon whip our faces as one team.” In the video, Strelkov says that Russia “is moving toward military defeat” because “we got into a long, protracted war for which our economy turned out to be completely unprepared. Neither the army nor the political system was ready for it.” In a Telegram post, Strelkov said the club “was created two weeks ago. So far, organizational issues have not been resolved publicly.” Strelkov previously played a crucial role in forming a separatist movement in the Donbas region.

The video also featured a statement from Pavel Gubarev, who in 2014 proclaimed himself the commander of the Donbas People’s Militia. In the video, he says, “We are angry that we are going from one defeat to another, and nothing changes.” He called the system in Russia “thievish and corrupt” and said the Russian elite are “elite in catastrophe.”

The video further featured Vladimir Grubnik, who in 2015 was arrested in Ukraine in connection to an explosion near a Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) building in Odesa; in 2019, he was part of a prisoner exchange and returned to the Russian forces in Donbas. Grubnik said that defeat would lead to Russia falling apart.

Vladimir Kucherenko, an Odesa-born Russian propagandist better known by his pen name Maksim Kalashnikov, said, “We are not afraid to criticize the actions of the government. Why? Because it can somehow help victory. Otherwise, they will do nothing, they will not move.” He called the Russian elite “looters,” “resource grabbers,” and “corrupts.” He predicted the war would turn into “carnage to death” and that the “corrupt Russian elites” would organize a coup that would “betray the country” by agreeing to Russia’s “separation” and “giving up of nuclear arms” in order to “earn the forgiveness of the West.” In 2015, the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture included Kucherenko in the list of Russians “threatening national security.”

Another figure in the video is Maksim Klimov, a pro-Kremlin military expert, who said, “The authorities do not know the real situation.” He added, “They do not hear nor see what is happening in the special military operation zone.” Klimov also did not rule out Russia’s defeat.

The video gained some traction online, garnering 177,000 views on YouTube at the time of writing and 623,600 views and 2,500 shares on Strekov’s Telegram channel. According to TGStat, most of the shares on Telegram came from private accounts. Many Ukrainian media outlets reported on the newly founded club. The DFRLab did not identify any mainstream Russian media outlets reporting on the club besides Kommersant, a Kremlin-approved media outlet focused on business.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Resident Fellow, Riga, Latvia

Russian propaganda reaches Ukrainian users via Facebook ads

This week, the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security (CSCIS) and Ukrainian civil society members reported that Facebook advertising campaigns are being used to spread negative content about Ukraine. The ads range from posts that claim “Romania wants to annex Ukrainian territories” to videos that claim “This is the end. There are no men to fight for Ukraine.” While these campaigns were quickly de-platformed and the pages sharing them were banned, the DFRLab was able to investigate some of the ads via the Facebook Ad Library. The DFRLab previously reported on Facebook ads promoting pro-Russia disinformation to Ukrainian users.

The ads included links to the website luxurybigisland.net, with some ads sharing variations of the URL, such as luxurybigisland.net/rbk or luxurybigisland.net/pravda. The website was built using the Russian website builder Tilda, and its the landing page featured German text that translates to, “Nothing that can’t be removed. We care for your textiles as gently as possible with the utmost care, iron and steam, so that you can enjoy your clothes for a long time. We care.” The same phrase appeared on the now-defunct Tilda-made website google-seo-top.com and the website of a German textile care company. Registration data for luxurybigisland.net is redacted, but WhoIs data for google-seo-top.com shows that the website was registered in Russia. Both luxurybigisland.net and google-seo-top.com include metadata, shown in Google results, that states, in German, “the USA are against the entire world.”

A composite image of a Google search result showing google-seo-top.com (top) and an archive of luxurybigisland.net (bottom) sharing an identical German phrase in their metadata. (Source: Google/Google cache, top; Luxurybigisland.net/archive, bottom)

One URL shared in the ads, luxurybigisland.net/pravda, remained online at the time of writing. The URL redirects to a forged article mimicking the Ukrainian news outlet Pravda. The article shared in the ads never appeared on the authentic Pravda website, but its byline cited a genuine journalist working at the outlet. The DFRLab confirmed the article was a forgery by reviewing the journalist’s author page on the authentic Pravda website, reviewing Pravda’s archived section, conducting a Google search for the forged headline, and then a more specific website search via Google.

Visually the forged website is identical to the authentic one and even features links to contact information copied from the original website. However, the forged website’s image format is different. The text of the forged article claims that the Ukrainian economy is heavily damaged and that “continuation of the war will lead to even greater losses in the economy.” The data shared in the article appears to be copied from multiple media sources and is not false, but the article’s framing contains pro-Russian sentiments as it calls for Ukraine’s surrender.

A second forged article, discovered by CSCIS, was shared on the now-offline URL luxurybigisland.net/RBK. The article mimicked the website of the reputable Ukrainian outlet RBC.

Meta itself has taken – and continues to take – action against similar cross-platform, pro-Russia networks that push users to websites designed to impersonate legitimate news organizations. The DFRLab could not tie its identified assets to those previous Meta actions, but there is some probability that they were related given the similarity of behavior.

A Facebook page with “Cripto” in its name shared some of the ads. The DFRLab identified another Facebook page with the word Cripto in the name sharing pro-Kremlin narratives via Facebook ads. The ads pushed a false story claiming there was a “riot in Kyiv over losses.” CSCIS previously debunked another narrative pushed by a similarly named page that also fomented anti-Ukrainian military sentiment.

A composite image of two ads from pages with “cripto” in the name. The first, at left, is the Facebook page identified by the DFRLab, while the second, at right, is an earlier ad previously identified by CSCIS. (Source: Cripto ukijed, left; Cripto nucergeq, right)

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Poland and Ukraine sign cooperation deal for production of tank shells

During Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Poland, Polish manufacturer Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa and Ukroboronprom signed a cooperation agreement for the joint production of 125-mm tank ammunition. The agreement assumes that the deployment of new production lines will be in Polish cities and the agreement indicates that they plan to produce a large amount of ammunition for 125-mm guns. The decision to start production in Poland was made due to the high risks of Russian missile attacks on production facilities if they were to be based in Ukraine. In place of locating the production in the country, the Ukrainian side will provide technologies and highly qualified specialists with experience in production. This will be the second factory that will produce 125-mm tank shells.

The supply of shells is of particular importance to Ukrainian forces, which are preparing a counter-offensive in southern and eastern Ukraine as heavy fighting with the Russian army continues in the Bakhmut and Donetsk regions.

Separately, German manufacturer Rheinmetall is building a service center for Western military equipment used by Ukraine’s armed forces in Romania, Reuters reported on April 2. The construction for the center is already underway in the Romanian city of Satu Mare, close to the country’s border with Ukraine. The hub is expected to open later this month.

This development is happening against the background of diplomatic activity and statements. Ukraine is not ready to sign any peace agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin, but the war could end as early as this year, according to an April 5 interview with Ukraine’s Minister of Defense Oleksii Rezniko, who said, “I think this war will end soon. Of course, I would like it not to start, but I personally believe in this year as a year of victory.”

Rezniko also commented on a statement made in March by Czech Republic President Petr Pavel, who claimed that Ukraine had only one chance to conduct a successful counter-offensive this year. “I think that the president of the Czech Republic now speaks more like a military man than a politician, and the logic of the military is such that they constantly calculate the worst options. But even if this is his assessment, it is subjective, and he still lays down useful for us. The message is that European countries should unite more powerfully and strengthen assistance to Ukraine,” said Reznikov. Later, Andriy Sybiha, an adviser to Zelenskyy, told the Financial Times that Kyiv is willing to discuss the future of Crimea with Moscow if its forces reach the border of the Russian-occupied peninsula.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

The post Russian War Report: Belarus accuses Ukraine of plotting terrorist attack appeared first on Atlantic Council.

NATO poses a threat to Russian imperialism not Russian security

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 06 Apr 2023 21:13:14 +0000

Finland has just become the thirty-first member of NATO and the silence from across the border in Russia is deafening. For more than a year, the Kremlin has been using the distant prospect of Ukrainian NATO membership to justify the largest European conflict since World War II. In stark contrast, Moscow has offered virtually no resistance whatsoever to neighboring Finland joining the alliance, despite the fact that this has more than doubled the length of NATO’s shared border with Russia.

Russia’s apparent lack of concern over Finland’s NATO accession raises obvious questions about the validity of Vladimir Putin’s efforts to portray the invasion of Ukraine as a reasonable response to creeping NATO enlargement. If Putin genuinely felt NATO posed a security threat to Russia, he could have attempted to derail Finland’s membership bid via a combination of diplomatic and military pressure. At the very least, he could have dramatically increased the Russian army presence in the region. Instead, he did next to nothing.

During the period since Helsinki’s May 2022 NATO application, Moscow has largely limited itself to grumbling about the accession process. At the same time, Russia has reportedly withdrawn up to 80% of its forces from the Finnish border zone. “The drawdown we’ve seen from this region in the past seven months is very significant. Russia had this ground force posture facing us for decades that is now effectively just gone,” a senior Nordic defense official told Foreign Policy in September 2022.

Kremlin officials have since reacted to confirmation of Finnish membership by vowing to strengthen Russia’s military potential in the border area, but this belated bluster merely serves to highlight how underwhelming Russia’s overall response has been. The contrast with Moscow’s devastating use of force in nearby Ukraine could hardly be greater.

Why has Putin remained so calm over the NATO membership of one neighbor while waging a major war over the unlikely NATO aspirations of another? After all, even with the Russian army heavily committed in Ukraine, Putin still has vast additional military, diplomatic, cyber, and economic resources at his disposal and could conceivably have opposed Finland’s NATO bid in a wide range of ways. This inconsistency has little to do with legitimate security concerns. Instead, it reflects the unapologetic imperialism that shapes Putin’s personal worldview and defines modern Russia’s national identity.

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Ever since the early years of his reign, Putin has made no secret of his bitterness over the Soviet collapse, which he has always viewed as a Russian defeat. In 2005, when he famously referred to the disintegration of the USSR as “the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” he stressed that it was a tragedy for “the Russian people” and the millions of Russians who suddenly found themselves living beyond Russia’s borders in newly independent countries such as Ukraine. Putin went even further in 2021, lamenting the fall of the USSR as “the collapse of historical Russia under the name of the Soviet Union.” In other words, he regards the entire Soviet era as a continuation of the Czarist Russian Empire, and sees the settlement of 1991 as anything but final.

Putin’s sense of historical injustice has led to an unhealthy obsession with Ukraine, which he insists is an inherent part of historical Russia that has been subjected to artificial separation. He is fond of claiming that Ukrainians are in fact Russians (“one people”), and took the unusual but revealing step in July 2021 of publishing a lengthy essay arguing against the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood.

This fixation has been further fueled by fears that the emergence of a democratic Ukraine could serve as a catalyst for similar changes inside Russia itself. Putin remains haunted by the pro-democracy uprisings that swept Central Europe in the late 1980s while he was a young KGB officer in East Germany, and views modern Ukraine’s embrace of democracy as a direct threat to his own authoritarian regime. It is no coincidence that in the buildup to last year’s invasion, Putin began referring to Ukraine as an intolerable “anti-Russia.”

Over the past 13 months of full-scale war, Putin’s imperial objectives in Ukraine have become increasingly evident. He has compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great, and has repeatedly spoken of returning historical Russian lands while attempting to annex four partially occupied Ukrainian regions representing almost 20% of the war-torn country. Meanwhile, his army has imposed brutal policies of russification throughout occupied Ukraine, complete with summary executions, forced deportations, the suppression of Ukrainian national symbols, and widespread use of torture against anyone deemed a potential opponent of Russian rule.

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Putin’s imperialistic views on Ukraine are regarded as uncontroversial by domestic Russian audiences. While public enthusiasm for the invasion may vary, many Russians share Putin’s rejection of Ukrainian statehood, while millions appear comfortable embracing an unambiguously imperial agenda. However, such messaging would be disastrous on the international stage. To counter this, Putin has sought to frame the invasion of Ukraine as a defensive measure by emphasizing Russia’s longstanding grievances over NATO’s post-1991 enlargement.

This approach has played well in an international climate colored by anti-Western sentiment and widespread suspicion of America’s dominant role in global affairs. Over the past year or so, the NATO expansion argument has proved easily the most effective of the multiple narratives promoted by the Kremlin to defend the invasion. While international audiences have remained largely unconvinced by Russian attempts to portray the war as a fight against everything from Western cancel culture to Satanists and fictitious “Ukrainian Nazis,” Moscow’s accusations toward NATO have resonated around the world. Kremlin claims of NATO responsibility for the war have been echoed by everyone from Chinese President Xi Jinping to prominent Western academics and even Pope Francis.

The success of Russia’s NATO expansion narrative has distorted international perceptions of what is the most brazen example of European aggression since the days of Hitler and Stalin. It has encouraged many commentators to view the war as a clash between two competing superpowers rather than a genocidal invasion by an expansionist empire. This has naturally impacted efforts to end the war, with calls to help Ukraine defend itself often met by demands for NATO to deescalate.

In reality, Russia’s accusations regarding NATO involvement in Ukraine have never stood up to serous scrutiny. Far from pursuing Ukraine, the alliance actually sidestepped calls to grant the country a Membership Action Plan in 2008, settling instead for vague promises of future membership. NATO has consistently refused to revise this position, even after the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine with the 2014 seizure of Crimea. On the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion last year, Ukraine was widely recognized as being decades away from potentially joining NATO.

The Kremlin has argued that even without Ukrainian membership, any deepening of cooperation between NATO and Ukraine represents an unacceptable security threat. However, this conveniently ignores the existing NATO status of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, all of which border Russia. The three Baltic states are just as close to Moscow as Ukraine, and have been full members of the alliance for almost two decades without any major incident.

The Kremlin’s passive acceptance of Finnish accession has further undermined Russian attempts to pose as victims of NATO aggression. After years of insisting that NATO’s largely imaginary presence in Ukraine posed an existential threat to Russia, Moscow must now explain why today’s very real NATO presence along Russia’s 1,340 km border with Finland is so apparently inconsequential. Whatever they may say in public, Putin and his Kremlin colleagues clearly recognize that any talk of a NATO attack on Russia is absurd.

This is not to say that Russian displeasure over NATO enlargement is entirely manufactured. On the contrary, Moscow’s objections are real enough, but they are rooted in resentment rather than genuine security concerns. The Kremlin’s frustration over the expanding presence of the alliance is not difficult to understand. While NATO poses no plausible security threat to Russia itself, it does create major obstacles for Russian imperialism. Put simply, NATO prevents Russia from bullying its neighbors.

This should provide critics of NATO enlargement with food for thought. Opponents have long accused the alliance of provoking Russia by welcoming countries from the former Eastern Bloc, but it is now painfully apparent that the decision to keep Ukraine internationally isolated was actually far more provocative in practice. Indeed, the security guarantees that come with NATO membership are probably the only reason why we are not currently confronted by an even larger war and further Russian invasions. Unless Ukraine can secure similar security guarantees, a lasting peace in Eastern Europe will likely remain elusive.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

These figures point to strong levels of public support for the war but they must be viewed in context. Critics question the validity of any public opinion polling in a dictatorship such as Putin’s Russia, where people are legally obliged to call the invasion a “Special Military Operation” and can face criminal prosecution for social media posts. This is worth keeping in mind when analyzing surveys of Russian opinion.

Many poll respondents may be inclined to demonstrate their patriotism and their support for the Russian military while being less enthusiastic about the invasion itself or the Kremlin’s war aims. Others may have become swept up in the relentless flow of pro-war propaganda or cut off from alternative sources of information. It is also important to acknowledge that a large majority of people refuse to participate in polling of this nature. They may choose to decline for a wide range of reasons, but it is possible that many simply prefer not to share anti-war opinions with strangers.

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What evidence is there of anti-war sentiment in today’s Russia? When the invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, efforts to claim strong public backing for the war were hampered by a series of protests in cities across the country involving mainly young Russians. However, these public demonstrations failed to reach any kind of critical mass and were fairly rapidly suppressed by the authorities with large numbers of detentions.

Other Russians have voted with their feet. A mass exodus of Russian nationals began during the first weeks of the war, with a second wave starting in September 2022 in the wake of Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. Hundreds of thousands of military-age Russian men fled to neighboring countries in the last four months of the year, leading in some cases to massive queues at border crossings.

This outflow of people has had a considerable negative demographic impact on Russia, but it would not be accurate to claim that everyone who has left the country during the past year holds anti-war views. Many chose to leave in order to avoid military service, while others feared the inconvenience of wartime conditions. Thousands of wealthy Russians have relocated to destinations like Dubai, where they can manage their Russian businesses while distancing themselves physically and psychologically from the war.

For those who remain in Russia, it is still possible to live a fairly normal life despite the imposition of sanctions and the departure of many high-profile Western brands. Meanwhile, some members of Russia’s billionaire elite are believed to oppose the war, but most see their fortunes as tied to Putin and are fearful of the consequences if they break with the regime publicly.

There are indications that the war is becoming less and less popular among the very troops charged with leading the invasion. The refusal of many contract soldiers to extend their service has forced the Russian authorities to introduce legislative changes, while in recent months there has been a sharp increase in video addresses on social media featuring mobilized Russian soldiers complaining about suicidal tactics and high death tolls. At the same time, there is little indication yet that mounting demoralization on the front lines is shaping the public mood back in Russia itself.

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What of Russia’s beleaguered political opposition? For more than twenty years, the Putin regime has sought to silence any genuine opposition forces via increasingly direct means. These efforts have intensified since the onset of the Ukraine invasion, with independent media outlets shut down and many of the country’s relatively few remaining opposition figures either jailed or forced to flee. Some have attempted to speak out against the war while in exile, with others who left Russia in previous years such as Gary Kasparov and Mikhail Khodorkovsky serving as vocal opponents of the invasion.

The most prominent opposition figure in today’s Russia, Alexei Navalny, remains in prison. Navalny has managed to issue a number of statements from jail condemning the war. In February 2023, he published a fifteen-point plan calling for the Russian military to withdraw completely from Ukraine and arguing that Russia must accept Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders. While many have welcomed Navalny’s unambiguous opposition to the invasion, others remain wary due to his ties to Russian nationalism and earlier reluctance to back the return of Crimea to Ukraine.

At this point, extreme Russian nationalism appears to pose a far greater threat to the Putin regime than liberal anti-war sentiment. A new class of pro-war bloggers has emerged over the past year and has become a powerful force within the more active segments of Russian society. Hardliners such as Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov have gained in stature thanks to their prominent roles in the invasion and have engaged in rare public criticism of key establishment figures.

The authoritarian nature of the Putin regime makes it almost impossible to accurately gauge levels of anti-war sentiment in today’s Russia. It may take a decisive military defeat before many of those who oppose the war dare to speak up and demand change. In a sense, this is exactly what Putin is fighting against. He invaded Ukraine primarily because he feared Ukrainian democracy would serve as a catalyst for similar demands inside Russia itself. So far, he has managed to prevent anti-war or pro-democracy movements from gaining momentum. However, if his invading army’s battlefield fortunes continue to deteriorate in Ukraine, those who dream of a different Russia may finally find their voices.

Christopher Isajiw is an international relations commentator and business development consultant to private, governmental, and non-governmental organizations.

Russia’s Wagner Group is a feature not a bug of the Putin regime

Allen Maggard — Tue, 04 Apr 2023 19:57:07 +0000

Of the various parties embroiled in Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, few have attracted as much international attention as the paramilitary Wagner Group. Indeed, a veritable cottage industry has emerged dedicated to monitoring the Wagner network’s alleged involvement as unofficial agents of Russian foreign policy everywhere from Estonia to Sub-Saharan Africa.

The general consensus is that private military companies (PMCs) like Wagner Group must be countered because they advance Kremlin interests and help the Putin regime to project Russian power internationally. But a closer look suggests the Wagner Group and other Russian mercenary organizations may ultimately be liabilities and not assets for Putin.

For Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, 2023 already looks to be a tumultuous year. He has accused senior Russian military leaders of “treason” for allegedly holding up logistical and material support to Wagner mercenaries battling for control of Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine, and recently complained of being cut off altogether from the Kremlin.

Some commentators believe Prigozhin’s frequent jabs at members of the Russian elite could presage a contest for political power that may reach the heights of the Kremlin towers. Indeed, Prigozhin now says that he plans to remold Wagner into “an army with an ideology,” suggesting that he seeks to officially re-brand himself as an out-and-out political operator.

For all the speculation regarding the potential threat Prigozhin poses to the stability of the Putin regime, few have explored the Wagner leader’s relationship to the power structures that Putin himself depends upon for the perpetuation of his rule. In reality, the Wagner Group is as much a product of this system as it is a tool of Kremlin foreign and military policy. Western policymakers seeking to understand the role of Russian private paramilitaries should treat them as a symptom of the institutionalized corruption at the heart of Putin’s regime and not as just another instrument in Russia’s hybrid warfare toolbox.

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Prigozhin has managed to carve a niche for himself by leveraging opaque corporate networks to facilitate Russian hard and soft power projection in Ukraine, Syria, and various conflict zones across Africa. This appears to be profitable work; his companies have reportedly raked in hundreds of millions of dollars from mineral extraction alone. White House officials have even claimed in recent months that Prigozhin directed Wagner fighters to capture the Ukrainian town of Soledar in order to secure access to nearby salt and gypsum mines. The notion that Prigozhin personally benefits from enabling the Kremlin’s foreign policy adventures appears to be a feature rather than a bug of Putin’s particular approach to governance.

Political scientists generally characterize Putin’s rule as a corrupt patron-client system in which elites are compensated for their allegiance with access to resources. Vladimir Gel’man of the University of Helsinki contends that Putin accepts bad governance by trusted elites to cultivate a loyal, informal power base separate from those formal institutions which might challenge his authority. Russia analyst Mark Galeotti likens this arrangement to a public-private “adhocracy” in which informal networks of enterprising business and political elites, rather than formal institutions, end up taking the initiative in divining and executing official policy.

The Wagner phenomenon reflects a political ecosystem that rewards the stewards of government policy with official as well as illicit perks in exchange for loyalty. Wagner benefits Putin by providing deniable cover for a wide range of military operations outside of Russia. In exchange, Prigozhin is allowed to pursue commercial ventures in the countries where his forces are active.

Eurasia Center events

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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Prigozhin’s trajectory is an indication that the Russian state’s claim to a monopoly on violence may be the next frontier to be challenged by Kremlin elites. The Wagner Group’s example appears to have encouraged everyone from Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov to Russian natural gas giant Gazprom to organize PMCs of their own, a trend that some analysts argue could portend a “descent into warlordism.” Recent reports of a company owned by longtime Putin associate Gennadiy Timchenko hiring another PMC outfit not affiliated with Wagner to secure oil and gas infrastructure in Syria further suggest that Prigozhin is not the only person vying to supply PMC services to regime insiders.

International efforts to counter the Wagner network will require many of the same mechanisms used to combat corruption more generally. This will require governments to reflect on how their own institutions play into the interests of figures like Prigozhin, who has pursued journalists through the British courts despite being the subject of UK sanctions. Critics claim transnational imbalances in financial transparency that allow offshore jurisdictions to provide a veil of corporate secrecy to American and European nationals also help to obscure the Wagner network’s operations.

Efforts by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control to target Wagner-linked shell companies registered in tax havens are a step in the right direction. But Western governments should also aim to hold accountable those individuals responsible for managing the network of corporate entities behind Wagner’s more mundane business operations.

One may reasonably question why Ukraine and its allies should go after Russian PMCs at all if their continued presence has the potential to undo Putin. Why not let them multiply and further weaken the foundations of the Putin regime? While potentially tempting, such an approach would involve considerable risks. If and when Putin leaves office, this is likely to create a power vacuum in which Russia’s nascent PMC class would flourish. Such an outcome could return Russia to a state of lawlessness reminiscent of the “wild nineties,” a period characterized by a proliferation of organized crime groups whose mercenary enforcers were often veterans of military campaigns in Afghanistan and Chechnya.

Putin often invokes the chaos of the 1990s to justify his authoritarian rule. Tolerating the presence of PMCs like the Wagner Group in the hope that they could unseat Putin risks reducing Russia to new depths of disorder and thereby facilitating the rise of aspiring autocrats in the years to come. Combating Russia’s private paramilitaries is essential not just in order to contain Putin, but to preempt the empowerment of future Russian leaders molded in his likeness.

Allen Maggard is a Russia analyst and specialist in the intersection of Russian political economy and the defense industry at C4ADS.

Russian War Report: A new private military company emerges in Crimea

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 31 Mar 2023 20:29:11 +0000

Security

Russia escalates attacks in Avdiivka as new private-military-company unit launches in Crimea

Tracking narratives

Russia and its political allies in Moldova continue to inflame information space around Transnistria

Putin and Lukashenka announce plans to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus after news of UK uranium-depleted ammo transfer

Secretary of Kremlin Security Council accuses NATO of being “party to the conflict” in Ukraine

Documenting dissent

New audio allegedly documents Russian elites criticizing Putin for war in Ukraine

Russia escalates attacks in Avdiivka as new private-military-company unit launches in Crimea

Russian forces continue their attempts to break through Ukrainian army defenses in several directions. Russian units attacked Ukrainian positions in Pervomaisk, and conducted strikes on Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv. On March 30, at least ten Iranian-made Shahed drones targeted Ukrainian territory as Russian aviation dropped guided bombs on Lvove village in Kherson Oblast.

The Russian army continues to pressure Ukrainian forces in the direction of Avdiivka, where fighting has recently escalated. Ukraine’s 36th Marine Brigade, active in Avdiivka, has been successful in countering Russian attacks. However, Russian Telegram channels claimed that incendiary shells struck Ukrainian positions around the Avdiivka Coke and Chemical Plant.

On March 29, Russia claimed that Ukraine had struck a railway depot in the Russian-occupied city of Melitopol, located deep behind the front line, knocking out power. Ukraine’s exiled mayor of the city also confirmed the explosions. Footage published online shows explosions lighting up the night sky. Melitopol is located on the edge of the range of Ukraine’s HIMARS multiple rocket launchers but is within reach of newer weapons, including air-launched joint direct attack munitions and ground-launched small-diameter bombs (GLSDB). The strike could disturb Moscow’s logistics at a time when Kyiv has suggested it could soon launch a counterattack.

On March 28, Russia reported for the first time that it had shot down a GLSDB. The Russian Ministry of Defense also claimed that air defenses had shot down a new Ukrainian Hrim-2 ballistic missile in the area of Novoandriivka, Donetsk Oblast.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin-installed head of occupied Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, has created his own Wagner-like military unit. To lead the group, dubbed “Convoy” (Конвой), Aksyonov has recruited Konstantin Pikalov, a former Wagner commander who served in Africa. The mercenary unit is said to be composed of three hundred fighters and has reportedly already deployed to occupied parts of Kherson Oblast. On March 16, Aksyonov spoke about the “professional military unit” on Crimean television. “The guys who have gone through everything that is possible,” he said, discussing military honors they had received. “The leaders have several Orders of Courage; the chief of staff is a Hero of Russia.”

A video published on the Convoy Telegram channel showed Aksyonov inspecting the positions of the new unit. The channel was created last November and heavily features Russian Orthodox imagery and icons. It also refers to Ukrainians as “satanists.”

Vladimir Osechkin, the founder of the Russian human-rights organization Gulagu, said the new private military contractors are designed to replace Wagner units on the frontlines. He said the new unit could be expected to operate alongside the Russian army in Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and areas just north of Crimea.

Convoy’s training grounds are located in the village of Perevalne, southeast of Simferopol, according to the independent Russian news outlet Important Stories. This village has existing military infrastructure from the Cold War era, including the 165th Training Center, used for the training of foreign military personnel. A January 2023 Convoy ad recruiting snipers on Telegram offered room and board at the training center, as well as clothing, equipment, and a scholarship worth 100,000 rubles ($1,286).

Convoy sniper recruitment poster circulated on Telegram, January 17, 2023. (Source: @lobaev_vlad/archive)

The ad included a contact email address with the domain conwoy.org; according to a WHOIS search, the domain was registered on June 15, 2022, by “’Military Security Company Convoy’ Limited Liability Company” in Leningrad Oblast.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia and its political allies in Moldova continue to inflame information space around Transnistria

In an interview with the Russian state-owned news outlet TASS, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov alleged Ukrainian interference in the unrecognized breakaway region of Transnistria, saying Ukrainian leadership “[demonstrates] in every way its readiness to interfere in this process, including with the use of force.” Lavrov accused Ukraine of playing an “extremely negative, subversive role” in the “5+2” negotiation format, a diplomatic platform designed to settle the Transnistria conflict. The minister said that by clearly siding with Chisinau, “Kyiv authorities support its belligerent, destructive policy towards Transnistria.” Lavrov also emphasized Russia’s responsibility for the security of Transnistria, which according to him, is “in full accordance” with the mandate of Russian troops.

Earlier, Marina Tauber, vice president of the pro-Russian Moldovan opposition party Sor, claimed that Moldovan authorities were preparing a military provocation near the border of Transnistria, scheduled for April 17, after the Easter holidays. “[Moldovan President] Maia Sandu and [Moldovan Prime Minister] Dorin Recean are preparing a military provocation on the border with Transnistria,” Tauber claimed, citing “international intelligence services.” Tauber further asserted that Moldova had sent ten thousand uniforms to Romania for the Romanian security forces, with the goal of involving them in a military conflict. She also claimed that authorities had ordered three thousand coffins.

Moldovan government spokesperson Daniel Voda dismissed Tauber’s claims, saying, “Tauber’s statements are false and are part of a constant discourse promoting fear and division in society.”

The Russian Defense Ministry had previously alleged that Kyiv was preparing an armed provocation against Transnistria, which Kyiv and Moldova have denied.

—Victoria Olari, research assistant, Chisinau, Moldova

Putin and Lukashenka announce plans to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus after news of UK uranium-depleted ammo transfer

The Kremlin may be exploiting a March 20 announcement by the United Kingdom concerning the transfer of depleted uranium armor-piercing rounds to Ukraine, using it as an excuse to allegedly deploy tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus.

Despite the fact that depleted uranium rounds do not actually contact radioactive elements, state-owned Russian news outlets claimed the ammunition could indeed contain radioactive uranium, which fueled a Kremlin-led narrative advocating for deploying tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus as retaliation. Putin said the transfer of weapons by the West containing “nuclear components” called for “an adequate answer.” State-owned news outlet TASS reported that Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called the transfer of these rounds a further escalation of the conflict, and claimed without evidence that the use of them would contaminate Ukraine’s food supply.

In a March 23 video on the Russian military TV station Zvezda News, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka said that if Russian forces are targeted by Ukrainian depleted rounds, “the response will be terrifying, it will be a lesson for the whole planet.” On his personal Telegram channel, Lukashenka noted that discussions about the transfer of nuclear weapons took place in November 2021.

In a March 25 interview on Rossiya 1, Putin announced plans to relocate tactical nuclear weapons to Belarusian territory. He said that Belarus was already equipped with ten bomber aircrafts as well as Iskander systems compatible with nuclear-class weapons. The Russian president insisted the weapons would be deployed to Belarusian “territory.” Using this wording indicates that Putin is trying to avoid being accused of nuclear proliferation to a neighboring country.

According to a report by the Belarusian website Motolko Help citing Putin’s interview, Russia will reportedly build storage facilities for tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus by June 1. Citing a video posted on the Belarusian YouTube channel ONT, Motolko also assessed that the 465th Missile Brigade in Osipovichi district—the only missile brigade in Belarus—was likely already equipped with Iskander missile systems. This claim has not been independently verified.

Motolko also reported that Lukashenka recently announced that additional SU-25 fighter jets would undergo “reequipment” to adapt their technical capabilities to carry nuclear payloads. However, the Belarusian president also made similar claims in June and August 2022.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, security, Brussels, Belgium

Secretary of Kremlin Security Council accuses NATO of being “party to the conflict” in Ukraine

On March 27, Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Kremlin Security Council, said that NATO is a party to the war in Ukraine. The government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta quoted Patrushev saying, “in fact, NATO countries are a party to the conflict. They made Ukraine one big military camp. They send weapons and ammunition to the Ukrainian troops, provide them with intelligence.”

On March 21, at a meeting in Ulyanovsk, Russia, Patrushev said that foreign intelligence agencies are trying to “stir up protest and separatist sentiments in Russia,” with the support of “pseudo-political structures” located abroad and foreign nongovernmental organizations. The remarks were made amid ongoing military setbacks by the Russian military in eastern Ukraine and internal problems within the officer corps fueled by a power struggle in the Kremlin that has been on display since the early months of the full-scale invasion.

Patrushev, a close ally of Putin, previously served as the head of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). He has served in the powerful role of secretary of the Kremlin Security Council since 2008. The anti-NATO remarks are the latest in an ongoing campaign of narratives that the Kremlin has utilized to justify its war on Ukraine.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

New audio allegedly documents Russian elites criticizing Putin for war in Ukraine

On March 7, audio emerged online purporting to capture a phone call between Russian music producer Iosif Prigozhin and Farhad Akhmedov, the Azerbaijan-born billionaire and former Russian senator, in which they criticized Putin for the war in Ukraine. The audio did not gain traction until March 24, when Ukraine’s Channel 5 published the conversation.

During the alleged call, Prigozhin seems to refer to Kremlin leaders as “criminals.” He then appears to claim that former Russian Prime Minister Igor Sechin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and National Guard Director Viktor Zolotov are “united” and “blame everything” on Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. “Putin is pinning everyone against each other to save himself,” Prigozhin allegedly added. Akhmedov, in turn, appears to say that Putin would not be able to save himself and would be held accountable for his actions.

The independent Russian media outlet Important Stories reported that the audio was genuine, citing an anonymous source in Russian intelligence services. According to the source, “the leadership of the FSB recently held a meeting and instructed subordinates to take action.”

When the audio first gained attention, Prigozhin shared a video on his Telegram channel insisting the audio was fake. “This recording is a symbiosis of spoken phrases and those that were generated, they were never spoken,” he insisted.

Wagner Group founder Yevgenzy Prigozhin, who bears no relation to the music producer, called Iosef Prigozhin “impudent, aggressive, and quick-tempered.” He speculated that whoever recorded the call may have thought that they had been recording the Wagner Group leader instead of the music producer.

—Ani Mejlumyan, research assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

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Banning TikTok alone will not solve the problem of US data security

Jonathan Panikoff — Fri, 31 Mar 2023 16:24:22 +0000

Last week, the TikTok chief executive officer, Shou Zi Chew, appeared before the US House of Representatives Energy and Commerce Committee. The media and political perception within the Washington Beltway is that it did not go well, and it didn’t. Chew’s answers were unconvincing and at times disingenuous, including when he downplayed accusations that the company had spied on journalists critical of the company. On social media, including on TikTok, the perception of the hearing by users was equally decisive, but not in Congress’s favor.

There are 150 million US users of TikTok, and the contrast between the creative and often viral nature of clips produced on the platform—including those defending Chew—and the stodgy nature of C-SPAN’s fixed camera positions, pre-planned talking points, and members demanding “yes” or “no” answers to their questions, made for an unfavorable contrast for committee members. US policymakers considering a ban on TikTok need to think about the very serious ramifications to people and small businesses whose livelihoods do, at least in part, rely on the app. Those Americans who use the app for professional and business purposes should have their legitimate concerns addressed by policymakers in a meaningful manner alongside any sort of ban.

But TikTok users’ usage of the social media app, even if only to generate business, does not mitigate the potential threats to US national security associated with it. In December, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines warned about the potential uses of TikTok by Beijing stemming from the data the app collects and the possibility of using it to influence public opinion. TikTok’s algorithm, for example—which experts view as more advanced than that of Facebook parent company Meta—could be used by China to create propaganda that seeks to influence or manipulate elections and the broader information environment.

TikTok’s connections to China’s government stem from it being a wholly owned subsidiary of the Beijing-based company ByteDance. Chew testified that “ByteDance is not owned or controlled by the Chinese government.” However, Article VII of China’s National Intelligence Law of 2017 makes clear the mandated responsibility for private sector companies (and any Chinese organization) to “support, assist, and cooperate” with China’s intelligence community. ByteDance, therefore, has an absolute obligation to turn over to China’s intelligence apparatus any data it requests.

There are significant reasons to be skeptical of Chew’s claims that “Project Texas”—TikTok’s effort to wall off US user data from Chinese authorities by solely storing it in the United States—will prevent China from having access to US user data in the future. Worse, even if one takes Chew at his word that “Project Texas” will accomplish this feat, it defies logic to believe that ByteDance would not—independently or compelled by China’s intelligence agencies—retain a copy of all 150 million current US users’ data.

At the same time, TikTok is just a symptom of a much bigger problem. The United States and its allies have a more fundamental issue when it comes to their citizens using China-based apps, programs, or any technology that collects their data. All China-based companies have the same obligations to provide data information to China’s intelligence services whenever requested.

What the US government can do

TikTok’s ban would mitigate the immediate threat posed by the ByteDance subsidiary, but there’s far more work that needs to be done. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has, up until now, been the most prominent tool used to prevent foreign governments, or individuals associated with them, from making investments in the United States that could be used to ultimately undermine US national security. CFIUS has a specific and meaningful role focused on investments, but nowadays it has too often become the default instrument for reconciling an increasingly broad swath of national security challenges. This is in part because it has a track record of success, but also because it’s one of the only meaningful tools available to policymakers. But it is not an ideal tool for every situation, something best demonstrated by CFIUS’s challenge in resolving TikTok’s ongoing review that has stretched on for more than two years now.

The bipartisan RESTRICT Act—which would give the Department of Commerce the right to review foreign technologies and ban them in the United States or force their sale—is a thoughtful place from which to begin discussions about additional ways to mitigate the US national security challenges related to information and communications platforms available for mass use. But that act alone would not solve the broader data challenges as they exist today.

The lack of federal regulation related to commercial data brokers, which today can and do legally collect and resell the data of millions of Americans, is a glaring gap that needs to be filled immediately. A ban on TikTok, for example, would do nothing to prevent data brokers from aggregating the same consumer data from other apps and re-selling it to commercial entities, including those in China.

The threat posed by China to US national security, and to Americans’ individual data, is acute. The good news is the United States can deal with these challenges, but it will take more than just banning TikTok.

Jonathan Panikoff is a senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and the former director of the Investment Security Group, overseeing the intelligence community’s CFIUS efforts, at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

The views expressed in this publication are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the intelligence community, or any other US government agency.

The post Banning TikTok alone will not solve the problem of US data security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling is a sign of dangerous Russian desperation

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 30 Mar 2023 20:55:26 +0000

Vladimir Putin resumed his nuclear saber-rattling in late March with the announcement that he plans to place nuclear weapons in neighboring Belarus. This largely symbolic move was clearly designed to intimidate Western leaders and deter them from continuing to arm Ukraine. In reality, however, it merely serves to highlight Russia’s growing desperation and the Kremlin’s lack of alternative options as the attempted conquest of Ukraine continues to unravel.

Putin has repeatedly resorted to nuclear blackmail since embarking on the full-scale invasion of Ukraine just over thirteen months ago. During the first few days of the invasion, the Russian dictator signaled his readiness to engage in nuclear intimidation by very publicly placing his country’s nuclear forces on “special alert.” This was widely interpreted as an attempt to discourage any Western intervention.

Further thinly-veiled nuclear threats came in September 2022 as Putin sought to escalate his faltering invasion. Following a string of battlefield defeats and embarrassing retreats, he announced his country’s first mobilization since World War II before boasting of Russia’s unrivaled “weapons of destruction” and vowing to “use all the means at our disposal” to defend the country. “I am not bluffing,” Putin warned.

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It is not difficult to imagine why Putin is now once again indulging in nuclear saber-rattling. In recent months, military aid to Ukraine has expanded to new levels and crossed multiple Russian red lines in the process. Western countries have agreed to supply Kyiv with state-of-the-art air defense systems, modern battle tanks, and jet fighters. Tellingly, Putin framed his plans for nuclear weapons in Belarus as a response to Britain’s decision to provide Ukraine with anti-tank ammunition that contains depleted uranium.

Meanwhile, Russia’s military fortunes in Ukraine have continued to deteriorate. The six-month campaign to bomb Ukraine into submission by targeting the country’s civilian infrastructure has ended in failure. Along the front lines in southern and eastern Ukraine, a much-hyped Russian offensive has been underway since early 2023 but has failed to make significant progress while suffering disastrous losses. This is leading to the rapid demoralization of Putin’s army in Ukraine, with video appeals regularly posted to social media featuring groups of recently mobilized Russian soldiers complaining of suicidal tactics and high death tolls.

There is also little cause for Russian optimism on the international front, where initial expectations of a weakening in Western support for Ukraine are rapidly evaporating. Indeed, during the early months of 2023, the democratic world’s commitment to Ukraine has looked stronger than ever. In February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was given a hero’s welcome during a brief trip to London, Paris, and Brussels. Weeks later, US President Joe Biden arrived in Kyiv to emphasize his resolve to stand with Ukraine.

There was more bad news for Russia in mid-March, when the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for Putin’s arrest on war crimes charges related to the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. While there is no immediate danger of the Russian ruler ending up in court, the indictment is a further humiliation that underlines Putin’s pariah status while weakening his position both at home and abroad.

Even the recent visit of Chinese leader Xi Jinping to Moscow failed to lift the gloom. The summit produced few concrete gains for Putin while confirming his position as junior partner in what is an increasingly unequal bilateral relationship. Interestingly, one of the few security-related outcomes of the visit was a joint statement calling on all nuclear powers to refrain from deploying nuclear weapons beyond their national borders. Putin’s subsequent decision to place nukes in Belarus may well be an indication of his frustration over China’s obvious reluctance to back Russia more forcefully.

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It remains far from clear whether Russia is capable of regaining the military initiative in Ukraine via conventional means. Kremlin officials have recently begun speaking of massive increases in military production, while rumors persist of additional mobilization waves to bolster the depleted ranks of Russia’s invasion force. However, this optimism is at odds with the realities on the ground in Ukraine, with the UK Ministry of Defense recently reporting that Russia is now deploying tanks and armored vehicles from the 1950s and 1960s “to make up for previous losses.” With limited access to sanctioned Western technologies, many analysts question the offensive potential of what will be a largely conscript Russian army of poorly motivated troops with limited training and outdated equipment.

This grim outlook helps to explain why Putin is playing the nuclear card. His nuclear threats may ring hollow, but they are too serious to be disregarded completely and he knows it. At the same time, the international community cannot afford to let Putin’s intimidation tactics succeed. If nuclear blackmail pays off for Putin in Ukraine and allows him to snatch a victory of sorts from the jaws of defeat, it will become a normalized element of international relations with devastating consequences for global security. Countries around the world will scramble to acquire nuclear arsenals of their own in order to avoid the fate of Ukraine.

So far, the response to Putin’s latest bout of nuclear saber-rattling has been encouraging. US, EU, and NATO officials were united in their condemnation. EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell branded it “an irresponsible escalation and threat to European security,” while Germany’s Foreign Ministry accused Russia of “another attempt at nuclear intimidation.” Perhaps the most fitting commentary came from Kyiv, with Presidential Advisor Mykhailo Podolyak claiming Putin’s comments demonstrate that he fears defeat in Ukraine and has nothing to offer other than scare tactics.

We are likely to see such scare tactics increasingly in the coming months. With the Ukrainian military currently preparing to launch what promises to be their largest offensive of the war, Russia’s position could worsen significantly during spring and summer 2023. If he finds himself faced with the prospect of decisive military defeat, Putin will almost certainly escalate his nuclear blackmail to new levels of danger. At that point, the international community must unite to prevent Russia from dragging the world into catastrophe.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

What to expect from the world’s democratic tech alliance as the Summit for Democracy unfolds

Katherine Walla — Wed, 29 Mar 2023 17:37:06 +0000

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Online Event Mon, March 27, 2023 • 1:30 pm ET

Live from the Freedom Online Coalition: How the FOC works for people around the world

The DFRLab hosts the US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman along with civil society and industry experts for a discussion on the Freedom Online Coalition and how the world’s democratic tech alliance advances human rights online.

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Ahead of the Biden administration’s second Summit for Democracy, US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman gave a sneak peek at what to expect from the US government on its commitments to protecting online rights and freedoms.

The event, hosted by the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab on Monday, came on the same day that US President Joe Biden signed an executive order restricting the US government’s use of commercial spyware that may be abused by foreign governments or enable human-rights abuses overseas.

But there’s more in store for this week, Sherman said, as the United States settles into its role as chair of the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC)—a democratic tech alliance of thirty-six countries working together to support human rights online. As chair, the United States needs “to reinforce rules of the road for cyberspace that mirror and match the ideals of the rules-based international order,” said Sherman. She broke that down into four top priorities for the FOC:

Protecting fundamental freedoms online, especially for often-targeted human-rights defenders
Building resilience against digital authoritarians who use technology to achieve their aims
Building a consensus on policies designed to limit abuses of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI)
Expanding digital inclusion

“The FOC’s absolutely vital work can feel like a continuous game of catch-up,” said Sherman. But, she added, “we have to set standards that meet this moment… we have to address what we see in front of us and equip ourselves with the building blocks to tackle what we cannot predict.”

Below are more highlights from the event, during which a panel of stakeholders also outlined the FOC’s role in ensuring that the internet and emerging technologies—including AI—adhere to democratic principles.

Deepening fundamental freedoms

Sherman explained that the FOC will aim to combat government-initiated internet shutdowns and ensure that people can “keep using technology to advance the reach of freedom.”
Boye Adegoke, senior manager of grants and program strategy at the Paradigm Initiative, recounted how technology was supposed to help improve transparency in Nigeria’s recent elections. But instead, the election results came in inconsistently and after long periods of time. Meanwhile, the government triggered internet shutdowns around the election period. “Bad actors… manipulate technology to make sure that the opinions and the wishes of the people do not matter at the end of the day,” he said.
“It’s very important to continue to communicate the work that the FOC is doing… so that more and more people become aware” of internet shutdowns and can therefore prepare for the lapses in internet service and in freely flowing, accurate information, Adegoke said.
On a practical level, once industry partners expose where disruptions are taking place, the FOC offers a mechanism by which democratic “governments can work together to sort of pressure other governments to say these [actions] aren’t acceptable,” Starzak argued.
The FOC also provides a place for dialogue on human rights in the online space, said Alissa Starzak, vice president and global head of public policy at Cloudfare. Adegoke, who also serves in the FOC advisory network, stressed that “human rights [are] rarely at the center of the issues,” so the FOC offers an opportunity to mainstream that conversation into policymakers’ discussions on technology.

Building resilience against digital authoritarianism

“Where all of [us FOC countries] may strive to ensure technology delivers for our citizens, autocratic regimes are finding another means of expression,” Sherman explained, adding that those autocratic regimes are using technologies to “divide and disenfranchise; to censor and suppress; to limit freedoms, foment fear, and violate human dignity.” New technologies are essentially “an avenue of control” for authoritarians, she explained.
At the FOC, “we will focus on building resilience against the rise of digital authoritarianism,” Sherman said, which has “disproportionate and chilling impacts on journalists, activists, women, and LGBTI+ individuals” who are often directly targeted for challenging the government or expressing themselves.
One of the practices digital authoritarians often abuse is surveillance. Sherman said that as part of the Summit for Democracy, the FOC and other partners will lay out guiding principles for the responsible use of surveillance tech.
Adegoke recounted how officials in Nigeria justified their use of surveillance tech by saying that the United States also used the technology. “It’s very important to have some sort of guiding principle” from the United States, he said.
After Biden signed the spyware executive order, Juan Carlos Lara, executive director at Derechos Digitales, said he expects other countries “to follow suit and hopefully to expand the idea of bans on spyware or bans on surveillance technology” that inherently pose risks to human rights.

Addressing artificial intelligence

“The advent of AI is arriving with a level of speed and sophistication we haven’t witnessed before,” warned Sherman. “Who creates it, who controls it, [and] who manipulates it will help define the next phase of the intersection between technology and democracy.”
Some governments, Sherman pointed out, have used AI to automate their censorship and suppression practices. “FOC members must build a consensus around policies to limit these abuses,” she argued.
Speaking from an industry perspective, Starzak acknowledged that sometimes private companies and governments “are in two different lanes” when it comes to figuring out how they should use AI. But setting norms for both good and bad AI use, she explained, could help get industry and the public sector in the same lane, moving toward a world in which AI is used in compliance with democratic principles.
Lara, who also serves in the FOC advisory network, explained that the FOC has a task force to specifically determine those norms on government use of AI and to identify the ways in which AI contributes to the promise—or peril—of technology in societies worldwide.

Improving digital inclusion

“The internet should be open and secure for everyone,” said Sherman. That includes “closing the gender gap online” by “expanding digital literacy” and “promoting access to safe online spaces” that make robust civic participation possible for all. Sherman noted that the FOC will specifically focus on digital inclusion for women and girls, LGBTI+ people, and people with disabilities.
Starzak added that in the global effort to cultivate an internet that “builds prosperity,” access to the free flow of information for all is “good for the economy and good for the people.” Attaining that version of the internet will require a “set of controls” to protect people and their freedoms online, she added.
Ultimately, there are major benefits to be had from expanded connectivity. According to Sherman, it “can drive economic growth, raise standards of living, create jobs, and fuel innovative solutions” for global challenges such as climate change, food insecurity, and good governance.

Katherine Walla is an associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

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Putin’s plan for a new Russian Empire includes both Ukraine and Belarus

Taras Kuzio — Wed, 29 Mar 2023 14:45:58 +0000

Over the past year, Vladimir Putin has compared himself to empire-building eighteenth century Russian Czar Peter the Great, and has attempted to annex entire regions of Ukraine while declaring that he is “returning historically Russian lands.” A recently leaked document purportedly detailing Russian plans to absorb neighboring Belarus now provides further insight into the imperial ambitions that are also driving the invasion of Ukraine.

Allegedly produced by Putin’s Presidential Administration with input from the Russian intelligence services and armed forces, the 17-page internal strategy paper was made public in early 2023 by an international consortium of journalists. It serves as a comprehensive guide to the unofficial annexation of Belarus via a combination of economic, military, political, and social measures, with the objective of full absorption into a so-called “Union State” with Russia by 2030.

The Russian takeover of Belarus as outlined in the document appears to closely mirror Moscow’s plans for Ukraine, albeit by less direct means. “Russia’s goals with regard to Belarus are the same as with Ukraine. Only in Belarus, Russia relies on coercion rather than war. Its end goal is still wholesale incorporation,” commented Michael Carpenter, the US Ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, following publication of the leaked document.

The strategy document for Belarus envisions the comprehensive russification of Belarusian society along with a sharp reduction in the influence of nationalist and pro-Western forces, which are viewed by Russia as virtually indistinguishable in relation to both Belarus and Ukraine. The Belarusian political, financial, business, and education systems would be fully integrated into Russia, with a network of pro-Russian media, NGOs, and cultural institutions established to aid this integration process.

In the military sphere, the Belarusian army would become de facto part of the Russian military, with Belarus increasing the number of Russian bases in the country and allowing Moscow to dramatically expand its military presence. Putin’s recently announced intention to base Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus are an indication that this plan is already advancing.

The publication date of this alleged Russian blueprint for the takeover of Belarus is particularly interesting. It was reportedly produced in summer 2021 at a time when Putin’s mind seems to have been turning toward grand visions of imperial conquest. Increasingly isolated due to the Covid pandemic and surrounded by a shrinking circle of imperial hardliners and sycophants, Putin appears to have made the fateful decision in mid 2021 to extinguish Belarusian and Ukrainian independence once and for all.

Efforts to unofficially annex Belarus were well underway by this point. Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka was already heavily reliant on Russia following a Kremlin intervention to prop up his tottering regime in the wake of nationwide protests over the country’s rigged August 2020 presidential election.

As Kremlin officials were busy drawing up plans to incorporate Belarus, Putin himself was penning a 6000-word treatise outlining his denial of Ukraine’s right to statehood and his insistence that Ukrainians were really Russians (“one people”). Putin’s July 2021 essay was widely seen as a declaration of war against Ukrainian independence. His lengthy article laid the ideological foundations for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began seven months later.

Putin’s plans for a subjugated Ukraine share many common features with his vision for the takeover of Belarus. Following the anticipated military conquest of Ukraine, Russia intended to install a puppet ruler in Kyiv who would replace Zelenskyy and play the same role as Lukashenka in Belarus. For both countries, Moscow’s ultimate goal is the same: Complete absorption into a new Russian Empire.

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Putin’s dreams of a new Russian Empire have been evident since his first term in office but became more obvious following his formal return to the presidency in 2012. From this point onward, Putin began to openly embrace an imperialistic brand of nationalism that positioned him as the latest in a long line of Kremlin rulers celebrated as “gatherers of Russian lands.” In the contemporary context, this meant incorporating fellow East Slavic states Belarus and Ukraine into a new Russia-led union.

The idea of a union between Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine was not new and first gained prominence during the collapse of the USSR when promoted by Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn. East Slavic unity had both ideological and practical appeal for Putin. It would secure his place in Russian history while also creating a solid basis for the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Putin’s alternative to the EU.

Initially, Putin hoped to absorb Ukraine without a fight. Indeed, in 2012 and 2013, the Kremlin adopted many of the same tactics later used in Belarus to strengthen Russia’s grip on the country. However, post-Soviet Ukraine had a far stronger sense of national identity than Belarus, with a majority of Ukrainians seeing themselves as Europeans and embracing the country’s fledgling democratic traditions. This was to prove a major obstacle for Putin’s imperial project.

As Ukraine prepared to sign a long-anticipated Association Agreement with the European Union in last 2013, Moscow unleashed a trade war and began pressuring Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president Viktor Yanukovych to reject Brussels in favor of Moscow. When Yanukovych attempted to do so, mass protests erupted in Ukraine that escalated into a full-scale revolution in support of democracy and European integration. Within three months, Yanukovych found himself deserted by his allies and escaped to Russia.

Russia responded to the success of the Euromaidan Revolution by occupying Crimea and attempting to orchestrate uprisings throughout southern and eastern Ukraine. Targeted regions of Ukraine were rebranded by the Kremlin using the old Czarist-era imperial term of “Novorossiya” or “New Russia.” This strategy was only partially successful, with Kremlin-backed uprisings defeated in most major Ukrainian cities except for Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, where Kremlin control was secured with the assistance of the invading Russian army.

Over the next eight years, Putin attempted to rebuild Russia’s political influence inside Ukraine while pressuring the country to accept a Kremlin-friendly interpretation of the February 2015 Minsk Accords, which had brought the worst of the fighting to an end in eastern Ukraine without establishing a durable peace. Moscow’s vision for the implementation of the Minsk Accords would have transformed Ukraine into a dysfunctional Russian satellite, but this outcome met with resistance from successive Ukrainian presidents.

By early 2021, Putin had come to the conclusion that his strategy was failing and appears to have recognized that Ukraine was slipping irreparably out of the Russian orbit. At this point, he and other Kremlin leaders began referring to Ukraine as an “anti-Russia” and portraying the country as an intolerable outpost of NATO and US interests on Russia’s borders. The available evidence suggests that by the time Putin published his notorious essay in summer 2021, he was already fully committed to crushing Ukrainian independence by military means.

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In a clear echo of the strategy adopted for Belarus, Russia’s FSB security service was tasked in 2021 with preparing plans for the military occupation and pacification of Ukraine. However, a combination of FSB corruption, wishful thinking, and misplaced stereotypes about modern Ukraine resulted in a series of disastrous miscalculations.

Collaborators within the Ukrainian government told FSB agents what they wanted to hear with no regard for the realities on the ground, while the Kremlin’s networks of Ukrainian informants, NGOs, and other “experts” assured their Russian colleagues that the invading Russian army would be welcomed. Meanwhile, FSB officers confidently predicted that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy would soon be captured or forced to flee, with organized Ukrainian resistance unlikely to last longer than a few days.

These intelligence failures persuaded Putin to embark on the biggest gamble of his presidency with a wholly inadequate force of less than 200,000 troops. This was regarded as sufficient to install a pro-Russian regime and place Ukraine on the same path as Belarus toward absorption into the Russian Federation.

Captured documents, prisoner accounts, and the actions of the Russian occupation forces in regions of Ukraine under Kremlin control now make it possible to produce a comprehensive picture of Russia’s plans for the subjugation of the country. These plans share many features with Moscow’s approach to the creeping annexation of Belarus, while employing infinitely more direct and brutal methods.

The events of the past year make clear that Russia’s stated invasion objective of “de-Nazification” actually means the execution, imprisonment, deportation, or otherwise silencing of anyone deemed to be a Ukrainian patriot. Those targeted since the invasion began in February 2022 have included elected officials, civil society activists, educators, journalists, army veterans, and cultural figures.

The systematic suppression of Ukrainian national identity has been undertaken alongside intensive russification efforts, including the introduction of a Kremlin-approved Russian school curriculum and the promotion of an imperial identity. In parallel, local businesses have been forced to integrate into the Russian economy, with the wider population in occupied Ukraine obliged to accept Russian citizenship.

The obvious similarities between the Kremlin’s long-term Belarus strategy and the tactics being employed in occupied Ukraine undermine Russian efforts to portray the ongoing invasion as a defensive measure driven by valid security concerns. Instead, a picture emerges of Vladimir Putin’s overriding ambition to absorb both countries and secure his place in history as a “gatherer of Russian lands.”

While his approach to each country may currently differ in the details, Putin clearly aims to bring both Ukrainian and Belarusian independence to an end, and has placed these imperial ambitions at the heart of his entire reign. This makes a mockery of calls for a compromise with the Kremlin. Instead, Western leaders must recognize that peace in Europe will remain elusive until the Russian dictator is forced to abandon his dreams of empire.

Taras Kuzio is professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the newly published “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

Wendy Sherman on the United States’ priorities as it takes the helm of the Freedom Online Coalition

Atlantic Council — Tue, 28 Mar 2023 14:22:55 +0000

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Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Introduction
Rose Jackson
Director, Democracy & Tech Initiative, Digital Forensic Research Lab

Opening Remarks
Wendy Sherman
Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State

Panelists
Boye Adegoke
Senior Manager, Grants and Program Strategy, Paradigm Initiative

Juan Carlos Lara
Executive Director, Derechos Digitales

Alissa Starzak
Vice President, Global Head of Public Policy, Cloudflare

Moderator
Khushbu Shah
Nonresident Fellow, Digital Forensic Research Lab

ROSE JACKSON: Hello. My name is Rose Jackson, and I’m the director of the Democracy + Tech Initiative here at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC.

I’m honored to welcome you here today for this special event, streaming to you in the middle of the Freedom Online Coalition, or the FOC’s first strategy and coordination meeting of the year.

For those of you watching at home or many screens elsewhere, I’m joined here in this room by representatives from thirty-one countries and civil-society and industry leaders who make up the FOC’s advisory network. They’ve just wrapped up the first half of their meeting and wanted to bring some of the conversation from behind closed doors to the community working everywhere to ensure the digital world is a rights-respecting one.

It’s a particularly important moment for us to be having this conversation. As we get ready for the second Summit for Democracy later this week, the world’s reliance and focus on the internet has grown, while agreement [on] how to further build and manage it frays.

I think at this point it’s a bit of a throwaway line that the digital tools mediate every aspect of our lives. But the fact that most of the world has no choice but to do business, engage with their governments, or stay connected with friends and family through the internet makes the rules and norms around how that internet functions a matter of great importance. And even more because the internet is systemic and interconnected, whether it is built and imbued with the universal human rights we expect offline will determine whether our societies can rely on those rights anywhere.

Antidemocratic laws have a tendency of getting copied. Troubling norms are established in silence. And a splintering of approach makes it easier for authoritarians to justify their sovereign policies used to shutter dissent, criminalize speech, and surveil everyone. These are the core democratic questions of our time, and ensuring that the digital ecosystem is a rights-respecting one requires democracies [to row] in the same direction in their foreign policy and domestic actions.

The now twelve-year-old FOC, as the world’s only democratic tech alliance, presents an important space for democratic governments to leverage their shared power to this end, in collaboration with civil society and industry around the world.

We were encouraged last year when Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced at our open summit conference in Brussels that the US would take over as chair of the FOC in 2023 as part of its commitment to reinvest in the coalition and its success. Just over an hour ago, the US announced a new executive order limiting its own use of commercial spyware on the basis of risks to US national security and threats to human rights everywhere really brings home the stakes and potential of this work.

So today we’re honored to have Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman here to share more about the US government’s commitment to these issues and its plans for the coming year as chair.

We’ll then turn to a panel of civil-society and industry leaders from around the world to hear more about how they view the role and importance of the FOC in taking action on everything from internet shutdowns to surveillance tech and generative AI. That session will be led by our nonresident fellow and the former managing editor of Rest of World Khushbu Shah.

Now, before I turn to the deputy secretary, I want to thank the FOC support unit, the US State Department, and our Democracy and Tech team here for making this event possible. And I encourage you in Zoomland to comment on and engage liberally with the content of today’s event on your favorite social media platforms, following at @DFRLab, and using the hashtags #SummitforDemocracy, #S4D too, or #PartnersforDemocracy.

For those tuning in remotely in need of closed captioning, please view today’s program on our YouTube channel through the link provided in the chat.

It is now my distinct honor to pass the podium to Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, who needs no introduction as one of our nation’s most experienced and talented diplomats.

Deputy Secretary, thank you so much for joining us.

WENDY SHERMAN: Good afternoon. It’s terrific to be with you, and thank you, Rose, for your introduction and for all of the terrific work that the Freedom Online Coalition is doing.

It is fitting to be here at the Atlantic Council for this event because your mission sums up our purpose perfectly: shaping the global future together. That is our fundamental charge in the field of technology and democracy: how we use modern innovations to forge a better future.

That’s what the DFRLab strives to achieve, through your research and advocacy, and that’s what the Freedom Online Coalition, its members, observers, and advisory network seek to accomplish through our work. Thank you for your partnership.

More than five decades ago—seems like a long time ago, but really very short—the internet found its origins in the form of the first online message ever sent, all of two letters in length, delivered from a professor at UCLA to colleagues at Stanford. It was part of a project conceived in university labs and facilitated by government. It was an effort meant to test the outer limits of rapidly evolving technologies and tap into the transformative power of swiftly growing computer networks.

What these pioneers intended at the time was actually to devise a system that could allow people to communicate in the event of a nuclear attack or another catastrophic event. Yet what they created changed everything—how we live and work, how we participate in our economy and in our politics, how we organize movements, how we consume media, read books, order groceries, pay bills, run businesses, conduct research, learn, write, and do nearly everything we can think of.

Change didn’t happen overnight, of course, and that change came with both promise and peril. This was a remarkable feat of scientific discovery, and it upended life as we know it for better, and sometimes, worse.

Over the years, as we went from search engines to social media, we started to face complicated questions as leaders, as parents and grandparents, as members of the global community—questions about how the internet can best be used, how it should be governed, who might misuse it, how it impacts our children’s mental and emotional health, who could access it, and how we can ensure that access is equitable—benefitting people in big cities, rural areas, and everywhere in between. Big-picture questions arose about these tectonic shifts. What would they mean for our values and our systems of governance? Whether it’s the internet as we understand it today or artificial intelligence revolutionizing our world tomorrow, will digital tools create more democracy or less? Will they be deployed to maximize human rights or limit them? Will they be used to enlarge the circle of freedom or constraint and contract it?

For the United States, the Freedom Online Coalition, and like-minded partners, the answer should point in a clear direction. At a basic level, the internet should be open and secure for everyone. It should be a force for free enterprise and free expression. It should be a vast forum that increases connectivity, that expands people’s ability to exercise their rights, that facilitates unfettered access to knowledge and unprecedented opportunities for billions.

Meeting that standard, however, is not simple. Change that happens this fast in society and reaches this far into our lives rarely yields a straightforward response, especially when there are those who seek to manipulate technology for nefarious ends. The fact is where all of us may strive to ensure technology delivers for our citizens, autocratic regimes are finding another means of expression. Where democracies seek to tap into the power of the internet to lift individuals up to their highest potential, authoritarian governments seek to deploy these technologies to divide and disenfranchise, to censor and suppress, to limit freedoms, [to] foment fear and [to] violate human dignity. They view the internet not as a network of empowerment but as an avenue of control. From Cuba and Venezuela to Iran, Russia, the PRC, and beyond, they see new ways to crush dissent through internet shutdowns, virtual blackouts, restricted networks, blocked websites, and more.

Here in the United States, alongside many of you, we have acted to sustain connections to internet-based services and the free flow of information across the globe, so no one is cut off from each other, the outside world, or cut off from the truth. Yet even with these steps, none of us are perfect. Every day, almost everywhere we look, democracies grapple with how to harness data for positive ends, while preserving privacy; how to bring out the best in modern innovations without amplifying their worst possibilities; how to protect the most vulnerable online while defending the liberties we hold dear. It isn’t an easy task, and in many respects, as I’ve said, it’s only getting harder. The growth of surveillance capabilities is forcing us to constantly reevaluate how to strike the balance between using technologies for public safety and preserving personal liberties.

The advent of AI is arriving with a level of speed and sophistication we haven’t witnessed before. It will not be five decades before we know the impact of AI. That impact is happening now. Who creates it, who controls it, [and] who manipulates it will help define the next phase of the intersection between technology and democracy. By the time we realize AI’s massive reach and potential, the internet’s influence might really pale in comparison. The digital sphere is an evolving and is evolving at a pace we can’t fully fathom and in ways at least I can’t completely imagine. Frankly, we have to accept the fact that the FOC’s absolutely vital work can feel like a continuous game of catchup. We have to acknowledge that the guidelines we adopt today might seem outdated as soon as tomorrow.

Now let me be perfectly clear: I am not saying we should throw up our hands and give up. To the contrary, I’m suggesting that this is a massive challenge we have to confront and a generational change we have to embrace. We have to set standards that meet this moment and that lay the foundation for whatever comes next. We have to address what we see in front of us and equip ourselves with the building blocks to tackle what we cannot predict.

To put a spin on a famous phrase, with the great power of these digital tools comes great responsibility to use that power for good. That duty falls on all our shoulders and the stakes could not be higher for internet freedom, for our common prosperity, for global progress, because expanded connectivity, getting the two billion unconnected people online can drive economic growth, raise standards of living, create jobs, and fuel innovative solutions for everything from combating climate change to reducing food insecurity, to improving public health, to promoting good governance and sustainable development.

So we need to double down on what we stand for: an affirmative, cohesive, values-driven, rights-respecting vision for democracy in a digital era. We need to reinforce rules of the road for cyberspace that mirror and match the ideals of the rules-based international order. We need to be ready to adapt our legal and policy approaches for emerging technologies. We need the FOC—alongside partners in civil society, industry, and elsewhere—to remain an essential vehicle for keeping the digital sphere open, secure, interoperable, and reliable.

The United States believes in this cause as a central plank of our democracy and of our diplomacy. That’s why Secretary Blinken established our department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy, and made digital freedom one of its core priorities. That’s why the Biden-Harris administration spearheaded and signed into and onto the principles in the Declaration for the Future of the Internet alongside sixty-one countries ready to advance a positive vision for digital technologies. That’s why we released core principles for tech-platform accountability last fall and why the president called on Congress to take bipartisan action in January.

That’s why we are committed to using our turn as FOC chair as a platform to advance a series of key goals.

First, we will deepen efforts to protect fundamental freedoms, including human rights defenders online and offline, many of whom speak out at grave risk to their own lives and to their families’ safety. We will do so by countering disruptions to internet access, combating internet shutdowns, and ensuring everyone’s ability to keep using technology to advance the reach of freedom.

Second, we will focus on building resilience against the rise of digital authoritarianism, the proliferation of commercial spyware, and the misuse of technology, which we know has disproportionate and chilling impacts on journalists, activists, women, and LGBTQI+ individuals. To that end, just a few hours ago President Biden issued an executive order that for the first time will prohibit our government’s use of commercial spyware that poses a risk to our national security or that’s been misused by foreign actors to enable human rights abuses overseas.

On top of that step, as part of this week’s Summit for Democracy, the members of the FOC and other partners will lay out a set of guiding principles on government use of surveillance technologies. These principles describe responsible practices for the use of surveillance tech. They reflect democratic values and the rule of law, adherence to international obligations, strive to address the disparate effect on certain communities, and minimize the data collected.

Our third objective as FOC chair focuses on artificial intelligence and the way emerging technologies respect human rights. As some try to apply AI to help automate censorship of content and suppression of free expression, FOC members must build a consensus around policies to limit these abuses.

Finally, we will strengthen our efforts on digital inclusion—on closing the gender gap online; on expanding digital literacy and skill-building; on promoting access to safe online spaces and robust civic participation for all, particularly women and girls, LGBTQI+ persons, those with disabilities, and more.

Here’s the bottom line: The FOC’s work is essential and its impact will boil down to what we do as a coalition to advance a simple but powerful idea, preserving and promoting the value of openness. The internet, the Web, the online universe is at its best when it is open for creativity and collaboration, open for innovation and ideas, open for communication and community, debate, discourse, disagreement, and diplomacy.

The same is true for democracy—a system of governance, a social contract, and a societal structure is strongest when defined by open spaces to vote, deliberate, gather, demonstrate, organize, and advocate. This openness could not be more important, because when the digital world is transparent, when democracy is done right, that’s when everyone has a stake in our collective success. That’s what makes everyone strive for a society that is free and fair in our politics and in cyberspace. That’s what we will give—that’s what we’ll give everyone reason to keep tapping into the positive potential of technology to forge a future of endless possibility and boundless prosperity for all.

So good luck with all your remaining work; lots ahead. And thank you so much for everything that you all do. Thank you.

KHUSHBU SHAH: Hello, everybody. Thank you so much for joining us. I’m Khushbu Shah, a journalist and a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab.

We’re grateful to have these three experts here with us today to discuss rights in the digital world and the Freedom Online Coalition’s role in those rights. I’ll introduce you to these three experts.

This is Adeboye Adegoke, who is the senior manager of grants and program strategy at Paradigm Initiative. We have Alissa Starzak, the vice president and global head of public policy at Cloudflare, and Juan Carlos, known as J.C., Lara, who’s the executive director of Derechos Digitales. And so I will mention that both J.C. and Adeboye are also on the FOC’s Advisory Network, which was created as a strong mechanism for ongoing multi-stakeholder engagement.

And so I’ll start with the thirty-thousand-foot view. So we’ve heard—we’ve just heard about the FOC and its continued mission with the United States at the helm as chair this year in an increasingly interconnected and online world. More than five billion people are online around the world. That’s the majority of people [on] this planet. We spend nearly half of our time that we’re awake online, around more than 40 percent.

We as a global group of internet users have evolved in our use of the internet, as you’ve heard, since the creation of the FOC in 2011.

So Adeboye, why do you think now suddenly so many people are suddenly focused on technology as a key democratic issue? And speaking, you know, from your own personal experience in Nigeria, should we be?

ADEBOYE ADEGOKE: Yeah. I mean, I think the reasons are very clear, not just [looking out] to any region of the world, but, you know, generally speaking, I mean, the Cambridge Analytica, you know, issue comes to mind.

But also just speaking, you know, very specifically to my experience, on my reality as a Nigerian and as an African, I mean, we just concluded our general elections, and technology was made to play a huge role in ensuring transparency, you know, the integrity of the elections, which unfortunately didn’t achieve that objective.

But besides that, there are also a lot of concerns around how technology could be manipulated or has been manipulated in order to literally alter potential outcomes of elections. We’re seeing issues of microtargeting; you know, misinformation campaigns around [the] election period to demarcate, you know, certain candidates.

But what’s even most concerning for me is how technology has been sometimes manipulated to totally alter the outcome of the election. And I’ll give you a very clear example in terms of the just-concluded general elections in Nigeria. So technology was supposed to play a big role. Results were supposed to be transmitted to a central server right from the point of voting. But unfortunately, those results were not transmitted.

In fact, as a matter of fact, three or four days after the election, 50 percent of the results were not uploaded. As of the time that the election results were announced, those results were—less than 50 percent of the results had been transmitted, which then begin to, you know, lead to questioning of the integrity of those outcomes. These are supposed to be—elections are supposed to be transmitted, like, on the spot. So, you know, it becomes concerning.

The electoral panel [gave] an excuse that there was a technical glitch around, you know, their server and all of that. But then the question is, was there actually a technical glitch, or was there a compromise or a manipulation by certain, you know, bad actors to be able to alter the outcome of the election? [This] used to be the order of the day in many supposedly, you know, democratic countries, especially from the part of the world that I come from, where people really doubt whether what they see as the outcomes of their election is the actual outcome or somebody just writing something that they want.

So technology has become a big issue in elections. On one side, technology has the potential to improve on [the] integrity of elections. But on the other side, bad actors also have the tendency to manipulate technology to make sure that the opinions or the wishes of the people do not matter at the end of the day. So that’s very important here.

KHUSHBU SHAH: And you just touched on my next question for Alissa and J.C. So, as you mentioned, digital authoritarians have used tech to abuse human rights, limit internet freedoms. We’re seeing this in Russia and Myanmar, Sudan, and Libya. Those are some examples. [The] deputy secretary mentioned a few others. For example, in early 2022, at the start of its invasion of Ukraine, Russia suppressed domestic dissent by closing or forcing into exile the handful of remaining independent media outlets. In at least fifty-three countries, users have faced legal repercussions for expressing themselves online, often leading to prison terms, according to a report from Freedom House. It’s a trend that leaves people on the frontlines defenseless, you know, of course, including journalists and activists alike.

And so, J.C., what have you seen globally? What are the key issues we must keep an eye on? And what—and what are some practical steps to mitigate some of these issues?

JUAN CARLOS LARA: Yeah. I think it’s difficult to think about the practical steps without first addressing what those issues are. And I think Boye was pointing out basically what has been a problem as perceived in many in the body politic, or many even activists throughout the world. But I think it’s important to also note that these broader issues about the threats to democracy, about the threats to human rights, [they] manifest sometimes differently. And that includes how they are seen in my region, in Latin America, where, for instance, the way in which you see censorship might differ from country to country.

While some have been able to pass laws, authoritarian laws that restrict speech and that restrict how expression is represented online and how it’s penalized, some other countries have resorted to the use of existing censorship tools. Like, for instance, some governments [are] using [Digital Millennium Copyright Act] notice and technical mechanisms to delete or to remove some content from the online sphere. So that also becomes a problematic issue.

So when we speak about, like, how do we go into, like, the practical ways to address this, we really need to identify… some low-level practices [that] connect with the higher-level standards that we aspire to for democracies; and how bigger commitments to the rule of law and to fair elections and to addressing and facing human rights threats goes to the lower level of what are actually doing in governments, what people are actually doing when they are presented with the possibility of exercising some power that can affect the human rights of the population in general. So to summarize a bit of that point, we still see a lot of censorship, surveillance, internet blockings, and also, increasingly, the use of emerging technologies as things that might be threatening to human rights.

And while some of those are not necessarily exclusive to the online sphere, they are certainly been evolving—they have been evolving [for] several years. So we really need to address how those are represented today.

KHUSHBU SHAH: Thank you. Alissa, as our industry expert I want to ask you the same question. And especially I want you to maybe touch upon what J.C. was saying about low-level practices that might be practical.

ALISSA STARZAK: You know, I think I actually want to step back and think about all of this, because I think—I think one of the challenges that we’ve seen, and we certainly heard this in Deputy Secretary Sherman’s remarks—is that technology brings opportunities and risks. And some of the challenges, I think, that we’ve touched on are part of the benefit that we saw initially. So the drawbacks that come from having broad access is that you can cut it off.

And I think that as we go forward, thinking about the Freedom Online Coalition and sort of how this all fits together, the idea is to have conversations about what it looks like long term, what are the drawbacks that come from those low-level areas, making sure that there is an opportunity for activists to bring up the things that are coming up, for industry, sort of folks in my world, to do the same. And making sure that there’s an opportunity for governments to hear it in something that actually looks collaborative.

And so I think that’s our big challenge. We have to find a way to make sure [that] those conversations are robust, that there is dialogue between all of us, and [that] we can both identify the risks that come from low-level practices like that and then also figure out how to mitigate them.

KHUSHBU SHAH: Thank you. And so, back to you—both of you. I’d like to hear from you both about, as part of civil society—we can start with you, Adegoke—what role as an organization, such as the Freedom Online Coalition, what kind of role can it play in all of these issues that we’re talking about as it expands and it grows in its own network?

ADEBOYE ADEGOKE: Yeah. So I think the work of the Freedom Online Coalition is very critical in such a time as this. So when you look at most international or global [platforms] where conversations around technology, its impact, are being discussed, human rights is rarely at the center of the issues. And I think that is where the advocacy comes in terms of highlighting and spotlighting, you know, the relevance of human rights of this issue. And as a matter of fact, not just relevance but the importance of human rights to this issue.

I think the work of the FOC is relevant even more to the Global South than probably it is to the Global North because in the Global South you—our engagement with technology, and I mean at the government level, is only from the—it’s likely from the perspective of… economics and… security. [Human rights] is, sadly, in an early part of the conversation. So, you know, with a platform like the FOC, it’s an opportunity to mainstream human rights into the technology, you know, conversation generally, and it’s a great thing that some of us from that part of the world are able to engage at this level and also bring those lessons back to our work, you know, domestically in terms of how we engage the policy process in our countries.

And that’s why it’s very important for the work of FOC to be expanded to—you know, to have real impact in terms of how it is deliberate—in terms of how it is—it is deliberate in influencing not just regional processes, but also national processes, because the end goal—and I think the beauty of all the beautiful work that is being done by the coalition—is to see how that reflects on what governments, in terms of how governments are engaging technology, in terms of how governments are consciously taking into cognizance the human rights implication of, you know, new emerging technologies and even existing technologies. So I think the FOC is very, very important stakeholder in technology conversation globally.

KHUSHBU SHAH: J.C., I want to ask you the same question, especially as Chile recently joined the FOC in recent years. And love to hear what you think.

JUAN CARLOS LARA: Yeah. I think it’s important to also note what Boye was saying in the larger context of when this has happened for the FOC. Since its creation, we have seen what has happened in terms of shutdowns, in terms of war, in terms of surveillance revelations. So it’s important to also connect what the likemindedness of certain governments and the high-level principles have to do with the practice of those same governments, as well as their policy positions both in foreign policy forums and internally, as the deputy secretary was mentioning.

I think it’s—that vital role that Boye was highlighting, it’s a key role but it’s a work in progress constantly. In which way? Throughout the process of the FOC meeting and producing documents and statements, that’s when the advisory network that Boye and myself are members of was created. Throughout that work, we’ve been able to see what happens inside the coalition and what—the discussions they’re having to some degree, because I understand that some of them might be behind closed doors, and what those—how the process of those statements comes to be.

So we have seen that very important role [in] how it’s produced and how it’s presented by the governments and their dignitaries. However, I still think that it’s a work in progress because we still need to be able to connect that with the practice of governments, including those that are members of the coalition, including my own government that recently joined, and how that is presented in internal policy. And at the same time, I think that key role still has a big room—a big role to play in terms of creating those principles; in terms of developing them into increasingly detailed points of action for the countries that are members of; but also then trying to influence other countries, those that are not members of the coalition, in order to create, like, better standards for human rights for all of internet users.

KHUSHBU SHAH: Any thoughts, Alissa?

ALISSA STARZAK: Yeah. You know, I think J.C. touched on something that is—that is probably relevant for everyone who’s ever worked in government which is the reality that governments are complicated and there isn’t one voice, often, and there frequently what you see is that the people who are focused on one issue may not have the same position as people who are working on it from a different angle. And I think the interesting thing for me about the FOC is not that you have to change that as a fundamental reality, but that it’s an opportunity for people to talk about a particular issue with a focus on human rights and take that position back. So everybody sitting in this room who has an understanding of what human rights online might look like, to be able to say, hey, this is relevant to my government in these ways if you’re a government actor, or for civil society to be able to present a position, that is really meaningful because it means that there’s a voice into each of your governments. It doesn’t mean that you’re going to come out with a definitive position that’s always going to work for everyone or that it’s going to solve all the problems, but it’s a forum. And it’s a forum that’s focused on human rights, and it’s focused on the intersection of those two, which really matters.

So, from an FOC perspective, I think it’s an opportunity. It’s not going to ever be the be all and end all. I think we all probably recognize that. But you need—I think we need a forum like this that really does focus on human rights.

KHUSHBU SHAH: An excellent point and brings me to my next question for you three. Let’s talk specifics, speaking of human rights: internet shutdowns. So we’ve mentioned Russia. Iran comes to mind as well during recent months, during protests, and recently, very recently, the Indian government cut tens of millions of people off in the state of Punjab as they search for a Sikh separatist.

So what else can this look like, J.C.? Those are some really sort of very basic, very obvious examples of internet shutdowns. And how can the FOC and its network of partners support keeping people online?

JUAN CARLOS LARA: Yes, thank you for that question because specifically for Latin America, the way in which shutdowns may present themselves is not necessarily a huge cutting off of the internet for many people. It sometimes presents in other ways, like, for instance, we have seen the case of one country in South America in which their telecommunication networks has been basically abandoned, and therefore, all of the possibilities of using the internet are lost not because the government has decided to cut the cable, but rather because it’s let it rot, or because it presents in the form of partially and locally focused cutting off services for certain platforms.

I think the idea of internet shutdowns has provided awareness about the problems that come with losing access to the internet, but that also can be taken by governments to be able to say they have not shut access to the internet; it’s just that there’s either too much demand in a certain area or that a certain service has failed to continue working, or that it’s simply failures by telecommunication companies, or that a certain platform has not complied with its legal or judicial obligations and therefore it needs to be taken off the internet. So it’s important that when we speak about shutdowns we consider the broader picture and not just the idea of cutting off all of the internet.

KHUSHBU SHAH: Adeboye, I’d like to hear what your thoughts are on this in the context of Nigeria.

ADEBOYE ADEGOKE: Yeah. It’s really very interesting. And to the point, you know, he was making about, you know, in terms of when we talk about shutdown, I think the work around [understanding shutdowns] has been great and it’s really helped the world to understand what is happening globally. But just as he said, I think there are also some other forms of exclusion that [happen] because of government actions and inactions that probably wouldn’t fall on that thematic topic of shutdown, but it, in a way, is some sort of exclusionary, you know, policy.

So an example is in some remote areas in Nigeria, for example, for most of the technology companies who are laying cables, providing internet services, it doesn’t make a lot of business sense for them to be, you know, present in those locations. And to make the matter worse for them, the authorities, the local governments, those are imposing huge taxes on those companies to be able to lay their fiber cables into those communities, which means that for the businesses, for the companies it doesn’t make any economic sense to invest in such locations. And so, by extension, those [kinds] of people are shut down from the internet; they are not able to assess communication network and all of that.

But I also think it’s very important to highlight the fact that—I mean, I come from the continent where internet is shut down for the silliest reason that you can imagine. I mean, there have been [shutdowns] because [the] government was trying to prevent students cheating in exams, you know? Shutdowns are common during elections, you know? [Shutdowns] happen because [the] government was trying to prevent gossip. So it’s the silliest of reasons why there have been internet [shutdowns] in the area, you know, in the part of the world that I am from.

But what I think—in the context of the work that the FOC does, I think something that comes to mind is how we are working to prevent future [shutdowns]. I spoke about the election that just ended in Nigeria. One of the things that we did was to, shortly before the election, organize, like, a stakeholder meeting of government representative, of fact checkers, of, you know, the platforms, the digital companies, civil society [organizations], and electoral [observers]… to say that, OK, election is—if you are from Africa, any time election is coming you are expecting a shutdown. So it’s to have a conversation and say: Election is coming. There is going to be a lot of misinformation. There’s going to be heightened risk online. But what do we need to do to ensure that we don’t have to shut down the internet?

So, for Nigeria, we were able to have that conversation a few weeks before the election, and luckily the [internet was] not shut down. So I mean, I would describe that as a win. But just to emphasize that it is helpful when you engage in a platform like the FOC to understand the dimensions that [shutdowns] take across the world. It kind of helps you to prepare for—especially if you were in the kind of tradition that we were to prepare for potential shutdown. And also I think it’s also good to spotlight the work that Access Now has done with respect to spotlighting the issue of shutdown because it helps to get their perspective.

So, for example, I’m from Nigeria. We have never really experienced widespread shutdown in Nigeria, but because we are seeing it happen in our sister—in our neighboring countries—we are kind of conscious of that and were able to engage ahead of elections to see, oh, during election in Uganda, [the] internet was shut down. In Ethiopia, [the] internet was shut down. So it’s likely [the] internet will be shut down in Nigeria. And then to say to the authority: No, you know what? We don’t have to shut down the internet. This is what we can do. This is the mechanism on [the] ground to identify risk online and address those risks. And also, holding technology platform accountable to make sure that they put mechanism in place, to make sure they communicate those mechanisms clearly during elections.

So it’s interesting how much work needs to go into that, but I think it’s… important work. And I think for the FOC, it’s also—it’s also very important to continue to communicate the work that the FOC is doing in that regard so that more and more people become aware of it, and sort of more people are prepared, you know, to mitigate it, especially where you feel is the highest risk of shutdown.

KHUSHBU SHAH: Thank you. I’m going to jump across to the other side of that spectrum, to surveillance tech, to the—to the almost literally—the opposite, and I wanted to start with the news that Deputy Secretary Sherman mentioned, with the news that the Biden administration announced just this afternoon, a new executive order that would broadly ban US federal agencies from using commercially developed spyware that poses threats to human rights and national security.

The deputy secretary also mentioned, Alissa, some guiding principles that they were going to announce later this week with the FOC. What are some—what are some things—what are some principles or what are some ambitions that you would hope to see later this week?

ALISSA STARZAK: So I think there’s a lot coming is my guess. Certainly the surveillance tech piece is an important component, but I think there are lots of broad guidelines.

I actually want to go back to shutdowns for a second, if you don’t mind…. Because I think it’s a really interesting example of how the FOC can work well together and how you take all of the different pieces—even at this table—of what—how you sort of help work on an internet problem or challenge, right? So you have a world where you have activists on the ground who see particular challenges who would then work with their local government. You have industry partners like Cloudflare who can actually show what’s happening. So are there—is there a shutdown? Is there a network disruption? So you can take the industry component of it, and that provides some information for governments, and then governments can work together to sort of pressure other governments to say these aren’t acceptable. These are—these norms—you can’t—no, you can’t shut down because you are worried about gossip, and cheating, and an exam, right? There’s a set of broad international norms that become relevant in that space, and I think you take that as your example. So you have the players—you have the government to government, you have the civil society to government, you have the industry which provides information to government and civil society. And those are the pieces that can get you to a slightly better place.

And so when I look at the norms coming out later this week, what I’m going to be looking for are that same kind of triangulation of using all of the players in the space to come to a better—to come to a better outcome. So whether that’s surveillance tech, sort of understanding from civil society how it has been used, how you can understand it from other tech companies, how you can sort of mitigate against those abuses, working with governments to sort of address their own use of it to make sure that that doesn’t become a forum—all of those pieces are what you want from that model. And I think—so that’s what I’m looking for in the principles that come out. If they have that triangulation, I’m going to be—I’m going to be very happy.

KHUSHBU SHAH: What would you both be looking for, as well? J.C., I’ll start with you.

JUAN CARLOS LARA: Yeah, as part of the [FOC advisory network], of course, there might be some idea of what’s coming in when we speak about principles for governments for the use of surveillance capabilities.

However, there are two things that I think are very important to consider for this type of issue: first of all is that which principles and which rules are adopted by the states. I mean, it’s a very good—it’s very good news that we have this executive order as a first step towards thinking how states refrain from using surveillance technology disproportionately or indiscriminately. That’s a good sign in general. That’s a very good first step. But secondly, within this same idea, we would expect other countries to follow suit and hopefully to expand the idea of bans on spyware or bans on surveillance technology that by itself may pose grave risks to human rights, and not just in the case of this, or that, or the fact that it’s commercial spyware, which is a very important threat including for countries in Latin America who are regular customers for certain spyware producers and vendors.

But separately from that, I think it’s very important to also understand how this ties into the purposes of the Freedom Online Coalition and its principles, and how to have further principles that hopefully pick up on the learnings that we have had for several years of discussion on the deployment of surveillance technologies, especially by academia and civil society. If those are picked up by the governments themselves as principle, we expect that to exist in practice.

One of the key parts of the discussion on commercial spyware is that I can easily think of a couple of Latin American countries that are regular customers. And one of them is an FOC member. That’s very problematic, when we speak about whether they are abiding by these principles and by human rights obligations or not, and therefore whether these principles will generate any kinds of restraint in the use and the procurement of such surveillance tools.

KHUSHBU SHAH: So I want to follow up on that. Do you think that there—what are the dangers and gaps of having this conversation without proposing privacy legislation? I want to ask both of our—

JUAN CARLOS LARA: Oh, very briefly. Of course, enforcement and the fact that rules may not have the institutional framework to operate I think is a key challenge. That is also tied to capacities, like having people with enough knowledge and have enough, of course, exchange of information between governments. And resources. I think it’s very important that governments are also able to enact the laws that they put in the books, that they are able to enforce them, but also to train every operator, every official that might be in contact with any of these issues. So that kind of principle may not just be adopted as a common practice, but also in the enforcement of the law, so get into the books. Among other things, I think capacities and resources are, like—and collaboration—are key for those things.

KHUSHBU SHAH: Alissa, as our industry expert, I’d like to ask you that same question.

ALISSA STARZAK: You know, I think one of the interesting things about the commercial spyware example is that there is a—there is a government aspect on sort of restricting other people from doing certain things, and then there is one that is a restriction on themselves. And so I think that’s what the executive order is trying to tackle. And I think that the restricting others piece, and sort of building agreement between governments that this is the appropriate thing to do, is—it’s clearly with the objective here, right?

So, no, it’s not that every government does this. I think that there’s a reality of surveillance foreign or domestic, depending on what it looks like. But thinking about building rulesets of when it’s not OK, because I think there is—there can be agreement if we work together on what that ruleset looks like. So we—again, this is the—we have to sort of strive for a better set of rules across the board on when we use certain technologies. And I think—clearly, I think what we’ve heard, the executive order, it’s the first step in that process. Let’s build something bigger than ourselves. Let’s build something that we can work across governments for. And I think that’s a really important first step.

ADEBOYE ADEGOKE: OK. Yeah, so—yeah, so, I think, yeah, the executive order, it’s a good thing. Because I was, you know, thinking to myself, you know, looking back to many years ago when in my—in our work when we started to engage our government regarding the issue of surveillance and, you know, human rights implications and all of that, I recall very vividly a minister at the time—a government minister at the time saying that even the US government is doing it. Why are you telling us not to do it? So I think it’s very important.

Leadership is very key. The founding members of the FOC, if you look FOC, the principles and all of that, those tests are beautiful. Those tests are great. But then there has to be a demonstration of—you know, of application of those tests even by the governments leading, you know, the FOC so that it makes the work of people like us easier, to say these are the best examples around and you don’t get the kind of feedback you get many years ago; like, oh, even the US government is doing it. So I think the executive order is a very good place to start from, to say, OK, so this is what the US government is doing right now and this is how it wants to define their engagement with spyware.

But, of course, like, you know, he said, it has to be, you know, expanded beyond just, you know, concerns around spyware. It has to be expanded to different ways in which advanced technology [is] applied in government. I come from a country that has had to deal with the issues of, you know, terrorism very significantly in the past ten years, thereabout, and so every justification you need for surveillance tech is just on the table. So whenever you want to have the human rights conversation, somebody’s telling you that, you want terrorists to kill all of us? You know? So it’s very important to have some sort of guiding principle.

Yeah, we understand [the] importance of surveillance to security challenges. We understand how it can be deployed for good uses. But we also understand that there are risks to human-rights defenders, to journalists, you know, to people who hold [governments] accountable. And those have to be factored into how these technologies are deployed.

And in terms of, you know, peculiar issues that we have to face, basically you are dealing with issues around oversight. You are dealing with issues around transparency. You are dealing with issues around [a] lack of privacy frameworks, et cetera. So you see African governments, you know, acquiring similar technologies, trying, you know, in the—I don’t want to say in the guise, because there are actually real problems where those technologies might be justified. But then, because of the lack of these principles, these issues around transparency, oversight, legal oversight, human-rights considerations, it then becomes problematic, because this too then become—it’s true that it is used against human-rights defenders. It’s true that it is used against opposition political parties. It’s true that it is used against activists and dissidents in the society.

So it’s very important to say that we look at the principle that has been developed by the FOC, but we want to see FOC government demonstrate leadership in terms of how they apply those principles to the reality. It makes our work easier if that happens, to use that as an example, you know, to engage our government in terms of how this is—how it is done. And I think these examples help a lot. It makes the work very easy—I mean, much easier; not very easy.

KHUSHBU SHAH: Well, you mentioned a good example; so the US. So you reminded me of the biometric data that countries share in Central and North America as they monitor refugees, asylum seekers, migrants. Even the US partakes. And so, you know, what can democracies do to address the issue when they’re sometimes the ones leveraging these same tools? Obviously, it’s not the same as commercial spyware, but—so what are the boundaries of surveillance and appropriate behavior of governments?

J.C., can I throw that question to you?

JUAN CARLOS LARA: Happy to. And we saw a statement by several civil-society organizations on the use of biometric data with [regard] to migrants. And I think it’s very important that we address that as a problem.

I really appreciated that Boye mentioned, like, countries leading by example, because that’s something that we are often expecting from countries that commit themselves to high-level principles and that sign on to human-rights instruments, that sign declarations by the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly of the [United Nations] or some regional forums, including to the point of signing on to FOC principles.

I think that it’s very problematic that things like biometric data are being used—are being collected from people that are in situations of vulnerability, as is the case of very—many migrants and many people that are fleeing from situations of extreme poverty and violence. And I think it’s very problematic also that also leads to [the] exchange of information between governments without proper legal safeguards that prevent that data from falling into the hands of the wrong people, or even that prevent that data from being collected from people that are not consenting to it or without legal authorization.

I think it’s very problematic that countries are allowing themselves to do that under the idea that this is an emergency situation without proper care for the human rights of the people who are suffering from that emergency and that situations of migrations are being treated like something that must be stopped or contained or controlled in some way, rather than addressing the underlying issues or rather than also trying to promote forms of addressing the problems that come with it without violating human rights or without infringing upon their own commitments to human dignity and to human privacy and to the freedom of movement of people.

I think it’s—that it’s part of observing legal frameworks and refraining from collecting data that they are not allowed to, but also to obeying their own human-rights commitments. And that often leads to refraining from taking certain action. And in that regard, I think the discussions that there might be on any kind of emergency still needs to take a few steps back and see what countries are supposed to do and what obligations they are supposed to abide [by] because of their previous commitments.

KHUSHBU SHAH: So thinking about what you’ve just said—and I’m going to take a step back. Alissa, I’m going to ask you kind of a difficult question. We’ve been talking about specific examples of human rights and what it means to have online rights in the digital world. So what does it mean in 2023? As we’re talking about all of this, all these issues around the world, what does it mean to have freedom online and rights in the digital world?

ALISSA STARZAK: Oh, easy question. It’s really easy. Don’t worry; we’ve got that. Freedom Online’s got it; you’ve just got to come to their meetings.

No, I think—I think it’s a really hard question, right? I think that we have—you know, we’ve built something that is big. We’ve built something where we have sort of expectations about access to information, about the free flow of information across borders. And I think that, you know, what we’re looking at now is finding ways to maintain it in a world where we see the problems that sometimes come with it.

So when I look at the—at the what does it mean to have rights online, we want to—we want to have that thing that we aspire to, I think that Deputy Secretary Sherman mentioned, the sort of idea that the internet builds prosperity, that the access to the free flow of information is a good thing that’s good for the economy and good for the people. But then we have to figure out how we build the set of controls that go along with it that are—that protect people, and I think that’s where the rule of law does come into play.

So thinking about how we build standards that are respect—that respect human rights in the—when we’re collecting all of the information of what’s happening online, right, like, maybe we shouldn’t be collecting all of that information. Maybe we should be thinking of other ways of addressing the concerns. Maybe we should be building [a] framework that countries can use that are not us, right, or that people at least don’t point to the things that a country does and say, well, if they can do this, I can do this, right, using it for very different purposes.

And I think—I think that’s the kind of thing that we’re moving—we want to move towards, but that doesn’t really answer the underlying question is the problem, right? So what are the rights online? We want as many rights as possible online while protecting security and safety, which is, you know, also—they’re also individual rights. And it’s always a balance.

KHUSHBU SHAH: It seems like what you’re touching on—J.C., would you like to—

JUAN CARLOS LARA: No. Believe me.

KHUSHBU SHAH: Well, it seems like what you’re talking about—and we’re touching—we’ve, like, talked around this—is, like, there’s a—there’s a sense of impunity, right, when you’re on—like in the virtual world, and that has led to what we’ve talked about for the last forty minutes, right, misinformation/disinformation. And if you think about what we’ve all been talking about for the last few weeks, which is AI—and I know there have been some moments of levity. I was thinking about—I was telling Alissa about how there was an image of the pope wearing a white puffer jacket that’s been being shown around the internets, and I think someone pointed out that it was fake, that it was AI-generated. And so that’s one example. Maybe it’s kind of a fun example, but it’s also a little bit alarming.

And I think about the conversation we’re having, and what I really want to ask all of you is, so, how might these tools—like the AI, the issue of AI—further help or hurt [human rights] activists and democracies as we’re going into uncharted territories, as we’re seeing sort of the impact of it in real time as this conversation around it evolves and how it’s utilized by journalists, by activists, by politicians, by academics? And what should the FOC do—I know I’m asking you again—what can the FOC do? What should we aim for to set the online world on the right path for this uncharted territory? I don’t know who wants to start and attempt.

ADEBOYE ADEGOKE: OK, I’ll start. Yeah.

So I think it’s great that, you know, the FOC has, you know, different task [forces] working on different thematic issues, and I know there is a task force on the issue of artificial intelligence and human rights. So I think for me that’s a starting point, you know, providing core leadership on how emerging technology generally impacts… human rights. I think that’s the starting point in terms of what we need to do because, like the deputy secretary said, you know, technology’s moving at such a pace that we can barely catch up on it. So we cannot—we cannot afford to wait one minute, one second before we start to work on this issue and begin to, you know, investigate the human rights implications of all of those issues. So it’s great that the FOC’s doing that work.

I would just say that it’s very important for—and I think this [speaks] generally to the capacities of the FOC. I think the FOC needs to be further capacitated so that this work can be made to bear in real-life issues, in regional, in national engagement so that some of the hard work that has been put into those processes can really reflect in real, you know, national and regional processes.

ALISSA STARZAK: Yeah. So I definitely agree with that.

I think—I think on all of these issues I think we have a reality of trying to figure out what governments do and then what private companies do, or what sort of happens in industry, and sometimes those are in two different lanes. But in some ways figuring out what governments are allowed to do, so thinking about the sort of negative potential uses of AI may be a good start for thinking about what shouldn’t happen generally. Because if you can set a set of norms, if you can start with a set of norms about what acceptable behavior looks like and where you’re trying to go to, you’re at least moving in the direction of the world that you think you want together, right?

So understanding that you shouldn’t be generating it for the purpose of misinformation or, you know, that—for a variety of other things, at least gets you started. It’s a long—it’s going to be a long road, a long, complicated road. But I think there’s some things that can be done there in the FOC context.

JUAN CARLOS LARA: Yes. And I have to agree with both of you. Specifically, because the idea that we have a Freedom Online Coalition to set standards, or to set principles, and a taskforce that can devote some resources, some time, and discussion to that, can also identify where this is actually the part of the promise and which is the part of the peril. And how governments are going to react in a way that promotes prosperity, that promotes interactivity, and promotes commerce—exercise of human rights, the rights of individuals and groups—and which sides of it become problematic from the side of the use of AI tools, for instance, for detecting certain speech for censorship or for identifying people in the public sphere, because they’re working out on the streets, or to collect and process people without consent.

I think because that type of expertise and that type of high political debate can be held at the FOC, that can promote the type of norms that we need in order to understand, like, what’s the role of governments in order to steer this somewhere. Or whether they should refrain from doing certain actions that might—with the good intention of preventing the spread of AI-generated misinformation or disinformation—that may end up stopping these important tools to be used creatively or to be used in constructive ways, or in ways that can allow more people to be active participants of the digital economy.

KHUSHBU SHAH: Thank you. Well, I want to thank all three of you for this robust conversation around the FOC and the work that it’s engaging in. I want to thank Deputy Secretary Sherman and our host here at the Atlantic Council for this excellent conversation. And so if you’re interested in learning more about the FOC, there’s a great primer on it on the DFRLab website. I recommend you check it out. I read it. It’s excellent. It’s at the bottom of the DFRLab’s registration page for this event.

Watch the full event

The post Wendy Sherman on the United States’ priorities as it takes the helm of the Freedom Online Coalition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s Ukraine invasion is eroding Kremlin influence in Kazakhstan

Kamila Auyezova — Tue, 28 Mar 2023 13:32:31 +0000

The invasion of Ukraine was meant to advance Vladimir Putin’s vision of a revived Russian Empire. Instead, it is forcing neighboring countries to reassess their own relationships with Moscow and fueling growing calls for decolonization and derussification throughout a region that was once viewed by many international observers as an informal extension of Russia itself.

This embrace of decolonization is nowhere more evident than in Kazakhstan, the largest state in Central Asia and a regular target of imperialistic Russian rhetoric. In the year since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, Kazakh society has actively sought to accelerate ongoing nation-building processes amid a notable rise in anti-imperialist sentiment. Meanwhile, the Kazakh authorities have made it clear that they do not condone Moscow’s military campaign in Ukraine and refuse to back the war.

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One of the earliest indications that Kazakhstan would not align with Russia over the invasion of Ukraine was the decision in spring 2022 to cancel the country’s traditional World War II Victory Day celebrations. The cancellation was an unambiguous rebuff to the Putin regime, which has placed the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany at the heart of modern Russian national identity and expects regional leaders to demonstrate their loyalty via reverence for the Soviet war effort.

This snub was followed by an even more direct and public fallout in June 2022. While sharing a stage with Putin at a flagship annual economic forum in Saint Petersburg, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev declared that he would not recognize Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.

Perhaps the most eye-catching indication of Kazakh public support for Ukraine has been the “Yurt of Invincibility” initiative, which has seen a number of traditional Kazakh yurts set up in Ukrainian towns and cities in recent months to help Ukrainians cope with electricity blackouts caused by Russian bombing of the country’s civilian infrastructure.

Organized by the Kazakh business community and backed by private donations, the yurt initiative has proved highly popular among Ukrainians while sparking considerable anger in Russia. However, Kremlin attempts to elicit an official response from the Kazakh authorities were politely declined, with Kazakh Foreign Ministry spokesperson Aibek Smadiyarov stating there was “nothing to explain.”

It is not hard to imagine why the appearance of “Yurts of Invincibility” across Ukraine struck such a nerve in Russia. Manned by activists offering free electricity and internet access along with hot drinks, the yurts represent a humane response to the inhumanity of Russia’s brutal invasion. In a very real sense, these traditional Kazakh abodes serve as symbols of post-colonial solidarity between Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

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Russian discontent over the critical Kazakh response to the invasion of Ukraine has led to attacks on Kazakhstan from Russian officials and in the country’s Kremlin-controlled information space. Since the start of the invasion, pundits on Russia’s notoriously inflammatory political talk shows have begun speculating over the possibility of future Russian military intervention in Kazakhstan. During a November 2022 episode of prominent regime propagandist Vladimir Solovyov’s daily show, one commentator declared: “the next problem is Kazakhstan.” He went on to claim that “the same Nazi processes can start there as in Ukraine.”

These provocative statements were echoed by Russian Ambassador to Kazakhstan Alexei Borodavkin, who warned in December 2022 that “radical nationalist tendencies” were becoming more and more visible in Kazakhstan, before suggesting Russia was ready to “help” the Kazakh authorities address this issue.

The Russian Ambassador’s comments were particularly provocative as they closely mirrored the kind of language used by the Kremlin to justify the invasion of Ukraine. This played on longstanding Kazakh fears that Moscow may attempt to exploit the presence of a large ethnic Russian minority in Kazakhstan, which is concentrated in northern regions of the country bordering the Russian Federation.

Suggestions that ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan are somehow oppressed have sparked a bitter response from many Kazakhs, who pride themselves on their tolerant attitude toward Russia and their respectful approach to the shared inheritance of the imperial past.

Unlike other post-Soviet states, Russian remains an official language in today’s Kazakhstan. The country also accepted hundreds of thousands of Russians fleeing mobilization into the Russian military in late 2022. Critics say this welcoming stance makes a mockery of Kremlin propaganda claims about a rising tide of Russophobia in today’s Kazakhstan.

The past year has witnessed historic shifts in allegiances and attitudes across the entire post-Soviet space. Ukraine’s heroic fight against Russian imperialism has prompted countries throughout the region to question the nature of their own ties to the Kremlin and seek geopolitical alternatives capable of countering Russian influence.

In Kazakhstan, the invasion has amplified anti-imperial sentiment and enhanced existing decolonization processes. These trends look set to gain further momentum in 2023. Geography alone dictates that Kazakhstan cannot realistically hope to cut all ties with Russia, but there is no escaping the fact that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has seriously undermined Russian influence in a country where all roads once led to Moscow.

Kamila Auyezova is a research analyst who focuses on geopolitical and climate issues in Eurasia. You can find her on Twitter @KAuyezova.

Russian War Report: Kremlin edits footage of Mariupol visit to remove women shouting at Putin

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 24 Mar 2023 15:57:24 +0000

Security

Ukraine likely preparing counteroffensive as Russia diverts forces from Bakhmut

Missile strike on residential building in Zaporizhzhia caught on camera

Tracking narratives

Kremlin edits footage of Mariupol visit to remove women shouting at Putin

Russian ministry reports 5,000 offenses related to the spread of “fakes” about the Russian Army

New poll suggests support for the war in Ukraine remains high among Russians

International response

Armenia ratifies Rome Statute in the wake of Putin’s ICC arrest warrant

Ukraine likely preparing counteroffensive as Russia diverts forces from Bakhmut

After months of heavy fighting in which Russian forces failed to fully capture Bakhmut, the Ukrainian army is likely preparing its counteroffensive. Ukrainian ground forces commander Oleksandr Syrskyi said on his Telegram channel that Russian forces “are losing considerable strength and are running out of steam” and “very soon we will take advantage of this opportunity.” The DFRLab has observed indications of a Ukrainian counterattack and is closely monitoring the developments.

Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to exert pressure on Ukraine. Ukrainian military intelligence reported that Russian troops will likely focus on targets of military importance in their next missile strikes. Particular attention is being paid to areas with troop concentration, oil depots, airfields, supply routes for military equipment from allied countries, and other logistical facilities. In addition, the possibility of repeated attacks against energy infrastructure or other objects of significant economic importance for Ukraine cannot be ruled out.

A Russian slowdown in Bakhmut could mean that Moscow is diverting its troops and resources to other regions. Russian troops have made gains further north, partially regaining control over the axis to the town of Kreminna. Intense battles have also been underway in the south. Further, Russian forces have become more active in the regions of Kharkiv, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Russian troops are conducting offensives in the direction of Avdiivka with the aim of establishing control over Avdiivka and Marinka.

In the occupied Crimean town of Dzhankoi, an explosion reportedly destroyed cruise missiles utilized by Russia’s Black Sea navy to target Ukraine, according to a March 21 statement from Ukrainian military intelligence. The strike appeared to have originated from a drone. A video of the explosion published on March 20 shows the blast was immediately preceded by a loudly buzzing engine which bears audio similarities to the sound made by Iranian-made drones. The DFRLab cannot confirm whether an Iranian drone caused the blast.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Missile strike on residential building in Zaporizhzhia caught on camera

Video footage of a missile strike against a nine-story residential building in the center of Zaporizhzhia emerged on Telegram on March 29. The DFRLab identified the location of the missile strike and the apartment complex it struck using geolocation and geospatial analysis. As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy described in a tweet, the strike occurred near a residential area near a mall.

Geolocated images of the residential apartment building in Zaporizhzhia struck by a Russian missile. (Source: Valentin Châtelet)

A photograph shared online indicates that an S-300 missile system fired the missile from the Russian-occupied southern bank of the Dnipro River. This location was corroborated by other open-source investigators, including the GeoConfirmed project, which reported that the missile likely came from the southeast direction. Reports claimed the attack caused the death of seven people.

Later that same day, counternarratives emerged on the pro-Kremlin English-language Telegram channel Slavyangrad and spread to a French-language channel. The narrative claimed that the strike resulted from a Ukrainian S-300 system failure while attempting to intercept a Russian missile. Russian news outlets and pro-Kremlin amplification channels have repeatedly used similar narratives to obfuscate Russian culpability in incidents involving civilians.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Kremlin edits footage of Mariupol visit to remove women shouting at Putin

Following the International Criminal Court issuing an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin leader paid a defiant visit to the occupied Ukrainian city of Mariupol. The Kremlin shared a thirty-minute video of the visit, which reportedly took place on March 18. During the visit, Putin reportedly examined restoration work under way in the city. Approximately twenty minutes into the footage, Putin has a short conversation with individuals described as residents of Mariupol.

Footage of the visit published by state-owned news outlet RIA included frames cut out of the Kremlin video. The RIA footage includes an extended version of Putin’s interactions with alleged residents. During the filmed conversation, an unidentified female voice can be heard in the background shouting at Putin, approximately eighteen seconds into the clip. Meduza reported that the woman yelled, “This all is not true! It’s all for a show!” While the women’s comments do sound similar to Meduza’s interpretation, the voice is muffled and difficult to interpret with certainty. Immediately after the woman shouts, the officials accompanying Putin react and begin to look around the streets. The Kremlin version of the video cuts away approximately four seconds earlier, switching to another woman speaking with Putin.

A woman can be heard yelling in the background eighteen seconds into this video clip, causing Putin’s entourage to look around for her. (Source: RIA Novosti)

The Kremlin version of the video cuts away approximately four seconds before the woman starts yelling. (Source: Kremlin.ru)

According to Meduza, a Russian journalist described the district visited by Putin as “virtually the only one rebuilt” in the city destroyed by Russia.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian ministry reports 5,000 offenses related to the spread of “fakes” about the Russian Army

On March 20, Vladimir Kolokoltsev, the head of Russia’s interior ministry, said that in 2022, “Particular attention was paid to preventing the discreditation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” The ministry reported that last year police documented five thousand offenses and forty-one crimes related to the spread of “fakes” about the Russian Army. In addition, they documented almost ninety cases of “deliberate false publications” about the Russian military.

“In cooperation with Roskomnadzor, the dissemination of about 160,000 false and other prohibited information was stopped,” Kolokoltsev added.

The DFRLab has previously reported on Russian attempts to tighten control of the internet in order to prevent the spread of content the Kremlin considers undesirable.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

New poll suggests support for the war in Ukraine remains high among Russians

According to independent Russian pollster Levada, 77 percent of Russians supported the war in February 2023, the highest level of public support since March 2022. Only 17 percent of Russians currently disapprove the war, Levada reported.

The number of people supporting the continuation of hostilities has steadily increased since October 2022 “as the shock of the announcement of partial mobilization passed,” Levada concluded.

Seventy-one percent of Russians perceive the return of Luhansk and Donetsk to Ukraine as unacceptable conditions for a peace treaty, while 67 percent see the return of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions as unacceptable. In addition, 76 percent of respondents perceive Ukraine’s accession to NATO as unacceptable.

Since November 2022, the share of respondents who believe that the “special military operation” is advancing successfully increased from 54 to 65 percent.

The Levada research center, labeled a foreign agent by Russia, published its assessment on March 13. Russia has cracked down on public dissent since the start of the war; it remains unclear whether this crackdown impacted Levada’s poll results.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Armenia ratifies Rome Statute in the wake of Putin’s ICC arrest warrant

On March 24, the Armenian Constitutional Court gave its blessing to the parliament’s ratification of the Rome Statute, noting that the country’s obligations to the International Criminal Court do not contradict the national constitution. The decision is final and went into effect immediately.

Armenia’s plans to ratify the Rome Statute had been complicated by the International Criminal Court’s recent decision to issue an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin. On December 29, 2022, Armenian parliament approved the draft law, “On Ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” which then made its way to the constitutional court. Armenia signed the statute in 1999 but did not ratify it at the time.

Armenia’s recent push to ratify the ICC charter appears motivated by the ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan. Armenia initiated the ratification to take Azerbaijan to the ICC over alleged war crimes committed by Azerbaijani troops during the September 2022 invasion, but some observers thought the constitutional court would rule against it due to the Putin arrest warrant.

Human rights defender Artur Sakunts told Caucasus news outlet Jam News that Armenia would end up in a “miserable position” if it did not continue on course to ratify the statute. “We will remain in the status of an ally of a fascist regime – where Belarus is now,” Sakunts added. “And such regimes have no allies, they only have subordinates, colonies, zones of influence.”

Armenia’s Speaker of Parliament, Alen Simonyan, told reporters on March 20 that Armenia had begun the ratification process months before the ICC decision. When asked about the possibility of arresting Putin on a visit to Armenia, Simonyan said, “First, let’s ratify the Rome Statute for now, and then we’ll decide what to do next. I wonder what they will do in other countries in case of his arrival. I just physically can’t imagine it [the arrest].”

—Ani Mejlumyan, Research Assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

The post Russian War Report: Kremlin edits footage of Mariupol visit to remove women shouting at Putin appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Child abductions reveal the genocidal intent behind Putin’s Ukraine invasion

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 23 Mar 2023 20:58:18 +0000

The recent International Criminal Court decision to charge Vladimir Putin with war crimes has shed much-needed light on one of the darkest chapters of Russia’s ongoing invasion. During the past year, Russian forces have reportedly abducted thousands of children from occupied regions of Ukraine and attempted to deprive them of their Ukrainian identity. This campaign of forced deportations and anti-Ukrainian indoctrination reveals the genocidal intent at the heart of Russia’s Ukraine invasion.

Article II of the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention identifies five acts that qualify as genocide. The fifth act, forcibly transferring the children of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group to another group, concisely and accurately describes Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Kremlin officials have attempted to disguise the abductions as a routine wartime security measure, but Moscow’s well-documented efforts to “re-educate” young Ukrainians and turn them into Russians tells a very different story.

Since the invasion began in February 2022, evidence has mounted of a large-scale Russian operation to abduct and indoctrinate Ukrainian children throughout the territories that have fallen under their control. One recent report published by the Yale School of Public Health in February 2023 identified a systematic Russian program to re-educate thousands of abducted Ukrainian children via a network of more than 40 camps and facilities stretching from Russian-occupied Crimea to Siberia. “This is not one rogue camp, this is not one rogue mayor or governor,” commented Nathaniel Raymond, executive director of the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab. “This is a massive logistical undertaking that does not happen by accident.”

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Ukrainians in liberated regions have recounted how they frequently had to hide children from Russian occupation forces. Numerous Ukrainian orphanages were forced to smuggle children out of occupied areas to prevent them from being seized and sent to Russia. Some of the victims of these Russian abductions have been orphans or children living in care. Others have been physically separated from their families and told they are no longer wanted. In some cases, Ukrainian parents claim to have been tricked or coerced into sending their children to Russia. The overall number of abducted children is not yet known. Current estimates indicate that well over ten thousand young Ukrainians have been abducted and sent to Russia. Many fear the real total figure may be far higher.

Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, who has been indicted alongside Putin by the ICC for the “unlawful deportation and transfer” of Ukrainian children, has spoken openly about the apparent effectiveness of Russia’s indoctrination efforts. In late 2022, she acknowledged that a group of 30 children brought from Russian-occupied Mariupol initially sang the Ukrainian national anthem and shouted the patriotic slogan “Glory to Ukraine,” but claimed that this criticism was “transformed into love for Russia.”

The abduction and indoctrination of Ukrainian children is only one element of comprehensive Russian efforts to eradicate all traces of Ukrainian national identity. Throughout Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine, any symbols of Ukrainian identity and statehood are suppressed while access to the Ukrainian media is blocked. The Ukrainian language is being removed from the school system, with educators imported from Russia to teach a Kremlin-approved curriculum that promotes a Russian imperial identity while demonizing Ukraine. Parents who question these policies are told their children will be taken away if they refuse to comply.

Russia is also imposing more direct measures to outlaw any expressions of Ukrainian identity. Throughout the country, Russian-occupied regions have witnessed the same pattern of arrests targeting anyone deemed a threat to the Kremlin authorities. This typically includes local officials, journalists, former members of the Ukrainian military, civil society activists, and anyone expressing pro-Ukrainian views. In numerous instances, patriotic tattoos or pro-Ukrainian content on mobile phones have led to detentions and disappearances. Investigators working in newly liberated regions have uncovered evidence indicating thousands of civilian deaths along with the widespread use of sexual violence and torture.

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While the mass killing of Ukrainian civilians has been well documented, there is not yet any international consensus over whether Russia is committing genocide in Ukraine. A recent UN report found that Russia was guilty of “a wide range of war crimes” in Ukraine, but commission head Erik Mose said investigators had not yet uncovered conclusive proof confirming genocide.

Others argue that more than enough evidence of genocide has already been found, and point specifically to the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. Speaking to CNN’s Christiane Amanpour on March 22, Ukrainian Nobel laureate Oleksandra Matviichuk characterized the abductions as a component of “the genocidal policy which Russia has imposed against Ukraine.” Likewise, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva that the abduction of young Ukrainians amounted to genocide. “The most chilling crime is that Russia steals Ukrainian children,” he commented. “This is a genocidal crime.”

In order to prove that Russia is guilty of genocide, it is vital to demonstrate genocidal intent. It is this intent “to physically destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group,” that legally distinguishes genocide from war crimes and crimes against humanity.

In this particular case, Russia itself has provided mountains of evidence indicating a clear intention to destroy the Ukrainian nation. Indeed, there are few examples in history where a genocidal power has incriminated itself so comprehensively. Vladimir Putin himself has frequently argued against the existence of a separate Ukrainian identity, and has even published lengthy articles denying Ukraine’s historical legitimacy. Meanwhile, genocidal language aimed at Ukraine has become completely normalized in the Russian mainstream media and among senior government officials.

The grotesque calls for genocide that are so commonplace in today’s Russia have helped inspire the criminal actions of Putin’s invading army. Among the long list of crimes committed by the Russian military in Ukraine, the methodical abduction and indoctrination of Ukrainian children stands out. The scale and systematic nature of the abductions make them an unmistakable symbol of Russia’s intention to eradicate Ukrainian identity and extinguish the Ukrainian nation. It is therefore fitting that this should be the first crime Vladimir Putin is indicted for. Putin hoped the invasion of Ukraine would secure his place among Russia’s greatest rulers. Instead, he looks destined to enter history as a genocidal dictator forever linked with the mass abduction of Ukrainian children.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

The 5×5—Conflict in Ukraine’s information environment

Simon Handler — Wed, 22 Mar 2023 04:01:00 +0000

This article is part of The 5×5, a monthly series by the Cyber Statecraft Initiative, in which five featured experts answer five questions on a common theme, trend, or current event in the world of cyber. Interested in the 5×5 and want to see a particular topic, event, or question covered? Contact Simon Handler with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at SHandler@atlanticcouncil.org.

Just over one year ago, on February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of neighboring Ukraine. The ensuing conflict, Europe’s largest since World War II, has not only besieged Ukraine physically, but also through the information environment. Through kinetic, cyber, and influence operations, Russia has placed Ukraine’s digital and physical information infrastructure—including its cell towers, networks, data, and the ideas that traverse them—in its crosshairs as it seeks to cripple Ukraine’s defenses and bring its population under Russian control.

Given the privately owned underpinnings of the cyber and information domains by technology companies, a range of local and global companies have played a significant role in defending the information environment in Ukraine. From Ukrainian telecommunications operators to global cloud and satellite internet providers, the private sector has been woven into Ukrainian defense and resilience. For example, Google’s Threat Analysis Group reported having disrupted over 1,950 instances in 2022 of Russian information operations aimed at degrading support for Ukraine, undermining its government, and building support for the war within Russia. The present conflict in Ukraine offers lessons for states as well as private companies on why public-private cooperation is essential to building resilience in this space, and how these entities can work together more effectively.

We brought together a group of experts to provide insights on the war being waged through the Ukrainian information environment and take away lessons for the United States and its allies for the future.

#1 How has conflict in the information environment associated with the war in Ukraine compared to your prior expectations?

Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Baltics, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council:

“As the war in Ukraine started, everyone was expecting to see Russia conducting offensive information influence operations targeting Europe. Yes, we have identified and researched Russia’s coordinated information influence campaigns on Meta’s platforms and Telegram. These campaigns targeted primarily European countries, and their execution was unprofessional, sloppy, and without much engagement on respective platforms.”

Silas Cutler, senior director for cyber threat research, Institute for Security and Technology (IST):

“A remarkable aspect of this conflict has been how Ukraine has maintained communication with the rest of the world. In the days leading up to the conflict, there was a significant concern that Russia would disrupt Ukraine’s ability to report on events as they unfolded. Instead of losing communication, Ukraine has thrived while continuously highlighting through social media its ingenuity within the conflict space. Both the mobilization of its technical workforce through the volunteer IT_Army and its ability to leverage consumer technology, such as drones, have shown the incredible resilience and creativity of the Ukrainian people.”

Roman Osadchuk, research associate, Eurasia, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council:

“The information environment was chaotic and tense even before the invasion, as Russia waged a hybrid war since at least the annexation of Crimea and war in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. Therefore, the after-invasion dynamic did not bring significant surprises, but intensified tension and resistance from Ukrainian civil society and government toward Russia’s attempts to explain its unprovoked invasion and muddle the water around its war crimes. The only things that exceeded expectations were the abuse of fact-checking toolbox WarOnFakes and the intensified globalization of the Kremlin’s attempts to tailor messages about the war to their favor globally.”

Emma Schroeder, associate director, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council:

“The information environment has been a central space and pathway throughout which this war is being fought. Russian forces are reaching through that space to attack and spread misinformation, as well as attacking the physical infrastructure underpinning this environment. The behavior, while novel in its scale, is the continuation of Russian strategy in Crimea, and is very much living up to expectations set in that context. What has surpassed expectations is the effectiveness of Ukrainian defenses, in coordination with allies and private sector partners. The degree to which the international community has sprung forward to provide aid and assistance is incredible, especially in the information environment where such global involvement can be so immediate and transformative.”

Gavin Wilde, senior fellow, Technology and International Affairs Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:

“The volume and intensity of cyber and information operations has roughly been in line with my prior expectations, though the degree of private and commercial activity was something that I might not have predicted a year ago. From self-selecting out of the Russian market to swarming to defend Ukrainian networks and infrastructure, the outpouring of support from Western technology and cybersecurity firms was not on my bingo card. Sustaining it and modeling for similar crises are now key.”

#2 What risks do private companies assume in offering support or partnership to states engaged in active conflict?

Aleksejeva: “Fewer and fewer businesses are betting on Russia’s successful economical future. Additionally, supporting Russia in this conflict in any way is morally unacceptable for most Western companies. Chinese and Iranian companies are different. As for Ukraine, supporting it is morally encouraged, but is limited by many practicalities, such as supply chain disruptions amid Russia’s attacks.”

Cutler: “By providing support during conflict, companies risk becoming a target themselves. Technology companies such as Microsoft, SentinelOne, and Cloudflare, which have publicly reported their support for Ukraine, have been historically targeted by Russian cyber operations and are already familiar with the increased risk. Organizations with pre-conflict commercial relationships may fall under new scrutiny by nationally-aligned hacktivist groups such as Killnet. This support for one side over the other—whether actual or perceived—may result in additional risk.”

Osadchuk: “An important risk of continuing business as usual [in Russia] is that it may damage a company’s public image and test its declared values, since the continuation of paying taxes within the country-aggressor makes the private company a sponsor of these actions. Another risk for a private company is financial, since the companies that leave a particular market are losing their profits, but this is incomparable to human suffering and losses caused by the aggression. In the case of a Russian invasion, one of the ways to stop the war is to cut funding for and, thus, undermine the Russian war machine and support Ukraine.”

Schroeder: “Private companies have long provided goods and services to combatants outside of the information environment. The international legal framework restricting combatants to targeting ‘military objects’ provides normative protection, as objects are defined as those ‘whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage’ in a manner proportional to the military gain foreseen by the operation. This definition, however, is still subject to the realities of conflict, wherein combatants will make those decisions to their own best advantage. In the information environment, this question becomes more complicated, as cyber products and services often do not fall neatly within standard categories and where private companies themselves own and operate the very infrastructure over and through which combatants engage. The United States and its allies, whether on a unilateral of supranational basis, work to better define the boundaries of civilian ‘participation’ in war and conflict, as the very nature of the space means that their involvement will only increase.”

Wilde: “On one hand, it is important not to falsely mirror onto others the constraints of international legal and normative frameworks around armed conflict to which responsible states strive to adhere. Like Russia, some states show no scruples about violating these frameworks in letter or spirit, and seem unlikely to be inhibited by claims of neutrality from companies offering support to victimized states. That said, clarity about where goods and services might be used for civilian versus military objectives is advisable to avoid the thresholds of ‘direct participation’ in war outlined in International Humanitarian Law.”

#3 What useful lessons should the United States and its allies take away from the successes and/or failures of cyber and information operations in Ukraine?

Aleksejeva: “As for cyber operations, so far, we have not seen successful disruptions achieved by Russia of Ukraine and its Western allies. Yes, we are seeing constant attacks, but cyber defense is much more developed on both sides than before 2014. As for information operations, the United States and its allies should become less self-centered and have a clear view of Russia’s influence activities in the so-called Global South where much of the narratives are rooted in anti-Western sentiment.”

Cutler: “Prior to the start of the conflict, it was strongly believed that a cyber operation, specifically against energy and communication sectors, would act as a precursor to kinetic action. While a WannaCry or NotPetya-scale attack did not occur, the AcidRain attack against the Viasat satellite communication network and other attacks targeting Ukraine’s energy sector highlight that cyber operations of varying effectiveness will play a role in the lead up to a military conflict.”

Osadchuk: “First, cyber operations coordinate with other attack types, like kinetic operations on the ground, disinformation, and influence operations. Therefore, cyberattacks might be a precursor of an upcoming missile strike, information operation, or any other action in the physical and informational dimensions, so allies could use cyber to model and analyze multi-domain operations. Finally, preparation for and resilience to information and cyber operations are vital in mitigating the consequences of such attacks; thus, updating defense doctrines and improving cyber infrastructure and social resilience are necessary.”

Schroeder: “Expectations for operations in this environment have exposed clear fractures in the ways that different communities define as success in a wartime operation. Specifically, there is a tendency to equate success with direct or kinetic battlefield impact. One of the biggest lessons that has been both a success and a failure throughout this war is the role that this environment can play. Those at war, from ancient to modern times, have leveraged every asset at their disposal and chosen the tool they see as the best fit for each challenge that arises—cyber is no different. While there is ongoing debate surrounding this question, if cyber operations have not been effective on a battlefield, that does not mean that cyber is ineffective, just that expectations were misplaced. Understanding the myriad roles that cyber can and does play in defense, national security, and conflict is key to creating an effective cross-domain force.

Wilde: “Foremost is the need to check the assumption that these operations can have decisive utility, particularly in a kinetic wartime context. Moscow placed great faith in its ability to convert widespread digital and societal disruption into geopolitical advantage, only to find years of effort backfiring catastrophically. In other contexts, better trained and resourced militaries might be able to blend cyber and information operations into combined arms campaigns more effectively to achieve discrete objectives. However, it is worth reevaluating the degree to which we assume offensive cyber and information operations can reliably be counted on to play pivotal roles in hot war.”

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#4 How do comparisons to other domains of conflict help and/or hurt understanding of conflict in the information domain?

Aleksejeva: “Unlike conventional warfare, information warfare uses information and psychological operations during peace time as well. By masking behind sock puppet or anonymous social media accounts, information influence operations might be perceived as legitimate internal issues that polarize society. A country might be unaware that it is under attack. At the same time, as the goal of conventional warfare is to break an adversary’s defense line, information warfare fights societal resilience by breaking its unity. ‘Divide and rule’ is one of the basic information warfare strategies.”

Cutler: “When looking at the role of cyber in this conflict, I think it is critical to examine the history of Hacktivist movements. This can be incredibly useful for understanding the influences and capabilities of groups like the IT_Army and Killnet.”

Osadchuk: “The information domain sometimes reflects the kinetic events on the ground, so comparing these two is helpful and could serve as a behavior predictor. For instance, when the Armed Forces of Ukraine liberate new territories, they also expose war crimes, civilian casualties, and damages inflicted by occupation forces. In reaction to these revelations, the Kremlin propaganda machine usually launches multiple campaigns to distance themselves, blame the victim, or even denounce allegations as staged to muddy the waters for certain observers.”

Schroeder: “It is often tricky to carry comparisons over different environments and context, but the practice persists because, well, that is just what people do—look for patterns. The ability to carry over patterns and lessons is essential, especially in new environments and with the constant developments of new tools and technologies. Where these comparisons cause problems is when they are used not as a starting point, but as a predetermined answer.”

Wilde: “It is problematic, in my view, to consider information a warfighting ‘domain,’ particularly because its physical and metaphorical boundaries are endlessly vague and evolving—certainly relative to air, land, sea, and space. The complexities and contingencies in the information environment are infinitely more than those in the latter domains. However talented we may be at collecting and analyzing millions of relevant datapoints with advanced technology, these capabilities may lend us a false sense of our ability to control or subvert the information environment during wartime—from hearts and minds to bits and bytes.”

#5 What conditions might make the current conflict exceptional and not generalizable?

Aleksejeva: “This war is neither ideological nor a war for territories and resources. Russia does not have any ideology that backs up its invasion of Ukraine. It also has a hard time maintaining control of its occupied territories. Instead, Russia has many disinformation-based narratives or stories that justify the invasion to as many Russian citizens as possible including Kremlin officials. Narratives are general and diverse enough, so everyone can find an explanation of the current invasion—be it the alleged rebirth of Nazism in Ukraine, the fight against US hegemony, or the alleged historical right to bring Ukraine back to Russia’s sphere of influence. Though local, the war has global impact and makes countries around the world pick sides. Online and social media platforms, machine translation tools, and big data products provide a great opportunity to bombard any internet user in any part of the world with pro-Russia massaging often tailored to echo historical, racial, and economic resentments especially rooted in colonial past.”

Cutler: “During the Gulf War, CNN and other cable news networks were able to provide live coverage of military action as it was unfolding. Now, real-time information from conflict areas is more broadly accessible. Telegram and social media have directly shaped the information and narratives from the conflict zone.”

Osadchuk: “The main difference is the enormous amount of war content, ranging from professional pictures and amateur videos after missile strikes to drone footage of artillery salvos and bodycam footage of fighting in the frontline trenches—all making this conflict the most documented. Second, this war demonstrates the need for drones, satellite imagery, and open-source intelligence for successful operations, which distances it from previous conflicts and wars. Finally, it is exceptional due to the participation of Ukrainian civil society in developing applications, like the one alerting people about incoming shelling or helping find shelter; launching crowdfunding campaigns for vehicles, medical equipment, and even satellite image services; and debunking Russian disinformation on social media.”

Schroeder: “One of the key lessons we can take from this war is the centrality of the global private sector to conflict in and through the information environment. From expedited construction of cloud infrastructure for the Ukrainian government to Ukrainian telecommunications companies defending and restoring services along the front lines to distributed satellite devices, providing flexible connectivity to civilians and soldiers alike, private companies have undoubtedly played an important role in shaping both the capabilities of the Ukrainian state and the information battlespace itself. While we do not entirely understand the incentives that drove these actions, an undeniable motivation that will be difficult to replicate in other contexts is the combination of Russian outright aggression and comparative economic weakness. Companies and their directors felt motivated to act due to the first and, likely, free to act due to the second. Private sector centrality is unlikely to diminish and, in future conflicts, it will be imperative for combatants to understand the opportunities and dependencies that exist in this space within their own unique context.”

Wilde: “My sense is that post-war, transatlantic dynamics—from shared norms to politico-military ties—lent significant tailwinds to marshal resource and support to Ukraine (though not as quickly or amply from some quarters as I had hoped). The shared memory of the fight for self-determination in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s to early 1990s still has deep resonance among the publics and capitals of the West. These are unique dynamics, and the degree to which they could be replicated in other theaters of potential conflict is a pretty open question.”

Simon Handler is a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative within the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab). He is also the editor-in-chief of The 5×5, a series on trends and themes in cyber policy. Follow him on Twitter @SimonPHandler.

The Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, under the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), works at the nexus of geopolitics and cybersecurity to craft strategies to help shape the conduct of statecraft and to better inform and secure users of technology.

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An imperative for women’s political leadership: Lessons from Brazil

Valentina Sader, Isabel Bernhard — Tue, 21 Mar 2023 13:00:00 +0000

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In politics and positions of power, the lack of equitable representation of women is striking. Women represent 49.7 percent of the world population, yet only twenty-seven countries have a female leader as of February 2023.2 Brazil, which elected its first and only woman president in 2011, has seen slow progress in ensuring greater female participation in politics. Political violence against women, among other factors, is a deterring factor for women’s political participation.

Political violence is not a new phenomenon, nor it is exclusive to women. However, evolving analysis has identified differences between political violence generally and political violence against women. The latter is directed at women with the intent of restricting their political participation and active voice, while also generalizing women’s participation as “wrong.” In the Brazilian context, political violence against women is a “physical, psychological, economic, symbolic, or sexual aggression against women, with the purpose of preventing or restricting access to and exercise of public functions and/or inducing them to make decisions contrary to their will.” As such, political violence against women plays an important role in deterring women’s active participation in politics—and even more daunting for black, indigenous, or LGBTQI+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer) women.

Brazil has a unique opportunity to adjust its legislation and reframe the incentives in the political sphere tackle this issue now, ahead of municipal elections in 2024. Doing so will ensure greater and more equitable political participation, enrich the political debate, strengthen the legislative agenda, and further solidify the country’s democratic ethos, even if other challenges to democracy remain. This report presents solutions Brazil could take to reach this more representative and resilient version of democracy.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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Shahid quoted in Article 14: How Indian media mainstreamed the ‘Land Jihad’ propaganda

Atlantic Council — Fri, 17 Mar 2023 16:59:00 +0000

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Russian War Report: DFRLab confirms aerial strikes on industrial plants north of Bakhmut

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 17 Mar 2023 14:07:42 +0000

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DFRLab confirms aerial strikes on industrial plants north of Bakhmut

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International response

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DFRLab confirms aerial strikes on industrial plants north of Bakhmut

Russian armed forces continue their offensive inside the contested city of Bakhmut. At the time of writing, the western part of Bakhmut remained under Ukrainian control, with the Bakhmutka River acting as a buffer zone between the artillery and infantry forces deployed on either side of the waterway. Russian missile and aerial strikes targeted intermediary positions to push back Ukrainian armed forces, from Yahidne in the north towards Bakhmut industrial plants.

The DFRLab collected open-source satellite imagery dating back to the first two weeks of March to document missile strikes on an industrial plant in the north of Bakhmut. The imagery was collected from the European Space Agency’s Sentinel hub using images provided by satellite constellation Sentinel-2.

Analysis of the damage inflicted on buildings in the area reveals that potential missiles struck buildings belonging to two different industrial plants. The easternmost plant is the Bakhmut non-ferrous metals factory.

Satellite imagery showed the factory’s main building was destroyed, with a second building damaged. Traces of burns on the roof of the building can be seen from an explosion. This building belongs to the Makiivka metal construction plant.

Sentinel-2 satellite imagery north of Bakhmut released on March 4, 2023, annotated by the DFRLab. (Source: DFRLab via ESA/Sentinel-2, Ukraine Control Map)

Sentinel-2 satellite imagery north of Bakhmut released on March 14, 2023, with DFRLab annotations. Dark spots on the bottom show a damaged building belonging to the metal construction factory. Destroyed houses seen in the top left part of the image are where the non-ferrous metal factory once stood. (Source: DFRLab via ESA/Sentinel-2, Ukraine Control Map)

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Battle for Vuhledar highlights tensions between Wagner and Russian defense ministry

Eastern Ukraine continues to be a key arena for clashes as Russian forces attempt to advance in the directions of Vuhledar and Bakhmut. Ukrainian forces are using remote mining near Vuhledar, according to a March 16 report from UK defense intelligence. The remote anti-armor mine system (RAAMS) makes it possible to create an anti-tank minefield up to seventeen kilometers away from the firing unit. The United Kingdom reported that Ukraine was also firing the mines behind advancing Russian forces, leading to additional losses in the event of a retreat. The United Kingdom also reported that there is a “realistic possibility” that Russia’s push for Vuhledar is driven by the Russian defense ministry’s desire to produce better results than Wagner, who are driving Russia’s tactical progress towards Bakhmut.

The UK report supports the DFRLab’s analysis that the ongoing offensive operations in eastern Ukraine are provoking a competition between the different military units, particularly Wagner and the Russian defense ministry. In the direction of Bakhmut, Wagner’s forces continue to be the primary units fighting within the city. However, the combat has been difficult, and the urban environment makes progress challenging. In addition, Chechen forces in Bakhmut continue to fight alongside the Ukrainian army against Russian positions.

Russian forces are also having issues restoring tanks, according to a report published by Ukrainian outlet Defense Express. The 103rd armored repair plant in Russia has reportedly not been able to restore T-62 tanks under the terms originally contracted, which would have required the plant to restore twenty-two to twenty-three tanks per month. According to Defense Express, however, the real capacity of the plant is likely around seven tanks per month. On March 6, UK defense intelligence reported that Russia was deploying outdated T-62 tanks to the battlefield due to major losses in armored equipment.

Acts of sabotage against occupying Russian forces continue in the direction of Kherson. On March 11, the Telegram channel of the pro-Ukraine resistance movement Atesh reported that its members blew up a railway line in the Kherson region, between Radensk and Abrykosivka. This appears to be an attempt by Atesh partisans to impede logistics for the Russian troops deployed in the area.

Ukraine has also reported new arrests of alleged Russian infiltrators. On March 16, the Security Service of Ukraine reported the detention of two women accused of tracking the movement of Ukrainian equipment in the interest of Russian intelligence. The women also allegedly photographed the results of attacks on Ukrainian facilities. One of the women reportedly worked as a nurse in Ukraine’s territorial defense combat unit.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian channels amplify Quran desecration video

Footage emerged online on March 15 showing the burning of the Islamic holy book, the Quran. Russian social media channels shared the one minute and six second video, accusing Ukrainian soldiers of being behind the desecration. The video sparked a wave of reactions on social media, particularly on Twitter, where a TikTok version of the video went viral. The TikTok video has since been removed.

The video is difficult to analyze and cannot be verified. It does not show the faces of the alleged Ukrainian soldiers. The people in the video are speaking broken Ukrainian and use a Russian military knife, said Oleg Nikolenko, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s foreign ministry.

A screenshot of the video, published in the Readovka Telegram channel on March 15, shows a knife allegedly used by the Russian army. (Source: Readovkanews/archive)

The video was denounced as a provocation by Said Imagilov, Mufti of the Spiritual Administration of Ukraine’s Muslims, as well as the Ukrainian military and Ukrainian officials.

Ukraine’s army has Muslim soldiers in its ranks, and Imagilov is an active participant on the frontlines defending Kyiv. The Ukrainian army is also supported by several Chechen units, the most well-known of which are the two volunteer battalions, the Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion and the Sheikh Mansur Battalion. Chechens are among the most active defenders of Bakhmut, with their Adam special unit operating behind Russian army defense lines.

The provenance of the video remains unknown.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

European allies train Ukrainian forces on tank operation

Ukraine’s Western allies are continuing to help strengthen Kyiv’s defense against Russia by training Ukrainian troops on tank operation and trench warfare. Thierry Breton, European Commissioner for Internal Market, is visiting EU countries in a bid to shore up more ammunition for Ukraine. His first visit was to Bulgaria. This visit came as the Slovak news outlet Pravda published data on March 15 showing that, in the year since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Slovakia has doubled its ammunition production and plans to double it again from current levels.

Meanwhile, Greece and the United States agreed to a deal that will see the US transfer 300 M2 Bradley fighting vehicles to the Greek army as part of a modernization program, according to Greek media reports on March 10. Greece is expected to send Ukraine BMP-1 vehicles and M113 armored carriers in exchange for the purchase of the Bradleys.

On March 13, Spain’s Ministry of Defense announced that ten Ukrainian crews completed training in Spain on operating Leopard 2 tanks. Along with fifty-five servicemen, fifteen Ukrainian technicians also received training. According to El Periódico, “These fifty-five soldiers – some professionals and other reservists – were already on the front line, and their four-week training lasted twelve hours a day.”

In addition, the German army announced it was training Ukrainian troops on the Leopard 2 tanks in Germany. “Training on the weapon systems is not just about how to use it, but also about tactics so that the Ukrainians can achieve the greatest possible effect against their opponents,” said Colonel Heiko Diehl.

Ukrainian servicemen in the United Kingdom also completed training in conducting trench combat in realistic conditions. The program was led by the 5th Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment of the 1st Brigade of the Australian Defense Forces.

Earlier this week, Polish President Andrzej Duda announced that his country would send Ukraine thirty MiG 29 fighter jets. These are essential as Russia strives to achieve air dominance and has increased its aerial strikes throughout Ukraine. On March 14, a video emerged on Twitter showing Ukrainian soldiers taking part in trainings in the French military camp of Canjuers in the south of the country. The soldiers were reportedly training with the AMX-10RC armored personnel carriers. Minister of the Armed Forces of France Sebastien Lecornu confirmed during a defense commission hearing on March 15 that the carriers are already being delivered to Ukraine.

On March 15, the Israeli government approved licenses to export electronic warfare equipment to Ukraine that will help counter Iranian drones.

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

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Ukraine must do more to counter Russian narratives in the Global South

Mitchell Polman — Tue, 14 Mar 2023 19:24:38 +0000

More than one year since Vladimir Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, international reaction to the war remains sharply divided. While much has been made of Western unity in support of Ukraine, the rest of the world has been largely unwilling to oppose or even condemn Russia in any meaningful way.

This is not just a matter of winning UN votes and scoring political points at international forums. The reluctance of countries throughout the Global South to join Western sanctions significantly undermines efforts to isolate Russia, while providing Moscow with the financial and material lifelines to maintain the war in Ukraine indefinitely.

Attitudes in the Global South toward Russia’s Ukraine invasion are being shaped by a range of factors including economic and geopolitical interests along with widespread suspicion of American foreign policy and historic anti-Western sentiment dating back to the colonial era. Russia has skillfully exploited this post-colonial perspective by framing the invasion of Ukraine as a reaction to what it terms as yet more expansionist Western interference. As the war enters its second year, Ukraine should be doing much more to engage these non-Western audiences and make its voice heard.

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Ukraine has limited experience of rallying international support and has previously focused its efforts almost exclusively on the West. In the three decades since the country regained independence, Ukrainian politicians, activists, and journalists have spent comparatively little time communicating with people in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, where awareness of Ukraine is still often minimal. Ukraine now needs to develop a strategy that can rally the nations of the non-Western world to its side.

First of all, it is absolutely crucial to keep Ukraine at the heart of the debate. Across the Global South, it is common to witness public discussions about the Russian invasion that barely address Ukraine at all. Instead, the focus is frequently on Western colonialism, globalization, and other broad geopolitical themes. Ukrainians should not hesitate to insist that conversations about their country’s plight not get sidetracked by extraneous historical grievances.

Over the past year, Ukraine’s limited efforts to influence opinion in the Global South have concentrated on highlighting the imperial ambitions underpinning Putin’s current invasion while raising awareness of Russia’s own long history of colonialism as a major European empire. This approach certainly makes some sense, but too much emphasis on Russia’s colonial past risks shifting the conversation away from today’s Ukraine.

Another important ingredient shaping the debate in the Global South is the role played by the Soviet Union as a supporter of anti-colonial liberation movements during the second half of the twentieth century. Putin’s Russia has made much use of this favorable Soviet legacy, using it to garner goodwill and to emphasize its own anti-Western credentials. This ignores the obvious imperialism of the USSR itself, and overlooks the fact that Soviet-era Ukraine also contributed significantly to liberation movements throughout Africa and Asia.

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While it is essential for Ukrainians to correct the historical record regarding Russian imperialism, it is also vital to stress Ukraine’s current importance for the Global South. First and foremost, this means highlighting Ukraine’s status as one of the world’s emerging agricultural superpowers and a major prewar contributor to global food security.

As Ukraine seeks to influence opinion among non-Western audiences, the country must make maximum use of its limited resources. For example, officials in Kyiv should be doing much more to engage with the thousands of professionals throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin America who studied at Ukrainian universities before going on to have careers in their homelands. This pool of alumni is a potentially significant but largely untapped resource that could bring a degree of authenticity to the debate due to their personal experience of Ukraine.

Ukrainian nationals with family ties to the Global South can also contribute to greater international understanding of the issues at stake in today’s Ukraine. As one of the most prominent members of the Afro-Ukrainian community, politician and Olympic champion wrestler Zhan Beleniuk traveled to Africa in late 2022 as part of Ukraine’s fledgling outreach efforts. Others with similar backgrounds should be encouraged to speak up on behalf of Ukraine.

Ukraine’s success in shaping opinion throughout the Global South will hinge largely on the country’s ability to engage with the media. This is one area where the Kremlin enjoys overwhelming advantages. While Russia’s RT and Sputnik platforms have limited reach and minimal credibility among Western audiences, they enjoy considerable prominence and are often well-received in much of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Ukraine cannot hope to compete with the Kremlin’s billion dollar media budgets and must instead build relationships with existing local mainstream media. Brazil’s TV Globo is the second-largest commercial TV network in the world and can bring Ukrainian perspectives to huge domestic Brazilian audiences. Likewise, engagement with Spanish-language channels can help reach millions across Latin America. A comprehensive media strategy is needed in order to close the information gap and counter the current dominance of Russia’s narratives in the non-Western information space.

Ultimately, the truth is on Ukraine’s side. The good news it that there is very little evidence of actively anti-Ukrainian sentiment in today’s Global South. It should be entirely possible to persuade far more people that Ukraine’s cause is righteous and worthy of support. However, this will require a concerted effort that is currently lacking. Simply telling non-Western audiences that the Russians are also imperialists may be satisfying, but it is not nearly enough.

Mitchell Polman is a public diplomacy and international relations commentator.

Tracking narratives

Transnistria accuses Ukraine of staging a terrorist attack

Russian army advances toward Bakhmut, but its offensive capabilities remain unclear

The Russian army continues to carry out operations in the Bakhmut area, with heavy fighting occurring in recent days. The battle for Bakhmut has become the face of the war’s battlefield brutality. On March 8, Chechen fighters within the Ukrainian army shared footage of the mass destruction caused by the recent offensives there.

Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on March 8 that Russian forces, boosted by Wagner troops, had captured all of eastern Bakhmut. The Institute for the Study of War, however, assessed that Wagner “appears to have entered a temporary tactical pause and it remains unclear if Wagner fighters will retain their operational preponderance in future.” According to Politico.eu, Ukrainian army commanders agreed on March 6 to strengthen positions in Bakhmut. On March 7, Ukrainian forces conducted a controlled withdrawal from eastern Bakhmut. Admitting the possibility that Bakhmut could soon fall, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that the Russian capture of Bakhmut would not “necessarily reflect any turning point of the war,” though Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy expressed concern to CNN that the fall of Bakhmut would give Russia an “open road” to capture other Ukrainian cities.

It is unclear whether Russian forces can afford an offensive to pressure the Ukrainian army west and south of Bakhmut, however. Ukraine has fortified its frontlines in recent months, creating more obstacles for Russia, which is experiencing a series of issues in its command structure due to ongoing divisions between the Russian military and Wagner leadership. Prigozhin stated that Russia used Wagner forces to bear the brunt of the fighting and bled the unit’s ranks.

The reported infighting and probable lack of sufficient forces in the Russian army to launch an offensive could explain a recent announcement posted in the popular pro-Russian Telegram channel VoenKor (“Military Correspondent”) claiming that Gazprom is creating and supporting volunteer units. Initial reports suggested that Gazprom wanted to pursue creating its own private military company. On February 6, the Kremlin authorized Gazprom to create a private security organization to protect Russia’s energy infrastructure. Competition for resources between units can be expected if Gazprom pursues the use of mercenary units on the battlefield.

Over the past week, Ukrainian security forces have carried out raids as part of an anti-infiltration and anti-espionage operation, with the focus primarily falling on the Odesa region. The Security Service of Ukraine said they had detained the former commander of one of Ukraine’s special operations teams who allegedly agreed to cooperate with Russian intelligence and convinced the authorities in Ochakiv to side with Russia. According to the Ukrainian news outlet Babel, the former commander is Eduard Shevchenko, who until 2017 led the 73rd SOF Marine Operations Center, and fought in Sloviansk and Debaltseve, but he was relieved of his command due to a PTSD diagnosis. Shevchenko did not agree with this decision and filed a lawsuit in administrative court. On September 7, 2017, the court recognized the actions of the military leadership as illegal and ordered Shevchenko to be re-examined by the commission. In 2018, the Odesa Administrative Court of Appeals overturned the decision of the Ochakiv District Court of Mykolaiv Oblast, allowing Shevchenko to continue his military service in the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Large-scale Russian air attack targets Ukrainian civilian infrastructure

In the early hours of March 9, Russia conducted coordinated large-scale airstrikes against Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. The attack involved twenty-eight Kh-101 and Kh-555 air-surface missiles, twenty Kalibr missiles, thirteen S-300 anti-air missiles and eight Shahed UAVs. The Ukrainian Air Force posted a statement on Facebook indicating dozens of aircraft conducted the attack, including Tupolev Tu-95 and Tu-22M3, MiG-31K, and Su-35 fighters. Russia also launched at least a dozen hypersonic Kinzhal missiles, which Ukraine is unable to counter with its current air defense systems.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russia launched eighty-one missiles in total, with only thirty-four of them successfully intercepted.

Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu stated the attack was in retaliation to the Russian Volunteer Corps’ infiltration of western Russia’s Bryansk Oblast last week, which official Russian media is calling a “terror attack.” Ukraine denied involvement in the incident.

As a consequence of the attack, the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada reported disturbances to the energy grids in the Zhytomyr, Kharkiv, and Odessa Oblasts. The nuclear power plant of Zaporizhzhia was disconnected from the Ukrainian power grid for eleven hours, according to Ukrenergo, which operates Ukraine’s electricity transmission system. Power was later restored to the plant.

A residential area was struck as a result of the attack in the Zolochiv region of Lviv Oblast, killing six people. Pro-Russian sources countered Ukrainian reports on the incident by shifting the blame to Ukrainian S-300 anti-air missiles, which they allege missed while targeting a Russian missile.

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Transnistria accuses Ukraine of staging a terrorist attack

On March 9, the so-called Ministry of State Security (MGB) of Moldova’s breakaway Transnistria region claimed that they had stopped a “terrorist attack” against local high-level officials purportedly planned “under the guidance of the Security Service of Ukraine.” The investigating committee of the unrecognized republic claimed that the people behind the attack had planned to target a busy street in the city center of Tiraspol. The committee released a report that said attackers “packed a car with Transnistrian license plates with explosives and other deadly materials.”

A video purportedly showing the vehicle was uploaded to the Telegram channel of Transnistrian state television. The post claimed that “eight kilograms of RDX, screws, nuts, and wire were placed in the automobile doors (to hit as many people as possible).” The same Telegram channel claimed, without evidence, that the explosives were moved from Ukraine through Moldova.

Vitali Ignatiev, the foreign minister of the breakaway region, claimed in an interview with Russia24 that the materials used in the purported incident were manufactured in Ukraine. “We are talking about materials and technical means, which indicate that they were manufactured in or were associated with Ukraine,” he stated. Ignatiev also noted that the self-proclaimed republic could appeal to the United Nations Security Council “to draw attention to this egregious situation.”

Ukrainian authorities denied the allegations. According to a statement released by the Security Service of Ukraine, they view this “exclusively as a provocation coordinated by the Kremlin.” The SBU denounced Russia for trying to “destabilize the situation in the territory that is actually occupied and under its control.”

Ukrainian Presidential Adviser Mihail Podolyak said the accusation was the “the third phase of Russia’s plan” for the region. The first part was releasing information that Ukraine would invade Transnistria, and the second part was an attempt to plan a coup in Chisinau. “Ukraine has no reason, no intention to carry out certain actions that can be qualified as a terrorist act,” he said. “We don’t need that, we have things to do on the battlefield. No act of terrorism on foreign soil will give us any advantage.”

The Reintegration Bureau of Moldova commented on Facebook, “Information regarding a possible terrorist attack in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova is currently being investigated by the appropriate national authorities. The authorities will follow up with more information.”

In response to Transnistria’s claims, Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean said, “As of now, we have no evidence,” adding, “There is no threat of escalation. The Moldovan government is preoccupied with maintaining peace and addressing the ongoing provocations.”

Last month, Russia accused Ukraine of planning an invasion of Transnistria. Both Kyiv and Chisinau rejected the accusation. In another attempt to inflame anti-Ukraine rhetoric, Moscow expressed concern about the possibility of delivering radioactive substances to Ukraine through the port of Odesa, fearing a provocation in Transnistria.

—Victoria Olari, Research Assistant, Moldova

The post Russian War Report: Russian army advances toward Bakhmut, but its offensive capabilities remain unclear appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Will morale prove the decisive factor in the Russian invasion of Ukraine?

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 09 Mar 2023 22:13:28 +0000

Graphic footage emerged this week on social media depicting what appeared to be the final moments of a captive Ukrainian soldier being summarily executed by Russian forces. The brief video of this apparent war crime shows an unarmed Ukrainian POW, who was later identified as Chernihiv native Oleksandr Matsievsky, calmly repeating the patriotic slogan “Glory to Ukraine” before being gunned down by his captors in a hail of bullets.

These memorable last words resonated deeply with the Ukrainian public, who responded with a mixture of outrage over the criminal nature of the killing and admiration for the stunning courage of the victim. Within hours of the video’s appearance, Matsievsky was being commemorated across Ukrainian social media with hundreds of portraits and memes paying tribute to his defiant stand. Murals have already appeared on the streets of Ukrainian cities. There is even talk of a monument.

Matsievsky is the latest symbol of Ukraine’s unbreakable resolve in a war which has already produced plenty. From the famous “Russian warship, go f**k yourself” of the Snake Island garrison, to the seemingly superhuman tenacity of the Azovstal defenders, Ukraine has witnessed a large number of iconic moments over the past year capturing the spirit of resistance that has gripped the country since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

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This is not at all what Russia was expecting. When Putin gave the order to invade Ukraine, he had been led to believe the Ukrainian public would welcome his troops and had been assured that organized military resistance would collapse within a matter of days. Billions of dollars had been spent preparing the ground by bribing Ukrainian officials to change sides and back the invasion. The stage was supposedly set for a triumph that would extinguish Ukrainian statehood and confirm Putin’s place among Russia’s greatest rulers.

It is now clear that Putin’s complete misjudgment of Ukrainian morale was one of the most remarkable intelligence failures of the modern era. He appears to have fallen into the trap of many long-serving dictators and surrounded himself with loyalist yes-men intent on telling him what he wanted to hear.

This toxic trend was exacerbated by the enforced isolation of the Covid pandemic, which appears to have further fueled Putin’s Ukraine obsession and strengthened his conviction that the country must be subjugated at all costs. In the increasingly claustrophobic climate of the Putin Kremlin, it is hardly surprising that his intel chiefs chose to reinforce these prejudices and encourage his reckless imperial ambitions. If they had attempted to counsel caution, they would likely have been dismissed.

This sycophancy was to have disastrous consequences. Far from greeting Putin’s invading army with cakes and flowers, the Ukrainian nation rose up and united in defiance against Russian aggression. Tens of thousands flocked to enlist in the Ukrainian military and territorial defense units, while millions more mobilized to support the war effort through fundraising, donations, and the improvised production of essential items such as anti-tank obstacles and Molotov cocktails.

Within weeks of the invasion, a vast network of Ukrainian volunteers was supplying frontline soldiers with everything from food and medicines to drones and jeeps. Despite the horrors of the past year, this steely determination to defy Russia remains firmly intact throughout Ukrainian society. Whatever else today’s Ukraine may lack, morale is certainly not an issue. Quite the opposite, in fact.

The same cannot be said for the Russian army. In response to the catastrophic losses suffered during the first six months of the invasion, Putin announced Russia’s first mobilization since World War II in September 2022. The bulk of the estimated 300,000 men mobilized last year are now in Ukraine, where they are being thrown straight into battle despite being untrained and under-equipped.

Since late January, a steady stream of videos have begun appearing on social media featuring groups of mobilized Russian troops appealing to Putin or their own regional representatives. They typically complain of suicidal tactics and heavy casualties while protesting their role as frontline shock troops and calling for redeployment to rear areas. In some cases, mobilized men have announced that they will directly refuse to follow orders.

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Growing signs of demoralization within the ranks of the Russian military could become a major issue for the Kremlin at a time when Putin faces no other obvious domestic challenges to his war policy.

At present, there is little sign of significant anti-war sentiment on the home front inside Russia. On the contrary, independent surveys indicate consistently high levels of public support for the invasion, while those who do object have largely chosen to keep quiet or flee the country. While many question the validity of polling data in a dictatorship, the complete absence of any meaningful efforts to protest the war points to a passive acceptance of the invasion at the very least.

The prospects of a Kremlin coup look to be similarly slim. While many within the Russian elite are said to have been appalled by the decision to invade Ukraine, they have since reconciled themselves to the new reality and are for the most part far too personally dependent on Putin to mount any serious challenge to the Kremlin.

This leaves the military as the one potential source of serious opposition to the war. If Russian commanders persist with their human wave tactics and mobilized troops continue to die in large numbers, the current tide of discontent may evolve into outright mutiny, with highly unpredictable consequences for Putin and his regime.

The importance of morale in warfare has long been recognized. Napoleon Bonaparte famously observed that three-quarters of military success is down to morale. This helps explain why the Ukrainian army has over-performed so spectacularly during the first year of the invasion, while Russia itself has struggled to live up to its prewar billing as the world’s second most powerful military.

Crucially, Ukrainians know exactly what they are fighting for. They are defending their homes and families against an enemy intent on committing genocide and wiping their country off the map. Understandably, they need no further motivation. In contrast, Russians have been told they are fighting against everything from NATO expansion and gay parades to Anglo-Saxon Satanists and Ukrainian Nazis.

While Ukrainian soldiers are focused on the clearly defined objective of liberating their country, Russia’s war aims appear to be far more ambiguous and are often subject to sudden revision. Once the cannon fodder approach of the Russian generals is factored in, it is no surprise that morale is becoming such an issue for Putin’s army.

Could collapsing morale decisively undermine the Russian invasion? We should have a better idea regarding the scale of the problem in the coming few months, as both Russia and Ukraine pursue major spring offensives that will test the resilience of their respective armies. At this stage, Putin is preparing for a long war and still hopes to outlast the West. He has a stable home base and sufficient resources to potentially continue the invasion for at least two more years. However, the situation could change dramatically if his demoralized army refuses to fight.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Calls to appease Putin in Ukraine ignore the lessons of history

Arman Mahmoudian — Thu, 09 Mar 2023 21:07:04 +0000

As the full-scale invasion of Ukraine entered its second year last month, Western leaders were keen to demonstrate their continued determination to prevent a Russian victory. At the same time, with no end in sight to what is already by far the largest European conflict since World War II, calls are mounting for a compromise that would end the fighting. Such proposals typically assume a land-for-peace formula that would see Ukraine surrendering part of its sovereign territory and millions of its citizens to permanent Russian occupation.

While the desire for peace is perfectly understandable, calls to appease Putin by handing him a partial victory in Ukraine ignore the lessons of history and would almost certainly lead to more war. If the experience of the 1930s taught the world anything, it is that appeasement merely encourages dictators to go further. Like Hitler before him, Putin will not stop until he is stopped.

Long before last year’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, observers were already noting the obvious parallels between Russia’s trajectory under Vladimir Putin and the rise of Nazi Germany. Both regimes were deeply revisionist, with Hitler’s quest to avenge German defeat in World War I mirrored by Putin’s bitter resentment over Russia’s perceived humiliation following the Soviet collapse.

In foreign policy, the similarities were even more striking. Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 occupation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula drew widespread comparisons with Hitler’s early foreign policy successes, such as the Anschluss with Austria and the annexation of the Sudetenland. In an alarming echo of 1930s diplomacy, these early examples of Russian aggression met with a similarly underwhelming international response. Just as Hitler was encouraged by the appeasement policies of the West to swallow the rest of Czechoslovakia and invade Poland, the weak Western response to Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine set the stage for last year’s full-scale invasion.

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Like Hitler before him, Putin has framed his attack on Ukraine as a campaign to defend ethnic compatriots who have found themselves beyond the borders of the motherland. Given the extent of the Russian diaspora throughout the former USSR and beyond, this creates considerable scope for further expansionist wars.

Putin’s self-assumed position as guardian of Russians abroad, along with the Kremlin’s conveniently flexible interpretation of who qualifies as “Russian,” potentially endangers a long list of countries with significant Russian minorities including Kazakhstan, Moldova, Belarus, Latvia, and Estonia. All have prior experience of the Russian and Soviet empires; all remain vulnerable to Kremlin influence and potential military intervention.

Since the mid-2000s, Russia has been promoting its imperial agenda via the so-called “Russian World” ideology, which envisions Russia as the guardian of a unique civilization extending beyond the borders of today’s Russian Federation and united by the Russian language, Slavic ethnicity, and the Orthodox faith. In 2007, the Kremlin established the Russkiy Mir Foundation (RMF) to serve as a platform for Russia’s influence operations. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev referred to the RMF as the “key instrument of Russian soft power.”

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If Putin is not stopped in Ukraine, the countries most immediately at risk are Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The latter two both have authoritarian regimes that currently enjoy Moscow’s support but are nevertheless nervous about Russia’s expansionist ambitions.

Kazakhstan is vulnerable due to its isolated geographical position between Russia and China as the world’s largest landlocked country. Russian nationalists have long identified border regions in northern Kazakhstan with large ethnic Russian populations as potential targets for a new imperial adventure. With the Kazakh leadership refusing to publicly back the invasion of Ukraine, Kremlin propagandists have recently begun discussing the possibility of future military intervention.

Belarus is already deeply involved in the attack on Ukraine and served as a launch pad for the invasion in February 2022. This role as junior partner in Putin’s war reflects Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s dependence on the Kremlin, which intervened to prop up his regime following a pro-democracy uprising in August 2020. Members of Belarus’s exiled opposition argue that the country is already effectively under Russian occupation. While some would question this conclusion, today’s Belarus is clearly in danger of being either officially or unofficially annexed by Russia.

Meanwhile, undeterred by Russia’s military setbacks in Ukraine, the Kremlin has recently begun escalating its rhetoric against Moldova. In early February, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that the West seeks to turn the country into an “anti-Russian project” and warned that Moldova could become “the next Ukraine.” Weeks later, Moldovan President Maia Sandu accused Russia of plotting to overthrow her pro-EU government.

At present, it is difficult to predict where Russia is most likely to strike next. The one thing that can be said with any degree of certainty is that if Moscow is not defeated in Ukraine, it will continue to pursue expansionist policies. In other words, the future peace and stability of Eurasia hinges on the outcome of the war in Ukraine.

All those currently calling for compromise with the Kremlin in Ukraine would be wise to recall that policies of appeasement toward Hitler were widely popular at the time among populations desperate to avoid another world war. We now know how disastrously misguided those policies were and have no excuses for repeating the mistake. Defeating Putin in Ukraine will not be easy, but it is the only way to secure a lasting peace and convince Moscow that the era of easy victories over vulnerable neighbors is over.

Arman Mahmoudian is a PhD candidate and international affairs researcher at the University of South Florida.

How Putin’s fear of democracy convinced him to invade Ukraine

Michael John Williams — Mon, 06 Mar 2023 20:22:59 +0000

Throughout the past year, the Kremlin has sought to blame the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on decades of post-Cold War NATO expansion. Many international commentators have accepted these Russian claims uncritically and have argued that the West must accept a high degree of responsibility for provoking what has become the largest European conflict since World War II.

In reality, Putin has always known that NATO poses no credible security threat to Russia itself. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO’s force posture and the US military presence in Europe have greatly declined, reducing any potential military threat to Russia. What really scares the Russian elite is the spread of democracy. Today’s war can be traced directly back to the pro-democracy revolutions that rocked the former Soviet neighborhood in the early 2000s, all of which were bottom-up political movements that called for more accountable government while demanding the rule of law.

The revolutions of the early twenty-first century were aftershocks of the democratization wave that began in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. As post-Soviet countries like Ukraine and Georgia struggled to establish more genuinely democratic forms of government in the early 2000s, Russia under Putin’s leadership was turning decisively away from democracy toward autocracy and illiberalism. This set the stage for an ideological struggle that would eventually lead to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine as Russia attempted to crush the growing democratic threat in its former imperial heartlands.

In the late 1980s, the Communist system in Eastern Europe began to crumble under the weight of its own internal contradictions and thanks to the role of civil society in Poland and other countries across the region. This democratization drive was people-centered and soon spread to the Soviet Union itself, which collapsed in 1991. A new wave of democratization emerged at the turn of the millennium with the Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia, the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan all taking place within the space of six years.

Each of these revolutions served as a potential model for neighboring populations that were also suffering from the same kind of chronic corruption and lack of political accountability. By studying and adopting the tactics of the activists who led these grassroots pro-democracy movements, they could push back against their own ineffective and autocratic political systems. This represented a serious threat to Putin’s increasingly authoritarian regime in Russia. The Kremlin responded by dubbing the uprisings “color revolutions” and attempting to discredit them as artificially orchestrated Western vehicles for regime change.

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The idea of revolutionary ideologies proving contagious is nothing new. Revolutions that succeed in changing the political order in one country have always had the potential to inspire calls for similar change among neighboring populations. In the nineteenth century, liberal revolutions were seen as a threat to the dominant conservative monarchical system of government across Europe. This led to the Concert of Europe, which saw the continent’s major powers cooperate to prevent the spread of the liberal revolutionary movement.

When Vladimir Putin looked west during the early years of his reign, it wasn’t NATO expansion that worried him. He was scared by the sight of ordinary people in Russia’s neighborhood attempting to topple their autocratic governments. As more countries in the region sought to liberalize, Putin instituted a set of laws to suppress Russian civil society and stifle any attempts to push for reforms on the domestic front.

The rising tide of democratization close to Russia’s borders in the 2000s was not only a threat to Russia’s internal stability; it also posed external challenges. This shift toward more democratic government across the region was helping to consolidate the rules-based system that had gradually begun to replace the old European balance of power in the decades following World War II.

This approach to international relations presented obvious challenges to Putin, who favored a world where great powers could dominate their weaker neighbors. The Russian dictator would have much preferred a return to the power dynamics of the nineteenth century Concert of Europe. Instead, he found himself confronted by a new “Concept of Europe,” meaning a system where all states are respected, regardless of strength or size. This directly undermined Putin’s vision of Russia’s privileged place in international relations as one of a handful of great powers with the right to a voice in global affairs.

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Over the past two decades, concerns over the growing threat posed by a new wave of democratization fueled Putin’s growing obsession with Ukraine, which he came to regard as the key battlefield in the ideological struggle for the future of Europe. Viewed from the Kremlin, Ukraine was a contested space where Russian illiberalism was in direct confrontation with liberal democracy. The Russian dictator appears to have convinced himself that Ukraine’s embrace of European democracy could eventually prove fatal for Russia itself.

Crucially, Putin stubbornly refused to recognize the agency of the Ukrainian people. Instead, he continued to insist that the country’s two post-Soviet revolutions and subsequent reform movements were driven by external pressure from the United States and the European Union. This was wishful thinking to spare the blushes of a rejected Russia. While the West was indeed supportive of Ukraine’s transformation, the desire for change always came primarily from the Ukrainian people.

As the full-scale invasion of Ukraine enters its second year, this Ukrainian hunger for a democratic future is more evident than ever, as is the country’s wholesale rejection of Russian authoritarianism. The weapons provided by Ukraine’s international partners have helped inflict devastating casualties on Putin’s invading army, but they would be useless without the soldiers to operate them. Luckily for Ukraine, the country can count on hundreds of thousands of highly motivated men and women who are prepared to defend their country’s European choice against Russia’s brutal assault.

Putin hoped his invasion would deal a decisive blow to Ukraine’s dreams of European integration and force the country permanently back into the Kremlin orbit. He expected to conquer Kyiv in a matter of days and planned to extinguish Ukrainian independence entirely. Instead, he has achieved the exact opposite. Today’s Ukraine is more united than ever around the idea of a liberal democratic future as part of the Western world. As the Russian military now knows to its cost, this is a vision Ukrainians are ready to fight for.

Michael Williams is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative.

Tracking narratives

Volunteer Russian unit fighting for Ukraine reportedly infiltrates Bryansk

Kremlin-linked Telegram networks coordinated to spread disinformation around the world

Media policy

Report examines Russia’s decentralized approach to internet censorship

DFRLab confirms increased Russian air force activity as Kremlin strives to achieve air dominance

The DFRLab confirmed that the Russian General Staff has intensified its air power in recent weeks across airfields in Crimea and Rostov Oblast. Satellite imagery collected by the DFRLab throughout February indicates that Russian air forces have increased their aerial activity at the Saki military airbase in western Crimea. Several MiG and Sukhoi class fighter aircraft have been identified in standby positions or on the runway.

DFRLab satellite analysis shows increased Russian aerial activity on the Saki military airbase in western Crimea. (Source: DFRLab via Planet.com)

The DFRLab’s findings are consistent with those published by open-source researcher Brady Africk, who identified seven different instances of aircraft located in the south of Ukraine on Sentinel-2 satellite imagery. The European Space Agency’s satellite imagery also serves as open-source evidence of the aircraft’s direction, located in the different color bands of Sentinel-2.

Screenshot of a tweet from Brady Africk, who identified seven different instances of aircraft located in the south of Ukraine on Sentinel-2 satellite imagery. (Source: Twitter/archive)

In addition, explosions reported at the Yeysk military air base in Krasnodar Krai further suggest the Russian army has been increasingly intensifying its air maneuvers. Geolocated footage of a Sukhoi-25 fighter aircraft near Luhansk indicated that further maneuvers can be expected from Russia’s western air base of Millerovo. The DFRLab also assessed that air activity possibly occurred during the last week of February at a seemingly deserted airfield south of Luhansk. Satellite imagery shows that although the meteorological conditions in January and February were mostly snowy, the main runway and several pads dedicated to aircrafts and helicopters were consistently clear of snow. Satellite imagery has not yet detected aircraft at the site, however, so it is unclear what class of aircraft is currently deployed in this airfield. Nevertheless, the operation of MiG and Sukhoi class fighters could be responsible for the melting snow on the pads.

Google Earth imagery from 2021 showed the airbase in dire condition, which could support the claim of its low military activity.

Satellite imagery of the Southern Luhansk air base. Source: DFRLab via Planet.com

As battles intensify to seize Bakhmut, the southern air base near Luhansk could serve as a strategic advantage for the Russian armed forces as it requires less fuel and maneuvers.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces continue to target strategic Russian installations on the southern front. On March 1, the Russian defense ministry claimed it had downed more than ten Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in an attack against occupied Crimea. This comes as unverified reports suggested a Ukrainian UJ-22 drone was also downed on February 28 between Moscow and Ryazan. Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak denied the accusation and said Ukraine is not launching attacks on Russian soil; he claimed the increased aerial strikes on infrastructure were the result of “internal attacks.” Open-source evidence suggests explosions near Yalta and Bakhchysarai, Crimea, could have resulted from other projectiles, not exclusively drone strikes.

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Russian army continues to pressure Ukraine in Bakhmut

Russian forces continue their efforts to encircle and capture the eastern Ukrainian city of Bakhmut. Interviewed by Reuters on February 28, the commander of Ukraine’s ground forces described the situation as “extremely tense.” Russian troops, including Wagner units, are attempting to cut Ukraine’s supply lines to the city in a bid to force troops to surrender or withdraw.

On February 28, pro-Russia sources shared a video showing Russian Su-25 fighter jets deployed over Bakhmut. The lack of adequate air support has been among the primary sources of friction between the Russian General Staff and the units fighting in Bakhmut. Footage from Ukraine’s 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade shows fighting escalating, but Ukrainian forces appeared to be holding off the advance at the time of writing. On February 27 and 28, Ukrainian soldiers repelled more than sixty attacks, including on the villages of Yahidne and Berkhivka, north of Bakhmut. According to a pro-Russia blogger’s Telegram channel, Wagner units are advancing north of Bakhmut, but Ukraine’s army has not retreated. Amid heavy fighting, Wagner reportedly advanced on February 27 towards the AZOM metallurgical plant in north Bakhmut.

Rybar, a Russian Telegram channel believed to be linked to the defense ministry, claimed on March 2 that Wagner’s troops had reached the western suburbs of Bakhmut and clashed with Ukrainian forces in the hills north of the area. According to Rybar, Russian troops approached the road between Chasiv Yar and Bakhmut. On March 2, The Insider reported that Bakhmut was under operative siege as Ukraine’s army repelled attacks in Orikhovo, Vasylivka, Dubovo, Khromove, and Ivanivske.

Meanwhile, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg told a Helsinki summit on February 28 that the end of the war in Ukraine “would not lead to normalization” of relations with Russia.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Volunteer Russian unit fighting for Ukraine reportedly infiltrates Bryansk

Russian government figures, Kremlin media, and pro-Russia Telegram channels are heavily focused on an alleged March 2 incursion by pro-Ukraine forces in the Russian village of Sushany, Bryansk oblast, approximately one kilometer away from Ukraine’s north-central border with Russia. DW News and Radio Free Europe reported that members of the Russian RDK volunteer corps crossed into Russia and were active in the Bryansk area at the time of publishing.

Google satellite imagery shows the village of Sushany. (Source: DFRLab via Google Maps)

According to DW News, RDK is “a unit of volunteers from Russia who have been fighting on the side of Ukraine since August 2022.” Initially, Ukrainian authorities dismissed the claims of an insurgency in the Russian village as a Russian false-flag operation. However, a video published on the official RDK Telegram channel showed fighters holding the unit flag and indicating a Russian government building behind them. In the video, and later in follow-up interviews, members of the unit adamantly denied claims spread by Russia that they had attacked the civilian population. They stated that the infiltration into Russian territory was done to sabotage Russian military targets. Additional reporting confirmed that RDK leader Denis Nikitin appeared in the video.

A screengrab from the RDK Telegram video shows a sign for the Health Services building of Liubechane village, approximately 17 km north of Sushany, on the Russian border. (Source: Telegram)

Russian Telegram channels and media did not distinguish that the volunteer troops are of Russian origin; instead they reported that a group of “Ukrainian saboteurs” had infiltrated sovereign Russian territory. The governor of Bryansk announced on March 2 that “saboteurs” had attacked the civilian population, killed a man, and taken hostages. President Vladimir Putin described the incident as a “terrorist attack” and condemned the alleged unprovoked shelling of a civilian vehicle. The Kremlin said it was closely monitoring the situation and continued to label the alleged insurgents as “Ukrainian militants.” It also tasked the Federal Security Service with conducting counterterrorism operations in response to the situation in Bryansk.

Russia also suggested that the Center of the Psychological Operations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (Центринформационно-психологических операций ВСУ) may have been responsible for the “attacks on civilians and infrastructure” in Bryansk, again making no distinction between the RDK and the official Ukrainian military. Echoing the Kremlin’s “terrorism” claim, far-right nationalist State Duma member Aleksey Zhuravlyov labeled the Ukrainian military and political leadership as “terrorists” in official public statements and called for an escalation of the “special military operation” into open war.

As the conflict along the eastern flank intensifies, escalatory narratives involving northern regions of Ukraine could serve as a critical Kremlin tool for conducting operations into the northern border, where Russian forces could tap into already stationed and mobilized Belarusian troops, military bases, and equipment, along with their own units left behind following joint military training exercises between Russia and Belarus.

—Kateryna Halstead, Research Assistant, Bologna, Italy

Kremlin-linked Telegram networks coordinated to spread disinformation around the world

The DFRLab recently discovered fifty-six pro-Kremlin Telegram channels that targeted twenty countries with pro-Kremlin disinformation. Three networks of similarly named accounts — Surf Noise, Info Defense, and Node of Time — targeted users worldwide, including in Europe, Asia, South America, and the Middle East. The operation primarily relied on volunteer work. It focused on translating and spreading pro-Russia disinformation, as well as amplifying reports from Kremlin media outlets, state organizations, and state actors.

The DFRLab found clear coordination between the three networks, but the approach to capturing a global audience was unsophisticated. The DFRLab consulted its global team of researchers to examine the accuracy of translations and found that the quality of translations was poor.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Research Fellow, Riga, Latvia

—Sayyara Mammadova, Research Assistant, Warsaw, Poland

Report examines Russia’s decentralized approach to internet censorship

Russian digital rights organization Roskomsvaboda collaborated with the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) to publish a report examining “a year of military censorship in Russia.” The report reviews censored topics, websites, and services, as well as the legislative mechanisms used to enforce the censorship.

According to the report, Russia blocked 494 domains over the course of 2022. These fell into twenty-eight categories, with news media representing the largest category, followed by social networks, human rights organizations, and circumvention tools.

The report found that “more than 247,492 URLs were added to Roskomnadzor’s registry of banned websites” in the past year. However, the orders to ban content did not only come from Russia’s internet regulator. Other Russian agencies that requested websites be blocked include the federal tax service, Russian courts, and the prosecutor general’s office, among others. The report’s authors found over 3,500 instances of an entity anonymously requesting a website block.

While blocking requests are centralized through Roskomnadzor’s registry, the implementation of internet censorship in Russia is decentralized, the report concluded. The authors found forty-eight of the 494 blocked domains were absent in Roskomnadzor’s registry. The report suggested that some internet providers in Russia can block content not listed in Roskomnadzor’s registry.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: DFRLab confirms increased Russian air force activity as Kremlin strives to achieve air dominance appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s invasion one year on: Ukraine is stronger than ever

Vitaly Sych — Tue, 28 Feb 2023 13:32:38 +0000

When my family and I left Kyiv on the first morning of Russia’s full-scale invasion last February, we had no idea if we would ever be able to return home or whether Ukraine itself would survive. In the following days, as the biggest European conflict since World War II continued to unfold, this sense of dread only deepened.

One year on, I can now look back with slightly less emotion and a sense of cautious optimism that is rooted in the remarkable resilience of the Ukrainian nation. Ukraine has not only survived, but has actually achieved a number of landmark battlefield victories over Putin’s invading army and has proven to international audiences that Russia can be beaten.

On the personal front, I have been back in Kyiv since May 2022, although my wife and two children remain among the millions of Ukrainians currently living in exile. Thankfully, they are able to visit.

Life in wartime Ukraine can be extremely stressful but Ukrainians have proven themselves far tougher and more resourceful than almost anyone could have imagined. For those living in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities far from the front lines, the greatest threat has come from frequent Russian missile and drone attacks. This airstrike campaign began on October 10 and has since become a feature of daily life.

During those initial October air raids, I found myself in our makeshift neighborhood bomb shelter for the first time, huddled in an underground car park together with 100 other people and their assorted pets. More recently, if I am at home when an attack takes place, I can often see explosions from my apartment window and feel the impact of incoming missiles through the shaking walls of the building.

Russia’s air campaign brought the war closer for millions of Ukrainians, creating a sense of heightened physical danger along with frequent blackouts. The whole of Ukraine spent the winter season with severely limited access to light, electricity, heating, water, and internet. I often had to walk up 20 flights of stairs just to reach my apartment. For people with mobility issues or families with small children, that is simply not an option.

Despite these hardships, Russia’s air attacks have failed to break Ukraine’s spirit. While everyone inevitably talks about the many inconveniences these attacks bring, nobody really complains. Instead, there is an understanding that this is part of the price we must pay for finally saying goodbye to Russia, and a determination to get on with our lives. After the first major attacks, people were shocked and discussed the implications for days on end. But after a few weeks, cafes and restaurants would fill up again within hours of each new bombardment.

Over the past five months, Ukrainians have acquired vast quantities of generators to provide power for businesses, homes, and public services. Each time a blackout begins, an orchestra of generators starts to play. This rumbling of engines has served as the background soundtrack to the winter season in wartime Ukraine. Meanwhile, we have all learned to keep our gadgets fully charged and to have power banks at the ready, just in case. Life goes on.

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Winter is now coming to an end and Ukrainians have not been frozen into submission. Indeed, there have been very few blackouts in recent weeks as Ukraine’s heroic air defense forces and power sector professionals continue to perform miracles. Putin’s bombing campaign is the latest in a long line of unsuccessful Russian efforts to undermine Ukrainian morale.

Surprisingly, the Kremlin-controlled Russian media openly boasted of targeting civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. Prior to the onset of the air attacks in late 2022, Kremlin propagandists had consistently insisted that the Russian army only struck military targets. However, it seems that a series of embarrassing military defeats in Ukraine left the Putin regime in desperate need of victories. It says much about the state of Russia’s war effort that the only victory Moscow could hope to deliver was news that Ukrainian civilians were being plunged into freezing darkness in the depths of winter.

The defiant Ukrainian response to Moscow’s terror-bombing tactics reflects the mood in the country as the war enters its second year. It also underlines the counter-productive nature of Putin’s invasion. The Russian dictator wanted to wipe out Ukrainian identity entirely. Instead, he has achieved the exact opposite.

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Throughout the country, Ukrainian national identity is visibly strengthening. Many people are switching from Russian to the Ukrainian language in their everyday lives. Monuments to Soviet figures are being removed from public spaces, and streets honoring Russian writers are being renamed. After decades of domestic geopolitical divisions, Ukrainian support for EU and NATO membership has rocketed to over 80% and is backed by strong majorities in every part of the country.

Whereas Ukrainian public anger following the initial Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 was largely directed against the Russian political leadership in the Kremlin, we are now witnessing demands for the wholesale de-russification of Ukraine. Most Ukrainians have been sickened by the atrocities of the Russian army and horrified by the obvious popularity of the war among the Russian public. They no longer wish to have anything in common with a nation that destroys entire cities and commits countless war crimes.

Ukrainians also understand perfectly well that when Russians talk about “Ukrainian Nazis” and call for the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine, they actually mean the de-Ukrainianization of Ukraine and the permanent return of the country to Russian control. The atrocities committed by Russian forces in occupied areas of Ukraine have brought home the horrors that would await the rest of the country if Ukrainian resistance were to crumble.

This has helped fuel a national outpouring of volunteerism as everyone has sought to contribute to victory. Ordinary Ukrainians have donated billions of dollars to help fund the country’s defense. People give whatever they can, with some contributing large sums and others handing over their last pennies. One day recently, three young boys approached my car selling home-made bracelets to raise funds for the army. Similar scenes can be encountered in towns and cities across Ukraine every day.

I recently attended a press conference in Kyiv to mark US President Joe Biden’s surprise visit to the Ukrainian capital. Biden made a point of expressing his admiration for Ukraine’s astounding resilience. The reason is simple: we know that our country is currently engaged in an existential fight for survival. If we stop fighting, we will simply disappear. If the Russians stop fighting, the war will end.

As things currently stand, the invasion is far from over. The military situation is complex and unpredictable. Ukraine enjoys strong morale following a series of battlefield successes and is also benefiting from a steady flow of modern weapons from the country’s Western partners. Meanwhile, Russia has strength in numbers thanks to the country’s first mobilization since World War II, while Putin appears to be preparing domestic audiences and the Russian economy for a long war. Ukrainians remain confident of ultimate victory, but there is also widespread recognition that the journey will be long and difficult.

Despite this uncertainty, there are reasons to look ahead with a sense of confidence. One year ago, Kyiv was supposed to fall within a matter of days. Instead, the Ukrainian capital has become a global symbol of courage and freedom. Over the past year, Ukraine has earned the respect of the watching world. Indeed, no country has ever undergone such a complete image transformation in such a short space of time. Once known primarily for corruption and poverty, Ukraine is now a byword for bravery.

For the first time in my life, I firmly believe Ukraine has a realistic change of joining the European Union. When this finally happens, it will confirm a civilizational shift that has been underway for the past few decades as Ukraine has struggled to shake off the shackles of empire and shed the country’s post-Soviet legacy. Despite the horrors of Russia’s ongoing invasion, I am convinced Ukraine is now moving toward better times. Most of all, I am absolutely sure this bright future is thoroughly deserved.

Vitaly Sych is Chief Editor of NV media house which includes a weekly magazine, national talk radio station, and news site NV.ua.

Examining and mitigating the risks related to the involvement of private technology companies in the war in Ukraine is crucial and looking forward, the United States government must also examine the same questions with regard to its own security and defense:

What is the complete incentive structure behind a company’s decision to provide products or services to a state at war?
How dependent are states on the privately held portions of the information environment, including infrastructure, tools, knowledge, data, skills, and more, for their own national security and defense?
How can the public and private sectors work together better as partners to understand and prepare these areas of reliance during peace and across the continuum of conflict in a sustained, rather than ad hoc, nature?

Russia’s war against Ukraine is not over and similar aggressions are likely to occur in new contexts and with new actors in the future. By learning these lessons now and strengthening the government’s ability to work cooperatively with the private sector in and through the information space, the United States will be more effective and resilient against future threats.

Introduction

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 held none of the illusory cover of its 2014 operation; instead of “little green men” unclaimed by Moscow, Putin built up his forces on Ukraine’s border for the entire international community to see. His ambitions were clear: To remove and replace the elected government of Ukraine with a figurehead who would pull the country back under Russia’s hold, whether through literal absorption of the state or by subsuming the entire Ukrainian population under Russia’s political and information control. In the year since the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s defense has held back the Russian war machine with far greater strength than many thought possible in the early months of 2022. President Zelenskyy, the Ukrainian government, and the Ukrainian people have repeatedly repelled Russian attempts to topple the state, buttressed in part by the outpouring of assistance from not just allied states, but also local and transnational private sector companies.

Amidst the largest conventional land war in Europe since the fall of the Third Reich, both Russia and Ukraine have directed considerable effort toward the conflict’s information environment, defined as the physical and digital infrastructure over and through which information moves, the tools used to interact with that information, and information itself. This is not only a domain through which combatants engage, but a parallel territory that the Kremlin seeks to contest and claim. Russian efforts in this realm, to destroy or replace Ukraine’s underpinning infrastructure and inhibit the accessibility and reach of infrastructure and tools within the environment, are countered by a Ukrainian defense that prioritizes openness and accessibility.

The information environment, and all the components therein, is not a state or military dominated environment; it is largely owned, operated, and populated by private organizations and individuals around the globe. The Ukrainian information environment, referring to Ukrainian infrastructure operators, service providers, and users, is linked to and part of a global environment of state and non-state actors where the infrastructure and the terrain is largely private. Russian operations within the Ukrainian information environment are conducted against, and through, this privately owned infrastructure, and the Ukrainian defense is likewise bound up in cooperative efforts with those infrastructure owners and other technology companies that are providing aid and assistance. These efforts have contributed materially, and in some cases uniquely, to Ukraine’s defense.

The centrality of this environment to the conduct of this war, raises important questions about the degree to which states and societies are dependent on information infrastructure and functionalities owned and operated by private actors, and especially transnational private actors. Although private sector involvement in the war in Ukraine has generally been positive, the fact that the conduct of war and other responsibilities in the realm of statehood are reliant on private actors leads to new challenges for these companies, for the Ukrainian government, and for the United States and allies.

The United States government must improve its understanding of, and facility for, joint public-private action to contest over and through the information environment. The recommendations in this report are intended to facilitate the ability of US technology companies to send necessary aid to Ukraine, ensure that the US government has a complete picture of US private-sector involvement in the war in Ukraine, and contribute more effectively to the resilience of the Ukrainian information environment. First, the US government should issue a directive providing assurance and clarification as to the legality of private sector cyber, information, capacity building, and technical aid to Ukraine. Second, a task force pulling from agencies and offices across government should coordinate to track past, current, and future aid from the private sector in these areas to create a better map of US collaboration with Ukraine across the public and private sectors. Third, the US government should increase its facilitation of private technology aid by providing logistical and financial support.

These recommendations, focused on Ukraine’s defense, are borne of and provoke larger questions that will only become more important to tackle. The information environment and attempts to control it have long been a facet of conflict, but the centrality of privately owned and operated technology—and the primacy of some private sector security capabilities in relation to all but a handful of states—pose increasingly novel challenges to the United States and allied policymaking communities. Especially in future conflicts, the risks associated with private sector action in defense of, or directly against, a combatant could be significantly greater and multifaceted, rendering existing cooperative models insufficient.

The Russian information offensive

The Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs defines information space—of which cyberspace is a part—as “the sphere of activity connected with the formation, creation, conversion, transfer, use, and storage of information and which has an effect on individual and social consciousness, the information infrastructure, and information itself.¹ Isolating the Ukrainian information space is key to both the short- and long-term plans of the Russian government. In the short term, the Kremlin pursues efforts to control both the flow and content of communications across the occupied areas.² In the longer term, occupation of the information environment represents an integral step in Russian plans to occupy and claim control over the Ukrainian population.

In distinct opposition to the global nature of the information environment, over the past decade or so, the Kremlin has produced successive legislation “to impose ‘sovereignty’ over the infrastructure, content, and data traversing Russia’s ‘information space,’” creating a sectioned-off portion of the internet now known as RuNet.³ Within this space, the Russian government has greater control over what information Russian citizens see and a greater ability to monitor what Russian citizens do online.⁴ This exclusionary interpretation is an exercise in regime security against what the Kremlin perceives as constant Western information warfare against it.⁵ As Gavin Wilde, senior fellow with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes, the Russian government views the information environment “as an ecosystem to be decisively dominated.”⁶

To the Kremlin, domination of the information environment in Ukraine is an essential step toward pulling the nation into its fold and under its control. Just as Putin views information domination as critical to his regime’s exercise of power within Russia, in Ukraine, Russian forces systematically conduct offensives against the Ukrainian information environment in an attempt to create a similar model of influence and control that would further enable physical domination. This strategy is evident across the Kremlin’s efforts to weaken the Ukrainian state for the last decade at least. In the 2014 and 2022 invasions, occupied, annexed, and newly “independent” regions of Ukraine were variously cut off from the wider information space and pulled into the restricted Russian information space.

The Crimean precedent – 2014

The Russian invasion of Ukraine did not begin in 2022, but in 2014. Examining this earlier Russian incursion illustrates the pattern of Russian offensive behavior in and through the information environment going back nearly a decade—a combination of physical, cyber, financial, and informational maneuvers that largely target or move through private information infrastructure. In 2014, although obfuscated behind a carefully constructed veil of legitimacy, Russian forces specifically targeted Ukrainian information infrastructure to separate the Crimean population from the Ukrainian information environment, and thereby the global information environment, and filled that vacuum with Russian infrastructure and information.

The Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 was a direct response to the year-long Euromaidan Revolution, which took place across Ukraine in protest of then-President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to spurn closer relations with the European Union and ignore growing calls to counter Russian influence and corruption within the Ukrainian government. These protests were organized, mobilized, and sustained partially through coordination, information exchange, and message amplification over social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Ustream—as well as traditional media.⁷ In February 2014, after Yanukovych fled to Russia, the Ukrainian parliament established a new acting government and announced that elections for a new president would be held in May. Tensions immediately heightened, as Russian forces began operating in Crimea with the approval of Federal Assembly of Russia at the request of “President” Yanukovych, although Putin denied that they were anything other than “local self-defense forces.”⁸ On March 21, Putin signed the annexation of Crimea.⁹

During the February 2014 invasion of Crimea, the seizure and co-option of Ukrainian physical information infrastructure was a priority. Reportedly, among the first targets of Russian special forces was the Simferopol Internet Exchange Point (IXP), a network facility that enables internet traffic exchange.¹⁰ Ukraine’s state-owned telecommunications company Ukrtelecom reported that armed men seized its offices in Crimea and tampered with fiber-optic internet and telephone cables.¹¹ Following the raid, the company lost the “technical capacity to provide connection between the peninsula and the rest of Ukraine and probably across the peninsula, too.”¹² Around the same time, the head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), Valentyn Nalivaichenko, reported that the mobile phones of Ukrainian parliament members, including his own, were blocked from connecting through Ukrtelecom networks in Crimea.¹³

Over the next three years, and through the “progressive centralization of routing paths and monopolization of Internet Service market in Crimea … the topology of Crimean networks has evolved to a singular state where paths bound to the peninsula converge to two ISPs (Rosetelecom and Fiord),” owned and operated by Russia.¹⁴ Russian forces manipulated the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)—the system that helps connects user traffic flowing from ISPs to the wider internet—modifying routes to force Crimean internet traffic through Russian systems, “drawing a kind of ‘digital frontline’ consistent with the military one.”¹⁵ Residents of Crimea found their choices increasingly limited, until their internet service could only route through Russia, instead of Ukraine, subject to the same level of censorship and internet controls as in Russia. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) monitored communications from residents of Crimea, both within the peninsula and with people in Ukraine and beyond.¹⁶ Collaboration between ISPs operating in Crimea through Russian servers and the FSB appears to be a crucial piece of this wider monitoring effort. This claim was partially confirmed by a 2018 Russian decree that forbade internet providers from publicly sharing any information regarding their cooperation with “the authorized state bodies carrying out search and investigative activities to ensure the security of the Russian Federation.”¹⁷

From March to June 2014, Russian state-owned telecom company Rostelcom began and completed construction of the Kerch Strait cable, measuring 46 kilometers (about 28.5 miles) and costing somewhere between $11 and $25 million, to connect the Crimean internet with the Russian RuNet.¹⁸ Rostelcom, using a local agent in Crimea called Miranda Media, became the main transit network for several Crimean internet service providers (ISPs), including KCT, ACS-Group, CrimeaCom, and CRELCOM in a short period of time.¹⁹ There was a slower transition of customers from the Ukrainian company Datagroup to Russian ISPs, but nonetheless, the number of Datagroup customers in Crimea greatly decreased throughout 2014. According to one ISP interviewed by Romain Fontugne, Ksenia Ermoshina, and Emile Aben, “the Kerch Strait cable was used first of all for voice communication … The traffic capacity of this cable was rather weak for commercial communications.”²⁰ But by the end of 2017, remnant usage of Ukrainian ISPs had virtually disappeared, following the completion of a second, better internet cable through the Kerch Strait and a series of restrictions placed on Russian social media platforms, news outlets, and a major search engine by Ukrainian President Poroshenko.²¹The combination of the new restrictions, and the improved service of Russian ISPs encouraged more Crimeans to move away from Ukrainian ISPs.

Russia’s efforts to control the information environment within Crimea, and the Russian government’s ability to monitor communications and restrict access to non-Russian approved servers, severely curtailed freedom of expression and belief—earning the region zero out of four in this category from Freedom House.²² Through physical, and formerly private, information infrastructure, Russia was able to largely take control of the information environment within Crimea.

A parallel occupation – 2022

Digital information infrastructure

Just as in 2014, one of the first priorities of invading Russian forces in 2022 was the assault of key Ukrainian information infrastructure, including digital infrastructure. Before, during, and following the invasion, Russian and Russian-aligned forces targeted Ukrainian digital infrastructure through cyber operations, ranging in type, target, and sophistication. Through some combination of Ukrainian preparedness, partner intervention, and Russian planning shortfalls, among other factors, large-scale cyber operations disrupting Ukrainian critical infrastructure, such as those seen previously in 2015 with BlackEnergy and NotPetya, did not materialize.²³ This could be because such cyber operations require significant time and resources, and similar ends can be more cheaply achieved through direct, physical means. Russian cyber operators, however, have not been idle.

Preceding the physical invasion, there was a spate of activity attributed to both Russian and Russian-aligned organizations targeting a combination of state and private organizations.²⁴ From January 13 to 14, for example, hackers briefly took control of seventy Ukrainian government websites, including the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, adding threatening messages to the top of these official sites.²⁵ The following day, January 15, Microsoft’s Threat Intelligence Center reported the discovery of wiper malware, disguised as ransomware, in dozens of Ukrainian government systems, including agencies which “provide critical executive branch or emergency response function,” and an information technology firm that services those agencies.²⁶ A month later, on February 15, Russian hackers targeted several websites with distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, forcing Ukrainian defense ministry and armed forces websites, as well as those of PrivatBank and Oschadbank, offline.²⁷ Around the same time, according to Microsoft’s special report on Ukraine, “likely” Russian actors were discovered in the networks of unidentified critical infrastructure in Odessa and Sumy.²⁸ The day before the invasion, cybersecurity companies ESET and Symantec reported that a new destructive wiper was spreading across Ukrainian, Latvian, and Lithuanian networks, as a second round of DDoS attacks again took down a spate of government and financial institution websites.“²⁹ This activity centered around information—with defacements sending a clear threat to the Ukrainian government and population, DDoS attacks impairing accurate communication, and wiper malware degrading Ukrainian data—and gaining access to Ukrainian data for Russia. Although many of these operations targeted Ukrainian government networks, the attacks moved through or against privately operated infrastructure and, notably, the first public notification and detailing of several of these operations was undertaken by transnational technology companies.

After February 24, Russian cyber activity continued and the targets included a number of private information infrastructure operators. A March hack of Ukrtelecom—Ukraine’s largest landline operator, which also provides internet and mobile services to civilians and the Ukrainian government and military—resulted in a collapse of the company’s network to just 13 percent capacity, the most severe disruption in service the firm recorded since the invasion began.³⁰ Another such operation targeted Triolan—a Ukrainian telecommunications provider—on February 24 in tandem with the physical offensive and a second time on March 9. These incursions on the Triolan network took down key nodes and caused widespread service outages. Following the March 9 attack, the company was able to restore service, but these efforts were complicated by the need to physically access some of the equipment located in active conflict zones.³¹ These attacks against Ukraine-based information infrastructure companies caused service outages that were concurrent with the physical invasion and afterwards, restricted communications among Ukrainians and impeded the population’s ability to respond to current and truthful information.

This unacceptable cyberattack is yet another example of Russia’s continued pattern of irresponsible behaviour in cyberspace, which also formed an integral part of its illegal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine.¹

Council of the European Union

These types of operations, however, were not restricted to Ukraine-based information infrastructure. A significant opening salvo in Russia’s invasion was a cyber operation directed against ViaSat, a private American-based satellite internet company that provides services to users throughout the world, including the Ukrainian military.³² Instead of targeting the satellites in orbit, Russia targeted the modems in ViaSat’s KA-SAT satellite broadband network that connected users with the internet.³³ Specifically, Russia exploited a “misconfiguration in a VPN [virtual private network] appliance to gain remote access to the trusted management segment of the KA-SAT network.”³⁴ From there, the attackers were able to move laterally though the network to the segment used to manage and operate the broader system.³⁵ They then “overwrote key data in flash memory on the modems,” making it impossible for the modems to access the broader network.³⁶ Overall, the effects of the hack were short-lived, with ViaSat reporting the restoration of connectivity within a few days after shipping approximately 30,000 new modems to affected customers.³⁷

SentinelOne, a cybersecurity firm, identified the malware used to wipe the modems and routers of the information they needed to operate.³⁸ The firm assessed “with medium-confidence“ that AcidRain, the malware used in the attack, had ”developmental similarities” with an older malware, VPNFilter, that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the US Department of Justice have previously linked to the Russian government.³⁹ The United States, United Kingdom, and European Union all subsequently attributed the ViaSat hack to Russian-state backed actors.⁴⁰

The effectiveness of the operation is debated, although the logic of the attack is straightforward. Russia wanted to constrain, or preferably eliminate, an important channel of communication for the Ukrainian military during the initial stages of the invasion. Traditional, land-based radios, which the Ukrainian military relies on for most of their communications, only work over a limited geographic range, therefore making it more difficult to use advanced, long-range weapons systems.⁴¹ It should be expected that landline and conventional telephony would suffer outages during the opening phases of the war and struggle to keep up with rapidly moving forces.

Initially, it was widely reported that the Russian strike on ViaSat was effective. On March 15, a senior Ukrainian cybersecurity official, Viktor Zhora, was quoted saying that the attack on ViaSat caused “a really huge loss in communications in the very beginning of the war.⁴² When asked follow-up questions about his quote, Zhora said at the time that he was unable to elaborate, leading journalists and industry experts to believe that the attack had impacted the Ukrainian military’s ability to communicate.⁴³ However, several months later, on September 26, Zhora revised his initial comments, stating that the hack would have impacted military communications if satellite communications had been the Ukrainian military’s principal medium of communication. However, Zhora stated that the Ukrainian military instead relies on landlines for communication, with satellites as a back-up method. He went on to say that “in the case land lines were destroyed, that could be a serious issue in the first hours of war.”⁴⁴ The tension, and potential contradictions, in Zhora’s comments underlines the inherent complications in analyzing cyber operations during war: long-term consequences can be difficult to infer from short-term effects, and countries seek to actively control the narratives surrounding conflict.

The effectiveness of the ViaSat hack boils down to how the Ukrainian military communicates, and how adaptable it was in the early hours of the invasion. However, it is apparent how such a hack could impact military effectiveness. If Russia, or any other belligerent, was able to simultaneously disrupt satellite communications while also jamming or destroying landlines, forces on the frontlines would be at best poorly connected with their superiors. In such a scenario, an army would be cut off from commanders in other locations and would not be able to report back or receive new directives; they would be stranded until communications could be restored.

The ViaSat hack had a military objective: to disrupt Ukrainian military access to satellite communications. But the effects were not limited to this objective. The operation had spillover effects that rippled across Europe. In Germany, nearly 6,000 wind turbines were taken offline, with roughly 2,000 of those turbines remaining offline for nearly a month after the initial hack due to the loss of remote connectivity.⁴⁵ In France, modems used by emergency services vehicles, including firetrucks and ambulances, were also affected.⁴⁶

ViaSat is not a purely military target. It is a civilian firm that counts the Ukrainian military as a customer. The targeting of civilian infrastructure with dual civilian and military capability and use has occurred throughout history and has been the center of debate in international law, especially when there are cross-border spillover effects in non-combatant countries. Both the principle of proportionality and international humanitarian law require the aggressor to target only military objects, defined as objects “whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage” in a manner proportional to the military gain foreseen by the operation. ⁴⁷ What this means in practice, however, is that the aggressor determines whether they deem a target to be a military object and a beneficial target and, therefore, what is legitimate. Konstantin Vorontsov, the Head of the Russian Delegation to the United Nations, attempted to justify Russian actions in October 2022 by saying that the use of civilian space infrastructure to aid the Ukrainian war effort may be a violation of the Outer Space Treaty, thereby rendering this infrastructure a legitimate military target.⁴⁸ Similar operations like that against ViaSat are likely to be the new norm in modern warfare. As Mauro Vignati, the adviser on new digital technologies of warfare at the Red Cross, said in November 2022, insofar as private companies own and operate the information infrastructure of the domain, including infrastructure acting as military assets, “when war start[s], those companies, they are inside the battlefield.”⁴⁹

Physical information infrastructure

In February 2022, as Russian forces moved to seize airfields and key physical assets in Ukraine, they simultaneously assaulted the physical information infrastructure operating within and beneath the Ukrainian information environment. Russian forces targeted this infrastructure, largely privately operated, by taking control of assets where possible and destroying them where not, including through a series of Russian air strikes targeting Ukrainian servers, cables, and cell phone towers.⁵⁰ As of June 2022, about 15 percent of Ukrainian information infrastructure had been damaged or destroyed; by July, 12.2 percent of homes had lost access to mobile communication services, 11 percent of base stations for mobile operators were out of service, and approximately 20 percent of the country’s telecommunications infrastructure was damaged or destroyed.⁵¹ By August “the number of users connecting to the Internet in Ukraine [had] shrunk by at least 16 percent nationwide.”⁵²

In some areas of Ukraine, digital blackouts were enforced by Russian troops to cut the local population off from the highly contested information space. In Mariupol, the last cell tower connecting the city with the outside world was tirelessly tended by two Kyivstar engineers, who kept it alive with backup generators that they manually refilled with gasoline. Once the Russians entered the city, however, the Ukrainian soldiers who had been protecting the cell tower location left to engage with the enemy, leaving the Kyivstar engineers alone to tend to their charge. For three days the engineers withstood the bombing of the city until March 21, when Russian troops disconnected the tower and it went silent.⁵³

Russian forces coerced Ukrainian occupied territories onto Russian ISPs, once again through Rostelcom’s local agent Miranda Media, and onto Russian mobile service providers.⁵⁴ Information infrastructure in Ukraine is made up of overlapping networks of mobile service and ISPs, a legacy of the country’s complicated post-Soviet modernization process. This complexity may have been a boon for its resilience. Russian forces, observed digital-rights researcher Samuel Woodhams, “couldn’t go into one office and take down a whole region … There were hundreds of these offices and the actual hardware was quite geographically separated.⁵⁵ Across eastern Ukraine, including Kherson, Mlitopol, and Mariupol, the Russians aimed to subjugate the physical territory, constituent populations, and Ukrainian information space. In Kherson, Russian forces entered the offices of a Ukrainian ISP and at gunpoint, forced staff to transfer control to them.⁵⁶

Russian bombardment of telecommunications antennas in Kiev (Attribution: Mvs.gov.ua)

Routing the internet and communications access of occupied territories through Russia meant that Moscow could suppress communications to and from these occupied areas, especially through social media and Ukrainian news sites, sever access to essential services in Ukraine, and flood the populations with its own propaganda, as was proved in Crimea in 2014. Moving forward, Russia could use this dependency to “disconnect, throttle, or restrict access to the internet” in occupied territories, cutting off the occupied population from the Ukrainian government and the wider Ukrainian and international community.⁵⁷

The Kremlin’s primary purpose in the invasion of Ukraine was and is to remove the Ukrainian government and, likely, install a pro-Russian puppet government to bring to an end an independent Ukraine.⁵⁸ Therefore, isolating the information environment of occupied populations, in concert with anti-Ukrainian government disinformation, such as the multiple false allegations that President Zelenskyy had fled the country and abandoned the Ukrainian people,⁵⁹ were a means to sway the allegiances, or at least dilute the active resistance, of the Ukrainian people.⁶⁰ Without connectivity to alternative outlets, the occupying Russians could promote false and largely uncontested claims about the progress of the war. In early May 2022 for example, when Kherson lost connectivity for three days, the deputy of the Kherson Regional Council, Serhiy Khlan, reported that the Russians “began to spread propaganda that they were in fact winning and had captured almost all of Mykolaiv.”⁶¹

Russia used its assault on the information environment to undermine the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and its ability to fulfill its governmental duties to the Ukrainian people. Whether through complete connectivity blackouts or through the restrictions imposed by Russian networks, the Russians blocked any communications from the Ukrainian government to occupied populations—not least President Zelenskyy’s June 13, 2022 address, intended most for those very populations, in which he promised to liberate all occupied Ukrainian land and reassured those populations that they had not been forgotten. Zelenskyy acknowledged the Russian barrier between himself and Ukrainians in occupied territories, saying, “They are trying to make people not just know nothing about Ukraine… They are trying to make them stop even thinking about returning to normal life, forcing them to reconcile.”⁶²

Isolating occupied populations from the Ukrainian information space is intended, in large part, said Stas Prybytko, the head of mobile broadband development within the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation, to “block them from communicating with their families in other cities and keep them from receiving truthful information.”⁶³ Throughout 2022, so much of what the international community knew about the war came—through Twitter, TikTok, Telegram, and more—from Ukrainians themselves. From videos of the indiscriminate Russian shelling of civilian neighborhoods to recordings tracking Russian troop movements, Ukrainians used their personal devices to capture and communicate the progress of the war directly to living rooms, board rooms, and government offices around the world.⁶⁴The power of this distributed information collection and open-source intelligence relies upon mobile and internet access. The accounts that were shared after Ukrainian towns and cities were liberated from Russian occupation lay bare just how much suffering, arrest, torture, and murder was kept hidden from international view by the purposeful isolation of the information environment and the constant surveillance of Ukrainians’ personal devices.⁶⁵ The war in Ukraine has highlighted the growing impact of distributed open source intelligence during the conduct of war that is carried out by civilians in Ukraine and by the wider open source research community though various social media and messaging platforms.⁶⁶

Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian news outlets justified a war of aggression against Ukraine

Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin employs information operations to erode global confidence in Ukraine

Russian operations against, especially transnational, digital infrastructure companies can mostly be categorized as disruption, degradation, and information gathering, which saw Russian or Russian-aligned hackers moving in and through the Ukrainian information environment. The attacks against Ukrainian physical infrastructure, however, are of a slightly different character. Invading forces employed physically mediated cyberattacks, a method defined by Herb Lin as “attacks that compromise cyber functionality through the use of or the threat of physical force” to pursue the complete destruction or seizure and occupation of this infrastructure.⁶⁷ Both ends begin with the same purpose: to create a vacuum of information between the Ukrainian government, the Ukrainian people, and the global population, effectively ending the connection between the Ukrainian information environment and the global environment. But the seizure of this infrastructure takes things a step beyond: to occupy the Ukrainian information environment and pull its infrastructure and its people into an isolated, controlled Russian information space.

Reclaiming the Ukrainian information environment

Preparation of the environment

The Russian assault on the Ukrainian information environment is far from unanswered. Russian efforts have been countered by the Ukrainian government in concert with allied states and with technology companies located both within and outside Ukraine. Russia’s aim to pull occupied Ukrainian territory onto Russian networks to be controlled and monitored has been well understood, and Ukraine has been hardening its information infrastructure since the initial 2014 invasion. Ukraine released its Cyber Security Strategy in 2016, which laid out the government’s priorities in this space, including the defense against the range of active cyber threats they face, with an emphasis on the “cyber protection of information infrastructure.”⁶⁸ The government initially focused on centralizing its networks in Kyiv to make it more difficult “for Russian hackers to penetrate computers that store critical data and provide services such as pension benefits, or to use formerly government-run networks in the occupied territories to launch cyberattacks on Kyiv.”⁶⁹

As part of its digitalization and security efforts, the Ukrainian government also sought out new partners, both public and private, to build and bolster its threat detection and response capabilities. Before and since the 2022 invasion, the Ukrainian government has worked with partner governments and an array of technology companies around the world to create resilience through increased connectivity and digitalization.

Bolstering Ukrainian connectivity

Since the 2014 invasion and annexation of Crimea, Ukraine-serving telecommunications operators have developed plans to prepare for future Russian aggression. Lifecell, the third largest Ukrainian mobile telephone operator, prepared its network for an anticipated Russian attack. The company shifted their office archives, documentation, and critical network equipment from eastern to western Ukraine, where it would be better insulated from violence, added additional network redundancy, and increased the coordination and response capabilities of their staff.⁷⁰ Similarly, Kyivstar and Vodafone Ukraine increased their network bandwidth to withstand extreme demand. In October 2021, these three companies initiated an infrastructure sharing agreement to expand LTE (Long Term Evolution) networks into rural Ukraine and, in cooperation with the Ukrainian government, expanded the 4G telecommunications network to bring “mobile network coverage to an estimated 91.6 per cent of the population.”⁷¹

The expansion and improvement of Ukrainian telecommunications continued through international partnerships as well. Datagroup, for example, announced a $20 million partnership in 2021 with Cisco, a US-based digital communications company, to modernize and expand the bandwidth of its extensive networks.⁷² Since the February 2022 invasion, Cisco has also worked with the French government to provide over $5 million of secure, wireless networking equipment and software, including firewalls, for free to the Ukrainian government.⁷³

This network expansion is an integral part of the Ukrainian government’s digitalization plans for the country, championed by President Zelenskyy. Rather than the invasion putting an end to these efforts, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov claimed that during the war “digitalization became the foundation of all our life. The economy continues to work … due to digitalization.⁷⁴ The digital provision of government services has created an alternate pathway for Ukrainians to engage in the economy and with their government. The flagship government initiative Diia, launched in February 2020, is a digital portal through which the 21.7 million Ukrainian users can access legal identification, make social services payments, register a business, and even register property damage from Russian missile strikes.⁷⁵ The Russian advance and consequent physical destruction that displaced Ukrainians means that the ability to provide government services through alternate and resilient means is more essential than ever, placing an additional premium on defending Ukrainian information infrastructure.

Backing up a government

As Russian forces built up along Ukraine’s borders, Ukrainian network centralization may have increased risk, despite the country’s improved defense capabilities. In preparation for the cyber and physical attacks against the country’s information infrastructure, Fedorov moved to amend Ukrainian data protection laws to allow the government to store and process data in the cloud and worked closely with several technology companies, including Microsoft, Amazon Web Services, and Google, to effect the transfer of critical government data to infrastructure hosted outside the country.⁷⁶ Cloud computing describes “a collection of technologies and organizational processes which enable ubiquitous, on-demand access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources.”⁷⁷ Cloud computing is dominated by the four hyperscalers—Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and Alibaba—that provide computing and storage at enterprise scale and are responsible for the operation and security of data centers all around the world, any of which could host customer data according to local laws and regulations.⁷⁸

According to its April 2022 Ukraine war report, Microsoft “committed at no charge a total of $107 million of technology services to support this effort” and renewed the relationship in November, promising to ensure that “government agencies, critical infrastructure and other sectors in Ukraine can continue to run their digital infrastructure and serve citizens through the Microsoft Cloud” at a value of about $100 million.⁷⁹ Amazon and Google have also committed to supporting cloud services for the Ukrainian government, for select companies, and for humanitarian organizations focused on aiding Ukraine.⁸⁰ In accordance with the Ukrainian government’s concerns, Russian missile attacks targeted the Ukrainian government’s main data center in Kyiv soon after the invasion, partially destroying the facility, and cyberattacks aggressively tested Ukrainian networks.⁸¹

Unlike other lines of aid provided by the international community to strengthen the defense of the Ukrainian information environment, cloud services are provided only by the private sector.⁸² While this aid has had a transformative effect on Ukrainian defense, that transformative quality has also raised concerns. Microsoft, in its special report on Ukraine, several times cites its cloud services as one of the determining factors that limited the effect of Russian cyber and kinetic attacks on Ukrainian government data centers, and details how their services, in particular, were instrumental in this defense.⁸³ In this same report, Microsoft claims to be most worried about those states and organizations that do not use cloud services, and provides corroborating data.⁸⁴ Microsoft and other technology companies offering their services at a reduced rate, or for free, are acting—at least in part—out of a belief in the rightness of the Ukrainian cause. However, they are still private companies with responsibilities to shareholders or board members, and they still must seek profit. Services provided, especially establishing information infrastructure like Cloud services, are likely to establish long-term business relationships with the Ukrainian government and potentially with other governments and clients, who see the effectiveness of those services illustrated through the defense of Ukraine.

Mounting an elastic defense

Working for wireless

Alongside and parallel to the Ukrainian efforts to defend and reclaim occupied physical territory is the fight for Ukrainian connectivity. Ukrainian telecommunications companies have been integral to preserving connectivity to the extent possible. In March 2022, Ukrainian telecom operators Kyivstar, Vodafone Ukraine, and Lifecell made the decision to provide free national mobile roaming services across mobile provider networks, creating redundancy and resilience in the mobile network to combat frequent service outages.⁸⁵ The free mobile service provided by these companies is valued at more than UAH 980 million (USD 26.8 million).⁸⁶ In addition, Kyivstar in July 2022 committed to the allocation of UAH 300 million (about USD 8.2 mil) for the modernization of Ukraine’s information infrastructure in cooperation with the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital transformation.⁸⁷ The statements that accompanied the commitments from Kyivstar and Lifecell—both headquartered in Ukraine—emphasized each company’s dedication to Ukrainian defense and their role in it, regardless of the short-term financial impact.⁸⁸ These are Ukrainian companies with Ukrainian infrastructure and Ukrainian customers, and their fate is tied inextricably to the outcome of this war.

As Russian forces advanced and attempted to seize control of information infrastructure, in at least one instance, Ukrainian internet and mobile service employees sabotaged their own equipment first. Facing threats of imprisonment and death from occupying Russians, employees in several Ukrtelecom facilities withstood pressure to share technical network details and instead deleted key files from the systems. According to Ukrtelecom Chief Executive Officer Yuriy Kurmaz, “The Russians tried to connect their control boards and some equipment to our networks, but they were not able to reconfigure it because we completely destroyed the software.”⁸⁹ Without functional infrastructure, Russian forces struggled to pull those areas onto Russian networks.

The destruction of telecommunications infrastructure has meant that these areas and many others along the war front are, in some areas, without reliable information infrastructure, either wireless or wired. While the Ukrainian government and a bevy of local and international private sector companies battle for control of on-the-ground internet and communications infrastructure, they also pursued new pathways to connectivity.

Searching for satellite

Two days after the invasion, Deputy Prime Minister Fedorov tweeted at Elon Musk, the Chief Executive Officer of SpaceX, that “while you try to colonize Mars — Russia try [sic] to occupy Ukraine! While your rockets successfully land from space — Russian rockets attack Ukrainian civil people! We ask you to provide Ukraine with Starlink stations and to address sane Russians to stand.”⁹⁰ Just another two days later, Fedorov confirmed the arrival of the first shipment of Starlink stations.⁹¹

Starlink, a network of low-orbit satellites working in constellations operated by SpaceX, relies on satellite receivers no larger than a backpack that are easily installed and transported. Because Russian targeting of cellular towers made communications coverage unreliable, says Fedorov, the government “made a decision to use satellite communication for such emergencies” from American companies like SpaceX.⁹² Starlink has proven more resilient than any other alternative throughout the war. Due to the low orbit of Starlink satellites, they can broadcast to their receivers at relatively higher power than satellites in higher orbits. There has been little reporting on successful Russian efforts to jam Starlink transmissions, and the Starlink base stations—the physical, earthbound infrastructure that communicates directly with the satellites—are located on NATO territory, ensuring any direct attack on them would be a significant escalation in the war.⁹³

Starlink has been employed across sectors almost since the war began. President Zelenskyy has used the devices himself when delivering addresses to the Ukrainian people, as well as to foreign governments and populations.⁹⁴ Fedorov has said that sustained missile strikes against energy and communication infrastructure have been effectively countered through the deployment of Starlink devices that can restore connection where it is most needed. He even called the system “an essential part of critical infrastructure.”⁹⁵

Starlink has also found direct military applications. The portability of these devices means that Ukrainian troops can often, though not always, stay connected to command elements and peer units while deployed.⁹⁶ Ukrainian soldiers have also used internet connections to coordinate attacks on Russian targets with artillery-battery commanders.⁹⁷ The Aerorozvidka, a specialist air reconnaissance unit within the Ukrainian military that conducts hundreds of information gathering missions every day, has used Starlink devices in areas of Ukraine without functional communications infrastructure to “monitor and coordinate unmanned aerial vehicles, enabling soldiers to fire anti-tank weapons with targeted precision.”⁹⁸ Reports have also suggested that a Starlink device was integrated into an unmanned surface vehicle discovered near Sevastopol, potentially used by the Ukrainian military for reconnaissance or even to carry and deliver munitions.⁹⁹ According to one Ukrainian soldier, “Starlink is our oxygen,” and were it to disappear, “our army would collapse into chaos.”¹⁰⁰

The initial package of Starlink devices included 3,667 terminals donated by SpaceX and 1,333 terminals purchased by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).¹⁰¹ SpaceX initially offered free Starlink service for all the devices, although the offer has already been walked back by Musk, and then reversed again. CNN obtained proof of a letter sent by Musk to the Pentagon in September 2022 stating that SpaceX would be unable to continue funding Starlink service in Ukraine. The letter requested that the Pentagon pay what would amount to “more than $120 million for the rest of the year and could cost close to $400 million for the next 12 months.” It also clarified that the vast majority of the 20,000 Starlink devices sent to Ukraine were financed at least in part by outside funders like the United States, United Kingdom, and Polish governments.¹⁰²

After the letter was sent, but before it became public, Musk got into a Twitter spat with Ukrainian diplomat Adrij Melnyk after the former wrote a tweet on October 3 proposing terms of peace between Russia and Ukraine. Musk’s proposal included Ukraine renouncing its claims to Crimea and pledging to remain neutral, with the only apparent concession from Russia a promise to ensure water supply in Crimea. The plan was rejected by the public poll Musk included in the tweet, and Melnyk replied and tagged Musk, saying “Fuck off is my very diplomatic reply to you @elonmusk.”¹⁰³ After CNN released the SpaceX letter to the Pentagon, Musk seemingly doubled down on his decision to reduce SpaceX funding at first. He responded on October 14 to a tweet summarizing the incident, justifying possible reduced SpaceX assistance stating, “We’re just following his [Melnyk’s] recommendation,” even though the letter was sent before the Twitter exchange. Musk then tweeted the following day, “The hell with it … even though Starlink is still losing money & other companies are getting billions of taxpayer $, we’ll just keep funding Ukraine govt for free.”¹⁰⁴ Two days later, in response to a Politico tweet reporting that the Pentagon was considering covering the Starlink service costs, Musk stated that “SpaceX has already withdrawn its request for funding.”¹⁰⁵ Musk’s characterization of SpaceX’s contribution to the war effort has sparked confusion and reprimand, with his public remarks often implying that his company is entirely footing the bill when in fact, tens of millions of dollars’ worth of terminals and service are being covered by several governments every month.

The Starlink saga, however, was not over yet. Several weeks later in late October, 1,300 Starlink terminals in Ukraine, purchased in March 2020 by a British company for use in Ukrainian combat-related operations, were disconnected, allegedly due to lack of funding, causing a communications outage for the Ukrainian military.¹⁰⁶ Although operation was restored, the entire narrative eroded confidence in SpaceX as a guarantor of flexible connectivity in Ukraine. In November 2022, Federov noted that while Ukraine has no intention of breaking off its relationship with Starlink, the government is exploring working with other satellite communications operators.¹⁰⁷ Starlink is not the only satellite communications network of its kind, but its competitors have not yet reached the same level of operation. Satellite communications company OneWeb, based in London with ties to the British military, is just now launching its satellite constellation, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine required the company to change its launch partner from Roscosmos to SpaceX.¹⁰⁸ The US Space Development Agency, within the United States Space Force, will launch the first low earth orbit satellites of the new National Defense Space Architecture in March 2023. Other more traditional satellite companies cannot provide the same flexibility as Starlink’s small, transportable receivers.

UA Support Forces use Starlink (Attribution: Mil.gov.ua)

With the market effectively cornered for the moment, SpaceX can dictate the terms, including the physical bounds, of Starlink’s operations, thereby wielding immense influence on the battlefield. Starlink devices used by advancing Ukrainian forces near the front, for example, have reported inconsistent reliability.¹⁰⁹ Indeed CNN reported on February 9^th that this bounding was a deliberate attempt to separate the devices from direct military use, as SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell explained “our intent was never to have them use it for offensive purposes.”¹¹⁰ The bounding decision, similar to the rationale behind the company’s decision to refuse to activate Starlink service in Crimea, was likely made to contain escalation, especially escalation by means of SpaceX devices.¹¹¹

But SpaceX is not the only satellite company making decisions to bound the area of operation of their products to avoid playing—or being perceived to play—a role in potential escalation. On March 16, 2022, Minister Fedorov tweeted at DJI, a Chinese drone producer, “@DJIGlobal are you sure you want to be a partner in these murders? Block your products that are helping russia to kill the Ukrainians!”¹¹² DJI responded directly to the tweet the same day, saying “If the Ukrainian government formally requests that DJI set up geofencing throughout Ukraine, we will arrange it,” but pointed out that such geofencing would inhibit all users of their product in Ukraine, not just Russians.¹¹³

While Russia continues to bombard the Ukrainian electrical grid, Starlink terminals have grown more expensive for new Ukrainian consumers, increasing from $385 earlier this year to $700, although it is unclear if this price increase also affected government purchasers.¹¹⁴ According to Andrew Cavalier, a technology industry analyst with ABI Research, the indispensability of the devices gives “Musk and Starlink a major head start [against its competitors] that its use in the Russia–Ukraine war will only consolidate.”¹¹⁵ Indeed, the valuation of SpaceX was $127 million in May 2022, and the company raised $2 billion in the first seven months of 2022.¹¹⁶ For SpaceX, the war in Ukraine has been an impressive showcase of Starlink’s capabilities and has proven the worth of its services to future customers. The company recently launched a new initiative, Starshield, intended to leverage “SpaceX’s Starlink technology and launch capability to support national security efforts. While Starlink is designed for consumer and commercial use, Starshield is designed for government use.”¹¹⁷ It is clear that SpaceX intends to capitalize on the very public success of its Starlink network in Ukraine.

Reclaiming Territory

The Russian assault is not over, but Ukraine has reclaimed “54 percent of the land Russia has captured since the beginning of the war” and the front line has remained relatively stable since November 2022.¹¹⁸ Videos and reports from reclaimed territory show the exultation of the liberated population. As Ukrainian military forces reclaim formerly occupied areas, the parallel reclamation of the information environment, by or with Ukrainian and transnational information infrastructure operators, follows quickly.

In newly liberated areas, Starlink terminals are often the first tool for establishing connectivity. In Kherson, the first regional capital that fell to the Russian invasion and reclaimed by Ukrainian troops on November 11, 2022, residents lined up in public spaces to connect to the internet through Starlink.¹¹⁹ The Ministry of Digital Transformation provided Starlink devices to the largest service providers, Vodaphone and Kyivstar, to facilitate communication while their engineers repaired the necessary infrastructure for reestablishing mobile and internet service.¹²⁰ A week after Kherson was recaptured, five Kyivstar base stations were made operational and Vodaphone had reestablished coverage over most of the city.¹²¹

Due to the importance of reclaiming the information space, operators are working just behind Ukrainian soldiers to reconnect populations in reclaimed territories to the Ukrainian and global information environment as quickly as possible, which means working in very dangerous conditions. In the Sumy region, a Ukrtelecom vehicle pulling up to a television tower drove over a land mine, injuring three of the passengers and killing the driver.¹²² Stanislav Prybytko, the head of the mobile broadband department in the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation, says “It’s still very dangerous to do this work, but we can’t wait to do this, because there are a lot of citizens in liberated villages who urgently need to connect.”¹²³ Prybytko and his eleven-person team have been central to the Ukrainian effort to stitch Ukrainian connectivity back together. The team works across a public-private collaborative, coordinating with various government officials and mobile service providers to repair critical nodes in the network and to reestablish communications and connectivity.¹²⁴ According to Ukrainian government figures, 80 percent of liberated settlements have partially restored internet connection, and more than 1,400 base stations have been rebuilt by Ukrainian mobile operators since April 2022.¹²⁵

Key Takeaways

The information environment is a key domain through which this war is being contested. The Russian government has demonstrated for over a decade the importance it places on control of the information environment, both domestically and as part of campaigns to expand the Russian sphere of influence abroad. Yet, despite this Russian focus, the Ukrainian government has demonstrated incredible resilience against physical assaults, cyberattacks, and disinformation campaigns against and within the Ukrainian information environment and has committed to further interlacing government services and digital platforms.

The centrality of this environment to the conduct of this war means that private actors are necessarily enmeshed in the conflict. As providers of products and services used for Ukrainian defense, these companies are an important part of the buttressing structure of that defense. The centrality of private companies in the conduct of the war in Ukraine brings to light new and increasingly important questions about what it means for companies to act as information infrastructure during wartime, including:

What is the complete incentive structure behind a company’s decision to provide products or services to a state at war?
How dependent are states on the privately held portions of the information environment, including infrastructure, tools, knowledge, data, skills, and more, for their own national security and defense?
How can the public and private sectors work together better as partners to understand and prepare these areas of reliance during peace and across the continuum of conflict in a sustained, rather than ad hoc, nature?

Incentives

The war in Ukraine spurred an exceptional degree of cooperation and aid from private companies within Ukraine and from around the globe. Much of public messaging around the private sector’s assistance of Ukrainian defense centers around the conviction of company leadership and staff that they were compelled by a responsibility to act. This is certainly one factor in their decision. But the depth of private actor involvement in this conflict demands a more nuanced understanding of the full picture of incentives and disincentives that drive a company’s decision to enter into new, or expand upon existing, business relationships with and in a country at war. What risks, for example, do companies undertake in a war in which Russia has already demonstrated its conviction that private companies are viable military targets? The ViaSat hack was a reminder of the uncertainty that surrounds the designation of dual-use technology, and the impact that such designations have in practice. What role did public recognition play in companies’ decisions to provide products and services, and how might this recognition influence future earnings potential? For example, while their remarks differed in tone, both Elon Musk on Twitter and Microsoft in its special report on Ukraine publicly claimed partial credit for the defense of Ukraine.

As the war continues into its second year, these questions are important to maintaining Ukraine’s cooperation with these entities. With a better understanding of existing and potential incentives, the companies, the United States, and its allies can make the decision to responsibly aid Ukraine much easier.

Dependencies

Private companies play an important role in armed conflict, operating much of the infrastructure that supports the information environment through which both state and non-state actors compete for control. The war in Ukraine has illustrated the willingness of private actors, from Ukrainian telecommunications companies to transnational cloud and satellite companies, to participate as partners in the defense of Ukraine. State dependence on privately held physical infrastructure is not unique to the information environment, but state dependence on infrastructure that is headquartered and operated extraterritorially is a particular feature.

Prior to and throughout the war, the Ukrainian government has coordinated successfully with local telecommunication companies to expand, preserve, and restore mobile, radio, and internet connectivity to its population. This connectivity preserved what Russia was attempting to dismantle—a free and open Ukrainian information environment through which the Ukrainian government and population can communicate and coordinate. The Ukrainian government has relied on these companies to provide service and connectivity, working alongside them before and during the war to improve infrastructure and to communicate priorities. These companies are truly engaging as partners in Ukrainian defense, especially because this information infrastructure is not just a medium through which Russia launches attacks but an environment that Russia is attempting to seize control of. This dependence has not been unidirectional—the companies themselves are inextricably linked to this conflict through their infrastructure, employees, and customers in Ukraine. Each is dependent to some degree on the other and during times of crisis, their incentives create a dynamic of mutual need.

The Ukrainian government has also relied on a variety of transnational companies though the provision of technology products or services and information infrastructure. As examined in this report, two areas where the involvement of these companies has been especially impactful are cloud services and satellite internet services. Cloud services have preserved data integrity and security by moving information to data centers distributed around the world, outside of Ukrainian territory and under the cyber-protection of those cloud service companies. Satellite services have enabled flexible and resilient connectivity, once again located and run primarily outside of Ukraine. These companies can provide essential services within the information environment and the physical environment of Ukraine, but are not fundamentally reliant on the integrity of the country. This dynamic is heightened by the fact that cloud service providers like Microsoft, Amazon Web Services, Google, and satellite internet service providers like Space X’s Starlink are operating within a market with global reach and very few competitors. While these companies and others have made the laudable decision to contribute to Ukrainian defense, the fact is that had they not, there are only a few, if any, other companies with comparable capabilities and infrastructure at scale. Additionally, there’s very little Ukraine or even the US government could have done to directly provide the same capabilities and infrastructure.

Coordination

Built into the discussions around dependency and incentives is the need for government and the private companies who own and operate information infrastructure to coordinate with each other from a more extensive foundation. While coordination with Ukrainian companies and some transnational companies emerged from sustained effort, many instances of private sector involvement were forged on an ad hoc basis and therefore could not be planned on in advance. The ad hoc approach can produce rapid results, as seen by Minister Fedorov’s tweet at Elon Musk and receipt of Starlink devices just days later. While this approach has been wielded by the Ukrainian government, and the Ministry for Digital Transformation in particular, to great effect, this very same example illustrates the complexity of transforming ad hoc aid into sustainable partnerships. Sustainability is especially important when states are facing threats outside of open war, across the continuum of insecurity and conflict where many of these capabilities and infrastructures will continue to be relied upon. Security and defense in the information environment requires states to work in coordination with a diverse range of local and transnational private actors.

Recommendations

Key recommendations from this paper ask the US government, in coordination with the Ukrainian government, to better understand the incentives that surround private sector involvement, to delineate states’ dependency on private information infrastructure, and to improve long-term public-private coordination through three pathways:

Define support parameters. Clarify how private technology companies can and should provide aid
Track support. Create a living database to track the patterns of technological aid to Ukraine from US private companies
Facilitate support requests. Add to the resilience of the Ukrainian information environment by facilitating US private aid.

Define support parameters

Private information infrastructure companies will continue to play a key role in this war. However, there are a number of unresolved questions regarding the decisions these companies are making about if, and how, to provide support to the Ukrainian government to sustain its defense. A significant barrier may be the lack of clarity about the risks of partnership in wartime, which may disincentivize action or may alter existing partnerships. Recent SpaceX statements surrounding the bounding of Starlink use is an example, at least in part, of just such a risk calculous in action. The US government and its allies should release a public directive clarifying how companies can ensure that their involvement is in line with US and international law—especially for dual-use technologies. Reaffirming, with consistent guidelines, how the United States defines civilian participation in times of war will be crucial for ensuring that such actions do not unintentionally legitimize private entities as belligerents and legitimate targets in wartime. At the direction of the National Security Advisor, the US Attorney General and Secretary of State, working through the Office of the Legal Advisor at the State Department, should issue public guidance on how US companies can provide essential aid to Ukraine while avoiding the designation of legitimate military target or combatant under the best available interpretation of prevailing law.

Track support

While a large amount of support for Ukraine has been given directly by or coordinated through governments, many private companies have started providing technological support directly to the Ukrainian government. Some private companies, especially those with offices or customers in Ukraine, got in touch directly with, or were contacted by, various Ukrainian government offices, often with specific requests depending on the company’s products and services.¹²⁶

However, the US government does not have a full and complete picture of this assistance, which limits the ability of US policymakers to track the implications of changing types of support or the nature of the conflict. Policymakers should have access to not only what kind of support is being provided by private US companies, but also the projected period of involvement, what types of support are being requested and denied by companies (in which case, where the US government may be able to act as an alternative provider), and what types of support are being supplied by private sector actors without a significant government equity or involvement. A more fulsome mapping of this assistance and its dependency structure would make it possible for policymakers and others to assess its impact and effectiveness. This data, were it or some version of it publicly available, would also help private companies providing the support to better understand how their contributions fit within the wider context of US assistance and to communicate the effect their products or services are having to stakeholders and shareholders. Such information may play a role in a company’s decision to partner or abstain in the future.

The US government should create a collaborative task force to track US-based private sector support to Ukraine. Because of the wide equities across the US government in this area, this team should be led by the State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy and include representatives from USAID, the Department of Defense’s Cyber Policy Office, the National Security Agency’s Collaboration Center, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security’s Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative. This task force should initially focus on creating a picture of public-private support to Ukraine from entities within the United States, but its remit could extend to work with allies and partners, creating a fulsome picture of international public-private support.

Facilitate support requests

Tracking the technical support that is requested, promised, and delivered to the Ukrainian government is an important first step toward gaining a better understanding of the evolving shape of the critical role that the private sector is increasingly playing in conflict. But closer tracking, perhaps by an associated body, could go further by acting as a process facilitator. Government offices and agencies have long been facilitators of private aid, but now states are increasingly able to interact with, and request support from, private companies directly, especially for smaller quantities or more specific products and services. While this pathway can be more direct and efficient, it also requires a near constant churn of request, provision, and renewal actions from private companies and Ukrainian government officials.

Private organizations have stepped into this breach, including the Cyber Defense Assistance Collaboration (CDAC), founded by Greg Rattray and Matthew Murray, now a part of the US-based non-profit CRDF Global. CDAC works with a number of US private technology companies, as well as the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine and the Ukrainian think tank Global Cyber Cooperative Center, to match the specific needs of Ukrainian government and state-owned enterprises with needed products and services offered by companies working in coordination.¹²⁷

The growth and reach of this effort demonstrate the potential impact that a government-housed, or even a government-sponsored mechanism, could have in increasing the capacity to facilitate requests from the Ukrainian government, decreasing the number of bureaucratic steps required by Ukrainian government officials while increasing the amount and quality of support they receive. In addition, government facilitation would ease progress toward the previously stated recommendations by building in clarity around what kind of support can be provided and putting facilitation and aid tracking within a single process. As discussed above, this facilitation should start with a focus on US public-private support, but can grow to work alongside similar allied efforts. This could include, for example, coordination with the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) program, which “enables Ukrainian agencies to access the services of commercial cybersecurity companies.”¹²⁸ Crucially, this task force, helmed by the State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy, would act as a facilitator, not as a restricting body. Its mission in this task would be to make connections and provide information.

In line with tracking, US government facilitation would enable government entities to communicate where assistance can be most useful, such as shoring up key vulnerabilities or ensuring that essential defense activities are not dependent on a single private sector entity, and ideally, avoiding dependency on a single source of private sector assistance. A company’s financial situation or philanthropic priorities are always subject to change, and the US government should be aware of such risks and create resilience through redundancy.

Central to this resilience will be the provision of support to bolster key nodes in the Ukrainian telecommunications infrastructure network against not just cyber attacks but also against physical assault, including things like firewalls, mine clearing equipment, and power generators. Aiding the Ukrainian government in the search for another reliable partner for satellite communication devices that offer similar flexibility as Starlink is also necessary, and a representative from the Pentagon has confirmed that such a process is underway, following Musk’s various and contradictory statements regarding the future of SpaceX’s aid to Ukraine back in October.¹²⁹ Regardless, the entire SpaceX experience illustrates the need to address single dependencies in advance whenever possible.

A roadblock to ensuring assistance redundancy is the financial ability of companies to provide products and services to the Ukrainian government without charge or to the degree necessary. While the US government does provide funding for private technological assistance (as in the Starlink example), creating a pool of funding that is tied to the aforementioned task force and overseen by the State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy, would enable increased flexibility for companies to cover areas of single dependence, even in instances that would require piecemeal rather than one-to-one redundancy. As previously discussed, many companies are providing support out of a belief that it is the right thing to do, both for their customers and as members of a global society. However, depending on whether that support is paid or provided for free, or publicly or privately given, a mechanism that provides government clarity on private sector support, tracks the landscape of US private support to Ukraine, and facilitates support requests would make it easier for companies to make the decision to start or continue to provide support when weighed against the costs and potential risks of offering assistance.

Looking forward and inward

The questions that have emerged from Ukraine’s experience of defense in and through the information environment are not limited to this context. Private companies have a role in armed conflict and that role seems likely to grow, along with the scale, complexity, and criticality of the information infrastructures they own and operate. Companies will, in some capacity, be participants in the battlespace. This is being demonstrated in real time, exposing gaps that the United States and its allies and partners must address in advance of future conflicts.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has created an environment in which both public and private assistance in support of Ukrainian information infrastructure is motivated by a common aversion toward Russian aggression, as well as a commitment to the stability and protection of the Ukrainian government and people. This war is not over and despite any hopes to the contrary, similar aggressions will occur in new contexts, and with new actors in the future. It is crucial that in conjunction with examining and mitigating the risks related to the involvement of private technology companies in the war in Ukraine, the US government also examines these questions regarding its own national security and defense.

The information environment is increasingly central to not just warfighting but also to the practice of governance and the daily life of populations around the world. Governments and populations live in part within that environment and therefore atop infrastructure that is owned and operated by the private sector. As adversaries seek to reshape the information environment to their own advantage, US and allied public and private sectors must confront the challenges of their existing interdependence. This includes defining in what form national security and defense plans in and through the information environment are dependent upon private companies, developing a better understanding of the differing incentive structures that guide private sector decision-making, and working in coordination with private companies to create a more resilient information infrastructure network through redundancy and diversification. It is difficult to know what forms future conflict and future adversaries will take, or the incentives that may exist for companies in those new contexts, but by better understanding the key role that private information and technology companies already play in this domain, the United States and allies can better prepare for future threats.

About the Authors

Emma Schroeder is an associate director with the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, within the Digital Forensic Research Lab, and leads the team’s work studying conflict in and through cyberspace. Her focus in this role is on developing statecraft and strategy for cyberspace that is useful for both policymakers and practitioners. Schroeder holds an MA in History of War from King’s College London’s War Studies Department and also attained her BA in International Relations & History from the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

Sean Dack was a Young Global Professional with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative during the fall of 2022. He is now a Researcher at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, where he focuses on the long-term strategic and economic implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Dack graduated from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in December 2022 with his MA in Strategic Studies and International Economics.

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Justin Sherman, Gregory Rattray, and Gavin Wilde for their comments on earlier drafts of this document, and Trey Herr and the Cyber Statecraft team for their support. The authors also thank all the participants, who shall remain anonymous, in multiple Chatham House Rule discussions and one-on-one conversations about the issue.

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1 ”The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Convention on International Information Security (2011), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/RUSSIAN-DRAFT-CONVENTION-ON-INTERNATIONAL-INFORMATION-SECURITY.pdf.

2 To learn more about Russian disinformation efforts against Ukraine and its allies, check out the Russian Narratives Reports from the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab: Nika Aleksejeva et al., Andy Carvin ed., “Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian News Outlets Justified a War of Aggression against Ukraine,” Atlantic Council, February 22, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/narrative-warfare/; Roman Osadchuk et al., Andy Carvin ed., “Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin Employs Information Operations to Erode Global Confidence in Ukraine,” Atlantic Council, February 22, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/undermining-ukraine/.

3 Previously, the term RuNet described Russian language portions of the global internet accessible anywhere in the world. However, since Russia passed a domestic internet law in May 2019, RuNet has come to refer to a technically isolated version of the internet that services users within the borders of Russia. Gavin Wilde and Justin Sherman, No Water’s Edge: Russia’s Information War and Regime Security, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 4, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/01/04/no-water-s-edge-russia-s-information-war-and-regime-security-pub-88644; Justin Sherman, Reassessing Runet: Russian Internet Isolation and Implications for Russian Cyber Behavior, Atlantic Council, July 7, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/reassessing-runet-russian-internet-isolation-and-implications-for-russian-cyber-behavior/.

4 Adam Satariano and Valerie Hopkins, “Russia, Blocked from the Global Internet, Plunges into Digital Isolation,” New York Times, March 7, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/07/technology/russia-ukraine-internet-isolation.html.

5 Gavin Wilde and Justin Sherman, No Water’s Edge: Russia’s Information War and Regime Security, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 4, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/01/04/no-water-s-edge-russia-s-information-war-and-regime-security-pub-88644; Stephen Blank, “Russian Information Warfare as Domestic Counterinsurgency,” American Foreign Policy Interests 35, no. 1 (2013): 31–44, https://doi.org/10.1080/10803920.2013.757946.

6 Gavin Wilde, Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Russia’s Unmet Expectations, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 12, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/12/cyber-operations-in-ukraine-russia-s-unmet-expectations-pub-88607.

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12 Jen Weedon, “Beyond ‘Cyber War’: Russia’s Use of Strategic Cyber Espionage and Information Operations in Ukraine,” in Geers, Cyber War in Perspective, 76; Liisa Past, “Missing in Action: Rhetoric on Cyber Warfare,” in Geers, Cyber War in Perspective, 91; “Ukrtelecom’s Crimean Sub-Branches Officially Report that Unknown People Have Seized Several Telecommunications Nodes in the Crimea,” Ukrtelecom, February 28, 2014, http://en.ukrtelecom.ua/about/news?id=120467; “Feb. 28 Updates on the Crisis in Ukraine,” New York Times, February 28, 2014, https://archive.nytimes.com/thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/latest-updates-tensions-in-ukraine/?_r=0; “The Crimean Regional Units of PJSC ‘Ukrtelecom’ Officially Inform About the Blocking by Unknown Persons of Several Communication Nodes on the Peninsula,” Ukrtelecom, February 28, 2014, https://web.archive.org/web/20140305001208/, http://www.ukrtelecom.ua/presscenter/news/official?id=120327.

13 Polityuk and Finkle, “Ukraine Says Communications Hit”; John Leyden, “Cyber Battle Apparently under Way in Russia–Ukraine Conflict,” The Register, April 25, 2018, https://www.theregister.com/2014/03/04/ukraine_cyber_conflict/.

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16 Yaropolk Brynykh and Anastasiia Lykholat, “Occupied Crimea: Victims and Oppressors,” Freedom House, August 30, 2018, https://freedomhouse.org/article/occupied-crimea-victims-and-oppressors.

17 Halya Coynash, “Internet Providers Forced to Conceal Total FSB Surveillance in Occupied Crimea and Russia,” Kyiv Post, February 2, 2018, https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/halya-coynash-internet-providers-forced-conceal-total-fsb-surveillance-occupied-crimea-russia.html.

18 Joseph Cox, “Russia Built an Underwater Cable to Bring Its Internet to Newly Annexed Crimea,” VICE, August 1, 2014, https://www.vice.com/en/article/ypw35k/russia-built-an-underwater-cable-to-bring-its-internet-to-newly-annexed-crimea.

19 Cox, “Russia Built an Underwater Cable.”

20 Romain Fontugne, Ksenia Ermoshina, and Emile Aben, “The Internet in Crimea: A Case Study on Routing Interregnum,” 2020 IFIP Networking Conference, Paris, France, June 22–25, 2020, https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03100247/document.

21 Sebastian Moss, “How Russia Took over the Internet in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine,” Data Center Dynamics, January 12, 2023, https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/analysis/how-russia-took-over-the-internet-in-crimea-and-eastern-ukraine/; “Ukraine: Freedom on the Net 2018 Country Report,” Freedom House, 2019, https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/freedom-net/2018.

22 “Crimea: Freedom in the World 2020 Country Report,” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/country/crimea/freedom-world/2020.

23 Kim Zetter, “Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid,” Wired, March 3, 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/; Andy Greenberg, “The Untold Story of Notpetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History,” Wired, August 22, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/.

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25 Jakub Przetacznik and Simona Tarpova, “Russia’s War on Ukraine: Timeline of Cyber-Attacks,” European Parliament, June 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/733549/EPRS_BRI(2022)733549_EN.pdf; Catalin Cimpanu, “Hackers Deface Ukrainian Government Websites,” The Record, January 14, 2022, https://therecord.media/hackers-deface-ukrainian-government-websites/.

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28 Microsoft, “Special Report Ukraine.”

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32 “Global Communications: Services, Solutions and Satellite Internet,” ViaSat, accessed November 14, 2022, http://data.danetsoft.com/viasat.com; Matt Burgess, “A Mysterious Satellite Hack Has Victims Far beyond Ukraine,” Wired, March 23, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/viasat-internet-hack-ukraine-russia/.

33 Michael Kan, “ViaSat Hack Tied to Data-Wiping Malware Designed to Shut down Modems,” PCMag, March 31, 2022, https://www.pcmag.com/news/viasat-hack-tied-to-data-wiping-malware-designed-to-shut-down-modems.

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36 ViaSat, “Ka-Sat Network.”

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39 Guerrero-Saade and Van Amerongen, “Acidrain.”

40 Joe Uchill, “UK, US, and EU Attribute Viasat Hack Against Ukraine to Russia,” SC Media, June 23, 2022, https://www.scmagazine.com/analysis/threat-intelligence/uk-us-and-eu-attribute-viasat-hack-against-ukraine-to-russia; David E. Sanger and Kate Conger, “Russia Was Behind Cyberattack in Run-Up to Ukraine War, Investigation Finds,” New York Times, May 10, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/10/us/politics/russia-cyberattack-ukraine-war.html.

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42 ”Reuters, “Satellite Outage.”

43 Sean Lyngaas, “US Satellite Operator Says Persistent Cyberattack at Beginning of Ukraine War Affected Tens of Thousands of Customers, CNN, March 30, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/30/politics/ukraine-cyberattack-viasat-satellite/index.html.

44 Zetter, “ViaSat Hack.”

45 Burgess, “A Mysterious Satellite Hack” Zetter, “ViaSat Hack”; Valentino, “Why the ViaSat Hack.”

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48 “Statement by Deputy Head of the Russian Delegation Mr. Konstantin Vorontsov at the Thematic Discussion on Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects) in the First Committee of the 77th Session of the Unga,” Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, October 26, 2022, https://russiaun.ru/en/news/261022_v.

49 Mauro Vignati, “LABScon Replay: Are Digital Technologies Eroding the Principle of Distinction in War?” SentinelOne, November 16, 2022, https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/are-digital-technologies-eroding-the-principle-of-distinction-in-war/.

50 Matt Burgess, “Russia Is Taking over Ukraine’s Internet,” Wired, June 15, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/ukraine-russia-internet-takeover/.

51 Nino Kuninidze et al., “Interim Assessment on Damages to Telecommunication Infrastructure and Resilience of the ICT Ecosystem in Ukraine.”

52 Adam Satariano and Scott Reinhard, “How Russia Took Over Ukraine’s Internet in Occupied Territories,” The New York Times, August 9, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/08/09/technology/ukraine-internet-russia-censorship.html; https://time.com/6222111/ukraine-internet-russia-reclaimed-territory/

53 Thomas Brewster, “The Last Days of Mariupol’s Internet,” Forbes, March 31, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/03/31/the-last-days-of-mariupols-internet/.

54 Matt Burgess, “Russia Is Taking over Ukraine’s Internet,” Wired, June 15, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/ukraine-russia-internet-takeover/; Satariano and Reinhard, “How Russia Took.”

55 ”Vera Bergengruen, “The Battle for Control over Ukraine’s Internet,” Time, October 18, 2022, https://time.com/6222111/ukraine-internet-russia-reclaimed-territory/.

56 Herbert Lin, “Russian Cyber Operations in the Invasion of Ukraine,” Cyber Defense Review (Fall 2022): 35, https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/Portals/6/Documents/2022_fall/02_Lin.pdf, Herb Lin, “The Emergence of Physically Mediated Cyberattacks?,” Lawfare, May 21, 2022, https://www.lawfareblog.com/emergence-physically-mediated-cyberattacks; “Invaders Use Blackmailing and Intimidation to Force Ukrainian Internet Service Providers to Connect to Russian Networks,” State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, May 13, 2022, https://cip.gov.ua/en/news/okupanti-shantazhem-i-pogrozami-zmushuyut-ukrayinskikh-provaideriv-pidklyuchatisya-do-rosiiskikh-merezh; Satariano and Reinhard, “How Russia Took.”

57 Gian M. Volpicelli, “How Ukraine’s Internet Can Fend off Russian Attacks,” Wired, March 1, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/internet-ukraine-russia-cyberattacks/; Satariano and Reinhard, “How Russia Took.”

58 David R. Marples, “Russia’s War Goals in Ukraine,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 64, no. 2–3 (March 2022): 207–219, https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2022.2107837.

59 David Klepper, “Russian Propaganda ‘Outgunned’ by Social Media Rebuttals,” AP News, March 4, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-volodymyr-zelenskyy-kyiv-technology-misinformation-5e884b85f8dbb54d16f5f10d105fe850; Marc Champion and Daryna Krasnolutska, “Ukraine’s TV Comedian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy Finds His Role as Wartime Leader,” Japan Times, June 7, 2022, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/02/26/world/volodymyr-zelenskyy-wartime-president/;“Российское Телевидение Сообщило Об ‘Бегстве Зеленского’ Из Киева, Но Умолчало Про Жертвы Среди Гражданских,” Агентство, October 10, 2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20221010195154/https://www.agents.media/propaganda-obstreli/.

60 To learn more about Russian disinformation efforts against Ukraine and its allies, check out the Russian Narratives Reports from the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab: Nika Aleksejeva et al., Andy Carvin ed., “Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian News Outlets Justified a War of Aggression against Ukraine,” Atlantic Council, February 22, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/narrative-warfare/; Roman Osadchuk et al., Andy Carvin ed., “Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin Employs Information Operations to Erode Global Confidence in Ukraine,” Atlantic Council, February 22, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/undermining-ukraine/.

61 Олександр Янковський, “‘Бояться Спротиву’. Для Чого РФ Захоплює Мобільний Зв’язок Та Інтернет На Херсонщині?,” Радіо Свобода, May 7, 2022, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/novyny-pryazovya-khersonshchyna-okupatsiya-rosiya-mobilnyy-zvyazok-internet/31838946.html.

62 Volodymyr Zelenskyy, “Tell People in the Occupied Territories about Ukraine, That the Ukrainian Army Will Definitely Come—Address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy,” President of Ukraine Official Website, June 13, 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/govorit-lyudyam-na-okupovanih-teritoriyah-pro-ukrayinu-pro-t-75801.

63 Satariano and Reinhard, “How Russia Took.”

64 Michael Sheldon, “Geolocating Russia’s Indiscriminate Shelling of Kharkiv,” DFRLab, March 1, 2022, https://medium.com/dfrlab/geolocating-russias-indiscriminate-shelling-of-kharkiv-deaccc830846; Michael Sheldon, “Kharkiv Neighborhood Experienced Ongoing Shelling Prior to February 28 Attack,” DFRLab, February 28, 2022, https://medium.com/dfrlab/kharkiv-neighborhood-experienced-ongoing-shelling-prior-to-february-28-attack-f767230ad6f6; https://maphub.net/Cen4infoRes/russian-ukraine-monitor; Michael Sheldon (@Michael1Sheldon), “Damage to civilian houses in the Zalyutino neighborhood of Kharkiv. https://t.me/c/1347456995/38991 …,” Twitter, February 27, 2022, 4:15 p.m., https://twitter.com/Michael1Sheldon/status/1498044130416594947; Michael Sheldon, “Missile Systems and Tanks Spotted in Russian Far East, Heading West,” DFRLab, January 27, 2022, https://medium.com/dfrlab/missile-systems-and-tanks-spotted-in-russian-far-east-heading-west-6d2a4fe7717a; Jay in Kyiv (@JayinKyiv), “Not yet 24 hours after Ukraine devastated Russian positions in Kherson, a massive Russian convoy is now leaving Melitopol to replace them. This is on Alekseev …,” Twitter, July 12, 2022, 7:50 a.m., https://twitter.com/JayinKyiv/status/1546824416218193921; “Eyes on Russia Map,” Centre for Information Resilience, https://eyesonrussia.org/.

65 Katerina Sergatskova, What You Should Know About Life in the Occupied Areas in Ukraine, Wilson Center, September 14, 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/what-you-should-know-about-life-occupied-areas-ukraine; Jonathan Landay, “Village near Kherson Rejoices at Russian Rout, Recalls Life under Occupation,” Reuters, November 12, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/village-near-kherson-rejoices-russian-rout-recalls-life-under-occupation-2022-11-11/.

66 Andrew Salerno-Garthwaite, “OSINT in Ukraine: Civilians in the Kill Chain and the Information Space,” Global Defence Technology 137 (2022), https://defence.nridigital.com/global_defence_technology_oct22/osint_in_ukraine; “How Has Open-Source Intelligence Influenced the War in Ukraine?” Economist, August 30, 2022, https://www.economist.com/ukraine-osint-pod; Gillian Tett, “Inside Ukraine’s Open-Source War,” Financial Times, July 22, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/297d3300-1a65-4793-982b-1ba2372241a3; Amy Zegart, “Open Secrets,” Foreign Affairs, January 7, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/open-secrets-ukraine-intelligence-revolution-amy-zegart?utm_source=twitter_posts&utm_campaign=tw_daily_soc&utm_medium=social.

67 Lin, “The Emergence.”

68 “Cyber Security Strategy of Ukraine,” Presidential Decree of Ukraine, March 15, 2016, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/NationalCyberSecurityStrategy_Ukraine.pdf.

69 Eric Geller, “Ukraine Prepares to Remove Data from Russia’s Reach,” POLITICO, February 22, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/02/22/ukraine-centralized-its-data-after-the-last-russian-invasion-now-it-may-need-to-evacuate-it-00010777.

70 Kuninidze et al., “Interim Assessment.”

71 Kuninidze et al., “Interim Assessment.”

72 “Datagroup to Invest $20 Million into a Large-Scale Network Modernization Project in Partnership with Cisco,” Datagroup, April 8, 2021, https://www.datagroup.ua/en/novyny/datagrup-investuye-20-mln-dolariv-u-masshtabnij-proyekt-iz-m-314.

73 Lauriane Giet, “Eutech4ukraine—Cisco’s Contribution to Bring Connectivity and Cybersecurity to Ukraine and Skills to Ukrainian Refugees,” Futurium, June 22, 2022, https://futurium.ec.europa.eu/en/digital-compass/tech4ukraine/your-support-ukraine/ciscos-contribution-bring-connectivity-and-cybersecurity-ukraine-and-skills-ukrainian-refugees; “Communiqué de Presse Solidarité Européenne Envers l’Ukraine: Nouveau Convoi d’Équipements Informatiques,” Government of France, May 25, 2022, https://minefi.hosting.augure.com/Augure_Minefi/r/ContenuEnLigne/Download?id=4FFB30F8-F59C-45A0-979E-379E3CEC18AF&filename=06%20-%20Solidarit%C3%A9%20europ%C3%A9enne%20envers%20l%E2%80%99Ukraine%20-%20nouveau%20convoi%20d%E2%80%99%C3%A9quipements%20informatiques.pdf.

74 ”Atlantic Council, “Ukraine’s Digital Resilience: A conversation with Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Mykhailo Fedorov,” December 2, 2022, YouTube video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vl75e0QU6uE.

75 “Digital Country—Official Website of Ukraine,” Ukraine Now (Government of Ukraine), accessed January 17, 2023, https://ukraine.ua/invest-trade/digitalization/; Atlantic Council, “Ukraine’s Digital Resilience.”

76 Brad Smith, “Extending Our Vital Technology Support for Ukraine,” Microsoft, November 3, 2022, https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/11/03/our-tech-support-ukraine/; “How Amazon Is Assisting in Ukraine,” Amazon, March 1, 2022, https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/community/amazons-assistance-in-ukraine; Phil Venables, “How Google Cloud Is Helping Those Affected by War in Ukraine,” Google, March 3, 2022, https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/how-google-cloud-is-helping-those-affected-by-war-in-ukraine.

77 Simon Handler, Lily Liu, and Trey Herr, Dude, Where’s My Cloud? A Guide for Wonks and Users, Atlantic Council, July 7, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/dude-wheres-my-cloud-a-guide-for-wonks-and-users/.

78 Handler, Liu, and Herr, “Dude, Where’s My Cloud?”

79 Brad Smith, “Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War,” Microsoft On the Issues, November 2, 2022, https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/06/22/defending-ukraine-early-lessons-from-the-cyber-war/; Smith, “Extending Our Vital Technology.”

80 Amazon, “How Amazon Is Assisting”; Sebastian Moss, “Ukraine Awards Microsoft and AWS Peace Prize for Cloud Services and Digital Support,” Data Center Dynamics, January 12, 2023, https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/ukraine-awards-microsoft-and-aws-peace-prize-for-cloud-services-digital-support/; Venables, “How Google Cloud”; Kent Walker, “Helping Ukraine,” Google, March 4, 2022, https://blog.google/inside-google/company-announcements/helping-ukraine/.

81 Catherine Stupp, “Ukraine Has Begun Moving Sensitive Data Outside Its Borders,” Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-has-begun-moving-sensitive-data-outside-its-borders-11655199002; Atlantic Council, “Ukraine’s Digital Resilience”; Smith, “Defending Ukraine.”

82 Nick Beecroft, Evaluating the International Support to Ukrainian Cyber Defense, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 3, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/11/03/evaluating-international-support-to-ukrainian-cyber-defense-pub-88322.

83 Smith, “Defending Ukraine,” 5, 6, 9.

84 Smith, “Defending Ukraine,” 3, 11.

85 Thomas Brewster, “Bombs and Hackers Are Battering Ukraine’s Internet Providers. ‘Hidden Heroes’ Risk Their Lives to Keep Their Country Online,” Forbes, March 15, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/03/15/internet-technicians-are-the-hidden-heroes-of-the-russia-ukraine-war/?sh=be5da1428844.

86 Kuninidze et al., “Interim Assessment,” 40.

87 Kuninidze et al., “Interim Assessment,”40; ““Київстар Виділяє 300 Мільйонів Гривень Для Відновлення Цифрової Інфраструктури України,” Київстар, July 4, 2022, https://kyivstar.ua/uk/mm/news-and-promotions/kyyivstar-vydilyaye-300-milyoniv-gryven-dlya-vidnovlennya-cyfrovoyi.

88 Київстар, “Київстар Виділяє”; “Mobile Connection Lifecell—Lifecell Ukraine,” Lifecell UA, accessed January 17, 2023, https://www.lifecell.ua/en/.

89 Ryan Gallagher, “Russia–Ukraine War: Telecom Workers Damage Own Equipment to Thwart Russia,” Bloomberg, June 21, 2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-21/ukrainian-telecom-workers-damage-own-equipment-to-thwart-russia.

90 Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), Twitter, February 26, 2022, 7:06 a.m., https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1497543633293266944?s=20&t=c9Uc7CDXEBr-e5-nd2hEtw.

91 Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), “Starlink — here. Thanks, @elonmusk,” Twitter, February 28, 2022, 3:19 p.m., https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1498392515262746630?s=20&t=vtCM9UqgWRkfxfrEHzYTGg.

92 Atlantic Council, “Ukraine’s Digital Resilience.”

93 “How Elon Musk’s Satellites Have Saved Ukraine and Changed Warfare,” Economist, January 5, 2023, https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/01/05/how-elon-musks-satellites-have-saved-ukraine-and-changed-warfare.

94 Alexander Freund, “Ukraine Using Starlink for Drone Strikes,” Deutsche Welle, March 27, 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-is-using-elon-musks-starlink-for-drone-strikes/a-61270528.

95 Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), “Over 100 cruise missiles attacked 🇺🇦 energy and communications infrastructure. But with Starlink we quickly restored the connection in critical areas. Starlink …,” Twitter, October 12, 2022 3:12 p.m., https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1580275214272802817.

96 Rishi Iyengar, “Why Ukraine Is Stuck with Elon (for Now),” Foreign Policy, November 22, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/22/ukraine-internet-starlink-elon-musk-russia-war/.

97 Economist, “How Elon Musk’s.”

98 Freund, “Ukraine Using Starlink”; Nick Allen and James Titcomb, “Elon Musk’s Starlink Helping Ukraine to Win the Drone War,” Telegraph, March 18, 2022, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/03/18/elon-musks-starlink-helping-ukraine-win-drone-war/; Charlie Parker, “Specialist Ukrainian Drone Unit Picks off Invading Russian Forces as They Sleep,” Times, March 18, 2022, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/specialist-drone-unit-picks-off-invading-forces-as-they-sleep-zlx3dj7bb.

99 Matthew Gault, “Mysterious Sea Drone Surfaces in Crimea,” Vice, September 26, 2022, https://www.vice.com/en/article/xgy4q7/mysterious-sea-drone-surfaces-in-crimea.

100 Economist, “How Elon Musk’s.”

101 Akash Sriram, “SpaceX, USAID Deliver 5,000 Satellite Internet Terminals to Ukraine Akash Sriram,” Reuters, April 6, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/technology/spacex-usaid-deliver-5000-satellite-internet-terminals-ukraine-2022-04-06/.

102 Alex Marquardt, “Exclusive: Musk’s Spacex Says It Can No Longer Pay for Critical Satellite Services in Ukraine, Asks Pentagon to Pick up the Tab,” CNN, October 14, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/13/politics/elon-musk-spacex-starlink-ukraine.

103 Elon Musk (@elonmusk), “Ukraine-Russia Peace: – Redo elections of annexed regions under UN supervision. Russia leaves if that is will of the people. – Crimea formally part of Russia, as it has been since 1783 (until …” Twitter, October 3, 2022 12:15 p.m., https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1576969255031296000; Andrij Melnyk (@MelnykAndrij), Twitter, October 3, 2022, 12:46 p.m., https://twitter.com/MelnykAndrij/status/1576977000178208768.

104 Elon Musk (@elonmusk), Twitter, October 14, 2022, 3:14 a.m., https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1580819437824839681; Elon Musk (@elonmusk), Twitter, October 15, 2022, 2:06 p.m., https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1581345747777179651.

105 Elon Musk (@elonmusk), Twitter, October 17, 2022, 3:52 p.m., https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1582097354576265217; Sawyer Merrit (@SawyerMerritt), “BREAKING: The Pentagon is considering paying for @SpaceX ‘s Starlink satellite network — which has been a lifeline for Ukraine — from a fund that has been used …,” Twitter, October 17, 2022, 3:09 p.m., https://twitter.com/SawyerMerritt/status/1582086349305262080.

106 Alex Marquardt and Sean Lyngaas, “Ukraine Suffered a Comms Outage When 1,300 SpaceX Satellite Units Went Offline over Funding Issues” CNN, November 7, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/04/politics/spacex-ukraine-elon-musk-starlink-internet-outage/; Iyengar, “Why Ukraine Is Stuck.”

107 Ryan Browne, “Ukraine Government Is Seeking Alternatives to Elon Musk’s Starlink, Vice PM Says,” CNBC, November 3, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/11/03/ukraine-government-seeking-alternatives-to-elon-musks-starlink.html.

108 William Harwood, “SpaceX Launches 40 OneWeb Broadband Satellites, Lighting up Overnight Sky,” CBS News, January 10, 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/spacex-launches-40-oneweb-broadband-satellites-in-overnight-spectacle/.

109 Marquardt and Lyngaas, “Ukraine Suffered”; Mehul Srivastava et al., “Ukrainian Forces Report Starlink Outages During Push Against Russia,” Financial Times, October 7, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/9a7b922b-2435-4ac7-acdb-0ec9a6dc8397.

110 Alex Marquardt and Kristin Fisher, “SpaceX admits blocking Ukrainian troops from using satellite technology,” CNN, February 9, https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/09/politics/spacex-ukrainian-troops-satellite-technology/index.html.

111 Charles R. Davis, “Elon Musk Blocked Ukraine from Using Starlink in Crimea over Concern that Putin Could Use Nuclear Weapons, Political Analyst Says,” Business Insider, October 11, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-blocks-starlink-in-crimea-amid-nuclear-fears-report-2022-10; Elon Musk (@elonmusk), Twitter, February 12, 2022, 4:00 p.m., https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1624876021433368578.

112 Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), “In 21 days of the war, russian troops has already killed 100 Ukrainian children. they are using DJI products in order to navigate their missile. @DJIGlobal are you sure you want to be a …,” Twitter, March 16, 2022, 8:14 a.m., https://twitter.com/fedorovmykhailo/status/1504068644195733504; Cat Zakrzewski, “4,000 Letters and Four Hours of Sleep: Ukrainian Leader Wages Digital War,” Washington Post, March 30, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/30/mykhailo-fedorov-ukraine-digital-front/.

113 DJI Global (@DJIGlobal), “Dear Vice Prime Minister Federov: All DJI products are designed for civilian use and do not meet military specifications. The visibility given by AeroScope and further Remote ID …,” Twitter, March 16, 2022, 5:42 p.m., https://twitter.com/DJIGlobal/status/1504206884240183297.

114 Mehul Srivastava and Roman Olearchyk, “Starlink Prices in Ukraine Nearly Double as Mobile Networks Falter,” Financial Times, November 29, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/f69b75cf-c36a-4ab3-9eb7-ad0aa00d230c.

115 Iyengar, “Why Ukraine Is Stuck.”

116 Michael Sheetz, “SpaceX Raises Another $250 Million in Equity, Lifts Total to $2 Billion in 2022,” CNBC, August 5, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/05/elon-musks-spacex-raises-250-million-in-equity.html.

117 “Starshield,” SpaceX, accessed January 17, 2023, https://www.spacex.com/starshield/; Micah Maidenberg and Drew FitzGerald, “Elon Musk’s Spacex Courts Military with New Starshield Project,” Wall Street Journal, December 8, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/elon-musks-spacex-courts-military-with-new-starshield-project-11670511020.

118 “Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” New York Times, February 14, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/world/europe/ukraine-maps.html#:~:text=Ukraine%20has%20reclaimed%2054%20percent,for%20the%20Study%20of%20War; Júlia Ledur, Laris Karklis, Ruby Mellen, Chris Alcantara, Aaron Steckelberg and Lauren Tierney, “Follow the 600-mile front line between Ukrainian and Russian forces,” The Washington Post, February 21, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2023/russia-ukraine-front-line-map/.

119 Jimmy Rushton (@JimmySecUK), “Ukrainian soldiers deploying a Starlink satellite internet system in liberated Kherson, allowing local residents to communicate with their relatives in other areas of Ukraine,” Twitter, November 12, 2022, 8:07 a.m., https://twitter.com/JimmySecUK/status/1591417328134402050; José Andrés (@chefjoseandres), “@elonmusk While I don’t agree with you about giving voice to people that brings the worst out of all of us, thanks for @SpaceXStarlink in Kherson, a city with no electricity, or in a train from …,” Twitter, November 20, 2022, 1:58 a.m., https://twitter.com/chefjoseandres/status/1594223613795762176.

120 Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), “Every front makes its contribution to the upcoming victory. These are Anatoliy, Viktor, Ivan and Andrii from @Vodafone_UA team, who work daily to restore mobile and Internet communications …,” Twitter, April 25, 2022, 1:13 p.m., https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1518639261624455168; Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), “Can you see a Starlink? But it’s here. While providers are repairing cable damages, Gostomel’s humanitarian headquarter works via the Starlink. Thanks to @SpaceX …,” Twitter, May 8, 2022, 9:48 a.m., https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1523298788794052615.

121 Thomas Brewster, “Ukraine’s Engineers Dodged Russian Mines to Get Kherson Back Online–with a Little Help from Elon Musk’s Satellites,” Forbes, November 18, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/11/18/ukraine-gets-kherson-online-after-russian-retreat-with-elon-musk-starlink-help/?sh=186e24b0ef1e.

122 Mark Didenko, ed., “Ukrtelecom Car Hits Landmine in Sumy Region, One Dead, Three Injured,” Yahoo!, October 2, 2022, https://www.yahoo.com/video/ukrtelecom-car-hits-landmine-sumy-104300649.html.

123 Vera Bergengruen, “The Battle for Control over Ukraine’s Internet,” Time, October 18, 2022, https://time.com/6222111/ukraine-internet-russia-reclaimed-territory/.

124 Bergengruen, “The Battle for Control over Ukraine’s Internet.”

125 Atlantic Council, “Ukraine’s Digital Resilience: A conversation with Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Mykhailo Fedorov,” December 2, 2022, YouTube video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vl75e0QU6uE; “Keeping connected: connectivity resilience in Ukraine,” EU4Digital, February 13, 2022, https://eufordigital.eu/keeping-connected-connectivity-resilience-in-ukraine/.

126 Greg Rattray, Geoff Brown, and Robert Taj Moore, “The Cyber Defense Assistance Imperative Lessons from Ukraine,” The Aspen Institute, February 16, 2023, https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Aspen-Digital_The-Cyber-Defense-Assistance-Imperative-Lessons-from-Ukraine.pdf, 8.

127 CRDF Global, “CRDF Global becomes Platform for Cyber Defense Assistance Collaborative (CDAC) for Ukraine,” News 19, November 14, 2022, https://whnt.com/business/press-releases/cision/20221114DC34776/crdf-global-becomes-platform-for-cyber-defense-assistance-collaborative-cdac-for-ukraine/; Dina Temple-Raston, “EXCLUSIVE: Rounding Up a Cyber Posse for Ukraine,” The Record, November 18, 2022, https://therecord.media/exclusive-rounding-up-a-cyber-posse-for-ukraine/; Rattray, Brown, and Moore, “The Cyber Defense Assistance Imperative Lessons from Ukraine.”

128 Beecroft, Evaluating the International Support.

129 Lee Hudson, “‘There’s Not Just SpaceX’: Pentagon Looks Beyond Starlink after Musk Says He May End Services in Ukraine,” POLITICO, October 14, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/10/14/starlink-ukraine-elon-musk-pentagon-00061896.

The post A parallel terrain: Public-private defense of the Ukrainian information environment appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: DFRLab releases investigations on Russian info ops before and after the invasion

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 24 Feb 2023 16:01:41 +0000

Tracking narratives

DFRLab releases investigations on Russian information operations before and after the invasion

Putin reshares narratives used to justify war of aggression in anniversary speech

Russia accuses Ukraine of plotting an invasion on Transnistria

Security

Ukraine prepares for Russian offensive on Vuhledar as Prigozhin accuses Russian command of lying

Prigozhin’s verbal attacks on Russian army leadership shed light on how Russian authorities supported Wagner Group

DFRLab releases investigations on Russian information operations before and after the invasion

This week, our team at the DFRLab released two investigative reports on how Russia employed information operations before and after its invasion of Ukraine one year ago today. The first report, Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian news outlets justified a war of aggression against Ukraine, examines how the Kremlin and its media proxies employed false and misleading narratives to justify military action against Ukraine, mask the Kremlin’s operational planning, and deny any responsibility for the coming war. Collectively, these narratives served as Vladimir Putin’s casus belli to engage in a war of aggression against Ukraine.

To research this report, we reviewed more than 350 fact-checks of pro-Kremlin disinformation published from 2014 to 2021 to identify recurring anti-Ukraine rhetoric, then collected more than ten thousand examples of false and misleading narratives published by fourteen pro-Kremlin outlets in the ten weeks leading up to the invasion. This allowed us to produce a timeline showing how Russia weaponized these narratives as its actions on the ground escalated toward war. When Vladimir Putin announced the invasion one year ago today, these narratives effectively served as his talking points, recurring more than 200 times during his remarks.

In our new reports, the @DFRLab analyzed 10,000+ narrative examples from Russian sources before the invasion that contained false and misleading narratives used later to justify the war. In his speech announcing the invasion, Putin used such narratives 200+ times in one speech. pic.twitter.com/bgjzSbzqnp
— DFRLab (@DFRLab) February 22, 2023

The second report, Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin employs information operations to erode global confidence in Ukraine, compiles some of our most important findings on Russian information operations identified over the last year in our Russian War Report. Once the war began in earnest, Russia expanded its information strategy with an additional emphasis on undermining Ukraine’s ability to resist in hopes of forcing the country to surrender or enter negotiations on Russia’s terms. This strategic expansion included efforts to maintain control of information and support for the war effort at home, undercut Ukrainian resistance, derail support for Ukrainian resistance among allies and partners, especially in the immediate region, and engage in aggressive information operations internationally to shape public opinion about Russia’s war of aggression, including in Africa and Latin America.

We will continue marking the first anniversary of the war next week with the publication of the DFRLab Cyber Statecraft Initiative report, A Parallel Terrain: Public-Private Defense of the Ukrainian Information Environment. A Parallel Terrain analyzes Russia’s continuous assaults against the Ukrainian information environment, not only striking though but attempting to contest and claim this environment in parallel with its conventional invasion. It examines how Russian offensives and Ukrainian defense move through this largely privately owned and operated environment, and how this war has highlighted the growing role that private companies play in conflict. This report will be published February 27. 

—Andy Carvin, Managing Editor, Washington, DC

Putin reshares narratives used to justify war of aggression in anniversary speech

On February 21, Vladimir Putin delivered an address to the Russian parliament that regurgitated many of the same narratives previously used to justify the invasion of Ukraine, which we explored in our Narrative Warfare report. The speech attempted to depict Putin as innocent of the bloodshed he started one year ago today. Putin spoke of a self-sufficient Russia and urged entrepreneurs to give up investments from overseas. Putin also urged Russian parents to protect their children from the “degradation and degeneration” of the West, one of the recurring themes we documented in Undermining Ukraine. Putin also said that the Sea of Azov “again became Russia’s landlocked sea” and added that Russia would develop the ports and cities in the area; he did not provide a timeline for this endeavor, however.

Putin also announced the creation of a special fund to compensate and assist those involved in the war and the relatives of the dead and wounded, as well as an additional fourteen days of annual leave for combatants to be with family and loved ones.

Putin delivered his speech just hours before US President Joe Biden delivered an address in Warsaw.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia accuses Ukraine of plotting an invasion on Transnistria

On February 23, the Russian defense ministry claimed that Ukrainian armed forces were planning a provocation against the breakaway Moldovan region of Transnistria “with the involvement of the nationalist Azov battalion.” The ministry added that Ukraine plans to stage an attack by Russian forces in Transnistria as a “pretext to invade.” To accomplish this, Ukrainian soldiers would allegedly dress in Russian military uniforms. Several pro-Russian Telegram channels circulated pictures alleged to show military equipment along the border of Transnistria. These accusations are eerily similar to ones made by leaders the breakaway Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, which Putin used as a pretext for Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

In light of these allegations, the Moldovan government issued a statement on February 23 denying the Russian defense ministry’s claims and urged the population to remain calm and follow credible sources.

Later that evening, the Russian defense ministry released another statement claiming there was “a significant accumulation of personnel and military equipment of Ukrainian units near the Ukrainian-Pridnestrovian border, the deployment of artillery at firing positions, as well as an unprecedented increase in flights of unmanned aircraft of the Armed Forces of Ukraine over the territory of the PMR [Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic].” These claims were shared without any evidence. According to the statement, these purported plans represent a direct threat to the “Russian peacekeeping contingent legally deployed in Transnistria,” and Russia will “adequately respond to the impending provocation of the Ukrainian side.”

It should be noted that both statements referred to the unrecognized Transnistria region as the “Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic,” the pro-Russia separatist name for Transnistria. Russian authorities previously referred to the area as Pridnestrov’ye, the Russian word for Transnistria, which tacitly acknowledged it was a part of Moldova, while “Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic” implies it is an independent entity.

On February 22, Putin revoked a 2012 decree that contained a clause stipulating Russia’s commitment to search for ways to settle the Transnistrian conflict “with respect to Moldova’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and neutral status.” The Kremlin warned that relations between Russia and Moldova are “extremely tense,” accusing the Moldovan government of having an anti-Russian agenda. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov recommended that Moldovan authorities “be cautious” in their assessments of the Transnistrian settlement.

—Victoria Olari, Research Assistant, Moldova

Ukraine prepares for Russian offensive on Vuhledar as Prigozhin accuses Russian command of lying

Ukrainian intelligence reported on the movement of Russian convoys not bearing identification marks headed toward the Chernihiv region. The troops reportedly wore uniforms resembling those of the Ukrainian army. Ukrainian military bloggers also reported that a Russian reconnaissance drone was detected in the Sumy region. Low-res satellite imagery indicates there may be renewed activity at the Zyabrovka airfield in Belarus, located north of Chernihiv, as movement was detected on February 18. In February 2022, before the invasion, Zyabrovka served as the site of joint air drills with Russia. Poland-based Rochan Consulting also reported that S-300 systems facing Chernihiv were deployed last month.

On February 21, Vadym Skibitsky, deputy head of Ukrainian military intelligence, said that Russia intensified its operations earlier this month in the directions of Luhansk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia. Skibitsky said Russia is concentrating military efforts on capturing Kupyansk, Lyman, Bakhmut, Marinka, Avdiivka, and Vuhledar. On February 23, the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense also reported on heavy fighting near Bakhmut, but said Ukrainian forces have managed to keep a key supply route in the western direction open despite Russia’s attempts at encirclement over the last six weeks. The UK ministry confirmed Vuhledar is under heavy shelling and said there is a “real possibility that Russia is preparing for another offensive in this area.”

On February 17, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced new commander roles, with Andrey Mordvichev leading the Central Military District (TsVO), Sergey Kuzovlev leading the Southern District (YuVO), Yevgeny Nikiforov leading the Western District (ZVO), and Rustam Muradov maintaining command of the Eastern District (VVO), which is responsible for operations in Vuhledar. Muradov is the commander who ordered the frontal assault on Vuhledar from February 8 to 10, which resulted in the defeat of the 155th Marine Corps of the Russian Navy. On February 20, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu presented epaulets to senior officers at the National Center of Defense Management in Moscow.

Meanwhile, the internal power struggle between Russian defense officials and Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin continues. In a series of audio clips, he accused the Russian defense ministry of lying about supplying Wagner troops with requested artillery munitions, claiming soldiers received only twenty percent of the artillery ammunition promised to them. Prigozhin urged the ministry to fulfill its promises instead of “lying” to the Russian public. Russian military bloggers defended and amplified Prigozhin’s claims, accusing the defense ministry of failing to support Russia’s most effective forces.

On February 23, the Russian army shelled Liubotyn in Kharkiv oblast with a Tornado-S multiple-launch rocket system, resulting in damaged buildings. Damage was also reported in Lemishchyne and Morozova Dolyna, also in Kharkiv oblast, due to Russian artillery shelling. In Kupiansk, two people were reportedly buried under rubble after a Russian S-300 missile strike. Observers also reported explosions in Kramatorsk.

That same day, Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Błaszczak announced the “preventive expansion of security measures” along the country’s borders with Belarus and the Russian territory of Kaliningrad, where the first fortifications are already underway.

According to a Reuters report, the European Union will develop and implement a program for the joint purchase of artillery shells for Ukraine. This will enhance coordination and facilitate investment in new production facilities.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Prigozhin’s verbal attacks on Russian army leadership shed light on how Russian authorities supported Wagner Group

As previously noted, Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin published multiple audio recordings lashing out at Russian military leadership for not adequately supplying a Wagner Group division with artillery munitions. The audio recordings revealed the model of collaboration between the Wagner Group and Russian Army according to Prigozhin.

On February 20, in reply to a media inquiry by RT correspondent Konstantin Pridybaylo about insufficient ammunition supplies, Prigozhin said that “there is ammunition in the country” and “the industry is producing as much as needed, even with oversupply,” but “no decisions are made” to supply the Wagner Group. “No one understands where alleged limits are coming from, where procedures to receive [ammunition] are coming from, no one knows the ways one or the other documents are signed,” he added. “Everyone is showing me upwards saying: ‘You know, Yevgeny Viktorovich, you have complicated relationships up there….You need to go, apologize, and obey. Then your fighters will receive ammunition.’”

In another audio recording on February 21, Prigozhin went further, stating “The Chief of General Staff [Valery Gerasimov] and the Minister of Defense [Sergei Shoigu] are handing out commands to the right and left not only to not give ammunition to the Wagner Group, but also to not provide help via air transport….This is direct opposition that is nothing short of an attempt to destroy the Wagner Group. It can be equated to treason.” In another audio recording that day, Prigozhin said that “other divisions are in constant undersupply of ammunition.” He claimed that “a bunch of near-the-war functionaries” are “trying to twist intrigues” by “calling Telegram channels and telling them, ‘Do not publish Prigozhin. Write that he – I don’t know – eats ammunition or sells it to Americans.'” By the end of the day, the Russian Ministry of Defense denied that it was blocking ammunition supply to “voluntary assault squads.” In return, Prigozhin accused the ministry of lying about ammunition supplies to Wagner Group forces fighting near Bahkmut.

The next day, on February 22, Prigozin continued to pressure defense ministry decisionmakers to supply Wagner Group with ammunition by forwarding a graphic image showing dozens of dead men lying on the snowy ground, as well as a screenshot of an ammunition request dated February 17 addressed to Chief of Staff Gerasimov. In an audio recording posted around the same time, Prigozhin stated, “The final signature needs to be made by either Gerasimov or Shoigu. None of them want to make the decision. I’ll explain. The Wagner Group allegedly does not exist. Previously, we received ammunition via some military divisions that are allegedly taking Bakhmut instead of us. But there is no one else and everyone knows about it by now.”

He also mentioned that a call to “give shells to the Wagners” (“Дайте снаряды Вагнерам”) had been “launched on social media.” Wagner accounts on VKontakte and pro-war Telegram channels amplified variants of the slogan.

Wagner campaign image using a variant of Prigozhin’s slogan, “give shells to the Wagners” (“Дайте снаряды Вагнерам”). It warns that not supplying Wagner forces with sufficient ammunition is “criminal” and either “a mistake or a betrayal.” (Source: VK/archive)

The DFRLab also identified a petition on Change.org with the slogan; it was deleted by February 24.

Screenshot of Google Search result showing the now-deleted Change.org petition. (Source: Change.org/archive)

Finally, in an audio recording on February 23, Prigozhin announced, “Ammunition shipment begins…on paper for now, but the most relevant papers are already signed.”

—Nika Aleksejeva, Resident Fellow, Riga, Latvia

The post Russian War Report: DFRLab releases investigations on Russian info ops before and after the invasion appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Invasion anniversary: Does Putin still have a pathway to victory in Ukraine?

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 23 Feb 2023 19:54:10 +0000

When Vladimir Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, he was expecting a brief and triumphant campaign that would extinguish Ukrainian independence and secure his place in Russian history among the country’s greatest rulers. One year on, it is now clear that his decision to invade was one of the biggest geopolitical blunders of the modern era.

Putin’s disastrous miscalculations reflect a leader increasingly detached from reality and surrounded by a shrinking circle of sycophants intent on telling him what he wants to hear. The delusional Russian dictator appears to have been convinced that Ukrainian military resistance would crumble in a matter of days and genuinely expected invading Russian troops to be welcomed as liberators. Instead, his own army has suffered catastrophic losses amid a series of battlefield defeats that have shattered Russia’s reputation as a military superpower.

The strength and tenacity of Ukraine’s national resistance has stunned Putin and made a mockery of his claims to be “returning historic Russian lands.” Nevertheless, as the war enters its second year, he shows no signs of abandoning his imperial ambitions. In recent months, Putin has moved to replenish the ranks of his depleted army by launching Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. Meanwhile, earlier attempts to shield the Russian public from the horrors of the invasion have been replaced by grim warnings to expect a long and bitter war.

While Putin continues to publicly insist he will achieve his objectives in Ukraine, many commentators are now questioning whether the Russian military retains the capability to mount large-scale offensive operations. Russia’s recent mobilization has generated an additional 300,000 troops, but much of this intake is poorly trained and appears prone to rapid demoralization. Moscow’s hopes of a collapse in international support for Ukraine also look unrealistic. Ukraine’s partners have begun 2023 by significantly expanding the range of weapons they are prepared to supply, while US President Joe Biden’s recent Kyiv visit was designed to send a strong signal of unwavering Western resolve.

Despite the setbacks of the past twelve months, Russia continues to enjoy considerable advantages over Ukraine in terms of both destructive power and sheer numbers. Could this eventually be enough to turn the tide in Moscow’s favor? As the invasion of Ukraine enters its second year, the Atlantic Council asked a range of experts whether Putin still has a pathway to victory in Ukraine.

Alyona Getmanchuk, Director, New Europe Center: Putin can still win if the West allows him to win. This could happen intentionally if Western leaders actively seek to avoid humiliating Putin, or less directly if Ukraine does receive the weapons it needs in time. We should be very clear that every single postponed political decision or delayed delivery of weapons brings Putin closer to victory. As Russia’s invasion passes the one-year mark, it is time to lift any remaining psychological barriers over the categories of weapons that can be sent to Ukraine. Putin is now completely committed to winning the war at all costs, but Ukraine’s international partners are still struggling to send just 10% of the available Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine despite a long and painful debate over the issue. This needs to change.

There should no longer be any illusions over the possibility of peace in Europe if Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is even partially successful. A fragile ceasefire or a compromise agreement imposed on Ukraine would reward Putin for his invasion and set the stage for the next war. The only way to secure a sustainable peace is via a decisive Ukrainian victory. It will then be up to the Kremlin propaganda machine to explain this defeat to the Russian public.

It is profoundly depressing to note that we are now entering the second year of a genocide in the heart of Europe with Russian victory still a possibility. The mere fact that this is even being discussed illustrates the utter inadequacy of the international reaction to Russian aggression. Clearly, a far tougher response is necessary if Putin is finally to be stopped.

Diane Francis, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council: Putin has no path to victory because Ukrainians will never surrender until Russia is expelled from their country. Last year’s invasion took Ukraine and the international community by surprise, but over the past 12 months the world’s strongest military coalition has taken shape to support Ukraine and enlarge NATO to prevent future incursions by Moscow. Russia’s armed forces have not won a major battle since last June. More than half of Putin’s initial invasion force of 190,000 men have been killed or wounded. Russian losses in tanks, armor, and aviation have been equally catastrophic.

Russia is now struggling to advance at Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine, where Putin’s generals sacrifice “human waves” of untrained conscripts and mercenaries and are still unable to break through Ukrainian defenses. Each side prepares new offensives, but Russia’s armed forces have been seriously degraded and impaired from doing so, according to the Institute for the Study of War.

Ukraine has already liberated around half of the land captured by Russia during the initial months of the invasion. Meanwhile, the Western world is currently more united behind Ukraine than ever and has recently agreed to provide new categories of weapons including tanks and long range missiles. Key factors such as support, time, money, motivation, and leadership all appear to be on Kyiv’s side. Perhaps most important of all, Ukrainians refuse to accept anything short of victory. As President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has stated, “Ukrainians are not ready to give away their land, to accept that these territories belong to Russia. This is our land.”

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Miriam Kosmehl, Senior Expert Eastern Europe, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Germany: As the war enters its second year, Putin still has a number of potential pathways to victory in Ukraine. A great deal will depend on whether Ukraine is provided with the military aid it needs to defeat Russia on the battlefield.

Putin is clearly preparing for a long war. The genocidal rhetoric on Russian TV and from senior Kremlin officials has not changed. He has also painted himself into a corner by declaring the “annexation” of four partially occupied Ukrainian regions, thereby creating major constitutional obstacles to any future peace process. Perhaps most importantly, it is now obvious that Putin is completely unconcerned by the scale of Russian losses in Ukraine and does not fear a domestic backlash.

While Russia’s military options in Ukraine currently appear limited, the Kremlin continues to communicate effectively to both Russian and international audiences. Tailored messages about food security resonate in Africa, while Russian charm offensives and anti-Western posturing have proved persuasive in Latin America and Asia.

If the alliance of liberal democracies that has formed around Ukraine over the past year limits its support to preventing a Ukrainian defeat, then the war will drag on. This will feed “Ukraine fatigue” and play into Putin’s hands. President Zelenskyy appears to understand this, which is why he has recently sought to increase the pressure on Ukraine’s allies by calling for greater urgency.

Western leaders need to understand that the idea of a compromise peace is an illusion. Putin only hints at a readiness for negotiations in order to weaken the West’s resolve and drive a wedge between Ukraine and its partners. In reality, Russia remains committed to Ukraine’s destruction as an independent state and as a separate nation.

Alexander Motyl, Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University-Newark: Everything depends on how Putin himself defines victory. Could Putin defeat Ukraine on the battlefield without massive casualties? Almost certainly not, as the Russian army is degraded, the Ukrainian army is performing well, and Ukraine’s Western-supplied weapons outclass Russia’s.

Could Putin win the war if he accepts enormous losses of up to a million men killed and wounded? This also seems unlikely, as Ukrainian battlefield skills and Western weapons should enable Ukraine to hold its own. In this second scenario, the main problem for Putin would probably be the Russian reaction. Would domestic audiences tolerate such catastrophic losses? Would the Russian elite not object? The probability of protests or a palace coup rises with every dead Russian soldier.

Alternatively, Putin could simply choose to define victory in terms other than Ukraine’s battlefield defeat. Victory could mean holding onto at least some of the Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia since February 24, 2022. This could be sold to the Russian public as a major advance for the Russian World. However, some Russians might question whether gaining control over relatively limited areas of devastated Ukrainian territory really warranted such huge sacrifices.

Putin’s best option may be to rebrand the war entirely and insist that Russia is actually fighting against Western (or more precisely American) imperialism rather than “Ukrainian Nazis”. This narrative is already being actively promoted and has in recent months begun to increasingly dominate Russian propaganda. It enables Putin to magically transform his “Special Military Operation” into a defensive action intended to forestall an imminent Western invasion of Russia via Ukraine. And since Russia still exists despite all Western efforts to destroy it, Putin can claim success and declare victory.

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council: Courtesy of Ukraine’s stunning defense, Putin has lost all paths to victory except through attrition, but this still poses a major threat. With superior numbers (however reluctant those troops are) and far greater resources, Putin can still realistically hope to outlast Ukraine if, as many fear, Western military support for Ukraine continues at its present pace or actually declines. Neither side currently enjoys a meaningful military advantage. This bloody stalemate favors Putin while Russia continues to pulverize Ukraine’s economy and energy sector.

Unless Western governments begin equipping Ukraine to actually win the war rather than simply not lose too badly, time is on Russia’s side. This is the tragic reality of the current situation. Russia’s sheer size may trump Ukraine’s resolve and dedication in the long run. If the watching world fails to step up its military and energy sector support to Ukraine, this inspiring, nascent democracy that is so eager to join with the West may well be ground slowly out of existence by the relentless brutality of Putin’s war machine. If Russia is allowed to erase Ukraine in part or in whole, the consequences for international security will be catastrophic.

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Brian Mefford, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council: Like the Byzantine emperors who tried to restore the glory of Constantinople following the Fourth Crusade, Putin’s attempt to restore the Soviet Union is also destined for failure. In the most optimistic scenario for Putin, the overwhelming weight of the Russian military could yet achieve a Pyrrhic victory in which the bulk of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region might be taken, with areas south of the Dnipro also remaining under Russian occupation.

Some commentators argue that Russia always fights badly during the first year of a war but then mobilizes to win. However, this observation neglects the fact that Russia does so only when defending its own territory. Historically, Russia has almost always performed poorly when invading other countries.

Putin’s goal is still to install a puppet regime in Kyiv. However, he wasn’t able to do so a year ago with his best troops. This objective is even less feasible now with Ukraine armed to the teeth and his own military badly depleted. A more realistic scenario would see economic hardships created by the war fueling ethnic rivalries and regional secession within Russia. These factors could eventually accelerate the Balkanization of Russia into a dozen new countries. Putin dreamed of regime change in Ukraine, but he is now more likely to bring regime change to Russia itself.

Kristina Hook, Assistant Professor, Kennesaw State University: Putin’s imperial dreams against Ukraine and the global order have irreversibly shattered. Russian goals have deteriorated from boasts of “Kyiv in three days” to straining for smaller Ukrainian towns at the cost of thousands of soldiers. Putin cannot realistically hope to overcome catastrophic losses in troops, officers, or equipment. Nor can he repair what he really cares about, namely Russia’s global reputation under his leadership.

Now that Putin’s intention to subjugate Ukraine through massive civilian targeting is indisputable, democracies must remain resolved that no pathway back to “business as usual” with Russia exists. Encouragingly, even Western leaders who were slower to accept the permanent schisms caused by Russia’s full-scale invasion are now signaling their commitment to Ukrainian victory. Nevertheless, Putin must be prevented from snatching limited successes from the jaws of defeat. Western political courage to boost defense production and avoid incrementalism must match the historical significance of the moment.

On the information front, Western leaders must champion the strategic importance of Ukraine’s full victory to their constituents. This is vital as Putin excels in propaganda that blames the victims of his revanchism instead of his own strategic incompetence and callous cruelty. Finally, without judicial prosecution of Putin and the return of trafficked Ukrainians including children, a hollow victory would demonstrate to other authoritarians that they can operate without full accountability.

Michael Bociurkiw, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council: Let’s be blunt. Had former US President Barack Obama responded to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 with lethal weaponry for Ukraine instead of sanctions, Russian forces wouldn’t be in Ukraine at the moment. It was a miscalculation of historical proportions, the consequences of which Ukrainians and regional neighbors are forced to live with to this day.

Putin’s hopes of victory hinge on what happens between now and the next major Russian offensive. Russian forces are reportedly beefing up their air strength in Belarus and other areas close to Ukraine. Moscow, taking advantage of the gap before Western main battle tanks arrive, could succumb to the temptation to strike with a mix of waves of men, cruise missiles, modified Iranian-built drones, and cyber attacks.

The biggest challenge now is for the West to expedite shipments of ammunition, tanks, and missiles to the Ukrainian battlefront. It is regrettable that it took Western leaders so much time to send lethal weaponry to Ukraine; deliveries should now include missiles capable of striking legitimate military targets within Russia.

A huge obstacle to a victory for Putin in Ukraine is the irrepressible resilience of the Ukrainian people. Day in and day out over the past year, I’ve witnessed first-hand how the residents of Odesa and elsewhere in Ukraine have turned fear into anger and hopelessness into optimism. It is a response which, more than weaponry and sanctions, will deny Putin the ability to dictate the future arc of history.

Andreas Umland, Analyst, Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies: It is still possible to imagine a number of Russian military offensives with the potential to achieve victory. For instance, Russia could make an attempt to cut Ukraine off from vital supply lines of weapons flowing into the country across the western border with the EU. So far, there is little indication of any preparations for such an ambitious operation, which may indicate that it is simply beyond Russia’s current military capabilities.

Another option available to the Kremlin would be a mass killing event designed to shock Ukraine into surrender, such as the use of nuclear weapons or an orchestrated accident at a dam or nuclear power plant. However, desperate measures of this kind would be unlikely to break Ukrainian resistance and could easily have the opposite effect. This approach would also run the risk of stiffening Western resolve while alienating many of Russia’s remaining partners such as China and India.

With the war now entering its second year, Putin’s chances of achieving a decisive military victory are clearly fading. If the Russian army’s fortunes continue to deteriorate in the coming months, Ukraine and its international partners should brace themselves for massive pressure from Moscow as the Kremlin seeks to secure a ceasefire.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Undermining Ukraine

Roman Osadchuk, Andy Carvin — Wed, 22 Feb 2023 12:16:08 +0000

The post Undermining Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Our experts decode the Putin speech that launched Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Nancy Messieh — Wed, 22 Feb 2023 12:00:00 +0000

When Vladimir Putin looked directly into the camera at 5:30 AM Moscow time one year ago and announced a “special military operation” in Ukraine, it shocked the world, though the Russian military buildup had been evident for months.

Another buildup had happened in parallel, and to those monitoring it Putin’s predawn speech was somewhat less surprising. A flood of propaganda had cleared the way for the Russian onslaught that turned the Donbas conflict into an all-out war of aggression: false, misleading narratives coming from Putin, official Kremlin channels, and pro-Kremlin Russian media outlets. In his speech, Putin hammered home five main themes, variations of which had echoed throughout the Russian media ecosystem since the 2014 Donbas incursion:

“Russia is seeking peace”
“Russia has a moral obligation to do something about security in the region”
“Ukraine is aggressive” (including attempts to associate Ukraine with terrorism, Nazis, and weapons of mass destruction)
“The West is creating tensions in the region”
“Ukraine is a puppet of the West”

The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab has tracked Russian activity in Ukraine and Russian propaganda online since 2014. After Putin’s twenty-eight-minute litany of falsehoods, distortions, and excuses, and the full-scale war of aggression it launched, the DFRLab’s experts and researchers began a landmark study of the narrative warfare Putin has waged against Ukraine, cataloguing and analyzing the misinformation Russia weaponized. In an analysis of the February 24 speech transcript, the team found that Putin referred more than two hundred times to the pro-Kremlin narratives, escalatory events, and emotional themes that played a key role in the run-up to the war. The speech was carefully crafted to place the blame on Ukraine, the United States, and NATO, while framing Russia as desiring peace but now taking military action as a moral responsibility.

Don’t miss the full studies, Narrative Warfare and Undermining Ukraine, which delve deeper into Putin’s propaganda strategy, and consider what the future holds in terms of holding Russia accountable for its weaponization of information to engage in a war of aggression against Ukraine.

Below, revisit the speech that launched Putin’s war against Ukraine by clicking on a highlighted passage to see the related narratives tracked by the DFRLab:

Report Feb 22, 2023

Narrative warfare

By Nika Aleksejeva, Andy Carvin

In the weeks and months leading up to Russia invading Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Kremlin and pro-Kremlin media employed false and misleading narratives to justify military action against Ukraine, mask the Kremlin’s operational planning, and deny any responsibility for the coming war. Dive into a full accounting of the road to war.

Disinformation Russia

Report Feb 22, 2023

Undermining Ukraine

By Roman Osadchuk, Andy Carvin

From the very start of the war, the Kremlin emphasized demoralizing Ukrainian audiences and destroying their will to fight. Building on daily monitoring of the Kremlin media ecosystem, this report analyzes Russia’s attempts to undermine Ukraine by targeting local, regional, and global audiences since February 2022.

Disinformation Russia

The post Our experts decode the Putin speech that launched Russia’s invasion of Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Disinformation - Atlantic Council

Russian War Report: Wagner is still in business in Africa

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Wagner putsch is symptomatic of Russia’s ongoing imperial decline

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Putin’s nuclear threats will escalate as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds

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Russian War Report: Kremlin denies that it targeted civilians in a missile attack on a pizza restaurant

Security

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International Response

Military camps for Wagner reportedly under construction in Belarus

Pro-Kremlin sources spreading disinformation to justify missile strike in Kramatorsk

Kremlin blames Colombian victims for the injuries they sustained in the Kramatorsk attack

Prigozhin’s online assets reportedly blocked in Russia

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Analysis: With Wagner mutiny, Russia loses plausible deniability about its involvement in Africa

Investigation sheds light on how Putin’s childhood friends allegedly evade sanctions

The disinformation landscape in West Africa and beyond

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