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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Today’s Ukraine is often described as a testing ground for new military technologies, but it is important to stress that Ukrainians are active participants in this process who are in many instances leading the way with new innovations ranging from combat drones to artillery apps. This ethos is exemplified by initiatives such as BRAVE1, which was launched by the Ukrainian authorities in 2023 as a hub for cooperation between state, military, and private sector developers to address defense issues and create cutting-edge military technologies. BRAVE1 has dramatically cut down the amount of time and paperwork required for private sector tech companies to begin working directly with the military; according to Ukraine’s defense minister, this waiting period has been reduced from two years to just one-and-a-half months.

One example of Ukrainian tech innovation for the military is the Geographic Information System for Artillery (GIS Arta) tool developed in Ukraine in the years prior to Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion. This system, which some have dubbed the “Uber for artillery,” optimizes across variables like target type, position, and range to assign “fire missions” to available artillery units. Battlefield insights of this nature have helped Ukraine to compensate for its significant artillery hardware disadvantage. The effectiveness of tools like GIS Arta has caught the attention of Western military planners, with a senior Pentagon official saying Ukraine’s use of technology in the current war is a “wake-up call.”

Alongside intensifying cooperation with the state and the military, members of Ukraine’s tech sector are also taking a proactive approach on the digital front of the war with Russia. A decentralized IT army, consisting of over 250,000 IT volunteers at its peak, has been formed to counter Russian digital threats. Moreover, the country’s underground hacktivist groups have shown an impressive level of digital ingenuity. For example, Ukraine’s IT army claims to have targeted critical Russian infrastructure such as railways and the electricity grid.

Ukraine’s tech industry has been a major asset in the fightback against Russia’s invasion, providing a much-needed economic boost while strengthening the country’s cyber defenses and supplying the Ukrainian military with the innovative edge to counter Russia’s overwhelming advantages in manpower and military equipment.

This experience could also be critical to Ukraine’s coming postwar recovery. The Ukrainian tech industry looks set to emerge from the war stronger than ever with a significantly enhanced global reputation. Crucially, the unique experience gained by Ukrainian tech companies in the defense tech sector will likely position Ukraine as a potential industry leader, with countries around the world eager to learn from Ukrainian specialists and access Ukrainian military tech solutions. This could serve as a key driver of economic growth for many years to come, while also improving Ukrainian national security.

David Kirichenko is an editor at Euromaidan Press, an online English language media outlet in Ukraine. He tweets @DVKirichenko.

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Russia’s remarkably relaxed reaction to the NATO accession of Finland and Sweden stands in stark contrast to the hysteria over Ukraine’s far less substantial ties to the military alliance. In the months leading up to Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin and other Kremlin leaders told the world that the escalating crisis was due to years of provocative NATO expansion, while warning that deepening ties between the Alliance and Ukraine represented a red line. In reality, however, Ukraine in early 2022 was not even remotely close to joining NATO. Far from pursuing Ukraine, the Alliance had repeatedly sidestepped appeals from Kyiv for a Membership Action Plan, refusing to offer even a clear signal regarding future accession. On the eve of Russia’s invasion, the most optimistic forecasts indicated that Ukraine’s dream of joining NATO was still decades away.

It is hard to see any military logic behind the dramatically different Russian reactions to NATO’s Nordic enlargement and the Alliance’s involvement in Ukraine. After all, while a theoretical future NATO presence inside Ukraine could pose a range of major headaches for military planners in Moscow, the recent accession of Finland has already doubled the length of Russia’s shared border with the Alliance overnight. Swedish membership will arguably be even more consequential for Russia, transforming the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake. If Russia is so apparently unconcerned by these very real military challenges, why was Putin prepared to launch the biggest European war since World War II over the far more distant prospect of Ukrainian NATO membership?

It is clear from Putin’s own actions that he understands perfectly well NATO will never attack Russia. This should come as no surprise. Indeed, the entire notion of NATO invading Russia is recognized as absurd by all but the terminally swivel-eyed. This does not mean Russian objections to NATO’s post-1991 enlargement are entirely insincere; on the contrary, the growing presence of the Alliance in the former Eastern Bloc over the past thirty years is perhaps the leading source of geopolitical bitterness and resentment throughout the Russian establishment. However, it is critical to clarify that this indignation has nothing to do with legitimate security concerns. NATO is not a threat to Russian security; NATO is a threat to Russian foreign policy because it prevents Russia from bullying its neighbors. In other words, NATO enlargement is no more or less provocative than a burglar alarm is to a thief.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

None of this has prevented Putin from using the NATO issue as a smokescreen for his imperial ambitions. For years, he has skillfully exploited anti-Western sentiment and widespread international suspicion of US foreign policy to distract from Russia’s own acts of international aggression. This tactic has proved remarkably successful; in the seventeen months since Russian troops began the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a wide range of academics, commentators, and politicians around the world have all echoed Putin in blaming NATO for provoking the war. They have continued to do so even as Putin himself has compared his invasion to the imperial conquests of eighteenth-century Russian Czar Peter the Great.

The fact that so many prominent personalities remain ready to accept Russia’s dishonest NATO narrative is evidence of fundamental misconceptions regarding the role of the Alliance and the nature of its post-Cold War enlargement. NATO is routinely depicted by critics as an expansionist military institution seeking to impose Western dominance, but this is entirely at odds with the growth of the Alliance over the past three decades. Nobody has ever been forced to join NATO; instead, every single new member since 1991 has asked for membership and has been obliged to meet a series of strict standards in order to qualify. Indeed, the loaded term “NATO expansion” may itself be misleading, as unlike Russia, the Alliance only ever expands on a voluntary basis. It is also worth underlining that while Putin plays the victim card and complains of being encircled, fear of Russian aggression has been by far the leading cause of all new membership applications.

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine now approaching the one-and-a-half-year mark, it is time to retire the NATO narrative. Putin has demonstrated that he is not at all threatened by the growing presence of the Alliance on Russia’s northwestern border, and is increasingly open about his imperial agenda in Ukraine. It is this Russian imperialism that poses a grave threat to international security, not the defensive guarantees offered by NATO.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The similarity between the imperial and Soviet views is unmistakable, albeit with one dissonant nuance: Soviet nationality policy, while doing all it could to erase Ukrainian national identity, at the same time officially recognized the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a state entity and Ukrainians as a separate nationality. Putin has been highly critical of Lenin for this approach, and has claimed the Bolshevik leader was personally responsible for “creating” Ukraine. This line of thinking reached what may be seen as its logical conclusion with Putin’s insistence that Ukrainians and Russians are “one people.” By denying the existence of a separate Ukrainian national identity, Putin brought the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood into question and set the stage for the current war.

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Russian misconceptions about Ukraine are in part due to the simplistic notion that ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine, as well as those who express an affinity for Russian culture or share Russia’s antagonism toward the EU, NATO, and the West in general, all fall within the same “pro-Russian” category. Likewise, Many Russians have been all too ready to assume that any Ukrainian expressing nostalgia for the Soviet era is waiting to be “liberated” by Moscow. These misconceptions have been echoed by numerous commentators in the West, who have similarly treated evidence of favorable Ukrainian attitudes toward modern Russia or the Soviet past as indications of a desire for some form of Russian reunion.

In reality, being “pro-Russian” is understood one way in Ukrainian cities like Donetsk, Kramatorsk, or Mariupol, and quite differently in Moscow, Omsk, or Tomsk. During the initial stages of Russian aggression against Ukraine in April 2014, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology conducted a wide-ranging poll in the eight southeastern Ukrainian provinces (excluding Crimea) targeted by the Kremlin. This revealed that 70 percent of respondents were against separation from Ukraine and unification with Russia, while just 15 percent were in favor.

If separation from Ukraine was not on their wish list, what did they in fact want? A relative majority of 45 percent preferred the decentralization of power and greater rights for their region; another 25 percent favored a federated Ukraine, while only 19 percent were happy with the existing relationship with Kyiv. Other surveys conducted at around the same time yielded similar findings.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Unsurprisingly, Russia’s full-scale invasion has further shaped Ukrainian attitudes toward issues of national identity. Today, the people of Ukraine are more consolidated as a political nation than at any time since regaining independence more than thirty years ago. According to the Razumkov Centre, 94 percent of respondents in a May 2023 survey expressed pride in their Ukrainian citizenship; 74 percent expressed feelings of patriotism and love for their country; and 71 percent were ready to come to its defense, either with weapons in hand or as participants in volunteer support groups.

Meanwhile, negative attitudes toward Russia and Russian citizens have skyrocketed. At the end of 2019, only 20 percent of Ukrainians held negative attitudes toward Russians; six months after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in September 2022, 80 percent of respondents asserted that they would not allow Russians into Ukraine. In terms of attitudes toward Russia, the turnaround has been even more drastic. In early February 2022, about a week before the Russian invasion, 34 percent of Ukrainians held positive views of Russia. That number dropped to just two percent three months later, with 92 percent saying they viewed the country in a negative light.

With the war clearly going badly for the Kremlin, there could now be a glimmer of hope for some reality-based adjustments to Russian illusions about Ukraine. Russian MP Konstanin Zatulin, who is well known for championing the plight of Russian “compatriots” abroad and promoting aggressive policies toward Ukraine, has recently questioned the wisdom of denying Ukrainian identity. “I would be happy if there was no Ukraine, but if we continue to constantly repeat that there is no Ukraine and no Ukrainians,” this will only strengthen their resistance on the battlefield, he noted at a June 2023 forum in Moscow.

Zatulin’s comments hint at growing recognition in Russia that widely held beliefs about Ukraine’s indivisibility from Russia are both inaccurate and unhelpful. However, resistance to the entire notion of Ukrainian statehood is so deeply ingrained in Russian society that it may take generations before the attitudes underpinning the current war are no longer dominant.

Roman Solchanyk is author of “Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition” (2001). He has previously served as a senior analyst at the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute and the RAND Corporation.

Kroenig in Foreign Policy on Machiavelli’s Art of War

sodal — Tue, 18 Jul 2023 15:24:54 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On July 16, Scowcroft Vice President and Director Matthew Kroenig was featured in Foreign Policy’s 2023 Summer Reading List, recommending Niccolò Machiavelli’s Art of War. Despite it being published in the 16th century, Kroenig argues that it has contemporary relevance in its discussion of emerging technologies that will revolutionize security, militaries, and war. After all, the famed political thinker faced the same issues surrounding firearms and artillery that modern militaries face with artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and hypersonic missiles.

If one of the world’s greatest minds could not fully appreciate the transformative effects of gunpowder on the battlefield, then it is likely that we, too, lack sufficient imagination to fully conceptualize the disruptive wars to which we will bear witness in our futures.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in Foreign Policy on Machiavelli’s Art of War appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Tantardini in Longitude on the future of human spaceflight

Atlantic Council — Mon, 17 Jul 2023 14:58:28 +0000

In the June 2023 Issue of Longitude, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Marco Tantardini published an article on the complexity of recovering manned spacecraft from orbit and landing them on other bodies in the solar system.

Further than the Moon is Mars, where only the US and China have been capable of diving into the thin and tricky atmosphere and landing a robotic spacecraft without crashing.

Marco Tantardini

Fellow

Marco Tantardini

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Italy Space

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

The post Tantardini in Longitude on the future of human spaceflight appeared first on Atlantic Council.

After Wagner: Could the Russian army now turn against Putin?

Mercedes Sapuppo — Thu, 13 Jul 2023 20:52:09 +0000

The Wagner mutiny in late June was a brief affair, but it is casting a long shadow over Putin’s Russia. In less than forty-eight hours, Wagner chief Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his troops succeeded in shattering the carefully constructed myth of Putin the strongman, while exposing the weakness at the heart of his regime. Although the immediate danger has passed, many now believe it is only a matter of time before the Russian dictator faces new threats to his authority. However, with all genuine political opposition inside Russia long since eliminated, the real question is: Who could realistically challenge Putin?

It is easy to understand why many observers believe Putin is currently weaker than at any time in his entire twenty-three-year reign. During their short-lived uprising, Wagner forces managed to capture one of Russia’s largest cities, Rostov-on-Don, without a fight. A column of Wagner troops then advanced across Russia virtually unopposed, coming to within 200 kilometers of Moscow before choosing to turn back. As the drama unfolded, neither the Russian establishment nor the public rallied around Putin, who was conspicuously absent. Instead, there were widespread reports of panic across the country, while crowds in Rostov actively cheered Wagner troops.

The exact nature of the deal that ended the mutiny remains unclear, but the few details that are publicly known have done little to repair the damage done to Putin’s reputation. Neither Wagner leader Prigozhin nor his soldiers have been arrested or otherwise punished for their revolt, despite the fact that they downed a number of Russian aircraft and killed Russian servicemen. Instead, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has recently confirmed that Putin personally met with Prigozhin and dozens of other Wagner commanders just five days after the mutiny. Remarkably, Peskov revealed that Putin spoke about future job opportunities during his three-hour discussion with the leaders of the mutiny.

Putin’s apparent readiness to compromise has created the impression of a vulnerable dictator who lacks both the support and the military strength to follow through on his earlier vow to “crush” the mutiny. This has led to widespread speculation that the Wagner revolt may now inspire other anti-regime uprisings. In a 9 July interview with ABC News, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy suggested the Wagner mutiny might serve as a catalyst for further domestic destabilization in Russia. “There is a signal that there might be another mutiny in Russia, a revolution,” he noted. “More than that, there are many people who might support such a mutiny.”

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Who could lead the next uprising? One obvious candidate is Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. Like Wagner chief Prigozhin, Kadyrov enjoys a high degree of autonomy and has large numbers of troops under his personal command. With the Kremlin’s blessing, he rules Chechnya as his personal fiefdom. He also has a long history of clashes with Russian governmental institutions and has joined Prigozhin in criticizing the conduct of the war in Ukraine. However, Kadyrov was ultimately one of the few prominent figures to publicly back Putin during the Wagner mutiny, and also sent Chechen fighters to Rostov-on-Don.

Kadyrov’s eagerness to support Putin was telling. While he might have the manpower and independence to take action challenging Putin’s power, it is not clear that he sees any advantage in doing so. Secure in his autonomy, Kadyrov may have calculated that it would be more beneficial to preserve his place in the current system than to back a risky rebellion with uncertain prospects.

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New narrative accuses US and Ukraine of planning false flag attack on Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

A more substantial challenge to the Putin regime may yet emerge from within the ranks of Russia’s increasingly disgruntled military. The Kremlin’s meek response to the Wagner mutiny has exacerbated already declining morale among Russian troops and commanders currently serving in Ukraine.

For more than half a year, a steady stream of video addresses posted to social media by Russian soldiers complaining of suicidal orders and catastrophic losses have pointed to growing demoralization. Meanwhile, recent developments indicate that dissatisfaction with the Kremlin has now reached the level of senior commanders. A July 13 report in the Wall Street Journal claimed that numerous high-ranking officers including top Russian general Sergei Surovikin had been detained in the wake of the Wagner revolt. Surovikin, who formerly commanded the Russian invasion of Ukraine, is reportedly still being held and interrogated in Moscow over possible links to the mutiny.

In a further sign of mounting tension within Putin’s military, a senior Russian commander in charge of forces based in southern Ukraine claimed on July 12 that he had been suddenly dismissed from his post after raising the alarm over the mismanagement of the invasion. In a recorded audio statement, General Ivan Popov accused Russia’s military leadership of “treacherously and vilely decapitating the army at the most difficult and tense moment.”

Popov’s explosive accusations suggest that many in the Kremlin prefer to silence critics within the Russian military rather than address uncomfortable truths about the war in Ukraine. Unless this problematic approach is abandoned, it is likely to fuel further anger among front line commanders and troops as casualties continue to mount amid Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive.

If disgruntled officers and demoralized soldiers from the regular Russian army do turn against the Putin regime, they may be joined by thousands of former Wagner fighters along with members of Russia’s many other private military companies. These mercenary formations typically enjoy a significant degree of operational independence from the Kremlin and will have noted with interest the precedent set by the apparent lack of negative consequences following the Wagner mutiny.

For more than two decades, Vladimir Putin has ruthlessly suppressed any potential sources of domestic opposition to his rule. With the Russian media muzzled and his political opponents imprisoned, exiled, or dead, the force most capable of mounting a serious challenge to the regime is the Russian military. Putin has been careful to keep loyalists in top positions, but as the invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel, there are growing indications of disaffection among both commanders and troops. With Russian generals now reportedly being detained and dismissed, the scale of the threat should not be underestimated. In the months ahead, this may lead to fresh challenges to Putin’s rule that will dwarf the Wagner mutiny.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Media policy

Former employees share details about Prigozhin’s media group and troll farms

Kremlin-owned RT offers jobs to former employees of Prigozhin’s troll factory

Russian missile strike in Lviv kills ten civilians, injures dozens

At least ten people were killed and thirty-seven injured in Russia’s July 6 attack on Lviv, in western Ukraine. Regional Governor Maksym Kozytskyy said that a Russian missile struck a residential building in the city, destroying more than fifty apartments.

Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to launch offensive actions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Ukrainian forces reported thirty-eight combat engagements against Russian troops near Novoselivske, Novohryhorivka, Berkhivka, Bohdanivka, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka. In the direction of Lyman, Russian forces shelled Nevske, Bilohorivka, Torske, Verkhnokamyanske, and Rozdolivka in Donetsk. Russian aviation conducted an airstrike in Bilohorivka. Russia also attacked villages in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts, including Levadne, Olhivske, Malynivka, Huliaipole, and Bilohirka. On July 6, Russian troops shelled Chervonohryhorivka and Nikopol, damaging civilian infrastructure.

On July 5, reports from Russian military bloggers suggested that Ukrainian forces had advanced southwest of Berkhivka, west of Yahidne, and southwest of Bakhmut. The Ukrainian army said it conducted offensive operations south and north of Bakhmut and is moving on Bakhmut’s southern flank. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that the Ukrainian army conducted offensive operations near Lyman, Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka front, on the border between Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk, and in western Zaporizhzhia.

The Ukrainian army appears to have launched a coordinated attack on Russian army logistical and communications hubs. On July 4, Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an ammunition depot in occupied Makiivka, Donetsk. Russian sources claimed without evidence that Ukraine had struck a hospital. Former Russian army commander Igor Strelkov, also known as Igor Girkin, said the attack demonstrates how Ukraine regularly launches missile strikes against Russian rear targets. Other unconfirmed reports from July 5 indicate Ukraine may have struck Russian positions near Debaltseve. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces hit Russian positions near Yakymivka in the Melitopol area and attempted to strike Berdyansk in the Zaporizhzhia region.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

New narrative accuses US and Ukraine of planning false flag attack on Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

Ahead of next week’s NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, allegations that the United States and Ukraine will launch a false flag operation on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant are spreading on various platforms, including Twitter, 4chan, and Instagram. The allegations seemingly aim to create panic and, in the event of a future attack on the plant, establish a narrative the West and Ukraine are to blame.

On July 3, a post appeared on 4chan from an anonymous user who introduced himself as a US Marine Corps veteran now working for the government in electronic espionage. The user claimed that the Ukrainian and US governments are working together to bomb the Zaporizhzhia power plant. According to the conspiracy theory, after the false flag operation, the United States will be able to use “nuclear warheads” against Russia. At the time of writing, the post had been deleted from 4chan. However, similar posts remain on the platform.

Screencap of an anonymous 4chan post claiming the US and Ukraine are planning a false flag attack. (Source: 4chan)

However, the false flag claims did not originate on 4chan. Russian Twitter accounts posted similar claims building the false flag narrative. After the 4chan post, the claim circulated again on Twitter.

A similar narrative was also shared by Renat Karchaa, an adviser to Rosenergoatom, a subsidiary of the Russian state nuclear agency Rosatom. Karchaa claimed on Russian state television channel Russia-24 that on the night of July 5, the Ukrainian army would attempt an attack on the Zaporizhzhia plant. Without evidence, he accused the United States and the West of planning a false flag incident to damage Russia’s reputation. The claims were further amplified by Russian state media outlets.

The allegations escalated on social media after July 4, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy repeated Ukraine’s concerns about the status of the nuclear power plant. In an address, Zelenskyy restated that Russia plans to attack the plant and that Russian troops have placed explosive-like objects on the building’s roof. In June, Ukrainian military intelligence made similar claims when it reported that the plant’s cooling pond had been mined by Russian troops.

On July 5, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that it was aware of reports that mines and other explosives had been placed around the plant. The IAEA said their experts inspected parts of the facility and did not observe any visible indications of mines or explosives. IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi added, “The IAEA experts requested additional access that is necessary to confirm the absence of mines or explosives at the site.” On July 7, the IAEA announced that Russia had granted its experts further access, “without – so far – observing any visible indications of mines or explosives.”

—Sayyara Mammadova, research assistant, Warsaw, Poland

Former employees share details about Prigozhin’s media group and troll farms

Several independent Russian media outlets published stories this week interviewing former employees of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Patriot Media Group, which dissolved on June 30.

In a video published on Telegram, Yevgeny Zubarev, director of Patriot Media Group’s RIA FAN, said the goal was to “work against the opposition, such as Alexei Navalny and others who wanted to destroy our country.” Zubarev confirmed key details previously reported by independent Russian journalists at Novaya Gazeta in 2013 and the now-Kremlin-controlled RBC in 2017 about the existence of paid commentators and the creation of Prigozhin-affiliated media outlets. Zubarev added that, after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2018 re-election, the group hired “foreign affairs observers.” The timing corresponds with attempts by Prigozhin’s Internet Research Agency to meddle in the 2020 US presidential election.

Further, independent Russian media outlets Sever.Realii, Bumaga, and Novaya Gazeta interviewed former employees of Prigozhin’s media group. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, the former employees confirmed that Prigozhin’s “troll factory” and “media factory” conducted coordinated information attacks on opposition leaders, published fabricated or purchased news “exclusives,” praised Putin, and deliberately ignored particular individuals who criticized Wagner Group. Bumaga and Sever.Realii described a smear campaign against Saint Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov. In 2019, Prigozhin’s media group supported and promoted Beglov, but in 2021, Prigozhin reportedly launched a smear campaign, as Beglov allegedly prevented him from developing a waste collection business in the city. Novaya Gazeta’s report also provided evidence that Prigozhin’s troll farm activities extended beyond Russia, with employees portraying skinheads and fascists in the Baltic region, specifically in Lithuania.

In recent years, additional revelations about Prigozhin’s media group have come to light. For example, Bumaga reported that prospective hires had to pass a “lie detector test” in which “security service specialists” asked candidates about their attitudes toward the opposition and Alexei Navalny in particular. Once hired, employees were closely surveilled. One former employee Bumaga interviewed characterized the atmosphere as being in a “closed military company.” Both Bumaga and Novaya Gazeta’s interviewees said that most of the employees did not believe in the mission. In one example, an employee left after refusing to launch a smear campaign against Ivan Golunov, a journalist at the independent news outlet Meduza who was detained in 2019 under false pretenses. Bumaga, citing an unnamed former employee, also reported that at one point an employee had hacked the system, erased a database, and fled to Poland. The same interviewee claimed they employed two Telegram administrators who also administered pro-Ukraine channels.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

Kremlin-owned RT offers jobs to former employees of Prigozhin’s troll factory

RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan offered to hire employees of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Patriot Media Group, which reportedly housed his troll factories. In the latest episode of the program Keosayan Daily, Simonyan praised the work of “Wagner’s media empire.” She said their work “was super professional” and that anyone left without a job can join “them,” referring to Russian propaganda outlets. She added, “We know you as professional colleagues of ours.”

The fate of Patriot’s former employees is being actively discussed in Russia. According to Russian outlet Novie Izverstia, Pavel Gusev, editor-in-chief of the pro-Kremlin outlet MK.ru, volunteered to help find jobs for former employees of Patriot. In addition, the chairman of the Saint Petersburg branch of the Union of Journalists of Russia stated that the union would contact the heads of media outlets to help find opportunities for dismissed employees and would provide additional informational support.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Russian conspiracy alleges false flag at Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wagner fallout: Time to begin preparing for a post-Putin Russia

Oleksiy Goncharenko — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 20:48:03 +0000

The recent revolt by Russia’s Wagner Group was a short-lived affair but the repercussions continue to be felt throughout the Russian Federation and beyond. Perhaps the biggest single lesson from the aborted coup is the fragility of the Putin regime. For many years, the Kremlin has sought to present Vladimir Putin as a powerful and popular ruler exercising complete control over a loyal and disciplined power vertical. The Wagner uprising has now shattered this myth of Putin the strongman.

Ever since coming to power at the turn of the millennium, Putin has sought to portray himself as an uncompromising and macho leader. He has frequently employed vulgar slang when promising to dispatch his opponents, and has notoriously engaged in a series of PR stunts including posing topless on horseback and scuba-diving to “discover” ancient Greek urns. However, there was little sign of this tough guy persona during the early stages of the Wagner revolt in late June. As Wagner troops captured Rostov-on-Don and began to march on Moscow, the Russian dictator was nowhere to be seen. He did not appear until the second day of the mutiny, when he delivered a brief video address.

The Kremlin appears to recognize the seriousness of the situation, and has since embarked on an intensive post-putsch PR offensive designed to repair public perceptions of Putin. In the days following the Wagner drama, the Russian dictator has made a flurry of carefully choreographed appearances emphasizing national unity and regime stability. However, this sudden burst of activity has only served to highlight the damage done by Putin’s earlier absence. In a little over twenty-four hours, the Putin regime was exposed as significantly weaker than almost anybody had previously imagined. Despite the best efforts of the Kremlin propaganda machine, this fact is plain as day to both the international community and the Russian elite.

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Nobody will have failed to notice that while Putin has continued to talk tough, he failed to crush the Wagner uprising and instead struck some kind of deal with Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his mutinous troops. Putin demonstrated a readiness to compromise despite the fact that Wagner fighters reportedly shot down a number of Russian aircraft and killed numerous Russian airmen. This indicated an apparent lack of concern for the lives of Russian servicemen at a time when tens of thousands of Russian soldiers have already been killed as a result of Putin’s fateful decision to invade Ukraine.

The brief Wagner uprising also revealed a remarkable shortage of Russian military strength and fighting spirit on the home front. Wagner troops were able to seize one of Russia’s largest cities, Rostov-on-Don, without a fight. Perhaps even more significantly, they were cheered and supported by crowds of locals. Wagner forces then advanced to within 200 kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed before choosing to turn back.

Meanwhile, there was no surge in street-level or elite support for Putin. Instead, pro-war propagandists fell largely silent as rumors swirled of establishment figures fleeing Moscow. For a brief period, Russia looked to be leaderless and defenseless. The immediate danger has now passed, but these stunning developments have changed attitudes toward Putin and his regime in fundamental ways.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

It would appear that history repeats itself. Just as in 1990 very few foresaw the looming collapse of the USSR, Russia now once again looks suddenly fragile. Unsurprisingly, this is regarded as good news in Ukraine, where any sign of Russian instability is welcomed. Attitudes elsewhere are not so clear-cut. Many international observers are openly alarmed by the potential demise of the Russian Federation in its current form. They worry about the fate of Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal, and also question the legitimacy of the many new states that could potentially emerge from the wreckage of Putin’s Russia.

These concerns mirror attitudes during the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union. Indeed, it is often forgotten that US President George Bush H. W. Bush came to Kyiv in the weeks before Ukraine’s August 1991 declaration of independence to argue against such a move in his “Chicken Kiev” speech. Many of today’s leaders share these fears over the potential disintegration of Russia. Nevertheless, the Wagner revolt has demonstrated that the Putin regime may well collapse due to its own internal weaknesses, regardless of the Western world’s wishes.

Elements of the international community, including in the West, also cling to the idea of reaching some kind of compromise and returning to business as usual with Russia. While it is obvious to almost everyone in Ukraine and in nearby countries including Poland and the Baltic states that Russia will only stop when it is decisively defeated, there are still many observers elsewhere who believe they can turn back the clock to 2021 or even 2013. They fondly recall a time when Vladimir Putin was the respected leader of a economically strong nation at the heart of global affairs, and dream of returning to this state of affairs. Such thinking is dangerously delusional.

In reality, there can be no way back to international respectability for Putin. As a result of the disastrous invasion of Ukraine, he will be an enemy of the entire Western world for as long as he remains in power. Crucially for the future of his regime, Putin is also clearly no longer able to guarantee domestic security or protect the interests of the Russian elite on the international stage.

As the international community assesses the fallout from the Wagner revolt, it no longer makes sense to be afraid of a new Russian collapse. On the contrary, the time has come to begin preparing for the possibility of a post-Putin Russia. Western policymakers should now be thinking seriously about how to make any future transition as smooth as possible. This means preparing for the emergence of a democratic Russia, and also exploring what a breakup of the current Russian Federation into a number of smaller states would mean for international security.

When similar processes were underway in the early 1990s, the international community prioritized stability above all else, paving the way for the eventual rise of a revisionist Russia under Putin. This time, a new Russian collapse should be managed in order to bring about a sustainable shift toward democracy. The experience of the past three decades has demonstrated that this is the only way to secure a durable peace. Today’s Western leaders must learn from the mistakes of their predecessors in order to avoid repeating them.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a member of the Ukrainian parliament with the European Solidarity party.

Kroenig and Miller in Foreign Policy on democratic renewal at home and abroad

sodal — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 20:40:10 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On July 4, Scowcroft Center senior director and vice president Matthew Kroenig and Scowcroft Center assistant director Danielle Miller penned a review of Charles Dunst’s new book, Defeating the Dictators: How Democracy Can Prevail in the Age of the Strongman, in Foreign Policy. In it, they discuss how democracies can outperform autocracies and maintain their edge.

If democracies want to maintain their edge in the global competition against autocracies… they will need to identify their own deficits and remedy them. Only when democracies are flourishing at home can they maximize their power and influence abroad—and convince the world that the democratic model is one to be admired and emulated.

Matthew Kroenig and Danielle Miler

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Matthew Kroenig

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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Danielle Miller

Assistant Director

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Wagner putsch is symptomatic of Russia’s ongoing imperial decline

Richard Cashman, Lesia Ogryzko — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 20:14:43 +0000

The attempted putsch by Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his Wagner troops in late June is perhaps best understood as a symptom of Russia’s ongoing imperial decline. Much like the invasion of Ukraine itself, it is part of a broader historical process that can be traced back to 1989 and the fall of the Soviet incarnation of the Russian Empire in Central and Eastern Europe.

Anyone looking to make sense of recent events in Russia should begin by noting that Prigozhin’s dramatic actions were not aimed at ending the war in Ukraine or steering Russia away from its increasingly totalitarian course. On the contrary, he sought to correct mistakes in the conduct of the invasion by effecting changes in the country’s military leadership.

This should come as no surprise. The vast majority of Prigozhin’s public statements about the invasion of Ukraine align him with prominent ultranationalists, which in the Russian context translates into imperial reactionaries. This group is demanding a fuller commitment to the war against Ukraine which, with Belarus, it sees as the core of Russia’s imperial heartlands. Ideally, this group wants to see full mobilization of Russia’s citizens and the country’s productive capacity for the war effort.

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Prigozhin is not generally regarded as a member of Putin’s inner circle, but he is believed to have supporters within the Kremlin elite, some of whom may have backed or sympathized with his uprising. This support reflects widespread demands among members of the Russian establishment for national leadership that can arrest and reverse the process of imperial retreat which began in 1989.

It is also clear that Prigozhin enjoyed significant backing from ordinary Russians and, probably, ordinary soldiers. Support for Prigozhin amongst the Russian public is rooted in anger over the mismanagement of the invasion and endemic state corruption along with dissatisfaction over the prospect of increasing costs without identifiable gains in Ukraine.

The scale of public sympathy for the putsch could be seen in videos of Rostov-on-Don residents congratulating Wagner troops on capturing the city while bringing them food and water. It was also striking that Rostov-on-Don and its Southern Military District headquarters were seized without a fight, while Wagner troops were able to advance to within two hundred kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed, despite passing close to numerous Russian army bases. Prigozhin’s tough rhetoric and hawkish attacks on Russia’s military leadership clearly resonate widely among large numbers of ordinary Russians.

Prigozhin’s abruptly abandoned putsch reinforces the lesson that coups are relatively common in Russia, whereas genuine revolutions are not. Vladimir Putin and the clan which took control of Russia at the turn of the millennium in many ways see themselves as the heirs to the 1991 coup plotters who attempted but failed to prevent the unravelling of the USSR. Their own vulnerability to being overthrown in similar fashion has now been laid bare before the Russian public and the wider world.

The course of the war to date, including cross-border incursions by Ukrainian-backed Russian militias into Russia’s Belgorod and Bryansk regions, had already fractured the facade of monolithic strength so carefully projected by the Kremlin throughout Putin’s twenty-three-year reign. Prigozhin’s putsch has further exposed the brittleness of the regime and of the Russian state. It has highlighted the very real possibility of turmoil and transformation within the country, which so many observers previously thought impossible.

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Policymakers around the world must now prepare for a range of dramatic scenarios in Putin’s Russia. This planning should involve studying the more than 100 nationalities within the Russian Federation, their cultures and political aspirations, as well as possible fracture lines between regional and business interests.

More specifically, governments must begin to plan for a post-Putin Russia. Putin’s elderly clan represents the last of the Soviet-era elites and their distinct embrace of Russia’s imperial consciousness. That imperial identity will not disappear overnight, but Putin’s obvious overreach in Ukraine and events like Prigozhin’s putsch are likely to engender a less certain sense of imperial destiny.

Putin has emerged from the Wagner putsch a significantly weakened figure, especially among members of the Russian establishment who once saw him as a guarantor of stability. He has also been embarrassed internationally and now looks a far less reliable partner for countries such as China, India, and Brazil that have so far sought to remain neutral over the invasion of Ukraine.

Moving forward, there will be considerable paranoia within the Russian establishment as suspicion swirls regarding potentially shifting loyalties. Rumors continue to circulate regarding measures targeting military and security service personnel who failed to oppose the Wagner uprising. The invasion of Ukraine has already seriously eroded trust within Russian society; Prigozhin’s actions and Putin’s timid response will intensify this negative trend.

Ukraine’s partners cannot control the processes set in train by the Wagner episode, but they can surge military support for Ukraine and embrace bolder policies that reflect the revealed weakness of the Putin regime. The fact that Putin was apparently prepared to strike a deal with Prigozhin further demonstrates that the Russian dictator is inclined to back down rather than escalate when confronted by a resolute opponent or faced with the prospect of possible defeat.

Prigozhin’s putsch was a brief but revealing event in modern Russian history. It hinted at deep-seated dissatisfaction among both the elite and the Russian public over the country’s inability to reclaim what it perceives as its imperial heartlands, and served as a reminder that the imperial Russian state is still collapsing.

The Russian decline that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall is ongoing, with Putin and his clan seeking but failing to reverse the settlement of 1991. This path has led to a war based on imperial fantasies that may now hasten the real end of empire. The Wagner putsch did not bring down Putin’s regime which seeks to maintain empire, but it may come to be seen as the beginning of its end.

Richard Cashman and Lesia Ogryzko are fellows at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

#AtlanticDebrief – What’s the significance of the EU’s AI Act? | A Debrief with Brando Benifei MEP

nlawler — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 16:20:54 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

What’s behind the EU’s push to regulate AI? What will the legislation require of companies who develop AI systems? With the trialogues underway, what are some of the key issues that will dominate interinstitutional negotiations? How did the introduction of ChatGPT change the way the European Parliament was looking at regulating AI? And what’s the relationship between regulation and innovation when it comes to AI technologies?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Fran Burwell sits down with Brando Benifei MEP, co-rapporteur of the EU’s AI Act, to discuss what the EU hopes to achieve with its legislative proposal.

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

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The post #AtlanticDebrief – What’s the significance of the EU’s AI Act? | A Debrief with Brando Benifei MEP appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Roberts quoted in South China Morning Post

kimai — Sun, 02 Jul 2023 23:03:44 +0000

On July 2, 2023 Nonresident Senior Fellow Dexter Tiff Roberts was quoted in a South China Morning Post article on a proposal by Chinese officials to update its Trademark Law in an attempt to improve intellectual property protection to better appeal to foreign investors amid its slowing economy.

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Russian War Report: Kremlin denies that it targeted civilians in a missile attack on a pizza restaurant

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 30 Jun 2023 19:00:00 +0000

Security

Military camps for Wagner reportedly under construction in Belarus

Tracking narratives

Pro-Kremlin sources spreading disinformation to justify missile strike in Kramatorsk

Kremlin blames Colombian victims for the injuries they sustained in the Kramatorsk attack

Media policy

Prigozhin’s online assets reportedly blocked in Russia

International Response

Questions abound over the future of Wagner contracts and Prigozhin-linked businesses in Africa

Analysis: With Wagner mutiny, Russia’s loses plausible deniability about its involvement in Africa

Investigation sheds light on how Putin’s childhood friends allegedly evade sanctions

Military camps for Wagner reportedly under construction in Belarus

Russian independent outlet Verstka reported on the construction of camps for Wagner forces near Asipovichi, Mogilev Oblast, located in Belarus approximately two hundred kilometers from the Ukraine border. According to Verstka’s local forestry source, the area will cover 2.4 hectares (5.9 acres) and accommodate eight thousand Wagner fighters. The source also claimed that there will be additional camps constructed. Family members of Wagner fighters also confirmed to Verstka that they were deploying to Belarus.

Radio Svaboda, the Belarusian-language edition of Radio Liberty, reviewed satellite imagery from Planet Labs that suggested signs of expansion at the Unit 61732 military camp adjacent to the village of Tsel, twenty kilometers northwest of Asipovichi. The outlet interviewed Ukrainian military analyst Oleg Zhdanov, who suggested it was “too early to tell” as to whether the military camp’s expansion is specifically for Wagner forces. “Very little time has passed to start building a camp specifically for the Wagnerites—it’s unreal,” Zhdanov told Radio Svaboda.

Location of possible construction at the Unit 61732 military camp in Tsel, Belarus. (Source: Planet Labs)

On June 27, in his first speech after the Wagner mutiny, Russian President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed the deal that ended the rebellion on June 24 in which Yevgeniy Prigozhin would relocate to Belarus. Putin praised those Wagner fighters who did not participate in the revolt and said they could sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense of other services. He added that other mercenaries who do not want to join could go either home or follow Prigozhin to Belarus.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Pro-Kremlin sources spreading disinformation to justify missile strike in Kramatorsk

Pro-Kremlin sources denied Russia targeted civilians when a missile struck a crowded pizza restaurant in Kramatorsk, killing at least twelve civilians and injuring more than fifty others. According to this narrative, RIA Pizza was actually a military base hosting US and Ukrainian soldiers. To support the claims, pictures taken after the strike were published on Telegram and Twitter.

To support the claim that soldiers of 101st Airborne Division were located at the pizza “military base,” pro-Kremlin sources circulated grisly footage of the attack aftermath recorded by freelance journalist Arnaud De Decker. The clip shows a man wearing a morale patch of a US flag with the words “Always Be Ready: 5.11 Tactical.” 5.11 Tactical is a military apparel company that sells branded merchandise, including morale patches, worn to offer support to various causes and slogans but not used official unit patches. Various types of 5.11 Tactical’s “Always Be Ready” patches are readily available for purchase online.

Top: A 5.11 Tactical morale patch for sale on its website. Bottom: Image taken during the aftermath of the Kramatorsk attack showing a man wearing the same morale patch on his helmet. (Source: 5.11 Tactical/archive, top; @arnaud.dedecker/archive, bottom)

Similarly, another post from Aleksandr Simonov’s Telegram channel that a man wearing an 101^st Airborne t-shirt was a member of the US Army division. These t-shirts are also readily available from online retailers.

Montage of three screenshots from online retail websites selling 101^st Airborne t-shirts. (Sources: top left, Etsy/archive; bottom left, Predathor/archive; right, Allegro/archive)

Montage of three screenshots from online retail websites selling 101st Airborne t-shirts. (Sources: top left, Etsy/archive; bottom left, Predathor/archive; right, Allegro)

—Sayyara Mammadova, research assistant, Warsaw, Poland

Kremlin blames Colombian victims for the injuries they sustained in the Kramatorsk attack

In addition to pro-Kremlin accusations that the Kramatorsk attack targeted a base housing US Army soldiers, Kremlin influencers also targeted citizens of Colombia, three of whom were injured in the attack, for being at the site of the incident. Colombian President Gustavo Petro said the attack targeted “three defenseless Colombian civilians” in violation of the protocols of war and called for the Colombian Foreign Ministry to submit a note of diplomatic protest to Russia. While the Kremlin acknowledged launching the attack, it insisted the assault struck military personnel rather than civilians.

The three Colombian citizens injured in the attack include acclaimed Colombian writer Hector Abad Faciolince; Sergio Jaramillo Caro, who previously led Colombia’s peace negotiations with FARC rebels; and Ukrainian-based journalist Catalina Gomez. According to the New York Times, Abad and Jaramillo were in Kramatorsk “collecting material” in support of their initiative, ¡Aguanta Ucrania! (“Hang On Ukraine!”), which seeks to garner support for Ukraine in Latin America.

Following the attack, Colombian influencers and officials criticized the attack through media outlets and social media accounts in Spanish. Danilo Rueda, Colombia’s current high commissioner for peace, issued a statement expressing support for the victims without mentioning Russia, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its “strongest condemnation of the unacceptable attack by Russian forces on a civilian target.”

Gomez, who was injured in the attack, broadcast a video for France 24 from the site of the explosion. Meanwhile, Abad and Jaramillo conducted interviews with Colombian media outlets such as El Tiempo in which they described the incident.

Actualidad RT, a Russian media outlets with enormous reach in the Spanish-speaking world, insisted that the victims of the attack were mercenaries and instructors of NATO and Ukraine rather than civilians. Actualidad RT quoted statements from Igor Konashenkov, spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Defense, and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov, who said the attack struck “military targets” and that “Russia does not attack civilian infrastructure.” Actualidad RT promoted its claims via Twitter and Facebook multiple times on June 28.

Colombian radio station WRadio interviewed Kremlin foreign policy spokesperson Maria Zakharova on the morning of June 28. Zakharova stated that the restaurant was a Russian military target and called for an investigation into Victoria Amelina, a Ukrainian writer who was gravely injured while purportedly hosting the Colombians at the restaurant, claiming without evidence that Amelina had prior knowledge that the restaurant was a military target. Zakharova reiterated this statement after a WRadio journalist asked her to confirm the accusation. In contrast, Abad stated that it was Gomez who suggested they visit the restaurant, and that she apologized for doing so after the attack.

The Russian embassy in Colombia amplified Zakharova’s narrative later that same afternoon and evening. On Twitter, the embassy insisted that the city was “an operational and logistical-military hub, not a suitable place to enjoy Ukrainian cuisine dishes.” It also seemed to celebrate that the “reckless trip [of the Colombians] did not turn into an irreparable tragedy.”

—Daniel Suárez Pére z, research associate, Bogota, Colombia

Prigozhin’s online assets reportedly blocked in Russia

Over the course of the thirty-six-hour Wagner mutiny, the Kremlin attempted to limit information about Yevgeniy Prigozin on Russian social media and search engines, eventually blocking websites affiliated with Prigozhin. On June 24, the Telegram channel of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet RT reported that several Prigozhin-controlled media outlets including RIA FAN, People’s News, and Patriot Media Group were no longer accessible in parts of Russia. RT added that the reason for their disappearance was unknown. Similar reports appeared in Mediazona and several Telegram channels.

The DFRLab used the Internet censorship measurement platform OONI to verify the claim and check the accessibility of RIA FAN within Russia. OONI detected signs that riafan.ru was blocked in the country.

Internet censorship measurement platform OONI detected the apparent blocking of Prigozhin-owned media outlet RIA FAN. (Source: OONI)

On June 29, independent Russian outlet The Bell claimed the Kremlin was searching for a new owner for Patriot Media Group, which includes media assets associated with Prigozhin. The following day, multiple Russian outlets reported that Prigozhin had dissolved Patriot Media Group.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Questions abound over the future of Wagner contracts and Prigozhin-linked businesses in Africa

For years, Wagner has acted as Russia’s primary form of influence in Africa—spreading disinformation and propaganda, securing military contracts, and exporting natural resources to support Putin’s war effort. Following Prigozhin’s attempted mutiny, the future of Wagner’s operations on the continent has come into question. While it is highly unlikely the Kremlin would willingly abandon its influence in Africa, if Wagner is retired or its troops absorbed into the Ministry of Defense, it is uncertain who would maintain the group’s operations on the continent.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov confirmed that Russia’s work in Africa will continue. In a TV interview with Russia Today, Lavrov said, “In addition to relations with this PMC the governments of CAR and Mali have official contacts with our leadership. At their request, several hundred soldiers are working in CAR as instructors.”

A top advisor to Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadéra appeared unconcerned about the weekend’s events. Speaking of Wagner’s military instructors, Fidèle Gouandjika said, “If Moscow decides to withdraw them and send us the Beethovens or the Mozarts rather than Wagners, we will have them.” In a statement released to its Telegram channel, the Officer’s Union for International Security—a US-sanctioned Wagner front company operating in CAR—claimed CAR’s defense minister had apologized for Gouandjika’s remarks. It quoted Defense Minister Claude Rameaux Bireau as saying, “The people of the CAR are grateful to the Russian instructors of Wagner, ask any Central African on the streets of Bangui or in the village of the CAR—he will confirm my words.”

In Mali, where Wagner forces have taken over responsibility for pushing back jihadists after the departure of French forces, the online outlet Mali Actu reported that the situation could dramatically impact Mali. “This situation raises major concerns about the security, stability and sovereignty of Mali, as well as the impact on the local population and counter-terrorism efforts,” it wrote.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Analysis: With Wagner mutiny, Russia loses plausible deniability about its involvement in Africa

While Wagner’s future in Africa remains uncertain, it is important to consider that the Wagner Group not just a paramilitary force. It is also a conglomerate of companies active in different sectors, from mining and logistics to political warfare and moviemaking, able to travel the spectrum between private entrepreneurism to state proxy. This flexibility has previously allowed Moscow to deploy Wagner to act as a force multiplier in Africa while simultaneously denying Russia’s direct presence on the continent. In Africa, Russia has used Wagner multiple times as part of a strategy to help authoritarian leaders stay in power and gain a pro-Russian military presence on the ground, all while maintaining plausible deniability. Until now, the positive outcomes of this strategy have far exceeded the costs for the Kremlin, as Russia has built a strong network of African influence with relatively little effort, securing concessions in strategic extractive industries, and expanding military-to-military relations on the continent.

However, this principle of plausible deniability, which made Wagner so successful and so useful for Moscow as an extension of its foreign policy and influence, is now damaged. As previously noted, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, as well as Putin, publicly confirmed direct links between Wagner and the Russian state apparatus.

Africa is intimately linked to Wagner: In the wake of Wagner’s involvement in Syria, Africa became the scene of the group’s expansion. Engaging in Sudan, the Central African Republic, Libya, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Mali, Wagner employed an opportunistic strategy of supplying security while taking concessions to mine natural resources. While its forces were in most cases invited to stabilize fragile states, its actions actively invited further instability, creating more opportunities and a greater demand signal for its services, ultimately granting renewing opportunities to Moscow to reinforce its footprint in the continent.

While denying direct links to Wagner’s actions in Africa might have become more difficult for the Kremlin, Russia is unlikely to waste the network of influence built by the group in recent years. Instead, Moscow will likely continue to deploy hybrid tools such as Wagner, although organized in different shapes and forms, so Russia can continue displacing Western influence, exploiting natural resources, and evading sanctions through dozens of front companies.

—Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

Investigation sheds light on how Putin’s childhood friends allegedly evade sanctions

On June 20, the Organized Crime and Corruption reporting project (OCCRP) published a series of investigations titled “The Rotenberg Files” that shed light on the business dealings and alleged sanctions evasion attempts of Boris and Arkady Rotenberg, close friends of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The report is based on fifty thousand leaked emails and documents, examined by journalists from seventeen outlets. The OCCRP said the leak came from a source who worked for the brothers at a Russian management firm. The OCCRP investigation was conducted in partnership with the Times of London, Le Monde, and Forbes, among others.

Boris and Arkady Rotenberg are childhood friends of Putin. The billionaire brothers faced Western sanctions amid Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, but their lavish lifestyles do not appear to have been impacted.

According to the OCCRP, the leaked documents demonstrate how the Rotenberg brothers allegedly used Western lawyers, bankers, corporate service providers, and proxies to evade sanctions.

One of the report’s findings also alleges the brothers maintain business links to Prince Michael of Kent, a cousin of the late Queen Elizabeth II who was previously accused by the Sunday Times and Channel 4 of profiting off close access to the Kremlin. According to the latest investigation, “Prince Michael distanced himself from earlier ties to the Putin regime in the wake of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. But leaked emails and corporate records show he co-owns a company with two Russian businessmen who helped billionaire oligarch and Putin ally Boris Rotenberg dodge Western sanctions.”

Another investigation from the Rotenberg files reported that Putin’s eldest daughter regularly visited a holiday property financed by Arkady Rotenberg in an exclusive Austrian skiing destination. Documents reviewed by the OCCRP suggest that the house was purchased by a Cypriot company in 2013 with a loan from a bank then owned by Arkady, using funds invested by another company he owned. Other records suggested that the former romantic partner of Putin’s daughter is connected to the company that owns the Austrian property. Residents claim to have seen Putin himself at the Kitzbühel residence, though this has not been confirmed.

The Rotenberg brothers and Prince Michael declined to comment to the OCCRP investigative consortium.

—Ani Mejlumyan, research assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

The post Russian War Report: Kremlin denies that it targeted civilians in a missile attack on a pizza restaurant appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What policymakers need to know about artificial intelligence

Philip L. Frana — Thu, 29 Jun 2023 13:00:00 +0000

Defining artificial intelligence
How artificial intelligence works
Machine learning
Deep learning
Global competition and controversies
Dangers, myths, and misconceptions

Despite an abundance of books, articles, and news reports about artificial intelligence (AI) as an existential threat to life and livelihoods, the technology is not a grave menace to humanity in the near term. Undeniably, the comments of deep learning pioneer Geoffrey Hinton, who resigned from Google, are concerning. “I have suddenly switched my views on whether these things are going to be more intelligent than us. I think they’re very close to it now and they will be much more intelligent than us in the future. How do we survive that?” Hinton said in a recent interview. Hinton fears that AI may come to intentionally or inadvertently exert control over humanity, a hypothetical scenario known as an “AI takeover.” He is also worried about the potential spread of AI-generated misinformation or the possibility that an oppressive leader may attempt to use AI to create lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). But AI programs have no agency to act on their own. Generative AI language models currently operate only within the controlled environments of computer systems and networks, and their capabilities are constrained by training datasets and human uses.

The generative transformer architecture that is powering the current wave of artificial intelligence may reshape many areas of daily life. OpenAI CEO Sam Altman has been making a global tour to engage with legislators, policymakers, and industry leaders about his company’s pathbreaking Generative Pre-trained Transformer (GPT) series of large language models (LLMs). While acknowledging that AI could inflict damage on the world economy, disrupt labor markets, and transform global affairs in unforeseen ways, he emphasizes that responsible use and regulatory transparency will allow the technology to make positive contributions to education, creativity and entrepreneurship, and workplace productivity.

At present, however, Altman’s generative AI is most useful in improving natural language processing and machine translation. Generative transformers are flexible and scalable models that outperform recurrent neural networks—which made voice-activated assistants on smartphones possible—in certain tasks, such as capturing relationships between different words within long documents and answering questions about them. Examples include GPT, BERT, T5, and LaMDA. They do not on their own possess independent capabilities associated with artificial general intelligence or superintelligence, and it is unlikely that a truly versatile human-like cognitive AI will become a reality before 2050. Even an ultrasmart AI program may never bootstrap itself into consciousness. And there is almost zero chance that—as in the Roko’s Basilisk thought experiment—a spiteful and malicious AI will emerge that rewards those humans who assist it and punishes any who dare attempt to stop it. As Sam Altman puts it “GPT4 is a tool not a creature.”

What is certain is that AI tools and methods will be crucial for confronting a slew of slow-motion catastrophes unfolding across the world. COVID-19 has claimed almost seven million lives worldwide, and based on excess mortality likely many more. Strife, stress, and conflict endangers democracies on both sides of the Atlantic. Unschooling and remote work movements mingle with cultural and political divisions and societal disruptions. Climate change brings extremes in heat, drought, and wildfires along with melting ice caps and sea level rise.

Machine learning (ML) is able to tackle these issues head-on. Admittedly, it has a long way to go before it’s a feasible tool for pandemic control, but AI is attaining good performance in the diagnosis, evaluation, and prognosis of infected individuals; predictions of pandemic spread; and COVID-19 drug discovery as well as vaccine development. Responsible applications of AI are strengthening communities and empowering democracies. Over the past few years, this technology played a particularly powerful role in knitting humanity together virtually amidst the spread of disease, snarled traffic, scarce fuel, and the high cost of living. AI-enabled technologies are also monitoring the world’s climate, agriculture, and economies, as well as providing solutions to feed and clothe the world without further damaging the environment. They can facilitate many paths to sustainable planet-wide development. Green AI technologies representative of the convergence of social innovation and technological change include ecobots, biodiversity and ecosystem services, and renewable energy solutions.

Nonetheless, humanity is living in uncertain, complex, and ambiguous times. But as Sun Tzu explained in The Art of War, in the midst of chaos, there is also opportunity. It is not surprising that the current generation has invented AI and social media-fueled empathy scorecards intended to replace or supplement credit scores, prescription video games and other “calmtainments,” and AI-assisted chatbot therapists (Woebot and Wysa). AI is being brought to bear against the labor squeeze and workers’ demands for higher wages, supply chain disruptions and volatilities in manufacturing, and the omnipresent threats of wars of occupation.

Defining artificial intelligence

The ultimate goal of AI is to emulate human-like thinking or perform tasks that normally require human activity. John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Nathaniel Rochester, and Claude Shannon, in their original proposal to bring together mathematicians, cyberneticists, and information processing innovators for a formative 1956 summer research workshop on AI at Dartmouth College, contended that “every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it.” AI can be subdivided in several different ways, but the major branches are usually described as artificial narrow intelligence (ANI), artificial general intelligence (AGI), and artificial superintelligence (ASI).

ANI is the branch where the overwhelming majority of AI-inclined developers work. ANI thereby represents the state of the art in AI. It is a category that includes all useful applications of AI to specific problems such as calculating risks and reducing errors, handling repetitive or boring tasks, making informed recommendations or decisions quickly, or automating job duties that are difficult or dangerous. ANI developers are rarely concerned about whether their AI systems are capable of true cognition, awareness, metacognition, or affectivity. Instead, they are content to regard them as models for understanding intelligent behavior and building useful tools. Common areas of activity in ANI are speech recognition, natural language processing, chatbots, search engines, recommender systems, digital assistants, computer vision, image recognition, and machine translation. Every sort of machine intelligence encountered in daily life is limited to specific tasks and knowledge domains that are not readily translated into other tasks or domains irrespective of how sophisticated they are.

On the other hand, AGI and ASI have as their shared goal the achievement of a complete or comprehensive range of human intelligence capabilities, including perhaps even consciousness. In AGI and ASI, the model is the mind; the map is the territory. Should the goal be reached, some researchers believe ASI will surpass human intelligence, with cognitive capacities well beyond those of the smartest people and in a wide variety of domains. An ASI’s “mind” would not just be different in degree from the human one; it would be different in kind. Indeed, some researchers assume that any potential candidate for ASI would require a self-modifying property. Many people, including, most famously, Bill Gates, Stephen Hawking, and Elon Musk, have spoken out about AGI/ASI safety and control. Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig, authors of the leading textbook on AI, note that “[a]lmost any technology has the potential to cause harm in the wrong hands, but with AI and robotics, we have the new problem that the wrong hands might belong to the technology itself.” Others have been more sanguine. Neuroscientist Anthony Zador and computer scientist Yann LeCun, for example, suggest that there is no reason why a machine would develop a self-preservation instinct or evolve into a dangerous competitor.

How artificial intelligence works

The typical AI developer writes code—sometimes employing the assistance of context-aware intelligent code-completion software like IntelliSense or Copilot. At the core of all AI systems written today are intelligent agents. The classical approach to AI is in the form of sense-think-act: agents perceive their environment using sensors, consider choices and make decisions, and react using effectors. They may be physical (robots) or virtual (software) and are often both. Agents now have all sorts of different abilities, goals, preferences, knowledge representations, and memories of past experiences. Humans themselves are considered very complex intelligent agents by AI developers, albeit biological ones. This is why it is sometimes said that the “holy grail” of AI is to understand man as a machine.

Agents are ubiquitous in everyday life. Siri, Cortana, and the Google Assistant are agents, as are tabletop smart home appliances like Amazon Echo, Google Home, Samsung Bixby, Xiaomi Xiao Ai, and Apple HomePod. Agents are also embedded in many autonomous and semiautonomous robotic devices like the Roomba vacuum cleaner, Tesla driver-assistance system, and General Atomics Gray Eagle Extended Range unmanned aerial military drone. Large, pretrained language models are the foundation of the latest—potentially disruptive and transformative—conversational agents like Google Bard, Jasper Chat, OpenAI’s ChatGPT, and Microsoft’s Bing chatbot.

Practitioners of symbolic AI, a dominant early approach to simulating humanlike cognition, compared the brain to a sophisticated computer program. From the mid-1950s and continuing into the 1980s, computer scientists created general and specific problem solver programs. Software developers also created general inference engines upon which specialized rule bases could be applied interchangeably. These so-called expert systems consisted of heuristics or rules of thumb developed from direct interviews with experts and professionals (e.g., physicians, lawyers, mechanics, and chemists). Heuristic programming assumed as a given that an expert is a specialist.

Expert knowledge, however, is rarely fixed. Indeed, it is regularly updated through new discoveries and experience. Heuristic systems struggle to keep up with all but the most predictable definitions and structured reasoning methods. AI researchers describe this as the “knowledge acquisition bottleneck.” Training an AI program to serve as a clinical decision support system, for example, is only feasible if there is a reasonably efficient way to keep up with an exponentially growing reservoir of medical knowledge and know-how. Often, the domain expert and the programmer find it difficult to maintain their systems and keep them current.

Knowledge engineers argue among themselves about whether the right approach is to carefully simulate the reasoning abilities of experts in models of human information processes or rather to discover entirely new methods for weighing evidence that can only be accomplished using computers. Ironically, as expert system prototypes proliferated, they became more specialized, limited in scope, and fragmentary. The history of expert systems has proven that machines, like humans, perform better in specialized domains. Exceptional general-purpose thinking is rare among machines, and perhaps also among human beings.

Expert systems gave way to directly mining the data of extremely large numbers of cases. Data mining requires figuring out how to represent knowledge and extract useful patterns through automatic or semiautomatic analyses so that they might be used effectively. Data mining techniques include cluster analysis, anomaly detection, and association rule mining. This movement away from the primacy of experts has been likened to the demise of the Greek Oracle of Delphi.

By the 1990s, connectionist approaches featuring artificial neural networks (ANNs) eclipsed symbolic AI in popularity. The metaphor for the connectionist approach to AI is the brain as a collection of billions of neurons that both wire and fire together. The application of neural networks to AI also dates to the 1950s but had fallen out of favor until resuscitated by Hinton, the cognitive psychologist who recently left Google, and others who described a new procedure called “backpropagation” for training multilayered neural networks. The connectionist approach became even more exciting as advances in computing hardware and schemes for handling large volumes of structured, semi-structured, and unstructured data (“big data”) made it possible to improve the efficacy of neural networks.

Machine learning

ML today is a subset of AI which relies on both the symbolic and neural network approaches. The synthesis of neuro-symbolic AI and development of hybrid architectures is relatively new. Computer scientists use ML and data analytics to train algorithms and neural networks with statistical methods to discern patterns, make classifications, predict outcomes, and uncover significant insights from available masses of information. In ML, models of learning are used to dexterously organize the capabilities of intelligent agents as they improve themselves using data extracted from online systems or the environment. ML is divided into roughly three categories—supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement learning.

In supervised learning, labeled data are used to train algorithms. The computer is “taught” to recognize general rules using “training data” (labeled inputs and desired outputs). Supervised learning algorithms may engage in active learning to label new data points with desired outputs, classification to organize data into relevant categories, regression analysis to investigate relationships between independent features or variables and dependent variables or outcomes, or similarity learning, where the goal is to measure the resemblance or relatedness between things.

In unsupervised learning, the algorithm discovers structure, features, and insights from unlabeled data. Unsupervised learning is helpful where common properties of the dataset are unknown or poorly understood. Additionally, unsupervised learning is helpful in solving clustering and association-type problems. Clustering algorithms group data based on similarities and differences. Marketing companies often use clustering and demographic segmentation of customers to identify and group households that are similar to one another in wealth, buying behavior, or lifestyle. These clusters are given names like Married Sophisticates, Penny Pinchers, Skyboxes and Suburbs, Summit Estates, Shotguns and Pickup Trucks, Rolling Stones, Single City Struggles, Aging Upscale, and Timeless Elders. Association algorithms find interesting relationships between variables. Association rule learning can be useful in market-based analyses of customer purchases, allowing retailers to recognize relationships between items that customers frequently buy together and predict the likelihood of purchases of an item based on the occurrence of other items in an individual transaction.

A computer performs reinforcement learning when it learns through interaction with the environment and feedback to achieve a predefined goal or maximize a reward. In reinforcement learning, the AI improves by first making mistakes. Reinforcement learning has applications in teaching self-driving cars to avoid obstacles and stay on the road, training AI non-player characters in video games, and instructing caregiver robots on how to grasp common household objects.

Deep learning

Deep learning is a type of ML that depends primarily on ANNs and training data. The neural networks train by imitating the natural neural interconnectivity of the brain using layers of nodes and connections. These nodes are composed of various inputs and weights, a given threshold, and an output value. When the output value surpasses the predefined threshold, it “fires” like a biological neuron, activating the node and passing data along to the next layer of the network. AlexNet, one of the pioneering technologies in the field of computer vision, was designed by Hinton and his students. This deep learning tool used to analyze visual imagery is composed of eight layers—five convolutional layers, two hidden layers, and one output layer. AlexNet was trained on graphics processing units (GPUs). It outperformed all other challengers in the 2012 ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge. Deep neural networks and platforms are employed in many contexts today; they promote cybersecurity (Deep Instinct), predict criminal recidivism (COMPAS Core), make early diagnoses in oncology (Behold.ai), teach next-gen driverless cars (Tesla, Waymo, Nvidia), and boost the creativity of artists (DALL-E, Stable Diffusion) and writers (GPT-4, Charisma). Generative transformer models are a prime example of deep learning, and they are revolutionary in their ability to quickly find relationships and capture context across large datasets.

Computational creativity is one subfield of AI that has been dramatically reshaped by deep learning. Computational creativity applications attempt to generate original ideas and artifacts. These “generative AI” applications are transforming our understanding of machines as helpmates to humans and altering bedrock conceptions of novelty. Is the goal to replicate human storytelling or to create new media for storytelling? Can an AI agent create a real emotional connection with a person? Can a machine have an original thought or imagination? How would an AI program recognize that something is imaginary? In a world of computational creativity, some common tropes and normative modes of seeing, hearing, and knowing may have to be unlearned.

All sorts of possibilities are being explored with generative AI. The annual National Novel Generation Month (NaNoGenMo) contest is the brainchild of computer programmer and internet artist Darius Kazemi. NaNoGenMo is the artificial spiritual twin of the National Novel Writing Month (NaNoWriMo), a nonprofit organization that encourages human authors to find their voices by banging out drafts of fifty-thousand-word novels in November. Programmers following Kazemi’s rules instead write code that generates fifty thousand words of machine-made fiction. NaNoGenMo provides a standard corpus of public domain lists and texts for rapid prototyping, but participants use all sorts of public domain writings to train their AIs. In the NaNoGenMo submission The Seeker, the intelligent agent is at once algorithm, agent, protagonist, and narrator. The Seeker reads differently each time because the code randomly shuffles in a new selection from its corpus to parse, deconstruct, and reconstruct.

Today, humans and artificial intelligences have joined forces to tell prize-worthy stories like The Day a Computer Writes a Novel, which passed the first round of screening for the Hoshi Shinichi Literary Award in Japan, and 1 the Road published by Jean Boîte Éditions. The author of 1 the Road, Ross Goodwin, was a speechwriter in the Obama administration. Goodwin trained a Long Short-Term Memory Recurrent Neural Network (LSTM-RNN) with three different sets of texts (science fiction, poetry, and “bleak” writings) totaling sixty million words. 1 the Road is particularly interesting because the AI’s input is supplemented using sensors—a video camera, microphone, GPS device, and clock timer—exposed to the sights and sounds of a road trip from New York to New Orleans. Typically, large language models are trained on massive amounts of textual data and can be tens of gigabytes—even petabytes—in size. Researchers are concerned about running low on this kind of data to train models, which means that accessing data from other sources such as audio dialogue, images, spreadsheets and databases, and video clips will become increasingly important.

In this networked world exposure to content is constant. Generative AI promises to exponentially increase the amount created annually. Generative AI applications today are spiritedly responding to an apparent “creativity crisis” among human beings as measured by a thirty-year decline in scores on the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking, a prominent test for human creativity. Generative AI has manufactured all sorts of objects, discoveries, and/or performances. However, some examples of computer-aided creativity are quite old. One precedent is Alan Turing’s imitation game. Another is the general problem solver of AI pioneers Herbert Simon, Allen Newell, and John Clifford Shaw.

In 1958, Simon and Newell wrote that “within ten years a digital computer will write music that will be accepted by critics as possessing considerable aesthetic value.” This prediction has now been fulfilled by the subfield of generative music and algorithmic composition. One of the most famous examples is David Cope’s Experiments in Musical Intelligence (“Emmy”). Emmy is an algorithmic composer capable of analyzing existing musical compositions, rearranging and recombining them, and ultimately inventing new works that are indistinguishable from those of Johann Sebastian Bach, Frédéric Chopin, and Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart. Shimon at Georgia Tech University is a marimba-playing improvisational jazz-bot musician. DeepMusic.AI, OpenAI’s MuseNet, and the Magenta Music Transformer are all online tools for creating music with deep learning and generative AI. Recently, two programmers have been trying to make music infringement lawsuits obsolete by securing copyright to every combination of eight quarter notes in the C major scale using tones generated with the Musical Instrument Digital Interface (MIDI) standard electronic music protocol. And, similar to NaNoGenMo, a song contest has sprung up that is exclusively for artificially generated music. The first AI “Eurovision Song Contest” winner, the Australian group Uncanny Valley, sampled kookaburra bird calls and koala grunting noises. Additionally, there are AI painters, Dungeons & Dragons dungeon masters, journalists, filmmakers, dancers, stunt performers, and theater players.

Global competition and controversies

A number of countries have established national strategies, initiatives, and funding mechanisms to promote AI innovation and adoption. Former US President Donald J. Trump established the American AI Initiative by signing an executive order in 2019. The order did not allocate any direct federal funding, but it highlighted the significance of employing AI in a responsible manner and taking action to respond to significant investments made by other nations. In 2020, the US Congress passed the National AI Initiative Act. The National AI Initiative (NAII) establishes a coordinated program that spans the federal government. It is aimed at expediting AI research and development (R&D) to strengthen the country’s economic growth and national security. The act provides almost $6.5 billion in funding over five years for R&D, education, and standards related to AI. The National Science Foundation, the Department of Energy, the Department of Commerce, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Department of Defense will jointly oversee a nationwide network of interdisciplinary AI research institutes.

The US government’s efforts are partially motivated by China’s substantial investments in AI technology. The New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan, announced in 2017, is the Chinese government’s national strategy for AI R&D. China hopes to overtake the United States by 2030 and establish the country as a global leader in the production of AI technology and talent. The major port city of Tianjin in northern China has declared its intention to establish reserves totaling ¥100 billion (equivalent to $15.7 billion) to bolster the AI industry, as well as a separate ¥10 billion fund to advance intelligent manufacturing. China passed a national law aimed at addressing ethical and regulatory concerns related to AI in 2021. In April 2023, the Cyberspace Administration of China issued regulations mandating that content generated by AI must align with the fundamental principles of socialism.

The Russian Federation also has a National AI Development Strategy designed to bolster investment in AI research, education, and industrial development. Somewhat surprisingly, the 2019 Russian AI strategic decree does not mention national defense, though it does emphasize the importance of AI for economic development and healthcare. The decree also does not mention budget, deadlines, or enforcement mechanisms. Due to the recent military conflicts in Libya, Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Ukraine, it is anticipated that Russia will allocate significant resources toward developing AI systems for unmanned aerial drones, counter-drone technologies, and AI-powered surveillance systems.

Significant and unheralded projects are also underway in Africa. The African Union has unveiled an Artificial Intelligence Continental Strategy for Africa, which is intended to facilitate the participation of stakeholders, initiate capacity-building efforts, and fortify regulatory frameworks for AI technology and data management. Artificial Intelligence for Development in Africa (AI4D) is a four-year initiative launched in 2020 by Canada’s International Development Research Centre and Sweden’s International Development Cooperation Agency. The objective of AI4D is to team up with Africa’s government and scientific communities to encourage AI research, innovation, and talent. The ultimate aim is to elevate the standard of living for people in Africa and beyond. African nations are particularly concerned with issues of machine bias and ethics and wary of patterns of manipulation and abuse in the form of automated imperialism, algorithmic colonialism, and digital extractivism.

Canada, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom also have significant national strategies to address challenges posed by a future empowered by AI. Many of these nations are worried about the likelihood of global competition in AI leading to an arms race or authoritarianism fueled by information technologies. Entrepreneurs, politicians, and engineers warn of an impending “AI Cold War.” An AI arms race to create near-autonomous weapons systems is in full swing, despite being a topic of controversy. The banning of these so-called killer robots may not even be practical. Governments around the world have developed a number of other controversial applications of AI, such as image recognition and mass surveillance, predictive policing, deepfakes and misinformation campaigns, and social credit scoring.

Dangers, myths, and misconceptions

AI can be destructive even when used as an instrument for creative discovery. One of the dangers of unleashing computational creativity tools is being submerged by a culture of automation that dampens individual creative expression and dialogue with human audiences, participants, and partners. In 2022, an AI-generated artwork took first place in a fine arts competition at the Colorado State Fair, which outraged many. Only months later, an internationally acclaimed photography competition—the Sony World Photography Awards—was won by an image generated using AI. Getty Images and established art communities are refusing to accept AI-generated masterpieces. But in general, AI is valuable because it empowers humanity with tools that extend bodies and minds and mitigates risks and perilous circumstances.

Deep learning pioneer and serial entrepreneur Andrew Ng has said that worrying about AI is like worrying about overpopulation on Mars. Artificial agents will not need to be excused or incarcerated for crimes and misdemeanors that upon analysis and reflection can be traced to human error, indifference, or greed. Whole brain emulation, artificial consciousness, technological singularity, and AI apocalypse are all well over the horizon. The threats that remain are still significant. The chief near-term dangers of AI technology are pervasive and more subtle. They include risks such as over-optimization, weaponization, deception and distraction, complexification, moral and practical deskilling, amplification of competition and conflict, job losses due to automation, and harms to human uniqueness, privacy, and accountability.

What lies behind the hype and fear of AI is a fundamental misunderstanding of current objectives, as well as severe shortsightedness. Most AI is meant to supplement human intelligence, not replace it. AI is intelligence augmentation until—and only if—humanity commits and finds ways to entirely remove human beings from the loop as creators, controllers, and decisionmakers. “Exiting the loop” will prove difficult: Humans are extraordinarily skilled at handling ambiguous situations, such as intuiting the emotional state of other drivers on the road. AI will not become human-like merely because humans anthropomorphize it either. An AI program does not try to learn (although it can improve through reinforcement learning methods); it plucks statistical patterns and distributions from training data using pipelines, algorithms, and parameters unglamorously selected behind the scenes by programmers. ANNs are not reasoning the way brains do, and adversarial ML involves no clashing of titans. Thinking about the past, present, and future of AI is imperative. When IBM said that the Jeopardy!-winning Watson AI would also revolutionize medicine, it in effect denied a century of hard-won gains in health informatics R&D (and has yet to achieve its lofty promises). It is not possible to simply wave our hands and say that quantum computing, DNA data storage, and neuromorphic chips will pave the way for an AI-infused next industrial revolution. Real progress in AI comes much more slowly, albeit with occasional surprising leaps forward, and ultimately depends on the real wants and needs of human beings.

Philip L. Frana is an associate professor in the Interdisciplinary Liberal Studies and Independent Scholars programs at James Madison University. His scholarly interests focus on the social and cultural aspects of robotics, automation, and information technology.

GeoTech Cues May 22, 2023

The regulators are coming for your AI

By Steven Tiell

The Group of Seven (G7) has lobbed the latest of three notable salvos in signaling that governments around the globe are focused on regulating Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI). The G7 ministers have established the Hiroshima AI Process, an inclusive effort for governments to collaborate on AI governance, IP rights (including copyright), transparency, mis/disinformation, and responsible […]

Technology & Innovation

GeoTech Cues Jan 25, 2023

AI generates new policy risk

By Jonno Evans

New AI tools will have a huge impact on how people work and live and can support innovation and productivity across sectors. But it is also important to be mindful of its potential for misuse. Governments, policymakers, and other stakeholders must be proactive to ensure that these tools are not exploited to cause harm.

Technology & Innovation

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Championing positive paths forward that societies can pursue to ensure new technologies and data empower people, prosperity, and peace.

The post What policymakers need to know about artificial intelligence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The disinformation landscape in West Africa and beyond

Tessa Knight, Jean le Roux — Thu, 29 Jun 2023 09:00:00 +0000

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Introduction

The prominence of West Africa, and Africa as a whole, within the global disinformation ecosystem cannot be ignored. A report by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies released in April 2022 identified twenty-three disinformation campaigns targeting African countries dating back to 2014. Of these campaigns, sixteen are linked to Russia.

The listed disinformation campaigns—nine of which were identified by the DFRLab—reveal two key points. First, there has been a marked increase in the number of publicly identified disinformation campaigns in recent years. Whether this is due to an increase in the scrutiny, analytical capacity, or efforts on the part of bad actors is unclear. Second, the characteristics of each of these influence operations are distinct—these operations target a wide variety of issues, such as elections, the war in Ukraine, commercial interests, and domestic and international politics.

Further, relations between France and francophone West Africa have, following years of amicable relations built on the back of military cooperation, seen a marked erosion that was underscored by the exit of the last of the French troops from Mali in August 2022. Anti-France and pro-Russia sentiments have surged contemporaneously, with overlapping narratives positioning Russia as a viable alternative to Western aid. When French forces began their departure from Mali in June 2022, Russian private military companies (PMCs) such as the Wagner Group stood ready to fill the void.

This report examines several influence operation case studies from the West African region, with a particular emphasis on Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Niger. The narratives, actors, and contexts supporting these influence operations are summarized alongside their impact on regional stability. Russian influence plays a significant role in these case studies, an unsurprising fact considering the geopolitical history of this region.

This report also includes case studies from outside the Sahel region, consisting of thematically distinct but strategically noteworthy influence campaigns from elsewhere on the continent. For example, the Nigerian government used social media influencers to suppress citizen participation in the #EndSARS movement. Elsewhere, the Ethiopian diaspora used innovative click-to-tweet campaigns to spread international awareness of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. In South Africa, the rise in violent xenophobic demonstrations was precipitated by a popular social media campaign that normalized prejudice against foreign nationals.

The plethora of actors, targets, strategies, and tactics make a blanket approach to studying African disinformation networks difficult. The depth and breadth of these campaigns shows that Africa is facing the same challenges as the rest of the world insofar as disinformation is concerned. Moreover, the interest shown by foreign governments attests to the region’s geopolitical significance. This combination of geopolitical importance and a vulnerability to influence campaigns makes Africa a notable case study.

Background

Africa’s information environment is not monolithic Analog channels such as radio and film are used in conjunction with digital efforts to reach audiences, but Internet penetration rates and the accompanying reli- ance on analog media differ significantly from country to country For example, as of January 2022, Morocco, the Seychelles, and Egypt maintained Internet penetration rates of higher than 70 percent, nearly ten times the rate of the country with the lowest penetration rate, the Central African Republic (7 percent).

In the countries mentioned in the table above, Facebook and Instagram maintain a leading position insofar as social media penetration is concerned This can be partly ascribed to Facebook’s Free Basics service that “zero-rates” data (including Facebook and Instagram data) on participating mobile networks. These mobile networks can then bundle Facebook and Instagram data into a consumer’s service plan without the consumer having to pay extra for that data use Considering that mobile connections outstrip desktop connections, and that mo- bile data is more expensive than fixed broadband, it is clear why this has been effective to expand Facebook and Instagram’s footprint Meta shuttered the Free Basics program in some regions at the end of 2022 as the program’s spiritual successor – Meta Discover – was being rolled out The impact this will have on the information environment remains to be seen.

Social media and internet penetration rates in some of the African countries referenced in this report

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The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) has operationalized the study of disinformation by exposing falsehoods and fake news, documenting human rights abuses, and building digital resilience worldwide.

The post The disinformation landscape in West Africa and beyond appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wagner drama drags Belarus deeper into Russia’s wartime turbulence

Hanna Liubakova — Wed, 28 Jun 2023 22:06:15 +0000

Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka appears eager to take full credit for his role in countering Russia’s short-lived but hugely significant recent Wagner rebellion. Speaking on June 27 just days after the uprising came to an abrupt end, Lukashenka provided a detailed and highly flattering account of negotiations with Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin that contrasted his own strong leadership with Russian ruler Vladimir Putin’s apparent indecisiveness.

This was a bold move by Lukashenka, who has been heavily dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival ever since Russia intervened to prop up his regime during a wave of Belarusian pro-democracy protests in the second half of 2020. Clearly, Lukashenka feels emboldened by Putin’s apparent weakness and sees the Wagner affair as an opportunity to burnish his own credentials as both a wise ruler and a skilled negotiator.

Lukashenka’s version of events is certainly convenient but may not be entirely accurate. In reality, he is more likely to have served as a messenger for Putin. The Russian dictator had good reason to avoid any direct talks with rebel leader Prigozhin, who he had publicly branded as a traitor. It is also probably no coincidence that Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rather than Lukashenka announced news of Prigozhin’s subsequent departure for Belarus. This has reinforced perceptions of Belarus as a vassal state of Russia that serves as a place of exile for disgraced members of the Kremlin elite. Indeed, Putin himself went even further and offered thousands of Wagner troops who participated in the rebellion the choice of relocating to Belarus if they wish.

It is not yet clear whether significant numbers of Wagner fighters will accept Putin’s invitation and move to Belarus. For now, Lukashenka claims to have offered Wagner the use of an abandoned military base. He has hinted that Wagner troops may serve in a training capacity for his own military, praising their performance in Ukraine and hailing them as “the most prepared unit in the Russian army.”

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Many ordinary Belarusians do not share Lukashenka’s enthusiasm and worry that the potential arrival of Wagner fighters will drag Belarus further into the turmoil engulfing Putin’s Russia. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, research has consistently found that the overwhelming majority of Belarusians oppose any involvement in the war. Belarusian railway workers and other activists have sabotaged the movement of Russian troops and military equipment across the country, while Belarusian military volunteers have joined the fight against Russia inside Ukraine.

News that Belarus may now serve as a place of exile for large numbers of Wagner fighters is certain to deepen existing concerns over the country’s role as a junior partner in Russia’s faltering invasion of Ukraine. Lukashenka granted Putin permission to use Belarus as a springboard for an attempt to seize Kyiv during the initial stages of the war in early 2022. He continues to supply Russia with military equipment and ammunition, while also allowing Russian troops to train at Belarusian bases. Most recently, Belarus has reportedly begun the process of receiving Russian nuclear weapons.

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The delivery of Russian nukes and the proposal to host Wagner forces underscore the significance of Belarus in Putin’s regional strategy. The continued presence of Lukashenka in Minsk gives Moscow options in its confrontation with the West and enables the Kremlin to enhance its influence in the wider region. This appears to suit Lukashenka, who knows the Kremlin is unlikely to abandon him as long as he remains indispensable to the Russian war effort.

The outlook for Belarus as a whole is less promising. If large numbers of Wagner troops begin arriving in the country, this will dramatically increase Russia’s overall military presence and spark renewed speculation over a possible fresh Russian offensive from Belarusian territory to capture the Ukrainian capital. This would force Ukraine to strengthen its defenses along the country’s northern border and could potentially make Belarus a target.

The stationing of Wagner units in Belarus would also cause alarm bells to ring in nearby European Union and NATO member states such as Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Many of these countries have already taken steps to increase border security with Belarus. The arrival of Russia’s most effective and battle-hardened military units in the country would likely lead to a new iron curtain and the further isolation of the Belarusian population from their European neighbors.

In all likelihood, Lukashenka probably had very little say in the decision to use Belarus as a place of exile for mutinous Wagner forces. At the same time, he may view these troops as a means of protecting himself against any form of domestic opposition. Lukashenka remains vulnerable to the kind of widespread anti-regime protests that swept the country in 2020, and is well aware that his decision to involve Belarus in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is deeply unpopular. Having thousands of Wagner fighters on hand might be the perfect insurance against an uprising aiming to topple his regime.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. She tweets @HannaLiubakova.

Executive editors

Frederick Kempe
Alexander V. Mirtchev

Editor-in-chief

Matthew Kroenig

Editorial board members

James L. Jones
Odeh Aburdene
Paula Dobriansky
Stephen J. Hadley
Jane Holl Lute
Ginny Mulberger
Stephanie Murphy
Dan Poneman
Arnold Punaro

Executive summary

The United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are engaged in a strategic competition surrounding the development of key technologies. Both countries seek to out-compete the other to achieve first-mover advantage in breakthrough technologies, and to be the best country in terms of the commercial scaling of emerging and existing technologies.

Until recently, the United States was the undisputed leader in the development of breakthrough technologies, and in the innovation and commercial scaling of emerging and existing technologies, while China was a laggard in both categories. That script has changed dramatically. China is now the greatest single challenger to US preeminence in this space.

For the United States, three goals are paramount. The first is to preserve the US advantage in technological development and innovation relative to China. The second is to harmonize US strategy and policy with those of US allies and partners, while gaining favor with nonaligned states. The third is to retain international cooperation around trade in technology and in scientific research and exploration.

The strategy outlined in these pages has three major elements: the promotion of technologically based innovation; the protection of strategically valuable science and technology (S&T) knowhow, processes, machines, and technologies; and the coordination of policies with allies and partners. The shorthand for this triad is “promote, protect, and coordinate.”

On the promotion side, if the United States wishes to remain the leading power in scientific research and in translating that research into transformative technologies, then the US government—in partnership with state and local governments, the private sector, and academia—will need to reposition and recalibrate its policies and investments. On the protect side, a coherent strategy requires mechanisms to protect and defend a country’s S&T knowledge and capabilities from malign actors, including trade controls, sanctions, investment screening, and more. Smartly deploying these tools, however, is exceedingly difficult and requires the United States to hone its instruments in a way that yields only intended results. The coordination side focuses on “tech diplomacy,” given the need to ensure US strategy and policy positively influence as many allies, partners, and even nonaligned states as possible, while continuing to engage China on technology-related issues. The difficulty lies in squaring the interests and priorities of the United States with those of its allies and partners, as well as nonaligned states, and even China itself.

This strategy assumes that China will remain a significant competitor to the United States for years to come. It also assumes that relations between the United States and China will remain strained at best or, at worst, devolve into antagonism or outright hostility. Even if a thaw were to reset bilateral relations entirely, the US interest in maintaining its advantage in technological development would remain.

Any successful long-term strategy will require that the US government pursue policies that are internally well coordinated, are based on solid empirical evidence, and are flexible and nimble in the short run, while being attentive to longer-run trends and uncertainties.

There are two major sets of risks accompanying this strategy. Overreach is one because decoupling to preserve geopolitical advantages can be at odds with economic interests. A second involves harms to global governance including failure to continue cooperation surrounding norms and standards to guide S&T research, and failure to continue international science research cooperation focused on solving global-commons challenges such as pandemics and climate change.

The recommendations that follow from this analysis include the following, all directed at US policymakers.

Restore and sustain public research and development (R&D) funding for scientific and technological advancement.
Improve and sustain STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) education and skills training across K–12, university, community college, and technical schools.
Craft a more diverse tech sector.
Attract and retain highly skilled talent from abroad.
Support whole-of-government strategy development.
Ensure private-sector firms remain at the cutting edge of global competitiveness.
Improve S&T intelligence and counterintelligence.
Ensure calibrated development and application of punitive measures.
Build out and sustain robust multilateral institutions.
Engage with China, as it cannot be avoided.

A 2033 What If…

Imagine that it is the year 2033. Imagine that China has made enormous strides forward in the technology arena at the expense of the United States and its allies and partners. Suppose that this outcome occurred because, between 2023 and 2033, China’s economy not only does not weaken substantially but instead goes from strength to strength, including (importantly) increasing its capabilities in technological development and innovation. Suppose, too, that the US government failed to craft and maintain the kinds of investments and policies that are needed to sustain and enhance its world-leading tech-creation machine—its “innovation ecosystem”—to stay ahead of China. Suppose that the US government also failed to properly calibrate the punitive measures designed to prevent China from acquiring best-in-class technologies from elsewhere in the world—where calibration means the fine-tuning of policies to achieve prescribed objectives without spillover consequence. Finally, suppose that the United States and its allies and partners around the world failed to align with one another in terms of strategies and policies regarding how to engage China and, just as critically, about alignment of their own ends. What might that world look like?

Looking at that world from the year 2033, a first observation is that US scientific and technological (S&T) advantage, a period that lasted from 1945 to the 2020s, has come to an end. In its place is a world where China’s government labs, universities, and firms are often the first to announce breakthrough scientific developments and the first to turn them into valuable technologies.

For the US government and for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, the strategic consequences are severe, as China has not only closed much of the defense spending gap by 2033 but is able to employ weaponry as advanced, and in some cases more advanced, than those of the United States and its allies.¹ Military planners from Washington to New Delhi watch China’s rising capabilities with much anxiety, given the geostrategic leverage that such changes have given Beijing across the region.

Nor is this problem the only headache for the United States and its coalition of partners in 2033. For a variety of reasons, many of China’s tech firms are outcompeting those elsewhere in the world, including some of the United States’ biggest and most important firms. Increasingly, the world looks as much to Shenzhen as to Silicon Valley for the latest tech-infused products and services.

China’s long-standing ambition to give its tech firms an advantage has paid off. The Chinese state has successfully pursued its strategy of commercial engagement with other countries, one that has been well known for decades and is characterized by direct and indirect financial and technical aid for purchases of Chinese hardware and software. This approach, while imperfect, drove adoption of Chinese technology abroad, with much of that adoption happening in the Global South.² Across much of Africa, Latin America, South and Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, China has grown into the biggest player in the tech space, with its technologies appealing both to consumers and to many governments looking for financial assistance in upgrading their tech infrastructure. Moreover, China’s tech assistance has aided authoritarian governments seeking the means to control access to information, especially online, and the desire to surveil citizens and suppress dissent.³ China’s efforts have been a major reason why the internet has fractured in many countries around the world. The ideal of the internet as an open platform is largely gone, replaced by a system of filtered access to information—in many instances, access that is controlled by authoritarian and illiberal states.

In 2033, even the biggest US-based tech firms struggle to keep pace with Chinese firms, as do tech firms based in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. Although still formidable, Western firms find themselves at a disadvantage in both domestic and foreign markets. China’s unfair trading practices have continued to give its firms an edge, even in markets in mature economies and wealthy countries. China has continued its many unfair trading practices, including massive direct and indirect state subsidies and regulatory support for its firms, suspect acquisition—often outright theft—of intellectual property (IP) from firms abroad, and requiring that foreign firms transfer technology to China in exchange for granting access to its enormous domestic consumer market, in 2033 the biggest in the world.⁴ When added to the real qualitative leaps that China has made in terms of the range and sophistication of its tech-based products and services, foreign firms are often on the back foot even at home. In sector after sector, China is capturing an increasingly large share of global wealth.

Nor is this all. China’s rising influence means that the democratic world has found it impossible to realize its preferences concerning the global governance of technology. This problem extends beyond China’s now significant influence on technical-standards development within the range of international organizations that are responsible for standards.⁵ The problem is much larger than even that. Since the early 2020s, because of decreasing interest in scientific cooperation, the United States, China, and Europe have been unable to agree on the basic norms and principles that should guide the riskiest forms of advanced tech development. As a result, big gaps have appeared in how the major players approach such development. This patchwork, incomplete governance architecture has meant that countries, firms, and even individual labs have forged ahead without common ethical-normative frameworks to guide research and development. In such fields as artificial intelligence (AI), China has increased its implementation of AI-based applications that have eroded individual rights and privacies—for example, AI-driven facial-recognition technologies used by the state to monitor individual activity—not only within China, but in parts of the world where its technologies have been adopted.⁶

Nor is even this long list all that is problematic in the year 2033. Scientific cooperation between the United States and China—and, by extension, China and many US allies and partners—has declined precipitously since 2023. Cross-national collaboration among the world’s scientists has always been a proud hallmark of global scientific research, delivering progress on issues ranging from cancer treatments to breakthrough energy research. Collaboration between China on the one hand, and Western states on the other, used to be a pillar of global science. Now, unfortunately, much of that collaboration has disappeared, given the rising suspicions and antagonism and the resulting policies that were implemented to limit and, in some cases, even block scientific exchange.⁷

From the perspective of developments that led to this point in the year 2033, the United States and its allies and partners failed to pursue a coherent, cooperative, and united strategy vis-à-vis strategic competition with China. Policymakers were unable to articulate, and then implement, policies that were consistent over time and across national context. Various international forums were created for engagement on strategy and policy questions, but they proved of low utility as policy harmonization bodies or tech trade-dispute mechanisms.

Opening session of US-China talks at the Captain Cook Hotel in Anchorage, Alaska, US March 18, 2021. REUTERS/Frederic J. Brown

Strategic context

The above scenario, which sketches a world in 2033 where China has gained the upper hand at the expense of the United States and its allies and partners, is not inevitable. As this strategy paper articulates, there is much that policymakers in the United States and elsewhere can do to ensure that more benign futures, from their perspectives, are possible. However, as this strategy paper also articulates, their success is far from a given.

The United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are engaged in a strategic competition surrounding the development of key technologies, including advanced semiconductors (“chips”), AI, advanced computing (including quantum computing), a range of biotechnologies, and much more. Both countries seek to out-compete the other to achieve first-mover advantage in breakthrough technologies, and to be the best country at the commercial scaling of emerging and existing technologies.

These two capabilities—the first to develop breakthrough technologies and the best at tech-based innovation—overlap in important respects, but they are not identical and should not be regarded as the same thing. The first country to build a quantum computer for practical application (such as advanced decryption) is an example of the former capability; the country that is best at innovating on price, design, application, and functionality of electric vehicles (EVs) is an example of the latter capability. The former will give the inventing country a (temporary) strategic and military advantage; the latter will give the more innovative country a significant economic edge, indirectly contributing to strategic and military advantage. The outcome of this competition will go a long way toward determining which country—China or the United States—has the upper hand in the larger geostrategic competition between them in the coming few decades.

For China, the primary goal is to build an all-encompassing indigenous innovation ecosystem, particularly in sectors that Chinese leadership has deemed critical. Beijing views technology as the main arena of competition and rivalry with the United States, with many high-level policies and strategy documents released under Xi Jinping’s tenure emphasizing technology across all aspects of society. Under Xi’s direction, China has intensified its preexisting efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in key technology sectors, centering on indigenous innovation and leapfrogging the United States.

On the US side, the Joe Biden administration and Congress have emphasized the need to maintain leadership in innovation and preserve US technological supremacy. Although there are many similarities between the Donald Trump and Biden administrations’ approaches to competition with China, one of the primary differences has been the Biden administration’s focus on bringing allies and partners onboard and trying to make policies as coordinated and multilateral as possible. While a laudable goal, implementation of a seamless allies-and-partners coordination is proving difficult.

Until recently, the United States was the undisputed leader in the development of breakthrough technologies, and in the innovation and commercial scaling of emerging and existing technologies. Until recently, China was a laggard in both categories, falling well behind the United States and most, if not all, of the world’s advanced economies in both the pace of scientific and technological (S&T) development and the ability to innovate around technologically infused products and services.

That script has changed dramatically as a result of China’s rapid ascension up the S&T ladder, starting with Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in the 1970s and 1980s and continuing through Xi Jinping’s tenure.⁸

Although analysts disagree about how best to measure China’s current S&T capabilities and its progress in innovating around tech-based goods and services, there is no dispute that China is now the greatest single challenger to US preeminence in this space. In some respects, China may already have important advantages over the United States and all other countries—for example, in its ability to apply what has been labeled “process knowledge,” rooted in the country’s vast manufacturing base, to improve upon existing tech products and invent new ones.⁹

Chinese President Xi Jinping speaks at the military parade marking the 70th founding anniversary of People’s Republic of China, on its National Day in Beijing, China October 1, 2019. REUTERS/Jason Lee

This competition represents a new phase in the two countries’ histories. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the decade that followed saw US leadership seek to include China as a member of the rules-based international order. In a March 2000 speech, President Bill Clinton spoke in favor of China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), arguing that US support of China’s new permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status was “clearly in our larger national interest” and would “advance the goal America has worked for in China for the past three decades.”¹⁰ China’s leadership returned the favor, with President Jiang Zemin later stating that China “would make good on [China’s] commitments…and further promote [China’s] all-directional openness to the outside world.”¹¹

Despite some US concerns, the period from 2001 through most of the Barack Obama administration saw Sino-American relations at their best.¹² The lure of the Chinese market was strong, with bilateral trade in goods exploding from less than $8 billion in 1986 to more than $578 billion in 2016.¹³ People-to-people exchanges increased dramatically as well, with tourism from China increasing from 270,000 in 2005 to 3.17 million in 2017, and the number of student F-visas granted to PRC students increasing tenfold, from approximately 26,000 in 2000 to nearly 250,000 in 2014.¹⁴ US direct investment in China also grew significantly after 2000, as US companies saw the vast potential of the Chinese market and workforce. Notably, overall US investment in China continued to grow even after the COVID-19 pandemic.¹⁵

So what changed? In a 2018 essay titled “The China Reckoning,” China scholars Ely Ratner and Kurt Campbell—now both members of the Biden administration—described how the US plan for China and its role in the international system had not gone as hoped.

Neither carrots nor sticks have swayed China as predicted. Diplomatic and commercial engagement have not brought political and economic openness. Neither US military power nor regional balancing has stopped Beijing from seeking to displace core components of the US-led system. And the liberal international order has failed to lure or bind China as powerfully as expected. China has instead pursued its own course, belying a range of American expectations in the process.
Campbell and Ratner, “The China Reckoning.”

These sentiments were shared by many others in Washington. Many felt like China was taking advantage of the United States as the Obama administration transitioned to its “pivot to Asia.” For example, in 2014 China sent an uninvited electronic-surveillance ship alongside four invited naval vessels to the US-organized Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) military exercises, damaging what had appeared to be improving military-to-military relations.¹⁶ On the economic side, despite the two sides signing an agreement in April 2015 not to engage in industrial cyber espionage, it soon became clear that China did not plan to uphold its side of the bargain. In 2017, the US Department of Justice indicted three Chinese nationals for cyber theft from US firms, including Moody’s Analytics, Siemens AG, and Trimble.¹⁷

Within China, political developments were also driving changes in the relationship. Xi Jinping assumed power in November 2012, and most expected him to continue on his predecessors’ trajectory. However, in 2015 a slew of Chinese policies caught the eye of outside observers, especially the “Made in China 2025” strategy that caused a massive uproar in Washington and other global capitals, given its explicit focus on indigenization of key sectors, including the tech sector.

On the US side, when President Trump was elected in 2017, the bilateral economic relationship came under further fire, sparked by growing concerns surrounding China’s unfair trade practices, IP theft, and the growing trade deficit between the two countries. First the first time, frustration over these issues brought about strong US policy responses, including tariffs on steel, aluminum, soybeans, and more, a Section 301 investigation of Chinese economic practices by the US trade representative, and unprecedented export controls on the Chinese firms Huawei and ZTE. On the Chinese side, a growing emphasis on self-reliance, in conjunction with narratives surrounding the decline of the West, has dominated the conversation at the highest levels of government. In many instances, some of these statements—like China’s relatively unachievable indigenization goals in the semiconductor supply chain—have pushed the US policy agenda closer toward one centering on zero-sum tech competition.

In 2023, the Biden administration continued some Trump-era policies toward China, often reaching for export controls as a means to prevent US-origin technology from making its way to China. The Biden administration is even considering restricting outbound investment into China, stemming from concerns around everything from pharmaceutical supply chains to military modernization. The bottom line is that US-China competition is intense, and is here to stay for the foreseeable future.

Goals

There are three underlying goals for policymakers in the United States to consider when developing a comprehensive strategy.

Preserve the US advantage in technological development and innovation relative to China. Although the United States has historically led the world in the development of cutting-edge technologies, technological expertise, skills, and capabilities have proliferated worldwide and eroded this advantage. Although the United States arguably maintains its first position, it can no longer claim to be the predominant global S&T power across the entire board. As a result, US leadership will have to approach this issue with a clear-eyed understanding of US capabilities and strengths, as well as weaknesses.

Further, it is impractical to believe that the United States alone can lead in all critical technology areas. US policymakers must determine (with the help of the broader scientific community) not only which technologies are critical to national security but also how these technologies are directly relevant in a national security context. This point suggests the need for aligning means with ends—what is the US objective in controlling or promoting a specific technology? Absent strong answers to this question, technology controls or promotion efforts will likely yield unintended results, both good and bad.

Further, it is impractical to believe that the United States alone can lead in all critical technology areas. US policymakers must determine (with the help of the broader scientific community) not only which technologies are critical to national security but also how these technologies are directly relevant in a national security context. This point suggests the need for aligning means with ends—what is the US objective in controlling or promoting a specific technology? Absent strong answers to this question, technology controls or promotion efforts will likely yield unintended results, both good and bad.

Further, the United States’ capacity to transform basic research into applications and commercial products is an invaluable asset that has propelled its innovation ecosystem for decades. In contrast, Chinese leadership is keenly aware of its deficiencies in this area.

First-mover advantage in laboratory scientific research is not the same thing as innovation excellence. A country needs both if it seeks predominance. A country can have outstanding scientific capabilities but poor innovation capacity (or vice versa). Claims that China is surpassing the United States and other advanced countries in critical technology areas are premature, and often fail to consider how metrics to assess innovative capacity interact with one another (highly cited publications, patents, investment trends, market shares, governance, etc.).¹⁸ Assessing a country’s ability to preserve or maintain its technological advantage requires a holistic approach that takes all of these factors into account.
Harmonize strategy and policy with allies and partners, while gaining favor with nonaligned states. With respect to strategic competition vis-a-vis China, the interests of the United States are not always identical to those of its allies and partners. Any strategy designed to compete in the tech space with China needs to align with the strategies and interests of US allies and partners. Simultaneously, US strategy should offer benefits to nonaligned states within the context of this strategic competition with China, so as to curry favor with them.

This goal is especially important, given that the United States relies on and benefits from a network of allies and partners, whereas China aspires to self-sufficiency in S&T development. To preserve the United States’ advantage, US leadership must first recognize that its network is one of the strongest weapons in the US arsenal.

US allies and partners, of which there are many, want to maintain and strengthen their close diplomatic, security, and economic ties to the United States. The problem is that most also have substantial, often critical, economic relationships with China. Hence, they are loath to jeopardize their relationships with either the United States or China.

This strategic dilemma has become a significant one for US allies in both the transpacific and transatlantic arenas. As examples, Japan and South Korea, the two most advanced technology-producing countries in East Asia, are on the front lines of this dilemma. Their challenging situation owes to their geographic proximity to China on the one hand—and, hence, proximity to China’s strategic ambitions in the East and South China Seas, as well as Taiwan—and to their close economic ties to both China and the United States on the other.¹⁹ Although both have been attempting an ever-finer balancing act between the United States and China for years, the challenge is becoming more difficult.²⁰ In January 2023, Japan reportedly joined the United States and the Netherlands to restrict sales of advanced chipmaking lithography machines to China, despite the policy being against its clear economic interests.²¹ In April and May 2023, even before China banned sales of chips from Micron Technology, a US firm, the US government was urging the South Korea government to ensure that Micron’s principal rivals, South Korea’s Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix, did not increase their sales in China.²²

For nonaligned states, many of which are in the Global South, their interests are manifold and not easily shoehorned into a US-versus-China bifurcation. Many states in this category have generalized concerns about a world that is dominated by either Washington or Beijing, and, as such, are even more interested in hedging than are the closest US allies and partners. Their governments and business communities seek trade, investment, and access to technologies that can assist with economic development, while their consumers seek affordable and capable tech. Although China has made enormous strides with respect to technological penetration of markets in the Global South, there also is much opportunity for the United States and its allies and partners, especially given widespread popular appetite for Western ideals, messaging, and consumer-facing technologies.²³
Retain cooperation around trade and scientific exploration. One of the risks that is inherent in a fraught Sino-American bilateral relationship is that global public-goods provision will be weakened. Within the context of rising tensions over technological development, there are two big concerns: first, that global trade in technologically based goods and services will be harmed, and second, that global scientific cooperation will shrink.

An open trading system has been an ideal of the rules-based international order since 1945, built on the premise that fair competition within established trading rules is best for global growth and exchange. The US-led reforms at the end of the World War II and early postwar period gave the world the Bretton Woods system, which established the International Monetary Fund (IMF), plus the Marshall Plan and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Together, these reforms enabled unprecedented multi-decade growth in global trade.²⁴ China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, which the US government supported, marked a high point as many read into China’s entry its endorsement of the global trade regime based on liberal principles. However, since then—and for reasons having much to do with disagreements over China’s adherence to WTO trading rules—this global regime has come under significant stress. In 2023, with few signs that the Sino-American trade relationship will improve, there is significant risk of damage to the global trading system writ large.²⁵

Any damage done to the global trading system also risks harm to trade between the two countries, which is significant given its ongoing scale (in 2022, bilateral trade in goods measured a record $691 billion).²⁶. Tech-based trade and investment remain significant for both countries, as illustrated by the February 2023 announcement of a $3.5-billion partnership between Ford Motor Company and Contemporary Amperex Technology Limited (CATL) to build an EV-battery plant in Michigan using CATL-licensed technology.²⁷ A priority for US policymakers should be to preserve trade competition in tech-infused goods and services, at least for those goods and services that are not subject to national security-based restrictions and where China’s trade practices do not result in unfair advantages for its firms.

Beyond trade, there are public-goods benefits resulting from bilateral cooperation in the S&T domain. These benefits extend to scientific research that can hasten solutions to global-commons challenges—for example, climate change. China and the United States are the two most active countries in global science, and are each other’s most important scientific-research partner.²⁸ Any harm done to their bilateral relationship in science is likely to decrease the quality of global scientific output. Further, the benefits from cooperation also extend to creation and enforcement of international norms and ethics surrounding tech development in, for example, AI and biotechnology.

A worker conducts quality-check of a solar module product at a factory of a monocrystalline silicon solar equipment manufacturer LONGi Green Technology Co, in Xian, Shaanxi province, China December 10, 2019. REUTERS/Muyu Xu

Major elements of the strategy

The strategy outlined in these pages has three major elements: the promotion of technologically based innovation, sometimes labeled “running faster”; the protection of strategically valuable S&T knowhow, processes, machines, and technologies; and the coordination of policies with allies and partners. This triad—promote, protect, and coordinate—is also shorthand for the most basic underlying challenge facing strategists in the US government and in the governments of US allies and partners. In the simplest terms, strategists should aim to satisfy the “right balance between openness and protection,” in the words of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.²⁹ This strategic logic holds for both the United States and its allies and partners.

Promote: The United States has been the global leader in science and tech-based innovation since 1945, if not earlier. However, that advantage has eroded, in some areas significantly, in particular since the end of the Cold War. If the United States wishes to remain the leading power in scientific research and in translating that research into transformative technologies (for military and civilian application), then the US government, in partnership with state and local governments, the private sector, and academia, will have to reposition and recalibrate its policies and investments.

The preeminence of America’s postwar innovation ecosystem resulted from several factors, including: prewar strengths across several major industries; massive wartime investments in science, industry, and manufacturing; and even larger investments made by the US government in the decades after the war to boost US scientific and technological capabilities. The 1940s through 1960s were especially important, owing to the whole-of-society effort behind prosecuting World War II and then the Cold War. The US government established many iconic S&T-focused institutions, including the National Science Foundation (NSF), Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), most of the country’s national laboratories (e.g., Sandia National Laboratories and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories), and dramatically boosted funding for science education, public-health research, and academic scientific research.³⁰

This system, and the enormous investments made by the US government to support it, spurred widespread and systematized cooperation among government, academic science, and the private sector. This cooperation led directly to a long list of breakthrough technologies for military and civilian purposes, and to formation of the United States’ world-leading tech hubs, Silicon Valley most prominent among them.³¹

The trouble is that after the Cold War ended, “policymakers [in the US government] no longer felt an urgency and presided over the gradual and inexorable shrinking of this once preeminent system,” in particular through allowing federal spending on research and development (R&D) and education to flatline or even atrophy.³² From a peak of around 2.2 percent of national gross domestic product (GDP) in the early 1960s, federal R&D spending has declined since, reaching a low of 0.66 percent in 2017 before rebounding slightly to 0.76 percent in 2023.³³

Today, US competitors, including China, have figured out the secrets to growing their own innovation ecosystems (including the cultural dimensions that historically have been key to separating the United States from its competition) and are investing the necessary funding to do so. For example, several countries, especially China, have outpaced the United States in R&D spending. Between 1995 and 2018, China’s R&D spending grew at an astonishing 15 percent per annum, about double that of the next-fastest country, South Korea, and about five times that of the United States. By 2018, China’s total R&D spending (from public and private sources) was in second place behind the United States and had surpassed the total for the entire European Union.³⁴ From the US perspective, other metrics are equally concerning. A 2021 study by Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) projected that China will produce nearly twice as many STEM PhDs as the United States by 2025 (if counting only US citizens graduating with a PhD in STEM, that figure would be three times as much). This projection is based, in part, on China’s government doubling its investment in STEM higher education during the 2010s.³⁵

The United States retains numerous strengths, including the depth and breadth of its scientific establishment, number and sizes of its Big Tech firms, robust startup economy and venture capital to support it, numerous world-class educational institutions, dedication to protection of intellectual property, relatively open migration system for high-skilled workers, diverse and massive consumer base, and its still-significant R&D investments from public and private sources.³⁶

In addition, over the past few years there have been encouraging signs of a shift in thinking among policymakers, away from allowing the innovation model that won the Cold War to further erode and toward increased bipartisan recognition that the federal government has a critical role to play in updating that system. As was the case with the Soviet Union, this newfound interest in strengthening the US innovation ecosystem owes much to a recognition that China is a serious strategic competitor to the United States in the technology arena.³⁷ The Biden administration’s passage of several landmark pieces of legislation, including the CHIPS and Science Act, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), increased the amount of federal government spending on S&T, STEM education and skills training, and various forms of infrastructure (digital and physical), all of which are concrete evidence of the degree to which this administration and much of Congress recognize the stiff challenge from China.
Protect: A coherent strategy requires mechanisms to protect and defend a country’s S&T knowledge and capabilities from malign actors. Policy documents and statements from US officials over the past decade have called out the many ways in which the Chinese state orchestrates technology transfer through licit and illicit means, ranging from talent-recruitment programs and strategic mergers and acquisitions (M&A) to outright industrial espionage via cyber intrusion and other tactics.³⁸

On the protect side, tools include trade controls, sanctions, investment screening, and more. On the export-control side, both the Trump and Biden administrations have relied on dual-use export-control authorities to both restrict China’s access to priority technologies and prevent specific Chinese actors (those deemed problematic by the US government) from accessing US-origin technology and components.³⁹ Investment screening has also been a popular tool; in 2018, Congress passed the bipartisan Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) that strengthened and modernized the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)—an interagency body led by the Treasury Department that reviews inbound foreign investment for national security risks.⁴⁰ Under the Biden administration, a new emphasis on the national security concerns associated with US outbound investment into China has arisen, with an executive order focused on screening outbound tech investments in the works for almost a year.⁴¹ On sanctions, although the United States has so far been wary of deploying them against China, the Biden administration has, in conjunction with thirty-eight other countries, imposed a harsh sanctions regime on Russia and Belarus following Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.⁴²

Trade controls can be effective tools, but they need to be approached with a clear alignment between means and ends. For decades, an array of export controls and other regulations have worked to prevent rivals from accessing key technologies. However, historical experience (such as that of the US satellite industry) shows that, with a clear alignment between means and ends, trade controls can have massive implications for the competitiveness of US industries and, by extension, US national security.⁴³

Before deploying these tools, it is critical for policymakers to first identify what China is doing—both within and outside its borders—in its attempts to acquire foreign technology, an evaluation that should allow the United States to hone more targeted controls that can yield intended results. Trade controls that are too broad and ambiguous tend to backfire, as they create massive uncertainties that lead to overcompliance on the part of industry, in turn causing unintended downside consequences for economic competitiveness.

Understanding China’s strategy for purposes of creating effective trade controls is not as difficult as it once appeared. For instance, a 2022 report from CSET compiled and reviewed thirty-five articles on China’s technological import dependencies.⁴⁴ This series of open-source articles, published in Chinese in 2018, provides specific and concrete examples of Chinese S&T vulnerabilities that can be used by policymakers to assess where and how to apply trade controls. Other similar resources exist. Although the Chinese government appears to be systematically tracking and removing these as they receive attention, there are ways for US government analysts and scholars to continue making use of these materials that preserve the original sources.
Coordinate: The final strategy pillar is outward facing, focused on building and sustaining relationships with other countries in and around the tech strategy and policy space. This pillar might be labeled “tech diplomacy,” given the need to ensure US strategy and policy positively influences as many allies, partners, and even nonaligned states as possible, while continuing to engage China on technology-related issues. As with the other two pillars, this pillar is simple to state as a priority, but difficult to realize in practice.

In a May 2022 speech, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the administration’s shorthand formula is to “invest, align, [and] compete” vis-a-vis China.⁴⁵ Here, he meant “invest” to refer to large public investments in US competitiveness, “align” to closer coordination with allies and partners on tech-related strategy and policy, and “compete” largely to geostrategic competition with China over Taiwan, the East and South China Seas, and other areas.

Blinken’s remarks underscore the Biden administration’s priority for allies and partners to view the United States as a trusted interlocutor. When it comes to technology policy on China, the trouble lies in the execution—in particular, overcoming the tensions inherent within the “invest, align, compete” formula. After Blinken’s speech, for example, the IRA became law, which triggered a firestorm of protest among the United States’ closest transpacific and transatlantic allies. Viewing the IRA’s ample support for domestic production and manufacturing of electric vehicles and renewable-energy technologies—designed to boost the US economy and tackle climate change while taking on China’s advantages in these areas—the protectionist European Union (EU) went so far as to formulate a Green Deal Industrial Plan, widely seen as an industrial policy response to the IRA.⁴⁶ Much of the row over the IRA resulted from the perception—real or not—that the United States had failed to properly consider allies’ and partners’ interests while formulating the legislation. In the words of one observer, “amid the difficult negotiations at home on the CHIPS Act and the IRA, allies and partners were not consulted, resulting in largely unintended negative consequences for these countries.”⁴⁷

Long-term investment by US policymakers in multilateral institutions focused on technology will be a critical aspect of any potential victory. The Biden administration is already making strides on this front through several multilateral arrangements, including the resurrection of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) and the establishment of the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) and AUKUS trilateral pact. All three of these arrangements have dedicated time and resources to specific technological issues in both the military/geopolitical and economic spheres, and all three have the potential to be massively impactful in terms of technology competition.

However, history has shown that these types of arrangements are only effective as long as high-level political leadership remains involved and dedicated to the cause. Cabinet officials and other high-level leaders from all participating countries—especially the United States—will have to demonstrate continued interest in and commitment to these arrangements if they want them to produce more than a handful of documents with broad strategic visions.

Assumptions

The strategy outlined in these pages rests on two plausible assumptions. First, this strategy assumes that China will not follow the Soviet Union into decline, collapse, and disintegration anytime soon, which, in turn, means that China should remain a significant competitor to the United States for a long time to come.

China’s leadership has studied the collapse of the Soviet Union closely and learned from it, placing enormous weight on delivering economic performance through its brand of state capitalism while avoiding the kind of reforms that Mikhail Gorbachev instituted during the 1980s, which included freer information flows, freer political discourse, and ideological diversity within the party and state—all of which Chinese leadership believes to have been key to the Soviet Union’s undoing.⁴⁸ China also does not have analogous centrifugal forces that threaten an internal breakup along geographic lines as did the Soviet Union, which had been constructed from the outset as a federation of republics built upon the contours of the tsarist empire. (The Soviet Union, after all, was a union of Soviet Socialist republics scattered across much of Europe and Asia).⁴⁹

These factors weigh against an assessment that China will soon collapse. Nicholas Burns, the US ambassador to China, has said recently that China is “infinitely stronger” than the Soviet Union ever was, “based on the extraordinary strength of the Chinese economy” including “its science and technology research base [and] innovative capacity.” He concluded that the Chinese challenge to the United States and its allies and partners “is more complex and more deeply rooted [than was the Soviet Union] and a greater test for us going forward.”⁵⁰

A more realistic long-term scenario is one in which the United States and its allies and partners would need to manage a China that will either become stronger or plateau, rather than one that will experience a steep decline. Both variants of this scenario are worrisome, and both underscore the need to hew to the strategy outlined in this paper. A stronger China brings with it obvious challenges. A plateaued China is a more vexing case, owing to the very real possibility that Chinese leadership might conclude that, as economic stagnation portends a future decline and fall, the case for military action (e.g., against Taiwan) is more, rather than less, pressing. The strategist Hal Brands, for example, has suggested that a China that has plateaued will become more dangerous than it is now, requiring a strategy that is militarily firm, economically wise (including maintenance of the West’s advantages in the tech-innovation space), and diplomatically flexible.⁵¹

Second, the strategy outlined here assumes that relations between the United States and China will remain strained at best or, at worst, devolve into antagonism or outright hostility. In 2023, the assumption of ongoing strained relations appears wholly rational, based on a straightforward interpretation of all available diplomatic evidence.

How this strategy should shift if the United States and China were to have a rapprochement would depend greatly on the durability and contours of that shift. Even if a thaw were to reset bilateral relations to where they were at the beginning of the century (an unlikely prospect), the US interest in maintaining a first-mover advantage in technological development would remain. As reviewed in this paper, there was a long period during which the United States and China traded technologically based goods and services in a more open-ended trading regime than is currently the case. During that period, the United States operated on two presumptions: that China’s S&T capabilities were nowhere near as developed as its own, and that the US system could stay ahead owing to its many strengths compared with China’s.

The trouble with returning to this former state is that both presumptions no longer hold. China has become a near-peer competitor in science and technological development, and its innovative capabilities are considerable.

If China and the United States were to thaw their relationship, the policy question would concern the degree to which the United States would reduce its “protect” measures—the import and export restrictions, sanctions, and other policies designed to keep strategic technologies and knowhow from China, while protecting its own assets from espionage, sabotage, and other potential harms.

Guidelines for implementation

As emphasized throughout this paper, any successful long-term strategy will require that the US government pursue policies that are internally well coordinated, are based on solid empirical evidence, and are flexible and nimble in the short run, while being attentive to longer-run trends and uncertainties. The government will need to improve its capabilities in three areas.

Improved intelligence and counterintelligence: The US government will need to reassess, improve, and extend its intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities about tech development. The intelligence community will need to be able to conduct ongoing, comprehensive assessments of tech trends and uncertainties of relevance to the strategic competition with the United States. To properly gauge the full range of relevant and timely information about China’s tech capabilities, the Intelligence Community’s practice of relying on classified materials will need to be augmented by stressing unclassified open-source material. Classified sources, which the Intelligence Community always has prioritized, do not provide a full picture of what is happening in China. Patent filings, venture-capital investment levels and patterns, scientific and technical literature, and other open sources can be rich veins of material for analysts looking to assess where China is making progress, or seeking to make progress, in particular S&T areas. The US government’s prioritization of classified material contrasts with the Chinese government’s approach. For decades, China has employed “massive, multi-layered state support” for the “monitoring and [exploitation] of open-source foreign S&T.”⁵² There is recognition that the US government needs to upgrade its capabilities in this respect. In 2020, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence observed that “open-source intelligence (OSINT) will become increasingly indispensable to the formulation of analytic products” about China.⁵³

An intelligence pillar will need a properly calibrated counterintelligence element to identify where China might be utilizing its means and assets—including legal, illegal, and extralegal ones—to obtain intellectual property in the United States and elsewhere (China has a history of utilizing multiple means, including espionage, to gain IP that is relevant to their S&T development).⁵⁴ Here, “properly calibrated” refers to how counterintelligence programs must ensure that innocent individuals, including Chinese nationals who are studying or researching in the United States, are not brought under undue or illegitimate scrutiny. At the same time, these programs must be able to identify, monitor, and then handle as appropriate those individuals who might be engaging in industrial espionage or other covert activities. The Trump administration’s China Initiative was criticized both for its name (it implied that Chinese nationals and anyone of East Asian descent were suspect) and the perception of too-zealous enforcement (the program resulted in several high-profile cases ending in dismissal or exoneration for the accused). In 2022, the Biden administration shuttered this initiative and replaced it with “a broader strategy aimed at countering espionage, cyberattacks and other threats posed by a range of countries.”⁵⁵
Improved foresight: Strategic-foresight capabilities assist governments in understanding and navigating complex and fast-moving external environments. Foresight offices in government and the private sector systematically examine long-term trends and uncertainties and assess how these will shape alternative futures. These processes often challenge deeply held assumptions about where the world is headed, and can reveal where existing strategies perform well or poorly.

This logic extends to the tech space, where the US government should develop a robust foresight apparatus to inform tech-focused strategies and policies at the highest levels. The purpose of this capability would be to enhance and deepen understanding of where technological development might take the United States and the world. Such a foresight capability within the US government would integrate tech-intelligence assessments, per above, into comprehensive foresight-based scenarios about how the world might unfold in the future. The US government has impressive foresight capabilities already, most famously those provided by the National Intelligence Council (NIC). However, for a variety of reasons, including distance from the center of executive power, neither the NIC nor other foresight offices within the US government currently perform a foresight function described here. The US government should institutionalize a foresight function within or closely adjacent to the White House—for example, within the National Security Council or as a presidentially appointed advisory board. Doing so would give foresight the credibility and mandate to engage the most critical stakeholders from across the entire government and from outside of it, a model followed by leading public foresight offices around the world.⁵⁶ This recommendation is consistent with numerous others put forward by experts over the past decade, which stress how the US government needs to give foresight more capabilities while bringing it closer to the office of the president.⁵⁷
Improved S&T strategy and policy coordination: One of the major challenges facing the US government concerns internal coordination around S&T strategy and policy. As technology is a broad and multidimensional category, the government’s activities are equally broad, covered by numerous statutes, executive orders, and administrative decisions. One of many results is a multiplicity of departments and agencies responsible for administering the many different pieces of the tech equation, from investment to development to monitoring, regulation, and enforcement. In just the area of critical technology oversight and control, for example, numerous departments including Commerce, State, Defense, Treasury, Homeland Security, and Justice, plus agencies from the Intelligence Community, all have responsibilities under various programs.⁵⁸

Moreover, the US government’s approach to tech oversight tends to focus narrowly on control of specific technologies, which leads to an underappreciation of the broader contexts in which technologies are used. A report issued in 2022 by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine argued that the US government’s historic approach to tech-related risks is done through assessing individual critical technologies, defining the risks associated with each, and then attempting to restrict who can access each type of technology. Given that technologies now are “ubiquitous, shared, and multipurpose,” the National Academies asserted, a smarter approach would be to focus on the motives of bad-faith actors to use technologies and then define the accompanying risks.⁵⁹ This approach “requires expertise that goes beyond the nature of the technology to encompass the plans, actions, capabilities, and intentions of US adversaries and other bad actors, thus involving experts from the intelligence, law enforcement, and national defense communities in addition to agency experts in the technology.”⁶⁰

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, June 19, 2023. REUTERS

Major risks

There are two major sets of risks accompanying this strategy, both of which involve the potential damage that might result from failure to keep the strategic competition within acceptable boundaries.

Decoupling run amok: Overreach is one of the biggest risks associated with this strategy. Geopolitical and economic goals contradict, and it can be difficult to determine where to draw the line. As such, reconciling this dilemma will be the hardest part of a coherent and effective competition strategy.

Technology decoupling to preserve geopolitical advantages can be at odds with economic interests, which the United States is currently experiencing in the context of semiconductors. The October 7, 2022, export controls were deemed necessary for geopolitical reasons, as the White House’s official rationale for the policy centered around the use of semiconductors for military modernization and violation of human rights. However, limiting the ability of US companies like Nvidia, Applied Materials, KLA, and Lam Research to export their products and services to China, in addition to applying complex compliance burdens on these firms, has the potential to affect these firms’ ability to compete in the global semiconductor industry.

In addition, the continued deployment of decoupling tactics like export controls can put allies and partners in a position where they feel forced to choose sides between the United States and China. On the October 7 export controls, it took months to convince the Netherlands and Japan—two critical producer nations in the semiconductor supply chain whose participation is critical to the success of these export controls—to get on board with US policy.⁶¹ Even now, although media reporting says an agreement has been reached, no details of the agreements have been made public, likely due to concerns surrounding Chinese retaliation.

These issues are not exclusive to trade controls or protect measures. On the promote side, the IRA has also put South Korea in a difficult position as it relates to EVs and related components. When first announced, many on the South Korean side argued that the EV provisions of the IRA violated trade rules. At one point in late 2022, the South Korean government considered filing a complaint with the WTO over the issue.⁶² Although things seem to have cooled between Washington and Seoul—and the Netherlands and Japan have officially, albeit privately, agreed to join the US on semiconductor controls—these two instances should be lessons for US policymakers in how to approach technology policies going forward. Policies that push allies and partners too hard to decouple from the Chinese market are likely to be met with resistance, as many (if not all) US allies have deeply woven ties with Chinese industry, and often do not have the same domestic capabilities or resources that the United States has that can insulate us from potential harm. China is acutely aware of this, and will likely continue to take advantage of this narrative to convince US allies to not join in US decoupling efforts. China has historically leveraged economic punishments against countries for a variety of reasons, so US policymakers should be sure to incorporate this reality into their policy planning to ensure that allies are not put in tough positions.

Recently, government officials within the Group of Seven (G7) have been using the term “de-risking ” instead of “decoupling.” The term was first used by a major public official during a speech by Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, in a March 2023 speech where she called for an “open and frank” discussion with China on contentious issues.⁶³ The term was used again in the G7 communique of May 2023: economic security should be “based on diversifying and deepening partnerships and de-risking, not de-coupling.”⁶⁴ This rhetorical shift represents a recognition that full economic decoupling from China is unwise, and perhaps impossible. Moreover, it also is a tacit admission that decoupling sends the wrong signals not only to China, but to the private sector in the West as well.

In the authors’ opinion, de-risking is superior to decoupling as a rhetorical device—but changes in phrasing do not solve the underlying problem for policymakers in the United States, Europe, East Asia, and beyond. That underlying problem is to define and then implement a coherent strategy, coordinated across national capitals, that manages to enable them to stay a step ahead of China in the development of cutting-edge technology while preventing an economically disastrous trade war with China.
Harm to global governance: Another major set of risks involves the harms to global governance should the strategic competition between the United States and China continue on its current trajectory. Although the strategy outlined in these pages emphasizes, under the coordination pillar, maintenance of global governance architecture—the norms, institutions, pathways, laws, good-faith behavior, and so on that guide technology development—there is no guarantee that China and the United States, along with other important state and nonstate actors, will be able to do so given conflicting pressures to reduce or eliminate cooperative behavior.

Tragic outcomes of this strategic competition, therefore, would be: failure to continue cooperation regarding development of norms and standards that should guide S&T research; and failure to continue S&T research cooperation focused on solving global-commons challenges such as pandemics and climate change.

Any reduction in cooperation among the United States, China, and other leading S&T-research countries will harm the ability to establish norms and standards surrounding tech development in sensitive areas—for instance, in AI or biotechnology. As recent global conversations about the risks associated with rapid AI development show, effective governance of these powerful emerging technologies is no idle issue.⁶⁵

Even under the best of circumstances, however, global governance of such technologies is exceedingly difficult. For example, Gigi Kwik Gronvall, an immunologist and professor at Johns Hopkins University, has written that biotechnology development is “inherently international and cannot be controlled by any international command and control system” and that, therefore, “building a web of governance, with multiple institutions and organizations shaping the rules of the road, is the only possibility for [effective] governance.”⁶⁶ By this, she meant that—although a single system of rules for governing the biotechnology development is impossible to create given the speed of biotech research and multiplicity of biotech research actors involved (private and public-sector labs, etc.) around the world—it is possible to support a “web of governance” institutions such as the WHO that set norms and rules. Although this system is imperfect, as she admits, it is much better than the alternative, which is to have no governance web at all. The risk of a weak or nonexistent web becomes much more real if the United States, China, and other S&T leaders fail to cooperate in strengthening it.

Conclusions and recommendations

The arguments advanced in this paper provide an overview of the range and diversity of policy questions that must be taken into consideration when formulating strategies to compete with China in science and technology. This final section offers a set of recommendations that follow from this analysis.

Restore and sustain public R&D funding for scientific and technological advancement. As noted in this paper, public investment in R&D—most critically, federal-government investment in R&D—has been allowed to atrophy since the end of the Cold War. Although private-sector investment was then, and is now, a critical component of the nation’s R&D spending, public funding is also imperative for pure scientific research (versus applied research) and for funneling R&D toward ends that are in the public interest (defense, public health, etc.). Although the CHIPS and Science Act and the IRA both pledge massive increases in the amount of federal R&D investment, there is no guarantee that increased funding will be sustained over time. Less than a year after the CHIPS Act was signed into law, funding levels proposed in Congress and by the White House have fallen well short of amounts specified in the act.⁶⁷
Improve and sustain STEM education and skills training across K–12, university, community college, technical schools. It is widely recognized that the United States has fallen behind peer nations in STEM education and training at all levels, from K–12 through graduate training.⁶⁸ Although the Biden administration’s signature pieces of legislation, including the CHIPS Act, address this problem through increased funding vehicles for STEM education and worker-training programs, the challenge for policymakers will be to sustain interest in, and levels of funding for, such programs well into the future, analogous to the federal R&D spending challenge. Other related problems include the high cost of higher education, driven in part by lower funding by US states, that drives students into long-term indebtedness, and the need to boost participation in (and reduce stigma around) STEM-related training at community colleges and technical schools.⁶⁹ Germany’s well-established, well-funded, and highly respected technical apprenticeship programs are models.⁷⁰
Craft a more diverse tech sector. A closely related challenge is to ensure that the tech sector in the United States reflects the country’s diversity, defined in terms of gender, ethnicity, class, and geography. This is a long-term challenge that has multiple roots and many different pathways to success, including public investment in education, training, and apprenticeship programs, among other things.⁷¹ Among the most challenging problems (with potentially the most beneficial solutions) are those rooted in economic geography—specifically regional imbalances in the knowledge economy, where places like Silicon Valley and Boston steam ahead and many other places fall behind. As in other areas, recent legislation including the IRA, CHIPS Act, and IIJA have called for billions in funding to spread the knowledge economy to a greater number of “tech hubs” around the country. As with other pieces of the investment equation, however, there is no guarantee that billions will be allocated under current legislation.⁷²
Attract and retain high-skilled talent from abroad. One of the United States’ enduring strengths is its ability to attract and retain the world’s best talent, which has been of enormous benefit to its tech sector. A December 2022 survey conducted by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), for example, found that between 1990 and 2016, about 16 percent of all inventors in the United States were immigrants, who, in turn, were responsible for 23 percent of all patents filed during the same period.⁷³ Although the United States is still the top destination for high-skilled migrants, other countries have become more attractive in recent years, owing to foreign countries’ tech-savvy immigration policies and problems related to the US H-1B visa system.⁷⁴
Support whole-of-government strategy development. This paper stresses the need to improve strategic decision-making regarding technology through improving (or relocating) interagency processes and foresight and intelligence capabilities. One recommendation is to follow the suggestion by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and bring a whole-of-government strategic perspective together under the guidance of the White House.⁷⁵ Such a capacity would bring under its purview and/or draw upon a tech-focused foresight capacity, as well as an improved tech-focused intelligence apparatus (see below). The CHIPS Act contains provisions that call for development of quadrennial S&T assessments followed by technology strategy formulation, both to be conducted by the White House’s Office of Science Technology and Policy (OSTP).⁷⁶ A bill that was introduced in June 2022 by Senators Michael Bennet, Ben Sasse, and Mark Warner (and reintroduced in June 2023) would, if passed, create an Office of Global Competition Analysis, the purpose of which would be to “fuse information across the federal government, including classified sources, to help us better understand U.S. competitiveness in technologies critical to our national security and economic prosperity and inform responses that will boost U.S. leadership.”⁷⁷
Ensure private sector firms remain at the cutting edge of global competitiveness. Policymakers will need to strengthen the enabling environment to allow US tech firms to meet and exceed business competition from around the world. Doing so will require constant monitoring of best-practice policy development elsewhere, based on the presumption that other countries are tweaking their own policies to outcompete the United States. Policymakers will need to properly recalibrate, as appropriate and informed by best practices, an array of policy instruments including labor market and immigration policies, types and level of infrastructural investments, competition policies, forms of direct and indirect support, and more. An Office of Global Competition Analysis, as referred to above, might be an appropriate mechanism to conduct the horizon scanning tasks necessary to support this recommendation.
Improve S&T intelligence and counterintelligence. Consistent with the observations about shortcomings in the US Intelligence Community regarding S&T collection, analysis, and dissemination, some analysts have floated creation of an S&T intelligence capability outside the Intelligence Community itself. This capability would be independent of other agencies and departments within the government and would focus on collection and analysis of S&T intelligence for stakeholders within and outside of the US government, as appropriate.⁷⁸
Ensure calibrated development and application of punitive measures. As this paper has stressed at multiple points, although the US government has powerful protect measures at its disposal, implementing those measures often comes with a price, including friction with allies and partners. The US government should create an office within the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at the Commerce Department to monitor the economic impact (intended and unintended) of its export-control policies on global supply chains before they are implemented (including impacts on allied and partner economies).⁷⁹ This office would have a function that is similar in intent to the Sanctions Economic Analysis Unit, recently established at the US Treasury to “research the collateral damage of sanctions before they’re imposed, and after they’ve been put in place to see if they should be adjusted.”⁸⁰
Build out and sustain robust multilateral institutions. This paper has stressed that any effort by the United States to succeed in its tech-focused competition with China will require that it successfully engage allies and partners in multilateral settings such as the EU-TTC, Quad, and others. As with so many other recommendations on this list, success will be determined by the degree to which senior policymakers can stay focused over the long run (i.e., across administrations) on this priority and in these multilateral forums. In addition, US policymakers might consider updating multilateral forums based on new realities. For example, some analysts have called for the creation of a new multilateral export-control regime that would have the world’s “techno-democracies…identify together the commodities, software, technologies, end uses, and end users that warrant control to address shared national security, economic security, and human rights issues.”⁸¹
Engagement with China cannot be avoided. The downturn in bilateral relations between the United States and China should not obscure the need to continue engaging China on S&T as appropriate, and as opportunities arise. There are zero-sum tradeoffs involved in the strategic competition with China over technology. At the same time, there are also positive-sum elements within that competition that need to be preserved or even strengthened. As the Ford-CATL Michigan battery-plant example underscores, trade in nonstrategic technologies (EVs, batteries, etc.) benefits both countries, assuming trade occurs on a level playing field. The same is true of science cooperation, where the risk is of global scientific research on climate change and disease prevention shrinking if Sino-American scientific exchange falls dramatically. Policymakers in the United States will need to accept some amount of S&T collaboration risk with China. They will need to decide what is (and is not) of highest risk and communicate that effectively to US allies and partners around the world, the scientific community, and the general public.

The authors would like to thank Noah Stein for his research assistance with this report.

Report authors

Staff

Peter Engelke

Global Energy Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Technology & Innovation Europe & Eurasia

Fellow

Emily Weinstein

Global China Hub

China Technology & Innovation

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1 Although China likely will not close the spending gap with the United States by the mid-2030s, current spending trajectories strongly suggest that China will have narrowed the gap considerably. See the US-China bilateral comparison in: “Asia Power Index 2023,” Lowy Institute, last visited June 13, 2023, https://power.lowyinstitute.org; “China v America: How Xi Jinping Plans to Narrow the Military Gap,” Economist, May 8, 2023, https://www.economist.com/china/2023/05/08/china-v-america-how-xi-jinping-plans-to-narrow-the-military-gap.

2 See, e.g., the arguments presented by: Bryce Barros, Nathan Kohlenberg, and Etienne Soula, “China and the Digital Information Stack in the Global South,” German Marshall Fund, June 15, 2022, https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/china-digital-stack/.

3 For a brief overview of China’s efforts in this regard, see: Bulelani Jili, China’s Surveillance Ecosystem and the Global Spread of Its Tools, Atlantic Council, October 17, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/chinese-surveillance-ecosystem-and-the-global-spread-of-its-tools/.

4 For background to these practices, see: Karen M. Sutter, ““Made in China 2025’ Industrial Policies: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, March 10, 2023, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF10964.pdf; Gerard DiPippo, Ilaria Mazzocco, and Scott Kennedy, “Red Ink: Estimating Chinese Industrial Policy Spending in Comparative Perspective,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 23, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/red-ink-estimating-chinese-industrial-policy-spending-comparative-perspective; “America Is Struggling to Counter China’s Intellectual Property Theft,” Financial Times, April 18, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/1d13ab71-bffd-4d63-a0bf-9e9bdfc33c39; “USTR Releases Annual Report on China’s WTO Compliance,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, February 16, 2022, press release, 3, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2022/february/ustr-releases-annual-report-chinas-wto-compliance.

5 On China and technical standards, see: Matt Sheehan, Marjory Blumenthal, and Michael R. Nelson, “Three Takeaways from China’s New Standards Strategy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 28, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/10/28/three-takeaways-from-china-s-new-standards-strategy-pub-85678.

6 China’s current (2023) AI regulations are generally seen as more developed than those in either Europe or the United States. However, analysts argue that the individual rights and corporate responsibilities to protect them, as outlined in China’s regulations, will be selectively enforced, if at all, by the state. See: Ryan Heath, “China Races Ahead of U.S. on AI Regulation,” Axios, May 8, 2023, https://www.axios.com/2023/05/08/china-ai-regulation-race.

7 The scientific community has warned that this scenario is a real risk, owing to heightened Sino-American tension. James Mitchell Crow, “US–China partnerships bring strength in numbers to big science projects,” Nature, March 9, 2022, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-00570-0.

8 Deng Xiaoping’s reforms included pursuit of “Four Modernizations” in agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense. In the S&T field, his reforms included massive educational and worker-upskilling programs, large investments in scientific research centers, comprehensive programs to send Chinese STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) students abroad for advanced education and training, experimentation with foreign technologies in manufacturing and other production processes, and upgrading of China’s military to include a focus on development of dual-use technologies. Bernard Z. Keo, “Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones: Deng Xiaoping in the Making of Modern China,” Education About Asia 25, 2 (2020), 36, https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/crossing-the-river-by-feeling-the-stones-deng-xiaoping-in-the-making-of-modern-china/.

9 Dan Wang, “China’s Hidden Tech Revolution: How Beijing Threatens U.S. Dominance,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/chinas-hidden-tech-revolution-how-beijing-threatens-us-dominance-dan-wang.

10 “Full Text of Clinton’s Speech on China Trade Bill,” Federal News Service, March 9, 2000, https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Full_Text_of_Clintons_Speech_on_China_Trade_Bi.htm.

11 “Speech by President Jiang Zemin at George Bush Presidential Library,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, October 24, 2002, https://perma.cc/7NYS-4REZ; G. John Ikenberrgy, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?” Foreign Affairs 87, 1, (2008), https://www.jstor.org/stable/20020265.

12 Elizabeth Economy, “Changing Course on China,” Current History 102, 665, China and East Asia (2003), https://www.jstor.org/stable/45317282; Thomas W. Lippman, “Bush Makes Clinton’s China Policy an Issue,” Washington Post, August 20, 1999, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/campaigns/wh2000/stories/chiwan082099.htm.

13 Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations,” Foreign Affairs, February 18, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-13/china-reckoning.

14 “Number of Tourist Arrivals in the United States from China from 2005 to 2022 with Forecasts until 2025,” Statista, April 11, 2023, https://www.statista.com/statistics/214813/number-of-visitors-to-the-us-from-china/; and “Visa Statistics,” U.S. Department of State, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-statistics.html.

15 “Direct Investment Position of the United States in China from 2000 to 2021,” Statista, January 26, 2023, https://www.statista.com/statistics/188629/united-states-direct-investments-in-china-since-2000/.

16 Robbie Gramer, “Washington’s China Hawks Take Flight,” Foreign Policy, February 15, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/15/china-us-relations-hawks-engagement-cold-war-taiwan/; Sam LaGrone, “China Sends Uninvited Spy Ship to RIMPAC,” USNI News, July 18, 2014, https://news.usni.org/2014/07/18/china-sends-uninvited-spy-ship-rimpac.

17 “Findings of the Investigations into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, March 22, 2018, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF. When asked in November 2018 if China was violating the 2015 cyber-espionage agreement, senior National Security Agency cybersecurity official Rob Joyce said, “it’s clear that they [China] are well beyond the bounds today of the agreement that was forced between our countries.” See: “U.S. Accuses China of Violating Bilateral Anti-Hacking Deal,” Reuters, November 8, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-cyber/u-s-accuses-china-of-violating-bilateral-anti-hacking-deal-idUSKCN1NE02E.

18 Jacob Feldgoise, et. al, “Studying Tech Competition through Research Output: Some CSET Best Practices,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, April 2023, https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/studying-tech-competition-through-research-output-some-cset-best-practices.

19 The World Intellectual Property Organization’s annual “Global Innovation Index,” considered the gold standard rankings assessment of the world’s tech-producing economies, ranks South Korea sixth and Japan thirteenth in the 2022 edition. “Global Innovation Index 2022. What Is the Future of Innovation-Driven Growth?” World Intellectual Property Organization, 2022, https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator.

20 For a general review of the Japanese case, see: Mireya Solis, “Economic Security: Boon or Bane for the US-Japan Alliance?,” Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, November 5–6, 2022, https://spfusa.org/publications/economic-security-boon-or-bane-for-the-us-japan-alliance/#_ftn19. For the South Korean case, see: Seong-Ho Sheen and Mireya Solis, “How South Korea Sees Technology Competition with China and Export Controls,” Brookings, May 17, 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2023/05/17/how-south-korea-sees-technology-competition-with-china-and-export-controls/.

21 Jeremy Mark and Dexter Tiff Roberts, United States–China Semiconductor Standoff: A Supply Chain under Stress, Atlantic Council, February 23, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/united-states-china-semiconductor-standoff-a-supply-chain-under-stress/.

22 Yang Jie and Megumi Fujikawa, “Tokyo Meeting Highlights Democracies’ Push to Secure Chip Supplies,” Wall Street Journal, May 18, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/tokyo-meeting-highlights-democracies-push-to-secure-chip-supplies-54e1173d?mod=article_inline; “US Urges South Korea not to Fill Chip Shortfalls in China if Micron Banned, Financial Times Reports,” Reuters, April 23, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-urges-south-korea-not-fill-china-shortfalls-if-beijing-bans-micron-chips-ft-2023-04-23/.

23 See, e.g., the arguments in: Matias Spektor, “In Defense of the Fence Sitters. What the West Gets Wrong about Hedging,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/global-south-defense-fence-sitters.

24 On the expansion of trade under Bretton Woods during the first postwar decades, see: Tamim Bayoumi, “The Postwar Economic Achievement,” Finance & Development, June 1995, https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/022/0032/002/article-A013-en.xml.

25 For a review of the history of the bilateral trade relationship, see: Anshu Siripurapu and Noah Berman, “Backgrounder: The Contentious U.S.-China Trade Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 5, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/contentious-us-china-trade-relationship.

26 Eric Martin and Ana Monteiro, “US-China Goods Trade Hits Record Even as Political Split Widens,” Bloomberg, February 7, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-07/us-china-trade-climbs-to-record-in-2022-despite-efforts-to-split?sref=a9fBmPFG#xj4y7vzkg

27 Neal E. Boudette and Keith Bradsher, “Ford Will Build a U.S. Battery Factory with Technology from China,” New York Times, February 13, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/13/business/energy-environment/ford-catl-electric-vehicle-battery.html.

28 “Tracking the Collaborative Networks of Five Leading Science Nations,” Nature 603, S10–S11 (2022), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-00571-z.

29 “Protecting U.S. Technological Advantage,” National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2022, 12, https://doi.org/10.17226/26647.

30 Robert W. Seidel, “Science Policy and the Role of the National Laboratories,” Los Alamos Science 21 (1993), 218–226, https://sgp.fas.org/othergov/doe/lanl/pubs/00285712.pdf.

31 The federal government’s hand in creating Silicon Valley is well known. For a short summary, see: W. Patrick McCray, “Silicon Valley: A Region High on Historical Amnesia,” Los Angeles Review of Books, September 19, 2019, https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/silicon-valley-a-region-high-on-historical-amnesia/. A forceful defense of the federal government’s role in creating and sustaining Silicon Valley is: Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, “Why Technological Innovation Relies on Government Support,” Atlantic, March 28, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/andy-grove-government-technology/475626/.

32 Robert D. Atkinson, “Understanding the U.S. National Innovation System, 2020,” International Technology & Innovation Foundation, November 2020, 1, https://www2.itif.org/2020-us-innovation-system.pdf.

33 “National Innovation Policies: What Countries Do Best and How They Can Improve,” International Technology & Innovation Foundation, June 13, 2019, 82, https://itif.org/publications/2019/06/13/national-innovation-policies-what-countries-do-best-and-how-they-can-improve/; “Historical Trends in Federal R&D, Federal R&D as a Percent of GDP, 1976-2023,” American Association for the Advancement of Science, last visited June 13, 2023, https://www.aaas.org/programs/r-d-budget-and-policy/historical-trends-federal-rd.

34 Matt Hourihan, “A Snapshot of U.S. R&D Competitiveness: 2020 Update,” American Association for the Advancement of Science, October 22, 2020, https://www.aaas.org/news/snapshot-us-rd-competitiveness-2020-update.

35 Remco Zwetsloot, et al., “China is Fast Outpacing U.S. STEM PhD Growth,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, August 2021, 2–4, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/china-is-fast-outpacing-u-s-stem-phd-growth/.

36 As reviewed in: Robert D. Atkinson, “Understanding the U.S. National Innovation System, 2020,” International Technology & Innovation Foundation, November 2020, https://www2.itif.org/2020-us-innovation-system.pdf.

37 See, e.g., the arguments laid out by Frank Lucas, chairman of the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee, in: Frank Lucas, “A Next-Generation Strategy for American Science,” Issues in Science and Technology 39, 3, Spring 2023, https://issues.org/strategy-american-science-lucas/.

38 “Findings of the Investigations into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974”; “Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruitment Plans,” Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, US Senate, November 2019, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/2019-11-18%20PSI%20Staff%20Report%20-%20China’s%20Talent%20Recruitment%20Plans%20Updated2.pdf; Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable A Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation,” Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), January 2018, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4549143-DIUx-Study-on-China-s-Technology-Transfer.

39 Steven F. Hill, et. al, “Trump Administration Significantly Enhances Export Control Supply Chain Restrictions on Huawei,” K&L Gates, September 2020, https://www.klgates.com/Trump-Administration-Significantly-Enhances-Export-Control-Supply-Chain-Restrictions-on-Huawei-9-2-2020; and “Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Entity List Modification,” Bureau of Industry and Security, US Department of Commerce, October 14, 2022, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/10/13/2022-21658/implementation-of-additional-export-controls-certain-advanced-computing-and-semiconductor.

40 “The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States,” US Department of the Treasury, last visited June 13, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius.

41 Hans Nichols and Dave Lawler, “Biden’s Next Move to Box China out on Sensitive Tech,” Axios, May 25, 2023, https://www.axios.com/2023/05/25/china-investments-ai-semiconductor-biden-order.

42 “With Over 300 Sanctions, U.S. Targets Russia’s Circumvention and Evasion, Military-Industrial Supply Chains, and Future Energy Revenues,” US Department of the Treasury, press release, May 19, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1494.

43 Tim Hwang and Emily S. Weinstein, “Decoupling in Strategic Technologies: From Satellites to Artificial Intelligence,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, July 2022, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/decoupling-in-strategic-technologies/.

44 The articles were published in China’s state-run newspaper, Science and Technology Daily. Ben Murphy, “Chokepoints: China’s Self-Identified Strategic Technology Import Dependencies,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, May 2022, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/chokepoints/.

45 Antony J. Blinken, “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” US Department of State, May 26, 2022, https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/.

46 “Media Reaction: US Inflation Reduction Act and the Global ‘Clean-Energy Arms Race,’” Carbon Brief, February 3, 2023, https://www.carbonbrief.org/media-reaction-us-inflation-reduction-act-and-the-global-clean-energy-arms-race/; Théophile Pouget-Abadie, Francis Shin, and Jonah Allen, Clean Industrial Policies: A Space for EU-US Collaboration, Atlantic Council, March 10, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/clean-industrial-policies-a-space-for-eu-us-collaboration/.

47 Shannon Tiezzi, “Are US Allies Falling out of ‘Alignment’ on China?” Diplomat, December 19, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/are-us-allies-falling-out-of-alignment-on-china/.

48 “The Fall of Empires Preys on Xi Jinping’s Mind,” Economist, May 11, 2023, https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/05/11/the-fall-of-empires-preys-on-xi-jinpings-mind; Kunal Sharma, “What China Learned from the Collapse of the USSR,” Diplomat, December 6, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/what-china-learned-from-the-collapse-of-the-ussr/; Simone McCarthy, “Why Gorbachev’s Legacy Haunts China’s Ruling Communist Party,” CNN, August 31, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/31/china/china-reaction-mikhail-gorbachev-intl-hnk/index.html.

49 For a review of the complex history of the construction and deconstruction of the Soviet Union, see: Serhii Plokhy, “The Empire Returns: Russia, Ukraine and the Long Shadow of the Soviet Union,”Financial Times, January 28, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/0cbbd590-8e48-4687-a302-e74b6f0c905d.

50 Phelim Kine, “China ‘Is Infinitely Stronger than the Soviet Union Ever Was,’” Politico, April 28, 2023, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/global-insider/2023/04/28/china-is-infinitely-stronger-than-the-soviet-union-ever-was-00094266.

51 Hal Brands, “The Dangers of China’s Decline,” Foreign Policy, April 14, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/14/china-decline-dangers/.

52 Tarun Chhabra, et al., “Open-Source Intelligence for S&T Analysis,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service, September 2020, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/open-source-intelligence-for-st-analysis/.

53 A summary of and link to the committee’s redacted report is in: Tia Sewell, “U.S. Intelligence Community Ill-Prepared to Respond to China, Bipartisan House Report Finds,” Lawfare, September 30, 2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-intelligence-community-ill-prepared-respond-china-bipartisan-house-report-finds.

54 William Hannas and Huey-Meei Chang, “China’s Access to Foreign AI Technology,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service, September 2019, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/chinas-access-to-foreign-ai-technology/.

55 Ellen Nakashima, “Justice Department Shutters China Initiative, Launches Broader Strategy to Counter Nation-State Threats,” Washington Post, February 23, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/02/23/china-initivative-redo/.

56 Tuomo Kuosa, “Strategic Foresight in Government: The Cases of Finland, Singapore, and the European Union,” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 43, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/145831/Monograph19.pdf.

57 For a review, including a summary of such recommendations, see: J. Peter Scoblic, “Strategic Foresight in U.S. Agencies. An Analysis of Long-term Anticipatory Thinking in the Federal Government,” New America, December 15, 2021, https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/strategic-foresight-in-us-agencies/.

58 See, for example: Marie A. Mak, “Critical Technologies: Agency Initiatives Address Some Weaknesses, but Additional Interagency Collaboration Is Needed,” General Accounting Office, February 2015, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-288.pdf.

59 “Protecting U.S. Technological Advantage,” 97.

60 Ibid.

61 Toby Sterling, Karen Freifeld, and Alexandra Alper, “Dutch to Restrict Semiconductor Tech Exports to China, Joining US Effort,”Reuters, March 8, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/technology/dutch-responds-us-china-policy-with-plan-curb-semiconductor-tech-exports-2023-03-08/.

62 Troy Stangarone, “Inflation Reduction Act Roils South Korea-US Relations,” Diplomat, September 20, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/inflation-reduction-act-roils-south-korea-us-relations/; “S. Korea in Preparation for Legal Disputes with U.S. over IRA,” Yonhap News Agency, November 3, 2022, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20221103004500320.

63 “Speech by President von der Leyen on EU-China Relations to the Mercator Institute for China Studies and the European Policy Centre,” European Commission, March 30, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_2063.

64 “G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué,” White House, May 20, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/20/g7-hiroshima-leaders-communique/.

65 See, e.g.: Kevin Roose, “A.I. Poses ‘Risk of Extinction,’ Industry Leaders Warn,” New York Times, May 30, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/30/technology/ai-threat-warning.html.

66 Gigi Kwik Gronvall, “Managing the Risks of Biotechnology Innovation,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 30, 2023, 7, https://www.cfr.org/report/managing-risks-biotechnology-innovation.

67 Madeleine Ngo, “CHIPS Act Funding for Science and Research Falls Short,” New York Times, May 30, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/30/us/politics/chips-act-science-funding.html; Matt Hourihan, Mark Muro, and Melissa Roberts Chapman, “The Bold Vision of the CHIPS and Science Act Isn’t Getting the Funding It Needs,” Brookings, May 17, 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2023/05/17/the-bold-vision-of-the-chips-and-science-act-isnt-getting-the-funding-it-needs/.

68 See, e.g.: Gabrielle Athanasia and Jillian Cota, “The U.S. Should Strengthen STEM Education to Remain Globally Competitive,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 1, 2022, https://www.csis.org/blogs/perspectives-innovation/us-should-strengthen-stem-education-remain-globally-competitive.

69 On per-student university funding at state level, see: Mary Ellen Flannery, “State Funding for Higher Education Still Lagging,” NEA Today, October 25, 2022, https://www.nea.org/advocating-for-change/new-from-nea/state-funding-higher-education-still-lagging

70 Matt Fieldman, “5 Things We Learned in Germany,” NIST Manufacturing Innovation Blog, December 14, 2022, https://www.nist.gov/blogs/manufacturing-innovation-blog/5-things-we-learned-germany.

71 For a review, see: Peter Engelke and Robert A. Manning, Keeping America’s Innovative Edge, Atlantic Council, April 2017, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/keeping-america-s-innovative-edge-2/.

72 To date, Congress has allocated only 5 percent of the funds called for in the piece of the CHIPS Act that funds the tech hubs. Madeleine Ngo, “CHIPS Act Funding for Science and Research Falls Short,” New York Times, May 30, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/30/us/politics/chips-act-science-funding.html; Mark Muro, et al., “Breaking Down an $80 Billion Surge in Place-Based Industrial Policy,” Brookings, December 15, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2022/12/15/breaking-down-an-80-billion-surge-in-place-based-industrial-policy/.

73 Shai Bernstein, et al., “The Contribution of High-Skilled Immigrants to Innovation in the United States,” National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2022, 3, https://www.nber.org/papers/w30797.

74 Miranda Dixon-Luinenburg, “America Has an Innovation Problem. The H-1B Visa Backlog Is Making It Worse,” Vox, July 13, 2022, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/23177446/immigrants-tech-companies-united-states-innovation-h1b-visas-immigration.

75 “Protecting U.S. Technological Advantage,” 98–99.

76 Matt Hourihan, “CHIPS And Science Highlights: National Strategy,” Federation of American Scientists, August 9, 2022, https://fas.org/publication/chips-national-strategy/.

77 “Press Release: Bennet, Sasse, Warner Unveil Legislation to Strengthen U.S. Technology Competitiveness,” Office of Michael Bennet, June 9, 2022, https://www.bennet.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2022/6/bennet-sasse-warner-unveil-legislation-to-strengthen-u-s-technology-competitiveness.

78 Tarun Chhabra, et al., “Open-Source Intelligence for S&T Analysis,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET),Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service, September 2020, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/open-source-intelligence-for-st-analysis/.

79 Emily Weinstein, “The Role of Taiwan in the U.S. Semiconductor Supply Chain Strategy,” National Bureau of Asian Research, January 21, 2023, https://www.nbr.org/publication/the-role-of-taiwan-in-the-u-s-semiconductor-supply-chain-strategy/.

80 Daniel Flatley, “US Treasury Hires Economists to Study Consequences of Sanctions,” Bloomberg, May 17, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-18/us-treasury-hires-economists-to-study-consequences-of-sanctions?sref=a9fBmPFG.

81 Kevin Wolf and Emily S. Weinstein, “COCOM’s daughter?” World ECR, May 13, 2022, 25, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/WorldECR-109-pp24-28-Article1-Wolf-Weinstein.pdf.

The post Global Strategy 2023: Winning the tech race with China appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How Ukraine can pin down Russia in Crimea without a land campaign

John B. Barranco — Mon, 26 Jun 2023 13:44:45 +0000

Crimea is the location that most often captures international attention when it comes to Ukraine’s fight to regain all its lost territory. But it would be militarily foolish for Ukraine, as part of the counteroffensive that is now underway, to charge into the Russian-occupied peninsula. Instead, there are ways for the Ukrainians to render Crimea strategically irrelevant militarily to their Russian foes.

By initially attacking along a broad front, the Ukrainians can probe Russian lines and hide their true objective until they determine the weakest point to strike. Once the Ukrainians reach Russia’s multi-layered defensive fortifications, the most challenging phase of the counteroffensive will begin.

Ukrainian combat engineers will need to go through the slow and deadly process of clearing mines and blowing up tank obstacles under the cover of infantry and creeping artillery barrages. While the United States recently sent Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs), mine rollers, and demolition equipment for obstacle clearing, Ukraine will need much more to break through the Russian defenses.

If the Ukrainians can exploit the advantage of their superior tanks supplied by NATO members, they can drive deep into the rear area of Russian-occupied territory and split the Russian force in two with a combination of armor and HIMARS strikes guided by unmanned aircraft systems. This would enable the Ukrainian military to break the land bridge that Russia has created by occupying a continuous swath of Ukrainian territory from the Russian border to Crimea.

If Ukraine can breach the Russian defensive line of obstacles and minefields in two or three locations, it could provide multiple axes of advance to exploit and keep the Russians off balance, or allow the Ukrainians to at least feint in one or more spots and tie down Russian defenders. At the same time, Ukrainian tanks could rapidly move to exploit their success before the Russians recognize these advances, and could ideally penetrate the Russian rear area before they can deploy their reserves. This scenario would offer the Ukrainians the best chance they have had thus far in this war to liberate large swaths of occupied territory. But it would also in all likelihood be a long battle with significant casualties.

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It is unlikely that this counteroffensive will result in the liberation of Crimea. The narrow isthmus that connects the peninsula to the mainland of Ukraine makes it the most easily defensible piece of Russian-occupied territory. Because the Ukrainian military lacks an amphibious capability, the Russians can concentrate all their forces there, making any attempt at a southward advance extraordinarily deadly.

Yet the Ukrainians are savvy enough to realize that the actual value of Crimea to the Russians is the port of Sevastopol, despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claims of solidarity with the largely Russian-speaking population of the peninsula.

Ukraine has the ability to render the strategic value of Crimea moot and make Russia’s Black Sea Fleet pay a high price every time it attempts to leave the port of Sevastopol. Ukraine can achieve this by deploying advanced naval mines offensively as effectively as they did defensively close to the Ukrainian port city of Odesa; and by employing their Neptune anti-ship missiles as they have done to deadly effect in the past.

Eurasia Center events

How Prigozhin used Telegram to declare war on the Russian Ministry of Defense – and then suddenly pull back

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The addition of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine’s arsenal will provide another weapon to strike Russia’s naval base in Sevastopol and is a welcome change in US policy. Although still a fourth-generation aircraft and susceptible to Russia’s S-400 surface-to-air missile system, the F-16 is superior to anything the Ukrainian Air Force currently operates as a fighter or an air-to-ground attack aircraft.

Unlike the MiG-29, Su-27, Su-24, and Su-25 of the Ukrainian Air Force, the F-16 can carry the entire range of US and NATO laser-guided and GPS-guided air-to-ground ordnance, which will be vital for striking Russian targets deep in occupied territory including Crimea while avoiding collateral damage and civilian casualties. Additionally, its superior radar and ability to employ the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and AIM-9X Sidewinder make it superior to Russia’s Mig-29 and Su-27 in aerial combat. But since it will take three to four months to transition Ukrainian pilots to the F-16, these fighters will not play a significant role in the current counteroffensive.

The Ukrainians have demonstrated their commitment to their cause through superior leadership, morale, and courage under fire. At the same time, Russia’s shift to prepared defenses may allow them to shore up the flagging confidence of their largely conscripted army. While the current Ukrainian counteroffensive is a welcome step toward victory in this war, it will be one of many campaigns over the course of what will likely be a long and arduous struggle.

Col. John B. Barranco (Ret.) was the 2021-22 US Marine Corps senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is currently executive vice president of Potomac International Partners.

Russian War Report Special Edition: Prigozhin and Wagner forces mutiny against Moscow

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Sat, 24 Jun 2023 17:04:28 +0000

On the evening of Friday, June 23, Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin effectively broke ties with Moscow and initiated a mutiny against the Russian military, successfully occupying Rostov. Russian President Vladimir Putin condemned Prigozhin’s actions in an address to the nation as Russian authorities secured Moscow and reportedly engaged Wagner forces around Rostov. At the time of writing on the afternoon of Saturday, June 24, Prigozhin appears to have accepted a pause in further escalation, stating that Wagner forces will return to base. Today’s special edition of the Russian War Report provides an overview of the last thirty-six hours, including details on how Prigozhin’s rhetoric escalated into open conflict, open-source analysis of the latest footage, and a review of some of the competing narratives on Telegram and across the Russian information ecosystem.

Tracking narratives

Putin calls Prigozhin’s “criminal adventure” an “armed mutiny” and “treason”

Security

Wagner forces enter Rostov, occupy Russian Southern Military District headquarters

Wagner forces emerge south of Moscow in Lipetsk

Explosion at oil depot in Russian city of Voronezh

Media policy

Amid chaos in the Russian information space the Kremlin attempts to limit information on Prigozhin

How Prigozhin used Telegram to declare war on the Russian Ministry of Defense – and then suddenly pull back

The Russian-founded messaging platform Telegram, which became a primary tool circulating pro-Kremlin narratives throughout Russia’s war in Ukraine, achieved an unprecedented level of influence on June 23, with Prigozhin wielding it to vent his rage at the Russian defense establishment and launch a mercenary mutiny. For months, Prigozhin has engaged in rhetorical warfare against his rivals in the Kremlin, in particular Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Valery Gerasimov. The Wagner founder blamed them for ineptitude over the course of the war in Ukraine, including a months-long public argument about supplying his forces with adequate munitions during its siege of Bakhmut.

Prigozhin’s one-man war against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reached new heights in a series of Telegram posts that began on Friday, June 23, and continued into Saturday. At 10:50 am Moscow time, he posted a thirty-minute video to his Prigozhin Press Service Telegram channel excoriating the MoD, accusing its leadership of deceiving Putin and the Russian public in early 2022 into believing that Ukrainian aggression was imminent, and that Russia had no choice but to invade Ukraine.

Sitting in a chair in front of a Wagner Group flag pinned to an otherwise blank wall, Prigozhin proceeded to make his case against the MoD and its entire war effort. “Right now, the [MoD] is trying to deceive society and the president and tell a story that there was insane aggression from the Ukrainian side and they were going to attack us together with the whole NATO bloc,” Prigozhin said effectively undermining the Kremlin’s entire case for war. “Therefore, on February 24, the so-called special operation was launched for completely different reasons.” He described Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a “monstrous shame show” and an “incompetently planned operation” conducted by “a bunch of creatures” and “mentally ill scum” who “don’t have the balls” to fight aggressively with the necessary decisiveness to win the war, including their unwillingness to use tactical nuclear weapons. “The grandfathers are rather weak. They cannot get out of their comfort zone,” he added.

“A handful of dipshits decided for some reason that they were so cunning that no one would realize what they were doing with their military exercises, and nobody would stop them when they went to Kyiv,” Prigozhin said. He went on to blame Shoigu for killing thousands of capable Russian soldiers, and he directed his ire at Russian oligarchs enriching themselves on the war while seeking to return former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to power. “Our sacred war against those who wrong the Russian people has turned into racketeering, into theft,” he said.

Prigozhin later added that he would follow up the video with a second “interview,” but this would turn out to be a gross understatement, as the initial video was merely the first of more than a dozen messages he would post to his Prigozhin Press Service Telegram channel over the next thirty-six hours.

Later in the day at 5:10 pm Moscow time, Prigozhin amped up his criticism of the MoD even further with a Telegram audio post in which he accused it of committing “genocide” against Russians. Calling out Shoigu and Gerasimov directly, Prigozhin said “they should be held responsible for the genocide of the Russian people, the murder of tens of thousands of Russian citizens, and the transfer of Russian territories to the enemy.”

As angry audio clips of Prigozhin continued to appear into the evening, multiple pro-Wagner Telegram channels circulated a video around 9:00 pm Moscow time purporting to document the aftermath of a Russian airstrike on a Wagner encampment. The video shows scenes of a wooded area lined with stone paths subjected to a moderate amount debris and several fires burning in trenches; a body is briefly seen towards the end of the clip. It is unclear where or when the footage was filmed, and it brought to mind similar suspicious footage contextually devoid footage circulated prior to the February 2022 invasion accusing Ukraine of engaging in sabotage and other aggression against Russia.

The drama continues. Prigozhin publishes a video which he claims shows the aftermath of a rocket attack by the Russian ministry of defence on a Wagner camp. “Many of our guys died…We will make a decision how to respond to this evil. The next move is ours” pic.twitter.com/o7l14yVBMX
— Pjotr Sauer (@PjotrSauer) June 23, 2023

Within ten minutes, Prigozhin posted another angry statement, this time accusing the MoD of attacking his forces at the camp. “Today, seeing that we aren’t broken, they decided to launch rocket attacks on our rear camps,” he exclaimed. “A huge number of fighters were killed, our comrades in arms. We’ll decide how to respond to this atrocity. The ball’s in our court.”

Approximately fifteen minutes later, Prigozhin effectively declared war against the MoD in another Telegram audio clip. “The Wagner Group commanders’ council has made a decision,” he announced. “The evil that the country’s military leadership is carrying out must be stopped. They neglect soldiers’ lives. They’ve forgotten the word ‘justice’ and we’re bringing it back. Those who destroyed our guys today, those who destroyed many tens of thousands of Russian soldiers’ lives will be punished.” Later, he described his forces as “25,000 strong,” adding, “We’re going to get to the bottom of the lawlessness in this country.”

As Prigozhin continued posting additional threats and taunts on Telegram, the MoD described the alleged footage circulated on pro-Wagner channels as fake, while Russia’s National Anti-Terrorism Committee announced that the Federal Security Service, or FSB, would initiate a criminal case against Prigozhin “on the fact of calling for an armed rebellion.”

Prigozhin continued posting on and off throughout Saturday as his forces advanced north in the direction of Moscow. Then just before 8:30pm local time, he uploaded another message, stating he would return Wagner forces to their camps. It remains unclear whether he intends to keep that promise.

Prigozhin just now: "They wanted to disband Wagner. We set out on June 23 for the "March of Justice". In a day we marched just short of 200 km from Moscow. During this time, we have not shed a single drop of the blood of our fighters. Now is the moment when blood can be shed.…
— Mary Ilyushina (@maryilyushina) June 24, 2023

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington, DC

Putin calls Prigozhin’s “criminal adventure” an “armed mutiny” and “treason”

After spending Friday night away from cameras, Putin released a televised statement late Saturday morning. Addressing the Russian public as well as the armed forces and security personnel “who are now fighting in their combat positions, repulsing enemy attacks,” Putin described Prigozhin’s actions as a “criminal adventure” and an “armed mutiny.”

“Today, Russia is waging a tough struggle for its future, repelling the aggression of neo-Nazis and their patrons,” he stated. “The entire military, economic, and informational machine of the West is directed against us. We are fighting for the lives and security of our people, for our sovereignty and independence, for the right to be and remain Russia, a state with a thousand-year history.”

“This battle, when the fate of our nation is being decided, requires consolidation of all forces,” Putin continued. “It requires unity, consolidation, and a sense of responsibility, and everything that weakens us, any strife that our external enemies can use and do so to subvert us from within, must be discarded. Therefore, any actions that split our nation are essentially a betrayal of our people, of our comrades-in-arms who are now fighting at the frontline. This is a knife in the back of our country and our people.”

Comparing the mutiny to 1917, when “Russians were killing Russians and brothers were killing brothers,” Putin declared, “We will not allow this to happen again. We will protect our people and our statehood from any threats, including from internal betrayal…. Inflated ambitions and personal interests have led to treason—treason against our country, our people and the common cause which Wagner Group soldiers, and commanders were fighting and dying for.”

“Once again, any internal revolt is a deadly threat to our statehood and our nation. It is a blow to Russia, to our people,” he continued. “Our actions to defend the fatherland from this threat will be harsh. All those who have consciously chosen the path of betrayal, planned an armed mutiny, and taken the path of blackmail and terrorism, will inevitably be punished and will answer before the law and our people…. Those who staged the mutiny and took up arms against their comrades—they have betrayed Russia and will be brought to account. I urge those who are being dragged into this crime not to make a fatal and tragic mistake but make the only right choice: to stop taking part in criminal actions.”

“I am certain that we will preserve and defend what we hold dear and sacred, and together with our motherland we will overcome any hardships and become even stronger,” Putin concluded.

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington, DC

Wagner forces enter Rostov, occupy Russian Southern Military District headquarters

Over the course of Prigozhin’s Telegram posts, he boasted that his “25,000 strong” Wagner forces had marched across the border from Ukraine into Russia before claiming they had shot down a Russian armed forces helicopter before entering the city of Rostov. For many hours overnight, he provided no evidence to back his claims. This finally began to change as footage emerged on Russian Telegram, ultimately confirming that Prigozhin had indeed occupied Rostov.

At 3:47 am Moscow time, the pro-Wagner channel VChK-OGPU posted a video in which a helicopter can be heard circling over Rostov at night. The channel noted, however, “No one has yet seen the video of the Wagner PMC column and the battles with the Ministry of Defense.” Two minutes later, the channel changed its tune by sharing a second video appearing to show rocket fire and bursts of assault rifles, describing it as the “first video reportedly showing fighting between PMC Wagner and Ministry of Defense units.” The footage circulated widely on Telegram but remained unverified.

Less than twenty minutes later, at 4:09 am, VChK-OGPU shared a third clip showing what appeared to be a convoy of Wagner tanks, trucks, and other vehicles crossing a checkpoint without any opposition. Unlike the previous clips, however, the footage was easily visible, as it appeared to have been recorded during the pre-dawn twilight. According to open-source sun-tracking data, the sun rose in Rostov this morning at 4:25 am, with twilight commencing at 3:50 am, putting the video’s release squarely in the middle of pre-dawn twilight. The exact location of the footage is still under review and cannot be confirmed.

At 5:01 am, not long after sunrise, the Verum Regnum Telegram channel circulated video clips of what appeared to show Wagner forces arriving in central Rostov, just outside the MoD’s Southern Military District headquarters at the intersection of Pushkinskaya Ulitsa and Budonnovskiy Prospekt. One of the videos appeared to show forces beginning to set up a perimeter around the MoD building.

Telegram footage allegedly of Wagner forces in central Rostov. (Source: Verum Regnum/archive)

Top: Highlights from the video showing a tank in front of the southwest corner of Pushkinskaya Ulitsa and Budonnovskiy Prospekt (top left) and a man recording footage on his phone in front of the intersection’s northwest corner in front of the MoD’s Southern Military District building (top right). Bottom: Google Street View of the same intersection facing westward, where both corners are visible. (Source: Verum Regnum/archive, top left and top right; Google Street View/archive, bottom)

A second clip showed how that presence had expanded with the placement of additional armored vehicles blocking the entire intersection from vehicle traffic.

Wagner soldiers (left) and armored vehicles (center and right) block the intersection in front of the Southern Military District building in Rostov. (Source: Verum Regnum/archive)

Around 7:30 am Moscow time, a pair of videos appeared on the WAGNER Z GROUP/Z PMC WAGNER’Z Telegram channel and Prigozhin’s press channel respectively. The first video showed Prigozhin and his entourage entering the inner courtyard of the Southern Military District building. Prigozhin is later seen bragging about his successes with Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov while demanding that Yevkurov speak to him respectfully. In the second video, he addressed the camera and bragged that he had captured Rostov without firing a single shot.

Just wow. A video has surfaced showing Prigozhin at the Southern Military District HQ in Rostov-on-Don talking to (and HUMILIATING) Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov. He threatens to blockade Rostov and head for Moscow!

I have extreme trouble understanding Yevkurov and… pic.twitter.com/jGr9gaLB1i
— Kevin Rothrock (@KevinRothrock) June 24, 2023

#UPDATE Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, leading a mutiny to bring down Moscow's top brass, said Saturday his fighters captured the army HQ in Russia's Rostov-on-Don "without firing a single shot" and claimed to have the support of locals. pic.twitter.com/5F0uC0pDFQ
— AFP News Agency (@AFP) June 24, 2023

Later, prior to 2:00 pm Moscow time, new footage emerged showing people running from the neighborhood of the MoD building. Initial reports suggested it was a Russian Armed Forces attack within the vicinity, but this has not been confirmed.

The explosion occurred near the headquarters of the Southern Military District in Rostov. pic.twitter.com/CUuygkpiZq
— Maria Drutska (@maria_drutska) June 24, 2023

The many civilians running from the sound of an explosion were likely due to the crowds that came out to observe Wagner’s occupation of the MoD building. In one video, people can be seen chatting with Wagner soldiers and thanking them.

Rostov – people approaching the mercenaries to thank them and shake hands. pic.twitter.com/teLqMGtMWh
— Dmitri (@wartranslated) June 24, 2023

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington, DC

Wagner forces emerge south of Moscow in Lipetsk

The governor of Lipetsk, Igor Artamonov, announced Saturday afternoon that Wagner forces had entered the region, approximately 400 km south of Moscow. The Associated Press noted that the governor added, “The situation is under control.” Meanwhile, footage emerged that appeared to show excavators destroying the highway between Lipetsk and Moscow.

Digging up the road to make roadblocks. Lipetsk. pic.twitter.com/ObDcEHFPOo
— Michael Weiss (@michaeldweiss) June 24, 2023

At the time of writing there were conflicting reports as to whether the Wagner convoy had traveled from Rostov or was comprised of defectors from the Russian Armed Forces.

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington, DC

Explosion at oil depot in Russian city of Voronezh

On June 24, videos depicting an explosion at an oil depot in the region of Voronezh were widely circulated online. The DFRLab identified the precise location of the explosion and confirmed the videos as authentic.

The video published online was captured from buildings in close proximity to the Leroy Merlin store in Voronezh, as clearly observed in the footage. The DFRLab also corroborated the location of the oil depot Red Flag Oil Combine (Комбинат Красное знамя) and identified approximate coordinates for the area where the video was recorded. Below, the screenshot on the left is extracted from the video, while the image on the right is from Google Maps, illustrating the precise positions of the oil depot, store, and the recorded video.

Photo shows the locations of oil depot, store, recorded video, marked as blue, yellow, red respectively. (Source: Left Twitter/archive, Right Google Maps/archive)

Additional footage documented the shelling of a residential area in Voronezh. The footage reveals visible damage to cars. In order to verify the location of the building, the DFRLab utilized reverse image search via Google and Yandex, then cross-referenced the results with Google Maps, verifying the location of the shelling.

Imagery from Google Maps (left) shows the location of residential area in Voronezh (center and right). (Source: Google Maps/archive left; RtrDonetsk/archive, center; @christogrozev/archive, right)

The location of residential area as seen on Yandex Maps. (Source: Yandex/archive)

—Sayyara Mammadova, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Amid chaos in the Russian information space the Kremlin attempts to limit information on Prigozhin

According to TASS, Russian social network VKontakte (VK) and search engine Yandex are blocking content related to Prigozhin. Reportedly, instead of Prigozhin’s statement that was published on June 23 at 9:52 pm Moscow time, a VK page for Prigozhin’s Concord company displayed a message that the material was blocked on the territory of Russia on the basis of the decision of the Prosecutor General’s Office. At the time of the writing, Prigozhin’s posts on Concord VK page were available, though none of them correspond to 9:52 pm Moscow time. TASS added that the Yandex search results for Prigozhin notifies a reader that some of the search results are hidden in accordance with federal law. Using a virtual private network (VPN), the DFRLab replicated the search of the content mentioned by TASS and found that they are accessible from other locations. The restrictions seem to be geofenced to Russia.

Separately, TASS reported that there are Telegram-access disruptions detected in various Russian cities, including Moscow, St. Petersburg, Voronezh, and Volgograd Oblasts.

Russia’s internet regulator Roskomnadzor warned that the government can place internet performance restrictions in locations where counter-terrorist operations might take place, such as Moscow, Voronezh, or Rostov. Roskomnadzor also added that the use of Telegram is not limited for now.

Meanwhile, the Telegram channel Faridaily reported that residents of Moscow and the surrounding region are receiving calls from unknown mobile numbers with messages from Wagner. According to the Telegram post, one person received a call on their Viber messenger with a recording of Prigozhin’s appeal about “restoring justice.” Another person received a call on behalf of Wagner with an automated voice encouraging them to join Wagner when their units move toward Moscow.

Meanwhile, footage from Russian state media Rossiya 24 surfaced online showing a confused news anchor. Apparently lacking instructions from the Kremlin on how to report about the armed insurrection in Russia, they said, “Next we are going for short commercial and then… commercial.”

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report Special Edition: Prigozhin and Wagner forces mutiny against Moscow appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The ‘de-risk’ is in the details: A look at Europe’s ambitious new economic security strategy

Atlantic Council experts — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 18:23:24 +0000

Don’t call it decoupling. This week, the European Commission released its European economic security strategy, an ambitious plan to intercede in the European economy to reduce security risks across supply chains, critical infrastructure, and digital technology. European Commission Executive Vice-President Margrethe Vestager underscored that the strategy will “de-risk” the European Union (EU) from threats, not “decouple” its economy. But from whom? While the strategy dodges a direct answer, the EU’s top trading partner in goods, China, is an understood top concern.

Read insights below from Atlantic Council experts on what’s in the strategy and what it reveals about Europe’s economic and geopolitical future.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jörn Fleck and James Batchik: Europe is taking a hard look at itself

Barbara C. Matthews: The EU is acting to decrease points of vulnerability for renewable energy

Charles Lichfield: While not mentioned, China is the central focus of the strategy

Sarah Bauerle Danzman: The road to an EU outbound investment mechanism will be rocky

Elmar Hellendoorn: The strategy seeks to be adaptable but also comprehensive

Europe is taking a hard look at itself

The European economic security strategy represents a welcome development not just for its contents but in how the European Commission is thinking about economic security—and itself.

Under a framework of “promote, protect, and partner,” the strategy sheds light on the commission’s approach to de-risking, the phrase du jour of today’s geopolitics. It proposes new assessments of vulnerabilities, strengthened rules on key areas like foreign direct investment and export controls, and new rules on outbound investment. It also recycles existing proposals—the Critical Raw Materials Act, Net-Zero Industry Act, and Cyber Resilience Act, for example. By themselves, these are not groundbreaking. But it would be a mistake to stop there. Taken together, the strategy is a welcome document that outlines how the commission sees its policies become larger than the sum of their parts.

The contents of the strategy notwithstanding, there are three takeaways about how Europe sees its economic future. First, it starts with knowing oneself. The strategy opens with a frank acknowledgement that Europe was “insufficiently prepared” for many of the challenges that the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and challenges from unnamed—read: China—players posed to Europe. Second, the strategy acknowledges that the European market, its regulations, and cohesion is by itself a European strength that can “keep global supply chains open and shape standards.” Third, that there is a direct reference that the economic risks identified could threaten Europe’s national security is a small but notable addition. It shows a recognition of the convergence of the geopolitical and the economic.

However, the strategy also shows both the potential and the limitations of the commission. First, as much as the Berlaymont may be thinking geopolitically, the commission still relies on capitals across the continent to approve and implement new rules. Throughout the strategy, there are polite reminders for member states to implement or enforce existing or future rules. Second, and perhaps more crucially, it’s clear that the commission is increasingly out ahead of member states on issues of security, defense, and now economics. Many member states will have reservations, if not objections to some of the conclusions and proposals in the strategy. There is no shared consensus among member states about how to adequately defend themselves against China.

It’s important to remember that, as the strategy’s sentences, conjunctions, and punctuation will now be parsed and debated across the continent and the European Parliament, the strategy is not a roadmap that will solve all of Europe’s woes but an opening salvo.

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Europe Center at the Atlantic Council.

—James Batchik is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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The EU is acting to decrease points of vulnerability for renewable energy

The newly announced European economic security strategy constitutes a shift beyond the EU’s previous “strategic autonomy” security priorities. It will likely generate friction with both China and the United States in the near term regarding key renewable energy resources.

Until this year, the EU’s main focus was to ensure that its capacity to pursue its strategic interests remain unconstrained. It sought to ensure that policy conflicts and tensions between the United States and other countries (such as China and Russia) did not adversely impact its own interests.

Now, the EU seeks actively to minimize “the risks arising from economic linkages that in past decades we viewed as benign.” Those past linkages include Russia (natural gas), China (automobile component and other industrial manufactured exports) and the United States (a deeply integrated, multidimensional trade relationship that includes a deep reliance on retail technology giants that dominate the twenty-first century). Following Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the EU effectively replaced Russia with the United States as the key external supplier of energy resources, even as it made great strides toward delivering an energy mix that, for the first time, is generated more from renewable sources (specifically, wind and solar) than from gas.

The new EU “de-risking” strategy now views none of these economic linkages as benign. It views concentrated economic relationships as a source of risk that must be managed through a diversification strategy that places alignment on key norms (such as democracy, decarbonization, and commitment to open economies) as the foundation for future engagement.

Europe’s successful shift in the last year toward renewable energy implies a sharp increase in demand by Europe for a range of energy inputs that are, at present, predominantly controlled by China. Not only does China “dominate all steps of solar panel production,” it also has long served as the “dominant or near-monopoly producer” of most critical minerals needed to produce modern technology and renewable energy components such as wind turbine parts. Europe’s demand for hydrogen and lithium are set to skyrocket in the next decade, increasing the importance of the forthcoming Critical Minerals Agreement negotiations with the United States. The EU is acting now to decrease these points of vulnerability by mobilizing significant financial resources to promote renewables developments across Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, even as it prepares to implement its carbon tax later this year.

The European policy shift to “de-risking” holds the promise of aligned transatlantic policy priorities in which EU and US initiatives complement each other to provide an effective counterbalance to Chinese economic pressure globally across the resource-rich Global South. It also holds the risk that misalignment with the United States regarding resource access and digital policy will generate frictions that can be exploited by other countries. Successful execution of this policy will require more than checkbook diplomacy. It will require Washington and Brussels to focus on the larger strategic picture to avoid individual technical issues from derailing their strategic relationship.

—Barbara C. Matthews is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. She was the first US Treasury attaché to the EU with the Senate-confirmed diplomatic rank of minister-counselor.

While not mentioned, China is the central focus of the strategy

The seventeen-page long “communication” on a European economic security strategy does not mention China once. It does refer to Russia, but only in its scene-setting introduction. For the rest of the paper, economic risks stem only from phenomena, not countries. Third countries are the focus of the section following these risks, but this puts them in an exclusively positive light: to confront challenges to its economic security, Europe needs the broadest possible partnerships.

Can there be any purpose to a strategy that dares not mention which countries are causing the risks it is supposed to tackle? The answer is still yes.

The robust discussions that took place between European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s team and the European Council—representing the views of all twenty-seven member states—are well publicized. A critical mass of national capitals, though concerned about the consequences of Chinese economic practices, are keen to avoid falling into a ratchet of policies and partnerships leading to an anti-China coalition. This includes members who have long been calling for the EU to take a more hands-on approach on economic statecraft, such as France.

And yet, even under such constraints, the strategy gets many things right. Alongside the traditional calls for cooperation, it pushes for more structured dialogue with the private sector—something that has been lacking on economic security strategy so far. We should also remember that von der Leyen did get to set out her views on EU-China relations not too long ago. So even if China isn’t mentioned, we can be pretty sure it remains the central focus of the EU’s fledgling strategy.

—Charles Lichfield is the deputy director and C. Boyden Gray senior fellow, of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The road to an EU outbound investment mechanism will be rocky

This strategy makes clear that the commission is going to bat for outbound investment controls, likely tightly connected to the three emerging technologies most poised to transform war making capabilities—advanced semiconductors, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence. This position reflects a rapid evolution in the commission’s thinking; just last year it was less enthusiastic toward outbound controls when the United States first announced its intention to develop a tool to regulate such investments. Then it only agreed to “study the issue.” Despite the commission’s commitment to propose an outbound initiative by the end of 2023, the debate between the EU, member states, and the business community is likely to be fierce.

In the near term, the inclusion of outbound investment in the strategy has two important implications. First, it substantially increases the likelihood that the United States will move forward with its own mechanism—through an executive order—in the next couple of months. The Biden administration can now point to the document as evidence of a growing consensus among partners and allies to place narrow restrictions on outbound investments into key strategic technologies. Second, and in line with the recent Group of Seven (G7) communiqué on economic resiliency, it frames the issue of outbound regulation squarely around technology security and technology leakage rather than around broader policy objectives such as supply-chain diversification.

The road to an EU outbound investment mechanism will be rocky. The economic security strategy identifies technology security as an element of “economic security,” but the proliferation of dual-use technology has traditionally been viewed as a matter of national security—an area over which member states, rather than the commission, have competence. Moreover, the EU has traditionally—through both export control and inward screening policies—sought to develop tools that do not discriminate between foreign countries. If the EU maintains this policy principle, its outbound mechanism will likely look quite different from the United States’ plan to only focus on investments into entities operating in or owned by “countries of concern” such as China.

—Sarah Bauerle Danzman is a nonresident senior fellow with the GeoEconomics Center’s Economic Statecraft Initiative and associate professor of international studies at the Hamilton Lugar School for Global and International Studies, Indiana University Bloomington.

The strategy seeks to be adaptable but also comprehensive

The most important element of the document can be read between the lines: it is not so much about what the commission is going to do about economic security but how. Three key principles seem to be guiding the commission’s economic security strategy.

The first principle is strategic adaptability. The commission announces that it will constantly work toward a vision on economic security that will help to tie the different policy instruments together. As geopolitical circumstances are changing in unforeseeable and complex ways, the commission has wisely refrained from setting its economic security policy approach in stone. Adaptability and flexibility appear to be baked into the commission’s thinking on this issue.

The second principle is comprehensiveness. In the strategy, the commission clearly expresses the ambition to break through different policy silos. While it does sum up the different policy instruments the EU has to strengthen its economic security—ranging from foreign direct investment screening to cybersecurity—the underlying question is how it is going to coordinate the use of its economic statecraft toolkit to achieve a maximum result.

The third principle is cooperation. The commission also shows a certain humility in pointing out all the work ahead on economic security. Clearly, it needs the support of its member states, not only in terms of policy execution, but also in helping to fully understand the challenge. Also, the EU is going to align its diplomacy and economic security policy more, thus targeting countries that the EU can work with to achieve greater economic security. Lastly, in terms of further conceptualization of its strategic approach to economic security, the commission also seems to be reaching out to the wider private sector.

—Elmar Hellendoorn is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The post The ‘de-risk’ is in the details: A look at Europe’s ambitious new economic security strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Wagner attempts to draft gamers as drone pilots

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 18:12:27 +0000

Security

Ukrainian counteroffensive sees advances in Zaporizhzhia and eastern Ukraine

Wagner attempts to draft gamers as UAV pilots

Tracking narratives

Deripaska blames hackers after his website briefly takes credit for potential war crime

Rumors of alleged death of popular pro-Kremlin war correspondent gain traction on Twitter

Ukrainian counteroffensive sees advances in Zaporizhzhia and eastern Ukraine

On June 19, Ukrainian forces launched counteroffensive actions in at least three areas and appear to have made gains in Zaporizhzhia and eastern Ukraine. The Telegram channel of Russian military blogger WarGonzo reported that Ukrainian forces continued attacks northwest, northeast, and southwest of Bakhmut and advanced near Krasnopolivka. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar announced that over the past week Ukrainian troops advanced up to seven kilometers in the direction of Zaporizhzhia and retook 113 square kilometers of territory. Russian Telegram channels also reported that fighting was ongoing south and southwest of Orikhiv on June 19. Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk oblasts continue to be the most active areas of the frontline, as the Ukrainian army attempts to advance in the directions of Novodarivka, Pryutne, Makarivka, Rivnopil, Novodanylivka, and Robotyne.

On June 17, the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks west and south of Kreminna. It also stated that the Russian army had repelled Ukrainian attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk sector. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces continued operations around Velyka Novosilka near the border between Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

According to Ukrainian forces, Russian forces conducted offensive actions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The Ukrainian military reported forty-five combat engagements with Russian forces near Yampolivka, Torske, Hryhorivka, Spirne, Avdiyivka, Krasnohorivka, Marinka, Pobieda, Novomykhailivka, and Donetsk’s Dibrova and Orikhovo-Vasylivka. According to Ukraine, the Russian army continued to shell villages in the direction of Marinka, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Lyman, and Kupiansk. Ukraine also alleged that Russian forces launched Kalibr cruise missiles from a submarine in the Black Sea and Shahed drones from the eastern coast of the Sea of Azov.

On June 20, Kyrylo Budanov, chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence for the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, alleged that Russian troops mined the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant’s cooling pond, which is necessary for the safe operation of the plant. According to Budanov, if Russia triggers an explosion, there is a “high probability that there will be significant problems.” Budanov did not provide any evidence to support the allegation, and the statement cannot be independently verified at this time. If true, however, it would put the nuclear plant at greater risk of a significant accident. The power plant complex, Europe’s largest, has been under occupation since February 2022.

On January 22, the governor of Russian-occupied Crimea accused Ukraine of targeting a bridge that connects the peninsula to Kherson Oblast, near the village of Chonhar. In a Telegram post, Vladimir Sal’do alleged that Ukraine struck the bridge with “British Storm Shadow missiles,” creating a hole in the middle of the bridge.

As fierce hostilities continue in eastern and southern Ukraine, there are signs of a new wave of arrests in Russia, including of people with ties to Ukraine. On June 20, Russian state media outlet RIA Novosti announced that a woman of Ukrainian origin was detained in Saransk and charged with treason.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Wagner attempts to draft gamers as UAV pilots

A June 19 Telegram post from Russian opposition news outlet Verstka claimed that Wagner Group is encouraging gamers to apply to serve as unmanned aerial vehicle pilots in the war against Ukraine. The media outlet reported that no prior military experience was required to apply for the position. Posts from Wagner emerged on Vkontakte the same day, inviting gamers with experience in “manipulating joysticks in flight simulators” to enroll.

Wagner ad recruiting gamers as UAV pilots. (Source: VK)

Verstka, which contacted a Wagner recruiter as part of its reporting, stated that the campaign aims to recruit soldiers to pilot “copters and more serious machines.” In this particular context, “copters” (коптеры) is a reference to commercial drones that are sold to the public and have been widely used in the war against Ukraine. A May 19 investigation published by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project found that Chinese manufacturers have reportedly continued to provide Russian armed forces with DJI drones through third parties in Kazakhstan.

Verstka also noted that in 2022, the Russian defense ministry attempted to recruit gamers with a targeted ad campaign that invited them to play “with real rules, with no cheat codes or saves.”

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Deripaska blames hackers after his website briefly takes credit for potential war crime

The Russian-language website of Russian industrialist and US-sanctioned oligarch Oleg Deripaska briefly displayed an article appearing to take credit for deporting Ukrainian children to Russian-occupied Crimea in partnership with Kremlin official Maria Lvova-Belova, who is already facing an International Criminal Court arrest warrant for allegedly deporting children.

Yaroslav Trofimov, chief foreign affairs correspondent at the Wall Street Journal, noted the article’s appearance and disappearance in a June 15 tweet. Trofimov shared screengrabs of the article, which by that time had already been deleted from Deripaska’s Russian-language website, deripaska.ru. A complete copy of the article can be found at the Internet Archive.

Later in the article, it added, “Separately, the Fund and personally Oleg Vladimirovich [Deripaska] express their gratitude to Maria Lvova-Belova and her project ‘In Hands to Children,’ which not only provided methodological materials, but also found an opportunity to send employees for psychological work with affected babies.” In March 2023, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Lvova-Belova and Russian President Vladimir Putin, alleging they are responsible for unlawful deportation and transport of children from Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.

In a response to Russian independent news outlet Meduza, which also covered the incident, a team of representatives for Deripaska called the article a “gross fake press-release” and blamed hackers for the article’s appearance. “The team added that Deripaska ‘unequivocally condemns the separation of children from their parents’ and that he is ‘one of the very few prominent Russian industrialists who openly criticizes the fratricidal war and consistently advocates for peace in Ukraine, as well as a reduction in global military spending,’” Meduza noted.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Rumors of alleged death of popular pro-Kremlin war correspondent gain traction on Twitter

Rumors are spreading online that claim Ukrainian forces killed pro-Kremlin war correspondent Semyon Pegov, who operates an influential group of social media accounts under the name Wargonzo. The rumor first spread on Twitter on June 19 following the release of a graphic video from the 73rd Naval Center of Operations documenting how Ukrainian special forces unit had shot Russian soldiers in trenches. On June 19, Pegov’s Twitter account disregarded the allegations as fake. Wargonzo’s Telegram account has continued to operate as usual.

DFRLab analysis conducted with the social media monitoring software Meltwater Explore revealed that the most retweeted tweet came from the pro-Ukraine Twitter account @GloOouD, which stated, “LOOKS LIKE RUSSIAN TERRORISTS AND WAR REPORTER SEMEN PEGOV WAS KILLED BY UKRAINIAN SPECIAL FORCES.” The account shared a screenshot of a low-quality video frame depicting a red-bearded man that bears resemblance to Pegov.

Screenshot of @GloOouD’s tweet suggesting that Semyon Pegov was killed by Ukrainian special forces. (Source: @GloOouD/archive)

The DFRLab confirmed that the video frame depicting Pegov’s look-alike was extracted from the graphic video posted posted by the 73rd Naval Center of Operations. The video’s metadata indicates the clip was created on June 18, 2023, at 22:16:07 GMT+0300. However, the video shows events occurring in daylight.

Pegov’s most recent public appearance was on June 13 during a meeting between Putin and Russian war correspondents. The Kremlin-controlled Channel One Russia broadcast the meeting on June 18.

Comparison of the red-bearded man from the 73rd Naval Center of Operations’ video and Pegov talking at a press conference. (Source: @ukr_sof/archive, top; Perviy Kanal/archive, bottom)

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

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Ukraine’s counteroffensive is a marathon not a blitzkrieg

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 17:44:48 +0000

Less than two weeks since he first confirmed that Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive was finally underway, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy already finds himself forced to hit back at criticism over the pace of military operations. “Some people believe this is a Hollywood movie and expect results now. It’s not,” he told the BBC on June 21. “Whatever some might want, including attempts to pressure us, with all due respect, we will advance on the battlefield the way we deem best.”

Zelenskyy’s comments reflect frustration in Kyiv over reports in the mainstream international media and widespread claims on social media platforms suggesting Ukraine’s counteroffensive is already floundering. Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak was one of many Ukrainian commentators to suggest this trend is part of a coordinated Kremlin disinformation operation. In a June 20 post, he accused Moscow of fueling media hysteria about the alleged failure of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in order to secure a ceasefire and “freeze the conflict at any cost.”

Kremlin-tied or Russia-friendly sources are likely to be behind at least some of the recent criticism over the initial pace of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. At the same time, negative assessments are also a consequence of the unrealistically high expectations that built up in the half-year period prior to the start of the campaign.

In the final months of 2022, the Ukrainian military stunned the watching world by liberating large areas of the country from Russian occupation. A lightning September offensive saw most of northeastern Ukraine’s Kharkiv region de-occupied, while a more methodical push in the south eventually resulted in the liberation of Kherson. These successes encouraged many to expect similarly rapid progress during the current campaign. In reality, Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive represents a far greater challenge in almost every sense.

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Ukraine must overcome a vast Russian invasion force strengthened by 300,000 mobilized troops that is dug in behind successive lines of sophisticated defensive fortifications stretching for over one thousand kilometers. They must do so without air superiority and while outgunned by Russian artillery at many points along the front. Nor can they count on the element of surprise. This incredibly ambitious task would challenge the world’s most powerful militaries. Understandably, Ukrainian commanders are adopting a methodical approach to the campaign.

Progress so far has been very slow but steady. During the first few weeks of the counteroffensive, Ukraine claims to have liberated at least eight settlements. While most represent sparsely populated frontline villages with little strategic value, the sight of the Ukrainian flag raised in liberated communities provides all Ukrainians with a massive morale boost. Meanwhile, the big battles still lie ahead.

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For now, the Ukrainian military is focusing on probing attacks at numerous points along the front in order to identify weaknesses and thin out Russian defenses. Ukraine is also carrying out a comprehensive campaign of airstrikes against Russian military and logistical targets deep inside occupied territory. Britain’s May 2023 decision to provide Ukraine with long-range Storm Shadow cruise missiles is playing an important role in these air attacks, making it possible to hit targets virtually anywhere in occupied Ukraine. For example, Storm Shadow missiles are believed to have been used in the June 22 attack on a strategically important bridge connecting Crimea with Russian-occupied southern Ukraine.

These tactics are reminiscent of the early stages of last year’s ultimately triumphant Ukrainian campaign to liberate Kherson. At the beginning of August 2022, Ukraine very publicly signaled the start of a counteroffensive to free the southern port city and surrounding region. Progress was initially slow, leading to widespread criticism and pessimistic forecasts. However, Ukraine’s strategy of systematically targeting key bridges across the Dnipro River which Russian troops relied upon for resupply eventually paid off. Hemmed in and cut off, Russian commanders ordered a humiliating retreat in early November.

While the Kherson counteroffensive was on a far smaller scale than the current operation, it offers perhaps the best guide to Ukraine’s current objectives and envisioned timeline. The campaign to liberate Kherson involved tens of thousands of troops and took approximately three months to complete. Today’s counteroffensive involves hundreds of thousands of troops on both sides, with an area equal to a medium-sized European country at stake. It may be months before Ukraine’s commanders feel the conditions are right to attempt a major push to achieve a comprehensive breakthrough.

Ukraine’s international partners seem to appreciate the need for patience and are now emphasizing a long-term commitment to Ukraine that goes far beyond the current counteroffensive. At the Ukraine Recovery Conference in London on June 21, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak reiterated his promise to “stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes.” Other Western leaders have made similar pledges in recent weeks.

These statements are particularly important at a time when Russian hopes of rescuing their faltering invasion increasingly hinge on a weakening of Western resolve and a reduction in support for Ukraine. Despite the many setbacks of the past sixteen months, Putin and other senior regime figures in Moscow are apparently still convinced they can ultimately outlast the democratic world in Ukraine. European and American leaders are attempting to dampen such expectations by signaling the strength of their commitment to Ukrainian victory.

As international anxiety grows over the perceived lack of progress in Ukraine’s big summer counteroffensive, it is vital that this message of Western unity and resolution remains clear and unambiguous. The campaign to defeat Russia’s invasion is a marathon not a blitzkrieg, but it has every chance of success as long as Ukraine and the country’s partners are unwavering in their commitment.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Tantardini in Longitude on the space workforce

Atlantic Council — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 13:54:12 +0000

In the June 2023 Issue of Longitude, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Marco Tantardini published an article on the state of the space industry work force. He noted that the average age of many employees of aerospace companies is rising closer to retirement and that there is competition from other sectors for qualified engineers.

The European Space Agency (ESA) has about 2,400 staff members and expects that by 2030 44% of its personnel will retire.

Marco Tantardini

Fellow

Marco Tantardini

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Italy Space

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Putin’s nuclear threats will escalate as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds

Diane Francis — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 00:15:34 +0000

Ukraine’s counteroffensive is still in its early stages but concerns are already mounting that Russia may eventually resort to desperate measures in order to stave off defeat. At present, fears are focused primarily on Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling, which is expected to escalate as the counteroffensive unfolds.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has recently warned that Moscow may intend to blow up the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in southern Ukraine. Meanwhile, US President Joe Biden acknowledged on June 19 that the threat of Putin using nuclear weapons is “real.” Days later, Ukrainian military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov accused Russia of mining the cooling pond used to control temperatures at the Zaporizhzhia plant’s reactors. Clearly, an occupied nuclear plant that is blown up becomes a nuclear weapon.

Preventing this from happening should be an international priority. The fallout from a detonation at the plant would spread across many countries in a matter of hours. In addition to Ukraine itself, Belarus, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Russia would all be at serious risk, according to analysis by Ukraine’s Hydrometerological Institute.

Russia has occupied Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia plant since the first weeks of the invasion. Last summer, the Kremlin allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor its operational safety remotely. But in April 2023, IAEA officials began warning of growing risks and calling for additional measures to protect the plant. With Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive now underway, alarm is mounting.

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Zelenskyy’s claims that the Kremlin is planning to orchestrate a nuclear disaster in Ukraine are not at all far-fetched, given how Putin’s forces have been purposely laying waste to the country for the past sixteen months. The invading Russian army has planted landmines across an area the size of Switzerland, displaced more than ten million people, and destroyed dozens of Ukrainian towns and cities. Countless residential apartment buildings, schools, and hospitals have been reduced to ruins. A comprehensive and methodical nationwide bombing campaign has targeted the country’s civilian infrastructure.

In recent weeks, Russia is suspected of having blown up the Khakovka dam in southern Ukraine, causing an ecological catastrophe. However, even this unprecedented act of ecocide failed to stop Ukraine’s counteroffensive. With Russia’s military predicament expected to become increasingly grim in the weeks and months ahead, the likelihood of further extreme measures will grow. “They constantly need destabilization here. They want the world to put pressure on Ukraine to stop the war,” commented Zelenskyy.

Putin has been making nuclear threats since the very first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion. During the initial stages of the war, he very publicly placed his nuclear forces on high alert. With the invasion in danger of unravelling in September 2022, he again hinted at a possible nuclear response while warning, “I’m not bluffing.”

Not everyone is convinced. Former Russian diplomat Boris Bondarev, who resigned after last year’s invasion, told Newsweek in early 2023: “today [Putin is] bluffing and we know that he has bluffed about nuclear threats. Ukrainians recovered some parts of their territory, and there was no nuclear retaliation. If you’re afraid of Putin using nukes, then you already lose the war against him and he wins.”

Others warn against possible complacency. The recent destruction of Kakhovka dam has caused many observers to reassess their earlier skepticism over Russia’s readiness to go nuclear in Ukraine. Putin has also crossed another red line by vowing to place nukes in Belarus. The Russian dictator is currently holding all Europeans hostage with the threat of a deadly explosion at the continent’s largest nuclear plant, and is moving nuclear weapons closer to the heart of Europe.

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The world must heed Ukraine’s warnings before it is too late. Zelenskyy first raised the alarm about the Kakhovka dam in October 2022 but the international community failed to react. Since the destruction of the dam, the relatively weak and ineffective international response has fuelled fears that Russia will read this as a green light to go further.

For now, most international attention appears to be focused on Putin’s placement of nukes in Belarus. “I absolutely believe that moving weapons to Belarus demands an unequivocal response from NATO,” Polish President Andrzej Duda said recently before meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Significantly, Russia’s decision to deploy nukes to Belarus even drew a critical response from Chinese officials, who renewed calls for de-escalation and reminded Russia that its leaders had reaffirmed their opposition to nuclear war at their March 2023 summit with China in Moscow.

Ultimately, there is no way of knowing whether Russia’s nuclear threats are genuine or not, but Western leaders cannot afford to let Putin’s nuclear blackmail tactics succeed. If the Russian dictator’s nuclear saber-rattling enables him to rescue the faltering invasion of Ukraine, he will do it again and others will follow. To prevent this nightmare scenario, the West must respond forcefully by escalating support for Ukraine militarily, diplomatically, and economically. The only sensible answer to Russia’s reckless nuclear intimidation is a heightened international commitment to Ukrainian victory.

In parallel to increased support for Ukraine, international watchdogs must be dispatched to monitor the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and other Ukrainian infrastructure sites that Russia could potentially target. Strong pressure must also be placed on China and India to condemn Russia’s nuclear threats. The invasion of Ukraine has already transformed the international security climate; Putin must not be allowed to normalize nuclear blackmail.

Diane Francis is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, editor-at-large with the National Post in Canada, author of ten books, and author of a newsletter on America.

Improving state governance, institutional capacity, and transparency

The private sector has a strong opportunity to contribute to, and benefit from, a better business climate in LAC by partnering with governments to improve state governance, particularly in three areas: “regulation and institutional environment,” “political instability,” and “corruption.” Every survey respondent named at least one of these issues as a regional detriment, while 85 percent selected two, as seen in Figure 8. Several indices of governance, such as the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index, rank LAC below the OECD average for measures of accountability, political stability, and government effectiveness, among other indicators, and below the global average for rule of law.¹

SOURCE: Atlantic Council survey 2022

Quality of government and respect for the rule of law—including transparency, accountability, and enforceability—are instrumental in improving effective delivery of public services, as well as creating a business climate that incentivizes domestic and foreign investment and supports private-sector development.

Recommendations for the private sector

Businesses in LAC can assist governments in combating institutional capacity and governance challenges. Private-sector know-how and technology, including digital and cloud-based tools, can streamline government-service delivery and improve user experience. Public-private collaboration on information access and analytics, regulatory issues, and integrity mechanisms can help expose graft, boost transparency, and establish best practices, while keeping citizens informed. Together, these steps can help mitigate the region’s trust deficit, cultivate an attractive business climate, and boost economic growth.

Improving digital-government services: Private-sector technology and expertise should be leveraged to optimize the provision of government services and boost trust in government.
Promoting information access and analytics: Firms and citizens can examine and disseminate governments’ open data in ways that enforce transparency and accountability in the public sector (for example, in public procurement).
Improving integrity and regulatory quality: Commitment by the private sector (and the public sector) is critical to enhancing governance in LAC, from combating corruption to improving regulations.

About the author

Staff

Pepe Zhang

Senior Fellow

China Coronavirus

Report Jun 5, 2023

Enhancing market size, scalability, and regional integration in Latin America and the Caribbean

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To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. The private sector can strengthen the hard and soft infrastructure supporting Latin America and the Caribbean’s economies, while drawing them closer together through trade, regulatory, and other integration.

Americas Economy & Business

Report Jun 16, 2023

Accelerating digitalization and innovation in Latin America and the Caribbean

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. The private sector can improve infrastructure, foster skills, and promote adoption to help the region transform its digital potential into development gains.

Americas Economy & Business

Report Jun 22, 2023

Addressing multidimensional inequality

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. Private-sector actions to reduce gender inequality, like level the playing field between SMEs and large firms and narrow the urban-rural divide, can enable a more inclusive economy for LAC.

Americas Inclusive Growth

Report Jun 26, 2023

Meaningfully advancing the green agenda

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. Private firms can help advance the green agenda by working to create green jobs, taking measures to promote a transition to a circular-economy model, and partaking in green finance.

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The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1 “Worldwide Governance Indicators,” World Bank, last visited January 25, 2022, https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports. Results derived from the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index, available at: https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-index-2021/current-historical-data. LAC average: 0.523; global average: 0.557 (author’s calculations).

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The 5×5—Cyber conflict in international relations: A scholar’s perspective

Simon Handler — Tue, 20 Jun 2023 04:01:00 +0000

This article is part of The 5×5, a monthly series by the Cyber Statecraft Initiative, in which five featured experts answer five questions on a common theme, trend, or current event in the world of cyber. Interested in the 5×5 and want to see a particular topic, event, or question covered? Contact Simon Handler with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at SHandler@atlanticcouncil.org.

Over the past decade, scholarly debate over the topic of cyber conflict’s place in international relations has evolved significantly. The idea that cyber tools would fundamentally change the nature of war and warfare has largely given way to the idea that cyber conflict is merely a different way of doing the same old things, and primarily suited for engaging in an intelligence contest. Other, less settled questions range from whether cyber operations are useful tools of signaling to if these operations lead to escalation. These unsettled questions remain active in scholarly literature and, critically, inform policymaking approaches.

We brought together a group of leading scholars to provide insights on cyber conflict’s role in international relations, how the topic can best be taught to students, and how scholars and policymakers can better incorporate each other’s perspectives.

 #1 What, in your opinion, is the biggest misconception about cyber conflict’s role in international relations theory?

Andrew Dwyer, lecturer in information security, Department of Information Security, Royal Holloway, University of London; steering committee lead, Offensive Cyber Working Group:

“[The biggest misconception is] that cyberspace is malleable and controllable. The environment is often presented tangentially and, when it is, it is often about how people use the terrains of computation. I think that a lack of attention on how the environment ‘shapes’ people is one of the greatest missing parts of international relations thought. Simply, the environment and terrain have much more impact than is typically accounted for.”

Melissa Griffith, lecturer in technology and national security, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and the Alperovitch Institute for Cybersecurity Studies; non-resident research fellow, University of California, Berkeley’s Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity (CLTC):

“Much of the scholarship focused on the intersection between cyber conflict and international relations theory has concentrated on capturing the nature of the evolving cyber threat. This has led, in turn, to ongoing and vibrant debates over whether (a) deterrence strategies are feasible or valuable, (b) cyberspace favors the offense or defense, (c) cyber operations are useful tools for coercion, (d) cyberspace is escalatory, or (e) strategic competition in cyberspace is best understood as an intelligence contest, for example. While these are important areas of focus, they have previously overshadowed other lines of inquiry. Such as, why we see variation in how states respond in practice, a line of inquiry that requires leveraging international relations theories beyond those focused on grappling with what best captures the dynamics of this new threat space as a whole.”

Richard Harknett, professor & director, School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA); chair, Center for Cyber Strategy and Policy (CCSP), University of Cincinnati:

“[The biggest misconception is] that the most salient impact of cyber operations should be in conflict; that is, the equivalent of armed attack and warfighting. Much of cybersecurity studies, itself, has focused on the construct of cyber war and thus international relations theory has primarily treated ‘cyber’ as another form of war, when the majority of state cyber activity is actually a strategic attempt to gain relative power via an alternative to war. I argue from a realist-structuralist perspective that the most fascinating theoretical question is the interplay between states struggle for autonomy and the organizing principle of interconnectedness that defines the cyber strategic environment.”

Jenny Jun, research fellow, CyberAI Project, Center for Security and Emerging Technology; nonresident fellow, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council; Ph.D. candidate, Department of Political Science, Columbia University:

“It is much more useful to think that conflict and competition have cyber dimensions to them, rather than to think that cyber conflict occurs in isolation.”

Jon Lindsay, associate professor, School of Cybersecurity and Privacy, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology:

“The biggest misconception remains that cyber operations are a revolution in military affairs akin to the invention of nuclear weapons. Cyber ‘conflict’ is better understood as the digital dimension of intelligence competition, between both state and nonstate competitors, which is an increasingly important and still understudied dimension of international relations.”

Michael Poznansky, associate professor, Strategic & Operational Research Department, US Naval War College; core faculty member, Cyber & Innovation Policy Institute:

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed below are the author’s alone and do not represent those of the U.S. Naval War College, the Department of Navy, the Department of Defense, or any government entity.

“One potential misconception is that we need entirely new theoretical frameworks to understand cyber conflict. Are there are distinctive attributes of cyberspace that should give us pause from unthinkingly applying existing international relations theories to it? You bet. But the real task—which many have been doing and are continuing to do—is to figure out where we can apply existing theories, perhaps with certain modifications, and where novel frameworks are genuinely needed.”

#2 What would you like to see change about how cyber conflict is widely taught?

Dwyer: “As much as there is frequent discussion about ‘interdisciplinarity’ in the study of cyber conflict, all too often we teach through and in silos. That is, we teach ‘from’ an angle, whether that be international relations, computer science, psychology, and so on. I think this does a disservice to the study of cyber conflict. I am not claiming for a wholly radical empiricism here, but about one that is less grounded in theory as a starting place for exploration.”

Griffith: “Notably, in this field, perhaps far more so than others, there is no uniform or widely pursued approach across classrooms, as pointed out by Herr, Laudrian, and Smeets in ‘Mapping the Known Unknowns of Cybersecurity Education‘. That said, students entering this field armed with social science and policy leaning coursework should be comfortable engaging with technical and private sector reporting alongside academic, government, and legal documents. At risk of straying beyond the focus of this topic (i.e., theory), I favor introducing students first to core technical foundations and operational realities—what is cyberspace and how has it evolved; how, when, and which groups hack; and how, where, and when does defense play out—before turning to policy, strategy, or theoretical debates. In my experience, this approach allows subsequent discussions of systemic, international, national, and subnational questions to be firmly grounded in the realities of the space.”

Harknett: “Cybersecurity is not a technical problem, but a political, economic, organizational, and behavioral challenge in a technically fluid environment. Thus, how cyber insecurity can be reduced and state competition in and through cyberspace can be stabilized should be taught from multiple perspectives across the computing and social sciences and humanities. Basically, a more multidisciplinary integrated, rather than segmented, approach to courses and curriculum.”

Jun: “There should be a greater effort to integrate literature on cyber conflict as part of bigger international relations themes such as coercion, signaling, trade, etc., and move away from viewing dynamics in cyberspace as monolithic. In many international relations syllabi, cyber conflict often appears at the very end (if at all) in about week thirteen as a standalone module. Often, the discussion question then becomes, “To what extent is cyber different from all of the traditional stuff we learned so far?” This not only leads to overgeneralizations about cyberspace and cyber conflict, but also nudges students into viewing cyber as something separate and distinct from other major themes and dynamics in international relations.”

Lindsay: “Two things that would improve cybersecurity education would be 1) to situate it in the history of intelligence and covert action, and 2) to give more attention to the political economy of cyberspace, which fundamentally shapes the dynamics of cyber conflict.”

Poznansky: “My hunch is that cyber conflict is often included in many international relations courses as part of a module on emerging technologies alongside space, autonomous systems, quantum, and so forth. Because cyberspace has relevance for almost all aspects of modern statecraft—warfighting, coercion, commerce, diplomacy—a better approach may be to consciously integrate it into modules on all these broader topics. Stand-alone courses also have high upside by allowing for a deep dive, but infusing cyber throughout discussions of major international relations concepts would offer a better foundation.”

#3 What is a piece of literature on cyber conflict theory that you recommend aspiring policymakers read closely and why?

Dwyer: “I think one of the best and underacknowledged written pieces is by JD Work, ‘Balancing on the Rail – considering responsibility and restraint in the July 2021 Iran Railways incident.’ In this piece, Work examines an incident on Iranian railways in July 2021. The explication of responsibility and restraint in offensive cyber operations is a must-read for anyone interested in the area.”

Griffith: “Whether or not readers agree with them, Michael Fisherkeller, Emily Goldman, and Richard Harknett’s Cyber Persistence Theory (2022) sets the stage for a productive and ongoing theoretical debate over the structural conditions animating cyberspace. Though an exercise in theory development rather than policy prescription, the book is not merely of interest to academics. Echoes of the underlying logic can be found animating US Cyber Command’s Persistent Engagement and the UK National Cyber Force’s recently released, ‘Responsible Cyber Power in Practice,’ for example.”

Harknett: “As Alexander George correctly wrote to bridge the gap between policy and theory, it is the theoretician that must cross-over the bridge to meet policymakers on their own turf. Two recent books that do a good job at this are Max Smeets’ No Short Cuts: Why States Struggle to Develop a Military Cyber-Force and a just released edited book from Smeets and Robert Chesney, Deter, Disrupt, or Deceive, which examines the debate between those who posit cyberspace as strategic competition and those who view it as an intelligence contest and thus apply research from intelligence studies. Misconceiving this fundamental categorization would have profound impact on policy development, and thus grappling with the difference between the two perspectives is important.”

Jun: “Aspiring policymakers should be familiar with the arguments made in Cyber Persistence Theory by Goldman, Fischerkeller, and Harknett, as well as the back-and-forth debate leading up to the publication of this book in various journals and opinion pieces. Ideas laid out in this book embody much of the thinking behind the 2018 US government pivot towards Persistent Engagement and Defend Forward away from a strategy based on deterrence by punishment. Reading the book as well as the debate around it will allow an aspiring policymaker to trace how certain characterizations of cyberspace and its functions will lead to corresponding theoretical predictions, and how such assessments are translated into strategy documents by various agencies.”

Lindsay: “I highly recommend the new volume by Robert Chesney and Max Smeets exploring the debate over cyber as an intelligence contest or something else. I also recommend that international relations scholars become more familiar with the Workshop on the Economics of Information Security community, which produces fascinating papers every year.”

Poznansky: “I am going to cheat and highlight two. First is an article by Jordan Branch looking at how the military’s use of familiar metaphors to understand and describe cyberspace affected investments and policy decisions. Branch shows that the comparisons we invoke to understand new phenomena have real-world impacts. Second is a new book by Erica Lonergan and Shawn Lonergan on the dynamics of escalation in cyberspace. It tackles one of the most pressing issues in cyber conflict in a way that appeals to scholars and practitioners alike.”

The 5×5—Conflict in Ukraine’s information environment

The cyber strategy and operations of Hamas: Green flags and green hats

The 5×5—Non-state armed groups in cyber conflict

#4 How has the theory of cyber conflict evolved in the last five years and where do you see the field evolving in the next five years?

Dwyer: “Undoubtedly, the greatest transformation has been the demise of ‘cyber war’ and ‘cyber weapons’ in both theory and practice. This has steadily been replaced (albeit over much more than the past five years) by cyber conflict as an ‘intelligence contest.’ In many ways, this is a welcome development. For the next five years, one might ask what then is distinct about cyber conflict; is it simply a transplant of conventional intelligence-related activity with new tools? I would wager not, and I hope that the cyber conflict studies community examines the role that technology plays that does not simply reduce computation to a tool with none of its own agency.”

Griffith: “Two significant shifts stand out. One of the biggest was the pivot away from the early focus on war toward a recognition of the diversity of activity that occurs in the absence of and below the threshold of war. In the process, the theories and disciplines cyber conflict scholars brought to bear expanded beyond security studies approaches, which had largely dominated the field, to increasingly include intelligence studies, history, economics, law, etc. In the next five years, I hope to see that aperture continue to widen as we continue to move beyond those early ‘cyber war’ framings to an array of questions stemming from a diversity of disciplines and examining a greater diversity of countries.”

Harknett: “Along with the work above, Ben Buchanan’s The Hacker and the State and Daniel Moore’s Offensive Cyber Operations have begun to examine the operational space as it is, rather than how people thought it would be. I think there is a significant pivot away from the cyber war construct occurring. Of course, my own bias is that Cyber Persistence Theory as presented by myself, Emily Goldman and Michael Fischerkeller offers a foundational piece of theory that explains a lot of the shifting in state strategy and behavior. I think the utility of the constructs of initiative persistence, campaigning, and strategic competition, will garner debate and may emerge or will be challenged as further research with this focus develops.”

Jun: “In the past five years, there has been a shift away from efforts to study cyber deterrence to focus on the dynamics of cyber incidents and/or campaigns below the threshold of armed conflict that occur on a regular basis. The field is also becoming more methodologically diverse. In the next five years, the field is likely to focus on getting at the nuances of cyber activity occurring below the threshold of armed conflict. The scholarly community may seek to answer questions such as: when a state takes certain offensive or defensive actions in cyberspace, what do these actions signal, and how are they interpreted on the receiving side? How do we measure or evaluate the effectiveness of cyber campaigns? As other states acquire cyber capabilities and respond to cyber threats, what accounts for how their cyber strategies evolve?”

Lindsay: “In the last five years, the field has taken a decidedly empirical turn. Cyber is no longer an emerging technology. It has emerged. We have decades of data to explore. This empirical turn complements the theoretical emphasis on intelligence that I mentioned above.”

Poznansky: “There has been an explosion of work over the last few years devoted to better understanding what exactly cyberspace represents. Is it yet another arena of warfare with some new bells and whistles or is it more akin to an intelligence contest? How we understand the nature of cyberspace has major implications for how we theorize cyber conflict and, equally important, what sorts of policy implications we arrive at. There is much more to be done here.”

#5 How can scholars and policymakers of cyber conflict better incorporate perspectives from each other’s work?

Dwyer: “This is by far the hardest question; however, it is about understanding the needs and goals of both academics and policymakers. This simply requires 1) a firm commitment and foundation from policymakers to fund critical social science and humanities work that can sustain positive engagement and trust building; 2) recognition and support for academics in the translation of their work and impact in ways that are visible to their institutions; and 3) for academics not enter a room with preconceived notions of the solutions to policymakers’ problems.”

Griffith: “There are a variety of models at our disposal, but one approach of note is on full display in Robert Chesney and Max Smeets’ recent edited volume, Deter, Disrupt, or Deceive, which explicitly puts authors who disagree—and who spearhead emerging schools of thought—in direct conversation with each other. This volume represents the culmination of roughly four years of formal and informal debate and has actively sought to continue the conversation through an ongoing, global series of workshops in the wake of its publication. Another model can be found in the field-building work of the Cyber Conflict Studies Association in United States and the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative in Europe.”

Harknett: “Again, the bridge between policy and theory has never been easy to traverse, but one essential element is adopting an agreed upon lexicon. There is, currently, this interesting phenomena in which the UK’s National Cyber Mission Forces’ Responsible Cyber Power in Practice document and the US Defense Department’s approaches of cyber persistent engagement and defend forward, as well as the broader 2023 US National Cybersecurity Strategy, align with the logic of initiative persistence and the structural reasoning of cyber persistence theory, with growing focus on continuous campaigns and seizing the initiative, rather than legacy constructs such as deterrence threats. Although full lexicon consensus has yet to solidify, it will be interesting to observe whether it occurs overtime.”

Jun: “[Scholars and policymakers of cyber conflict can better incorporate perspectives from each other’s work with] more frequent conversations that raise good new policy-relevant research questions, efforts to ground theoretical and empirical research in what is actually going on, and efforts to turn conclusions from scholarly analysis into actionable policy agendas.”

Lindsay: “This question is tricky because there are several different groups on either side of the gap, and it is important for all of them to talk. On the policy side, there are government policymakers and intelligence professionals, but also the hugely important commercial sector. And on the academic side you have international relations scholars, computer scientists, and many other social scientists and engineers working in related areas. Cybersecurity is a pretty wicked interdisciplinary problem.”

Poznansky: “For scholars, being open to the possibility that many of the things we often bracket, in part because they can be hard to measure—bureaucratic politics, organizational culture, leadership, and so forth—is valuable. These factors probably explain more about cyber conflict than we care to admit. For practitioners, remaining open minded to debates that might sound purely academic in nature at first blush but in fact have immense practical relevance is also valuable. Whether cyberspace is mainly an arena for intelligence competition or warfighting—a debate, as mentioned, that is happening right now—matters for the prospect of developing norms, the utility of coercion, the dynamics of escalation, and more.”

Simon Handler is a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative within the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab). He is also the editor-in-chief of The 5×5, a series on trends and themes in cyber policy. Follow him on Twitter @SimonPHandler.

The Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, under the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), works at the nexus of geopolitics and cybersecurity to craft strategies to help shape the conduct of statecraft and to better inform and secure users of technology.

The post The 5×5—Cyber conflict in international relations: A scholar’s perspective appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Accelerating digitalization and innovation in Latin America and the Caribbean

Pepe Zhang — Fri, 16 Jun 2023 17:43:18 +0000

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

This is the 2nd installment of the Unlocking Economic Development in Latin America and the Caribbean report, which explores five vital opportunities for the private sector to drive socioeconomic progress in LAC, with sixteen corresponding recommendations private firms can consider as they take steps to support the region.

Accelerating digitalization and innovation

When asked about areas where they see themselves making an important social impact, 47 percent of surveyed services firms selected “digital transformation,” making it the second most impactful area only after “economic growth and job creation” (as shown below in Figure 7). Indeed, the private sector can unlock the three enablers (infrastructure, skills, and adoption), thus helping the region materialize its digital friendliness into better digital outcomes. In particular, firms in the services industries (financial, telecommunications, and information technology) consider digital transformation a vital part of their responsibility and contribution to society.

SOURCE: Atlantic Council survey 2022

Recommendations for the private sector

The private sector is well positioned to help LAC economies, governments, and citizens make the most of its digital-innovation potential. As employers, service providers, consumers, partners, and investors, companies can leverage an ecosystem approach to enhance digital infrastructure, skills, and adoption within and across countries, delivering better digital outcomes conducive to economic inclusion and competitiveness.

Improving digital infrastructure: Firms can help strengthen digital connectivity in LAC, both operationally (as information and communication technology (ICT) product and service providers and investors can help strengthen digital connectivity in LAC operationally and financially.
Fostering skills: Employers and employees should stay innovative and competitive in an increasingly digitized economy through upskilling, reskilling, and workforce-development programs.
Promoting adoption: Multinational corporations (MNCs) can accelerate digital development by undertaking internal digital transformation and spurring adoption among suppliers and other businesses within their entrepreneurial ecosystems.

About the author

Staff

Pepe Zhang

Senior Fellow

China Coronavirus

Report Jun 5, 2023

Enhancing market size, scalability, and regional integration in Latin America and the Caribbean

By Pepe Zhang

Americas Economy & Business

Report Jun 20, 2023

Improving state governance, institutional capacity, and transparency

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. Technological, governance, and other cooperation between the public and private sectors can enhance institutional capacity, integrity, government service delivery, and regulatory quality in LAC.

Americas Inclusive Growth

Report Jun 22, 2023

Addressing multidimensional inequality

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. Private-sector actions to reduce gender inequality, like level the playing field between SMEs and large firms and narrow the urban-rural divide, can enable a more inclusive economy for LAC.

Americas Inclusive Growth

Report Jun 26, 2023

Meaningfully advancing the green agenda

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. Private firms can help advance the green agenda by working to create green jobs, taking measures to promote a transition to a circular-economy model, and partaking in green finance.

Americas Climate Change & Climate Action

Online Event Thu, February 17, 2022 • 9:00 am ET

#ProactiveLAC: A digital future for regional prosperity

A virtual conversation on the role of public-private partnerships and policy actions in increasing digital connectivity across Latin America and the Caribbean.

Coronavirus Digital Policy Inclusive Growth Latin America

Deadly Russian barrage targets residential building in Kryvyi Rih as fighting continues in south and east

The post Accelerating digitalization and innovation in Latin America and the Caribbean appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The world’s regulatory superpower is taking on a regulatory nightmare: artificial intelligence

Atlantic Council experts — Thu, 15 Jun 2023 23:02:29 +0000

The humans are still in charge—for now. The European Parliament, the legislative branch of the European Union (EU), passed a draft law on Wednesday intended to restrict and add transparency requirements to the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in the twenty-seven-member bloc. In the AI Act, lawmakers zeroed in on concerns about biometric surveillance and disclosures for generative AI such as ChatGPT. The legislation is not final. But it could have far-reaching implications since the EU’s large size and single market can affect business decisions for companies based elsewhere—a phenomenon known as “the Brussels effect.”

Below, Atlantic Council experts share their genuine intelligence by answering the pressing questions about what’s in the legislation and what’s next.

1. What are the most significant aspects of this draft law?

The European Parliament’s version of the AI Act would prohibit use of the technology within the EU for controversial purposes like real-time remote biometric identification in public places and predictive policing. Member state law enforcement agencies are sure to push back against aspects of these bans, since some of them are already using these technologies for public security reasons. The final version could well be more accommodating of member states’ security interests.

—Kenneth Propp is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and former legal counselor at the US Mission to the European Union in Brussels.

The most significant aspect of the draft AI Act is that it exists and has been voted on positively by the European Parliament. This is the only serious legislative attempt to date to deal with the rapidly evolving technology of AI and specifically to address some of the anticipated risks, both due to the technology itself and to the ways people use it. For example, a government agency might use AI to identify wrongdoing among welfare recipients, but due to learned bias it misidentifies thousands of people as participating in welfare fraud (this happened in the Netherlands in 2020). Or a fake video showing a political candidate in a compromising position is released just prior to the election. Or a government uses AI to track citizens and determine whether they exhibit “disloyal” behavior.

To address these concerns, EU policymakers have designed a risk-management framework, in which higher-risk applications would receive more scrutiny. A few uses of AI—social scoring, real-time facial recognition surveillance—would be banned, but most companies deploying AI, even the higher-risk cases, would have to file extensive records on training and uses. Above all, this is a law about transparency and redress: humans should know when they are interacting with AI, and if AI makes decisions about them, they should have a right of redress to a fellow human. In the case of generative AI, such as ChatGPT, the act requires that images be marked as coming from AI and the AI developer should list the copyrighted works on which the AI trained.

Of course, the act is not yet finished. Next, there will be negotiations between parliament and the EU member states, and we can expect significant opposition to certain bans from European law enforcement institutions. Implementation will bring other challenges, especially in protecting trade secrets while examining how algorithms might steer users toward extreme views or criminal fraudsters. But if expectations hold, by the end of 2023 Europe will have the first substantive law on AI in the world.

—Frances Burwell is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a senior director at McLarty Associates.

There are numerous significant aspects of this law, but there are two and a half that really stand out. The first is establishing a risk-based policy where lawmakers identify certain uses as presenting unacceptable risk (for example, social scoring, behavioral manipulation of certain groups, and biometric identification by groups including police). Second, generative AI systems would be regulated and required to disclose any copyrighted data that was used to train the generative model, and any content AI outputs would need to carry a notice or label that it was created with AI. It’s also interesting what’s included as guidance for parliament to “ensure that AI systems are overseen by people, are safe, transparent, traceable, non-discriminatory, and environmentally friendly.” This gives parliament a wide mandate that could see everything from data provenance to data center energy use be regulated under this draft law.

—Steven Tiell is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center. He is a strategy executive with wide technology expertise and particular depth in data ethics and responsible innovation for artificial intelligence.

2. What impact would it have on the industry?

Much as the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) became a globally motivating force in the business community, this law will do the same. The burden on companies to maintain and keep separate infrastructure exclusively for the EU is much higher than the cost of compliance. And the cost (and range) of noncompliance for companies (and individuals) has risen—prohibited uses, those deemed to have unacceptable risk, will incur a fine up to forty million euros or 7 percent of worldwide annual turnover (total global revenue) for the preceding financial year, whichever is greater. Violations of human-rights laws or any type of discrimination perpetrated by an AI will incur fines up to twenty million euros or 4 percent of worldwide turnover. Other noncompliance offenses, including from foundational models (again, the draft regulation affects generative AI), are subjected to fines of up to ten million euros or 2 percent of worldwide annual turnover. And those supplying false, incomplete, or misleading information to regulators can be fined up to five million euros or 1 percent of worldwide annual turnover. These fines are a big stick to encourage compliance.

—Steven Tiell

As I wrote for Lawfare when the European Commission proposed the AI Act two years ago, the proposed AI regulation is “a direct challenge to Silicon Valley’s common view that law should leave emerging technology alone.” At the same time, though the legislation is lengthy and complex, it is far from the traditional caricature of EU measures as heavy-handed, top-down enactments. Rather, as I wrote then, the proposal “sets out a nuanced regulatory structure that bans some uses of AI, heavily regulates high-risk uses, and lightly regulates less risky AI systems.” The European Parliament has added some onerous requirements, such as a murky human-rights impact assessment of AI systems, but my earlier assessment remains generally true.

It’s also worth noting that other EU laws, such as the GDPR adopted in 2016, will have an important and still-evolving impact on the deployment of AI within EU territory. For example, earlier this week Ireland’s data protection commission delayed Google’s request to deploy Bard, its AI chatbot, because the company had failed to file a data protection impact assessment, as required by the GDPR. Scrutiny of AI products by multiple European regulatory authorities employing precautionary approaches likely will mean that Europe will lag in seeing some new AI products.

—Kenneth Propp

3. How might this process shape how the rest of the world regulates AI?

It will have an impact on the rest of the world, but not simply by becoming the foundation for other AI acts. Most significantly, the EU act puts certain restrictions on governmental use of AI in order to protect democracy and a citizen’s fundamental rights. Authoritarian regimes will not follow this path. The AI Act is thus likely to become a marker, differentiating between those governments that value democracy more than technology, versus those that seek to use technology to control their publics.

—Frances Burwell

Major countries across the globe from Brazil to South Korea are in the process of developing their own AI legislation. The US Congress is slowly moving in the same direction with a forthcoming bill being developed by Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer likely to have important influence. If the EU sticks to its timetable of adopting the AI Act by the end of the year, its legislation could shape other countries’ efforts significantly by virtue of being early out of the gate and comprehensive in nature. Countries more concerned with promoting AI innovation, such as the United Kingdom, may stake out a lighter-touch approach than the EU, however.

—Kenneth Propp

The world’s businesses will comply with the EU’s AI Act if they have any meaningful amount of business in the EU and governments in the rest of the world are aware of this. Compliance with the EU’s AI Act will be table stakes. It can be assumed that many future regulations will mimic many components, big and small, of the EU’s AI Act, but where they deviate will be interesting. Expect to see other regulators emboldened by the fines and seek commensurate remuneration for violations in their countries. Other countries might extend more of the auditing requirements to things such as maintaining outputs from generative models. Consumer protections in different countries will be more variable as well. And it will be interesting to see if countries such as the United States and United Kingdom pivot their legislation toward being more risk-based as opposed to principles-based.

—Steven Tiell

4. What are the chances of this becoming law, and how long will it take?

Unlike in the United States, where congressional passage of legislation is typically the decisive step, the European Parliament’s adoption on Wednesday of the AI Act only prepares the way for a negotiation with the EU’s member states to arrive at the final text. Legislative proposals can shift substantially during such closed-door “trilogues” (so named because the European Commission as well as the Council of the European Union also participate). The institutions aim for a final result by the end of 2023, during Spain’s presidency of the Council, but legislation of this complexity and impact easily could take longer to finalize.

—Kenneth Propp

Based on this week’s vote, there are strong signals of overwhelming support for this draft law. The next step is trilogue negotiations among the parliament, the Council of the European Union, and the European Commission, and these negotiations will determine the law’s final form. There are strong odds these negotiations will finish by the end of the year. At that point, the act will take about two years to transpose to EU member states for implementation, similar to what happened with GDPR. Also similar to GDPR, it could take at least that long for member states to develop the expertise to assume their role as market regulators.

—Steven Tiell

5. What are some alternative visions for regulating AI that we may see?

In general, we see principles-based, risk-based, and rights-based legislation. Depending on the government and significance of the law, different approaches might be applied. The EU’s AI Act is somewhat unique and interesting as it started life as a principles-based approach, but through its evolution became primarily risk-based. Draft legislation in the United States and the United Kingdom is principles-based today. Time will tell if these governments are influenced by the EU’s approach.

—Steven Tiell

The post The world’s regulatory superpower is taking on a regulatory nightmare: artificial intelligence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Anti-Ukrainian counteroffensive narratives fail to go viral

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 15 Jun 2023 18:59:00 +0000

Security

Putin confirms Russian conscripts are protecting Belgorod Oblast against raids

Tracking narratives

Narrative targeting Ukraine’s counteroffensive fails to gain traction on Twitter

Deadly Russian barrage targets residential building in Kryvyi Rih as fighting continues in south and east

On June 13, Russia attacked a residential building in Kryvyi Rih, killing at least twelve people and injuring at least thirty-four. Rescue operations continued the morning of June 14.

Elsewhere, the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine said at least three people were killed and thirteen wounded after Russia launched Kalibr cruise missiles against Odesa on the night of June 13. The air force said it shot down three of four Kalibr cruise missiles and nine of ten Shahed drones. In addition, shelling in Karyerne, in Kherson Oblast, killed a nine-year-old girl, according to the Prosecutor General’s Office.

Further, a Donbas Telegram channel citing Governor Pavlo Kyrylenko reported at least two people killed and two others wounded after Russian missile strikes in Kramatorsk. In the Dnipropetrovsk region, Governor Serhiy Lysak said three Shahed drones were shot down, while in Svitlovodsk, Kirovohrad Oblast, a Shahed drone reportedly struck an unnamed “infrastructure object.” Russian Tu-22M3 bombers also launched Kh-22 missiles against targets in Donetsk Oblast. Meanwhile, shelling was reported in Russia’s Kursk region, targeting Glushkovo, Korovyakovka, Tetkino, and Popovo-Lezhachi. A police station in Glushkovo was reportedly damaged.

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported on June 13 twenty-eight clashes between its forces and the Russian army. Near Bakhmut, Russian forces attempted to carry out attacks in the areas of Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Ivanivske, and Bila Hora. Attacks were also reported in the direction of Lyman near Vesele and Rozdolivka.

The office of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that evacuations are planned in Armyansk, a Russian-occupied town in north Crimea, prompted by the collapse of the Nova Kakhovka dam. Operations at the Titan titanium dioxide plant in Armyansk were critically disrupted as a result of the dam collapse. The presidential office said an attack against the Titan plant could release up to two hundred tons of ammonia into the air, posing a significant threat to north Crimea and south Kherson Oblast. Flooding is also silting up the North Crimean Canal; Reuters noted that the canal has traditionally supplied 85 percent of Crimea’s water.

Ukrainian volunteer Roman Donik reported on June 13 that the 47th Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, known as Magura, is advancing through continuous minefields. Ukraine’s current de-mining equipment is reportedly insufficient for handling the density of the minefields. Despite the risks, the soldiers of the brigade are moving forward on foot. The following day, Speaker of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Andriy Kovalev announced that Ukrainian forces had advanced in various areas in the direction of Berdyansk at a distance of 200 to 1,400 meters. Currently, the main battles are taking place in Makarivka, Novodanylivka, and Novopokrovka.

The investigative unit of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Ukraine service reported that satellite imagery shows Russia transferred twenty helicopters to the Berdyansk airfield after the launch of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the direction of Zaporizhzhia. Currently, there are at least twenty-seven Russian military helicopters at the occupied airfield, as well as five Ka-52 units, nine Mi-8 or Mi-24 units, and thirteen Ka-29 units. According to the report, these aircraft are designed to support Russian ground forces with the operational transfer of troops or equipment closer to the battlefield, in addition to possible evacuation operations.

According to Mykola Kolesnyk, a Ukrainian paramilitary leader, a Russian ammunition depot was hit in occupied Staromlynivka by the aerial reconnaissance unit of the 129th Territorial Defense Forces Brigade and the artillery unit of the 55th Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Footage from the 53rd Brigade of Ukraine’s Armed Forces shows strikes against Russian equipment, warehouses, and bases.

Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced a new military assistance package for Ukraine, which will include additional munitions for national advanced surface-to-air missile systems (NASAMS), Stinger anti-aircraft systems, missiles for high mobility artillery rocket systems (HIMARS), 155mm and 105mm artillery shells, fifteen Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, ten Stryker armored personnel carriers, Javelin anti-armor systems, and more than 22 million rounds of small arms ammunitions and grenades, in addition to demining and communications systems. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom announced a new $116 million aid package for Ukraine, which will include a radar system to track Russian missiles, artillery, and ammunition.

Lastly, Danish military instructors will train Ukrainian crews on German Leopard 1A5 tanks, according to a Danish media. Denmark is scheduled to send Ukraine eighty restored Leopard 1A5DK tanks this month. The machines were bought by the private German company FFG after they were withdrawn from the Danish army in 2005. Denmark and Germany allocated $3.2 million to repair and modernize the tanks. In early February, the German company Krauss-Maffei Wegmann began preparing the tanks for delivery to Ukraine.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Putin confirms Russian conscripts are protecting Belgorod Oblast against raids

In a June 13 address, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke about the situation in Russian regions bordering Ukraine. Since May 22, Belgorod Oblast has been the target of two incursions allegedly led by the Russian Volunteer Corps, an anti-Putin military unit made of Russian pro-Ukrainian partisans. In a meeting with Russian military bloggers and war correspondents, Putin reportedly said, “If this continues, then we will need to examine the question—and I say this carefully—of creating on Ukraine’s territory a sanitary zone at such a distance from where it could be impossible to reach our territory.” While this appears to be the first time the term “sanitary zone” has been used in reference to the war in Ukraine, the Russian president is likely referring to the creation of a demilitarized buffer zone in Ukraine.

In sharing an anecdote about a battalion commander in Belgorod Oblast, Putin confirmed Russian conscripts had been deployed to the region. When asked how many mobilized soldiers and conscripts were under his command, the commander reportedly replied, “They’re all conscripts,” adding, “None of them shivered!”

Russia’s spring conscription kicked off on March 30, 2023, with future recruits called to undergo military preparation. Although Putin declared in March 2022 that no conscript would fight in the war, suspicions were raised following the reported death of three conscripts after a June 1 attack against Belgorod. The three soldiers served in the 43rd Railway Brigade. In a VKontakte post, a Russian official said the conscripted soldiers had been relocated from the Sverdlovsk region to Belgorod. According to pro-Russian media outlet Lenta, Russian MP Leonid Slutsky reportedly proposed a legal mechanism so that “conscripts, fighting the enemy in the Belgorod Oblast, could be recognized as participants of combat operations and receive all the payments due under the law.”

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Narrative targeting Ukraine’s counteroffensive fails to gain traction on Twitter

A small number of influential Twitter accounts are spreading a narrative that frames the Ukrainian counteroffensive as unsuccessful. The DFRLab conducted a query using the social media analysis platform Meltwater Explore to identify tweets that mention the Ukrainian counteroffensive. It returned 352,000 results from 118,000 users, which averages almost three tweets per user. The results indicate organic traffic.

Chart comparing the sentiment of tweets about Ukraine’s counter-offense, determined by number of tweets, average number of retweets, and total retweets of top 100 most retweeted posts. (Source: @nikaaleksejeva/DFRLab via Meltwater Explore)

Three of the five most-retweeted tweets claimed the counteroffensive was unsuccessful. All three tweets came from @KimDotcom, a controversial hacker, entrepreneur, and activist currently based in New Zealand. In his tweets, he suggested that sanctions against Russia do not work, implied that Ukrainian soldiers are suffering enormous casualties, and amplified a tweet from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs allegedly showing destroyed Western military vehicles. The second most-active account declaring the counteroffensive a failure was the anonymous account @WarMonitors, which shared allegedly destroyed Western military equipment and praised Russian equipment.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

The post Russian War Report: Anti-Ukrainian counteroffensive narratives fail to go viral appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Nadadur in Nikkei Asia: India’s infrastructure and logistics transformation is for real

Atlantic Council — Thu, 15 Jun 2023 14:56:44 +0000

The post Nadadur in Nikkei Asia: India’s infrastructure and logistics transformation is for real appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why Ukrainian NATO membership would actually be good for Russia

Leonid Gozman — Wed, 14 Jun 2023 07:42:05 +0000

Vladimir Putin claims one of the main goals of his Ukraine invasion is to prevent the country joining NATO. This objective may at first glance appear broadly reasonable, but on closer inspection, it actually goes directly against Russia’s own national interests.

The idea that Ukrainian NATO membership would pose a security threat to Russia ranks among Putin’s most enduring myths. In reality, however, no NATO member has ever threatened to attack Russia. On the contrary, Russia’s shared borders with NATO have always been strikingly calm and secure. Notably, this was also the case throughout the Soviet era and stands in contrast to some other Russian borders. If Ukraine joins NATO, it would significantly increase Russia’s own border security.

The interests of the Russian people are best served by a sustainable and lasting peace rather than wars of conquest. Ukraine’s NATO accession would strengthen the alliance and improve its ability to resist Russian aggression. This would greatly reduce the risk of a new war in Ukraine, as not even Putin is ready to enter into an open war with NATO. Instead, the Russian population would be much likelier to live peaceful lives.

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Crucially, Ukrainian NATO membership would mean an end to dreams of restoring the Russian Empire. This would be good news for all Russians, who have no need of an empire. In today’s world, imperial ambitions bring crushing economic and moral burdens that hamper the development of a country and lead to stagnation.

It is also inaccurate to assume, as many currently do, that a majority of Russians share the same imperial aspirations promoted by Putin himself. In fact, during the years of the Soviet collapse, there were literally zero rallies calling on Moscow to prevent the various Soviet republics from securing independence, despite the fact that protests were possible at that time. Indeed, following the tragic events of January 1991 in Vilnius, when Soviet troops killed 13 Lithuanians, around a million people attended a massive rally in central Moscow demanding recognition of Lithuanian independence. These people took to the streets not in defense of empire but in support of freedom.

Back then, nobody saw the fall of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” as Putin would later state. According to polling data, the Russian public only began showing signs of “imperial nostalgia” some 15 years later in the mid-2000s. This change in mood was due to official propaganda rather than any deep-seated notions of imperial identity.

Far from marking a regrettable retreat from empire, the collapse of the Soviet Union was an undeniably positive development for Russia. Similarly, the current revival of imperialism in Russia poses an existential threat to the country’s future. Ukrainian NATO membership would be a big step toward abandoning the idea of empire entirely, and that would be a positive development for all Russians.

It is clearly in Russia’s interests to have stable, predictable, and non-aggressive neighbors. NATO member states represent exactly this kind of neighbor. If Ukraine joins the alliance, this would go a long way to allaying fears within Russia over possible future Ukrainian revenge after the current war ends.

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Ukrainian accession to NATO would help raise living standards in the country by obliging the Ukrainian authorities to implement vital reforms. This would be particularly good news for Russia. Like any other country, Russia has an interest in the prosperity of neighboring states and stands to benefit from improved trade and other economic ties if Ukraine achieves a higher standard of living.

Joining NATO would also strengthen Ukraine’s democratic institutions. This would help demonstrate to the Russian public that democracy can thrive in the post-Soviet space. Russians are just as interested in personal freedoms and democratic values as anyone else, but they are bombarded with propaganda from the Kremlin convincing them that freedom and democracy are only possible in the West and will never take root inside Russia.

The Putin regime supports this incompatibility argument by pointing to various aspects of Russian society that allegedly make the country unsuitable for democracy, such as Russia’s dominant Slavic Orthodox culture. However, as a fellow predominantly Slavic Orthodox nation that many Russians view as extremely similar to their own country, Ukraine can debunk such arguments. Indeed, this is a key reason why the Kremlin views Ukrainian democracy as such a threat.

Unless Ukraine joins NATO, even the complete liberation of the country will not bring sustainable peace. Putin will not accept defeat and will inevitably attack again. This is exactly what Hitler would have done if the allies had not destroyed his criminal regime along with his war machine. Just as lasting peace was only possible after World War II due to the removal of the Nazi system, future peace in Eastern Europe will depend on the end of the Putin regime. This is clearly in the interests of the Russian people, and will be much more likely if Ukraine joins NATO. Membership of the alliance would provide Ukraine with long-term security, but the benefits to Russia itself would be no less profound.

Leonid Gozman is a Russian politician and commentator.

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Ukraine’s counteroffensive will likely create new reintegration challenges

Lesia Dubenko — Sun, 11 Jun 2023 23:58:10 +0000

As Ukraine’s long anticipated counteroffensive gets underway, international attention is firmly fixed on military developments. If the Ukrainian Armed Forces are able to achieve significant advances, the authorities in Kyiv will also be faced with the challenge of reintegrating communities that have lived for more than a year, and in some cases over nine years, under Russian occupation.

The obstacles to successful reintegration should not be underestimated. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine first began in 2014, Moscow has prioritized control of the information space and has subjected the population in occupied regions of Ukraine to relentless propaganda. Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that the communities living in occupied Ukraine can be successfully reintegrated following liberation if the right policies are adopted.

Much to the Kremlin’s disbelief, Ukrainian national identity has proven far stronger than anyone in Moscow anticipated in 2014. Similarly, it should now be abundantly clear that the percentage of Ukrainian citizens who speak Russian in their daily lives or embrace aspects of Russian popular culture is in no way indicative of political loyalty to the Kremlin.

Even in regions of Ukraine where the Russian language remained dominant in everyday life following the Soviet collapse, and where cultural connections to post-Soviet Russia appeared strongest, there has also been significant exposure to Ukrainian culture, language, and national identity since the 1990s. For many years, everything from TV advertising to movies have been broadcast in Ukrainian, while education has predominantly been in Ukrainian as the official state language. An entire generation of Russian-speaking Ukrainians grew up and reached adulthood with an awareness of their Ukrainian identity prior to the initial Russian invasion of 2014.

Policymakers in the Kremlin appear to have bet that historic ties to Russia would trump any emerging sense of Ukrainian identity. This confidence was no doubt reinforced by Russia’s prominence in Ukrainian popular culture, with Russian pop singers, film stars, comedians, and literary figures all enjoying widespread popularity. However, the rapid decline since 2014 of Russian cultural influence in parts of Ukraine not subject to direct Kremlin control has illustrated the fragility of Russia’s informal empire.

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Since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, Ukraine has consistently stated that it will settle for nothing less than the liberation of the entire country within the international borders recognized in 1991. This is a massive military undertaking that will involve defeating a Russian invasion force numbering in excess of 300,000 soldiers. Beyond that, Ukraine must also reintegrate perhaps five million people who have spent an extended period living under Russian occupation.

While millions of Ukrainians fled Russia’s initial invasion in 2014 and the subsequent full-scale invasion of 2022, many more remained behind. They have been fed a diet of Kremlin propaganda portraying Ukraine as both a Nazi state and a puppet of the West. Russia has focused particular attention on indoctrinating young Ukrainians to convince them that their future lies with Moscow.

Despite these challenges, there is reason to believe that Russia’s efforts will ultimately fail. Ukrainians as a whole have been subjected to many decades of russification but have demonstrated in recent years that they are not convinced by the Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian messaging. Indeed, the past nine years of Russian aggression have sparked a sharp rise in Ukrainian patriotism across the country, particularly in regions previously regarded as being highly russified. The shared sense of Ukrainian identity forged since 1991 has proven far stronger than the Kremlin had anticipated, while Russian aggression has had a powerful unifying impact on Ukrainian society.

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Crucially, none of the Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine has been fully cut off from the rest of Ukraine since 2014. Until the launch of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, regular interaction across the front lines in Crimea and eastern Ukraine was the norm. Even the intensification of hostilities over the past 16 months has not led to a complete breakdown in communication.

Victims of Russian aggression will have a key role to play in the reintegration process. In every region liberated from Russian occupation, Ukrainian officials have uncovered evidence of widespread war crimes including summary executions, torture, sexual violence, abductions, and mass deportations. It is vital that survivors share their experiences with their wider communities to underline the horrors of the Russian occupation. Local residents will be seen as far more credible than government officials.

It will also be important to communicate in Russian as well as Ukrainian. While growing numbers of Ukrainians are embracing the Ukrainian language, many communities in southern and eastern Ukraine remain predominantly Russian-speaking and have been cut off from the Ukrainian language by Russia’s invasion. They will likely be far more receptive to Russian-language messaging, especially during the initial period following de-occupation, regardless of their personal attitudes toward issues of national identity.

It goes without saying that Ukraine’s top priority is to win the war. At the same time, military victories will prove hollow if the Kyiv authorities are unable to successfully reintegrate millions of Ukrainian citizens who have spent extended periods living under Russian occupation. In order to win hearts and minds, it is vital to underline to liberated communities that they are coming home to a nation that values and embraces them.

Lesia Dubenko is a Ukrainian analyst and journalist. Her articles have appeared in the Financial Times, Politico Europe, New Eastern Europe, and the Atlantic Council.

There are additional concerns over a potential nuclear disaster as the reservoir behind the collapsed dam supplies the cooling water for the nearby Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest in Europe. Floodwaters are also thought to have dislodged significant numbers of mines, creating further potential for civilian casualties.

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While the Kremlin has denied blowing up the dam and has instead accused Ukraine, initial analysis strongly suggests Russian responsibility. A New York Times article citing engineering and munitions experts concluded that a “deliberate explosion” inside the Russian-controlled dam “most likely caused it to collapse.” Only Russian forces could have carried out such an explosion.

Many have also questioned the credibility of Moscow’s counterclaims suggesting the dam was destroyed by Ukrainian missile or artillery fire. Independent experts have confirmed that the Cold War era dam, which was built to withstand a nuclear attack, would be extremely difficult to destroy via external bombardment, according to The Times.

Russia also has a clear military motive and a long record of attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. At the time of the dam collapse, Russian forces were preparing to face a long anticipated Ukrainian summer counteroffensive. The widespread flooding produced by the disaster effectively ruled out the possibility of Ukrainian troops attempting a river crossing along an entire section of the 1000-kilometer front. Meanwhile, Russia spent much of the winter and spring seasons conducting a methodical nationwide bombing campaign designed to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and freeze the country into submission. While the destruction of a major dam would mark an escalation in this campaign, it would clearly not be unprecedented.

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Despite the likelihood that Russia is responsible for the dam collapse, in legal terms it is still too early to hold anyone directly accountable. First, there would need to be incontrovertible proof that this was actually an attack rather than some kind of horrible accident, miscommunication, or mistake made amid the “fog of war.” Then, the issue of attribution would have to be dealt with. This means that Russia’s responsibility for the attack would need to proven beyond doubt.

If it can be established that Russia intentionally carried out an attack on the dam, there are many potential pathways to justice. For example, Ukraine could pursue accountability through its own domestic courts; international actors could establish a regional tribunal; the International Criminal Court could investigate and potentially indict a responsible individual; or countries could choose to exercise universal jurisdiction in order to prosecute Russia for its actions.

Unfortunately, there are many obstacles to overcome in pursuing accountability through these mechanisms. History has shown that the wheels of justice are excruciatingly slow in international war crimes cases. Prosecutors and Ukrainians alike would have to show extraordinary patience in waiting for these approaches to pay dividends. It would also be difficult to prove who ordered the attack and get that person in the dock, barring unlikely regime change within Russia itself. These are neither fair nor easy circumstances for Ukrainians to accept in the face of such trauma.

Furthermore, there are still huge information gaps. There would need to be a committed fact-finding effort, starting in the immediate present, to fill these gaps for a case that might not be prosecuted for many years or even decades. Ukrainians have shown an unprecedented ability to document abuses in real time throughout the current war. The onus would be on them to identify the individual Russian units and commanders responsible for blowing up the dam.

The challenges are even greater if Ukraine or the international community wants to pursue specific accountability for ecocide. Although there has been a lot of momentum in this direction, ecocide is not yet codified as a crime under international law (although it is under Ukrainian law). Even if this were to be accomplished in the near future and ecocide came to fall under the Rome Statute that established the ICC, there would still be enough ambiguity and lack of legal precedent to potentially deter prosecutors from pursuing the charge of ecocide in the Kakhovka dam case. There would also need to be an extensive investigation, which would not be easy given bureaucratic and financial barriers along with the fact that many affected areas remain under Russian control or are heavily mined.

In light of these obstacles, what can be done in the short-term to help hold Russia accountable for the destruction of the Kakhovka dam and its devastating consequences? First, the international community needs to broaden its view of what might constitute justice beyond the courtroom. This means listening to and supporting local civil society in Ukraine. It also means investing in Ukraine not only in the short-term, but in sustainable ways that bolster the country’s longer-term recovery and reconstruction, quite possibly by using frozen Russian assets to finance it. This requires helping the Ukrainian authorities combat corruption and build the capacity of the country’s own judicial system to pursue accountability.

In the pursuit of justice for Ukraine, the most meaningful steps are those that ensure Russia’s decisive defeat. Accountability will be much more difficult to achieve if the conflict becomes protracted or frozen. In such circumstances, it is highly unlikely that anyone will ever face prosecution over the destruction of Kakhovka dam. Ultimately, the only way to achieve a just and durable peace is through Ukrainian victory.

Danielle Johnson holds a PhD in Politics from Oxford University and is currently a Senior Ukraine Analyst at ACAPS.

Kakhovka dam collapse threatens Europe’s largest nuclear plant

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti — Thu, 08 Jun 2023 20:06:08 +0000

The blowing up of the Kakhovka dam in Russian-occupied southern Ukraine in the early hours of June 6 has produced a range of catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences. The resultant draining of the Kakhovka reservoir also creates significant risks for the nearby Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. The plant, which is the largest in Europe, is not believed to be in any immediate danger, but rapidly dropping water levels in the reservoir will make it difficult to access the water necessary to cool the plant’s six reactors.

Nuclear power plants work by splitting atoms to create tremendous heat, which turns turbines to generate electricity. The heat created is so extreme that advanced cooling systems are required to keep temperature levels under control and prevent a meltdown. The Fukushima disaster was the result of a cooling system failure when a tsunami caused by a major earthquake disabled the Japanese nuclear power plant’s cooling system and three reactors melted down from their own heat. By contrast, the 1986 Chornobyl disaster in Soviet Ukraine was due to human error that caused the graphite reactor cores to burn.

The Zaporizhzhia plant features VVER-1000 pressurized light water reactors. This means that a Chornobyl-style meltdown is not possible as there is no graphite to burn, but the risk of a cooling system failure is a grave concern. The plant has been carefully monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since it was first captured by Russian troops in March 2022 during the early weeks of the full-scale Russian invasion.

Since then, Russia has repeatedly struck the transmission lines that power the plant’s cooling systems, necessitating the use of back-up generators to keep the cooling system operational. Despite regular alarms over the close proximity of combat operations and the deployment of Russian troops at the plant, the risk of a nuclear disaster has been seen as present but never pressing due to numerous residual safety features. For example, the plant can run on its own power for short periods of time if power grid access and generators simultaneously fail. So far, this hasn’t happened.

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The Kakhovka dam collapse has now increased the risk of disaster. In addition to electricity, the plant needs large quantities of water to run its cooling system. The plant was built in the 1980s, decades after the Kakhovka dam was constructed, and features a design that relies on reservoir water for its cooling system. And although the plant’s six reactors have been turned off for more than eight months to reduce the likelihood of wartime nuclear accidents, it will still be a decade before the reactor fuel rods are cool enough to be moved into dry storage.

Water levels in the reservoir have plummeted since the blast on Tuesday morning. At this stage, nobody can say with any certainty how far the water levels will eventually drop before leveling out. The IAEA commented on June 7 that if water levels fall below 12.7 meters, the lowest level at which water can be pumped upstream to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, there are alternative options that can be used to source cooling system water. One day later, this point was reportedly reached. With the Kakhovka dam beyond repair and no clear way to stop it hemorrhaging water from the reservoir, it seems likely that external water sources will be necessary.

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At present, IAEA officials say there is “no immediate risk” to the plant, while officials from Ukraine’s nuclear operator Energoatom have stated that water supplies stored close to the facility are sufficient for the next few months. However, others have noted that summer heat could speed evaporation and exhaust existing reserves far sooner.

The destruction of Kakhovka dam is widely viewed as the latest and most reckless in a series of attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure carried out by Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began almost sixteen months ago. While Moscow has officially denied destroying the dam, initial analysis points to Russian responsibility. A New York Times article citing engineering and munitions experts concluded that a “deliberate explosion” inside the Russian-controlled dam “most likely caused its collapse.” Meanwhile, independent experts have confirmed that the Cold War era dam, which was built to withstand a nuclear attack, would be extremely difficult to destroy via external bombardment, according to The Times.

In addition to the heightened risk to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the destruction of the dam has also unleashed an ecological disaster throughout the region. Tens of thousands of local residents whose homes have been flooded are in urgent need of care and shelter. Significant quantities of oil and chemicals have poured into the Dnipro River and must be contained, along with munitions. These are the most immediate challenges facing the Ukrainian authorities.

The risks posed to Europe’s largest nuclear power plant by the loss of access to reservoir water must also be addressed without delay before the situation becomes critical. Beyond this pressing logistical issue, the blowing up of the Kakhovka dam is also fueling speculation over whether Russia may be prepared to adopt similarly drastic measures at the Zaporizhzhia plant itself. With this in mind, the international community must send a clear message to Moscow that it will be held accountable for any further attempts to intimidate the world with the threat of nuclear disaster.

Suriya Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

The European Commission’s Rita Wezenbeek on what comes next in implementing the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act

Atlantic Council — Thu, 08 Jun 2023 19:19:36 +0000

Activists and experts assemble in Costa Rica to protect human rights in the digital age

By Digital Forensic Research Lab

Our Digital Forensic Research Lab is convening top tech thinkers and human-rights defenders at RightsCon to collaborate on an agenda for advancing rights globally.

Cybersecurity Disinformation

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speaker

Rita Wezenbeek
Director, Platforms, DG CNECT, European Commission

RITA WEZENBEEK: My name is Rita Wezenbeek, and I am the director in charge of the implementation of the new legislation in the European Union concerning tech platforms, so this is the Digital Services Act—the DSA—and the Digital Markets Act—the DMA.

So the Digital Services Act addresses a wide range of potential societal harms on online platforms, ranging from the sale of illegal goods to disinformation, from child pornography to terrorists’ online content.

Providers of online platforms will be subject to democratically adopted rules, which set a comprehensive accountability and transparency framework. The first obligations on this Digital Services Act already started to apply in February this year and on [April 25], the commission designated seventeen very large online platforms and two very large online search engines that reach at least forty-five million active users on a monthly basis in the European Union, which is an equivalent to more than 10 percent of the EU’s population. These [very large online platforms and search engines] fall under the direct supervision of the European Commission.

The effects of these rules will be felt soon. Designated [very large online platforms and search engines] will have to provide the EU with risk assessments at the end of August and the beginning of September. In addition to that, under the Digital Markets Act, which is much more an act on market contestability, the designations under this act will follow the latest by the beginning of September.

For both sets of regulation, the commission will become the regulator for the large platforms and search engines. The commission will supervise under the DSA that the online platforms put into place systems to tackle illegal content and disinformation that uphold users’ rights and also protect users’ health and well-being and in order to do so the commission is equipped with wide-ranging investigatory and supervising powers, including the power to impose sanctions and remedies.

That being said, making the implementation of the DSA work in practice is something that the commission is not going to do alone. Many actors will contribute to the success of this regulation and we would, of course, stand ready to share our first regulatory experiences. We have to act decisively to safeguard the universal principles and we do it in a way that does not exclude adopting a global approach to platform regulation. So our platform rules optimize fundamental rights protections by giving agency back to society, which leads to an informed and effective choice for safety and contestability.

Now, also other rules are relevant in this context. For instance, the UNESCO draft guidelines for platform regulation reflect a similar architecture. And it involves proportionate, risk-based, all-of-society approaches. Under such a global approach, it is important to exchange on standards for key building blocks of human rights-based platform regulation through risk assessments for systemic platforms, also through auditing cycles, and through data access for researchers.

This means that in the EU, we need input from stakeholders around the world to make the most of this opportunity. We need to set out, for instance, how platforms should conduct such a risk assessment. Also, how they can give access to data to researchers in a secure and privacy-preserving manner. And also how third-party auditors should be involved. If we achieve a degree of consistency in implementing these systems globally, we will mutually be more resilient.

We need auditors that are truly independent of online platforms and that have sufficient expertise to have full awareness of civil society’s understanding of the systemic risks and their drivers. In addition to these procedural questions, we need a global debate about what are our priority research questions regarding systemic risks that are caused by online platforms. We can already link our global academic teams to investigate different priority risks. And we can set coherent standards for vetting these researchers, so that they are both independent and able to secure funding. We also need to identify proportionate and effective risk mitigation measures.

Now, you can make your voice heard. State of the art research, as well as technology, will shape our collective responses. Both directly, for instance, in implementing moves, and indirectly, for instance, because auditors look at your evidence. We’re currently seeking feedback on a number of rules. First on how to organize data access for researchers in a user-friendly, yet safe, manner. A short consultation has already ended on the [May 31], but there will be a new consultation on a draft-delegated act that will probably be at the beginning of 2024. We’re also consulting on a draft delegated act of independent audits. And that delegated act, the consultation, will expire on [June 2].

And finally, there will be a big, multistakeholder event in Brussels on [June 22], when many issues addressed by the Digital Services Act will be discussed. You’re welcome to join online, and you can follow the information on this event on our website. Then lastly, our European Center for Algorithmic Transparency is setting up a global network of researchers. And also there, you are welcome to express your interest. Now, other need for guidance may follow as the necessity arises.

On the Digital Markets Act, the legislation concerning contestability of markets, we already had four workshops involving competitors, consumers, and regulators. And more will follow in the future. And these are crucial meeting points where all specialist actors can publicly discuss and challenge the gatekeepers’ proposed remedies with respect to how to address compliance, including regarding technical methods such as end-to-end encryption and interoperability obligations.

These workshops reflect that both the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act make platforms actually regulated entities, similar to systemic banks under the supervision of the European Central Bank. Compliance with these rules has to occur on an ongoing basis. And it will be adapted. In a way, relative to today, the tables will be turned. Platforms have to proactively propose mitigation measures and remedies that need to be proven to work in practice. This proof of concept should come from a broader stakeholder community. So you need to be involved on an ongoing basis too.

Let my key message to you today, therefore, be that your involvement is not a one-off request, such as today. We will need to collectively drive solutions that represent the state of the art in optimizing the protection of all fundamental rights online.

And this also goes to the question of how do we define success under the new legislation. Success will be a consistent implementation of the rules on the one hand and their use by society on the other hand.

So let me end by saying that I hope I can rely on your support and participation. Thank you very much.

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Mapping the last decade of Russia’s disinformation and influence campaign in Ukraine

Atlantic Council — Thu, 08 Jun 2023 15:43:53 +0000

Activists and experts assemble in Costa Rica to protect human rights in the digital age

By Digital Forensic Research Lab

Our Digital Forensic Research Lab is convening top tech thinkers and human-rights defenders at RightsCon to collaborate on an agenda for advancing rights globally.

Cybersecurity Disinformation

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speakers

Andy Carvin
Senior Resident Fellow, Managing Director, DFRLab, Atlantic Council

Ksenia Iliuk
Co-founder, LetsData

Roman Osadchuk
Research Associate, DFRLab, Atlantic Council

ANDY CARVIN: I’m really excited to have all of you here today. Sorry if there was a bit of an echo there for a moment. Today I’m honored to have Ksenia Iliuk joining us. She is co-founder of LetsData, a Ukrainian research company that uses AI to detect and monitor influence operations. Previously, she was head of Detector Media. We’re also joined today by one of my colleagues from the DFRLab, Roman Osadchuk, a research associate who focuses on Ukraine.

So today we’re getting together to discuss the case study of Russian disinformation and influence operations in Ukraine. We’re now about fifteen or sixteen months since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, but of course it goes back much further than that with Russia annexing Crimea and invading eastern Ukraine 2014. And in the years in between 2014 and the reinvasion last year, we saw countless instances of Russian media, Russian influencers, Kremlin politicians, painting Ukraine as aggressors, painting them as Nazis, presenting Ukraine as a country that needs to be stopped.

And in the months leading up to February of last year, despite the fact that there was an enormous amount of mounting evidence that Russia was moving troops and armaments into place to conduct an invasion, Russia continued to amplify these narratives. And basically, trying to justify a war of aggression, while at the same time denying any responsibility of what was about to happen. After the invasion, of course, Russian information operations have continued in a variety of forms, not only targeting Ukraine but targeting Russian citizens to secure and maintain support for the war domestically. Information operations targeting countries and regions all over the world to undermine support for Ukraine and undermine Ukraine’s morale.

And to some extent, Russia has had successes, but they’ve also had a lot of duds. They’ve also had a number of instances where these campaigns clearly have not worked. And so today we’re going to take a look at Russia’s efforts to undermine Ukraine since the invasion started, but also before that as well. And I’d love to start by giving the floor to Ksenia to talk a bit about her work and some of her findings.

Ksenia, the floor is yours.

KSENIA ILIUK: Thank you so much for having me today. So we’ll start by saying within all of these years of analyzing malign information campaigns, and with the start of post their invasion, what became very clear for me as an analyst in this field, as well as Ukrainian myself, and fellow Ukrainians, that malign information campaigns is not something, you know, far away from us. It’s not just about politics. This is something that can literally kill. This very, very tough realization, it actually went upon a lot of Ukrainians. And as of now, according to different studies conducted by Detector Media and other Ukrainian nongovernmental organizations, over 80 percent of Ukrainians consider disinformation as a threat. And that is all because people saw how these threats can be facilitated in their everyday lives.

We see that—how through all of these years, before the first invasion and then the annexation in Crimea, then the full-scale invasion, all of this year Russia has been using its information influence activities to reach any kind of geopolitical and military goals. And so, you know, it’s hard to kind of admit, but all of this—all of the years of the analysis, they showed that Russia has been preparing from the information perspective different audiences in different countries to the full-scale invasion.

And I would focus a bit more on actually the start of the full-scale invasion and the time since the start and how Russia has been targeting with this—with their malign influence different countries worldwide. And I will start by saying that here we have data. We’ve been analyzing information space around Ukraine in forty countries from Brazil to Japan, and we have noticed some quite interesting things that helps us to better understand how malign information influence operates, what are their strong sides and what are their weak sides and how we can resist as democratic countries and build a way to resist actually that is based on democratic principles.

So the first thing that we saw quite visually is that the farther geographically the countries are from Ukraine, the more intense there was Russian malign information campaigns, meaning that with the first wave of Russian malign information campaigns with the start of the full-scale invasion Russia has been specifically in Europe, US, Canada, and partly Australia.

So we’ve seen different polls showing that the support for Ukraine in terms of wider audience population of the countries is quite high. So what we’ve seen is that—and also on the other side most of the things that were done in terms of the regulations like banning [Russia Today] and different social media platforms’ regulations they were mostly done with a focus on Europe—Europe, North America. That is why we see Russia acting across the world differently.

So what they are doing there they are continuing developing their information infrastructure that has remained actually untouched since the start of the full-scale invasion. So, for example, what we reported is that about 20 percent of media publications concerning Ukraine were using as a primary source of information Russian state-affiliated media, the exact same media that were publishing the articles with open genocidal rhetoric with open calls to basically slaughter Ukrainians and doing justification for that.

So we have this part, so we see the information infrastructure. And unfortunately, in that regard Russia remains quite strong, especially the more to the Global South we go where RT is functioning as if nothing happened, continuing pushing its open lies because it’s not—no longer even, you know, the subtle malign influence where they just manipulate a bit with the context. Still until today most of the content of RT is just—outrageously just portraying the reality in a completely different way.

And here when we look into details, we have on one side this is how Russia uses its information infrastructure and making it to the discourse—to the discourse of the media, and on the other side we have social media. And what we see here in terms of topics and how Russian malign influence is using it is that they actually go very hyperlocal.

What they are good at is in actually exploiting the historical background of the countries—basically, the pains of different countries—and attacking it. So, for example, in most parts of South America, Russia is exploiting the anti-US sentiment. So they build numerous conspiracy theories to kind of create this image that the war—the Russian war against Ukraine is allegedly started by the US.

And it’s very interesting because they tailor different messaging to different audiences within the countries. They claim that, for instance—for one audience, they would claim that, oh, US wants to dominate the world again, and with their hands on Ukraine they want to destroy Russia. Well, the other audience they would push that the US elites are just profiting from the war allegedly and that’s kind of the main reason for the war. So they would start, like, constantly, constantly bringing these various conspiracies that are based on this general anti-US sentiment that is, in reality, quite present and widespread in this region.

The other thing quite interesting was from—as well, from most countries in Latin America, particularly in Argentina and Brazil that we noted, that Russia is heavily pushing the topic of corruption. Because, again, the topic of corruption is something that the people in these countries know, they’ve faced. They consider it, as well, as a big threat on their way to prosperity and developing. So what they are doing is that they are trying to make any case of small, minor corruption, invent different cases of corruption, and promote them for this audience. But what they are doing is that the way they distort the reality, they will take one case and they will try to pin it to the very big conspiracy blaming like, oh, you see, here is the level of corruption of Ukraine; that means that Ukraine is a failed state, it cannot exist… They are leading it to the way, so it cannot exist, so why should they fight? They better—they better just give up. They better, like, go to Russia; they are not a country anyway. And these are kind of different, different speculations that are being pushed over there.

However, here, on the other side, this is also rather a positive thing from the perspective that when there are monitorings and media in Brazil, for instance, all of the analytical materials, different pieces about how Ukraine is actually fighting corruption, how Ukraine is fighting corruption in the middle of, of course, an invasion, where very much they got lots of traction in these countries. So thus we see how—you know, how you could shape this, how you could frame it. And unfortunately, Russian malign actors are framing it in a—with a very bad, ill intent to distort the reality and bring these, you know, very simplified conclusions to what should be done about Ukraine.

So, overall, we will—we will talk more about, like, what are the tools how we could resist it. But I would say that what we see so far, especially in the Global South, is that Russian information infrastructure remained untouched. Moreover, they are spreading it and they are developing it even [farther]. We see some very, very concerning developments in terms of the usage of Telegram, the anonymous Telegram channels and how they were—are being replicated in different countries with different models by malign actors. And we see in terms of the content this great orientation on the lack of context, which means combining these two things makes it very, very dangerous for different audiences out there.

Thank you.

ANDY CARVIN: Thanks. Thanks, Ksenia. I really appreciate it.

Roman, let’s turn it over to you now.

ROMAN OSADCHUK: Thank you, Andy. It’s a great pleasure to be here with all of you today.

So I will stomp on a few things that we, the DFRLab, did in—also a long time ago. So we presented two big reports that look at the whole year after the invasion. So one of the reports were called “Narrative Warfare.” Sorry. So it was investigating the rhetoric in pro-Kremlin media in three months after the initial invasion. So what we found there, they were, like, amplifying the messages of the officials, Russian officials; amplifying some negative rhetoric… kind of bringing up this, like, negative intent and perception of Ukrainians, as well. They also amplified multiple false-flag operations, because Russia were, like, in desperate search of casus belli. They didn’t find any, but they tried a lot. So, like, different operations, different disinformation campaigns trying to portray Ukraine as an aggressor when, in reality, we all, as of now, know that Russia is the main aggressor who actually started the invasion and actually annexed Crimea, and were in eastern Ukraine 2014.

So what we found was that there was no actual evidence that there was some, per se, coordination, right? When the media published some messages citing some specific official, it doesn’t mean that they, like, coordinated on that. It’s just because they’re amplifying their officials. But because they were using more escalatory rhetoric, that’s why it became more evident that there is something, truly.

And what is even more interesting is that many of those disinformation narratives that started while back in 2014, get amplified during the winter of 2021, 2022. Many of them ended up being in Putin’s speech. So basically all of those things that media actually vocalized and amplified for their audiences in Russia, they ended up being in those speeches. And the whole world’s seen them. And this is really interesting, that those things were the basis of the speech itself.

The second report is Undermining Ukraine, a slightly different one, because it looked at the different tactics that Kremlin and pro-Kremlin actors did all over the world, so including Russia, Ukraine, Europe, South America, Africa, and et cetera. So what we found is that, first of all, Russians did not abandon their previous old tactics and toolkit. For instance, overinflation of information space, the same thing that they did during the March 2017 Skripal poisoning, they continue doing it now, right? When there is some evidence of war crimes by Russians, they will try to come up with so many explanations of what’s happening that could you possibly imagine, so that people who are not closely following they would see that the truth is contested. So that’s why they will not be actually making final decision or, like, understanding what’s going on. So that’s the main thing that Russia aims for.

The second thing, usage of conspiracies, right? So these different conspiracy leading that. Actually, gaining tractions in some parts of the world in some conspiracy-leaning audiences, like that some parts of the war were, like, filmed in some film studio, which is—actually, it’s not true, but those things gaining traction. They’re being amplified, and they’re being equally consumed by some audiences.

Now, on atrocities. I kind of already said that, but it’s a clear pattern that Russia is trying to avoid any responsibility and deny us basically anything that their troops done on Ukrainian soil, ranging from bombing the maternity hospitals, mass killings, killings of civilians, and this list goes on and on, unfortunately. But what are they trying to do? They always try to avoid this by shifting the attention to either something else or trying to shift the blame to Ukrainians.

Also, another thing is the usage, as Ksenia said, right? So RT and Sputnik might not be that active in Europe, but they are still pretty active in other parts of the world. And they’re still working there. They still have their audiences. Moreover, in some places what we’ve found is that even if the Sputnik is—or, RT are banned, some actors and some smaller channels are actually reappearing and rebroadcasting what those channels are trying to promote and show their audiences.

But also, there are some new tricks, right? So the false fact-checking, the notorious war on facts that actually uses fact-checker toolbox to falsify truth, to promote propaganda, and many things like that, is actually broadcasting—or, not broadcasting—but it’s a website in multiple languages. So and they are being shared quite a lot by Russian embassies, for instance, and Russian ministry of defense.

Another thing is what they are doing is that sometimes they are inventing some things. Put this, as it is, information campaign that Ukrainians launched and marketed, but in reality it didn’t exist. Also, they’ve hacked media websites to get credibility. So Ukrainian media websites were hacked, with at least one evidence when they planted a story, archived it, and then used it as evidence that, look, Ukrainians also have the same conclusions that we did. But in reality, those story were not published by Ukrainians. They were because their website was breached.

Another thing is multistep approach. So there are narratives being told for months, some of them even for years, in order to be used again and again and be sharper, put in the more solid basis to them, so that they are becoming more serious in the view of a person who sees them for the first time or for the second time. Another thing—so, and this build up on the previous messages—creates this illusion that this is well-developed topic, when in reality it isn’t and it’s based on the bogus claims. But when you see, like, fourteen different links to different stories, people might perceive that there might be something behind it. But in the final turn, they’re all—they’re all not that credible. But it’s hard to check it.

And the main idea here, the main topic that we found, the main success probably, is that they aim to reach mainstream media elsewhere, right? So not in Russia, but in other audiences. So to reach even more population in those targeted countries. Because they cannot reach everybody, but the mainstream media in our respected target countries could, and that’s one of their objectives. Another thing that we’ve seen is the identity they have of well-known Western media. So they steal the identity and visuals of BBC, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Al Jazeera, to promote their conspiracy stories and videos using the identities and visuals of those of West. In reality, those materials were not being prepared at all, forgeries.

Russians post everything from military plans to some dark web pictures supposedly that Ukraine is supposedly selling Western-donated weapons, when in reality it wasn’t the case… And as Ksenia said, right, they are using regional-specific approach. They are crafting their messages for specific audiences in specific countries. And, again, whataboutism, this is the widespread thing, right?

So they’re always trying to put the blame on somebody else and claiming we’re not the first one who’ve done that. So that’s why we should avoid any responsibility. And that’s their thing. They are trying to find some useful actors on the ground to be their kind of foot soldiers, in the meaning that they would start some narratives so that they could use it further. So they’re looking for some local actors who would actually spread the initial claim, or just amplify their messages for those specifically targeted audiences.

And it continues now. So what I wanted to say is that it doesn’t end with our reports. We’re continuing our work, as many other researchers. And there is many more different campaigns that are ongoing at the moment. So, as of now, they’re actively trying to undermine trust of Ukrainians towards military leadership and political leadership so that Ukrainians will stop actually supporting the government and being discouraged to fight and to resist.

Another thing is that they are trying to undermine support towards Ukraine. They’re launching ads on Facebook that surprisingly, with some caricatures and links to some websites that are actually copycats of the initial and real websites of those media, claiming that you should not help. I’ve seen it two days ago a threat on Israel. So there was, like, ads targeting Israel. And similar ads I’ve seen in Ukraine, targeting Ukrainians. So there is, like, definitely a pattern there.

They also amplified futility of Ukrainian resistance, claiming that you shouldn’t be doing that, any fights would be futile against Russian army, so you should give up. And again, coverage of the war crimes continues, unfortunately. Usually it’s been covered up, like, cui bono—so, who benefits from this? And for any horrible thing that ends up on media, they would create up to, like, twenty different stories claiming who would benefit from it. It’s not beneficial for Russians to commit atrocities in Bucha, or bomb maternity hospital. So probably it might be staged. When the reality actually is far different, and the reality actually—like, actually tells otherwise.

So there will be more campaign in the future, so we need to keep an eye because Russians are playing long game. So my main, I don’t know, idea is that we need to continue doing that, and we need to keep a closer look at what they will do in the nearest future as well.

Thank you.

ANDY CARVIN: Thank you, Roman.

So both of you discussed how Russia weaponizes information in different ways around the world. I’ve sometimes heard media pundits discuss the information war taking place between Russian and Ukraine, as if there’s a singular argument between the two countries and a single—and a singular group of narratives targeting each other. But it seems like what we’re really talking about are, like, theaters of operations around the world where different types of information warfare is taking place. So in Western Europe, you might see examples that are attempting to have people living in the EU or NATO member states to see it as economically detrimental to support Ukraine; while, as Ksenia mentioned, in South America anti-imperialism and America’s history in Latin America is often used to frame the debate; and we’ve seen the same thing in West Africa, as well, targeting French support for Ukraine.

So there really isn’t a single information war there. They’re really tailoring it globally. How do you combat that?

KSENIA ILIUK: That’s a million-dollar question, I would say.

So, first of all, I think the very important thing that is very much lacking from all of those different geographies that we analyzed is actually threat awareness, threat awareness and readiness to facilitate it. I mean, it sounds a bit, you know, like, oh, but we do acknowledge that Russia is doing malign information campaigns. No, the threat awareness—the true threat awareness should be among different decision-makers in the country, I mean from the state institutions to everyday citizens, to everyday life of everyday citizens, because the modern information space we each live in with the development of technologies and sampling requires everyone to be aware of those things, everyone to have the skillsets—different types of skillsets—to navigate through it.

And I think that’s kind of like, when we look at this, this is what’s lacking. Because, for example, when we look at the media, Roman mentioned that Russians are trying to go to mainstream media as much as possible. And how they are managing it? Usually because there is a very low threat awareness from the journalistic community, that think that RT is, oh, just a media outlet. I am even very cautious of using the word “media” when talking about RT, you know, because any analysis of any researches worldwide shows that it has nothing to do with journalism and media. But the threat awareness is so low that, like, people co-opt it. People consider it as a credible source. The RT is not banned. Russia is managing to have their manipulations around, like, oh, that’s a freedom of speech, we just want to express our opinions, and other things. This all comes from the lack of threat awareness and readiness to facilitate it.

So I think that should be, like, the very first building block of everything, because after that we go into details on many—on many tools. There are various tools of, actually, building this resilience to malign information campaigns, starting with developing different policies with advertisements—with advertisers that—to create some different regulation, self-regulation spaces because—Roman mentioned Facebook. There were also numerous cases when Russian-affiliated malign actors, they were just buying—you know the Google ads on different websites, just banners? They were just buying the banner spaces and just, like, putting all—the notorious lies just out there. So this is one of the tools that we have—educational tools. We have free banking and so many different tools out there. But none of the [tools] would work just within itself. We need to combine all these [tools]. But the very first step should be within acknowledging the threat, facilitating it, and starting different discussions on different levels—OK, what should we do about it.

ROMAN OSADCHUK: Yeah. I would maybe start from saying that information is actually the essence of life in a way that actually influences any decisions that we’re making and it’s definitely, like, information warfare. It’s not like one fight is going on. There’s, like, multitude of different things happening simultaneously and it’s incredibly hard to control all of the things simultaneously.

But as Ksenia said, indeed, there should be more done in a way that’s raising awareness that those things exist. Another thing, there should be more skills for journalists and actually wider audiences because media literacy becomes a needed skill. It’s, basically, essential skill in our time like reading, I don’t know, a few centuries ago.

So it becomes more and more needed to people to understand what type of information they are consuming and how to work with that. And I would echo Ksenia’s point that actually some journalists would also need to understand that the equivalence and the balance of two points is not always the right way to promote because if one side does not base their claims on truth and on pure fantasies or disinformation equalizing them is not a way of going.

And the final thing that I would say is that it’s based, actually, on our colleague Jakub Kalenský’s four line of defense, is that it should be harder for disinformers to do their—to do their job, right? So something should be regulated, as Ksenia said, maybe like advertising industry.

Actors should be named and shamed so that, like, their way of how they promote information, what they are writing about, how—what tools they are using audience need to be actually informed on that, know about this, and that’s why this effect might—their effect might be lesser.

But also another problem is that if we do not see the immediate effect of those things they are working slowly. The information builds up slowly step by step because the repetition works, as some research shows of different studies.

So even if you see that there is not much of the audience of RT in the particular country it doesn’t mean that it will not build up and not make this, even this small part of the country, really eager fans of the pro-Kremlin narratives and messages.

ANDY CARVIN: So throughout the war and preceding it as well it’s often felt like the Kremlin is trying to throw every idea they have at the wall like spaghetti to see what sticks and what doesn’t, and certain narratives resonate and take on a life of their own and spread and others don’t.

What factors do you think cause certain narratives to spread and be successful versus ones that don’t? Are there any particular patterns you’ve noticed?

ROMAN OSADCHUK: I could start. So I think the main issue here is whether they are hitting the nerve of a specific audience so if they’re, like, actually hitting the cleavage between some polarized audiences, let’s say, or some groups. So if they are actually with their messaging actually hitting the, I don’t know, side guys or the actual problem that this specific group cares about, then it would work out.

So, for instance, let’s take this—there is a group of people who are seeing the conspiracy that [the] West is, I don’t know, preparing a plot for the worldwide government or something like that. So this audience would be extremely receptive for the conspiracies that the war was induced by the West. It’s not the war between Ukraine and Russia. It’s war because—it’s the war between West and Russia. So this is just, like, slightly explaining the technology here. If it coincides with interest of a specific group then it would probably work. And if—another thing. If it actually involved, again, things that people care about.

So, for instance, in Ukraine some disinformation—when there were, like, a lot of blackouts after the Russian attacks on energy infrastructure, many people lived without electricity for hours, some of them for a few days, and Russians injected messages that actually those energy blackouts are not because there was some shelling but because Ukraine is selling electricity to other places and to other cities.

And it is extremely emotional. You could just imagine, right, because people were definitely desperate and they’re, like, in not the best position and those messages they resonated, not because they were, like, fantastically crafted or something because most of them were just hitting the nerve of the people and the exact situation at the moment.

ANDY CARVIN: Ksenia, anything you want to add to that?

KSENIA ILIUK: Very much agree with Roman on that. I will just add that it’s also important to understand when we look at the narratives of Russian malign influence is that a lot of them and different messages that fuel the narratives itself, they are not always there to kind of stick. They are very often there to completely disorient the audience. And this—and also sometimes, you know, that is varied. Here I’m talking about the more sophisticated Russian malign influence, not the ones that [claim] that Ukraine has biological biting mosquitoes but more elaborated ones.

They are very often—they can promote the narratives that are from the first sight are not beneficial to them and that is what makes it very hard for different audiences to spot them because when you see them you’re, like, oh, but that doesn’t look like this is something that would be beneficial for Russia to promote, you know.

But that’s a part of the strategy because when they are sending any kind of piece of malign information, whether it’s faith, whether it’s manipulation, whether it’s a bigger message, you know, a bigger story they’re spitting out, each of them has its goal and very often this goal is not about actually making sure that these are the narratives that are—that people believe in and that impact their decision making but to distract, to disorient, sometimes to completely focus attention on a different thing.

In Ukraine, for instance, with the start of the full-scale invasion there was numerous fakes that Russia was spreading to, basically, all the—to shift the attention of all of the Ukrainian volunteers that were working and were actually doing the stuff that was very productive—not productive Russia, obviously. So they were trying to sway them into doing other things, useless but, like, to make sure that they do it.

So this is also very important. When we see any piece of information, just ask ourselves, OK, what do we feel about it? Who can benefit from it?… Because sometimes they’re just there to distract.

ANDY CARVIN: So we have a number of questions coming in from the audience, from attendees at RightsCon. So I want to start with a question from Mais, and I’m hoping I’m pronouncing that right. Mais writes: There are striking similarities with the tactics Russia employed in Syria, from amplifying disinformation to vilifying rescue workers responding to war crimes and appealing to anti-West sentiments. What crucial lessons can be learned from Russia’s playbook in Syria to develop more effective resilience against information warfare in Ukraine?

Now, I know neither of you are necessarily Syria experts. But I think it’s fair to say that this isn’t the first time Russia has deployed these techniques in a conflict or just to undermine its adversaries. So I guess I would ask do you see similarities with other aspects in Russian history or going further back in Soviet history of how they’ve weaponized information?

KSENIA ILIUK: I would definitely say that there is nothing new under the sun when we see all of the—when we look at the essence, not of the shape, the format of malign influence but the essence, that the essence is the same.

About Syria what I would like to note that there is, indeed, a lot of strikingly similar or even the same patterns being applied and I think the biggest thing that we kind of failed as democratic societies worldwide to learn from Syria is actually the fact of actually analyzing the situation and learning.

I would personally say that the situation of Syria is much more complicated. Information-wise, with the situation in Ukraine… there is a very clear unity between lots of efforts in civil society, state institutions. So in this regard in Syria, the situation is much more complex.

But I think we actually failed from learning that. We failed because we again say that, oh, these techniques, oh, we already knew them before. So if we knew them before, why haven’t we [prevented] them from spreading again? And with most of malign information campaigns happening right now, they are—they are not the same, but most of them could be easily anticipated and prevented. And here we have a very strong tool of preventing when we can actually inform in advance about the tactics, about the manipulation that will be used. And I think in this regard, in the context of Syria, we just, unfortunately, very much failed to do that.

ROMAN OSADCHUK: I would echo that we kind of failed, probably, on learning on the tactics. They are definitely not new. If you read about the active measures, there is a wonderful book with the same name that actually describes different operations that took place in the twentieth century. So it’s all over—all over there. You could also look at some defectors—Soviet defectors to United States who also acknowledged what they had done in the—in different parts of KGB, and how, and what they spread to different audiences. So it’s definitely not new.

But we, indeed, failed to learn more on the—on the example, Syria. But at the same time, I would say it was slightly different because of the sheer amount of footage and the files that we could actually document. So now this war is probably more captured and—I don’t know—captured meaning on photo, video. There’s so much evidence of basically anything that happens. So that’s why in a sense it’s easier to collect all of this data. So hopefully this time it will be easier to prove involvement of some specific troops in some particular war crimes, or what actually happened on the ground, because having those materials is actually more beneficial.

But again, I completely agree that it’s not new and it’s actually—Russians are using similar tactics again and again.

ANDY CARVIN: We have another question, from Andrew, who writes: Although RT and Sputnik are banned in most Western countries now, Russia has recruited a notable amount of so-called citizen journalists and whistleblowers. Tara Reade’s defection to Russia recently made the news, but she’d previously been using pro-Russian talking points online since at least 2018. Could you provide some perspective on how these disinformation actors are cultivated and amplified by the Russian state?

Do we have any insight on that? And not necessarily her specifically? I mean, it’s—just more broadly, how does Russia exploit outside actors to promote their ideas?

KSENIA ILIUK: We have just finished, actually, the quite interesting analysis of information space of countries of Eastern Partnership plus Georgia and Armenia. And it was—one of the things that we saw that Russia more and more started focusing, as you’ve mentioned, on these kind of amplifiers—these independent people, independent journalists that, like, actually echo the rhetoric completely. And what we see very interesting in there that, especially in these countries, a lot of them are moving to Telegram, heavily going to Telegram, creating Telegram channels. Some of them already have, like, over a million of subscribers or so. They are—most of them that we discovered during this research are focusing on the Russian-speaking population, but again we see more and more of a tendency on doing the same recipe, the same playbook in the national languages of the countries. And here we see, especially concerning, that not only they go to Telegram, because of Telegram it’s very—it’s understandable why they go there, because there is fear of content moderation. So they’re very open in their thoughts and everything. Like, the expressions are just very, very sharp. They usually do not write on—even if they have the Twitter page, that on Twitter that they allow themselves to write on Telegram. And we also see a tendency of them going to TikTok, and we see—even just, like, the other day we uncovered one of the—of such influencer… we don’t know what category to put them—that was targeting [the] Ukrainian audience. And he was—his videos on TikTok also had almost [a] million of views, each.

And he was doing it in such a sophisticated way, so it’s, like, from the—it took us quite some time to follow him to understand that he actually echoing Russian line narratives. But what was most striking is that actually the advertisement that Roman mentioned today, on Facebook, they were using how he kind of understood that he is a part of the network. They were using his profiles as one of the things against this kind of advertisement. So this is indeed something. Again, there was already an infrastructure for that. A lot of them already existed way before… but we’ve seen more new faces popping up.

ROMAN OSADCHUK: I would add that there are, like, quite a lot of actors. There were quite a few—a surge of Russian darlings or amplifiers in Europe since the annexation of Crimea and invasion of 2014. So… I agree that now there are more actors. And I think we could roughly divide them into a few groups. So some of them are, like, maybe beneath four layers.

So at the beginning of the invasion, there were, like, some information campaigns against Ukrainian refugees, let’s say, in Moldova. And it were mostly TikToks. So those campaigns were kind of factchecked by local factchecking organizations. They were being reported on. And when people spotted them, at some point they could just delete that. And they seemed that they went by the same kind of script, which was there was no direct link with Russia, but the same campaign took place in Russia one week before. So that’s why it kind of coincided.

Another interesting thing is that there are a lot of think tanks that are already partnering with Russian ones. So in for—in pillars of Russian disinformation—it’s the Global Engagement Center well-known report—there are actually identified quite a few platforms… that they are amplifying Russian messages through local actors and partners all over Europe, at least, and not only even Europe.

And finally, there are some people who are either sympathizers towards the Russian cause, or whatever, or just hardcore anti-West, anti—I don’t know, anti-Western imperialism folks, right? So those people, they would share something that goes in line that Russia will inject. So I could provide an example of I made one of the investigation. There was a French politician, just French user on Twitter, who published the news about the Howitzers, that French Howitzers were being acquired by Russians intact so that they could reverse engineer them, something like this. But what’s interesting, when people ask him what was his source, he claimed FSB.

And then this thing was used by Russian media again and again a lot of the time. So then the story lead up to some other publications as well. But how it started is that there was some person abroad writing something on the basis of some message of FSB. So, yeah, there are definitely a lot of people who are actually being used by Russian disinformation machine and propaganda machine.

ANDY CARVIN: So we have a pair of questions that complement each other, one from Jonah and one from Marti, that I’ll read.

First, from Jonah: Does Ukraine and its allies have any means of replicating Russia’s tactics within Russia, and perhaps other authoritarian states? To elaborate, is it feasible to reach ordinary Russians and expose propaganda on social media, for example? Or the Russian state’s control of information space is in constructing—or, is Russia’s state control of information spaces too powerful?

And Marti writes: Do you know of any efforts to counter Russian disinformation campaigns by replying to each post and comment? It seems like the West has accepted that employing AI and troll armies is something Russia does, but why does the US, Ukraine not use the same tools in order to respond with the truth?

So, first of all, are there any efforts that we’re aware of, of direct responses trying to counter campaigns, or these messages in real time? And I guess I’d ask, the next level is, why aren’t we replicating or why isn’t Ukraine or the US replicating Russian strategies? Would it—do you think it would be in Ukraine’s interest to do so, to essentially participate in actively spreading disinformation as well? Or would that be counterproductive?

ROMAN OSADCHUK: I could start. I think it would be slightly immoral to do that. So we should be better than the Russians, because many of these tactics they are, quite frankly, are extremely in a dark area. We look at the ethics side of things. So we should not be replicating. We should find more clever ways how to fight it. If answering on the question whether people try to reach out to Russians, many Ukrainians at the beginning of the invasion—early invasion, right, they started reaching out to Russians, even relatives, families.

Family members reached to their parents who lived in Russia. And many people understood that those attempts were futile, because there were quite a few examples—you could find them in the media—when people talked to their parents, and their parents told them: Don’t worry. Russian Army is only aiming at military facilities. We will de-Nazify you and you will be totally fine. They are not shelling at the residential areas. When literally the person shows the videos of residential areas nearby being shelled.

So those attempts were there, but they definitely didn’t work out as intended. And if you look at some interviews, you know, on the Russian—like, Russians inside Russia, who tried to poll people and ask them about whether they know what’s happening, it seems that they actually know what’s happening. So intentions of many Ukrainians was that, like, when the Russians realized what’s happening they would go and try to do something and be against this war. But in reality, it didn’t actually happen.

There were protests at the beginning, but they quickly stopped. And actually, that’s a big problem. So another thing that I wanted to raise is that at least Telegram is available in Russia. And it means that even opposition platforms, like literally any media that is on Telegram, is available in Russia. So they could read—they could see what’s happening. It’s not that they’re living behind an iron curtain, they cannot reach, like, Western media. They get it. Thank you.

KSENIA ILIUK: Really agree with Roman that we have to be aware of the fact that they actually have the access to information. And that’s the choice they make, whether to go—to see or not to see. And a lot of them are choosing not to because, you know, it’s just the realization of the fact that they are—all of them are responsible for all the atrocity happening in Ukraine by their action or inaction. This is something that they should not do, you know? They choose better to live in the world of Russian propaganda that says that they are this great nation that is saving the world…

So I think this is one very important point to understand. The second, about their tactics, like should we or not? I think we definitely shouldn’t use the same tools. Again, just the principles and values we operate, or at least striving to operate, are very different from the ones that authoritarian regimes are operating. So I would definitely say that it’s not a way for us to go, because—and on the other hand, I believe that we have various tools that are based on the principles of democracy and democratic values that could be applied. And there’s no restriction from doing that.

And in terms of whether there are groups, of course there are some groups that are—some organizations, there are even some initiatives from states trying to reach so-called average Russians in Russia. But I don’t know that many of them are successful. As you see, not so much progress is happening in terms of their resistance. And definitely we can share the information, we can spread, but I don’t think this should be our target priority as of now because it seems that the people are clearly making their own choice.

ANDY CARVIN: So we have about five minutes left, which might be enough for one or two more questions before we begin to wrap up.

We have a question from Levisa, who asks: With the maturity and accessibility of AI tools, what do you recommend we do to identify disinfo created by these tools? Would showing provenance of the content be useful? Is there anything out there that you feel like is allowing people to detect AI-generated content yet? And, arguably, it would say, that for real content the entire open-source community is providing provenance by researching things in real time.

KSENIA ILIUK: Yeah, I would start saying here, because I’m a big supporter of using AI for that, because we use that for our everyday analytics, and it helps us to analyze on average basis—on a daily basis a few millions of publications in multiple languages, and to be much more efficient into spotting things, the Russian malign information campaigns, at the very beginning, you know, when we are able to actually, to some extent, you know, kill them before they gain the momentum. So in that regard, sure.

In terms of using AI tools to verify the contents themselves, the one that was created by AI, I think here it’s—again, there are a lot of tools out there. I think the bigger question would be, what would be the overall policy of doing that? Because we see right now that people are not going and checking the information. You know, it’s media literacy 101. You have to go and check in these sources. People are not doing that. And they are not going to do that because everyone has family, a dog, you know, a job, and everything. Like, we can’t do that. We don’t have time for that. So if we actually are AI and it’s something that any text, any video, any picture could be generated, and we want people to go and check, even if they are told of this… I don’t think people are going to go and do that.

So that’s the question to the policy. Like, are we forcing social-media platforms to apply these kind of tools? Or, for example, are we enforcing some kind of a culture—a few—there are a few startups, actually, that are doing digital signature for the content. Like, for example, if you post a video, you could put its invisible digital signature on it to ensure that this is the content with me, with my presence, and this is not deep fake, whatever. So I think the key question here would be, like, on more of a broader policy level and the regulation level.

ROMAN OSADCHUK: I would agree. It’s a highly complicated issue. If we talk about the—like, facts being generated by AI in some, I don’t know, bot farms or something, extremely hard to spot. And even if you’re using AI tools to identify whether it’s being AI-generated, there is always AI tools to rewrite what’s being generated so that you cannot spot it. It’s a constant game. I guess, like, with the disinformation field at whole, right, so there is always some malign tool being prepared by some malign actors, and then fact-checkers need to understand how to—how to work with that, how to identify there was something happen. So we are still in this space when we understand how it could be used against us, right, and societies, democratic institutions. So we are about to guess and find out how to effectively use AI against those informations…

Maybe there are some other venues. Maybe with some detection, but we’ll see.

ANDY CARVIN: So we have barely a minute left, so if you guys could summarize in maybe twenty seconds or so: What big lessons or takeaways should the rest of the world have regarding Ukraine’s resilience to disinformation?

KSENIA ILIUK: … The thing that I was telling today, threat awareness. What the Ukrainians realize because of their firsthand experience is that malign information influence is actually killing people, that it has enormous capacity to influence our everyday lives—the lives of business, companies… Governments are suffering. Democratic regimes are suffering. So I think the first key and most important to any other step which they are taking is actually acknowledging and facilitating threat on a different level…

ROMAN OSADCHUK: Yeah. I would say that there is no such thing as win or lose in information war. So it will always be with us, information will be with us, and will still be essence of our decision-making process. So, actually, critically evaluate any piece of information that you receive. It might be hard. It’s painful. It’s not extremely pleasant to do so. But try to analyze everything because there is so much manipulation could be coming your way. The ones that we already know, AI brings many more. But we just should be vigilant and continue our fight against those malign influences against democratic institutions.

ANDY CARVIN: Well, on behalf of RightsCon and the DFRLab, I’d like to thank both of you for joining us. I wish we could continue talking because this has been an absolutely fascinating conversation barely scratching the surface on some of these issues. But sincerely, Roman and Ksenia, I do appreciate you taking the time to talk with us today and join everyone virtually at the conference. Thank you.

Thanks, everyone. Enjoy the rest of your event.

The post Mapping the last decade of Russia’s disinformation and influence campaign in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The international community must protect women politicians from abuse online. Here’s how.

Atlantic Council — Thu, 08 Jun 2023 15:41:08 +0000

Activists and experts assemble in Costa Rica to protect human rights in the digital age

By Digital Forensic Research Lab

Our Digital Forensic Research Lab is convening top tech thinkers and human-rights defenders at RightsCon to collaborate on an agenda for advancing rights globally.

Cybersecurity Disinformation

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speakers

Tracy Chou
Chief Executive Officer, Block Party

Julie Inman Grant
eSafety Commissioner, Australian Government

Neema Lugangira
Member of Parliament, Tanzania

Fernanda Martins
Director, Internet Lab

Moira Whelan
Director, Democracy and Technology, National Democratic Institute

MOIRA WHELAN: Hi, everybody, and thanks for joining us [for] a conversation about women’s political participation and the consequences of harassment. And before we get started today and I introduce our fantastic panelists, I just wanted to express my thanks to Access Now but especially also to DFRLab, who is cosponsoring this panel in particular. And what we’re going to do today is we’re going to walk through a short introduction, I’ll open the conversation to our participants, and then we’re happy to take your questions online.

So just to get us started, I first wanted to acknowledge that this panel is really a representation of a lot of the incredible work that’s been going on in our community for a really long time. And I would point to organizations that we’ve worked with such as DanishChurchAid, Internews, Policy, and many, many others. Here at RightsCon, there are more than thirty sessions happening to address these issues of online violence against women in politics.

And you know, so first acknowledging that others are doing the work. And then, saying that, some of the organizations that we work with—and I think an expectation we now have—is that if we’re doing this work, we face that harassment and that abuse as a community and as an organization, and that goes along with including the organizations that have helped organize this panel.

So first I want to say a little bit about NDI and how we came to this work. NDI is a democracy organization that trains women around the world to help them run for office, help them prepare for their life in civil society and the public sphere. And this issue has become blinking red for us. The number of women who are self-censoring, who are pulling out of politics, who are deciding another path is probably the biggest threat to democracy that we face today.

So we really started down the path of using our traditional models of working on information—on the information space and bringing actors together to address this issue. But we also believe it’s a solvable problem and I want to note that part of what we’re talking about today and the reason we’ve talked about building the community we want to build with our guests is because we want to talk about solutions but also some of the setbacks.

So without further ado, our panelists are Julie Inman Grant, who is the eSafety commissioner of Australia; and also Tracy Chou, who is the founder of Block Party and also an entrepreneur and is—we’re really thrilled to have her; as well as Fernanda Martins, who is the director at Internet Lab; and, finally, Neema Lugangira, who is a member of parliament from Tanzania.

So welcome, all of you, and, Neema, I want to start with you. The thing that we have noticed in doing this work is that it’s very rare for active female politicians to speak up because you don’t want to make, to use your words, this is not the agenda, right. You have other issues as a parliamentarian you want to address.

So I wonder if you can walk us through your personal experience of being so outspoken on the harassment you face and also what that’s done for your political experience.

NEEMA LUGANGIRA: Thank you very much. I, first, want to sincerely thank yourself, Moira, and NDI Tech for facilitating and enabling me to be here at RightsCon. So thank you, once again.

As you rightly said, that being a female in politics, unfortunately, the more outspoken you are, the more popular you are and well known the more abuse you get, and oftentimes you find on social media platforms the abuse that we tend to get it’s a group of people who want to disqualify you, discredit you, belittle you.

So instead of focusing on the issue that you’re presenting, instead of focusing on their agenda, they shift the issue and start focusing on the gender and, unfortunately, being a female politician what they do is they sexualize the issue. So they will sexualize everything that you’ve presented. If it’s a photo they’ll sexualize that. If you happen to take a photo with a guy in a meeting they’ll probably change the backgrounds so just to shift the narrative and to kind of belittle you and kind of shut you up.

And what that has done is, unfortunately, in Africa—and I believe it’s probably the same even in the Global North—is that the number of women in politics or female members of parliament who are active online is very, very minimal.

For example, in Tanzania we have about 146 female MPs and probably less than 5 percent active on social media, using social media for their work, and what that does—what that does very quickly it has a huge detrimental effect because, one, it limits our own visibility and if you’re not visible as a politician it limits your own reelection.

But it also takes a step back. You know, organizations like NDI are making strides to increase the number of women in politics but young women, aspiring women, they see us women in politics who are supposedly in power but we are being abused and we’re helpless and nobody comes to the defense of women in politics.

Like, I’ve seen it over and over again when a female in politics is being abused nobody comes to their defense. Actually, more people mob attack. It’s almost it comes—it comes kind of with the territory.

And just to sum up, I decided that since we’re a group that nobody speaks for us so I’m going to speak for members of parliament. I’m going to speak for women in politics, and as a result of that, yes, it brings about more abuse but then some of us have to go through it so that we can address this issue because I want to see more women in politics visible so that we can strengthen their visibility because we are doing a lot of incredible work and it needs to be seen.

MOIRA WHELAN: I couldn’t agree with you more and I think, quickly, I want to shift to you, Julie, because, you know, there is that issue of full participation and it’s something you’ve really focused on at eSafety in Australia and getting to sort of moving us from the research that we’ve worked on to the solutions.

I wonder if you can walk everyone through here this sort of example of addressing some of the concerns that Neema has raised in Australia.

JULIE INMAN GRANT: [For those] who don’t know what an eSafety commissioner is, we’re the first national independent regulator for online harms and online safety. And we were established in 2015, and so there is an Online Safety Act that enables me to take action when Australians report all forms of abuse to social media platforms, gaming sites, dating sites, you name it, and it isn’t taken down. So we serve as that safety net to advocate on behalf of our citizens when things go wrong online. We know tons fall through the cracks. And so we can bridge that inherent power balance that exists.

So I deal with everything from child sexual exploitation to image-based abuse, the non-consensual sharing of intimate images and videos. And I can say that recently we’ve been getting reports of deepfake videos of female politicians and other prominent women. We have a cyberbullying scheme for youth, and an adult cyber abuse scheme, which is at a much higher threshold to make sure that freedom of expression isn’t undermined. But we all realize here that targeted misogynistic abuse is designed to silence voices. And, as you say, women will self-censor.

Now, we—beyond these laws, we focus on prevention, in the first instance. Protection, through these regulatory schemes. And then what I call proactive change. So part of that has to do with putting responsibility back on the platforms themselves through initiatives like Safety by Design. You know, AI is a perfect use case as to how these—the collective brilliance of the technology industry should be used to tackling this at scale and preventing hateful, and misogynistic, and homophobic content from being shared.

So on the prevention side, well, first of all, I should say all of these forms of abuse are gendered. Ninety-six percent of the child sexual abuse material we look at—which happens, sorry to say, at toddler age—96 percent are of girls. Eighty-five percent of our image-based abuse are from women and girls. And then when you get more to the pointy end, we know that 99 percent of women experiencing domestic and family violence are also experiencing an extension of that, be it through technology-facilitated abuse, in 99.3 percent of cases.

So 89 percent of our adult cyber abuse cases are from women, and many of whom are either being cyber-stalked and doxed as [an] extension of domestic and family violence, or by perpetrators who specifically target women. And as Neema said, the way that online abuse against women manifests is different versus men. It’s sexualized. It’s violent. It talks about rape, fertility, supposed virtue, and appearance. It just manifests in very, very different ways. So I’ve had so many politicians say to me, you know, their male counterparts will say: Well, just toughen up, sweetheart, this is politics. Well, it is different.

So I actually tried to start a program called Women in the Spotlight to provide social media self-defense to women politicians, to journalists, to anyone in the public eye. And I was told by a previous government, we can’t fund that. That’s protecting privileged women. So I set up the program anyway, and started to do the training. And we can’t keep up with demand for social media self-defense training. And I don’t need to tell any of you that if being a woman receiving misogynistic abuse isn’t enough, if you’re from a—you have a disability, you end up—you identify as LGBTQI+, or you’re from a diverse background, that kind of abuse is compounded.

So again, I think we’ll continue to persevere. We need these prevention programs. We also know that the average professional woman in Australia is receiving online abuse. So one in three women. And 25 percent of them won’t take a job opportunity or a promotion if it requires them to be online. So we’re starting to see normalization of this kind of abuse across the population. And that’s why I’m trying to use my powers much more strongly to send a message that you cannot abuse people with total impunity. And this also involves penalties and fines for perpetrators, as well as the platforms themselves that refuse to remove content. We always try and work informally first, but I have used my formal powers. And if the platforms don’t comply, I can take them to court and to fine them as well.

MOIRA WHELAN: Well, and we are going to wing our way to Silicon Valley when we get to Tracy, but I wanted to stop in Brazil first and give Fernanda a chance. Because I think one of the things you said, Julie, was really about the intersectional issues as well that are linked to this. But also, the successes that you’ve had as civil society at Internet Lab, first having to prove to governments that this is a problem; second, getting them to pay attention and to work through the process. And I’m wondering if you can tell us a little bit about your involvement working with the government of Brazil.

FERNANDA MARTINS: Yeah, sure. Thank you, Moira, for this question. And thank you, DFRLab, for organize it.

I think Internet Lab, we have been working to improve the way that political gender-based violence is treated by governments independent of the government at the moment. So at this moment also it’s different because we have a progressive government, but at the same time we have parliamentaries that is not defenders of human rights. So the context is our fragile democracy, yet so we have these challenge to understand how we can contribute to this issue in Brazil.

So at this moment we have the fake news bill to trying to address the problems related to platforms, but it is important to mention that in the bill don’t have any mention to gender, any mention to LGBTQAI+ community, and a brief note about the law, political violence law and racism law in Brazil. But it’s like we are running in parallel avenues. It’s not connected. So we are trying to talk to government, talk to private sector, and understand how we can mix different social sectors to address the problem. And I think we have the law approved in 2021 addressing political violence, but we started the enforcement of the law in the last election and it was really weak. We need to just expand more the comprehension and not focus only on banal answers. We need education and other things in this context.

MOIRA WHELAN: Well, and I think that’s really important, especially as Julie was talking about so much the value of implementation and needing to see that it’s not just legal frameworks that are going to get us there.

But all of you have talked about the platforms. All of you have talked about tech. And I want to turn to Tracy now because I do have to tell you a story. Tracy was with us when DFRLab hosted us in Brussels to really introduce this issue and to really put it on the center stage, literally. And we’re big fans of Block Party. But, Tracy, we have a different panel here today. So we were here celebrating the success of Block Party, but I think you should maybe tell us about the current status.

TRACY CHOU: Yes. So, hi, everyone. I’m Tracy. I’m the founder and CEO of Block Party. We build technology to fight harassment online and make the internet safe for everyone. Until last week, our flagship product was available on Twitter to combat harassment, and it is now sadly on hiatus thanks to platform changes.

Before we get to that, maybe some context. I started my career as an early engineer at social media companies that are now very big platforms—at Facebook, Pinterest, and Quora—so I kind of understand how platforms are built and what are their incentives not just at the high levels for the companies, but also for individual people working at those companies.

And separately, I became an activist for diversity, equity, and inclusion in the tech industry, seeing how the people that are in the room really matter for the product that we’re building. That led to me getting a lot of harassment, and so I set out to solve that problem blending together the different parts of my experience…

So what we built on top of Twitter was something to solve my own problem, essentially a sort of spam folder where you can choose who you want to hear from. Everything gets filtered into that folder that you don’t—you might not want to see. You can review it later and take action later, involve your community for help. And it works really well. Like, it was great for me.

Silicon Valley talks about “dogfooding” your own products, building things that you use yourself. And it was great for me to experience the mental health impact of not having to see all of that terrible stuff. It’s not just me. It’s a lot of other folks that we’ve already heard from on this panel, people who are working in politics, people who are activists, academics. It’s been really sad to see that we’ve had to shut down—or, hopefully just put in hiatus. We’re really hopeful that we can bring it back in some capacity in the future. We’re already seeing the outpouring of folks who are who are using our product on Twitter really sad to see it go. There are people who are tweeting every day now saying, like, I miss Block Party, literally every day, because I’m now getting all this harassment that is no longer filtered. So lots more to share on that. That is the current status.

MOIRA WHELAN: Well, Tracy, I’m not going to—I’m going to stay with you for a second, because you should know that here in this room, I have heard repeatedly people saying they miss Block Party. We wish you could be here with us so that you could feel it directly, but we’re sending it to you virtually, because we need products like this. And I think the other aspect of this story that we would love if you could—if you could share it, if you can channel your rage into helping this room help you. You’re an entrepreneur. You’ve been building.

And yet—and it should be very obvious to all of us the business case for creating safe spaces for all people to fully participate online. And yet, your experience in Silicon Valley had been decidedly different. And I wonder if you can just kind of give us an insight into the experience of going with your fundraising rounds, and when you walked into rooms with funders. Because I think people here need to know just how challenging the environment is from beginning to end. It’s not just about fixing the existing giant platforms. We have a fundamental challenge here.

TRACY CHOU: Yeah. First, I might back up a little bit and talk about the decision to create Block Party as a for-profit entity. And that was because I believe that there is a business case, and that also that in order to align the incentives going for a capitalist approach, which is building solutions for people who pay for the value that they’re getting, is the best way. In order to build really compelling technology as well, be able to hire the best people in technology for a design and product engineering, also requires being able to pay those salaries. And so VC money, venture capital money, made the most sense to me, as aligning all of those things together. There’s a big opportunity there. And we need that initial capital to get going to build the technology.

So when I went out to raise I felt like, so I have, like, a pretty good shot at making this case. I’m a technical founder, with deep experience in top companies. I have two engineering degrees from Stanford, where I graduated with top honors. Like, this is a good resume that Silicon Valley typically likes. I’m solving my own problem, which they also talk about as a great thing. Like, if you know the problem intimately, because you experience it then you’re very motivated to solve it, and you know all the ins and outs of it. Again, usually something that’s very positive.

I did not have a good experience. There were a lot of people who were skeptical. You might imagine the typical demographic of VC, very white, very male. People were dubious that there was a market. So I was told that this was very niche, and also that it’s already a solved problem, and it will be solved by machine learning, the platform’s already addressing it, so, like, no issue anymore. I suspect some of this has to do with the fact that there’s a lack of diversity in the VC industry and even though our products are for everyone, they do disproportionately serve women and people from marginalized communities, who are more targeted by abuse.

I think there’s also the latent sexism in there, where even the people who thought that there might be a market here told me that they didn’t think that I could solve it, which is very frustrating. By comparison, I saw a number of men trying to tackle the same problem. Fewer credentials, building poor copycats of my product, raise exorbitant sums of money. In some cases, ten times as much. I talked with some of these founders and they would say things like, oh, well, just because, like, I used to work at Google and so, you know, I had the credibility. And I would just have to call myself and say, well, I worked at Google, and Facebook, and Pinterest, and Quora, and also have engineering degrees. But I guess that doesn’t matter when I’m a woman.

So very frustrating experience. Had to power through that. Ultimately did raise money. So very glad that I was able to raise the seed round last year and can actually hire people to keep tackling these problems. But I guess to the point that Moira’s trying to draw out here, there are really systemic issues. If we want to be able to solve these problems, we also need the funding to be able to do so. And when there’s systemic biases in the funders and they don’t believe that there is a problem here, we’re going to have additional challenges in trying to create these solutions.

MOIRA WHELAN: Well, thank you for that, Tracy. And I can’t say, again, you know, when we talk about the thing we’ve all been told of putting on a thicker skin, really, does it get any thicker than Tracy’s, having walked through that?

And Julie, I want to talk about these systemic issues, right? We actually had a question come in on Slido, so please all participate. But it gets to the next question I wanted to ask you, which was around the barriers. And is one of the barriers freedom of expression and where we allow freedom of expression and what is abuse? And I think, you know, you’re at the forefront of, like, how we define the digital experience for people, and I wonder if you can talk a little bit about: Is that a barrier? And then my second part is: Why aren’t more countries doing what Australia’s doing, and how do we help them?

JULIE INMAN GRANT: No, that’s—thank you so much.

And I want to thank Tracy for her perseverance. I’ve been watching her journey from afar, all this stuff about funding and tech bros. And this just shows you how gender inequality can manifest in so many different ways and at so many different levels, and we have to support technologists and entrepreneurs like Tracy to create, building these incredible products. Because I can say, having worked at Microsoft and Twitter and Adobe, that not enough is doing—being done inside and safety is always an afterthought. I mean, even if you look at the patterns of layoffs happening at companies like Twitter and Meta and Microsoft, the trust and safety people go first.

But I guess one thing that we have learned is that we’ll never regulate or wrest our way out of online harms with the speed, the scale, and the volume of content online. It’s always going to be a game of Whac-a-Mole, I guess, or Whac-a-Troll if you will.

But we are also talking about fundamental human behavior and societal ills that work underneath. And that was my experience at Twitter. I joined right after the Arab Spring with the belief that it was going to be a great leveler and people would be able to speak truth to power, but what I started to see very clearly is that women and those from marginalized communities were being silenced. So if you don’t draw a line about what constitutes online hate and online harm and you allow it to fester, then you’re actually suppressing freedom of expression. So it’s a—it’s a difficult line to tread.

Our parliament in Australia, online safety is very bipartisan. And there are different approaches that, of course, different parties would want to take, but collectively the government decided that they wanted to draw a line; and if online speech turns into online invective and is designed with a serious intent to harm, to menace, or harass, that we would draw a line and that we would have an investigative process, that there’d be lots of transparency and accountability, and multiple ways to challenge any decision I make. That’s the right thing. Never been challenged by any decision. And we’re actually helping to remediate harm of individuals.

So the good news is there are more countries coming onboard with online harms regulators. Ireland and Fiji both have online safety commissioners now. Of course, the online safety bill in the U.K. is pending, but that again is a much more polarized debate. Canada’s looking at this. I’m not sure where we’ll get to in the United States.

But we do want tech companies to start stepping up and protecting, empowering, and supporting people online. And that’s why five years ago we started the Safety by Design Initiative with industry to ask them to start providing the tools to do just that—to think about the design process, the deployment, the development process, the maintenance and the refresh process rather than retrofitting safety protections after the damage has been done. There will always be room for specialist tools like Block Party and [Privacy] Party, and we want to facilitate that—you know, let thousands of innovative flowers bloom so that we can all have safer, more positive experiences online.

We also have to keep an eye out in the future. I’m very concerned about the power of generative AI and these large language models and, you know, conversational models with the ability to manipulate—to manipulate young people for extortion, for grooming, for, you know, deep fakes and misinformation and disinformation. We need to think about immersive technologies and the Metaverse.

When we’re, you know, in high-sensory, hyper-realistic environments, the online harassment we’re feeling now will be much more extreme and much more visceral. Think about with haptics and headsets that are picking up, you know, your retinal scans and flushing, what that technology can tell these major companies about you. Neuro technology—you bring that into a toxic mix.

If we don’t start putting the onus back on these technology companies to be thinking about the risks and how their technologies can be misused and have them doing this at the forefront we’re never going to be able to get ahead of this.

So I do hope that more governments come on board. We’ve just established a global online safety regulators network with members who are independent statutory authorities who can demonstrate a track record on human rights and independence. But we’re also making room for observers for governments and other organizations that want to consider best practice in terms of setting up online harms regulators.

And with the DSA and other developments, I expect in the next five or ten years we will have a network of online harms regulators and we will no longer in Australia feeling like we’re at the head of the peloton going up [a mountain] with no one drafting behind us.

I think governments need to get together with the civil society sector and start to counter the stealth, the wealth, and the power of the technology industry. It’s the only way we’re going to get ahead this.

MOIRA WHELAN: Well, and I couldn’t agree more and I should say I think we all want to live in Julia Inman Grant’s internet. You know, that’s definitely the space we want to go.

I’d also point to the global partnership that Australia, the United States, and others have founded to address online abuse that NDI is very happy to support and we like the direction it’s going. But I think you made one really important point and that was the really clear leadership of civil society in both identifying this issue, making it a global issue instead of a personal issue that each politician is facing.

And you had, Fernanda, talked a little bit about the barriers you were facing. So you talked about tech versus government and I wonder if you can expand on that a little bit and tell us, like, where do you spend your time. How do you prioritize both of those needs and who needs to change first? Who needs to change in what way to—you know, this is what civil society does. You put yourself in the middle and you change it.

Please tell us a little bit more about how you’re doing that in Brazil.

FERNANDA MARTINS: Yeah. Sure. It was great to hear from Julie because I was thinking in similar things here and we know—we live at this moment a shift of violence concept and in less years ago when you talk to platforms about gender-based violence online we are talking mainly about dissemination of [non-consented materials].

And now when we try to talk about political violence it’s like we are tension the relationship between freedom of expression and the limit that needs to exist. So it’s interesting to note that when we look at the Brazilian context, in the legislative context we have some laws directed to domestic violence. And when we talk to platforms, they told us about the necessity to protect women related to these issues and violence that is targeted by ex-partners, for example.

But it’s difficult. It is a challenge made—government made platforms and everyone involved in this issue—that we are in public is fair. And not just women; we are talking to marginalized groups in general. So our effort at this moment is to demonstrate that, OK, we demonstrated before that the violence exists, so now what we can do inclusively when we talk about difference what needs to be excluded in platforms, what to be—have flagged that there is content here, it is an insult; but we have—we have, too, platforms that have the policy that public figures need to be more tolerant to attacks and insults, as Meta’s platform. So how we can educate society in general if the example on platforms is, say, women candidate could be attacked, the other could be attacked—women, LGBTQI+ community.

So we need to change the policies, and we need to—we need strong—make strong our laws and their relationship globally. So I think it is a little what we’re trying to do.

MOIRA WHELAN: And I think it’s an excellent point. When you were working with NDI on our program to identify interventions, we identified twenty-six. We have colleagues at Web Foundation, at CG, at other places that were coming up with theirs. We just did an inventory, and we have, like, 450 identified opportunities for changes.

But I want to turn us to Neema, because it all comes back to politics, right? A lot of those changes weren’t just with platforms. They weren’t just with governments. They were also within political parties. How media outlets, you know, cover it. Because even though we’re talking about these major global issues, as a politician that’s still a very personal experience and it’s still very—you know, it’s hard to look at fixing the whole tech system when you’re going through this every day. And I wonder if you can talk about—bring us a little closer to home, and what we need to do, and what are the barriers getting in the way of fixing it, for your own political experience?

NEEMA LUGANGIRA: Thank you. I think one of the things—there are different moving blocks. The first one is the social media platforms. And exactly like what she just said, in the sense is that it is expected because we’re in politics we should have thick skin. But why should I have thick skin? Why should I tolerate abuse? If you’re not able to abuse me online, why should you abuse—if you’re not able to abuse me offline, why should you abuse me online? So the challenges on the social media platforms is although Julie said a positive feedback on AI, at the same time artificial intelligence also has an issue.

In the sense that we have—myself, and my colleagues—we have reported on a number of times, you report on abuse, and it’s written in Kiswahili, for example, or the local language, and you try to even go further and translate it. But still, someone replies and says: This doesn’t violate our rules. And you’re thinking, what rules? This violates every kind of rule. So on the social media platforms, there’s a lot of work that needs to be done. And I think one of the things through organizations like NDI is to give us the opportunity also as the women in politics to be in the same room with the decisionmakers at the social media platforms. Because we need to tell them these issues, and they need to hear these issues from us. Not from someone else, but they need to hear these issues from us.

Secondly, when it comes to media, in a lot of countries, unfortunately, media—the way the media do the gender profiling of women in politics also results into abuse. You may find that maybe you’ve been in a meeting. There were several pictures that they were taken—that a particular media took of you. And they decide to use the picture that shows some parts of the body accidentally. You know, maybe your dress went a little bit down, so your shoulder is showing, or the cleavage is showing. And they would use that picture and say: Maybe Honorable Neema said such and such, such a brilliant thing. But because the image they chose to use, it totally shifts the issue and it results into abuse. So sometimes the gender profiling is also an issue.

But the other thing that I’m currently working on in Tanzania is to try and see—there are a lot of laws that are existing that talk about bits and pieces of online abuse. But none are more, like, specific for women in politics. So I’m trying right now in Tanzania to push that we should have a regulatory reform on our political parties act and election acts, so that these two acts recognize online abuse as an offense. Because there’s a number of offenses in political parties acts whereby if you can be proven—let’s say you’re a male, and you have—you’re vying for a position. If it can be proven you’ve done a GBV offense, you can be taken off the candidates list.

So I’m trying to push that online abuse should also be recognized for women in politics, because a lot of the abuse that we get is also related to politics. So that can also reduce a certain group, a group of people, at least those who are aspiring to get into politics. And it can give us the power to now start documenting this. And if you hear, maybe, I don’t know, Gregory has been nominated for something, you can go and use that particular law and say: This person has been abusing women online, kind of thing. So trying to push the political parties act and the election act to do so.

But at the same time, I set up an NGO called Omuka Hub. And what we are trying to do is to strengthen online visibility of women in politics and continentally we are trying to do that through the African Parliamentary Network on Internet Governance, again, to strengthen the visibility of women in politics. But to do that, organizations that have funding or that are talking about digital development, digital gender gaps. Oftentimes they don’t remember that there’s a group of women in politics. So I would like to stress that whenever we are having interventions, we should have funding also allocated to support the training and the capacity, exactly like what Julie said. A lot of us are online, but we don’t know how to protect ourselves.

Very recently, I experienced the most horrific abuse through WhatsApp. Like, I have—I have experienced it a lot on other platforms, but it was the first time experiencing it in WhatsApp. So these are people I know in an WhatsApp group. And it went on for, like, four days. I didn’t want to leave the group, because I didn’t want to be seen like I’m running away, but it didn’t want to be seeing them. And you can’t help it, because they’re there. And I actually got to learn that you can archive the group, so you don’t see it. I just learned this, like, two weeks ago. So I can tell you.

But that was about, like, three or four days of excruciating, like, emotional rage. And you can’t do anything about it. You want to respond, but people are calling you, you know, you’re an MP. Don’t respond. So you’re keeping quiet. At the same time, you have to show up in Parliament, do your contributions. You have to show face and do all of that. But why should I be doing that? Why should I have to do that, you know?

MOIRA WHELAN: Absolutely. I want to back up to one thing. We’re going to go to two things. We have, like, less than five minutes, and I want us to do two things. One, we got a question from online. And I think one of the things we really tried to do here was show the completely different environments that we’re dealing with, right? We have Australia, we have Brazil, we have Tanzania.

And we got a question asking, we’ve all cited social media regulation as an opportunity here, but that’s a challenge, right? How do you regulate social media from all different perspectives and from all different countries, recognizing cultural challenges, recognizing the responsibilities they have to localize platforms? So I don’t know who wants it—who wants to pick up on the—on the regulation. Maybe Julie and Neema, quickly.

And then after that, what we’re going to do is you have a captive audience. We have the entire digital rights community here. We need to send them out with something to do. We’re all good at that. We’re going to give them a job. So be thinking quickly about what your job is for everyone in this room. But, Neema, and then Julie, and then we can kind of go around.

NEEMA LUGANGIRA: So very quickly, in terms of the regulation, I think one is we cannot avoid regulating social media, but the issue is how to regulate because we still want the environment—you don’t want it to be stringent. And we can learn from other countries who have done it. But the bottom line is, especially for Global South countries who don’t have that muscle that Global North have, what I would like to say is when Global North are negotiating with social media companies, getting into agreements, they should insert requirements that the same behavior they do in their bloc—in the EU or the US, Canada, Australia—they should also behave the same way in Africa. We’re seeing the same thing with data protection. They are doing a great job in the EU, horrible job in Africa.

MOIRA WHELAN: That’s a good point.

We’re going to flip it over really quick to Julie and then, Tracy, you’re up with your pitch. So go ahead, Julie, if you want to jump in on that one.

JULIE INMAN GRANT: I was just going to say, you know, the challenge is that laws are national and local and the internet is global.

Moira, you’re aware that we just issued a number of mandatory codes and are working on standards that will apply to eight different sectors of the technology industry. This has to do with illegal and harmful content, specifically child sexual abuse material and terrorist and violent extremist content. But it isn’t very easy for these global technology companies to sort of quarantine their activities just to Australia, and that applies to safety as well. So the hope is as—you know, and like the European Commission deploying the Digital Services Act and possibly the AI Act, as we’ve seen with GDPR there should be systemic changes and reforms that happen.

But again, the really important thing in bringing different countries together with different needs, different levels of resourcing and funding, and even different political systems and approaches to regulation is going to be challenging. And one of the reasons we set up this global network is to prevent a splinternet so that countries coming onboard can learn from what is best practice.

You know, we did not have a playbook. We had to write it as we went along, and we’re happy to share those learnings. And there will be others who will engage and will try to something different that will be successful. So, again, it has to be a whole-of-society approach to tackling this.

MOIRA WHELAN: Absolutely.

So, Tracy, you have, ironically, like a tweet level because we have less than a minute and we’re going to try to get around. So Tracy, then Fernanda: What’s the pitch for everybody here?

TRACY CHOU: I actually want to comment on the regulation side, which is that regulation can also create the space for more solutions. So it doesn’t just have to be about the content or behaviors that are happening. The reason why Block Party had to shut down our classic product on Twitter was that there was no openness in the APIs, these programming interfaces. And what regulation can do here is require that openness such that we can have these consumer solutions. There’s a bill in the New York State Senate introduced this legislative session, S.6686, which introduces this concept. So just want to put that pitch out there for on the regulation side what we can do.

The other one-line pitch is Block Party has a new product called Privacy Party, and this is making it so that we are teaching people what they should do to be safe online and also helping to automate that. So we have automated playbooks for you to lock down your social media settings. Check it out. Give us feedback. And we want to keep building these tools to help keep people safe.

MOIRA WHELAN: Thank you so much, Tracy.

And Fernanda, last word.

FERNANDA MARTINS: I think the next step is to change the way that we are looking at indigenous, women, Black people, and LGBTQAI+ community because we are—we have been seen as a problem to solve, but we are part of the solution. So we need to be included. The digital rights field need to be include these people, these communities to solve the problem together.

MOIRA WHELAN: Absolutely. And I would also say none of us have mentioned it, but we need more male allies. So any of you are out there, we need men in all of these companies, in government, in civil society joining us in this conversation. So we hope to see—that’s a mantle I would take.

So thank you all for joining us today. Have a great RightsCon. Really appreciate everyone being so brave to share your individual stories.

FERNANDA MARTINS: Thank you.

JULIE INMAN GRANT: Thank you.

TRACY CHOU: Thank you.

NEEMA LUGANGIRA: Thank you.

The post The international community must protect women politicians from abuse online. Here’s how. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Satellite imagery analysis captures flood threat after dam’s destruction

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 08 Jun 2023 12:00:00 +0000

Security

Fighting between Russian volunteers and Russian army escalates in Belgorod Oblast

Interference on satellite imagery points to enhanced military activity on the border between Belgorod and Kharkiv prior to saboteur raid

Tracking narratives

Pro-Kremlin sources contradict each other in laying blame for Nova Kakhovka dam destruction

Deepfake impersonating Putin ‘declares’ martial law in Russian regions bordering Ukraine

Russia recycles false narrative that Ukraine plans to use a ‘dirty bomb’

Nova Kakhovka dam rupture floods acres of civilian settlements in Kherson Oblast

On June 6, satellite imagery published by Maxar confirmed the collapse of the Nova Kakhovka dam in Ukraine. The dam is located downstream of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, and upstream of the city of Kherson, in southeast Ukraine. Ukraine and Russia continue to blame each other for its destruction.

For months, Russian and Ukrainian armed forces have been facing each other on either side of the riverbank, as Ukraine retook the city of Kherson after Russia claimed to have evacuated the city as “a gesture of good will.” The contents of the Kakhovka reservoir have been flowing downstream into the Kherson region ever since the dam’s rupture, resulting in the flooding of acres of civilian settlements stretching from near the dam down to the mouth of the river along the Black Sea.

The DFRLab collected data from MapZen using Sentinel’s EOBrowser platform. The imagery notably contains a digital elevation model enabling the DFRLab to model high risk areas subject to floods. Using geographic analysis relying on raster calculations, a technique for mapping individual pixels to altitude data, the DFRLab assessed two scenarios of potential flooding downstream of Nova Kakhovka. This information was cross-referenced with other data posted by Russian opposition Telegram channel Agentstvo to assess the extent of the flood.

An animated map showing potential locations subjected to flooding hazards as a result of the rupture of the Nova Kakhovka dam. (Source: MapZen via ESA/Sentinel EOBrowser, annotations: DFRLab)

Agentstvo geolocated footage taken by civilians on either side of the river. The DFRLab added these locations to the above map in an attempt to compare the modeled area to the actual reported locations of flooding. As of June 6, the mapped locations are consistent with areas that would flood if the river rose by just two meters. Footage shows parts of Kherson also subjected to inundation.

Additionally, security concerns are growing as mines located on both sides of the riverbank are at risk of exploding as a result of the rising water level. The Ukrainian Independent Information Agency reported that some Russian mines had already detonated. Villagers and inhabitants on alluvial islands and in Kherson were forced to leave their homes. Furthermore, Russia and Ukraine are blaming one another for the destruction of the dam. While Ukrainian officials accused Russia of bombing the Kakhovka dam to undermine Ukraine’s counteroffensive efforts, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said Ukraine committed a “terrorist attack” to “prevent a Russian attack.”

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, security, Brussels, Belgium

Fighting between Russian volunteers and Russian army escalates in Belgorod Oblast

The fighting continues in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast, a short distance from Ukraine’s northeastern border, but details about the situation remain murky. The Russian Volunteer Corps, an anti-Putin military unit made of Russian pro-Ukrainian partisans, and the Freedom of Russia Legion said they carried out a number of attacks in the region, while Moscow claims to have repelled several attacks.

The Freedom of Russia Legion announced it had destroyed two Russian army tanks, one BMP infantry fighting vehicle, and one BRDM armored vehicle near the Shebekino border crossing in Belgorod on the night of June 4. The veracity of the claim has not been independently verified, however. On June 4, another unconfirmed report appeared on the Telegram channel of Ukrainian journalist Andrii Tsaplienko, citing an unnamed military officer, claiming the Russian army shelled a settlement in the Belgorod region. There have been signs of fighters from the Russian Volunteer Corps being active in Belgorod, so shelling the region could signal an escalation. In addition, the Russian Telegram channel Brief reported that the Ukrainian army shelled Novaya Tavolzhanka in Belgorod Oblast on June 5; this too has not been confirmed. Another Russian Telegram channel reported explosions in Grayvoron, Belgorod Oblast that same day.

One day earlier, the Russian Volunteer Corps said on Telegram that a Polish volunteer unit has been fighting “shoulder-to-shoulder for the freedom and independence of Ukraine for several months.” According to the statement, Russian and Polish fighters jointly carried out “a number of operations” in the areas of Orikhiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Bakhmut. The Polish unit, known as the Polish Volunteer Corps (Polski Korpus Ochotniczy), has published videos of its operations in Bakhmut and Zaporizhzhia on their Telegram channel, which was created in February 2023. According to the Russian Volunteer Corps, the Polish fighters are providing military and medical logistics only within the state borders of Ukraine. The information published by the two military units on Telegram have not been verified independently.

The Polish government has denied it has any involvement with Polish volunteer units. Stanisław Żaryn, the secretary of state for the chancellery of the prime minister of Poland, said on Twitter that the Polish Volunteer Corps are “in no way associated with the Polish Armed Forces or any Polish institution.” According to Polish media outlet Defence 24, the Polish Volunteer Corps was created in February 2023 and operates as part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The Polish Volunteer Corps reportedly posted on its Telegram channel that they participated in the combat mission in Belgorod alongside the Russian Volunteer Corps. The Telegram post reportedly argued that “all returned from the mission safely. The task was completed successfully.” However, it appears that the post was later removed, as there are currently no posts in the Telegram channel containing information about the participation of Polish units in the Belgorod raid.

Russian Volunteer Corps fighters also claimed to be holding captive Russian soldiers who were handed over to Ukrainian forces because authorities in Belgorod had shown no desire to retrieve them. At the 1:26 mark in a video posted on June 4 to the Telegram channel of the Russian Volunteer Corps, a dozen men in Russian uniforms are seen. It is possible the men were captured during fighting between the militants and the Russian army in the village of Novaya Tavolzhanka in Belgorod Oblast, though this is unconfirmed. According to The New Voice of Ukraine, the volunteer fighters reached out to Belgorod Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov with an offer to return the captured soldiers as a goodwill gesture. In return, they asked for a private audience with the governor to discuss the present state of the region. The governor has reportedly not responded to the request. Previously, Gladkov described the fighters as “those fascists,” and said they were responsible for “daily civilian deaths.” The Freedom of Russia Legion also claimed to be holding Russian soldiers captive in a video published on their Telegram channel on June 5.

Meanwhile, the Armed Forces of Ukraine stated that Russian forces on June 4 and 5 conducted offensive actions in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, with the Ukrainian military fighting the Russian army near Novoselivske and Bilohorivka in Luhansk and Ivanivske and Marinka in Donetsk. Ukrainian forces also alleged that a Russian saboteur group attempted to infiltrate the border near Zelene in Kharkiv Oblast. Ukraine added that settlements in Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson were shelled by Russia, including a building belonging to Kherson State University.

Meanwhile, Sky News obtained a purported arms contract detailing a purchase agreement between Russia and Iran. According to the contract, Iran supplies Russia with tank and artillery ammunition, as well as barrels for T-72 tanks and howitzers. The sixteen-page document, which has not been independently verified, is dated September 14, 2022, and presents samples of variously sized artillery and tank shells and rockets worth just more than one million dollars.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

—Givi Gigitashivili, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

Interference on satellite imagery points to enhanced military activity on the border between Belgorod and Kharkiv prior to saboteur raid

A map showing interference patterns caught on SAR Imagery by Sentinel-1 on May 18, 2023 (Source: ESA/Sentinel-1, annotations: DFRLab)

Satellite Aperture Radar (SAR) imagery from May 18 released by the European Space Agency’s Sentinel-1 satellite shows massive levels of interference in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast. The DFRLab previously reported on similar interference patterns observed in the Black Sea and in Belgorod throughout April 2023. The May 18 imagery indicates that more prominent interference activity took place in Belgorod Oblast, with patterns stretching several hundred kilometers. The imagery was obtained just after midnight local time that morning as the satellite was flying over the border with Kharkiv.

Simultaneously, consistent reports of aerial activity in Belgorod, including missile launches, emerged on Telegram. These patterns were observed nearly one week prior to the Russian Volunteer Corps’ raids in Russia’s border outposts of Shebekino and Grayvoron.

Several smaller interference patterns also stretch east of Kharkiv in Ukraine. These could also be consistent with reports from the Telegram channel Kharkiv Live which indicated Russian aviation raids and artillery rocket launches between 11:58 pm and 12:31 am local time. Local authorities issued an air raid alert between 12:31 and 1:01 am.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Pro-Kremlin sources contradict each other in laying blame for Nova Kakhovka dam destruction

Pro-Russian Telegram channels, sometimes referred to as “Z channels,” began reporting on the Nova Kakhovka dam around 3:00 am Moscow time, stating that the shelling of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant occurred at 2:35 am. Initially, Vladimir Leontev, the Russian-installed mayor of occupied Novaya Kahovka, denied any explosion, shelling, or damage to the dam. In an interview with Kremlin-owned RIA Novosti, Leontev said, “That’s bullshit! Everything is fine, everything is fine everywhere; I just got on the [police] radio. Everywhere everything is normal in the city; everything is quiet and calm.” Further, Kremlin-owned TASS quoted an unnamed source from the Russian authorities as saying, “It was quiet at night. There was no shelling. The dam could not stand, one support collapsed, and flooding began.”

Later, the narrative changed. In a video, Leontev said, “At about 2:00 am there was shelling on Kahovka dam and its valves were destroyed.” RIA Novosti blamed the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the damage that caused the “unregulated discharge of water.” The pro-Kremlin Telegram channel Swodki commented, “Russian positions are located on the lower Dnipro riverbank. The flow of water can erode the line of [Russian] defense on the coast and prevent and repel a potential boat landing of an aircraft of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.” In addition, former Russian commander Igor “Strelkov” Girkin, who played a crucial role in forming the separatist movement in the Donbas, suggested that the dam’s destruction helped Ukrainian forces advance militarily.

The exact cause of its destruction remains unknown. The New York Times reported that some experts believe it was “probably breached” by an “internal blast,” but acknowledged this assessment should be treated “cautiously.” Pro-Ukraine social media pointed fingers at Russia causing the breach, but at times the debate was muddled due to sharing of old footage capturing the explosion of a bridge adjacent to the facility in November 2022.

Meanwhile, some social media posts from pro-Kremlin fighters suggested the dam’s destruction benefits Russia. For example, Russian solider Yegor Guzenko suggested on his Telegram channel Separ13_13 that the destruction of the dam was in Russia’s favor. In one video, he said, “Whoever did it, it is good if no Russian Army soldier suffers. Then it does not matter who did it even if it were [Ukrainians] themselves.” Later, he posted about why the destruction might have been in Ukraine’s favor.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

Deepfake impersonating Putin ‘declares’ martial law in Russian regions bordering Ukraine

On June 5, Russian television and radio stations broadcast a clip featuring a deepfake of President Vladimir Putin. In the fabricated “emergency address,” the impersonated Russian president reportedly declared, “Ukrainian troops, armed by the NATO bloc with the consent and support of Washington, invaded the territories of the Kursk, Belgorod, and Bryansk regions.” The Putin deepfake then “announced” martial law in these regions and said that he plans to sign an executive order declaring a general mobilization throughout the country.

The incident was reported in the Russian oblasts of Voronezh, Bryansk, and Belgorod. These regions sit along the border with Ukraine, where frequent drone attacks are reported and armed group incursions forced some to evacuate in May. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov declared that Putin did not address the nation and confirmed that “a hack occurred in several regions.” According to Peskov and information posted on the Telegram channel Ukraine Informer, radio stations also broadcast the same message.

Russian State Duma members of parliament have set out to draft a law enforcing the labeling of content created by neural networks.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Russia recycles false narrative that Ukraine plans to use a ‘dirty bomb’

On June 6, the same day the Novo Kakhovka dam was destroyed, Russia shared a new iteration of its narrative that accuses Ukraine of planning to use a “dirty bomb” against Russia.

Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) published a statement in which the agency claimed to have “received additional information on the involvement of the Ukrainian special services in the planning and preparation of acts of international terrorism.” The FSB claimed that Ukraine created an air unit to supply “sabotage and reconnaissance groups on Russian territory” with “dirty bombs.” The statement alleged that Ukraine planned to place dirty bombs in various places, detonate them simultaneously, and “make areas [in Russia] unsuitable for human habitation.”

The DFRLab has previously covered Russian attempts to spread similar disinformation in order to prime audiences for the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and justify the war. Since then, the DFRLab have observed multiple instances of Russian officials accusing Kyiv of plotting to use a “dirty bomb.”

— Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Satellite imagery analysis captures flood threat after dam’s destruction appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive will aim to keep the Russians guessing

Peter Dickinson — Wed, 07 Jun 2023 21:00:33 +0000

Is Ukraine’s hotly anticipated counteroffensive finally underway? That is the question dominating much of the international media this week following reports from both the Ukrainian and Russian sides of a significant upswing in activity along the front lines in southern and eastern Ukraine.

This speculation is understandable; after all, expectations have been mounting since early 2023 over an offensive that is being widely billed as a potential turning point in the sixteen-month war. It may be more helpful, however, to view Ukraine’s counteroffensive as a rolling series of local probes and thrusts rather than a single big push to penetrate Russian defenses and secure a decisive breakthrough.

Talk of a coming Ukrainian counteroffensive began following the liberation of Kherson from Russian occupation in late 2022. In the six months since that last major military success, Ukraine has sent tens of thousands of fresh troops for training in NATO countries and received unprecedented amounts of Western military aid including modern battle tanks, cruise missiles, armored personnel carriers, and enhanced air defense systems. With these newly trained and equipped formations now believed to be largely in position, observers have been watching for indications that the offensive is indeed underway. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy added to the sense of anticipation by declaring in a June 3 interview with the Wall Street Journal: “We are ready” for the counteroffensive.

Anyone expecting to witness major battles is set to be disappointed, at least for the time being. While the long lines of opposing trenches and emphasis on artillery duels has led many to compare the fighting in Ukraine to the horrors of World War I, few expect the Ukrainian military to begin its counteroffensive by going “over the top” and attempting to smash through Russian lines with their newly formed brigades. Instead, Ukrainian commanders will likely seek to test Russian defenses at a number of locations along the length of the 1,000-kilometer front in a bid to stretch Vladimir Putin’s invasion force and identify weak points to exploit.

A series of recent cross-border incursions into the Russian Federation conducted by Ukrainian-backed Russian militias may be part of these efforts. While militarily insignificant in terms of size or territorial gains, the raids have proved a major personal embarrassment for Putin and could force Moscow to reduce its military presence in Ukraine in order to bolster the badly exposed home front.

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As they look to advance, Ukraine’s troops will face formidable obstacles. Russia has not sat idly by during the past half-year; it has created a defense in depth in anticipation of Ukraine’s coming attack that includes several lines of trenches and other fortifications.

Russia appears to have provided an indication of its resolve early on June 6 by blowing up the Kakhovka dam and power plant on the Dnipro River in southern Ukraine. While Moscow officially denies destroying the dam, initial analysis points to Russian responsibility. A June 7 New York Times article referencing engineering and munitions experts concluded that a deliberate explosion inside the Russian-controlled dam “most likely caused its collapse.” The ensuing ecological disaster has flooded the surrounding area, virtually ruling out a Ukrainian thrust across the river toward Crimea.

Moscow’s preparations for the Ukrainian counteroffensive certainly look impressive, but questions remain over the morale of Russian troops, with a steady stream of video addresses posted to social media in recent months indicating widespread demoralization among mobilized Russian soldiers complaining of poor conditions, suicidal tactics, and heavy losses. In contrast, Ukrainian morale is believed to be high, despite the large numbers of casualties incurred during intense fighting over the winter and spring months around the eastern Ukrainian city of Bakhmut.

Crucially, Ukraine’s troops are defending their homes and have a clear vision of what they are fighting for, while Russia has struggled to articulate its war aims or define what a potential victory could look like. In the heat of the coming summer counteroffensive, this morale factor could play a critical role.

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Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Most commentators agree that the primary military objective of Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive is to cut the land bridge running across southern Ukraine that connects Russia itself and the occupied Donbas region with the Crimean peninsula. If this is achieved, it would isolate large numbers of Russian troops in Crimea and south Ukraine while dealing a painful blow to Russian prestige.

Ultimately, Ukraine’s stated goal remains the liberation of Crimea itself, which has been under Russian occupation since 2014. A successful advance toward Crimea would leave the peninsula exposed to Ukrainian airstrikes and could spark a political crisis inside Russia. The military failures of the past sixteen months have already led to significant infighting among different elements within the Russian establishment; if Crimea itself is threatened, the international community must brace for a major escalation in Putin’s nuclear threats as he attempts to ward off what would be a catastrophic defeat.

Many believe a showdown over the fate of Crimea will serve as the end game of the entire war. But before we approach that point, Ukraine must first deploy its fresh forces effectively and overcome Russia’s deeply entrenched army on the mainland. This will involve much maneuvering and diversionary attacks before any major advances are attempted.

Ukraine’s successful 2022 campaigns may offer the best indication of what to expect from the summer counteroffensive. In August 2022, Ukrainian officials loudly trumpeted a counteroffensive in the south to retake Kherson. When Russia duly dispatched many of its best units to meet the expected Ukrainian attack, Ukraine struck instead in the thinly defended east and liberated most of the Kharkiv region. With Russia still reeling from this defeat and scrambling to hold the line, the Ukrainian military then renewed its southern offensive and forced Russia to abandon Kherson.

This masterclass in the art of military deception rightfully won Ukraine considerable plaudits. Ukrainian commanders will be looking to spring some similar surprises in the months ahead. Their stated goal is the complete liberation of Ukrainian territory, but they will aim to keep the Russians guessing as to exactly how they plan to achieve this.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Activists and experts assemble in Costa Rica to protect human rights in the digital age

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Wed, 07 Jun 2023 20:21:18 +0000

Will the world’s human-rights defenders be able to match the pace of quickly moving technological challenges arising from artificial intelligence, information wars, and more?

Rights activists, tech leaders, and other stakeholders are meeting at RightsCon Costa Rica on June 5-8 to collectively set an agenda for advancing human rights in this digital age.

Our experts at the Digital Forensic Research Lab are coordinating part of that effort, with a slate of RightsCon events as part of their 360/Open Summit: Around the World global programming. Below are highlights from the events at RightsCon, which cover digital frameworks in Africa, disinformation in Ukraine, online harassment of women globally, and more.

The latest from San José

Rethinking transparency reporting

Day two wraps with a warning about dangerous threats, from militant accelerationism to violence toward women

What’s behind today’s militant accelerationism?

The digital ecosystem’s impact on women’s political participation

Day one wraps with recommendations for Africa’s digital transformation, Venezuela’s digital connectivity, and an inclusionary web

What does a trustworthy web look like?

Mapping—and addressing—Venezuela’s information desert

Where open-source intelligence meets human-rights advocacy

Rethinking transparency reporting

On Day 3 of RightsCon Costa Rica, Rose Jackson, director of the DFRLab’s Democracy & Tech Initiative, joined panelists Frederike Kaltheuner, director for technology and human rights at Human Rights Watch, and David Green, civil liberties director at Electronic Frontier Foundation, for a panel on rethinking transparency reporting. The discussion was led and moderated by Gemma Shields, Online Safety Policy Lead at the United Kingdom’s Office of Communications (Ofcom).

Shields opened the session by describing the online safety bill currently making its way through the UK parliament and the role of Ofcom in its implementation. The bill will give new powers to Ofcom to test mandatory platform transparency reporting requirements. Through these efforts, Ofcom hopes that “good, effective meaningful transparency reporting might encourage proactive action from the platforms,” Shields explained.

During the discussion, the panelists discussed what will be central to implementation of the online safety bill, including what effective transparency reporting looks like. Kaltheuner emphasized the complexity of defining meaningful transparency when the use cases vary across end users, regulators, civil society, journalists, and academics. Green underscored the importance of centering user needs in the conversation and the need to tailor reporting mandates to specific platforms.

Jackson noted that it is a strategic imperative for the UK government to consult experts from the global majority and consider how regulations and norms could be potentially used for harm by non-democratic actors. As Jackson put it, “what happens in the most unprotected spaces is the beta test for what will show up in your backyard.” She also highlighted the importance of global civil society engaging with the UK Online Safety Bill and European transparency regulations, such as the Digital Services Act, because these policies are first movers in codifying more regulation, and future policies will refer back to these efforts.

Human rights must be central in the African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy

The DFRLab gathered stakeholders from the policy-making, democracy, rights, and tech communities across the African continent to discuss the African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy. Participants compared notes and identified opportunities for increasing the strategy’s human-rights focus as it approaches its mid-mandate review. Participants also agreed that trusted conveners, such as watchdog agencies within national governments, can play a critical facilitating role in ensuring effective communication between experts, users, and civil society on one hand and policymakers and elected officials on the other. Discussion of particular concerns with the Strategy or recommendations to increasingly center human rights in it will be continued in future gatherings.

Day two wraps with a warning about dangerous threats, from militant accelerationism to violence toward women

The DFRLab kicked off day two at RightsCon with a conversation on how Russian information operations, deployed ahead of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, were used to build false justifications for the war, deny responsibility for the war of aggression, and mask Russia’s military build-up. The panel also highlighted two DFRLab reports, released in February 2023, that examine Russia’s justifications for the war and Russia’s attempts to undermine Ukraine’s resistance and support from the international community.

Transcript

Jun 8, 2023

Mapping the last decade of Russia’s disinformation and influence campaign in Ukraine

By Atlantic Council

Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has continued its information operations, targeting more than just Ukraine, say speakers at a RightsCon event hosted by the Digital Forensic Research Lab.

Disinformation Russia

While at RightsCon, the DFRLab participated in a discussion on militant accelerationism, its impact on minority communities, and how bad actors can be held accountable. The event, hosted by the United Kingdom’s Office of Communications and Slovakia’s Council of Media Services, featured panelists who discussed the ways in which policy can hold all voices, including those of the powerful, accountable. During the panel, DFRLab Research Fellow Meghan Conroy discussed how such violent narratives have become increasingly commonplace in some American ideologies and how extremist individuals and groups sympathetic to these narratives have been mobilized.

To close out the day, the DFRLab and the National Democratic Institute co-hosted a panel featuring global experts from civil society, government, and industry on how the threat of violence and harassment online has impacted the potential for women to participate in politics. As noted by the panelists, abuse suffered online is meant to strictly intimidate and silence those who want to get involved, and it is, therefore, all the more important that these very women, and those already established, stand up and speak out so as to serve as role models and protect diversity and equity in politics, tech, and beyond.

What’s behind today’s militant accelerationism?

By Meghan Conroy

While at RightsCon, I—a DFRLab research fellow and co-founder of the Accelerationism Research Consortium—joined an event hosted by the UK Office of Communications and Slovakia’s Council of Media Services on militant accelerationism.

My co-panelists and I provided an overview of militant accelerationism and an explanation of the marginalized groups that have been targets of militant accelerationist violence. I discussed accelerationist narratives that have not only permeated mainstream discourse but have also mobilized extremists to violence. Hannah Rose, research fellow and PhD candidate at King’s College London’s International Centre for the Study of Radicalization, zeroed in on the role of conspiracy theories in enabling the propagation of these extreme worldviews.

Stanislav Matějka, head of the Analytical Department at the Slovakian Council of Media Services, delved into the October 2022 attack in Bratislava. He flagged the role of larger, more mainstream platforms as well as filesharing services in enabling the spread of harmful content preceding the attack. Murtaza Shaikh, principal at the UK Office of Communications for illegal harms and hate and terrorism, highlighted the office’s work on the May 2022 attack in Buffalo, New York. He raised that these attacks result, in part, from majority populations framing themselves as under threat by minority populations, and then taking up arms against those minority populations.

Attendees then broke into groups to discuss regulatory solutions and highlight obstacles that may stand in the way of those solutions’ implementation or effectiveness. Key takeaways included the following:

Powerful voices need to be held to account. Politicians, influencers, and large platforms have played an outsized role in enabling the mainstreaming and broad reach of these worldviews.
Bad actors will accuse platforms and regulators of censorship, regardless of the extent to which content is moderated. As aforementioned, they’ll often position themselves as victims of oppression, and doing so in the context of content moderation policies is no different—even if the accusations are not rooted in reality.
Regulators must capitalize on existing expertise. Ahost of experts who monitor these actors, groups, and narratives across platforms, as well as their offline activities, can help regulators and platforms craft creative, adaptive, and effective policies to tackle the nebulous set of problems linked to militant accelerationism.

This conversation spurred some initial ideas that are geared toward generating more substantial discussion. Introducing those unfamiliar with understudied and misunderstood concepts, like militant accelerationism, is of the utmost importance to permit more effective combatting of online harms and their offline manifestations—especially those that have proven deadly.

Meghan Conroy is a US research fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

The digital ecosystem’s impact on women’s political participation

By Abigail Wollam

The DFRLab and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) co-hosted a panel that brought together four global experts from civil society, government, and industry to discuss a shared and prevalent issue: The threat of digital violence and harassment that women face online, and the impact that it has on women’s participation in political life.

The panel was facilitated by Moira Whelan, director for democracy and technology at NDI; she opened the conversation by highlighting how critical these conversations are, outlining the threat to democracy posed by digital violence. She noted that as online harassment towards women becomes more prevalent, women are self-censoring and removing themselves from online spaces. “Targeted misogynistic abuse is designed to silence voices,” added panelist Julia Inman Grant, the eSafety commissioner of Australia.

Both Neema Lugangira (chairperson for the African Parliamentary Network on Internet Governance and member of parliament in Tanzania) and Tracy Chou (founder and chief executive officer of Block Party) spoke about their experiences with online harassment and how those experiences spurred their actions in the space. Lugangira found, through her experience as a female politician in Tanzania, that the more outspoken or visible a woman is, the more abuse she gets. She observed that women might be less inspired to participate in political life because they see the abuse other women face—and the lack of defense or support these women get from other people. “I decided that since we’re a group that nobody speaks for… I’m going to speak for women in politics,” said Lugangira.

Chou said that she faced online harassment when she became an activist for diversity, equity, and inclusion in the tech community. She wanted to address the problem that she was facing herself and founded Block Party, a company that builds tools to combat online harassment.

Despite these challenges, the panelists discussed potential solutions and ways forward. Australia is leading by example with its eSafety commissioner and Online Safety Act, which provide Australians with an avenue through which to report online abuses and receive assistance. Fernanda Martins, director of InternetLab, discussed the need to change how marginalized communities that face gendered abuse are seen and talked about; instead of talking about the community as a problem, it’s important to see them as part of the solution and bring them into the discussions.

Abigail Wollam is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab

Transcript

Jun 8, 2023

The international community must protect women politicians from abuse online. Here’s how.

By Atlantic Council

At RightsCon, human-rights advocates and tech leaders who have faced harassment online detail their experiences—and ways the international community can support women moving forward.

Disinformation Resilience & Society

.@rightscon Day 2 in the books! Stay tuned, still more to come with @DFRLab #360OS. pic.twitter.com/V8KapT1PVb
— DFRLab (@DFRLab) June 7, 2023

Day one wraps with recommendations for Africa’s digital transformation, Venezuela’s digital connectivity, and an inclusionary web

This year at RightsCon Costa Rica, the DFRLab previewed its forthcoming Task Force for a Trustworthy Future Web report and gathered human-rights defenders and tech leaders to talk about digital frameworks in Africa, disinformation in Latin America and Ukraine, and the impact online harassment has on women in political life, and what’s to come with the European Union’s Digital Services Act.

Transcript

Jun 8, 2023

The European Commission’s Rita Wezenbeek on what comes next in implementing the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act

By Atlantic Council

At a DFRLab RightsCon event, Wezenbeek spoke about the need to get everyone involved in the implementation of the DSA and DMA.

Disinformation European Union

The programming kicked off on June 5 with the Digital Sherlocks training program in San José, which marked the first time the session was conducted in both English and Spanish. The workshop aimed to provide human-rights defenders with the tools and skills they need to build movements that are resilient to disinformation.

On June 6, the programming opened with a meeting on centering human rights in the African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy. The DFRLab gathered stakeholders from democracy, rights, and tech communities across the African continent to discuss the African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy. Participants compared notes and identified opportunities for impact as the strategy approaches its mid-mandate review.

Next, the DFRLab, Venezuela Inteligente, and Access Now hosted a session on strengthening Venezuela’s digital information ecosystem, a coalition-building meeting with twenty organizations. The discussion drew from a DFRLab analysis of Venezuela’s needs and capabilities related to the country’s media ecosystems and digital security, literacy, and connectivity. The speakers emphasized ways to serve vulnerable groups.

Following these discussions, the DFRLab participated a dialogue previewing findings from the Task Force for a Trustworthy Future Web. The DFRLab’s Task Force is convening a broad cross-section of industry, civil-society, and government leaders to set a clear and action-oriented agenda for future online ecosystems. As the Task Force wraps up its report, members discussed one of the group’s major findings: the importance of inclusionary design in product, policy, and regulatory development. To close out the first day of DFRLab programming at RightsCon Costa Rica, the task force notified the audience that it will be launching its report in the coming weeks.

What does a trustworthy web look like?

By Jacqueline Malaret and Abigail Wollam

The DFRLab’s Task Force for a Trustworthy Future Web is charting a clear and action-oriented roadmap for future online ecosystems to protect users’ rights, support innovation, and center trust and safety principles. As the Task Force is wrapping up its report, members joined Task Force Director Kat Duffy to discuss one of the Task Force’s major findings—the importance of inclusionary design in product, policy, and regulatory development—on the first day of RightsCon Costa Rica.

In just eight weeks, Elon Musk took over Twitter, the cryptocurrency market crashed, ChatGPT launched, and major steps have been made in the development of augmented reality and virtual reality, fundamentally shifting the landscape of how we engage with technology. Framing the panel, Duffy highlighted how not only has technology changed at a breakneck pace, but the development and professionalization of the trust and safety industry have unfolded rapidly in tandem, bringing risks, harms, and opportunities to make the digital world safer for all.

Task Force for a Trustworthy Future Web

The Task Force for a Trustworthy Future Web will chart a clear and action-oriented roadmap for future online ecosystems to protect users’ rights, support innovation, and center trust and safety principles.

The three panelists—Agustina del Campo, director of the Center for Studies on Freedom of Expression; Nighat Dad, executive director of the Digital Rights Foundation; and Victoire Rio, a digital-rights advocate—agreed that the biggest risk, which could yield the greatest harm, is shaping industry practices through a Western-centric lens, without allowing space for the global majority. Excluding populations from the conversation around tech only solidifies the mistakes of the past and risks creating a knowledge gap. Additionally, the conversation touched on the risk of losing sight of the role of government, entrenching self-regulation as an industry norm, and absolving both companies and the state for harms that can occur because of the adoption of these technologies.

Where there is risk, there is also an opportunity to build safer and rights-respecting technologies. Panelists said that they found promise in the professionalization and organization of industry, which can create a space for dialogue and for civil society to engage and innovate in the field. They are also encouraged that more and more industry engagements are taking place within the structures of international law and universal human rights. The speakers were encouraged by new opportunities to shape regulation in a way that coalesces action around systemic and forward-looking solutions.

But how can industry, philanthropy, and civil society maximize these opportunities? There is an inherent need to support civil society that is already deeply engaged in this work and to help develop this field, particularly in the global majority. There is also a need to pursue research that can shift the narrative to incentivize investment in trust and safety teams and articulate a clear case for the existence of this work.

Jacqueline Malaret is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab

Abigail Wollam is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab

Mapping—and addressing—Venezuela’s information desert

By Iria Puyosa and Daniel Suárez Pérez

On June 6, the DFRLab, Venezuela Inteligente, and Access Now (which runs RightsCon) hosted a coalition-building meeting with twenty organizations that are currently working on strengthening Venezuela’s digital information ecosystem. The discussion was built on an analysis, conducted by the DFRLab, of the country’s media ecosystems and digital security, literacy, and connectivity; the speakers focused on ways to serve vulnerable groups such as grassroots activists, human-rights defenders, border populations, and populations in regions afflicted by irregular armed groups.

The idea of developing a pilot project in an information desert combining four dimensions—connectivity, relevant information, security, and literacy—was discussed. Participants agreed that projects should combine technical solutions to increase access to connectivity and generate relevant information for communities, with a human-rights focus. In addition, projects should include a digital- and media-literacy component and continuous support for digital security.

Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab

Daniel Suárez Pérez is a research associate for Latin America at the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab

What a great first day for @DFRLab’s #360OS at @rightscon Costa Rica! We’ll be in San José all week so stay tuned for more great content. pic.twitter.com/JGzIzp4sKD
— DFRLab (@DFRLab) June 5, 2023

Where open-source intelligence meets human-rights advocacy

By Ana Arriagada

On June 5, the DFRLab hosted a Digital Sherlocks workshop on strengthening human-rights advocacy through open-source intelligence (OSINT) and countering disinformation.

Learn more about the Digital Sherlocks program

The Digital Sherlocks program convenes a global community of researchers to build resilience against disinformation. Each semester, the program offers more than thirty free online trainings, ranging from basic to advanced levels, to cohorts drawn from universities, civil society, journalism, and academia. Through the Digital Sherlocks program, the DFRLab has trained at least 2,300 people in over 130 countries.

I co-led the workshop with DFRLab Associate Researchers Jean le Roux, Daniel Suárez Pérez, and Esteban Ponce de León.

In the session, attendees discussed the worrying rise of antidemocratic governments in Latin America—such as in Nicaragua and Guatemala—who are using open-source tools for digital surveillance and are criminalizing the work of journalists and human-rights defenders. When faced with these challenges, it becomes imperative for civil-society organizations to acquire and use investigative skills to produce well-documented reports and investigations.

During the workshop, DFRLab researchers shared their experiences investigating paid campaigns that spread disinformation or promote violence or online harassment. They recounted having used an array of tools to analyze the origin and behavior of these paid advertisements.

DFRLab researchers also discussed tools that helped them detect suspicious activity on platforms such as YouTube, where, for example, some gamer channels spread videos related to disinformation campaigns or political violence. The workshop attendees also discussed how policy changes at Twitter have made the platform increasingly challenging to investigate, but they added that open-source researchers are still investigating, thanks to the help of available tools and the researchers’ creative methodologies.

The workshop also showcased the DFRLab’s work with the Action Coalition on Meaningful Transparency (ACT). Attendees received a preview of ACT’s upcoming portal launch, for which the DFRLab has been offering guidance. The new resource will offer access to a repository of transparency reporting, policy documents, and analysis from companies, governments, and civil society. It will also include a registry of relevant actors and initiatives, and it will allow users to establish links between entries to see the connections between organizations, the initiatives they are involved in, and the reports they have published.

The workshop ended with the DFRLab explaining that social network analysis— the study of social relationships and structures using graph theory—is important because it allows for investigating suspicious activity or unnatural behavior exhibited by users on social media platforms.

Ana Arriagada is an assistant director for Latin America at the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab

The post Activists and experts assemble in Costa Rica to protect human rights in the digital age appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Export controls: A surprising key to strengthening UK-US military collaboration

Deborah Cheverton — Wed, 07 Jun 2023 15:06:15 +0000

UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak arrived in Washington Tuesday night for talks with US President Joe Biden. According to the White House, discussions will focus on shared economic and security challenges including energy security, the climate crisis, and Ukraine. Both leaders are fresh off the Group of Seven (G7) Summit in Japan where these issues got a thorough airing, and these talks should be an opportunity to go deeper into the details on a bilateral basis. While Ukraine will likely grab the headlines from a national security perspective, another important, albeit under-the-radar issue should also be on the agenda: export controls reform.

Export controls are often thought of for their role in preventing the transfer of arms and other sensitive technologies to malign actors, or as a foreign policy tool used alongside economic sanctions to punish illegal activity. This was the angle taken at the G7 with specific reference to Russia and China, but that viewpoint obscures a different problem. The United States’ closest allies have been quietly frustrated for decades that the indiscriminate and extraterritorial application of these same export controls, in particular the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), seriously hinders efforts to share technologies and collaborate with allies on capability development projects. This is due to the costly and time-consuming processes associated with ITAR compliance. But this isn’t just a time-versus-cost-versus-quality issue for program managers to deal with. It’s much bigger than that. As William Greenwalt, a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, has said, “US government security policies related to export controls no longer support long-term national security interests and if not modified will likely result in the US military falling further behind in the competition with China.” ITAR was enacted during the Cold War, at a time when the United States enjoyed such technological and industrial dominance over its potential adversaries that it could afford to go it alone, write off allied contributions to military capability development, and absorb the consequences in time and cost when they did choose to partner up. None of those things are true anymore.

The Department of Defense has long recognized that it no longer holds complete technological advantage and recent administrations of both parties have promoted the critical role of allies and partners in their national security strategies. Yet ITAR directly prevents the United States from accessing some of the best allied technology and indirectly reduces the military capabilities of its allies. For example, the UK government estimated in 2017 that it costs UK companies almost half a billion dollars a year to comply with ITAR. That’s effectively a 0.7 percent tax levied by the United States on the national defense budget of a close ally, and money which could be far better spent on increased readiness or on more advanced capabilities that would benefit the United States. After all, depending on exchange rate fluctuations and production lot, half a billion dollars equates to four or five F-35B fighter jets. Even worse, that figure only covers those companies that have the resources and risk appetite to work with the United States in the first place. So-called “ITAR taint,” the risk that any technical cooperation with US entities will lead to the loss of control over their technology, prevents some non-US companies from engaging at all. Data is anecdotal as it mainly comes down to internal bidding decisions by individual companies, but it seems that small and medium size enterprises are especially affected. These are exactly the sort of cutting-edge companies that the United States needs in its corner on everything from quantum computing to materials science.

A focus for discussions at the White House

You would think that with such an obvious downside it would be an easy fix, but no. Unfortunately for the Department of Defense, it doesn’t own ITAR policy or its implementation. The State Department does, and it does not feel the pain of delayed programs and degraded technological advantage. Despite the efforts of many talented and hardworking officials who have dedicated their careers to keeping the United States’ most critical technological advancements out of enemy hands, the organizational incentives are not structured to support the pace or flexibility that modern technology and the current geostrategic and security situation demand. The outdated systems State Department officials are working within have become a mechanism of national self-harm and, at the end of the day, it is the warfighter that loses out.

The good news is that the right people in the legislative and executive branches of the US government are starting to take notice of the problem, particularly in the context of the nuclear submarine deal involving Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, known as AUKUS. To date, much of the press about AUKUS has been on the trilateral effort to support Australia in acquiring conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines under Pillar One of the agreement. Arguably though, it is the wider cooperation in critical technologies such as artificial intelligence, autonomy, cyber, and electronic warfare envisaged under Pillar Two that represents the real generational opportunity. Behind the scenes, officials and politicians in all three nations are realizing that Pillar Two just won’t stand with ITAR as it’s currently enforced. This is driving unprecedented interest on Capitol Hill, where congressional Republicans in the House and Senate are leading efforts to force the State Department to address the problem. They are advancing the fantastically named Truncating Onerous Regulations for Partners and Enhancing Deterrence Operations (TORPEDO) Act. To quote Senator Jim Risch (R-Idaho), the ranking member of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, this legislation “aims to speed up the implementation process by reforming the US regulatory system so we can cooperate in a timely and efficient manner on the capabilities we and our partners need.” This is extremely welcome, but in the complicated world of export controls reform the story begins with legislation but it doesn’t end there. Previous attempts at reform, such as the 2016 legal expansion of the National Technology Industrial Base and the 2022 Open General License pilot program, have stumbled on implementation issues which can only be fixed from within the State Department and will require coordinated action between the executive and legislative branches.

This is where Sunak and Biden should focus their discussions. With his reputation for pragmatism, Sunak should easily avoid the temptation to request a blanket ITAR exemption for the United Kingdom as this would be politically unpalatable and counterproductive. Biden, with his flagship foreign policy initiative in the balance, should commit to work with Congress on a bounded and enforceable exemption under the Arms Export Controls Act for AUKUS nations, and then incentivize the State Department to make it work in practice. Collaboration with longstanding allies and partners is critical to the United States’ success in combating the increasingly dynamic threat posed by its adversaries. To let that flounder on account of an out-of-date and inappropriately enforced export control regime should be an unacceptable outcome for all involved.

Deborah Cheverton is a visiting senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Cheverton is a career civil servant from the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MOD), where she has spent almost fifteen years working across a range of policy and delivery areas with a particular focus on science and technology policy, industrial strategy, capability development, and international collaboration. She writes here in her personal capacity as an Atlantic Council fellow, not in an official government capacity. Her views are her own.

The post Export controls: A surprising key to strengthening UK-US military collaboration appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Enhancing market size, scalability, and regional integration in Latin America and the Caribbean

Pepe Zhang — Mon, 05 Jun 2023 16:00:00 +0000

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

This is the 1st installment of the Unlocking Economic Development in Latin America and the Caribbean report, which explores five vital opportunities for the private sector to drive socioeconomic progress in LAC, with sixteen corresponding recommendations private firms can consider as they take steps to support the region.

Enhancing market size, scalability, and regional integration

Latin America and the Caribbean’s market size and scalability make it an attractive environment for businesses, but the public and private sectors have an opportunity to strengthen its appeal further through deeper regional integration. Private-sector leadership and participation will be crucial for efficiently improving hard and soft infrastructure for trade, energy, and other forms of integration. Together with public sector efforts, these improvements will help pull more nearshoring and reshoring investment to the region.

Recommendations for the private sector

The private sector, in coordination with the public sector, has a key role to play in scaling regional potential and furthering regional integration in trade, climate, digitalization, and other areas. Three promising opportunities for private sector action in this space include:

Financing and managing hard infrastructure: Competitive construction, services, and other firms can help boost the cost and operational efficiencies of physical infrastructure underpinning LAC integration (achieved through intraregional trade, energy, etc.)
Improving “soft” infrastructure: Private-sector expertise and actions can inform and spur regulatory modernization and harmonization in LAC and internationally, which helps attract investment conducive to regional integration.
Prioritizing nearshoring and reshoring efforts: Firms across a wide range of sector may contribute to, and benefit from, better integrated regional supply chains and subsequent export gains.

About the author

Staff

Pepe Zhang

Senior Fellow

China Coronavirus

Report Jun 16, 2023

Accelerating digitalization and innovation in Latin America and the Caribbean

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. The private sector can improve infrastructure, foster skills, and promote adoption to help the region transform its digital potential into development gains.

Americas Economy & Business

Report Jun 20, 2023

Improving state governance, institutional capacity, and transparency

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. Technological, governance, and other cooperation between the public and private sectors can enhance institutional capacity, integrity, government service delivery, and regulatory quality in LAC.

Americas Inclusive Growth

Report Jun 22, 2023

Addressing multidimensional inequality

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. Private-sector actions to reduce gender inequality, like level the playing field between SMEs and large firms and narrow the urban-rural divide, can enable a more inclusive economy for LAC.

Americas Inclusive Growth

Report Jun 26, 2023

Meaningfully advancing the green agenda

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. Private firms can help advance the green agenda by working to create green jobs, taking measures to promote a transition to a circular-economy model, and partaking in green finance.

Americas Climate Change & Climate Action

Online Event Thu, February 17, 2022 • 9:00 am ET

#ProactiveLAC: A digital future for regional prosperity

A virtual conversation on the role of public-private partnerships and policy actions in increasing digital connectivity across Latin America and the Caribbean.

Coronavirus Digital Policy Inclusive Growth Latin America

Alleged Ukrainian drones conduct attack in Moscow region

The post Enhancing market size, scalability, and regional integration in Latin America and the Caribbean appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Moscow is on edge after the latest drone attack

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 01 Jun 2023 13:53:17 +0000

Security

International response

Georgian prime minister blames NATO for Russia’s war in Ukraine

Alleged Ukrainian drones conduct attack in Moscow region

One week after the incursion in the Belgorod region allegedly orchestrated by Russian Volunteer Corps, Russia’s border has become more permeable to Ukrainian attacks. Nearly a month after the first attack against the Kremlin’s Senate building in Moscow, another drone attack was reported in the morning of May 30.

Reports posted on Telegram channel SHOT revealed footage taken by civilians showing drones and explosions in suburban Moscow. Throughout the day, Moscow Oblast Governor Andrey Vorobyov and Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin confirmed several drones had struck various locations, which resulted in evacuation of civilians. According to Russian media outlet Mediazona, drones hit residential buildings in three different parts of the city. Two civilians were reportedly injured, although their condition did not require them to be hospitalized; there were no reported fatalities.

Russian officials, including government spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, accused “the Kyiv regime” of orchestrating the attack as “retaliation for effective drone attacks against Kyiv’s decision-making centers on Sunday [May 29]”. This theory was also embraced by Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose comments also referenced the “effective work of the air defense systems.” Meduza reported that the Kremlin ordered Russian media to cover the drone attacks using specific talking points, though this has not been independently confirmed. In contrast, the Moscow Prosecutor’s Office recommended that bloggers and the media refrain from commenting on the incident, as unverified claims would be punishable by law. The Moscow Investigative Committee launched an investigation into the drone attacks as an act of “terrorism.”

Meduza additionally geolocated drones that appeared in open-source footage, and estimated that between five to seven UAVs were downed in the Moscow area. Other unconfirmed reports from the opposition Telegram channel Baza claimed twenty-five drones took part in the attack, while Telegram channel SHOT reported on thirty-two drones. These figures remain unconfirmed, however. There were also conflicting estimates on the number of drones successfully intercepted by Russian air defense systems; while Russia’s defense ministry claimed only eight drones were shot down, SHOT reported nineteen drones as intercepted and destroyed.

Although Ukraine has not claimed responsibility for the attack, one piece of footage points at an alleged UJ-22 airborne drone of Ukrainian fabrication. Despite circumstantial evidence which could indicate Ukraine’s direct involvement, presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak denied the allegations. Information posted by opposition media outlet Agentstvo quoting a tweet by Foreign Policy Research Institute Senior Fellow Rob Lee, indicated that the drones responsible for the May 30 attack appear to be the same ones that conducted another attack on May 26 in Russia’s Krasnodar region.

Meanwhile, a report posted by Mediazona quoting a list published by Russian MP Alexander Khinshtein regarding the alleged locations of the drone suggested they may have targeted the houses of oligarchs in Moscow’s wealthy Rublyovka neighborhood. While this has not been confirmed, a separate report posted by the Telegram channel Baza alluded to an orchestrated attack in the same area.

This is the second drone attack reported in the Russian capital city since the May 3 drone attack against the senate building of the Kremlin. The DFRLab reported on that incident and assessed that defense countermeasures, including a ban on flying commercial drones, would likely be enforced as a defensive measure. GPS interference data also indicated elevated levels of GPS interference on May 30 in the Moscow area. This information would be consistent with an assessment expressed by Russian businessman and former Roskosmos chief Dmitry Rogozin, who proposed suspending GPS across Russia.

Lastly, on June 1, multiple sources reported movements of the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Free Russia Legion in the villages Shebekino and Novaya Tavolzhaka in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast, adjacent to the Ukrainian border. The oblast’s governor reported shelling by Grad rockets and initiated an evacuation of the local population to Belgorod Arena stadium, in the region’s capital. The DFRLab will continue to monitor the situation.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Georgian prime minister blames NATO for Russia’s war in Ukraine

Speaking at the GLOBSEC forum in Bratislava, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili claimed that NATO enlargement was to blame for Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a long-standing Kremlin narrative used to justify Russia’s war in Ukraine.

“I think everybody knows the reason… one of the main reasons was NATO, NATO enlargement,” Garibashvili said, adding that “Ukraine’s determination” to become a NATO member state had its “consequences.” According to recent polling by IRI, 80 percent of Georgians support the country joining NATO.

Several Kremlin-owned and pro-Kremlin outlets quoted Garibashvili and used his remarks to reinforce pro-war narratives. The outlets also reported on additional comments made by the prime minister during GLOBSEC on how the Georgian government is “setting a good precedent by maintaining peace and stability in a turbulent environment.”

The DFRLab has previously covered how the Georgian Dream-led government and the Kremlin spread similar narratives blaming the West for orchestrating protests in Georgia.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Moscow is on edge after the latest drone attack appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Will the debt ceiling deal mean less for homeland security?

Thomas S. Warrick — Wed, 31 May 2023 19:00:12 +0000

What the new budget deal to raise the federal debt ceiling means for homeland security is only slowly coming into focus. Very few of the initial statements out of the White House or House Republican leadership about the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 mention what the new budget cap means for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or for homeland security more broadly. A close look, however, leaves reason for concern. DHS will be competing for fewer civilian budget dollars against the full range of the nation’s domestic needs and priorities. This puts the United States’ defenses at risk in areas where the threats are increasing, as in cybersecurity, border and immigration security, and domestic counterterrorism.

US President Joe Biden and House Speaker Kevin McCarthy deserve praise for avoiding a catastrophic default on the United States’ fiscal obligations that otherwise would have disrupted debt payments, Social Security payments to seniors, and the federal payroll that includes everyone who keeps the United States safe. Most commentators on the budget part of the deal have focused on the contrast between “defense spending,” where the agreement largely endorses the Biden administration’s requested increase for the Department of Defense, versus domestic programs, which are slated for a cut over the previous year’s levels. However, it is important to remember that DHS leads the defense of the United States against nonmilitary threats. DHS is responsible for border, aviation, and maritime security, as well as cybersecurity. It also helps protect critical infrastructure, oversees immigration, builds resilience, restores communities after disasters, and combats crimes of exploitation. As the third-largest cabinet department in the federal government, DHS’s budget is intrinsically linked to the security of the United States. However, DHS’s budget for fiscal year (FY) 2024 is not getting the same treatment as the budget for the Department of Defense (DOD).

When security is “nonsecurity”

The Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 classifies most of DHS’s budget as “nonsecurity.” This is paradoxical but true. Barring future changes to the deal, which are always possible, DHS will be in a zero-sum competition in the FY 2024 budget negotiations against other civilian programs such as nutrition programs for children, domestic law enforcement, housing programs, community grants programs, and national parks. Whereas the federal government should be spending more on cybersecurity, border and immigration security, and community programs to prevent violent extremism and domestic terrorism, the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 will make this harder because the overall pot of money for nondefense programs for FY 2024 will be less than in FY 2023. This appears to be the case even though more spending on cybersecurity and border security has strong bipartisan support.

The Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 follows the legislative language of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (the first of several debt ceiling deals in the Obama administration), which divided so-called “discretionary” federal spending into two different two-way splits. First, there is the “security category” and the “nonsecurity category.” The security category includes most of the budgets of the departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Veterans Affairs. It also includes the National Nuclear Security Administration, the intelligence community management account, and the so-called “150 account” for international programs such as military aid, development assistance, and overseas diplomatic operations. The nonsecurity category is essentially everything else, such as the departments of Justice, Health and Human Services, Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, and Interior.

Central to the 2011 budget deal was that it did not apply to nondiscretionary programs such as Social Security and fee-based programs such as citizenship and visa applications, which are not considered “discretionary” spending. Emergency spending, narrowly defined, was exempt from the budget caps, as was most of the war against al-Qaeda, which was categorized as “Overseas Contingency Operations” and exempt from the budget caps that began in 2011.

DHS will be competing for fewer civilian budget dollars against the full range of the nation’s domestic needs and priorities.

The second split in budget law, which originated in a budget deal in December 2013, is between the “revised security category” and the “revised nonsecurity category.” The revised security category includes only budget account 050, roughly 96 percent of which is the Department of Defense (budget code 051). About 3 percent is for nuclear programs run by the Department of Energy (code 053), and about 1 percent is for national defense-related programs at DHS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (mainly counterintelligence programs), and parts of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The main DHS programs funded under this revised security category (budget code 054) are extremely limited: emergency management functions of the Federal Emergency Management Agency on things like emergency communications systems and alternate sites the federal government could use in case of emergency or an extreme event such as a nuclear attack, as well as some functions of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.

Thus, since 2013, most of the budgets of DHS, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and foreign military assistance have been in the “security category” but have also paradoxically been in the “revised nonsecurity category.”

In the May 2023 budget deal, the $886.3 billion spending cap agreed to by the White House and the House Republican leadership for FY 2024 is only for the “revised security category.” Most of DHS, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and military assistance are lumped in with the $703.6 billion cap for “revised nonsecurity” civilian parts of the federal government. Of that, $703.6 billion, $121 billion is earmarked for veterans’ programs. After several other adjustments and offsets, as the White House calculates it, this leaves $637 billion for all other “revised nonsecurity” programs. This is a nominal cut of one billion dollars from what those departments got in the FY 2023 budget passed in December 2022. Because inflation in the past year was 4.9 percent, the effective budget cut to “revised nonsecurity programs” would be greater than one billion dollars. The House Republicans calculate an even greater cut, to $583 billion, by not including the adjustments and offsets.

Flash back to 2011 and forward to 2024

In 2011, the debate between the Obama administration and the Republicans in Congress could be simplified into the idea that Democrats wanted more spending on social programs in the “nonsecurity category,” while Republicans wanted more money spent on “security,” principally defense spending but also including homeland security.

The debate in 2023 does not break down so neatly. There is increasing, bipartisan agreement that the United States needs to be spending more on border and immigration security, and that waiting until the start of FY 2024 to address this shortfall is not going to enable the administration’s strategy to succeed. There is also bipartisan agreement that the federal government as a whole should spend more on cybersecurity. And as the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act showed, mental health and community grants to address the causes of school shootings have bipartisan support. There is also bipartisan support for military assistance to help Ukraine defend itself from Russian aggression and to help Taiwan build up its defenses to deter a possible Chinese invasion. These programs are all funded mostly or wholly from “revised nonsecurity” programs. It is not clear how these programs will fare in the budget environment created by the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023.

Commercial aviation and borders still need to be protected, even while cyber threats mount and increased quantities of fentanyl come through ports of entry.

Other departments and agencies can reallocate funds when priorities change, but not DHS. After DOD successfully led international efforts to take away the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’s territory in Iraq and Syria, the military was able to pivot to Asia, redeploying drones and personnel out of the Middle East to defend the Indo-Pacific. However, for DHS, as the 2023 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review made clear, threats seldom go away, even when the homeland faces new threats. Commercial aviation and borders still need to be protected, even while cyber threats mount and increased quantities of fentanyl come through ports of entry.

As valid as these concerns are, they are no reason to torpedo the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023. To the contrary, failure to pass the bill would gravely jeopardize national and homeland security, not to mention the economic security of the United States.

Nor do these concerns mean that other departments and agencies do not have their own justifications for increased resources in FY 2024. But the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 is not going to make it easier for homeland security. Congress needs to recognize this as it works toward the final budget for FY 2024, and, perhaps more urgently, when it considers whether to pass an emergency supplemental appropriations bill for border and immigration security. Congress needs to ensure, as it provided for military security in the “security category” of the Fiscal Responsibility Act, that DHS has the resources it needs to defend the nation against nonmilitary threats.

Thomas S. Warrick is the director of the Future of DHS project at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense program and a nonresident senior fellow and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. He is a former DHS deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy.

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Garlauskas in Quartz

everges — Wed, 31 May 2023 17:26:10 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On May 30, Markus Garlauskas was quoted in Quartz on North Korean satellites: “Some of the things that North Korea is trying to do…things like ICBMs and [missiles with several warheads]—you’re talking about technology that’s over 50 years old.”

Staff

Markus Garlauskas

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Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

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Ukraine’s Diia platform sets the global gold standard for e-government

Anatoly Motkin — Wed, 31 May 2023 01:30:31 +0000

Several thousand people gathered at the Warner Theater in Washington DC on May 23 for a special event dedicated to Ukraine’s award-winning e-governance platform Diia. “Ukrainians are not only fighting. For four years behind the scenes, they have been creating the future of democracy,” USAID Administrator Samantha Power commented at the event.

According to Power, users of Diia can digitally access the kinds of state services that US citizens can only dream of, including crossing the border using a smartphone application as a legal ID, obtaining a building permit, and starting a new business. The platform also reduces the potential for corruption by removing redundant bureaucracy, and helps the Ukrainian government respond to crises such as the Covid pandemic and the Russian invasion.

Since February 2022, the Diia platform has played a particularly important part in Ukraine’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion. According to Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov, in the first days of the invasion the platform made it possible to provide evacuation documents along with the ability to report property damage. Other features have since been added. The e-enemy function allows any resident of Ukraine to report the location and movement of Russian troops. Radio and TV functions help to inform people who find themselves cut off from traditional media in areas where broadcasting infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed.

Today, the Diia ecosystem offers the world’s first digital passport and access to 14 other digital documents along with 25 public services. It is used by more than half the Ukrainian adult population. In addition to consumer-oriented functions, the system collects information for the national statistical office and serves as a digital platform for officials. Diia is widely seen as the world’s first next-generation e-government platform, and is credited with implementing what many see as a more human-centric government service model.

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In today’s increasingly digital environment, governments may find that they have a lot of siloed systems in place, with each system based on its own separate data, infrastructure, and even principles. As a result, people typically suffer from additional bureaucracy and need to deal repeatedly with different official organizations. Most e-government initiatives are characterized by the same problems worldwide, such as technical disparity of state systems, inappropriate data security and data protection systems, absence of unified interoperability, and inefficient interaction between different elements. Ukraine is pioneering efforts to identify more human-centric solutions to these common problems.

One of the main challenges on the path to building sustainable e-government is to combine user friendliness with a high level of cyber security. If we look at the corresponding indices such as the Online Services Index and Baseline Cyber Security Index, we see that only a handful of European countries have so far managed to achieve the right balance: Estonia, Denmark, France, Spain, and Lithuania. Beyond Europe, only Singapore and Malaysia currently meet the necessary standards.

Ukraine has a strong record in terms of security. Since the onset of the Russian invasion, the Diia system has repeatedly been attacked by Russian cyber forces and has been able to successfully resist these attacks. This is an indication that the Ukrainian platform has the necessary reserve of cyber security along with a robust and secure digital public infrastructure.

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The success of the IT industry in Ukraine over the past decade has already changed international perceptions of the country. Instead of being primarily seen as an exporter of metals and agricultural products, Ukraine is now increasingly viewed as a trusted provider of tech solutions. The Ministry of Digital Transformation is now working to make Diia the global role model for human-centric GovTech. According to Samantha Power, the Ukrainian authorities are interested in sharing their experience with the international community so that others can build digital infrastructure for their citizens based on the same human-centric principles.

USAID has announced a special program to support countries that, inspired by Diia, will develop their own e-government systems on its basis. This initiative will be launched initially in Colombia, Kosovo, and Zambia. Ukraine’s Diia system could soon be serving as a model throughout the transitional world.

As they develop their own e-government systems based on Ukraine’s experience and innovations, participating governments should be able to significantly reduce corruption tied to bureaucratic obstacles. By deploying local versions of Diia, transitional countries will also develop a large number of their own high-level IT specialists with expertise in e-government. This is an important initiative that other global development agencies may also see value in supporting.

Anatoly Motkin is president of the StrategEast Center for a New Economy, a non-profit organization with offices in the United States, Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

On the rare occasions when Putin has traveled abroad since launching the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, his interactions with other heads of state have tended to underline his reduced status. For years, Putin was notorious for making world leaders such as Angela Merkel, Donald Trump, and Pope Francis wait while he arrived hours after the appointed time. With his position seriously undermined by the disastrous war in Ukraine, Putin is now the one doing the waiting. During a September 2022 conference in Uzbekistan, the leaders of Turkey, Azerbaijan, India, and Kyrgyzstan all left Putin standing as they arrived fashionably late for bilateral meetings.

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Putin’s geopolitical isolation looks even uglier when compared to the remarkable recent international ascent of his nemesis, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. In recent weeks, Zelenskyy has been lionized during high-profile visits to Rome, Berlin, Paris, and London; he has grabbed the headlines at the Arab League summit in Saudi Arabia and was the center of attention at the G7 summit in Japan. While everyone apparently wants to be seen alongside the Ukrainian leader, very few appear eager to stand with Putin.

This is not just a problem for Putin alone. Indeed, the toxicity engulfing his personal reputation has also led to Russia’s international ostracism. When the owner of popular dating apps Tinder and Hinge announced its departure from the Russian market in May 2023, company officials made clear that they could not afford the reputational damage of association with Vladimir Putin. “It’s not a good look for a trusted brand to be continuing operations in a nation where the head of state has been indicted by the International Criminal Court,” commented Match Group executive director Jeff Perkins.

Dating apps are only the tip of the iceberg, of course. A long list of global brands including McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, Nike, and Starbucks have exited or begun the process of leaving Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. European countries have pivoted away from Russian energy imports, leading to an historic loss of market share for the Kremlin. Russia is also finding it increasingly difficult to source the spare parts it needs to keep its war machine rolling due to chronic shortages caused by the unprecedented sanctions imposed by the West over the attack on Ukraine.

None of this was anticipated by Putin when he first gave the order to invade Ukraine early last year. Based on his prior experience of Western weakness following the 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 seizure of Crimea, Putin fully expected the democratic world to respond to his latest act of international aggression with vocal protests and symbolic sanctions before getting back to business as usual. This was an extremely costly miscalculation that has left Russia more isolated than at any time since the immediate aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution one hundred years ago.

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As something of an amateur historian, Putin must be painfully aware that he has brought his own country to one of its lowest points in centuries. He has long been preoccupied with his place in Russian history and has authored a number of lengthy historical essays that have been carefully crafted to justify his own deeply revisionist worldview. This obsession with the past has defined Putin’s entire reign and lies at the heart of his fateful decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Since coming to power at the turn of the millennium, Putin has consistently expressed his bitterness over the perceived historical injustice of the Soviet collapse. This has fed a vicious contempt for Ukrainian statehood, which he has come to view as the primary obstacle to his sacred mission of reuniting “historical Russia.” Putin is notorious for claiming Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), and has called Ukraine “an inalienable part of Russia’s own history, culture, and spiritual space.” In February 2022, he resolved to settle the matter once and for all.

From the very beginning of Russia’s invasion, the baleful influence of Putin’s historical baggage has been abundantly clear. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov acknowledged this on day one of the war, when he reportedly quipped that Putin only has three advisors: “Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and Catherine the Great.” Speaking months later in summer 2022, Putin confirmed the accuracy of Lavrov’s observation by publicly comparing his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Czar Peter.

With the war now in its sixteenth month, it is fair to say things have not gone according to plan for the would-be conqueror. Putin originally envisioned a blitzkrieg campaign that would rapidly extinguish Ukrainian independence and mark the dawn of a new Russian Empire. Instead, his soldiers have suffered a string of humiliating defeats that have shattered Russia’s reputation as a military superpower, and stand accused of sickening war crimes that have horrified the watching world.

For now, Putin remains defiant and insists his war aims will eventually be achieved, but it is difficult to see how Russia can hope to repair the damage done to its international standing. Instead, the decision to invade Ukraine looks set to be remembered as one of the greatest geopolitical blunders of the modern era. It has left Russia shunned and greatly diminished on the world stage, while earning Putin himself a place in infamy alongside history’s greatest criminals. He dreamed of emulating Peter the Great, but he has become Putin the Pariah.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

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Aluf leads SIGNAL’s interdisciplinary research team, developing in-depth knowledge and theories for policy practitioners working in the sphere of Sino-Israeli relations. Aluf has been a Visiting Fellow at the Intellisia Institute in Guangzhou, China, where he researched China’s Belt & Road Initiative, the Digital Silk Road, and social science perspectives on Artificial Intelligence. His areas of expertise include Chinese foreign policy, China-Middle East relations, the geopolitics of technology, cross-cultural analysis, and political psychology.

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The 5×5—Cross-community perspectives on cyber threat intelligence and policy

Simon Handler — Tue, 30 May 2023 04:01:00 +0000

A core objective of the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative is to shape policy in order to better secure users of technology by bringing together stakeholders from across disciplines. Cybersecurity is strengthened by ongoing collaboration and dialogue between policymakers and practitioners, including cyber threat intelligence analysts. Translating the skills, products, and values of these communities between each other can be challenging but there is prospective benefit, as it helps drive intelligence requirements and keeps policymakers abreast of the latest developments and realities regarding threats. For younger professionals, jumping from one community to another can appear to be a daunting challenge.

We brought together five individuals with experience from both the worlds of cyber threat intelligence and cyber policy to share their experiences, perspectives on the dynamics between the two communities, and advice to those interested in transitioning back and forth.

#1 What’s one bad piece of advice you hear for threat intelligence professionals interested in making a transition to working in cyber policy?

Winnona DeSombre Bernsen, nonresident fellow, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council:

“I have not heard bad pieces of advice specifically geared toward threat intelligence professionals, but I was told by someone once that if I wanted to break into policy, I could not focus on cyber. This is mostly untrue: the number of cyber policy jobs in both the public and the private sectors are growing rapidly, because so many policy problems touch cybersecurity. Defense acquisition? Water safety? Civil Rights? China policy? All of these issues (and many more!) touch upon cybersecurity in some way. However, cyber cannot be your only focus! As most threat intelligence professionals know, cybersecurity does not operate in a vacuum. A company’s security protocols are only as good as the least aware employee, and a nation-state’s targets in cyberspace usually are chosen to further geopolitical goals. Understanding the issues that are adjacent to cyber in a way that creates sound policy is important when making the transition.”

Sherry Huang, program fellow, Cyber Initiative and Special Projects, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation:

“I would not count this as advice, but the emphasis on getting cybersecurity certifications that is persistent in the cyber threat intelligence community is not directly helpful to working in the cyber policy space. Having technical knowledge and skills is always a plus, but in my view, having the ability to translate between policymakers and technical experts is even more valuable in the cyber policy space, and there is not a certification for that.”

Katie Nickels, nonresident senior fellow, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council; director of intelligence, Red Canary:

“I think there is a misconception that to work in cyber policy, you need to have spent time on Capitol Hill or at a think tank. I have found that to be untrue, and I think that misconception might make cybersecurity practitioners hesitant to weigh in on policy matters. The way I think of it is that cyber policy is the convergence of two fields: cybersecurity and policymaking. Whichever field is your primary one, you will have to learn about the other. Practitioners can absolutely learn about policy.”

Christopher Porter, nonresident senior fellow, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council:

“When intelligence professionals think about policy work, they often experience a feeling of personal control—‘now I get to make the decisions!’ So there is a temptation to start applying your own pet theories or desired policy outcomes and start working on persuasion. That is part of it, but in reality policymaking looks a lot like intelligence work in one key aspect—it is still a team sport. You have to have buy-in from a lot of stakeholders, many of whom will have different perspectives or intellectual approaches to the same problem. Even if you share the same goal, they may have very different tools. So just as intelligence is a team sport, policymaking is too. That is a reality that is not reflected in a lot of academic preparation, which emphasizes theoretical rather than practical policymaking.”

Robert Sheldon, director of public policy & strategy, Crowdstrike:

“I sometimes hear people treating technical career paths and policy career paths as binary–and I do not think that is the direction that we are headed as a community. People currently working in technical cybersecurity disciplines, including threat intelligence, should consider gaining exposure to policy work without fully transitioning and leaving their technical pursuits behind. This is a straightforward way to make ongoing, relevant contributions to a crowded cyber policy discourse.”

#2 What about working in threat intelligence best prepared you for a career in cyber policy, or vice versa?

Desombre Bernsen: “Threat intelligence gave me two key skills: the first is the ability to analyze a large-scale problem. Just like threat intelligence analysts, cyber policymakers must look through large systems to find chokepoints and potential vulnerabilities, while also making sure that the analytic judgments one makes about the system are sound. This skill enables one to craft recommendations that best fit the problem. The second skill is the ability to tailor briefings to different principal decisionmakers. Threat intelligence is consumed by network defenders and C-suite executives alike, so understanding at what level you are briefing is key. A chief information security officer does not care about implementing YARA rules, just like a network defender does not want their time wasted with a recommendation on altering their company-wide phishing policies. Being able to figure out what the principal cares about, and to tailor recommendations to the audience best able to action on them is applicable to the cyber policy field as well. When briefing a company or government agency, knowing their risk tolerance and organization mission, for example, helps tailor the briefing to help them understand what they can do about the problem.”

Huang: “Being a cyber threat intelligence analyst gave me exposure to a wide variety of issues that are top of mind for government and corporate clients. In a week, I could be writing about nation-state information operations, briefing clients on cybersecurity trends in a certain industry, and sorting through data dumps on dark web marketplaces. Knowing a bit about numerous cyber topics made it easier for me to identify interest areas that wanted to pursue in the cyber policy space and, more importantly, allows me to easily understand and interact with experts on different cyber policy issue areas, which is helpful in my current role.”

Nickels: “The ability to communicate complex information in an accessible way is a skill I learned from my threat intelligence career that has translated well to policy work. Threat intelligence is all about informing decisions, so there are many overlaps with writing to inform policy.”

Porter: “In Silicon Valley, it is typical to have a position like ‘chief solutions architect.’ I have spent most of my career in intelligence being the ‘chief problems architect.’ It is the nature of the job to look for threats, problems, and shortcomings. Policymakers have the inverse task—to imagine a better future and build it, even if that is not the path we are on currently. But still, I think policymakers need to keep in mind how their plans might fail or lead to unintended consequences. When it comes to cybersecurity, new policies almost never eliminate a threat, they only change its shape. Much like the end to Ghostbusters, you get to choose the kind of problem you are going to face, but not whether or not you face one. Anyone with a background in intelligence will be ready for that step, where you have to imagine second- and third-order implications beyond the first-order effect you are seeking to have.”

Sheldon: “Working as an analyst early in my career taught me a lot about analytical methods and rigor, evidence quality, and constructing arguments. Each of these competencies apply directly to policy work.”

#3 What realities of working in the threat intelligence world do you believe are overlooked by the cyber policy community?

Desombre Bernsen: “The cyber policy community has not yet realized that threat intelligence researchers and parts of the security community themselves—similarly to high level cyber policy decisionmakers—are targets of cyberespionage and digital transnational repression. North Korea, Russia, China, and Iran have all targeted researchers and members of civil society in cyberspace. Famously, North Korea would infect Western vulnerability researchers, likely to steal capabilities. In addition, threat intelligence researchers lack the government protections many policymakers have. Researchers that publicly lambast US adversaries can be targeted and threatened online by state-backed trolls. Protections for these individuals are few and far between—CISA just this year rolled out a program for protecting civil society members targeted by transnational repression, so I hope it gets expanded soon.”

Huang: “Most of the time, threat intelligence analysts (at least in the private sector) do not hear from clients after a report has gone out and do not have visibility into whether their analysis and recommendations are helpful or have real-world impact. Feedback, whether positive or constructive, can help analysts fine-tune their craft and improve future analysis.”

Nickels: “I think the cyber policy community largely considers threat intelligence to be information to be shared about breaches, often in the form of indicators like IP addresses. While that can be one aspect of it, they may not recognize that threat intelligence analysts consider much more than that. Broadly, threat intelligence is about using an understanding of how cyber threats work to make decisions. Under that broad definition, cyber policymakers have a significant need for threat intelligence—if policymakers do not know how the threats operate, they cannot determine how to create policies to help organizations better protect against them.”

Porter: “There are aspects of the work—such as attribution—that are more reliable and not as difficult as imagined. Conversely, there are critical functions, like putting together good trends data or linking together multiple different pieces of evidence, that can be very difficult and time-intensive but seem simple to those outside the profession. So there is always a little bit of education that needs to take place before getting into a substantive back-and-forth, where the cyber intelligence community needs to explain a little bit about how they are doing their work, and the strengths and limitations of that so that everyone has the same assumptions and understands one another’s perspective.”

Sheldon: “The policy community sometimes lacks understanding of the sources and methods that threat intelligence practitioners leverage in their analysis. This informs the overall quality of their work, the skill needed to produce it, timeliness, extensibility, the possibility for sharing, and so on. All of these are good reasons for the two communities to talk more about how they do their work.”

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#4 What is the biggest change in writing for a threat intelligence audience vs. policymakers?

Desombre Bernsen: “The scope is much broader. Threats to a corporate system are confined largely to the corporate system itself, but the world of geopolitics has far more players and many more first- and second-order effects of the policies you recommend.”

Huang: “Not having to be as diligent about confidence levels! Jokes aside, it is similar in that being precise in wording and being brief and to the point are appreciated by both audiences. However, I do find that a policy audience often cares more about the forward-looking aspect and the ‘so what?’”

Nickels: “The biggest difference is that when writing for policymakers, you are expected to express your opinion! As part of traditional intelligence doctrine, threat intelligence analysts avoid injecting personal opinions into their assessments and try to minimize the effects of their cognitive biases. Intelligence analysts might write about potential outcomes of a decision, but should not weigh in on which decision should be made. However, policymakers want to hear what you recommend. It can feel freeing to be able to share opinions, and it remains valuable to try to hedge against cognitive biases because it allows for sounder policy recommendations.”

Porter: “Threat intelligence professionals are going to be very interested in how the work gets done, as the culture—to some degree—borrows from academic work, in terms of rewarding reproducibility of results and sharing of information. But, strictly speaking, policymakers do not care about that. Their job is to link the findings in those reports to the broader strategic context. One really only need to show enough of how the intelligence work was done to give the policymaker confidence and help them use the intelligence appropriately without understating or overstating the case. The result is that for policy audiences you end up starting from the end of the story—instead of a blog post or white paper building up to a firm conclusion, you talk about the conclusion and, depending on the level of technical understanding and skepticism on the part of the policymaker, may or may not get into the story of how things were pieced together at all.”

Sheldon: “Good writing in both disciplines has much in common. Each should be concise, include assertions and evidence, provide context, and make unknowns clear. But there are perhaps fewer ‘product types’ relevant to core threat intelligence consumers and, in some settings, analysts can assume some fundamental knowledge base among their audience.”

#5 Where is one opportunity to work on policy while still in industry that most people miss?

Desombre Bernsen: “You absolutely can work on policy issues while working in threat intelligence! I cannot just choose one, but I highly recommend searching for non-resident fellowship programs in think tanks (ECCRI, Atlantic Council, etc.), speaking at conferences on threat trends and their policy implications, and doing more policy through corporate threat wargaming internally.”

Huang: “Volunteering at conferences that involve the cyber policy community, such as Policy@DEF CON and IGF-USA. These are great opportunities to support policy-focused discussions and to have deeper interactions with peers in the cyber policy space.”

Nickels: “In the United States, one commonly missed opportunity is to reach out to elected representatives with opinions on cybersecurity legislation. Cybersecurity practitioners can also be on the lookout for opportunities to provide comments that help shape proposed regulations affecting the industry. For example, the Commerce Department invited public comments to proposed changes to the Wassenaar Arrangement around export controls of security software, and cybersecurity practitioners weighed in on how they felt the changes would influence tool development.”

Porter: “That will vary greatly from company to company; almost universally though, you will have the opportunity to help your colleagues and future generations by providing mentorship and career development opportunities. Personnel is policy, so in addition to thinking about particular policies you might want to shape, think also about how you can shape the overall policymaking process by helping others make the most of their talents. It will take years, but, in the long run, those are the kinds of changes that are most lasting.”

Sheldon: “Regardless of your current role, you can read almost everything relevant to the policy discourse. National strategies, executive orders, bills, commission and think tank reports, and so on are all publicly available. Unfortunately, many in the policy community are only skimming, but reading these sources deeply and internalizing them is a great basis to distinguish yourself in a policy discussion. Also, there are more opportunities than ever to read and respond to Requests for Comment from the National Institute of Standards and Technology and other government agencies, and these frequently include very technical questions.”

Frances Burwell: The TTC must help the US and EU confront their geopolitical challenges

The post The 5×5—Cross-community perspectives on cyber threat intelligence and policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Here’s what to expect on China, AI, green energy, and more when EU and US officials meet in Sweden

Atlantic Council — Fri, 26 May 2023 16:31:06 +0000

The United States and the European Union (EU) appear poised to take joint action on some of their biggest common challenges in trade and technology, including on export controls, China’s non-market practices, and possibly even artificial intelligence (AI).

Those actions are set to be unveiled on May 30-31, when US and EU officials convene in Luleå, a small city in northern Sweden, for the fourth meeting of the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC). What can Europeans and Americans expect to see at this meeting? And can Brussels and Washington surmount lingering obstacles to transatlantic cooperation on trade and technology? We gathered rapporteurs from the TTC Track 2 Dialogues series—a forum for policy debate and stakeholder dialogue organized jointly between the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and the Brussels-based European Policy Centre—to share their insights.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Georg Riekeles: The first step to addressing China is improving the EU-US relationship

Andrea García Rodríguez: The TTC meeting must meet the moment on AI

Olga Khakova: The TTC is timely and powerful—but it needs to launch into action in Sweden

Philipp Lausberg: The TTC should lay out the path for a transatlantic green industrial policy

Annika Hedberg: The TTC should help unleash transatlantic power for sustainable prosperity

The TTC must help the US and EU confront their geopolitical challenges

When the TTC was announced in June 2021, many analysts and stakeholders believed it could usefully address the severe asymmetries between US and EU approaches to trade and technology, while also repairing the transatlantic rifts that had emerged during the Trump administration. That optimism was almost immediately challenged as the TTC leadership agreed that pending legislation was excluded from the discussion agenda and as negotiations over data privacy and green steel were put on separate tracks. Instead, the TTC focused on laying small stepping stones toward future cooperation on AI, standards setting, supply-chain transparency, small and medium-sized enterprises, and external trade issues such as the use of forced labor.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the TTC turned from a moderately useful mechanism for coordinating US-EU standards-setting efforts to an important forum for dealing with challenges posed by China and Russia. The TTC quickly became the transatlantic forum for coordinating export controls on Russia, dove deeper into tracking supply chains, focused more intensely on tech and democracy issues, and began to experiment with countering Chinese influence in the Global South through small projects in Kenya and Jamaica.

These new priorities are not, however, the ones most valued by stakeholders from the business community, whose support for the TTC has become rather tepid. Those stakeholders focus on instances of potential protectionism or overly intrusive regulation, such as the possible forced sharing of data under the EU Digital Services Act. The TTC has increased its stakeholder engagement in recent months, with a focus on standards for 6G rollout, digital trade, e-mobility, AI taxonomy, and other issues. These are important and will help the United States and the EU develop a foundation for future technical and economic cooperation.

But these “deliverables” should not be the only measure of the TTC’s success. Perhaps even more important has been the increase in communication between US and EU officials at all levels, but especially among the leadership. European concerns about the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) could have escalated sharply without the relationships and communication channels constructed by the TTC. This has also contributed to a visible transatlantic convergence of views around AI, supply chains, subsidies, investment controls, and other issues.

The question now for the TTC is whether it can steer the growing use of economic measures to address geopolitical concerns in a way that is complementary and cooperative. The TTC will need to expand its work on supply chains from simply mapping to jointly addressing issues. It will also need to seek greater transatlantic cooperation aimed at limiting the spread of disinformation via social media and AI. And the United States and EU must figure out, through the TTC, how they can jointly approach countries with significant quantities of rare-earth elements so that they do not compete over resources to their mutual detriment. Finally, the TTC will need to navigate a way through the green transition that enhances US and EU resilience without weakening the transatlantic partnership (a weakening that seemed likely when the IRA first emerged).

The TTC has evolved since its founding in 2021, and it will continue to do so. The true test of its relevance will not be whether it builds cooperation in a particular standard-setting body—although that is useful—but whether it helps the United States and EU confront their current geopolitical challenges.

—Frances Burwell is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a senior director at McLarty Associates. She is also a rapporteur for the data and technology-regulation track of the TTC Track 2 Dialogues series.

Issue Brief

Apr 20, 2023

The US-EU Trade and Technology Council: Assessing the record on data and technology issues

By Frances Burwell and Andrea G. Rodríguez

The TTC must keep its forward-looking gaze, but also take steps to address challenging regulatory issues, either by oversight or direct discussion, or it will lose the essential support among stakeholders that can keep US engagement in the TTC alive.

Digital Policy Economy & Business

The first step to addressing China is improving the EU-US relationship

Highs and lows have marked the EU-US Trade and Technology Council since its inception in 2021, but the definitive low point came at the most recent ministerial meeting in December. Officials on both sides were putting on brave faces, despite being fundamentally at loggerheads over the IRA’s discriminatory and protectionist measures.

A central question at the Sweden meeting inevitably will be whether the EU and the United States can agree on how to work effectively together—not against each other—to address challenges posed by China. China was in many ways a raison d’être for the TTC from the beginning, with the United States wanting a tech ally against China and Europe wanting a deeper transatlantic economic space.

In early phases this worked well, and a convergence of views on China was further buoyed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and unprecedented transatlantic collaboration on sanctions. Here in Brussels, the word was that Europeans and Americans had rarely before thought so similarly about China.

Then came the IRA in August 2022 and much changed. In Europe’s eyes, it became clear not only that the continent could become collateral damage from the US-China rivalry, but that Washington’s actions bluntly aimed to establish US economic domination by capturing European investments, value chains, and industry. Fundamentally, it brought to the fore the central difficulty with attaining economic security: Partners can also be rivals.

Europe can ill afford Washington’s logic of economic confrontation with China and unruly competition across the Atlantic. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing last November demonstrated this divergence. While Washington insists on an economic and technological decoupling from China, Berlin still believes in and plays a game of mutual dependency, as symbolized by the parallel investments of German industrial flagship BASF in Zhanjiang and of the Chinese state-owned Cosco in the port of Hamburg.

Are there any grounds for more optimism on transatlantic agreement now? Not all Europeans are ready for a hardline approach to China (as highlighted also by French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent Beijing visit), but they agree on the need to protect themselves against an increasingly hegemonic and coercive power. As von der Leyen said recently during a speech she gave on EU-China relations at the European Policy Centre, through the decade that Chinese leader Xi Jinping has ruled, there has been a clear push to “make China less dependent on the world and the world more dependent on China.”

The United States and EU will meet in Sweden a week after attending a momentous G7 Summit in Japan. But succeeding at the TTC is much harder than at the G7 because it is not enough to produce carefully worded communiqués, it’s about tangible deliverables and actions. Doubts about the council’s effectiveness have marred the TTC since its inception. In Sweden, US-Europe convergence on China now depends on being able to deliver concretely on trade, industry, and economic-security priorities. This includes forging a viable partnership on critical minerals, agreeing on transparency and rules for green-industrial subsidies and making progress on methodologies for carbon accounting. It also hinges on taking credible steps toward deepening transatlantic trade, because the first step in building common economic security is certainly to remove obstacles and discriminatory practices between one another.

—Georg Riekeles is an associate director and head of the Europe’s political economy program with the European Policy Centre. He is also a rapporteur of the trade and supply-chains track of the TTC Track 2 Dialogues series.

New Atlanticist

Dec 2, 2022

Policy memo: How the EU and US should overcome their trade and supply-chain disputes

By Charles Lichfield and Georg Riekeles

Ahead of the next meeting of the US-EU Trade and Technology Council, here are five tests for the EU and United States to show progress on the trade and supply-chains agenda.

Economy & Business European Union

The TTC meeting must meet the moment on AI

The meeting in Sweden will be fundamental for the continuity of the TTC over the next few months. Since the TTC’s last meeting in December, the European Parliament cleared the way for a plenary vote on the AI Act (slated for mid-June) and the use of OpenAI’s ChatGPT has skyrocketed, sparking a variety of reactions to generative AI. China has unveiled its own model, Baidu’s Ernie Bot, and several European countries have accelerated policies to respond to AI’s challenges. For instance, Italy banned ChatGPT until OpenAI addressed regulators’ concerns. All in all, these developments have raised new questions about how to govern general-purpose AI systems to ensure they remain aligned with democratic values. A transatlantic response is essential in addressing these concerns.

Following the publication of the Joint AI Roadmap after the TTC meeting in December, it is important that the coming meeting unveils developments in this area. This is not only because challenges are multiplying rapidly, but also because the roadmap presents a unique opportunity for the United States and the EU to design common approaches to governing emerging technologies—and if democratic powers want to be the ones to set international technology standards they shouldn’t let that opportunity go to waste. These approaches to addressing AI can be replicated when addressing other technological challenges, such as challenges posed by the Metaverse or quantum computing. That is a reason why this next meeting is crucial: It will either show that the TTC can take real action or it will bring the council’s diplomatic weight—and its ability to advance the global governance of emerging technologies—into question, increasing the risk that the multistakeholder community loses interest in such collaboration.

—Andrea García Rodríguez is the lead policy analyst for digital at the European Policy Centre and a rapporteur of the data and technology regulation track of the TTC Track 2 Dialogues.

Issue Brief

Apr 20, 2023

The US-EU Trade and Technology Council: Assessing the record on data and technology issues

By Frances Burwell and Andrea G. Rodríguez

Digital Policy Economy & Business

The TTC is timely and powerful—but it needs to launch into action in Sweden

An indispensable resource for deploying technology and trade tools to address the most urgent climate and energy security threats, European leaders need to reinvigorate the TTC’s full potential in coming meetings. This is especially critical in the face of other challenges facing Europe, not least Russia’s brutal war and escalating global tensions with China.

The TTC’s lack of progress on the green transition track since its last meeting in December is not indicative of the TTC’s potential to address the trade, supply-chain, and technology barriers that arise when forging secure and low-carbon economies on both sides of the Atlantic. The May meeting could be the springboard to launch this track into action.

To achieve more meaningful clean-energy outcomes, policymakers must use the upcoming meeting to outline tangible goals for its existing green transition work streams, including those related to semiconductors, the Transatlantic Initiative on Sustainable Trade, export controls, the Talent for Growth Task Force, additive manufacturing, the recycling of plastics, and alignment on electric-vehicle charging infrastructure. Policymakers should also utilize this meeting to ensure that trade and tech policy is maximizing efforts to curb emissions and strengthening energy security. To do so, the EU and the United States will need to more broadly align on standards related to measuring carbon and environmental impacts, including by clarifying the role of digitalization in decarbonization and the role of digital solutions in streamlining carbon-emissions measurements and verification.

One particularly meaningful action the TTC can focus on is efforts to build on its export-controls track by improving transparency and information sharing regarding export-control evasion—particularly around the energy sector, since the energy industry is one of Russia’s biggest sources of funds for its war. The TTC’s work on the critical-minerals supply chain could reinforce the work of the US-EU Task Force on the IRA. In areas in which the TTC may not have capacity to do the work, the platform could still outline key opportunities for action and work closely with the existing mechanisms, such as the World Trade Organization, the US International Development Finance Corporation, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the US-EU Energy Council, and others.

The TTC won’t be the panacea for all trade and technology challenges. However it is a timely, powerful body for exchanging information and best practices, aligning standards, forging transparency, and testing out audacious ideas—and most importantly, identifying concrete actions for US-EU cooperation.

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center. She is a rapporteur for the green transition track of the TTC Track 2 Dialogues.

The TTC should lay out the path for a transatlantic green industrial policy

The IRA cast a shadow on the previous TTC meeting outside Washington in December. Its local content requirements—which extend subsidies to clean tech goods produced only in North America—is perceived in the EU as an attempt to capture the bloc’s manufacturing base. Since then, the EU has launched its own Green Deal Industrial Plan, and both sides have been keen to limit the fallout of the IRA and move ahead together amidst mounting geoeconomic challenges. The two sides set up a special US-EU Task Force on the IRA, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited US President Joe Biden at the White House where they announced their intent to conclude a targeted agreement on critical minerals and put in place a Clean Energy Incentives Dialogue. This presents the United States and EU with four tests for showing whether they can coordinate on green industrial policy and economic security at their upcoming Sweden meeting—and beyond.

The first test is how far the United States will accommodate EU demands to adjust the elements of the IRA that are “discriminatory” against European companies. The aforementioned critical minerals agreement would allow relevant raw materials extracted or processed in the European Union to count toward requirements for clean vehicles delineated in the clean-vehicle tax-credit section of the IRA, effectively circumventing the “made in America” provisions. Although the form this agreement takes—and whether it could be extended to a wider set of European products—is yet to be determined.

Second, the United States and EU will be tested on whether they can better coordinate industrial incentive programs in the future. While expectations on fundamental changes to the IRA are low, its negative fallout for the EU has also been blamed on a lack of institutionalized coordination on transatlantic industrial policy. The new Clean Energy Incentives Dialogue presents the TTC with the opportunity to correct this fault by creating a better understanding of mutual interests and vulnerabilities through increased information sharing. However, it is unclear whether information sharing and closer coordination will be enough to prevent one side from granting advantages to its industry at the expense of the other in the future.

A third test is how the two sides can facilitate a more coordinated and effective approach to green industrial policy on the international level: for example, with respect to non-market practices by third parties such as China, but also in multilateral fora such as within the Group of Seven (G7) Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. The two sides will be tested on whether they can tackle their economic-security challenges while also fostering sustainability and development in third countries.

A fourth test will be whether the United States and EU are willing to cooperate deeply enough in the global scramble for critical raw materials. This includes bauxite, cobalt, lithium, and nickel, which are necessary for clean-tech products such as batteries, wind turbines, and electric vehicles. So far, there has been little cooperation in this field, but a coordinated strategy on these critical raw materials has huge potential given the EU and United States’ combined economic might and their similar geopolitical interests.

—Philipp Lausberg is a policy analyst in the European Political Economy Programme at the European Policy Centre.

The TTC should help unleash transatlantic power for sustainable prosperity

The benefits of enhanced transatlantic cooperation on the green agenda are immense—and wait to be seized. Collaborating in creating more sustainable energy, mobility, and food systems, and improving production and consumption patterns, would lead to greater resilience, security, and prosperity. It can benefit consumers, companies, and workers. It would lead to better jobs, cleaner air, and healthier societies. It would allow us to address the climate, environmental, and resource crises more effectively.

Thus, it is no surprise that the EU and the United States have committed to strengthening and accelerating much-needed transatlantic collaboration on the green transition under the TTC. What is disappointing, though, is how slow the progress on the green transition track has been, despite the benefits that such collaboration promises.

The upcoming TTC meeting should bring new momentum into these discussions. There is no time to waste. This world is fraught with geopolitical tensions—fueled by Russia’s war in Ukraine and China’s unreliability as a partner—which also influence global supply chains and access to resources. The climate emergency, environmental degradation, and pollution are threatening life as we know it and demand our urgent attention. It is vital for the EU and the United States to work together and with like-minded countries if they wish to succeed in addressing these multiple challenges.

Some progress has already been made. A good example is the ongoing attempt to develop similar electric vehicle charging infrastructure across the Atlantic. The potential for collaboration, however, is so much greater than what has been realized thus far. To achieve the green transition, including the clean energy transition, it’ll be essential for the EU and the United States to team up on ensuring they have access to needed resources (i.e. materials, technologies, and skills); creating resilient and sustainable supply chains; and reducing risky dependencies. The EU and the United States should also do more to explore transition pathways to a circular economy, which should include eliminating trade barriers for recycled materials and enhancing the durability, reusability, and recyclability of materials and products needed for the green transition.

The TTC is far from the only channel for the EU-US collaboration. However, it is in the interest of both to use the TTC platform to step up efforts toward creating a transatlantic marketplace for products and services that are urgently needed to address planetary crises. The EU and the United States must turn competition and partnership into a transatlantic green power that will enhance prosperity across the Atlantic.

—Annika Hedberg is the head of the programme for sustainable prosperity for Europe at the European Policy Centre. She is a rapporteur of the green transition track of the TTC Track 2 Dialogues.

About the “TTC Track 2 Dialogues” series

The “TTC Track-2 Dialogues” series was created by the Atlantic Council and the European Policy Centre to foster policy debate and stakeholder dialogue on the issues covered by the US-EU Trade and Technology Council. The series aims to connect US and EU stakeholders for discussions along three thematic tracks relating to the TTC’s priorities: (i) trade and supply chains issues; (ii) data and technology regulation, and (iii) the green transition. Each track consists of two separate workshops with transatlantic stakeholders, which are used to inform short policy briefs containing concrete recommendations for US and EU decision makers.

The post Here’s what to expect on China, AI, green energy, and more when EU and US officials meet in Sweden appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian narratives ignore real reasons for Western support of Ukraine

Richard Cashman — Thu, 25 May 2023 20:02:54 +0000

Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev gave a lengthy interview to Russian publication Izvestia in early May that read like a script for Russian officials and sympathisers seeking to justify the invasion of Ukraine. Patrushev’s arguments should not be taken lightly; he is one the most influential figures in today’s Russia, perhaps the second most powerful person in the country after President Putin himself.

Ukraine and its partners ought to push back against and debunk many of Patrushev’s assertions and theories. In particular, Patrushev made several references to British geographer Halford Mackinder and his so-called “Heartland Theory” of geopolitics, which the Russian official identified as the inspiration behind NATO’s eastward enlargement since 1997 and its support for Ukraine since 2014.

In his 1904 article The Geographical Pivot of History, Mackinder conceived of a global struggle between sea powers and land powers, with Britain, the United States, and Japan representing the foremost sea powers, and Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary the leading land powers. Mackinder ascribed a special importance to the area approximating to modern Ukraine, Belarus, and Western Russia, which he called the Heartland within the Eurasian World Island, and which he said was largely impervious to coercion by the sea powers. Who controls the Heartland, argued Mackinder, controls the World Island, and therefore the world.

Mackinder’s ideas have long held a fascination for those inclined to deterministic and reductive interpretations of international history. For most serious historians and foreign policy practitioners, however, his ideas are far too simplistic and doctrinaire to explain the full gamut of reasons for events in the past, or to facilitate realistic policy formulation in the present.

Mackinder’s arguments were very much of their time, especially in respect of the early twentieth century’s pervasive imperial thinking. His conclusions also reflect the military technologies then available. Attitudes toward imperialism have radically altered since Mackinder was writing, and technological development has generally acted to undermine many of his core assumptions.

Moreover, with the establishment of the Warsaw Pact following World War II, Moscow did establish control over Mackinder’s Heartland, which it then enjoyed for several decades. However, this in no way enabled the Kremlin to dominate the rest of the world.

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Far from being a story of Euro-Atlantic sea power moving to dominate the Heartland, NATO enlargement since 1997 has overwhelmingly been a response to dynamic lobbying by former Warsaw Pact members. Some, such as Poland, immediately sought sanctuary without waiting to see what sort of country the new Russian Federation might become. Others made applications once Putin and the clan which captured the Russian state at the turn of the millennium revealed their intention to reverse rather than manage Russia’s imperial decline.

In most cases, applications were met with initial skepticism by existing NATO members. Yet Patrushev ignores this and wholly removes agency from what he terms as the small states of Eastern Europe when he implies that NATO membership was imposed on them.

Overtures toward Moscow at the end of the Cold War that might have been read as condoning a sphere of influence were made in the expectation that the Russian Federation would develop into a democratic and rule of law-based society. Indeed, many of the applications to join NATO by former Warsaw Pact nations would not have been made if Russia had evolved meaningfully in that direction. Instead, Russia’s unreconstructed imperial mindset has been instrumental in persuading countries in Central and Eastern Europe that NATO membership is the only way to guarantee their national security.

Eurasia Center events

Russian media spins Australian solidarity rally for Julian Assange as an anti-NATO event

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Patrushev promotes a conspiracy-driven view of the world that is all-too-common in today’s Russia. In reality, strong international support for Ukraine derives not from outdated geopolitical dogmas or anti-Russian agendas, but from a principled and realistic assessment of what is at stake for democratic, rule of law-based societies around the world should Russia prevail in its aggression. In other words, it is the gallantry of Ukrainians in defending the principles they have chosen, not the space Ukraine occupies on the map, which begets such broad support.

Patrushev’s interview contained a number of other idiosyncratic and occasionally lunatic assertions, which any countries engaging with Russia would do well to take note of when deciding how to calibrate their relations with Russia and Ukraine. His arguments may often appear absurd, but similar claims are regularly repeated by other Russian officials when addressing both domestic and international audiences.

Broad-based support for Ukraine and its Euro-Atlantic integration is far more about ideas and values than about early twentieth century geopolitical abstractions or other obscure theories. Indeed, it is Ukraine’s adoption and defense of core democratic principles which lie at the heart of Moscow’s fear and loathing.

Richard Cashman is an Adjunct Fellow at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

International response

US sanctions Armenian company for helping Russia evade sanctions

Belgorod raid sparks trolling activity on social media

Drone imagery from a burning border control outpost in the Russian region of Belgorod sparked a frenzy on social media this week. According to Riga-based Russian news outlet Meduza, members of the Russian Volunteer Corps and other Russian nationals crossed from Ukraine into Belgorod Oblast and attacked a border outpost in Grayvoron. The Russian Volunteer Corps, an anti-Putin military unit made of Russian pro-Ukrainian partisans, claimed responsibility for the attack; the Free Russia Legion also claimed responsibility.

An assessment by Russian news outlet RBC regarding the broader situation in Belgorod indicated an armed incursion, with shelling and artillery fire reported. On the evening of May 22, Russian government declared a state of counterterrorist emergency in Belgorod Oblast. Although the governor of the oblast did not officially issue an order to evacuate the civilian population immediately, footage and photographs posted on social media indicated that at least some residents evacuated to other areas in the region. Meduza also reported several drone strikes on the city of Belgorod itself.

Conflicting reports emerged on May 23 after Russian officials lifted the counterterrorist alert. While the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to have “liquidated” around seventy “saboteurs,” reporting from the news outlet Mash indicated the deployment of additional Russian law enforcement in nearby Bryansk Oblast. In an effort to support their assertions of having eliminated the insurgency, Russian news outlets also released photos of military-class vehicles allegedly used by the insurgents stuck in the mud; some open-source analysts, however, questioned the authenticity of the photos. Russian media chased these reports with claims of destroyed Ukrainian tanks, while the Russian Volunteer Corps posted footage to Telegram seemingly showing intact military equipment.

Shortly after the news broke out, footage of a drone attack on the local Russian border outpost, APP Grayvoron, appeared on the outpost’s Google Maps profile, though it was later deleted. At the time of writing, it had been replaced with footage showing a convoy of vehicles, one flying the flag of the Russian Volunteer Corps.

The Google Maps profile for a Russian border outpost in Belgorod featured a video of a mechanized convoy flying the flag of the Russian Volunteer Corps. (Source: Google Maps/archive)

Simultaneously, trolling reviews appeared on the border outpost’s Google Maps profile, calling the border guards “friendly” and the facilities “understaffed.” These too have been deleted, though not before they were documented by the Saint Javelin Twitter account and other Twitter users.

Trolls post mocking reviews of Russia’s Belgorod border post. (Source: @SaintJavelin/archive)

Other trolls took to Twitter, where members of the NAFO meme movement, a pro-NATO and pro-Ukrainian community on the platform, renamed their account to “Government of The Bilhorod’s Peoples Republic” as a joking reference to the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples Republics. “Bilhorod” is the Ukrainian name for Belgorod.

NAFO meme account @nitro19820 changes its Twitter name and bio to joke that it now represented a new “People’s Republic” in Belgorod. (Source: @nitro19820/archive)

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Russian pro-war military bloggers criticize the handling of Belgorod incursion

Following the apparent border incursion into Belgorod Oblast and subsequent attacks on the region, pro-war military bloggers condemned Moscow’s handling of the war in Ukraine, including its border defenses.

Telegram channel Vоенкор Котенок Z (“Milblogger Kitten Z”) criticized the Kremlin for being late in declaring a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod and not knowing how to fight “for real.” “There is a war, and in Russia … they are afraid to call the war a war,” stated the Telegram post.

The channel ДШРГ Русич (“DShRG Rusich”) questioned “commanders of all levels” on how the incursion happened. It also blamed Russia’s intelligence services for failing to reveal “plans of an enemy.” The channel added that as long as there is no photographic evidence of corpses or burned equipment, “the enemy has no losses, and the [Russian] propagandists crapped themselves a little, saying that everything is fine.”

The Kotsnews Telegram channel addressed pro-Kremlin pundits who dismissed military blogger concerns as “hysteria” by insisting that the threat to Russian territory is real and that there are uncomfortable questions around Russia’s defensive capabilities that nobody wants to ask. “What is happening with our technical equipment at the border, surveillance systems, tracking, motion detection?” the channel asked. “What about the mining of potentially dangerous areas? What about anti-tank weapons? Why did the enemy armored group calmly penetrate deep into our territory?”

As Russia’s war against Ukraine has dragged on, the frequency and intensity of pro-war military bloggers’ criticism have increased and become bolder. The DFRLab has previously covered how Russian military bloggers criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Ministry of Defense.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian media spins Australian solidarity rally for Julian Assange as an anti-NATO event

On May 20, a series of so-called “World Wide Freedom Rallies” took place in many cities around the world. The Telegram account for Simeon Boikov, a pro-Kremlin activist and blogger in Australia, claimed to have organized the Sydney edition of the rally, part of a decentralized movement that originated in 2021 to express dissatisfaction with COVID security measures. Boikov promoted a poster for the event on April 6, a day before the event announcement on the movement’s official Telegram channel.

The rally ostensibly focused on demanding the release of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, who is currently being held in London facing potential extradition to the United States. After the event, however, Boikov highlighted a speech by Assange’s father, John Shipton, in a video showing scenes from the rally and emphasized that Shipton was wearing a “double headed eagle and St George’s ribbons,” both of which are Russian symbols. Additional videos and images from the rally showed many people carrying Russian flags and wearing pro-Kremlin symbols.

Kremlin-controlled media outlets emphasized in their headlines not just the pro-Russia nature of the event, but also claims of anti-NATO sentiment, which appear to have been exaggerated. Reviewing footage from the event, the DFRLab identified only one instance of someone sporting anti-NATO messaging. Nonetheless, Russian media embraced the event as specifically anti-NATO, including state outlets Gazeta.ru, TASS, RIA Novosti, and Komsomolyskaya Pravda, and pro-Kremlin media such as News Front, Inforeactor, Ekonomika Segodnya. Additionally, The Eastern Herald, an Indian media outlet, and Belarus state-controlled television both framed the event as anti-NATO in their English-language publications.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

US sanctions Armenian company for helping Russia evade sanctions

On May 22, the US Department of Commerce announced that it had amended its list of sanctioned entities and individuals by adding seventy-one entities that the US government had determined to be acting “contrary to [US] national security or foreign policy interests.” Alongside Russian companies, one Kyrgyz company, Tro.Ya LLC, and one Armenian company, Medisar LLC, were included in the amended list. According to the Department of Commerce, both companies engaged in conduct that “prevented the successful accomplishment of an end-use check.” In other words, the Department of Commerce suspected that the final destination for the products was Russia but the companies themselves had obfuscated this information.

Medisar LLC, which was registered in Armenia in 2001, is an importer of chemicals and laboratory equipment. The company is one of the thousand largest taxpayers in Armenia, paying about one million dollars in taxes in 2022. It also has a longstanding trade history with Russian companies. On its website, Medisar indicates that one of its trading partners, dating back to 2011, is Russian company Minimed.

Screenshot from the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project’s (OCCRP) Aleph database, made available through Friends of OCCRP access, about Medisar’s trade. The third and fourth companies on the list are both OOO Minimed, a Russian company with a long-term trading relationship with Medisar. (Source: DFRLab via OCCRP)

On May 20, Armenian investigative website Hetq reported that data obtained from the country’s customs service showed that in 2022, Medisar exported equipment from Armenia to Russia, including electronic integrated circuits, diodes, transistors, and similar semiconductor devices.

A company executive who did not want to be identified acknowledged to RFE/RL that Medisar imported chemicals and laboratory equipment from the United States and the European Union and re-exported them to Russia.

Medisar is the second-largest company registered in Armenia to be sanctioned by the United States. The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the other firm, TAKO, in April. The company is in the wholesale of electronic and telecommunications equipment and parts. TAKO, spelled TACO in Armenia’s legal entities register, was registered in May 2022 in Armenia and is fully owned by a Russian citizen, according to public registry records.

On April 18, the New York Times reported that in 2022, Armenia imported 515 percent more chips and processors from the United States and 212 percent more from the European Union than in 2021, and that Armenia exported 97 percent of those same products to Russia.

During a May 22 press conference, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that despite Armenia’s “strategic” relationship with Russia and membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, the country “cannot afford to come under Western sanctions.” Pashinyan underscored that if Armenia faced sanctions, “it wouldn’t be good for any of our allies, while we would ruin our relations with our Western partners.”

A joint “compliance note” issued on March 2 by the US Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and Commerce, titled “Cracking Down on Third-Party Intermediaries Used to Evade Russia-Related Sanctions and Export Controls,” mentioned Armenia, along with China, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, as “transshipment points commonly used to illegally redirect restricted items to Russia or Belarus.”

According to the Statistical Committee of the Republic of Armenia, Russian-Armenian trade soared in 2022, including exports to Russia, which nearly tripled to $2.4 billion.

—Ani Mejlumyan, research assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

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Deputy Director Colleen Cottle quoted in the National Journal on China’s response to debt-ceiling negotiations in Washington

sboyle — Wed, 24 May 2023 17:39:43 +0000

On May 24, 2023, Global China Hub Deputy Director Colleen Cottle spoke to the National Journal about Beijing’s response to ongoing gridlock in Washington D.C. over debt ceiling negotiations, suggesting that China would use the opportunity to further its narratives about “dysfunctional” democracies, and to undermine Asia’s trust in the US’ leadership under President Joe Bide.

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Colleen Cottle

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Iran is using its cyber capabilities to kidnap its foes in the real world

Borzou Daragahi — Wed, 24 May 2023 16:28:19 +0000

In November 2020, as results for the closely watched and hotly contested United States presidential and congressional elections began to emerge, hackers gained access to at least one website announcing results. They were thwarted, but it took the resources of the US military and the Department of Homeland Security to block what could have turned into another attempt to spread doubts and confusion about a vote that would eventually threaten to undermine US democracy some weeks later.

The culprit in the attack, according to US officials and tech professionals cited by The Washington Post, was a hacking group operating out of or at the direction of Iran—an increasingly powerful state actor in the world of cyber warfare.

The Islamic Republic has been steadily improving and sharpening its cyber warfare, cyber espionage, and electronic sabotage abilities, staging complex operations that, while not always successful, show what experts in the field describe as devious inventiveness.

In addition to its nuclear ambitions, its refining of missile technologies, and cultivation of armed ideologically motivated proxy paramilitary groups, Iran’s electronic warfare and intelligence operations are emerging as yet another worry about the country’s international posture.

The cyber realm fits snugly into Iran’s security arsenal. It is characterized by the asymmetricity, clandestinity, and plausible deniability that complement the proxy and shadow operations that have long been Islamic Republic’s favored tools for decades.

Iran’s most aggressive cyber realm actions are also powered by a sense of righteous grievance and resentment, emotional and ideological motivations that have long energized the clerical establishment. After all, it was US and Israeli spy agencies that, according to many experts, launched the era of cyber warfare by deploying the Stuxnet virus against the country’s controversial nuclear program in 2010, damaging hundreds of its centrifuges. Tehran is proud that its growing army of techies is catching up and, in some ways, surpassing the West at its own games.

Iran’s cyber efforts have been steadily broadening. They range from attempting to hack into defense, civil society, and private systems abroad to harassment campaigns against opponents in the diaspora. Experts closely watching Iran’s Internet and electronic warfare activities have detected an escalation of its abilities and ambitions in recent months. In early May, Microsoft issued a warning about Iran’s increasingly aggressive and sophisticated tactics.

“Iranian cyber actors have been at the forefront of cyber-enabled influence operations, in which they combine offensive cyber operations with multi-pronged influence operations to fuel geopolitical change in alignment with the regime’s objectives,” said the report by Microsoft’s Clint Watts, a former FBI cybersecurity expert.

In particular, Iran appears to be building complex tactics that merge cyber and real world operations to lure people into kidnappings. This new form of transnational repression has alarmed security professionals and governments worldwide.

“We’re seeing an evolution over time of this actor evolving and using their techniques in ever more complex ways,” Sherrod DeGrippo, a former head of threat research and detection at the cyber security firm Proofpoint told me in January. “Iran is seen in the big four of the main actors. It is really stepping onto the stage and evolving what it’s doing.”

One particularly nefarious tactic that they are using is creating fake personas in the form of researchers who approach targets and try to glean information or lure them out into the open for suspected kidnapping practices. Through my research in Turkey, we learned that it is quite possible Iranian intelligence operatives have infiltrated the Turkish mobile phone networks and are using the data to track dissidents in the country. In one instance, a vocal dissident journalist received a message identifying a cafe near her home that she walked past every day. She was so terrified that she refused to leave her home for months and wound up obtaining asylum in a Western country.

In another instance, a dissident living in Turkey received messages with photographs of recent tourist sites he had visited on a trip to Istanbul. The speculation is that Iran had managed to purchase or surreptitiously access tracking data for their phones and use it to intimidate them.

According to a December 2022 report by ProofPoint, Iran’s cyber activities have gone beyond anonymous hacks and phishing campaigns to include made-up personas meant to lure people out into the open and in at least one alleged attempt, a kidnapping attempt. Sometimes alleged Iranian operatives use US or Western phone numbers to register WhatsApp accounts which can obscure their identities.

Last year, Israel’s domestic security service Shin Bet uncovered an alleged plot to use false identities with robust and complex legends to lure businessmen and scholars abroad in what security officials suspect were Iranian kidnapping plots. In one case, an operative pretending to be a prominent Swiss political scientist invited Israelis to a conference abroad. A number of Israelis were on the verge of traveling before the plot was exposed.

Experts are also noticing that Iran is getting better and better at creating virtual honey traps. “They’re evolving their ability to create personas,” said DeGrippo, who has since moved to Microsoft. “They’ve used these personas that are mildly attractive. They like to use women’s names, as they have learned that they get a bit more interaction and success when they use female personas.”

The US and other Western countries are well aware of the threat posed by Iranian cyber operations and have taken steps to counter them. But Iran’s state-sponsored program continues to evolve. Tehran likely believes the cyber capabilities give it leverage to yield information without the messiness of a hostage crisis, the headlines of a boat seizure, the riskiness of a human intelligence operation, or the potential retribution of a missile strike.

In January, the London cyber security firm Secureworks published a report on the emergence of a new likely Iranian hacking collective called Abraham’s Ax, which aimed to use leaks and hacks to prevent the expansion of the Abraham Accords normalizing ties between Israel and some Arab states. The collective leaked allegedly stolen from the Saudi Ministry of the Interior and a recording said to be an intercepted phone conversation between Saudi ministers.

“There are clear political motivations behind this group with information operations designed to destabilize delicate Israeli-Saudi Arabian relations,” Rafe Pilling, a researcher at Secureworks, was quoted as saying.

Less than two months later, in March, Saudi Arabia signed a deal to resume ties with Iran rather than commence them with Israel, as many in Washington and Jerusalem were expecting.

While Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s hardline government and his rightwing policies likely played a major role in Saudi’s decision to hold off on joining the Abraham Accords, Riyadh’s hopes that it could rein Iran’s diverse array of threats—including its increasing cyber warfare capabilities—likely played a role in its decision to pen the China-brokered deal with Tehran.

Iran invests in its cyber warfare program because it works.

Borzou Daragahi is an international correspondent for The Independent. He has covered the Middle East and North Africa since 2002. He is also a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Security Initiative. Follow him on Twitter: @borzou.

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Belgorod raid sparks border alarm for Russia ahead of Ukrainian offensive

Peter Dickinson — Wed, 24 May 2023 00:48:53 +0000

Ukrainians woke up on Monday morning to the unexpected news of an unfolding military operation across the border in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast. The incursion was reportedly the work of two Ukraine-based Russian opposition militias, the Free Russia Legion and the Russian Volunteer Corps, who claimed the attack marked the start of a campaign to “liberate Russia.”

Further details remain confused, with conflicting information still circulating on Tuesday evening regarding the fate of the Russian militias. However, the mere fact of the incursion is itself noteworthy and may be part of Ukrainian shaping operations ahead of a widely anticipated counteroffensive. By exposing the weakness of Russia’s largely undefended borders, Ukraine could succeed in forcing Putin to reluctantly pull troops out of Ukraine in order to defend his own country.

At the official level, Ukraine has denied any involvement in the Belgorod border raid. However, while Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak declared that Ukraine “has nothing to do with it,” he could not resist mocking the Kremlin. “As you know, tanks are sold at any Russian military store, and underground guerrilla groups are composed of Russian citizens,” he tweeted in an obvious reference to the transparent lies employed by Vladimir Putin during the 2014 Russian military seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. These tongue-in-cheek comments were widely interpreted as confirmation that Ukraine was now using Russia’s own hybrid war playbook against the Putin regime.

Podolyak was not the only Ukrainian to revel in what many saw as Russia receiving a long overdue taste of its own medicine. As news of the Belgorod incursion spread, Ukrainian social media was flooded with memes proclaiming the establishment of the “Belgorod People’s Republic,” playing on earlier Kremlin disinformation about a “Ukrainian civil war,” and favorably comparing the speed of the Belgorod advance with the Russian army’s own glacial progress in eastern Ukraine.

Predictably, few in Russia saw the funny side. Instead, reactions ranged from anger and indignation on Kremlin TV to alarm over the apparent ease with which the Ukrainian-backed Russian militias were able to penetrate the border and enter the Russian federation. The outspoken leader of Russia’s mercenary Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, used the incident to launch another of his regular attacks on the Russian military establishment. “As far as I know, the military is not bothering with the strengthening of our borders,” he commented.

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While the Belgorod incursion has undoubtedly lifted Ukrainian spirits and plunged Russia into a minor panic, this was not just an example of Ukraine’s world-class trolling skills. The attack has very real implications for Russian national security and is a huge personal embarrassment for Vladimir Putin, who prides himself on his strongman image. After all, what kind of strongman ruler cannot even secure the borders of his own realm?

It is too early to predict the exact nature of the Russian response to events in Belgorod Oblast, but it seems inevitable that any reaction must necessarily include a strengthening of the entire Russia-Ukraine border. To achieve this, Moscow must find the additional soldiers and weapons systems to reinforce a frontier stretching for approximately one thousand kilometers beyond the front lines of the current military conflict.

At a time when the vast majority of the Russian military’s available forces have already been deployed in Ukraine, this will be no easy task. Indeed, British Defense Minister Ben Wallace claimed in February that 97% of the Russian army is already in Ukraine. Any efforts to bolster defenses along the Russian border with Ukraine will likely mean reducing this presence.

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Russia’s military equipment shortages were recently laid bare by the country’s exceptionally modest Victory Day celebrations, with traditional parades canceled in a string of cities and a solitary tank taking part in the flagship event on Moscow’s Red Square. The manpower situation in the Russian army is unlikely to be much better. Russian losses during the first six months of the Ukraine invasion were so severe that Putin was forced to launch the country’s first mobilization since World War II in September 2022. However, many of the 300,000 extra troops mobilized late last year have already become casualties, with US officials estimating Russian losses since December at 100,000.

This poorly prepared, badly mauled, and increasingly demoralized Russian invasion force is currently bracing to face a major Ukrainian counteroffensive that has been under preparation for the past half year. Tens of thousands of fresh Ukrainian soldiers have undergone training in NATO countries, while Ukraine has received a wide array of new equipment including modern battle tanks, armored vehicles, and long-range cruise missiles. The last thing Russian commanders would want to do at this critical point in the invasion is withdraw soldiers from the front lines, but that is exactly what may now happen.

As Ukraine continues to set the stage for the coming offensive, shaping operations could include further border incursions designed to embarrass the Kremlin and force Russia to thin the ranks of its invasion army. Any attempts to penetrate deep inside Russia or establish bridgeheads on Russian territory would probably be frowned upon by Ukraine’s Western partners, but there is unlikely to be much opposition to additional destabilizing border raids.

This week’s Belgorod incident remains shrouded in mystery but it may come to be seen as a symbolically significant moment in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. For the past fifteen months, Russia has attacked Ukraine with impunity while assuming Ukraine would never dare to strike back inside Russia. That complacency has now been very publicly shattered, creating a serious security headache for the Kremlin. Leaving Russia’s borders largely undefended is no longer an option, but reinforcing them will inevitably weaken Putin’s army in Ukraine. Ukraine’s commanders may have just outsmarted their Russian counterparts yet again.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Ukraine’s coming counteroffensive has a good chance of succeeding

Richard D. Hooker, Jr. — Tue, 23 May 2023 16:37:45 +0000

As the Ukrainian General Staff prepares for its much-heralded counteroffensive, retaking Crimea is at the top of the operational wish list. Some experts, including senior US officials, consider this an unrealistic aim. To be sure, there are many challenges. Attacking Crimea from the Kherson region would likely involve an opposed crossing of the Dnipro river, intense fighting to reach the narrow Perekop isthmus, and then essentially frontal attacks against heavily mined barriers to breach successive lines of Russian defenses, all in the face of strong Russian artillery. Ukraine will be hindered by its lack of air power and long-range fires, as well as an absence of amphibious or airborne platforms, making a frontal assault almost the only option.

Nevertheless, while daunting, the task is far from impossible. From the Huns and the Mongols to the British, the Bolsheviks, and the Germans, many invading armies have managed to conquer Crimea. Furthermore, Ukrainian morale, generalship, and combined arms capabilities all exceed Russia’s, while the fielding of up to eleven fresh brigades with excellent Western equipment has greatly strengthened Ukraine’s ground forces.

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What might a Crimean offensive look like? The Ukrainian military may well conduct sophisticated shaping operations using drones, artillery strikes, and special operations forces. A successful crossing of the Dnipro and advance to the isthmus would also shake the resolve and fighting spirit of Russian defenders.

There may, however, be a better way. Past invasions, while successful, often proved extremely costly. The British and French lost 165,000 men during the mid-nineteenth century Crimean War, for example. Given its high losses to date, Ukraine will seek to achieve its strategic objectives while preserving as much of its armed strength and physical infrastructure as possible. Bitter fighting on the Crimean peninsula would also take a heavy toll on civilians. Accordingly, cutting Crimea off from Russia and starving it of military support could achieve Ukrainian war aims at much lower cost.

This approach would see the bulk of Ukraine’s new mobile brigades massing near Dnipro, a major road and rail hub in southeastern Ukraine well outside Russian artillery range, before rupturing the front and driving for Zaporizhzhia. From there, the operational objective would be the capture of Melitopol and the severing of the land bridge from Russia to Crimea.

The open, flat terrain of southern Ukraine and the region’s relatively good road network create favorable conditions for mobile operations and logistical resupply. Supporting efforts would include maintaining pressure on Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine to hold Russian forces in place there.

If a thrust to sever Russia’s land bridge proved successful, two options could then be considered. One would be to wheel westward and isolate Russian troops in the Kherson region. Alternatively, Ukrainian forces could turn to the east and attempt to recover Mariupol, which has been occupied by Russia since May 2022.

In either case, seizing Melitopol would cause a crisis among Russian political and military leaders, as Russian forces in the south and east would be cut off from each other, rendering a coherent defense at the operational level impossible. This would dramatically undermine Russian morale and encourage further international support for Ukraine.

If mounted in June, Ukraine’s counteroffensive could potentially be concluded by summer’s end, leaving the Crimean Bridge as the only remaining option for ground resupply of Russian forces in Crimea. Campaign success, however, would bring Ukrainian long-range missiles within range of the bridge, which would also be vulnerable to drone attacks.

Meanwhile, resupply of Russian forces in Crimea by air and sea would become precarious, as ports and airfields would now be vulnerable to drone, missile, and rocket artillery strikes. In short, Crimea would be effectively isolated. Regained Ukrainian control of the North Crimean Canal, Crimea’s principal water supply, would only add to Russia’s logistical woes.

If Ukraine’s counteroffensive makes good progress in the south, the Russian Black Sea Fleet will likely find that it cannot remain in Crimea. With its home port of Sevastopol in range of Ukrainian rocket artillery, the fleet would be forced to withdraw to Novorossiysk on the Russian Black Sea coast, a much poorer anchorage with fewer facilities for naval units.

Putin would probably react to such unprecedented setbacks by reviving threats to respond with nuclear weapons, while simultaneously demanding international intervention in the form of diplomatic pressure on Kyiv for a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement that would leave him in possession of at least some Ukrainian territory. However, Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling has lost much of its impact through overuse, and because China has made it clear that nuclear weapons must be off the table.

As for salvation through diplomacy, major Ukrainian advances on the ground this summer could bring ultimate victory within sight and encourage Ukraine to carry on. If Ukrainian troops are making progress, the country’s leaders will not be in the mood to negotiate and throw away hard-won success at the conference table, however much pressure comes from outside. Allies and partners like the British, the Poles, the Nordics, and the Baltic nations can be counted on to offset other dissenting voices and to reinforce Ukrainian battlefield gains.

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Are the Ukrainian armed forces capable of bringing this off? A number of variables will come into play. Adequate quantities of fuel, spare parts, artillery, and air defense munitions along with other classes of supply must be available.

As with the Kharkiv offensive in September 2022, operational security and successful deception operations will be critical. The Ukrainian General Staff must be capable of true operational art. They must be able to sequence combined arms battles and engagements in time and space and across multiple domains to achieve decisive battlefield results. The Russians, too, must cooperate by continuing to demonstrate flawed generalship, low morale, and an inability to synchronize combat power at points of decision.

In war, of course, the future remains uncharted territory. But all signs point to a clear opportunity for the Ukrainian counteroffensive to succeed. In spite of heavy casualties, continuous combat, and an unending rain of missiles on its civilian infrastructure, Ukraine has managed to generate fresh, well-equipped, and well-trained reserves in large numbers. Talented commanders have come to the fore, vetted by years of experience fighting the Russians.

The Ukrainian General Staff is not likely to accept the risks inherent in major operations of this sort without confidence that its logistics are in place and its planning is sound. Furthermore, Ukrainian commanders must be encouraged by what they see across the front lines. Facing them are a shattered Russian army that has taken enormous losses in tanks, troops, and munitions; an ineffective Russian air force; and a Russian Black Sea Fleet that can do little but shelter in its anchorage. No outstanding Russian commanders have emerged from the carnage of the past 15 months. One must assume the Russians are currently waiting for Ukraine’s attack with low confidence and a sense of foreboding.

Subsequent phases of the campaign will seek, through diplomacy, continued sanctions, and military force, to liberate Ukraine entirely. Recent moves, such as the UK’s provision of Storm Shadow cruise missiles and other long-range munitions, are changing the military calculus. So, too, will the long-delayed decision to train Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 fighter jet. Putin is counting on support for Ukraine to degrade as allies and partners tire. In fact, Ukraine grows stronger while Russia increasingly turns to obsolete equipment and ever-more reluctant conscripts.

As we are often told, no plan survives contact with the enemy. There will likely be the occasional tactical miscue or operational hiccup during the coming counteroffensive, but a careful assessment suggests the odds are heavily in favor of Ukraine. More savage fighting lies ahead, but the end of the war may gradually be coming into view, and it looks very promising from Ukraine’s perspective.

Richard D. Hooker Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. He previously served as Dean of the NATO Defense College and as Special Assistant to the US President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia with the National Security Council.

While the EU is indexing their regulation from the risk associated with the activities AI is affecting, with ratings of low/minimal, limited, high, and unacceptable. In doing so, the EU is signaling that the higher the risk, the more regulation–—where those activities with unacceptable risk are banned outright (e.g., real-time biometric identification in public spaces, including for uses such as social credit scoring and certain aspects of predictive policing). Specifically responding to the latest developments in Generative AI, the EU is also looking to require organizations to be more responsible by assessing the environmental damage of training Large Language Models (LLMs), which are quite energy/compute-intensive, and forcing model makers to disclose “the use of training data protected under copyright law.” Another provision calls for the creation of a database to catalog where, when, and how models in the two mid-tiers of risk are being deployed in the EU. The devil is in the details…and the details haven’t been solidified yet.

At the May 16, 2023 Judiciary Committee hearing in the US, lawmakers sent strong signals of support for an entirely new agency to regulate the use of AI. Surfaced in testimony from Sam Altman (OpenAI), Christina Montgomery (IBM), and Gary Marcus (NYU), were calls for licensing systems that are capable of certain tasks (e.g., technology that can persuade, manipulate, or influence human behavior or beliefs, or create novel biological agents) or require a certain amount of compute/memory to train/operate; while this risk-based approach is similar to the current EU AI Act, it differs by suggesting a regulator could require pre-review and licensing in certain situations. This license could be taken away when compliance with yet-to-be-defined safety standards falls short (e.g., if models can self-replicate or self-exfiltrate into the wild). Commensurate with pre- and post-review of deployed AI systems, the testimony uniformly made calls for some form of impact assessments and/or audits.

Both governments have recognized the unique needs for competition and suggest that their regulatory regimes will be significantly less onerous on small innovators and startups, simultaneously encouraging innovation while stifling the ability of AI innovation at scale to cause harm to humanity.

Perhaps legislators have learned a lesson from the blanket protections Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act has provided to social media companies for decades, shielding them from liability for the content that people share on their services. These protections were recently sidestepped, and thus upheld, in a May 18, 2023 Supreme Court decision where the justices said they, “decline to address the application of Section 230 to a complaint that appears to state little, if any, plausible claim for relief.” It’s clear the Court is calling on Congress to amend the laws, especially when taken in context of Justice Elena Kagan’s comments during oral arguments where she said, “every other industry must internalize the cost of its conduct. Why is it that the tech industry gets a pass? We’re a court, we really don’t know about these things. These are not like the nine greatest experts on the Internet.”

Given the interest in legislating for and regulating the tech industry, new sub-sectors within the tech industry should be paying attention. Over the last fifteen years, the demand for regulatory reform has been focused on social media companies that host user-generated content, but with Generative AI, the focus will quickly shift. With strong signals from European and US regulators, it won’t be long until social media companies are in the minority of all the tech companies staring down the barrel of regulation.

During the Judiciary Committee hearing, the spotlight was solely focused on Generative AI. Based on suggestions put forth in testimony for regulation, hyperscalers and infrastructure companies could see regulation sooner than social media companies. For example, if systems require a certain amount of compute to be licensed, then hyperscalers and infrastructure companies may have to provide this data to regulators and be subjected to audit and governance controls. The implications expand as the use cases for Generative AI continue to proliferate and the promise that these real-time technologies will yield real-world outcomes for humanity grows by the day.

Already, consumer use of Generative AI is growing at an order of magnitude faster pace than any consumer technology in history. For this growth to transfer to the enterprise and scale to augment global workforces, foundational models will need to be fine-tuned for specific domains and research and development funds invested to reduce the costs associated with training and executing generative models. The portfolio of solutions that emerges will mean that every company must become a Real-time AI company in order to compete and thrive. When time-sensitive, contextual, and low-latency response times are critical to business and consumer success, there will be no other option than Generative AI solutions delivered in real-time.

While professionals across industries are scrambling to understand how Generative AI can help their organizations to enter new markets and disrupt existing ones, their service providers–big and small–are likely to have an increasingly important role to play with regulatory compliance. Will your infrastructure as a service provider be a help or a hindrance to your organization’s ability to thrive in the era of widespread, and regulated real-time AI?

Steven Tiell is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center. He is a strategy executive with wide technology expertise and particular depth in data ethics and responsible innovation for artificial intelligence.

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Regional cyber powers are banking on a wired future. Expanding the Abraham Accords to cybersecurity will help.

Thomas S. Warrick — Fri, 19 May 2023 19:44:07 +0000

The Abraham Accords is one of the major diplomatic achievements of the last five years. This historic agreement normalized relations between Israel and the Arab countries of Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), in partnership with the United States. Following the initial burst of activity late in the Donald Trump administration, the accords’ first expansion under the Joe Biden administration was announced in Tel Aviv on January 31, when Bahrain, Israel, the UAE, and the United States said they would widen the scope of the accords to include cybersecurity.

The January announcement by US Department of Homeland Security Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans Robert Silvers was, like the accords themselves, a surprise that seems perfectly logical in hindsight. Israel and the Arab countries who participated in the announcement are among the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region’s most dynamic economies, with substantial public and private investments in high tech being an important factor in each country. These countries face threats from hostile actors, and defending their technology and their peoples is a challenge. A challenge shared can lead to a challenge overcome.

Cyberattacks from nation-states and cybercriminals affect everyone

Each of the countries involved, with the possible exception of Morocco, has recent historical reason to be concerned about protecting its people and its industrial base—cyber and non-cyber—against cyberattacks. The greatest threats come from the Islamic Republic of Iran and cybercriminals—and the two overlap like Venn diagram circles.

Iran uses a well-documented peculiar sense of symmetry in how it conducts cyberattacks. Iran has an especially aggressive cyber offensive state capability for a country its size. Most of Iran’s nearby peers in population (ex: Turkey, Congo, Thailand, and Tanzania) or GDP per capita (ex: Bosnia, Namibia, Paraguay, and Ecuador) do not mount offensive cyberattacks or information operations against other countries on the scale that Tehran does. Iran and Israel have been engaged in “gray zone” cyberattacks against each other for more than a decade, and Iran has carried out various kinds of cyber operations against Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, most of the Arab countries of the Gulf, and the United States.

Cybercrime is another threat that has increased in recent years. The United States has convened two international conferences on ransomware, with the most recent being held in October-November 2022. The UAE and Saudi Arabia were reportedly the main targets in the Gulf for ransomware attacks, according to media reports, but other Gulf Arab countries are also at risk.

Complicating the picture is the fact that Iran often uses private contractors to carry out cyber operations—sometimes those entities carry out cyberattacks for profit as well. This complicates attribution and gives Tehran a patina of plausible deniability.

These factors make deterring cyberattacks especially difficult in the Middle East. The United States has sometimes retaliated against Iranian cyberattacks by carrying out operations against the perpetrators. However, the logic of deterrence requires an ability to impose costs that surpass the adversary’s perceived gains from the conduct in question. Iran has shown limited susceptibility thus far to being deterred by the US or others’ cyber operations. This makes cyber defense even more important.

Setting aside old rivalries to work together on cybersecurity is now in everyone’s interest

Iranian cyber behavior, the rising threat of cybercrime, and the inability so far to deter these behaviors have made it imperative that Israel, the Gulf countries, and the United States work more closely on civilian cyber defense.

Network imperatives make it important that this collaboration be both at network speeds and peer-to-peer. Cybersecurity needs to move quickly to be effective at addressing threats, which means that governments facing common threats should work together. The architecture of pre-Internet times allowed for hub-and-spoke information sharing in a situation where several governments were regional rivals but all had a common ally they could trust (usually, an ally that was considerably far away).

As a result, the United States could simultaneously be an ally of Israel and most Arab countries in the Middle East, and each of the countries would be willing to share information with the United States, even if they wouldn’t do so with each other (France and the United Kingdom have played similar roles with different sets of countries). Each country could trust the United States to protect its sources and methods while working for the common good, which, in earlier days, was focused on keeping the Soviet Union at bay.

For a time, this approach worked in cybersecurity. But this is no longer the case. Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) were social-media savvy but lacked the resources and deep bench of a nation-state, allowing the United States and MENA to limit terrorists’ efforts to raise funds and recruit new fighters.

Today, Iran, even under sanctions, has far more resources than al-Qaeda ever did to use cyber tools to target Israel and the Gulf Arab states. While there are signs that a lack of funds holds back some of Iran’s cyber operations, cyberattacks are still remarkably cost-effective. Cybercrime raises enough funds to enrich organized gangs to run their own 24/7 ransomware help desks. “Ransomware-as-a-service” is now an actual thing.

The countries in the MENA region still face a number of challenges in the cyber domain. The use of Chinese technology by some countries raises fears of possible network penetration. Each country needs to work out how privacy norms and expectations should govern electronic surveillance tools, because the abuse of those tools has become an international concern. US concerns over “spyware” has already led to an executive order against the use of commercial tools that pose a risk to national security or have been misused to enable human rights abuses around the world.

A number of countries in MENA—Israel, Bahrain, and the UAE included—are increasingly becoming regional cyber powers and are banking on a wired future. Many governments in the region are trying to stimulate local investment in the digital sector, and protecting small but growing companies from cyber threats is becoming a significant business, with market research experts estimating a doubling of dollar volume in five years. The UAE’s new National Security Strategy aims to train more than forty thousand cybersecurity professionals and encourages Emirati students to pursue a career in this field.

To the private sector, an agreement among Abraham Accords members is more than just a sign of possible government-to-government cooperation. The agreement gives a valuable green light for direct business-to-business exchanges that could benefit the economy of the region. It may also heighten the value of joining the accords for other nations facing cyber threats, such as Saudi Arabia.

Given the importance of a closer cybersecurity partnership among Israel, key Gulf Arab states, and the United States, broadening the Abraham Accords to include cybersecurity is an eminently sensible approach. Like other parts of the accords, expanding them to include cybersecurity will have a lasting impact if cooperation leads to real benefits in security and commerce, making the Middle East more secure and prosperous than ever before.

Thomas S. Warrick is the director of the Future of DHS project at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice, and a senior fellow and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

The post Regional cyber powers are banking on a wired future. Expanding the Abraham Accords to cybersecurity will help. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s growing defense tech prowess can help defeat Russia

Mykhailo Fedorov — Thu, 18 May 2023 18:41:08 +0000

For as long as humans have waged war, technology has played a key role. New military technologies determine the form and manner of warfare while offering undeniable advantages to those who possess them. Today, the rise of AI, drones, and autonomous control systems is changing the face of warfare and shifting the battlefield to the technological realm. Ukraine is at the cutting edge of this process.

Since February 2022, Ukraine has been defending itself in a major war against an enemy that enjoys overwhelming superiority in both conventional weapons and manpower. But while Russia relies on the brute force of artillery bombardments and human wave tactics, Ukraine is waging an innovative form of warfare that utilizes a range of highly creative and often improvised tech solutions. This emphasis on defense tech has been instrumental in many of Ukraine’s most striking military successes of the past fifteen months. Given the right support, it can help secure victory over Russia.

The Ukrainian military has already demonstrated its ability to use everything from drone technologies to satellite communications to effectively manage the modern battlefield. These technologies help save the lives of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians while also dramatically enhancing the effectiveness of combat operations.

At the same time, it is important not to underestimate the enemy. Russian army commanders recognize the increasing importance of defense tech and are working hard to close the gap in areas where Ukraine has established a lead. To stay ahead, it is vital to constantly innovate. This requires a systematic approach to the development of Ukraine’s defense tech sector.

Ukraine’s immediate goal is to create a fast track for defense tech innovation that can make a powerful contribution to the defeat of Russia’s invasion. We must create an environment where startups flourish and innovative products can move rapidly toward mass production. Creativity must be tailored to the specific needs of the military, with the necessary expertise and state support readily available to turn great ideas into military advantages.

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This was the thinking behind the Brave1 defense tech cluster, which was launched by Ukraine in late April. A joint initiative of Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation, Defense Ministry, General Staff, National Security and Defense Council, Ministry of Strategic Industries, and Economy Ministry, Brave1 is designed to serve as a hub for the country’s defense tech industry. It is a platform to optimize cooperation between individual defense tech companies, the state, the Ukrainian military, investors, and other potential partners.

The scope of Brave1 is necessarily broad. Ukraine is seeking to promote new developments in a wide range of defense-related tech segments including supply and logistics, unmanned aerial vehicles, cybersecurity, navigation, and medical care. We have designed the initiative relying on international experience, though in the end, we have quite a unique Ukrainian story. Brave1 includes partner accelerators and incubators, investor engagement opportunities, and educational courses.

The Brave1 Defense Innovation Council is headed by Mark Lennon. Mr. Lennon has held senior leadership positions at Apple, Gartner, and in the US government, and has also served for 24 years as a US Naval Officer. His background and credibility will enable Brave1 to become a powerful platform capable of generating war-winning technologies.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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The long-term objective is clear: Ukraine must become one of the world’s leading defense tech countries. This is entirely realistic. After all, Ukraine is already acquiring unique wartime experience on a daily basis and boasts a very large number of highly skilled IT professionals and engineers. Moscow’s full-scale invasion has turned Ukraine into a testing ground for new military technologies. It is also transforming the country into a defense tech superpower.

This process has the potential to profoundly impact Ukraine’s national security and the country’s economy. I am confident that in the coming years, we will witness the emergence of powerful Ukrainian defense tech companies worth billions of dollars. The growth of this sector will play a critical role in Ukrainian defense policy for decades to come and will remain a top national priority.

All that lies ahead. The task now is to defeat Russia. The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin is unlikely to end soon. Instead, it should be viewed as a marathon. Ukrainians must be ready for a long fight. We must play to our strengths as a tech-savvy nation of innovators, and must do everything to maximize effective cooperation between creative minds, state bodies, and the military. Ukrainians have already demonstrated to global audiences that they are some the bravest fighters on the planet. They must now confirm that are also among the smartest.

Mykhailo Fedorov is Ukraine’s Vice Prime Minister for Innovations, Development of Education, Science and Technologies, and Minister of Digital Transformation.

A conversation on the transformational potential of decentralized and distributed technologies for Pakistan

Amir Husain and Uzair Younus — Thu, 18 May 2023 14:25:58 +0000

The world is on the cusp of a seismic technological shift. In the coming years, decentralized technologies and artificial intelligence are going to disrupt the status quo and create new models of development and growth. The opportunity for emerging markets is immense, and these technologies can enable countries like Pakistan to leapfrog ahead.

In this Pakistan Initiative conversation, Uzair Younus talks to Amir Husain, founder and chief executive officer of SparkCognition, about current and emerging trends, what countries like Pakistan can do to take advantage of these seismic shifts, and how individuals can better prepare themselves for the future.

Watch the full interview below:

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

SouthAsiaSource May 3, 2023

How Pakistani women use technology solutions to overcome barriers to entrepreneurship

By Fatimata Ndiaye, Ishani Srivastava, Estelle Thomas, and Yiran Zha

A field study of women entrepreneurs in urban Pakistan, commissioned by the South Asia Center in conjunction with Johns Hopkins University and the American Pakistan Foundation, revealed how technology solutions can support women to jumpstart their entrepreneurial ventures.

Entrepreneurship Pakistan

Issue Brief Apr 17, 2023

Pakistan’s rapidly digitizing society requires clear policymaking

By Uzair Younus

This issue brief provides recommended steps that policymakers in Pakistan ought to take to address key concerns around free expression on the internet, and to generate momentum to catalyze higher levels of growth in Pakistan’s technology ecosystem.

Digital Policy Economy & Business

SouthAsiaSource Mar 6, 2023

Amid Pakistan’s political and economic turmoil, risks to curbs on digital freedoms grow

By Uzair Younus

Growing polarization and instability in Pakistan have increased the likelihood that as elections draw near, curbs on speech, largely limited thus far to television channels, may extend to internet platforms like YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter.

Civil Society Elections

Wagner chief’s rants highlight Russian infighting ahead of Ukraine offensive

Olivia Yanchik — Mon, 15 May 2023 13:51:14 +0000

The head of Russia’s Wagner mercenary group has launched a series of outspoken attacks on the country’s military leadership in recent weeks that point to mounting internal divisions within Putin’s invading army as it prepares to face a potentially decisive Ukrainian counteroffensive.

In one of his most recent rants, Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin mocked Russian Defense Ministry claims of a “redeployment to defensive positions” near to the hotly contested city of Bakhmut and warned that in reality, the front was in danger of collapsing. “The Defense Ministry’s attempts to cover up the situation will lead to a global tragedy for Russia,” he stated on May 12. “They must stop lying immediately.”

This was the latest in a series of public statements by Prigozhin accusing the Russian army and defense ministry of failing to provide his Wagner troops with sufficient front line support. He had earlier threatened to withdraw his forces from Bakhmut altogether due to alleged ammunition shortages.

In his many video addresses, Prigozhin has sought to burnish his own credentials as a straight-talking military man while attacking members of the Russian military establishment. Speaking in the wake of recent Russian retreats from the flanks around Bakhmut, he declared: “Soldiers should not die because of the absolute stupidity of their leadership.”

He also raised eyebrows last week by referring mockingly to a “happy grandpa,” which many assumed was a reference to Putin himself. This was clearly too much even for Prigozhin, who quickly released a new statement clarifying that the “grandpa” in question may have been a number of military leaders including chief of the Russian general staff Valery Gerasimov, but was most certainly not Putin.

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Prigozhin’s public attacks on Russia’s military leadership reflect his rising profile and growing swagger. The Wagner mercenary group he leads first came into being nine years ago during the initial stages of Russia’s military invasion of eastern Ukraine, at a time when the Kremlin was eager to maintain a degree of plausible deniability. Subsequent roles in Syria and Africa allowed Wagner to expand significantly, but it was the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 that transformed the fortunes of the mercenary force and thrust it into the international limelight.

Over the past fifteen months of the Ukraine invasion, Wagner has emerged as the only group within the Russian military to meet or surpass expectations. While units of the regular army have been decimated and forced into a series of humiliating retreats, Wagner has achieved numerous grinding advances in eastern Ukraine. This has given Prigozhin the confidence and the clout to name and shame his superiors for their alleged shortcomings. Such attacks have only added to his popularity among Russian audiences.

Prigozhin’s criticisms are in a sense hypocritical, given the notoriously high casualty rates among his own soldiers. Indeed, the brutal tactics adopted by Wagner forces in the Battle of Bakhmut have led many to describe the battle as a “meat grinder.” According to US officials, around half of the estimated 20,000 Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine since December 2022 have been Wagner troops fighting in and around Bakhmut.

Ukrainian sources have also questioned the credibility of Prigozhin’s efforts to praise the valor of his Wagner forces while accusing regular Russian troops of abandoning their positions. “The first soldiers to flee were Wagner,” a Ukrainian commander who took part in early May engagements near Bakhmut told CNN. This and other similar accounts may indicate that Prigozhin is lashing out at the army high command from a position of weakness as Wagner’s earlier exploits risk being overshadowed by more recent setbacks.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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Why has Putin not intervened to end the increasingly bitter public feud between Prigozhin and Russia’s military leadership? Some see it as a sign of the Russian dictator’s own growing weakness, while others argue that it may be a deliberate ploy to position the likes of Defense Minister Shoigu and army chief Gerasimov as scapegoats for a coming defeat. At the very least, Prigozhin’s attacks on military commanders serve to deflect the blame for the failing invasion away from Putin himself.

While Prigozhin’s headline-grabbing rants may help to protect Putin from criticism on the domestic front, they also risk further undermining morale among Russian forces in Ukraine. The issue of demoralization is already posing major challenges for Russian commanders, with more cases of desertion recorded in Russian military courts in the first four months of the current year than during the whole of 2022. Recent months have also seen a sharp rise in video addresses posted to social media by Russian soldiers complaining of suicidal “human wave” tactics and catastrophic battlefield losses.

With Ukraine expected to launch a major counteroffensive in the coming weeks, Russian military morale will likely soon face its stiffest test since the invasion began in February 2022. Major question marks remain over the ability of Russian troops to stand their ground, particularly given the Kremlin’s growing reliance on poorly trained conscripts drafted into the military late last year as part of Russia’s first mobilization since World War II.

These mobilized troops proved highly ineffective during Russia’s failed winter offensive, suffering high casualties while making almost no progress. They must now prepare for defensive operations against a Ukrainian force that has been training for the coming offensive for the past six months. Russia has also been digging in and preparing sophisticated defenses, but morale will be a huge factor during what many observers predict will be some of the most intense battles of the entire war. Prigozhin’s frequent public criticism of Russian troops and commanders is unlikely to boost fighting spirit at this critical moment for Putin’s invasion.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Dexter Tiff Roberts quoted in DW on Chinese exit bans and foreign investment

sboyle — Fri, 12 May 2023 19:19:00 +0000

On May 12, 2023 Nonresident Senior Fellow Dexter Tiff Roberts was quoted in Deutsche Welle, discussing how China’s tightening domestic security policies risk scaring away foreign investors.

“Foreign companies might no longer want to invest in certain Chinese companies as they can’t figure out what businesses they are doing and how real they are,” Roberts said.

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Dexter Tiff Roberts

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The post Nonresident Senior Fellow Dexter Tiff Roberts quoted in DW on Chinese exit bans and foreign investment appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin’s embarrassing one-tank parade hints at catastrophic losses in Ukraine

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 09 May 2023 21:58:17 +0000

It would be hard to image a more fitting symbol of Russia’s declining military fortunes than the sight of a solitary Stalin-era tank trundling across Red Square during the country’s traditional Victory Day celebrations on May 9. For the past two decades, Vladimir Putin has used Victory Day to showcase modern Russia’s resurgence as a military superpower, with dozens of the very latest tanks typically taking part in each annual parade. This year, however, the only tank on display was a T-34 model dating back to World War II.

Inevitably, the embarrassing absence of tanks at this year’s Victory Day parade has been widely interpreted as further evidence of Russia’s catastrophic losses in Ukraine. Social media was soon buzzing with posts poking fun at the Kremlin. “Modern Russian military equipment can be found much more easily at Ukrainian military trophy exhibitions than at the Victory Parade in Moscow,” noted the Ukrainian Defense Ministry’s official Twitter account. Others were less subtle. “There was one tank at the parade in Moscow! We laugh all over Ukraine,” posted Ukrainian MP Oleksiy Goncharenko. “There are farmers in Ukraine with more tanks than that,” quipped another Twitter user.

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Tuesday’s one-tank parade was the latest in a series of blows that had already cast a shadow over preparations for this year’s Victory Day celebrations. In the month preceding the holiday, more than twenty cities across Russia canceled plans to hold military parades. While security concerns were officially cited, these cancellations fueled speculation that Russia simply doesn’t have enough military equipment available to stage regional parades, with the vast majority of tanks and other vehicles having already been sent to Ukraine.

The complete cancellation of this year’s Immortal Regiment marches was an even bigger blow. This mass participation event, which sees members of the public marching through Russian towns and cities while displaying portraits of family members who served in the Red Army during World War II, has become an integral part of Russia’s Victory Day rituals over the past decade and has been endorsed by Putin himself. Nevertheless, the Kremlin decided to ban marches this year amid fears that family members of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine may seek to participate. With Russian officials still in denial over the disastrous consequences of the Ukraine invasion, the last thing the Kremlin wanted was for thousands of grieving relatives to gather in public and draw attention to the scale of the tragedy.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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The negative optics surrounding this year’s Victory Day celebrations are personally damaging for Vladimir Putin, who has been instrumental in placing the holiday at the very heart of modern Russia’s national identity. It is often assumed that Victory Day has always dominated the Russian calendar, but this is simply not true. In fact, during the 46-year period between the end of World War II and the fall of the USSR, the Soviet authorities held just three Victory Day military parades. Other holidays such as May Day and the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution were considered far more significant.

It was not until Putin came to power at the turn of the millennium that Victory Day began to assume its current position as Russia’s most important public holiday. Over the past two decades, Putin has transformed Victory Day into the centerpiece of a pseudo-religious victory cult complete with its own sacred symbols, feast days, saints, and dogmas. The hysteria surrounding the holiday has come to be known as “Pobedobesie” or “victory mania,” with anyone who dares question the Kremlin’s highly sanitized version of World War II likely to be treated with the kind of severity once reserved for medieval heretics.

The veneration of Russia’s role in the defeat of Nazi Germany has proven extremely politically profitable for Putin. It has helped him rebuild Russian national pride following the humiliation of the 1990s, and has paved the way for a return to authoritarianism in today’s Russia by rehabilitating Stalin and minimizing the crimes of the Soviet era. Putin has also revived the lexicon of World War II as a convenient way to attack his enemies, with domestic and foreign opponents routinely branded as “fascists.” Indeed, in modern Russia the term “Nazi” has lost all meaning and has come to indicate anyone viewed as “anti-Putin.”

This toxic trend is most immediately apparent in relation to Ukraine. Kremlin leaders have spent years demonizing Ukrainians as “Nazis,” despite the complete absence of any actual far-right politicians in the Ukrainian government. Predictably, when Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he declared the “de-Nazification” of the country to be his chief war aim. The Russian dictator returned to this theme again during Tuesday’s Victory Day address, directly comparing his unprovoked attack on Ukraine to the struggle against Nazi Germany.

Putin’s endless appeals to the memory World War II are clearly designed to mobilize the Russian public in support of the current war, but they cannot completely disguise the grim realities of his rapidly unraveling Ukraine invasion. What was initially envisaged as three-day campaign to overthrow the Ukrainian government and seize control of the country has become the bloodiest European conflict since the days of Hitler and Stalin. Over the past fifteen months, Russian military losses have been so heavy that senior US intelligence officials are now openly questioning whether Putin’s army still retains the capacity to “sustain even modest offensive operations.” With a major Ukrainian counteroffensive expected to begin in the coming weeks, there is little cause for optimism in Moscow.

It is in some ways poetic that developments surrounding this year’s Victory Day holiday have brought Russian audiences closer to the unpalatable truth. From the cancellation of regional parades and public marches to the lack of tanks on Red Square, it is now becoming painfully obvious to the average Russian that things are not going according to plan in Ukraine. An event conceived as a propaganda spectacle to project the strength of the Putin regime has instead served to underline Russia’s growing weakness. Putin is often accused of living in the past, but this is one Victory Day he will wish to forget.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

The post Sec. Mark Esper and Sec. Deborah Lee James promote DoD budget flexibility and program management reform in Defense One appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bangladesh draft data protection act 2023: Potential and pitfalls

Christabel Randolph — Mon, 08 May 2023 19:07:07 +0000

Download pdf

The Bangladesh government’s updated draft data protection bill is a welcome revision of its 2022 attempt to address the country’s lack of a comprehensive data protection law, but there is still room for constructive change to heighten regulatory certainty.

The Information and Communications Technology Division of the Ministry of Posts, Telecommunication, and Information Technology released the proposed Data Protection Act 2023 (DPA 2023 or the bill) 1 on March 14—just days after the publication of the South Asia Center’s March issue brief—and the revised version responds to some of the criticism of the digital protectionism and restrictive provisions on digital business activity in the 2022 draft.

Specifically, the proposed legislation reflects an operational sensibility based on stakeholder feedback on significant issues. It has incorporated more flexibility to frame rules to address changing situations, provided for a transition period, relaxed data localization requirements, and expressly recognized the importance of international cooperation and safeguard measures for facilitating data flows.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

Issue Brief Mar 8, 2023

Inside Bangladesh’s new data protection laws

By Stephen Weymouth

The 2022 Draft Data Protection Act (DPA), which establishes new restrictions related to the processing, storage, and transfer of data, appears to move Bangladesh’s digital governance in a different direction.

Bangladesh Digital Policy

Issue Brief Apr 17, 2023

Pakistan’s rapidly digitizing society requires clear policymaking

By Uzair Younus

Digital Policy Economy & Business

Issue Brief May 4, 2023

India’s personal data protection act and the politics of digital governance

By Stephen Weymouth

The Digital Personal Data Protection Bill of 2022 aims to balance the interests of Indian consumers seeking enhanced privacy and data security against the business need for unconstrained data flows.

Digital Policy Economy & Business

Southasiasource Blog

The post Bangladesh draft data protection act 2023: Potential and pitfalls appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Dakota Cary in Bloomberg as China tightens grip on information flows

sbryant — Sun, 07 May 2023 16:57:12 +0000

On May 7th, 2023, Nonresident fellow Dakota Cary spoke to Bloomberg about Beijing’s recent efforts to curtail overseas firms’ access to Chinese data sources as tensions with Washington mount. “By taking crucial data off the table, public discourse on China will drift further from the truth. It’s a reckless move by China to limit access to the data,” said Cary. “The US-China relationship will be made worse by this decision.”

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Tantardini in Longitude on Central and Eastern European involvement in space

Atlantic Council — Fri, 05 May 2023 19:27:38 +0000

In the May 2023 Issue of Longitude, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Marco Tantardini published an article on the budding involvement of Central and Eastern European countries in the European Space Agency and in commercial space activities. He noted that concerns about European security have been reflected in an increased focus on outer space.

It is no surprise in the current geopolitical landscape [that] the spatial activism of former Soviet Republics [is] scaling up the eastern defense flank of NATO and the EU

Marco Tantardini

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Marco Tantardini

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Prigozhin threatens Wagner withdrawal from Bakhmut

The post Tantardini in Longitude on Central and Eastern European involvement in space appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Prigozhin threatens Wagner withdrawal from Bakhmut

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 05 May 2023 16:54:34 +0000

Security

Russia accuses Ukraine of conducting “terrorist attack” targeting Putin

Russia carries out attacks across Ukraine, attempting to break through Ukrainian defenses

Prigozhin threatens Wagner withdrawal from Bakhmut

In a Telegram video published on May 5, Yevgeny Prigozhin stood in front of a group of Wagner fighters and threatened to withdraw Wagner forces from Bakhmut on May 10. He added that they will “celebrate” Russia’s May 9 Victory Day “with the brilliance of Russian weapons” and then hand the positions over to the Russian defense ministry.

The withdrawal threat came on the heels of a May 4 post on the Telegram channel Kyepka Prigozhina (“Prigozhin’s Hat”) featuring a graphic video of Prigozhin furiously addressing Russia’s military leadership over an ammunition shortage. In the video footage, Prigozhin stands in front of dozens of dead bodies and identifies them as Wagner Group fighters killed in Ukraine. Shouting, Prigozhin addresses Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Armed Forces Chief Valery Gerasimov, “Shoigu! Gerasimov! Where the [expletive] is the ammunition?” Prigozhin says that Wagner is “lacking 70 percent of needed ammunition” and that those who are not providing them shells “will be in hell.” Continuing with more profanities, Prigozhin complains that Russian military leadership is sitting in their luxurious offices with their children living their best lives, while Wagner fighters are dying without ammunition in Ukraine.

Prigozhin has repeatedly complained about not receiving sufficient ammunition from the Russian defense ministry.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russia accuses Ukraine of conducting “terrorist attack” targeting Putin

On the night of May 3, CCTV footage showed two drones crashing into a flagpole located atop the Kremlin Senate Palace in Moscow. Later in the day, statements emerged from the Kremlin, alongside reporting from TASS and other pro-Kremlin outlets, referring to the action as a “terrorist attack” and “an attempt on the life of the president.”

The two drones crashed into the flagpole of the Kremlin’s presidential residence, located next to Moscow’s Red Square, which at the time was closed for preparations ahead of the annual May 9 Victory Day parade. The drones reportedly crashed within fifteen minutes of each other, the first coming from the south of Moscow, and the second came from the east.

Although the Kremlin brought forward no hard evidence to prove the incident was an assassination attempt, Russian politicians and media figures nonetheless called for retaliation. RT editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan tweeted, “Maybe now it will start for real?” Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev called for the elimination of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Pro-Russian Telegram channel BALTNEWS referenced a Ukrainian crowdfunding initiative to buy drones for Ukrainian forces, claiming that Ukraine is raising funds to launch new attacks on Russia. The initiative is connected to a Ukrainian drone manufacturer’s announcement offering a prize if someone could land a drone during Moscow’s May 9 Victory Day parade. Crowdfunding is not limited to the Ukrainian side; the Russian armed forces and Wagner Group also collect money for such drones using similar tactics. These allegations do not establish causality with the May 3 attack.

Although no party has officially claimed responsibility for the attack, Ukrainian drone strikes have intensified over the past two weeks, with several disruptive actions carried out targeting trains in the Bryansk region, as well as strikes against oil units in Sevastopol, Crimea and Illinski, Russia. Ukraine appears to have increased its offensive actions in trying to disrupt supply routes to Russian forces.

An investigative thread posted on Twitter by the open-source project GeoConfirmed raised the possibility of Ukrainian partisans having carried out the attack. However, as reported by Meduza, Russia uses effective GPS jamming systems in the area surrounding the Kremlin. This, in conjunction with the January 2023 deployment of defense systems next to President Putin’s offices and private residences, raises questions about the feasibility of such an attack. According to data from the map-based web project GPSJam, GPS jamming was enforced over the entire Moscow Oblast on May 2. In addition, the Guardian reported on the possibility of a false-flag operation led by Russia to excuse escalating violent measures against Ukraine.

As the rumored Ukrainian counteroffensive remains an open question, the Russian military is trying to replenish its reserve, causing unrest amongst the civilian population in Russia. A post from the Russian Telegram channel VChK-OPGU quoted an unnamed source who claimed that “’unprecedented’ safety measures will be introduced by the Moscow municipal authorities,” including “patrolling the area of objects, educational institutions, prefectures and administration [buildings] by staff of local institutions.” They added that staff members are asked to report any “suspicious flying object as well as people, check seals of basements and attics,” indicating the possibility of enhanced monitoring for dissent.

–Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Russia carries out attacks across Ukraine, attempting to break through Ukrainian defenses

Donetsk remains the most active sector of the frontline in eastern Ukraine, where the Russian army continues its attempts to break through Ukrainian defenses in the direction of Bakhmut and Marinka. Vuhledar is also a target of attacks, including an exchange of heavy artillery shelling between Ukrainian and Russian forces.

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine claimed it had repelled forty-one attacks from Russian forces on May 1. In addition, the Russian army tried to attack Severnoye and Pervomaiskoye in the direction of Avdiivka, and in the area of Bilohorivka and Novoselivka in the direction of Lyman. On May 3, Russian forces reportedly conducted more than forty offensive operations while attempting to advance near Bilohorivka, Bakhmut, Severnoye, Marinka, and Novomykhailivka. Between May 3 and the morning of May 4, the Russian army is believed to have carried out two missile strikes, sixty-eight airstrikes, and sixty-seven shellings with multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) across Ukraine.

On May 1, Russian forces launched a rocket attack on Kramatorsk, wounding one person and damaging a school, according to Ukrainian reports. Another rocket attack targeted Kramatorsk on May 4, damaging an educational institution and nearby residential buildings. There were no initial reports of casualties.

In Russia, local media reported fires at the Ilyinsky refinery in the Krasnodar region and the Novoshakhtinsky oil products plant in the Rostov region, allegedly due to drone strikes. On May 4, Russian occupation authorities in Crimea reported a drone was shot down near Belbek.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

The post Russian War Report: Prigozhin threatens Wagner withdrawal from Bakhmut appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How Pakistani women use technology solutions to overcome barriers to entrepreneurship

Fatimata Ndiaye, Ishani Srivastava, Estelle Thomas, and Yiran Zha — Wed, 03 May 2023 17:27:20 +0000

Pakistan is far behind the curve in terms of women’s labor force participation. It ranks 145^th of 146 countries on the Economic Participation and Opportunity Subindex of the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report, focusing on workforce participation levels, salaries, and access to high-skilled employment. At 21 percent, women’s labor force participation in the nation is well below the 35 percent average for lower-middle-income countries.

With a growing economy and a young population, entrepreneurship is a crucial solution to create much-needed jobs while bringing more women into the labor force.

A field study of women entrepreneurs in urban Pakistan, commissioned by the South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council in conjunction with the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and the American Pakistan Foundation, explored how technology solutions can support women to jumpstart their entrepreneurial ventures, promote their businesses, and facilitate financial transactions. The full report can be viewed here.

Digital access is crucial for entrepreneurship, and its importance is only expected to grow with time. Social media and e-commerce enable entrepreneurs to reach new customers and maintain links with existing ones, build their brands, and expand their networks. Productivity tools for communicating with vendors and employees, bookkeeping, and inventory management are increasingly digitized as well. However, there is a significant gender gap in access, and it is compounded for poorer, less-educated, and rural women.

Women entrepreneurs often lack business skills, education, experience, and access to networks in comparison to male peers. Women are also less likely to own bank accounts, take a business loan, and formally register their business, all of which hinder the business’ growth and success rate. The majority of women who do embark on entrepreneurial ventures rely on their own funds or borrow from a family member for startup capital. This naturally restricts access for women from lower-income socioeconomic strata.

In addition to these systemic barriers, women also face societal barriers, including limited agency in household decision-making, restrictions on mobility, and a disproportionate burden of household labor and unpaid care work.

A growing trend of “social media entrepreneurship” is leveling the playing field. Women are able to monetize their skills despite lacking access to business education and male-dominated professional networks. The study also revealed that the ability to run a business from home helps women to circumvent societal barriers and balance their household duties with work. However, in the long run, this increases the risk of entrenching the same regressive gender norms, thus serving as a potential barrier to further growth.

Nevertheless, increasing access to smartphones and the internet remains the most important lever to boost women’s engagement in entrepreneurship.

Making it easier for women to register for fintech products such as mobile wallets as well as promoting the adoption of mobile wallets can drive women’s entrepreneurship. Women who already have entrepreneurial ventures are found to be generally familiar with mobile wallets, which also indicates that these can be leveraged as an avenue to facilitate formal financial inclusion for these entrepreneurs. For instance, public sector banks can encourage women to use mobile wallet credit history to apply for a business loan.

In addition, most women entrepreneurs are unaware of business skill development and startup incubation programs currently being implemented in Pakistan. However, high penetration of social media indicates that these platforms are ideal channels for outreach and awareness generation. Direct linkages between social media platforms and women entrepreneurs can bring needed business skills where the women already are. One aspect of this linkage could also aim to encourage women from lower socioeconomic classes to diversify their presence on social media, encouraging them to take up platforms with wider reach and greater monetization potential.

In the long term, however, it is necessary to promote society-wide, gender-positive norms, and to gender-sensitize the business ecosystem as well as government and banking regulations.

All four authors are pursuing the Master of Arts in International Relations degree at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. They took on this project as part of their final-year capstone requirements.

Fatimata Ndiaye is currently focusing on states, markets, and institutions, with a regional focus on Africa.

Ishani Srivastava is focusing on development, climate, and sustainability, with a regional focus on Asia.

Estelle Thomas has pursued numerous benevolent ventures as well as forefronted social justice student organizations, in parallel with her academic career.

Yiran Zhan is focusing on international economics and finance, as well as sustainable development.

This research was made possible by the generous support of Seema and Shuja Nawaz on behalf of the Pakistan Initiative of the South Asia Center and the American Pakistan Foundation, in partnership with the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

Shuja Nawaz is a distinguished fellow and the founding director of the South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council, Washington DC. His latest book is The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood. On Twitter: @ShujaNawaz

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

Issue Brief Mar 27, 2023

The future of women in India: Barriers, facilitators and opportunities

By Amita N. Vyas, Misha Iqbal, Capucine Querenet, Harris Samad, Irfan Nooruddin

This issue brief describes cross-cutting themes, a proposed theory of change, and recommendations that emerged from the Atlantic Council and US Department of State expert convening, “Future of Women and Work in South Asia” on how to foster cross-sectoral collaboration and catalyze knowledge sharing to support women’s economic empowerment in South Asia.

Education India

SouthAsiaSource Sep 26, 2022

To support Afghan women activists, prioritize local knowledge over numbers

By Sophie Mae Berman and Yelena Biberman

Though Afghan women have been included in certain peacebuilding efforts, these experiences were largely tokenist and minimally empowering.

Afghanistan Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

Report Oct 3, 2022

Pakistan sees growing culture of innovation amid tech startup boom

By Hamna Tariq and Uzair Younus

A tightening global macro environment coupled with increasing domestic political instability is a cause of concern for the sector, especially the domestic startup economy.

Economy & Business Entrepreneurship

The 5×5—Cryptocurrency hacking’s geopolitical and cyber implications

Simon Handler — Wed, 03 May 2023 04:01:00 +0000

In January 2023, a South Korean intelligence service and a team of US private investigators conducted an operation to interdict $100 million worth of stolen cryptocurrency before its hackers could successfully convert the haul into fiat currency. The operation was the culmination of a roughly seven-month hunt to trace and retrieve the funds, stolen in June 2022 from a US-based cryptocurrency company, Harmony. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) attributed the theft to a team of North Korean state-linked hackers—one in a string of massive cryptocurrency hauls aimed at funding the hermit kingdom’s illicit nuclear and missile programs. According to blockchain analysis firm Chainalysis, North Korean hackers stole roughly $1.7 billion worth of cryptocurrency in 2022—a large percentage of the approximately $3.8 billion stolen globally last year.

North Korea’s operations have brought attention to the risks surrounding cryptocurrencies and how state and non-state groups can leverage hacking operations against cryptocurrency wallets and exchanges to further their geopolitical objectives. We brought together a group of experts to explore cybersecurity implications of cryptocurrencies, and how the United States and its allies should approach this challenge.

#1 What are the cybersecurity risks of decentralized finance (DeFi) and cryptocurrencies? What are the cybersecurity risks to cryptocurrencies?

Eitan Danon, senior cybercrimes investigator, Chainalysis:

Disclaimer: Any views and opinions expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect the official position of Chainalysis.

“DeFi is one of the cryptocurrency ecosystem’s fastest-growing areas, and DeFi protocols accounted for 82.1 percent of all cryptocurrency stolen (totaling $3.1 billion) by hackers in 2022. One important way to mitigate against this trend is for protocols to undergo code audits for smart contracts. This would prevent hackers from exploiting vulnerabilities in protocols’ underlying code, especially for cross-chain bridges, a popular target for hackers that allows users to move funds across blockchains. As far as the risk to cryptocurrencies, the decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies increases their security by making it extraordinarily difficult for a hostile actor to take control of permissionless, public blockchains. Transactions associated with illicit activity continue to represent a minute portion (0.24 percent) of the total crypto[currency] market. On a fundamental level, cryptocurrency is a technology—like data encryption, generative artificial intelligence, and advanced biometrics—and thus a double-edged sword.”

Kimberly Donovan director, Economic Statecraft Initiative, and Ananya Kumar, associate director of digital currencies, GeoEconomics Center, Atlantic Council:

“We encourage policymakers to think about cybersecurity vulnerabilities of crypto-assets and services in two ways. The first factor is the threat of cyberattacks for issuers, exchanges, custodians, or wherever user assets are pooled and stored. Major cryptocurrency exchanges like Binance and FTX have had serious security breaches, which has led to millions of dollars being stolen. The second factor to consider is the use of crypto-assets and crypto-services in money-laundering. Often, attackers use cryptocurrencies to receive payments due to the ability to hide or obfuscate financial trails, often seen in the case of ransomware attacks. Certain kinds of crypto-services such as DeFi mixers and aggregators allow for a greater degree of anonymity to launder money for criminals, who are interested in hiding money and moving it quickly across borders.”

Giulia Fanti, assistant professor of electrical and computer engineering, Carnegie Mellon University:

“The primary cybersecurity risks (and benefits) posed by DeFi and cryptocurrencies are related to lack of centralized control, which is inherent to blockchain technology and the philosophy underlying it. Without centralized control, it is very difficult to control how these technologies are used, including for nefarious purposes. Ransomware, for example, enables the flow of money to cybercriminial organizations. The primary cybersecurity risks to cryptocurrencies on the other hand can occur at many levels. Cryptocurrencies are built on various layers of technology, ranging from an underlying peer-to-peer network to a distributed consensus mechanism to the applications that run atop the blockchain. Attacks on cryptocurrencies can happen at any of these layers. The most widely documented attacks—and those with the most significant financial repercussions—are happening at the application layer, usually exploiting vulnerabilities in smart contract code (or in some cases, private code supporting cryptocurrency wallets) to steal funds.”

Zara Perumal, chief technology officer, Overwatch Data:

“Decentralized means no one person or institution is in control. It also means that no one person can easily step in to enforce. In cases like Glupteba, fraudulent servers or data listed on a blockchain can be hard to take down in comparison to cloud hosted servers where companies can intervene. Cybersecurity risks to cryptocurrencies include endpoint risk, since there is not a centralized party to handle returning accounts as the standard ways of credential theft is a risk to cryptocurrency users. There is a bigger risk in cases like crypto[currency] lending, where one wallet or owner holds a lot of keys and is a large target. In 2022, there were numerous high-profile protocol attacks, including the Wormhole, Ronin, and BitMart attacks. These attacks highlight the risks associated with fundamental protocol vulnerabilities via blockchain, smart contracts or user interface.”

#2 What organizations are most active and capable of cryptocurrency hacking and what, if any, geopolitical impact does this enable for them?

Danon: “North Korea- and Russia-based actors remain on the forefront of crypto[currency] crime. North Korea-linked hackers, such as those in the Lazarus Group cybercrime syndicate, stole an estimated $1.7 billion in 2022 in crypto[currency] hacks that the United Nations and others have assessed the cash-strapped regime uses to fund its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles programs. Press reporting about Federation Tower East—a skyscraper in Moscow’s financial district housing more than a dozen companies that convert crypto[currency] to cash—has highlighted links between some of these companies to money laundering associated with the ransomware industry. Last year’s designations of Russia-based cryptocurrency exchanges Bitzlato and Garantex for laundering hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of crypto[currency] for Russia-based darknet markets and ransomware actors cast the magnitude of this problem into starker relief and shed light on a diverse constellation of cybercriminals. Although many pundits have correctly noted that Russia cannot ‘flip a switch’ and run its G20 economy on the blockchain, crypto[currency] can enable heavily sanctioned countries, such as Russia, North Korea, and others, to project power abroad while generating sorely needed revenue.”

Donovan and Kumar: “We see actors from North Korea, Iran, and Russia using both kinds of cybersecurity threats described above to gain access to money and move it around without compliance. Geopolitical implications include sanctioned state actors or state-sponsored actors using the technology to generate revenue and evade sanctions. Hacking and cyber vulnerabilities are not specific to the crypto-industry and exist across digital infrastructures, specifically payments architecture. These threats can lead to national security implications for the private and public entities accessing or relying on this architecture.”

Perumal: “Generally, there are state-sponsored hacking groups that are targeting cryptocurrencies for financial gain, but also those like the Lazarus Group that are disrupting the cryptocurrency industry. Next, criminal hacking groups may both use cryptocurrency to receive ransom payments or also attack on chain protocols. These groups may or may not be associated with a government or political agenda. Many actors are purely financially motivated, while other government actors may hack to attack adversaries without escalating to kinetic impact.”

#3 How are developments in technology shifting the cryptocurrency hacking landscape?

Danon: “The continued maturation of the blockchain analytics sector has made it harder for hackers and other illicit actors to move their ill-gotten funds undetected. The ability to visualize complex crypto[currency]-based money laundering networks, including across blockchains and smart contract transactions, has been invaluable in enabling financial institutions and crypto[currency] businesses to comply with anti-money laundering and know-your-customer requirements, and empowering governments to investigate suspicious activity. In some instances, hackers have chosen to let stolen funds lie dormant in personal wallets, as sleuths on crypto[currency] Twitter and in industry forums publicly track high-profile hacks and share addresses in real-time, complicating efforts to off-ramp stolen funds. In other instances, this has led some actors to question whether this transparency risks unnecessary scrutiny from authorities. For example, in late April, Hamas’s military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, publicly announced that it was ending its longstanding cryptocurrency donation program, citing successful government efforts to identify and prosecute donors.”

Donovan and Kumar: “Industry is responding and innovating in this space to develop technology to protect and/or trace cyber threats and cryptocurrency hacks. We are also seeing the law enforcement, regulatory, and other government communities develop the capability and expertise to investigate these types of cybercrimes. These communities are taking steps to make public the information gathered from their investigations, which further informs the private sector to safeguard against cyber operations as well as technology innovations to secure this space.”

Fanti: “They are not really. For the most part, hacks on cryptocurrencies are not increasing in frequency because of sophisticated new hacking techniques, but rather because of relatively mundane vulnerabilities in smart contracts. There has been some research on using cutting-edge tools such as deep reinforcement learning to try to gain funds from smart contracts and other users, particularly in the context of DeFi. However, it is unclear to what extent DeFi users are using such tools; on-chain records do not allow observers to definitively conclude whether such activity is happening.”

Perumal: “As the rate of ransomware attacks rises, cryptocurrency is more often used as a mechanism to pay ransoms. For both that and stolen cryptocurrency, defenders aim to track actors across the blockchain and threat actors increase their usage mixers and microtransactions to hide their tracks. A second trend is crypto-jacking and using cloud computing from small to large services to fund mining. The last development is not new. Sadly, phishing and social engineering for crypto[currency] logins is still a pervasive threat and there is no technical solution to easily address human error.”

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#4 What has been the approach of the United States and allied governments toward securing this space? How should they be approaching it?

Danon: “The US approach toward securing the space has centered on law enforcement actions, including asset seizures and takedowns with partners of darknet markets, such as Hydra Market and Genesis Market. Sanctions in the crypto[currency] space, which have dramatically accelerated since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last February, have generated awareness about crypto[currency] based money laundering. However, as is the case across a range of national security problems, the United States has at times over relied on sanctions, which are unlikely to change actors’ behavior in the absence of a comprehensive strategy. The United States and other governments committed to AML should continue to use available tools and data offered by companies like Chainalysis to disrupt and deter bad actors from abusing the international financial system through the blockchain. Given the blockchain’s borderless and unclassified nature, the United States should also pursue robust collaboration with other jurisdictions and in multilateral institutions.”

Donovan and Kumar: “The United States and its allies are actively involved in this space to prevent regulatory arbitrage and increase information sharing on cyber risks and threats. They have also increased communication with the public and private sectors to make them aware of cyber risks and threats, and are making information available to the public and industry to protect consumers against cybercrime. Government agencies and allies should continue to approach this issue by increasing public awareness of the threats and enabling industry innovation to protect against them.”

Fanti: “One area that I think needs more attention from a consumer protection standpoint is smart contract security. For example, there could be more baseline requirements and transparency in the smart contract ecosystem about the practices used to develop and audit smart contracts. Users currently have no standardized way to evaluate whether a smart contract was developed using secure software development practices or tested prior to deployment. Standards bodies could help set up baseline requirements, and marketplaces could be required to report such details. While such practices cannot guarantee that a smart contract is safe, they could help reduce the prevalence of some of the most common vulnerabilities.”

Perumal: “Two recent developments from the US government are the White House cybersecurity strategy and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) move to ‘secure by default.’ They both emphasize cooperation with the private sector to move security of this ecosystem to cloud providers. While the system is inherently decentralized, if mining or credential theft is happening on major technology platforms, these platforms have an opportunity to mitigate risk. The White House emphasized better tracing of transactions to “trace and interdict ransomware payments,” and CISA emphasizes designing software and crypto[currency] systems to be secure by default so smaller actors and users bear less of the defensive burden. At a high level, I like that this strategy moves protections to large technology players that can defend against state actors. I also like the focus on flexible frameworks that prioritize economics (e.g., cyber liability) to set the goal, but letting the market be flexible on the solution—as opposed to a prescriptive regulatory approach that cannot adapt to new technologies. In some of these cases, I think cost reduction may be a better lever than liability, which promotes fear on a balance sheet, however, I think the push toward financially motivated goals and flexible solutions is the right direction.”

#5 Has the balance of the threats between non-state vs. state actors against cryptocurrencies changed in the last five years? Should we be worried about the same entities as in 2018?

Danon: “Conventional categories of crypto[currency]-related crime, such as fraud shops, darknet markets, and child abuse material, are on the decline. Similarly, the threat from non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, remains extremely low relative to nation states, with actors such as North Korea and Russia continuing to leverage their technical sophistication to acquire and move cryptocurrency. With great power competition now dominating the policy agenda across many capitals, analysts should not overlook other ways in which states are exercising economic statecraft in the digital realm. For example, despite its crypto[currency] ban, China’s promotion of its permissioned, private blockchain, the Blockchain-based Service Network, and its central bank digital currency, the ‘digital yuan,’ deserve sustained research and analysis. Against the backdrop of China’s rise and the fallout from the war on Ukraine, it will also be instructive to monitor the efforts of Iran, Russia, and others to support non-dollar-pegged stablecoins and other initiatives aimed at eroding the dollar’s role as the international reserve currency.”

Donovan and Kumar: “More is publicly known now on the range of actors in this space than ever. Agencies such as CISA, FBI, and the Departments of Justice and the Treasury and others have made information available and provided a wide array of resources for people to get help or learn—such as stopransomware.gov. Private blockchain analytics firms have also enabled tracing and forensics, which in partnership with enforcement can prevent and punish cybercrime in the crypto[currency] space. Both the knowledge about ransomware and awareness of ransomware attacks have increased since 2018. As the popularity of Ransomware as a Service rises, both state and non-state actors can cause destruction. We should continue to be worried about cybercrime in general and remain agnostic of the actors.”

Perumal: “State actors continue to get more involved in this space. As cryptocurrencies and some digital currencies based on the blockchain become more mainstream, attacking it allows a more targeted geopolitical impact. In addition to attacks by governments (like Lazarus Group), a big recent development was China’s ban on cryptocurrency, which moved mining power from China to other parts of the world, especially the United States and Russia. This changed attack patterns and targets. At a high level, we should be worried about both financially-motivated and government-backed groups, but as the crypto[currency] market grows so does the sophistication of attacks and attackers.”

The post The 5×5—Cryptocurrency hacking’s geopolitical and cyber implications appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How strong is Russian public support for the invasion of Ukraine?

Sviatoslav Hnizdovskyi — Tue, 02 May 2023 18:56:56 +0000

Ever since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, the Kremlin has worked hard to create the impression of enthusiastic support for the war among the Russian population. However, many continue to question the true scale of this public backing. In order to get a sense of Russian attitudes toward the invasion, we need to go beyond official statements and explore everything from online activity and fundraising initiatives to psychological factors that may be shaping opinion in Putin’s Russia.

Polling data remains the most commonly cited evidence of widespread Russian support for the invasion of Ukraine. However, such indicators must be treated with a high degree of skepticism due to the obvious risks inherent in expressing anti-regime opinions in an authoritarian state such as modern Russia. Over the past year, various polls have identified strong levels of public support ranging from 55% to 75%, with relatively little fluctuation. The Levada Center, which is regarded by many international observers as Russia’s only legitimate independent pollster, has conducted monthly polls since the beginning of the invasion that have consistently indicated public backing of over 70%.

While opinion polls indicating pro-war sentiment must be treated with caution, there is very little evidence of any active opposition to the invasion within Russian society. In the weeks following the outbreak of hostilities, relatively small protests took place in a number of Russian cities, but this trend failed to gain momentum. Despite awareness of the atrocities taking place in Ukraine and the Russian military’s unprecedented losses, there remains no real anti-war protest movement in Russia.

This absence of anti-war activity is perhaps unsurprising. The Kremlin has adopted a series of draconian laws in the wake of the invasion that criminalize any criticism while outlawing use of the word “war” in favor of the euphemistic “Special Military Operation.” As a result of these legislative changes, numerous high-profile opposition figures have been given long prison sentences for their anti-war stances. At the same time, it is important to note that although more than one million Russians have fled the country in response to the invasion of Ukraine, very few have taken advantage of their newfound freedoms to stage anti-war rallies outside Russia.

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Public support for the invasion can be seen in the many examples of ordinary Russians mobilizing to back the war effort. Across the country, large numbers of fundraising initiatives have emerged to help supply Russian soldiers with everything from drones and radios to food and warm clothing. These grassroots efforts are entirely voluntary and point to high levels of public sympathy for the Russian soldiers currently serving in Ukraine.

A further indication of pro-war sentiment within Russia is the revival of Stalin-era denunciations targeting anyone seen as critical of the war. There have been numerous high-profile instances of colleagues, teachers, and even family members reporting people to the authorities for voicing anti-war opinions. During the first half of 2022 alone, Russian media and information space regulator Roskomnadzor reportedly received 144,835 individual denunciations.

Social media remains comparatively free in today’s Russia and provides important insights into the public mood. Young supporters of the war have largely congregated on TikTok, where they often form pro-war groups and post messages celebrating the Russian army.

Telegram has emerged as a key platform for Russian audiences seeking to follow the invasion. There are a substantial number of military-themed accounts offering some of the most credible coverage of the war, often including remarkably frank criticism of the Russian establishment. These pro-war accounts have gained considerably in status since February 2022 and have attracted millions of followers.

Eurasia Center events

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Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Research conducted by Ukraine’s Open Minds Institute has identified widespread pro-war sentiment on Russian social media. While it is important to acknowledge that the Kremlin is believed to invest heavily in bot farms and troll armies, the vast majority of the accounts studied by the Open Minds think tank appear to represent real people with their own wide-ranging interests and long histories of posting on different topics.

Support for the war on Russian social media tends to be expressed in abstract terms relating to national pride rather than any concrete benefits deriving from the invasion. Accounts based in Moscow demonstrate the lowest levels of interest in the war, while regions closest to Ukraine are the most negative. Meanwhile, areas of Russia furthest from the conflict tend to be more positive. Posts and comments closely mirror changing events on the ground and typically reflect the latest developments in Ukraine, indicating high levels of awareness regarding the current status of the invasion.

While it is impossible to determine exact levels of pro-war sentiment within Russian society, it is clear that the invasion of Ukraine enjoys considerable backing. What is fueling these positive attitudes toward a war that has horrified global audiences?

A combination of factors have shaped Russian public opinion in favor of the invasion. Propaganda has played a central role in this process, with Russian audiences subjected to years of relentless messaging throughout the Kremlin-controlled mainstream media preparing the population for war with Ukraine.

Many Russians appear to be driven by feelings of faith and obedience toward the authorities. Other factors include notions of national identity rooted in the imperial past and a strong desire to belong. Many Russians may be choosing to adopt pro-war positions in order to associate with like-minded people and demonstrate their own patriotism. Others may be motivated primarily by a desire to avoid accusations of disloyalty.

Unfortunately, such conformity often comes at the expense of critical thinking or moral constraints. This has made it possible for millions of otherwise unremarkable people to support the largest European war of aggression since the days of Hitler and Stalin. Some observers speculate that much of this support is insincere and would soon evaporate if circumstances within Russia changed. Nevertheless, the currently available evidence indicates overwhelming acceptance of the invasion, at the very least.

Sviatoslav Hnizdovskyi is founder and CEO of the Kyiv-based Open Minds Institute.

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Russia’s recent geopolitical isolation has complicated the situation further by pushing Moscow toward Tehran. This growing military cooperation between Russia and Iran has sparked alarm in Israel amid fears that it could have significant negative consequences for the country’s national security.

Firstly, by providing Russia with weapons including drones, Iran is gaining important battlefield experience and improving its drone technology, potentially increasing the threat to Israel in the long run. Secondly, some observers fear that if Russia reduces its Syrian presence due to the invasion of Ukraine, it would give Iran more room to operate freely in Syria.

Not everyone is convinced. Omer Dostri, a specialist at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, does not think a complete Russian withdrawal from Syria is currently likely. He argues that Russia remains a major world power and can simultaneously engage in the war in Ukraine while also remaining in Syria. However, if Russia does significantly decrease its military presence in Syria, he argues that Israel might acutally enjoy more freedom of action and air control.

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Israel’s greatest concern remains the possibility of Russia potentially helping Iran in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Yossi Melman, a senior analyst for the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, says Russia could do so either by lobbying for a relaxation of international restrictions or by directly providing nuclear material to Iran in exchange for weapons.

For now, Israel’s objective is to dissuade Russia and demonstrate that its aid to Iran is a waste of resources and finances. However, if Russia were to significantly increase its military and security assistance to Iran, particularly in the context of Iran’s presence in Syria, Israel would likely respond by rethinking its support for Ukraine and its approach to the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Potential Russian military aid to Iran could include ballistic missiles, fighter jets, and air defense systems. Additionally, recent reports indicate Moscow may be considering establishing production lines in Iran for certain Russian weapons.

Israel is also concerned that Russia could supply equipment to upgrade the Iranian nuclear program, although Moscow may be reluctant to do so due to its own strategic interests. Nevertheless, the prospect of such a scenario has caused considerable alarm in Israel, with experts acknowledging that it would be a game-changer for the country that would require a significant shift in its relations with Moscow.

The deepening partnership between Russia and Iran is likely to remain Israel’s key focus in the months ahead. If Russia suffers further military setbacks in Ukraine, there is a danger that Moscow’s increased reliance on Tehran could result in greater Iranian influence in Syria while also strengthening the country’s position during negotiations with the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, many in the West would like to see Israel play a larger role in efforts to support Ukraine. Although neither Russia nor Iran has crossed any red lines that would prompt a formal shift in Israel’s stance toward Ukraine, the longer the current war persists, the more Israel will be pressured by its Western allies to take an active role in opposing Russian aggression.

According to Dostri, the United States is already calling on Israel to support Ukraine more robustly. “At present, Israel is providing humanitarian and medical aid, as well as defensive support, such as helmets along with missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attack warning systems. Israel is also sharing intelligence related to the threat from Iran’s UAVs,“ he says. The US is reportedly urging Israel to take further steps, such as providing the Ukrainian army with anti-missile defense systems and potentially even attack drones.

With no end in sight to the Russian invasion, Israel will likely face further calls in the coming months to stand with the democratic world and back Ukraine. “Israel has to take a side and not sit on the fence because Israel’s main ally is the US, not Russia,“ notes Melman.

Joseph Roche is a journalist and former MENA junior analyst at Oxford Analytica. He holds a master’s degree in international history from The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva.

One key reason is the opportunity to scale R&D innovations attuned to the needs of the region. Google opened its first African AI lab in Ghana. Why did Google do this? A few technology corporations, like IBM, Google, and others, have created R&D labs in Africa as they begin to understand the landscape of African research and innovation. Due to their knowledge and experience on both the local and global scales, some have hired African diaspora professionals to run these labs. IBM maintains research facilities in Kenya and South Africa, while Google operates an AI facility in Ghana. Why did they decide to reside there? They undoubtedly want to find out what fresh ideas startups, AI researchers, and other organizations are working on, as well as new trends that can be made into products. This kind of foresight is wise for business, but it will be necessary moving forward. One in five people on the planet will be African in thirty years, so if a business wants to be first to market, a local Africa presence will be essential to cater to this growing demographic market.

Utilizing AI and emerging technologies in healthcare and medicine

The tropical regions of Africa are a hotbed for many emerging diseases that pose a threat to global health. These regions also have a high incidence of poverty, which limits access to quality healthcare. As a result, there is a great need for new medical technologies that can be used to prevent, diagnose, and treat existing and upcoming diseases. AI and other emerging technologies have the potential to transform healthcare in Africa by providing early detection of disease outbreaks, developing more effective treatments, and improving access to quality care. Additionally, these technologies can help reduce the cost of healthcare delivery by automating tasks and improving efficiency.

US technology multinationals are investing in AI and other emerging technologies because they recognize the potential impact these technologies can have on global health. By commercializing and scaling R&D innovations from Africa, the private sector, technology multinationals, and academic institutions are partnering to improve the lives of millions of people across the continent and other frontier markets. Zindi, a start-up based in Cape Town, South Africa, called upon African data scientists to develop solutions to address the COVID-19 crisis when it was at its peak. Similarly, Christian Happi—a Professor of Molecular Biology and Genomics, as well as director of the ACEGID at Redeemer’s University in Nigeria—has assembled a team of data scientists who are utilizing AI and other advanced technologies to sequence the SARS-CoV-2 virus.

The opportunity for US technology multinationals in Africa

Due to the continent’s variety of entrepreneurial ecosystems, particularly tech incubators, accelerators, and co-working spaces, US technology multinationals are turning to Africa and other frontier markets as a proving ground to test AI and other emerging technologies solutions. These entrepreneurial ecosystems are starting to serve as a testing ground for new ideas that, for a variety of reasons, such as a lack of base-load power or the high cost of Internet data, would not take off in a developed market. The continent also has a growing population of young people who are embracing digital technologies, which presents a significant opportunity for companies that are looking to expand their customer base and broaden their workforce.

African critical minerals used in emerging technologies

Several critical minerals, such as cobalt, lithium, graphite, platinum metals, etc., serve as essential materials for everyday tech such as consumer electronic products—thus far an untapped market for powering the global emerging technology ecosystem. Additionally, Africa’s natural resources also offer the opportunity to make the African continent a leading player in the global green transition to electric vehicles that run on batteries. This is a market that China has largely cornered, however, due to African governments realizing the potential to generate more revenue from these critical minerals, African countries have recently started to ban unprocessed raw commodities being used in emerging technologies. For instance, Zimbabwe recently instituted a raw lithium ban and other African countries are starting to realize the opportunity to navigate geopolitical competition between the world’s industrial powers to capitalize on their critical minerals for their own development–foreign direct investment, value-addition, and increased job creation.

The challenge of scaling R&D innovations in Africa

The challenge of scaling R&D innovations is that they require significant investments of time and money to bring to market, and these investments are often riskier than traditional businesses. For US technology multinationals, the opportunity to scale their R&D investments in Africa is an attractive proposition. The continent has a vast population with a growing middle class, and its resources are largely untapped. However, doing business in Africa comes with its own set of challenges, including infrastructure constraints and political instability. Nevertheless, for companies willing to invest in the continent, the rewards could be significant.

There are significant challenges associated with scaling R&D innovations in Africa, including:

• Infrastructure: Many African countries do not have the basic infrastructure required to support large-scale R&D operations. Challenges include unreliable base-load power, telecommunications, and transportation.
• Skilled labor: In many African countries, education levels are low and there is a lack of trained personnel who can work in R&D facilities.
• Political instability: There are political risks associated with doing business in Africa. These risks include instability, corruption, and government interference.

The benefits of an Afro-centric R&D innovation strategy

There are many benefits to pursuing an Afro-centric R&D innovation strategy, including the ability to scale innovations more effectively across frontier and emerging markets. By focusing on developing technologies that can be adapted to work in tropical climates, US technology multinationals can gain a first mover advantage in the African market and tap into a vast untapped customer base. Additionally, this strategy can help build long-term relationships with local partners and suppliers, which is essential for successful business operations in Africa. The natural environment in Africa, which includes semi-arid temperatures, deserts, and tropical climates, can also be a suitable testing ground for innovations that could thrive in developed markets. Moreover, US companies can position themselves as global leaders in the race to develop impactful innovations for Africa by investing in R&D of technologies relevant to the continent’s needs. Finally, by 2030 African youth are expected to constitute forty two percent of the global youth population. This is an enormous demographic who will be tech savvy, ambitious, and hungry for economic opportunity.

Conclusion

US technology multinationals have recognized the potential for scaling up Afro-centric R&D innovations in Africa. With access to a large and growing digitized population, as well as an abundance of data resources untapped for AI, this continent offers enormous opportunities for responsibly advancing AI and other emerging technologies. By leveraging local knowledge and expertise, US technology companies can develop new products and services designed specifically for African markets while also contributing to the development of innovative solutions applicable globally in emerging and developed markets.

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Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes

Tiffany Vora — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 13:00:49 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

ISSUE BRIEF

The “United States Space Priorities Framework,” released in December 2021, confirmed the White House’s commitment to American leadership in space.¹ Space activities deliver immense benefits to humankind. For example, satellite imaging alone is crucial for improvements in daily life such as weather monitoring as well as for grand challenges like the fight against climate change. Such breakthrough discoveries in space pave the way for innovation and new economies on Earth. Exploration is at the cutting edge of this process: it expands humankind’s knowledge of the universe, transforming the unknown into the supremely challenging, expensive, risky, and promising. US allies and partners accelerate this transformation via scientific and technical achievements as well as processes, relationships, and a shared vision for space exploration. By integrating these allied capabilities, the United States and its allies and partners set the stage for safe and prosperous space geopolitics and economy in the decades to come.

However, harnessing the capabilities of US allies and partners for space exploration is complex, requiring the balance of relatively short-term progress with far-horizon strategy. Space exploration has changed since the US-Soviet space race of the 1960s. In today’s rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical environment, it is unclear whether the processes, relationships, and vision that previously enabled allied cooperation in space, epitomized by the International Space Station (ISS), will keep pace. Here, China is viewed as the preeminent competitor for exploration goals and capabilities—as well as the major competitor for long-term leadership in space.² This development drives fears of space militarization and weaponization, prompting protectionist legislation, investment screening, and industrial policies that can disrupt collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners.³ Further complication stems from the rise of commercial space, with opportunities and challenges due to the decentralization, democratization, and demonetization of technologies for robotic and crewed space exploration.

China is viewed as the preeminent competitor in space. Pictured here, the Shenzhou-14 has been used extensively by both the PLA and Chinese commercial sector. May 29, 2022. Source: China News Service

This paper serves as a primer for current US space exploration goals and capabilities that will be critical to achieving them. It highlights arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned to jointly accelerate space exploration while also benefitting life on Earth. This paper concludes with recommended actions—gleaned from interviews with international experts in space exploration—for the US government as well as allied and partner governments to increase the number and impact of global stakeholders in space exploration, to remove friction in collaboration, and to guide the future of space toward democratic values.

Current space exploration efforts

Over the next few decades, US and allied space exploration will integrate uncrewed (robotic) and crewed missions to achieve scientific discovery, technological advancement, economic benefits, national prestige, and planetary defense.

Concept art for NASA’s Gateway Program, includes elements from international partners and government partners. Credit : NASA

Uncrewed space exploration missions generally focus on expanding fundamental scientific knowledge and laying the foundation for future activities such as resource extraction. Collaborators include the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the European Space Agency (ESA) and member space agencies, and the space agencies of India, Japan, South Korea, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), with public-private partnerships delivering additional capabilities.⁴ Several missions to Mars will study the planet’s geology, atmosphere, and possible past or current life, with sample-return missions currently scheduled by NASA and the ESA for the early 2030s.⁵ The search for conditions suitable to life will be extended to other locations in the solar system, such as the moons of Jupiter and Saturn. Robotic missions will continue to increase understanding of the Sun, Mercury, Venus, the Moon, asteroids, Jupiter and its moons, and deep space. Observational studies of planets outside our solar system, black holes, comets, stars, and galaxies will be enabled by space telescopes and other imaging modalities. Uncrewed exploration goals are also being pursued by the China National Space Administration, with particular attention to its planned International Lunar Research Station.⁶ Note that important technological gaps in robotic space exploration—such as dust mitigation⁷ and space situational awareness⁸ —are being tackled by critical research and development by US partners and allies.

Crewed space exploration objectives for the United States and its allies and partners are encapsulated by the Moon to Mars roadmap,⁹ an integrated strategy that, over the next several decades, will synergize exploration goals in low-Earth orbit (LEO), cislunar space, and Mars. Within this roadmap, for which all timelines may shift, the Artemis program will return humans (including the first woman and person of color) to the Moon no earlier than 2025, with the long-term goal of establishing a sustainable human presence on the lunar surface.¹⁰ The Artemis program will use the heavy-lifter Space Launch System (SLS) and the Orion spacecraft to send astronauts and payloads to a space station in lunar orbit called the Gateway. From there, the Human Landing System will transport them to and from the Artemis Base Camp on the lunar surface (note that mission details are still being refined). The program involves crucial contributions from allied governments and industries. Hardware, software, and lessons learned from the Artemis program and other activities in LEO and on the ISS will lay the foundation for Mars:¹¹ human exploration (generally projected for the 2030s), scientific investigation, and eventual permanent settlement.¹² In particular, the Gateway serves important roles in infrastructure development (e.g., supply chains) and better understanding of the effects of extended deep-space missions on the human body—both crucial aspects of crewed space exploration.

NASA’s Artemis I rocket carrying the Orion research spacecraft, Wednesday from Launch Complex 39B at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Florida, Nov. 16, 2022. Source : Andrew Parlette

International partners are critical for the success of the Artemis program. They are providing expertise, technology, and funding across the spectrum from basic science and engineering to specific software and hardware mission deliverables. A few examples highlight the benefits of leveraging the capabilities of US allies and partners.¹³ The ESA is contributing to the construction and operation of the Gateway and the Orion service module. Canada is delivering several critical components of the Gateway,¹⁴ while Japan and the ESA are building important components of habitation modules. Navigation, tracking, and communication capabilities are key contributions from Australia; an ESA program will also provide lunar telecommunications and navigation.¹⁵ Other important hardware, subsystems, and expertise will be supplied by space agencies such as those of Italy¹⁶ and the United Kingdom. Moreover, allied companies are partners in the design, development, and deployment of capabilities underlying the Artemis program.

Today, US and allied cooperation in space rests on the Artemis Accords,¹⁷ a set of principles, guidelines, and best practices for peaceful civilian space exploration building on the Outer Space Treaty of 1967¹⁸ and subsequent policies. Key principles include peaceful operations, transparency, interoperability, and commitments to deconfliction and the collaborative management of orbital debris and space resources. The original group of eight signatories in 2020 has since expanded to twenty-three as of March 2023, with representation across the globe from the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific, and Africa.

Signatory nations host mature or developing industries directly or indirectly pertinent to space exploration (see Table 1), signaling strong potential for bilateral and multilateral collaboration. Notably, neither Russia nor China—the two largest competitors to allied space exploration—have signed, nor appear likely to sign, the Artemis Accords. Thus, it is imperative for the United States to follow through on its commitments to its allies and partners, demonstrating that it remains the partner of choice for open and transparent space exploration and scientific inquiry.

To project leadership in space exploration, the United States and its allies and partners ought to be first in returning humans to the Moon and landing astronauts on Mars. Most experts interviewed for this paper agreed that—with China and Russia also racing to these benchmarks—achieving these “firsts” is important for prestige, diplomacy, and establishing a strong foundation for a rules-based order in outer space, similar to that seen across traditional domains, with the goal of promoting long-term freedom and prosperity. Failure to achieve these “firsts” could arise due to Chinese achievements, insufficient allied funding and political will, geopolitical events, a catastrophic mission failure, or from the United States underutilizing the capabilities of its allies and partners, both in the public and private sectors. The latter becomes more likely due to protectionist policies, including caps on foreign contributions, and political interference in competition. Overall, early stakeholders in this new phase of space exploration will set the culture, norms, and standards that will underpin space activities for years to come—a major reason to strengthen the systems and processes that enable US-led collaboration with allies and partners.

Technological opportunities and challenges

There are numerous opportunities to facilitate, enrich, and expand collaboration in space exploration between the United States and its partners and allies. At the same time, important challenges hold back current efforts to harness allied capabilities, pointing to opportunities to improve collaboration in the coming years.

Allied opportunities in space exploration

Continuing to advance space exploration by both machines and humans requires costly, sophisticated, interdisciplinary technology development across sectors; this can only be done through the aggregate efforts of the United States and its allies and partners from start to finish.¹⁹ Such international cooperation, and cooperation between the public and private sectors, will not only overcome the major technical, logistical, and scientific challenges of space exploration, but also complement Earth-focused innovation initiatives in critical technologies (see Table 1).²⁰ For example, formal and informal strategies to leverage biotechnological advances for the expansion of bioeconomies²¹ have been formulated for the United States,²² Germany,²³ United Kingdom,²⁴ European Union,²⁵ India,²⁶ and others—including China.²⁷ Together, allied and partner space agencies play crucial roles as early funders of the science, engineering, and business development of space and space-adjacent products and services that will both benefit from and drive space exploration in the coming decades; they also serve as early (and often sole) clients for these products and services.

Autonomous robotic system²⁸ are an illustrative example of how collaboration around a major technology objective for space exploration can overcome a series of challenges and deliver benefits across both Earth and space. Such systems rely on sophisticated integration of sensors, robotics, microelectronics, imaging, and computation. Depending on the target application, they must withstand extremes in temperature, radiation, gravity, pressure, resource constraints, and other parameters. Autonomous operation is imperative because of the vast distances that signals must travel (the one-way time delay for operating a robot on the asteroid closest to Earth that may be suitable for mining, 16 Psyche, is at least ten minutes).²⁹ Trusted (cybersecure) autonomous robotic systems will be critical for resource extraction, safety, human health, and sustainability in space environments; related technology development is benefiting Earth-based applications such as mining, surgery, supply chains, and transportation. The European Space Resources Innovation Center—a partnership of the Luxembourg Space Agency, the Luxembourg Institute of Science and Technology, and the ESA—is running an incubation program for early projects around utilizing space resources,³⁰ a salient example of how public and private entities can cooperate to drive capabilities for exploration and commercialization. All experts interviewed for this paper agreed that the quicker pace, receptiveness to risk, and sensitivity to costs and markets of commercial endeavors can benefit public-private partnerships for space exploration.

Challenges to allied space exploration

Despite the affordances of international cooperation, systems and processes can make it difficult to harness allied capabilities. Protectionist activity by the United States and its allies and partners can arise when a single government has made large investments in research and development, hindering the transfer of technologies, personnel, information (including unclassified information), and data across borders. Many of the technologies shown in Table 1 appear on lists of critical, emerging, and breakthrough technologies from the United States,³¹ European Union,³² and other public and private organizations. This complicates collaboration, as many of these technologies are dual use and under intense Chinese scrutiny/competition, and are thus subject to export regulations—in some cases, even to US allies.

A lightweight simulator version of NASA’s Resource Prospector undergoes a mobility test in a regolith bin at the agency’s Kennedy Space center in Florida. The Resource Prospector mission aims to be the first mining expedition on another world. Source: NASA/Kim Shiflett

Notably, space exploration and the technology segments in Table 1 support concentrated, high-paying jobs with strong economic impact,³³ and are therefore subject to political protection from competition, from allies, and/or between the public and private sectors. For example, the US Congress’s NASA Authorization Act of 2010 called for the reuse in the SLS of components of the Space Shuttle, with reliance on legacy suppliers, infrastructure, and personnel.³⁴ The resulting SLS is not reusable, and a single launch may cost upward of $1 billion.³⁵ In contrast, SpaceX (one of several companies developing rockets) claims that its Starship is fully reusable, has a larger payload, has much lower development costs (which have been partially funded by NASA), and—controversially—may have operational costs of less than $10 million per launch within the next few years.³⁶ Several experts interviewed for this paper suggested that a healthy sense of competition between the public and private sectors could encourage government space agencies to support ambitious timelines and budgets while upholding their commitment to safety.

Harnessing allied space capabilities will be key for constraining duplication of efforts and optimizing value creation, resource sharing, technology transfer, and costs. Over time, the hardware, software, and data from exploration missions will support off-Earth communities of increasing size, complexity, and duration in LEO, cislunar space, the Moon, Mars, asteroids, and beyond—underscoring the importance of harnessing allied capabilities in these technology areas for space exploration today.

Table 1: Allied and partner offerings in key space exploration technologies

This table includes select nations with a strong history of space- and/or Earth-related success within a specific technological segment (examples labeled “Now”) and/or have burgeoning commercial sectors worth examining (examples labeled “Next”). Note: This table is not exhaustive.

Recommendations and conclusions

Harnessing allied capabilities is crucial for future space exploration, with major potential benefits to life on Earth as well. The US government, working alongside allied and partner governments, should therefore consider the following next steps:

Recommendation #1: US government actors—including Congress, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, the State Department including its Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, and the Defense Technology Security Administration in the Office of the Secretary of Defense—should reexamine and reform Export Administration Regulations. Priority should be given to potential reforms that strengthen the United States’ position as an orchestrator of complex international collaborations and supply chains, in contrast to a paradigm of the United States as a globally dominant, unilateral player. Support from executive- and ministerial-level offices is essential.

Effects include:

Promote removal of friction in international collaborations and public-private partnerships.
Enable reciprocity in cooperation (including data transfer and potential to bid).
Balance safety with risk.
Render attractive the inclusion of US companies and government bodies in allied workflows, supply chains, and markets, particularly for businesses in emerging technologies.
Support short-term economic and security goals as well as long-term diplomatic efforts, particularly with close allies and partners.

Recommendation #2: NASA and the National Space Council should collaborate with allied space agencies, both national and international, to identify opportunities to engage in space exploration at whatever level of contribution is individually appropriate, given the state of maturity of allied sectors (see Table 1) and geopolitics. For example, allies could contribute commodities or launch locations rather than mature costly software or hardware. Attention should be paid to maturing industries to identify opportunities for early relationships and processes that will accelerate space exploration.

Effects include:

Decentralization to improve the resilience of space exploration to disruptions in funding, supply chains, politics, and unexpected but highly impactful events.
Diplomacy and inspiration of young workers.
Expansion of the community of active stakeholders in space exploration aligned with democratic values, with the United States serving as the trusted partner.

Recommendation #3: The Office of Science and Technology Policy, Office of the Secretary of Commerce, Department of Defense, and other US interagency actors should identify and support synergies between technology development for space exploration and for Earth-focused innovation in critical technologies. New multistakeholder (cross-border) grants, fellowships, seed funding, and prizes should be modeled on current international efforts like XPRIZE and the Deep Space Food Challenge. Programs such as the NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts and the ESA Open Space Innovation Platform, which incubate early-stage innovations in space exploration, should be expanded to noncitizens.

Effects include:

Risk-mitigated financial support of early and maturing technologies for space exploration.
Exchange of human capital across public/private, international, Earth/space, and industry boundaries.

Recommendation #4: Through organizations like the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, international stakeholders in space exploration—including space agencies, companies, philanthropic groups, and nongovernmental organizations—should formulate an actionable, unified multilateral space strategy that goes beyond the Artemis Accords. For example, while the Artemis Accords recognize “the global benefits of space exploration and commerce,” they do not explicitly address commercial activity, and commercial enterprises are not signatories. Action is urgently needed, as it is conceivable that extraction and exploitation of lunar resources could begin in the very short term—in the mid 2020s. An expanded space strategy must include the commercial sector.

Effects include:

Identification of pathways to create/strengthen linkages among stakeholders and eliminate choke points that render exploration vulnerable to disruption and negative outcomes.
Establishment of rule of law and crisis-mitigation strategies spanning early crewed and uncrewed exploration missions through permanent human habitation off Earth, including commercial activity.

In conclusion, just as no one could have foreseen the precise progression from the Wright brothers’ first flight to today’s rapidly exploding telecommunications and space industrial ecosystems, one cannot expect to accurately predict the progression—or the ramifications—of today’s space exploration to tomorrow’s future. Nonetheless, international collaboration is certainly key to success. Now is the time to enhance the processes, relationships, and shared vision for space exploration, thereby expanding humankind’s knowledge of the universe, improving life on Earth, and setting the stage for a reliable, routine, and prosperous space economy for all.

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1 “United States Space Priorities Framework,” White House, December 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/united-states-space-priorities-framework-_-december-1-2021.pdf.

2 “China’s Space Program: A 2021 Perspective,” State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, January 28, 2022, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2022-01/28/content_78016843.htm.

3 “Rethinking Export Controls: Unintended Consequences and the New Technological Landscape,” Commentary series on expert controls, Center for a New American Security, accessed March 23, 2023, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/rethinking-export-controls-unintended-consequences-and-the-new-technological-landscape.

4 “Our Missions,” European Space Agency, accessed February 14, 2023, https://www.esa.int/ESA/Our_Missions; and Gary Daines, “Solar System Missions,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, March 11, 2015, http://www.nasa.gov/content/solar-missions-list.

5 Timothy Haltigin et al., “Rationale and Proposed Design for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Science Program,” Astrobiology 22, no. S1, June 2022, https://doi.org/10.1089/ast.2021.0122.

6 Andrew Jones, “China Outlines Pathway for Lunar and Deep Space Exploration,” SpaceNews, November 28, 2022, https://spacenews.com/china-outlines-pathway-for-lunar-and-deep-space-exploration/.

7 Scott Vangen et al., “International Space Exploration Coordination Group Assessment of Technology Gaps for Dust Mitigation for the Global Exploration Roadmap,” in AIAA SPACE 2016 (American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics), accessed March 23, 2023, https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2016-5423.

8 Daniel L. Oltrogge and Salvatore Alfano, “The Technical Challenges of Better Space Situational Awareness and Space Traffic Management,” Journal of Space Safety Engineering 6, no. 2 (June 1, 2019): 72–79, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsse.2019.05.004.

9 “Moon to Mars Objectives: Executive Summary,” NASA, September 2022, https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/m2m-objectives-exec-summary.pdf.

10 S. Creech, J. Guidi, and D. Elburn, “Artemis: An Overview of NASA’s Activities to Return Humans to the Moon,” 2022 IEEE Aerospace Conference (AERO), Big Sky, Montana, 2022, 1–7, https://doi.org/10.1109/AERO53065.2022.9843277.

11 Steve Mackwell, Lisa May, and Rick Zucker, “The Ninth Community Workshop for Achievability and Sustainability of Human Exploration of Mars (AM IX),” hosted by Explore Mars at The George Washington University, June 2022, https://www.exploremars.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/AM-9_Upload_v-1.pdf.

12 P. Kessler et al., “Artemis Deep Space Habitation: Enabling a Sustained Human Presence on the Moon and Beyond,” 2022 IEEE Aerospace Conference, 1–12, https://doi.org/10.1109/AERO53065.2022.9843393.

13 Here, country/agency designations simplify complex agreements between public and private entities, sometimes across borders, showcasing the need for processes and relations that enable allied cooperation.

14 Canadian Space Agency, “Canada’s Role in Moon Exploration,” Canadian Space Agency, February 28, 2019, https://www.asc-csa.gc.ca/eng/astronomy/moon-exploration/canada-role.asp.

15 “Moonlight,” ESA, accessed March 9, 2023, https://www.esa.int/Applications/Telecommunications_Integrated_Applications/Moonlight.

16 Fulvia Croci, “Artemis Mission: Signed Agreement Between ASI and NASA,” ASI (blog), Italian Space Agency, June 16, 2022, https://www.asi.it/en/2022/06/artemis-mission-signed-agreement-between-asi-and-nasa/.

17 “The Artemis Accords: Principles for Cooperation in the Civil Exploration and Use of the Moon, Mars, Comets, and Asteroids,” NASA, October 13, 2020, https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/img/Artemis-Accords-signed-13Oct2020.pdf.

18 “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” United Nations, 1967, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20610/volume-610-I-8843-English.pdf.

19 See “State Exploration and Innovation,” UN Office of Outer Space Affairs, annual reports on national space activities and innovation accessed March 9, 2023, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/topics/space-exploration-and-innovation.html.

20 “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” United Nations, 2015, https://sdgs.un.org/sites/default/files/publications/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf; and “Exploring Space Technologies for Sustainable Development,” UN Conference on Trade and Development, 2021, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/dtlstict2021d1_en.pdf.

21 “Report to the President: Biomanufacturing to Advance the Bioeconomy,” US President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, December 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/PCAST_Biomanufacturing-Report_Dec2022.pdf.

22 White House, “Executive Order on Advancing Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Innovation for a Sustainable, Safe, and Secure American Bioeconomy,” White House Briefing Room, September 12, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/09/12/executive-order-on-advancing-biotechnology-and-biomanufacturing-innovation-for-a-sustainable-safe-and-secure-american-bioeconomy/; and White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, “Bold Goals for U.S. Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing: Harnessing Research and Development to Further Societal Goals,” March 2023.

23 “National Bioeconomy Strategy,” German Federal Government, July 2020, https://www.bmel.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Publications/national-bioeconomy-strategy.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2.

24 “UK Innovation Strategy: Leading the Future by Creating It,” UK Department of Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy, July 22, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-innovation-strategy-leading-the-future-by-creating-it/uk-innovation-strategy-leading-the-future-by-creating-it-accessible-webpage.

25 Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (European Commission), European Bioeconomy Policy: Stocktaking and Future Developments: Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022), https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2777/997651.

26 Narayanan Suresh and Srinivas Rao Chandan, “India Bioeconomy Report 2022,” prepared for Biotechnology Industry Research Assistance Council by Association of Biotechnology Led Enterprises, June 2022, https://birac.nic.in/webcontent/1658318307_India_Bioeconomy_Report_2022.pdf.

27 Xu Zhang et al., “The Roadmap of Bioeconomy in China,” Engineering Biology 6, no. 4 (2022): 71–81, https://doi.org/10.1049/enb2.12026.

28 Issa A. D. Nesnas, Lorraine M. Fesq, and Richard A. Volpe, “Autonomy for Space Robots: Past, Present, and Future,” Current Robotics Reports 2, no. 3 (September 1, 2021): 251–63, https://doi.org/10.1007/s43154-021-00057-2.

29 Smiriti Srivastava et al., “Analysis of Technology, Economic, and Legislation Readiness Levels of Asteroid Mining Industry: A Base for the Future Space Resource Utilization Missions,” New Space 11, no. 1 (2022): 21–31, https://doi.org/10.1089/space.2021.0025.

30 “ESRIC: Start-up Support Programme,” ESRIC: European Space Resources Innovation Centre, accessed March 9, 2023, https://www.esric.lu/about-ssp.

31 “Critical and Emerging Technologies List Update,” Fast Track Action Subcommittee on Critical and Emerging Technologies of the National Science and Technology Council, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/02-2022-Critical-and-Emerging-Technologies-List-Update.pdf.

32 European Innovation Council, “Identification of Emerging Technologies and Breakthrough Innovations,” January 2022, https://eic.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-02/EIC-Emerging-Tech-and-Breakthrough-Innov-report-2022-1502-final.pdf.

33 Yittayih Zelalem, Joshua Drucker, and Zafer Sonmez, “NASA Economic Impact Report 2021,” Nathalie P. Voorhees Center for Neighborhood and Community Improvement, University of Illinois at Chicago, October 2022, https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/nasa_fy21_economic_impact_report_full.pdf.

34 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C. 18301 (2010).

35 “The Cost of SLS and Orion,” Planetary Society, accessed March 9, 2023, https://www.planetary.org/space-policy/cost-of-sls-and-orion.

36 Kate Duffy, “Elon Musk Says He’s ‘Highly Confident’ That SpaceX’s Starship Rocket Launches Will Cost Less than $10 Million within 2-3 Years,” Business Insider, February 11, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-spacex-starship-rocket-update-flight-cost-million-2022-2.

The post Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

Nicholas Eftimiades — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 13:00:31 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

ISSUE BRIEF

Introduction

Over the last two decades, the world entered a new paradigm in the use of space, namely the introduction of highly capable small satellites, just tens or hundreds of kilograms in size. This paradigm has forever changed how countries will employ space capabilities to achieve economic, scientific, and national security interests. As is so often the case, the telltale signs of this global paradigm shift were obvious to more than just a few individuals or industries. Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate began exploring the use of small satellites in the 1990s. The Air Force also established the Operationally Responsive Space program in 2007, which explored the potential use of small satellites. However, both research efforts had no impact on the US Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) satellite acquisition programs. The advancement of small satellites was largely driven by universities and small commercial start-up companies.¹

The introduction of commercial and government small satellites has democratized space for states and even individuals. Space remote sensing and communications satellites, once the exclusive domain of the United States and Soviet Union, can now provide space-based services to anyone with a credit card. Eighty-eight countries currently operate satellites, and the next decade will likely see the launch of tens of thousands of new satellites.² Commercial and government small satellites have changed outer space into a more contested, congested, and competitive environment.

The United States has shared space data with its allies since the dawn of the space age.³ Yet it also has a history of operating independently in space. Other domains of warfare and defense policy are more closely integrated between the United States and its allies and partners. The United States has military alliances with dozens of countries and strategic partnerships with many more.⁴ In recent years, there have been calls to coordinate with, or even integrate allied space capabilities into US national security space strategy and plans. In this regard, the US government has made significant advances. However, much work needs to be done. There is pressure on the United States to act quickly to increase national security space cooperation and integration, driven by rapidly increasing global capabilities and expanding threats from hostile nations and orbital debris.

This paper examines the potential strategic benefits to US national security of harnessing allied space capabilities and the current efforts to do so, as well as barriers to achieving success. The paper identifies pathways forward for cooperating with allies and strategic partners on their emerging space capabilities and the potential of integrating US and allied capabilities.

The security environment in space

The changing security environment in space is driving the United States and allies’ collective desire to cooperate in the national security space. Several recent statements and actions demonstrate potential adversaries’ plans and intentions to dominate the space domain. China and Russia have demonstrated offensive and defensive counterspace capabilities. In 2021, the two countries announced plans to build a joint International Lunar Research Station on the moon, although the path forward on this effort may have been impacted by the Russian invasion of the Ukraine.⁵ The US Space Force notes this action would give those nations control of cislunar space, an area of balanced gravity between the Earth and moon. The movement of potential adversaries to cislunar space changes the strategic environment by forcing the United States to maintain surveillance of that region of space. In addition, Russia and China have threatened to destroy entire US orbital regimes.⁶ China has also expressed its intention to be the world’s leading space power by 2045.⁷ In 2022, Chinese researcher Ren Yuanzhen of the Beijing Institute of Tracking and Telecommunications led a People’s Liberation Army study to counter SpaceX’s Starlink small satellite constellation. Ren boasted they had developed a solution to destroy thousands of satellites in the constellation.⁸

Russian MiG-31 ‘Foxhound’ supersonic interceptor jet carrying an anti-satellite weapon during the 2018 Victory Day Parade. Source: kremlin.ru

Benefits of collaborating in space

Collaborating may be defined as coordinating development programs and operational efforts of current or projected allied and partner space and related capabilities.⁹ US interests would be to ensure these programs and operational efforts support US national security space strategy and planning objectives. Allied nations’ interests are in leveraging extensive US space capabilities and establishing collective security. The United States, allies, and partners have a shared interest in establishing behavioral norms in space. Collaboration between allies in space capabilities would have numerous benefits, including the following.

Altering the calculus for offensive actions. A hostile nation or nonstate actor risks a stronger response from multiple nations when attacking a coalition (versus a single nation). If the United States and allies had interoperable or integrated space capabilities, then an attack on any single country’s space systems would no longer be solely against the United States and would have impact on the collaborating or integrated systems of allies and partners. Changing the calculus for offensive actions could lead to increased deterrence against foreign aggression: “Partner capabilities increase both resilience and the perceived cost to an adversary, when an attack on one partner is seen as an attack on all,” according to the US Air Force.¹⁰

Accessing geostrategic locations. Access to global geographic locations also provides access for ground-based space situational awareness (SSA); telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C); and increasing launch resilience. Ground-based SSA requires globally distributed telescopes and radar systems. Allied collection systems operating in Japan, Australia, and territories of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and others ensure all partners have access to global SSA data. Given that the United States has only two major space launch facilities, natural or manmade disasters could significantly erode the US ability to provide responsive space launch. Use of allied launch facilities could lessen US reliance on limited launch sites and thus mitigate that risk.

Burden-sharing in space. Allied investments in less costly smaller satellites, along with other space technologies, would increase their security and potentially reduce the financial burden on the United States to maintain space security. There have been positive developments in this realm, including Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy, which identified several new space systems the country intends to procure.¹¹ Given Russia’s military aggression and the success of Space-X’s Starlink satellites in supporting Ukraine, the European Union (EU) recently adopted the proposal to develop the Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnection, and Security by Satellites (IRISS) constellation to provide broadband connectivity via up to 170 satellites.¹² The system, with an expected deployment date in 2025, expects to employ quantum cryptography and be available to governments, institutions, and businesses (in 2027). Canada’s Department of National Defense is developing the Redwing optical microsat to provide space domain awareness (SDA).¹³

Establishing global norms and standards. The space domain lacks adequate rules of the road to regulate the behavior of spacefaring nations. As the United States and its allies and partners coordinate and perhaps integrate national security space systems, they also are in the position to shape norms and increase pressure on potential adversaries to accept global standards for acceptable space behavior.

Crisis management in space. Several allies have expressed the need to ensure their strategic autonomy—that is, not being wholly dependent on the United States and therefore free to act in their own interests. The EU’s IRISS “system aims to enhance European strategic autonomy, digital sovereignty, and competitiveness.”¹⁴ Still, institutions such as NATO and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue offer an avenue to explore collective options for crisis management in space by establishing agreed-upon terminology, codes of conduct, and response policies and procedures for emergencies or crises in the space domain.

Resiliency in the face of conflict. While seemingly unlikely, a conflict in the space domain would result in attrition of space-based services. Yet, unlike in other domains, a stockpile of space systems does not exist. The emerging commercial small satellite market now provides an opportunity for resiliency in space systems. Interoperable or integrated use of allied and US government and commercial space capabilities would provide improved resiliency in response to accident or attack.¹⁵

China and Russia have proposed constructing a Sino-Russo International Lunar Research Sation, a joint modular project proposed to strengthen international security cooperation and the monetization of space for both nations. Source: Mil.ru

Bolstering industrial partnerships and reducing supply chain vulnerabilities. If cybersecurity standards are put in place, integrating allied manufacturing capabilities could diversify the US supply chain and reduce existing vulnerabilities. As a first step, the space-industrial supply chain must transition away from China and toward US allies and partners, who would then be able to enhance their production capabilities by contributing to interoperable or integrated space and associated systems. However, despite a long record of international procurement collaboration between the United States and its allies and partners, the outcomes of past programs have often been mixed.¹⁶

Existing efforts toward allied integration

Collaboration does not merely mean standardization and interoperability. Rather, the effort to create an overall US and allied space vision is a necessary first step in integrating allied space capabilities in order to obtain interoperability. Through various partnerships and efforts, the US Space Force has led efforts with six allies and partners to create a unified vision for national security space cooperation.

Combined space operations vision 2031

In 2022, the United States, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom signed the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) Vision 2031, which aims to “generate and improve cooperation, coordination, and interoperability opportunities to sustain freedom of action in space, optimize resources, enhance mission assurance and resilience, and prevent conflict.” This shared vision establishes a framework to guide individual and collective efforts.¹⁷

CSpO participants’ shared-objectives effort is a framework to guide individual national and collective efforts:

Develop and operate resilient, interoperable architectures to enable space mission assurance and unity of effort.
Enhance command, control, and communications capabilities and other operational linkages among CSpO participants.
Foster responsible military behaviors, discourage irresponsible behavior, and avoid escalation.
Collaborate on strategic communications efforts.
Share intelligence and information.
Professionalize space cadres and training.¹⁸

Training to fight together

Since 2018, the United States has been integrating allies and partners into space warfighting plans, most notably through Operation Olympic Defender, a US effort to synchronize with spacefaring nations to deter hostile acts in space. The annual Schriever Wargame—designed to explore critical space issues and advance space support across domains—also allows select allies and partners to coordinate defense-related space activities with the United States. In August 2022, US Space Command conducted its Global Sentinel exercise, which serves as US Space Command’s premier security cooperation effort, with twenty-five participating countries. Over a one-week period, this series simulated scenarios focused on enhancing international partnerships, understanding procedures and capabilities, and integrating global SSA. These scenarios further allow participants to understand allies’ and partners’ capabilities and operating procedures, serving as a foundation for future collaboration.¹⁹

Multinational and joint military space operators stand for a photo in the Combined Space Operations Center after the safe return of NASA’s Commercial Crew Program Demonstration Mission 2. Source: US Air Force

To date, the joint training efforts between the United States and its allies have been limited to tabletop exercises, thereby restricting participants’ experience in real-world applications of offensive and defensive counterspace measures. Tabletop exercises do not test capabilities or demonstrate how well an ally or partner might perform in crises or conflict scenarios. Space capabilities are integrated into major military exercises conducted with allies but do not address offensive or defensive counterspace measures.²⁰

Challenges and barriers to integration

While the United States recognizes the value of working with allies and partners in the space domain, myriad hurdles stand in the way to fully realize the competitive advantage space alliances and partnerships offer.

In total, US allies could bring a significant fraction of US capabilities. A systemic problem is how to leverage those capabilities in a coherent way. Limited coordination limits the values of those allied capabilities. Those capabilities are only additive to United States if there is good integration and understanding on how they will have a contributing effect.²¹

Lack of strategy to execute the vision for space. While a shared vision exists among the defense establishments of select allies and partners, there is little in the way of strategy or planning to fully realize that vision. Perhaps the greatest problem with the US approach to working with its allies and partners in space is that there is no coherent strategy for integrating allied space capabilities. Several subject matter experts interviewed for this study noted US public statements around the value of and desire to integrate allies, yet no interviewee was able to identify an existing strategy or plan to do so at any level of US government.

Bureaucratic impediments. Collaborating with allies is far easier than integrating multinational space capabilities. Allied integration must be done through a national-level strategy, integrating what, to date, are largely disconnected efforts between the National Space Council, National Security Council, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, US Space Command, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Department of State. While each organization is credited with making strides in integrating allies (with varying degrees of success), the efforts are disjointed and lack connectivity and unified goals and strategy.²²

Mind the gap. Allies and partners are attempting to understand existing gaps in the US national security space architecture and the capabilities they could provide to fill those gaps. Ironically, the CSpO Vision 2031 states that allies will collaborate “through identification of gaps and collaborative opportunities.” With the onus almost exclusively placed on the ally or partner, interviewees noted nations’ repeated requests to the United States to identify capability gaps in its projected architectures. The lack of information is due to the sensitivity of US defense gaps, with classified information making it more feasible for allies and partners to provide add-on capabilities rather than fully integrating assets.

Some level of gap analysis should be done by the United States to identify the niche areas that allies and partners could fill in the national security space architecture. That analysis should cover a period of at least five to ten years, thereby allowing allies to budget, develop, and deploy capabilities. Identifying capability gaps as requested by allies would ensure a future interoperable or integrated architecture. Primary focus areas should include space situational awareness, on-orbit servicing, communications, positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT), and cybersecurity. Each of these areas are baseline capabilities that should be interoperable or integrated between the United States and its allies and partners.²³

Classification issues. There exists a widespread belief that the United States’ overclassification of intelligence is hindering US and allied space security. This issue has been publicly acknowledged by several senior US military leaders. Misclassification might be a better word to describe the problem. In addition, the US system for sharing intelligence is cumbersome, requiring an exception to the normal production processes to share intelligence with allies. Experts (including myself) note cases where sharing space-related intelligence with allies was difficult due solely to organizational culture, established processes, poorly administered policies, and other bureaucratic impediments.²⁴

The H-IIA rocket lifts off from the Tanegashima Space Center in Japan. The H-IIA has been supporting satellite launch missions as a major large-scale launch vehicle with high reliability. Source: NASA

Many of these classification-related problems have existed for decades—and the United States should not wait to figure out how to share information until its hand is forced by a crisis or war. There is an inability to share information, particularly information that can be integrated into a kill chain for weapon systems. The United States has integrated information-sharing systems in other warfighting environments, but as of yet, not in space. This lack of imagination even spreads down to the US combatant commands (COCOMs): allied integration would be enhanced if US COCOMs had joined with allied space personnel providing integrated PNT and communications.²⁵ Moreover, the US Space Force could deploy space attachés to select embassies, perhaps under the Office of Defense Cooperation, to further embed space security interests across the globe. ²⁶

Communications and data integration. After spending hundreds of millions of dollars to build the Joint Mission System to track satellites and space debris, the US Department of Defense still has no automated means to seamlessly integrate SSA data provided by allies into the US space surveillance system. One particularly high-level interview with a close ally called out the biggest issue as being communications, noting that it is impossible to discuss interoperable deterrence until this issue is addressed.²⁷

Fifteen NATO members recently signed a memorandum of understanding to launch a Space Center of Excellence in Toulouse, France. This body could provide a mechanism for data integration and operational coordination. The Toulouse center is in addition to the already operating NATO Space Centre at Allied Air Command in Ramstein, Germany, which serves as a single point for the requests and production of NATO space products.²⁸ As of February 2023, the US and Canadian governments are not founding members of the Toulouse Space Center effort.

Case study: US-Japanese space integration

While allied integration has seen success across other warfighting domains, the same cannot be said for the space domain.²⁹ Space collaboration with Japan is illustrative of the challenges in integrating efforts.

Overclassification of information related to US programs and operation capabilities makes allied integration even more difficult. For example, France and Japan have publicly stated their intentions to build geo satellites for space domain awareness. Currently, a strategy to coordinate those systems with the operating US geosynchronous space situational awareness program (GSSAP) does not exist, demonstrating a lack of plans for data sharing, burden sharing, or coordination of mission operations.³⁰ However, Japan and the United States have agreed that space domain awareness data will be shared between the Japan Air-Self Defense Force and US Space Command starting in federal year 2023.

In 2022, the government of Japan approached the United States about its interest in playing a role in the Space Development Agency’s “Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture,”³¹ as Japan intends to launch a similar constellation of satellites for missile defense purposes. However, the United States has been unresponsive to Japan on how it could achieve integration. This is partly because the United States maintains concerns about Japan’s level of information security, despite Japan’s commitment to “strengthen and reinforce information security practices and infrastructure.”³² Yet, Japan has the world’s third largest defense budget and is a spacefaring nation with launch infrastructure, years of experience, and advanced satellite manufacturing capabilities. In addition, Japan faces increasing threats from China and North Korea, providing incentive to expand its security relationship with the United States.³³ In 2010, the United States came to agreement with Japan to integrate SSA sensors into the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) PNT system.³⁴ However, to date, there is no plan on how to integrate the data.³⁵

Overclassification of US intelligence is hindering cooperation with allies and partners. Two controllers work in the Global Strategic Warning and Space Surveillance System Center. Source: US Air Force

Policy recommendations

There are several key actions the United States can take to integrate allies and partners into national security space efforts.

Recommendation #1: The US Space Force should conduct a gap analysis to guide allied investments into space capabilities, prioritizing capabilities such as SSA, on-orbit servicing, communications, PNT, and cybersecurity. This gap analysis should identify in which areas the United States wants to collaborate with allies, identify opportunities for interoperability, and which areas are open to integration of capabilities.

Recommendation #2: It would benefit the US Space Force to have an outside entity analyze its internal policies, procedures, bureaucratic obstacles, and human capital levels to determine why the effort to integrate allies has been so minimally effective.

Recommendation #3: The US National Space Council should lead an interagency working group to develop a US government integrated strategy that establishes goals for and metrics to assess US and allied space capabilities and integration efforts.

Recommendation #4: The US Department of Defense and Office of the Director of National Intelligence should form a working group to establish best practices for sharing classified information with allies.

Recommendation #5: US Space Command should develop real-world exercises with allies and partners to test SDA, electronic warfare, and space control capabilities—all of which will be critical to deterring and, if necessary, responding to future space conflicts.

Recommendation #6: The US Departments of Defense and State should work toward consistency of approach in terms of governance of space activities, including through establishment of multilateral engagement and national regulations to allow flexibility and transportability of launch access at short notice.

Recommendation #7: The National Security Council should lead an interagency effort to establish consistency of national regulations between allies and partners (comparable laws and/or standards) so that systems and operations are transferable and receive mutual recognition and acceptance.

Conclusion

The United States and its allies and partners are moving toward sharing SSA data, understanding each other’s policies and procedures, and collaborating on space operations. Still, much work needs to be done to expand collaboration and achieve interoperability (if desired) between rising space powers. Without a strong indication from the US government of what exactly it wants from its allies and partners—as well as what it is prepared to give in return—the United States will not be able to effectively harness the competitive advantages offered by allied space capabilities. It is incumbent on the United States and its allies to immediately embark on a way forward to jointly ensure a safe and secure environment in space. Failure to change current practices and act in a timely fashion will lead to increased space threats and diminished national and economic security.

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1 The pioneer in small-satellite design and production at this time was Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. (SSTL) of Surrey University, United Kingdom.

2 Nicholas Eftimiades, “Small Satellites: The Implications for National Security,” Atlantic Council, May 5, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/small-satellites-the-implications-for-national-security/.

3 Examples include remote sensing and the global positioning system (GPS).

4 Claudette Roulo, “Alliances vs. Partnerships,” US Department of Defense, March 22, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/story/Article/1684641/alliances-vs-partnerships/.

5 “International Lunar Research Station Guide for Partnership”, Vol. 1.0, June 2021, http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6812150/content.html ; Andrew Jones, “China Seeks New Partners for Lunar and Deep Space Exploration,” Space News, September 8, 2022, https://spacenews.com/china-seeks-new-partners-for-lunar-and-deep-space-exploration/; and “International Lunar Research Station Guide for Partnership,” China National Space Administration, Vol. 1.0, June 2021, http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6812150/content.html.

6 Matthew Mowthorpe, “Space Resilience and the Importance of Multiple Orbits, The Space Review, January 3, 2023, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4504/1.

7 Ma Chi, “China Aims to Be World-leading Space Power by 2045,” China Daily (state-owned daily), November 17, 2017, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-11/17/content_34653486.htm.

8 Stephen Chen, “China Military Must Be Able to Destroy Elon Musk’s Starlink Satellites if hey Threaten National Security: Scientists,” South China Morning Post, May 25, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3178939/china-military-needs-defence-against-potential-starlink-threat.

9 Note that related capabilities could include software, sensors, SSA systems, ground stations, etc.

10 Curtis E. Lemay Center for Counterspace Operations, “Counterspace Operations,” US Air Force, Last Updated, January 25, 2021 https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-14/3-14-D05-SPACE-Counterspace-Ops.pdf.

11 National Security Strategy of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Provisional Translation, December 2022, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf.

12 Andrew Jones, “European Union to Build Its Own Satellite-internet Constellation,” Space.com, Future Publishing, March 1, 2023, https://www.space.com/european-union-satellite-internet-constellation-iriss.

13 David Pugliese, “Canadian Military Orders Space Surveillance Micro Satellite,” Space News, March 10, 2023.

14 “Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnection and Security by Satellites (IRISS) Constellation,” European Parliament (video), in Jones, “European Union to Build Its Own Satellite-internet Constellation,” Space.com, segment between 47 seconds and 55 seconds, https://cdn.jwplayer.com/previews/hMtl8Ak7.

15 B. Bragg, ed., “Allied/Commercial Capabilities to Enhance Resilience,” NSI Inc., December 2017, https://nsiteam.com/leveraging-allied-and-commercial-capabilities-to-enhance-resilience/.

16 A successful example of coordinated global defense production includes the F-35, which is produced by over 1,900 companies based in the United States and ten additional nations. See “A Trusted Partner to Europe: F-35 Global Partnership,” Lockheed Martin (video), https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/who-we-are/international/european-impact.html.

17 Theresa Hitchens, “US, Close Allies Sign ‘Call to Action’ in Space Defense,” Breaking Defense, February 22, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/02/us-close-allies-sign-call-to-action-in-space-defense/.

18 US Department of Defense, “Combined Space Operations Vision 2031,” February 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/22/2002942522/-1/-1/0/CSPO-VISION-2031.PDF.

19 “25 Nations Participate in Global Sentinel 22,” US Space Command, August 3, 2022, https://www.spacecom.mil/Newsroom/News/Article-Display/Article/3115832/25-nations-participate-in-global-sentinel-22.

20 For example, such military exercises include Balikatan, Cobra Gold, Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), Northern Edge, Saber Strike, and Talisman Sabre.

21 Off-the-record online interview by the author with a close US ally, November 30, 2022.

22 Interviewees noted difficulties in the US internal coordination efforts between the US Space Force’s conduct of international relations, US Department of Defense acquisition, and national and defense policy formulation.

23 Note that on-orbit servicing is not a baseline capability, but should eventually become one.

24 The author travelled with then-Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, who was pursuing establishment of an intelligence exchange with a foreign country; the effort had limited success because the ODNI was unable to get analysts to release data. Notably, intelligence community information systems use “No Foreign Dissemination” as a default setting in the production of intelligence products; foreign disclosure of intelligence requires additional effort. It also should be noted that interviews conducted for this study with US and allied officials did not uncover any instances where space or related systems (or a national interest) were damaged due to overclassification of space intelligence.

25 This is the case at US INDOPACOM. See “Space Force Presents Forces to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command,” Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, US Air Force (website), November 23, 2022, https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article/3227481/space-force-presents-forces-to-us-indo-pacific-command/.

26 Space Force already deploys a few liaison officers globally.

27 Off-the-record online interview by the author with a close US ally, December 5, 2022.

28 NATO, “NATO’s Approach to Space,” last updated February 16, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_175419.htm.

29 An example of integrated international military operations would be the NATO International Security Armed Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan. At its height, ISAF was more than 130,000 strong, with troops from fifty-one NATO and partner nations.

30 GSAP is a US geosynchronous space surveillance system, which operates like a space-based SSA system.

31 “The Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture” is a layered network of military satellites and supporting elements; the architecture was formerly known as the “National Defense Space Architecture.”

32 “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (‘2+2’),” Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100284739.pdf.

33 John Hill (deputy assistant secretary for space and missile defense, US Department of Defense), telephone interview with the author, January 2023.

34 QZSS operates at the same frequency and same timing as GPS. This service can be used in an integrated way with GPS for highly precise positioning. The additional US sensor is unknown.

35 Paul McLeary and Theresa Hitchens, “US, Japan to Ink Hosted Payload Pact to Monitor Sats,” Breaking Defense, August 5, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/08/us-japan-to-ink-hosted-payload-pact-to-monitor-sats/.

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Harnessing allied space capabilities

Robert Murray, Tiffany Vora, and Nicholas Eftimiades — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 13:00:00 +0000

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The United States’ vast network of alliances and partnerships offers a competitive advantage—this is especially evident in outer space. Often characterized as a global commons, space holds value for all humankind across commercial, exploration, and security vectors. As technological advancements trigger a proliferation in spacefaring nations, the United States and its allies and partners are confronted with new challenges to and opportunities for collective action.

This series examines how US space strategy can recognize the comparative advantages of allies and partners in space and best harness allied capabilities:

Robert Murray examines the state of the commercial space market and key drivers, considering how government investments in enabling activities can support broader national imperatives.

Tiffany Vora analyzes current US space exploration goals and the capabilities that will be critical to achieving them, highlighting arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned for integration.

Nicholas Eftimiades assesses the potential benefits to US national security offered by allied integration, identifying pathways for cooperating with allies and partners on their space capabilities.

The way forward for US and allied coordination in space

Several common themes emerge across this series. First, outer space is characterized by a transforming landscape and market. Commercial tech advancements—including the introduction of small satellites, advancements in Earth observation and asteroid mining, and the rise of space tourism—drive the development of what Murray terms the “NewSpace” market. The way in which the United States and its allies do business in space is changing, with the private sector leading in capability development and the government becoming the consumer. The burgeoning space sector, totaling $464 billion in 2022, is attracting allies and adversaries alike to invest in and expand their space operations. Strategic competitors recognize they can now target US and allied commercial and national security imperatives from space.

Second, this increasingly competitive environment further accentuates the value of alliances and partnerships in space. As Vora highlights, US and allied cooperation in space today rests on the Artemis Accords, which advances shared principles for space activity, and is a key mechanism for the international transfer of expertise, technology, and funding. The US Department of Defense also houses the Combined Space Operations Vision 2031, which offers a framework to guide collective efforts with several allies, and a host of collaborative exercises and wargames. Eftimiades describes the cross-cutting benefits of this collaboration: it alters the decision calculus for hostile actors, threatening a response from a coalition of nations; offers the ability to share capabilities, responsibilities, and geostrategic locations; and creates consensus in setting the norms for responsible space behavior. Current collective efforts in the space domain are limited, albeit expanding, considering the benefit allies and partners bring to the table.

Third, in order to promote stronger collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners, it is necessary to address and overcome the barriers that stand in the way. Vora identifies protectionist policies and regulations that act as hurdles to the transfer of key technologies and information. Murray explains that lengthy government contract timelines, coupled with insufficient investment in technologies critical to NewSpace, hinder US and allied commercial advancement. Eftimiades argues that the United States has yet to articulate a strategy for space coordination, highlighting a lack in transparency with allies and partners on capability and data gaps.

The authors put forth ideas to pave the way forward for US and allied space development. Recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners include conducting gap analysis on where allied investments can complement existing US capabilities, establishing a “space bank” to support NewSpace actors, and formulating a US and allied strategy for space development, building upon the Artemis Accords. To maintain its competitive advantage in space, the United States cannot go at it alone.

Read the full papers:

The NewSpace market: Capital, control, and commercialization

By Robert Murray

Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes

By Tiffany Vora

Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

By Nicholas Eftimiades

Acknowledgements

To produce this report, the authors conducted a number of interviews and consultations. Listed below are some of the individuals consulted and whose insights informed this report. The analysis and recommendations presented in this report are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the individuals consulted. Moreover, the named individuals participated in a personal, not institutional, capacity.

Allen Antrobus, strategy director, air and space, Serco
John Beckner, chief executive officer, Horizon Technologies
Dr. Mariel Borowitz, associate professor, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology
Steven J. Butow, director, space portfolio, Defense Innovation Unit
Chris Carberry, chief executive officer and co-founder, Explore Mars
Darren Chua, EY space tech consulting partner and Oceania innovation leader, Ernst & Young Australia
Kenneth Fischer, director for business development North America, Thales Alenia Space
David Fogel, nonresident senior fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Dr. Yasuhito Fukushima, senior research fellow, National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan
Peter Garretson, senior fellow in defense studies, American Foreign Policy Council
Sqn Ldr Neal Henley, chief of staff, Joint Force Space Component, UK Space Command
John Hill, deputy assistant secretary of defense for space and missile defense, US Department of Defense
Komei Isozaki, Japan Chair fellow, Hudson Institute
Mat Kaplan, senior communications adviser, The Planetary Society
Cody Knipfer, director of government engagement, GXO, Inc.
Dr. Jerry Krasner, independent consultant, US Department of Defense
Massimiliano La Rosa, director, marketing, sales, and business, Thales Alenia Space
Ron Lopez, president and managing director, Astroscale U.S. Inc.
Douglas Loverro, president, Loverro Consulting, LLC; former deputy assistant secretary of defense for space policy, US Department of Defense
Russ Matijevich, chief innovation officer, Airbus U.S. Space & Defense, Inc.
Jacob Markish, vice president, strategy and corporate development, Thales North America
Brig Gen Bruce McClintock, USAF (ret.), lead, RAND Space Enterprise Initiative, RAND Corporation
Col Christopher Mulder, USAF, active-duty officer, US Air Force; 2020-2021 senior US Air Force fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Dr. Eliahu Niewood, vice president, Air and Space Forces Center, MITRE Corporation
Dr. Jana Robinson, managing director, Prague Security Studies Institute
Audrey Schaffer, director for space policy, National Security Council
Paul Szymanski, director, Space Strategies Center
Dr. Christian Willmes, doctor of philosophy, University of Oxford

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Tiffany Vora

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Nicholas Eftimiades

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

Watch the launch event

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Harnessing allied space capabilities

A panel of experts explores how the United States can work with its allies and partners to achieve common security, commercial, and exploration objectives in outer space.

Europe & Eurasia National Security Security Partnerships Space

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Putin’s dreams of a new Russian Empire are unraveling in Ukraine

Mark Temnycky — Tue, 25 Apr 2023 20:09:04 +0000

Over the past year, Russian President Vladimir Putin has openly compared his invasion of Ukraine to eighteenth century Russian Czar Peter the Great’s imperial conquests, and has boasted of “returning” historically Russian lands. However, his dreams of a new Russian Empire are now in danger of unraveling as military setbacks in Ukraine undermine Moscow’s position throughout the entire former USSR.

The invasion of Ukraine has clearly not gone according to plan. Putin anticipated a short and victorious war that would extinguish Ukrainian statehood and force the country decisively back into the Russian orbit. Instead, his army has lost tens of thousands of soldiers and vast amounts of equipment while struggling to achieve its military objectives. With the war now in its fifteenth month, Russia is struggling to advance in Ukraine and finds itself subject to unprecedented international sanctions that pose a grave threat to the country’s long-term development.

Crucially, the faltering invasion of Ukraine has also undermined Russian influence throughout the post-Soviet region. Following the 1991 collapse of the USSR, Russia remained deeply reluctant to concede full sovereignty to the 14 non-Russian countries that emerged from the wreckage of the Soviet Union. While Baltic states Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania soon began pursuing a path of Western integration leading to EU and NATO membership, Russia was initially able to maintain its dominant position in relation to most of the newly independent post-Soviet nations.

Over the past three decades, relations between Russia and its former Soviet vassals have varied greatly, with some welcoming continued strong ties and others seeking to turn away from Moscow. Putin has made no secret of his desire to revive Russian influence throughout his country’s former imperial domains, and has publicly lamented the fall of the USSR as the “disintegration of historical Russia under the name of the Soviet Union.”

The Kremlin has employed a mixture of carrot and stick tactics in order to retain and strengthen its influence across the former USSR. Measures have ranged from elite enrichment, customs unions, and security cooperation to trade wars, military interventions, and the creation of “frozen conflicts.”

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The 2014 invasion of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and Donbas region was a major landmark in Russia’s post-Soviet empire-rebuilding efforts, but the full-scale invasion of Ukraine eight years later was to prove the biggest turning point of all. Since February 24, 2022, countries throughout the former Soviet Empire have rallied in support of Ukraine and have sought to distance themselves from an increasingly isolated and humbled Russia.

Throughout the war, the three Baltic states have supplied large amounts of defense, financial, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine while welcoming thousands of Ukrainian refugees. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have also been very supportive of Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership bids. During a recent Kyiv visit, Estonian PM Kaja Kallas underlined this backing, commenting, “For peace in Europe, we need Ukraine in the EU and NATO. The way to lasting peace is to end grey areas in European security.”

In the South Caucasus region, Russia’s status has clearly been diminished by the invasion of Ukraine and the embarrassing failures of Putin’s once-vaunted military. The Kremlin has long served as peacekeeper and arbiter between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the region, maintaining a significant military presence in Armenia. However, the war in Ukraine has prevented Russia from fulfilling its commitments, with Moscow unable to stop renewed fighting. This has encouraged the Armenians to reconsider their relations with Russia.

With Russian influence in decline, the Armenian government has deepened cooperation with both the United States and the European Union, including the opening of a new EU Mission in Yerevan. Armenia has also begun to distance itself from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Russia-led military bloc bringing together six former Soviet republics.

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In Central Asia, the invasion of Ukraine has amplified existing distrust of Russia. This is most apparent in the region’s largest nation, Kazakhstan. Like Ukraine, Kazakhstan has a significant ethnic Russian population, leading to concerns that the country could become the next target of Russian imperial aggression. These fears have been further fueled by Kremlin propagandists, who have warned that Kazakhstan will pay a high price for the country’s alleged disloyalty to Moscow. Kazakh officials appear unmoved by these threats, and have recently canceled Victory Day celebrations for the second consecutive year in what many see as a direct snub to Putin.

Since the invasion of Ukraine began, Kazakhstan has attempted to strengthen ties with China, Turkey, the EU, and the US, while questioning its relationship with Russia and the CSTO. This geopolitical shift was perhaps most immediately obvious in summer 2022, when Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev made international headlines by rejecting recognition of Russian territorial claims against Ukraine while standing alongside Putin at a flagship economic forum in Saint Petersburg.

Over the past fifteen months of the invasion, Kazakhstan has demonstrated its support for Ukraine via the donation of considerable quantities of humanitarian aid. Other countries throughout the former Soviet world have done likewise. Azerbaijan has sent nearly €20 million in humanitarian and medical assistance. Turkmenistan has dispatched a cargo plane filled with medicines and medical supplies. Uzbekistan sent several tons of humanitarian aid. Given continued Russian leverage in the region and Moscow’s traditional expectations of loyalty, these relatively innocuous moves should be seen as bold gestures that reflect a changing geopolitical climate.

The invasion of Ukraine has exposed the extent of Kremlin control over Belarus, with Russia using its neighbor as a platform for airstrikes against Ukraine and the failed Kyiv offensive of early 2022. However, Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has so far resisted pressure to directly enter the war, despite being heavily dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival. With the Belarusian public and military both believed to be strongly against any direct participation in the invasion, Lukashenka finds himself in a difficult position. He understands that if he were to involve Belarusian forces in the war, this would likely lead to a strong and unpredictable domestic backlash.

Putin saw the invasion of Ukraine as a key step toward rebuilding the Russian Empire. Instead, it has forced countries across the former Soviet Union to distance themselves from the Kremlin. These countries feel able to do so in part due to the poor performance of the Russian army in Ukraine, which has made a mockery Moscow’s claims to military superpower status while reducing Russia’s ability to intimidate its neighbors. The invasion of Ukraine is still far from over, but the damage done to Russia’s regional influence and to Putin’s own imperial ambitions is already impossible to ignore.

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He can be found on Twitter @MTemnycky.

Russia’s invasion highlights the need to invest more in Ukrainian studies

Oleksandra Gaidai — Tue, 25 Apr 2023 16:44:06 +0000

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the need for greater international investment in Ukrainian studies. However, this discussion does not always take into account the realities of wartime Ukraine.

While Russia’s invasion has generated unprecedented international interest in Ukrainian studies, it has also had a profound and overwhelmingly negative impact on the academic community in Ukraine itself. This must be taken into account. After all, the international development of Ukrainian studies depends largely on the state of academia in Ukraine. As Andriy Zayarnyuk wrote last year, “the center of Ukrainian studies is now in Ukraine.”

A recent report evaluating the current state of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar studies identified more than 160 study centers located mainly in North America and Europe. Ukrainian studies centers are mostly placed within Slavic studies departments, with courses tending to focus on Ukrainian culture, language, and literature rather than politics and economics.

Europe has the most centers primarily concentrated in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Poland. Notably, Ukrainian studies remains virtually nonexistent in some neighborhood countries such as Romania and Turkey. This absence became particularly evident following Russia’s full-scale invasion, with a recent survey of Ukrainian studies professionals identifying increased demand for expert commentary.

Even in countries with Ukrainian studies programs, the focus is often limited. Universities typically employ individual lecturers who offer courses on Ukrainian topics which can change from semester to semester. Factors leading to the closure of Ukrainian studies centers include lack of funding, lack of student interest, weak institutionalization, and reliance on the activities of individual researchers.

A more comprehensive approach to Ukrainian studies is clearly needed. This should include the establishment of Ukrainian professorships to make studies an integral part of the academic environment and less exposed to changes in political preferences.

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Growing international interest in Ukraine as a result of Russia’s invasion has already boosted the field of Ukrainian studies. Universities have been able to bypass bureaucracy to host more people from Ukraine, with a diverse range of Ukrainian academics fleeing the war and arriving in the West over the past fifteen months. Among students, interest in Ukrainian studies has never been higher. The challenge is to ensure this does not become a mere passing fad.

To make Ukrainian studies more resilient in the long run, Ukrainian topics need to be integrated into existing classes on subjects such as Soviet or Russian imperial history, or even European studies, contemporary politics, and international relations. The goal should be to make Ukraine part of the conversation on different issues.

At the same time, much will depend on parallel progress in Ukraine. Key objectives include translating source materials, integrating Western academic practices, and improving English skills among the academic community.

Wartime realities in Ukraine have created new possibilities for Ukrainian academia but have also deepened many of the problems that existed before the invasion. Much of the country’s educational infrastructure has been destroyed, but the impact on human capital has been even more devastating. In short, Ukraine is currently losing many of its best people including significant numbers of irreplaceable academic professionals.

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Ukraine’s universities are currently in survival mode but reform is also on the agenda. Just one day before the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, the Ukrainian government adopted a new two-year development strategy for the country’s higher education system. The Ministry of Education has since announced that it will use this strategy as a road map for the reconstruction and continuation of reforms in the post-war period. However, the strategy was designed before the war and does not target the specific problems caused by Russia’s invasion.

Last month, Oksen Lisovyi was appointed as Ukraine’s new Minister of Education. It is not yet clear whether he intends to implement radical reform with long-term goals or keep the existing higher education system largely in place. While support for change is widespread, many within the academic community and education industry also appear to favor a more conservative approach.

Ukraine may not have the luxury of time for an extended debate. Funding for education has been severely cut as a result of the Russian invasion, with academics struggling to survive on inadequate salaries. This is forcing many to consider a career change. Others have left their university positions to serve in the army. It is not clear how many will return to academia, or whether they will have jobs to return to.

Students also find themselves confronted by harsh realities. With no end in sight to the Russian invasion, today’s Ukrainian high school graduates face a choice between an uncertain fate in their homeland or exploring the wide range of study options currently available at European and North American universities.

Ukraine’s universities have responded to the challenges of the invasion with ingenuity, utilizing tools developed during the Covid pandemic to switch to distance learning. However, uncertainty over the future looms large.

Some Ukrainian universities still maintain cooperation with Western institutions, but these relationships typically depend on prewar ties and offer one-sided academic mobility enabling Ukrainian scholars and students to study abroad. It would be good to see European and North American universities launch more nonresident fellowships for Ukrainians who are unwilling or unable to leave the country.

It may also be time to consider establishing new platforms and institutions for collaboration between Ukrainian scholars and their international colleagues. Ukraine can offer opportunities for Western academics focused on the Soviet and Russian empires who are no longer able to access Russian archives. Ukraine’s State Archive Service has been digitizing materials for some time and has introduced a united search system of Ukrainian archives.

The past year of war has sparked unprecedented interest in Ukrainian studies while creating both huge challenges and exciting opportunities. Ukrainian studies is now widely recognized as an important field that requires far more international attention. Looking ahead, the discussion must address both institutional and practical issues. The most important task at this stage is to prevent the further erosion of Ukraine’s academic potential and create the conditions for sustainable post-war development.

Oleksandra Gaidai is a Department of History postdoctoral fellow at American University.

Tantardini in Longitude on the competition for Cislunar space.

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Apr 2023 14:26:50 +0000

In the April 2023 Issue of Longitude, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Marco Tantardini published an article on the history and future of lunar and Cislunar or xGEO (the area between the Earth geosynchronous orbit and the Moon) space missions. Tantardini discusses how this zone could become the next frontier of economic and security competition.

Some strategic thinkers are looking at xGEO not only as a destination, but in the context of Earth-centric disputes. Backup satellites could be stored at higher orbits, as a strategic reserve

Marco Tantardini

Fellow

Marco Tantardini

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Italy Space

The post Tantardini in Longitude on the competition for Cislunar space. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Assessing China’s approach to technological competition with the United States

Peter Engelke, Emily Weinstein — Mon, 24 Apr 2023 18:30:00 +0000

TO: Technology Policy Strategists

FROM: Peter Engelke and Emily Weinstein

DATE: April 24, 2023

SUBJECT: Assessing China’s approach to technological competition with the United States

This past winter, the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Global China Hub convened experts and officials in a private workshop to discuss how China views technological competition with the United States. Participants examined the state of China’s technological system, how the country is crafting its own strategies and policies for success in technological development, and how it has reacted to the Biden administration’s export control policies. This memo draws from insights gathered during the workshop to give policymakers a better understanding of how China sees this strategic competition and to help shape appropriate policies in response.

Purpose

The United States and the People’s Republic of China are increasingly engaged in a strategic competition for superiority in key technologies, including semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, biotechnologies, and more. Leadership in both countries wants to ensure that its country enjoys a first-mover advantage in a competition driven by geopolitical and economic interests.

The purpose of this memo is to focus on how China views this competition with the United States and its allies and partners. China is treated as an important actor with its own perspectives on how it should engage in this space. The memo will assess China’s goals and strategies as they relate to this competition and offer recommendations for policymakers in the United States and elsewhere.

Strategic context

Beijing views technology as the “main arena” of competition and rivalry with the United States ¹. Many high-level policies and strategy documents released during President Xi Jinping’s tenure have emphasized the role of technology across all aspects of society. Under Xi’s direction, China has intensified its efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in key technology sectors, particularly in the wake of recent US technology export controls. These efforts center on China’s ability to indigenously innovate and leapfrog the United States in its technological capabilities.

China’s goals are reflected in intertwined economic, geopolitical, and military contexts. For example, China’s Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) development strategy is a “holistic approach” that bolsters “the seamless flow of materials, technology, knowledge, talent, and financial resources between the military and commercial industrial complexes.”² While MCF has been closely associated with Xi during his presidency, antecedents in Chinese policy can be found extending back to the early 1980s under Deng Xiaoping.³ MCF, therefore, appears to reflect a long-standing view within Chinese leadership that an integrated technology ecosystem that fuses military and economic pillars will improve China’s capacity to innovate and ultimately surpass other advanced nations, especially the United States. This emphasis on fusion, or integration across sectors and actors, can be found in other Chinese state documents. For example, its recently announced plan for “Building a Digital China” stresses creation of “a strongly coordinated integrated system that is horizontally and vertically linked” in the digital domain.⁴

Although many experts do not believe that China is a peer to the United States in terms of advanced technological production, there is no question that China has been closing the gap with the United States in many, if not most, areas. For instance, since the mid-2000s, China has consistently graduated more science, technology, engineering, and mathematics PhDs than the United States.⁵ China has also been gaining in scientific research. Studies focused on measuring China’s progress in research generally conclude as much—over the past decade, for example, Chinese scientists have produced a growing share of the world’s top 5 percent AI publications.⁶ (An important qualifier is that China’s rising academic output partially results from incentives within its system that encourage publication quantity, resulting in an explosion of often poor-quality and sometimes fraudulent papers authored by Chinese researchers.)⁷

These results suggest that in some areas at least, China has overtaken the United States. Dan Wang, a visiting scholar at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center, argued recently that China has surpassed the United States in a large array of technologically intensive industrial applications. This leadership position is the result of China having grounded much of its technology ecosystem in scaled manufacturing and the process knowledge that comes with it (that is, the know-how derived from learning by doing). This advantage is highly consequential, enabling China to dominate global trade in some lucrative and manufacturing-intensive fields such as electric vehicle (EV) batteries and renewable energy systems.⁸

Not all experts, however, are convinced that China’s rapid technological ascent will continue at such a pace. Influential Peking University scholar Wang Jisi has argued that despite revolutionary breakthroughs in some key technologies and a narrowing gap between China and the United States in terms of technological capacity, the United States still maintains key global advantages over China, including its open education model and talent cultivation system.⁹ Some within China argue that Beijing’s desire for self-sufficiency has made China’s situation worse. Yao Yang of Peking University, for example, recently argued that China has reacted too strongly to the US push for technology decoupling, resulting in an overemphasis on technological autonomy within China.¹⁰ Still others contend that China’s technology ecosystem is riven with contradictions that will doom it to second-tier status behind the United States. The lingering effects of the government’s 2020 crackdown on technology companies, for instance, stifled investment in Chinese tech companies and might harm both investors’ and entrepreneurs’ long-term interest in the country’s ecosystem.¹¹

China’s strategy for navigating technology competition with the United States remains in progress. Although there has been significant scientific and technological (S&T) progress by China over the past two decades, much of which aligns with goals laid out in policy documents from the early 2000s, geopolitical shifts have forced China, and other states, to be more reactive. Regarding semiconductors, for example, although China has been focused on chip development as a key part of its technology strategy for more than a decade, recently it has even more strongly endorsed the concept of self-sufficiency in semiconductor production, with limited results.¹² This emphasis is almost certainly a result of the United States reducing or eliminating exports of high-end chips and chip manufacturing equipment to China.

Implications

The Financial Times columnist Edward Luce has written that, unlike the Soviet Union, China “is never likely to dissolve” and therefore the United States will have to “cope with a China that will always be there.”¹³ In other words, China is unlikely to collapse from the contradictions that beset the Soviet Union, at least not anytime soon. It is true that China’s economy is slowing, a possible sign that the country’s boom decades are finally over, yet the odds nonetheless remain high that China will continue to be a major power, in economic and geopolitical terms, for some time to come. Policymakers in the United States and elsewhere should heed this basic insight and develop their policies appropriately, including in the technological arena.

The fundamental strategic question facing policymakers is where the line should be drawn on technological decoupling with China. The bilateral trading relationship between the United States and China is massive; and despite years of rising tensions and punitive trading policies on both sides, it continues to grow, measuring a record $690 billion in 2022.¹⁴ Decoupling, it turns out, is exceedingly difficult and against powerful economic interests within both countries. As just one example, Ford Motor Company in February 2023 announced a partnership with Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Ltd. (CATL), a leading Chinese battery manufacturer, to build and operate an EV battery plant in Michigan. While both firms clearly believe the deal is worth pursuing, some government officials in both countries think otherwise, with elected officials in Washington protesting the deal and, ironically, officials in Beijing asking for a review to ensure that Ford cannot acquire CATL’s battery technology.¹⁵

This last point underscores the strategic question facing China regarding how it approaches technological development and exchange. That question is parallel to the one facing strategists in the United States and those of its allies and partners. Although Chinese leadership sees technological ascendancy as key to China’s ability to surpass the United States in military and geopolitical terms, China also requires tech-based engagement with the outside world, especially the United States and its allies and partners, to ensure its prosperity. As has been shown by the Chinese government’s unwillingness to engage in a tit-for-tat skirmish with the United States on technology export controls, China appears to have settled into a compromise position wherein it continues to trade in tech-intensive goods and services to maintain access to foreign markets; engages in selective retaliation against individual countries, foreign firms, and persons as it deems necessary; crafts work-around strategies to evade US technology restrictions; brings cases against US trade policy at the World Trade Organization; and doubles down on its already heavy investment in its own tech-innovation ecosystem. ¹⁶ What China has not done is implement nuclear options, including wholesale bans of the biggest US companies from its gigantic domestic market.¹⁷

Given that China’s dual interests mirror those of the United States and its allies and partners, there should be space for strategists to navigate a relationship with China that maintains trade in tech-based goods and services while protecting strategic scientific and technological assets and know-how. Doing so will require acceptance of some collaboration risk, whether that risk is incurred through joint scientific research and academic exchange, investments in or from Chinese firms, or trade in technologically based goods and services with China.

These observations yield three recommendations:

On the protect side of the ledger, policymakers in the United States and elsewhere should deploy well-calibrated instruments that are necessary to guard only the most sensitive S&T assets possessed by the United States and its allies and partners. The downsides include the risk of policy overreach that adversely affects US innovation. History has shown that unilateral US technology controls are eventually ineffective and counterproductive, potentially causing loss of market share and revenue for US firms that are forced out of a market in which their competitors can continue operating.¹⁸

Moreover, aggressive protect policies risk bringing on a destructive tit-for-tat response from China, wherein it responds in kind or worse, reducing or eliminating mutually beneficial exchange (see point two below), and creating a rift between the United States on the one hand and allies and partners on the other regarding what exactly constitutes strategic assets and how to protect them (see point three below).

Thus far, policies such as the October 2022 export controls on semiconductors and critical semiconductor machinery, implemented by the Biden administration, have not elicited the harshest policy responses from China. Although US allies and partners have not and almost certainly will not flout the Biden administration’s rules, they have strongly signaled their concern with aggressive unilateralism in this space.¹⁹
It follows that policymakers should resist implementation of measures that prove destructive to the promote side of the ledger. As the Ford-CATL partnership demonstrates, despite increasing geopolitical tension between China and the United States, both countries still have much to gain from trade in technology. They also have much to lose. As the science journal Nature reported in 2022, the worsening bilateral relationship puts the countries’ robust scientific exchange (“the two nations are each other’s most important collaborative partners”) at risk of slowing or even atrophying.²⁰ This argument highlights the fact that emerging technologies, even in strategically prioritized areas like AI or quantum computing, are at root scientific and engineering endeavors with many useful applications across sectors.

Policymakers therefore should craft processes that lead to nuanced guidelines regarding which types of exchanges with China are regulated or prohibited. Such processes should include sustained, structured input from the private sector, scientific and engineering institutions, and other affected parties. Their purpose should be to restrict only the most sensitive technologies and knowledge while allowing beneficial scientific and economic transactions. Doing so will have the least harmful impacts on promotion (that is, a country’s capacity to invent and commercialize tech-infused goods and services).

This work will be difficult. As a timely example, finding an appropriate regulatory line appears to be at the core of the White House’s internal debate over a proposed new outbound investment rule. Currently, there are few constraints on US private sector investment in China. If the rule is implemented, it will subject to US government screening some US private sector investments in some Chinese entities for some technologies. The debate within the White House appears to be over the scope of this rule, with administration officials publicly recognizing that an overly broad rule could produce a chilling effect on economically and scientifically desirable investment in China.²¹

Finally, as we have previously written, it is imperative that US policymakers continue to strengthen America’s innovation ecosystem, which, although the world’s strongest, is now challenged by China.²². Policymakers will need to keep their eyes on numerous factors to sustain the US system’s lead. Strengthening the nation’s research and development (R&D) system must be a priority. There are several interlocking factors at work, including a declining share of public investment (primarily federal) in R&D and the concentration of the private sector’s R&D investments in a few large tech firms. Policymakers will need to address issues including the roles of public versus private investment and how proposed antitrust legislation might affect private sector R&D investments.²³ Some recent policy developments in the US are encouraging. For example, recent federal legislation such as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), and the CHIPS and Science Act (CHIPS) significantly upgrade support for workforce development, a key component of any high-functioning tech-innovation ecosystem.²⁴
While China has no allies that are global leaders in technology production, in contrast the United States can count almost all the world’s leading tech producers as allies and partners.²⁵ Because this situation is to the great and lasting strategic advantage of the United States, it is imperative that the country’s allies and partners do not perceive China-focused US technology policies as harmful to their interests.

That goal is easier to articulate than it is to attain. While the bulk of the world’s major technology producers might be America’s allies and partners, they have deep economic ties to China, as does the United States. Because their economic fortunes revolve greatly around exports of tech-infused goods and services to China, they must navigate between the American desire to restrict sensitive technology exports to China for security reasons and their own desire to keep exporting to China. Moreover, some allies and partners have perceived recent US domestic policies on the promote side of the ledger as threatening their own economic competitiveness vis-à-vis the United States.²⁶

These two concerns often meet in the same diplomatic setting. For example, the South Korean government has voiced concerns about both US export controls on chips to China—South Korean chip manufacturers are among the world’s most important, with significant business interests in China—and the IRA’s subsidies that might harm South Korean competitiveness (South Korea, along with other major EV manufacturers, contends that the IRA’s subsidies to encourage US EV production are discriminatory).²⁷ Such concerns strongly echo a high-profile row between the United States and the European Union regarding the IRA’s clean-tech subsidies, which EU officials are concerned will render Europe’s clean-tech industries uncompetitive.²⁸

It should be stressed that China is not sitting still in this global competition for diplomatic influence. A recently announced Global Security Initiative, prefigured in a Xi speech in April 2022, includes appeals for tighter global cooperation in AI, biosecurity, and cybersecurity, among many other domains, all presumably under Chinese leadership.²⁹ Such high-profile diplomatic overtures are complemented by numerous concrete instances of commercial diplomacy, wherein the Chinese state, state-owned enterprises, and private sector companies coordinate to ensure that Chinese companies succeed in foreign markets, of which there is substantial empirical evidence.³⁰

The bottom line for policymakers in the United States, and for that matter among its allies and partners in the transatlantic and transpacific contexts, is that the scale and complexity of the diplomatic challenge arising from China’s robust and growing presence in the global technology race cannot be underestimated. The United States and its allies and partners will have to define areas of agreement among one another, create mechanisms to ensure that their preferences remain viable in the face of Chinese competition, and build stronger mechanisms to combat China’s well-coordinated commercial diplomacy in nonaligned countries.

Peter Engelke is Deputy Director and Senior Fellow for Foresight at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at Global Energy Center.

Emily Weinstein is a Research Fellow at The Georgetown University Center for Security and Emerging Technology and a Nonresident Fellow at the Global China Hub.

1 “Sino-US Strategic Competition in Technology: Analysis and Prospects,” US-China Perception Monitor, https://perma.cc/KPB8-5FH9.

2 Emily S. Weinstein, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on ‘U.S. Investment in China’s Capital Markets and Military- Industrial Complex,’” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 19, 2021, 2-3, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-03/Emily_Weinstein_Testimony.pdf.

3 Elsa B. Kania and Lorand Laskai, “Myths and Realities of China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy,” Center for a New American Security, January 28, 2021, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/myths-and-realities-of-chinas-military-civil-fusion-strategy.

4 “Translation: ‘Plan for the Overall Layout of Building a Digital China,’” Digichina, March 3, 2023, https://digichina.stanford.edu/work/translation-plan-for-the-overall-layout-of-building-a-digital-china/?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email.

5 Remco Zwetsloot et al., Data Brief: China is Fast Outpacing U.S. STEM PhD Growth, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, August 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/china-is-fast-outpacing-u-s-stem-phd-growth/.

6 Ashwin Acharya and Brian Dunn, Data Brief: Comparing U.S. and Chinese Contributions to High-Impact AI Research, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, January 2022, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/comparing-u-s-and-chinese-contributions-to-high-impact-ai-research/.

7 See, e.g., Eleanor Olcott, Clive Cookson, and Alan Smith, “China’s Fake Science Industry: How ‘Paper Mills’ Threaten Progress,” Financial Times, March 27, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/32440f74-7804-4637-a662-6cdc8f3fba86.

8 Dan Wang, “China’s Hidden Tech Revolution: How Beijing Threatens U.S. Dominance,” Foreign Affairs 102, no. 2 (March/April 2023), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/chinas-hidden-tech-revolution-how-beijing-threatens-us-dominance-dan-wang.

9 Wang Jisi, “The coming technology picture,” China US Focus, February 7, 2023, https://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/the-coming-technology-picture.

10 Thomas des Garets Geddes, “PKU Economist Yao Yang on US-China Tech War and China’s Economy,”Sinification, January 10, 2023, https://sinification.substack.com/p/pku-economist-yao-yang-on-us-china.

11 See, e.g., Zen Soo, “Chill Pervades China’s Tech Firms Even as Crackdown Eases,” Associated Press, February 2, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/technology-science-china-government-business-930e13900317684c3e4124b799bcaab9. For a review of the crackdown’s central features, see Chang Che and Jeremy Goldkorn, “China’s ‘Big Tech Crackdown’: A Guide,” SupChina, August 2, 2021, https://supchina.com/2021/08/02/chinas-big-tech-crackdown-a-guide/.

12 For an analysis of China’s attempt to endogenize chip production, see Elliot Ji, “Great Leap Nowhere: The Challenges of China’s Semiconductor Industry,” War on the Rocks, February 24, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/02/great-leap-nowhere-the-challenges-of-chinas-semiconductor-industry/.

13 Edward Luce, “China Is Right about US Containment,” Financial Times, March 8, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/bc6685c1-6f17-4e9e-aaaa-922083c06e70.

14 Doug Palmer, “What Cold War? U.S. Trade with China Hits New High,” Politico, February 7, 2023, https://www.politico.com/news/2023/02/07/trade-china-relations-economies-00081301.

15 Seaton Huang, “Ford-CATL Partnership Illustrates the Challenge of Decoupling EV Supply Chains,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 7, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/blog/ford-catl-partnership-illustrates-challenge-decoupling-ev-supply-chains.

16 Eleanor Olcott, Qianer Liu, and Demetri Sevastopulo, “Chinese AI Groups Use Cloud Services to Evade US Chip Export Controls,” Financial Times, March 8, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/9706c917-6440-4fa9-b588-b18fbc1503b9; Arjun Kharpal, “China Brings WTO case Against U.S. and Its Sweeping Chip Export Curbs as Tech Tensions Escalate,” CNBC, December 13, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/12/13/china-brings-wto-case-against-us-chip-export-restrictions.html; Jeff Moon, “China’s Retaliation Playbook Can’t Meet the US Export Control Challenge,” The Hill, October 20, 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3697077-chinas-retaliation-playbook-cant-meet-the-us-export-control-challenge/.

17 “How the US Chip Export Controls Have Turned the Screws on China,” Financial Times, October 22, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/bbbdc7dc-0566-4a05-a7b3-27afd82580f3.

18 Tim Hwang and Emily S. Weinstein write that “decoupling regimes are imperfect and frequently act as a hindrance, rather than an absolute bar, to a rival’s technological progress.… [T]he transition of a hard-to-access, cutting-edge technology to a widespread, commodified one over time means that the effectiveness of decoupling tactics declines dramatically over time.” See Hwang and Weinstein, Decoupling in Strategic Technologies: From Satellites to Artificial Intelligence, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, July 2022, 2, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/decoupling-in-strategic-technologies/.

19 See, e.g., analyses by Jon Bateman, “Biden Is Now All-in on Taking Out China,” Foreign Policy, October 12, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/12/biden-china-semiconductor-chips-exports-decouple/, and Eric Levitz, “Biden’s New Cold War Against China Could Backfire,” New York Magazine, November 14, 2022, https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2022/11/biden-economic-war-china-chips-semiconductors-export-controls.html.

20 James Mitchell Crow, “US–China Partnerships Bring Strength in Numbers to Big Science Projects,” Nature, March 9, 2022, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-00570-0.

21 Christian C. Davis et al., “Biden Administration Plans for Outbound Investment Regulation Coming into Focus,” Akin Gump, March 13, 2023, 2-3, https://www.akingump.com/a/web/vDAJCgyS7szACyHF76GhNo/7yphd1/biden-administration-plans-for-outbound-investment-regulation-coming-into-focus.pdf; Rintaro Tobita, “U.S. Readies Targeted Screening for Investment in Chinese Tech,” Nikkei Asia, March 23, 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/U.S.-readies-targeted-screening-for-investment-in-Chinese-tech.

22 Peter Engelke and Emily Weinstein, “Designing Domestic and Multilateral Strategies for Maintaining Technological Superiority,” Atlantic Council, November 15, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/strategic-insights-memos/designing-domestic-and-multilateral-strategies-for-maintaining-technological-superiority/

23 For a review of R&D trends in the US and China, see Ashish Arora and Sharon Belenzon, American Innovation Under Threat: Restrictive Legislation and Global Competition, Innovation Frontier Project, November 2021, https://innovationfrontier.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/American-Innovation-Under-Threat-UPDATED-51622.pdf.

24 For a summary, see “Workforce Development in the IIJA, CHIPS and IRA,” National Governors Association, February 8, 2023, https://www.nga.org/publications/workforce-development-in-the-iija-chips-and-ira/.

25 [25] Major indexes that rank countries by tech-driven innovation substantiate this proposition. As an example, the 2022 edition of the World Intellectual Property Organization’s (WIPO’s) gold-standard Global Innovation Index shows that nearly the entirety of the top 25 ranked countries are allies or partners of the United States. Although China has economic ties to all countries in the top 25, none can be counted as allies. (The index ranks the United States second and China 11th.) Russia, the first country on WIPO’s list that plausibly can be called an ally of China’s, is 47th. See World Intellectual Property Organization, Global Innovation Index 2022, 19, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo-pub-2000-2022-en-main-report-global-innovation-index-2022-15th-edition.pdf.

26 Edward Alden, “Biden’s ‘America First’ Policies Threaten Rift with Europe,” Foreign Policy, December 5, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/05/biden-ira-chips-act-america-first-europe-eu-cars-ev-economic-policy/.

27 Jiyoung Song, “South Korea Plans Mega Chip-Making Base to Stay Ahead,” Wall Street Journal, March 15, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/south-korea-plans-mega-chip-making-base-to-stay-ahead-b2bec41f.

28 See, e.g., the summary articulated in Peter Campbell, “Why Europe Is Struggling to Compete with the US on Green Subsidies,” Financial Times, March 10, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/2bc8f6a2-99a1-437e-a382-72908448205d.

29 “The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, February 21, 2023, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230221_11028348.html. For a critique, see Michael Schuman, “How China Wants to Replace the U.S. Order,” The Atlantic, July 13, 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/07/china-xi-jinping-global-security-initiative/670504/.

30 See Barry Naughton and Briana Boland, CCP Inc.: The Reshaping of China’s State Capitalist System, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 31, 2023, 24-26, https://www.csis.org/analysis/ccp-inc-reshaping-chinas-state-capitalist-system.

The post Assessing China’s approach to technological competition with the United States appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Practice makes perfect: What China wants from its digital currency in 2023

Ananya Kumar — Mon, 24 Apr 2023 16:58:55 +0000

It’s been a year since the Beijing Olympics, where China’s central bank digital currency (CBDC), the e-CNY, debuted in front of an international audience. As the e-CNY network has expanded over the last 12 months, China’s goals have become clearer. Domestically, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) is still in test-and-learn mode, prioritizing experimentation over adoption. Globally, China is less focused on internationalizing the RMB than it is on setting technical and regulatory standards that will define how other countries’ central bank digital currencies will work going forward.

Domestic ambitions

Even with its persistent low adoption rates, the e-CNY is by far the largest CBDC pilot in the world by both the amount of currency in circulation—13.61 billion RMB—and the number of users—260 million wallets. As the pilot regions have expanded to 25 cities, so have the real-world use-cases tested through the pilots. From the start, the PBOC’s objective within its borders has been to not just to compete in China’s domestic payments landscape, which is dominated by two “private” players—AliPay and TencentPay/WePay—but to expand the universe of economic activities that are included the state-enabled payments network. So far, common use-cases being tested include public transportation, public health checkpoints including COVID test centers, integrated identification cards to receive and pay utilities such as retirement benefits and school tuition payments, as well as tax payments and refunds. The pilots have also begun testing technical and programmability functions like smart contracts for B2B and B2C functions, e-commerce and credit provision. Some of these projects are described in the table below..

These domestic test cases are likely to expand this year and cover a broader range of activities and regions. Already, the PBOC is looking to reach the margins of society: e-CNY is being tested amongst elderly populations and in broader rural connectivity schemes initiated to improve digitization. It is also aiming to reach AliPay and TencentPay/WePay customers through integrating their wallet and e-commerce functions for e-CNY distribution. Over the last few years, the PBOC, like the broader Chinese state apparatus, has displayed a tendency toward centralizing regulatory authority when it comes to the two sectors at the intersection of CBDCs —finance and technology. The universe of expanded economic networks enabled by the e-CNY has rightly created concerns regarding the centralization of authority by the PBOC, and the resulting impacts on freedom of choice and from state surveillance for its users. The expanded network of use cases across applications that would collect data on personal identification, health information, and consumption habits and behavior should also raise concerns around the vulnerability of such data to cyber threats domestically and abroad.

Recent developments on regulation

Interestingly, on the regulatory side, at the National People’s Congress in early March, there were a few changes announced to China’s financial regulators. The PBOC has lost its authority over financial holding companies and financial consumer protection regulation to a new regulator, the State Administration of Financial Supervision, which will also oversee banking and insurance regulation. The PBOC is also opening up 31 new provincial-level branches signaling deeper coordination between the PBOC and provincial level authorities. This reshuffle in authority signals further centralization of power under the party apparatus. Unlike other central banks, the PBOC is not fully independent, and requires the State Council to sign off on decisions relating to money supply and interest rates, and the State Council has been tracking PBOC’s research into e-CNY since approving the initial plan in 2016.

From a monetary policy perspective, the e-CNY infrastructure could be a handy tool in the hands of the PBOC, with which it can increase or decrease money supply. As China devises a strategy to stimulate consumer spending this year, there is an opportunity to do so by using and expanding the e-CNY network. China has already increased bank’s short term liquidity by $118 billion and long term liquidity by $72 billion through reducing reserve ratio requirements this year.

PBOC’s ambition for an all-encompassing domestic network of e-CNY infrastructure raises questions about the state’s ability and reach in controlling citizens’ activities. The pilots test real-world scenarios for CBDC use cases, and while adoption has been low, the broad range of applications suggest that testing, not adoption, is the priority for now.

e-CNY around the world

Use of the word “e-CNY” commonly refers to this domestic, retail payments infrastructure. However, much of the discussion in Washington references the cross-border, wholesale capabilities that the PBOC has been testing publicly for a while now. The PBOC participates in a joint experiment with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the Bank of Thailand, the Central Bank of the UAE and the Bank for International Settlements named Project mBridge, the purpose of which is to create a common infrastructure across borders to facilitate real-time and cheap transaction settlement. Last October, the project successfully conducted 164 transactions in collaboration with 20 banks across the 4 countries, settling a total of $22 million. Instead of relying on correspondent banking networks, banks were able to link with their foreign counterparts directly to conduct payments, FX settlements, redemptions and issuance across e-HKD, e-AED, e-THB and e-CNY. Interestingly, almost half of all transactions were in e-CNY, which amounted to approximately $1,705,453 issued, $3,410,906 used in payments and FX settlements and $6,811,812 redeemed. Both issuance and redemption transactions were highest in e-CNY, and as stated by the BIS, it was likely because of the automatic integration of the retail e-CNY system and the higher share of RMB in regional trade settlements.

Analysts have characterized wholesale cross-border arrangements like the mBridge as an effort towards de-dollarization and internationalization of the RMB. The e-CNY, much like its physical counterpart, faces the same liquidity constraints due to capital controls on off-shore transactions and holdings. This was reflected in the mBridge experiment, as one of the main feedback from participants was the need for greater liquidity from FX market makers and other liquidity providers to improve the FX transaction capabilities of the platform. Additionally, even if e-CNY were to become freely traded in the future, it could lead to significant appreciation of RMB and balance of payments issues for the PBOC. This is likely not a desirable outcome for the PBOC, which is why currency arrangements like the mBridge can only have a limited impact on the role of the dollar.

If winning the currency competition is an unlikely short-term objective of the PBOC, what has raised national security concerns regarding the e-CNY? China has long used the rhetoric of international cooperation and “do no harm” principles in its cross-border CBDC engagements. However, these cross-border experiments require months of preparation and coordination between central and commercial banks to ensure that regulatory and jurisdictional requirements are aligned. They highlight the need for legal pathways and standards for data sharing, privacy, and risk frameworks between heretofore unsynchronized jurisdictions. Similarly, experiments rely on technological prototypes that interact with existing domestic e-CNY framework, creating de-facto technical standards for cross-border transactions which are likely to be replicated by other jurisdictions. What can potentially emerge is a set of technical and regulatory standards built in the image of the e-CNY, and with that comes the baggage of surveillance and unauthorized access by the Chinese state. MBridge’s platform, for instance, can be utilized for domestic CBDC infrastructure if required by any jurisdiction.

Already, Chinese company Red Date Technology—which, along with China Mobile, UnionPay, State Information Center and others—is behind the creation of Blockchain Service Network (BSN) (a blockchain infrastructure service that connects different payment networks) has launched a similar product under the name of Universal Digital Payments Network. At an event at the World Economic Forum in January 2023, it targeted emerging markets experimenting with CBDCs and stablecoins, since the project wants to build an interconnected global architecture in the vein of BSN’s ambitions.

Technological and regulatory replication by country blocs, enabled by Chinese state and private actors, could create a parallel system of financial networks outside of the dollar, especially where there is a high volume of transactions. The United States relies on the dollar’s dominance to establish global anti-money laundering standards and achieve effective and broad implementation of financial sanctions. The emergence of alternate currency-blocs—enabled by e-CNY-like technology—has the potential to chip away at the primacy of the dollar in global finance and trade, as the dollar will not be the only available option.

Therefore, even though it is unlikely that the development of e-CNY would lead to a broader share of the RMB as a payment or reserve currency, replication of the e-CNY’s technical and regulatory model could further payments infrastructure that is not only inherently unworkable with the dollar, but exacerbates the privacy and surveillance concerns of the retail e-CNY by exporting the problem to the world. China’s domestic motivations of greater control and surveillance, therefore, are intertwined with its global ambitions, and the consequences will be dire in the absence of a competing, privacy preserving, dollar-enabling, payments infrastructure.

Ananya Kumar is the associate director for digital currencies with the GeoEconomics Center.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.