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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

None of this has prevented Putin from using the NATO issue as a smokescreen for his imperial ambitions. For years, he has skillfully exploited anti-Western sentiment and widespread international suspicion of US foreign policy to distract from Russia’s own acts of international aggression. This tactic has proved remarkably successful; in the seventeen months since Russian troops began the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a wide range of academics, commentators, and politicians around the world have all echoed Putin in blaming NATO for provoking the war. They have continued to do so even as Putin himself has compared his invasion to the imperial conquests of eighteenth-century Russian Czar Peter the Great.

The fact that so many prominent personalities remain ready to accept Russia’s dishonest NATO narrative is evidence of fundamental misconceptions regarding the role of the Alliance and the nature of its post-Cold War enlargement. NATO is routinely depicted by critics as an expansionist military institution seeking to impose Western dominance, but this is entirely at odds with the growth of the Alliance over the past three decades. Nobody has ever been forced to join NATO; instead, every single new member since 1991 has asked for membership and has been obliged to meet a series of strict standards in order to qualify. Indeed, the loaded term “NATO expansion” may itself be misleading, as unlike Russia, the Alliance only ever expands on a voluntary basis. It is also worth underlining that while Putin plays the victim card and complains of being encircled, fear of Russian aggression has been by far the leading cause of all new membership applications.

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine now approaching the one-and-a-half-year mark, it is time to retire the NATO narrative. Putin has demonstrated that he is not at all threatened by the growing presence of the Alliance on Russia’s northwestern border, and is increasingly open about his imperial agenda in Ukraine. It is this Russian imperialism that poses a grave threat to international security, not the defensive guarantees offered by NATO.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

…the Israel model for Ukraine would effectively be a formalization of what’s happening now, but I would argue that it’s actually more credible as a promise because of that. Biden would commit to maintain a suitable level of support to Ukraine, rather than making a potential future promise to include it in an alliance… I think Ukraine would be wise to focus its efforts there, not on NATO membership.

Emma Ashford

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

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Charai in the National Interest: Sweden’s NATO Accession Limits Putin’s Options

Atlantic Council — Mon, 17 Jul 2023 18:16:12 +0000

Original Source

The Western powers are now more united with the Baltic nations than ever before. After months of diplomatic delays, Sweden can now join NATO—a genuine triumph for the Biden administration. This development has enormous geostrategic implications for the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

While European leaders are starting to realize that the Russian bear’s teeth and claws are not as sharp as they once feared, it would be a mistake to believe that the Russians can no longer wreak vast harm across Europe, even without resorting to nuclear weapons. Now is the time for realism about Russia, not over-confidence.

Ahmed Charai, 2023

Ahmed Charai is a Moroccan publisher and an Atlantic Council Board Director. He is also an international counselor of the Center for a Strategic and International Studies, a board of trustees member of International Crisis Group, and a member of the Advisory Board of The Center for the National Interest in Washington and Global Board of Advisors at The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security in Jerusalem.

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Wieslander interviewed by Spanish La Razón

Eric Adamson — Sun, 16 Jul 2023 07:09:23 +0000

Anna Wieslander was interviewed on how Sweden will contribute to NATO’s collective security and the reaction from Russia.

“Sweden has a modern and professional Armed Forces and an advanced defense industrial base. weden possesses a highly advanced air force, with the Swedish JAS Gripen fighter aircraft at its core. In addition, Sweden’s significant naval power, including its submarine fleet, adds to the military strength. With a history of operating submarines in the Baltic Sea since 1904, Sweden has extensive regional experience in submarine warfare.”

“Now, with Turkey’s approval for Sweden, the Kremlin has stated that it will respond with measures similar to those proposed for Finland. The specific nature of these measures remains unclear, but it is conceivable that Russia could resort to hybrid tactics, such as cyber attacks and disinformation campaigns, as part of its response.”

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Dispatch from Vilnius: Inside a NATO Summit of high drama on Ukraine—and historic opportunity

Frederick Kempe — Sat, 15 Jul 2023 11:30:00 +0000

VILNIUS—Drafting NATO Summit communiqués is usually less the stuff of high drama and more mind-numbing bureaucracy.

But that wasn’t the case this week. The NATO Summit in Lithuania will be remembered both for the public fireworks over Ukraine’s aspirations for Alliance membership and outcomes that included a breakthrough on Swedish membership, the most detailed and robust defense plans since the Cold War, and unprecedented Group of Seven (G7) defense commitments to Kyiv.

Let’s start with the fireworks, unusual in a consensus-driven Alliance that values decorum and discretion, and end with the historic outcomes.

Tensions began simmering long before the summit among Biden administration officials and other NATO allies—with Ukraine lobbing arguments from the outside—over just how far to go in committing the Alliance to a time-linked invitation and roadmap for Ukraine’s membership.

For the Biden administration, it was a matter of geopolitical prudence to oppose any fixed timeline for an invitation for fear it would draw NATO, and hence the United States, into a direct conflict with Russia. With one eye on the 2024 US presidential election and the other on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear capabilities, why take the risk, particularly as full Ukrainian membership wasn’t likely to come before the war ended anyway?

For Ukraine’s more impatient supporters—particularly, but not exclusively, those geographically closer to the Russian threat—it was a matter of strategic imperative and moral obligation to draft language that provided more clarity on the pathway and potential timing of a NATO membership invitation than Washington considered acceptable. Several of those supporters had previously been occupied and repressed by Moscow, so they understand the value of NATO security guarantees.

Even if membership itself wouldn’t come for some time, they wanted to demonstrate maximum common cause for a people who miraculously and at enormous human cost are countering Russia’s war and revanchist ambitions.

The behind-the-scenes simmer boiled over when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, apparently having read a draft of the summit communiqué about to be released, threw a Twitter bomb into the negotiating room.

What he objected to was text at the end of paragraph eleven, which read: “We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when allies agree and conditions are met.”

Zelenskyy shot back before the draft could be released:

“It’s unprecedented and absurd when time frame is not set neither for the invitation nor for Ukraine’s membership. While at the same time vague wording about ‘conditions’ is added even for inviting Ukraine. It seems there is no readiness neither to invite Ukraine to NATO nor to make it a member of the Alliance. This means that a window of opportunity is being left to bargain Ukraine’s membership in NATO in negotiations with Russia. And for Russia, this means motivation to continue its terror. Uncertainty is weakness. And I will openly discuss this at the summit.”

Before long, word spread in Vilnius that at least one ally had “broken silence,” which in NATO-speak means that during an agreed period after the communiqué has been finalized and before it is publicly released, any ally may come back with an objection and reopen negotiations.

Though it’s unclear what transpired next, officials involved in the negotiations described scenes during the summit in which US President Joe Biden and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stood over the document and hand-drafted changes. In the end, the US stance on Ukrainian membership proved immovable, even resisting attempts by at least one other ally to at the very least state that it was NATO’s intention to explore ways to invite Ukraine to join the Alliance as soon as the seventy-fifth-anniversary summit in Washington next July.

Given all that, there was more than a little buzz when Biden, in his fiery speech in Vilnius—in which he hailed the “unbroken” Ukrainian people—neglected to mention or encourage their NATO membership aspirations.

Even after NATO made the communiqué public, tensions still simmered.

At the NATO Public Forum, (a side event for the summit that the Atlantic Council co-hosted), Daria Kaleniuk, a Ukrainian anti-corruption activist, provocatively asked Sullivan how to explain to her young son, who is sleeping in their corridor due to air raids, that Biden isn’t ready to accept Ukraine into NATO. She suggested it might be “because he is afraid of Russia, afraid of Russia losing, afraid Ukraine winning,” or even suggested, “because there are back-channel negotiations with Russia” that ostensibly had Ukraine’s NATO hopes as a bargaining chip.

Sullivan was warm but firm to his questioner, acknowledging that the world stands in “awe” at the way Ukrainians have made sacrifices with “hell raining down from the skies” around them. At the same time, he scolded Kaleniuk for making “insinuations” that were “unfounded and unjustified” and asked that those insinuations “get checked at the door, so that we can talk to one another in goodwill and good faith.”

Beyond that, Sullivan added, “I think the American people do deserve a degree of gratitude” from both the US government and the rest of the world “for their willingness to step up” to provide such plentiful military assistance to Ukraine.

With tensions high, British Defense Minister Ben Wallace hit a similar theme, “providing a slight word of caution” that Ukraine should express more appreciation to its supporters.

When asked by reporters for his response to Wallace, Zelenskyy replied, “he can write to me about how he wants to be thanked.”

Were it not for the fireworks, the world’s focus would have been more singularly on the summit’s results.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan dropped his objections to Sweden’s membership, opening the way for it to join the Alliance. That leaves Putin facing a bigger and more unified NATO, strengthening defense in the Baltic states and the High North.

Real progress also came through a pledge by G7 countries (all in NATO except Japan), although it is not binding, to provide Ukraine “enduring” support—which each country will determine individually—including more defense equipment, increased intelligence sharing, and expanded training, dramatically reducing the likelihood of eroding resolve.

There was plenty more in the NATO Summit communiqué on defense plans, strengthened commitments to defense investment, and deeper global partnerships, particularly with leaders on hand from Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea; there was also robust language on China and warnings not to provide lethal support to its Russian friends for their Ukraine war.

By summit’s end, and by the convening of the renamed and reconstituted NATO-Ukraine Council, tempers had calmed some and diplomacy had intervened on the Ukraine issue, though some bad blood will likely linger.

Zelenskyy went home not with a NATO invitation but with family photo-like pictures alongside NATO leaders, as mentioned in my Inflection Points column last week, and a dramatically different tone than his earlier missive, as shown in a video he tweeted from his train ride home to Kyiv:

“We are returning home with a good result for our country and, very importantly, for our warriors… For the first time since independence, we have formed a security foundation for Ukraine on its way to NATO. These are concrete security guarantees that are confirmed by the top seven democracies in the world. Never before have we had such a security foundation, and this is the level of the G7… Very importantly, during these two days of the [NATO] Summit, we have put to rest any doubts and ambiguities about whether Ukraine will be in NATO. It will! For the first time, not only do all the allies agree on this, but a significant majority in the alliance is vigorously pushing for it.”

At a closing session for the NATO Public Forum, I asked Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis how history would remember the Vilnius summit.

“Strategically, we won,” he said. “We committed ourselves to Ukrainian membership in NATO.” Unlike the 2008 commitment at the Bucharest NATO Summit that had no follow up, Landsbergis said the Alliance and Ukraine this time won’t waste another day, because of the urgency that Putin’s war had placed on everyone.

The Vilnius summit “was not the last stop,” he said. “We have to see it as a bridge. And the next stop is Washington. So, we have a full year. Lots to do…. Washington can actually be even more historic than Vilnius.”

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 NATO’s promises to Ukraine mark real progress
ECONOMIST

The Economist reports that although NATO allies could have done more at this week’s summit in Vilnius, they dealt a number of blows to Putin that went far beyond Ukraine.

“Putin’s first defeat was over a different expansion of NATO,” the Economist writes. “Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, said he is dropping his objections to Sweden’s membership, enabling it to follow its Nordic neighbor, Finland, into the alliance. That will strengthen the Baltic states and the High North, and tie up more of Putin’s resources should he attempt mischief against NATO anywhere along its frontier.”

Further, with increased military assistance from G7 countries, it will become harder for Putin to maintain his resolve. “The G7 members promise that this will be an ‘enduring’ commitment, and that each country will, individually, craft its own security guarantees for Ukraine that will give it a ‘sustainable force capable of defending Ukraine now and deterring Russian aggression in the future.’… This matters because it helps disabuse Putin and his elites of the belief that Western resolve will crumble if only Russia clings on.”

Although delaying Ukraine’s NATO membership process until after the war will likely give Russia incentive to prolong the war, the Economist argues, the additional military assistance should prevent that from happening. “That is where the summit made real progress.” Read more →

#2 The ‘Israel Model’ Won’t Work for Ukraine
Eliot A. Cohen | ATLANTIC

In this important Atlantic piece, Eliot Cohen argues that the “Israel model”—in which the West would arm Ukraine to the teeth to guarantee its ability to defeat any credible military threat—is a poor policy choice based on flawed reasoning.

Cohen writes that the main difference between 1973 Israel and 2023 Ukraine is that Israel had a military edge over its neighbors, which Ukraine currently lacks over Russia. “Israel staged bombing raids against targets deep in Syria and Egypt, including their capitals, from the 1960s forward, and unlike the Ukrainian drones flying to Moscow, these were not mere symbolic strikes. The Six Day War, in 1967, was an overwhelming Israeli victory, which involved the annihilation of its neighbors’ air forces and the advance of Israeli armor and infantry across the de facto 1949 border. The 1973 war similarly ended with Israeli forces within artillery range of Damascus and on the verge of destroying half the Egyptian force that had crossed the Suez Canal.”

Most provocatively, Cohen writes about the difference between an Israel with a nuclear arsenal and a Ukraine that gave up its nuclear weapons in 1994 in a deal under which Moscow promised to safeguard its sovereignty and security. “Unless, of course,” Cohen warns in his conclusion, “[Biden] prefers to be the father of the Ukrainian atom bomb.” Read more →

#3 Russia’s Nuclear Option Hangs Over Ukraine and NATO
Robbie Gramer | FOREIGN POLICY

To gain an understanding of how fears of nuclear conflict played into this week’s decision, read Robbie Gramer in Foreign Policy.

“The nuclear question is an existential one for the alliance,” he writes, “one that’s driven Washington’s calculations on what military aid to send to Ukraine and when, and it has also influenced the debate on when and how to allow Ukraine to join the military alliance as a full-fledged member.”

According to Gramer, US and allied officials are divided over the validity of Russian threats. “Some US and other NATO defense officials believe there could be an increased risk of Russia launching a limited nuclear strike with a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon to stave off a major battlefield defeat if its forces look to be on the verge of a rout, or if Ukraine appears poised to capture Crimea and large swaths of occupied territory in southern and eastern Ukraine. Others say that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling won’t go further than that, and bowing to such threats will only embolden Russia to use such ‘nuclear blackmail’ in the future.”

“At the same time, Ukrainian and Western officials also fear that Russia could mount an attack on Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant to attempt to trigger a major radiological event, irrespective of whether it launches a nuclear strike—though it’s unclear how successful those efforts would be.” Read more →

#4 Biden Pledges Long-Term Backing for Ukraine, but a U.S. Election Looms
Zolan Kanno-Youngs | NEW YORK TIMES

For insight into the role of US domestic politics on the NATO summit and Biden’s decision making, look no further than Zolan Kanno-Youngs’s reporting in the New York Times.

“Despite Biden’s repeated promises of staying by Ukraine’s side in its war against Russia, questions about the shelf life of support among American people and lawmakers hung over the summit of Western allies,” Kanno-Youngs writes. “Even as the US president was giving a long-term commitment, a group of far-right Republican lawmakers in Washington was pushing legislation that would scale back aid to Ukraine, exposing fractures in the Republican Party and raising doubts about its commitment should it capture the White House next year.”

According to Kanno-Youngs, to sway domestic public opinion to favor providing aid to Ukraine, Biden has framed the war as an existential battle between democracy and autocracy. In Vilnius, Biden was determined to address the doubts about continued US support for Ukraine. “We will not waver,” Biden said. “I mean that. Our commitment to Ukraine will not weaken.” Read more →

#5 Should Ukraine Negotiate with Russia?
Dmytro Natalukha; Alina Polyakova and Daniel Fried; Angela Stent; Samuel Charap | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In dialogue with Samuel Charap, who previously urged the use of diplomacy as a tool to end the war with Ukraine, Dmytro Natalukha, Alina Polyakova and Daniel Fried (an Atlantic Council distinguished fellow), and Angela Stent argue that negotiations with Russia are bound to fail. Read this multifaceted analysis to understand the pros and cons of negotiation with Russia.

Natalukha claimed that the only way to secure Ukraine’s future is to remove Putin from power. “If the goal is to prevent Russia from threatening democracies around the world, allowing it to reach an armistice with Ukraine won’t do much good,” he writes. “Ukraine and its allies must aim to make Russia less anti-Western. Regardless of what happens at the negotiating table, therefore, Putin cannot remain in power.”

Polyakova and Fried believe that although negotiation will most likely happen, the battlefield is Ukraine’s best position from which to win the war: “A military stalemate is indeed possible. And at some point, negotiations with Russia will be needed to end this war. But Ukraine should start negotiating only when it is in the strongest possible position; it should not be rushed into talks when Russia shows no interest in any settlement terms other than Ukraine’s surrender. Starting negotiations now would mean accepting Putin’s maximalist terms. If Russia suffers further setbacks on the battlefield, however, talks could proceed from a better starting place.”

Polyakova and Fried continue, “The most important point, which Ukraine’s allies agree on, is that Ukraine must define the right moment for negotiations. That may or may not be when all of Ukraine’s territory is liberated. The key is for Ukraine to maintain flexibility in its decisions about its territory and the path toward a just peace.” Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

New Atlanticist Jul 11, 2023

Experts react: What NATO’s Vilnius summit means for Ukraine and the Alliance’s future

By Atlantic Council experts

Atlantic Council experts decode the summit’s implications for Ukraine’s membership, NATO’s approach to China, and more.

Belarus Central Europe

UkraineAlert Jul 11, 2023

NATO summit leaves Ukrainians frustrated

By Peter Dickinson

The 2023 NATO summit failed to deliver on hopes for a clear commitment on future Ukrainian membership, leaving many in Ukraine deeply frustrated by the apparent lack of urgency among the country’s allies, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Corruption

New Atlanticist Jul 10, 2023

Experts react: Erdogan just agreed to support Sweden’s NATO bid. What does that mean for Turkey, Sweden, and the Alliance?

By Atlantic Council experts

Atlantic Council experts weigh in on what’s behind this dramatic and consequential turnabout from Erdoğan and what to expect next.

Europe & Eurasia European Union

The post Dispatch from Vilnius: Inside a NATO Summit of high drama on Ukraine—and historic opportunity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wieslander interviewed by Svenska Dagbladet

Eric Adamson — Sat, 15 Jul 2023 08:39:01 +0000

Wieslander explains that she worked on NATO standardization in the 1990s at the Swedish Ministry of Defence. There she was responsible for the work on the partnership that Sweden entered into with the alliance. “Nevertheless, for various reasons, the countries have chosen to make national solutions and variants of a lot of different things, and this is now showing up in Ukraine when they receive weapons from all sorts of places that have to work together in real life.”

The post Wieslander interviewed by Svenska Dagbladet appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wieslander interviewed by Finnish YLE

Eric Adamson — Sat, 15 Jul 2023 08:31:34 +0000

“If Turkey had not given Sweden the green light, the Vilnius meeting could not have been considered a success. The negotiations between Sweden and Turkey were difficult and required diplomatic efforts. Ulf Kristersson’s government worked hard on them, alongside the allies and also Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg,” Wieslander told Finnish news outlet YLE.

The post Wieslander interviewed by Finnish YLE appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With re-election behind him, Erdogan is turning toward the West

Grady Wilson — Fri, 14 Jul 2023 22:13:53 +0000

In a reprise of the accession drama at last year’s NATO Summit, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan flashed Turkey’s long-awaited green light for Sweden’s NATO membership on the eve of this year’s summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. But that green light signals much more than “go” for Stockholm: It also signals that Turkey has taken the opportunity to greater align itself with the West in the months since Erdoğan secured re-election.

Sweden’s journey to accession seems to be playing out along Turkey’s preferred timeline, coming one month after Sweden’s tougher anti-terror laws came into force and having been affirmed at the Alliance’s marquee gathering for maximum effect. Recent developments—including fresh pro-Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) demonstrations and a Quran burning in Sweden—threatened to derail the process, but Turkey should be credited for not giving in to these provocations.

The agreement is the latest and greatest signal that Turkey has decided to align more with the West. Other notable signals came in the form of Turkey’s hosting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (during which Ankara reiterated its longstanding support for Ukraine’s NATO membership and angered Moscow by releasing Azov battalion commanders) and the reiteration of the value it places on European Union membership. All these signals happened in a span of three days. The developments stand in stark contrast to speculation—that has arisen since before Turkey first raised an issue with Sweden’s accession—that Turkey, under Erdoğan, is pivoting toward Russia and the East.

Two months ago, when in the heat of a tough re-election campaign, Erdoğan accused Western countries (including the United States) of colluding with the opposition to remove him from power. At that point, the trajectory of Turkey’s relations with transatlantic allies appeared much less clear. Once Erdoğan won the presidential elections and the parliament became distinctly more nationalist, there were fears an emboldened Turkey would move toward the East. The first hint that this would not be the case, and that the president’s pragmatism would once again emerge, appeared in the selection of the post-election cabinet, which broadly elevated several pro-Western voices—including widely respected Mehmet Şimşek, who was brought back as minister of treasury and finance—and sidelined the most outspoken transatlantic skeptics.

Analysts close to the Turkish government were quick to assert that Turkey’s moves constitute not so much a pivot to the West but a push to balance relations and mend troubled relationships in line with a course Turkey has been pursuing for many years. On the other hand, there is speculation that part of the impetus lies in the perception of a weakened Russia following the Wagner Group mutiny in June and its aftermath. What is clear is that a weaker Russian President Vladimir Putin renders Moscow a less reliable partner for Turkey. Particularly since the 2016 coup attempt against Erdoğan’s government, Turkey-Russia relations have been driven from the top down by leader-to-leader chemistry. While Turkey and Russia’s deep economic relations are unlikely to be interrupted or curtailed, the idea or illusion of Russia as a balance or alternative to the West in any kind of strategic sense will begin to fray.

This move from Erdoğan is a major win for Sweden, Turkey, and the whole Alliance. It’s also a big win for the Biden administration and for NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who both worked very hard behind the scenes to make the agreement possible.

The breakthrough followed soon after a phone call between the US and Turkish presidents and after a flurry of contact between US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and their counterparts. A major, yet unofficial, sweetener to the agreement appears to be the United States’ assurance, issued one day after Erdoğan’s agreement, that it will sell F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, which Turkey first requested in October 2021 (after its ejection from the F-35 program) but has been thus far blocked by Congress.

In a pre-NATO Summit interview over the weekend, Biden alluded to boosting support for both Greece and Turkey’s defense capabilities simultaneously as a way to push the F-16 deal through Congress. That hearkens back to how the United States has historically balanced its two key allies in Southeastern Europe through aid dating back to the Truman Doctrine, which laid the groundwork for the eventual inclusion of both in NATO. It also underlines the importance of Turkey’s warming of ties with Greece in the wake of the devastating earthquake this February. These factors may play a role in overcoming the concerns of key members of the US Congress, including Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez (D-NJ), who confirmed that he is in talks with the Biden administration on the F-16 sale.

Finalizing Sweden’s NATO accession—which still needs to be ratified by Turkey’s parliament (as well as Hungary’s)—and completing the F-16 deal would be big steps toward rebuilding trust between Turkey and its transatlantic partners. In a speech on July 12, Erdogan announced that Turkey’s parliament will take up ratification after the long recess in October, in line with the parliamentary calendar.

One grievance from Turkey regarding its troubled transatlantic relationship is the perception that its Western allies have never fully appreciated Turkey’s security concerns. Despite officially designating the PKK—Turkey’s number one security threat—as a terrorist organization, the United States and Europe have not shown Turkey the deference that it feels due on this issue. This is in part due to the United States’ cooperation with the PKK’s Syrian affiliate to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. Turkey’s temporary block on Sweden afforded Turkey the opportunity, in high-stakes fashion, to remind the Alliance that its concerns need to be taken more seriously moving forward.

One way to read Turkey’s post-election foreign-policy posture is a willingness to improve its relations with the West. Over the past three years, Turkey has aggressively pursued and concluded rapprochements with many countries in its neighborhood including Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. While Turkey’s relations with its NATO allies never deteriorated as much as they did with the aforementioned countries, there is without question room to improve. Turkey, Sweden, the United States, and NATO have all committed to win-win moves that would contribute to a more positive and productive atmosphere. Now, they all need to follow through.

Grady Wilson is associate director at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. Follow him on Twitter @GradysWilson.

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Disappointed but not discouraged: Ukrainians react to NATO summit

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 13 Jul 2023 20:15:34 +0000

The annual NATO summit in Vilnius this week failed to produce the kind of breakthrough toward membership of the alliance that many Ukrainians were hoping for. However, it did offer up ample evidence of continued strong international support for Ukraine in the fight against Russia’s ongoing invasion.

Despite widespread recognition that Ukraine’s future must be as part of NATO, member states were unable to reach a consensus on the crucial issue of a membership invitation. Instead, the summit declaration featured vague references to future membership “when allies agree and conditions are met,” leading to considerable frustration and talk of missed opportunities.

While no NATO invitation was forthcoming, Ukraine did secure confirmation that the country would not have to go through the Membership Action Plan (MAP) stage of the accession process. The summit was also marked by the inaugural session of the NATO-Ukraine Council, a new forum designed to intensify cooperation while helping to prepare Ukraine for future membership. Additional positives included a series of significant announcements on military aid, and a joint declaration from the G7 nations pledging long-term security assistance for Ukraine.

Many in Ukraine expressed frustration over the failure to secure a clear signal over NATO membership, but others argued that expectations had been unrealistically high and noted that the annual gathering in Lithuania brought plenty of good news for Ukraine. The Atlantic Council invited a number of Ukrainian commentators to share their assessment of the Vilnius summit.

Danylo Lubkivsky, Director, Kyiv Security Forum: The NATO summit in Vilnius calls for sober assessment. The alliance has clearly failed to seize the strategic initiative or achieve a political breakthrough. Naturally, this has provoked a wave of disappointment and concern.

Unlike the Ukrainian military, NATO leaders still appear to trapped in defensive thinking. This is unfortunate as Western caution only encourages the enemy. Gradual provision of arms prolongs the war and increases the number of casualties. Far from protecting NATO members, ambiguity over Ukraine’s future membership serves to undermine the alliance’s international authority.

Despite these reservations, I do not think there was much for Russia to cheer in Vilnius. The summit demonstrated that while there is no consensus over Ukraine’s NATO ambitions, the entire Western world remains firm and unwavering in its support for the Ukrainian war effort. This message will have been well understood in Moscow.

Attention must now turn toward next year’s summit in Washington DC. This jubilee summit marking 75 years of NATO will take place against a backdrop of the 2024 US presidential election campaign. The historic nature of the summit may work in Ukraine’s favor, creating a climate for historic decisions. After Vilnius, it is clear that the Ukrainian authorities must work consistently with all partners to secure a positive outcome next summer. Ultimately, much will also depend on the Ukrainian military and its ability to create the conditions for NATO accession by succeeding on the battlefield.

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Olena Halushka, Board Member, Anti-Corruption Action Center (AntAC): Many practical steps were taken during the Vilnius summit to strengthen Ukraine’s war effort. These included new commitments to supply weapons, F-16 jet fighter training for Ukrainian pilots, and the establishment of the NATO-Ukraine Council.

However, Kyiv’s key goal was to receive an official invitation to join NATO. Based on the understanding that full NATO membership would not be possible as long as hostilities continue, Ukrainians saw no legal or practical obstacles to issuing an invitation and beginning the accession process. Instead, the summit declaration made vague references to membership “when allies agree and conditions are met.” This was disappointing but not discouraging. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg called this year’s Vilnius summit historic for Sweden. We now hope next year’s summit in Washington DC will finally make history for Ukraine, too.

Oleksiy Goncharenko, Ukrainian MP, European Solidarity Party: This was definitely not an historic summit from a Ukrainian perspective. While Ukraine dominated the summit agenda, NATO leaders chose not to take the bold step of officially inviting Ukraine to join the alliance. It is somewhat ironic that 15 years ago at the NATO summit in Bucharest, the United States was leading the push to offer Ukraine membership. This year, the roles were reversed.

The language adopted in the summit communique was not strong enough. This was a big mistake as the only language Vladimir Putin understands is strength. Instead, NATO leaders opted for the language of caution and hesitation.

There were also some reasons for optimism in Vilnius. The communique included the word “invitation” and also acknowledged that Ukraine can sidestep the Membership Action Plan (MAP) stage of the accession process, which is good news. We must now focus our efforts on securing an historic breakthrough at next year’s summit in the US. Further failure could have a profoundly negative impact on Ukrainian public opinion at a time when Ukrainians overwhelmingly back the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration.

Eurasia Center events

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Volodymyr Dubovyk, Associate Professor, Odesa Mechnikov National University: I did not have high expectations for the summit and did not think it was likely to become a breakthrough moment in Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership, so I cannot say I was particularly disappointed. At the same time, it is clear that the wording of the final communique was not good. It was reminiscent of the vague language used in Bucharest back in 2008, and reflected the widely acknowledged lack of agreement among NATO allies over Ukrainian membership. Some of the passages from the communique, such as the references to interoperability between Ukraine and the alliance, gave the impression that the dramatic events of the past year and a half had not happened at all.

Having said that, my main concern was that tension over the NATO membership issue could damage ongoing military, political, and financial support for Ukraine in its war of liberation. This did not happen. There was some evidence of emotions flying high, with President Zelenskyy’s angry tweet on the way to the summit provoking a defensive reaction from some allies, but the overall mood was one of constructive cooperation and partnership.

Iuliia Mendel, former press secretary to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy: Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians demonstrate their commitment to Ukrainian democracy and independence every day as they defend the country along the front lines of the war with Russia. This NATO summit was an opportunity to send a positive signal to them that their sacrifices are acknowledged and appreciated. Unfortunately, the summit communique was too vague to send a clear message.

Instead of decisive action, I saw a lot of bureaucratic discussion. This was frustrating, especially as an invitation would not have meant immediate Ukrainian accession to NATO. It would not have triggered Article 5 or plunged NATO into a war with Russia. Ukrainians find this approach hard to stomach. For us, NATO is a matter of national survival, not a box-ticking exercise.

There are two main reasons for the diplomatic compromises we witnessed in Vilnius. Firstly, some Western leaders are still concerned that issuing Ukraine with an invitation to join NATO could lead to an escalation and expansion of the current war. Secondly, there are also legitimate reservations over Ukraine’s readiness for membership, particularly in terms of the country’s domestic reform agenda.

Despite the disappointment of the Vilnius summit, I remain confident that Ukraine has earned the right to join NATO and will achieve membership sooner or later. Nevertheless, there is no denying that an important opportunity to demonstrate international support for Ukraine has been missed.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Kyoko Imai

Assistant Director

Politics & Diplomacy Japanese

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Cynkin on Radio Free Asia

everges — Wed, 12 Jul 2023 21:00:00 +0000

On July 12, IPSI Nonresident Senior Fellow Tom Cynkin was mentioned in Radio Free Asia discussing NATO’s eastward expansion into the Indo-Pacific. He highlights China’s concern about the growing interest by European countries to participate in Asian security issues.

Fellow

Thomas Cynkin

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Indo-Pacific Japan

The post Cynkin on Radio Free Asia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s Andriy Yermak and Lithuania’s Gabrielius Landsbergis on the path ahead for Ukraine to join NATO

Atlantic Council — Wed, 12 Jul 2023 15:08:24 +0000

Watch the event

Online Event Tue, July 11, 2023 • 9:00 am ET

NATO Public Forum

On the margins of the NATO Summit in Vilnius, the Alliance’s leaders and experts from across the transatlantic community gather for the NATO Public Forum on July 11 – 12. At a time of unprecedented public interest in the Alliance and the defence and security of the Euro-Atlantic area, the NATO Public Forum brings together leading experts and decision-makers from around the world to reflect on these issues and provide perspectives on the Summit’s agenda.

Europe & Eurasia NATO Security & Defense

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speaker

Andriy Yermak
Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine

Gabrielius Landsbergis
Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moderator

Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council

FREDERICK KEMPE: So, Mr. Yermak, how wonderful to see you; Minister Landsbergis. Because the [NATO-Ukraine Council] is about to start and because of the bravery and courage that you’ve shown Ukraine, we actually think we’re going to throw protocol to the wind and turn first to you.

And I wonder if you could talk about—I was with you not so long ago, a few weeks ago, with President Zelenskyy in his office during a time of attacks, and President Zelenskyy said if he didn’t get what he wanted at the NATO Summit, that he wouldn’t come because he would consider it a betrayal to the Ukrainian people. So he came. He hasn’t gotten entirely what we wanted. We read that in his Twitter feed. Give us your feeling of why he decided to come.

And then some people argue the communiqué was a prudent outcome. NATO doesn’t want to go to war with Ukraine. Others call it a missed opportunity. I’d love to have your view.

ANDRIY YERMAK: Thank you very much.

First of all, of course President Zelenskyy, president of Ukraine, [came] to Vilnius because it’s important to be here and to be the partners, to be the alliance. And first of all, the unity of NATO and the support which we really received during [the] more than five hundred days of this war, it’s a very, very strong signal to the aggressor that—first of all, that [the] Alliance and partners not just believe, they’re sure about our victory. The second, let’s see, it’s [that] today, it’s not finished. And we are looking for some very serious results of the summit.

And of course, our president, he’s a very principled person. And of course, everything which he said before and our estimate and our feelings you can listen, you can see he is very honest, he is always very clear, declared on the position of our country. But let’s see. We really will have in several minutes starting this very important, the—I think the maybe most important for Ukraine—meetings with the NATO alliance in which we will discuss, first of all, of course, the [continuation] of the military aid, which [is] very important for us to win this war, and of course we will continue—and I hope it will be today—one very important moment for the security guarantees for Ukraine and the way to be a member of NATO.

FREDERICK KEMPE: And just a quick follow-up, then, on that. In this balance between prudent outcome/missed opportunity, are you saying it all depends on how things go from now? Because if you had listened to President Zelenskyy’s or read President Zelenskyy’s tweet from yesterday where he’s calling the language about Ukraine and NATO absurd, it seems to me that this is a movement in another direction, though.

ANDRIY YERMAK: I hope that this summit [will not] be the missed opportunity, but once again you can… listen and see in the result of this day. We have very positive bilateral [meetings] already with some partners and… the positives of the results from this summit.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you. And then just finally, how has it been received in Ukraine thus far?… This summit and the outcomes, how are Ukrainians receiving this and responding to it inside Ukraine?

ANDRIY YERMAK: You know, we have more than [five hundred] days of war. And you know, all [of] us in Ukraine, we are living in very specific reality, the reality of the war. And of course, Ukrainians looking for this summit and for the results, very concrete things. And of course, you know in these seconds, these minutes, our heroes continue to [fight]. For us, sometimes these days it’s [a] very special atmosphere because here at peace, here the silence, here is not you listen—not listen the sirens. And you personally and my colleague and friends personally can see this reality in Ukraine.

But you know, our nation [shows] all these five hundred days how we are brave, how it’s possible to not be afraid, how it’s possible to fight for independence, for freedoms. And of course, we hope that today’s results of this summit will be more inspired and give not just emotional, some very practical support of our people for our soldiers to go forward.

And I’d like to say very important things: that we [are] not stopping our [fight]. No [forces] exist [that] can stop us until we [liberate] all our territories, we back all our people, and really win this war. And I absolutely sure that this will be our joy and victory.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So, Mr. Yermak, I think that’s a great transition to the prime minister. Having been with you recently in Kyiv, I slept a lot better at night because of Patriot missiles. Here I can sleep well at night not because of the Patriot missiles that are out there right now for your airport.

Minister Landsbergis, I followed your history [for] a long time. I was here when you were in the Warsaw Pact and in the final days and at the time of the Vilnius 10 ahead of your 2004 membership. Talk about this summit in the context of history, but also how you think history might remember this summit.

GABRIELIUS LANDSBERGIS: Well, that’s an excellent question. We tend to look at Vilnius and Vilnius summits in a way that they sometimes do not offer a tactical change, but they offer strategic opportunity. And it happened in 2014, when tactically at that day, some of us felt that we might not have won the day, but at the end we won Ukraine and Ukraine has won.

I believe that something of that [sort] is happening these days, that quite a lot of those here in this room and in this country expected more that happened today. But I think that in strategy—strategically, we won. We committed ourselves to Ukrainian membership in NATO. That’s the biggest achievement, I would say, strategically.

Now, where the problem lies. The way that I look at history, the promise in Bucharest, it was a strong statement: Georgia and Ukraine will become members of NATO. It was a strong statement. The problem was not with the statement itself; it was with our lack of commitment afterwards. We did not come back. We came back to the statement three invasions later. That was a problem. So now I’m quite sure that we are committed that we won’t waste another year, another month, and another day staying on the question and doing everything in our power so that we stay true to the meaning that we put into the declaration.

And that means that Vilnius Summit was not the last stop. We have to see it as a bridge. And the next stop is Washington. So we still have a full year. Lots to do. And I count on every single one of you to do your part so that Washington can actually be even more historic than Vilnius.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that. And it being the seventy-fifth anniversary, I hope that’s true.

A follow-up question on that. Some say the actual communiqué language, because of how conditional it was made, is weaker than 2008 in Bucharest. But am I interpreting weaker language but stronger commitment toward the goal?

GABRIELIUS LANDSBERGIS: Yeah. I was not there in the room in 2008, unfortunately, so I’ve just read about it and I was told about it. I think that the way it is being presented, that the consensus in 2008 was weaker, it was not there. Now it’s much wider, definitely. You don’t see an objection, you know, from the people in the room who would say Ukraine should not be part of NATO, we cannot commit ourselves to that idea. There is nobody saying that. So that is a step forward.

Again, you know, coming from [the] eastern flank, we tend to see the situation a tiny bit different. And for us, actually, the history has changed since the last year. That’s why our wording is stronger. That’s why our stance is stronger. That’s why our support to Ukraine, you know, is more vocal, because for us the history runs a different course right now.

And I tend to use the example of [the] Berlin Wall. I think it’s a very monumental time in European history, in world history, in 1989. So for us, last year the wall [was] rebuilt or it’s being rebuilt. So basically, in that principle, we’re back into—for us, it’s cold war. For Ukraine, it’s hot war. But we’re back in 1989 and going backwards.

So this is where our mentality is. This is how we see the situation. And therefore, we are building on a different reality than it was in 2008.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So we all know that an alliance has to balance the long term and the short term. We also know that—and Jake Sullivan was talking about that earlier today—unity doesn’t mean you don’t disagree. And press reports have it that at least eight countries of the thirty-one were fighting very hard for different language, stronger language toward invitation for Ukraine… Where is the alliance unified? Where is it un-unified? What is the crux of the differences in the room?

GABRIELIUS LANDSBERGIS: I would say in some cases there is difference in horizon. We tend to see that problems that we are trying to solve, the way that we’re helping Ukraine, the way that Ukraine should be helped, we’re talking decades of a new reality in Europe and decades of Putin, who’s still in power, who will be a dangerous neighbor, who might attack again, who might assault other neighbors, even try Article 5, how that works. We are thinking in this term. It might not happen next year. In some cases, the horizon is way shorter—way, way shorter. We’re talking years; in some cases, it’s months. How do we survive this month? How do we survive until next year? How do we survive until the next election?…

FREDERICK KEMPE: One more question for you, then I want to go back to Mr. Yermak. The Baltic aerospace agreement, in all the reporting about everything else, very little has been [placed] on this. And then put that in the context of Swedish membership. Obviously, this was the big success of this week, in many respects unanticipated. Put together this Baltic aerospace agreement, the Swedish membership; how does that change your region? How does it change security around the Baltics and Lithuania?

GABRIELIUS LANDSBERGIS: Well, I think that Swedish membership is monumental, definitely. If we, you know, remain on the example of a bridge, so it’s a pillar, definitely. It’s a very strong pillar.

And you know, the way that we frame it currently, the promise of swift accession—Swedish swift accession has been made, and now we’re very much looking forward to it. But it changes the situation in the Baltic Sea dramatically. It affects defense plans that are being voted for, that were adopted, but it changes them as well. Sweden is a very strong element in all of our defense—not just Lithuania, but also Poland, also—I mean, I’m not even talking about Sweden itself, but also Finland, also Estonia. The whole Baltic Sea, you know, becomes a different, different concept. That’s a very strong thing.

When it comes to the air defense, we’re saying that, look, we have to talk about the content. Things don’t happen overnight. So it’s a very strong step forward, but now we—will be looking for, you know, how it will be materialized.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that.

Mr. Yermak, so not a prudent outcome, not a missed opportunity, but a bridge. What would you like to see this week’s events in Vilnius be a bridge to on behalf of Ukraine? You talked about Washington. What do you hope will happen between now and Washington?

And obviously, we have a spring offensive we’re talking about at the same time. So there are two battles, one of them very real and on the frontlines for Ukraine against the aggressor, Putin’s troops, and the other is the bureaucratic contest in NATO of where we want to land by next summer in Washington.

ANDRIY YERMAK: First of all, I hope that during this period of time we will win this war. This is—will be, first of all, the most important for us, and I’m sure will be very important for all the world.

The second, of course, as we are looking this way and to the Washington summit, of course, we will receive the fixed security guarantees, because security guarantees to Ukraine is the [guarantee] of the security of the whole Europe. And as I said, we hope that just today we will have very important stage of issue of the security.

And of course, I [agree] with my colleagues that we are looking [at] a bridge and we hope that—you know, during these five hundred days Ukraine a lot of times surprised everybody in the world.

First of all, we [were] surprised, when it started, this [invasion], and somebody gave us three days, one week, one month. We [were] surprised and we still not just defended, we liberated our lands.

The second, you remember [how] then President Zelenskyy, the speaker of the parliament, the head of the government [sent] the documents for the candidate states. Many people [were] very skeptical. We already received this status. We [were] talking about coalitions of our jets. We [were] talking about coalitions of tanks. We [were] talking about the coalitions of air defense. Already, it’s reality.

And I think that we try everything from our side to surprise in Washington. And of course, we are looking, finally, as how said President Erdoğan in his—in the last meeting with President Zelenskyy in Istanbul, that Ukraine [has] everything to be a member of the NATO. And of course, we believe in it.

And I’m glad that today we—I think nobody in the world don’t think that it’s happened. Of course, we’re looking for the prospective, for the future, but not hesitation that it’s happen.

And about—I’m sorry, about your second part of the—of the—I mean the reforms. And you know, in the beginning when Volodymyr Zelenskyy [went] for the presidential campaign in 2019, one of his [priorities] was the [reforming] of Ukraine. I can say it’s in our blood. And of course, I can say that [it] may be, will be difficult to find another country in the world who just, in the circumstances of this terrible war, [is] not stopping any reforms, and we go forward. And I think many people, and Ursula von der Leyen, and the European leaders many times said how really impressed by the reforms, which we continue doing just during this war.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So final question. We’ve run out of time, so final question for each of you, Mr. Yermak and then Minister Landsbergis. You have said, President Zelenskyy has said that strategic commitments can’t replace NATO membership. Do you still believe that? Strategic support.

ANDRIY YERMAK: Yes, of course. Yes, of course. Of course, it’s—you know, we are living in so region of life that immediately back to Ukraine we continue to do all the best from our side. That—just if somebody [has] some hesitations in the colleagues, there is [none], and to do and go forward and not stopping, because this is the goal and this is the [decision] of Ukrainian society. Today, more than 90 percent of Ukrainian [support] and believe that very soon Ukraine will be the members of the NATO.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you, Mr. Yermak.

Minister Landsbergis, the bridge, Vilnius to Washington. How should that bridge be built?

GABRIELIUS LANDSBERGIS: I think that there are some very practical steps that could be taken and should be taken. First of all, there was a discussion about the need for additional reforms in Ukraine. At least this is what allies agreed upon. And Ukraine has shown a tremendous, unbelievable capacity to reform under duress. This has happened on the path to EU. So I think that if concrete requirements are being presented to Ukraine, I’m absolutely 100 percent convinced that Ukraine will deliver on those so that we could have, you know, to show up for the allies that—because the statement goes that when allies agree and the conditions are met. So I’m sure that Ukraine can deliver on part of [the] conditions.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So an invitation in Washington would be potentially possible, would be possible?

GABRIELIUS LANDSBERGIS: I’m convinced that it could be historic, not just because of the years.

FREDERICK KEMPE: I think that’s a good spot to end on. So let me thank Mr. Yermak not just for being here, but for the courage of your country. And please send our best wishes to President Zelenskyy and all Ukrainians.

And then, Minister Landsbergis, what wonderful hosts you’ve been. And what an incredibly well-executed and organized summit. We’ve been taken care of so well here by every citizen of this country.

Watch the event

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Wieslander interviewed on Radio Sweden

Eric Adamson — Wed, 12 Jul 2023 14:55:49 +0000

Studio Ett

The NATO summit in Vilnius is coming to an end. What promises will Ukrainian President Zelenskyy take home with him? Sveriges Radio speaks to Anna Wieslander, Director for Northern Europe.

“Stoltenberg said that there is a new chapter between NATO and Ukraine. Is it that new?”

“‘No, you can understand the Ukrainian disappointment. What they wanted in the first place was an invitation. Already in 2008, NATO said that Ukraine would become a member, so in that way it is nothing new. Now various steps have been taken so that Ukraine can work closer to NATO, but the timing is still uncertain”, says Anna Wieslander.

“What does NATO’s inability to provide greater support to a country in Europe that is at war, tell us about NATO as an organization?”

“It reflects the fact that there is a relatively large division within NATO regarding Ukraine and the future”, says Anna Wieslander.

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Hutchison in the Dallas Morning News

msmallman — Wed, 12 Jul 2023 13:15:01 +0000

Former US ambassador to NATO and Atlantic Council board member Kay Bailey Hutchison penned an op-ed for the Dallas Morning News, “This week’s NATO summit may be the most important in decades.“

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Wieslander interviewed on SVT Aktuellt

Eric Adamson — Wed, 12 Jul 2023 09:41:00 +0000

Listen here

On Tuesday, July 11, Anna Wieslander, director for Northern Europe, participated in SVT Aktuellt, to discuss Turkey’s statement about letting Sweden into NATO.

“NATO membership requires a change in strategic culture for Sweden. On the military side, it is about going from planning everything nationally to entering a collective system. In addition, it is about the political side, where we of course are used to cooperating within the UN and the EU, and we are happy to be an active player, but in defense and security we have been quite cautious. Accordingly, there will also be a change to perhaps take on this active role that others probably see that Sweden often has internationally”, says Anna Wieslander.

Anna Wieslander can be heard at minute 29:30.

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Wieslander interviewed in Aftonbladet

Eric Adamson — Wed, 12 Jul 2023 08:48:01 +0000

Sweden’s role in NATO’s new defense plan

“‘Sweden is not part of the plans now. But when we become members, new demands will be placed on the Swedish Armed Forces. (…) Sweden should provide a brigade for NATO operations outside of Sweden, that is the stated expectation’, says Anna Wieslander, Director of Northern Europe.”

“‘Another expectation of Sweden as a member is political’, says Anna Wieslander. According to her, Sweden is perceived as a solid democracy with a strong economy, a leading Nordic country that has been successful in the UN, one that can both provide solutions within the NATO circle, as well as act as a bridge builder between NATO and the EU. ‘Therefore, we cannot think: We have been non-aligned for so long, now we will just sit and look around. We are expected to perform differently.'”

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Wieslander interviewed by BBC News from Vilnius

Eric Adamson — Wed, 12 Jul 2023 08:23:17 +0000

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Europe needs a nuclear deterrent of its own

Jacques Lanxade, Denis MacShane, Margarita Mathiopoulos, and Klaus Naumann — Wed, 12 Jul 2023 01:19:45 +0000

Sixteen months after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, Europe, and Germany in particular, have changed profoundly. Now as NATO leaders meet in Vilnius, it is vital for the Alliance’s European members led by Berlin to build on the transformation in their approach to security that they have been forced to adopt because of the war.

The war in Ukraine exposed bluntly once more the appalling state of European defense capabilities—as seen in former Yugoslav republics in the late 1990s—and how Europe still depends on the United States to fight a war on its own continent.

Under US President Joe Biden, Washington has demonstrated its indispensability to NATO and European security at the very moment of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But the present situation is unsustainable.

To stay safe against Russian and other aggression in the future, Europe will need a convincing conventional and nuclear deterrent of its own, and Germany will be key. The invasion of February 24, 2022 opened many eyes, but the biggest awakening took place in Germany.

Moscow’s assault on a European neighbor caused an epiphany in Berlin’s decades-long, complacent foreign and energy policy, as well as in its free-riding security and defense posture under Washington’s nuclear and NATO’s conventional umbrella. Chancellor Olaf Scholz understood the urgency for his country as he declared in his famous speech a Zeitenwende (time for change) for Germany’s foreign, security, defense, and energy policy, which was well received in Europe and the United States. Scholz pledged a one hundred billion euro special fund to rebuild the German armed forces that had decayed under the sixteen-year-long chancellorship of his predecessor, Angela Merkel. Berlin’s selfish post-1989 mantra—essentially “make peace without spending money for weapons”—became history almost overnight.

Today Germany is one of Ukraine’s biggest weapons providers after the United States. It is about to increase its defense budget of fifty-one billion euros to fifty-three billion euros. But Berlin needs to understand that the moment of truth has arrived for the Euro-Atlantic community of democracies.

After the US presidential election next year—no matter who makes it into the White House—Europe will need its own capabilities to defend European territory and borders from an outside aggressor. If Donald Trump returns to the White House or another Republican president takes office, we could see a shrinking of defense support for NATO, as the US military may concentrate its forces toward Asia and the Indo-Pacific.

Former US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis admitted during his confirmation hearing in 2017 that the US military is not strong enough to meet the challenges it faces around the globe. Or in the words of Elbridge A. Colby, former deputy assistant secretary of defense, “if we have to leave Europe exposed, so be it… Asia is more important than Europe.”

Therefore, to make Europe safe for peace and democracy in the future, NATO needs to strengthen its conventional and nuclear pillars. Russia’s aggression today against Ukraine and tomorrow perhaps against Poland or the Baltic states makes the Europeanization of NATO imperative. In the words of former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger: “Europe has to play a special role in American thinking… But I could understand in a modified arrangement that Europe could play a more important role in some areas. I am not offended by autonomy in my definition of it.”

For the past twenty years, US presidents from both the Democratic and Republican parties have been asking European allies to take burden-sharing seriously. Here are four ways to start:

It is imperative to strengthen the competitiveness and innovativeness of Europe’s military technological and industrial complex and to harmonize its procurement base. Buying off-the-shelf US equipment can go hand-in-hand with buying European equipment—and this should apply to all NATO members.
Not only must NATO forces be interoperable—allowing them to use each other’s platforms seamlessly while fighting alongside each other—but this should extend to potential future NATO members like Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.
For the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, a permanent increase of their defense spending to beyond the NATO target of 2 percent of gross domestic product should be seen as an obligation. Emerging from the Vilnius summit, where a new push is under way to get all allies beyond 2 percent, it is the responsibility of the biggest European economies to upgrade their conventional forces in order to protect European soil—when Washington might be too busy in Asia.
Europe needs a credible nuclear deterrent of its own, under NATO command. Only a trilateral British, French, and German nuclear umbrella, combined with a US umbrella, all under the command and control of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) will be a credible deterrent for Russia. This would require that France and Germany find a solution for equipping their joint Future Combat Air System—a new generation of advanced fighter jets—and the German F-35 dual capable aircraft with French nuclear weapons. Germany would not have its own nuclear weapons, so this arrangement would not violate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NATO command structure must be tailored in such a way that Europe can fight a conflict in which neither Americans nor Canadians may wish to get involved, while taking advantage of NATO commands and systems. To this end the deputy SACEUR has to be European, and a headquarters-based Combined Joint Task Force must serve as his or her operational command.

Today it is clear that the main threat to European security does not come from Russia’s conventional forces, but from its tactical nuclear weapons and its sophisticated hybrid warfare. For Germany to be a full and equally strong part of a new European pillar of NATO, it needs to break the ultimate taboo and accept that a wider shared European nuclear deterrence should now be part of Berlin’s Zeitenwende defense thinking.

Of course, an outcry will arise: A stronger nuclear role for Germany will sound unthinkable to many. But so was Russia’s full-scale invasion and war in Europe only last year.

There have been strategic debates in Bonn since the 1950s about whether the Article 5 joint defense pact would really be implemented by Washington in case of an attack—whether a US president would sacrifice New York for Berlin or New Orleans for Munich. Today 62 percent of Germans are in favor of spending more money to modernize the Bundeswehr properly so that it can defend its country. Meanwhile, 47 percent of Germans agree with their government’s heavy support of the Ukrainian military—with another 16 percent wanting it to go further.

This, then, is the moment to start a debate in Berlin, Paris, and London about a trilateral French, British, and German nuclear European Defense Initiative, and the responsibility of those three powers to protect Europe if Article 5 is invoked in a worst-case-scenario.

Adm. Jacques Lanxade was joint chief of staff of the French Armed Forces and served as a defense advisor to French President Francois Mitterrand.

Denis MacShane is a former UK minister of Europe and a former UK delegate to the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO.

Margarita Mathiopoulos is a defense expert and professor emerita of US foreign policy and international security at Potsdam University. She also served as a foreign policy advisor to the former chairman of the German Free Democratic Party, Guido Westerwelle.

Gen. Klaus Naumann served as chairman of the military committee of NATO and joint chief of staff of the German Armed Forces.

A German language version of this article first appeared in Handelsblatt. It is printed here with the authors’ and publisher’s permission.

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NATO summit leaves Ukrainians frustrated

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 11 Jul 2023 20:45:19 +0000

As Ukrainians digested the outcome of the NATO summit on July 11, the mood across the country was one of frustration. While the annual gathering of NATO leaders in Vilnius brought a number of tangible gains for Ukraine including confirmation of new weapons deliveries and the creation of a coalition to train Ukrainian pilots to fly F-16 fighter aircraft, the all-important summit declaration failed to provide a clear timetable for Ukraine’s NATO membership. Instead, the communique spoke of “additional democratic and security sector reforms” before concluding: “We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the alliance when allies agree and conditions are met.”

This vague wording represented modest progress but fell far short of Ukrainian expectations. In the run-up to the summit, Ukraine and many of the country’s international allies had been calling for a clear signal from NATO regarding future Ukrainian membership. However, while a number of countries have publicly backed Ukraine’s bid to join NATO, there is no unanimity on the issue among the 31-nation alliance. On the eve of this week’s meeting in Lithuania, US President Joe Biden said Ukraine was not ready for membership and claimed it was “premature” to start the accession process in the middle of a war.

Supporters of Ukraine’s bid to join NATO see it as the only way to end Russian aggression against the country and achieve a sustainable peace in Eastern Europe. Anything less, they say, will merely result in a pause before a new Russian invasion as Moscow seeks to achieve its overriding foreign policy goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and returning the country permanently to the Kremlin orbit. Skeptics have responded by noting that the promise of fast-track Ukrainian NATO membership after the war would be likely to convince Putin of the need to prolong hostilities indefinitely. This lack of consensus resulted in what was an underwhelming NATO summit outcome in Vilnius.

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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy traveled personally to Lithuania on Tuesday, but his last-minute intervention was unable to sway the doubters and secure the kind of unambiguous membership commitment Ukraine has long sought. “Today I embarked on a trip here with faith in decisions, with faith in partners, with faith in a strong NATO. In a NATO that does not hesitate, does not waste time, and does not look back at any aggressor,” he wrote in a carefully worded but emotionally charged post following publication of the summit declaration. “I would like this faith to become confidence; confidence in the decisions that all of us deserve and every warrior, every citizen, every mother, every child expects. Is that too much to expect?” In a social media commentary posted earlier on Tuesday, he was significantly more outspoken, criticizing NATO’s failure to state a specific membership timeline as “unprecedented and absurd.”

Others were in even less diplomatic mood. “No amount of spin will turn this into a “great” or “historic” summit. Best not even to start,” posted former Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves. Some fellow politicians in the Baltic region clearly agreed. “This is not leadership,” tweeted Lithuanian MP Zygimantas Pavilionis. “This is appeasement that normally leads to final defeat.” In Kyiv, Ukrainian Ambassador for Strategic Communications Olexander Scherba questioned the logic behind the apparent fear among some NATO members of provoking Putin. “The strategy of “not provoking Russia” is in reality a strategy of provoking Russia,” he wrote. “That’s how it goes with bullies. Will the West ever see it?”

Eurasia Center events

John Herbst: A step forward for Ukraine’s security, but not a large one

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Meanwhile, many in Ukraine expressed anger at the apparent lack of urgency among the country’s international partners. These feelings of frustration were summed up in a powerful post by veteran Ukrainian anti-corruption activist Daria Kaleniuk: “Ukraine needs “strategic patience”. Should I patiently wait until a Russian missile strikes my apartment in Kyiv with my kids inside? Or should I patiently wait for my son to turn eighteen and go to fight in a war against the largest threat to NATO? Delays cost lives!”

Despite the undeniable mood of anti-climax in Ukraine, the country’s famed wartime spirit of resilience was also on display as Ukrainians reacted to news from Lithuania. “Disappointment but not discouragement. Next stop, Washington DC,” posted Alyona Getmanchuk, director of the Kyiv-based New Europe Center think tank and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, in reference to next year’s NATO summit, which is scheduled to take place in the US capital.

Ukrainian MP Oleksiy Goncharenko echoed this sentiment regarding the need to focus on securing a firm membership commitment at the 2024 summit, but warned that further delays could have grave consequences for public opinion in Ukraine. If there is no progress toward joining NATO by this time next year, he wrote, Ukrainians will ask: “So we are good enough to die for democracy and not good enough to live together with other free nations in one alliance?”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

John E. Herbst (@JohnEdHerbst): Senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine
Rachel Rizzo (@RachelRizzo): Nonresident senior fellow at the Europe Center
Christopher Skaluba: Director of the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and former principal director for European and NATO policy at the US Defense Department

Roadmap or roadblock?

John tells us that the communiqué’s conditional language and lack of timeline amounts to “not much movement beyond the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit language noting that Ukraine would eventually be a member.”
That’s remarkable given that the 2008 language, which also encompassed prospective Georgian membership, “has been derided for years for placing both Georgia and Ukraine in the worst strategic position possible,” Rachel observes, with multiple Russian invasions of both countries occurring in the intervening years. “The problem with vague language like this is that it kicks the can down the road.”
“Inside the geeky NATO universe, the upgrading of the NATO-Ukraine Commission to Council status and the removal of formal membership action plan requirements for Ukraine are significant developments,” Chris adds. “But neither packs a political punch or will be viewed as real progress on the membership question.”
There was also no mention in the communiqué of security guarantees for Ukraine “that were broadly promised in the run-up to the summit,” Chris notes. “The combination of these things makes for an underwhelming package for Ukraine, though some small hope remains for better outcomes at tomorrow’s inaugural NATO-Ukraine Council meeting.”

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DC drama

John relays that the communiqué’s release was delayed due to the “clear disagreement” between the United States and Germany on one side, and Nordic, Eastern European, and some Western European allies on the other with regard to Ukraine’s membership. Both sides had to bend a bit to get to the final consensus language. “The end result was not quite inspiring,” he says.
But inspiration could always strike: The Alliance will celebrate its seventy-fifth anniversary next year with a Washington summit, which offers US President Joe Biden “a chance to establish a legacy as an outstanding national security president,” John argues. To make that happen, he adds, Biden will need to “provide Ukraine all the weapons it needs to defeat the Kremlin on the battlefield” and “move beyond caution to hasten the anchoring of Ukraine in NATO.”
Rachel fears more disappointment ahead, whether at the Washington summit or ten years from now, when “NATO allies will come face to face with the undeniable truth that all allies might not ever be on the same page regarding Ukraine’s NATO membership. That’s a tough pill for many to swallow, but it might just be reality.”

Defensible moves

John welcomed the communiqué’s labeling of Russia as “the most significant and direct threat” to the Alliance. “This is an important reminder that US and NATO support for Ukraine is not philanthropy, but the smart way to defend our vital interests,” he explains.
Chris points out that on the positive side, the Vilnius gathering will be remembered as another “enlargement summit” because of Monday’s deal with Turkey paving the way for Sweden’s accession.
Flying under the radar, the allies also agreed to adopt “some four thousand pages of classified regional plans for the defense of NATO territory,” Chris says. This move “completes a shift, started in 2014 after Russia’s invasion of Crimea, to a deterrence-by-denial strategy absent since the waning days of the Cold War. Heady stuff.”

The post The NATO Summit’s underwhelming support for Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: What NATO’s Vilnius summit means for Ukraine and the Alliance’s future

Atlantic Council experts — Tue, 11 Jul 2023 19:48:24 +0000

The leaders were backed by a NATO banner, but it wasn’t NATO doing the backing. Group of Seven (G7) leaders on Wednesday announced plans for long-term security commitments to Ukraine at the NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. The new framework seeks to create bilateral security commitments between individual G7 member states and Ukraine, providing security assistance, modern military equipment, and economic assistance “for as long as it takes.” This announcement comes a day after NATO released its communiqué, drawing criticism from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and others because the Alliance did not establish a timetable for Ukraine to become a NATO member.

Below, our experts decode all the goings-on in Vilnius—and what they mean for Kyiv’s path to NATO membership, the war in Ukraine, Sweden’s forthcoming accession, the Alliance’s growing focus on China, and more.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Reactions from Wednesday, July 12

Anca Agachi: A mixed bag, but with signs of quiet progress

Daniel Fried: The G7 Joint Statement is no Article 5, but it’s a start

Hans Binnendijk: Vilnius was a bridge to next year’s NATO summit in Washington

Phillip Cornell: Energy issues took a backseat in the Vilnius communiqué, but loom large in NATO’s future

Reactions from Tuesday, July 11

John Herbst: An uninspiring result for Ukraine

Christopher Skaluba: ‘Ambiguous’ ‘head-scratching and disappointing’ language about Ukraine’s NATO membership

Daniel Fried: Allies make clear Ukraine is firmly in the transatlantic family

Shelby Magid: Calling out the ‘most significant and direct threat’—and its accomplice

Rich Outzen: A clear-eyed snapshot that meets the geopolitical moment

Andrew D’Anieri: The NATO-Ukraine Council is a net positive step, but also the ‘bare minimum’

Rachel Rizzo: Summit statement shows continued disagreement about Ukraine ‘at the highest levels’ of NATO

David O. Shullman: The communiqué confirms NATO’s growing attention to Indo-Pacific security

Ian Brzezinski: The Biden administration was ‘largely alone’ in blocking Ukraine’s roadmap to membership

A step forward for Ukraine’s security, but not a large one

There is significant overlap among the members of the G7, NATO, and the European Union (EU). Four of the G7 nations are in the EU and six are in NATO. It is therefore no surprise that the general approach of the three organizations to Moscow’s war on Ukraine share similar characteristics. All three organizations have actively supported Ukraine since Moscow’s aggression began in February of 2014, and much more so when it intensified in February of 2022. All assert Ukraine’s right to enjoy the peace and stability that should be provided by the liberal international order. With the United States in the lead in NATO and the G7, both organizations have provided significant support to Ukraine, ensuring that Russian President Vladimir Putin could not achieve his goal of establishing effective political control in the country.

At the same time, again with the United States’ decisive influence, the G7, like NATO, has avoided steps that might seem overly provocative to Moscow—a clear call for Ukraine’s victory against Moscow’s aggression or decisive steps that would lead to a faster Ukrainian victory. So the best way to look at the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine issued by the G7 on July 12 in conjunction with the NATO Summit in Vilnius is as a mostly US-influenced two-step.

The NATO Summit produced an uninspiring communiqué on the Ukraine-NATO relationship that moved only slightly beyond the language of the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit. The G7 Declaration was timed to the NATO Summit because the question of Ukraine joining NATO is linked with the issue of security guarantees. Both are meant to address the difficult question of how an independent Ukraine can live in peace and security alongside a hostile Russia. So it is no surprise that the G7 statement is a step forward toward enhancing Ukraine’s security but not a very large one.

The declaration affirmatively states Ukraine’s right to choose its own course, join the West, and be free from intimidation and aggression. But it does not offer collective G7 action that might provide greater protection against future Kremlin provocations; instead, it encourages bilateral arrangements between Ukraine and individual G7 states. It places emphasis on the provision of weapons to Ukraine to make it a less appetizing target for a predatory Kremlin. This is a reasonable concept, but less effective than an actual guarantee by the G7 countries to respond forcefully to future Kremlin aggression. Yet even this step is undermined by the fact that all the G7 countries—with the possible exceptions of the United Kingdom and, perhaps now, France—have been reluctant to send Ukraine the more advanced weapons it needs to deliver that decisive blow to Russian forces on its territory.

Russian commentators have dismissed the NATO communiqué as a disappointment for Kyiv, but expressed some dissatisfaction with the G7 Declaration. Their real ire, though, is aimed at Paris, after the French decision to send SCALP long-range missiles to Ukraine. This underscores France’s differences with Washington, which is still unwilling to send Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS). French President Emmanuel Macron’s boldness is welcome, but no substitute for strong US leadership.

—John Herbst is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He served as US ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006.

A mixed bag, but with signs of quiet progress

Overall, the Vilnius summit stuck the landing, and to continue the metaphor, the gymnastic feat was about as tough as it gets. This was indeed a summit of unity, as US President Joe Biden had hoped, and the breakthrough regarding Sweden’s NATO accession especially contributed to that sense. The Alliance also successfully positioned itself as a global actor that understands that the security environment has fundamentally changed, and the European and Indo-Pacific theaters are inextricably linked. The attendance of the Asia-Pacific 4 (Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand) and language in the communiqué elevating the role of partners is crucial in this regard.

However, the summit’s results were mixed on a range of other issues. Despite high hopes and a strong moral argument, Ukraine was not offered the clear path and timeline it was hoping for to join the Alliance, even as its future in the Euro-Atlantic family was reconfirmed. This outcome, while not surprising, was also likely the best achievable outcome at the moment given Allied differences. This hints at a tough road for NATO in making the ambitious progress necessary by 2024, especially if Ukrainian battlefield advances slow down. Eastern flank reinforcements to brigade-level will only happen “where and when required,” and the language on China was modest in advancing proposals for action, as it was more intent on defining the challenge Beijing poses. The Alliance generally make the most important progress quietly, and here is where I saw encouraging signs: the focus on resilience and securing critical infrastructure; important mentions of Allied enablement and sustainment; and cooperation with the private sector and defense industry to deblock defense supplies.

While kicking the can down the road offers some time, Allies need to start to work with aplomb now to deliver. If anything, the NATO Summit in Washington in 2024 will be an even higher order to rise to—morally and strategically.

—Anca Agachi is an associate director and resident fellow for Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The G7 Joint Statement is no Article 5, but it’s a start

The G7 Joint Statement on Ukraine is out. It’s no Article 5 security guarantee. It’s a framework for negotiations of bilateral and G7 arrangements with Ukraine to provide military and economic assistance, as well as unspecified security commitments for that country. It includes a promise of consultations with Ukraine in case of a future Russian armed attack that could generate military and other forms of support. For its part, Ukraine commits in the statement to continue its democratic and rule of law transformation, as well as its military reforms. Notably, the statement makes clear that it is no substitute for NATO membership but is intended to help Ukraine while it pursues that goal.

Cynics can make a meal of the statement. It provides little beyond what G7 countries are already doing. But there is another way to look at it. The big strategic question that NATO, the G7, and the United States have faced is whether Ukraine is part of the transatlantic and European family and its institutions or whether it is part of a Kremlin sphere of domination. The Kremlin claims Ukraine as its own.There are many in Europe and the United States who tacitly (or overtly) agree and would cut a dirty deal with Moscow to that end.

Happily, that’s not where NATO and the G7 have come out. The NATO communiqué’s language on Ukraine could have been stronger and the G7 statement is no security guarantee. But they both rest on the premise that Ukraine is part of the European and transatlantic family. The details of how and when have yet to be worked out. The goal is clear: NATO membership for Ukraine. The G7 statement can serve as scaffolding for Ukraine while it works to get there.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Vilnius was a bridge to next year’s NATO summit in Washington

The NATO Summit in Vilnius was a success. But its success was limited, and it will be seen more as a bridging mechanism between last year’s Madrid summit and next year’s Washington summit. At Madrid, the allies agreed on the nature of the new threats and challenges emanating from both Russia and China. Madrid’s new Strategic Concept refocused the Alliance.

Vilnius was to be an implementation summit. And it was. It recorded progress in multiple areas, from enhanced deterrence to hybrid war to climate change. But it stopped short on several key issues like Ukraine’s membership, NATO’s role in the Indo-Pacific, and managing the nuclear weapons threat posed by Russia and, increasingly, China.

The Vilnius summit took place in the midst of Europe’s most destructive war in nearly eight decades and a US effort to rebalance its relationship with China. This resulted in a degree of caution. Unity formed around lowest common denominator solutions. During the coming year between Vilnius and Washington, the bridge created this week will hopefully be strengthened enough to bear the weight that the Alliance will need to carry next year.

The most successful element of the Vilnius summit was enhancing NATO deterrence along its front line with Russia, from the High North to the Mediterranean Sea. With Finland in and Sweden soon to be in, there is a solid line of defense against Russian aggression. There is no clearer evidence of Russia’s strategic failure. NATO’s New Force Model, agreed upon last year, will provide clarity for nations with regard to their specific wartime responsibilities and incentives to meet NATO’s 2 percent of gross domestic product defense spending floor. NATO’s forward presence in eight front line states needs further strengthening to include a continuous brigade-level presence in each. And the readiness and mobility initiatives need further attention.

The greatest disappointment at Vilnius was the inability to provide a more concrete path for Ukrainian membership after the war ends. But cautious steps were taken. The NATO-Ukraine Commission became a Council, giving Ukraine a stronger voice in NATO political affairs. The Council will be used to plan for future Ukrainian membership, which was again solemnly committed to “when allies agree and conditions are met.” This shortfall for Kyiv was somewhat offset by the G7 joint declaration of support for Ukraine, which pledges additional long-term security commitments and arrangements. Hopefully by the Washington summit, that path can be paved with more concrete.

—Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Energy issues took a backseat in Vilnius communiqué, but loom large in NATO’s future

While the debate over membership (delayed for Ukraine, confirmed for Sweden) dominated the last-minute negotiations over the NATO Summit communiqué, the opening bulk of the document itself is rightly dedicated to reaffirming the traditional and newly relevant core tenets of NATO’s existence—collective defense, nuclear deterrence, and the production and logistics to achieve them. But about two-thirds of the way down, the communiqué turns to how the Euro-Atlantic security environment has shifted.

The war in Ukraine has reaffirmed that “emerging security challenges” (in NATO parlance) have arrived, from the weaponization of energy to the widespread “digitalization” of warfare and the importance of resilience.

Indeed, energy security and climate change are gaining renewed importance for the Alliance. Climate security issues are a personal priority of the secretary general, and a changing energy economy means that the pipeline politics of yesterday will look simple compared to the complex security implications of integrated power systems, critical digital infrastructure, supply chains for key inputs to transition, and the like. And while NATO wades into the tech innovation space with its own acceleration fund (DIANA), it has yet to grasp the power of military procurement for demonstrating, scaling, and standardizing technologies that will be key to mitigating emissions in the civilian space while also boosting military effectiveness. Meanwhile the energy transition itself will be a messy process, with pockets of volatility and economic mismatches that could directly impact political stability, popular support for a sustainable transition, and strategic relations.

The Vilnius summit is a turning point for many reasons, but perhaps the most fundamental for NATO as an institution is its shift from an internally focused bureaucracy with declining budgets fighting to justify its existence in the post-Cold War world, to one compelled to adopt a growth and ambition mentality. Where before it was simpler to ring-fence NATO’s military mission, concerns about climate change and strategic competition are imposing policy-driven global economic realignments. To fulfill its ambitions for leadership in that new environment, NATO needs the competence and reach to provide important security-related input to key decisions about infrastructure investment and managing new technology—and it needs to be convinced of its own relevance in those spaces.

—Phillip Cornell is a principal at Economist Impact and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

An uninspiring result for Ukraine

Talk about the eleventh hour! The NATO Summit communiqué was finally released at approximately 6:40 p.m. in Vilnius, rather late for a summit document. There was a good reason for this: clear disagreement between a large number of East European, Nordic, and some Western European allies on the one side and the United States and Germany on the other about how forthcoming the Alliance should be about Ukraine’s eventual membership in NATO. While the ad hoc coalition wanted clarity in hastening Ukraine’s membership, Washington and, to a lesser extent, Berlin were cautious. Given the weight Washington enjoys in NATO deliberations, this meant that the much larger number of allies could not get their preference. But given the importance of NATO unity, this meant that the United States and Germany had to move beyond their original position.

The end result was not quite inspiring. The communiqué notes that Ukraine no longer needs to meet a Membership Action Plan, and the NATO-Ukraine Commission will become a NATO Ukraine Council: small steps in the right direction. On the crucial membership issue, the communiqué states, “the Alliance will support Ukraine in making these reforms on its path towards future membership. We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met.” This is not much movement beyond the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit language noting that Ukraine would eventually be a member.

It was no surprise that a few hours before the communiqué appeared, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy tweeted his dissatisfaction: “It’s unprecedented and absurd when [a] time frame is not set neither for the invitation nor for Ukraine’s membership. While at the same time vague wording about ‘conditions’ is added even for inviting Ukraine.” This is somewhat sharp, but perhaps understandable from a man whose country is facing an aggression designed to destroy “Ukrainianness.”

While this denouement does not add luster to the Vilnius summit, there are other developments that make this a historic occasion. The main thing, of course, is the admission of Finland and Sweden to the Alliance. This greatly strengthens NATO security in the north. But also important is NATO finally recognizing that “the Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.” This is an important reminder that US and NATO support for Ukraine is not philanthropy, but the smart way to defend our vital interests. The communiqué also directly addresses the Belarus problem: “Belarus’ support has been instrumental as it continues to provide its territory and infrastructure to allow Russian forces to attack Ukraine and sustain Russia’s aggression. In particular Belarus, but also Iran, must end their complicity with Russia and return to compliance with international law.”

These two items portend a further strengthening of NATO policy against the Kremlin threat and in support of Ukraine. Vilnius also foreshadows what is to come in NATO dynamics and policy. The seventy-fifth anniversary of the Alliance will be celebrated at the NATO Summit next year in Washington DC. That event will give US President Joe Biden a chance to establish a legacy as an outstanding national security president. For that to occur, he will need to listen closely to the United States’ newly active East European allies and 1) provide Ukraine all the weapons it needs to defeat the Kremlin on the battlefield and 2) move beyond caution to hasten the anchoring of Ukraine in NATO.

—John Herbst is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He served as US ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006.

‘Ambiguous’ ‘head-scratching and disappointing’ language about Ukraine’s NATO membership

The Vilnius summit is likely to be viewed as a landmark summit for two things that happened and two things that didn’t.

What did happen: The pending agreement by Turkey to ratify Sweden’s membership application will soon add a thirty-second ally to NATO’s ranks, making Vilnius, like Madrid before it, an enlargement summit. That every littoral Baltic Sea state, besides Russia, will be a member of the Alliance is a significant development for NATO’s defense of its northeastern flank. To that end, the adoption of some four thousand pages of classified regional plans for defense of NATO territory completes a shift, started in 2014 after Russia’s invasion of Crimea, to a deterrence-by-denial strategy absent since the waning days of the Cold War.

Missing from the Vilnius communiqué, however, is any clear pathway for Ukraine’s membership. Inside the geeky NATO universe, the upgrading of the NATO-Ukraine Commission to “Council” status and the removal of formal membership action plan requirements for Ukraine are significant developments. But neither packs a political punch, nor will either move be viewed as real progress on the membership question. In fact, communiqué language stating “we will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when allies agree and conditions are met” is as ambiguous as the infamous Bucharest statement from 2008 promising that Ukraine “will become” a member of NATO. It is a head-scratching and disappointing formulation. Moreover, the bilateral security guarantees that were broadly promised in the runup to the summit were missing from the final statement. The combination of these things makes for an underwhelming package for Ukraine, though some small hope remains for better outcomes at tomorrow’s inaugural NATO-Ukraine Council meeting.

—Christopher Skaluba is the director of the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and former principal director for European and NATO policy at the US Defense Department.

Allies make clear Ukraine is firmly in the transatlantic family

It might have and should have been stronger. Nevertheless, the NATO communiqué language on Ukraine’s accession to NATO puts Ukraine within, and not outside, the transatlantic family. The “when” and “how” of Ukraine’s accession to NATO have yet to be worked out but, critically, the Vilnius summit has decided the “whether” of Ukraine’s NATO membership in the affirmative–something that the 2008 Bucharest summit did only at a high level of generality. “We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when allies agree and conditions are met” is the key sentence from today’s communiqué. It’s weakened by the gratuitous qualifier “we will be in a position to” rather than a straightforward “we will extend an invitation.” Still, this offer—any offer—of an invitation to Ukraine is a step forward, and a big one compared to where the United States and most NATO member governments were even a few months ago.

Less noticed (and less debated) was the communiqué text that makes clear, without weakening qualifiers, that “we do not and will never recognize Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexations, including Crimea.” That language, though it reaffirms long-held positions, helps kill the temptation by some to push Ukraine into surrendering its territory in exchange for a dubious “peace” on Putin’s terms.

While NATO has now set out the goal—Ukraine in the Alliance—much depends on continuing to provide robust military support to Ukraine to help it fight back, and win, on the battlefield. Paragraph twelve of the communiqué notes that allies at the summit agreed on a “substantial package of expanded political and practical support” for Ukraine. It doesn’t provide details, but hopefully they will be announced soon, either by NATO or separately by allies.

Zelenskyy and a number of NATO allies have pushed hard (and pushed the Biden administration) to get the most from this summit. They were right to do so. Now they need to consolidate their gains and prepare next steps, including for next year’s NATO Summit in Washington DC.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Calling out the ‘most significant and direct threat’—and its accomplice

The Vilnius summit communiqué rightly places the Russian Federation as the most significant and direct threat to allies’ security, peace, and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area due to Moscow’s illegal war of aggression in Ukraine, terrorism, war crimes, and horrific violations of international law and norms.

Just as Russia deserves to be so centrally acknowledged for its role as the critical threat to Euro-Atlantic security, Belarus deserves to be right beside it. Any disregard of the role Belarus plays as a threat to regional security and an accomplice to the unprovoked war in Ukraine would be a mistake. NATO smartly recognized the threat from Belarus, condemning Belarus’s instrumental support to the Russian war effort by allowing its territory and infrastructure to be used by Russian forces for attacks into Ukraine.

While the communiqué notes Belarus’s complicity in this aggression, it’s critical to remember these crimes are committed and abetted by the illegitimate regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka. The dictator, desperately clinging to power, has driven Belarus deeper into the Kremlin’s clutches. NATO’s firm declaration of concern for the situation in Belarus is in part due to Lukashenka deepening the military integration between Russia and Belarus, potentially allowing the deployment of “so-called private military companies” to Belarus (the Wagner Group), as well as (perhaps too mildly put) “malign activities” without respect to human rights, fundamental freedoms, and international law; the Alliance’s declarations are an important signal and sign of hope that Belarus will not be forgotten in the international agenda.

While it is good to see the declaration about threats within Belarus itself, what will surely frustrate many in the democratic forces (along with their supporters), is that there is no acknowledgement that these actions are taken by an illegitimate regime, nor mention of the democratic forces rallying against these actions, against the war, and against any deployment of Russian nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable systems on Belarusian territory.

While the communiqué’s comments on Belarus could have been stronger, there is hope NATO leaders and experts in Vilnius have listened in on conversations featuring the democratically elected leader of Belarus and Lukashenka’s rival in the widely disputed 2020 election, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who has been boldly speaking in Vilnius in side-events calling for commitments to Belarus and reminding the world that the Lukashenka regime does not represent the Belarusian people.

—Shelby Magid is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

A clear-eyed snapshot that meets the geopolitical moment

The communiqué presents a clear-eyed snapshot of the Alliance in an era of great power rivalry and strategic competition. Russia receives thorough and excoriating attention as the shatterer of peace and a continuing threat. China is called out for challenging the norms, interests, and security of the Alliance and its members. New and prospective members in the room or at the doorstep (Finland, Sweden, and on a farther horizon, Ukraine) were appropriately hailed, as were Asian partners Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea. NATO member Turkey will be pleased by paragraphs four and five, which appreciate Turkish support to Sweden’s accession process and mention Ankara’s preferred language on terrorism as a threat “in all its forms and manifestations” to the Alliance. Hard power, conventional deterrence, and readiness are key focal points, though emerging and nontraditional threats are treated as well. Surprisingly, energy security makes an appearance only in paragraph sixty-eight. All in all, though, the document shows energy, focus, and seriousness appropriate to the geopolitical moment.

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY.

The NATO-Ukraine Council is a net positive step, but also the ‘bare minimum’

Much of the conversation immediately ahead of the NATO summit in Vilnius focused on whether the allies would take concrete steps toward Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance. On Sunday, Biden dumped cold water on Ukraine imminently joining NATO, but whispers in expert circles in Washington suggested that an intermediate initiative toward membership might make a splash at Vilnius. In fact, the communiqué itself caused barely a ripple: a new NATO-Ukraine Council that will formalize consultations between Brussels and Kyiv on Ukraine’s “aspirations for membership in NATO.”

A NATO-Ukraine Council is certainly a net positive step toward Ukrainian accession, but the fact that this was the centerpiece of the communiqué suggests it was the bare minimum step upon which allies could agree. The Alliance should have gone further and instead established a defense and deterrence partnership to provide Ukraine lethal aid and training (the renewed Comprehensive Assistance Package will help Ukraine become more interoperable with NATO, but provisions only five hundred million euros for nonlethal aid).

The signers also left open the question of when Ukraine will join the Alliance, writing only that Ukraine will be invited “when allies agree and conditions are met.” This ambiguity may help prevent Russia from blocking specific preconditions to Ukraine’s accession, but it could also create further indignation in Ukraine and in the Baltics if allies continue to disagree on whether Ukraine is “ready” for NATO.

Pressure will grow on the White House and Western European capitals to elucidate their conditions for Ukraine’s membership, at least in private channels, as Kyiv no doubt campaigns for an invitation at the 2024 NATO summit in Washington DC.

—Andrew D’Anieri is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Summit statement shows continued disagreement about Ukraine ‘at the highest levels’ of NATO

For many, the July 11 communiqué was along the lines of what was expected coming out of the NATO Summit in Vilnius. For others, hope was high that NATO allies would rally around Ukraine and show some clear steps not just in terms of whether the country will eventually join NATO, but exactly how and exactly when. NATO allies didn’t (and couldn’t) go that far, which shows continued disagreement at the highest levels as to Ukraine’s future relationship with the military alliance.

But it’s not all bad news—NATO allies were able to reaffirm their statements in the 2008 communiqué that Ukraine’s future is, indeed, in NATO. The problem with vague language like this is that it kicks the can down the road. The communiqué language basically says that Ukraine can join when all allies agree and when conditions are met. That leaves a lot of room for interpretation. My sense is that in the future—whether it’s in a year at NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington, or five years from now, or ten—NATO allies will come face to face with the undeniable truth that all allies might not ever be on the same page regarding Ukraine’s NATO membership. That’s a tough pill for many to swallow, but it might just be reality.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The communiqué confirms NATO’s growing attention to Indo-Pacific security

While the communiqué naturally reflects NATO’s laser focus on the war in Ukraine and the proximate threat from Russia, it also confirms the Alliance’s renewed strength and growing attention to China and the broader Indo-Pacific region.

Much attention will understandably be paid to the communiqué’s hedging on Ukraine’s eventual NATO membership. But for China, this week’s summit underscores that the war unleashed by its friends in Moscow has single handedly revitalized NATO, which Beijing only recently had viewed (happily) as sinking into irrelevance. This development throws a large wrench into China’s plans to dismantle the US-led alliance network, carve out a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific, and transform the rules-based global order.

The document reiterates language in last year’s Strategic Concept on China’s threat to NATO’s “interests, security and values;” “malicious” hybrid and cyber operations; disinformation; and efforts to control key tech sectors, critical minerals, and supply chains. The communiqué also builds on last year’s warnings about China’s “deepening strategic partnership” with Russia to call on Beijing to abstain from all forms of support for Russia’s war against Ukraine—particularly the provision of any lethal aid.

The call for China to condemn Russia and adhere to the principles of the United Nations Charter—paired with a clear refusal to recognize Russia’s illegal annexations—throws cold water on any hopes that Beijing would be welcomed to facilitate peace negotiations based on Putin’s terms.

Beijing will be pleased that the document does not include a reference to the opening of a proposed NATO office in Japan, reflecting a lack of consensus on NATO’s role in Asia. But language on the importance of the Indo-Pacific to security in the Euro-Atlantic and specific praise for the contributions of the four Indo-Pacific countries whose leaders are present in Vilnius—Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand—reflect NATO’s growing recognition that the regions’ fortunes are linked. NATO cannot ignore the threat of war over Taiwan and, as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently put it, “China is watching to see the price Russia pays, or the reward it receives, for its aggression.”

—David O. Shullman is senior director of the Global China Hub at the Atlantic Council and former US deputy national intelligence officer for East Asia on the National Intelligence Council.

The Biden administration was ‘largely alone’ in blocking Ukraine’s roadmap to membership

NATO fell short of placing Ukraine onto a clear track to Alliance membership, but that cause for membership gained unambiguous momentum at the Vilnius summit. The assertion in the summit communiqué that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO” frustratingly provides no more clarity than the 2008 Bucharest declaration in which NATO first declared Ukraine “will become” a member of NATO. While the Alliance dropped the requirement for Ukraine to jump through the hoops of a membership action plan (MAP)—as was done for the fast-tracked accession of Finland and Sweden—the communiqué states that Ukraine must implement “additional democratic and security sector reforms that are required” which infers an unnecessary de jure MAP.

What we must not overlook or underestimate is the fact that allies brought to the Vilnius summit unprecedented support for Ukraine’s membership aspirations. The warmth with which Zelenskyy was greeted demonstrated how Ukraine is regarded as part of the transtatlantic community. While full allied consensus—a requirement in NATO decision-making—was not achieved, the Biden administration found itself largely alone blocking efforts to provide Ukraine that roadmap to NATO. Even Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan asserted that “without a doubt, Ukraine deserves to be in NATO.”

The key now is to ensure that Ukraine defeats Russia’s invasion quickly and decisively, and to build on the expanded and significant allied support behind Kyiv’s membership aspirations, leveraging the fact that Ukraine today meets the requirements. These are mutually reinforcing goals. Their achievement will make Europe more secure and NATO more powerful. The progress made in Vilnius should make us all the more determined to secure Ukraine’s accession to NATO at the Alliance’s 2024 Washington summit.

—Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.

The post Experts react: What NATO’s Vilnius summit means for Ukraine and the Alliance’s future appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Grady Wilson quoted in NRC (Dutch) on balancing in Turkish foreign policy

Grady Wilson — Tue, 11 Jul 2023 14:43:43 +0000

The post Grady Wilson quoted in NRC (Dutch) on balancing in Turkish foreign policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wieslander interviewed on Radio Sweden

Eric Adamson — Tue, 11 Jul 2023 14:31:05 +0000

Podcast Gräns

When Turkey makes demands and delays Sweden’s membership, there is a risk that NATO appears weak and that the principle of open doors is challenged. Sveriges Radio speaks to Anna Wieslander, Director for Northern Europe at the Atlantic Council. “The process has taken longer than I expected”, she says.

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Wieslander quoted in Financial Times

Eric Adamson — Tue, 11 Jul 2023 14:09:00 +0000

Sweden poised to strengthen Nato’s northern defences

Membership of alliance marks historic shift for non-aligned country, precipitated by Russia’s war against Ukraine. Swedish membership will help Nato bolster its defence of the entire Nordic and Baltic regions and reinforce its presence in the Arctic. Its forces, logistics, airspace and maritime areas can now be fully integrated into Nato operational planning.

“Anna Wieslander, director for northern Europe, said Sweden would need to develop a ‘strategic culture’ among its top commanders and political decision makers. As a non-aligned country, albeit one active in multilateral institutions such as the EU and UN, it had the ability to hold back and sit on the fence. ‘Moving from national defence planning to a more collective defence planning process is a quite a big shift both practically and mentally,’ she said. ‘The expectations will be that Sweden will be an active member of Nato but that will be quite a challenge.’”

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Wieslander quoted in TIME

Eric Adamson — Tue, 11 Jul 2023 14:04:45 +0000

Why Sweden’s Path to NATO Membership Has Been So Rocky

“Why is Sweden not already a NATO member?”

“‘Sweden had to withdraw from Northern Europe’s power politics around 1809. We got a new French king, Bernadotte, and we withdrew because we were too weakened,’ Anna Wieslander, director for Northern Europe at the Atlantic Council, tells TIME. ‘Since then, we have kept that stance but it was never treaty bound for Sweden. It was always about navigating and maneuvering in European politics.’”

“What happens next?”

“’When you have disagreement on which allies to include in NATO, that weakens NATO politically and benefits Russia,’ says Wieslander.”

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Rich Outzen joins CNN International to discuss Erdogan’s approval of Sweden’s NATO membership

aozen — Tue, 11 Jul 2023 13:04:43 +0000

The post Rich Outzen joins CNN International to discuss Erdogan’s approval of Sweden’s NATO membership appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Rich Outzen joins TRT World to discuss Erdogan’s approval of Sweden’s NATO membership

aozen — Tue, 11 Jul 2023 12:53:46 +0000

Defne Arslan: Turkey comes away with major gains as it prepares to ratify in the fall

The post Rich Outzen joins TRT World to discuss Erdogan’s approval of Sweden’s NATO membership appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wieslander interviewed on Expressen TV

Eric Adamson — Tue, 11 Jul 2023 09:16:45 +0000

Listen here

Anna Wieslander is at the NATO summit in Vilnius, where Turkey yesterday night said yes to Sweden joining Nato.

Anna Wieslander, director for Northern Europe states: “Turkey’s EU demands were introduced in the last minute.”

“It was about bringing everything to an end”, she says.

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Wieslander on BBC World Service

Eric Adamson — Tue, 11 Jul 2023 07:44:37 +0000

Listen Here

Turkey’s president agrees to back Sweden’s request to join the western military defence alliance NATO – but what will it mean when Sweden becomes part of the alliance?

Anna Wieslander spoke with BBC’s World Service about the Turkey-Swedish deal and a possible Ukraine membership.

Anna Wieslander can be heard at minute 28:30.

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What’s behind Erdogan’s backing of Sweden’s NATO bid?

Atlantic Council — Tue, 11 Jul 2023 00:03:53 +0000

JUST IN

The wait is (nearly) over. After more than a year of ups and downs since Sweden applied to join NATO in May 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has agreed to back Stockholm’s bid to become the Alliance’s thirty-second member. The announcement came on the eve of the NATO Summit in Vilnius after Erdoğan, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson held a lightning round of negotiations. Erdoğan agreed to advance ratification of Sweden’s NATO accession to Turkey’s legislature, with Hungary expected to follow suit to complete the process. What changed Erdoğan’s mind? What’s next for the Alliance? Our experts on the ground in Vilnius and beyond share their insights.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

Rich Outzen (@RichOutzen): Nonresident senior fellow at Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, former US State Department official, and former US Army foreign area officer
Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried): Weiser family distinguished fellow and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe
Christopher Skaluba: Director of the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and former principal director for European and NATO policy at the US Defense Department
Anna Wieslander (@AnnwieAnna): Director for Northern Europe and secretary-general of the Swedish Defence Association

How done is this deal?

The joint memorandum from Monday’s meeting spells out increased counterterrorism efforts by NATO to address Turkey’s security concerns and fresh support from Sweden for Turkey’s bid to join the European Union, among other provisions—and came as a surprise, following Erdogan’s skeptical comments in recent days about the prospects for an agreement.
“It is a typical Erdoğan move to take a maximalist position in a high-stakes negotiation, show readiness to walk, then compromise for progress on key demands,” Rich tells us.
Not (yet) in writing is a looming deal for Turkey to buy F-16 fighter jets from the United States, a likely carrot for Turkish approval of Sweden’s membership. “The practice of international relations is not an art for the purist,” says Dan. “If the Biden team made some understanding, I would look favorably on it.”
Chris, who’s in Vilnius, notes that Erdoğan is only sending the decision on Sweden’s NATO accession to the Turkish parliament, which his party controls, so this is not a done deal. Erdoğan made a show of lending his support to an invitation for Finland and Sweden to join NATO a year ago in Madrid before drawing out the process until now. “There is a non-zero chance that some intervening circumstance (like another public Quran burning [in Sweden]) could serve as pretext for derailing the process again,” he says. “I want to be optimistic, but worry that I have seen this movie before. NATO should not spike the football until it is over the goal line.”
With the action now moving to the Turkish legislature, Erdoğan “retains the ability to kill or delay accession if Sweden backs off on counterterror” measures that Turkey wants or if an F-16 deal doesn’t materialize, Rich adds.
Nevertheless, there was a palpable sense of celebration and relief in Vilnius. “It is unclear how long it will take, but the agreement undoubtedly removes the risk of Sweden falling into a limbo situation—that is, being close to, but not fully in, the Alliance,” Anna tells us from the summit.

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The Wagner factor

Erdoğan’s turnabout comes two weeks after mercenary leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s short-lived mutiny in Russia—and on the same day that news broke of Russian leader Vladimir Putin meeting with Prigozhin in the days after the revolt—developments that “suggest [Putin] regime weakness,” according to Dan.
“Erdoğan’s reaction to the failed 2016 coup in Turkey showed no such mixed messages,” Dan adds. In choosing to advance Sweden’s efforts to join NATO, “Erdoğan might have concluded that betting on Putin after the mutiny seemed less wise.”
Rich argues that the Prigozhin drama was not much of a factor, since this agreement was all part of a long-term push for NATO to help address Turkish security concerns such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK): “The Turks need a functional relationship with Russia but see more common cause with the West; the approach to Sweden should be seen in those terms, as how to prove bona fides to the Western Alliance while extracting necessary concessions to their own security.”
If its security concerns are addressed, Turkey actually favors a bigger NATO with countries such as Sweden, Finland, Ukraine, and Georgia, Rich tells us, “because by NATO structure and bylaws” Turkey, like other Alliance members, “gets a veto on the world’s most powerful security organization.” So “the bigger the better.”

All for one

“The deal means that the Vilnius Summit is off to a good start,” Anna says, as the Alliance “faced the risk of appearing fragmented and weak” with its members not yet fully united around Sweden’s NATO membership. Now focus turns to a possible membership roadmap and security guarantees for Ukraine, where “tough decisions” await, she says.
Erdoğan also gets to bask in the limelight. “He has lost no real leverage,” Rich notes, “but gained a tremendous optic of Turkey supporting the Atlantic Alliance.”

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Experts react: Erdogan just agreed to support Sweden’s NATO bid. What does that mean for Turkey, Sweden, and the Alliance?

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 10 Jul 2023 23:08:40 +0000

Now that’s an opening act. On the eve of the NATO Summit in Vilnius, and after more than a year of twists and turns, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Monday that he would push forward Sweden’s accession into NATO. The announcement came after a meeting with Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, with NATO agreeing to enhance its counterterrorism work to address Turkey’s security concerns and Sweden agreeing to back Turkey’s European Union (EU) membership bid. Erdoğan, for his part, agreed to push for ratification of Sweden’s accession in its legislature. With Hungary expected to follow suit, the path to Sweden’s entrance into the Alliance could soon be clear.

Below, Atlantic Council experts weigh in on what’s behind this dramatic and consequential turnabout from Erdoğan and what to expect next.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Rich Outzen: Inside Erdoğan’s calculus

Anna Wieslander: Sweden gets out of limbo as the Alliance shows a united front

Christopher Skaluba: Don’t spike the football just yet

Rachel Rizzo: Both sides gain in this geopolitical tit-for-tat

Daniel Fried: Did Erdoğan sense Putin’s weakness?

Ian Brzezinski: Sweden makes the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake—and seals the Vilnius summit’s place in history

Turkey comes away with major gains as it prepares to ratify in the fall

On July 10, Erdoğan committed to send Sweden’s NATO membership ratification to the Turkish parliament. The news was welcomed by all NATO members heading into the NATO summit in Vilnius—and will prove beneficial to Turkey, a major ally with a key role in the Alliance’s southern flank, from the Black Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean. The announcement also came right after Erdoğan demanded long-sought EU membership for Turkey in return for Sweden’s accession, in addition to Sweden taking Turkey’s security concerns seriously. Sweden eventually took steps on adopting an anti-terrorism law in June. Additionally, language regarding terrorist organizations, which pose an existential threat to Turkey, appeared in the NATO communiqué. These were important gains for Turkey. It is also encouraging to see that NATO will be establishing a terrorism coordination mechanism for the first time.

What will be the timeline for Sweden’s ratification in the Turkish parliament? It is important to note that apart from Erdoğan’s remarks, there has not been any official announcement from the Turkish side regarding Sweden’s accession yet. This tells me that Erdoğan will wait for the next steps both from Sweden and NATO, as well as from the EU before he sends the protocol to the Turkish parliament.

Erdoğan also announced on July 12 in Vilnius that Sweden’s accession will move forward once the Turkish Parliament opens in October, but not before. As the parliament opens, the ratification needs to be discussed and adopted at the parliament’s foreign affairs committee first, before it goes to the floor.

Erdogan’s move on July 10not only took the pressure off of Turkey during the summit, but also gave the president more time to monitor the developments in Turkey’s favor. From the EU side, a customs union revitalization and update, as well as visa liberalization will be beneficial for Turkey, and if things move fast enough, there is always a chance that Sweden’s ratification can happen in September. That said, I also would like to underline that this announcement in Vilnius will also bring obligations to Turkey to meet its side of the agreement.

—Defne Arslan is senior director of the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY program.

Inside Erdoğan’s calculus

I am mildly surprised that this comes before and not during the Summit, which convenes Tuesday, but overall it makes sense. It is a typical Erdogan move to take a maximalist position in a high-stakes negotiation, show readiness to walk, then compromise for progress on key demands.

It’s the wrong question to ask, “What pushed Erdogan to do this?” Because it underestimates the degree of strategy he and his advisors have applied—and misreads their original intent. Erdogan and the Turks have long said publicly and privately that they favor NATO enlargement. They have supported Ukraine and Georgia in the past, approved Finland this past year, and would like to see Sweden in—if the notoriously lax Swedish counterterror laws, now amended, are fully implemented. Turkey wants a big NATO because by NATO structure and bylaws Erdogan gets a veto on the world’s most powerful security organization—as do all members. The bigger the better. Yet the nature of the enlargement matters greatly for a country with a serious terrorism threat. So the better question is: Did Erdogan get what he thinks he needs on his own security needs, regarding the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and a potential F-16 fighter jet deal with the United States, to advance Sweden’s candidacy? What was the quid pro quo?

It’s important to remember that Erdogan’s announcement was not approval of the bid; it was a statement of intent to pass the question of approval to the Turkish parliament, which Erdogan’s party controls. Thus he retains the ability to kill or delay accession if Sweden backs off on counterterror implementation, or if the United States reneges on the F-16 deal. So all in all, he has lost no real leverage, but gained a tremendous optic of Turkey supporting the Atlantic Alliance.

This removes the question of Swedish accession from the summit’s main agenda, and places it in the category of “business successfully managed.” Thus the summit can focus on two more pressing issues: how to support Ukraine and how to implement NATO’s revised security concept. I would expect that on the first topic (Ukraine) we will see a roadmap or statement of principles that lays out robust military support for Ukraine’s defense, amounting to a security guarantee, but carefully calibrated not to constitute a near-term prospect of accession, an escalation, or an engagement of NATO as an organization in the current defensive war against Russia. On the second topic (security concept), there will be technical progress on how to divide responsibilities and resources more equitably, but this will likely be of less interest to general audiences.

I think this has less to do with the mutiny of Yevgeniy Prigozhin and perceptions of Vladimir Putin’s standing than with the leverage game vis-a-vis NATO allies and how to ensure that if European NATO problems become Turkish problems, Turkish problems become European NATO problems. Ankara will continue to conduct a balancing act by which it maintains trade, diplomatic relations, and occasional strategic cooperation with Russia—while ensuring that together with other NATO powers Turkey disabuses Russia of its dreams of imperial revanche. Putin, Prigozhin, Wagner—in Turkish eyes these are all just layers of the Russian Matryoshka or Maskirovka, deceptive games that obscure a fairly direct power play. The Turks need a functional relationship with Russia but see more common cause with the West; the approach to Sweden should be seen in those terms, as how to prove bona fides to the Western Alliance while extracting necessary concessions to their own security.

As to quid pro quo, for Turkey, it can be only two things—counter-PKK commitments by Sweden, and agreement on F-16s (and perhaps broader strategic engagement) by Washington. Anything else is peripheral, and if these are not obtained, the deal is a bad one for Ankara. Of course there is an escape hatch—Erdogan passed the ball to the Turkish parliament and approved nothing directly—but the pieces are in place now for a good transactional deal that helps NATO, Sweden, and Turkey in a stroke.

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY.

Sweden gets out of limbo as the Alliance shows a united front

Finally Sweden got its green light from Turkey to join NATO. Late in the evening in Vilnius, Stoltenberg called July 10, 2023, “a historic day.” The agreement between Sweden, Turkey, and NATO that was signed on Monday evening means that Sweden will join the Alliance as its thirty-second member “as soon as possible,” given that the Turkish and Hungarian parliaments need to ratify the accession protocol.

It is unclear how long it will take, but the agreement undoubtedly removes the risk of Sweden falling into a limbo situation—that is, being close to, but not fully in, the Alliance. Sweden´s military and political adjustments toward NATO membership can proceed with full speed, which is beneficial not only for Sweden, but for the defense of Northern Europe, in which Sweden could play a crucial role.

The green light also facilitates Finland’s integration as a new member, since the security and defense of the two Nordics is heavily interlinked. As Finnish President Sauli Niinistö stated: “Finland’s NATO membership is not complete without Sweden.”

For NATO, the deal means that the Vilnius Summit is off to a good start. As twenty-nine allies already have ratified Sweden’s accession, NATO otherwise faced the risk of appearing fragmented and weak. Lack of progress could put the credibility of NATO’s “open door” policy at risk, since the Alliance also has to make some tough decisions on Ukrainian membership.

Turkey managed to push Sweden and NATO to take a step forward on counterterrorism measures, and in the end, Erdoğan also put the EU into the mix. Sweden’s decision to support Turkish ambitions to get the European Commission to restart the accession process appeared to seal their NATO agreement. Whether Turkey will also get to purchase the long-sought F-16 fighter jets from the United States remains to be seen. But then, the summit has not even started and US President Joe Biden has yet to arrive.

—Anna Wieslander is the director for Northern Europe and head of the Atlantic Council’s Northern Europe office in Stockholm.

Don’t spike the football just yet

While my instinct tells me that it would be difficult for Erdoğan to backtrack on an agreement he has seemingly made in good faith, recent history provides a cautionary tale. Just over a year ago on the margins of the Madrid Summit, glasses were clinking on what most observers assumed would be a straightforward process for admission once Turkey joined consensus in inviting Finland and Sweden to become members. Yet Erdoğan knew he had a second bite at the apple. He took the accolades in Madrid, only to run Sweden through the paces for another year before another dramatic set of negotiations in Vilnius, where he once again demanded the spotlight before conceding. If he moves with alacrity to push the ratification through the Turkish parliament, skeptics can be reassured. But there is non-zero chance that some intervening circumstance (like another public Quran burning) could serve as pretext for derailing the process again. I want to be optimistic, but worry that I have seen this movie before. NATO should not spike the football until it is over the goal line.

—Christopher Skaluba is the director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Both sides gain in this geopolitical tit-for-tat

For months, NATO leaders have been working behind the scenes to broker this agreement between Turkey and Sweden. It’s important to tip our hats to Stoltenberg, Biden, and other leaders who exerted diplomatic pressure to see this through. This is a classic example of a geopolitical tit-for-tat: Erdoğan using his strategic position—as a member of NATO but also straddling the East and West—to extract concessions from Sweden that both bolster his power at home and demonstrate to the broader NATO Alliance that they need him. It also gives both sides something they want: Erdoğan gets to look like a statesman, and Sweden appears on track to finally get its NATO membership. It will be interesting in the coming days to follow reports of what took place behind closed doors over the last few weeks, days, and even hours, and what was actually on offer for Erdoğan to create this shift. He wouldn’t have changed his tune if he didn’t see this move as in his interests. Next up: Be sure to watch the US-Turkey F-16 space closely.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Did Erdoğan sense Putin’s weakness?

While it’s only speculation, the Prigozhin mutiny and the Kremlin’s uncertain response (Prigozhin at liberty in Russia, not in exile in Belarus; Prigozhin’s meeting with Putin) suggest regime weakness. Erdoğan’s reaction to the failed 2016 coup in Turkey showed no such mixed messages. Erdoğan might have concluded that betting on Putin after the mutiny seemed less wise.

We won’t know what the United States might do with respect to F-16 or other military sales to Turkey. If there were an understanding, the details will become clear in coming weeks. Whether a possible deal is a good deal depends on the details. But the practice of international relations is not an art for the purist. Erdoğan’s decision to support Sweden’s (and Ukraine’s) NATO accession is a big deal and worth advancing. If the Biden team made some understanding, I would look favorably on it.

Sweden will bring to the Alliance military capacity (though it will need to build more), political savvy, and good geography. Sweden will help with the defense of NATO’s eastern flank countries and the Baltic Sea. Having worked with Swedish diplomats for many years, I believe they will also be excellent partners in forging NATO consensus and a sustainable, strong policy toward Russia.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Sweden makes the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake—and seals the Vilnius summit’s place in history

Assuming Erdoğan’s announcement is followed by expeditious approvals from the Turkish and Hungarian parliaments, it will be one of the key substantive and geopolitically significant deliverables of NATO’s Vilnius summit. Sweden’s accession will bring to the Alliance real military capability, reinforce its transatlantic outlook, and above all, bring into the Alliance’s ranks a new member determined to fulfill its military responsibilities. Sweden’s membership will complete the transformation of the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake, thereby strengthening the security and military stability of North Central Europe.

—Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.

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Four big takeaways from the new Czech national security strategy

Petr Tůma — Mon, 10 Jul 2023 16:19:32 +0000

With Russia’s brutal attempt to redraw borders by force, Europe underwent a massive tremor. Moscow’s desecration of the rules-based world order woke up the continent from its geopolitical sleepwalking. Security and defense are beginning to be taken seriously again. Adjusting to the new geopolitical reality, several European countries have drafted new security strategies and similar documents, including France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Germany. One can add here the European Union (EU) and NATO strategic outlooks from last year.

Now the Czechs have joined the swarm. On June 28, the government in Prague approved a new national security strategy, replacing the previous strategy from 2015. Though perhaps less weighty than papers presented by major European powers, it is worth paying attention to the Czech strategy. As highlighted by Martin Povejšil, the Czech foreign ministry’s director general for security and multilateral issues, the new document is “addressing threats and risks in the most open and direct way, compared to other countries.” This directness offers a refreshingly realistic assessment of the current security environment and helps to explain the ongoing European strategizing momentum.

Drafting the thirty-seven-page document took nine months, and the work was coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), leaving a clear mark on the text. There were discussions in the past about whether the MFA should be the penholder, considering that an important part of the document dealt with internal security and also the defense ministry does the work in France and some other countries. The increasing impact of external factors on internal security has assuaged these doubts. Still, it appears to have been a thoroughly intergovernmental effort that included a number of ministries and collected inputs from parliament, the president’s office, and nongovernmental organizations.

The security strategy has a twofold purpose: First, it is meant to be the starting point and binding guidance for further work on security for the whole public sector, from ministries to municipalities. Second, the strategy should also become a “StratCom” tool to communicate major security-related messages to the Czech population, as well as to Czechia’s friends and adversaries. The language, structure, and content of the document reflect this purpose.

There are four distinctive features of the new national security strategy to note.

1. ‘Czechia is not secure’

The document is built on the foundational acknowledgment that “Czechia is not secure,” not due to an internal threat but because of the deteriorating international context. The text gets as far as admitting the possibility that the country “could become part of an armed conflict.” Some may consider this statement overblown, yet it’s deliberate. The risk of open aggression against Czechia remains low but is currently the highest since the end of the Cold War. An effective defense against new security challenges starts with admitting them and forsaking the state of security unconsciousness.

The new strategy wants to contribute to the strategic awakening, the whole of society becoming conscious of current threats. When Karel Řehka, the chief of the general staff of the Czech army, stated in February that he can’t rule out a war between Russia and NATO, which would lead to a partial mobilization, he shocked many of his compatriots. This document puts additional weight behind the seriousness of the situation for Czechs.

2. It’s direct about Russia and China

Compared to previous Czech security strategies (2003, 2011, 2015), the current one is more direct in pointing out the threats and risks.

If the strategy from 2015—which is still partly oriented by the post-9/11 paradigm of the war on terrorism—speaks indirectly about some states seeking the revision of the existing international order, the current document, reminiscent of the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, denotes Russia as “the biggest immediate and long-standing direct threat to the security of Europe and to the international rules-based order.” And it will remain so—one can read a few lines lower—“unless Russia goes through a fundamental and deep transformation, political as well as social, no matter what outcome the war in Ukraine may have.” Czechia and its neighbors have a particular reason to worry, given the assumption that Moscow “continues to treat Central Europe as its natural sphere of influence.” That’s why it’s important for the EU to engage in a serious reconsideration of its relations with Russia, which some member states are still reluctant to support.

China is described as a country that represents “a fundamental systemic challenge globally and is attempting to change the existing international order.” There were reportedly some discussions about whether to explicitly designate China as a “threat.” In the end, the text avoids creating a new precedent and keeps closer to the language used by the EU and NATO allies. The document highlights that Beijing “continues with massive arming… engages in cyber espionage, seeks to control global data flows, and uses diverse forms of socio-economic coercion and other hybrid interference tools.” One can easily identify Beijing where the text describes—without attribution—other major dangers and risks. Interestingly, the paragraph after China’s portrayal begins as follows: “Yet another long-term threat comes from…” Logically, what was discussed just before—China—could be interpreted also as a long-term threat.

Other threats mentioned are North Korea’s nuclear program, Iran’s malign activities in the region, lasting conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, and uncontrolled migration. The document also points out the security challenges related to climate change, instability in the Western Balkans, and—importantly—the risks of declining democracy and rule of law in any EU member state.

3. A whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach is needed

The new strategy is distinguished by its holistic approach to security. The country’s defense is no longer just the responsibility of the military and a few other relevant government bodies. The document advances the idea that all the ministries and the public sector should be involved, along with business and civil society. Indeed, all citizens should be somehow engaged, as they are not only security consumers but its contributors and creators. It’s the government’s role to prepare people for this task.

To paraphrase a French anthropologist Marcel Mauss—one of the godfathers of modern sociology and anthropology—national security appears here as “total social fact,” even if different players are engaged at different levels.

Given the whole-of-society dimension of national security, the strategy makes an effort to present an easy-to-read text accessible to the broader public, hoping to generate a public debate. Czechia’s more integrated approach appears to have more in common with the German strategy, compared to, for example, France’s 2022 strategic review, which is more focused on the military (and a military-minded audience). On the other hand, Prague’s new security strategy is closer to the French strategy in that both seem unified and clearer in their priorities compared with the German document, in which one can easily identify different voices of the three coalition partners, making it a bit more of a patchwork.

4. The focus is unity, not autonomy

If the new strategy is realistic in the assessment of threats, it also reflects the values-based policies Czechia is now championing. There’s now a broad consensus in Prague toward restoring former President Václav Havel’s legacy of values-consistent foreign policy, from Prime Minister Petr Fiala’s coalition government to new President Petr Pavel and the leaders of both chambers of parliament.

The strategy repeatedly emphasizes Czech NATO and EU membership as key to ensuring the country’s security, especially while the “role of the [United Nations] as a protector of the order keeps losing traction.” The document alludes to the need for reinforcement of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy while highlighting complementarity with NATO and the Alliance’s key role in collective defense.

Those following the debate about EU “strategic autonomy” won’t be surprised that the concept, put to the forefront by French President Emmanuel Macron, isn’t mentioned. Instead of “strategic autonomy,” which can imply greater European separation from the United States, Prague prefers to talk about “strategic unity” within the EU and, importantly, across the Atlantic.

There’s more to come

The new Czech security outlook will be complemented by other strategic documents, including a defense strategy, foreign policy concept, and reviews of approaches toward China, Russia, and energy security. This should be done by early 2025, when the foreign ministry, in coordination with the national security adviser, will review the implementation of the current security strategy, as stipulated by the relevant government resolution.

Yet, even the new strategy alone makes it clear Prague is taking a bolder approach to national security, and it presents yet another indicator of a tectonic shift in Europe’s politics. It likely won’t be the last. Expect more countries in Central and Eastern Europe to step up and take on a more proactive approach as well. As an appetizer, one could refer to Lithuania’s bold Indo-Pacific strategy, released July 5.

Petr Tůma is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a Czech career diplomat with an expertise on Europe, Middle East, and transatlantic relations. He previously worked at the Czech Embassy in Washington, DC. His views are his own.

The post Four big takeaways from the new Czech national security strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

We don’t really know which NATO allies are pulling their weight. Here’s how to fix that.

John R. Deni — Mon, 10 Jul 2023 15:22:05 +0000

The Defense Investment Pledge agreed to by NATO allies in 2014 is reaching its decade-long finish line. The Alliance’s own data indicate that not all allies will cross that line, as many still spend less than the equivalent of 2 percent of their gross domestic products on defense and several still devote less than 20 percent of their defense budgets to acquisition and related research and development. Nonetheless, some allies like the United States are advocating to increase the 2 percent target. This is sure to run into resistance. How can the United States and like-minded allies successfully negotiate higher targets? They might start by agreeing to portray NATO burden- and risk-sharing more accurately. Although some argue that inputs like defense spending tell us a lot about outputs like contributions to Alliance operations, recently available data indicate this is not necessarily the case: New statistical analysis shows that whether or not a country has met the 2 percent spending target doesn’t tell us whether or not they’re contributing equally to the Alliance’s mission. If burden- and risk-sharing could be portrayed more accurately, those opposed to increasing the input targets might be more willing to reconsider. Even if they do not, improving how NATO depicts burden- and risk-sharing would benefit lawmakers, analysts, academics, and the public. Recommendations on how to achieve this follow the statistical analysis.

Introduction

NATO has been negotiating new defense spending targets.¹ In 2014, the allies agreed to a Defense Investment Pledge (DIP) comprised of two related burden-sharing commitments. The DIP committed each ally to work toward spending the equivalent of 2 percent of their gross domestic products (GDPs) on defense and 20 percent of their defense budgets on acquisition and related research and development (R&D). Allies gave themselves ten years to achieve these goals. With the end of this timeframe just around the corner, some allies like the United States, Poland, and Estonia are pushing for more ambitious defense spending targets while others would be content to see the DIP disappear altogether.² Clearly, the negotiations have been difficult.

Burden-sharing disagreements within the Alliance are nearly as old as NATO itself. Today, though, transatlantic tension regarding burden-sharing is heightened by a complex security landscape. Increased Russian aggression since 2014 has required reinvestment in conventional military capabilities, while asymmetric threats including cyberattacks, global warming, pandemics, mass migration, and terrorism continue to threaten allied security. Equitable burden-sharing among allies is not only a matter of principle, but also has operational and even tactical implications. Without equitable burden-sharing, the allies will quickly prove unable to meet their security commitments.

The latest allied defense spending figures show that while progress has been made on both elements of the DIP, not all allies will achieve the 2 percent and 20 percent goals by 2024. How then can the United States and like-minded allies successfully negotiate even higher targets? They might start by agreeing to portray NATO burden- and risk-sharing more accurately, as a way of ameliorating the naming and shaming that comes with not achieving the 2 percent and 20 percent goals. Although some argue that “inputs” like defense spending tell us a lot about “outputs” like contributions to Alliance operations, recently available data indicate this is not necessarily the case. If burden- and risk-sharing could be portrayed more accurately, those opposed to increasing the input targets might be more willing to reconsider their opposition. Even if they do not, improving how NATO depicts burden- and risk-sharing would benefit lawmakers, analysts, academics, and the public.

This issue brief begins by examining whether defense inputs really do tell us much about defense outputs, particularly contributions to allied operations. The brief does this first qualitatively by analyzing allied troop contributions to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2011, at the height of the troop surge. It then employs a statistical analysis to examine allied troop contributions to not just ISAF in 2011 but also to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) mission in the Baltic states. The issue brief concludes with recommendations on how NATO might more accurately depict burden- and risk-sharing, as a way of ultimately reaching higher DIP targets.

What do defense inputs tell us?

NATO relies on eleven metrics to measure burden-sharing.³ Two of the metrics focus on so-called inputs and nine focus on outputs. Inputs refer to the funds that member states allocate to defense, and these formed the basis for the 2014 DIP. The DIP was noteworthy not because allies had committed to the 2 percent/20 percent targets—in fact, the 2 percent target had existed for many years prior—but rather because the commitments were made by Alliance heads of state and government. In the past, Alliance defense ministers were the ones who had committed to the defense spending targets.

Regarding burden-sharing outputs, most of the data on these NATO metrics are classified for a variety of political and operational reasons. For example, publicly acknowledging that some Alliance forces are not as ready to respond to a crisis as claimed could prove politically embarrassing, provide adversaries like Russia with useful intelligence, and undermine deterrence. However, the fact that not all burden-sharing metrics are public leaves some decision-makers, legislators, experts, and allied citizens without a complete picture of who in the Alliance is doing their fair share.

Some experts argue that the inputs correlate “a lot” with defense capabilities and capacity and hence provide a good enough picture of the outputs.⁴ This may appear somewhat intuitive—you get what you pay for. However, such claims are problematic on at least two counts. First, these claims ignore risk-sharing, an important yet often overlooked component of the broader concept of burden-sharing. The examples of Greece and Denmark illustrate this point well. Greece routinely spends more than the equivalent of 2 percent of its GDP on defense and recently it has spent well above 20 percent of its defense budget on equipment and related R&D (38.8 percent in 2021). Greece, therefore, may appear to be a model ally. In contrast, Denmark routinely spends less than the equivalent of 2 percent of its GDP on defense, averaging just 1.23 percent since 2014, and less than 20 percent of its defense budget on equipment, averaging 13.8 percent since 2014. Clearly, the Danes appear to be burden-sharing laggards.

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However, during NATO’s operation in Afghanistan, Danish forces operated in southern Afghanistan, a region that saw some of the heaviest fighting. As a result, the Danes had one of the highest per capita casualty rates of allied troop-contributing countries.⁵ Meanwhile, Greek forces served primarily at Kabul’s international airport and in allied medical facilities in Afghanistan. These troops performed important, necessary missions, but they did not face the same risks as Danish troops.

The second reason to doubt claims that NATO’s defense input measures tell us most of what we need to know about defense outputs is that merely possessing capabilities is no guarantee that those capabilities will be used in allied operations, regardless of the risk-sharing factors noted above. Again, referring to the cases of Greece and Denmark, the contributions of the former to Alliance operations in Afghanistan⁶ (1.2 percent of all allied troops during the 2010-12 surge) and Kosovo⁷ (2.8 percent of the total Kosovo Force as of August 2022) were and are somewhat low, given that Greek troops constitute 3.34 percent of total NATO forces. In contrast, at the height of the surge in Afghanistan, Denmark had deployed 0.56 percent of all allied troops even though its forces constituted just 0.51 percent of total NATO forces in 2011. Similarly, today Denmark contributes 0.93 percent of all allied troops in Kosovo even though its troops constitute just 0.52 percent of total NATO forces. In other words, when it comes to sending troops into harm’s way, Denmark appears to do more than what might be expected of it.

It is possible, though, that the cases of Greece and Denmark constitute idiosyncratic burden- and risk-sharing behavior. To explain, perhaps most allies at or above the 2 percent/20 percent thresholds make contributions that are what would be expected of them or greater—given their relative sizes within the Alliance. Conversely, it may be the case that most below the 2 percent/20 percent thresholds make undersized contributions, again relative to their sizes within the Alliance.

This can be tested by looking at three recent NATO operations—the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan in 2011; the Kovoso Force over the last decade; and the Enhanced Forward Presence mission in the Baltic states (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria) from 2017 until the present.⁸ These three operations were selected for two reasons. First, they are primarily land operations, and nearly all allies have land forces that could play a role in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Eastern Europe. This permits a more broad-based analysis than, for instance, examining NATO’s Baltic air policing operation, since not all allies have fighter aircraft. Second, the operations represent a good mix of typologies—crisis response/counterinsurgency (ISAF), peacekeeping (KFOR), and defense/deterrence (eFP)—even if the needs of the Alliance today likely skew toward defense and deterrence.

The specific time periods for each operation were selected for the following reasons:

NATO’s presence in Afghanistan was at its height in 2011, during the surge of allied forces there. Allies were under pressure from both Washington and Brussels to participate.
KFOR is a long-term peacekeeping operation and examining it over the last decade includes the period when NATO was consumed with Afghanistan, the period when NATO was increasingly focused on deterring and defending against Russia, and the few years in between.
The eFP mission in the Baltics is tied to the very heart of the Alliance—the Article 5 mutual defense clause of the NATO treaty—especially since Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

By examining each ally’s contribution to the three operations relative to that ally’s military forces within the entire Alliance, one can get a sense of whether the success in achieving the goals of the DIP really does yield better burden-sharing.⁹ For example, if a particular ally met either the 2 percent or 20 percent threshold, and if inputs tell us a lot about outputs, it is reasonable to expect that that ally would contribute a proportional share of its military forces (relative to its forces within the Alliance) to the three operations.

Table 1 shows the data for ISAF in August 2011. Although the Defense Investment Pledge would not be made for another three years, the second and third columns indicate whether allies were above or below the 2 percent and 20 percent thresholds at the time—cells are highlighted green when above either threshold and red when below. Table 1 then shows a comparison between, on the one hand, each ally’s contribution to ISAF as a percent of all ISAF forces and, on the other hand, their military forces as a percent of NATO’s total military forces. (The figures on defense spending as a percent of GDP and the figures on percent of defense spending dedicated to equipment and R&D are lagged by three years because it takes time for money spent to have impact on capabilities.)

Table 1: NATO in ISAF, August 2011

If defense inputs tell us a lot about defense outputs, one might presume that if a country has sufficient inputs (i.e., it spends at least 2 percent on defense and meets or exceeds the 20 percent threshold for equipment and related R&D), it would contribute a percentage of ISAF’s forces proportionate to its share of total NATO forces. The last column of the table shows whether and to what degree allies’ contributions to ISAF were over (positive number) or under (negative number) their proportion of the Alliance’s total military forces. If an ally failed to spend 2 percent on defense and failed to meet the 20 percent threshold for equipment and related R&D, we would expect this number to be negative—that is, it fielded a percent of ISAF’s total force at a level below that which its forces represent within NATO more broadly. Conversely, if it spent more than 2 percent on defense or crossed the 20 percent threshold for equipment and related R&D, we would expect this number to be positive—that is, it fielded a percent of ISAF’s total force at a level above that which its forces represent within NATO more broadly. Exceptions—either over or under expectations—are highlighted in yellow. Of the twenty-four allies listed,¹⁰ eight did not contribute troops in a way one might expect, either positively or negatively, while sixteen did. More specifically, seven out of twenty-four allies met all or part of the DIP and yet failed to meet expectations for providing defense outputs in ISAF at the height of the surge.

Seven laggards out of twenty-four is not too bad. If roughly 70 percent of the time allies met expectations, it may be fair to conclude that defense inputs result in expected outputs, at least in terms of contributions to current operations. However, when analyzed statistically and when considering other operations like KFOR and eFP, the evidence of correlation between defense inputs and outputs is more mixed.

Table 2 shows the pairwise correlations among non-US allied defense spending as a percent of GDP, equipment spending as a percent of overall defense spending, “other” spending (which includes operations and maintenance, or O&M) as a percent of overall defense spending, and each ally’s defense budget as a percent of NATO’s overall defense spending on the one hand and the percent of ISAF troops on the other. Pairwise correlations allow for comparisons between a pair of variables, to shed light on whether a linear relationship exists between them. The results of a pairwise correlation analysis are expressed as correlation coefficients, ranging from -1, meaning a perfect negative correlation, to 1, meaning a perfect positive correlation. The closer the correlation coefficient is to either end of the scale (-1 or +1), the closer the relationship between the two variables. If, for example, a correlation coefficient between two variables is 0.75, this means that 75 percent of the time, if one of the variables moves in one direction (e.g., increasing), we can predict that the other variable moves in the same direction (e.g., also increasing). In social sciences generally, a coefficient from 0.7 (or -0.7) to 1 (or -1) indicates a strong positive (or negative) correlation; 0.3 (or -0.3) to 0.69 (or -0.69) indicates a moderately positive (or negative) correlation; and coefficients between 0.29 (or -0.29) and 0 indicate a weak or no positive (or negative) correlation.¹¹ Note that correlation does not mean or imply causation.

In the case of ISAF in 2011, the percent of troops contributed is poorly correlated with most key defense spending input measures, including the DIP and the percent of defense spending on O&M.¹² The only variable that shows any strong correlation with the percent of troops contributed to ISAF is each ally’s defense spending as a percent of total NATO defense spending.¹³

Table 2: Correlations among Defense Input Measures and ISAF Troop Contributions, 2011

Moreover, statistical analyses of non-US troop contributions to other Alliance operations show similarly mixed correlations at best or no correlation at all. Table 3 features a similar pairwise correlation analysis for KFOR from 2012 through 2020. Given the nine-year timeframe considered here, the analysis includes over 240 data points. As seen in the table, there are no strong or moderate correlations, positive or negative, between any of the inputs addressed here.

Table 3: NATO in KFOR, 2012-2020

Table 4 features statistical analysis of non-US allied contributions to eFP from 2017 through 2022. The table is based on data for allied contributions to eFP in the eight host countries—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland from 2017 to the present, and Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia since 2022. Data here include contributions from non-US allies each year from 2017 through 2022, resulting in 140 data points. As with the case of ISAF, the only defense input strongly correlated with percent of troop contributions to eFP is the percent of total allied defense spending. It is unclear why percent of total NATO defense spending is the only defense input that strongly correlates to both ISAF and eFP contributions, but it may reflect differing allied attitudes toward those operations on the one hand versus attitudes toward KFOR on the other.

Table 4: NATO in EFP, 2017-2022

Alternative measures, or just repackaging?

If defense inputs do not tell us much about the outputs, and if NATO does not make public the nine output measures it tracks, how can legislators, academics, other experts, and average citizens understand whether burden-sharing within NATO is fair? NATO burden-sharing is an inherently subjective and political issue. Given this, allies will likely try to manipulate whatever figures or data are used to measure burden-sharing to depict themselves in the best light. In short, no set of measures nor burden-sharing assessment process is perfect.

Nonetheless—and although it may be impossible to keep countries from using burden-sharing assessments as a way of burnishing their images—NATO can and should do more to include outputs in its publicly accessible annual reports. Doing so may offer all allies a fairer depiction of whether and how they are sharing burdens and risks, which could help lessen opposition from some allies to increasing the defense spending targets.

To achieve this, NATO should better leverage the data it already has available publicly—this will be far easier than trying to convince allies to declassify other information. For example, the Alliance should include in its annual defense expenditures report the troop contributions of each ally to ongoing operations. Information on allied contributions to particular operations is already publicly available, but it is not aggregated with the annual defense spending figures. This is sure to displease allies that contribute to other, non-NATO military missions in Europe and beyond including European Union or United Nations operations. To appease these allies, their contributions to non-NATO missions ought to be at least acknowledged, assuming those non-NATO operations are deemed to contribute to security in the transatlantic space.

Additionally, NATO should consider recrafting how it depicts the data it already makes public. For example, the Alliance staff charged with portraying the annually collected fiscal data should add an average trend line for all defense spending categories in its annual defense expenditures report. This is especially important for the personnel, infrastructure, and other (O&M) spending categories, which are not currently part of the DIP. Although there are no recommended minimum spending allocations for these categories, as there is for acquisition and related R&D (20 percent), simply showing a NATO average across all spending categories would provide a sense of which allies may need to recalibrate their spending.

Finally, the Alliance should think about ways to better portray risk-sharing. For instance, the Alliance should consider including per capita casualty figures in its reporting on current operations. For example, none of the “placemats” that the Alliance makes available for its operations in ISAF, KFOR, or eFP list casualty figures. This is politically risky and of course there have been few, if any, casualties in KFOR or eFP, given the nature of operations in Kosovo and across Eastern Europe. Additionally, the Alliance should continue to produce and release maps depicting in gross terms where allies (by country flag) are deployed in a particular operation. For instance, with an understanding that Alliance operations in southern Afghanistan were generally more challenging and dangerous than those in the north, a map depicting Danish, British, Canadian, Romanian, and American flags in the south provides a good sense of which allies are bearing greater risk.

Conclusion

The burden-sharing inputs used by NATO, specifically the Defense Investment Pledge agreed to at the 2014 Wales summit, do not correlate well or sometimes at all with one of the most important outputs—namely, relative troop contributions to NATO operations. Moreover, the inputs tell us nothing about risk-sharing, an important yet often overlooked component of broader burden-sharing considerations.

All of this means that those outside closed-door Alliance meetings—such as the general public but also most legislators—have little insight into whether allies are sharing responsibilities equitably. As the Alliance debates whether and how to replace the 2014 DIP, it should also consider ways to more accurately report on and portray burden- and risk-sharing. Doing so would permit a better informed transatlantic discussion on how allies should equitably share responsibilities, may lessen opposition toward increasing defense spending targets, and would ultimately improve transatlantic security in an era of strategic competition.

Dr. John R. Deni is a research professor of security studies at the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and a nonresident associate fellow at the NATO Defense College. The views expressed are his own. The author would like to thank Matthew Woessner, Jordan Becker, and two anonymous peer reviewers for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts. Additionally, the author is grateful for research assistance from Chelsea Quilling, Nate Forrest, Max Haseman, and Sean Sanko.

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1 “NATO Countries to Discuss Defence Spending Target—Stoltenberg,” Reuters, January 3, 2023, www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-countries-discuss-defence-spending-target-stoltenberg-2023-01-03.

2 Robbie Gramer, Amy Mackinnon, and Jack Detsch, “Eastern Europe Wants NATO to Beef Up Defense Spending,” Foreign Policy, February 2, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/02/eastern-europe-nato-defense-spending-ukraine-russia-poland-estonia/.

3 Douglas Lute, remarks delivered during “The Cost of European Security” panel event sponsored by Carnegie Europe and held in Brussels, Belgium, on September 17, 2015. Transcript available at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CE_Transcript_Cost_of%20European%20Security.pdf, and video available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kw_jJ4jNqyY.

4 Jordan Becker, “Clearing the Air on Transatlantic Burden-Sharing, Part 2: You Gotta Give (Inputs) to Get (Outputs),” War on the Rocks, May 31, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/clearing-the-air-on-transatlantic-burden-sharing-part-2-you-gotta-give-inputs-to-get-outputs/.

5 Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, “Afghanistan Index,” Brookings, March 31, 2012, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/index20120331.pdf.

6 “Afghanistan Troop Numbers Data: How Many Does Each Country Send to the NATO Mission There?” The Guardian, June 22, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2009/sep/21/afghanistan-troop-numbers-nato-data.

7 NATO, “Kosovo Force (KFOR): Key Facts and Figures,” August 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/8/pdf/2022-08-KFOR-Placemat.pdf.

8 There are a variety of reasons why a country may contribute troops to a particular mission, including the role of threats and their proximity, domestic political calculations, relations with other allies, or any number of other factors. The analysis in this issue brief is agnostic on which of these matters most for each ally; instead, the emphasis herein is on whether, from a broader Alliance-wide perspective, there exists a positive relationship between defense inputs and defense outputs like troop contributions.

9 Some have instead sought to focus on the allied contribution to each mission per 1,000 citizens as a measure of burden-sharing. This measure misrepresents the burden carried (or shirked) by those allies that have smaller militaries relative to their populations but that make proportionally larger contributions to allied military operations, like Canada, the Czech Republic, or Latvia, as well as those allies that have large militaries relative to their populations but that make below-average contributions to allied military operations, like Greece and Turkey.

10 The list of allies includes Canada and all European allies that had been in the Alliance for at least three years as of 2011 and that have military forces. Hence, Iceland is not listed because it does not have military forces, and Albania and Croatia are not listed because they did not join the Alliance until 2009. (Montenegro joined in 2017, North Macedonia joined in 2020, and Finland joined in 2023.)

11 Subsequently, a test for statistical significance can indicate whether a strong correlation between the two variables is due to random chance.

12 The conclusions drawn from the pairwise correlations shown in this issue brief stand up even when run through a bivariate regression analysis.

13 It is worth noting that this last correlation—percent of ISAF with percent of NATO’s overall defense spending—is the only one that is statistically significant.

The post We don’t really know which NATO allies are pulling their weight. Here’s how to fix that. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Prigozhin was a torpedo to the idea that the West must not humiliate Putin

Ana Palacio — Mon, 10 Jul 2023 14:40:23 +0000

Two weeks have passed, and few clues have emerged from the theatrical failed coup in Russia. It was closely followed by millions of spectators worldwide, who were captivated by the sensation of attending a gruesome reality show, although aware that, behind the scenes, leaders were carelessly playing with lives and fortunes.

The questions surrounding the June 23-24 events—which, were it not for the nuclear warheads and the casualties, would easily merit the qualification of vaudevillian—have multiplied. One is particularly relevant: What are the consequences for the war in Ukraine? More specifically, how does this plot twist affect Europe’s security?

If one imagines matryoshka dolls (Russian stacking dolls) as a symbol of Russian politics, the Wagner organization has existed because of—and for—Russian President Vladimir Putin. It depended—with all the ambiguity the term implies in the context of the whims of an all-powerful tsar and the personalistic nature of power—on three institutions also apparently controlled by the president: the Russian armed forces, its military intelligence (GRU), and the Federal Security Service (FSB). Notably, the intervention of these institutions in the rebellion—if any—was unclear.

The structure built by Putin has become a snake pit. Perhaps a “house of cards” is a more fitting term. Having previously refrained from sanctioning Yevgeniy Prigozhin, the ruthless leader of the Wagner paramilitary group, Putin spoke following the mutiny of punishing his enemies, even if such efforts are complicated by Wagner’s penetration into the Russian elite. The first arrest related to these consequences (still unconfirmed) appears to be that of Russian General Sergey Surovikin.

Prigozhin had been engaged in a power struggle with the military leadership for some time. Specifically, his attacks have targeted Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. The confrontation was exacerbated after last February’s invasion by the increasing relevance that the head mercenary and his followers have gained. Their relative effectiveness compared to the regular Russian army—which collapsed in the early onslaught of the war—brought Wagner into the spotlight inside and outside of Russia. In addition to its military actions, the group’s cruelty went viral on social media, as did its sermons in the courtyards of the prisons Wagner forces toured, recruiting convicted criminals of all kinds.

The mercenary leader’s strong connection with the great leader—a connection forged during the murky stage of the president’s public debut in Saint Petersburg in the 1990s—seemed to give Prigozhin a blank check. He first emerged on the scene as “Putin’s chef,” a nickname earned from managing the catering service of someone well acquainted with the dangers at the table, himself being a master in the use of poison as a political weapon.

Before the insurrection, the outspoken warrior had been making accusations of all kinds of irregularities, misconduct, and mistreatment against his two enemies: that they had claimed credit for Wagner’s victory in Bakhmut, that men were dying so they could “get fat in their mahogany offices,” and that they had denied his fighters necessary ammunition and support. And, most importantly, that they had deceived Putin about the progress of the military campaign.

The speech that kicked off the mutiny goes even further. No one had dared to question Putin’s justification of the invasion based on a victim mentality incessantly fed to the Russian people. The few in Russia who dared to dissent, such as Vladimir Kara-Murza, immediately found themselves behind bars.

Thus, Prigozhin’s words should be considered inflammatory: a qualified member of the establishment dared to openly and boldly denounce the falsehood of “the story that there was insane aggression on the part of Ukraine, and they were going to attack [Russia] together with the entire NATO bloc.” Careful not to mention the president by name, he stated that, contrary to Kremlin messaging, the war served “not to demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine,” but rather “it was launched for completely different reasons.” He implied that the disaster was orchestrated by high-ranking military officials (driven by economic greed and vanity), in combination with “some oligarchs.”

[The] turmoil has shattered the thesis that the Euro-Atlantic community must not humiliate Putin for fear of provoking him, with the unpredictable consequences regarding the use of nuclear weapons that doing so would entail.

Putin’s response was not long in coming. In his televised address on June 24, he labeled the uprising as “a stab in the back of [the] country and [the] people.” His references to the Russian Empire—a frequent topic of his outdated musings—were to be expected, but his implicit identification with the ill-fated Tsar Nicholas II was surprising.

He equated the situation triggered by Prigozhin to the prelude of the upheaval of 1917, which led to the collapse of the system. Was he seeking, in his association with the tragic figure, a symbolic reincarnation of the tsar—in his case, having made the right decisions to avoid falling into the black hole of violence that characterized those years when “Russians killed Russians, brothers killed brothers”? It was a diatribe made with his citizens in mind, who retain a collective memory of that terrible period and who found their livelihoods crushed during the 1990s following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

During the uprising, the lack of response was salient, both from the siloviki (the economic and political elite) and the common people. There was no notable support of—or clear opposition to—Putin, who exploits the fact that people cling to the status quo out of fear of the unknown.

Prigozhin has nonetheless proven to be a torpedo aimed at Putin’s narrative. He punctured the myth of a war of necessity, of an inevitable war for historical justice. He undermined Putin’s explanation of an existential struggle against US aggression disguised as NATO. Furthermore, the turmoil has shattered the thesis that the Euro-Atlantic community must not humiliate Putin for fear of provoking him, with the unpredictable consequences regarding the use of nuclear weapons that doing so would entail. This thesis has justified the countries’ stinginess in sending to Ukraine certain equipment classified as offensive and the West’s delay in accepting stark realities, such as the urgent need for full operational readiness in the air.

The Euro-Atlantic community must move away from the habit of delaying decisions based on speculation about the consequences of its actions for third parties. It needs to look beyond the pipe dream of an immediate peace negotiation based on the stalemate on the front or a Kremlin-asserted “right” to subjugated areas. NATO allies’ opportunity to demonstrate determination when facing Russia will come soon—on July 11 in Vilnius at the NATO Summit.

Ana Palacio is a former minister of foreign affairs of Spain (2002-2004) and former senior vice president and general counsel of the World Bank Group. She is also a member of the Atlantic Council’s Board of Directors.

A version of this article originally appeared in El Mundo. It has been translated from Spanish by the staff of Palacio y Asociados and is reprinted here with the author’s and publisher’s permission.

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Rich Outzen joins TRT World to discuss what to expect from the NATO Vilnius Summit

aozen — Mon, 10 Jul 2023 13:09:50 +0000

The post Rich Outzen joins TRT World to discuss what to expect from the NATO Vilnius Summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wieslander interviewed in Dagens Nyheter

Eric Adamson — Mon, 10 Jul 2023 09:06:42 +0000

“It is unclear what kind of agreement will be reached in Vilnius.”

“‘I think it will be some kind of political declaration. You can put it on paper or you can just express it. The best thing now is to put the declaration in the form of a statement rather than conditioning things on paper’, says Anna Wieslander.”

“What happens to Sweden’s application if there is no clear sign in Vilnius?”

“Anna Wieslander fears that the ‘energy of the process’ will lose momentum.”

“‘The imminent issues surrounding Ukraine will take over even more. The risk is that NATO loses its commitment and does not know how to proceed with the issue with Sweden’, she says.”

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Yevgeniya Gaber joins TVP World to discuss Zelenskyy’s visit to Turkey and why Ukraine expected invitation to join NATO at the Vilnius Summit

aozen — Sun, 09 Jul 2023 14:09:29 +0000

The post Yevgeniya Gaber joins TVP World to discuss Zelenskyy’s visit to Turkey and why Ukraine expected invitation to join NATO at the Vilnius Summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Dispatch from Vilnius: Will Zelenskyy show at the summit? It depends on whether Biden listens to frontline NATO allies.

Frederick Kempe — Sun, 09 Jul 2023 12:45:27 +0000

VILNIUS—Here’s an easy way to judge the success of NATO’s summit here on Tuesday and Wednesday: Will President Volodymyr Zelenskyy join the traditional “family photo” of the Alliance’s thirty-one leaders?

“The summit has only one essential outcome,” Doug Lute, a former US ambassador to NATO and member of the Atlantic Council’s board of directors, told me. “Whatever the agreements on supporting Ukraine, this year it is essential that Zelenskyy be in the photo, capturing vividly that NATO has his back and reminding the world that Russia has no such support.”

Beyond that, if the Ukrainian leader is photographed standing among the thirty-one NATO heads of state, Zelenskyy more than likely got enough of what he needed to make the trip to Lithuania. When I met with him recently in Kyiv, as part of an Atlantic Council delegation, he said anything short of security guarantees and a clear roadmap to NATO membership for Ukraine would be seen as a betrayal of Ukrainians’ sacrifice.

If Zelenskyy doesn’t come to Vilnius, allied leaders will have missed a crucial opportunity to signal to Ukrainians and the world their unflinching commitment to defeating Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s criminal war and revanchist designs in Europe—at a crucible moment in the five-hundred-day-old war.

Zelenskyy was in Turkey on Saturday as part of a pre-summit European tour, shoring up support from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who is still withholding his support for Sweden’s membership in NATO. Regarding Kyiv, however, Erdoğan said: “There is no doubt that Ukraine deserves NATO membership.”

Though much still could change before the summit opens on Tuesday, Central European alliance members say that the Biden administration has led the recalcitrance to a stronger, time-linked roadmap to NATO membership for Ukraine.

One Central European senior official, who asked that his name and that of his country not be named, compared the tone coming from the White House to that of Jacques Chirac in 2003, when the French president lectured Central Europeans who were supporting the United States on Iraq that they had “missed a good opportunity to shut up.”

What’s on the table for Ukraine thus far in Vilnius is, among other measures, the renaming of a NATO consultative group to give it more weight, security assurances similar to those the United States has with Israel, and the removal of the bureaucracy of a membership action plan (MAP)—though US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said on Friday that Ukraine “needs to take additional reforms,” hinting that it will still face a MAP-like process. Zelenskyy told us in Kyiv that such moves would be insufficient given his country’s service to democracies everywhere.

To be sure, the Biden administration deserves high praise for its handling of Russia’s war thus far, starting with its early leaking of intelligence predicting the invasion so that Ukraine and Europe were forewarned (not to mention China). Without concerted US military and financial support, Ukraine likely would have failed.

At the same time, if Ukrainians had received the weaponry and equipment they wanted faster and in greater quantities, thousands of Ukrainians would still be alive and the battlefield gains would have been greater.

Softening the potential blow of a disappointing summit outcome for Ukraine, the Biden administration cleared the way this week to provide Ukrainians with the cluster munitions they have long sought, prompting Zelenskyy to praise Biden’s “decisive steps.”

A form of air-dropped or ground-launched explosives that release smaller submunitions, cluster munitions have been widely used by Russia but are outlawed by many allies, though not by the United States. With Ukraine running low on 155 mm artillery shells, which are in low supply globally, cluster munitions are the fastest, most plentiful way to flush out dug-in Russian positions that are blocking the Ukrainian counteroffensive.

The Biden administration’s green light for cluster munitions has followed a pattern: The White House at first blocks the provision of certain weapons, from High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and Abrams tanks to Patriot air defenses, only to agree to their provision months later. The administration’s go-slow approach to Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations reflects that caution, born of a desire to defend Ukraine without provoking greater Russian escalation, including tactical nuclear weapons use.

All NATO summits have to balance the longer-term needs of the Alliance with immediate demands. However, officials from non-US NATO member countries who I spoke to last week said there are several reasons why Ukraine’s immediate needs should take on greater priority:

Mercenary leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s short-lived rebellion in June underscored both the fissures in Russia’s leadership and the low morale and discipline of its military. It’s thus an ideal time to double down on support for Ukraine, recognizing that only significant ground gains can force useful negotiations.
Despite the economic and military cost of supporting Ukraine, the costs will grow exponentially if Putin prevails, and the threats go beyond Ukraine. One Biden administration official told me that the geopolitical importance of Ukraine to Washington is far greater than either Afghanistan or Iraq ever was, yet Ukraine can stop Russia at far lower cost and without risking American or other allied soldiers.
To argue that NATO membership for Ukraine can only come after the war ends and Russia leaves Ukrainian territory only provides Moscow an incentive to continue the war. Holding back due to concern about Russian nukes rewards Putin’s nuclear blackmail—and will encourage other unsavory leaders to acquire nukes as well.
Much is said about why Ukraine needs NATO, but not enough is said about why the Alliance needs Ukraine, now one of the strongest and most battle-hardened militaries in the world. The lesson of NATO in Central and Eastern Europe is that it brings stability to its neighbors and more peaceful and secure relations with Russia. The countries that Russia invaded—Georgia and Ukraine—were gray zones outside any military alliance. “Gray zones are green lights” for Putin, argues former US ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker.
Putin thus far has been wrong to count on Ukrainian failure and Western fatigue, but the dangers will grow in 2024 when the United States and much of Europe face elections. Bold decisions that can be made in 2023 will be much more difficult to achieve next year. Ukraine’s biggest threat might be the election year of 2024, and not just in the United States.

“We don’t any longer have the luxury of time,” one senior European official told me. “We certainly don’t have the luxury of getting it wrong. The stakes are too large—they are generational and go far beyond NATO’s borders.”

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 The war in Ukraine shows how technology is changing the battlefield
ECONOMIST

The Economist breaks down the lessons of the Ukraine war and what they mean for the future of warfare. Read the whole report to gain a deep and nuanced understanding of the implications for future military planning.

“[T]he paradox of the war,” the Economist writes, “is that mass and technology are intimately bound together. Even the artillery war shows this. Weeks before the invasion, America sent Ukraine Excalibur shells. Inside each was a small, rugged chip that could receive GPS signals from America’s constellation of navigation satellites. Whereas Russia often relied on barrages over a wide area, Ukrainian gunners could be more precise.”

This, the Economist argues, portends a shift towards the defensive, analogous to the late nineteenth century. “Precision warfare can counter some advantages of mass: Ukraine was outnumbered 12 to one north of Kyiv. It can also complement mass. Software-based targeting saves around 15-30% in shells, according to sources familiar with the data. But what precision cannot do, says Michael Kofman of the Centre for Naval Analyses (CNA), a think-tank, is substitute for mass.” Read more →

#2 Ukraine wants and expects an invitation to join NATO. Allies are not sure.
David L Stern, Emily Rauhala, and Isabelle Khurshudyan | WASHINGTON POST

For an understanding of what Ukraine seeks at the upcoming NATO summit in Vilnius, what might happen, and what the Ukrainians are worried about, read this excellent piece of reporting from David Stern, Emily Rauhala, and Isabelle Khurshudyan in the Washington Post.

“With or without membership,” they write, “Ukrainian officials are looking for security commitments by Western nations ‘without delay and as soon as possible,’ which would potentially encourage Moscow to withdraw its forces. Many analysts say Russian President Vladimir Putin is counting on Ukraine’s Western supporters to grow exhausted and halt the expensive flow of weapons and economic aid they have been sending to Kyiv. Such security guarantees could also serve to deter Russia from any major acts of aggression in the future. ‘I am sure that if the regime in the Kremlin does not change in the coming years, even after our victory, there will be — in their heads — a desire for revenge,’ [Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii] Reznikov said.” Read more →

#3 Putin’s Real Security Crisis
Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

For another angle on the implications of Prigozhin’s failed coup, read this smart analysis of the failure of the Russian security services during the coup and Putin’s apparent non-response to that failure.

“Then, as Wagner forces made their move,” Soldatov and Borogan write, “both the FSB and Russia’s National Guard, the main body assigned to maintain internal security and suppress unrest in Russia, failed as rapid response forces. The National Guard made every effort to avoid a direct confrontation with Wagner; for its part, the FSB—which also has several elite special forces groups—did not appear to take any action at all. Instead, the most powerful security agency in the country issued a press release calling on Wagner’s rank and file to stay out of the uprising and to go arrest Prigozhin—on their own.”

And yet, they note, no one has yet been punished.

“This lack of repercussions for the security services is particularly startling in view of the FSB’s performance in the crisis. When Prigozhin captured the headquarters of the Southern Military District—where he spoke to [Deputy Minister of Defense Yunus-Bek] Yevkurov and [First Deputy Head of the GRU Vladimir] Alekseyev—it looked almost like a hostage taking of several of Russia’s top military commanders. Yet according to sources in the FSB, in response to the arrival of Wagner forces, the FSB agents in Rostov-on-Don simply barricaded themselves in their local headquarters… While a column of Wagner mercenaries marched toward Moscow, taking down helicopters and shooting into the houses of civilians on the way, these brave generals failed to show up—not at the scene or in front of the public at all.” Read more →

#4 Multilateral Man Is More Powerful Than Putin Realized
Anne Applebaum | THE ATLANTIC

In this must-read profile of NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Anne Applebaum makes a powerful case for why Stoltenberg’s brand of quiet multilateral leadership will ensure Ukraine’s long-term integration into Europe from behind the scenes.

“[A]lthough historians will argue about whether NATO countries could have done more to deter Russia, they did much more to help Ukraine than Putin expected once the war began. Putin not only underestimated Ukraine; he also underestimated Multilateral Men—the officials who, like Jens Stoltenberg and his counterparts at the European Union, helped the White House put together the military, political, and diplomatic response. Putin believed his own propaganda, the same propaganda used by the transatlantic far right: Democracies are weak, autocrats are strong, and people who use polite, diplomatic language won’t defend themselves. This turned out to be wrong. “‘Democracies have proven much more resilient, much stronger than our adversaries believe,’ Stoltenberg said. And autocracies are more fragile: ‘As we’ve just seen, authoritarian systems can just, suddenly, break down.’” Read more →

#5 Evan Gershkovich, Detained for 100 Days
WALL STREET JOURNAL

As a former Wall Street Journal reporter and longtime advocate for press freedom, I remain determined to do what’s possible to end the Russian imprisonment of WSJ reporter Evan Gershkovich, which is now at one hundred days and counting. I urge Inflection Points readers to follow the WSJ’s guide on what you can do to support Evan and his family.

Writes Emma Tucker, the WSJ’s editor-in-chief, “In the days since Evan was arrested we have been inspired by the support that you, our readers, have provided. It has helped us to keep Evan’s plight at the top of the news agenda. As we reflect on this difficult milestone, we encourage you to continue sharing Evan’s reporting and the latest updates on his situation. Journalism is not a crime, and we will not rest until Evan is released.”

Amen. Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

New Atlanticist Jul 5, 2023

Here’s the ‘concrete’ path for Ukraine to join NATO

By Franklin D. Kramer, Hans Binnendijk, Christopher Skaluba

The upcoming NATO summit in Vilnius should establish a High Level Group to design a roadmap for Ukraine’s fast-track membership.

Conflict Crisis Management

New Atlanticist Jul 6, 2023

Ukraine needs NATO membership, not an ‘Israel model’

By Ian Brzezinski

Granting NATO membership to Ukraine is critical to ensuring it wins the war against Russia quickly and decisively.

Israel NATO

New Atlanticist Jul 6, 2023

Four scenarios for Russia’s future after the Wagner Group mutiny

By Jeffrey Cimmino

What will be the long-term aftermath of Russia’s Wagner mutiny? Here are four possible paths for Russia’s future the West should consider.

Belarus Crisis Management

The post Dispatch from Vilnius: Will Zelenskyy show at the summit? It depends on whether Biden listens to frontline NATO allies. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A looming US-Turkey F-16 deal is about much more than Sweden’s NATO bid

Rich Outzen, Pınar Dost — Sat, 08 Jul 2023 19:47:16 +0000

The NATO Summit in Vilnius starting on July 11 will mark milestones in several strategic processes of vital importance to the Alliance. These include assessing progress on the Strategic Concept adopted in Madrid last year, recognizing Finland’s successful accession, debating the path forward on Ukraine’s application, and consideration of the end game towards Swedish membership. A long-awaited deal for the United States to sell F-16 fighter jets to Turkey is also on the table in Vilnius, but it’s about much more than unlocking Sweden’s accession: It is a puzzle piece in a broader strategic calculation about Ankara’s role in NATO’s Southeast.

At the 2022 summit, Finland and Sweden signed a trilateral Memorandum of Understanding outlining a path for accession through progress on Turkey’s security concerns. After Finland officially became a member country on April 4, 2023, the United States and other NATO member countries started to exert pressure on Turkey to accelerate approval for Sweden prior to the Vilnius summit. Sweden, with two hundred years of military non-alignment, and Finland, neutral throughout the Cold War, applied for membership only after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February last year. Enhancing Ukraine’s security is high on the agenda at the NATO Summit, necessitating attention to direct support for Ukraine’s defense, Alliance enlargement, and effective cooperation in the Black Sea region.

For Ankara the primary consideration in approving Sweden is tougher enforcement of counter-terror laws against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), an internationally recognized terrorist group, and its offshoots. Washington has dangled possible approval of Turkey’s proposed purchase of F-16 fighter jets and upgrade kits in attempts to influence Ankara’s calculation. Ankara, which is a long-time F-16 producer and user, desires reasonable compensation for its earlier expulsion from the F-35 program, after it went ahead with the purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile defense system which also led to the imposition of US sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Both the United States and Turkey see Turkish air power as a NATO anchor in the Black Sea region.

Securing the Black Sea

Alongside Romania and Bulgaria, Turkey is the largest of three NATO member countries in the Black Sea region and controls access to it under the Montreux Convention. With the Alliance’s second largest military and unique geographic positioning, Turkey has been a crucial player in the Russia-Ukraine war both diplomatically and militarily. Turkey has managed to maintain trade and diplomatic ties with Russia while providing vigorous support to Ukraine’s defense, and it has built a record of frustrating Russian military ventures in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Securing NATO’s interests in the Black Sea depends on a strong Turkey. Ukraine understands this, leading its officials to consider Turkey as one of the few potential security guarantor countries.

Turkey has provided support to NATO maritime operations in the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions, and most recently agreed to sell Bayraktar drones to Romania. Yet Turkey’s ability to deter Russia depends in part on the health of its F-16 fleet—the third largest in the world but feeling its age. Ankara’s request for forty new F-16s and upgrade packages for its seventy-nine existing fighters to sustain its air capabilities has made little headway over the past two years, and members of the US Congress have added Swedish accession as a new condition to the frozen sale. At the same time, many members of Congress have indicated that Turkey agreeing to Sweden’s accession will not be enough for them to approve Ankara’s F-16 request.

Ironically, Turkey is not an ordinary F-16 buyer. It has been an important F-16 manufacturer through Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ) established in 1984, according to the company, as a “Turkish-U.S. joint investment company to carry out the manufacture of F-16 aircraft, integration of on-board systems and flight tests” following the initial Turkish decision to acquire F-16s. Working with US defense giants such as General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, and General Electric, TUSAŞ manufactured and tested almost all of the Turkish F-16 fleet—nearly three hundred aircraft in various configurations.

Additionally, TUSAŞ produced forty-six F-16s for the Egyptian Air Force between 1993 and 1995, and helped modernize the F-16 fleet of the Royal Jordanian Air Force. In short, Turkey has been a critical partner in the F-16 program for decades—and a further sale remains in the mutual interest of Ankara, Washington, and NATO.

A de facto arms embargo?

In February 2023, the US Senate NATO Observer Group co-chairs, Senators Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Thom Tillis (R-NC), presented a bipartisan letter to President Joe Biden requesting that “F-16 fighter jet sales to Türkiye should not begin until the NATO protocols [for Finland and Sweden] are ratified.” This followed, according to a report in Defense News, multiple congressional holds of US arms sales to Turkey starting in 2018 or earlier.

Turkey has not added any new F-16s to its inventory since 2012 as the country was expecting to receive more than one hundred F-35 jets, for which it has already paid $1.4 billion. After Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program in March 2020, Ankara requested F-16s in exchange for the amount it had already paid.

The Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries also remains sanctioned by the United States under CAATSA. There has been a sustained campaign by congressional opponents of Turkey to deny major new arms sales to Ankara, spearheaded by the Hellenic and Armenian caucuses. Ironically, 1970s-era congressional sanctions against arms sales to Turkey catalyzed the drive for defense industrial autonomy that drove Turkey’s rise as a defense exporter. The ongoing replay of similar resistance from the US Congress is only reinforcing Turkey’s view that the United States is not a reliable arms provider in the long run. The resulting drive for self-sufficiency has increased the domestic share of Turkish defense production from roughly 20 percent to 80 percent and established the Turkish arms industry as a major international player.

Defense industrial decoupling

Consequently, Turkey has dropped from the seventh-largest US arms importer between 2013-17 to the twenty-seventh largest between 2018-2022. Meanwhile, Turkey’s defense exports skyrocketed by 69 percent during the same period, making the country the twelfth largest exporter of arms globally. In 2022, it set a new arms export record of $4.3 billion—an increase of nearly 37 percent from the previous year.

In order to produce a national fighter aircraft that can replace the aging F-16, the Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries signed a contract with TUSAŞ in 2016 to develop the fifth-generation National Combat Aircraft. The first successful taxi test of the prototype was completed in March this year, and it is expected that the first Kaan (previously known as the TF-X) will join the Turkish air force by 2030.

In the medium to long term, defense industrial decoupling of Turkey from the United States would seem to suit both sides. Ankara will be free from the strings that come with US systems, and Congress will be able to satisfy select constituencies that it is not complicit in Turkish military actions. Bilateral relations can move on to happier and less complicated storylines—like the drive towards one hundred billion dollars in bilateral trade. Turkey will continue to partner with countries with a more streamlined defense cooperation model, such as the United Kingdom and Ukraine.

In the short term, a deal on F-16s could restore a modicum of mutual trust, meet the needs of the Alliance, and close the chapter of US-Turkish defense cooperation on a positive note. For those reasons, far more than to spur Swedish accession, US and Turkish leaders continue to push for progress.

Approval of Swedish accession before the Vilnius Summit is unlikely not because of F-16 haggling, but due to the early stage of implementation of Sweden’s new counter-terror laws. The arrest and conviction of a PKK financier in Stockholm in early July, a first of its kind under Sweden’s newly strengthened anti-terror laws, could mark a new phase of progress. It is unlikely that enough can be done in a few days to conclude the process. More likely, and encouraging nonetheless, would be positive signals out of the summit that real progress is being made: in counter-terror implementation, in F-16 talks, and in eventual Swedish accession. Vilnius probably will not mark the completion of these processes, but it could mark the start of a decisive and positive stage toward their conclusion.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on Twitter @RichOutzen.

Pınar Dost is a historian of international relations with a PhD dissertation on the history of US-Turkey relations (Sciences Po Paris). Follow her on Twitter @pdosting.

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Wieslander quoted in Dagens Nyheter

Eric Adamson — Sat, 08 Jul 2023 08:18:46 +0000

“‘Another important reason for NATO to include Sweden is political’, as Anna Wieslander points out.”

“‘Sweden is a solid old democracy, we have a strong economy and we are members of the EU. Politically, we are a reliable country because NATO is based on democratic values with respect for the rule of law and individual freedom. From that point of view, we are an asset’ says Anna Wieslander”.

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Will eleventh-hour diplomacy get Sweden into NATO by the Vilnius summit?

Anna Wieslander and Eric Adamson — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 18:43:14 +0000

With the NATO summit set to begin July 11, Sweden, alongside several allies and Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, are making a last-minute push with high-level meetings in Washington and Brussels to ensure that Stockholm’s membership will get a green light from Turkey—the final big step before it can join the Alliance.

On Wednesday, Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson met with US President Joe Biden in Washington DC, followed by a meeting between Swedish, Finnish, and Turkish foreign ministers in Brussels on Thursday. The central message: Sweden is ready to become an ally—immediately.

For several months, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has kept Sweden and NATO allies on the edge of their seats over Swedish extraditions of individuals connected to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Stockholm and Ankara have been at an impasse, trading arguments over due process and terrorist threats. Enflaming the whole process has been a series of Quran burnings, something which Kristersson has said is legal, but not respectful.

Just like at the NATO Summit in Madrid last year, Erdogan has placed himself in the role of kingmaker. All allies except Turkey and Hungary have ratified Sweden’s membership, and Hungary is widely considered to be following Turkey’s lead.

In the symbolically important meeting with Kristersson this week, Biden sent a clear signal to Ankara: The United States is committed to welcoming Sweden into NATO as soon as possible. Kristersson reiterated that Swedish membership would contribute to the security of the Alliance as a whole. “No country knows this better than the United States,” he said.

The trilateral meeting in Brussels showed, however, that Turkey is still not on board. Swedish NATO membership is “within reach,” Stoltenberg said. He added that everyone is working toward a positive outcome in Vilnius and leaders will meet again on Monday, one day before the start of the summit.

At stake in Vilnius is not only the security of Sweden and the Alliance as a whole, but NATO’s open-door credibility.

Potentially paving the way for a successful outcome is this week’s conviction by a Swedish court of a PKK member for the crime of terror financing, the first use of the country’s new anti-terror laws that entered into force in June. The four-and-a-half-year sentence followed by a possible extradition is exactly the type of implementation Turkey has wanted to see from Sweden. Moreover, former Foreign Minister Ann Linde admitted this week that Sweden had not taken the threat posed by the PKK seriously enough in the past. Swedish police are now prioritizing the issue and deeper cooperation with Turkish authorities on combatting terrorism is expected to continue. Public opinion is also shifting, with a majority now in favor of banning the burning of religious texts. Hate speech laws, though not part of the trilateral memorandum, are additionally under review. All the while, rumors continue to swirl of the US Congress ending its roadblock on F-16 fighter jet sales to Turkey, a prospect that could help push the process across the finish line.

At stake in Vilnius is not only the security of Sweden and the Alliance as a whole, but NATO’s open-door credibility. With twenty-nine allies already having ratified Sweden’s membership, failure to fully admit Sweden undermines unity within the Alliance and makes NATO look weak and fragmented. As Stoltenberg correctly pointed out on Thursday, only Russian President Vladimir Putin and the PKK profit from continued delay.

Anna Wieslander is director for Northern Europe at the Atlantic Council and head of its Northern Europe office in Stockholm. She is a former official at the Swedish Defence Ministry and Swedish Parliament.

Eric Adamson is project manager at the Northern Europe office.

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The view from Vilnius: NATO needs speed and scale to ensure deterrence

Giedrimas Jeglinskas — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 16:31:04 +0000

Preparations are underway here in Vilnius for the upcoming NATO leaders’ summit, but there is difficult and important diplomatic work ahead. If there is one thing the summit needs to accomplish, it’s to confidently demonstrate the scale and the speed of the Alliance’s ability to defend freedom.

The run-up to the July 11-12 summit in Lithuania has revealed both continuity and chaos: Continuity in that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg will now stay on in his role for another year, after he had earlier said he would step down in the coming weeks; chaos in the fascinating but incomplete coup d’état in Russia. But at this juncture of history—with war raging in Ukraine, uncertainty complicating relations with China, and shifting internal political landscapes in some member states—the Alliance has more work to do to ensure that the international rules-based order remains relevant and potent.

Ukraine’s desire for a firm commitment on joining NATO is likely to hover over the summit. The secretary general and other national leaders have expressed reservations about taking any groundbreaking action on the issue, tempering the expectations of Ukrainians and their most vocal supporters. Yet there is still time to formulate consensus language that goes beyond the empty narrative of the 2008 Bucharest Summit, which only said that Ukraine would become a member at some point.

Assessing the threat picture

Defense spending is a perennial focus at these summits. Since the Alliance’s founding seventy-four years ago, the issue of Europe’s underspending on defense and security has haunted the halls of NATO. While the current ambition to set 2 percent of gross domestic product as a floor is a step in the right direction, success remains far-fetched: Only seven of the then thirty allies met the guideline in 2022 (before Finland’s accession). At the same time, success is very real in strengthening the cyber pledge and the official launch of the NATO Innovation Fund, the first-of-its-kind one billion euro multi-sovereign venture capital fund. Good things can happen in Vilnius.

The question is, will those good things include welcoming Sweden to the Alliance? The puzzle of the Turkish hayir, or no, on Sweden’s accession initially seemed like a misunderstanding, later evolved into a national election issue, and now, unfortunately, has become an example of allied disunity. The same goes for Hungary’s unacceptable drag of the ratification. Yes, allies argue all the time, and NATO offers a forum to align on all the important issues. Democracies know how to deal with these disagreements without compromising members’ security. Without Sweden, NATO is weaker, the Baltic Sea is less secure, and Turkey and Hingary, too, will be less secure.

Taking a step back and looking at the threat picture—and at the elevated volatility due to Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine—one cannot help but ask: What do allies need to do to ensure that NATO remains relevant in deterring aggression against the Alliance and beyond? Are NATO members sufficiently protecting its most vulnerable members and its vast geographic boundary to the east? Does “tripwire” deterrence still work? Can deterrence succeed without proper defense?

Last year, NATO leaders in Madrid made huge promises to be specified and agreed in due course—kicking the can down the road?—on strengthening the eastern perimeter with more troops and better readiness. In other words, the initial enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battalions no longer seem to suffice for effective deterrence on the eastern flank. The same goes for reinforcements, which had been signaled as up to 300,000 troops (and now 400,000 troops), yet whose deployment requires both logistical support and prepositioned equipment and armaments for their deterrent role. All of the above is to be underscored by NATO’s new defense plans, which are in the works.

A speed-and-scale mindset

To make deterrence and defense credible, NATO must make key decisions to act at relevant speed and scale. “Tripwire” deterrence is, hopefully, outmoded thinking—and the realization that defense is a key element of deterrence is slowly setting in. To be fair, it took three years for NATO to set up its eFP in the form of multinational forces in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Can the Alliance be taken seriously if it continues to build its defense at this pace?

The same goes for scale. Will the “brigade-per-country” principle become obsolete in a year or two? A piecemeal approach to defense yields great public relations benefits, many pats on the back, and self-congratulatory speeches. But at the end of day, when an adversary moves further, allies are left scrambling precisely because they underdelivered.

Speed and scale call for more allied troops in place, more prepositioned equipment and ammunition, and swift reinforcement—plus the autonomy of NATO’s supreme allied commander. Essentially, it is a resource question, yet it is affected by how urgently the Western public views the existential threat. If the military and economic support the West has provided to Ukraine so far is a gauge of its threat perception, then there is something to be proud of. Yet much more could have probably been done and faster.

The test in Vilnius will be this: Can leaders adopt a speed-and-scale mindset for a stronger deterrence?

Giedrimas Jeglinskas is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served as the assistant secretary general for executive management at NATO and as the deputy minister of defense of Lithuania in charge of capability development, defense acquisition, industry, and technology partnerships.

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Wieslander interviewed by BBC on Sweden’s NATO prospects

Eric Adamson — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 08:09:19 +0000

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Ukraine needs NATO membership, not an ‘Israel model’

Ian Brzezinski — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 18:22:03 +0000

As Ukraine undertakes a challenging and costly counteroffensive against Russia’s invasion, NATO members are discussing how to reinforce Kyiv’s military capacities and ensure its long-term sovereignty. The Biden administration has reportedly told Congress it wants a security assistance model based on the United States’ relationship with Israel. This approach, an alternative to Ukraine’s membership in NATO, is a mistaken application of Israel’s geopolitical circumstances, one that would indefinitely perpetuate Russia’s aggression.

For decades, the United States has reinforced Israel’s security by providing it $2-4 billion in annual military assistance. Today, that assistance is codified in a ten-year agreement directing $38 billion in military aid to Israel between 2019 and 2028. While Washington does not provide Israel with security guarantees—commitments to intervene militarily in the event of an attack—its military aid has enabled Israel to develop one of the world’s premier fighting forces.

Those advocating this model for Ukraine fear that extending NATO membership to Kyiv today would drag the Alliance into a war with dangerous escalatory risks. Long-term security assistance arrangements, they assert, can sustain Ukraine’s qualitative military edge over Russia. That will eventually break Moscow’s will and lead to a peace settlement, they argue, after which Ukraine can be granted NATO membership.

Indeed, US assistance has been critical to Israel’s survival. Israeli fighters, like their Ukrainian counterparts, are admired around the world for their courage, tenacity, and ingenuity. But that is where the similarities end. Ukraine faces a far different and ultimately more challenging threat.

Israel’s adversaries in the Islamic world are not major powers. They are disparate and often divided. Some are poor and suffer from significant internal schisms. None of their militaries are highly capable. Some have been defeated by Israel. None are armed with nuclear weapons. Israel, by contrast, like Russia, has nuclear weapons. Ukraine does not. Kyiv gave up its nuclear deterrent in 1994 under pressure from the United States and other NATO countries.

Moreover, several of Israel’s previous adversaries are now its security partners. Some have been beneficiaries of Western economic aid and military equipment. These relationships enable the West to exercise some, though not always decisive, influence over their actions. The West is not on track to have similar leverage over Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Russia.

If the transatlantic community consigns Kyiv to the Israel model, Ukraine will be left indefinitely in the gray zone of insecurity that has repeatedly catalyzed Putin’s hegemonic ambitions into violent actions.

Nor has the Israel model prevented aggression. Israelis have endured decades of artillery fire, missile strikes, and cross-border terrorist attacks—including those orchestrated by Iran, which arguably faces stricter Western sanctions than those imposed on Russia.

Kyiv confronts a far more significant adversary. Russia is a massive unitary state whose population is more than three times greater than Ukraine’s and whose economy is ten times larger. Moscow’s determination to obliterate Ukraine and its history far exceeds the collective intensity of Israel’s adversaries.

Sustaining Ukraine under such circumstances will be exponentially more expensive than what the United States has provided Israel. The Kiel Institute for the World Economy estimates that Ukraine has received more than $150 billion in military, economic, and humanitarian assistance commitments in just the first year of the war. Of that total, $77 billion came from the United States alone.

If the transatlantic community consigns Kyiv to the Israel model, Ukraine will be left indefinitely in the gray zone of insecurity that has repeatedly catalyzed Putin’s hegemonic ambitions into violent actions. Ukraine would have to consider its options. Regardless of US economic and military assistance, Israel has often undertaken military actions against its adversaries that have contradicted the desires of its Western benefactors. Israel developed its own nuclear arsenal. Why wouldn’t Ukraine do the same?

As long as NATO is not fully committed to defending the security of Ukraine, Putin will continue his violent quest, especially if he believes continuing the conflict is the key to preventing Ukrainian membership in the Alliance. Putin must not be given an indefinite veto over transatlantic security.

Granting NATO membership to Ukraine is critical to ensuring it wins the war against Russia quickly and decisively. It is the most unambiguous way to demonstrate to Putin that suborning Ukraine is unachievable and wasteful. It is the most reliable way to ensure such aggression never happens again.

Establishing an Alliance force posture to credibly deter Russian aggression against Ukraine will be far less financially onerous than reinforcing and sustaining Ukraine’s defenses and rebuilding its economy under perpetual wartime conditions.

NATO could extend its security guarantee to the territory Ukraine controls at the time of accession. The rest of Ukraine could be addressed in the future; such was the case of Germany, as a third of its territory was controlled by the Soviet Union when it joined the Alliance. Moscow would then have to decide whether to expand its war to the Alliance. Recent events have demonstrated that Russian forces are clearly not prepared for that task.

As allied leaders approach their summit meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania, on July 11, the United States is remarkably alone in its reluctance to grant Kyiv an invitation and clear roadmap to NATO membership. Taking that step is essential to reinforce the morale of the Ukrainian people at a decisive moment in this war, convince Moscow that its hegemonic ambitions are unachievable, and establish military stability along Europe’s frontier with Russia.

This is in the interest not just of Ukraine. It is to the strategic benefit of the transatlantic community.

Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. Formerly, he served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.

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Here’s the ‘concrete’ path for Ukraine to join NATO

Franklin D. Kramer, Hans Binnendijk, Christopher Skaluba — Wed, 05 Jul 2023 21:05:02 +0000

As Ukraine continues its determined defense against Russia’s brutal invasion, NATO nations seem ready at their upcoming summit in Vilnius on July 11-12 to take two important steps to provide for Ukraine’s long-term security. NATO is expected to affirm an enduring pledge of arms support for Ukraine and upgrade the NATO-Ukraine Commission to a “Council,” thus providing a more regularized and effective consultative mechanism. But a third step is urgently needed as well. NATO allies should, as French President Emmanuel Macron described it, establish a “concrete” path for Ukraine to join the Alliance.

Other forms of deterrence have failed Ukraine twice since 2014, and only NATO membership will prevent a third failure. There are obstacles to be overcome, not least of which is that Ukraine is at war and Russian forces occupy some of its internationally recognized sovereign territory. But creating a concrete path for future membership at Vilnius is crucial to enhance Ukrainian morale during its difficult counteroffensive and to strengthen its position in any future negotiations with Russia. It will allow NATO to bolster its credibility by taking an overdue step toward a membership pathway, consistent with its 2008 statement that Ukraine “will become” a member of NATO.

With the Vilnius Summit only a few days away, differences remain among allies about Ukraine’s aspirations, and those differences need to be resolved. There is, however, a way forward that all NATO nations should be able to accept. Namely, the summit should establish a High Level Group reporting to NATO’s secretary general to design a roadmap for Ukraine’s fast-track membership. All NATO nations would have a voice in the group. This roadmap should be delivered no later than next year’s NATO summit in Washington.

The High Level Group could include either ambassadors from the North Atlantic Council or senior officials from member nations, an approach NATO has previously undertaken to analyze and resolve difficult issues. In effect, this would allow for an expedited process akin to the one utilized to extend membership offers to Finland and Sweden. In the case of Ukraine, it is possible that there might be divergent views among members of the group. While unanimity is obviously desirable, the group should be authorized to present alternative analyses if agreement cannot be reached.

As part of its remit, the group would stay apprised of the ongoing military interactions between NATO, its members, and Ukraine. Given the high degree of NATO standardization that Ukraine has already achieved, it should be expected that such efforts would proceed smoothly and that the group would not find any standardization issues as a bar to membership.

The two most complex issue areas for the group to assess will be:

Issues of corruption, judicial independence, and protection of minority rights, and
The conditions in the conflict that would generate circumstances in which a membership offer would be extended.

With respect to the first set of issues, Ukraine has been taking significant steps. It has established a Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, a National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, a High Anti-Corruption Court, and a High Qualification Commission of Judges. Independent international experts have been engaged in such efforts, as has civil society. These efforts have borne fruit. By way of example, the head of Ukraine’s Supreme Court is facing corruption charges related to an alleged $2.7 million bribe. More efforts are nonetheless required.

Meanwhile, the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) has undertaken intensive reviews of the minority rights situation in Ukraine. Its June 2023 report “welcome[d] the adoption of a long-expected new Law on National Minorities, which provides a number of guarantees in conformity with international standards.” The report further stated that “to ensure full conformity with such standards, a number of provisions of that Law should be reconsidered.”

In judging Ukraine’s progress on these issues, the group would have the benefit of the Venice Commission’s report, discussions with Ukrainian authorities and civil society, and consultations with the European Union, which has included such issues as part of extending candidacy status to Ukraine.

The more complicated set of issues for resolution by the group involves deciding under what conditions of conflict a membership offer should be extended. The most desirable circumstance, of course, would be a victory by Ukraine that regains the country’s pre-2014 borders and is followed by a settlement with Russia. Were that to happen by the time of the Washington summit, there would be strong reasons for the Alliance to extend a membership offer. Given the uncertainty of war, however, it would also be valuable for the group to evaluate at least two other circumstances.

First, it could be the case that Ukraine succeeds in achieving significant control of much of its territory but not all. The group might consider whether membership with a guarantee covering only that portion of territory should be considered. This is an option that would likely have a higher degree of clarity closer to the Washington summit. As noted above, different NATO nations may have different views with respect to such an approach, but the group could design relevant recommendations and propose a roadmap for each.

Second, it might be the case that Ukraine is entirely—or very substantially—successful in regaining its pre-2014 borders but that Russia continues sporadic or low-level attacks, so the conflict is somewhat diminished but not ended. Again, the group could make recommendations as to whether a membership offer should be extended in such circumstances.

In sum, heads of state and government should establish a High Level Group in Vilnius tasked to provide an evaluation of the key issues affecting Ukraine’s potential membership and to present specific recommendations at the Washington summit that constitute the “concrete” path suggested by Macron. This would be a significant step forward politically for Ukraine. It would prompt NATO to define the conditions for membership while not immediately altering the status quo. It is a proper compromise between those who want to extend an immediate membership offer and those who prefer to avoid the membership question until the war is settled.

Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished fellow and board member at the Atlantic Council. He is a former US assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He previously served in the White House as special assistant to the president for defense policy and as director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies.

Christopher Skaluba is the director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He formerly served as the principal director for European and NATO policy and the principal director for strategy and force development in the office of the US secretary of defense.

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Wieslander interviewed on Radio Sweden

Eric Adamson — Wed, 05 Jul 2023 10:27:10 +0000

P1 Morgon

President Biden and Swedish prime minister Kristersson met in Washington, D.C. to discuss Sweden’s accession to NATO. Sveriges Radio speaks to Anna Wieslander, Director for Northern Europe at the Atlantic Council.

The post Wieslander interviewed on Radio Sweden appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wieslander quoted in Washington Post

Eric Adamson — Wed, 05 Jul 2023 10:21:33 +0000

Biden meets with Swedish prime minister to bolster country’s bid to join NATO

Biden’s meeting with Kristersson sent an important signal to Turkey that the United States will stand by Sweden, but it remains to be seen whether a last-ditch push from the White House changes the timeline or trajectory.

“It is important that it is happening, that the U.S. is embracing Sweden at this point, that the U.S. is supporting this process despite harsh rhetoric from Turkey,” said Anna Wieslander, director for Northern Europe at the Atlantic Council. “But the question is: Can Biden do anything to change the picture?”

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Wieslander interviewed on Radio Sweden

Eric Adamson — Tue, 04 Jul 2023 10:42:15 +0000

Swedish PM to meet US President Biden Wednesday evening to discuss NATO

Sweden’s PM Ulf Kristersson will meet with US President Joe Biden Wednesday evening to discuss Sweden’s entry into NATO. Anna Wieslander, director of Northern Europe at Atlantic Council, says that the meeting will possibly give new energy into the process of NATO accession for Sweden. But will Sweden have its NATO application approved by Turkey and Hungary before the big NATO summit in Vilnius next week?

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Wieslander interviewed on Radio Sweden

Eric Adamson — Fri, 30 Jun 2023 13:07:27 +0000

P1 Morgon

The NATO summit in Vilnius is coming up in a couple of weeks and it seems doubtful that Sweden will be a member of NATO. What does this mean for Sweden and NATO? What are the main risks? Reporter Mikael Kulle speaks to Michael Claesson, Chief of the Defense Staff and Anna Wieslander, Director for Northern Europe at the Atlantic Council.

The post Wieslander interviewed on Radio Sweden appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin’s Wagner weakness is a signal to support Ukraine’s counteroffensive

Taras Kuzio — Thu, 29 Jun 2023 20:57:02 +0000

The recent Wagner mutiny in Russia was a short-lived affair but it has succeeded in exposing the myth of Vladimir Putin as a formidable political strongman who will go to extremes to achieve his goals. In reality, Putin’s failure to punish mutinous troops who seized a major Russian city and marched on Moscow has revealed him as a weak leader who is more inclined to capitulate than escalate.

This makes a mockery of longstanding international concerns over “provoking Putin” that have done so much to slow down the flow of Western military aid to Ukraine over the past sixteen months. The Russian dictator’s feeble response to the Wagner rebellion should now serve as a strong signal to increase Western support for Ukraine’s current counteroffensive.

Putin’s handling of the Wagner mutiny compares unfavorably to the conduct of his predecessor in the Kremlin, Boris Yeltsin, and that of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Yeltsin famously led opposition to the failed coup in August 1991 that sealed the fate of the USSR. When the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Zelenskyy rejected offers to evacuate and instead announced that he was staying in Kyiv. In contrast, Putin was notably absent during the first day of the Wagner mutiny when Russia appeared to be in real danger. Subsequent attempts to minimize the damage via a series of carefully choreographed public appearances have merely served to highlight Putin’s earlier absence.

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In hindsight, none of this is surprising. Throughout his career, Putin has made a habit of backing down whenever he has found himself confronted by a determined adversary. In 2014, Putin occupied Crimea without a fight but then got cold feet when faced with fierce resistance in eastern Ukraine. Instead of pressing home his overwhelming military advantage and seizing the whole of eastern and southern Ukraine, he settled for less than half of the Donbas region. Likewise, Putin ordered no direct military response when Turkey shot down a Russian jet in 2015, and took no action three years later when clashes with US forces in Syria led to the heavy casualties among Russian Wagner troops.

Like a true bully, Putin only embarked on the full-scale invasion of Ukraine because he believed the country was an easy target. His intelligence agencies claimed the Ukrainian military would not fight back and assured him that most ordinary Ukrainians would welcome his invading army as liberators. Crucially, Putin was also confident the Western response would be as half-hearted as it had been in 2014 when he invaded Crimea and eastern Ukraine. These miscalculations have proven extremely costly for Russia.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Ukraine’s resolute resistance and the West’s powerful military support have placed Putin in a quandary. He has responded with empty bluster, declaring a series of meaningless red lines while refraining from any attacks on the NATO countries engaged in arming Ukraine. Throughout the war, Putin has used nuclear blackmail in a bid to intimidate Western leaders, but even this extreme measure is proving increasingly ineffective. In September 2022, he vowed to use nuclear weapons to defend recently annexed Ukrainian lands, declaring, “I’m not bluffing.” However, when Ukrainian forces called his bluff and continued to advance, he did not act on his earlier nuclear threats.

This lack of decisive leadership has contributed to the poor battlefield performance of the Russian army in Ukraine. Demoralized Russian troops have barely advanced since summer 2022, and spent more than ten months capturing the small city of Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine. Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin was at pains to state that his recent mutiny was against Russia’s army chiefs rather than Putin himself, but the Russian dictator must ultimately accept personal responsibility for the disastrous invasion. After all, he has stood by his failing commanders despite their obvious shortcomings, and has consistently placed loyalty above competence.

Putin’s emphasis on loyalty reflects his fear of domestic opposition. For much of his reign, he has been preoccupied with the idea of losing power through a popular uprising or palace coup. This has led to the elimination of all political opponents and the silencing of independent media in today’s Russia. It has also shaped the conduct of the current war, with Putin deeply reluctant to undertake a new round of mobilization that could further destabilize the situation inside Russia.

The Wagner mutiny demonstrated that these fears of a domestic uprising are entirely justified. Wagner troops were able to capture Rostov-on-Don without a fight and then advance virtually unopposed across Russia to within 200 kilometers of Moscow. Strikingly, thousands of ordinary Russians in Rostov-on-Don welcomed the Wagner takeover of the city and openly demonstrated their backing for the mutiny.

Meanwhile, there was little evidence of any surge in support for Putin, either among the public or within the ranks of the Russian military and security services. Putin’s obvious reluctance to hold Prigozhin or his troops accountable for their actions has now further undermined morale within the armed forces and raised the prospect of infighting engulfing Russia.

Putin’s toothless response to Prigozhin’s mutiny has sent a signal that he is far from the all-powerful ruler of Kremlin propaganda, and is in fact much weaker than previously imagined. Many within the Russian elite now recognize this reality and are growing increasingly alarmed over the fragility of the current regime. They understand that Putin has lost his legitimacy as a strongman ruler and is leading Russia toward an uncertain future of deepening domestic divisions and international isolation. Understandably, thoughts are now turning to the post-Putin era.

Western leaders should respond to the Wagner affair by doubling down on their military aid to Ukraine. Ever since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, misplaced concerns over possible Russian escalation have served to limit weapons deliveries to Kyiv, when a more decisive approach might have already ended the war. With Putin’s weakness now on display for all to see, the time has come to provide Ukraine with everything it needs to secure victory.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. His latest book is “Genocide and Fascism. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

Ambassador John Herbst, Senior Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council; Former US Ambassador to Ukraine

President Kersti Kaljulaid, Member, International Advisory Board, Atlantic Council; Former President of Estonia

Angela Stent, Senior Advisor at the Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies, Georgetown University

General Wesley K. Clark (Ret.), Member, Board of Directors, Atlantic Council; Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe

General Curtis Scaparrotti (Ret.), Member, Board of Directors, Atlantic Council; Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe

FREDERICK KEMPE: Stephen Hadley, how have you been working this weekend’s events through your head? And if were you briefing the president of the United States right now, how might you do that?

STEPHEN HADLEY: This is a work in progress, a lot of uncertainty. We’re through act one. We don’t know whether this is a one-act play or a five-act play. We don’t really know the terms of this settlement that has been worked out with Wagner Group leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s blessing. We don’t know whether it will be complied with. But even if it turns out to be act one of a one-act play, this has been an earthquake within the Russian political system and it’s going to take a while for its effects to be clear as—over time as it plays out over time.

So in light of that, one of the things the president would say would be: Well, what are our objectives here? And I think our objectives in this situation are twofold.

One, to continue to try to get Russian forces out of Ukraine and to assure that Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and viability as a secure and prosperous state is maintained.

And the second objective, I think, is we do not want to encourage a Russian civil war. The consequences of that for regional instability, for refugee flows into our allies, from questions about who controls the nuclear weapons, these are troubling questions that we’d like to avoid.

So those would be the objectives.

Second question is: Well, what do you say about this publicly? Because the administration is going to have to talk about it publicly. And I think the statements made over the weekend are pretty close to right—watching the situation, internal matter to be resolved among the Russians themselves. But I think we should emphasize that it’s further evidence that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine was a strategic mistake for Russia, that Russian troops should leave Ukraine—whether they are withdrawn or whether it’s 1917 style, they put down their arms and they decide to walk home—and because Russia clearly has to attend to a lot of internal affairs. That’s clear from what we’ve seen over the week.

The president would ask about what to watch for going forward. Well, Putin has clearly been weakened by this. Prigozhin’s forces got within something like 150 miles of Moscow. They received tacit support, I would have to say, or at least not active opposition from the Russian security forces. That’s a problem for Putin internally, and I would expect you’re going to see some purges of his security services and further crackdown internally. His problem is whether he can pull it off. It’s a little bit like kids playing with mud pies. Sometimes, you know, the tighter you squeeze, the more mud squeezes out between your fingers. We’ll have to see how Putin does.

I think the other thing for Putin is he’s going to have to try to frustrate the Ukrainian counteroffensive, because the more Ukrainians are able to take back territory from Russian forces the more Putin looks weak and the more the Ukrainian war looks like, as Prigozhin has been saying, a strategic mistake for Russia.

There’s a question about Prigozhin. He’s got to stay alive. He’s been called traitor by Putin. People who are called traitors by Putin don’t usually have a very long life expectancy. He’s got to decide whether this is over or whether this is act one of his effort to confront the minister of defense, Sergei Shoigu, and General Valery Gerasimov, chief the Russian General Staff, and whether he wants to continue this campaign or not, and if so how he would do it.

There’s a question about the future of the Wagner Group. They’re supposed to be either demobilized or brought within the Russian Ministry of Defense. Will they do that? Will they continue to be a force? If not in Ukraine, what about their continued presence in Africa? A lot of uncertainties there.

Questions for Ukraine: This is potentially an opportunity for them to more effectively push their counteroffensive, because if you are already demoralized Russian troops on the frontline with Ukraine and you look at what’s going on at home, it may make you even less willing to fight. That may be an opportunity for Ukraine.

Questions for China: Xi Jinping cannot afford for Putin to go down, and China and Xi may decide that the best way to save Putin is to put pressure on him to bring this war to a close, which has to involve withdrawal of Russian troops. Question of how this affects China.

And finally, I would expect the administration to be going around with friends and allies, but particularly with fence-sitters around the world—South Africa, Brazil, India—saying: Do you really want to be neutral and be perceived as supporting someone who is as weak as Putin? This was a bad bet. Now it’s time for you to change your bet.

Seems to me those are the things that the president would want to be watching to understand where this is heading over the longer term.

Watch Stephen Hadley’s brief for the president

FREDERICK KEMPE: The way it’s been described to me by one really interesting analyst is that there were four sorts of power centers. One of them was the FSB, special ops, all the troops around there, including the presidential guard, which is a very terrific bunch of troops around Putin that he can rely on. The second power is the military, the Defense Ministry. The third is the Wagner Group. And the fourth is the Chechens.

What we do know is if these are the power pillars, that they’ve been shaken; that whatever stability there was, however fragile it was, it’s shaken. So how unstable does the situation remain? And then what role does the president of the United States with his allies play in this kind of situation?

STEPHEN HADLEY: Unknown. So why did Putin do this deal six or eight hours after he called Prigozhin a traitor and promised the most draconian kinds of punishment? I think there are probably three reasons.

One, the progress Prigozhin made moving towards Moscow and the fact that it was really fairly unobstructed… if you look at the preparations that were going on in Moscow, they took this push very seriously. I think that was one reason.

Secondly, I think Putin realized that the longer this went on, the more likely Prigozhin’s narrative that the Ukraine war was a mistake—that Ukraine did not threaten Russia, and the brotherly relations between Ukrainians and Russians could have been restored without force—might catch on within Russia.

And third, I think Putin had to worry about schisms and breaches within the security services themself.

Putin has been balancing these various groups you talked about for a long time and fairly effectively. He either didn’t see this one coming or didn’t step in soon enough. Where this goes depends a little bit on whether Putin regains his footing, is able to do a crackdown and a purge for those that were disloyal, and is able to restore the sort of balancing act that he was doing before. So in some sense, his future is in some measure in his own hands.

In terms of the US role, I think it’s very difficult to know what’s going on, and I think our effort to try to affect what’s going on from the outside just would justify all kinds of anti-Western, anti-US narratives that Putin has based his rhetorical strategy on. So my guess is the administration would and should stay out of this matter.

This is the opportunity to accelerate help to Ukraine. This is the opportunity for the Ukrainians to exploit what looks like chaos in Russia and maybe a degraded morale among Russian troops to try to effectively retake Ukrainian territory from Russian forces if they can.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So I’m going to turn next to views on what is going on inside Russia. President Kaljulaid, how have you been looking at this over the weekend and in general?

PRESIDENT KERSTI KALJULAID: The Estonian people have been extremely happy to be watching this time from the front row rather than being on the scene, like thirty years ago. But I also have to say that many people, interestingly—even if it is the only happy-end military coup in the last century, the one which we witnessed 1991—are drawing parallels. And many were actually hoping that this would be the end, and people are quite disappointed that it wasn’t. But of course, well, you don’t get the fairytale military coup every thirty years in Russia.

What is very clear from here is that Putin is now weak and he’s much more perceived to be weak by people inside Russia. And if we were concentrating only on Putin and what he might do, then I think we are overlooking the fact that he’s not alone. There is a regime, what Putin actually is presenting and is representing. But that means this regime is now fully aware that Putin cannot project power and might inside the country, and this is becoming critical. And that is why I think that his days at the helm of Russia are also relatively numbered.

But do not be fooled; we might be seeing somebody else there, but it will still be the same regime, which knows very well that Putin has no way out, but Russia and the regime has a way out. And the way out, the logical way out, is that Putin is somehow replaced. Things might happen. I mean, things might naturally happen. And they might want, then, of course, to end the war in Ukraine, but also for us to believe that this is now the new Russia, and therefore start a new cycle, and therefore start to rebuild Russian military forces having learned from the catastrophe in Ukraine and continue with their imperialistic ambition. This, for me, is the real danger scenario from Russia now.

I’m less worried about Russia turning into a tribal kind of war terrain of domestic war because, frankly speaking, outside of Prigozhin and Wagner, there don’t seem to be contenders who would be able to amass such a force and march on Moscow. So if Prigozhin truly is out of the picture—and he might well be out of the picture, alive or soon dead; I do also think that his life expectancy is not long—there simply doesn’t seem to be anybody else who would be able to stage this kind of coup.

But regime change will not happen, but presenting us a new face might very well happen. And then it is not—it’s very important that we are not fooled.

Concerning Ukraine: There is nothing better than, I mean, continuing our effort and intensifying out effort indeed so that Ukraine is able to take this opportunity, that Russia military command is a little bit at least confused. Keep also in mind it was said before that Russian military might be actually demotivated by the events. I don’t think so. I think that the normal Russian soldier has no access to social media or media online. They’re not on phones—well, very few are—and even if they were they would not be drawing too many conclusions. So my understanding is that we need to continue and help Ukraine to win this war, because the sooner Russia realizes that it really and truly has lost this war the regime will try to wriggle out. And then it is for us to be vigilant, to not accept that this is now the new and democratic Russia until we really and truly see changes in Russia—and real changes, not what we saw in 1991, accepting for a change which in reality which was not change.

Our view from here: Continue towards Vilnius strongly. Continue after Vilnius strongly. Make sure Ukraine wins. Make sure Russians all understand that they are losing. And then not to be fooled by what comes next. And also, not to be too afraid of what comes next.

Russia is not going to turn into a kind of a tribal competition ground. There will be someone who will replace Putin as we know him in a relatively orderly way and represent the old regime in a new way.

That seems to be what we here in the front row are thinking collectively.

FREDERICK KEMPE: As you were watching this on Saturday, what did you think was going to be the best outcome for Estonia? And where do you think you are right now?

PRESIDENT KERSTI KALJULAID: I am afraid it might be the best outcome that, I mean, Russian people are starting to realize Putin is weak, but they were given a time period to decide what to do about it. Because, indeed, if things had unraveled very quickly like they did in 1991, we would be looking at somebody taking power in Russia today—not Prigozhin, I think he was only able to create disturbances—but somebody else would have stepped into the void and taken responsibility, then we would be already in the position which I am personally and many Estonians are most fearing. And this, our fear, is that everybody in the West again believes this is the new Russia, but it would not have been. It would have been the same Russia with a new face in front of it.

So right now, the current outcome, that we all know Putin is weak and we can prepare ourselves, is much better. So we also stepped up our border controls and everything, but I think we need to stay the course and focus more on what we can do in Ukraine and how we can help Ukraine to benefit from this situation. But I mean, nothing massively changed.

FREDERICK KEMPE: NATO membership for Ukraine in July? Would you move that fast? Maybe not give it there, but the road map? Should this change anything at the Vilnius summit in July?

PRESIDENT KERSTI KALJULAID: Precisely not. I mean, this is what we have been saying from this corner of the world: Let’s do what is right, and let’s stop guessing what is going on and what will happen thereafter in Russia and with Russia. Let’s do what is right. And we have heard hopeful noises also, for example, from France on this subject a few days ago, before even this occasion. Nothing has changed in this sense.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So, Angela Stent, you’ve been following this leader of Russia for a long time. Love to hear your situation report, what you think is going on. Is this just the beginning of a Game of Thrones that we’re going to see? Is this the beginning of the end of Putin? What is your take on all this?

ANGELA STENT: When I look at just what happened on Saturday, I think of the title of Peter Pomerantsev’s book, Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible. So what we saw happening doesn’t compute for me because you had Prigozhin starting off in the last week telling the Russian people that the war was unnecessary, that Ukraine didn’t threaten them, and the reason why Russia went to war with Ukraine is because Russian oligarchs wanted to get their hands on Ukrainian assets.

Then, you know, what Wagner was facing, obviously, was its dissolution and the Ministry of Defense saying that the Wagner fighters had to join the regular armed forces, so that clearly was not to his liking. His forces have done so much of the fighting in Bakhmut.

Then you see him go to Rostov, and the Wagner troops were really welcomed there, and they were like heroes.

Then you have Putin giving this very angry speech on Saturday morning likening what was happening to 1917, to the beginning of the Russian Civil War, to the intervention by Western powers in Russia at that time, saying that the Wagnerites were traitors and that they had to be brought to justice.

And then you have the march on Moscow. You have Prigozhin stopping within two hundred kilometers. And then you suddenly have this announcement by Dmitry Peskov, the press secretary—not by Putin or any one of his colleagues—that an agreement had been reached and that Prigozhin wasn’t going to be tried, he could go to Belarus, and the same would be true for the Wagner troops. I think there were, in the end, about eight thousand of them who had followed him, who would have gone to Moscow. It doesn’t really make any sense at all.

We haven’t seen any of Putin’s close colleagues publicly support him; radio silence in Moscow. We had a video today of the defense minister, Shoigu, allegedly in Ukraine. I’m not sure that anyone has verified that that was from today and not from sometime last week or sometime a few weeks ago. Clearly, one of the major demands that Prigozhin has made is that both Shoigu and Gerasimov, the chief of the General Staff, should be fired. As far as we know, they haven’t been fired.

So one has to wonder what it was that Prigozhin got for agreeing to stand down and not going to Moscow. One suspects that he was maybe waiting for more indications of support in Moscow. We don’t know if he had a plan about what he would have done had he gone to Moscow. And we do know that Wagner has been very closely related to the GRU, the military intelligence, but there are now people also saying that the FSB was somehow also involved to some extent supporting him. There’s so much that we don’t know.

But I think what we can say is that Putin certainly does look weaker than he did before that. And the fact that the message that Prigozhin has sent has clearly fallen on fertile ground among some of the Russians, even though the public opinion polls show—if you believe them—that a majority of the people still support this war. I think there are certainly more questions. And because we haven’t seen anything from any of his colleagues in supporting him, we have really no clue about what’s going on there.

But I certainly agree that the war in Ukraine will go on. I’m not sure that this necessarily benefits the Ukrainians at this point. I’m going to be very interested to hear what our other colleagues have to say about that. But clearly, the West should continue supporting Ukraine, and we’ll wait and see if there’s any change.

I think most of us believed before this happened that Putin believed that he could wait the West out; that our unity would weaken; and that if he waits to the end of the year, the beginning of next year—and who knows what’s going to happen in the US elections—that that would be to his advantage. I’m not really sure whether he can really believe that anymore. I think there should be a big question mark.

However, I think if this is the beginning of the unraveling of his regime, it’s probably not going to happen quickly. Having said that, of course, anyone who studies Russia knows that you can be surprised. It may be a slower process, but one just does have to assume that this erodes some of the support that he has. But he still has his own national guard, the Rosgvardiya. He’s got three hundred thousand troops that are allegedly loyal to him. So it’s not as if he’s left without any support.

FREDERICK KEMPE: John Herbst, can you give us what your situation report is right now? On the one hand, Putin looks weak. The troops have to question whether they want to die right now for this leader and this country in a time where they’ve just seen what happened over the weekend. On the other hand, you have Prigozhin in Belarus, and there were some rumors that maybe he could open up a new front in Belarus, which would be a great problem for Ukraine. But does Putin really embrace a person he’s called a traitor opening up a new front?

JOHN HERBST: I would underscore that this is certainly a sign of, a) Putin’s weakness; and, b) fissures in the Putin regime—things that have been evident, albeit much less clear to people who don’t follow it closely, since last October, when the extent of the success of Ukraine’s 2022 counteroffensive became clear and Prigozhin began, with some help from Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, going after Gerasimov and Shoigu. But Prigozhin became increasingly louder, and already about two-and-a-half months ago he gave a peculiar speech in which he foreshadowed his clear criticism of the war in Ukraine and the unjustifiable pretext for that war. So this has all been building, again, since last fall.

We don’t know what the senior power players in Moscow have been doing and thinking. We do know, however, that this is truly Putin’s war, and very few people—including among his siloviki, closest pals—wanted this big invasion. And everyone understands that Russia’s paid a large price for this, as has Putin’s regime. The interesting thing about Prigozhin is saying this publicly, with at this point no pushback.

One more small indicator of perhaps the continuing weakening of the Putin regime: There is a member of the Duma, a think tanker as well, Sergei Markov, who’s a very reliable indicator of people who are close to Putin, or rather want to be close to Putin, and are trying to position themselves for the future. He’s had several Telegram posts this morning essentially saying that Russian spinmeisters are putting out the following instructions for explaining what happened, such as: It’s all over. This demonstrates the stability and the wisdom of the Putin regime. The fact that he’s putting that out suggests he’s trying to hedge. He doesn’t think that the regime is doing that well, and I think that’s true.

Now, what’s going on in Ukraine and the war? At an absolute minimum, this is a plus for the Ukrainians because the already demoralized Russian soldiers have one more reason to be demoralized. Also—and this actually predates the coup attempt—Wagner has essentially pulled out of the fight after it “took Bakhmut” several weeks ago. And Wagner, whatever its liabilities, remains the most potent force fighting on the field in Ukraine. So them being at least partly out of the fight is important. If now they are going to meekly go into the Ministry of Defense, become part of the regular Russian military, and they will be notably less effective. They’re not going to strengthen the already demoralized troops; they will just be a part of the morass. So this is another plus for Ukraine.

As for what we should do, I mean, my views have not been hidden. I think we should be stronger than we’ve been for the last several years. That predates Joe Biden’s presidency, though it includes Biden. And I think that we should be sending the weapons Ukraine needs to ensure that they can break the land bridge in the next six months. So far, the administration’s not willing to go there. Maybe this will help them move in that direction.

We should also be planning for a much more robust Vilnius NATO summit than Washington seems to be interested in, although the White House has been embarrassed by being behind most of the allies now, including the French, regarding NATO and Ukraine. And they are trying to come up with something, and hopefully they’ll come up with more than they were planning a few weeks ago.

One major part of the debate on our policy towards Ukraine and Russia has been what I consider to be the well-played by the Kremlin-Putin nuclear bluff. The Russians have spent twenty years building the elaborate metaphor of Putin as the rat in a corner who would lash out if cornered. But we just saw what the rat in the corner does when he was confronted with a a flying column heading towards Moscow: He headed for the tall grass. This should also inform our understanding of what Putin might do if Ukraine were to take the land bridge. In other words, I don’t think we have to always have to take into account the possibility of, but we should not be intimidated by, his increasingly hollow nuclear threats.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Angela, does jockeying begin now among the fissures in the Putin regime? What do we know and what’s your reading of the silence?

ANGELA STENT: It really is a black box. I mean, I’m not talking about the very inner circle. We certainly know that there are significant numbers of people among the elite who are very dissatisfied with what’s been happening, not the least because they can’t travel to Europe or the US or whatever, they can’t visit their bank accounts in their homes, and they thought that they were part of this globalized elite and now they’re stuck in Russia and sanctioned, many of them. And I think that was very evident even at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum a couple of weeks ago, how different it was from what it used to be before this war began.

Now, having said that, a lot of those people understand that they can’t leave and have been told that, so they’re stuck. But as for Putin’s very inner circle, we really don’t know much about that at all. I mean, that is Nikolai Patrushev, the head of his security council; probably the heads also of the foreign and domestic intelligence services, the SVR and the FSB. And then there are people who are close friends of Putin who don’t have official jobs in the administration like Yuri Kovalchuk, who owns one of the big banks there. And probably Igor Sechin, who is the head of Rosneft. And those are the people he talks to.

There has been some speculation—when people talk about a potential successor to Putin, people go back now to Sergey Kirienko, who was actually prime minister briefly in 1999 and now is an enthusiastic supporter of the war and has a much more public profile. And there are a few younger governors whose names pop up as potential successors. But of course, until now, you know, Putin hasn’t wanted to be a lame duck, and therefore he clearly hasn’t named that. But again, I come back to the fact that none of the people who hold these positions—and including the prime minister, Mikhail Mishustin, who’s been very, very quiet, really, since the war began (who would, by the way, if something happened to Putin, he would actually succeed him for the first few months until there was an election)—have come out and supported him.

So I wouldn’t be able to come up with a name for you, but I would say if there’s an orderly succession then you would still have someone coming to power who shares Putin’s views. If there is some discontinuity, then that could all change. But if there’s an orderly one, it would be a similar regime.

Now, would it continue to prosecute the war in Ukraine? I mean, that’s a huge question. Or it might decide that it wanted to think about ways of getting out and saving face. But we really know very little about all of this just because it’s the people who surround him are mainly from the intelligence services, and they know how to suppress information.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So, General Clark first and General Scaparrotti, let’s do this round. What is your situation report?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, the first thing is to make sure the Russian soldiers know what’s happened so they can be demoralized. One of the things the Russian forces have done is take away the mobile communications from their soldiers when they reach a certain point on the battlefield. So the Ukrainians have been running information operations for some time. They’ve been encouraging Russian soldiers to surrender, threatening them, doing other things. They need to intensify those information operations now, make sure that they take advantage of their situation to exact the most demoralization they can from the Russian forces that they’re facing.

Secondly, got to understand that these Ukrainian forces are facing a huge problem with minefields. Virtually the whole front is mined. They’ve got to find a way through it. That’s slow. It’s painstaking. And we didn’t give them sufficient equipment to do this. In particular, they need more mine-clearing line charges, probably by a factor of ten. The only way you’re going to get through this is to blow your way through it. You can’t have a soldier on his belly with a knife probing for mines and expect you’ll really make a breakthrough on this. And you can’t put your mine-clearing tanks up front in broad daylight, or even at night, and think you can drill a path through this. These are really deep minefields. They can be reinforced with artillery-delivered mines and have been. So this is the significant problem.

The third thing is we need to continue to push equipment to the Ukrainians. In particular, they need 155 artillery systems. Not just the ammunition, the systems. They are in a tough counter-fire fight with Russian artillery. They started the fight outnumbered. They’re now perhaps on par in terms of being able to return shell for shell, but when they take losses, they can’t fix it. If it’s Western, they have to send it out. So they need more tubes. You cannot advance against this kind of a defense without winning the counter-fire battle. They need more air defense that’s available to protect mobile forces. We need to give the ATACMS right away. And we don’t need to announce it. We just need to put it in there. It’s fired from the same launcher, minimal train-up; put a few hundred systems in there and let’s get rid of the Russian reserves and the Russian artillery positions that can be detected.

Are we giving the Ukrainians real time battlefield intelligence? The latest, I believe, is we’re not. But the Brits are, and I guess they’re taking ours. Can we do anything to focus this and get the information down to the individual units that are trying to breach these minefields? If we go back with our imagery records, we know exactly where the defenses are, when they were put in, what was put in there. It doesn’t do any good to have it published in the Financial Times. It has to be down at the tank crewman level, down to sixty-degree coordinates. So if we haven’t done that, we need to do that. So those would be the immediate things on the battlefield.

Where did Prigozhin’s forces go? Now, the newspapers say that we saw this buildup happening. Well, if we saw the buildup happening, surely we’ve got listening devices in there. We can hear who’s talking. We know who they are. What are they saying? We’re not hearing anything from national sources on this. I hope we know where they went. Is Prigozhin really going to Belarus? Is he going to really link up with the nuclear warheads that are there? Is he going to run a coup against leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka? Has this all been a Kabuki dance?

Probably not, but could they make something of it later? Maybe. I’d say the chances are remote on that. I think it’s 90 percent what you see is what there was—a weak chain of command, no real support for Putin, and the Russian military in the field being vulnerable. But if we don’t get that information down to the individual soldier on the Russian side and erode his confidence in his chain of command, then all this talk at high levels about Putin being weak and so forth doesn’t affect the military situation on the ground.

Final point, if I were Ukraine, I would strengthen my observation of what’s going on at the border with Belarus. You just never know.

We’ve got to get Ukraine into NATO. And this looking around for security guarantees that will let us avoid this, it’s like we want to hold back the NATO decision to use it as a bargaining chip with Putin. Surely what we’ve seen here is that Putin is weak. Put it out that Ukraine will join NATO next year. Create some conditions. And if Putin wants to come forward and preemptively surrender rather than have NATO come into Ukraine, good, good. But use the bargaining chip the correct way, not by looking weak but by looking strong, and showing strength to Russia.

FREDERICK KEMPE: I could argue this both ways: that this is a time to really double down in supporting Ukraine because there’s a moment of weakness, but there are some in the administration that would say, no, that could trigger a response, nuclear or otherwise, where out of desperation Putin does something really truly crazy. What is your situation analysis?

GENERAL CURTIS SCAPARROTTI: I’ve been one that believed that our administration has been too timid. I respect the leadership within NATO, and what we have done for Ukraine, and that we’ve been focused on that. But I think we’ve been too cautious in what we’ve provided Ukraine and when we provided it—i.e., doing it in somewhat of an incremental way.

So because of that, I think this is a real opportunity. And now is the time to make sure the Ukrainians have what they need and they get it quickly. I think we’ve just done this in too slow of a fashion. So now is the time to show strength and now is the time to reinforce them. I would be less concerned about provocation. From my point of view, Putin’s in a very, very bad spot right now, with lots of problems. But I just don’t—I don’t think that supporting Ukraine at this point, exploiting the situation—certainly being aware of indicators—but I don’t believe that that’s a reason for extreme concern.

I would also say that this has got to be undermining the Russian troops’ morale. Certainly, they don’t have full access, but I’m sure the command and them know that there’s things happening. And we have ways within information operations to make sure we get that out. And I would certainly be working those aspects of it. And I hope that we’re helping the Ukrainians be effective at that. And, if I were the Ukrainians, I would exploit this as much as I possibly could.

One of the things that I wonder about, there’s a lot that we don’t know, which has been sad. But it’s interesting to me as this thing unraveled that, you know, typically the Russians put their private armies or commercial armies, if you will, under their intelligence apparatus, under the FSB or those. And that’s what they’ve done throughout history. And so for this to occur, and not see more of a response than we did, even over the indicators over the past couple of weeks, is really surprising to me. And that leads me to believe that there’s a lot that we don’t know about what’s going on.

I was also surprised that Putin didn’t react as quickly as one might expect. So I think there’s a lot that we don’t know yet, and certainly watching it closely. But on the part of the United States, being also somewhat cautious in our response. Let’s wait and see how this unrolls in terms of policy. Having said that, I also would probably be in contact with China to see what their thoughts are on this, and leverage that for their assistance. Because it’s just another indicator that this is a strategic mistake by Putin.

FREDERICK KEMPE: What was China’s response over the weekend?

STEPHEN HADLEY: I don’t think we know. I think China’s initial reaction, from what I’ve seen in the press and that’s my only source, has been very cautious. I think they’re watching and waiting. But this can’t be reassuring to Xi, to see his life partner have a column get within 150 miles of Moscow. So I think this is an opportunity for the administration to get China to double down on a potential effort to pressure Putin to bring this war to an end in a way that involves getting Russian troops out of Ukraine. Because that’s, in a way, the way you save Putin at this point in time. I hope the administration is making that argument to the Chinese.

BRIAN KELLY: How should we be thinking about the EU, US, and China coordinating on a response? Is there some coordination on leverage between the three kind of legs of the stool? And if there is coordination, does that actually create a counter-reaction from Putin kind of lashing out, as in a corner?

GENERAL CURTIS SCAPARROTTI: I think that should occur. And I think it’s in the manner in which it’s approached as to how Putin reacts to that. I think it’s valuable to collaborate like that. And I think a message from the three could be powerful, from those entities for Putin, informing him. And again, I think part of that is how it is messaged to him. What’s the message? And I think there’s ways to do that that could be helpful. All along I’ve believed that the United States bringing together as many countries as we can to message the stance is always the best route.

JOE NYE: What, if anything, did we learn from the weekend’s events about Lukashenka and his role? I mean, the conventional wisdom has been that Lukashenka was Putin’s puppet. On the other hand, if he has alliances with other factions, and Putin has been weakened, he may have more leeway for Belarusian policy than before. Is he able, or even willing, to protect Prigozhin?

ANGELA STENT: I would caution: we were told that Lukashenka was negotiating all day on Saturday with Prigozhin. And maybe that’s true. One reason why he might have been given that role is because if something goes wrong, then Putin himself wouldn’t get the blame for it. They could always blame Lukashenka if there are things that don’t go the way they want them to do. Otherwise, it’s difficult to see because until now we’ve seen Lukashenka in a very subordinate position to Putin. He’s totally dependent on Putin for staying in power. And therefore, it was surprising to think that he would take any initiative like that.

We don’t know whether Prigozhin really is in Belarus or not. I mean, there was a cryptic message yesterday on his internet platform from Wagner saying that he would communicate with people when he had better cellphone service, which is pretty funny because that raises the question of why he doesn’t have better cellphone service now. So I don’t have a good answer to this. I can’t imagine that there would be any kind of an alliance between Lukashenka and Prigozhin. It’s already been raised, the question of would Prigozhin be using Belarus as a way of going back with his soldiers into Ukraine. But I doubt that, because I think they want to resolve Wagner, the Russian MOD does. So I’m not sure what its future is there.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Prigozhin just denied trying to overthrow the Russian government. And the truth is, all he said was he wanted Gerasimov and Shoigu replaced. In fact, he didn’t talk about Putin at all on Saturday. But, Stephen, I know you wanted to comment on how the talks unfolded.

STEPHEN HADLEY: I will just say what the press was saying over the weekend in answer to Joe’s question. One, Lukashenka said that he spoke with Putin before he undertook this role with Prigozhin. And, secondly, Angela, I saw a press report that said that Lukashenka was supported by Putin’s chief of staff and by the Russian ambassador to Belarus. So while he was the figurehead, I’m not sure he was a disinterested third party negotiating this. It seems to me more he was doing it on instructions and with coaching from Putin forces. But that’s just press reports.

GENERAL JAMES L. JONES: I think one of the big issues as a result of this is the issue of whether Ukraine should join NATO now or later. Prior to this event, I think the consensus was that a NATO membership would come later, although there’d be some affirmation at Vilnius that it would come, and some guarantees. But, you know, in view of Putin’s weakness at this point, I would think that this is a matter that will be openly discussed as to the timing of NATO membership.

Second, on getting the Ukrainians the arms that they need, I completely agree that it should be now, and as quickly as possible. And then I think another question is, what’s the future of the Wagner Group? What are they going to do? And I don’t think that’s been resolved yet. And Belarus’ role is, I think, worthy of waiting to see what happens there. I can’t imagine that an exile to Belarus with whatever guarantees Putin or Lukashenka may have given Prigozhin would have much value. I think Prigozhin’s life expectancy in Belarus would be quite short.

And I’ll say we should really engage with China on this as much as we can, as these things go on, because I’m sure that leader Xi Jinping is watching this unfold with asking himself a lot of questions about the future that China might contemplate on Taiwan.

JOHN HERBST: Regarding Prigozhin and Belarus, whoever took the initiative—whether it was Lukashenka trying to get some leverage or the Kremlin seeking to use Lukashenka, this is kind of a coup for him. Since his failed election, after which he claimed himself president despite the results in 2020, he has become more and more under Putin’s control. So this may give him a little bit of a standing to push back. But Prigozhin in Belarus is going to be under Putin’s control in some fashion.

A lot of people are speculating that he is not long for this world, and that’s possible because Putin looks weak for having allowed Prigozhin to get out of this mess after he launched the coup. But there’s a good reason for Putin not to take him down, because Prigozhin remains a figure of some popularity and legitimacy in Russia. And while Putin could try and do this, you might say, behind closed doors, everyone will assume it’s him. And I think Putin has to worry about that.

FREDERICK KEMPE: President Kaljulaid, you’re closer to Belarus than any of us are. How do you look at the situation in Belarus, Prigozhin going there, and the whole role that Lukashenka could end up playing, or Prigozhin could end up playing, on that long border that Belarus has with Ukraine?

PRESIDENT KERSTI KALJULAID: I actually don’t think Lukashenka is playing any important role here in this game. I’m quite sure that he was not the initiator, and he was not the negotiator. He was chosen as someone who could resolve, immediately, the problem. And to resolve the problem immediately was, indeed, to get Prigozhin somehow out of the way. I definitely don’t think that any promises given to him relating to Shoigu or Gerasimov will be kept. And definitely he’s just put aside and then those people who really decide, they will think about how to handle this situation.

Whether Prigozhin’s twenty-five thousand soldiers will even follow him to the region, which is now indicated, in Belarus where they would have a new camp, I have serious doubts. Many might actually go back to Syria and to Africa, and some might take up the opportunity to join the regular army. But those who will go there, I don’t see them anymore as a risk to Ukraine, after what Prigozhin has been saying. That, I mean, this war was a mistake, it is just serving Shoigu, it is serving the Russian oligarchs who is enriching themselves. I do think Lukashenka is a pawn. And I do think that Prigozhin will face his fate sooner rather than later.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Could somebody give me the potential impact on Africa? The Wagner Group is playing an outsized role there. The troops—are they listening to Prigozhin? Is he still their commander? Is Putin their commander? But there are knock-on impacts all over the world from this.

STEPHEN HADLEY: I think part of it is the money. It’s been a terrific source of income for Prigozhin and supporting his forces. And the question is whether people will decide this is now up for grabs. I suspect Putin is already getting his cut. The question is whether others will want some kind of cut. Don’t know. There’s a question of when we talk about incorporating the Wagner Group into the Ministry of Defense, does that include the forces in Africa? Because for the moment, Putin and Russia have been basically one step behind and have had a certain amount of deniability. Do they really want to take explicit responsibility for what the Wagner troops have been doing in Africa?

So I think there are a lot of questions. I don’t think we know the answer at this point in time.

Wagner has become a very important arm of the Russian state in terms of projecting its influence, particularly on the African continent. Wagner owns very lucrative gold, diamond, and other precious minerals, assets in the Central African Republic, in other parts of Africa. It’s very active in Sudan, in a number of places. It’s not only that Prigozhin and the other commanders benefit from this financially, but so does the Kremlin. I mean, we know that.

So I would find it very hard to believe that they’re going to suddenly dismantle Wagner, particularly at this time when the Russian regular forces are fighting in Ukraine—and have someone else take over their activities in Africa. So I think this is something to watch very carefully. Will they continue doing what they’re doing there? And they’ve expanded their activities in the last year. Or is there going to be another big struggle, because we’re talking about huge assets and then the support of a number of authoritarian leaders there who are very dependent on Moscow.

FREDERICK KEMPE: What are the odds that we’re actually not going to have a permanent break at all between Putin and Prigozhin? Putin said things about Prigozhin on Saturday, but Prigozhin said nothing critical about Putin at all. They’ve been awfully close for awfully long. Is this really the breaking point between the two of them, or not?

ANGELA STENT: Yeah, so, I mean, Prigozhin did criticize Putin a few weeks ago, indirectly. He talked about the war not going well, and then about “the happy grandfather” who’s a little bit removed from reality. So this was seen to get a gentle criticism of Putin. I’m not sure that there will be a break between them. And they have been dependent on each other. And we get back to the question, there are obviously great tensions within the inner circle there, between the ministry of defense and other groups. We’ll just have to wait and see. I mean, we might see Prigozhin now recant and then come back to the field. Or he could meet with an unfortunate accident any day.

JOHN HERBST: There’s also a significant Wagner presence in Syria and in Libya. And that, apparently, has not changed in recent weeks. And there are vested interests. Both commanders in the field and others who have profited from Wagner’s activities in the Middle East and in Africa. And chances are, those activities will continue. They’ll just make sure that Prigozhin’s hands are not on them.

GENERAL JAMES L. JONES: What’s the feeling about, going into Vilnius, about NATO membership for Ukraine now that this has happened?

PRESIDENT KERSTI KALJULAID: Everything that we can do to fast-forward the messaging towards Russia, that they are really losing everything on every ground, this is what we need to do. And therefore, the clearer the message Ukraine will join NATO, the better. There is no other way forward, to drive home to Russians—to ordinary Russians—that they really are losing.

FREDERICK KEMPE: How do you navigate the following? The argument is that you can’t bring a country into NATO when part of the country is occupied, or it’s at war with somebody. On the other hand, all that does is reinforce Putin’s position to continue to occupy and to continue to be at war. And I just wonder if there is some sort of workaround here, so that we don’t give him the wrong incentives.

PRESIDENT KERSTI KALJULAID: I’m quite sure that whatever linguistic acrobatics we would use, Russia will understand our intent. I mean, we will continue. We will help Ukraine to get rid of partial occupation. And we will help Ukraine to join NATO. We don’t need to be specific about what will be the conditions, what will be the timeframe. But I think we need to be very clear that we see Ukraine in NATO when they have restored their territorial integrity. But also pointing out that history knows occasions when countries have joined while having been partially occupied or broken, like for example Germany.

So I don’t think that trying to be particularly nimble with the words will help. Russians will get the message, one way or the other. One message is we are weak, we are afraid. And the other message is, we are strong, and we will persevere, and we will make this happen for Ukraine in a safe timeframe, in a safe format. And there is no third way, I believe. And my feeling is that in Europe for months, thinking also back to discussions which we’ve had here in Europe for a couple of months, there has been—also in Germany and in France—kind of coming to the common conclusion, which is not publicly mentioned yet, but there is no other way that Ukraine has to be within NATO.

STEPHEN HADLEY: One of the lessons I think I would draw from our experience in 2008 at Bucharest where we, on the one hand the Germans and the French, split on this issue of a membership action plan for Ukraine and Georgia: I think rather than being a provocation for Putin it was an opportunity for Putin, because he saw that the French and the Germans were really unalterably opposed to any near-time consideration of membership for Ukraine. And he took that as an opportunity. It is interesting that the only two countries Putin has invaded in this neighborhood, Georgia and Ukraine, are the ones that are not in NATO.

So I think it actually was an opportunity. But the lesson for it is that whatever comes out of Vilnius has to be unified. We cannot have a split between one group of allies and another. It would present another opportunity for Putin. But furthermore, it might undermine the existing steadfast and, I think, very strong consensus between the United States and Europe for support for Ukraine. So I think that that’s the risk. So it’s got to be won by consensus. And there will be those in the administration who will say that if we move forward with NATO membership for Ukraine in any way now, it will bail Putin out because it will be to justify and seem to validate his notion that he is defending Russia against a NATO moving eastward.

I don’t agree with that. I think we’re going to have to answer that argument. There’s a proposal that Sandy Vershbow and Ian Brzezinski did that basically said you would upgrade the current relationship between NATO and Ukraine. You would set a timetable for the next NATO summit to develop two things: One, a robust plan for readying Ukraine for NATO membership and, separately, supporting and institutionalizing acceleration of support militarily for Ukraine so that by that same NATO date it is in a position, as best as it can, to defend itself by itself. Which is the commitment we’ve really given to Israel.

I think there is something there. And it also puts a time out there where we would consider firmly bringing Ukraine into NATO. I think something like that may be able to get a consensus within the alliance. But I do think we need a consensus. We don’t need a falling out among US and the European allies at this point on anything over

FREDERICK KEMPE: What are you watching now? I mean, this is a difficult situation to sort out. What are you going to watch in the next few days? I’m certainly going to watch whether the Chief of Staff Gerasimov and the Secretary of Defense Shoigu stay in power. And I’m going to watch where Prigozhin appears and what Putin and Prigozhin say about each other.

GENERAL CURTIS SCAPARROTTI: I mean, I’d certainly watch the leadership. I’m surprised, frankly, that Shoigu and Gerasimov have stayed in positions as long as they can. So I think to see how this shakes out with them, given that Prigozhin’s attacks have been directed primarily at them throughout this time. The second thing is just watching the responsiveness of their chain of command and their troops, and what we can learn about their performance and their response to this. What do they know? I think that will be quite interesting.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: I think it’s very strange that we haven’t heard anything about the people—the troops in Rostov. And they surrendered their garrison to Prigozhin. Is that going to be acceptable or are they going to be punished for that? And again, we’ve got to locate those Wagner troops. Where are they? What are they doing? And where is Prigozhin? What is his plan? So those are things I’d be watching.

One thing on NATO. I do think that the Vershbow-Brzezinski plan is good, but not sufficient. I think, to go back to what the president said, we’ve got to have an agreement they will be in NATO. Maybe it’s not in twenty-four months. Maybe it’s not in twelve months. But we’ve got to put NATO in there. We don’t want to try to push Ukraine into an Israel solution, and I hear that being discussed. That’s not a lasting solution in Europe. That’s a gray zone in Europe. They need to be in NATO. And we need to say it at this summit.

I’m in France, and the French are telling me that France wants them in NATO and the Americans are saying to the French: You’re trying to escape your responsibilities by making us take your security responsibilities. So they believe that our administration is ducking the responsibility for bringing Ukraine into NATO. That’s what I’m getting from French people associated with the leadership.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So I can share with this group, because President Zelenskyy allowed us to use this on the record and John Herbst, John Rogers, and General David Petraeus were in our meeting with Zelenskyy a couple of weeks ago. And he said that if NATO doesn’t come further than it’s agreed to come so far—and that included the Vershbow-Brzezinski piece, which I thought was quite good and forward-leaning—but he would not be able to come to Vilnius because the Ukrainian people would consider it a betrayal of them; that there they are, dying on the frontlines in order to stop an authoritarian who threatens us all and threatens freedoms more generally, and that they really need a stronger sign and stronger security guarantees for him to actually come to the summit, which I thought was very interesting. And it was in an off-record conversation, and then we went back to him later and I asked whether I could use it on record, and his people said that they were willing to do that.

So it’s not that he’s anti-NATO. I mean, without the US and the US’s support, he wouldn’t be able to fight the war right now. But on the other hand, this is a difficult time for Ukraine as well, as you can well imagine.

JOHN HERBST: Watch Prigozhin very closely, watch Putin very closely. I’d also be looking for any statements coming from any of the siloviki—Patrushev, Dvornikov, people who are usually quiet—but see if there’s any indication there.

But the one place where you have people who are willing to talk is on Telegram and the Russian military bloggers, who have often been criticizing the way the war has been conducted but not, in fact, the decision to go to war. So they are worth watching because they could provide some indication of where developments are going to head.

PRESIDENT KERSTI KALJULAID: I wouldn’t be watching Shoigu and Gerasimov. I think they are safer in their jobs for the next months than they have been for the last year because Putin needs to save face, and giving in to Prigozhin would be really not something.

I think I would watch whether Prigozhin is alive two weeks or a month from now, because the only way for Putin to reestablish that he’s still strong with the Russian people would be, actually, that he would be able to show that he was able to deal with Prigozhin—somehow. And he has to demonstrate that, some way, somehow. If he’s not able to do it, then I think we should really be watching how Putin gets weaker and weaker, and who are the people who will then speak out against him.

For example, Russian nationalists who have been strongly supporting the war in Moscow, the really radical, you would say Russian neo-Nazi groups, have been yesterday also criticizing Putin. This is new.

So things will continue. Putin will either be weakened, or he will be able to demonstrate somehow that he has regained the upper hand. My guess is he will not be able to, so his power will kind of be downgraded gradually and then we will see something happening when the rest of the decisionmakers decide they can do without him. That is something which I think is the most probable. But Shoigu was inspecting the troops, he’s been visible, rather than before he wasn’t, actually, so I think they are safe in their jobs for a couple of weeks.

ANGELA STENT: I am going to be watching whether Shoigu and Gerasimov stay in place, and they probably will. I will be watching to see whether Prigozhin resurfaces, where he is. And I will also be watching to see what any of the siloviki around Putin, what they’re saying. And I’ll be watching Putin, too—where does he appear, what does he say, what does he not say.

And let me just add my two cents: I do not think that the Israel solution is the solution for Ukraine, and I think it certainly has to get into NATO sooner rather than later.

STEPHEN HADLEY: I want to watch what we do. First, my view is it’s not “Israel” as a substitute for NATO; it’s NATO membership plus the kind of support for Ukraine we give Israel. So in my view, it’s NATO plus “Israel.” We need to try to get that out of Vilnius, but it needs to be a consensus among the alliance. And the message, I think, to the Russians is if you don’t like this direction this is heading, then get out of Ukraine.

Secondly, I think we’ve got to watch whether the US administration is going to take the advice from General Clark and General Scaparrotti and really ramp up our support militarily for Ukraine so they can take advantage of the situation.

And, three, monitoring Russian troop morale and everything we can do to encourage its undermining.

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Finland and Sweden’s NATO entries are a mixed blessing for the old Nordic allies

Ann-Sofie Dahl — Tue, 27 Jun 2023 11:57:04 +0000

The accession of Finland and, soon, Sweden to NATO has been described as a game-changer that will make the Alliance “stronger than ever,” to quote US President Joe Biden. Not only will this new round of enlargement have a huge impact on security in the Nordic-Baltic region; it will also lead to significant changes within NATO, as its northern flank gains substantial weight and influence with the addition of two strong and capable allies next door to expansionist Russia. As a matter of fact, NATO doubled its border with Russia overnight when Finland became the thirty-first member of the Alliance on April 4.

The intra-NATO balance will thus shift heavily in a northern and northeastern direction. This round of NATO enlargement further reinforces the trend of post-Cold War accessions, which have moved the Alliance’s center of gravity away from continental “old Europe.” Behind closed doors, not all allies greet this development with equal enthusiasm.

What’s more, Finland and Sweden’s membership will also shift the balance within the Nordic bloc. For the three old Nordic allies—Denmark, Norway, and Iceland, all founding members of the Alliance—this development is a mixed blessing. All three are, of course, delighted to see their two neighbors at long last abandon their traditional nonalignment in favor of NATO membership, and all welcome the enhancement of regional security that follows from this historic step. At the same time, Finland and Sweden’s size and strategic importance could cause the old Nordics to be overshadowed and overlooked within the Alliance.

The Baltic Sea as a ‘NATO lake’

The strategic impact of NATO’s enlargement to include Sweden and Finland will indeed be profound. The Baltic Sea will be almost entirely surrounded by Alliance members except for Russia, making it in effect a “NATO lake” with dramatically enhanced deterrence capabilities and security for the Nordic and the Baltic countries. Though Kaliningrad will remain as a Russian exclave—and a heavily weaponized one at that—the Russian room for any anti-access/area denial maneuvers in the Baltic Sea will be minimal. Instead, the main strategic tension with Russia is likely to move further north to the Kola Peninsula and the northeastern parts of the Nordic Arctic region known as Nordkalotten, or the “cap of the North.”

This area can be expected to draw a considerable amount of Alliance attention and resources away from the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap and will thus come at the expense of the western parts of the High North and Arctic; that is, Greenland, the Faroe Islands—both part of the Kingdom of Denmark—Iceland, and the Norwegian coast.

The greatest impact of this new balance in “Nordic NATO” will likely be felt in Denmark: the small ally that has been known as an activist star within NATO, always ready to embark on new operations, whether in faraway corners of the world or in battlegroups closer to home.

Over the years, Denmark has shown an impressively high tolerance for losses, as witnessed in its contribution to the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan, where the country suffered the highest number of fatalities per capita among NATO members.

The good news, as seen from Copenhagen, is that Denmark will no longer be a frontline state as NATO’s border moves east. When Sweden joins NATO, the strategic task of guarding the entrance to the Baltic Straits will no longer fall exclusively on Danish shoulders. In addition, the second-largest Swedish city, Gothenburg, will likely become a main transit port on the Scandinavian west coast, reducing the role of the Danish port city of Esbjerg, which has been undergoing a costly and extensive upgrade in the last few years.

More defense spending, more influence

Another factor is defense spending. Sweden is currently investing heavily in its military; this is much needed after decades of relentless and irresponsible cuts. Sweden’s ambition now is to reach NATO’s minimum budgetary requirement for defense spending of 2 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) by 2026.

Finland, on the other hand, easily meets the 2 percent requirement. With a history of war with its great power neighbor, Finland takes national defense seriously and never even contemplated following the rest of Europe’s post-Cold War disarmament trend.

Both newcomers bring substantial capabilities, especially in maritime and air defense. NATO will, for instance, gain a new fleet of Swedish submarines as well as JAS 39 Gripen fighter jets, in addition to Finnish F-35 fighter jets. Jointly, the Nordic militaries will assemble a substantial force on NATO’s northern flank and in the entire Nordic-Baltic region, ranging from the southern parts of the Baltic Sea all the way to the High North and the Arctic.

With this development, however, the old Nordic allies risk being downgraded to a secondary role as NATO and the United States turn their focus to the two new allies, whose vast territory and strategic location dominate the region.

Again, this could especially affect Denmark, and the trouble here is to some extent of its own making. While its three neighbors (Iceland has no national military) already meet the 2 percent requirement (Finland) or have ambitious and realistic plans to reach that target within the next few years (Sweden and Norway), Denmark’s defense budget currently amounts to only 1.38 percent of its GDP.

After receiving a harsh treatment in the NATO Defense Planning Capability Review 2021/2022, Denmark moved the date for reaching the 2 percent requirement up to 2030, three years sooner than the previous target—and six years after the 2024 deadline agreed upon at the 2014 Wales summit. Along with Slovenia, Denmark is listed as having the latest target date in the Alliance for meeting the current budgetary requirement.

This problem is far from new, though. Former US President Donald Trump famously criticized Denmark’s insufficient military spending, and variations of that theme have been repeated over the years since. In response, the then-prime minister and current foreign minister of Denmark, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, argued that what really matters is the actual content of this defense spending, not the exact amount.

Rasmussen and others have also suggested that the many years of Danish contributions at the forefront—such as fighting in Afghanistan, combatting international terrorism elsewhere, upholding deterrence in NATO’s battle groups in Estonia and Latvia, and participating in the Baltic air policing mission—should be considered in the overall evaluation of Denmark’s commitment to the Alliance.

In addition, right before Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen’s visit to the White House earlier this month, a creative solution to the 2 percent dilemma was found by including Danish military support to Ukraine in the defense budget. (Frederiksen is rumored to be a top candidate to replace Jens Stoltenberg as NATO’s next secretary general; that her country meets the budgetary requirement would certainly not hurt any such ambitions). Danish support for Ukraine is high; the country trains Ukrainian pilots, has donated Leopard tanks to Ukraine, and may soon donate F-16 fighter jets, as well.

Billions of Danish kroner will now be spent to restore Denmark’s military and align national capabilities with NATO’s requirements. That includes dealing with the challenges which have accumulated on the home front while the Danish military has been deployed overseas. Worn-out properties and recruitment difficulties are among these challenges. Denmark also has yet to deliver the heavy infantry brigade that it has promised NATO for some time now (and to provide it with crucial air defense systems).

That Finland and—hopefully—Sweden will join the NATO Vilnius Summit in July as two strong new allies is great news for regional security and for NATO. However, while celebrating this historic event, the old Nordic allies’ many years of loyal service and fearless contributions should not be forgotten, neither at NATO headquarters nor in the White House.

Ann-Sofie Dahl is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Transatlantic Security Initiative. Though a native Swede, she is a long-time resident of Copenhagen, where she does research on security and defense, including previously at the Center for Military Studies (from 2013 to 2016). Dahl is a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences.

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Five steps toward Ukrainian victory and a lasting peace with Russia

Arseniy Yatsenyuk — Mon, 26 Jun 2023 11:07:48 +0000

A few years ago, against the backdrop of a national pro-democracy uprising in Belarus, I called on European leaders to develop a clear strategy for Eastern Europe. This envisaged EU and NATO membership for Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and a free Belarus. Alas, many European politicians preferred to wait and see.

It is admittedly difficult to make historic political decisions, but the price of not doing so is often horrendously high. In this case, the price is obvious: By failing to integrate Ukraine and bring the countries of Eastern Europe out of the geopolitical grey zone, Western leaders set the stage for the full-scale Russian invasion of 2022.

Further mistakes will be just as costly. Thankfully, there is now a growing consensus throughout the West that only Ukrainian victory can end the global security crisis sparked by Russia’s invasion. Nevertheless, there is still a need for greater clarity on what would constitute victory and how Europe can achieve a lasting peace.

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Defeating Russia and securing peace will require a series of interrelated measures that go far beyond the battlefield. I have identified five key elements to a sustainable settlement that will end the current carnage and prevent any repetitions in the years ahead.

The first element is arming Ukraine sufficiently for victory. This process is well underway, but serious issues remain in terms of both quantities and timing. Every single delay in military aid costs Ukrainian lives and emboldens Russia. Ukraine’s Western partners must overcome their misplaced fear of provoking Putin and should instead seek to streamline the delivery of weapons. After all, it is now widely recognized that Russia must be defeated on the battlefield.

The second element is the strategic deterrence of Russia and creation of a new NATO-centered security architecture in Europe. There should now be no illusions: NATO alone can provide Europe with a credible and efficient security system. This means NATO membership for Ukraine. Nothing less will force Moscow to retreat. The upcoming NATO summit in Vilnius should conclude by inviting Ukraine to join the alliance. No bilateral guarantees or other compromise measures can hope to replace NATO’s Article Five or stop Russia.

The third element is Ukrainian membership of the European Union and restoration of the Ukrainian economy in close unison with the wider European economy. There has been significant progress toward this objective since the outbreak of Russia’s full-scale invasion, but overall results remain disappointing and fall far short of the many political statements on the importance of Ukraine’s European integration.

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The fourth key task is undermining Russia’s potential to act aggressively. It is hard to assess how long Russia will remain capable of waging the current war, but financial issues will play an important role in any decision-making process. Last year, official Russian military expenditure amounted to approximately $85 billion. This year, the figure is set to reach at least $108 billion. Unofficially, the total sum spent on the war is likely to be far higher. Clearly, sanctions must continue and need to intensify. Additional steps could include the prevention of dual-purpose goods transit through Russia and the maximum implementation of secondary sanctions.

In parallel, it is also vital to protect and strengthen Ukraine’s economy. Further measures are necessary to facilitate Ukrainian exports. NATO-led naval convoys should break Russia’s Black Sea blockade and enable Ukraine to resume international exports throughout the country’s southern ports. Ukraine’s external debt should undergo restructuring.

The fifth element necessary for a sustainable peace in Eastern Europe is perhaps the most important and at the same time the most intangible. Genuine victory will only be possible when Russian imperialism is no longer a threat to the region.

Once Ukraine is liberated and secure under the collective umbrella of NATO membership, the top priority for the international community will be addressing the imperial ideology that encourages Russians to commit acts of international aggression with impunity and contempt for human life. Russia must bear full legal and financial responsibility for its aggression against Ukraine and for the genocide of the Ukrainian nation. The era of Russian impunity for war crimes must end.

Unless the underlying issue of Russian imperialism is addressed at the international level, the liberation of Ukraine will provide little more than temporary relief. Confronting Russia’s imperial identity is the only way to achieve a lasting peace. This would pave the way for a new global security system and the much-needed reform of international bodies such as the UN Security Council. World peace will remain elusive until Russian imperialism is consigned to the dustbin of history.

Arseniy Yatsenyuk is Chairman of the Kyiv Security Forum and former Prime Minister of Ukraine (2014-16).

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Will Ukraine join NATO? Here’s a top Ukrainian official and former NATO leader’s game plan for the Vilnius summit.

Katherine Walla — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 17:57:36 +0000

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Securing Ukraine’s future in NATO with Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Andriy Yermak

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – A conversation on Western efforts to establish security guarantees for Ukraine and strategies to prepare for a productive NATO Summit in July.

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If Ukraine’s friends want to see faster progress in the recently launched counteroffensive, they should look in the mirror, said Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former secretary general of NATO: “So far we have provided weapons for Ukraine just to survive. Now [the] time has come to provide weapons for Ukraine to win.”

Rasmussen spoke at an Atlantic Council Front Page discussion with Andriy Yermak, head of the Office of the President of Ukraine. Yermak added that aside from seeking more and better weapons, the people of Ukraine are keeping a close eye on next month’s NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. They “expect that Ukraine will be invited to NATO,” Yermak said. If not, they will feel a “very, very strong demotivation” on the battlefield, Yermak argued.

Yermak and Rasmussen have delivered a plan to Ukraine’s supporters called the Kyiv Security Compact. It includes large-scale weapons transfers, enhanced intelligence sharing, and support to Ukraine’s defense industry so that it can more independently produce weapons and ammunition.

With both security guarantees and NATO membership potentially on the table in Vilnius, Rasmussen clarified that “these security guarantees will not replace Ukrainian membership [in] NATO.” They will, however, “build the bridge and will allow Ukraine to defend itself until it is covered by NATO’s Article 5.”

Below are more highlights from the conversation on Ukraine’s road to NATO membership and Western efforts to establish security guarantees, moderated by John E. Herbst, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Battlefield needs

The “incremental, step-by-step approach” by Ukraine’s supporters, Rasmussen argued, won’t help achieve victory. “You have to surprise and overwhelm your adversary,” he said. “So that’s why we need to use the big hammer to put a quick end to this conflict.”
That big hammer, according to Rasmussen, should be forged from battle tanks, longer-range missiles, and eventually fighter jets. Yermak added that long-range missiles—including the oft-discussed Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMs)—are certainly on Ukraine’s wish list. He believes a decision on long-range missiles will be reached with supporters in the “very, very near future.”
To get around the obstacles blocking the supply of advanced weapons systems, Rasmussen said it would take “determined political leadership” to break the habit of taking long periods of time to decide what to send—and of incrementally providing support. In the meantime, Russian President Vladimir Putin “has exploited our long decision-making processes to fortify Russian defenses,” he warned.

Joining the club

One of the arguments against admitting Ukraine as a NATO member is that it is currently at war. Rasmussen argued that making NATO membership dependent on the cessation of hostilities gives “Putin an incentive to continue the war.”
Plus, there’s precedent: West Germany joined the Alliance in 1955, and Article 5 covered its territory—not that of East Germany. “We could use exactly the same formula when it comes to Ukraine,” Rasmussen proposed. But doing so would still require “careful consideration,” he explained, as there will be “outstanding questions” about how Article 5 applies to areas such as the Donbas and Crimea.
For Ukraine’s path to NATO, Rasmussen backed the removal of the membership action plan (MAP) requirement, saying that “Ukraine already fulfills all the criteria within the MAP” because it has “demonstrated such efficiency on the battlefield.” Yermak also said that he believes Ukraine “has already passed all exams” and “is passing them every day [on the] battlefield.”
Rasmussen predicted that “there will be no consensus” on NATO membership for Ukraine at the Vilnius summit. But compromise is still possible: “The second-best option,” he said, would be to outline Ukraine’s path to NATO membership clearly. That would include removing the need for a MAP, pledging to review NATO’s enlargement at the 2024 summit, and establishing a NATO-Ukraine Council to identify what Kyiv needs to do before it can join the Alliance.
The current lack of clarity surrounding Ukraine’s path to NATO membership is dangerous, Yermak argued: It is precisely in that “gray zone” that “Russia has the advantages,” he said.

What’s at stake

Rasmussen said that NATO membership for Ukraine would help tell Putin that he “cannot stop this process” and that NATO’s door is open for Ukraine—and “[Putin is] not the doorman.”
“Simply restoring the status quo [is] not [an] option,” Yermak said, explaining that any Western uncertainty about the outcome of this war will amount to a Russian victory. “It will reinforce the Kremlin’s narratives of Russia fighting against an Alliance expansion in Ukraine—and winning.”
And with Russian presidential elections slated for next year, that narrative would only strengthen support for Putin’s regime, Yermak added, both at home and across the Global South countries that are watching Russia closely.
Ultimately, an invitation to join NATO would be a “supporting element” in a quicker Ukrainian victory, Yermak said. “I am sure about it.”

Katherine Walla is the associate director for editorial at the Atlantic Council.

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Ukraine’s counteroffensive is a marathon not a blitzkrieg

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 17:44:48 +0000

Less than two weeks since he first confirmed that Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive was finally underway, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy already finds himself forced to hit back at criticism over the pace of military operations. “Some people believe this is a Hollywood movie and expect results now. It’s not,” he told the BBC on June 21. “Whatever some might want, including attempts to pressure us, with all due respect, we will advance on the battlefield the way we deem best.”

Zelenskyy’s comments reflect frustration in Kyiv over reports in the mainstream international media and widespread claims on social media platforms suggesting Ukraine’s counteroffensive is already floundering. Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak was one of many Ukrainian commentators to suggest this trend is part of a coordinated Kremlin disinformation operation. In a June 20 post, he accused Moscow of fueling media hysteria about the alleged failure of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in order to secure a ceasefire and “freeze the conflict at any cost.”

Kremlin-tied or Russia-friendly sources are likely to be behind at least some of the recent criticism over the initial pace of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. At the same time, negative assessments are also a consequence of the unrealistically high expectations that built up in the half-year period prior to the start of the campaign.

In the final months of 2022, the Ukrainian military stunned the watching world by liberating large areas of the country from Russian occupation. A lightning September offensive saw most of northeastern Ukraine’s Kharkiv region de-occupied, while a more methodical push in the south eventually resulted in the liberation of Kherson. These successes encouraged many to expect similarly rapid progress during the current campaign. In reality, Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive represents a far greater challenge in almost every sense.

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Ukraine must overcome a vast Russian invasion force strengthened by 300,000 mobilized troops that is dug in behind successive lines of sophisticated defensive fortifications stretching for over one thousand kilometers. They must do so without air superiority and while outgunned by Russian artillery at many points along the front. Nor can they count on the element of surprise. This incredibly ambitious task would challenge the world’s most powerful militaries. Understandably, Ukrainian commanders are adopting a methodical approach to the campaign.

Progress so far has been very slow but steady. During the first few weeks of the counteroffensive, Ukraine claims to have liberated at least eight settlements. While most represent sparsely populated frontline villages with little strategic value, the sight of the Ukrainian flag raised in liberated communities provides all Ukrainians with a massive morale boost. Meanwhile, the big battles still lie ahead.

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For now, the Ukrainian military is focusing on probing attacks at numerous points along the front in order to identify weaknesses and thin out Russian defenses. Ukraine is also carrying out a comprehensive campaign of airstrikes against Russian military and logistical targets deep inside occupied territory. Britain’s May 2023 decision to provide Ukraine with long-range Storm Shadow cruise missiles is playing an important role in these air attacks, making it possible to hit targets virtually anywhere in occupied Ukraine. For example, Storm Shadow missiles are believed to have been used in the June 22 attack on a strategically important bridge connecting Crimea with Russian-occupied southern Ukraine.

These tactics are reminiscent of the early stages of last year’s ultimately triumphant Ukrainian campaign to liberate Kherson. At the beginning of August 2022, Ukraine very publicly signaled the start of a counteroffensive to free the southern port city and surrounding region. Progress was initially slow, leading to widespread criticism and pessimistic forecasts. However, Ukraine’s strategy of systematically targeting key bridges across the Dnipro River which Russian troops relied upon for resupply eventually paid off. Hemmed in and cut off, Russian commanders ordered a humiliating retreat in early November.

While the Kherson counteroffensive was on a far smaller scale than the current operation, it offers perhaps the best guide to Ukraine’s current objectives and envisioned timeline. The campaign to liberate Kherson involved tens of thousands of troops and took approximately three months to complete. Today’s counteroffensive involves hundreds of thousands of troops on both sides, with an area equal to a medium-sized European country at stake. It may be months before Ukraine’s commanders feel the conditions are right to attempt a major push to achieve a comprehensive breakthrough.

Ukraine’s international partners seem to appreciate the need for patience and are now emphasizing a long-term commitment to Ukraine that goes far beyond the current counteroffensive. At the Ukraine Recovery Conference in London on June 21, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak reiterated his promise to “stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes.” Other Western leaders have made similar pledges in recent weeks.

These statements are particularly important at a time when Russian hopes of rescuing their faltering invasion increasingly hinge on a weakening of Western resolve and a reduction in support for Ukraine. Despite the many setbacks of the past sixteen months, Putin and other senior regime figures in Moscow are apparently still convinced they can ultimately outlast the democratic world in Ukraine. European and American leaders are attempting to dampen such expectations by signaling the strength of their commitment to Ukrainian victory.

As international anxiety grows over the perceived lack of progress in Ukraine’s big summer counteroffensive, it is vital that this message of Western unity and resolution remains clear and unambiguous. The campaign to defeat Russia’s invasion is a marathon not a blitzkrieg, but it has every chance of success as long as Ukraine and the country’s partners are unwavering in their commitment.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Q&A with General (retired) Wesley K. Clark

aozen — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 12:02:14 +0000

Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe Gen. (ret.) Wesley K. Clark looks back at the fundamentals of US-Turkish strategic cooperation in an interview with the Atlantic Council’s Rich Outzen.

Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY (DJ): You spent a lot of time working with the Turkish military at the tactical, operational, strategic, and political-military levels. What stands out as the key to success when working with this unique ally?

Gen. (ret.) Wesley K. Clark: Clarity of mission. Clarity of requirements. Clarity of the rules. This was actually the critical element in relationships with the Turkish military and at the higher levels. Don’t be slippery, don’t be vague, don’t leave the details undiscussed. Think it through. Lay it out. It’s a very engineering-centric approach. Not, let’s say, a soft science approach to military affairs. I think it was a very effective approach, and we were effective when we understood and worked in the same spirit.

DJ: A bit reminiscent of the Prussian approach to planning, perhaps? No nonsense?

Clark: It’s no nonsense, and it’s no backsliding on a commitment once given. So, we always understood that, you know. When you are working with Turkey, if you get the agreement they will follow through. You must also follow through. You will not be given the opportunity to back away from commitments, and this is the key with Turkey. Know what you’re doing, what you’re ultimately going after. Lay it out clearly, work it out in detail, and when you shake hands on it, it’s as good as gold.

DJ: Is it easier to work with the Turks on a multilateral and alliance basis than bilaterally?

Clark: The Turkish approach is consistent—this is the way the Turks are. Work is consistent both in an alliance and bilaterally. But the differences have been in the circumstances, the environment, the exogenous issues. Turkey has always been very sensitive about its internal security, going back to the creation really of modern Turkey. Some of the key concerns and issues go back to the founding by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Concern over the Aegean is one. We were trying to resolve cross tell [military information exchange between organizations at the same operational level] when I was a young major, then again when I came back eighteen years later.

We were working with different generations of equipment and personnel, but it was the same set of issues more or less. Turkish leadership has always been proud, nationalistic, cognizant of their heritage, and also the unique geography and position of their country.

DJ: Washington as a policy community in the post-Cold War period shifted from operating within formal alliance structures to more ad hoc or issue-based coalitions. Alliances can be cumbersome and bureaucratically challenging, but there is a payoff in terms of trust and institutional commitment. Turkey is a prime case of an ally that becomes more difficult the further afield we get from formal understandings. Has Washington lost the muscle memory, or the patience, for such alliances?

Clark: I think the Biden administration is getting very high marks for consultation. But, unfortunately, there’s a legacy that they picked up from the previous administration.

And, as you know, NATO was prepared to invoke Article 5 in support of the United States after 9/11, and the United States chose to primarily to work through a coalition of the willing rather than through NATO. We didn’t want to mess with this messy political stuff.

The policy decision was taken to work more unilaterally under the Bush administration. This was driven by [then US Defense] Secretary [Donald H.] Rumsfeld, rather than [then US] Secretary [of State Colin L.] Powell. [Rumsfeld] was a dominant leader who didn’t want to worry too much about the diplomatic niceties that were required. He wanted people who would follow easily rather than having to work out an agreement. That was his operating style, and I think that style is what drove serious problems in our relationship with Turkey, such as our inability to bring the 4^th Infantry Division through Turkey in 2003. It was astonishing—astonishingly ineptly managed by the United States and this has had consequences that have lasted for a long time.

DJ: This goes back perhaps to the issue of stating the end-state commitments up front. Ankara was pretty clear on their concerns over economic losses and destabilization in northern Iraq. This was portrayed in the US press as haggling or “bargaining at the souk,” but perhaps it had more to do with the engineering mentality you referred to earlier, and their prior experiences with regional instability.

Clark: This was a real problem we faced with the end of the Cold War, the problem of regional instability. Of course, we were focused on the Balkans, and in the Balkans, Turkey did a wonderful job with us. But at the same time, we were dealing with the legacy of the Gulf War and the problem of Operation Provide Comfort, where we depended greatly on the Turks and operated out of the base at İncirlik. Yet we were pursuing policies which promoted an independent Kurdistan, which was a threat to Turkey. So, you have to give the Turks credit for being able to handle an ambiguous and ambivalent situation. They were, at the time, happy to have the United States’ support, and we had overlapping interests. They certainly wanted to protect the Muslim community in the Balkans, as we did. I think they did more than they were ever given credit for officially in this, but at the same time they were very patient in putting up with the United States’ need to hem in Saddam [Hussein in Iraq].

During my time as NATO commander, we flew repetitive missions out of Turkey under Operation Northern Watch. We overflew Iraq, and in 1998 we began responding to radar lock-on with kinetic fire. Turkey was very accommodating with that. If you look at the balance of the relationship, they’ve been long-term excellent partners for the United States.

DJ: Turkey has developed impressive defense industrial relationships, operational reach, and power projection capabilities beyond its own border areas. It’s engaged in Africa, Central and South Asia, the Caucasus, and the Gulf as well as the Balkans. Is this a threat or an opportunity for the West?

Clark: I think it’s a great opportunity. It’s based on something fundamental that’s changed in Turkey, which is the development of Turkey’s home-grown engineering and higher education.

In the 1950s, when we first had our relationship with Turkey through NATO, and we were brought together as allies in Korea, Turkey was a much different place. It always had a cadre of good engineers and tools, but it was more isolated.

Turkish engineering today is working throughout the world. They were very effective in supporting us in Afghanistan. They’re working in the Middle East. They’re working in Africa. It’s a tremendous opportunity for the West to work with Turkish engineering in general, not just the military.

DJ: Lastly, what’s your fondest memory of the Turks or Turkey?

Clark: Great restaurants in Istanbul and having three kinds of lamb in the same meal, looking up and out at the beautiful architecture. I love looking at the city whenever I fly to or through Istanbul, and watching all the ships going through the Bosporus. You get a sense of the wonderful civilization, the dynamism, the economic development. The place is a testament to Turkish entrepreneurship and character, and I feel so blessed to have seen some of this in my lifetime.

General (Retired) Wesley K. Clark is a former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) who now serves as Chairman and CEO of Wesley K. Clark and Associates. He is a board director at the Atlantic Council and a member of the Defense Journal’s honorary advisory board.

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Q&A with General (retired) Philip M. Breedlove

aozen — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 12:02:13 +0000

Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe Gen. (ret.) Philip M. Breedlove looks back at his experience managing the US-Turkish defense relationship in an interview with the Atlantic Council’s Rich Outzen. General Breedlove was a key player in US-Turkish relations during a turbulent period.

Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY (DJ): You worked with the Turkish military a fair amount, interacting at both operational and political-military levels. What lessons did you learn about the Turks, the bilateral relationship, what works and what doesn’t work within it?

Gen. (ret.) Philip M. Breedlove: My career was bookended in a way by Turkey. Early in my career, I found myself at İncirlik [Air Base] a lot. During that time, I made a lot of very close associations and acquaintances. I got to know a lot of the Turkish leadership down there personally. I found them to be good, faithful, understanding partners.

When I came back as the three-star numbered Air Force commander [Third Air Force], İncirlik was home to one of my wings. I would conduct regular visits, and when our talks focused on the mission at hand in İncirlik, we had willing, wonderful partners. Yet we were starting to run into some of the difficulties associated with not being able to operate out of Turkey during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Then, of course, I was chosen to be SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe]. We were starting to see the front end of Washington’s friction with [Turkish] President [Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan, though I still found on the personal level that my interaction with Turkish peers was very good. Turkey had undergone a change of political philosophy in a few years, more clearly challenging the principle of Western alignment.

I found that as I related to the ambassadors and civilian officials, they were less warm than the officers perhaps, but they were very professional. Turkish statesmen are very professional; inside of that word is a lot of things [smiling]. They were insistent…really good at presenting their side of the story, and [had] an amazing sense of historical recall. They were adept at leading off conversations with historical precedents and anecdotes. They were professional and, yes, difficult.

DJ: What did you find to be the key challenges in dealing with allies within NATO, especially Turkey?

Breedlove: The first thing for [the United States] to remember in dealing with an ally, in this case Turkey, is that in an alliance it is a peer-peer relationship. We need Turkey geopolitically; the physics, the geography, the place that Turkey finds itself—we need them onside. We need them just like they need us; this is not a lopsided relationship. Their control of the Dardanelles and of access to the Black Sea—these are very important things, and even though we have drawn down our forces a bit at İncirlik, it remains an incredibly important airfield for anything you need to do in the Middle East. So, we have to start from that—geography and a peer relationship.

What causes the complications in working from that basis? Well you’ve got politics on both sides. In Turkey, you’ve got the politics of Erdoğan, very different from what preceded it. In the United States, all too often we take what should be bipartisan geopolitical and geostrategic issues and subject them to the priorities of domestic politics. We allow petty politics to dominate the geostrategic narrative. Recently, we’ve seen a bipartisan body formed in Congress to watch and attend to China policy and issues, to build effort across the aisle for something that works. Perhaps we need something like that for Turkey.

DJ: Domestic concerns in both countries impact the framing and conduct of bilateral relations. This is perhaps natural, but creates challenges for “relationship managers”—diplomats, military, bureaucrats, and others. Given your experience as one of the managers, how did you account for the role of domestic factors in foreign policy decisions?

Breedlove: In Turkey, before the [2016] coup attempt, the military had a different relationship with the government than after. The military was respected, but not only protected the people from external enemies, but from internal disorder as well. The attempted coup represented a major dislocation in civil-military relations, and prompted a redefinition and restructuring. Things have changed, and the United States needs to understand that—it won’t go back to a situation where the Turkish military drives the bilateral relationship. [We] also need to understand that some, but not all, problems go away if there is political change. We’ve had our own presidents who prompted allies to say, “If it weren’t for that guy, things would be great.” All governments have their challenging times, and we are certainly going through one of those now.

DJ: Turkey has developed important power projection capabilities in recent years and has demonstrated those in Libya, Syria, the Caucasus, and is engaged in Central and South Asia, the Balkans, Africa. This is a relatively new phenomenon. Do Turkey’s Western allies view this as a threat or an opportunity?

Breedlove: The question is one of coherent strategic action with allies. If growth of capabilities is accompanied by NATO solidarity and consultation with allies, the allies cheer. Whereas if capability growth is perceived as being driven by narrow or parochial interests, even partisan interests, many see it as destabilizing or nefarious. Taking the long view, Turkey was an ally before and will be an ally after the current period of tension within the Alliance, and we want Turkey to play that role as a capable and formidable partner. We’ll have to navigate through the present period, but again, allies of the United States have occasionally had to navigate difficult periods with our political leaders, too.

DJ: In an era of great-power competition, what are the keys to better alignment and cooperation between the United States and Turkey? Where are the opportunities?

Breedlove: This is a tough one. I suppose I understand portions of what Turkey is doing: they want to sell kit [military gear], they want to exercise influence abroad. Yet it still interests me that Ankara takes the stance it does with Russia. When you look north from Turkey and see what Russia is doing—immoral, inhumane, illegal military action in Ukraine—one would think that there would be a different approach to Russia. It would be easy to say just embrace our values and morals, but that card doesn’t play so well. The geostrategic security piece, looking at Russia’s destabilizing actions in the Black Sea and elsewhere on Turkey’s periphery, that’s where we have opportunity and work to do.

DJ: Several years ago, an argument was made in the State Department that Turkey had options with Russia, and if Washington insisted on pursuing regional policies in Turkey’s near neighborhood that contradicted Turkish interests, especially regarding the PKK [the anti-Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party] and YPG [PKK-affiliated People’s Defense Units], we would see Turkish cooperation with Russia. Not out of perfidy, but out of “naked practicality.” There were few takers for that argument at the time because there were few people that believed Turkey had the leverage and agility to do so.

Breedlove: I believed it. I was fairly vocal during that period of time. [US Defense Secretary] Lloyd Austin and I were peers at the time, commanders of the two combatant commands. I still count him as a friend; we agreed on about 90 percent of our views on strategy, but YPG was not one of those things. I argued more than once that we were aligning with a group for an immediate purpose that would ultimately cause us major problems over decades and generations with Turkey. This is another one of those occasions when I think politicians played an unhealthy role in deciding how to move forward, because it was all about how to win a war, and not win the peace afterwards.

DJ: Defense was traditionally the heart of US-Turkey bilateral relations: defense industry, military cooperation, regional cooperation. These have attenuated in recent years, and other sources of traction—bilateral trade, tourism, people-to-people contact—have not taken their place, lagging Europe, Russia, and other partners.

Breedlove: Yes, in military terms the contact has decreased. This is also a problem in the United States in terms of how the military relates to other Americans: fewer people serve, the military becomes sort of a family business for some and mysterious for others. A smaller military and less overseas basing have affected relations with Turkey.

Lack of people-to-people contact is one of the biggest problems we have. In my generation we had very close contact with our peers in the Turkish military, we maintained those relationships, and we were able to keep in touch and deepen mutual awareness and understanding over time. The reduced contact is not producing the same types of contacts and friendships at present—the informal relationships. The granular contact that we used to have at the middle rank and senior rank levels, joint exercises and training especially, we’ve lost it. That would be a place to start rebuilding.

The second place is the politicization of defense industrial products. The F35, the F16, and other defense sales all went south too quickly and without due concern for long-term effects. On the Turkish side, they messaged us hard that they wanted Patriots, but we couldn’t find our way to mutually acceptable terms until they had already concluded negotiations with Russia on the S-400, which set off an unfortunate chain of events. If the US side had shown a little more flexibility on meeting Turkish terms—similar to what was offered in the end but after decisions were made—and realizing that every deal is a new negotiation…if we had approached that differently, we might be in a very different place. Turkish industries are amazing and were going to be a big part of building F35s for countries all around the world.

Lack of close personal contacts, decreasing cooperation, and deficits of trust are all mutually reinforcing.

General (Retired) Philip M. Breedlove is a former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). He is a board director at the Atlantic Council.

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Continuity and change in Turkish foreign policy

Alper Coşkun — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 12:02:10 +0000

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s recent electoral success after more than twenty years in power represents a historic period of political continuity in Turkey. Nowadays, an integral part of this continuum has to do with an ongoing recalibration of the country’s foreign policy. Internal and external dynamics had prompted this course correction three years ago, and it will now be up to Turkey’s former spy chief and new top diplomat, Hakan Fidan, to steer the effort.

Change by necessity

It was in the latter part of 2020 when Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) government first showed signs of buckling under the need for change. Its hard-nosed, adventurous approach to international relations, regional military posturing, and power projection had not increased Turkey’s circle of friends. The country’s self-inflicted regional isolation and alienation from its Western allies had become too costly. Hence, olive branches were extended to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel—countries with which Turkey’s relations had been fraught for some time. Meanwhile, Erdoğan toned down his characteristically combative rhetoric toward the West. Most surprisingly, as the issue of uncontrolled migration and especially the future of more than three and a half million Syrians displaced in Turkey began to weigh heavily on the domestic political scene, even the idea of normalizing relations with once nemesis Bashar Assad’s Syria entered the picture.

The motivation behind this changing foreign policy posture was not driven solely by Turkey’s problems in the international arena. It was also about the deteriorating circumstances at home. The Turkish economy was underperforming, spelling trouble for Erdoğan. Poor governance and inept policy decisions had entrapped Turkey in a vicious cycle. While democratic backsliding and an erosion of the rule of law undermined the investment climate, unorthodox economic policies and reckless foreign policy actions triggered international unease, hastening capital flight.

Turkey’s economic woes deepened against this backdrop due to high inflation, a severely depreciating national currency, and a widening balance of payments deficit. With its coffers already drained in vain, Turkey’s need for external financial flows became acute. Recasting Turkey’s image in a positive light for investors and potential donors alike, particularly in the Arab Gulf, was seen as the way out of this conundrum. Hence began the foreign policy recalibration, and soon enough, the much-needed financial support started to trickle in.

Mother Nature barges in

The massive twin earthquakes of February 6, which claimed nearly fifty thousand lives and wreaked destruction in Turkey estimated at more than $100 billion, compounded existing economic challenges. They also made access to foreign financial flows and aid even more critical.

On the flip side, the earthquake disaster ushered in a worldwide wave of empathy and support that touched everyone’s hearts in Turkey. This positive sentiment also found its place in official statements, stressing appreciation and vowing to always remember that Turkey had not been deserted in its time of need. An abrupt change of atmosphere in Turkey’s engagement with the rest of the world occurred. Longstanding differences were set aside, at least temporarily, and there was a respite from the tension between Turkey and its most fervent rivals, Greece and Armenia, who also rushed to Turkey’s assistance.

This sobering experience impacted Turkish society’s outlook on the other and the rest of the world. It ran contrary to a populistic narrative that had become fashionable in Turkey, that foreign actors are harmful by design and do nothing but collude against the country. Images of foreign search and rescue teams frantically digging in the rubble to save lives, mourning with the Turkish people, and rejoicing with them when lives were saved, told a different story. Nevertheless, the political utility of fearmongering about external forces lingers on, as masterfully practiced by Erdoğan during his latest election campaign, and disagreements with other actors have surely not evaporated. Still, it is possible to speak of a positive spirit that has dawned on Turkey’s foreign relations after the February earthquakes. This is an important window of opportunity that adds impetus to the idea of conducting a rational reframing of Turkish foreign policy.

Post-election options: To reset or not to reset?

As Turkey enters a new era under Erdoğan’s third term, with a new cabinet of ministers, the question is where the country goes from here. For international relations analysts, the core issue is whether Turkey will sustain the effort to reset its foreign policy and, if so, what that will mean for its engagement with the rest of the world.

The simple answer to the first part of the question is a straightforward yes. Turkey will stay the course in recalibrating its foreign policy. The reasons for this, which constitute an answer to the second part of the same question, are twofold.

First, Turkey’s security interests require it to do so. A regional state of isolation and sowing excessive doubts over one’s place in the transatlantic alliance are risky propositions, especially as the war in Ukraine rages on and rivalry, rather than cooperation, defines the global order. Turkey must rebuild its circle of friends, and the effort needs to start in its region and with its allies. Turkey will, therefore, prioritize defusing tension over an escalation in its international dealings. This does not mean it will forfeit long-held positions on issues like its disagreements with Greece or its view on how to solve the Cyprus problem. But managing these challenges will become easier, and Turkey will not be the hasty spoiler in the event of a shared interest in making progress on any of them.

Turkey will continue to adjust to the realities of a multipolar world order and pursue its regional and global interests through multiple vectors. Yet, it will concurrently safeguard its legacy role within NATO by maintaining its contributions to the Alliance and readily assuming additional responsibilities in areas that overlap with its priorities. Ankara’s most recent decision to deploy reserve forces to Kosovo in support of NATO’s prudent planning can be seen as a concrete manifestation of this calculation. Turkey will maintain such a trajectory, with specific nuances of its own. While deepening defense cooperation with Russia will no longer be an idea it will flirt with, Ankara will carefully steer away from deliberate confrontation with Russia and China. It will continue to see merit in its ability to maintain open communication channels with Moscow and strive to preserve and, where possible, leverage its access. But at the end of the day, Turkey knows better than to irreversibly discredit its place in the Western security architecture. It will approach the issue of Sweden’s pending application for NATO membership in this light and be ready to move forward on the matter, assuming Sweden can display a reasonable degree of progress on Turkey’s expectations.

Second, Turkey’s economic interests also require new thinking, coupled with a foreign policy reset. The Turkish economy is overwhelmingly integrated with the West, particularly with the European Union (EU), which sources more than 50 percent of foreign direct investment in Turkey and is its largest trading partner. Meanwhile, Turkey’s trade relations with the United States have lately flourished, with a potential for further growth.

Turkey will have a strong incentive to nurture these ties, to attract more aid and investment, and, in the case of the EU, to start negotiations on upgrading its Customs Union. All of this will only be possible if the climate in relations with Turkey is positive.

The assertion by Turkey’s newly appointed finance minister, Mehmet Şimşek, that Turkey has no other choice than to return to a rational framework in the conduct of its economy leaves no room for doubt on that front. Rekindling the considerable capacity of the Turkish economy and emerging from the historical destruction of the February earthquakes will only be possible, and most certainly easier, if Turkey’s ties with its traditional partners and allies in the West are stable and robust.

This mutually reinforcing dynamic between foreign and economic policy interests will inevitably have to be factored into Turkey’s actions in the days ahead.

Conclusion: Continuity and change

Turkey has had a good taste of what unorthodox approaches to foreign and economic policies look like. The results brought more costs than benefits.

The experiment of totally rejecting Turkey’s traditional foreign policy playbook and casually rewriting it in more ways than one simply failed. Justifications have been argued on grounds of Western missteps in Syria, traumas associated with the failed coup attempt by a faction within the Turkish Armed Forces in 2016, and a need for balanced approaches in a multipolar world. Yet each country’s foreign policy needs an organizing principle, and membership in the Western community of nations has a better track record in this regard than does the status of free agent, equidistant from all.

Turkey, under Erdoğan, has been trying to break out of a disruptive cycle of serial foreign policy crises for some time now. As the country enters a new era under Erdoğan, representing a remarkable period of uninterrupted rule, the post-election atmosphere lends itself well to such a recalibration, and the vast experience that Turkey’s new foreign minister carries under his belt will be very useful in this effort.

Alper Coşkun is a senior fellow within the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former director general for international-security affairs at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Follow him on Twitter: @iacoskun.

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Prospects for US-Turkish convergence on Syria

Rich Outzen — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 12:02:06 +0000

Syria has been a point of deep contention in US-Turkish relations for the past decade, despite the fact that the two NATO allies have cooperated on diplomatic pressure campaigns against Bashar al-Assad’s regime, humanitarian relief, and refugee assistance. History offers relatively few examples of two countries committed to the same outcome of a war but largely incapable of cooperation within it. In fact, the two are fighting parallel wars in Syria—the Turks against forces affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terror group (the People’s Protection Units, or the YPG), the Americans against the Islamic State (IS) using those same affiliates—with neither effort focused on the mutual opponent (Assad and his sponsors). Is there any prospect for change in this odd equation?

A rift opens up

The war in Syria has grown into a major wedge between the United States and Turkey. Many Turks believe that Washington wants to erect a PKK-aligned state in Syria, and many in Washington believe Turkey has been insufficiently focused on eradicating Sunni extremism. Yet it was not always so; once upon a time there was a sense of shared purpose. National leaders from both countries demanded Assad’s ouster at the outset of the war. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan pledged Turkish support should the United States impose a no-fly zone and saw general overlap on Syria with then US president Barack Obama.

Obama came to view the war as more about the IS than Assad, his support to the Syrian opposition evaporated and the war became overwhelmingly a matter of counterterrorism policy. The United States and Turkey each demurred from new military commitments while urging the other to take the lead. Between the fall of Mosul to the IS in 2014 and the fall of Aleppo to Assad in 2016, the United States exited the war against Assad and refocused on the war against the IS; this removed the common, if tenuous, shared political logic.

Unwilling to commit large US forces to Syria and disappointed in hopes that Turkey might, Obama in 2014 struck a bargain of “naked practicality” to support the PKK-aligned YPG. While the move was billed as “temporary, transactional, tactical,” its open-ended nature constituted a “ticking time bomb” by disregarding Turkish concerns over empowering PKK networks. Over time, some in Washington came to think that a rebranded YPG might be able to create an autonomous Kurdish region on the cheap, analogous to the Kurdish region in Iraq and useful as a long-term platform for US forces. The YPG seemed to offer what had eluded Washington for a generation: effective counterterrorism without the need for state building or a political theory of success.

A multiaxial proxy game

It became clear after 2014 that the YPG’s ambitions extended beyond the defense of Kurdish-majority areas right up to security and political control over northern Syria and a key role in shaping the political future of Syria. This comported with the broader PKK project of carving self-ruled regions out in Syria, Turkey, and elsewhere under a common ideological banner. Because the US “by-with-through” operational approach abjured strategic control over the YPG while arming and equipping it, the United States became a de facto sponsor of that project.

The Euphrates River became a proverbial Rubicon in 2016 when YPG forces crossed it and remained in control of Arab-majority areas, despite US assurances of withdrawal. This proved to be a watershed moment for Ankara, as the Turks adopted an increasingly militarized approach to strengthening the anti-Assad opposition and rolling back YPG gains. A series of Turkish military operations in Syria eviscerated the YPG’s ambitions for autonomy, leaving them much-reduced territory and growing dependence on Damascus. Yet they retained a singular strategic asset—massive US military aid and a free hand in local and regional politics.

Northern Syria has become a region of intricate balances and overlapping conflicts. The Turkish-supported Syrian National Army (SNA) and the US-supported Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF, the core of which is the YPG) skirmish and spar uneasily while Ankara contemplates further action against the YPG. The SDF works with Assad’s forces in some places, claiming official status under Assad, while the United States provides its salaries and logistical support. Turkish and Russian forces conduct joint patrols in sensitive areas. Iran-backed militias target US bases in the east, while YPG and Iran-backed militias confront the SNA in northern Aleppo.

Meanwhile, SDF forces appear increasingly enmeshed in the struggle for control of the neighboring Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). The YPG’s parent organization, the PKK, has come into open conflict with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which the United States and Turkey support, while parlaying the weakening of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) into greater control of Iraq’s border with Iran. Meanwhile, highly trained elite counter-terror units (YAT) from the SDF have been operating in PUK-controlled Iraqi territory using PUK helicopters, likely with the knowledge of US forces. Even as Iran instrumentalizes the PKK to undermine the KDP, the PKK appears to be instrumentalizing the SDF to support its drive to supplant the KDP. The US war against the IS has morphed into something else—a multiaxial proxy game with no clear end game and multiplying side effects—and the biggest beneficiary may be Iran, in Syria as well as Iraq.

A narrowing path

Turkish commitment to prevent a PKK-aligned entity from ruling northern Syria or northern Iraq has been amply demonstrated. Washington, too, seems committed to keeping troops in Syria, less for a clear political goal than to prevent any other power from filling in when they leave. The modus vivendi of simply staying in Syria but out of one another’s way satisfies no one (not even the YPG). Are there ways to find convergence between the respective national policies, other than one or both parties exiting Syria and leaving it to Assad and the Iranians?

One theoretical path would be the YPG and its political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), renouncing the broader PKK movement and its armed campaigns against Turkey. This could result in the movement being seen as authentically Syrian, and cooperating with the Syrian opposition in negotiations to end the war. Yet YPG fighters consider themselves inextricably linked to the PKK and its ideology, rendering distinctions more cosmetic than substantive. Further, the US interest in sustained use of the YPG as a counter-IS force requires continued arming and training that by definition poses a threat to Damascus, Ankara, and other Syrians, making reconciliation unlikely. The PKK uses the YPG as connective tissue to the Assad regime, and PKK-appointed commissars or “kadros” in Syria ensure that key decisions taken by the YPG or PYD comply with the political line set by the PKK’s senior leaders. The United States lacks the means, or the will, to reform the PKK control mechanism to placate Ankara or promote power sharing with other Syrians.

Former US Syrian envoy James Jeffrey argued that a reasonable compromise for Ankara and Washington lies in physical separation between Turkish-backed groups and the SDF, with consistent efforts to address specific Turkish sensitivities. Yet how long can the United States keep nine hundred troops on Syrian soil while they are subject to increasing attacks from Iranian proxies and there is no discernible end state? Other observers have argued that the time has come to negotiate with Moscow and Damascus a US withdrawal that returns nominal control to Assad but maintains SDF control in fact. It is hard to conceive of a more blatant repudiation of US values than to reward, and trust, Assad as guarantor of what follows.

The path forward

One obstacle to the United States simply declaring victory and leaving is al-Hol and prison camps like it. These camps hold tens of thousands of IS members, supporters, and relatives, and the SDF guards them; US withdrawal would likely lead to their release. In a sense, the United States is prisoner to the prisoners; with fewer IS targets in SDF-controlled areas, preventing a new wave of IS attacks by keeping IS members in prison has become a key measure of “enduring defeat.” The assumption of this contingent form of stability that outside actors—Turkey, Iran, Russia, or Damascus—will refrain in perpetuity from disrupting it appears tenuous.

US forces will depart Syria in the coming years, and the YPG and its political wing lack the resources and legitimacy to maintain control of majority-Arab northeast Syria on their own. A reasonable political strategy for the United States must recognize that protecting US geopolitical and humanitarian interests, as well as effective counterterrorism, in the long run rest more on cooperation with Ankara and Erbil than on propping up the YPG. A soft landing of sorts for those that fought the IS with the United States should be part of the strategy but can only be achieved if Ankara and Erbil receive assurances that the massive US military subsidies and political license granted the movement will be removed, forcing it into compromises with them, rather than with the United States’ enemies in Tehran and Damascus.

In short, the United States might signal an off-ramp from the YPG to Ankara and Erbil while incentivizing authentically Syrian components of the YPG and PYD to seek peace and political cooperation with the Syrian opposition—and with the KDP. Ironically, the best protection for US interests in Syria may rest in building down the power of its current proxy in a deliberate and transparent manner and negotiating a new relationship between it and our other friends in the region. This is no mean task but offers much-needed clarity to all sides. The alternatives of propping up an unsustainable status quo or matchmaking between the YPG and Assad, whatever their other results, will perpetuate the deep Syria rift in US-Turkish relations.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on Twitter @RichOutzen.

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Turkish-Ukrainian defense partnership in a new geopolitical realm

Can Kasapoglu — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 12:02:04 +0000

In his 2021 Atlantic Council article, Ukraine’s top diplomat, Dmytro Kuleba, argued that Ukraine and Turkey should pursue a coherent vision for security of the Black Sea together. Kuleba emphasized the need for NATO to see the Ukrainian-Turkish defense partnership as a valuable driver that can contribute to the region’s stability.

Less than a year later, the Russian aggression against Ukraine at NATO’s doorstep underscored the importance of Kuleba’s words. When the dust settles, the international community may, for the first time, witness what a real post-Soviet Russia looks like. The Turkish-Ukrainian strategic partnership would mark a promising window of opportunity for Western military industries in the post-Soviet space.

Think geopolitically: Turkey and Ukraine can rejuvenate European military resiliency

In early February 2022, three weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Kyiv to meet his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Welcoming Erdoğan’s visit, Zelenskyy focused on defense and aviation industry collaboration during the talks, describing cooperation in these segments “as a driving force” behind the bilateral strategic partnership. The objective, he stated, is to implement high-value, specific projects; establish joint ventures; and facilitate the exchange of expertise and technology. During the visit, Turkey and Ukraine agreed to coproduce Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones in Ukraine.

As the ideas promoting a “political NATO” have sunk without a trace following the Russian aggression at the Alliance’s east, NATO is fast rolling back to its Cold War roots. NATO’s present Strategic Concept document, adopted at the Alliance’s 2022 Madrid summit, considers Russia a direct threat to the allied nations in Europe. The paradigm laid out at the Erdoğan-Zelenskyy summit is thus gaining more ground. At present and for the foreseeable future, NATO members’ capacity and their capabilities have become the prime question. Notably, in a few years, NATO members Turkey and Poland, as well as the Alliance’s partner Ukraine, will likely field among the largest armed forces across Europe.

Corvettes, drones, and more

Following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Turkey and Ukraine have discovered shared geopolitical interests in Black Sea security. While Ankara has not adopted a pronounced anti-Russia stance in the region, Turkey’s contributions to rebuild Ukraine’s navy, which has lost most of its platforms following the Russian aggression against Crimea, speak volumes.

Kyiv has opted to procure MILGEM/Ada-class corvettes from Ankara. According to the manufacturer, STM, Ada-class corvettes are designed to conduct a broad array of operations, including the determination, location, classification, identification, and destruction of underwater, air, and surface targets, as well as to provide naval gunfire support. Patrol and maritime surveillance missions, as well as infrastructure and coastal protection, also fall under the MILGEM/Ada-class corvettes’ mission portfolio.

The Turkish-Ukrainian corvette deal aims to manufacture four platforms based on the MILGEM/Ada-class design philosophy with the goal of rebuilding Ukraine’s battered navy. Manifesting the predominant trend in Turkish-Ukrainian joint defense ventures, the deal extends to coproduction arrangements between the two nations. Ukraine is the first country to which Turkey has granted coproduction privileges for the corvette baseline in question. Finally, the Ukrainian Navy’s Ada-class surface vessels can potentially introduce yet another critical weaponry to Kyiv’s arsenal. While Ukraine had initially planned to equip its new corvettes with Neptune missiles, with the Ukrainian defense industry currently overstretched, Turkey might soon advance its offer of the ATMACA anti-ship cruise missile to Kyiv. Albeit significant in defense-technological scale, these capability-building efforts will translate into a warfighting edge in the long run.

Besides strategic partnerships in the maritime domain, another key segment of Turkish-Ukrainian defense cooperation is drone warfare. Following its successful combat record in different conflict zones of the world, the “Pantsir-killer drone” Bayraktar TB2 has shown its combat capabilities against the Russian columns, particularly in the opening stages of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. More importantly, at a time when the West offered help to Zelenskyy’s government to evacuate Kyiv, the Bayraktar TB2 drones’ successes were not solely about combat capabilities but also political warfare and keeping the morale high among the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ ranks.

Nowadays, the Turkish-Ukrainian strategic partnership in drone warfare is setting sail to new horizons. The joint production of Turkey’s rising strategic drone Akinci (Raider), as well as the unmanned turbofan-engine aircraft Kizilelma (Red Apple), mark the perfect marriage between Ankara and Kyiv in defense technology.

Ukraine brings a significant amount of defense industrial innovation know-how to the table. When matched with Turkey’s cutting edge in smart systems and drone warfare assets, the Turkish-Ukrainian strategic partnership is a true source of synergy. The Akinci drone’s first batch is powered by Ukrainian Ivchenko-Progress engines. Similarly, the Kizilelma baseline will use two different Ukrainian Motor Sich engines in various variants. The initial units fly with AI-25TLT turbofan engines. The following batches will be powered by the afterburner-capable AI-322F engines which will upgrade the unmanned aircraft to a transonic platform. These examples showcase the growing trust between the parties and could help strengthen cooperation among the Black Sea nations.

Last, Turkish defense company Baykar’s drone-manufacturing plant marks what Turkish-Ukrainian defense cooperation will look like in the future. The factory will turn operational within two years. Above all, Ukraine will become a TB2 producer nation soon. The project is also significant as it will boost the Turkish-Ukrainian strategic partnership and unveils new opportunities for joint research and development (R&D) activity.

A different European security architecture when the dust settles

At present, and perhaps in the history of mankind, NATO is the most successful political-military alliance in the world. Official writings consider NATO’s flexibility and its ability to adapt to changing defense landscapes to be the underlying reason behind the Alliance’s successful record so far. Nevertheless, the Alliance has to cope with a grim imbalance. Most member states cannot field combat-proven militaries for large-scale operations. Notably, merely two allied nations—the United States and Turkey—have ground forces that outnumber the Russian Western Military District. Worse, the armed forces of two-thirds of the allied nations are outmanned alone by Russia’s airborne branch (VDV), which employed some forty-five thousand before the invasion of Ukraine.

The Turkish Armed Forces have extensive combat experience and increasingly depend on indigenously produced weapon systems. In 2022, the annual turnover of the Turkish defense industry reached $12 billion. This marked an impressive 20 percent increase from 2021. Remarkably, turnover per capita rose to $150,000 in 2022, 12 percent more than the previous year. Around $4.5 billion of the $12 billion revenue came from exports, translating to an annual increase of 37 percent. Imports accounted for approximately $2.7 billion of the total turnover. Between 2021 and 2022, R&D expenditure hit $2 billion, and financial initiatives for R&D projects increased by 21 percent. In 2022, the Turkish defense industry employed 81,132 people, 7 percent more than in 2021.

Over the past twelve to eighteen months, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have come to operate a wide array of Western weaponry ranging from Javelin anti-tank missiles and Leopard 2 main battle tanks to Patriot air and missile defense systems and Stinger man-portable air-defense systems. More is on the way. This is a dramatic reversal of European—and US—reticence to provide lethal aid to Ukraine early in the war.

A sustainable model, based on technology exchange, co-development, and mutual trust between combat-experienced near-peers, is deepening of the decade-long bilateral defense relationship between Ukraine and Turkey.

Can Kasapoglu is a non-resident senior fellow at Hudson Institute, and the director of the Security & Defense Research Program at Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) in Istanbul. Follow him on Twitter @ckasapoglu1.

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Prospects for an improved US-Turkish strategic relationship

Lt. Gen. (ret.) Nihat Kökmen — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 12:02:01 +0000

Could Turkey return to the F-35 program with the potential sale by the United States of a modernization package for its F-16s and potential sale of billions of dollars’ worth of F-16V aircraft? Can progress on this issue serve as a step toward reestablishing a strategic partnership between the United States and Turkey? And how could it transform the political and military relationship between Turkey and the United States?

As I reflect on these questions, I am reminded of the late 1940s and early 1950s, a time when Turkish-US relations were at their peak. During this period, close to fifteen thousand Turkish Armed Forces personnel participated in the Korean War, demonstrating Turkey’s commitment to its alliance with the United States. The sacrifices were significant: 721 Turkish soldiers were killed and 2,147 wounded in the war. In February 1952, a little over a year before an armistice brought an end to the war, Turkey became a member of NATO. Many refer to Turkey’s participation in the Korean War as the “cost” of joining the Alliance.

In addition to the deepening political and economic relations between Turkey and the United States during that era, the two countries were also engaged in robust military cooperation, particularly in aviation. Admittedly, there were times when the political environment was fraught with tension. Some prominent examples include the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, crises involving Cyprus in 1964 and 1974, the 1975-78 US arms embargo on Turkey, and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, which caused a strain in the friendly atmosphere, even interrupting it. Nevertheless, through prudent diplomacy, mindful of ever-changing realities and alliance interests, sagacious minds prevailed. Relations were eventually restored, and strategic-level contacts were established in both civilian and military spheres.

Ties between Turkey and the United States, already strained over the 2016 coup attempt and US criticism on ties between Turkey and Russia, fell further in 2019 over the war in Syria and Turkey’s purchase of a Russian missile system.

Impact of the war in Syria

Turkey has borne some of the burden of the consequences of the war in Syria since its start in 2011. According to the United Nations, Turkey hosts some 3.6 million registered Syrian refugees. The large number of refugees has not only shifted the demographics in the border region, it has also added a crippling economic burden. Turkey has also faced cross-border terrorist attacks by Kurdish terrorist groups.

As a consequence of US policy miscalculations, northern Syria has become even more unstable with the presence of terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which the United States and the European Union (EU) consider to be a foreign terrorist organization.

Despite requests from Turkey, neither the United States nor the EU consider the PYD and YPG to be terrorist organizations. The United States first started providing support to the YPG and PYD in 2014 to assist them in their fight against the Islamic State in Syria. While the threat posed by the Islamic State in the region has effectively disappeared, the United States maintains its support to the PYD and YPG, which have been key partners of the US-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. The PYD and YPG also serve as the backbone of the coalition-created Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Despite Turkey providing Interpol and other senior US officials detailed allegations of terrorist acts by the PYD and YPG, aid to the terrorist organizations has not ceased, rather it has increased.

This support has caused significant harm to bilateral relations between the United States and Turkey. Early 2023 visits by the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and US Central Command (CENTCOM) commander to the region, although described as troop visits, have also contributed to rising tensions between the two countries. Ankara views these activities as part of an attempt by the United States to establish a satellite Kurdish statelet in eastern Syria, similar to what was tried in northern Iraq.

Missile defense

In 2013, NATO responded to Turkey’s request for ballistic missile defense by temporarily deploying systems such as the Patriot and SAMP-T from five allied countries to the region on a rotational basis with command and control located in Allied Air Command at Ramstein Air Base in Germany.

However, following Turkey’s 2018-19 operation against the YPG and PYD in northern Syria to safeguard its own security, the systems provided by the allied countries, with the exception of the Patriot system from Spain, were withdrawn. Despite ongoing discussions during bilateral meetings between the Turkish Ministry of National Defense and the Chief of General Staff at NATO headquarters, the allied countries that had previously deployed their systems declined to redeploy them citing various reasons.

In 2018, Turkey launched an effort to manufacture its own long-range regional air defense system called Siper. The war in Syria added a sense of urgency to this mission and a thorough review of alternatives, including the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system, was conducted at the request of the Air Force Command. The United States declined to meet the terms of a Turkish request for the Patriots. A 2018 attempt by Turkey to buy the SAMP-T from a Franco-Italian consortium also ground to a halt due to French objections. Turkey eventually opted to procure the S-400 system from Russia despite US opposition to the deal.

The procurement of the Russian S-400 system, coupled with US support to the YPG and PYD in Syria, proved to be the breaking point in the already strained US-Turkey relations.

As the Turkish military representative to NATO in Brussels at that time, I personally experienced not only the reactions of my US counterparts but also the questions and concerns raised by other representatives about the procurement of the S-400 system. Naturally, each country viewed the issue from their own perspective, which was closely tied to their respective policies and interests. However, recurring concerns centered on the compatibility of the Russian S-400 system with NATO’s integrated air defense system and the difficulty of safeguarding the intellectual property and sensitive information pertaining to the F-35 aircraft. Furthermore, there were frequent inquiries about why Turkey chose to procure such a system from Russia, a country that ranked as the top threat in NATO assessments since 2014.

Turkey faces a backlash

Following the S-400 purchase, the US Department of Defense removed Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019. And in 2020, the United States imposed sanctions on Turkey’s Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) pursuant to Section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).

Turkey had been a joint producer of the F-35 program, having signed a memorandum of understanding with the US government on January 26, 2007. Turkey had also paid for and completed the first package of pilot and ground personnel training. The justification for its removal was based on the claim that the use of the S-400 in the same environment as the F-35 could potentially lead to the theft of high-tech aircraft system information.

As a result of Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program, six F-35A aircraft that were produced for Turkey were confiscated and stored in hangars, and the personnel in training were sent back home. Negotiations are still ongoing regarding the repayment of the $1.25 billion that Turkey had previously paid for the program.

Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program led to a need to review the force structure of the Turkish Air Force, as relations between the Turkey and the United States became strained. It was decided to extend the lifespan of the F-4 aircraft that were originally planned to be phased out. Additionally, Turkey decided to acquire forty F-16V aircraft from the United States to meet its urgent air combat needs. The procurement by Turkey of seventy-nine modernization kits to boost the capabilities of its existing F-16 aircraft was also discussed.

A turning point?

Based on recent statements and evaluations made by Turkey and the United States, there appears to be a relatively positive atmosphere in administration circles. US President Joe Biden, who has not been very receptive to improving bilateral relations, has been supportive of Turkey’s request to procure aircraft and modernization kits. This support was especially visible in face-to-face meetings at the level of heads of state, such as the 2019 NATO summit and the Group of Twenty meeting in Rome in 2021. Yet, some members of the US Congress are dragging their feet regarding the implementation of these procurements.

It must be noted that even if the deal is approved today, delivery would take between three to five years in the best-case scenario. Nevertheless, reaching common ground can still be considered significant progress.

Rethinking the fate of the S-400 system, which was delivered in 2019, is of critical importance to resolving issues between Turkey and the United States. Regarding the S-400 systems that were stored in depots following some tests, I believe that a solution can be found involving either the frameworks proposed since then or by simply keeping the systems in storage.

A recent statement by Haluk Görgün, CEO of the Turkish defense firm Aselsan Elektronik Sanayi, is noteworthy. Görgün said that “with the development of UMBHSS-SIPER, we no longer need the S-300/S-400s.” Until the Siper system fully matures, though, SAMP-T might be a medium-term solution as well.

Removal of this obstacle may encourage members of Congress who are against Turkey to reconsider their positions on the supply of F-16Vs and modernization kits. With the establishment of such a positive climate, it is possible that Turkey could revive interest in its return to the F-35 program.

If Turkey can procure forty F-16V aircraft and modernization kits in sufficient numbers, it can easily embrace the motto “Leader in Its Region, Effective in Its Continent” that was popular in the early 2000s. A possible future return to the F-35 program might also lead to the reutilization of production capabilities that the Turkish defense industry lost after Turkey was removed from the program, the establishment of regional engine depot maintenance capability for domestic and allied use, and provide experience relevant to further development of the Turkish National Combat Aircraft (MMU).

Given Turkey’s formidable air force; its strategic location in a region with key transportation, energy, and hydrocarbon resources; and improving relations with Israel, the United States can again view it as a reliable and strong strategic ally. With the right mindset, Turkish and US state authorities can still turn back time.

The way ahead

The resolution of issues related to the S-400, PYD, and YPG is key to mending relations between Turkey and the United States. Ideally, this must be followed by the approval of the sale of F-16Vs, the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, and a return to the F-35 program.

Addressing Turkey’s security concerns is a prerequisite for successful and sustainable cooperation between strategic partners in the Middle East. This would allow for stability to be achieved in Syria, curtail the activities of foreign actors operating in the region, and encourage Syrian refugees currently residing in Turkey to return to Syria. Combined, these developments would drastically reduce the threats to Turkey’s security. In addition, it would have positive implications for peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean region, and it may also allow for the safe transport of natural gas extracted in the region to Europe via Turkey.

The United States, which has always prioritized Israel’s security in its Middle East policy, should also consider Turkey’s positive contributions to regional stability in the process of normalizing relations.

A partnership with Turkey is crucial for balancing China’s increasing economic and military strength in the Asia-Pacific region, especially as Russia’s position in the world has diminished as a consequence of its ongoing war in Ukraine. Turkey is located at a critical crossroads of the Middle East and the Caucasus. In the long run, Turkey’s strategic ties to Central Asia will also be an important asset for NATO. Hence, the United States must accept the importance of Turkey to NATO’s policy in these regions as an undeniable reality.

The Turkish-US relationship has had its bad days in the past. However, consultations resulted in the recognition of the significance of this strategic partnership, leading to a resumption of political and military relations. Now, similarly, I am hopeful that the US approach toward the support it provides to the PYD and YPG can be resolved in good faith alongside the S-400 issue.

Despite some members of Congress attempting to impose restrictions on Turkey similar to the 1975 arms embargo, I believe that the Biden administration will soon approve the supply of F-16V aircraft and the modernization package. This could potentially create a favorable atmosphere for Turkey’s return to the F-35 program as well, thereby removing obstacles to the development of bilateral political relations and a strengthened Turkish-US strategic partnership.

Turkish Air Force Lt. Gen. (ret.) Nihat Kökmen served as Turkey’s military representative to NATO from 2017 to 2019. Between 2001 and 2004, he served as the air plans officer at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. He currently serves as Executive and Supervisory Board member at the Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM).

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Putin’s nuclear threats will escalate as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds

Diane Francis — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 00:15:34 +0000

Ukraine’s counteroffensive is still in its early stages but concerns are already mounting that Russia may eventually resort to desperate measures in order to stave off defeat. At present, fears are focused primarily on Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling, which is expected to escalate as the counteroffensive unfolds.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has recently warned that Moscow may intend to blow up the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in southern Ukraine. Meanwhile, US President Joe Biden acknowledged on June 19 that the threat of Putin using nuclear weapons is “real.” Days later, Ukrainian military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov accused Russia of mining the cooling pond used to control temperatures at the Zaporizhzhia plant’s reactors. Clearly, an occupied nuclear plant that is blown up becomes a nuclear weapon.

Preventing this from happening should be an international priority. The fallout from a detonation at the plant would spread across many countries in a matter of hours. In addition to Ukraine itself, Belarus, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Russia would all be at serious risk, according to analysis by Ukraine’s Hydrometerological Institute.

Russia has occupied Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia plant since the first weeks of the invasion. Last summer, the Kremlin allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor its operational safety remotely. But in April 2023, IAEA officials began warning of growing risks and calling for additional measures to protect the plant. With Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive now underway, alarm is mounting.

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Zelenskyy’s claims that the Kremlin is planning to orchestrate a nuclear disaster in Ukraine are not at all far-fetched, given how Putin’s forces have been purposely laying waste to the country for the past sixteen months. The invading Russian army has planted landmines across an area the size of Switzerland, displaced more than ten million people, and destroyed dozens of Ukrainian towns and cities. Countless residential apartment buildings, schools, and hospitals have been reduced to ruins. A comprehensive and methodical nationwide bombing campaign has targeted the country’s civilian infrastructure.

In recent weeks, Russia is suspected of having blown up the Khakovka dam in southern Ukraine, causing an ecological catastrophe. However, even this unprecedented act of ecocide failed to stop Ukraine’s counteroffensive. With Russia’s military predicament expected to become increasingly grim in the weeks and months ahead, the likelihood of further extreme measures will grow. “They constantly need destabilization here. They want the world to put pressure on Ukraine to stop the war,” commented Zelenskyy.

Putin has been making nuclear threats since the very first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion. During the initial stages of the war, he very publicly placed his nuclear forces on high alert. With the invasion in danger of unravelling in September 2022, he again hinted at a possible nuclear response while warning, “I’m not bluffing.”

Not everyone is convinced. Former Russian diplomat Boris Bondarev, who resigned after last year’s invasion, told Newsweek in early 2023: “today [Putin is] bluffing and we know that he has bluffed about nuclear threats. Ukrainians recovered some parts of their territory, and there was no nuclear retaliation. If you’re afraid of Putin using nukes, then you already lose the war against him and he wins.”

Others warn against possible complacency. The recent destruction of Kakhovka dam has caused many observers to reassess their earlier skepticism over Russia’s readiness to go nuclear in Ukraine. Putin has also crossed another red line by vowing to place nukes in Belarus. The Russian dictator is currently holding all Europeans hostage with the threat of a deadly explosion at the continent’s largest nuclear plant, and is moving nuclear weapons closer to the heart of Europe.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The world must heed Ukraine’s warnings before it is too late. Zelenskyy first raised the alarm about the Kakhovka dam in October 2022 but the international community failed to react. Since the destruction of the dam, the relatively weak and ineffective international response has fuelled fears that Russia will read this as a green light to go further.

For now, most international attention appears to be focused on Putin’s placement of nukes in Belarus. “I absolutely believe that moving weapons to Belarus demands an unequivocal response from NATO,” Polish President Andrzej Duda said recently before meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Significantly, Russia’s decision to deploy nukes to Belarus even drew a critical response from Chinese officials, who renewed calls for de-escalation and reminded Russia that its leaders had reaffirmed their opposition to nuclear war at their March 2023 summit with China in Moscow.

Ultimately, there is no way of knowing whether Russia’s nuclear threats are genuine or not, but Western leaders cannot afford to let Putin’s nuclear blackmail tactics succeed. If the Russian dictator’s nuclear saber-rattling enables him to rescue the faltering invasion of Ukraine, he will do it again and others will follow. To prevent this nightmare scenario, the West must respond forcefully by escalating support for Ukraine militarily, diplomatically, and economically. The only sensible answer to Russia’s reckless nuclear intimidation is a heightened international commitment to Ukrainian victory.

In parallel to increased support for Ukraine, international watchdogs must be dispatched to monitor the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and other Ukrainian infrastructure sites that Russia could potentially target. Strong pressure must also be placed on China and India to condemn Russia’s nuclear threats. The invasion of Ukraine has already transformed the international security climate; Putin must not be allowed to normalize nuclear blackmail.

Diane Francis is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, editor-at-large with the National Post in Canada, author of ten books, and author of a newsletter on America.

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – A conversation on Western efforts to establish security guarantees for Ukraine and strategies to prepare for a productive NATO Summit in July.

NATO Security & Defense Security Partnerships Ukraine

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speakers

Anders Fogh Rasmussen
Former Secratary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Former Prime Minister of Denmark

Andriy Yermak

Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine

Moderator

John E. Herbst
Senior Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council

JOHN HERBST: We have a Front Page event for you today, a very special event. We have two very distinguished speakers. We have Mr. Andriy Yermak, who is the head of the president’s office in Kyiv in Ukraine. We have Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, a former Danish prime minister and former secretary general of NATO. And they’re going to talk today about the upcoming NATO summit, the question of the NATO-Ukraine relationship, and also—critical to the security guarantees for Ukraine—how do you ensure Ukraine’s stable, secure future? They were both the authors of the Kyiv Compact, which addressed the issue of security guarantees for Ukraine. And with that, we’ll turn it over to Mr. Yermak for some introductory remarks and then to Mr. Rasmussen. So, please.

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Thank you very much, Ambassador Herbst, and I would also like to thank the Atlantic Council for organizing this event. It’s indeed very timely. Next month, NATO leaders meeting in Vilnius have the opportunity to make history. Let me be completely clear right from the outset. I am personally in favor of extending an invitation to Ukraine to join NATO. It would be the first time that we invite into NATO a country that is at war. And that requires careful consideration. Not least, resolving practicalities regarding Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, and which areas and eventualities it would cover in the current conflict. I have reached this conclusion for three reasons.

First, in 2008, we decided that Ukraine will become a member of NATO, but we did not provide a roadmap. Now Ukraine has been in the waiting room for fifteen years. It is not a safe place. The time has come to move Ukraine into a safe place, as we are doing with Finland and Sweden.

Second, it is often argued that the prospect of NATO enlargement incited Putin. The truth is the opposite: It was the failure to extend security guarantees to Ukraine that incited Putin. Gray zones are danger zones. Neutrality provides no security. Finland and Sweden realized that.

Third, often I hear the argument that we cannot give Ukraine neither security guarantee nor membership of NATO while there is a war going on. That is an extremely dangerous argument. If you make security guarantees and NATO membership dependent on cessation of hostilities, you are giving Putin an incentive to continue the war. By extending an invitation now, we tell Putin Ukraine will become a member of NATO. It will not happen overnight, but you cannot stop this process. Our door is open for Ukraine and you are not the doorman.

Now, if allies cannot find consensus on an invitation to Ukraine in Vilnius, the second-best option would be to outline the path toward NATO membership in three steps.

First, to remove the need for a Membership Action Plan, as was the case with Finland and Sweden. The fact is the Ukrainian army is probably the most combat-ready army in Europe.

Second could be a pledge to review the question of NATO enlargement at the NATO summit in Washington, DC, next year.

And then, third, we could establish a NATO-Ukraine Council with a mandate—with a mandate to identify the conditions that must be met in order to join NATO. The deadline for the report should be the NATO summit next year.

Regardless, Ukraine will need security guarantees until it is a full member of NATO. We need strong methods to deter any further Russian aggression. And that’s the purpose of the Kyiv Security Compact that I coauthored with President Zelenskyy’s chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, who I’m very pleased joined us today.

The compact is based on four parts. First, deliver weapons on such a scale that Ukraine can repel or deter any further Russian aggression. Second, enhance intelligence sharing. Third, training of Ukrainian forces under EU and NATO flags. And fourth, support to build Ukraine’s defense industry so that Ukraine can produce weapons and ammunition itself. These security guarantees, similar to those that Israel received from the United States, will not replace Ukrainian membership of NATO, but they will build the bridge and allow Ukraine to defend itself until it is covered by NATO’s Article 5.

The summit in Vilnius is the most important NATO summit in a generation and let us not repeat the mistake of the Bucharest summit in 2008. Any pledge to Ukraine should be followed by a clear path forward. And NATO leaders must be prepared to be bold; otherwise, we risk constant war and instability on the European continent. Thank you.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you.

Mr. Yermak, over to you.

ANDRIY YERMAK: Yes. Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador Herbst.

Good day for everybody. I’m glad to welcome all of you here in the Atlantic Council.

There are about four hundred ways to prove fundamental Pythagorean theorem in mathematics, four hundred ways to prove the obvious. Sometimes it seems to me that during this war year we have provided not less explanation as to why Ukraine should get all the assistance it needs—why it requires reliable security guarantees, and the clear and understood prospect of the join NATO. In other words, throughout this year we, too, have to prove the obvious over and over again.

But the truth is simple: The Russian dictator’s desire to restore the empire is an existential threat to the Ukrainian state and nation. But it also poses a spectrum of the threats from the military to environmental to the Western civilization and humanity and the world. Therefore, Ukraine must win. It must integrate into Euro-Atlantic community. It must get reliable security guarantees for the transitional period. Not losing, it’s not [an] option for us. Simply restoring the status quo, it’s not [an] option. Any uncertainty involved outcome of this war, any ambiguity in NATO’s response to our inspiration will be equal to Russian victory. It will reinforce the Kremlin’s narratives of Russia fighting against an Alliance expansion in Ukraine and winning.

However, we cannot be—by war and sanctions, Russia will increasingly depend on China. Thus, by defending Ukraine, the West itself will have all the strategic advantages to Russia and geographical advantages to China in Europe.

The Ukrainian people have proven they will not give up their rights to stay free. They have paid with their blood, sweat, and tears for their place in the ranks of the world democratic community… To deny them now is to betray everything Ukraine has paid for the—with tens of thousands of lives and destructions unseen in Europe since World War II. It will be a defeat for democratic community far greater than Afghanistan. It will be a triumph for dictatorship. This must be prevented, not only for the sake of Ukraine but for the sake of all democracies on the planet.

Words about Russia having no way to power in the Alliance must finally be supported by actions. The fifteen-year schedule ban of Ukraine must come to end. Otherwise, Putin will get a huge bonus for his next presidential term, which is next year they have the elections… It will, obviously, strengthen support for his regime. It will increase the illusion of the legitimacy for the invasion among the Russian public—but also among the Global South countries, for, as we know, elections will be—inevitably be furnished in the occupied territories. Therefore, preparatory actions is needed. We must connect the dots once and for all. No arguments against Ukraine’s NATO membership go beyond… fear.

Throughout this war year, Ukraine has repeatedly been providing that the Russian threats are more a bluff than menace. The current wave of the alliance expansions has also proven this. Ultimately, it was the uncertainty in the Budapest and… in Bucharest that made the attack on Ukraine possible. Uncertainty… precisely the gray zone where Russia has the advantages, and we have got to deprive it of these advantages.

The state of war cannot be an obstacle to inviting Ukraine into Alliance because in that case Russia will do everything to indefinitely prolong this state. Our Alliance and partners prepared support Ukraine fighting for independence individually. Do we have enough resources to provide such support? I am afraid these are rhetorical questions.

Therefore, the solution is evident: The prospect of the membership when circumstances allow along with the reliable security guarantees for the transitional period. They will be not replace Ukraine’s participation in the Alliance, but we will be provided sufficient opportunity for defense until the possibility of actual NATO membership arise.

The International Working Group Anders Fogh Rasmussen and I co-chair has developed and presented our view of the guarantees in the Kyiv Security Compact documents. These documents has great potential for modifications to maintain a balance of the interest between Ukraine and the guarantor states for our common good.

We must win together, and together we must lay the base for reliable and secure peace in the future. It’s not the theorem. This is actual. And as such, it requires not proof. Thank you very much for your attention.

JOHN HERBST: OK. Thank you, Mr. Yermak.

All right. I have a few questions and then we will turn to audience questions.

So, Mr. Rasmussen, you made clear what you would like to see in Vilnius. You are, obviously, very well connected. What do you expect to happen there?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Well, I made clear that I would favor to extend an invitation to Ukraine already in Vilnius. My impression is there will be no consensus on that at this stage and that’s why I tried to outline the second best option and actually I think that could be possible to reach a compromise to remove MAP; to review the whole question again in Washington next year; and to establish, for instance, a NATO-Ukraine council with a clear mandate to identify the conditions that must be met.

That gives Ukraine a pledge but also a clear roadmap, and allies have still the control of the process. So, in my opinion, that should be achievable. So but, overall, I hope that Vilnius will demonstrate unity, and the worst thing would be a split and that would only serve the purpose of Putin.

JOHN HERBST: All right. Just one quick follow-up here, though.

You laid out a variety of things that I think would be a reasonable outcome, a good outcome, for Vilnius short of actual Ukrainian membership. We’ve seen—it looked like the United States was moving partly in that direction when they seemed that they were dropping MAP as required—the Membership Action Plan. But then President Biden said something over the weekend which wasn’t so clear about that. So do you think that MAP is still something that needs to be argued away or is this something which has been decided?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Yeah, I took notes of the same as you did. I would interpret the statement of President Biden as a negotiating position. I think everybody is now positioning themselves in the run-up to the Vilnius Summit.

Still, I think it would be a natural step forward to go beyond the 2008 language. Back in 2008 we decided that Ukraine will become a member of NATO and then we added next step in that process would be a Membership Action Plan, a so-called MAP.

Now, I mean, we—it’s easy to remove that precondition partly because we didn’t require a MAP for neither Finland nor Sweden before we extended an invitation to them and actually Ukraine already fulfills all criteria within a Membership Action Plan. They have demonstrated such efficiency on the battlefield that they don’t need a Membership Action Plan.

So I think it’s essential that Vilnius goes beyond the language of 2008.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you.

Mr. Yermak, as you know, I was in Kyiv. I spent ten days there last month, and the—it was clear from talking to many Ukrainians that there are high expectations for Vilnius. What are the Ukrainian people expecting in Vilnius and what is the president of Ukraine expecting in Vilnius, and you yourself?

ANDRIY YERMAK: I try to be—will answer very specifically. We really—the Ukrainians, because now—and, John, I’m sure that you can feel your—you know our country very, very good and you feel how united Ukrainians, how strong Ukrainians, and the—our position, the position of the president, the position of the team, it’s absolutely same that the positions of the—all Ukrainians, and the position is following.

We expect that Ukraine will be invited to NATO with open date but with concrete signal. And I agree with Anders that we need and everybody in the world need to receive strong signal the way to membership of Ukraine in NATO nobody can change; it’s decided and it’s happened.

And of course, in this way we want to receive and our expectation to receive the concrete security guarantees. We a lot of times talk about it. I mentioned in my speech about the Kyiv Security Compact. We can, on the base of these documents, continue to work with the partners.

This is two most important expectation of Ukraine, Ukrainians, president of Ukraine, and all our team.

JOHN HERBST: OK. Thank you. Let’s—well, let’s pursue this a bit more.

Mr. Rasmussen laid out four points from the Kyiv Security Compact regarding security guarantees and that started with substantial weapon supplies to make sure that Ukraine could defend itself.

I’ve been advocating, Ukraine has been requesting, various advanced weapons right now to conduct its counteroffensive and it’s gotten some—it’s gotten some of those weapons. It’s not gotten others.

Given the caution we see in the weapon supplies coming from the West to Ukraine just to fight the war, do you think they’d be willing to consider substantial weapon supplies now not just to fight the war but to insure you going forward? In other words, might that not be something you can’t quite count on at this point?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Me or—

JOHN HERBST: We’ll start with you, Mr. Secretary.

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Well, first of all, I appreciate, of course, all the deliveries of weapons we have seen so far. However, so far we have provided weapons for Ukraine just to survive. Now time has come to provide weapons for Ukraine to win. And that should be the overall goal. We should define the overall goal very clearly. We want a victory, and everything we do is with the goal to ensure a Ukrainian victory. And victory ultimately, of course, is to kick out all Russian troops from Ukrainian soil.

Next, you cannot win a war by an incremental, step-by-step approach. You have to surprise and overwhelm your adversary. We—so that’s why we need to use the big hammer to put a quick end to this conflict. So I’m in favor of lifting all self-imposed restrictions on weapon deliveries. We should deliver everything the Ukrainians need, not only heavy battle tanks, longer-range missiles, but eventually also fighter jets. We have seen how the Ukrainians lack air superiority during the first phases of their counteroffensive. So we should deliver fighter jets as soon as possible.

JOHN HERBST: Mr. Yermak, do you have anything you’d like to add to this?

ANDRIY YERMAK: I’m agreed with Anders. And, of course, you know that we are sure about our victory. But, of course, it depends of how in time we will receive everything which we need. We need very important things. We need strong character of our people, of our heroes. They are very motivated. And we receive enough people to be successful in the battlefield. And you can know that we have some success, and I hope we will see it more in the nearest future.

And of course, all this issue and all this kind of weapons which mentioned Anders, it’s, of course, very important. I just can add that we still have one option which still not open for us. It’s long-range missiles. But I hope and believe that it’s a question of the—of the very, very near future. Another—you know that this opportunity, it’s open. And we now closely working with the partners about the time and—for our jets and before it about tanks.

But the question is time. You know, every day it cost Ukraine the lives of our heroes, the lives of our civilians. You know that the Russian not stop this terroristic attack to our city. I’d like just to say just in the day when the delegation of the African countries was here, and they definitely know that next day they go to the—to the St. Petersburg, and they know exactly—they in Kyiv—they sended the twelve ballistic rockets to the Kyiv. Thanks God and thanks our heroes and thanks to United States for Patriot, we destroy all of them.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you.

Mr. Secretary General, you mentioned earlier that it’s very important for there to be unity in Vilnius. And I think everyone understands that. Sometimes that understanding is used to argue for a more cautious policy, because some members of the Alliance don’t want to be as strong in confronting Kremlin aggression as others. But now you have an interesting situation where a group of members of NATO, particularly in the east, want a stronger policy. So you have to worry about how you get to unity.

Now, I mention that as an introduction to this question-slash—well, this question. If NATO in Vilnius were willing to make commitments on weapons that we have not seen yet—of course, the US ATACMS, but of course, clear signal with clear delivery dates for F-16s and other fighter jets—while being more cautious on some of the other elements that we’ve discussed already, might that be a compromise which in fact could still—would help Ukraine have a more successful counteroffensive and pave the way for other direct NATO-Ukraine missions in the future? Would this be a suitable compromise that could work for everyone’s benefit?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: First of all, let me stress, it is not NATO as such that delivers weapons. NATO is not, as you know, a party to the conflict. But NATO allies—you’re right—NATO allies deliver the weapons. And actually, they are right to do so. They are parties to the conflict, and they have every reason and right to do so because, according to Article 51 in the UN Charter, Ukraine obviously has every right to defend itself against Russian aggression. But furthermore, Ukraine has the inherent right to ask its allies to help it to counter this Russian aggression. So when the US and the European allies deliver weapons to Ukraine, it’s on firm legal ground.

So I’ve never, ever understood this ridiculous discussion where the Russians time and again are complaining about NATO allies being engaged in this conflict. We are. Obviously, we are. And of course we are. Because we have every right to help Ukraine. Now, on weapon deliveries actually let me be very clear. I don’t understand why we have any restrictions on weapon deliveries. To make sure that Ukraine is winning this war, we need to deliver everything the Ukrainian people need. The Ukrainians have the will to fight. We have one thing to do, to give them the means to fight. And this is actually a winning formula.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you.

Mr. Yermak, you spoke about Ukrainian heroes. You’ve talked about the morale. Some people say that if there is a—

ANDRIY YERMAK: Sorry.

JOHN HERBST: I’m sorry?

ANDRIY YERMAK: John, we lost you.

JOHN HERBST: OK, I’ll repeat. You spoke about the Ukrainian heroes fighting off the Russians against great odds, in terms of numbers. And, for that matter, amount of weapons. You’ve spoken about the strong morale of the Ukrainian people. Some observers have expressed concern that if in Vilnius NATO does not offer something substantial in support of Ukraine, morale might be impacted. So here’s my question: If in fact—taking into account what Mr. Rasmussen just said—if the United States, Germany, the UK were to announce decisions on, you know, more robust weapon supplies in Vilnius, even if progress towards Ukraine’s eventual membership in NATO was not so much, would that be an outcome that can suit Ukraine? In other words, might that prevent any fall in morale because people would think, oh, news of weapons systems?

ANDRIY YERMAK: Yes. I think that of course the expectation of the Ukrainian society, the expectation of Ukrainian soldiers, it’s very high because we have historical unity around Ukraine. We have the historical unity with all our partners. And of course, no strong decisions in the—in the Vilnius, of course, it will be—that will be very, very strong demotivation of the people. And I absolutely agree with Mr. Rasmussen that he said—his phrase that it’s impossible to give Putin to be like not just right, like feel like a doorman in the—in the door of the NATO. It will be after the catastrophe in Kakhovka, after all these terrible things which continue to happen every day in Ukraine, it will be very bad signal.

And very—and, of course, the Russian, the Russian machine, it will be used against Ukraine. And of course, we very respect the opinion of our partners. But we also believe that Ukraine has already passed all exams and passing them every day in battlefield. I mean, exams to be—exams to be a real—to be a real member of the NATO. And I can say very openly that now the level of the professionalism, the level of the average soldier, we showed for all the world. I think we—I will be very surprised that still existing somebody in the planet who not be sure that Ukrainian army, Ukrainian people, one of the most strongest in the world.

And be very honest, let’s back to the first day of invasion. Many people in the world give to us three days, one week, one month. But look at it, one year and we have—we not just defend, we already show how we’re able to liberate our lands, how we can be real guarantors in the future of the security of our neighbors. I think it’s necessary to not forget about them because, you know, how in our childhood many people—you can listen many people, but you trust when you really see how your friends can fight it, and how your friends can be fighting himself and you. And Ukraine show this.

And I think now it depends for the final political points. It’s necessary to do. It’s necessary not give any more chance in the world to afraid any dictators, to afraid any countries who is breaking international law, who is not respect independence, who is not respect freedom, who is not respect territorial integrity and sovereignty of any countries. It’s great historical chances. We, Ukrainians, back the faith that it’s possible in our world—be free, be independent, be strong, and be secure.

JOHN HERBST: That’s very clear. We’ll turn now to audience questions. We’ve got a bunch. The first one I have here is from Jonathan Landay of Reuters.

He notes that—this is to you, Minister Yermak—he notes that Ukraine has agreed with NATO that it cannot join the alliance while the war continues. But you’ve spoken about, and other NATO members have spoken about, the need for security guarantees. But his question is this. He says: The Biden administration speaks only of security commitments to be considered from Vilnius. He asks, how has the Biden administration explained to you, to Ukraine, what these security commitments might look like and how they would bolster Ukraine’s security? Is this a question you feel comfortable answering?

ANDRIY YERMAK: Thank you. First of all, I’d like to say that we are very appreciative and always not tired to repeat the words of thanks personally President Biden, his administration, both parties, Congress, and Americans. It’s mean that for us very important that we in the every day’s dialogue, and now we continue consultation of the workings of these guarantees. I can say that administration absolutely understands our positions, our idea. And I didn’t listen any refuse or any not agreements that Ukraine need to have concrete security guarantees. Yes, we discussed wordings. Yes, we have that experience, and we remember Budapest. And of course, we have today war in our lands.

But I think we found the solutions. I hope in this. I very appreciate that we have very friends, very partners, conversations with other areas and, first of all, with United States. This job, it continues. It’s not easy, honestly. But I hope that this consultation will be continue all these days which we have before Vilnius. I optimist by my life. I do all my best from myself. I know the all best doing from the allied team. And I hope we found the forums which give to Ukraine can create a very serious working what is important, working security guarantees.

Look, I can say that when we are start with Mr. Rasmussen, our group understand, agree with me. We have mostly skeptics. Now I can say our documents in the table of all leaders—practically all leaders in the world. And now nobody discuss that this is very serious, very fundamental, a very strong document. We continue to work.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you. Mr. Rasmussen, we have a request from—a question from Volodymyr Svyryda. He asks: What is the likelihood of Russia using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, or for that matter in Poland?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Yeah. I am very often—I’m very often asked that question. And my answer is also very clear. I don’t think there is any risk of Putin using nuclear weapons in neither Ukraine, nor Poland, nor any other country. Why? Because the Russian military knows that it would face no strategic advantage in using nuclear weapons. It’s been clearly communicated to the Russian military that the response from the United States and its allies would have a devastating effect on the Russian military.

Further to that, we know that the rest of the world would probably turn its back to Russia if they were to use nuclear weapons. So, in conclusion, the Russian military would refuse to abide by orders from Putin, and their own alternative would be to remove Putin and install a new leader. So and any attempt to try to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine would be the end of the Putin era and the Putin regime. And for that reason, I’m not concerned about risk of Putin using nuclear weapons.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you. That was clear.

I have a question from Nino Gelashvili, who’s of the RFE/RL Georgian Service, and—well, actually, this is also for you, Mr. Rasmussen, but I’ll ask—well, then see if Mr. Yermak wants to add as well: Why are NATO members hesitant on moving towards Ukraine’s NATO membership? Are they afraid of being involved in a war with Russia? Is there something else, maybe the issue of nuclear escalation?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Yeah. Sometimes I’m asking exactly the same question because I think we should learn lessons from the past, and the ultimate security guarantee for Ukraine would be membership of NATO, let’s face it. Until Ukraine can join NATO Ukraine will need security guarantees and that’s why there’s a clear link between security guarantees and a future membership of NATO.

There may be allies who are concerned about the fact that a country that is currently at war would have difficulties in defining the coverage of Article 5. But I think where there is a will there is also a way forward.

We have precedents for solving that kind of problems in the past. Germany joined NATO back in 1955, the whole of Germany, actually, but as we all know at that time Germany was divided in a West Germany and an East Germany.

So when Germany—when western Germany joined NATO it was clearly stated that Article 5 covered only the territory controlled by the western German government in Bonn. We could use exactly the same formula when it comes to Ukraine. We could say, OK, Article 5 covers the territory controlled by the government in Kyiv but still we would have some outstanding questions, including in Donbas and Crimea we still have a war going on—maybe we still have a war going on and you have a borderline that move forth and back and you have continual clashes between the Ukrainian forces and Russian forces. And then, of course, the question is if Russia attacks Ukraine in Donbas would that invoke Article 5 or not? How should we respond in that case?

These are not trivial questions. They are crucial questions to guard the credibility of Article 5 and security guarantees in Article 5. So we have to work to sort out all those practicalities in confidential negotiations with Ukraine. That’s not for public use. But we have to spend some time in sorting out those questions and that’s why I think we should extend an invitation to Ukraine sooner rather than later and then spend some time sorting out those practical issues in confidential negotiations with Ukraine before you can actually access NATO.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you.

OK. We have a question from Roman Zakaluzny from Calgary, Canada, and it’s for Mr. Yermak: Can we say today that a Ukrainian victory in this war is not—not—a precondition for Ukrainian membership in NATO?

ANDRIY YERMAK: Yes. Yes, absolutely. I’m absolutely can confirm this phrase, this principle. I think vice versa. The membership of the—of the NATO, and just we are talking about invitation, will be—work as help and supporting element of the more sooner victory of Ukraine. I am sure about it.

I think that I can add one very important thing. We’re now in the stage when the authority and the power of the NATO very, very high. And today, NATO need one very important element after Sweden and Finland, Ukraine. It will be elements which fits everybody and now understand that NATO is the most strongest alliance in the world. And everybody understand only NATO can give the 100 percent guarantees of the security, because you can see in reality any countries of NATO not involved in the war, and the people—any potential aggressors understood it. I just can confirm this phrase.

JOHN HERBST: OK. Thank you.

We have a question which almost answers itself, but I’ll pose it anyway. It’s from Dr. Wayne Schroeder at the US Naval War College. He asks: Should the US provide long-range strike capabilities such as ATACMS on an urgent basis? And what is the likelihood that Ukraine will receive ATACMS, and when? So, Mr. Yermak, for you.

ANDRIY YERMAK: Yes, of course. Thank you for these questions.

Yes, of course we need it so much as soon as possible. We’re waiting for decisions. And my attitude that we are very near of these decisions, and I hope that it happens very soon. And I can say that as soon as possible it’s happened, it give to us possibility, first of all, to survive lives of our people. With Mr. President Zelenskyy it’s a lot of times and the represent of our team said one example is Kherson, which we occupied, but we have not how to protect our people because the enemy’s attack from another side of the river. And you can see terrible photos and videos how their rockets destroyed supermarkets, the civilian infrastructure. Of course, we will be more strong with the ATACMS.

Waiting. Waiting. And I can say, you know, maybe just for the positive things when we are talking about this very, very big tragedy for my country, I don’t know the person in Ukraine who is exactly know all these words: HIMARS, ATACMS, Leopards, and many others. I think because this is symbolic for our people. It’s—Patriot, of course. It’s symbolic of life. It’s symbolic of surviving. And what is very important, that you can see that you—I mean Americans—when you deliver these weapons, how it’s really work and how it’s strengthening our able—how we, with these weapons, more able to defend our country. I think it’s we—you can see the real evidence how these weapons really survive people, really survive children, really survive old people, women.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you.

We have a very large question from Albert Lee. It’s for you, Mr. Rasmussen: What can be done to further break down the mental, bureaucratic, and institutional obstacles blocking not just the supply of advanced weapons systems, but also future security guarantees and NATO membership for Ukraine?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Yeah.

JOHN HERBST: It’s a big one.

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: That’s a big question.

But first of all, I think it will take determined political leadership, because I fully agree we really have to overcome all those obstacles. As I said before, we cannot—we cannot conduct warfare in this bureaucratic way of an incremental, step-by-step approach because we are concerned about provoking Putin. Let’s face it, Putin has exploited our long decision-making processes to fortify Russian defenses in Donbas and Crimea, so it’s being even more complicated for Ukraine to conduct its counteroffensive because of our hesitation. So we really have to step up to the plate.

And that’s why I think it’s quite simple: We should deliver everything the Ukrainians need without any restrictions. And we shouldn’t be concerned about Putin’s reaction because he has been the one who has escalated the war already, and we are always two or three steps behind him. So I fully agree, and I think first and foremost it will take determined political leadership.

And let me stress if we are to ensure long-term peace and stability on the European continent, we need a strong and stable Eastern European ally like Ukraine to serve as a bulwark against a still-aggressive Russia. Because when this war is over you will still have an aggressive Russia, so we have to protect not only Ukraine but the whole of Europe against that threat. And to that end, we need Ukraine as a NATO ally.

JOHN HERBST: I can’t help but step out of my role to say that it would be wonderful if the problem was described the way you’ve described it by President Biden and other Western leaders, making it clear that this is a war of Putin not just on Ukraine but also, ultimately, on us.

OK. Mr. Yermak, question from Trudy Rubin from the Philadelphia Enquirer: Is retaking Crimea or cutting it off, making it impossible for Russia to hold it, a necessary goal for Ukraine’s counteroffensive? And are some NATO countries, including the US, opposed to this?

ANDRIY YERMAK: We are very open for our goals. And we said that our victory, it’s to back all our territory over the international-recognized border. And we’re very clear of this. And of course, Donbas, it’s Ukraine; and Crimea, it’s Ukraine.

I can say about—if the question is about the position of our partners, I know that the partners very respect this our positions. And I—me personally—never listen that somebody just try to talk with us about any compromise of this.

And I can say that, for example, today I have the meetings with the G7 ambassadors here in Kyiv and we discussed the Ukrainian peaceful plan. And what is—and our position is very clear and very principled—that we are ready to listen and to talk and to take some idea with all countries in the world who respect our territorial integrity, our sovereignty, our independence.

It’s my answer.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you.

OK. We have one minute and we have one more question. This one’s for Mr. Rasmussen, also from Trudy Rubin: What do you think would be Putin’s reaction if Ukraine were, in fact, to take back Crimea?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Yeah. Putin attaches strong importance to keeping Crimea, but as Andriy Yermak just stated Crimea is, according to international law, a part of Ukraine. So I wouldn’t be concerned about how Putin would react. He would, of course, react militarily in a very strong way. But why should we care about that? I mean, this is Ukrainian territory.

And actually, back in 1994, when Ukraine gave up her nuclear weapons and handed them over to Russia, of all countries, and Ukraine signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in exchange Ukraine received so-called security guarantees from Russia in which Russia pledged not to attack Ukraine. They violated that. And Russia also confirmed that they would respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine within these internationally-recognized borders, including Crimea. So Crimea is Ukrainian territory.

And if we accept that Putin can keep Crimea, it sends an extremely dangerous signal to the whole world because Xi Jinping would argue and he would conclude if Putin can take Crimea, I can take Taiwan. And I also say this as a message to the American public, where I have met the argument we should reduce—we Americans should reduce our support for Ukraine because we need the resources to protect Taiwan. The fact is those two conflicts are interrelated. A clear defeat—a clear Russian defeat in Ukraine will also tell Xi Jinping not to attack Taiwan.

So the two conflicts are interrelated. Crimea is Ukrainian territory. So I don’t care about how Putin would react. For me, a Ukrainian victory includes taking back Crimea.

JOHN HERBST: Well, I would agree with that.

And I would thank both of you for a wonderful and extensive conversation. I hope—in fact, I’m confident—that you’ve contributed to moving the debate in the right direction, and now we wait and see what happens.

So thank everyone for tuning in. We will be doing more stuff on Russia’s war on Ukraine and how the United States and the West should respond, and perhaps more stuff on NATO-Ukraine in the year to come.

Do pobachenn’a.

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Thank you.

Watch the event

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Yevgeniya Gaber joins TVP World to discuss Putin’s plans to visit Turkey

aozen — Mon, 19 Jun 2023 20:57:15 +0000

The post Yevgeniya Gaber joins TVP World to discuss Putin’s plans to visit Turkey appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Yevgeniya Gaber joins TVP World to discuss Putin’s plans to visit Turkey

aozen — Sun, 18 Jun 2023 13:58:08 +0000

The post Yevgeniya Gaber joins TVP World to discuss Putin’s plans to visit Turkey appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Rich Outzen joins TRT World Strait Talk to discuss Sweden-Finland-Turkey NATO Meeting

aozen — Fri, 16 Jun 2023 16:15:48 +0000

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The hits and misses in Germany’s new national security strategy

Atlantic Council experts — Wed, 14 Jun 2023 18:53:50 +0000

It sounds momentous in German, and it is. On Wednesday, Germany released its first comprehensive Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie, or national security strategy. Chancellor Olaf Scholz called the document a “major change” that seeks to integrate military planning with security issues ranging from climate change to alliances. It also carries forward the chancellor’s announcement of a Zeitenwende, or historical turning point, following Russia’s continent-unsettling invasion of Ukraine and Germany’s years of overdependence on Moscow for energy.

Below, Atlantic Council experts answer the most urgent questions about Germany’s new strategy and the path forward for this major European power.

1. How has Russia’s war in Ukraine changed Germany’s view of its security environment?

Germany’s new national security strategy calls out Russia as “the biggest threat to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.” For now, that means Germany isn’t at risk of going back to the way things were regarding its relationship with Russia. That is good news.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Germany’s first-ever national security strategy is one step in Germany security-proofing its politics and policies in the face of Russia’s war in Ukraine and the seismic changes in European security the war has brought. The disagreements, delays, and drawn-out process in finalizing the strategy show how challenging both the “mental” Zeitenwende required of Berlin decision makers and its practical implementation are. For far too long, strategic and security criteria seemed to play too little a role in German decision making. The national security strategy means progress on that front. Germany’s allies should consider the old adage “Der Weg ist das Ziel”—meaning “the journey is the reward,” or “the way is the goal.” Sure, the pace is too slow, and the end product is missing progress on key institutional elements like a national security council. But having undergone this process and attempted more of a whole-of-government and -society approach, Germany and its political decision makers have inched the ball forward on what is needed for the mental Zeitenwende and a more robust strategic culture in Berlin.

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Europe Center.

Germany takes a comprehensive societal view on its security environment, focusing not only on the immediate challenge that Russia poses, but also on hybrid threats arising from climate change, pandemics, world hunger, and poverty, as well as disinformation and cyberattacks.

—Roderick Kefferpütz is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and director of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union office in Brussels.

2. What does the focus on wehrhaft reveal about strengthening Germany’s armed forces?

The focus on wehrhaft—both the ability and, importantly, the willingness to defend oneself—goes beyond the necessary but in-and-of-itself insufficient modernization of the German armed forces. It means Germany has to build the strategic culture across government and society to consider geopolitical and security matters more prominently in comprehensive ways. Linked to that is the guiding principle of a “policy of integrated security” that runs through the strategy. Here implementation will be a steep hill to climb because of a variety of factors: from Germany’s federalist structures in law enforcement, intelligence, cybersecurity, and disaster management to variations on security concepts among the three-way governing coalition and growing budgetary constraints.

—Jörn Fleck

Germany is realizing that burgeoning trade ties and diplomacy alone don’t provide security. Peace comes through strength, and Germany’s first national security strategy rightfully emphasizes the importance of credible deterrence and lists the goal to make the Bundeswehr one of the most effective conventional armed forces in Europe.

—Roderick Kefferpütz

Germany’s national security strategy states that “the Federal Government will make the Bundeswehr one of the most effective conventional armed forces in Europe in the coming years, one that is able to respond and act rapidly at all times.” Given the current state of the Bundeswehr, it has a long way to go. The strategy also states that Germany will reach its 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) defense spending target, something it has said for years but hasn’t been able to reach yet. The strategy offers no clear sense of how this might be different going forward. It states that Germany will get there gradually over a “multi-year period” and “initially in part via the newly created special fund for the Bundeswehr.”

Unfortunately, in that same vein, one other glaring sentence stood out to me: “Given the considerable demands on our public finances at present, we will strive to implement this Strategy at no additional cost to the overall federal budget.” This doesn’t seem to make sense.

—Rachel Rizzo

3. How does Germany see its role in NATO and Europe going forward?

The strategy clearly underlines how essential European security, stability, and peace—as well as the role of the United States in Europe—are for Germany. A commitment to NATO’s 2 percent goal on defense spending—even if qualified as a multi-year average—is a good signal. So are commitments to enhanced forward presence in NATO and support for European security and defense policies and initiatives. But allies will find few tangible commitments to a greater German role and responsibility in hard security.

—Jörn Fleck

Collective defense is held high with NATO’s Article 5 mentioned alongside the European Union’s mutual assistance clause Article 42 as well as Article 4 of the Aachen Treaty with France. However, with regards to meeting NATO’s 2 percent of GDP goal, Germany has added the caveat of meeting this target “as an average over a multi-year period.” This underlines the difficulty the German government has in reaching this goal, particularly in these times of budgetary constraints.

—Roderick Kefferpütz

4. What does the strategy say about how Germany views China?

With a separate China strategy in the works, Germany’s new national security strategy says few things beyond the holy trinity of China as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival. It does acknowledge a rise in rivalry and competition, probably a careful compromise between the chancellor’s realist approach and the Greens’ more hawkish stance on China. But as so often with European initiatives, not everything about China bears a China label or framing. Trust that the strategy’s extensive discussions of supply-chain security, innovation and technology, and access to natural resources were driven with de-risking from Beijing in mind.

—Jörn Fleck

China is a conflictual issue within the governing coalition, and a first China strategy is expected to be released in the coming months. While Germany abides by the catch-all phrase that China is a partner, competitor, and systemic rival, it does acknowledge that the latter two elements have gained more traction in light of Chinese efforts to change the world order. However, the Indo-Pacific at large and likeminded partners such as India, Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan do not receive any attention in the national security strategy.

—Roderick Kefferpütz

Germany’s national security strategy offers the familiar framework of partner, rival, and systemic competitor for its relationship with China. However, what’s one word that doesn’t appear once in the strategy? Taiwan.

—Rachel Rizzo

5. What is missing in the strategy?

This strategy is comprehensive when it comes to nontraditional hard security threats, but it fails to address hard power questions in new arenas of competition. There is very little attention given to how geopolitical frontier areas, such as the Arctic, Antarctic, deep sea, and space might affect the security environment and international order.

—Roderick Kefferpütz

Not surprising for those who had followed the process but still a huge missed opportunity is the lack of institutional and process changes that would help the implementation of the Zeitenwende. Here, clearly the creation of a National Security Council–like format stands out. Most long-term observers of Germany will agree this is urgently needed to effectively coordinate an inter-agency process across the federal government and with state authorities and international partners, but also to drive strategic culture more in the medium term. Also missing are a clear follow-up process for implementation—always the biggest challenge with these strategies and who owns them—and installation of a regular review that forces future governments to keep up this process in regular intervals.

—Jörn Fleck

The post The hits and misses in Germany’s new national security strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why Ukrainian NATO membership would actually be good for Russia

Leonid Gozman — Wed, 14 Jun 2023 07:42:05 +0000

Vladimir Putin claims one of the main goals of his Ukraine invasion is to prevent the country joining NATO. This objective may at first glance appear broadly reasonable, but on closer inspection, it actually goes directly against Russia’s own national interests.

The idea that Ukrainian NATO membership would pose a security threat to Russia ranks among Putin’s most enduring myths. In reality, however, no NATO member has ever threatened to attack Russia. On the contrary, Russia’s shared borders with NATO have always been strikingly calm and secure. Notably, this was also the case throughout the Soviet era and stands in contrast to some other Russian borders. If Ukraine joins NATO, it would significantly increase Russia’s own border security.

The interests of the Russian people are best served by a sustainable and lasting peace rather than wars of conquest. Ukraine’s NATO accession would strengthen the alliance and improve its ability to resist Russian aggression. This would greatly reduce the risk of a new war in Ukraine, as not even Putin is ready to enter into an open war with NATO. Instead, the Russian population would be much likelier to live peaceful lives.

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Crucially, Ukrainian NATO membership would mean an end to dreams of restoring the Russian Empire. This would be good news for all Russians, who have no need of an empire. In today’s world, imperial ambitions bring crushing economic and moral burdens that hamper the development of a country and lead to stagnation.

It is also inaccurate to assume, as many currently do, that a majority of Russians share the same imperial aspirations promoted by Putin himself. In fact, during the years of the Soviet collapse, there were literally zero rallies calling on Moscow to prevent the various Soviet republics from securing independence, despite the fact that protests were possible at that time. Indeed, following the tragic events of January 1991 in Vilnius, when Soviet troops killed 13 Lithuanians, around a million people attended a massive rally in central Moscow demanding recognition of Lithuanian independence. These people took to the streets not in defense of empire but in support of freedom.

Back then, nobody saw the fall of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” as Putin would later state. According to polling data, the Russian public only began showing signs of “imperial nostalgia” some 15 years later in the mid-2000s. This change in mood was due to official propaganda rather than any deep-seated notions of imperial identity.

Far from marking a regrettable retreat from empire, the collapse of the Soviet Union was an undeniably positive development for Russia. Similarly, the current revival of imperialism in Russia poses an existential threat to the country’s future. Ukrainian NATO membership would be a big step toward abandoning the idea of empire entirely, and that would be a positive development for all Russians.

It is clearly in Russia’s interests to have stable, predictable, and non-aggressive neighbors. NATO member states represent exactly this kind of neighbor. If Ukraine joins the alliance, this would go a long way to allaying fears within Russia over possible future Ukrainian revenge after the current war ends.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Ukrainian accession to NATO would help raise living standards in the country by obliging the Ukrainian authorities to implement vital reforms. This would be particularly good news for Russia. Like any other country, Russia has an interest in the prosperity of neighboring states and stands to benefit from improved trade and other economic ties if Ukraine achieves a higher standard of living.

Joining NATO would also strengthen Ukraine’s democratic institutions. This would help demonstrate to the Russian public that democracy can thrive in the post-Soviet space. Russians are just as interested in personal freedoms and democratic values as anyone else, but they are bombarded with propaganda from the Kremlin convincing them that freedom and democracy are only possible in the West and will never take root inside Russia.

The Putin regime supports this incompatibility argument by pointing to various aspects of Russian society that allegedly make the country unsuitable for democracy, such as Russia’s dominant Slavic Orthodox culture. However, as a fellow predominantly Slavic Orthodox nation that many Russians view as extremely similar to their own country, Ukraine can debunk such arguments. Indeed, this is a key reason why the Kremlin views Ukrainian democracy as such a threat.

Unless Ukraine joins NATO, even the complete liberation of the country will not bring sustainable peace. Putin will not accept defeat and will inevitably attack again. This is exactly what Hitler would have done if the allies had not destroyed his criminal regime along with his war machine. Just as lasting peace was only possible after World War II due to the removal of the Nazi system, future peace in Eastern Europe will depend on the end of the Putin regime. This is clearly in the interests of the Russian people, and will be much more likely if Ukraine joins NATO. Membership of the alliance would provide Ukraine with long-term security, but the benefits to Russia itself would be no less profound.

Leonid Gozman is a Russian politician and commentator.

Economic security underpins military security

Members of the EU and NATO face a number of threats from authoritarian corrosive capital and critical economic dependencies. Whether originating from private or state-owned enterprises, unaccountable investments lack transparency, accountability, and market orientation. Corrosive capital largely originates from authoritarian states and exaggerates governance gaps to influence economic, political, and social developments in recipient countries. For example, authoritarian regimes, particularly China, use subsidies and other uncompetitive practices to invest in critical or other digital infrastructure that can have a dual military-civilian purpose, such as in port infrastructure in southeast Europe which could be used to transit military gear in support of NATO operations. Nontransparent investment flows, particularly in Bulgaria and the Western Balkans, undermine transparency and abet corruption. In the higher value-added sectors of the economy such as the thriving information and communications technology sectors in Bulgaria, unaccountable investments threaten the valuable intellectual property of Europe’s established firms and emerging start-ups alike. Last year, China weaponized Europe’s critical trade and supply chain dependency on the huge Chinese market to block Lithuanian imports to China, seeking to punish Vilnius for its foreign policy choices. Europe’s urgent transition in the last year away from Russian natural gas to renewable resources such as solar and wind power, which are dominated by China, risks replacing one set of strategic energy dependencies for another.

To address these challenges, many European countries have developed new EU-wide investment screening regulations and the European Union has proposed legislation to counter economic coercion. Since 2020, EU member states are required to have an investment screening mechanism in place as part of the EU-wide investment screening coordination framework—but the details are left up to the individual countries, which are responsible for their own national security.

NATO’s southeastern flank is the most vulnerable and least-prepared region to protect its economies from authoritarian corrosive capital. Montenegro has become famous for its “white elephant” Chinese-funded infrastructure projects. Croatia is host to the Chinese Southeast European Business Association and has actively courted Chinese investments in critical infrastructure, including ports and the EU-funded and China-built Peljesac bridge, the first example of subsidized Chinese firms beating out European firms for EU-funded projects in Europe. Bulgaria and North Macedonia have more pronounced links to unaccountable flows of Russian capital, including in the energy sector.

Among these countries, only Croatia is in the early stages of exploring the development of an investment screening law, and it is doing so at a leisurely pace. Bulgaria is in an even earlier stage than Croatia, but has an opportunity with its new government to make progress. North Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro also lack an investment screening mechanism, leaving NATO’s most vulnerable members and economies open to the risk of corrosive capital and unaccountable investment. These governments have largely failed to put investment security legislation and processes on the table because of a lack of political will. An initiative by key allies to put this issue on the table at NATO would help push lagging governments in southeast Europe to prioritize this issue. Yet, a push by NATO allies to close the investment security gap in southeast Europe should also be coupled with practical assistance to help those allies develop inclusive, transparent legislation on investment screening.

The risks of regulating economic activity in fragile democracies

Emerging markets in NATO’s southeastern flank, including Albania, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, and Croatia, face some of the greatest challenges to equipping themselves with the tools to protect their economies from national security threats. These allies face capacity and governance challenges that will require coordinated support from NATO, the EU, and key bilateral allies to help implement effective investment screening legislation.

First, the economies of southeastern Europe are among the least developed within NATO. As a result, most business leaders in these countries are desperate for any investment they can attract and are instinctively hostile to the idea of screening any investment. Coaxing the private sector into compliance with any relevant legislation will require an intentional and transparent process of policy dialogue between government and business to reassure business that legislation will not meaningfully harm the economy.

Second, these countries largely lack governmental capacity to effectively screen foreign investments, a highly technical process requiring competent bureaucrats armed with both economic and national security data and expertise. A related challenge is the need for the bureaucracy to maintain the confidentiality of proprietary corporate data during the screening process; leaks of government deliberations to tabloids are a pervasive problem in southeast European policymaking.

Third, the democracies of southeastern Europe are by and large low-trust societies with weak public-private dialogue and an often fragile rule of law, making effective and informed policy formulation a challenge. To ensure economic fairness and guard against regulatory abuse, any new tools allowing governments to regulate economic activity will need proper transparency, checks and balances, and oversight.

NATO and the EU face a conundrum in dealing with the geoeconomic challenges to southeastern Europe’s market, particularly in Bulgaria and Croatia, which are already in the European common market. On the one hand, failure to develop screening mechanisms and other tools in these economies leaves both the EU and NATO vulnerable to economic risk that could impact the wider single market. On the other hand, given the governance and capacity challenges in these countries, a rushed or opaque policy process could result in lack of awareness and compliance by the private sector or the emergence of unintended consequences such as barriers to legitimate competition.

What the EU, NATO, and Three Seas Initiative can do

To address these challenges, NATO, the European Union, and individual allies can play complementary roles.

Through its regulatory role, the EU should take the lead in supporting these countries in developing economic security legislation. The European Commission can provide technical support to help governments align their investment screening legislation with EU standards, particularly countries that are candidates for accession, such as Albania and North Macedonia. Meanwhile, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development can provide technical support to member governments such as Croatia to help them understand the likely impact an investment screening law will have on its economy and competitiveness as an investment destination.

Because the EU leads on economic and trade issues, NATO’s role will involve helping allies assess national security implications of investment risk in dual-use economic assets that can have a military or other national security purpose. Here, planning groups within NATO’s Resilience Committee can provide guidance on how to ensure that screening mechanisms meet compliance with NATO’s baseline requirements for national resilience. In the interest of building political will, the NATO summit communiqué at Vilnius could set a deadline to have investment screening legislation in place by the seventy-fifth anniversary Washington summit next year.

Finally, select allies can provide bilateral mentorship and support for these southeast European nations on best practices for securing business buy-in and compliance with screening mechanisms. A system modeled after the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States may not align with the needs, economic structure, or capacities of smaller countries in southeast Europe. Smaller allies such as the Czech Republic can advise southeastern European governments on the lessons learned from their experience, perhaps bringing in chambers of commerce and business associations to share their experiences on compliance with the law.

The Three Seas Initiative, an informal gathering supported by the Atlantic Council and including twelve Central and Eastern European member states focused on north-south infrastructure development, could also help. It could serve as a venue for members to coordinate economic-security regulations to ensure wider harmonization of economic policy. Differences in investment security regulations across countries complicate the kind of cross-border investments that the Three Seas Initiative is designed to attract and finance. The Three Seas business forums in particular can serve as a channel for business associations and chambers from within the Three Seas region and neighboring countries in the Western Balkans. The forums offer a place for parties to share their experiences, challenges, and concerns about complexities caused by differences in screening legislation within the region and to formulate recommendations on how to minimize the impact on the investment environment.

Ultimately, the national governments of Croatia, Bulgaria, Albania, North Macedonia, and Montenegro will have to do the hard work themselves to adopt these best practices and craft successful legislation. Governments will need to consult with the business sector before legislation is drafted to help promote understanding of these processes, incorporate recommendations to streamline red tape, and raise awareness in the business community of critical threats that can allow them to adapt their internal due diligence. But this will require a balance to ensure that economic security is not traded away for the sake of economic development. Including civil society is also essential to ensure effective transparency and monitoring of review processes to make sure they are not used for corrupt purposes or overlook key threats.

As NATO heads into its seventy-fifth year, its member states and partner institutions need to adapt to new challenges. Robust investment screening across the whole of the Alliance will help strengthen NATO against economic weapons that are increasingly central to today’s conflicts.

Jeffrey Lightfoot is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is the Bratislava-based program director for Europe at the Center for International Private Enterprise.

John Kay is a program manager at the Center for International Private Enterprise and worked previously in the Balkans with the US Agency for International Development.

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What’s really behind plans for a NATO office in Japan

Sara Bjerg Moller — Mon, 12 Jun 2023 20:17:20 +0000

“What is NATO really up to?” Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin posed this sharp question on June 6. It was in response to a question about Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s announcement last month that his government is exploring opening a NATO liaison office in Tokyo. The Chinese official went on to say the Alliance was “bent on going east into this region” and urged “high vigilance.” While the opening of a NATO liaison office in Japan, the first in Asia, would certainly be a significant development in the Alliance’s post–Cold War evolution, such a move ultimately reveals more about how Japan sees its regional security situation unfolding in the coming years than it does about how NATO views China.

The office is currently only an idea, and some NATO members have voiced resistance to it going any further, including French President Emmanuel Macron. If it were actually to happen, however, NATO’s first liaison office in the Indo-Pacific would not be a case of the Alliance extending “its tentacles to the Asia-Pacific,” as Chinese officials have charged in the past. Instead, it would represent the natural culmination of a multi-year effort by Western officials to strengthen cooperation with Asia-Pacific partners, not the start of some grand new security enterprise linking the Pacific and Atlantic alliances together.

After all, NATO and Japan have had formal relations for several decades and the opening of a liaison office, while symbolic, is mainly a tool of bureaucratic efficiency. The creation of a NATO liaison office in Tokyo would merely formalize the exchange of views and dissemination of information that has already been taking place for years, albeit via the Danish Embassy which serves as the NATO Contact Point Embassy in Japan.

Second, this development has as much (if not more) to do with how Japan sees the contemporary regional security situation in its neighborhood than how NATO views the Indo-Pacific. In at least one sense, as the Japanese foreign minister told CNN recently, Japan’s offer to host a NATO office is connected to security developments in Europe. But the connection goes only so far. As the foreign minister noted, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 forced his government to “rethink [its] regional security.” Or as Kishida has repeatedly warned since Russia launched its war in February 2022, “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.” Make no mistake, China’s rising assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific, more so than Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, is the real reason behind Japan’s decision to signal its willingness to welcome a NATO office in Tokyo.

The view from Tokyo

Japan’s offer to host a NATO liaison office should be viewed as part of a wider national security strategic reset the Kishida government has been conducting following the release of its latest national security strategy, national defense strategy, and defense buildup program in December 2022.

Unlike previous Japanese administrations which often focused primarily on strengthening security ties with the United States, the Kishida government’s approach has been multilateral from the outset. Japanese government officials have been working overtime since late last year to improve defense coordination with a number of countries. In October 2022, Japan and Australia signed a new enhanced security cooperation agreement, pledging to deepen their defensive and security ties. Only three months later, in January 2023, Tokyo signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with the United Kingdom. Similar to the status of forces agreements the United States concludes with other countries, the RAA sets out the conditions and procedures that apply when forces from one country visit another. Such agreements are sine qua non when countries want to conduct joint training and military exercises together. After Australia last year, the United Kingdom is only the second country to conclude an RAA with Japan. In April, the Japanese Diet formally approved both RAAs, paving the way for their implementation.

Closer to home, the Kishida government has stepped up efforts to improve security cooperation with South Korea. After a multi-year freeze, a thaw in bilateral relations between Washington’s Indo-Pacific allies has set in, as evidenced by the resumption of leadership-level visits between Seoul and Tokyo earlier this spring. Fresh on the heels of these visits, rumors that a new trilateral security apparatus or forum between Tokyo, Seoul, and Washington could be in the cards have begun to circulate in the press, and a trilateral meeting between the leaders of the three countries recently took place on the sidelines of the Group of Seven summit in Hiroshima last month.

Typically, diplomacy progresses in fits and starts. But by any measure the security cooperation news out of the region in recent months has been anything but. Indeed, the pace of new security agreements, declarations, statements, and other communiques issued by Tokyo and other capitals has been frenetic. And it is in this context that the recent news that the Kishida government has offered to host a NATO office should be viewed. This development, in other words, is notable more for what it reveals about how Tokyo sees the security landscape in the Indo-Pacific unfolding in the coming years, than for how NATO views its role in the region or China.

New office space but no new architecture

In terms of day-to-day activities, a NATO liaison office would likely look to build upon existing areas of military cooperation such as cybersecurity and peace-support operations, as well as explore new avenues of defense cooperation, especially in the area of equipment interoperability. Japan has participated in NATO’s Partnership Interoperability Initiative, the Alliance’s program for strengthening partner equipment interoperability, since the initiative’s founding in 2014. With Tokyo’s announcement last December that it will jointly develop a next-generation fighter jet with the United Kingdom and Italy by 2035, Japan will now require even more regular political and defense consultations with European partners. Along with serving as an information conduit, a NATO liaison office could help Japan expand access to other European defense programmes.

Even so, the opening of a NATO liaison office in Japan is unlikely to fundamentally alter the Indo-Pacific security architecture much. The creation of a one-person deep office for the coordination of information between Tokyo and Brussels does not equate with or portend an extension of the Alliance’s geographic reach into the Indo-Pacific. Rather than signaling some ambitious opening move in a larger strategic game of geopolitical chess, the opening of a NATO liaison office in Japan instead would mark the culmination of a multi-year process by NATO officials to improve ties with long-standing partner countries in the region.

Sara Bjerg Moller, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, as well as an associate teaching professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University.

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Should NATO extend Stoltenberg’s term as leader?

Charles Barry — Mon, 12 Jun 2023 17:25:36 +0000

As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg meets with US President Joe Biden at the White House on Tuesday, there is a lot for them to discuss. Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive has just begun, and key decisions will face allies at the NATO Summit in Vilnius less than a month away. One of those decisions may be confirming the “who”—and also the “when”—of changing NATO’s top leader in the midst of an ongoing war.

Stoltenberg has announced he will conclude his secretary general tenure as planned at the end of September. He has served since October 2014*, just a few months after Russia invaded Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region and Crimea. Since then, Stoltenberg has shown himself to be NATO’s most impactful wartime secretary general. It would surprise no one should historians ultimately deem him the strongest, most capable secretary general in Alliance history. He has kept NATO out of direct combat with Russia while boldly marshaling allied support for Ukraine with mountains of nonlethal matériel and the promise of political backing for “as long as it takes.” (NATO members themselves provide Ukraine lethal warfighting matériel outside of NATO structures, as the core of the fifty-nation Ukraine Defense Contact Group.)

Should NATO members accept Stoltenberg’s decision to step down? Or should he be pressed to stay on as NATO navigates the fierce fighting and political choices ahead; until the path of the war in Ukraine is better known, perhaps in early 2024? Alliance members may decide as soon as their July 11-12 NATO Summit in Vilnius.

Issue Brief

Apr 11, 2023

Defining success for NATO’s Vilnius summit: A primer

By Charles Barry and Christopher Skaluba

A successful NATO summit in July requires significant progress on a host of NATO’s political and military priorities, especially those enumerated at Madrid.

Europe & Eurasia National Security

There is a good case for Stoltenberg staying longer. He has been remarkably successful at countering Russian propaganda and nuclear threats and in parrying the internal disruptions of highly contentious members, including by former US President Donald Trump and current Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. He has also skillfully guided Alliance responses to China’s growing presence and influence in Europe. Above all, Stoltenberg has been the stalwart pillar of Alliance cohesion. As the war in Ukraine intensifies this summer and into the fall, and especially should Russia up the ante on nuclear threats, NATO would do well to have Stoltenberg’s seasoned leadership.

Allies might feel an urgency to select Stoltenberg’s replacement at the upcoming Vilnius summit, but they are not required to at that time. That decision could be made later in 2023 or early 2024, still in time for a new secretary general to be installed at the seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington DC. If Stoltenberg does indeed step down this September, he will have already completed nearly ten years of service, making him the second-longest serving NATO secretary general after Joseph Luns, who served from 1971 to 1984. Stoltenberg has given NATO a full measure of service. Yet changing captains in the heat of battle should give some NATO capitals pause.

Key calculations in choosing Stoltenberg’s eventual successor

Whether in September or later, when Stoltenberg does depart and a new secretary general is needed, whom should the allies select?

Some members chafe at the fact that twenty years after new members from Eastern Europe joined the Alliance, no candidate from those seven countries has been selected as secretary general. Other members, including the United States, have shown notable interest in seeing women chosen for high leadership positions. Women leaders have been elected as heads of state for many NATO members, as well as for international organizations such as the European Commission (Ursula Von der Leyen), the International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank (Christine Lagarde), the World Trade Organization (Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala), and the United Nations General Assembly (Maria Fernanda Espinosa Garcés).

To be sure, NATO is past due to join the growing club of glass ceiling breakers. That achievement must be weighed in the context of giving both any prospective candidate and the Alliance the best conditions for success. The conditions facing the next secretary general could not be more challenging. There will be no quiet time for a transition before assertive transatlantic leadership and momentous decisions will be required.

Most immediately, it is critical that NATO solidarity and momentum not slacken in backing Ukraine’s military success over Russia. By the end of this year, the war in Ukraine will likely have moved into a new stage, either—and hopefully—toward a full Ukrainian victory or into a steady stalemate. Until then, and as Vilnius approaches, the war and other major issues—Sweden’s NATO membership, defense spending levels, confronting China’s challenges—will demand unrelenting leadership and diplomacy. The months ahead are not optimum for farewelling NATO’s most capable leader—or for welcoming a new one. Proceed with caution!

Correction: An earlier version of this piece incorrectly stated Stoltenberg began his role as secretary general in March 2014. He was appointed as secretary general designate in March 2014, but formally began the role in October 2014.

Charles Barry is a visiting research fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Since 1990, he has assisted senior US and NATO officials in developing three NATO Strategic Concepts and preparing for fourteen NATO summits. These views are his own and do not reflect those of the US Department of Defense or the National Defense University.

The post Should NATO extend Stoltenberg’s term as leader? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Restocking US and allies’ arsenals starts with getting industry involved at the NATO summit

Giedrimas Jeglinskas and Viltaute Zarembaite — Thu, 08 Jun 2023 13:45:11 +0000

Defense industry chief executive officers and the leaders of NATO members and partner countries need to have an urgent discussion about insufficient stockpiles of ammunition and equipment. The NATO Leaders’ Summit July 11-12 in Vilnius, Lithuania, is a perfect opportunity to bring them together.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg summed up the problem last week. “So far allies have depleted stocks to be able to support Ukraine—that’s not a sustainable path so we need to ramp up production to fill these new and more ambitious targets,” he explained. The will to support Ukraine for “as long as it takes” is there, but the capacity to deliver support while also defending NATO members is also needed.

According to the Kiel Institute, Ukraine has received more than seventy billion dollars in military aid since Russia’s full-scale invasion started on February 24, 2022. While this figure is large and the aid has contributed to Ukraine’s ability to resist and later repel the Russian invasion, Ukrainian forces need more ammunition and equipment to finish the job. However, the countries supporting Ukraine are struggling to produce enough vital defense materiel. Ukraine is burning through ammunition a lot faster than NATO countries currently manufacture it.

Massive industrial bottlenecks in manufacturing of artillery shells and related equipment, if unresolved, threaten to undermine efforts to help the Ukrainians push out the invaders. Stoltenberg has dubbed it a “race of logistics,” and more than Ukraine’s future is at stake. The readiness of US and allied militaries is put at risk by ineffectively designed supply chains, cumbersome process-focused procurement, and political wrangling. This incapacity to replenish allies’ ammunition stocks and equipment undermines the deterrence posture of NATO as a whole.

Similarly, the US defense industry has been slow to deliver enough munitions to Taiwan as it faces increased saber-rattling from the People’s Republic of China. A recent report by Seth G. Jones at the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that, in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the United States would deplete certain long-range munitions in less than a week. As allies such as Australia and Japan start to ramp up defense spending, the US defense industry will need to deliver more weapons to meet the increasing demand.

In Europe, the defense industry revival is not fairing any better. In May, after weeks of negotiations, the European Union (EU) announced a one-billion-euro initiative to procure ammunition for Ukraine “via the European Union industry and Norway.” This initiative, however, has faced multiple stumbling blocks and delays as certain countries have prioritized defending the interests of national industries and using protectionist measures to purchase ammunition only from European companies. EU leaders appear to have decided to move forward, but it is clear that both the structure of the initiative and its lack of scale will not solve the long-term underinvestment issues in Europe. This is despite the level of ambition outlined in the EU’s Strategic Compass for Security and Defense last year and important progress made on the issue since.

What can be done?

Looking to history, the urgency and unity shown as allied—primarily US—industry mass produced equipment for World War II is nowhere to be found in today’s production process. The Atlantic Council’s Thomas S. Warrick recently advocated for “the Department of Defense to shift procurement to a wartime footing.” However, even short of this proposal, the United States and its allies and partners can nonetheless launch a coordinated effort to overcome industrial and bureaucratic constraints. It also must include both the governments and heads of industry responsible for stocking any future arsenal of democracy.

Representatives from the defense industry have already been invited by NATO to participate in a meeting of defense ministers in Brussels later this month. However, more is needed. The Vilnius summit in July is an important opportunity to further advance engagement with the defense industry, which NATO can do by holding an official side event for government officials to meet with the chief executive officers of the defense industry. Here they could all get on the same page about the true urgency of inadequate defense value chains. Defense contractors would benefit from direct awareness-raising conversations at the highest political level. In exchange, policymakers would benefit from hearing directly from defense contractors about what policies are necessary to streamline their production processes.

This would be taking a page out of Japan’s playbook. On the eve of last month’s Group of Seven (G7) Hiroshima summit, seven of the world’s largest semiconductor makers met with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in Tokyo to discuss plans to significantly increase Japan’s chipmaking capabilities. The unprecedented meeting demonstrated a concerted effort between the private and public sectors to reshape global commercial supply chains as tensions with China continue to grow.

Productive collaboration with the defense industry is essential not only for replenishing stockpiles and maintaining a steady supply of armaments, but also for addressing a wider range of future concerns, spanning from information sharing to cybersecurity and resilience. Developing a strong partnership with the defense industry will be vital for advancing in these areas. So, where might this collaboration start?

First, NATO’s Vilnius summit will be the second time in a row when Asia-Pacific partners are participating, offering opportunities to look into diversifying supply chains across Europe and North America and into the Indo-Pacific.

Second, allies need to rethink process-centered procurement, which avoids rather than manages risk and consumes massive financial and time resources rather than promptly delivering what is necessary. Anyone who has ever dealt with the notorious procurement schemes will agree that change is impossible without forceful political will. In Vilnius, heads of the defense industry and NATO member states could commit to pursue new and specific orders and deliverables, the fulfillment of which could help reorganize or override currently inefficient procurement processes.

Third, to truly empower NATO’s innovation efforts, such as the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic and the NATO Innovation Fund, industry leaders must commit to advancing these nascent initiatives. As disruptive technologies mature and become essential for future defense capabilities, a closer collaboration between the private sector and governments is needed to bridge the investment gaps and avoid the “valleys of death,” in which small but high-potential companies are left in limbo between initial development and production. In order to maintain technological edge and bring more companies and innovation into the defense space, NATO needs to boost investment in cutting-edge technologies and make its innovation cycle more efficient and robust.

The task of rebuilding the arsenal of democracy is a complex multi-stakeholder endeavor. What is required is a robust no-nonsense collaboration between an industry that can deliver and governments that can lead with political decisions to enable relevant industrial policies. Vilnius is a great place to start.

Giedrimas Jeglinskas is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He was previously assistant secretary general for executive management at NATO and deputy minister of defense of the Republic of Lithuania.

Viltaute Zarembaite is a visiting fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is also a career diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania. These views are her own and do not reflect those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania.

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Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive will aim to keep the Russians guessing

Peter Dickinson — Wed, 07 Jun 2023 21:00:33 +0000

Is Ukraine’s hotly anticipated counteroffensive finally underway? That is the question dominating much of the international media this week following reports from both the Ukrainian and Russian sides of a significant upswing in activity along the front lines in southern and eastern Ukraine.

This speculation is understandable; after all, expectations have been mounting since early 2023 over an offensive that is being widely billed as a potential turning point in the sixteen-month war. It may be more helpful, however, to view Ukraine’s counteroffensive as a rolling series of local probes and thrusts rather than a single big push to penetrate Russian defenses and secure a decisive breakthrough.

Talk of a coming Ukrainian counteroffensive began following the liberation of Kherson from Russian occupation in late 2022. In the six months since that last major military success, Ukraine has sent tens of thousands of fresh troops for training in NATO countries and received unprecedented amounts of Western military aid including modern battle tanks, cruise missiles, armored personnel carriers, and enhanced air defense systems. With these newly trained and equipped formations now believed to be largely in position, observers have been watching for indications that the offensive is indeed underway. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy added to the sense of anticipation by declaring in a June 3 interview with the Wall Street Journal: “We are ready” for the counteroffensive.

Anyone expecting to witness major battles is set to be disappointed, at least for the time being. While the long lines of opposing trenches and emphasis on artillery duels has led many to compare the fighting in Ukraine to the horrors of World War I, few expect the Ukrainian military to begin its counteroffensive by going “over the top” and attempting to smash through Russian lines with their newly formed brigades. Instead, Ukrainian commanders will likely seek to test Russian defenses at a number of locations along the length of the 1,000-kilometer front in a bid to stretch Vladimir Putin’s invasion force and identify weak points to exploit.

A series of recent cross-border incursions into the Russian Federation conducted by Ukrainian-backed Russian militias may be part of these efforts. While militarily insignificant in terms of size or territorial gains, the raids have proved a major personal embarrassment for Putin and could force Moscow to reduce its military presence in Ukraine in order to bolster the badly exposed home front.

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As they look to advance, Ukraine’s troops will face formidable obstacles. Russia has not sat idly by during the past half-year; it has created a defense in depth in anticipation of Ukraine’s coming attack that includes several lines of trenches and other fortifications.

Russia appears to have provided an indication of its resolve early on June 6 by blowing up the Kakhovka dam and power plant on the Dnipro River in southern Ukraine. While Moscow officially denies destroying the dam, initial analysis points to Russian responsibility. A June 7 New York Times article referencing engineering and munitions experts concluded that a deliberate explosion inside the Russian-controlled dam “most likely caused its collapse.” The ensuing ecological disaster has flooded the surrounding area, virtually ruling out a Ukrainian thrust across the river toward Crimea.

Moscow’s preparations for the Ukrainian counteroffensive certainly look impressive, but questions remain over the morale of Russian troops, with a steady stream of video addresses posted to social media in recent months indicating widespread demoralization among mobilized Russian soldiers complaining of poor conditions, suicidal tactics, and heavy losses. In contrast, Ukrainian morale is believed to be high, despite the large numbers of casualties incurred during intense fighting over the winter and spring months around the eastern Ukrainian city of Bakhmut.

Crucially, Ukraine’s troops are defending their homes and have a clear vision of what they are fighting for, while Russia has struggled to articulate its war aims or define what a potential victory could look like. In the heat of the coming summer counteroffensive, this morale factor could play a critical role.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Most commentators agree that the primary military objective of Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive is to cut the land bridge running across southern Ukraine that connects Russia itself and the occupied Donbas region with the Crimean peninsula. If this is achieved, it would isolate large numbers of Russian troops in Crimea and south Ukraine while dealing a painful blow to Russian prestige.

Ultimately, Ukraine’s stated goal remains the liberation of Crimea itself, which has been under Russian occupation since 2014. A successful advance toward Crimea would leave the peninsula exposed to Ukrainian airstrikes and could spark a political crisis inside Russia. The military failures of the past sixteen months have already led to significant infighting among different elements within the Russian establishment; if Crimea itself is threatened, the international community must brace for a major escalation in Putin’s nuclear threats as he attempts to ward off what would be a catastrophic defeat.

Many believe a showdown over the fate of Crimea will serve as the end game of the entire war. But before we approach that point, Ukraine must first deploy its fresh forces effectively and overcome Russia’s deeply entrenched army on the mainland. This will involve much maneuvering and diversionary attacks before any major advances are attempted.

Ukraine’s successful 2022 campaigns may offer the best indication of what to expect from the summer counteroffensive. In August 2022, Ukrainian officials loudly trumpeted a counteroffensive in the south to retake Kherson. When Russia duly dispatched many of its best units to meet the expected Ukrainian attack, Ukraine struck instead in the thinly defended east and liberated most of the Kharkiv region. With Russia still reeling from this defeat and scrambling to hold the line, the Ukrainian military then renewed its southern offensive and forced Russia to abandon Kherson.

This masterclass in the art of military deception rightfully won Ukraine considerable plaudits. Ukrainian commanders will be looking to spring some similar surprises in the months ahead. Their stated goal is the complete liberation of Ukrainian territory, but they will aim to keep the Russians guessing as to exactly how they plan to achieve this.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Export controls: A surprising key to strengthening UK-US military collaboration

Deborah Cheverton — Wed, 07 Jun 2023 15:06:15 +0000

UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak arrived in Washington Tuesday night for talks with US President Joe Biden. According to the White House, discussions will focus on shared economic and security challenges including energy security, the climate crisis, and Ukraine. Both leaders are fresh off the Group of Seven (G7) Summit in Japan where these issues got a thorough airing, and these talks should be an opportunity to go deeper into the details on a bilateral basis. While Ukraine will likely grab the headlines from a national security perspective, another important, albeit under-the-radar issue should also be on the agenda: export controls reform.

Export controls are often thought of for their role in preventing the transfer of arms and other sensitive technologies to malign actors, or as a foreign policy tool used alongside economic sanctions to punish illegal activity. This was the angle taken at the G7 with specific reference to Russia and China, but that viewpoint obscures a different problem. The United States’ closest allies have been quietly frustrated for decades that the indiscriminate and extraterritorial application of these same export controls, in particular the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), seriously hinders efforts to share technologies and collaborate with allies on capability development projects. This is due to the costly and time-consuming processes associated with ITAR compliance. But this isn’t just a time-versus-cost-versus-quality issue for program managers to deal with. It’s much bigger than that. As William Greenwalt, a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, has said, “US government security policies related to export controls no longer support long-term national security interests and if not modified will likely result in the US military falling further behind in the competition with China.” ITAR was enacted during the Cold War, at a time when the United States enjoyed such technological and industrial dominance over its potential adversaries that it could afford to go it alone, write off allied contributions to military capability development, and absorb the consequences in time and cost when they did choose to partner up. None of those things are true anymore.

The Department of Defense has long recognized that it no longer holds complete technological advantage and recent administrations of both parties have promoted the critical role of allies and partners in their national security strategies. Yet ITAR directly prevents the United States from accessing some of the best allied technology and indirectly reduces the military capabilities of its allies. For example, the UK government estimated in 2017 that it costs UK companies almost half a billion dollars a year to comply with ITAR. That’s effectively a 0.7 percent tax levied by the United States on the national defense budget of a close ally, and money which could be far better spent on increased readiness or on more advanced capabilities that would benefit the United States. After all, depending on exchange rate fluctuations and production lot, half a billion dollars equates to four or five F-35B fighter jets. Even worse, that figure only covers those companies that have the resources and risk appetite to work with the United States in the first place. So-called “ITAR taint,” the risk that any technical cooperation with US entities will lead to the loss of control over their technology, prevents some non-US companies from engaging at all. Data is anecdotal as it mainly comes down to internal bidding decisions by individual companies, but it seems that small and medium size enterprises are especially affected. These are exactly the sort of cutting-edge companies that the United States needs in its corner on everything from quantum computing to materials science.

A focus for discussions at the White House

You would think that with such an obvious downside it would be an easy fix, but no. Unfortunately for the Department of Defense, it doesn’t own ITAR policy or its implementation. The State Department does, and it does not feel the pain of delayed programs and degraded technological advantage. Despite the efforts of many talented and hardworking officials who have dedicated their careers to keeping the United States’ most critical technological advancements out of enemy hands, the organizational incentives are not structured to support the pace or flexibility that modern technology and the current geostrategic and security situation demand. The outdated systems State Department officials are working within have become a mechanism of national self-harm and, at the end of the day, it is the warfighter that loses out.

The good news is that the right people in the legislative and executive branches of the US government are starting to take notice of the problem, particularly in the context of the nuclear submarine deal involving Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, known as AUKUS. To date, much of the press about AUKUS has been on the trilateral effort to support Australia in acquiring conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines under Pillar One of the agreement. Arguably though, it is the wider cooperation in critical technologies such as artificial intelligence, autonomy, cyber, and electronic warfare envisaged under Pillar Two that represents the real generational opportunity. Behind the scenes, officials and politicians in all three nations are realizing that Pillar Two just won’t stand with ITAR as it’s currently enforced. This is driving unprecedented interest on Capitol Hill, where congressional Republicans in the House and Senate are leading efforts to force the State Department to address the problem. They are advancing the fantastically named Truncating Onerous Regulations for Partners and Enhancing Deterrence Operations (TORPEDO) Act. To quote Senator Jim Risch (R-Idaho), the ranking member of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, this legislation “aims to speed up the implementation process by reforming the US regulatory system so we can cooperate in a timely and efficient manner on the capabilities we and our partners need.” This is extremely welcome, but in the complicated world of export controls reform the story begins with legislation but it doesn’t end there. Previous attempts at reform, such as the 2016 legal expansion of the National Technology Industrial Base and the 2022 Open General License pilot program, have stumbled on implementation issues which can only be fixed from within the State Department and will require coordinated action between the executive and legislative branches.

This is where Sunak and Biden should focus their discussions. With his reputation for pragmatism, Sunak should easily avoid the temptation to request a blanket ITAR exemption for the United Kingdom as this would be politically unpalatable and counterproductive. Biden, with his flagship foreign policy initiative in the balance, should commit to work with Congress on a bounded and enforceable exemption under the Arms Export Controls Act for AUKUS nations, and then incentivize the State Department to make it work in practice. Collaboration with longstanding allies and partners is critical to the United States’ success in combating the increasingly dynamic threat posed by its adversaries. To let that flounder on account of an out-of-date and inappropriately enforced export control regime should be an unacceptable outcome for all involved.

Deborah Cheverton is a visiting senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Cheverton is a career civil servant from the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MOD), where she has spent almost fifteen years working across a range of policy and delivery areas with a particular focus on science and technology policy, industrial strategy, capability development, and international collaboration. She writes here in her personal capacity as an Atlantic Council fellow, not in an official government capacity. Her views are her own.

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Wieslander interviewed in Saab Security Talks

Eric Adamson — Wed, 07 Jun 2023 09:45:11 +0000

Listen here

NATO – How does it affect Sweden?

A changing environment has led Finland to join NATO and Sweden will soon do the same. What will NATO mean for us from a military, security and industrial perspective?Commander-in-Chief Micael Bydén and Anna Wieslander, Chairman of the Board of the Institute for Security and Development Policy, talk with Katarina Tracz about how Sweden will be affected – and influence – by joining NATO.

The post Wieslander interviewed in Saab Security Talks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig and Ashford debate the role of the US in European Security

sodal — Tue, 06 Jun 2023 15:10:22 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On May 19, Foreign Policy published its biweekly “It’s Debatable” column featuring Scowcroft Center Vice President and Senior Director Matthew Kroenig and Emma Ashford assessing the latest news in international affairs.

In their latest column, the pair extensively debate the role of the United States in European security, citing the long-established and substantial impact of the US in maintaining the transatlantic security alliance. Should the US continue to lead the transatlantic alliance while encouraging European states to increase contributions? Or should the US adopt a “hands-off” model to better focus on the rising threat of China?

Only the United States has the power and the widespread feeling of goodwill from within Europe to lead the transatlantic alliance. It should continue to provide overall vision and coordination. Only Washington can provide strategic deterrence against Russia. And I also think that European states should provide more of the nuts and bolts of the conventional defense, from aircraft to tanks to personnel, etc.

Matthew Kroenig

A division of labor within NATO in which European states carry most of the burden – and do most of the work in practical terms – of deterring Russia, defending themselves, and securing Europe’s frontiers, while the United States takes a more hands-off approach to focus on Asia but is available to provide resources and aid if a major crisis requires it. That’s a true partnership, and it’s where I believe the United States and Europe have to go if the transatlantic relationship is to continue to thrive.

Emma Ashford

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig and Ashford debate the role of the US in European Security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Dispatch from Kyiv: Ukraine deserves NATO membership and even more robust weapons

Frederick Kempe — Sun, 04 Jun 2023 11:45:00 +0000

The air raid siren sounded at 3:00 a.m. on Thursday morning, several hours after the Atlantic Council’s meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in his well-fortified offices, sounding the arrival of ten Russian Iskander ballistic missiles in Kyiv airspace.

Each of them—more than twenty feet long and weighing in at more than four tons—served as a further reminder that the time was over for providing half measures in supporting Ukraine. After fifteen months of withstanding and pushing back against Moscow’s aggression—acting in the interests of free people everywhere—Ukraine deserves support: faster and larger deliveries of ammunition, more plentiful supplies of Patriot and other air defenses, longer-range missiles to hit targets within Russia (that are killing Ukrainians) and, as rapidly as possible, F-16s and other fourth-generation fighter jets to reduce Moscow’s deadly air superiority.

Most of all, Ukraine deserves NATO membership. Given the generational consequences of Ukrainians’ struggles, NATO should provide much clearer and more robust security guarantees to Ukraine at the Alliance’s Vilnius summit in July. Most urgently, NATO should provide a concrete path to membership, including the timing and avenues for a fast-track accession decision by the Alliance’s seventy-fifth-anniversary summit in Washington next April. To put that off until after Russia’s war ends or until Russia withdraws from Ukrainian territory only encourages Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggression.

Mercifully on that Thursday morning, US-provided Patriot air defense systems took out all of the incoming Iskanders, but the fragments still killed three Ukrainians (including a woman and her nine-year-old child) and injured eleven others, adding to the victims from Russia’s murderous war. Dozens more would have been killed this week, the deadliest week in Kyiv in months, had the United States and other allied systems not been put in place in April, after long months of discussions.

After Ukrainian reports that Patriot missiles shot down a Russian hypersonic weapon for the first time on May 4 and six more in a single night two weeks later, Zelenskyy reflected with one of his top advisers on how many hundreds more Ukrainian lives might have been saved had the deliveries come faster. He also pondered how many more Ukrainians might die on the front lines in the coming summer offensive because the F-16s won’t be providing air cover for months to come, telling the Wall Street Journal that the lack of protection means “a large number of soldiers will die.”

However, in our meeting with Zelenskyy this week, where we presented him with the Atlantic Council Global Citizen Award, he adopted his more familiar public posture of looking forward and doing what he can to maintain domestic and international unity.

“I’m not looking at the past, but rather to the future,” he said. “We have to achieve comparable airpower to Russia in the sky.” He spoke about the historic cost not just to Ukraine, but also to Europe, the United States, and the world, should his country come up short. “We can’t be losers,” he said.

And that brought him to NATO’s upcoming Vilnius summit.

His advisers have briefed him on the options allies are said to be discussing regarding Ukraine, ranging from a security relationship akin to that between the United States and Israel, of robust weapons deliveries and intelligence exchanges, to the renaming and repurposing of a body at which NATO meets regularly with Ukraine in order to give it more heft.

Zelenskyy noted that Ukraine lacks the deterrent power of Israel’s nuclear capabilities, which it gave up along with Kazakhstan and Belarus after signing the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in 1994, when Russia provided assurances that it wouldn’t use military force or economic coercion against Ukraine or the others.

Given the urgency of their war with Russia, most Ukrainians would see a more robust consultative body within NATO as window dressing if it didn’t come with membership certainties. More NATO members are coming to realize that as well, with French President Emmanuel Macron telling the GLOBSEC conference in Slovakia this week that Ukraine deserved to be included “in an architecture of security.”

As Zelenskyy said to our delegation, “if Ukraine will not be given some hope at Vilnius, it will be demoralizing for our soldiers. It will be seen as a big message to our soldiers and people.”

If NATO doesn’t come forward with “more ambitious ideas” at its summit, Zelenskyy indicated to us, it might not be appropriate for him to accept the Alliance’s invitation to attend. “I don’t want to betray our people,” he said, sensing Ukrainians would feel underappreciated for the irreplaceable role they are playing on Europe’s front lines against Russian aggression.

“We need the world not to be afraid of Russia,” he said. His unstated message was clear: The world’s fears about Russia’s potential escalation of its war in Ukraine, up to and including the use of tactical nuclear weapons, have prevented more robust support at earlier stages—but that was the opposite of what would better deter Putin.

A short week’s stay in Ukraine underscores two inescapable realities as the country braces for its long-anticipated summer counteroffensive, which is expected to begin in the coming days.

The first reality is that without the remarkable level of US and partner support thus far, it would have been impossible for Ukrainians to have held the line against Russian adversaries, who are more numerous, are well-armed, and maintain still far superior airpower.

The second reality, however, is that the cautiousness and relative slowness in those deliveries of support have prevented the Ukrainians from making more rapid gains, made it harder to prevent civilian casualties, and made it harder for Ukraine to retake enough territory to force Russia to the negotiating table, prolonging the war.

As certainly as West Berlin’s survival was a pre-condition for Cold War victory, and as certainly as Poland’s Solidarity movement and democratic change laid the ground for Soviet collapse, so it is now Ukraine’s fate as a free and democratic nation—integrated into the European Union and NATO—that will be at the center of the context for Europe’s future.

Our Kyiv interlocutors (Ukrainian military strategists) see three potential scenarios for their coming summer counteroffensive.

The first, and most desired but least likely outcome, would be a complete Russian military collapse and retreat. The second, and more likely outcome, would be for Ukraine to achieve sufficient battlefield and territorial gains in the nearly twenty percent of Ukraine that remains in Russian hands to force a Putin reassessment and better negotiating terms. The third, and the most feared outcome, would be a Ukrainian failure in the summer offensive that would demoralize Ukrainians and dishearten their international backers.

The stakes for Ukraine in the coming months are enormous. Yet the stakes for the United States and Ukraine’s other friends may be even greater over time. In recognizing that, it will be easier to make the tough decisions regarding weapons and NATO membership that are so urgently required.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 Fake Signals and American Insurance: How a Dark Fleet Moves Russian Oil
Christiaan Triebert, Blacki Migliozzi, Alexander Cardia, Muyi Xiao, and David Botti | NEW YORK TIMES

In this powerful report, New York Times reporters track several cargo ships moving oil between Russia and China in violation of US sanctions and explain the technology and methodology these cargo ships use.

“The vessels,” they report, “are part of a so-called dark fleet, a loose term used to describe a hodgepodge array of ships that obscure their locations or identities to avoid oversight from governments and business partners.”

Moreover, as the Times points out, such tactics are not isolated to Russia. “[The dark fleet’s ships] have typically been involved in moving oil from Venezuela or Iran—two countries that have also been hit by international sanctions,” the authors write. “The latest surge of dark fleet ships began after Russia invaded Ukraine and the West tried to limit Moscow’s oil revenue with sanctions.” Read more →

#2 Bakhmut and the spirit of Verdun
ECONOMIST

The Economist compares the Russian assault on Bakhmut with the German assault on Verdun over one hundred years ago during World War I, and considers how Ukraine’s heroic defense has ground down the Russians and upheld the Ukrainian spirit of heroic defiance.

“Above all,” the Economist writes, “each place has acquired a symbolic importance that outweighs its original strategic value. At Verdun, the French were caught ill-prepared. Under Philippe Pétain’s command, they built resistance around the rotation of forces, limiting soldiers’ time at the front and supplying the effort by road from Bar-le-Duc. ‘They shall not pass’ became the Verdun battle cry, a defiant call to hold the town, just as President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called Bakhmut ‘our fortress.’”

“‘What Bakhmut shares with Verdun is the notion of prestige,’ says Nicolas Czubak, a historian at the Verdun Memorial. The war was not won or lost at Verdun; but the French turned it into an emblem of strength that made retreat unthinkable.” Read more →

#3 How the US is deepening military alliances in China’s backyard
Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille | FINANCIAL TIMES

To understand the Biden administration’s increased efforts to counter China using alliances, read this Financial Times report on the steps the United States has taken to build up a Pacific security architecture and what remains to be done.

The FT notes that “the US is not only focused on its biggest allies. It has also been forced to step up cooperation with smaller Pacific Island nations after Beijing shocked Washington last year by signing a security pact with the Solomon Islands. In response, the US last week signed a security pact with Papua New Guinea and extended so-called Compact of Free Association agreements with Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia—deals that will give the US military exclusive access to facilities for two decades.”

“Arguably the biggest challenge for the US, however,” the FT reports, “is to get its allies to the point where they are conducting joint operational exercises based on actual joint war plans. This particularly applies to Japan and Australia, the nations most likely to fight alongside the US in a war in the region.” Read more →

#4 The Illusion of China’s AI Prowess
Helen Toner, Jenny Xiao, and Jeffery Ding | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

As this smart Foreign Affairs analysis explains, one of the great ironies of Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s much touted authoritarian model is that the censorship it necessitates also hobbles China’s development of artificial intelligence (AI), by drastically limiting what Chinese scientists can include in the large language models, or LLMs, that underlie AI chatbot technology.

“Over the past three years,” Toner, Xiao, and Ding write, “Chinese labs have rapidly followed in the footsteps of US and British companies, building AI systems similar to OpenAI’s GPT-3 (the forerunner to ChatGPT), Google’s PaLM, and DeepMind’s Chinchilla. But in many cases, the hype surrounding Chinese models has masked a lack of real substance. Chinese AI researchers we have spoken with believe that Chinese LLMs are at least two or three years behind their state-of-the-art counterparts in the United States—perhaps even more. Worse, AI advances in China rely a great deal on reproducing and tweaking research published abroad, a dependence that could make it hard for Chinese companies to assume a leading role in the field. If the pace of innovation slackened elsewhere, China’s efforts to build LLMs—like a slower cyclist coasting in the leaders’ slipstream—would likely decelerate.” Read more →

#5 To Protect Europe, Let Ukraine Join NATO—Right Now
Andriy Zagorodnyuk | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In this must-read essay, former Ukrainian defense minister Andriy Zagorodnyuk (an Atlantic Council distinguished fellow) makes a strong case for immediate Ukrainian membership of NATO.

“It is time, then, to let Ukraine join—not sooner or later, but now,” Zagorodnyuk writes. “By entering the Alliance, the country will secure its future as part of the West, and it can be sure the United States and Europe will continue to help it fight against Moscow. Europe, too, will reap security benefits by allowing Ukraine to join the Alliance. It is now apparent that the continent is not ready to defend itself and that its politicians have largely overestimated its security. Indeed, Europe will never be secure from Russia until it can militarily stop Moscow’s attacks. And no state is more qualified to do so than Ukraine.”

“Ukraine should join NATO right away,” Zagorodnyuk adds. “But unfortunately, it will almost certainly have to wait. It takes a unanimous vote to add a country to the Alliance, and there are still far too many governments that remain opposed to the country’s ascension. But in Vilnius, NATO should at least move beyond vague promises about Ukraine’s future and get down to the specifics of helping Kyiv join the organization. It is time for Western states to stand firm against bullies and stop giving Russia (or any other outside state) a voice in the security architecture of an organization that considers it an adversary. Instead, now is the time for NATO to start strengthening itself, and bringing in Ukraine is essential to accomplishing this task. No state, after all, knows more about how to fight back against the Kremlin. In fact, no country has more current experience fighting large-scale wars anywhere. Ukraine’s only peer is Russia itself.” Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

New Atlanticist Jun 2, 2023

Five questions (and expert answers) about the recent clashes in Kosovo

By Atlantic Council experts

Protests this week in Kosovo when local officials took office resulted in injuries to NATO peacekeeping troops—and in fears of a further escalation of violence. Atlantic Council experts answer the critical questions.

Conflict Crisis Management

Fast Thinking May 28, 2023

What the world should expect from Erdogan now

By Atlantic Council

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan triumphed in his re-election bid on Sunday. Our experts break down what to expect next on the war in Ukraine, NATO enlargement, Syria, and more.

Conflict Elections

New Atlanticist Jun 1, 2023

China stands to gain from a weakened Russia. The West should prepare now.

By Andrew A. Michta

A protracted war of attrition in Ukraine serves Beijing’s interests in that it will lead to the long-term weakening of Russia, thereby fundamentally shifting the Sino-Russian power balance in China’s favor.

China Politics & Diplomacy

The post Dispatch from Kyiv: Ukraine deserves NATO membership and even more robust weapons appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Five questions (and expert answers) about the recent clashes in Kosovo

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 02 Jun 2023 21:03:44 +0000

All politics is local, all consequences are not. In April, the Serb majority population in the north of Kosovo boycotted municipal elections, which were held after their representatives left the official Kosovo government institutions following a dispute between Kosovo and Serbia, in part about car license plates. With Kosovo Serbian candidates and voters boycotting, Kosovo Albanian candidates won the local elections in the north, in which only 3.5 percent of the local population participated. Protests erupted when four mayors took office under instruction from Kosovo’s Albanian dominated central government and under special police protection, resulting in injuries to intervening NATO peacekeeping troops. Now, Europe and the world watch, trying to prevent an escalation of ethnic violence. Atlantic Council experts answer the critical questions below.

1. How did we get here?

Based on all the information we received from our contacts in civil society, including both Kosovo Serbs and Albanians, the question was not so much “if” but rather “when” the long-lasting crisis would escalate. There were numerous potential triggers for escalation that were plainly evident to those willing to acknowledge them. Many of these triggers stemmed from a series of escalatory decisions made by political leaders on both sides.

Just to highlight a few examples: the withdrawal of Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo institutions, particularly the police force; the deployment of Kosovo special police forces to the streets in the northern region; the expropriation of land in municipalities predominantly inhabited by Serbs; the refusal to participate in the elections; and ultimately, violent clashes between the Serbian minority and NATO soldiers this week triggered by four newly elected Kosovo Albanian mayors taking office in northern Kosovo after April elections that were boycotted by Kosovo Serbs.

—Maja Piscevic is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and representative of the Center in the Western Balkans.

The Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo have long been the flashpoint in the protracted dispute between Kosovo and Serbia. The escalation earlier this week followed a series of tit-for-tat actions on both sides after the most recent tense standoff over license plate enforcement on the Kosovo-Serbia border in late 2022.

What is different this time is the series of political miscalculations the government in Pristina seems to have made about its US and European allies’ postures. Having invested significant political capital into the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue led by the European Union (EU) for normalizing relations between both sides, Washington and its allies from Brussels to Paris and Berlin warned Pristina not to escalate the situation further. Instead, US and EU partners wanted to focus on progress in the dialogue. The government’s decision to double down on enforcing the outcome of the April local elections, which the Serb majority boycotted and in which less than 3.5 percent of the population in northern Kosovo participated, added fuel to the fire. With this escalation, Kosovo now risks losing part of what used to be largely unqualified US and European support.

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Europe Center at the Atlantic Council.

The situation in the north of Kosovo reached its current point due to a combination of factors and events. The lack of implementation of the Ohrid agreement to normalize relations and the failure to deliver on the establishment of the Association of Serb Municipalities created a growing frustration in the international community. One crucial factor is the lack of maturity displayed by leaders involved in the dialogue process and their challenges in engaging and moving forward through strong political will. It appears that the incentives for both sides to adhere to the agreements were not strong enough and therefore progress was hindered.

The catalyst for the situation in the north can be traced back to Kosovo Serbs’ deliberate withdrawal from local institutions, including by mayors and police officers. This helped create a vacuum which Kosovo’s government seized upon—by insisting on holding local elections and enforcing the mayors’ taking office to demonstrate that the north exists as a separate political reality outside Kosovo’s institutional framework.

—Ilva Tare is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and was most recently a broadcaster with EuroNews Group.

2. What could tip this into a more serious conflict?

Even if it seems that all sides are trying to lower the temperature in recent days, a combination of factors could further escalate the situation. Russia has long been an opportunist meddler in the region with significant disinformation tools, especially among Serbian media and audiences. A rally-around-the-flag effect among Kosovo’s majority Albanian population could put government decisionmakers in Pristina on the spot. They repeatedly seem to have chosen standing on principle over politically constructive solutions and have doubled down on symbolic actions, despite warnings by Western allies to avoid escalation. That could make it harder for them to back down. And Serbia has influence over gangs that can inflame the situation if they choose—or are instructed—to.

—Jörn Fleck

There are any number of potential flashpoints, but it is important to focus on the region, to recognize what the citizens of the area see as their grievances, and seek, in good faith, long-term solutions. The recent events are clearly a setback to this process.

—Cameron Munter is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and Europe Center. He spent three decades in the US Foreign Service, where he served as US ambassador to Serbia during the Kosovo independence crisis.

3. What should EU countries and the US do right now?

First of all, the United States and the EU should stop considering the Western Balkans as a peripheral issue, which they have for the last decade. Some progress has been made, but, for example, the five members of the EU that have not recognized Kosovo (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain) should not be allowed to simply pretend their actions do not make a difference. They, along with their fellow EU members, should make new efforts to seek resolution and not simply wait for someone else to address the issues.

—Cameron Munter

The current status quo in the north is unsustainable, as it is dominated by parallel structures, as the Kosovo government states. Addressing this issue and stopping the violent elements from the north should not distract from the broader political dialogue, which is brokered by the EU and supported by the United States.

The escalation of events in the north of Kosovo in recent days was an unfortunate distraction for Kosovo and Serbia in their efforts to normalize relations through political dialogue. The situation is back to square one, with the same requests for both sides and the urge for the parties to demonstrate loyalty to their Western allies and show that they can be credible and trustworthy partners in their Euro-Atlantic aspirations—especially for Kosovo, which cannot afford to lose the support of the United States or of key members of the EU.

—Ilva Tare

The United States and Europe should not reward spoilers of the progress made in the normalization process in recent months, following significant US and EU political investment. The current escalation is helping leaders in Pristina and Belgrade avoid executing on some tough steps toward normalization and dealing with domestic political challenges. Europe and the United States should make clear that the only way out of the current situation ultimately runs through the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue.

—Jörn Fleck

4. Will new elections defuse this situation?

In order to move toward a resolution, new elections should be held with preconditions such as the involvement of Kosovo Serbs, the establishment of working conditions for Kosovo police and mayors, and the complete withdrawal of special police units of the Kosovo government deployed in the north, which is one of Kosovo Serbs’ stated requirements to take part in local elections. Progress with the Association of Serb Municipalities by mid-November is now a concrete condition with a deadline for the Kosovo government to deliver.

—Ilva Tare

It’s worth discussing. Clearly, new elections would have to be conceived and implemented very carefully, to ensure their result would be recognized by all sides as legitimate. Thus, it’s not a guarantee of solving the problem, but it’s one possible way to address it.

—Cameron Munter

5. Are there any more creative solutions for Serbia and Kosovo to get to more stable relations?

In the current atmosphere of deep-seated distrust and personal animosity between the two political leaders, it is challenging, if not impossible, to envision any innovative solutions. This is a harsh reality that the West still appears hesitant to acknowledge, despite the events unfolding over the past two years involving Prime Minister Albin Kurti of Kosovo and President Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia. It is becoming increasingly clear that, at some point, the West will need to pause and reconsider its approach, asking itself a crucial question: Are the current political leaders genuinely willing and capable of achieving and ensuring a lasting normalization between the Serb and Albanian populations in Kosovo?

—Maja Piscevic

If the context is right, other initiatives, such as those described in the Berlin Process and discussed as part of Open Balkans, might make a difference. They would open the aperture, so to speak, going beyond the tense immediate points of contention to the larger, more substantive solutions to the local problems. But these more strategic and long-term solutions are hard to develop if the situation on the ground remains as tense as it now is.

—Cameron Munter

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The G7 can take NATO-EU climate cooperation to the next level

Francis Shin, Rachel Rizzo — Thu, 01 Jun 2023 23:37:57 +0000

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, decarbonization has emerged as an increasingly high priority for the transatlantic community. The European Union’s (EU) early discontent with the US Inflation Reduction Act also demonstrates that transatlantic policy consensus will be essential to the success of any decarbonization strategy. In January, NATO and the EU released their latest joint statement on how the two organizations plan to cooperate in the years ahead, including expanding and deepening cooperation on “the security implications of climate change.” This is good news. Unfortunately, the same issues that impede increased EU-NATO cooperation on other projects will continue to affect deeper cooperation on climate and decarbonization strategies. However, the Group of Seven (G7) could be a good platform to help inform each institution on ways to better coordinate their individual strategies and work together where able.

In recent years, NATO has become much more active in identifying global warming as a threat and focusing on how it can do its part to combat climate change and bolster energy security. Following NATO’s Madrid Summit last year, it released its Strategic Concept, in which it proclaimed “NATO should become the leading international organization when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security.” Furthermore, NATO policymakers have recognized that there is a potential danger of redundant replication of climate projects between the climate policies of NATO and member states that would not have additional value toward addressing climate change. The Strategic Concept does partially account for this, as it argues that NATO should strengthen its cooperation with the EU to accelerate the development of NATO’s climate strategy.

In contrast to NATO, the European Union has been a significant player in climate action dating back to as least 2001, when it issued Directive 2001/77/EC, which promoted renewable electricity generation. Moreover, some EU member states had already attempted to “mainstream” climate policy into NATO strategy. For example, some German senior officials hoped that the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) program, established in 2017, would introduce climate change as a challenge for NATO to face. Despite such efforts, these attempts with PESCO have had mixed success at best.

Likewise, NATO-EU cooperation is regularly hampered by the Cyprus dispute. Turkey, which is the only state that recognizes the breakaway republic of Northern Cyprus and has stationed military forces in its territory, is a NATO member but not an EU member, whereas Cyprus is an EU member but not in NATO. Turkey justifies its opposition to NATO-EU cooperation on the basis that doing so would imply its recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. In fact, following the aforementioned NATO-EU joint declaration, Turkish diplomats reportedly expressed discontent with the declaration and distanced themselves from it. As the Cyprus dispute is unlikely to be resolved soon, further NATO-EU cooperation on climate action beyond vague declarations is doubtful under existing channels.

On the surface, it might seem like NATO-EU cooperation should be easy (despite the Turkey/Cyprus issue) given that, for example, the two organizations are just a few miles from each other in Brussels. Unfortunately, when speaking with employees at both organizations, it’s always surprising at just how lacking the overlap and coordination truly is. Hence, any effort to develop, say, a NATO- or EU-led policy steering body to develop strategies to address climate change will likely run into the same issues most other NATO-EU cooperation projects run into.

To avoid this, the G7 could potentially act as a primary steering platform for NATO and the EU to develop climate strategies before being disseminated to NATO and EU member states to implement or deliberate further.

How would this work?

To start, the G7 could provide a permanent guest invitation to the NATO secretary general to attend G7 meetings, much like how the G20 provides permanent guest invitations to several intergovernmental organizations. This would ensure that the NATO secretary general has a direct means of communication with the European Commission and the United States simultaneously, which would help in preventing transatlantic discord like that seen over the US Inflation Reduction Act. It would also reduce chances of a NATO-EU impasse developing over the Cyprus dispute before consensus is reached at the most senior policymaking levels of NATO and the European Union, as neither Turkey nor Cyprus will be present in this channel.

Discussing climate change from a security perspective will not be a matter of ‘mission creep’ for the G7.

Beyond its membership structure and distance from the Cyprus dispute, the G7 is a suitable vehicle for NATO-EU cooperation because of its existing security and climate agenda, which is increasingly aligned with that of NATO’s. Except for Japan, every member of the G7 is a NATO ally, and the European Union is represented at the body by the European Commission. And, although it was originally formed as an informal forum to discuss economic policy following the 1970s energy crises, the G7 has put security on its agenda as far back as 1980 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. It has also addressed global warming since 1985. Discussing climate change from a security perspective will not be a matter of “mission creep” for the G7.

Additionally, the G7 has already incorporated a commitment to achieving net zero carbon emissions since 2015 and recognized climate change as an existential security risk in 2022. The same year, the G7 launched the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) to assist with global climate financing and introduced the G7-led Climate Club to tackle climate change, with membership open to all countries. Climate is a high priority for the recently concluded G7 Summit in Hiroshima as well, with the G7 ministers of Climate, Energy and the Environment releasing new ambitious targets for 2030, such as increasing offshore wind capacity.

The G7 has engaged in greater cooperation with NATO as well. Since February 2022, the G7 has coordinated closely with NATO in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This included the convening of the 2022 G7 Summit just prior to NATO’s Madrid Summit, with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President Charles Michel, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in attendance at the latter. Later, during the G20 Bali Summit, the G7 and NATO issued a joint statement for the first time in their histories to express their concern about the missile strike in Polish territory.

Altogether, there is a strong opportunity for meaningful NATO-EU cooperation by using the G7 as a convening platform for climate change-related discussions. The demand to accelerate decarbonization campaigns has never been stronger in all three organizations, and they should seize this opportunity together.

Francis Shin is a research assistant in the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Did Macron just dispel Central and Eastern Europe’s skepticism about France?

Marie Jourdain — Thu, 01 Jun 2023 17:56:14 +0000

Speeches by political leaders share the same important qualities as real estate: What matters is location, location, location. On Wednesday, French President Emmanuel Macron chose the GLOBSEC forum in Bratislava, Slovakia, to deliver an important speech on France’s foreign policy in Europe. A significant portion of his thirty-five-minute speech and the discussion that followed was aimed at reassuring Central and Eastern European (CEE) partners of France’s reliability (credibility was never so much in question). This skepticism about French reliability comes in part from CEE partners that had expected greater French involvement in NATO’s enhanced forward presence after Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014. These same CEE partners have since then scrutinized any French moves regarding engagement with Russian President Vladimir Putin as a possible risk to their own security.

Moreover, Macron’s ambitious agenda to ensure European sovereignty will only move forward with the inclusion of CEE countries. In fact, it’s an agenda that must be built with them. The stakes were thus high for the French president when he stepped on stage in Bratislava. But while location is important, what’s said in speeches by leaders matters even more. Macron’s speech shows his intent to build a stronger bridge between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe.

Ukraine needs ‘concrete and credible security guarantees’

France has supported Ukraine throughout Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country beginning in February 2022. At the same time, France is one of the few countries deciding to remain discreet about the exact type and quantity of military aid it is sending to Ukraine. It also engaged Putin in the first few months of the war to convey key messages to the Russian president. Moreover, France has spent time and resources to address concerns from the Global South, whose stance on the war Macron views as important. As a result, some of France’s attention and support in the form, for example, of food aid has gone to the Global South and not directly to Ukraine. This has conflicted with the views of some leaders in CEE countries, who have sought to make Ukraine the sole priority. In all, these policies, combined with its track record of outreach to Russia before the invasion, occasionally fell short of convincing France’s allies and partners of its commitment to deliver on its intent to support Ukraine “as long as necessary.”

In that regard, the speech offers three important points. First, Macron laid out the conditions for an eventual peace in Ukraine to be an enduring one. He stressed the necessity of avoiding a ceasefire that would simply turn into a frozen conflict.

Second, in line with the recent Group of Seven (G7) leaders’ statement, Macron underscored the need to “give Ukraine concrete and credible security guarantees” and rebuked the inadequacy of the 1994 Budapest memorandum, which provided Ukraine with non-legally binding security assurances rather than outright security guarantees.

Third, Macron demonstrated how the French policy toward European Union (EU) enlargement has strengthened significantly in just the last year. Remember that it was Macron’s trip to Kyiv in June 2022 with leaders from Germany, Italy, and Romania that laid the groundwork for the EU’s historic decision to grant candidacy status to Ukraine and Moldova. In Bratislava this week, the French president went further in stating that he supported a policy of EU enlargement with no intent of stalling (while also noting the need for the EU to have the capacity to effectively integrate more countries). He said, “the question is not about the if, or the when, but about the how.” Macron further emphasized this point by reiterating that the European Political Community is no alternative to EU enlargement.

NATO just had ‘the worst of electric shocks’

While US-French cooperation runs deep, Macron also believes in a need to make Europe stronger through strategic autonomy. This view is usually met with skepticism, sometimes less so in the United States than in the rest of Europe, where strategic autonomy can be perceived as potentially detrimental to NATO unity. In his Bratislava speech, Macron pushed back against such skepticism by dismissing the arguments that a stronger Europe would necessarily weaken the transatlantic community while also reinforcing “the European pillar of NATO.” Macron notably thanked Washington twice for critical US engagement in European security. He saluted the efficiency of NATO collective defense and, after referring to the Alliance as “brain dead” in 2019, said Wednesday that “Putin jolted it awake with the worst of electric shocks.”

In all, Macron’s speech offered an opportunity for more fruitful and closer cooperation between France and CEE countries. This is both due to France’s evolving foreign policy on key issues for these countries and to the tone Macron struck, which might be as important. Indeed, in a major applause line of the speech, Macron referred to a comment in 2003 by the then French President Jacques Chirac, saying that the CEE countries supporting the war in Iraq missed “the opportunity to shut up.”

“Some said you had missed an opportunity to stay quiet. I think we also lost an opportunity to listen to you,” Macron said. “This time is over.”

Marie Jourdain is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. Before that, she worked for the French Ministry of Defense’s Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy.

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Autonomy and asymmetry: The future of Norway’s defense 2022-2042

August Cole — Thu, 01 Jun 2023 14:20:16 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

Issue brief release

If Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 spurred a reassessment of European security, it also served as a poignant reminder to Norway of how quickly armed conflict can require, if not force, transformation of military technologies and norms to better prepare for future wars. In a matter of months, NATO members, including Norway, coalesced to respond with direct lethal military aid to Ukraine.¹ Soon after, Finland and Sweden joined NATO, creating a Scandinavian bloc for the first time since the alliance was founded in 1949. Russia’s brinksmanship over European energy also raised the strategic value of—and risk to—Norway’s oil and gas sector.

Against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict, it is time to revisit assumptions in Norway about how armed conflict will evolve from today through 2042 and what that means for Norway’s defense technology priorities in relation to threats from Russia and beyond. The lessons of how Ukraine and Russia employ emergent technologies in a war that seems to have one boot in the past and one in the future should prompt deep introspection about Norway’s military operations.

Some of the key technological concepts raised in this examination will be familiar, but what differs is how they can be employed in disruptive ways. For example, military officers should consider whether to defend Norwegian territory with mechanized forces in depth at the border or whether to draw in an adversary’s land and naval forces to better destroy them on familiar ground with armed autonomous drones. Other issues are new, such as defining the responsible use of autonomously armed drones inside Norway’s northern territory during a wartime scenario with Russia or China. Many of these technological advances have roots in civilian innovations, such as artificial intelligence (AI) software and commercial drones. All of them require facing the uncomfortable aspects of disruption that require reappraisal of whether the way things were done in the past will be sufficient to confront the present and future world as it is, not as we wish. While Norway is a core member of NATO and will soon remake longstanding defense partnerships with Sweden and Finland, it should not shy away from its own technology-forward approach to national security.

Norway’s challenge—and opportunity

The challenge

Norway’s armed forces are historically small in number, yet this highly professional force has transformed in recent years to perform myriad twenty-first-century missions that are unique to the nation. As a NATO member, it must defend Europe’s longest coastline, patrol the skies over the stormy and strategically vital North Atlantic, and maintain a small but economically and culturally vital border with Russia. It must also jointly protect Arctic interests such as Svalbard and natural ocean resources, in addition to assuring cyber and electronic infrastructure. It also has a fresh mandate to reimagine defense cooperation with new Scandinavian NATO allies Sweden and Finland.

A B-52H Stratofortress assigned to the 23rd Expeditionary Bomb Squadron flies over Norway during a Bomber Task Force mission March 16, 2023. Credit: US Air Force/ Senior Airman Zachary Wright

The challenge for Norway today involves countering growing numbers of potential asymmetric threats in each of these areas posed by the new technologies changing warfare, while traditional military threats requiring highly capable conventional forces have not gone away. Furthermore, Russia’s military failures in Ukraine are no guarantee that future operations will not succeed or at least be catastrophically harmful to Norway. Russia will certainly reform its military after the war in Ukraine. Moscow will likely address many of the operational shortcomings exposed by the conflict and may even accelerate their technological transformation.

It is tempting to assess Norway’s current and future military by its budget or the number of active-duty troops or squadrons of fighter jets. After all, the force is half the size it was at the end of the Cold War.² Yet spending has more than doubled since then to reach historical highs as the force has incorporated more technology.³ It is unlikely that Norway’s military will grow in end strength to past peaks, which therefore requires a fresh way of thinking about military strength and the role that technology can play in it. Moreover, Norway’s growing population of ageing citizens may pose challenges to filling the ranks of the armed forces.⁴

The opportunity

Recent advancements in robotics, software, satellites, and autonomy place a new onus on Norway’s leaders to carefully consider the technological possibilities in areas such as robotic systems capable of supplanting human forces, powerful individual weapons to target aircraft and armored vehicles, and lower-cost commercial geospatial data. Technological asymmetries can be turned into advantages with the right policies and investment. As such, this review offers an opportunity to consider how the above challenges can be addressed with investment in new technological capabilities that link to current and near-future warfare trends. It reflects observations from the conflict in Ukraine, such as:

Commercial space is vital for situational awareness and communications.
Defending civilians requires hard power because laws and norms are insufficient.
Mobile phones and AI create new battlefield transparency and cognitive effects.
Civilian expertise in AI, drones, and software is central to tactical operations.

Norway must also contend with more than the threat of Russia. As NATO recently asserted at its Madrid Summit in 2022: “We face systemic competition from those, including the People’s Republic of China, who challenge our interests, security, and values and seek to undermine the rules-based international order.”⁵ Irrespective of recent public tension between Beijing and Moscow, China’s military interoperability with Russia continues to expand, particularly in the Arctic.⁶ China’s growing defense-industrial capabilities, particularly in autonomy, hypersonic missiles, offensive space capabilities, and advanced shipbuilding portend Russia-like consideration of Beijing’s strategic interests and how military presence, if not force, may be used.

Norway’s military posture today also embodies a useful tension between high-tech platforms and traditional defense. Fifth-generation F-35 fighters patrol Arctic skies flying tens of thousands of feet over small-unit, long-range reconnaissance foot patrols along the Russian-Norway border. This is a useful paradigm for understanding how emergent technologies can contribute to Norway’s security, but not at the expense of common sense or overreliance on vulnerable systems.

The following concepts reflect this realistic understanding of what is not only technologically possible, but politically or culturally feasible. At the same time, it should be clear that some of the ideas offer a path that will lead to clear departures from traditional ways of thinking about the Norwegian military and how it employs technology. It would be easy to discount the concepts discussed as too radical. Even with that categorical reaction, it is worth considering the rationale behind them because they address underlying truths that future conflict will be waged at machine speed, with increasing autonomy, and involve greater peril to civilian populations from cognitive and kinetic effects.

Norway’s solutions

Thinking clearly about the future of warfare and technology’s role in it requires imagination. Yet such thinking must also remain anchored to a central line of questioning. In this case, the crucial questions focus on threats, priorities, and operations:

What technology areas will create new or amplify existing threats to such an extent that they will affect the defense sector in the next ten to twenty years?
What technology areas should the defense sector emphasize in order to avoid weakened defence capabilities in relation to Russia in the next ten to twenty years?
What types of technology should the defense sector use to maximize interoperability with allies and partners for the next ten to twenty years?

U.S. Marines work together with the Norwegian Army to conduct offensive and defensive operations at the battalion and brigade-level during Exercise Reindeer II in Blåtind, Norway. Credit: US Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Timothy J. Lutz

These questions lead to the conclusion that, to prevail in a high- or mixed-intensity war with Russia over the next two decades, Norway should invest in next-generation situational awareness and targeting, as well as seek-and-destroy weapons systems capable of semi- or fully autonomous target selection.

The Norwegian flag waves in the wind in Trondheim, Norway, June 20, 2022. Credit: U.S. Marine Corps/ Cpl. Brendan Mullin

As an example, traditional mechanized armored forces are still vital to domestic and foreign military operations. Yet the introduction of Sweden and Finland as NATO members allows for a reconsideration of how Norway should defend Finnmark at a time when heavy armored vehicles are increasingly vulnerable to both long- and close-range weapons systems. Instead, small, fast-moving, lightly armored units equipped with short- and medium-range strike weapons like rocket artillery, as well as organic anti-air and anti-drone defense systems, can have the same or greater destructive capability at greater range, but with less exposure to Russian artillery or long-range missiles fired from within Russian territory than traditional units. In the air, fifth-generation fighters like the F-35 will jointly defend Scandinavian airspace with the aid of autonomous unmanned fighter and ground attack aircraft, while providing crucial data and sensing capabilities to ground and maritime forces. Norway’s naval forces will necessarily operate with squadrons of distributed manned and unmanned squadrons for surface and undersea missions given the growing lethality of Russian and Chinese anti-ship missiles.⁷ As part of a renewed Scandinavian defense, Norway could become a regional or European leader in such autonomous and human-machine teamed systems by partnering with US and other allied software, sensors, and robotics programs. This would represent a new specialization for the Forsvaret of the late 2020s and 2030s and complement Swedish and Finnish capabilities.

Threats 2022-2042: What technology areas will create new or amplify existing threats to such an extent that they will affect the defense sector in the next ten to twenty years?

There is a long list of military-oriented or specific defense technologies that will have a significant impact on the threat environment Norway faces. Some, such as synthetic biology or quantum computing, have the potential to be truly game-changing in the near future. Yet the following three military technology threats that fuse next-generation software, AI, and breakthrough hardware are already extremely consequential, whether Russia or another nation employs them:

Space-based surveillance, communications, and offensive systems;
Inexpensive autonomous armed drones and unmanned ground systems; and
Smartphones and AI-personalized cognitive and kinetic warfare.

Space data

This is a new era for commercial space-based data from small satellites that has major implications for future warfare. Precise and accurate information about imagery on Earth is now accessible and relatively affordable due to a new generation of inexpensive and ultimately disposable satellites. At the same time, advances in AI make processing this new wave of data much faster and more reliable. Recently, space-based surveillance has proven extremely effective for the Ukrainian military for establishing situational awareness and targeting their operations against Russian forces. Norway’s sensitive maritime oil and gas resources and infrastructure are likely one such target of persistent space-based surveillance. This space-based approach is also part of a solution to protecting those same commercial assets. The emerging market for data from space will make hiding—and defending—much more difficult in the 2020s and 2030s, as will small satellite constellations owned by nation states.⁸ As precision weapons like rocket artillery and armed drones proliferate, the ability to locate targets from space will become increasingly important, particularly in contested airspace.

With communications, the Starlink space-based internet connectivity platform shows the military effectiveness of small satellite alternatives to terrestrial networks during wartime.⁹ For Norway, this is both risk and opportunity. Defensive fortifications or movement of material, for example, will be detected immediately. At the same time, purchased satellite data offers near real-time access to information on Russian preparations and movement.

Robotic autonomy

The past three years revealed a growing profile for drones in warfare, from the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict¹⁰ to Ukraine’s present battlefields, even with the rudimentary level of control and semi-autonomy that exists today. Small and inexpensive drones can now be equipped with AI-powered target-recognition systems, as well. As drones move from surveillance roles to regularly attacking targets, this will only grow and evolve tactics. Russia’s experience in Ukraine with drones shows a willingness to regularly employ them in warfare, and its import of foreign-made drones such as Iran’s indicates Moscow will continue employing armed drones.¹¹ Many nations are proliferating drone systems, including China as a leading exporter. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s crowd-sourced and civilian-driven drone innovation shows a new leading technological edge, while its military flies Turkey’s TB2 drone that can operate largely autonomously.

Members of the Office of Naval Research, based out of Washington, D.C., launch the REMUS 600 autonomous underwater vehicle for mine search and identification operations off the coast of Bornholm Island in support of exercise Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) 2018, June 7. Credit: U.S Navy/ Chief Mass Communication Specialist America A. Henry

A mix of heterogenous robotic capabilities will be a staple of future conflicts. Armed ground systems are poised to emerge onto battlefields, as well, in a replication of the aerial drone evolution. The recent Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipeline explosions point to the sort of high-consequence strategic economic attack that an undersea robotic system might carry out in the future with greater autonomy and therefore stealth.¹² The significant shift ahead will involve systems operating without that control stations and high-bandwidth communications that are necessary today. To that end, NATO is reportedly preparing a strategy for the responsible use of autonomy, in another recognition of evolving robotic systems. Even if NATO members adhere to such guidelines, it is unclear whether states such as Russia or China will do so even as they develop and employ autonomous weapons systems.¹³

Smartphones and AI

Smartphones are ubiquitous on twenty-first-century battlefields, but their use has evolved during the past few years, leading to new tactical and strategic implications. There is a developing fusion of AI-powered image processing, scaling information, and cognitive campaigns using social media, and ever-more refined kinetic and electronic targeting capabilities honing in on mobile devices. Just as space-based surveillance creates new levels of operational transparency, the proliferation of high-quality smartphone cameras linked to cloud computing means that as soon as information is identified with a handheld device it can be shared across civilian or military networks, not just social media. In a recent example, Ukraine’s software developers have created apps that can alert citizens in real-time to air raids, while the government’s eVorog chat program enables registered users to rapidly report Russian equipment or personnel, data which is screened by AI.¹⁴

Just as smartphones are sensors, they are vectors of information—and disinformation. The contest to capture an individual’s attention and influence their emotional state or real-world actions is in effect an evolution toward cognitive warfare, which could see the precision targeting of individuals at scale using new AI systems.¹⁵ Among those systems are text-generating tools called large language models, which have the ability to churn out an unending stream of realistic, human-like writing on social media and elsewhere. The open-source LLM Bloom features forty-six languages and thirteen programming languages.¹⁶ Image generation and manipulation tools using AI are also proliferating as easy-to-use programs, with social media consumer apps offering a preview.¹⁷ In Ukraine, deep fakes quickly emerged in the conflict with a spoofed video of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky ordering Ukrainian forces to stand down.¹⁸ Both of these software capabilities will increasingly be managed by AI programs themselves, a form of autonomy that is going to influence everything from propaganda to civil discourse during conflict.

Priorities and interoperability 2022-2042: What technology areas should the defense sector emphasize in order to avoid weakened defense capabilities in relation to Russia over the next ten to twenty years and how might they reinforce interoperability with allies and partners?

The other side of risk from technologies changing warfare is opportunity. The same inventions and innovation that exacerbate current and future threats to Norway also indicate where to focus research and investment. This requires consideration of Russian military capability and investment plans, as well as a realistic assessment of their effective execution over the next two decades. Caution is needed, however, in assuming the failures of Russian forces in Ukraine¹⁹ will contribute to the failings of late 2020s and 2030s Russian military forces. While military reform of the past five years in Russia has proven to be hollow, it is also possible that the same mistakes will not be made again. Either way, there are enduring aspects to the threat Russia poses to Norwegian territory and Norwegian forces operating abroad in support of NATO: threatening Arctic and North Sea lines of communication (including Svalbard), air-defense denial zones over Scandinavia, seizing and holding territory in Finnmark through massed armor, medium- and long-range precision and area weapons fired from inside Russia, as well as cyberattacks and “gray zone” operations.

Each of the following priorities addresses these threats:

Autonomous aerial, maritime, and ground systems for rural or open territory (surveillance, logistics, attack);
Small unit anti-armor, anti-ship, and anti-air: Javelin in every closet; and
Commercial space access and support

Autonomy 3.0

In the era of software-driven warfare, the ability to mass large numbers of forces still rings true—even if it strikes a different note. Advances in robotics and AI-powered autonomous systems will enable nations to mass forces differently than in the past, and in ways that are difficult for conventional defenses to counter. It also opens new avenues for defense. Today’s swarm-capable munitions like the Naval Strike Missile already show the potential of such systems and preview how they might develop.
Consider that Norwegian military forces must cover over 385,000 square kilometers of territory and more than 25,000 kilometers of coastline. Using unmanned and largely autonomous systems to patrol Norwegian territory would allow for the judicious use of manned platforms such as F-35 fighters or Norway’s six Skjold-class missile ships. Many strategic areas in Arctic Scandinavia, such as Cap of the North where Finland, Norway, and Sweden share interests and territory, are sparsely populated yet constitute significant land and maritime portions of each country. With traditional mechanized forces, such an area is difficult to patrol, let alone defend. Using more numerous autonomous air, ground, and sea systems for joint or unilateral patrolling, logistics support, and deterrence would allow for extending that presence beyond what has been traditionally possible.

Take the example of Norwegian military patrols on oil and gas infrastructure in the wake of the Nord Stream pipeline attacks: this presents a resource challenge to the Forsvaret if this mission becomes an enduring one.²⁰ Such persistent surveillance and interdiction missions are well suited to autonomous maritime and air systems whose data is collected and sorted by AI onboard or on the ground. Yet current unmanned aerial systems (UAS) spending in the air domain, for example, is less than 1 percent of 2021-2028 Norwegian Defense Ministry forecasts, and land domain spending for UAS is under 5 percent.²¹

Similar explorations of operational trade-offs are underway with the US Marine Corps Force Design 2030 reforms.²² By giving up main battle tanks and some fighter aircraft, the Marine Corps seeks to reinvest those resources in smaller units of infantry supported by robotic and autonomous systems whose military capabilities are on par with the conventional weapons they replace. Moreover, it will allow Marines to operate near China, often without direct support from conventional US military resources, and deploy a new generation of unmanned platforms, such as the NMESIS robotic wheeled vehicle armed with Naval Strike Missiles or the Metal Shark autonomous ship armed with loitering munitions.²³

Norwegian Leopard tank crews from the Telemark Battalion prepare for a live-fire exercise in Rena, Norway. Credit: US Marines

One of the abiding defensive challenges is how to protect Finnmark and southern Norway from a Russian incursion in the north. In the case of such a scenario, a Brigade North defensive line in or south of Finnmark could be reinforced and patrolled with autonomous ground and air vehicles, which could be armed and tasked with deterring or interdicting Russian forces. Similarly, an ongoing challenge of regional resupply to Finnmark during wartime could be addressed with the new generation of autonomous cargo aircraft.²⁴ Similar tactics could be used with unmanned maritime surface and undersea systems along Norway’s extensive coastline for patrol and supply. Because such autonomous robotic platforms’ software can train in AI-powered synthetic environments, they can be readied for wartime use without requiring as much real-world training.²⁵ They also allow for reconsidering the composition of land units, such as the Norwegian Army’s Brigade North. Acknowledging the break with traditional conceptions of military force and the attendant operational ethics issues of weaponized autonomy, a shift by the Norwegian military to employ autonomous robotic systems compensating for its end strength would allow for a novel way to counter massed (or dispersed) Russian ground forces with less risk and greater precision.

However, robotic systems have their own logistical challenges and operational limits. Yet there is existing software and robotics expertise in Norwegian society, which could be developed as a national resource of expertise in developing robotics for austere environments. The likely growing use of autonomous weapons systems by Russia and China necessitates ensuring those nations will not take a lead that will be difficult to close operationally—or ethically.

Small unit combat capability

The iconic imagery of “St. Javelin” as a pop-culture meme in Ukraine underscores how significant soldier-portable anti-armor systems like the FGM-148 Javelin are in an era of persistent surveillance and targeting.²⁶ Indeed, the United States and NATO members supplied Ukraine some 17,000 Javelins in less than a week in March.²⁷ What advantage Russia had with its armored forces was radically reduced by the proliferation of these portable anti-armor weapons. Other models have been rushed to Ukraine, as well. Of course, most of these weapons were shipped hurriedly after Russia invaded Ukraine. Whether they would have had a deterrent effect on Moscow were they already in place is debatable. Yet it is undeniable that they would be able to thwart the free movement of spearhead armor units and harass supply columns. The same could be achieved in Norway, particularly in Finnmark, by acquiring highly portable and concealable anti-tank missiles like the Javelin so that Norwegian Army and Home Guard forces have access not to hundreds, but thousands of missiles and launchers.

The Norwegian military’s approach to territorial defense, beyond deploying in support of NATO in the Baltics, would be aligned with technology trendlines converging on small units that can find their own targets with their own drones and access to satellite imagery, then attack them with their own anti-armor or weapons systems before dispersing. These are not partisan tactics from the 1980s, but a networked approach to small-unit warfare that exploits an invading adversary’s need to consolidate force around seized terrain. Portable anti-air, anti-ship, and anti-drone systems could also be dispersed along similar lines to deny airspace access from lower-altitude threats from attack drones and helicopters, as well as close-air support jets. As a model, reforms by the US Marine Corps to increase the combat power of small units portends this nearly inevitable reform of combined arms forces in high-threat contested environments.²⁸

Geospatial data and communications

Geospatial data from civilian satellites for military operations are becoming increasingly affordable—and effective. From exposing Chinese government transformation of South China Sea reefs²⁹ into military facilities to documenting pre-invasion Russian troop movements and wartime human rights violations in Ukraine,³⁰ there is a revolution underway with commercial space satellites. Norway is already active in the military space domain, including Norwegian satellites carrying Arctic communications payloads for the US Space Force.³¹ The Svalbard Archipelago, one of the world’s most important collections of satellite ground stations, naturally positions Norway as a space-oriented nation.³² This new generation of satellites and data represents a new opportunity for this status to evolve with the technology.

While conventional military- or intelligence-grade satellites can cost hundreds of millions of kroner, it is no longer necessary to outright acquire them. Defense spending plans for military space—at less than 1 percent of 2021-2028 spending in the space domain³³ —are relatively small and may be insufficient given the high-bandwidth requirements of military systems of the late 2020s and 2030s. Commercial imagery or communications bandwidth is available with “space as a service,” as are other orbital services related to specific terrestrial sensing tasks. This is already an area of interest and investment for many NATO member militaries, including the United States.³⁴ As the economic value of space activity grows, so does its strategic value. Yet much of that value will come from geospatial data or bandwidth from commercial assets, such as Starlink has shown in Ukraine. To that end, Svalbard’s military importance is only going to grow. The severing of an undersea fibre-optic cable from Svalbard to mainland Norway in January 2022 indicates the potential strategic vulnerability there and its potential as a target from Russian forces or interests.³⁵

Conclusion

These are vital questions considering how new technologies like lower cost geospatial data, AI-powered information campaigns, increasingly powerful individual anti-armor and anti-air weapons, and autonomous vehicles and aircraft could be used to reimagine the defense of Norway, as well as support Forsvaret operations abroad. Russia may be the near-term focus, but these explorations are also applicable to other strategically important areas, such as the growing importance of Arctic trade routes to nations like China. Allies and partners are essential, not just operationally in the defense of Norway but in how the nation prepares for the unthinkable. There are also lessons to be drawn elsewhere regarding technology and transformation, such as the Force Design 2030 reform of the United States Marine Corps, and emerging concepts around the civilian-military composition of combat units using new capabilities like drones. The war in Ukraine offers myriad hard-won lessons, too, but it is important to remember that Russia in 2022 will be different than the Russia of 2032 or 2042. For all the focus on technology and the questions about the future of Norway’s defense, it is impossible to understand, and prepare for, the kinds of technologies that will shape future conflicts without remaining focused on the human experience of twenty-first century warfare.

This essay was originally written for the Norwegian Defense Commission, which is reviewing Norway’s security and defense policies of the next ten to twenty years.

About the author

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August Cole

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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1 “Will donate Hellfire missiles and night vision equipment to Ukraine,” Norway Ministry of Defence, August 9, 2022, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/donerer-hellfire-missiler-og-nattoptikk-til-ukraina/id2926713/.

2 “Armed forces personnel, total – Norway,” World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1?locations=NO.

3 “Armed forces personnel, total – Norway,” World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1?locations=NO.

4 “A historic shift: More elderly than children and teenagers,” Statistisk Sentralbyra, June 3, 2020, https://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/a-historic-shift-more-elderly-than-children-and-teenagers.

5 “Madrid Summit Declaration,” NATO, June 29, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_196951.htm.

6 “NATO head warns about Russian, Chinese interest in Arctic,” Voice of America, August 26, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/nato-head-warns-about-russian-chinese-interest-in-arctic/6718667.html.

7 Timothy Wright, “Russia’s ‘new’ anti-ship missile,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, July 18, 2022, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2022/07/russias-new-anti-ship-missile.

8 Nicholas Eftimiades, Small satellites: The implications for national security, Atlantic Council, May 5, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/small-satellites-the-implications-for-national-security/.

9 Christopher Woody, “The US Air Force is signing up for Starlink after watching it help Ukraine stay online amid Russia’s ongoing attacks,” Business Insider, August 8, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-air-force-contracts-with-starlink-as-it-helps-ukraine-2022-8.

10 Craig A. Reed and James P. Rife, “New wrinkles to drone warfare,” US Naval Institute, January 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/january/new-wrinkles-drone-warfare.

11 Yaroslav Trofimov and Dion Nissenbaum, “Russia’s use of Iranian Kamikaze drones creates new dangers for Ukrainian troops,” Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-use-of-iranian-kamikaze-drones-creates-new-dangers-for-ukrainian-troops-11663415140 ; Samuel Bendett and Jeffrey Edmonds, “Russian military autonomy in Ukraine four months in,” Center for Naval Analyses, July 2022, https://www.cna.org/reports/2022/07/russian-military-autonomy-in-ukraine-four-months-in.

12 Arne Delfs, Elena Mazneva, and Anna Shiryaevskaya, “Germany suspects sabotage hit Russia’s Nord Stream pipelines,” Bloomberg, September 27, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-27/nord-stream-probing-pressure-drop-at-second-russian-gas-link.

13 Steven Zeitchik, “The future of warfare could be a lot more grisly than Ukraine,” Washington Post, March 12, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/11/autonomous-weapons-geneva-un/.

14 Drew Harwell, “Instead of consumer software, Ukraine’s tech workers build apps of war,” Washington Post, March 24, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/24/ukraine-war-apps-russian-invasion/ ; Ylli Bajraktari, “The first networked war: Eric Schmidt’s Ukraine trip report,” Special Competitive Studies Project, September 13, 2022, https://scsp222.substack.com/p/the-first-networked-war-eric-schmidts.

15 August Cole and Herve Le Guyader, Cognitive: A 6th domain of operations?, NATO, April 2021, https://www.innovationhub-act.org/content/cognitive-warfare.

16 Bloom, https://huggingface.co/bigscience/bloom.

17 Hitoshi Nasu, “Deepfake technology in the age of information warfare,” Lieber Institute, March 1, 2022, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/deepfake-technology-age-information-warfare/.

18 Bobby Allyn, “Deepfake video of Zelenskyy could be ‘tip of the iceberg’ in info war, experts warn,” NPR, March 16, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/03/16/1087062648/deepfake-video-zelenskyy-experts-war-manipulation-ukraine-russia.

19 Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, “Not built for purpose: The Russian military’s ill-fated force design,” War on the Rocks, June 2, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/.

20 Nora Buli, “Norway to deploy military to protect its oil and gas installations,” Reuters, September 28, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/norway-beefs-up-security-across-oil-gas-sector-2022-09-28/.

21 Future acquisitions for Norwegian defence sector 2021-2028, Forsvars Department, April 2021, https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/09d83a5cbefd4fb68064e6ca871acccb/faf-2021-2028-engelsk-versjon-__.pdf.

22 Andrew Feickert, “New U.S. Marine Corps force design initiative: Force Design 2030,” Congressional Research Service, March 7, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11281.

23 Peter Ong, “Latest details on the USMC’s NMESIS and long range USV,” Naval News, June 22, 2022, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/06/latest-details-on-the-usmcs-nmesis-and-long-range-usv/.

24 Kelsey D. Atherton, “What DARPA wants in a new recon and delivery drone,” Popular Science, September 14, 2022, https://www.popsci.com/technology/darpa-ancillary-drone-project-goals/.

25 Gerard Andrews, “NVIDIA Omniverse Replicator generates synthetic training data for robots,” NVIDIA Developer, November 9, 2021, https://developer.nvidia.com/blog/generating-synthetic-datasets-isaac-sim-data-replicator/.

26 Leila Barghouty, “How the St. Javelin mem raised a million dollars for Ukraine,” Washington Post, September 18, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/18/ukraine-war-meme-fundraising/.

27 David Sanger, Eric Schmitt, Helene Cooper, Julian Barnes, and Kenneth Vogel, “Amid Ukraine: 17,000 anti-tank weapons in 6 days and a clandestine cybercorps,” New York Times, March 6, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/06/us/politics/us-ukraine-weapons.html.

28 Megan Eckstein, “Marines Force Design 2030 update refocuses on reconnaissance,” Defense News, May 9, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/05/09/marines-force-design-2030-update-refocuses-on-reconnaissance/.

29 “China island tracker,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/.

30 Sandra Erwin, “Commercial spy satellites put Russia’s Ukraine invasion in the public eye,” Space News, February 27, 2022, https://spacenews.com/satellite-imaging-companies-increase-profile-as-they-track-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/.

31 Josh Luckenbaugh, “JUST IN: Space Force partners with Norway to launch Arctic comms satellites,” National Defense, August 31, 2022, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/8/31/space-force-partners-with-norway-to-launch-arctic-comms-satellites

32 Johannes Dobson, “Arctic space,” Konsberg Magazine, February 2018, https://www.kongsberg.com/kmagazine/2018/2/arctic-space/.

33 Future acquisitions for Norwegian defence sector 2021-2028, Forsvars Department.

34 Emmi Yonekura, Brian Dolan, Moon Kim, Krista Romita Grocholski, Raza Khan, Yool Kim, Commercial Space Capabilities and Market Overview, RAND Corporation, 2022, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA500/RRA578-2/RAND_RRA578-2.pdf.

35 Dan Henrik Klausen and Knut Anders Finnset, «Brudd på sjøkabel på Svalbard – heller mot at mennesker står bak,» Troms og Finnmark, February 11, 2022, https://www.nrk.no/tromsogfinnmark/politiet-tror-det-er-en-menneskelig-arsak-bak-bruddet-pa-sjokabel-pa-svalbard-1.15850988#:~:text=Brudd%20på%20sjøkabel%20på%20Svalbard,Her%20kommer%20sjøkabelen%20i%20land.

The post Autonomy and asymmetry: The future of Norway’s defense 2022-2042 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Moscow is on edge after the latest drone attack

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 01 Jun 2023 13:53:17 +0000

Security

Alleged Ukrainian drones conduct attack in Moscow region

International response

Georgian prime minister blames NATO for Russia’s war in Ukraine

Alleged Ukrainian drones conduct attack in Moscow region

One week after the incursion in the Belgorod region allegedly orchestrated by Russian Volunteer Corps, Russia’s border has become more permeable to Ukrainian attacks. Nearly a month after the first attack against the Kremlin’s Senate building in Moscow, another drone attack was reported in the morning of May 30.

Reports posted on Telegram channel SHOT revealed footage taken by civilians showing drones and explosions in suburban Moscow. Throughout the day, Moscow Oblast Governor Andrey Vorobyov and Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin confirmed several drones had struck various locations, which resulted in evacuation of civilians. According to Russian media outlet Mediazona, drones hit residential buildings in three different parts of the city. Two civilians were reportedly injured, although their condition did not require them to be hospitalized; there were no reported fatalities.

Russian officials, including government spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, accused “the Kyiv regime” of orchestrating the attack as “retaliation for effective drone attacks against Kyiv’s decision-making centers on Sunday [May 29]”. This theory was also embraced by Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose comments also referenced the “effective work of the air defense systems.” Meduza reported that the Kremlin ordered Russian media to cover the drone attacks using specific talking points, though this has not been independently confirmed. In contrast, the Moscow Prosecutor’s Office recommended that bloggers and the media refrain from commenting on the incident, as unverified claims would be punishable by law. The Moscow Investigative Committee launched an investigation into the drone attacks as an act of “terrorism.”

Meduza additionally geolocated drones that appeared in open-source footage, and estimated that between five to seven UAVs were downed in the Moscow area. Other unconfirmed reports from the opposition Telegram channel Baza claimed twenty-five drones took part in the attack, while Telegram channel SHOT reported on thirty-two drones. These figures remain unconfirmed, however. There were also conflicting estimates on the number of drones successfully intercepted by Russian air defense systems; while Russia’s defense ministry claimed only eight drones were shot down, SHOT reported nineteen drones as intercepted and destroyed.

Although Ukraine has not claimed responsibility for the attack, one piece of footage points at an alleged UJ-22 airborne drone of Ukrainian fabrication. Despite circumstantial evidence which could indicate Ukraine’s direct involvement, presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak denied the allegations. Information posted by opposition media outlet Agentstvo quoting a tweet by Foreign Policy Research Institute Senior Fellow Rob Lee, indicated that the drones responsible for the May 30 attack appear to be the same ones that conducted another attack on May 26 in Russia’s Krasnodar region.

Meanwhile, a report posted by Mediazona quoting a list published by Russian MP Alexander Khinshtein regarding the alleged locations of the drone suggested they may have targeted the houses of oligarchs in Moscow’s wealthy Rublyovka neighborhood. While this has not been confirmed, a separate report posted by the Telegram channel Baza alluded to an orchestrated attack in the same area.

This is the second drone attack reported in the Russian capital city since the May 3 drone attack against the senate building of the Kremlin. The DFRLab reported on that incident and assessed that defense countermeasures, including a ban on flying commercial drones, would likely be enforced as a defensive measure. GPS interference data also indicated elevated levels of GPS interference on May 30 in the Moscow area. This information would be consistent with an assessment expressed by Russian businessman and former Roskosmos chief Dmitry Rogozin, who proposed suspending GPS across Russia.

Lastly, on June 1, multiple sources reported movements of the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Free Russia Legion in the villages Shebekino and Novaya Tavolzhaka in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast, adjacent to the Ukrainian border. The oblast’s governor reported shelling by Grad rockets and initiated an evacuation of the local population to Belgorod Arena stadium, in the region’s capital. The DFRLab will continue to monitor the situation.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Georgian prime minister blames NATO for Russia’s war in Ukraine

Speaking at the GLOBSEC forum in Bratislava, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili claimed that NATO enlargement was to blame for Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a long-standing Kremlin narrative used to justify Russia’s war in Ukraine.

“I think everybody knows the reason… one of the main reasons was NATO, NATO enlargement,” Garibashvili said, adding that “Ukraine’s determination” to become a NATO member state had its “consequences.” According to recent polling by IRI, 80 percent of Georgians support the country joining NATO.

Several Kremlin-owned and pro-Kremlin outlets quoted Garibashvili and used his remarks to reinforce pro-war narratives. The outlets also reported on additional comments made by the prime minister during GLOBSEC on how the Georgian government is “setting a good precedent by maintaining peace and stability in a turbulent environment.”

The DFRLab has previously covered how the Georgian Dream-led government and the Kremlin spread similar narratives blaming the West for orchestrating protests in Georgia.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Moscow is on edge after the latest drone attack appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wieslander quoted in New York Times on Arctic tensions

Eric Adamson — Wed, 31 May 2023 09:50:40 +0000

Defne Arslan: It’s time for Turkey to shift its economic policy

Arctic Risks Loom Large as Blinken Tours NATO’s North:

“There remains a concern that China, which now has even closer ties to Russia, remains active in the Far North, building big icebreakers. ‘China will reach Europe through the Arctic,’ Ms. Wieslander said.”

The post Wieslander quoted in New York Times on Arctic tensions appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Five more years for Erdogan. What’s first on his agenda?

Atlantic Council experts — Tue, 30 May 2023 18:34:21 +0000

Turkey marks a hundred years as a republic this year. First as Turkey’s prime minister and then as its president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been at the political helm of the republic for a fifth of that century. His victory on Sunday in a runoff election now sets him up for five more years in power.

At the same time, Turkey is beset by change, including a reeling economy at home and open conflict in its neighborhood. To its north, Russia wages war on Ukraine. To its south, Syria is on edge. Below, Atlantic Council experts share their insights on what to expect on these issues and more.

Click to jump to an expert reaction:

Borzou Daragahi: Erdoğan signals he will tighten his grip

Rich Outzen: Expect more strategic semi-independence and balancing among great powers

Yevgeniya Gaber: How Erdoğan could use his leverage on Russia’s war in Ukraine

Ariel Cohen: Expect Turkey’s relationship with Europe and the US to weaken

Ali Bakir: Stability alone will not solve Turkey’s pressing issues

It’s time for Turkey to shift its economic policy

Turkey is getting ready for another five-year term under Erdoğan with an AK Party-led alliance holding a majority in the parliament. Given the presidential system and with a parliament majority behind him, the reelection of Erdoğan will give Turkey a five-year stable term without elections, except for municipal elections to be held in ten months. Erdoğan’s reelection means Turkey will be entering another era of centralized decision-making, however this five-year term can also be regarded as securing political stability for Turkey. If Turkey’s economic team can go back to credible and more conventional economic policies that can fix the current problems through setting strong economic benchmarks and implementing crucial structural reforms, then I believe Turkey can be a destination for foreign capital in time, given the current state of other emerging markets.

The Turkish economy currently has serious problems, including a high inflation rate and low currency reserves caused in part by a controlled exchange rate regime. Current unconventional policy is not helping Turkey achieve a high growth rate or a boost in its exports. In short, the economy needs to be addressed quickly. It is important for Erdoğan and the new government to reassure confidence in the Turkish economy both for domestic and foreign investors. With a strong economic team and more conventional and independent policies, this is possible. In his victory remarks, Erdoğan discussed the Turkish economy at length, which shows that he is determined to deliver a stronger road map for the economy. Regarding regional energy policies, I do not expect any shift there. Current policies will continue. We will be hearing from the new cabinet this weekend, if not by Friday, but early news signals that the economy is a major priority for Erdoğan.

—Defne Arslan is senior director of the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and Turkey programs, and former chief Turkey economist and senior energy policy adviser in the US embassy in Ankara.

Erdoğan signals he will tighten his grip

Early signs suggest that the reelection of Erdoğan will lead to further erosion of human rights and political freedoms in Turkey.

In the run-up to the second round of voting, it was an open question as to whether Erdoğan, who had promised to serve only one more five-year term, would burnish his legacy by easing some of the harsh measures he has imposed against his liberal and leftist political opponents and minority communities.

But in a pair of victory speeches on Sunday in Istanbul and Ankara, Erdoğan was hardly magnanimous in victory. He dispensed quickly with the obligatory post-election call to put aside differences. “There will be no losers in such a victory. The winner is Turkey,” he said, dutifully thanking all Turks who voted.

But his tone quickly darkened. He slammed his opponent Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as incompetent and smirked as the crowd booed him. He described jailed Kurdish political leader Selahattin Demirtas and other political opponents as “terrorists.”

He accused the Anglophone, French, and German media outlets covering Turkey of trying to overthrow him. He drew howls of delight from the crowd when he warned that opposition parties were pursuing a pro-LGBTQI+ agenda. “For us, family is sacred,” he said.

He also warned that he would prevent political opponents from damaging Turkey’s “success with other people and other intermediaries,” suggesting he would crack down on journalists, human-rights campaigners, and political dissidents who attempted to pressure Ankara by appealing to international governments and institutions.

Erdoğan’s vow to stay in office for just one more term appeared to fall by the wayside. “My commitment is until I die, until the grave,” he said.

Erdoğan still has time, opportunity, and breathing space to moderate his ways, draw in opponents, and focus the nation’s efforts on improving the country’s battered economy, which is now the most pressing concern for most Turks. But Erdoğan’s post-election posturing suggests he may have already settled on a path of demonizing vulnerable minorities and targeting political opponents to retain social control ahead of potentially rough economic times.

—Borzou Daragahi is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and an Istanbul-based journalist.

Expect more strategic semi-independence and balancing among great powers

When an incumbent president wins reelection—as Erdoğan has in Turkey by a roughly 52-48 margin—one expects more continuity than change in foreign policy. For Erdoğan, this means hewing to three pillars that have evolved as the basis for Turkish foreign policy under his lead: strategic semi-independence (anchored by NATO with expansive caveats), balancing and hedging among great powers, and a carrot-and-stick mixture of hard power and adaptive diplomacy in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood.

NATO remains the cornerstone of Turkish security, and Ankara has spoken in favor of admitting Ukraine and Georgia. After extracting concessions on defense cooperation and prosecution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terror group, the Turkish parliament approved Finland’s accession in March. As Sweden’s new counter-terror legislation takes full effect next month, the prospects for Swedish accession are looking up. Under Erdoğan’s upcoming presidential term, Turkey will remain a strong contributor to the Alliance’s training, readiness, and mutual defense missions. Should the war in Ukraine end during his presidential term, Erdoğan can be expected to continue offering strong defense partnership to Ukraine, as he has for the past decade.

Yet NATO membership offers little help to Erdoğan in an arc of conflict—and tension with Russia—that spans Turkey’s eastern and southern borders. The counter-PKK campaigns in Iraq and Syria, standoffs in the Caucasus and Libya, and the unresolved Syrian civil war all require that Erdoğan alternately deter and negotiate with Moscow, Tehran, Damascus, and other regional powers without much help from the West. One might add the Mediterranean and Aegean seas, where Turkey butts heads with Greece and Cyprus, necessitating an independent approach. In this “zone beyond NATO” for Turkish security, Erdoğan is likely to leave the door open for deals while rattling the saber occasionally for effect.

Syria stands out as a matter of personal legacy for Erdoğan; he will want to remove the PKK-linked People’s Defense Units (YPG) from the Turkish border, while facilitating the safe return of significant numbers of Syrian refugees to their homeland. What mixture of diplomatic finesse and military threats compels Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad to provide assurances on refugee protection and border security remains to be seen. If Ankara believes it can weaken the YPG and bring Assad to the table through drone and artillery strikes alone, it may forgo a large ground operation, but a major new operation against the YPG this year or next cannot be ruled out. Syrian refugees and Turkish nationalists both favored Erdoğan in the recent election, and the Turkish president feels an obligation to both—which he will seek to fulfill by ending YPG control of border areas and keeping Assad from annihilating the Syrian opposition or returning refugees.

Erdoğan emerges from his reelection campaign with a reasonably strong public mandate, an experienced foreign policy team, endorsement of his conservative-nationalist approach, and some margin for risk-taking. It will be interesting to see how he uses those things.

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and former military and civilian adviser in the US State Department.

How Erdoğan could use his leverage on Russia’s war in Ukraine

Erdoğan’s winning the presidential elections means much more continuity rather than change in Ankara’s foreign policy and business as usual with both Russia and Ukraine. Turkey’s ambivalent stance on the Russian invasion of Ukraine—trading and developing economic cooperation with the former while providing support for the self-defense of the latter—will likely remain unchanged. Turkey’s balancing policy between the two warring parties has paid off, not least in domestic politics. At the same time, Erdoğan’s shuttle diplomacy between Kyiv and Moscow has brought concrete results—enabling prisoner swaps in the early days of war, brokering the grain deal, and facilitating meetings of the delegations. With Erdoğan strengthening his position with a new “vote of confidence” from the Turkish people, and Russian President Vladimir Putin losing his grip on power both internally and externally, Erdoğan might play hard this time—pushing both sides for a ceasefire, maintaining the work of the grain corridors, and negotiating to get the rest of the Turkish ships out of Ukrainian ports.

One might assume that with a new, much more nationalistic parliament, the issue of Crimean Tatars and other Turkic communities discriminated against and persecuted by the Russian occupational authorities in Ukraine would play a bigger role in the future. However, this is very unlikely since both Turkey’s economic woes and geopolitical setting in the region demand its close cooperation with Russia. Tackling the problem of Syrian refugees, refueling exhausted central bank reserves, and accumulated problems in relations with the United States and European Union will keep Russia high among Turkey’s top partners, no matter what. “[Turkey’s] relations with Russia are no less important than those with the United States,” was Erdoğan’s message in the final days of the campaign. It’s no surprise that Putin was quick to congratulate Erdoğan on the victory—even before the official results were announced.

At the same time, ongoing projects with Ukraine—most notably in defense industry and military cooperation—will also likely remain in place, meaning that no time will be wasted on a transition period in Ankara had the leadership changed.

—Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a former foreign-policy adviser to the prime minister of Ukraine.

Expect Turkey’s relationship with Europe and the US to weaken

Erdoğan’s unprecedented two decades in office and third presidential term of five years will have far-ranging consequences for Europe and Asia. As Turkey continues its ascent as a major power, it will drift away from the West and weaken its relationship with Europe and the United States. Ankara is building ties with China through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which Erdogan is weighing joining. He also has aspirations to become a member of the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).

At the same time, its support of Ukraine and power projection into the Caucasus via Azerbaijan will lead to clashes with Russia and Iran, as will Turkey’s continuing involvement in the Middle East, where Iran is demonstrating insatiable quasi-imperial ambitions. The Turkey-Azerbaijan axis and Ankara’s support of the Organization of Turkic States, a tool of Turkish foreign policy in Central Asia, will likely bring both Moscow’s and Tehran’s ire.

Arab allies of Turkey, including Qatar, and old-new “friends” such as Saudi Arabia may also become weary of Ankara’s vast ambitions rooted in the Ottoman legacy. Frustrated with barriers to US arms supplies, Turkey, a leader in drone technology with its widely lauded Bayraktar, is likely to embark on an even more robust military-industrial build-up to boost its muscle. This could include investing more in its native fifth generation TAI Kaan (TF-X / F-X) fighter jet, its Altay Main Battle Tank, and its Hisar and Siper missile systems.

Finally, the challenges of economic reform and curbing inflation will be front and center. Erdoğan will likely (and hopefully) review his religiously inspired anti-usury, inflation-denying monetary policy. He may also support economic growth by building up Turkey’s role as an energy hub, with Azeri, Eastern Mediterranean, Iranian, Russian, Turkmen, and Gulf gas pipelines going through the country and into Europe. Erdoğan may also push for constructing a massive Mediterranean-Black Sea canal to bypass the congested and hard-to-navigate Bosporus, representing a significant economic development engine for the next decade and beyond.

—Ariel Cohen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Stability alone will not solve Turkey’s pressing issues

With Erdoğan’s win, both the presidency and parliament are now aligned under a single political front. This will likely facilitate Erdoğan’s task of maintaining stability and ensuring the continuity of his policies. However, this is not a panacea; no magical solutions will materialize to the most pressing issues.

Internally, this scenario could spell disaster for the opposition. The opposition coalition may now crumble, signaling the end of Kılıçdaroğlu’s political career, with Meral Akşener, head of the Good Party (Iyi), another possible political casualty. Sweeping changes are anticipated within the opposition camp if they are willing to show responsibility.

The most pressing issue on Erdoğan’s agenda is the economic situation. The president has already made clear that he has no intention of revising his unconventional economic theory. Should pressure mount, he would likely resort to a mix of strategies, including soliciting more money from regional partners and allies such as Azerbaijan, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Moreover, Erdoğan may expedite the exploration of oil and gas in the Black Sea and possibly in the Eastern Mediterranean and boost defense exports to secure hard currency. As he continues the normalization process with regional countries, including Egypt, to stabilize the situation and increase Turkey’s trade with the region, Syria is poised to emerge as the most significant obstacle.

From Erdoğan’s viewpoint, if normalization with Assad becomes inevitable due to the emerging regional and international dynamics, it should come at a price. Erdoğan will likely seek financial support from Qatar, other Gulf countries, and the international community to fund housing projects in liberated areas to accommodate returning refugees. He insists that Assad should demonstrate commitment on at least three fronts: countering the YPG and Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), ensuring the safety of those who choose to return voluntarily at the current moment, and making notable progress on the political front in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254. Should Assad fail to show such commitment, Erdoğan will be in a suitable position vis-à-vis Russia to launch a new military operation in northern Syria versus the offshoots of the PKK, backed by the nationalist voices in the parliament.

Under Erdoğan’s leadership, Turkey will prioritize its own interests and bolster its autonomous and independent foreign policy, as well as its forward defense policy. He has already reached out to Biden’s administration to try to resolve some persistent issues, including the F-16 fighter jet deal, and may discuss other hot topics such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Syria. Ankara is expected to affirm its position on the YPG and even show more assertiveness with its deployed unmanned combat aerial vehicles. Erdoğan will likely reassert Ankara’s position toward Sweden, emphasizing the need to counter terrorism to ensure Sweden’s access to NATO. Moreover, Erdoğan will likely reach out to Putin to ensure the continuation of Ankara’s constructive efforts in halting the ongoing war against Ukraine.

—Ali Bakir is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Middle East programs and an assistant professor at Qatar University’s Ibn Khaldon Center for Humanities and Social Sciences.

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Wieslander quoted in Wall Street Journal on Turkey & Sweden’s NATO accession

Eric Adamson — Mon, 29 May 2023 08:20:10 +0000

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

“The Turkish leader’s demands have created a political knot that will be difficult to address unless he is willing to soften his stance, said Anna Wieslander, the Stockholm-based director for Northern Europe at the Atlantic Council. ‘It’s worrisome that he put something on the table which is not solvable,’ Wieslander said. ‘Turkey is creating a wedge in the alliance. This serves the interest of Russia, keeping NATO fragmented,’ she added. “Sweden needs support from other NATO allies to solve this.”

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Agachi interviewed by TVR Info on Western unity and resolve before NATO Summit (in Romanian)

aagachi — Sat, 27 May 2023 18:55:00 +0000

Original INTERVIEW

Staff

Anca Agachi

Associate Director

Africa Conflict

Explore more

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Russian War Report: Belgorod incursion brings deluge of online mockery of Russia’s defenses

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 25 May 2023 19:09:42 +0000

Tracking narratives

Belgorod raid sparks trolling activity on social media

Russian pro-war military bloggers criticize the handling of Belgorod incursion

Russian media spins Australian solidarity rally for Julian Assange as an anti-NATO event

International response

US sanctions Armenian company for helping Russia evade sanctions

Belgorod raid sparks trolling activity on social media

Drone imagery from a burning border control outpost in the Russian region of Belgorod sparked a frenzy on social media this week. According to Riga-based Russian news outlet Meduza, members of the Russian Volunteer Corps and other Russian nationals crossed from Ukraine into Belgorod Oblast and attacked a border outpost in Grayvoron. The Russian Volunteer Corps, an anti-Putin military unit made of Russian pro-Ukrainian partisans, claimed responsibility for the attack; the Free Russia Legion also claimed responsibility.

An assessment by Russian news outlet RBC regarding the broader situation in Belgorod indicated an armed incursion, with shelling and artillery fire reported. On the evening of May 22, Russian government declared a state of counterterrorist emergency in Belgorod Oblast. Although the governor of the oblast did not officially issue an order to evacuate the civilian population immediately, footage and photographs posted on social media indicated that at least some residents evacuated to other areas in the region. Meduza also reported several drone strikes on the city of Belgorod itself.

Conflicting reports emerged on May 23 after Russian officials lifted the counterterrorist alert. While the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to have “liquidated” around seventy “saboteurs,” reporting from the news outlet Mash indicated the deployment of additional Russian law enforcement in nearby Bryansk Oblast. In an effort to support their assertions of having eliminated the insurgency, Russian news outlets also released photos of military-class vehicles allegedly used by the insurgents stuck in the mud; some open-source analysts, however, questioned the authenticity of the photos. Russian media chased these reports with claims of destroyed Ukrainian tanks, while the Russian Volunteer Corps posted footage to Telegram seemingly showing intact military equipment.

Shortly after the news broke out, footage of a drone attack on the local Russian border outpost, APP Grayvoron, appeared on the outpost’s Google Maps profile, though it was later deleted. At the time of writing, it had been replaced with footage showing a convoy of vehicles, one flying the flag of the Russian Volunteer Corps.

The Google Maps profile for a Russian border outpost in Belgorod featured a video of a mechanized convoy flying the flag of the Russian Volunteer Corps. (Source: Google Maps/archive)

Simultaneously, trolling reviews appeared on the border outpost’s Google Maps profile, calling the border guards “friendly” and the facilities “understaffed.” These too have been deleted, though not before they were documented by the Saint Javelin Twitter account and other Twitter users.

Trolls post mocking reviews of Russia’s Belgorod border post. (Source: @SaintJavelin/archive)

Other trolls took to Twitter, where members of the NAFO meme movement, a pro-NATO and pro-Ukrainian community on the platform, renamed their account to “Government of The Bilhorod’s Peoples Republic” as a joking reference to the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples Republics. “Bilhorod” is the Ukrainian name for Belgorod.

NAFO meme account @nitro19820 changes its Twitter name and bio to joke that it now represented a new “People’s Republic” in Belgorod. (Source: @nitro19820/archive)

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Russian pro-war military bloggers criticize the handling of Belgorod incursion

Following the apparent border incursion into Belgorod Oblast and subsequent attacks on the region, pro-war military bloggers condemned Moscow’s handling of the war in Ukraine, including its border defenses.

Telegram channel Vоенкор Котенок Z (“Milblogger Kitten Z”) criticized the Kremlin for being late in declaring a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod and not knowing how to fight “for real.” “There is a war, and in Russia … they are afraid to call the war a war,” stated the Telegram post.

The channel ДШРГ Русич (“DShRG Rusich”) questioned “commanders of all levels” on how the incursion happened. It also blamed Russia’s intelligence services for failing to reveal “plans of an enemy.” The channel added that as long as there is no photographic evidence of corpses or burned equipment, “the enemy has no losses, and the [Russian] propagandists crapped themselves a little, saying that everything is fine.”

The Kotsnews Telegram channel addressed pro-Kremlin pundits who dismissed military blogger concerns as “hysteria” by insisting that the threat to Russian territory is real and that there are uncomfortable questions around Russia’s defensive capabilities that nobody wants to ask. “What is happening with our technical equipment at the border, surveillance systems, tracking, motion detection?” the channel asked. “What about the mining of potentially dangerous areas? What about anti-tank weapons? Why did the enemy armored group calmly penetrate deep into our territory?”

As Russia’s war against Ukraine has dragged on, the frequency and intensity of pro-war military bloggers’ criticism have increased and become bolder. The DFRLab has previously covered how Russian military bloggers criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Ministry of Defense.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian media spins Australian solidarity rally for Julian Assange as an anti-NATO event

On May 20, a series of so-called “World Wide Freedom Rallies” took place in many cities around the world. The Telegram account for Simeon Boikov, a pro-Kremlin activist and blogger in Australia, claimed to have organized the Sydney edition of the rally, part of a decentralized movement that originated in 2021 to express dissatisfaction with COVID security measures. Boikov promoted a poster for the event on April 6, a day before the event announcement on the movement’s official Telegram channel.

The rally ostensibly focused on demanding the release of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, who is currently being held in London facing potential extradition to the United States. After the event, however, Boikov highlighted a speech by Assange’s father, John Shipton, in a video showing scenes from the rally and emphasized that Shipton was wearing a “double headed eagle and St George’s ribbons,” both of which are Russian symbols. Additional videos and images from the rally showed many people carrying Russian flags and wearing pro-Kremlin symbols.

Kremlin-controlled media outlets emphasized in their headlines not just the pro-Russia nature of the event, but also claims of anti-NATO sentiment, which appear to have been exaggerated. Reviewing footage from the event, the DFRLab identified only one instance of someone sporting anti-NATO messaging. Nonetheless, Russian media embraced the event as specifically anti-NATO, including state outlets Gazeta.ru, TASS, RIA Novosti, and Komsomolyskaya Pravda, and pro-Kremlin media such as News Front, Inforeactor, Ekonomika Segodnya. Additionally, The Eastern Herald, an Indian media outlet, and Belarus state-controlled television both framed the event as anti-NATO in their English-language publications.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

US sanctions Armenian company for helping Russia evade sanctions

On May 22, the US Department of Commerce announced that it had amended its list of sanctioned entities and individuals by adding seventy-one entities that the US government had determined to be acting “contrary to [US] national security or foreign policy interests.” Alongside Russian companies, one Kyrgyz company, Tro.Ya LLC, and one Armenian company, Medisar LLC, were included in the amended list. According to the Department of Commerce, both companies engaged in conduct that “prevented the successful accomplishment of an end-use check.” In other words, the Department of Commerce suspected that the final destination for the products was Russia but the companies themselves had obfuscated this information.

Medisar LLC, which was registered in Armenia in 2001, is an importer of chemicals and laboratory equipment. The company is one of the thousand largest taxpayers in Armenia, paying about one million dollars in taxes in 2022. It also has a longstanding trade history with Russian companies. On its website, Medisar indicates that one of its trading partners, dating back to 2011, is Russian company Minimed.

Screenshot from the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project’s (OCCRP) Aleph database, made available through Friends of OCCRP access, about Medisar’s trade. The third and fourth companies on the list are both OOO Minimed, a Russian company with a long-term trading relationship with Medisar. (Source: DFRLab via OCCRP)

On May 20, Armenian investigative website Hetq reported that data obtained from the country’s customs service showed that in 2022, Medisar exported equipment from Armenia to Russia, including electronic integrated circuits, diodes, transistors, and similar semiconductor devices.

A company executive who did not want to be identified acknowledged to RFE/RL that Medisar imported chemicals and laboratory equipment from the United States and the European Union and re-exported them to Russia.

Medisar is the second-largest company registered in Armenia to be sanctioned by the United States. The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the other firm, TAKO, in April. The company is in the wholesale of electronic and telecommunications equipment and parts. TAKO, spelled TACO in Armenia’s legal entities register, was registered in May 2022 in Armenia and is fully owned by a Russian citizen, according to public registry records.

On April 18, the New York Times reported that in 2022, Armenia imported 515 percent more chips and processors from the United States and 212 percent more from the European Union than in 2021, and that Armenia exported 97 percent of those same products to Russia.

During a May 22 press conference, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that despite Armenia’s “strategic” relationship with Russia and membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, the country “cannot afford to come under Western sanctions.” Pashinyan underscored that if Armenia faced sanctions, “it wouldn’t be good for any of our allies, while we would ruin our relations with our Western partners.”

A joint “compliance note” issued on March 2 by the US Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and Commerce, titled “Cracking Down on Third-Party Intermediaries Used to Evade Russia-Related Sanctions and Export Controls,” mentioned Armenia, along with China, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, as “transshipment points commonly used to illegally redirect restricted items to Russia or Belarus.”

According to the Statistical Committee of the Republic of Armenia, Russian-Armenian trade soared in 2022, including exports to Russia, which nearly tripled to $2.4 billion.

—Ani Mejlumyan, research assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

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Kroenig and Ashford debate the implications of Turkey’s elections

sodal — Wed, 24 May 2023 14:53:35 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

In their latest column, they discuss Turkey’s recent elections, tensions between the Russian military and the private Wagner Group, the Ukrainians’ delayed Spring offensive, and the surprising outcomes of Thailand’s recent elections. In particular, the co-authors delve deep into the topic of the Turkish elections, exploring how the results will impact NATO, as well as Sweden’s ascension into the Alliance.

Erdogan won a plurality, but not a majority, of votes, so it will go to a runoff election. But some of the voters for the now-eliminated candidates are likely to swing to Erdogan. If so, that will be too bad for Turkish institutions and also, potentially, for the NATO alliance… Let’s see how the runoff election goes. It’s not over until it’s over. But I think Washington will need to manage with several more years of Erdogan in power.

Matthew Kroenig

Erdogan’s victory will not be good for the Biden administration, though I’m less convinced it’s bad for the United States more generally. Erdogan has always been very transactional and self-interested; not the ideal ally, but you can work with him.

Emma Ashford

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

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Wieslander quoted in Dagens Nyheter

Eric Adamson — Tue, 23 May 2023 10:16:36 +0000

I. Background: The failure of deterrence
II. Why NATO membership for Ukraine?
A. The case for Ukraine joining the alliance
B. Hurdles to membership
III. NATO membership options
A. The nature of a NATO commitment
B. Borders to be defended, and the challenge of continuous low-level conflict
C. Membership options for the Vilnius summit
IV. Possible non-NATO options
A. Other possible multilateral initiatives
B. Possible unilateral US initiatives
C. The “Israel model” option
V. Assessing the options
VI. Conclusions and recommendations

“‘You could say that there are two completely different fears about Russia. The French and continental fear is that Russia will come out of this too badly. French President Macron has said that Russia must be defeated but not crushed,'” says Anna Wieslander.

“‘The second fear is the opposite. In the Baltics and Eastern Europe, they say the biggest danger is that Ukraine will lose. This will create an appetite for more wars of aggression in Russia. They fear that next time it could be their turn,’ she says.”

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Providing long-term security for Ukraine: NATO membership and other security options

Hans Binnendijk, Franklin D. Kramer — Tue, 23 May 2023 04:00:00 +0000

As Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine continues, a critical question will be whether and how NATO should enhance its support for Ukraine at its July summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. NATO has long stated that Ukraine will—eventually—become a member of the alliance, but a key decision for NATO will be how to implement that promise in the context of the ongoing war.

This issue brief evaluates membership and other security options for the alliance and its members to consider. The options range from formal actions by NATO as a whole to collective or individualized efforts by member nations. The brief recommends that for geopolitical and values-based reasons, the alliance should, at a minimum, offer Ukraine a Membership Action Plan (MAP) or its equivalent supported by security guarantees that will help ensure success in its fight against Russia and strengthen security in Europe for the long term.

I. Background: The failure of deterrence

The February 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia rests in significant part upon the historical context of a Russian desire for empire that has long challenged Ukraine’s separate identity. That separate identity was, however, recognized by Russia in the 1991 Belovezha Accords and then formally validated by the 1994 Budapest Memorandum to which Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are signatories along with Ukraine. France and China provided additional assurances in separate documents. The memorandum explicitly provides for Russia as a signato-ry to “respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine,” and to “refrain from the threat of the use of force or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine.”¹

Russia, of course, has ignored its pledged word, first undertaking the 2014 invasion of Crimea and the subsequent military activities in the Donbas region of Ukraine and then the full-scale invasion beginning February 2022. Underlying such actions is the worldview held by Russian President Vladimir Putin. “We are one people” is how he chooses to describe Russia and Ukraine, with Ukrainian sovereignty possible only in conjunction with Russia. That viewpoint has been a fundamental driver of Russian behavior toward Ukraine since President Putin came to power, though he only formally challenged Ukrainian sovereignty starting in 2014. Putin also has articulated a long list of grievances including purported security concerns against the United States and NATO, notably beginning with his speech at the 2007 Munich security conference.

For their part and by contrast, the people of Ukraine have increasingly aligned themselves with the transatlantic nations including through the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Maidan Revolution of Dignity in 2014. Part of that alignment includes a desire to join the European Union (EU), for which the formal process of membership has now begun, and part has included a desire to join NATO built on multiple years of interactions.

Ukraine’s partnership involvement with NATO is long-standing. Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991, the Partnership for Peace in 1994, and the Charter on Distinctive Partnership (and the NATO-Ukraine Commission) in 1997. A NATO Information and Documentation Center and a Liaison Office were established in 1997-1999. NATO partnership arrangements allowed Ukraine to participate in multiple NATO operations and exercises and to receive military assistance.²

In 2002, President Leonid Kuchma expressed interest in Ukraine joining the alliance and in 2008 President Viktor Yushchenko sought a Membership Action Plan for the country. Moscow firmly opposed the proposal.

In April 2008, a divided NATO summit in Bucharest declared that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members” of NATO but without a time frame—agreeing only to begin a period of intensive engagement to address outstanding questions including each country’s application for a MAP. Membership, of course, was not achieved; neither was entry into the MAP process. Moreover, that statement of policy arguably was a factor—among many others—leading to Russian invasions of both Georgia and later Ukraine.

In 2010, under pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine withdrew its candidacy for NATO membership and adopted a nonaligned status. After the 2014 Maidan protests, whose original cause was Yanukovych’s refusal to sign as he had promised an association agreement with the European Union, and Russia’s initial military action against Ukraine, NATO designed in 2016 a comprehensive assistance package for Ukraine. In 2017, the Ukraine parliament reversed itself and reinstated NATO membership as a strategic goal. Two years later, a constitutional amendment supporting NATO membership went into effect. Ukraine was invited to become an Enhanced Opportunity Partner in 2020 and after the 2022 invasion, Kyiv formally applied for NATO membership.³

The conclusion to be drawn from this history is that ensuring Ukraine’s long-term security will require mechanisms that extend well beyond those that have failed Ukraine in the past. The failures of deterrence in 2014 and 2022 occurred despite Russia’s Budapest Memorandum assurances, the series of partnership arrangements between NATO and Ukraine described above, the threat of massive Western sanctions prior to the February 2022 invasion, and the various Western efforts to provide Ukraine with military assistance prior to the war (including $2.7 billion from the United States between 2014 and 2022).

Failure of deterrence in the past and the risk that it could fail again in the future is the principal reason that NATO should take additional steps at the Vilnius summit to bring Ukraine closer to alliance membership.

A start has been made in this regard. During the first year of the war, the United States provided about $47 billion in military aid and $30 billion in economic assistance to Ukraine.⁴ European institutions and countries during this period committed a total of €54.9 billion to Ukraine, with Germany providing the largest amount.⁵

Moreover, NATO, through statements by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, and multiple heads of nations have declared that supporting Ukraine’s independence is critical for both security and value-based reasons. As French President Emmanuel Macron has said, Russia’s full-scale invasion “flouts the principles of the only international order possible, the only order that can guarantee peace; in other words, respect for national sovereignty and intangible borders.”⁶ Similarly, as Finland’s prime minister, Sanna Marin, has stated, Ukrainians “are representing all of our values, European values, and they are fighting for us, all of us.”⁷ Likewise, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has been clear: “You can count on us. We will continue to provide our full support. Now… and for the future.”⁸

The issue now facing NATO and Ukraine is how statements like these can be translated into specific security initiatives.

II. Why NATO membership for Ukraine?

There is a strong case for Ukraine to become a NATO member, but there are also some hurdles to overcome.

A. The case for Ukraine joining the alliance

There is a strong case for Ukrainian membership in NATO. The most obvious argument is that deterrence based on assurances, partnerships, threat of sanctions, and military assistance has failed Ukraine twice. For the long-term security of Europe, deterrence cannot be allowed to fail again. This is especially true with regard to a country that has sacrificed so much for its freedom. It has fulfilled most of the criteria of the Membership Action Plan, including the economic, political, and military requirements. Ukraine deserves NATO’s full protection. With the guarantee of long-term security, Ukraine will be able to participate in any future negotiation with Russia with greater confidence. In addition, during the past fifteen months of conflict, Ukraine has built firm cultural, political, and security bridges with all NATO members and with the European Union. Importantly, NATO membership for Ukraine would not be a one-way street. Ukraine’s military is one of the most capable and certainly the most battle tested in Europe. They are fully trained on a wide array of NATO munitions and thus interoperable with NATO forces. Their knowledge of how Russia fights would be of incalculable value to the alliance.

B. Hurdles to membership

Membership of course requires all existing NATO members to concur and ratify the agreement. The fact that Swedish membership has been held up by two countries based on extraneous reasons is a reminder that membership for Ukraine may not be easy to attain. Actual membership before the current conflict ends is unlikely because several countries fear that NATO would immediately be drawn directly into that fight. Other NATO nations even appear reluctant to concur if Russian troops continue to occupy some Ukrainian territory, fearing that this could eventually trigger Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Some have pointed to the high level of pre-war corruption in Ukraine and insist that progress is needed to reverse this situation. Any plan to bring Ukraine quickly into the alliance will need to contend with these hurdles.

III. NATO membership options

As it prepares for the Vilnius summit, NATO is considering ways it might approach the question of NATO membership for Ukraine.

A. The nature of a NATO commitment

A good place to start an analysis of NATO membership options for Ukraine is with the NATO treaty itself to understand the effect and obligations that Ukraine’s membership in NATO would establish.

Articles 3 and 4 of the treaty have important provisions providing, respectively, for “develop[ing] individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack,” and “consult[ing] together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”⁹ It should be apparent that, de facto, these provisions already describe Ukraine’s own actions and its interactions with NATO.

However, the heart of the NATO treaty is Article 5, whose key paragraph provides the following:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.¹⁰

The important point to take from the wording is that while an attack against one automatically triggers the Article 5 commitment, the “forthwith” response by a nation is by “such action as it deems necessary” which could be “including the use of armed force.”

Analytically, therefore, and according to the words of the treaty, there is no requirement of unanimity before a member can take “such action as it deems necessary.” Action can even be done “individually.” To be sure, the whole point of the NATO integrated military structure is to generate collective responses but no one member can stop others from acting with national capabilities—which are the very great majority of the capabilities that are available to the alliance. Thus, while it almost certainly would make geopolitical sense to have the North Atlantic Council (NAC) authorize any NATO action, nations do not have to wait for the NAC to take steps that nonetheless fall within the treaty.

On the other side of the coin, a nation might choose not to be part of a collective effort. France’s disengagement from the integrated military structure for many years but continued membership in the alliance is illustrative. Hypothetically, though extremely unlikely, even if Ukraine became a member of NATO in the near term, the other members could choose to provide only the type of support that Ukraine is already receiving.

The ability to calibrate responses could become important under certain circumstances, as dis-cussed below. However, while individual NATO nations would have the choice of how to respond to “an attack on one,” media reports suggest that at least some nations are concerned that premature membership for Ukraine will drag them into an unwanted war.

B. Borders to be defended, and the challenge of continuous low-level conflict

The current phase of the Ukraine-Russia war will end. How and when is not yet clear. The outcome of this phase will depend in part on the West’s ability to provide Ukraine with adequate weapons and in part upon Ukraine’s own actions, including the success of the anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive. Russian capabilities and geopolitical considerations, of course, also come into play. Possible outcomes include the following:

A Russian military defeat and successful Ukrainian effort to regain all or substantial parts of its occupied territory, leading to a negotiated end to the war on terms acceptable to Ukraine
A continued low-level conflict including changes in the effective line of control
A new cease-fire line formed wherever the fighting stops—with Russian troops still on some Ukrainian territory. A Russian conquest of the entirety of Ukraine is seemingly less likely.

If the past several years are any guide, they suggest the difficulty of accurately anticipating the future—and for that reason, NATO may wish to build a degree of flexibility into any agreements with Ukraine that are made at the Vilnius summit. Nonetheless, at such time as Ukraine becomes a member of NATO, a decision would have to be made as to precisely which borders NATO would be obliged to defend. That would not be difficult if Ukraine successfully regained its pre-2014 borders. But if the cease-fire line includes continued Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory, the situation would be more complicated. Ukraine would have to describe for NATO the territory and borders that would fall within the scope of the treaty, and NATO would have to agree.

Ukraine would understandably want to regain the entirety of its territory, and NATO presumably would not recognize any Russian claim to the contrary. The question thus arises as to what NATO’s position would be if Ukraine used force to retake occupied territory once it had become a NATO member. A somewhat related question would arise if despite an agreement for a cease-fire, there continued to be low-level conflict instituted from Russia-controlled territory, and Ukraine determined it needed to respond. At this time, a NATO consensus for membership would be unlikely if members thought Ukraine—post cease-fire and membership—would seek, without further Russian aggression, to retake additional occupied territory, thus initiating the prospect of a war between Russia and NATO. Inasmuch as the issue facing NATO is not immediate membership for Ukraine, however, that question and the issue of responding to low-level conflict could be left to the future to be analyzed in the context of an actual membership offer.

C. Membership options for the Vilnius summit

With the foregoing as background, the discussion below sets forth five possible approaches to Ukrainian membership in NATO that would create a stronger perspective for NATO membership and should be considered at the Vilnius summit.

1. Offer fast-track membership without conditions upon a cease-fire satisfactory to Ukraine

NATO could declare at the Vilnius summit that Ukraine has already met most of the criteria set forth for candidates in the Membership Action Plan. Those criteria are not a check list and have varied over time, but in general the principal criteria for membership have been the following:

New members must uphold democracy and the rule of law, including tolerating diversity.
New members must be making progress toward a market economy.
New members must be security providers with their military forces under firm civilian control and working toward compatibility with NATO forces.
New members need to settle their international disputes by peaceful means except if responding to unlawful use of force, armed attack, or other violation of international law.

A summit declaration could state that all such criteria have already been met, and that like Finland and Sweden, an MAP process is no longer needed for Ukraine. An offer of membership could then follow upon a cease-fire satisfactory to Ukraine.

Under this option, NATO would not seek any assurances from Ukraine regarding its future efforts to regain any occupied territory that Russia might hold after a cease-fire. Without these assurances, Ukraine would not be subject to any agreed constraints barring it from using force subsequently to retake lost territory. However, as a practical matter, Ukraine probably could not undertake such an action effectively without the support of NATO nations for sustainment, intelligence, logistics, and other military capabilities. Accordingly, NATO would have significant influence on Ukrainian decision-making.

Finally, it should be apparent that while such an approach has elements of being a “fast track,” it arguably incentivizes Russia not to enter into a cease-fire.

2. Offer fast-track membership upon a cease-fire satisfactory to Ukraine but with newly designed conditions

This option would be similar to the first in that it would bypass the existing MAP process for Ukraine. The argument would be that Ukraine deserves to be treated more like Finland and Sweden, where an MAP process was not required. But it would recognize that Ukraine has certain problems that Finland and Sweden did not have. Rather than setting no conditions for membership, NATO would create new criteria or metrics specifically designed for Ukraine.

Those new criteria would be developed based on what it would take to gain a NATO consensus for membership. In addition to an agreed cease-fire, those conditions might include the below:

Assurances from Ukraine that it would use means other than armed force to regain any remaining occupied territory. NATO would take on obligations to continue to put significant economic and diplomatic pressure on Russia to return any occupied territory. Such assurances would not preclude Ukraine from defending itself from Russian attacks.
Assurances consistent with those required in conjunction with Ukraine’s candidacy to the European Union including reduction of corruption, judicial independence, and protection of all minority rights.

This option could expedite Ukrainian membership in NATO. But the admissions process would not be free of conditions. It would be a significant step toward Ukrainian membership but would still give NATO nations control over the subsequent process.

3. Offer a traditional Membership Action Plan plus guarantees for continued military and economic support

This option would do what the United States originally proposed for the 2008 Bucharest summit. It would state that the “period of intensive engagement to address outstanding questions” agreed to in Bucharest had successfully taken place and that it is time to take the next step. It would be a more burdensome process for Ukraine and could allow the alliance to set the pace for future membership. Additional criteria could be added as needed to gain a political consensus. NATO has utilized the MAP process for multiple countries that have joined the alliance as well as for some that are still aspirants. NATO has summarized the MAP as follows:

The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a NATO programme of advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance. Participation in the MAP does not prejudge any decision by the Alliance on future membership….Upon decision of the North Atlantic Council, countries participate in the MAP by submitting individual annual national programmes on their preparations for possible future membership. These cover political, economic, defence, resource, security and legal aspects. The MAP process provides a focused and candid feedback mechanism on aspirant countries’ progress on their programmes. This includes both political and technical advice, as well as annual meetings between all NATO members and individual aspirants at the level of the North Atlantic Council to assess progress, on the basis of an annual progress report. A key element is the defence planning approach for aspirants, which includes elaboration and review of agreed planning targets. Throughout the year, meetings and workshops with NATO civilian and military experts in various fields allow for discussion of the entire spectrum of issues relevant to membership. ¹¹

For Ukraine, the MAP process presumably would be enhanced by continued military and economic support—the nature of that support being significantly affected by whether the military conflict with Russia was still ongoing. However, a pledge of a MAP plus ongoing support would be very reassuring.

4. Create a new type of NATO-Ukraine partnership designed to ensure long-term security assistance and eventual membership

This option would also set aside the requirement for a MAP, and create a new partnership arrangement for Ukraine designed to both provide ongoing security assistance and lead eventually to membership. For example, Ian Brzezinski and Alexander Vershbow have proposed establishing “a new NATO-Ukraine Deterrence and Defense Partnership (DDP).”¹² Building on Ukraine’s status as a member of the Enhanced Opportunities Partnership program, the DDP would build up Ukraine’s long-term capacity to defend itself and deter any future Russian aggression. Allies’ commitment to arm, train, and equip Ukrainian forces—backed, if possible, by NATO common funding—would serve as a post-war security guarantee for Ukraine until allies are ready to admit Ukraine as a full-fledged NATO member.

This partnership approach would be offered as an alternative to a NATO MAP, but like a MAP its objective would be to facilitate Ukraine’s preparation for eventual membership in the alliance. Such a program would open the door to direct accession by Ukraine as was offered to Finland and Sweden.

In substance, the suggested DDP is a promise to continue doing what the alliance members are already undertaking with respect to Ukraine’s capacity to defend itself against Russia, plus to-be-determined activities to “facilitate Ukraine’s preparation for eventual membership.”

5. Repeat NATO’s Bucharest summit language, but in addition task a high-level group to set a path for Ukrainian membership by a target date

If the heads of state are deadlocked on this issue at Vilnius, the summit documents could simply restate the Bucharest summit language and NATO’s “open door” policy. In light of Russian aggression in Ukraine, however, a simple repetition of a failed NATO policy would seem unwise. Yet if a consensus cannot be built for one of the other options, this might be NATO’s default position. Should NATO’s leadership be faced with this situation, one way to demonstrate progress toward Ukraine membership would be to establish a high-level group to create an implementation path and to set an early target date for Ukrainian membership.

IV. Possible non-NATO options

Establishing NATO membership for Ukraine would be the surest way to provide long-term security for the country. But there are other multilateral and unilateral suggestions that could complement NATO membership and, though weaker, could, if necessary, substitute for it should consensus fail at Vilnius. These efforts could be launched whatever the decision about Ukraine’s relations with NATO.

A. Other possible multilateral initiatives

1. Convert the current Ukraine Defense Contact Group of fifty-four nations into a permanent arrangement. The group could declare that after a cease-fire they will continue to supply Ukraine with all the weapons it needs to deter renewed Russian assaults. Such a declaration would make clear to Russia that Ukraine can count on continued Western military support and thus would enhance deterrence.

2. Create a smaller core group of major countries similar to AUKUS (the Australia, United Kingdom, and United States trilateral security pact) designed to provide high impact weapons to Ukraine. Such a group would commit to sharing top-of-the-line technology with Ukraine over time. It would include major NATO members such as France, Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It could serve as a steering group for the larger group of fifty-four arms donors.

3. Have nations adopt language similar to that in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The TRA states that the United States would have “grave concern” should China attack Taiwan and commits the United States to providing Taiwan with military equipment to defend itself.¹³ The defense commitment in the TRA is not absolute and efforts are being made in the United States to strengthen it. Yet it has been sufficient to deter China for over four decades. Having multiple nations undertaking such a common commitment could be of substantial value. The United States would likely have to take the first step. However, legislative action in the United States and elsewhere may be difficult to obtain.

4. Accelerate Ukrainian membership in the European Union, which would extend the Article 42.7 EU defense commitment to Ukraine. The European Union has granted candidate status to Ukraine. It remains unclear how long it would take for Ukraine to become a full EU member under normal circumstances. But Brussels could accelerate the process given the unusual circumstances. While generally considered weaker than NATO’s Article 5 defense commitment, Article 42.7 does create an “obligation of aid and assistance … by all means in their power” in case of armed aggression against the EU member.¹⁴ This commitment was considered inadequate to deter by Finland and Sweden when they decided to join NATO. Nonetheless, it could cause Russia to rethink further military aggression against Ukraine.

B. Possible unilateral US initiatives

1. Pass a concurrent resolution pledging to continue to provide necessary weapons to Ukraine after a cease-fire to ensure that Russia does not have the advantage to attack Ukraine again. This kind of congressional commitment, though not binding, would at least put Russia on notice that despite some opposition, Congress would pursue support for Ukraine “as long as it takes.” That might discourage Russia from pursuing a long-term war.

2. Declare Ukraine to have major non-NATO ally (MNNA) status. Currently nineteen nations have MNNA status—none of them in Europe. This US designation confers military and financial advantages to the recipient. But it does not convey a firm defense commitment. It could nonetheless be symbolically important, though it does risk conveying the impression that NATO membership is off the table.

While a US-only commitment would be credible, it likely would be politically less attractive to Congress than a multilateral approach.

C. The “Israel Model” option

Some have suggested the “Israel Model” as an approach for long-term Ukrainian security. This would include agreement to provide a certain level of annual military support and a moral commitment to come to the nation’s rescue if needed. This might be provided on a multilateral or bilateral basis. But Israel’s security situation is quite different from Ukraine’s. Israel’s conventional military is capable of defeating any combination of hostile neighbors. It has treaties and informal agreements with most of its neighbors which further assure its security. It produces its own high technology armaments. And it has a nuclear deterrent force which provides for its ultimate security. Ukraine has none of these assets. Its conventional defense requirements far outpace those of Israel. While pledges of sufficient levels of annual military support would be useful to Ukraine, the “Israel Model” alone would be inadequate to provide for Ukraine’s long-term security.

V. Assessing the options

To assess the array of multilateral and unilateral options presented above, there are six considerations that should shape the approach to providing Ukraine with support for its security at the Vilnius summit.

Commitments should be as multilateral as possible. It is important to make clear to Russia that the full NATO alliance stands behind Ukraine.
Commitments should be as realistic as possible, and designed to practically advance Ukraine’s interests and its movement to NATO membership.
Commitments should be as clear as possible with regard to the intention to support Ukraine over the long term so that Russia does not think it can outlast NATO support to Ukraine.
Commitments should be designed to both deter further Russian aggression and prevent a wider war in Europe.
Commitments should not constrain Ukraine’s ability to determine for itself whether and how to negotiate with Russia.
Commitments should be supported with the necessary financial resources.

VI. Conclusions and recommendations

In assessing the various options to provide Ukraine with longer-term stability and in light of the six considerations above, we offer the following conclusions and recommendations for both NATO and Ukraine to consider:

NATO membership would provide the strongest long-term deterrence against renewed Russian aggression, but the difficulty Sweden is having in securing Turkish and Hungarian approval of NATO accession indicates the difficulty that Ukraine might have. Seeking immediate NATO membership amid armed conflict would probably not succeed since it would create an immediate Article 5 situation.
Careful coordination will be needed before the Vilnius summit to ensure that the membership issue does not divide the alliance as it did at the Bucharest summit. Nonetheless, NATO should take additional steps at Vilnius to create a clear perspective for Ukrainian membership. Accelerated planning for this outcome must start now.
There are several options as described above that NATO should consider for the Vilnius summit. At a minimum, NATO should offer Ukraine a Membership Action Plan plus assurances of continued military and economic support. Initiating the MAP now would still allow NATO to control the pace of the process. NATO might also set a target date for membership.
Alternatively, the summit could set aside the MAP process and create new membership criteria or metrics specifically designed for fast-track membership, as outlined in Option 2.
Other multilateral and bilateral commitments as described above could also be made. In general, multilateral or coordinated unilateral commitments would be more feasible and valuable.
NATO should be clear on how Ukraine would eventually fit into overall NATO military planning. The operational requirements for Ukraine’s NATO membership would need to be assessed. Appropriate coordination would be necessary should Ukraine join NATO after an agreed cease-fire has been reached or under other circumstances.
NATO should also be clear on what borders will be defended and how any occupied territories or violations of a cease-fire would be dealt with including responding to low-level conflict. The alliance should evaluate in advance what might be appropriate responses if Ukraine were to become determined to regain territory that remained under Russian control after a cease-fire. Decisions on these issues would need to be made before a final invitation for membership is issued.
In any case, whatever options NATO chooses, it should affirm in ways that convey seriousness of purpose its 2008 commitment that NATO membership is the ultimate destination for Ukraine.

IV. About the authors

Fellow

Hans Binnendijk

Distinguished Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

Board director

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Cybersecurity Defense Policy

Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He is a former special assistant to the president for defense policy and director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies.

Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished fellow and on the board at the Atlantic Council. He is a former assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

Explore the Initiative

Issue Brief Apr 11, 2023

Defining success for NATO’s Vilnius summit: A primer

By Charles Barry and Christopher Skaluba

A successful NATO summit in July requires significant progress on a host of NATO’s political and military priorities, especially those enumerated at Madrid.

Europe & Eurasia National Security

Strategy Memo Apr 13, 2023

Memo to NATO leaders

NATO’s upcoming Vilnius summit has to produce more than a rhetorical expression of support for Ukraine. Allied leaders must leverage the opportunity to drive forward a NATO defense and deterrence posture that underscores NATO’s resolve to support Ukraine and begins the process of fully integrating Ukraine within the transatlantic community, including as a NATO member.

Conflict Europe & Eurasia

Issue Brief Apr 18, 2023

NATO deterrence and defense: Military priorities for the Vilnius Summit

By Franklin D. Kramer

Ahead of the NATO Summit in Vilnius, this issue brief sets forth six priority actions that NATO should undertake to enhance its deterrent and defense posture.

Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia

1 Ukraine, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of America, “Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Budapest, December 5, 1994, via United Nations Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%203007/Part/volume-3007-I-52241.pdf, paragraph 2.

2 For example, a NATO representative to Ukraine, the NATO-Ukraine Platform on Countering Hybrid Warfare, a Resilience Advisory Support Team, the NATO Building Integrity process, the NATO Defense Education Enhancement Programme, the Air Situation Data Exchange program, the Military Committee with Ukraine Work Plan, the Science for Peace and Security Programme, the Operational Capabilities Concept program, the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform, the Joint Working Group on Defence Technical Cooperation.

3 See “Relations with Ukraine,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, updated April 4, 2023.

4 See Council on Foreign Relations, “How Much Aid Has the US Sent to Ukraine?” updated February 22, 2023. These statistics cover the period January 24, 2022, to January 15, 2023.

5 Christopher Wolf, “Countries that Have Sent the Most Aid to Ukraine,” US News, February 24, 2023.

6 Emmanuel Macron, “Speech by the President of the French Republic at the United Nations General Assembly,” Élysée, September 20, 2022, https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2022/09/20/speech-by-the-president-of-the-french-republic-at-the-uunited-nations-general-assembly.

7 Brit Mccandless Farmer, “Finland’s Sanna Marin: Ukraine Must Win the War, CBS News, February 19, 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/finland-sanna-marin-ukraine-60-minutes-2023-02-19/.

8 European Commission, “Statement by President von der Leyen at the Joint Press Conference with President Michel and Ukrainian President Zelenskyy on the Occasion of the Special Meeting of the European Council of 9 February 2023,” February 9, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_722.

9 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The North Atlantic Treaty,” April 4, 1949, last updated April 10, 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm, Articles 3 and 4.

10 Ibid., Article 5.

11 “Membership Action Plan,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last updated April 19, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37356.ht.

12 Ian Brzezinski and Alexander Vershbow, “Memo to NATO Leaders: Decisive Action Needed at NATO’s Vilnius Summit on Ukraine and the Completion of Europe,” Atlantic Council, April 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/strategy-memo/memo-to-nato-leaders/.

13 United States Congress, “Taiwan Relations Act,” Public Law 96-8, April 10, 1979, https://www.congress.gov/96/statute/STATUTE-93/STATUTE-93-Pg14.pdf, Section 2(a)(4).

14 European Union External Action Service, “Article 42.7 TEU—The EU’s Mutual Assistance Clause,” October 6, 2022, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/article-427-teu-eus-mutual-assistance-clause_en.

The post Providing long-term security for Ukraine: NATO membership and other security options appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Jones and Stefanini in The Guardian discussing the need for continued support to Ukraine

sodal — Mon, 22 May 2023 20:00:09 +0000

Executive Chairman Emeritus

On April 17, Atlantic Council Executive Chairman Emeritus James Jones and Transatlantic Security Initiative Nonresident Senior Fellow Stefano Stefanini, along with other experts, co-authored an article for The Guardian arguing for democratic cooperation and unity in providing support to Ukraine.

The co-authors make the case that a Russian victory in Ukraine would be disastrous for the liberal world order, setting a dangerous precedent for territorial conquest by other autocratic regimes, specifically China. To counter Moscow and Beijing, the transatlantic Alliance must back up its rhetoric with decisive action: including issuing continued military aid to Ukraine, forging strong relationships with nations outside of the transatlantic community, increasing NATO defense spending, and more.

Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in the erroneous belief that Ukraine would be defeated within a few weeks. More than a year later, Ukraine’s unity and resilience in the face of Russia’s aggression have shown the country’s remarkable strength… To continue its fight for freedom and defeat Putin, however, Ukraine needs more support. Ukraine’s partners have to step up; when freedom is better equipped than tyranny, its victory is assured.

James L. Jones, Jr.

Board director

James L. Jones, Jr.

Fellow

Stefano Stefanini

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

English Europe & Eurasia

The post Jones and Stefanini in The Guardian discussing the need for continued support to Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Russia fires barrage at Kyiv while UK promises ‘kamikaze’ drones

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 19 May 2023 11:00:00 +0000

Security

New barrage of missiles targets Ukraine as UK promises hundreds of ‘kamikaze’ drones

Russian missile from December found in Polish forest sparks ‘cover-up’ controversy

Another barrage of missiles targets Ukraine as UK promises hundreds of ‘kamikaze’ drones

On May 16, Russian media reported that the Russian army had strengthened its positions in the Bakhmut area. According to Russian reports, four battalions have deployed around Bakhmut to prevent Ukrainian advances. The Russian Ministry of Defense said that its forces are focused on repelling Ukrainian counterattacks. Ukraine’s Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar said on May 15 that Russian forces are deploying additional airborne forces to defend their flanks in Bakhmut. Russian forces appear to have made limited gains within Bakhmut.

Another wave of Russian attacks targeted Ukraine with missiles and drones. The General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces reported that, in the early hours of May 16, Russia launched six Kh-47 Kinzhal missiles from six MiG-31K aircraft at Kyiv, in addition to nine Kalibr missiles and ten S-400 and Iskander-M missiles that targeted other areas. Ukraine said its air defenses shot down most of the missiles, including six Kinzhal missiles and nine drones, of which six were Iranian-made Shahed-131/136s drones. The Russian defense ministry claimed—and US officials later confirmed—that one of the Kinzhal missiles struck a Patriot missile defense system in Kyiv. A US official told CNN that the US-made Patriot system likely suffered damage but was not destroyed.

Elsewhere, the dam connected to the Russian-controlled Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant appears to be gushing water. A video taken on May 11 appears to show powerful streams of water flowing through the dam, which sits across the Dnipro River. The Ukrainian Center for Journalistic Investigations reported that the damage to the dam was caused by Russia. The report also cited Russian Telegram channels that claimed Russian positions were flooded and that a soldier had died as a result.

Meanwhile, allied military aid continues to flow into Ukraine, albeit at a slower pace. On May 15, the United Kingdom said it would send Ukraine hundreds of custom-built ‘kamikaze’ drones. According to The Telegraph, the drones will have a range of more than 200 kilometers, comparable to an artillery shell. Their delivery to Ukraine is expected in the coming months.

The German company Hensoldt said it will deliver six more TRML-4D radars compatible with the IRIS-T air defense system to Ukraine. These radars were introduced in 2018 and can detect and track up to 1,500 aerial targets at a distance of ten meters up to 250 kilometers, with an altitude reaching thirty kilometers. The radars can be used for detecting inconspicuous targets, such as hovering helicopters or low-flying cruise missiles. The combined value of the radar stations is €100 million ($108 million). Currently, Ukraine has only four TRML-4D radar systems.

In addition, Ukraine joined the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence on May 16, with the Ukrainian flag raised near the center’s headquarters, in Tallinn, Estonia. The center comprises thirty-one nations who exchange information, conduct research and specialist training, and undergo cyber military exercises.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian missile from December found in Polish forest sparks ‘cover-up’ controversy

On May 10, Polish broadcaster RMF reported on preliminary findings from the Polish Air Force Institute of Technology, which found that, on December 16, 2022, a Russian KH-55 cruise missile landed in Polish territory. The missile was not discovered until April 27, 2023, when a woman came across the remains of an air-to-surface missile while riding a horse through a forest. The Russian rocket reportedly flew 300 kilometers into Polish airspace before landing in a forest in Zamość, near the northern city of Bydgoszcz, 265 kilometers northwest of Warsaw. The missile was reportedly launched from a Russian plane flying over Belarusian territory. On December 16, 2022, Russian forces fired at least seventy-six missiles toward Ukraine.

The delayed discovery of the missile has sparked discussions about whether the Polish government tried to cover up the incident. Ukraine reportedly informed Polish armed forces on December 16 that an object, which could be a missile, was approaching Polish air space. Polish radars also spotted an unspecified object but later lost track of it near Bydgoszcz. Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reportedly initiated an immediate search, but according to Polish media outlet Onet citing high-ranking unnamed sources, the Ministry of Defense decided to halt the search after attempts to find the object were unsuccessful. RMF reported that the armed forces did not notify the prosecutor’s office about the airspace violation, meaning the investigation was not launched until months after the missile landed on Polish territory. Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki and President Andrzej Duda also claimed that they were not immediately notified about the incident and only learned of it in April 2023.

On May 11, Defense Minister Mariusz Blaszczak claimed that Operational Commander of the Polish Armed Forces Tomasz Piotrowski had “failed to carry out his duties by not informing me about the object that appeared in Polish airspace, nor informing the Government Centre for Security and other services associated with the procedures.” Blaszczak also claimed that Piotrowski had “failed to launch a sufficient search for the object.” However, Chief of General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces Rajmund Andrzejczak argued on May 11 that he immediately informed his superiors about the incident, in accordance with standard procedure. Poland’s TVN24 reported that, on December 19, Blaszczak met with Piotrowski and Andrzejczak at a Christmas event for Polish soldiers.

Donald Tusk, leader of the main opposition Civic Platform party, demanded Blaszczak’s resignation, accusing him of hiding “behind Polish generals.”

—Givi Gigitashvili, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

The post Russian War Report: Russia fires barrage at Kyiv while UK promises ‘kamikaze’ drones appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s European integration is the key to a sustainable peace

Stephen Nix, Zachary Popovich — Thu, 18 May 2023 21:14:09 +0000

On her first foreign trip since winning reelection in March, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas paid a highly symbolic visit to Ukraine. While in the country, the Estonian leader declared: “For peace in Europe, we need Ukraine in the EU and NATO.”

The people of Ukraine would certainly seem to agree. After over a year of defending their country against Russia’s war of aggression, Ukrainians are more committed than ever to a European future. According to recent polling data published by the International Republican Institute, 85% of Ukrainians want their country to join the EU and 82% wish to join NATO.

These trends represent a unique opportunity to integrate Kyiv within Europe’s institutional frameworks and pave the way for a sustainable peace. Ukraine’s trajectory as a free and modern European state would shore up the transatlantic community’s defense against Russian encroachment, and would also help to limit the scope for interference by Moscow’s autocratic ally in Beijing. An independent, European Ukraine not only denies Russia its delusional revanchist empire; it offers a path for Kyiv to secure freedom and prosperity centered around democratic values.

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In their quest for autocratic consolidation, Russia and China both seek to leverage economic and political vulnerabilities to expand their control over neighboring states. By building upon the support already directed to Ukraine and incorporating Kyiv within formal Western institutions, organizations like the EU and NATO would signal to other countries reliant on dominant regional powers like Russia and China that there is a better path forward.

Ukraine’s official membership status across European intrastate institutions would also provide protections from Chinese economic ambitions and expand opportunities for transatlantic states to strengthen economic and security relationships. In this sense, Ukraine’s further European integration is an imperative to safeguard Kyiv’s democratic progress along with US and European strategic interests.

Ukraine has already made considerable progress initiating the kind of institutional and political reforms necessary to formally join European institutions. After receiving official EU candidate country status in June 2022, Ukraine’s government moved quickly to adopt EU recommendations across various legislative and judicial sectors.

In 2022, the Ukrainian parliament confirmed Andriy Kostin as the new Prosecutor General, appointed Oleksandr Klymenko as the head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), and passed important reforms bolstering judicial oversight. SAPO and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) conducted almost 300 corruption investigations in the latter portion of 2022, underscoring Ukraine’s commitment to establishing transparent and accountable public institutions aligned with European ethical standards.

Eurasia Center events

Public Event Fri, May 5, 2023 • 8:30 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Europe’s collective support for Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 has built upon a growing technical relationship with Ukraine that significantly predates the current war. As recently as 2021, Ukrainian forces took part in joint military exercises with NATO colleagues. Since 2014, the Ukrainian military has implemented a wide range of NATO standards that many observers believe have helped pave the way for the remarkable successes achieved against Russia’s invading army over the past fifteen months.

Since February 2022, EU institutions have given Kyiv over $29 billion in financial aid, alongside the more than $26 billion provided by the United States. The US has been at the forefront of efforts to arm Ukraine and help the country to defend itself against Russian aggression. Countries like Germany, the UK, France, and Poland have provided growing quantities of sophisticated military assistance including fighter jets, modern battle tanks, and long-range cruise missiles.

After establishing the parliamentary Temporary Commission of Inquiry (TCI) on issues of monitoring the receipt and use of international material and technical aid during martial law, Ukraine continues to demonstrate it is equipped with both the security competencies and administrative procedures necessary to operate as a modern NATO ally.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s recent visits to Rome, Berlin, Paris, and London brought encouraging signs of a growing consensus regarding the necessity of Ukraine’s further integration. The time is now ripe for European leaders to formally include Ukraine within organizational frameworks.

Earlier strategic projects with Russia such as the Nordstream pipelines should be replaced with new long-term investments across Ukraine’s energy, tech, and agricultural sectors. Meanwhile, Ukraine must build upon the country’s recent successful institutional reforms and establish a robust reconstruction plan. Together, Ukrainians and their European partners have the potential to create not just a free Ukraine, but a better future for all of Europe.

Stephen Nix is Senior Director for Eurasia at the International Republican Institute. Zachary Popovich is a senior program associate at the International Republican Institute.

Ideas to implementation: Priorities for NATO’s Vilnius Summit

After more than a year of Russia’s brutal, illegal, and unprovoked war in Ukraine, the transatlantic community remains at a critical juncture. The upcoming Vilnius summit is an opportunity for the Alliance to turn ideas into action.

Defense Policy Eastern Europe Europe & Eurasia NATO

Responding to Russia, supporting Ukraine, and securing the region

NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept—a new strategy adopted at last year’s Madrid summit—named the Russian Federation as the “most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security.” Russia will remain at the top of NATO’s agenda in Vilnius, according to senior US and allied officials and experts at a recent Atlantic Council event—held in partnership with the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Lithuania—that mapped out priorities for the summit. The officials and experts at the event explained that it will be even higher a priority for the Alliance to make commitments that enable Ukraine’s victory as the current war continues and possibly becomes a protracted conflict.

Since the start of the war, NATO members have provided Ukraine with multipronged support ranging from humanitarian assistance to military aid. Solidarity and support from the West, according to Ukrainian Minister of Defense Oleksii Reznikov, is helping Ukraine face down Russia’s imperialist incursions and “[destroy] the military power targeting European values and freedoms.”

US Senator Jeanne Shaheen underscored the durability of allies’ support, explaining that “there is strong, continued, bipartisan support [for] the Ukrainians, appreciation for their courage [and] for how hard they are fighting, and a real commitment to continue to support this effort.” More can be done, however, to enable Ukraine’s victory and secure Euro-Atlantic stability. During the event, former US Permanent Representative to NATO Kay Bailey Hutchison emphasized that while the US Department of Defense’s new security assistance package and provision of high mobility artillery rocket systems are steps in the right direction, the United States and other NATO allies must expand coordinated military assistance and pivot towards “doing more and doing it faster” to help Ukraine ramp up activities for the coming counteroffensive. Reznikov added that “NATO should commit to meet Ukraine’s urgent military needs for military defense equipment, focusing on air defense systems, long-range artillery, and necessary ammo, tanks, and combat aircraft.” Expanded support, panelists added, will greatly enhance Ukraine’s ability to strike behind enemy lines and neutralize the bases that are launching attacks, killing Ukrainians, and destroying critical infrastructure in the next stage of the war.

NATO must also figure out how it will signal that Ukraine will be protected from future Russian assaults. For Reznikov, the answer is clear: The Vilnius summit must deliver a concrete path for Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance. But that is not all. Security guarantees and necessary military defense equipment are Ukraine’s top requests from NATO, and Reznikov is hoping NATO leaders will address these needs at the summit. In the long term, Western military presence within Ukraine will be the strongest deterrent against a future Russian attack, argued panelist Michael O’Hanlon, the Brookings Institution’s foreign policy director.

Securing the Euro-Atlantic area will require the Alliance to fortify its force posture on its eastern flank, according to Samuel J. Brannen, US deputy assistant secretary of defense for plans and posture. Although the United States has already begun to make force posture adjustments on NATO’s east, with the addition of a brigade combat team, rotational forces in the Baltic states, and prepositioned stocks, Brannen said that “having ready forces and having the plans to go with them” will have to remain at the top of NATO’s agenda in Vilnius. The increased readiness and capabilities that come with rotational forces can help NATO move towards deterrence by denial—reducing the likelihood of a future Russian attack and positioning the Alliance to prevail in the event one occurs.

On July 11-12, the Atlantic Council will host the NATO Public Forum, gathering experts and decision makers from the globe on the sidelines of the NATO Summit in Vilnius. Subscribe below to get updates about the forum.

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Assessing challenges on the horizon

An array of challenges—ranging from the rise of China to emerging disruptive technologies—will also feature on the agenda at the Vilnius summit.

Countering an assertive China amidst other evolving short- and long-term threats will require the Alliance to operationalize its 360-degree scope and, as Hutchison added, increase cooperation with NATO’s partners in the Pacific. That is because, as Sarah Kirchberger—head of the Center for Asia-Pacific Strategy and Security at Kiel University’s Institute for Security Policy and Atlantic Council nonresident senior fellow—put it, “anything can be a battlefield” in the eyes of China. Beijing has entrenched itself in Western economies, has forged a strategic partnership with Russia in its bid to undermine the rules-based international order, and (like Russia) employs hybrid tactics like information operations in an attempt to divide the Western alliance. Despite converging concern about the China challenge across the transatlantic, NATO will need to translate policy articulated in the 2022 Strategic Concept into action in Vilnius, a recent Transatlantic Security Initiative report argues.

What makes navigating the geopolitical environment difficult, according to Philippe Lavigne—a general and NATO’s supreme allied commander, transformation—is that today’s challenges are “more, faster, and everywhere.” He continued to explain that emerging and disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, and quantum technologies are changing how NATO operates and how wars are fought. There is more data, decision-making is faster, and conflict can happen in almost every domain. NATO’s digital transformation—through the integration of emerging technologies, interoperability of forces, and multi-domain operations—must ready the Alliance to tackle more challenges, do it rapidly, and operate everywhere. Lavigne said he is expecting a decision on the Digital Transformation Implementation Strategic Plan, an initiative he advises on and oversees at NATO, to maintain and sharpen the Alliance’s technological edge at the Vilnius summit.

As authoritarian leaders continue to take advantage of emerging technologies, experts argued that democracies can win the digital race—if they play to their strengths. Openness is NATO’s advantage, Kirchberger explained, so the Alliance must not “underestimate how innovative [its] ecosystem is.” To strengthen defense innovation, panelists pointed out, it will be important to both invest in emerging technologies and address urgent capability and critical-infrastructure gaps, which would require Allies to replenish weapons stocks and agree to spend more than two percent of their respective gross domestic products on defense (further military priorities for the summit are outlined in this recent Transatlantic Security Initiative issue brief).

Addressing the role of the private sector, Giedrimas Jeglinskas, former NATO assistant secretary general for executive management, said that the Alliance can leverage private capital to drive innovation, and Lavigne added that NATO should adopt best practices from the private sector. Jeglinskas proposed a practical solution for the Alliance at the summit, calling for NATO leaders to meet with top defense industry leaders in Vilnius to share those best practices. Lithuanian Minister of National Defense Arvydas Anušauskas stressed that the war “requires” NATO “to boost [its] defense industry as quickly as possible” and suggested that multinational contracts are signal to the defense industry.

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Gearing up for Vilnius

NATO allies and partners, according to Anušauskas, must “move full steam ahead” to “make [the] Vilnius summit [a] strategic win.” Experts and officials convening at the Atlantic Council conveyed that implementing NATO’s vision for Euro-Atlantic security will be of paramount importance. Allies must arrive ready to enable Ukraine’s victory, strengthen NATO’s forward presence, and tackle an increasingly contested security environment of evolving challenges—NATO’s adversaries, panelists emphasized, will be watching the summit’s outcomes closely.

Joslyn Brodfuehrer is an assistant director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Zelma Sergejeva is a visiting fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Russia’s last red line: Will the West help Ukraine liberate Crimea?

Dennis Soltys — Mon, 08 May 2023 17:12:36 +0000

Ukraine is expected to launch a long-awaited counteroffensive in the coming weeks following months of preparations. While only a handful of Ukrainian commanders are familiar with the country’s battle plans, most observers believe the offensive will attempt to strike south toward the Azov Sea in order to sever the land bridge across occupied southern Ukraine that connects Russia with Crimea.

If the coming campaign proves successful, Ukraine could soon be in a position to begin the liberation of Crimea itself. This would mark a new stage in the war that would test both Russia’s commitment to the occupied Ukrainian peninsula and the resolve of Ukraine’s international partners.

While Ukrainian leaders remain adamant that the war will continue until the entire country is de-occupied, Moscow has made clear that it regards any large-scale attack on Crimea as a major red line and an existential threat to Russia itself. Meanwhile, numerous influential voices in the West have questioned the wisdom of a Crimean offensive amid fears that a desperate Putin could resort to nuclear weapons in a bid to prevent the loss of the prized peninsula.

Any attempt to end the occupation of Crimea will likely reveal the true strength of international support for Ukraine. Since the full-scale Russian invasion began, the Crimean question has become a litmus test for Ukraine’s Western partners; do they want Ukraine to win the war, or are they merely seeking to deny Putin victory?

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With the Russian invasion now in its fifteenth month, the military situation is finely poised with neither side appearing to hold a decisive advantage. Although the front lines in southern and eastern Ukraine have hardly moved since the liberation of Kherson in November 2022, it is not accurate to describe the past six months as a stalemate. In reality, much has occurred.

Russia’s professional army, which was decimated during the first eight months of the invasion, has been bolstered by the arrival of newly mobilized troops in large numbers. However, these fresh soldiers have limited training and often substandard equipment. Putin’s revamped force has already experienced heavy losses during Russia’s underwhelming winter offensive. US officials recently estimated that the Russian army has suffered 100,000 casualties, including more than 20,000 dead, since December. These figures tally with widespread reports of “human wave” tactics and a steady stream of video addresses posted online by disgruntled Russian soldiers complaining of suicidal tactics and high death tolls.

Ukraine has also experienced high casualty rates in recent months, but Kyiv can now count on a large number of new troops who have undergone training in NATO countries and will be armed with modern Western weapons. Since the beginning of 2023, Ukraine’s partners have increased arms shipments to include armored vehicles and tanks in significant numbers. The Ukrainian military also has the advantage of superior satellite and electronic intelligence provided in real time by the country’s partners, as well as its own reported force of 10,000 drone pilots. Crucially, the Ukrainian military benefits from far higher motivation. While many Russians are unclear about what they are fighting for, Ukrainians know they are defending their homes and families against a genocidal enemy.

Despite these apparent advantages, Ukraine’s coming offensive is far from a foregone conclusion. Unlike earlier Ukrainian successes, Kyiv cannot rely on the element of surprise. On the contrary, Russia has hundreds of thousands of troops manning well-prepared defensive lines that have been intensively fortified throughout the past six months. Moscow also has a clear numerical and technical advantage in the air, although Russia has so far failed to establish dominance in the skies above Ukraine.

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If the Ukrainian military is able to break through Russian defenses and reach the southern coastline, Putin’s invasion force will be divided and large numbers of Russian troops will find themselves faced with the prospect of limited resupply and gradual encirclement. In such circumstances, they may be forced to retreat toward the Donbas in the east and Crimea to the south. By attacking the Kerch Bridge that links Crimea to mainland Russia, Ukraine could then effectively cut off retreating Russian troops on the peninsula. This would spark a political crisis in Moscow, which would inevitably be accompanied by a sharp rise in the Putin regime’s nuclear rhetoric.

The liberation of southern Ukraine would likely force Russia’s military leaders to address the painful issue of whether to withdraw their blockaded troops entirely from Crimea. If they chose to remain, Putin’s occupation forces could find themselves vulnerable to a campaign of Ukrainian missile and drone strikes designed to erode the Russian military’s logistical capabilities while destroying weapons reserves and command posts.

There is much debate over whether the Ukrainian military needs to mount a potentially bloody land offensive to complete the de-occupation of Crimea, with some arguing that Kyiv could simply isolate the peninsula and gradually wear down Russian forces until their position becomes untenable. Much will depend on the strike capabilities Ukraine can call upon, if and when Ukrainian troops are able to advance to the administrative borders of the occupied peninsula. A land campaign would be highly ambitious, but certainly cannot be ruled out.

International efforts to arm and train Ukraine over the past six months have been geared toward getting the country into a position where it can split Russia’s occupation forces and threaten to cross the Kremlin’s Crimean red line. And yet doubts remain over whether Ukraine’s partners will be fully supportive of efforts to liberate Crimea. If the opportunity to end the nine-year occupation of the Crimean peninsula arises in the coming months, Western leaders will have to decide if they want Ukraine to achieve a decisive victory, or whether their goal is simply to prevent Ukraine from losing.

The decisions they reach will shape the outcome of the war in Ukraine, and will also have far-reaching ramifications for the post-war international order. Will the collective West allow itself to be intimidated by Putin’s nuclear blackmail? Can Russia be permitted to redraw the map of Europe by force and retain territory seized through acts of international aggression? Western leaders need to think quickly, for the Ukrainian military is poised to advance and may soon be demanding answers to these challenging questions.

Dennis Soltys is a Canadian professor of public administration and international development at KIMEP University in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Moldova’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is roughly $5,200 a year (one of the lowest in Europe), and its inflation rate peaked at 34 percent after Russia invaded Ukraine and reduced fuel supplies. Yet many Moldovans blame their own government, not the Kremlin, an indication of Russia’s disinformation efforts that inflame the already tense domestic political divide.

While it is landlocked, Moldovan territory includes the Prut, the Dniester, and the Danube rivers, which empty into the Black Sea. Moreover, because it borders Ukraine and is only fifty kilometers from Odesa (Ukraine’s largest seaport), instability in Moldova—especially in Transnistria, which is effectively controlled by Moscow—could directly impact its neighbor’s security. A Russian-dominated Moldova could effectively become a southern Kaliningrad, and in conjunction with Crimea, it could provide Moscow with more control over the northern Black Sea and also possibly the ability to hamper Ukraine’s maritime activities. And, should Russia gain access to more Moldovan territory and flip Chisinau in its favor, Moscow’s expanded presence would also threaten Romania’s security and put even greater pressure on NATO’s southeastern flank.

Moldova has maintained its neutrality, which it had enshrined in its constitution. Despite this sentiment, Moldova is a member of the Partnership for Peace, which allows cooperation with NATO on a variety of activities. Yet Moldova has starved its security sector for decades, hoping its neutrality and Ukraine would protect it. Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, Chisinau has sought to reverse this neglect of its military; for example, it expanded its 2024 defense budget by 68 percent compared to its budget in 2022—but that’s still only an increase of approximately eighty million dollars, or 0.55 percent of its GDP.

On paper, Moldova can field a security contingent of 45,000 personnel; however, this force is poorly trained and equipped with virtually no air support. In Transnistria, Russia has 1,500 troops, mainly comprising local recruits. While Moscow might seek to augment these forces, that would be logistically difficult given its failure to take Odesa. Moscow does, however, have significant agents of influence in Moldova who could work more forcefully against the government.

Keeping Moldova out of the Kremlin’s grasp is vital to Eastern European security and NATO’s Black Sea mission. Moldova, NATO, and the West must send clear, unmistakable signals to the Kremlin:

The EU should approve the fast-tracking of Moldova’s EU accession, a plan for which Poland recently made the case.
While it would be problematic to offer Moldova a fast track to NATO membership—as the Alliance is viewed unfavorably in Moldova, and leaving the policy of neutrality is unpopular there—NATO or its members can take other actions. For example, the promise of air defense and heavy weapons and training in the case of conflict with Russia/Transnistria would be a deterrent.
Moldova and the West should provide Moldova’s armed forces with more training and modern equipment, ultimately to improve capabilities and interoperability. Ukraine demonstrated how a Western-oriented training program can give a smaller country’s military an edge over Russia’s armed forces. This could be accomplished without violating Moldova’s neutrality as it would not require deploying foreign forces on Moldovan territory.
Moldova should institute a robust strategic-communications and cyber-defense platform to counter Russian malign influence—and the West should help. A platform designed to counter misinformation and disinformation could help galvanize domestic support for greater alignment with NATO and the West.
Finally, Moldova is one of the world’s least energy-self-sufficient countries. While Chisinau, with the West’s support, has made progress in source diversification and sector reform, it should continue to wean itself off of Russian oil and gas and electricity from Transnistria. Moldova must build a more resilient energy infrastructure that is not dependent on Russia.

Through its energy manipulation, military intimidation, and official threats, the Kremlin is conducting a classic hybrid warfare campaign against Moldova. In comparison to early 2014—when the world stood stunned in the wake of ‘little green men’ and the effective dismemberment of Ukraine—NATO and Western allies have become more sophisticated in detecting and combating hybrid warfare tactics. Additionally, NATO members’ support to Ukraine, while belated and arguably still inadequate, has been instrumental in Kyiv’s successful defense against Russia’s full-scale invasion. The lessons in Ukraine are unmistakable and should not be lost on Western and Moldovan leadership. Strong leadership, a determined population, and NATO support are indispensable in halting Russian aggression.

Arnold C. Dupuy is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, a faculty member of the US Naval Postgraduate School, and chair of the NATO Science and Technology Organization’s SAS-183, “Energy Security Capabilities, Resilience and Interoperability.”

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Ukraine seeks more German support on Russia’s invasion and EU accession

Alyona Getmanchuk — Thu, 04 May 2023 16:16:31 +0000

Ukrainians have long admired Germany for its high standard of living and rule of law. However, for the past nine years, Berlin’s response to Russian aggression against Ukraine has often been a source of disappointment. With Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy expected to visit Berlin on May 13, many Ukrainians are hoping Germany will soon be doing more to defeat Russia’s invasion and advance their country’s European integration.

The first major milestone in Ukraine’s disillusionment with Germany was the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, when German Chancellor Angela Merkel was instrumental in vetoing a membership action plan for Ukraine. At the time, this was justified by the need to avoid provoking Russia. The mood of disappointment in Kyiv grew with Berlin’s subsequent support for the Nord Stream II gas pipeline, which appeared designed to bypass Ukraine and promised to leave the country exposed to the threat of increased Russian aggression. Germany defended this decision on purely economic grounds, but many Ukrainians argued that the economic benefits did not justify the geopolitical risks.

Germany’s involvement in the Minsk peace process from September 2014 further strengthened perceptions in Kyiv that Berlin’s priority was to avoid any decisive split with Moscow, with limited support for Ukraine often balanced by efforts to accommodate the Kremlin. For many Ukrainians, Germany’s position highlighted the inadequacy of the wider European response to Russian aggression. It was yet another example of the West’s reluctance to do anything that might be considered provocative by the Kremlin.

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With the benefit of hindsight, it is now painfully clear that policies designed to avoid provoking Putin are likely to do exactly that. The refusal to grant Ukraine a pathway to NATO in 2008 confirmed the country’s vulnerability, while Germany’s continued commitment to Nord Stream II following Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine reinforced the Kremlin’s conviction that hunger for profits outweighed any commitments to European values in Berlin. These developments helped set the stage for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Ukrainian frustration toward Germany has remained tangible since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, but has been tempered by Germany’s increasing willingness to cut ties with Russia and provide Kyiv with vital military aid. Berlin has faced significant criticism over the speed of weapons deliveries to Ukraine, but has emerged over the past fourteen months as a key partner. The early 2023 decision to provide Leopard tanks was a watershed moment in this process that reflected Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s talk of an historic “turning point” in relations with Russia almost one year earlier in the first days of the invasion.

In additional to military aid, Ukraine counts on German support in other areas. Post-war reconstruction is seen as a more straightforward issue for German involvement, with the Ukrainian authorities already expressing their gratitude for Germany’s readiness to contribute. However, any reconstruction requires a sustainable peace. This is simply not realistic until Ukraine defeats Russia militarily, which will not be possible without the expanded delivery of weapons from key Western partners such as Germany.

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Kyiv officials would also like to see Berlin adopt a more supportive stance on the issue of future Ukrainian EU membership. Germany has previously played this role for other countries seeking to join the European Union, but is still regarded by many in Ukraine as being somewhat skeptical of the country’s EU ambitions and was among the last to back EU candidate nation status for Ukraine in summer 2022. This is unfortunate. After all, Ukraine’s EU membership bid has major geopolitical and security implications for the entire continent.

As part of the EU, Ukraine would no longer be viewed as a potential component part of a revived Russian Empire. Progress toward Ukrainian EU membership would also fit well with Germany’s stated objective of a post-war Ukraine with less corruption, greater rule of law, transparent business climate, and resilient institutions. I am therefore convinced that Germany will match recent statements in favor of Ukraine’s EU accession with practical support.

In addition, there are hopes in Kyiv that German attitudes toward Ukrainian NATO membership will also change. On the positive side, Chancellor Scholz and other German leaders now appear to recognize that Ukraine’s NATO aspirations were not the cause of the current Russian invasion. The challenge is to convince them that the threat of further Russian aggression will continue unless Ukraine receives security guarantees equivalent to NATO membership, regardless of whether Putin himself remains in the Kremlin.

Any lasting peace settlement must also include justice for the Ukrainian victims of Russian war crimes. Kyiv expects Germany to back the push for accountability. Key issues include the establishment of a special international tribunal and the use of seized Russian assets to help finance the reconstruction of Ukraine. It seems highly unfair for the international community to pay for damage caused by Russia. Instead, Russia should fund efforts to rebuild Ukraine.

Rebuilding Ukraine will be an historic undertaking. German companies can be expected to play a major role in what promises to be the largest European construction initiative since the years following World War II. Reconstruction will enable millions of Ukrainian refugees to return home, while creating opportunities for thousands of German businesses.

Despite the disappointments and frustrations of the past fifteen years, Germany remains a key partner for Ukraine with a critical role to play in the twin tasks of winning the war and achieving a sustainable peace. The immediate priority remains weapons; Ukraine desperately needs everything from anti-aircraft systems to tanks and ammunition in order to defeat Putin’s invasion. Looking ahead, Berlin’s backing will be vital as Ukraine seeks to rebuild, integrate further into the EU, and attain the kind of comprehensive security guarantees through NATO membership that can prevent any repeats of Russia’s current invasion.

Alyona Getmanchuk is director of New Europe Center think tank and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. An expanded German-language version of this article was originally published by Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ).

When Helsinki refused to cede its land, a Soviet invasion loomed. Stalin’s generals were in no doubt that Finland would crumble quickly. Andrei Zhdanov, the Communist party chief in Leningrad, was so confident of a quick campaign that he ordered Russian composer Dmitri Shostakovich to produce a new piece of music to be performed by the Red Army’s marching bands at a victory parade in Helsinki.

Every student of Finnish history knows what happened next. Soviet forces invaded in November 1939 with more than 20 divisions totaling around 630,000 men. Bombs fell on Helsinki, killing dozens of civilians. The Russians, peddling lies then as now, claimed they were dropping food supplies. So heavily outgunned and outnumbered were the Finns that Soviet generals predicted Helsinki would fall by December 21, Stalin’s 60th birthday.

You can probably imagine the pleasure it gives a Ukrainian to write that Stalin never got his birthday present. The Finns fought back magnificently. Soldiers skilled at cross-country skiing launched a devastating guerrilla campaign. It is often forgotten that during this Winter War, the Finns invented the Molotov cocktail, a handmade explosive named after the Soviet foreign minister of the time.

The Red Army never made it to Helsinki. Thousands of soldiers died of frostbite. Many refused to fight. After an ambush blocked the Soviet advance on the Raate Road, Finnish soldiers found a Red Army truck full of musical instruments.

Today, it is Putin’s turn to wait for a victory parade he assumed would come so easily in Ukraine. Thousands more Russian soldiers have died in a futile attempt to crush a smaller neighbor. The Kremlin’s generals have again been humiliated.

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If Putin had hoped to occupy Ukraine to keep NATO away from Russia’s borders, he has achieved the opposite result. Finland’s accession has doubled the length of NATO’s borders with Russia. With Sweden’s admission to NATO still pending, there is no mistaking the paradigm shift in the European and Scandinavian security framework. This is the direct result of Putin’s calamitous misjudgments.

The question now is how NATO should move forward in light of Putin’s blind intransigence. The alliance’s next summit will be held in July in Vilnius. We sincerely hope that any remaining barriers to Sweden’s admission will be lifted. In Kyiv, we are convinced that NATO membership is the best guarantee of peace in Europe, not only for Ukraine, but for all countries in range of Putin’s missiles. In the face of naked Russian belligerence, it makes no sense that certain parts of Europe should be part of NATO while other countries are excluded.

Today, Ukraine is the best advertisement for NATO. The heroic fight of our people and the unity displayed by those who support us have proved that NATO is strongest security alliance in the world. That is why we continue to seek Ukrainian membership of NATO.

We are grateful to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who acknowledged during a recent visit to Kyiv that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO.” We fulfill the main requirements of membership: we are a functioning democracy with a market economy and we treat all sections of our population fairly.

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