National Security - Atlantic Council

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

China Cybersecurity

The post Allen in the Wall Street Journal on US efforts to simultaneously deter Russia and China appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was never about NATO

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 18 Jul 2023 22:01:29 +0000

Sweden is poised to become the thirty-second member of the NATO Alliance and Russia does not appear to be at all concerned by the prospect. The breakthrough moment for the Swedes came ahead of last week’s NATO summit in Vilnius, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan agreed to end months of opposition and back the Scandinavian nation’s bid to join the Alliance. Russia’s response to Sweden’s imminent NATO accession has been muted to say the least, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov limiting himself to promises of “appropriate measures” and Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov warning about unspecified “negative consequences.”

This apparent lack of concern mirrors the Kremlin position over Finland’s NATO membership, which was confirmed in April 2023. On that occasion, Russia also downplayed the significance of the news while making vague commitments to strengthen its own military posture in the region. Indeed, in the fourteen months since the two Nordic nations first announced their intention to join the Alliance, Moscow has done almost nothing to protest or obstruct this process, despite having a vast array of military, cyber, economic, informational, and diplomatic tools at its disposal. If Putin genuinely believed the NATO Alliance posed a security threat to the Russian Federation, he would at the very least have increased the Russian military presence close to the Finnish border. Instead, Russia reportedly reduced its troop deployments in the region by approximately 80%. These are obviously not the actions of a nation under siege.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Russia’s remarkably relaxed reaction to the NATO accession of Finland and Sweden stands in stark contrast to the hysteria over Ukraine’s far less substantial ties to the military alliance. In the months leading up to Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin and other Kremlin leaders told the world that the escalating crisis was due to years of provocative NATO expansion, while warning that deepening ties between the Alliance and Ukraine represented a red line. In reality, however, Ukraine in early 2022 was not even remotely close to joining NATO. Far from pursuing Ukraine, the Alliance had repeatedly sidestepped appeals from Kyiv for a Membership Action Plan, refusing to offer even a clear signal regarding future accession. On the eve of Russia’s invasion, the most optimistic forecasts indicated that Ukraine’s dream of joining NATO was still decades away.

It is hard to see any military logic behind the dramatically different Russian reactions to NATO’s Nordic enlargement and the Alliance’s involvement in Ukraine. After all, while a theoretical future NATO presence inside Ukraine could pose a range of major headaches for military planners in Moscow, the recent accession of Finland has already doubled the length of Russia’s shared border with the Alliance overnight. Swedish membership will arguably be even more consequential for Russia, transforming the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake. If Russia is so apparently unconcerned by these very real military challenges, why was Putin prepared to launch the biggest European war since World War II over the far more distant prospect of Ukrainian NATO membership?

It is clear from Putin’s own actions that he understands perfectly well NATO will never attack Russia. This should come as no surprise. Indeed, the entire notion of NATO invading Russia is recognized as absurd by all but the terminally swivel-eyed. This does not mean Russian objections to NATO’s post-1991 enlargement are entirely insincere; on the contrary, the growing presence of the Alliance in the former Eastern Bloc over the past thirty years is perhaps the leading source of geopolitical bitterness and resentment throughout the Russian establishment. However, it is critical to clarify that this indignation has nothing to do with legitimate security concerns. NATO is not a threat to Russian security; NATO is a threat to Russian foreign policy because it prevents Russia from bullying its neighbors. In other words, NATO enlargement is no more or less provocative than a burglar alarm is to a thief.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

None of this has prevented Putin from using the NATO issue as a smokescreen for his imperial ambitions. For years, he has skillfully exploited anti-Western sentiment and widespread international suspicion of US foreign policy to distract from Russia’s own acts of international aggression. This tactic has proved remarkably successful; in the seventeen months since Russian troops began the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a wide range of academics, commentators, and politicians around the world have all echoed Putin in blaming NATO for provoking the war. They have continued to do so even as Putin himself has compared his invasion to the imperial conquests of eighteenth-century Russian Czar Peter the Great.

The fact that so many prominent personalities remain ready to accept Russia’s dishonest NATO narrative is evidence of fundamental misconceptions regarding the role of the Alliance and the nature of its post-Cold War enlargement. NATO is routinely depicted by critics as an expansionist military institution seeking to impose Western dominance, but this is entirely at odds with the growth of the Alliance over the past three decades. Nobody has ever been forced to join NATO; instead, every single new member since 1991 has asked for membership and has been obliged to meet a series of strict standards in order to qualify. Indeed, the loaded term “NATO expansion” may itself be misleading, as unlike Russia, the Alliance only ever expands on a voluntary basis. It is also worth underlining that while Putin plays the victim card and complains of being encircled, fear of Russian aggression has been by far the leading cause of all new membership applications.

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine now approaching the one-and-a-half-year mark, it is time to retire the NATO narrative. Putin has demonstrated that he is not at all threatened by the growing presence of the Alliance on Russia’s northwestern border, and is increasingly open about his imperial agenda in Ukraine. It is this Russian imperialism that poses a grave threat to international security, not the defensive guarantees offered by NATO.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Email
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Who could lead the next uprising? One obvious candidate is Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. Like Wagner chief Prigozhin, Kadyrov enjoys a high degree of autonomy and has large numbers of troops under his personal command. With the Kremlin’s blessing, he rules Chechnya as his personal fiefdom. He also has a long history of clashes with Russian governmental institutions and has joined Prigozhin in criticizing the conduct of the war in Ukraine. However, Kadyrov was ultimately one of the few prominent figures to publicly back Putin during the Wagner mutiny, and also sent Chechen fighters to Rostov-on-Don.

Kadyrov’s eagerness to support Putin was telling. While he might have the manpower and independence to take action challenging Putin’s power, it is not clear that he sees any advantage in doing so. Secure in his autonomy, Kadyrov may have calculated that it would be more beneficial to preserve his place in the current system than to back a risky rebellion with uncertain prospects.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

A more substantial challenge to the Putin regime may yet emerge from within the ranks of Russia’s increasingly disgruntled military. The Kremlin’s meek response to the Wagner mutiny has exacerbated already declining morale among Russian troops and commanders currently serving in Ukraine.

For more than half a year, a steady stream of video addresses posted to social media by Russian soldiers complaining of suicidal orders and catastrophic losses have pointed to growing demoralization. Meanwhile, recent developments indicate that dissatisfaction with the Kremlin has now reached the level of senior commanders. A July 13 report in the Wall Street Journal claimed that numerous high-ranking officers including top Russian general Sergei Surovikin had been detained in the wake of the Wagner revolt. Surovikin, who formerly commanded the Russian invasion of Ukraine, is reportedly still being held and interrogated in Moscow over possible links to the mutiny.

In a further sign of mounting tension within Putin’s military, a senior Russian commander in charge of forces based in southern Ukraine claimed on July 12 that he had been suddenly dismissed from his post after raising the alarm over the mismanagement of the invasion. In a recorded audio statement, General Ivan Popov accused Russia’s military leadership of “treacherously and vilely decapitating the army at the most difficult and tense moment.”

Popov’s explosive accusations suggest that many in the Kremlin prefer to silence critics within the Russian military rather than address uncomfortable truths about the war in Ukraine. Unless this problematic approach is abandoned, it is likely to fuel further anger among front line commanders and troops as casualties continue to mount amid Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive.

If disgruntled officers and demoralized soldiers from the regular Russian army do turn against the Putin regime, they may be joined by thousands of former Wagner fighters along with members of Russia’s many other private military companies. These mercenary formations typically enjoy a significant degree of operational independence from the Kremlin and will have noted with interest the precedent set by the apparent lack of negative consequences following the Wagner mutiny.

For more than two decades, Vladimir Putin has ruthlessly suppressed any potential sources of domestic opposition to his rule. With the Russian media muzzled and his political opponents imprisoned, exiled, or dead, the force most capable of mounting a serious challenge to the regime is the Russian military. Putin has been careful to keep loyalists in top positions, but as the invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel, there are growing indications of disaffection among both commanders and troops. With Russian generals now reportedly being detained and dismissed, the scale of the threat should not be underestimated. In the months ahead, this may lead to fresh challenges to Putin’s rule that will dwarf the Wagner mutiny.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Burden-sharing disagreements within the Alliance are nearly as old as NATO itself. Today, though, transatlantic tension regarding burden-sharing is heightened by a complex security landscape. Increased Russian aggression since 2014 has required reinvestment in conventional military capabilities, while asymmetric threats including cyberattacks, global warming, pandemics, mass migration, and terrorism continue to threaten allied security. Equitable burden-sharing among allies is not only a matter of principle, but also has operational and even tactical implications. Without equitable burden-sharing, the allies will quickly prove unable to meet their security commitments.

The latest allied defense spending figures show that while progress has been made on both elements of the DIP, not all allies will achieve the 2 percent and 20 percent goals by 2024. How then can the United States and like-minded allies successfully negotiate even higher targets? They might start by agreeing to portray NATO burden- and risk-sharing more accurately, as a way of ameliorating the naming and shaming that comes with not achieving the 2 percent and 20 percent goals. Although some argue that “inputs” like defense spending tell us a lot about “outputs” like contributions to Alliance operations, recently available data indicate this is not necessarily the case. If burden- and risk-sharing could be portrayed more accurately, those opposed to increasing the input targets might be more willing to reconsider their opposition. Even if they do not, improving how NATO depicts burden- and risk-sharing would benefit lawmakers, analysts, academics, and the public.

This issue brief begins by examining whether defense inputs really do tell us much about defense outputs, particularly contributions to allied operations. The brief does this first qualitatively by analyzing allied troop contributions to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2011, at the height of the troop surge. It then employs a statistical analysis to examine allied troop contributions to not just ISAF in 2011 but also to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) mission in the Baltic states. The issue brief concludes with recommendations on how NATO might more accurately depict burden- and risk-sharing, as a way of ultimately reaching higher DIP targets.

What do defense inputs tell us?

NATO relies on eleven metrics to measure burden-sharing.³ Two of the metrics focus on so-called inputs and nine focus on outputs. Inputs refer to the funds that member states allocate to defense, and these formed the basis for the 2014 DIP. The DIP was noteworthy not because allies had committed to the 2 percent/20 percent targets—in fact, the 2 percent target had existed for many years prior—but rather because the commitments were made by Alliance heads of state and government. In the past, Alliance defense ministers were the ones who had committed to the defense spending targets.

Regarding burden-sharing outputs, most of the data on these NATO metrics are classified for a variety of political and operational reasons. For example, publicly acknowledging that some Alliance forces are not as ready to respond to a crisis as claimed could prove politically embarrassing, provide adversaries like Russia with useful intelligence, and undermine deterrence. However, the fact that not all burden-sharing metrics are public leaves some decision-makers, legislators, experts, and allied citizens without a complete picture of who in the Alliance is doing their fair share.

Some experts argue that the inputs correlate “a lot” with defense capabilities and capacity and hence provide a good enough picture of the outputs.⁴ This may appear somewhat intuitive—you get what you pay for. However, such claims are problematic on at least two counts. First, these claims ignore risk-sharing, an important yet often overlooked component of the broader concept of burden-sharing. The examples of Greece and Denmark illustrate this point well. Greece routinely spends more than the equivalent of 2 percent of its GDP on defense and recently it has spent well above 20 percent of its defense budget on equipment and related R&D (38.8 percent in 2021). Greece, therefore, may appear to be a model ally. In contrast, Denmark routinely spends less than the equivalent of 2 percent of its GDP on defense, averaging just 1.23 percent since 2014, and less than 20 percent of its defense budget on equipment, averaging 13.8 percent since 2014. Clearly, the Danes appear to be burden-sharing laggards.

Subscribe for events and publications on transatlantic security

Sign up for updates from the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, covering the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

However, during NATO’s operation in Afghanistan, Danish forces operated in southern Afghanistan, a region that saw some of the heaviest fighting. As a result, the Danes had one of the highest per capita casualty rates of allied troop-contributing countries.⁵ Meanwhile, Greek forces served primarily at Kabul’s international airport and in allied medical facilities in Afghanistan. These troops performed important, necessary missions, but they did not face the same risks as Danish troops.

The second reason to doubt claims that NATO’s defense input measures tell us most of what we need to know about defense outputs is that merely possessing capabilities is no guarantee that those capabilities will be used in allied operations, regardless of the risk-sharing factors noted above. Again, referring to the cases of Greece and Denmark, the contributions of the former to Alliance operations in Afghanistan⁶ (1.2 percent of all allied troops during the 2010-12 surge) and Kosovo⁷ (2.8 percent of the total Kosovo Force as of August 2022) were and are somewhat low, given that Greek troops constitute 3.34 percent of total NATO forces. In contrast, at the height of the surge in Afghanistan, Denmark had deployed 0.56 percent of all allied troops even though its forces constituted just 0.51 percent of total NATO forces in 2011. Similarly, today Denmark contributes 0.93 percent of all allied troops in Kosovo even though its troops constitute just 0.52 percent of total NATO forces. In other words, when it comes to sending troops into harm’s way, Denmark appears to do more than what might be expected of it.

It is possible, though, that the cases of Greece and Denmark constitute idiosyncratic burden- and risk-sharing behavior. To explain, perhaps most allies at or above the 2 percent/20 percent thresholds make contributions that are what would be expected of them or greater—given their relative sizes within the Alliance. Conversely, it may be the case that most below the 2 percent/20 percent thresholds make undersized contributions, again relative to their sizes within the Alliance.

This can be tested by looking at three recent NATO operations—the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan in 2011; the Kovoso Force over the last decade; and the Enhanced Forward Presence mission in the Baltic states (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria) from 2017 until the present.⁸ These three operations were selected for two reasons. First, they are primarily land operations, and nearly all allies have land forces that could play a role in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Eastern Europe. This permits a more broad-based analysis than, for instance, examining NATO’s Baltic air policing operation, since not all allies have fighter aircraft. Second, the operations represent a good mix of typologies—crisis response/counterinsurgency (ISAF), peacekeeping (KFOR), and defense/deterrence (eFP)—even if the needs of the Alliance today likely skew toward defense and deterrence.

The specific time periods for each operation were selected for the following reasons:

NATO’s presence in Afghanistan was at its height in 2011, during the surge of allied forces there. Allies were under pressure from both Washington and Brussels to participate.
KFOR is a long-term peacekeeping operation and examining it over the last decade includes the period when NATO was consumed with Afghanistan, the period when NATO was increasingly focused on deterring and defending against Russia, and the few years in between.
The eFP mission in the Baltics is tied to the very heart of the Alliance—the Article 5 mutual defense clause of the NATO treaty—especially since Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

By examining each ally’s contribution to the three operations relative to that ally’s military forces within the entire Alliance, one can get a sense of whether the success in achieving the goals of the DIP really does yield better burden-sharing.⁹ For example, if a particular ally met either the 2 percent or 20 percent threshold, and if inputs tell us a lot about outputs, it is reasonable to expect that that ally would contribute a proportional share of its military forces (relative to its forces within the Alliance) to the three operations.

Table 1 shows the data for ISAF in August 2011. Although the Defense Investment Pledge would not be made for another three years, the second and third columns indicate whether allies were above or below the 2 percent and 20 percent thresholds at the time—cells are highlighted green when above either threshold and red when below. Table 1 then shows a comparison between, on the one hand, each ally’s contribution to ISAF as a percent of all ISAF forces and, on the other hand, their military forces as a percent of NATO’s total military forces. (The figures on defense spending as a percent of GDP and the figures on percent of defense spending dedicated to equipment and R&D are lagged by three years because it takes time for money spent to have impact on capabilities.)

Table 1: NATO in ISAF, August 2011

If defense inputs tell us a lot about defense outputs, one might presume that if a country has sufficient inputs (i.e., it spends at least 2 percent on defense and meets or exceeds the 20 percent threshold for equipment and related R&D), it would contribute a percentage of ISAF’s forces proportionate to its share of total NATO forces. The last column of the table shows whether and to what degree allies’ contributions to ISAF were over (positive number) or under (negative number) their proportion of the Alliance’s total military forces. If an ally failed to spend 2 percent on defense and failed to meet the 20 percent threshold for equipment and related R&D, we would expect this number to be negative—that is, it fielded a percent of ISAF’s total force at a level below that which its forces represent within NATO more broadly. Conversely, if it spent more than 2 percent on defense or crossed the 20 percent threshold for equipment and related R&D, we would expect this number to be positive—that is, it fielded a percent of ISAF’s total force at a level above that which its forces represent within NATO more broadly. Exceptions—either over or under expectations—are highlighted in yellow. Of the twenty-four allies listed,¹⁰ eight did not contribute troops in a way one might expect, either positively or negatively, while sixteen did. More specifically, seven out of twenty-four allies met all or part of the DIP and yet failed to meet expectations for providing defense outputs in ISAF at the height of the surge.

Seven laggards out of twenty-four is not too bad. If roughly 70 percent of the time allies met expectations, it may be fair to conclude that defense inputs result in expected outputs, at least in terms of contributions to current operations. However, when analyzed statistically and when considering other operations like KFOR and eFP, the evidence of correlation between defense inputs and outputs is more mixed.

Table 2 shows the pairwise correlations among non-US allied defense spending as a percent of GDP, equipment spending as a percent of overall defense spending, “other” spending (which includes operations and maintenance, or O&M) as a percent of overall defense spending, and each ally’s defense budget as a percent of NATO’s overall defense spending on the one hand and the percent of ISAF troops on the other. Pairwise correlations allow for comparisons between a pair of variables, to shed light on whether a linear relationship exists between them. The results of a pairwise correlation analysis are expressed as correlation coefficients, ranging from -1, meaning a perfect negative correlation, to 1, meaning a perfect positive correlation. The closer the correlation coefficient is to either end of the scale (-1 or +1), the closer the relationship between the two variables. If, for example, a correlation coefficient between two variables is 0.75, this means that 75 percent of the time, if one of the variables moves in one direction (e.g., increasing), we can predict that the other variable moves in the same direction (e.g., also increasing). In social sciences generally, a coefficient from 0.7 (or -0.7) to 1 (or -1) indicates a strong positive (or negative) correlation; 0.3 (or -0.3) to 0.69 (or -0.69) indicates a moderately positive (or negative) correlation; and coefficients between 0.29 (or -0.29) and 0 indicate a weak or no positive (or negative) correlation.¹¹ Note that correlation does not mean or imply causation.

In the case of ISAF in 2011, the percent of troops contributed is poorly correlated with most key defense spending input measures, including the DIP and the percent of defense spending on O&M.¹² The only variable that shows any strong correlation with the percent of troops contributed to ISAF is each ally’s defense spending as a percent of total NATO defense spending.¹³

Table 2: Correlations among Defense Input Measures and ISAF Troop Contributions, 2011

Moreover, statistical analyses of non-US troop contributions to other Alliance operations show similarly mixed correlations at best or no correlation at all. Table 3 features a similar pairwise correlation analysis for KFOR from 2012 through 2020. Given the nine-year timeframe considered here, the analysis includes over 240 data points. As seen in the table, there are no strong or moderate correlations, positive or negative, between any of the inputs addressed here.

Table 3: NATO in KFOR, 2012-2020

Table 4 features statistical analysis of non-US allied contributions to eFP from 2017 through 2022. The table is based on data for allied contributions to eFP in the eight host countries—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland from 2017 to the present, and Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia since 2022. Data here include contributions from non-US allies each year from 2017 through 2022, resulting in 140 data points. As with the case of ISAF, the only defense input strongly correlated with percent of troop contributions to eFP is the percent of total allied defense spending. It is unclear why percent of total NATO defense spending is the only defense input that strongly correlates to both ISAF and eFP contributions, but it may reflect differing allied attitudes toward those operations on the one hand versus attitudes toward KFOR on the other.

Table 4: NATO in EFP, 2017-2022

Alternative measures, or just repackaging?

If defense inputs do not tell us much about the outputs, and if NATO does not make public the nine output measures it tracks, how can legislators, academics, other experts, and average citizens understand whether burden-sharing within NATO is fair? NATO burden-sharing is an inherently subjective and political issue. Given this, allies will likely try to manipulate whatever figures or data are used to measure burden-sharing to depict themselves in the best light. In short, no set of measures nor burden-sharing assessment process is perfect.

Nonetheless—and although it may be impossible to keep countries from using burden-sharing assessments as a way of burnishing their images—NATO can and should do more to include outputs in its publicly accessible annual reports. Doing so may offer all allies a fairer depiction of whether and how they are sharing burdens and risks, which could help lessen opposition from some allies to increasing the defense spending targets.

To achieve this, NATO should better leverage the data it already has available publicly—this will be far easier than trying to convince allies to declassify other information. For example, the Alliance should include in its annual defense expenditures report the troop contributions of each ally to ongoing operations. Information on allied contributions to particular operations is already publicly available, but it is not aggregated with the annual defense spending figures. This is sure to displease allies that contribute to other, non-NATO military missions in Europe and beyond including European Union or United Nations operations. To appease these allies, their contributions to non-NATO missions ought to be at least acknowledged, assuming those non-NATO operations are deemed to contribute to security in the transatlantic space.

Additionally, NATO should consider recrafting how it depicts the data it already makes public. For example, the Alliance staff charged with portraying the annually collected fiscal data should add an average trend line for all defense spending categories in its annual defense expenditures report. This is especially important for the personnel, infrastructure, and other (O&M) spending categories, which are not currently part of the DIP. Although there are no recommended minimum spending allocations for these categories, as there is for acquisition and related R&D (20 percent), simply showing a NATO average across all spending categories would provide a sense of which allies may need to recalibrate their spending.

Finally, the Alliance should think about ways to better portray risk-sharing. For instance, the Alliance should consider including per capita casualty figures in its reporting on current operations. For example, none of the “placemats” that the Alliance makes available for its operations in ISAF, KFOR, or eFP list casualty figures. This is politically risky and of course there have been few, if any, casualties in KFOR or eFP, given the nature of operations in Kosovo and across Eastern Europe. Additionally, the Alliance should continue to produce and release maps depicting in gross terms where allies (by country flag) are deployed in a particular operation. For instance, with an understanding that Alliance operations in southern Afghanistan were generally more challenging and dangerous than those in the north, a map depicting Danish, British, Canadian, Romanian, and American flags in the south provides a good sense of which allies are bearing greater risk.

Conclusion

The burden-sharing inputs used by NATO, specifically the Defense Investment Pledge agreed to at the 2014 Wales summit, do not correlate well or sometimes at all with one of the most important outputs—namely, relative troop contributions to NATO operations. Moreover, the inputs tell us nothing about risk-sharing, an important yet often overlooked component of broader burden-sharing considerations.

All of this means that those outside closed-door Alliance meetings—such as the general public but also most legislators—have little insight into whether allies are sharing responsibilities equitably. As the Alliance debates whether and how to replace the 2014 DIP, it should also consider ways to more accurately report on and portray burden- and risk-sharing. Doing so would permit a better informed transatlantic discussion on how allies should equitably share responsibilities, may lessen opposition toward increasing defense spending targets, and would ultimately improve transatlantic security in an era of strategic competition.

Dr. John R. Deni is a research professor of security studies at the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and a nonresident associate fellow at the NATO Defense College. The views expressed are his own. The author would like to thank Matthew Woessner, Jordan Becker, and two anonymous peer reviewers for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts. Additionally, the author is grateful for research assistance from Chelsea Quilling, Nate Forrest, Max Haseman, and Sean Sanko.

Fellow

John R. Deni

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

Explore more

1 “NATO Countries to Discuss Defence Spending Target—Stoltenberg,” Reuters, January 3, 2023, www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-countries-discuss-defence-spending-target-stoltenberg-2023-01-03.

2 Robbie Gramer, Amy Mackinnon, and Jack Detsch, “Eastern Europe Wants NATO to Beef Up Defense Spending,” Foreign Policy, February 2, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/02/eastern-europe-nato-defense-spending-ukraine-russia-poland-estonia/.

3 Douglas Lute, remarks delivered during “The Cost of European Security” panel event sponsored by Carnegie Europe and held in Brussels, Belgium, on September 17, 2015. Transcript available at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CE_Transcript_Cost_of%20European%20Security.pdf, and video available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kw_jJ4jNqyY.

4 Jordan Becker, “Clearing the Air on Transatlantic Burden-Sharing, Part 2: You Gotta Give (Inputs) to Get (Outputs),” War on the Rocks, May 31, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/clearing-the-air-on-transatlantic-burden-sharing-part-2-you-gotta-give-inputs-to-get-outputs/.

5 Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, “Afghanistan Index,” Brookings, March 31, 2012, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/index20120331.pdf.

6 “Afghanistan Troop Numbers Data: How Many Does Each Country Send to the NATO Mission There?” The Guardian, June 22, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2009/sep/21/afghanistan-troop-numbers-nato-data.

7 NATO, “Kosovo Force (KFOR): Key Facts and Figures,” August 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/8/pdf/2022-08-KFOR-Placemat.pdf.

8 There are a variety of reasons why a country may contribute troops to a particular mission, including the role of threats and their proximity, domestic political calculations, relations with other allies, or any number of other factors. The analysis in this issue brief is agnostic on which of these matters most for each ally; instead, the emphasis herein is on whether, from a broader Alliance-wide perspective, there exists a positive relationship between defense inputs and defense outputs like troop contributions.

9 Some have instead sought to focus on the allied contribution to each mission per 1,000 citizens as a measure of burden-sharing. This measure misrepresents the burden carried (or shirked) by those allies that have smaller militaries relative to their populations but that make proportionally larger contributions to allied military operations, like Canada, the Czech Republic, or Latvia, as well as those allies that have large militaries relative to their populations but that make below-average contributions to allied military operations, like Greece and Turkey.

10 The list of allies includes Canada and all European allies that had been in the Alliance for at least three years as of 2011 and that have military forces. Hence, Iceland is not listed because it does not have military forces, and Albania and Croatia are not listed because they did not join the Alliance until 2009. (Montenegro joined in 2017, North Macedonia joined in 2020, and Finland joined in 2023.)

11 Subsequently, a test for statistical significance can indicate whether a strong correlation between the two variables is due to random chance.

12 The conclusions drawn from the pairwise correlations shown in this issue brief stand up even when run through a bivariate regression analysis.

13 It is worth noting that this last correlation—percent of ISAF with percent of NATO’s overall defense spending—is the only one that is statistically significant.

The post We don’t really know which NATO allies are pulling their weight. Here’s how to fix that. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Oleksii Reznikov: Ukraine’s defense doctrine will define country’s future

Oleksii Reznikov — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 18:49:23 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has recently initiated a national debate over the creation of a Ukrainian Doctrine that will shape the future development of the country. I am confident that defense policy will be at the heart of this national dialogue and see a number of key points that are worth underlining.

The first point to note is the global nature of Ukrainian security. For decades to come, the entire world will live by the rules established by the outcome of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin has demonstrated its readiness to weaponize everything from energy resources and food supplies to cyberspace and social media. Moscow has engaged in nuclear blackmail, interfered with maritime freedoms, and called into question the very idea of territorial integrity. These challenges are not local or even regional in scope; they are global threats that resonate equally around the world.

How we respond to these issues in Ukraine will define the international security climate. Any attempts to address the Russian invasion on a purely local level by freezing the conflict or forcing Ukraine into territorial concessions will result in failure and will only fuel further international instability. Instead, we must acknowledge that the threats posed by Russia are global in character and demand a global response.

The second key point is the need to define Ukraine’s position in regional and global security systems. In simple terms, the desired trajectory should include security guarantees followed by full NATO accession, with internal transformations taking place in parallel that implement the best lessons from Ukraine’s wartime experience and enable the country to acquire the necessary domestic defense capabilities. These processes can and must be advanced during the current active phase of the war.

The third key point is the need to develop a defense doctrine that meets the security expectations of both Ukraine and the country’s partners. It is now clear that Ukraine is capable of serving as a shield on Europe’s eastern frontier. Indeed, Ukraine is currently carrying out NATO’s core mission of defending Europe against Russian military aggression. At the same time, over the past eighteen months Ukraine has received direct and indirect military aid worth more than the country’s entire defense budget since the restoration of Ukrainian independence in 1991. Without continued external assistance, Ukraine will not be able to carry out rapid rearmament or acquire the kind of defense capabilities it needs. The best solution would be to move toward greater reliance on internal resources while maintaining strong levels of international support.

Clearly, Ukraine’s partners will be reluctant to invest in a security model that differs significantly from established NATO standards, or one that conflicts with their own military, industrial, or economic interests. Finding the right balance between strengthening Ukraine’s domestic defense sector capabilities and optimizing international cooperation will be crucial.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Email
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Efforts to develop a practical vision for Ukraine’s army of the future have been underway since June 2022, when I ordered a capacity review. These findings, coupled with Ukraine’s unique wartime experience, form the basis of a concept paper on the transformation of Ukraine’s defense sector submitted to Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal at the beginning of June 2023. The next stage will involve consultations to coordinate interagency efforts required to create the right legislative framework and ensure effective cooperation between different government bodies. This synergy will be the key to success.

Russia’s invasion has underlined that defense is an investment not an expense. For instance, strengthening Ukraine’s naval capabilities will help guarantee maritime security in the Black Sea and Azov Sea, which secures vital income from trade. Likewise, failure to provide adequate security measures will leave Ukraine unable to rebuild and trapped in costly wartime insecurity. All of Ukraine’s security policy decisions must reflect these fundamental truths.

Complex defense capabilities revolve around three main factors: people, weapons, and financial resources. Each has their own planning specifics. Successful weapons and financing policies take years to plan; when it comes to human resources, it often takes a generation or longer to get it right.

Ukraine is now looking to coordinate the country’s defense sector transformation under conditions of extreme uncertainty. We know the current war will end in Ukrainian victory, but we do not know when this will be. This makes it difficult to begin the process of optimizing the range of weapons in use by the Ukrainian armed forces. After all, in order to defeat Russia, Ukraine needs to receive as many weapons as it can, and needs to get them as quickly as possible.

We also don’t know exactly when Ukraine’s partners will make the final decision to fully integrate the country into the Euro-Atlantic security community. This is fundamental. It is one thing to reform the Ukrainian military as part of a collective defense strategy in cooperation with partners; it is quite another to build defense capabilities in relative isolation with some external support.

One of my main requests to our partners is therefore to make a decision on Ukraine’s NATO accession as soon as possible. This will make it far easier for all parties to conduct long-term defense planning. If a decision is not forthcoming, Ukraine’s partners will be obliged to include the country’s security needs in their own planning on a bilateral and multilateral basis.

A further priority for Ukraine’s defense doctrine is the de-Sovietization of defense policy and planning. This needs to be addressed in a practical manner that goes beyond mere slogans. Eighteen months ago, many military analysts believed a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine would mean a fight between a large Soviet army against a small Soviet army. In reality, it soon became clear that the Ukrainian army had undergone significant change. However, the same cannot be said for the broader state systems underpinning Ukrainian defense policy. A wide range of political, social, and economic changes are still needed.

For example, the system of registration for military service is still linked in the Soviet fashion with place of work or study. This means that entrepreneurs along with the self-employed and unemployed are often outside the system. Far-reaching changes are needed in order to establish and maintain the right kind of reserve and effectively mobilize the country’s human, material, and financial resources. Efforts to overcome quality problems with quantity must be set aside. In conditions of resource scarcity, such an approach is suicidal.

The human dimension of future Ukrainian defense is a professional army. This must be based on the transparent logic of a military career and an extensive social protection package, relying on well-trained reserves formed of all men liable for military service and of women on a voluntary basis (with the exception of those categories of women who are liable for military service).

The registration of people liable for military service should be fully digitized. This process is underway. We also need to implement separate training policies for different groups in order to create a genuine rather than nominal reserve. This should look to maximize citizen engagement by improving the motivation system.

Statements about there being seven million Ukrainians liable for military service are meaningless if the country is not capable of structuring the reserve in ways that make efficient use of these people. Similarly, declarations that anyone subject to military service must complete their compulsory period in uniform do little to help the state capitalize on existing resources. Instead, basic training should be supplemented by the development of specific groups within the country’s military reserve forces. This should include a combat reserve consisting of those with combat experience; a territorial reserve for territorial defense units; an operational reserve of military veterans without combat experience; a mobilization reserve of those who previously passed through basic training; and a general reserve register featuring individuals with no prior military training.

The development of an efficient reserve is only possible in conjuction with an effective Heroes Policy, which has been identified as a priority by President Zelenskyy. This is a good example of the need for interagency synergies and is also an area where a sense of justice must serve as a cornerstone. Meanwhile, the task of managing military registration should be taken away from the General Staff and the Land Forces Command. Instead, it is necessary to establish a separate and tailored agency within the Ministry of Defense.

Similar efforts are required for the civil reserve. Over the past eighteen months of Russia’s full-scale invasion, it has become clear that a significant portion of the almost one million Ukrainian men and women in uniform perform purely civilian functions. It makes no sense to bunch all of these people together with the military until the end of hostilities. Instead, a more nuanced approach is required. When society sees that the state seeks to engage people in defense tasks as rationally and reasonably as possible, we will witness a decline in negative phenomena associated with military service. After all, many of those who seek to avoid military service do so in order to escape perceived uncertainty, injustice, and abuses.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

A new mobilization and reserve policy will require a new regulatory framework. This will involve comprehensive legislative changes. The entire mobilization system for central and local authorities, enterprises, and institutions should undergo revision, with mobilization tasks in their current form abolished. In its place, the emphasis should be on practical needs and common sense. Training for reservists should be synchronized with real life requirements and skills, with citizens aware of opportunities at the level of school leaver, university undergraduate, employee, or entrepreneur.

Professional military education and career management must be developed according to NATO principles and standards to ensure interoperability. At the same time, all training and education should be adjusted to reflect Ukraine’s unrivalled combat experience. This is the country’s unique advantage and should shape Ukraine’s defense doctrine as much as possible.

Work is already underway on the transformation of Ukraine’s military education system, with a concept approved by the government in December 2022. Over the coming decade, Ukraine’s military education will be fully integrated into the broader European military education environment in terms of both form and content. A separate element here is military-patriotic education. At the moment, this is governed by two laws and a presidential decree which contain a number of apparent conflicts and contradictions. We must achieve a clearer division of tasks and harmonization.

Ukraine’s entire defense doctrine should be underpinned by solid economic foundations. At present, the Ukrainian defense industry is not capable of meeting the demands of the military, but the sector has huge potential. Indeed, if managed correctly, a highly profitable Ukrainian defense industry could realistically become a major engine driving the country toward the goal of a one trillion dollar GDP.

I have repeatedly stated my position that self-sufficiency in the defense sector is a core component of genuine national sovereignty. Moving forward, Ukraine should be aiming to produce as much as possible itself. Once again, Ukraine’s unique combat experience creates exciting opportunities in this area. In order to make the most of the country’s experience and its industrial capabilities, a new defense industry development strategy is required. This should take international defense sector trends into account while also focusing on other economic factors and Ukraine’s specific strengths.

The time has come to turn away from the old Soviet model governed by unprofitability and resource consumption. Instead, Ukraine must strive to become a global defense sector leader and an attractive international partner. This will require a unified center capable of establishing and implementing policy, with exceedingly flexible R&D assets responding rapidly to the latest requirements. Procurement should be synchronized with budget planning, while efforts must be made to move away from lingering problems relating to blurred responsibilities. Efforts in this direction are already underway and must continue.

The overall objective of Ukraine’s defense doctrine is to defend the state against any possible threat. This requires new approaches to everything from managing mobilization and maintaining an effective reserve, to reforming the defense industry and boosting domestic production at every level. The country’s needs will inevitably evolve over time. Five years after victory in the current war, will Ukraine need a mobilization reserve of 500,000 or two million? This is why scalability is so critical.

In the defense sector, Ukraine has huge untapped potential and much to offer the international community. In the drone sector alone, Ukraine is at the cutting edge of current innovations and is well-placed to remain a key source of solutions for European and other markets. This military tech prowess will help open doors to new cooperation that are currently closed. Ukraine can build on its experience and expertize to become a major player in the global defense industry, but this requires solid foundations and a strong domestic sector.

Every day, our defenders are bringing victory closer. This progress is taking place in a rapidly changing world, and is contributing to these changes. Ukraine must be ready to capitalize on the opportunities this creates in ways that guarantee the safety of all Ukrainians while enabling the country to prosper.

Oleksii Reznikov is Ukraine’s Minister of Defense.

Just like at the NATO Summit in Madrid last year, Erdogan has placed himself in the role of kingmaker. All allies except Turkey and Hungary have ratified Sweden’s membership, and Hungary is widely considered to be following Turkey’s lead.

In the symbolically important meeting with Kristersson this week, Biden sent a clear signal to Ankara: The United States is committed to welcoming Sweden into NATO as soon as possible. Kristersson reiterated that Swedish membership would contribute to the security of the Alliance as a whole. “No country knows this better than the United States,” he said.

The trilateral meeting in Brussels showed, however, that Turkey is still not on board. Swedish NATO membership is “within reach,” Stoltenberg said. He added that everyone is working toward a positive outcome in Vilnius and leaders will meet again on Monday, one day before the start of the summit.

At stake in Vilnius is not only the security of Sweden and the Alliance as a whole, but NATO’s open-door credibility.

Potentially paving the way for a successful outcome is this week’s conviction by a Swedish court of a PKK member for the crime of terror financing, the first use of the country’s new anti-terror laws that entered into force in June. The four-and-a-half-year sentence followed by a possible extradition is exactly the type of implementation Turkey has wanted to see from Sweden. Moreover, former Foreign Minister Ann Linde admitted this week that Sweden had not taken the threat posed by the PKK seriously enough in the past. Swedish police are now prioritizing the issue and deeper cooperation with Turkish authorities on combatting terrorism is expected to continue. Public opinion is also shifting, with a majority now in favor of banning the burning of religious texts. Hate speech laws, though not part of the trilateral memorandum, are additionally under review. All the while, rumors continue to swirl of the US Congress ending its roadblock on F-16 fighter jet sales to Turkey, a prospect that could help push the process across the finish line.

At stake in Vilnius is not only the security of Sweden and the Alliance as a whole, but NATO’s open-door credibility. With twenty-nine allies already having ratified Sweden’s membership, failure to fully admit Sweden undermines unity within the Alliance and makes NATO look weak and fragmented. As Stoltenberg correctly pointed out on Thursday, only Russian President Vladimir Putin and the PKK profit from continued delay.

Anna Wieslander is director for Northern Europe at the Atlantic Council and head of its Northern Europe office in Stockholm. She is a former official at the Swedish Defence Ministry and Swedish Parliament.

Eric Adamson is project manager at the Northern Europe office.

The post Will eleventh-hour diplomacy get Sweden into NATO by the Vilnius summit? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Building a navy fighting machine

Bruce Stubbs — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 13:00:00 +0000

Key terminology
The navy’s approach to strategy development and force planning
The sources of the problem
Problem definition
Key issues shaping problem solution
Recommendations
First recommendation: Establish a new assistant secretary of the navy
Second recommendation: stand-up the navy strategy cell
Third recommendation: Stand-up the force planning directorate
Resourcing the recommendations
Conclusion
About the author

Key terminology

This paper uses five key terms. The first two, force design and force development, are precise US Navy terms that are not interchangeable.

Force design is the innovation and the determination of future Navy ships, aircraft, and weapon systems, along with a warfighting concept for a twenty-year and beyond timeframe. Force development is the adaptation and modernization of Navy in-service ships, aircraft, and weapon systems, along with a warfighting concept within a two-to-seven-year timeframe. The difference between these two official Navy terms may seem arcane: force design is all about the future force, and force development is all about the current force. However, both address Navy requirements based on an appraisal of US security needs, and then choose naval capabilities (along with a warfighting concept) to meet those requirements within fiscal limitations.

The following terms are also important for the reader’s comprehension.

Force planning is the more commonly understood term—used in place of force design and force development—and is used across Congress, defense media, academia, and industry. While force planning is not an official Navy term, the term is used in this paper to encompass both force development and force design.
Force structure is used by the Congress to mean the number and types of combat units the Navy can generate and sustain, as well as to represent the Navy’s combat capability.
Budget is an informal and shortened expression to encapsulate all Navy activities in the Defense Department’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system, especially the programming activity.

The navy’s approach to strategy development and force planning

The US Navy’s approach to strategy development and force planning in 2023 is not working. Strategy development is on life support and force planning uses an incremental approach of buying marginally better and more expensive versions of the same platforms the Navy has relied upon for decades. In effect, it is producing the Navy’s force structure one ship class at a time, without reference to an overall Navy strategy and force plan to field an integrated, aligned, and synchronized “Navy fighting machine.”¹ Moreover, this approach is delivering an unaffordable fleet over too long a procurement time. Proposals for developing new capabilities are viewed as threats to in-service platforms and programs, thereby blocking innovation.

Navy F/A-18E Super Hornets prepare to launch from the USS Harry S. Truman in support of Exercise Trident Juncture 18. Credit: US Navy, Navy Petty Officer 3rd Class Adelola Tinubu.

Congress, defense media, defense analysts, the Defense Department, and independent US government agencies have all found fault with the US Navy’s strategy development and force planning. Most notably, Congress has expressed its dissatisfaction.

In December 2017, Congress mandated a Navy with 355 crewed ships, a goal based on the Navy’s 2016 Force Structure Assessment (FSA) and, in February 2020, Representative Joe Courtney (D-CT) complained to then Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper about, “the lack of a shipbuilding plan and the [Donald] Trump administration not delivering a strategy to build a 355-ship Navy.”² In December 2021, Congress mandated the Navy to submit the Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report on its force structure plans for the near, middle, and far terms to meet the combatant commanders’ requirements using Defense Department-approved scenarios.³ However, Congress reacted with little enthusiasm for the Navy’s thirty-year shipbuilding plan for fiscal year 2023 (FY2023), despite its being the first such report from the Navy to Congress in more than three years, and was similarly unimpressed by the following year’s iteration. This has led Congress to mandate the establishment of an independent National Commission on the Future of the Navy in December 2022 to determine the size and force mix of the fleet by mid-2025.⁴

This litany of events—particularly the unprecedented direction for the Navy to submit the Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report, the establishment of an independent National Commission on the Future of the Navy, and the assignment to the commandant of the Marine Corps of sole responsibility to develop amphibious warfare ships requirements—indicates Congress’ displeasure with Navy force planning. Moreover, the inability of the Department of Defense (DoD) and Navy leaders to consistently state how many ships the Navy needs to meet its requirements may be a driving factor in Congress’ decision to legislate these unprecedented mandates. During the first seven months of 2022, DoD leaders suggested five different targets for the objective size of the Navy—316, 327, 367, 373, and five hundred.⁵ In addition, the use of three options in both the FY2023 and FY2024 thirty-year shipbuilding plan—rather than a single projection—handicaps congressional understanding of the Joe Biden administration’s goals concerning the future size and composition of the Navy, and assessing the Navy’s proposed FY2024 shipbuilding budget, five-year shipbuilding plan, and thirty-year shipbuilding plan. Moreover, to follow its mantra of providing best military advice to civilian leadership, the Navy must have a preferred option for what it needs to get the job done, and, most importantly, must assess the risk to the United States if it does not get the resources it needs (see Table 2).

As Dr. Scott Mobley pointed out in his November 2022 Proceedings essay, the Navy largely focuses on programming and budget to develop the means for strategy while “devaluing the strategic underpinnings for rationalizing and justifying those means.”⁶

Navy force planning uses a piecemeal approach—“buying at the margin [fewer, but] better [and more expensive] versions of the same [type] of platforms [the Navy] has relied upon for decades”—that is delivering an unaffordable fleet over too long a procurement time.⁷ Navy force planning almost always occurs in a resource-constrained environment imposing a zero-sum approach, in which proposals for new capabilities are frequently viewed as threats to in-service platforms, thereby blocking innovation. At the end of the day, the Navy’s new platforms, weapons, and systems are quite similar to what is already in the fleet.

The preponderance of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) platform and capability staffs each focus on a single platform or capability. No one looks at all the platforms and capabilities as an integrated, collective whole. No single staff entity ensures all these individual platform and capability staffs are integrated by a well-articulated, comprehensive strategy and warfighting concept to achieve the required strategy-force match.

The Navy cannot create a lasting OPNAV organizational structure to ensure its strategy drives its force planning and its budget in that order. OPNAV cannot conduct its business “with strategic intent” at all times in its key processes. Because it operates within the Defense Department’s mandated five-year Future Years Defense Program and is focused on the budget, OPNAV tends to concentrate on numerous process-centric products, which, coupled with cascading short-term urgent projects, frequently sees its strategic guidance displaced, or even lost, in the sausage making.

The continuing need to reconcile the interface between the Navy’s strategy with its mid-range to long-range forecasts, and between the Navy’s budget and its short-term timelines and all-consuming fiscal pressures, has eluded OPNAV. Numerous OPNAV reorganizations since the early 1980s underscore this observation. As a 2010 Center for Naval Analyses study highlighted: “successive CNOs have sought to make [OPNAV] responsive to their needs—chief among which is usually construction of a balanced and integrated program and budget.”⁸ They failed and, as a result, the Navy continues to address its force requirements incrementally, which frustrates innovation, alarms Congress, and delivers fewer, more expensive, and almost always bigger platforms. The various uncrewed surface vessels and aircraft may break the bigger-is-better paradigm, yet they are arriving too slowly.

The sources of the problem

The causes of the Navy’s problem with its approach to strategy development and force planning are numerous and diverse.

Divergent CNO proclivities prevent strategic consistency

Effective force planning suffers from insufficient strategic consistency between chiefs of naval operations (CNOs). The historical record suggests these service chiefs seem to believe they must differentiate themselves from their predecessors, with their own distinct, separate strategy—or what is typically a strategic, aspirational plan rather than a strategy with ends, ways, and means. As Dr. Peter Haynes explained in his book, Toward a New Maritime Strategy:

In the political climate of Washington, a place that demands constant change and where only new ideas can be ensured a hearing, strategic statements have a shelf life. Navy leaders have to replace or update their ideas or risk being seen as too slow in responding to changes in the domestic political or international security environments.⁹

Assuredly, senior Navy leaders would agree that, regardless of who is the CNO, the Navy has enduring institutional objectives and the benefits of consistency would be enormous for strategy development and force planning. There would be: assured continuity of strategic direction over the fielding of major platforms and weapons systems; no requirement for an incoming CNO to craft a “new” Navy strategic direction from whole cloth; unity of effort on the Navy’s way ahead based on organizational agreement hammered out at four-star updates; a consistent Navy message for strategic communications; and reduction in false starts and nonproductive efforts (see Table 1).

The service needs each CNO to build upon what has gone on before so that the Navy can benefit from continuous unity of effort over time. The service also needs a consistent planning process, and not a completely new version to accompany the incoming CNO’s new strategy. The challenge is to sustain consensus in a planning and acquisition process that runs a decade or more, and is instigated by a CNO who typically serves a four-year tenure.

OPNAV’s budget process dominates strategy and force planning

OPNAV remains focused on the budget as its overarching and defining process, believing strategy can be generated during the budget process. This narrow focus constrains the development of long-range strategies and plans to address transcendent challenges and opportunities. There is an irreconcilable difference between the needs of the budget process and the strategy-development process.

In a 2021 interview, a former deputy director of the Integration of Capabilities and Resources Directorate (OPNAV N8), Irv Blickstein, provided an explanation of why the budget process dominates. First, it is impossible to follow literally the linear prescript of strategy, requirements, and budget. If a strategy is unaffordable, then capability trade-offs must be made. The budgeteers knew that just opining about strategy would not carry the day for funding. Instead, the Navy needed analysis to show the effectiveness of its programs and the validity of its arguments. As deputy programmer in OPNAV in the early 1980s, Blickstein noted:

I had no relationship with anybody in OP-06 [Plans, Policies and Operations Directorate]. And you’d think, well you’re building a [budget] and they’re in charge of the Maritime Strategy, shouldn’t you guys be talking all the time? The answer is yes, but did the Maritime Strategy have an impact on our programming work? It really didn’t…Historically, there was no relationship between strategists and programmers, but I think it would be a good thing to have.¹⁰

In June 2015, the Naval Postgraduate School published a report on strategy’s role to drive the Navy’s budget process. The report’s principal findings stated that the “Navy has failed to ensure that strategy and policy priorities drive [budget] development and execution.” Specifically, within OPNAV, the budget process “eclipses strategy” and “is substituted for, and is often equated to, strategy.”¹¹ The report noted that the Integration of Capabilities and Resources Directorate, a directorate that acts essentially as OPNAV’s Chief Financial Officer, “wields most of the intra-bureaucratic authority and power when it comes to the making and implementation of strategy” and that the Operations, Plans, and Strategy Directorate (OPNAV N3/N5), with its strategy staff, does not “play meaningful role in strategy development and execution.” During his tenure as CNO (2015–2019), Admiral John Richardson attempted to change this attitude. His efforts did not succeed.

Currently, there are significant alignment issues among the budget process, strategy development, and long-range planning processes. The budget process focuses on a five-year period and emphasizes the application of quantitative analysis, which is effective for near-term resource decisions. However, with no clear-cut beginning or end to its annual cycle, the budget process dominates all OPNAV planning activities and “tends simply to encourage the continuation of programs already under way” and discourage “the development of fresh new alternatives.”¹² The Navy needs to avoid defaulting to budget execution to develop its strategy. All strategies are shaped and informed by available resources, but the budget should serve the strategy—not the other way around.

Currently,the responsibility to manage the Navy’s force-planning ecosystem is dispersed throughout OPNAV. The Warfighting Development Directorate (OPNAV N7) addresses force design. The Integration of Capabilities and Resources Directorate (OPNAV N8) addresses the quantitative means to support force design and development, and the Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities Directorate (OPNAV N9) addresses force development and force design. The CNO’s Commanders Action Group provides the terms of reference—strategic guidance—for force design and force development. The Naval Warfare Development Center produces warfighting concepts, such as the current Distributed Maritime Operations (See Figure 1).

Each of these responsibilities must occur, but they are uncoordinated. No directorate integrates these force-planning efforts along with the ongoing production of new ships, aircraft, and weapons to produce a unified Navy fighting machine. As a result, decisions about production of new forces and modernization of in-service forces directly shape decisions about determining future platforms and capabilities, and vice versa. This interrelationship among force development, force design, and the production of new platforms and capabilities demands alignment, integration, and synchronization into a comprehensive process—not as individual platforms and capabilities—along with a shared understanding of the future security environment and a common warfighting concept to deter and defeat future adversaries in specific time periods.

Furthermore, this dispersion of force-planning responsibility has harmful consequences. In February 2022, OPNAV sponsored a workshop, titled the Force Design Sprint, to assess the Navy’s force-design posture. At the conclusion, a senior N7 leader informed the author that the workshop determined, “everyone in OPNAV was in charge [of force design], but no one was in charge.” It was an astonishing discovery for a military service to declare no one in OPNAV actually held responsibility for force design, with its focus on future ships, aircraft, and weapon systems, along with warfighting concepts for the twenty-plus-year time horizon.

Insufficient strategic guidance misdirects force planning

The Navy lacks sufficient and coherent guidance to ensure strategy shapes its budget and warfighting concepts. It has no classified strategy to facilitate an unambiguous expression of its ends, ways, and means. It has no codified assessment of both the current and future security environments to provide baseline understandings of them and set conditions for effective concept-driven, threat-informed capability development. Another missing document is a warfighting concept for the 2040s timeframe. The result is that, in 2023, specialized N9 staffs are planning the next-generation platforms without the benefit of a common set of capstone strategic guidance. (See Figure 1a)

Navy platform communities distort force planning

Internecine warfare by the Navy’s three platform communities (its surface, aviation, and submarine communities) severely unbalances the Navy as a whole. Expected in theory to rise above their individual platform advocacy and warfare concerns, the communities are all too susceptible to pressures and rivalries from the others. Each warfare community produces an unclassified strategic guidance document with little regard for how the other communities interact and cooperate to generate a unified Navy fighting machine.

Problem definition

In response to this criticism, CNO Admiral Michael Gilday reassigned force-design responsibilities to N7 and focused its efforts on 2045, as outlined in the CNO’s 2022 Navigation Plan.¹³ However, the Navy has largely already decided upon a 2045 force design and, moreover, the Navy is full speed ahead on its implementation. The year 2045 is only about twenty years away, well within the service life for the ongoing production of new ships, aircraft, and weapon systems. CNO Gilday has approved the Navy’s future direction for its next generation of platforms and capabilities, which N9 has developed with the priority order of acquisition as the next-generation aircraft first, the next-generation destroyer second, and the next-generation attack submarine third.¹⁴ This prioritization seems to cement the aircraft carriers as the Navy’s warfighting center of gravity, rather than precision weapons launched from a variety of air, surface, and subsurface platforms.

The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson prepares for flight operations in the Arabian Gulf. Credit: US Navy/ Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Alex King.

The long-term problem confronting Navy strategy development and force planning is larger than reassigning force-design responsibility to N7. The Navy needs to address the problem of how it conducts and organizes for strategy development and force planning in toto, not as disparate processes. Based on this paper’s assessment of the Navy’s strategy development and force planning posture, the Navy faces a three-part problem.¹⁵

Part one: How does the Navy produce “a force structure, now and in the future, of the right size and the right composition (force mix) to achieve the nation’s security goals, in light of the security environment and resource constraints” and avoid a strategy-force mismatch?¹⁶
Part two: How does the Navy ensure its strategy—based upon codified current and future assessments of the security environments, along with associated warfighting concepts—drives force-planning decisions in its budget process, and not have those decisions made by default?
Part three: How does the Navy ensure its force-planning activities include revision of existing warfighting concepts and development of new ones that fully integrate all platforms to produce a single, lethal Navy fighting machine?

Key issues shaping problem solution

Several key issues significantly influence the formulation of recommendations to improve Navy strategy development and force planning.

Organizing OPNAV for effective strategy development

Given the enduring nature of developing, maintaining, updating, and iterating capstone strategic guidance, a dedicated strategy staff (to include responsibility for long-range planning) must have continuity and longevity. Because this guidance is so central to the Navy’s future, their production cannot be an on-again-off-again process. The key is for the CNO to select its director and have confidence in its staff. Once a strategy staff is up and running, the Navy needs to keep it in place. If the CNO is unhappy with its product, he or she should certainly bring in their own selectee to run the show, but the organization itself needs to retain its role, rather than being shoved aside and replaced with a new, favorite staff group.

Avoiding a federated organization to conduct force planning

OPNAV is using a federated organizational construct, which is problematic for conducting force planning. This construct attempts to achieve simultaneously decentralization of responsibilities and unity of effort. It supposedly unites, under a central entity, diverse responsibilities along with distinctive, associated processes, but with the responsibilities still controlled by different and independent entities. It is aspirational and relies on goodwill to meet mission in lieu of a hierarchical structure with authorities to make hard decisions and not focus on achieving consensus. Given the importance of successful force planning to the Navy, the organizing model to follow is a dedicated entity reporting directly to the CNO, such as the Navy Strategic Systems Programs and Naval Nuclear Propulsion, which, respectively, have cradle-to-grave responsibility for sea-launched nuclear-deterrent capabilities and for the Navy’s nuclear propulsion. The Navy needs to borrow a page from these two organizational successes and establish a dedicated, single entity responsible for all matters pertaining to force planning. The CNO’s force-planning responsibilities are so vast in scope, so complex, and so critical, that the Navy cannot disaggregate them across the OPNAV staff or employ a federated construct. It needs to establish a dedicated entity reporting directly to the CNO.

Providing CNO’s direct oversight of force planning and strategy

Only the CNO and the vice chief of naval operations (VCNO), with the authority vested in their offices, can ensure OPNAV maintains a strategic focus. They alone can focus the staff to keep the Navy’s strategic direction front and center, to drive force planning and the budget. The vice admirals who are the deputy chiefs of naval operations leading the seven major functional directorates cannot do it individually; they are challenged enough to meet the urgent demands of the budget process and the press of their daily business.

Understanding defense-analysis limitations to support force planning

Quantifiable defense analysis makes a strong contribution to force planning, especially in the near and middle terms, by understanding trade-offs among platforms and weapons systems. Defense analysis—operations research, campaign analysis, and systems analysis—has restricted relevancy to force planning with its long-range focus of twenty or more years into the future. Defense-analysis methods require certainty of data before they can productively yield reliable certainty in answers. The Navy’s current force-structure assessment methodology, which uses these quantifiable defense analysis tools, will be hard pressed to generate useful data about the long term. Its processes require data for modeling that are simply unavailable twenty years from now—hence, the need for a strong component of risk analysis, wargames, red teams, and alternative-futures work.

Incorporating net assessment capability to support force planning

Force planning requires long-range comparative assessment of trends, key competitions, risks, opportunities, and future prospects of Navy capability. Net assessment provides this comparison of red-blue interaction, using qualitative and quantitative factors across alternative future scenarios. The Navy cannot predict the future with certainty. However, net assessments generate a spectrum of needed capabilities for the Navy to draw upon. The Navy needs this capability because its reliance on campaign analysis, systems analysis, and operations research is grossly unbalanced. The Navy needs to conduct force planning based upon an assessment of the future security environment, and then use tools such as strategic wargames, emulations, expert-panel reports, and net assessment to build a strategy and a warfighting concept, and derive required capabilities. Once that is done, the quantifiable tools can refine the types and number of capabilities.

Clarifying N7 and N9’s force-planning roles

Force planning encompasses force design (i.e., the future fleet) and force development (i.e., the current fleet). CNO Gilday reassigned force-design responsibility from N9 to N7 in July 2022. In reality, N9 will likely continue to conduct force-design responsibility as it determinines the next generation of platforms for operational employment in the 2040s. Given all the approved and funded N9 force-design activity to plan the 2040s Navy, N7’s force planning responsibilities are far from clear.

Incorporating the secretary of the Navy into force planning

Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro has signaled caution and unease with Navy force planning, and wants a realistic approach to understand the total cost and impact of the next-generation destroyer, attack submarine, and crewed/uncrewed aircraft. He wants to test new technologies for these platforms before any production. Given the Navy’s uneven track record in planning and delivering surface ships, along with the issue of affordability to fund an immense recapitalization, his caution is warranted.

Evaluating new technologies and concepts for force planning

The Navy is replacing in-service platforms with newer, follow-on versions, with the exception of uncrewed platforms. This is significant because strong platform attachment may be preventing the Navy from embracing new technologies and warfighting concepts. More importantly, such a possible attitude may prevent the Navy from understanding the changing character of war at sea. For example, because of the convergence of technologies, by 2045 the air and surface domains might become so significantly transparent that, in the competition between the “finder” and the “hider,” the finder might well dominate. If this is correct, surface ships and even aircraft will be increasingly vulnerable to continuous enemy tracking, targeting, and long-range attacks, thereby ending their role—or, at a minimum, severely limiting it—as the principal means of conventional naval power projection. Such an outcome has enormous consequences for the design of a 2045 Navy fleet.

A fast-response cutter sails near a US sail drone explorer in the Gulf of Aqaba during the International Maritime Exercise/Cutlass Express (IMX) 2022. Credit: US Army/ Cpl. DeAndre Dawkins

Communicating Navy force-structure requirements

Given the December 2022 establishment of the National Commission on the Future of the Navy and the new reporting requirement for a Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report in December 2021, the Navy’s strategic-communications capability appears to have had little effect in countering the criticism of its force-planning efforts. The Navy’s strategic communications require an adjustment.

Recommendations

The overarching intent of these recommendations is to link OPNAV’s strategy, analysis, and budget processes. This is a challenge, as the work among the budgeteers, analysts, planners, and strategists is so different. Producing a budget is incremental work that “involves a great deal of analysis and negotiation, over and over again, year after year” and requires “orthodox bureaucratic labor.” Conversely, producing a strategy or a warfighting concept demands “unorthodox leaps of thought—of drawing exceptional inferences from exercises, war games, technology, intelligence, and events.”¹⁷

Historically, with a few notable exceptions, effectively linking these two groups has eluded OPNAV. Consequently, the recommendations address eliminating this gap by consolidating force-planning functions under the direct and strategic oversight of the CNO and VCNO to ensure the linkage between these two groups is maintained. In effect, force planning becomes OPNAV’s center of gravity, with the production of the budget in support.

The logic behind these recommendations is straightforward. The recommendations are governed by an overarching objective to ensure that the Navy’s strategy and policy priorities drive its force planning and budget, not the other way around. The Navy needs to build its forces and capabilities to implement the CNO’s recommended strategy. Force planning begins with that strategy, but the force-planning staff does not create that strategy; the origins of that strategy reside in the CNO’s personal domain, drawing upon higher-level guidance such as the National Defense Strategy. Using the CNO’s strategy, the force-planning staff determines the naval tasks required, and the problems and impediments—such as geography and the adversary’s capabilities—in the current and future security environment that must be surmounted. This activity, in turn, drives the development of warfighting concepts, which leads to the discovery of required naval forces and capabilities and their associated attributes (i.e., operational requirements). Finally, force planning calculates the number and mix of forces and capabilities required to achieve the strategy.¹⁸ The following recommendations make this logic a reality.

The eleven primary documents written by the proposed Navy Strategy Cell and the Force Planning Directorate would not be carved in stone and immutable like the Ten Commandants. In the final analysis, they would be the CNO’s documents. Vitally, they would be developed through the active participation of the Navy’s four-star leadership to identify the biggest challenges to the service’s continued relevancy and contribution to national security, and to devise a coherent approach to overcoming them, which the Navy senior leaders would hammer out and support. The purpose of this effort is to define how the Navy will move forward over successive five-year increments of the budget-planning process, with its senior leaders sharing and agreeing to a common approach. It is all about institutionalizing a force-planning process that can endure over decades from first inception to acquisition to initial operational employment, all managed by relatively short-tenured senior leaders.

Obviously, as the threat, budget, technology, and higher-level policy change, the CNO would update these documents on an annual basis, such as the process the Navy employed in the 1930s with at least nineteen major iterations to its War Plan Orange, and in the 1980s with several successive versions of the Maritime Strategy. Full participation of serving four-star and selected three-star admirals in this process will be vital, because, without question, one of these flag officers will become the next or subsequent CNO. If this participation does not occur, the probability for false starts and radical course changes will greatly increase as CNOs change.

First recommendation: Establish a new Assistant Secretary of the Navy

The secretary of the Navy should establish an assistant secretary of the Navy for strategy, concepts, and capabilities (ASN/SC&C) to assist the uniformed Navy (See Figure 2). The standing up of this position would deliver that assistance without needing another management layer. Instead, it offers enormous, impactful benefits by providing the secretary of the Navy the means to ensure:

Alignment of both Navy and Marine Corps resources, activities, and capabilities with the strategic military objectives and force planning goals of the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy;
Synchronization of Navy and Marine Corps force planning by integrating their efforts at the service-chief level, as well as at developmental level between the Navy’s Naval Warfighting Development Center and the Marine Corps’ Warfighting Laboratory;¹⁹
The establishment of a strategy-focused counterpart to the assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development, and acquisition (ASN/RDA), and a vital interface with the assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans and capabilities (ASD/SPC);²⁰
The development of a single Navy Department strategy, vis à vis the three separate strategies of the department, Navy, and Marine Corps;
Reform of Navy force-planning activities, reinvigoration of Navy strategic expertise, and the promotion of a strategy-centric culture in both the secretariat and OPNAV; and²¹
A resolution of protracted issues and problems bedeviling Navy strategy development and force planning.

The final benefit has immense implications, and requires elaboration. The number of issues and problems confronting Navy strategy development and force planning seem almost enduring, foster significant congressional concern, and underscore the compelling need for great secretariat and OPNAV integration. On its own, the Navy has been unable to solve, correct, or mitigate these issues and challenges. Examples of such issues and problems that substantiate the services of a new assistant secretary are as follows.

Increasing affordability of platform

In June 2021, then acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Harker signed a memo addressing Navy funding priorities in its fiscal year 2023 planning cycle to match fiscal guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Navy cannot afford to simultaneously develop the next generation of air, surface, and subsurface platforms and must prioritize these [three] programs, balancing the cost of developing next-generation capabilities against maintaining current capabilities. As part of the budget [program objective memorandum 2023], the Navy should prioritize one of [these three] capabilities and rephase the other two after an assessment of operational, financial, and technical risk.²²

However, it was not until January 2023 that the Navy explicitly admitted that it could not afford all three major acquisition programs simultaneously, when the Navy announced that the order of acquisition as first is Next Generations Air Dominance (NGADS), then Next-Generation Guided-Missile Destroyer program (DDG(X)), and finally the Next-Generation Attack Submarine program (SSN(X)).²³

PACIFIC OCEAN (Jan. 4, 2011) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Stockdale (DDG 106) pulls alongside the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) during a refueling at sea. Platforms like the Arleigh Burke can provide provided much of the same support offered by carriers in mixed battlegroups and run far cheaper in comparrison. Credit: US Navy/ Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Travis K. Mendoza.

Navy platforms keep getting bigger and more expensive

Strong platform attachment may be preventing the Navy from embracing new technologies and concepts, and consequently replacing in-service platforms with newer, follow-on versions. Navy force planning uses an incremental approach—“buying at the margin [fewer, but] better [and more expensive] versions of the same [type] of platforms [the Navy] has relied upon for decades”—that is delivering an unaffordable fleet over too long a procurement time.²⁴

The San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Anchorage (LPD 23), the littoral combat ship USS Coronado (LCS 4), the joint high-speed vessel USNS Millinocket (JHSV 3) and the Military Sealift Command mobile landing platform USNS Montford Point (MLP 1) transit in formation off the coast of Southern California as part of Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise 2014. Some of these platforms are showing their costly age in in the 2020s. Credit: US Navy/ Chief Mass Communication Specialist Mark C. Schultz.

Proposals for new capabilities can be viewed as threats to in-service platforms, thereby blocking innovation. Quite often, the Navy’s new platforms, weapons, and systems are quite familiar to what is already in the fleet. The DDG(X) is the large surface-combatant replacement for the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers, currently still being procured by the Navy. A November 2022 Congressional Budget Office report on the Navy’s FY-2023 thirty-year shipbuilding plan states, “the Navy has indicated that the initial [DDG(X)] design prescribes a displacement of 13,500 tons,” about 39 percent greater than the 9,700-ton Flight III DDG-51 design.²⁵ There are media reports that actual displacement may be closer to fifteen thousand tons, which would make them comparable to a World War II heavy cruiser.

Technological developments are changing the character of warfare.

The principal means of conventional naval power projection are transforming, and this has enormous consequences for the design of a 2045 Navy fleet. According to US strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., a disruptive shift is occurring from “precision-warfare regimes” to an emerging one based on “a new military revolution” incorporating “artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing, synthetic biology, and quantum computing, as well as military-driven technologies, including directed energy and hypersonic weapons.”²⁶ Krepinevich cautions that, too often, the US military gets the cart before the horse by fielding capabilities based on new technologies and not addressing “how these new capabilities would maintain their effectiveness” as a technological revolution matured, as was the case with the Navy’s next-generation cruiser.²⁷ Unfortunately, as of May 2023, such strategic-planning documents do not exist for the US Navy.

Ineffective strategic communications

The Navy’s poor strategic-communications practices are exemplified by its annual, unclassified thirty-year shipbuilding plan.²⁸ The plan fulfilled its purpose, but it was devoid of even a summary of a rigorous, unclassified, analytical rationale to make the case for a larger, more lethal Navy. With that, political leadership could understand the Navy’s defense role and support its claims upon the nation’s resources. It was a missed opportunity to strategically communicate the Navy’s case for resources to one of the Navy’s most important audiences.²⁹ The Navy does not know how to communicate its force requirements consistently. The best construct for Navy strategic communications is to use platforms. Right now, the Navy is using platform attributes—such as “Ensure Delivery,” which conjures images of Domino’s Pizza or Amazon delivery services—to communicate its requirements to Congress and the American people. Aircraft and ship types are not abstract; they are real things that people can easily visualize when they hear their names—submarine, destroyer, aircraft carrier, and jet fighter, among others.

An a-strategic Navy culture

Strategy is not an institutional Navy value; the service values operational and technocratic expertise above all. Indeed, one telling example illustrates this attitude. Unlike the five other armed services, the Navy does not formally board its selectees to attend the war colleges as students; in effect, the Navy assigns whoever is available. The Navy largely focuses on programming and budget to develop the means for strategy, while “devaluing the strategic underpinnings for rationalizing and justifying those means.³⁰ Regrettably, the Navy has become, “a technocracy—a technologically centered bureaucracy,” with the CNO and OPNAV staff acting as the “Navy’s lead programmers and budgeters, incentivizing a career system that rewarded officers who acquired the technical skills needed for these roles,” but not incentivizing a career path for strategists.³¹

A prescient 1984 US Naval Institute Proceedings essay encapsulated the Navy’s astrategic culture: “The finest personal accolade an officer can receive is, ‘He’s a great operator.’”³² However, the essay identified a major shortcoming these “great operators” have: they experience, “great difficulty comprehending or even identifying—long-term problems” and are, “convinced that only short-term problems are real, and that continued solutions to each in turn will eliminate or indefinitely postpone the distant ones.”³³ As a consequence of this attitude, the Navy cannot determine a lasting OPNAV organizational structure to ensure its strategy drives its force planning and its budget, in that order. On its own, the Navy cannot sustain its strategy enterprise over the long haul. Underscoring this assessment is the current lack of capstone strategic and force-planning guidance. The Navy does not have:

A classified version of a combined “2020 Advantage at Sea” and “2022 Navigation Plan” to facilitate a clear and unambiguous expression of Navy ends, ways, and means along with such topics as strategic assumptions, risk, capacity, concepts, and threats;
A classified assessment of the current and future security environments to provide baseline understandings of operating environments, setting conditions for effective concept-driven, threat-informed capability development;
A classified warfighting concept for the 2040s timeframe;
A classified red-blue net assessment at the strategic level;
A classified description of a red-blue war; and
A classified Navy long-range plan.

Competition among the Navy platform communities

The internecine warfare between the Navy’s three platform communities (the surface, aviation, and submarine communities) can severely unbalance the Navy as a whole. For example, the aviation tribe focuses on strike from the air; the submarine tribe on strike from the subsurface; the surface tribe on strike from the surface; and the amphibious tribe on strike across the beach. All the while, it is unclear if anyone is asking two fundamental questions: “What are we trying to do? And how can we accomplish this in a far more effective way than we can at present?”³⁴ Invariably, there is a competition among tribes for manpower and funding, resulting in disagreements over strategy and the allocation of resources. Reaching consensus among them has always been difficult, and remains a fundamental service chief responsibility.

As defense secretary, Mark T. Esper rejected the Navy’s force plans.

They seemed to be a product of internal Navy logrolling among the various tribes— surface, subsurface, aviation, etc.—to keep their share of the Navy budget largely unchanged. Insiders were confirming this to me.
— Mark T. Esper³⁵

Esper wanted more attack submarines and a mix of light aircraft carriers (large-deck amphibious ships with F-35B aircraft) for more operational choices and affordability.³⁶ He did not want a plan bounded by past warfighting constructs and irrelevant to a future fight with China.³⁷ Because the naval-warfare tribes could not give him what he wanted, he directed Deputy Secretary of Defense David Norquist in the spring of 2020 to lead a new force-structure assessment study to maintain naval dominance.

A U.S. Navy MH-60 Sea Hawk prepares to land aboard the Wasp-Class Amphibious Assault Ship USS Bataan (LHD 5) during a strait transit exercise part of Amphibious Squadron/MEU Integration Training (PMINT), Jan. 28, 2023. Credit: US Marine Corps/ Cpl. Michele Clarke.

Each warfare community produces an unclassified strategic guidance document—the aviation community has Navy Aviation Vision 2030–2035, the submarine community Commander’s Intent 4.0, and the surface community has Surface Warfare: The Competitive Edge. Each document, for the most part, encompasses community strategy, planning, policy, and vision topics about operations, capabilities, and personnel. There is little in each document about how that community interacts and cooperates with the other two to generate a unified Navy fighting machine. The lack of stated cooperation among the aviation, surface, and submarine-warfare communities in these documents is palpable. The three communities act like a true team of rivals whose intra-service actions have contributed substantively to the establishment of the National Commission on the Future of the Navy.

To resolve these and other such issues and problems challenges, the secretary of the Navy’s role in strategy development and force planning needs to be strengthened by the services of this new assistant secretary.

Second recommendation: Stand up the Navy strategy cell

The CNO should repurpose his Commander’s Action Group as the Navy Strategy Cell to produce the Navy’s capstone strategic guidance and to monitor its implementation by this one, central, and empowered staff entity reporting directly to the CNO (See Figure 2).

All CNOs understand that their most important responsibility as a service chief is to identify the biggest challenges to the Navy’s continued relevancy and contribution to national security, and to devise a coherent approach to overcoming them. This fundamental role serves as the basis for this recommendation. A 2010 Center for Naval Analyses report bluntly stated that developing and implementing such guidance “for the Navy is the CNO’s number 1 job.”³⁸ Indeed, from what many senior OPNAV veterans have privately communicated to the author, if this responsibility is not “totally owned by CNO,” OPNAV has no strategic focus. They believe the CNO most important responsibility is identifying the biggest challenges to the Navy’s continued relevancy and contribution to national security, and devising a coherent approach to overcoming them.

Already working directly for the CNO, the Commander’s Action Group produces strategic documents such as the annual posture statements, congressional testimony, keynote speeches, and the 2022 Navigation Plan. Building upon this foundation, the proposed Navy Strategy Cell would be uniquely positioned to describe preferred outcomes for the whole Navy. OPNAV’s seven directorates, on the other hand, tend to focus on the outcomes of individual supporting programs. With expansion, empowerment, and augmentation, the Navy Strategy Cell would:

Enable the CNO to break away from the budget and programming processes that dominate so much of OPNAV’s time and thinking, and increase his or her focus on realistic and effective strategies and concepts for fighting at and from the sea;
Strengthen the CNO’s ability to align and coordinate the activities of Navy organizations; communicate with a single Navy voice to external and internal audiences; and assess Navy policies, budgets, plans, and programs, and the resultant allocation of scarce resources; and
Ensure capstone strategic documents reflect a consistent and aligned set of principles, concepts, and tenets regarding the Navy’s fundamental role in implementing national policy, as well as the CNO’s direction.

This recommendation mirrors what most corporate chief executive officers do, which is to make their capstone strategy functions a direct report to the chief executive officer. Consequently, this is no longer a lead role for N3/N5. Every CNO requires the direct support of a staff to provide a coherent, contemporary, authoritative body of Navy strategic thinking—comprehensive in scope—that they can use to help conceptualize, develop, coordinate, maintain, communicate, refine, and assess their thinking. The CNO needs to be optimally assisted and supported by a small, dedicated strategy staff, which is a corporate best practice. The production of capstone strategic guidance and other strategic documents requires a close relationship and physical proximity to the CNO, with no interlocutors. It is a one-on-one relationship between the CNO and, in effect, their “chief strategist” residing in the Navy Strategy Cell. The one-on-one relationship is needed to:

Implement explicit CNO guidance, not guidance altered by OPNAV directorate agendas;
Provide unfiltered advice, especially alternative views to CNO; and
Do it quickly and with a minimum of interference from others.

Capstone strategic guidance describes how CNO intends to overcome “the biggest challenges to the Navy’s continued relevancy and contribution to national security”³⁹ across different timeframes and security environments. These documents require significant CNO involvement, visibility, and signature. They provide overarching direction to the service for planning, programming, and budgeting future forces, force planning, and operational employment, and convey fundamental principles about the application of naval power to achieve national policy goals. They drive all subordinate force-planning efforts and connect the Navy’s annual budget submissions and investment plans with the Navy’s key priorities. These documents are truly primus inter pares. They are consequential and substantive, must be derived from national and joint policy and strategy, and reflect a comprehensive, global view informed by the Navy’s current and future capabilities. The Navy Strategy Cell would draft for the CNO’s signature classified and unclassified versions of these four documents that comprise the Navy’s capstone strategic guidance (i.e., its “crown jewels”).

Assessments of Current and Future Security Environments (classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist).
The Navy Strategy (classified version does not currently exist).
Navy Long-Range Plan (classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist).
CNO’s Annual Budget Guidance (classified).

Third recommendation: Stand up the force-planning directorate

The CNO should consolidate all OPNAV force-planning responsibilities into a new Force-Planning Directorate under a vice admiral reporting to the VCNO and disestablish N7 (See Figure 2).

The unprecedented wakeup call from Congress, when it established an independent National Commission on the Future of the Navy, is sufficient reason to consolidate Navy force-planning efforts under one roof and reform them.

The Navy’s current federated organizational construct to force planning is ineffective. It is unclear in 2023 what OPNAV staff element acts as the central entity to coordinate all OPNAV force-planning efforts conducted by decentralized and independent staff elements. The functions of force planning are expansive, complex, and critical, as Congress just reminded the Navy. In recognition of the weakness of the federated approach, the Navy should follow its own successful examples of non-federated entities reporting directly to the CNO—the Strategic Systems Programs and Naval Nuclear Propulsion—and consolidate all matters pertaining to force planning into a new and dedicated single entity.

This single, dedicated Force-Planning Directorate would have the authority, staffing, and analytical means, to align, integrate, and synchronize the force-planning efforts into a comprehensive whole-of-Navy strategic plan. The relationship among force development and force design, as well their connection to the production of new ships, aircraft, and weapons systems, demands alignment, integration, and synchronization into a comprehensive force-planning blueprint.

This Force-Planning Directorate would have the authority, personnel, and analytical means to align, integrate, and synchronize all force-planning efforts to produce a Navy fighting machine. The new directorate would assess and integrate the future operational environment, emerging threats, and technologies to develop and deliver concepts, requirements, and future force designs, and support delivery of modernization solutions. Most importantly, it would position the Navy for the future by setting strategic direction, integrating the Navy’s future force-modernization enterprise, aligning resources to priorities, and maintaining accountability for modernization solutions.

The budget dominates all OPNAV activities. The only way to guarantee the budget supports and serves the needs of Navy strategy and force planning is to ensure the CNO or VCNO has direct oversight via a dedicated senior leader who has no other writ. The director of the new Force-Planning Directorate should report to the CNO via the VCNO. A Force-Planning Directorate addressing force design with its long-range time horizons and long-range results will not survive in an environment dominated by short-term results unless OPNAV clearly understands that the Force-Planning Directorate is working directly for the CNO, and that the OPNAV directorates have a supporting relationship to this new staff. As the Navy historical record documents, anything less than a direct report will repeat OPNAV’s past mistakes and failed attempts.

The Force-Planning Directorate would draft for the CNO’s signature classified and unclassified version of these seven documents.

Warfighting concepts (current and future): Classified and unclassified versions do not exist for the 2045 timeframe. A classified version for the current timeframe exists (i.e., distributed maritime operations), but not an unclassified version. The Naval Warfare Development Center would support the development of these service-level concepts.
Red-blue net assessment: Classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist.
Description of a red-blue war (current and future): Classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist.
Force Structure Assessment: Unclassified versions do not currently exist. The June 2023 Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report will provide a classified version.
Navy force planning blueprint (current and future): Classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist.
Thirty-year shipbuilding plan: An unclassified version exists.
Battle force ship assessment and requirement report: A classified version exists. The June 2023 version of this report could potentially serve as a classified Force Structure Assessment.

The Warfighting Concepts would establish a baseline understanding to set conditions for effective concept-driven, threat-informed force planning, in order to produce a Navy Force Planning Blueprint. It would be based on a common understanding of the current and future security environments and a shared articulation of how the Navy fights as a whole, and not merely as a collection of individual classes of platforms. It would be the Navy’s comprehensive plan—not a strategy—to integrate, align, and synchronize all its force-planning efforts, including the efforts of force development and force planning along with the ongoing production of new ships, aircraft, and weapons systems to produce the Navy fighting machine (i.e., a unified combination of air, surface, and subsurface Navy lethality). Figure 2a depicts the consolidated production of the Navy’s eleven key strategic guidance documents from numerous OPNAV organizational elements to just two.

Establishment of this new Force-Planning Directorate topples the budget process as OPNAV’s dominant process. Force planning would become OPNAV’s center of gravity, with the budget in support, and no longer the other way around. It turns over the proverbial apple cart, with force planning reporting directly to the CNO and leading a strategic-centric staff dialogue, as opposed to a budget-centric dialogue. This reversal will generate strong resistance from N8 and N9 in particular. Because the Force Planning Directorate will be the primus inter pares, and as the other OPNAV directorates are all headed by a vice admiral, the new Force-Planning Directorate must likewise be headed by a vice admiral or else be doomed to failure.

This new Force-Planning Directorate requires the capability to conduct Navy net assessments for strategic analysis of red-blue interactions for informed and realistic plans. Net assessments (along with defense analysis) are diagnostic means, whereas force planning is a prescriptive means. The two belong together; if not, dysfunction will continue to hamstring efforts. This capability does not currently exist in OPNAV, and would require new personnel resources.

Resourcing the recommendations

The resources to make these recommendations real are readily available; it is just a matter of resetting priorities. The Navy is under heavy congressional fire for its strategy-development and force-planning efforts. Correcting this situation for the long term is surely one of the Navy’s highest priorities.

Given these circumstances, can the Navy say, for example, that the large number of officers assigned to the front office of its three-star leaders is more important than staffing its capability for strategy development and force planning? Again, it is a matter of priorities. If staffing these front offices is more important than retrieving control of force planning from the National Commission on the Future of the Navy, then so be it. It is simply a matter of priorities, and making the tough choices that many leaders say they like to do. Here is another opportunity.

For the reasons presented in this paper, leadership of the Navy Strategy Cell and Force-Planning Directorate requires senior flag officers. Disestablishing the N7 directorate would provide the vice admiral billet to lead the Force-Planning Directorate and a rear admiral billet to head the Navy Strategy Cell. The majority of N7’s functions can return to OPNAV N3/N5 and a portion of N7’s functions can relocate to staff the Navy Strategy Cell and the Force-Planning Directorate.

While there are no perfect organizational frameworks, there are organizational frameworks that better align a greater number of common functions, as outlined in these recommendations. A strategy office reporting to the corporate chief executive officer—in the Navy’s case, the CNO—is a proven practice, and a direct-report senior leader responsible for all Navy force planning is no different than having the Naval Nuclear Propulsion and Nuclear Weapons Program/Strategic Systems Programs as direct reports.

The emphasis of the proposals in this white paper is on strategy-development and force-planning reinvigoration and reasonable consolidation of similar functions, given the centrality of Navy strategy and force planning to all other OPNAV responsibilities. Force planning, if done properly with strategy in the lead and with its capstone strategic-guidance documents, will generate enormous benefits.

Conclusion

Congress has lost patience and confidence in the Navy. There is no way to sugarcoat this action. It is nothing less than a strong condemnation of the Navy’s approach to strategy development and force planning. When US Representative Rob Wittman (R-VA) in December 2022 penned his scathing commentary in Defense News, he was on target in stating, “if the Navy refuses to learn lessons from this year, it will be doomed to repeat them.”⁴⁰

The warning signs have been evident for years. However, much like the Navy’s Bureau of Ordnance’s stubborn, twenty-one-month resistance in World War II to correct three major defects of the Mark 14 torpedo, the Navy since the end of the Cold War has neglected its strategy enterprise and resisted effective force planning.⁴¹ It has repeatedly failed to understand and act on the mismatch between OPNAV’s robust organization for building the budget and its ineffective organization for developing and implementing Navy strategy.

The Navy needs to think and act like it did in the 1920s and 1930s, when it prepared to confront the Imperial Japanese Navy. The US Navy’s strategy, future security environment, and warfighting concept were all reflected in nineteen iterations to its War Plan Orange and updates to the Rainbow series of war plans. The Naval War College focused its curriculum and wargames throughout the 1930s on defeating the Imperial Japanese Navy, and almost every Navy flag officer was a war-college graduate. While far from perfect, the Navy of the past shared a common view of what a war with Imperial Japan entailed and clearly understood logistics were a top-tier priority for warfare across the vast distances of the Pacific. Likewise, in 2023, the Navy needs the same level of focus and preparation as its predecessor, and the proposed Navy Strategy Cell and Force Planning Directorate will help ensure it is ready for whatever lies ahead.

The author would like to be more of an optimist than a realist, but the Navy continues to allow mistakes to go uncorrected decade after decade. It is, like Winston Churchill stated, a “long dismal catalogue of the fruitlessness of experience and the confirmed unteachability of mankind.”⁴² It is foolish to believe that the Navy will change on its own to conduct more effective strategy development and force planning.⁴³ The only way the Navy will change is for Congress to direct it, or else the Navy will continue with its flawed ways.

About the author

Bruce Stubbs

As a member of the Senior Executive Service for the Department of the Navy, Bruce Stubbs served on the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) staff from June 2011 to September 2022 as the Director of Strategy and Strategic Concepts (OPNAV N7), the Director of Strategy (OPNAV N3/5), and the Deputy Director of Strategy and Policy (OPNAV N3/5). Prior to those assignments, he served on the Secretary of the Navy’s immediate staff from June 2008 to May 2011 with responsibility for the coordination and implementation of Maritime Domain Awareness programs, policies, and related issues across the Defense Department.

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

1 Borrowed from, Bradley A. Fiske, The Navy as a Fighting Machine (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1916). He wrote the Navy, “must first determine the units of the force and their relation to each other: it must, in other words, design the machine.” Its use herein represents the ultimate objective of Navy force planning, i.e., an integrated combination of air, surface, sub-surface, and cyberspace lethality for the Navy to fight as a unified whole.

2 Mac [R-TX-13] Rep. Thornberry, “H.R.2810 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018,” Pub. L. No. 115–91 (2017), http://www.congress.gov/; Mark T. Esper, “Chapter 7: The Politics of Building a Better Navy,” in A Sacred Oath: Memoirs of a Secretary of Defense During Extraordinary Times, First edition. (New York, NY: William Morrow, an imprint of HarperCollins Publishers, 2022), p.196.

3 Please see section 1017 of, Rick [R-FL] Sen. Scott, “S.1605 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022,” Pub. L. No. 117–81 (2021), http://www.congress.gov/.

4 Section 1092 of, Peter A. [D-OR-4] Rep. DeFazio, “H.R.7776 – James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023,” Pub. L. No. 117–263 (2022), http://www.congress.gov/.

5 Lara Seligman, Lee Hudson, and Paul McLeary, “Inside the Pentagon Slugfest over the Future of the Fleet,” POLITICO, July 24, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/24/pentagon-slugfest-navy-fleet-00047551.For further background see, Sam LaGrone, “Lack of Future Fleet Plans, Public Strategy Hurting Navy’s Bottom Line in Upcoming Defense Bills,” USNI News, June 18, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/06/18/lack-of-future-fleet-plans-public-strategy-hurting-navys-bottom-line-in-upcoming-defense-bills; Sam LaGrone, “Navy Lacks ‘Clear Theory of Victory’ Needed to Build New Fleet, Experts Tell House Panel,” USNI News, June 4, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/06/04/navy-lacks-clear-theory-of-victory-needed-to-build-new-fleet-experts-tell-house-panel; Mark Cancian Saxton Adam and Mark Cancian, “The Spectacular & Public Collapse of Navy Force Planning,” Breaking Defense, January 28, 2020, https://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/2020/01/the-spectacular-public-collapse-of-navy-force-planning/.

6 Captain Scott Mobley, US Navy, Retired, “How to Rebalance the Navy’s Strategic Culture | Proceedings – November 2022 Vol. 148/11/1,437,” U.S. Naval Institute, November 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/how-rebalance-navys-strategic-culture.

7 Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare, First edition. (New York, NY: Hachette Books, Hachette Book Group, 2020).

8 Peter M. Swartz and Michael C. Markowitz, “Organizing OPNAV (1970 – 2009),” January 1, 2010, https://www.cna.org/reports/2010/organizing-opnav-1970-to-2009.

9 Peter D. Haynes, Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2015), p. 246.

10 Dimitry Filipoff, “Irv Blickstein on Programming the POM and Strategizing the Budget | Center for International Maritime Security,” 1980s Maritime Strategy Series (blog), March 26, 2021, https://cimsec.org/irv-blickstein-on-programming-the-pom-and-strategizing-the-budget/.

11 Dr. James A. Russell et al., “Navy Strategy Development: Strategy in the 21st Century,” Naval Research Program (Naval Postgraduate School in support of OPNAV N3/ N5, n.d.), https://news.usni.org/2015/07/24/document-naval-post-graudate-school-study-on-u-s-navy-strategy-development.

12 Commander Gordon G. Riggle, “Looking to the Long Run,” U.S. Naval Institute, September 1980, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1980/september/looking-long-run.

13 CNO Admiral Mike Gilday, “Chief of Naval Operations Navigation Plan 2022,” CNO Navigation Plan (US Navy, July 22, 2023). .

14 Sam LaGrone, “CNO Gilday: Next-Generation Air Dominance Will Come Ahead of DDG(X) Destroyer,” USNI News, January 18, 2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/01/18/cno-gilday-next-generation-air-dominance-will-come-ahead-of-ddgx-destroyer.

15 A Navy problem statement can either be posed as a question about how to solve an issue or as a negative statement.

16 Mackubin Thomas Ownes, “Force Planning: The Crossroads of Strategy and the Political Process – Foreign Policy Research Institute,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 1, 2015, https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/07/force-planning-the-crossroads-of-strategy-and-the-political-process/.

17 Thomas Hone, Private memorandum to author, March 9, 2023.

18 Mackubin Thomas Ownes, “Force Planning: The Crossroads of Strategy and the Political Process – Foreign Policy Research Institute,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 1, 2015, https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/07/force-planning-the-crossroads-of-strategy-and-the-political-process/.

19 The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory generates and examines threat-informed, operating concepts and capabilities and provides analytically-supported recommendations to inform subsequent force design and development activities.

20 Captain Scott Mobley, Retired, “How to Rebalance the Navy’s Strategic Culture | Proceedings – November 2022 Vol. 148/11/1,437,” U.S. Naval Institute, November 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/how-rebalance-navys-strategic-culture..

21 Mobley, Retired, “How to Rebalance the Navy’s Strategic Culture | Proceedings – November 2022 Vol. 148/11/1,437.”

22 Megan Eckstein, “Memo Reveals US Navy Must Pick between Future Destroyer, Fighter or Sub for FY23 Plan,” Defense News, June 8, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/06/08/memo-navy-will-have-to-pick-between-its-future-destroyer-fighter-and-sub-in-fiscal-2023-planning/.

23 Sam LaGrone, “CNO Gilday: Next-Generation Air Dominance Will Come Ahead of DDG(X) Destroyer,” USNI News, January 18, 2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/01/18/cno-gilday-next-generation-air-dominance-will-come-ahead-of-ddgx-destroyer.

24 Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare, First edition. (New York, NY: Hachette Books, Hachette Book Group, 2020).

25 Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy DDG(X) Next-Generation Destroyer Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” In Focus (Congressional Research Service, March 23, 2023), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11679.

26 Captain Gerald G. O’Rourke, USN (Ret.), “Great Operators, Good Administrators, Lousy Planners,” U.S. Naval Institute, August 1984, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1984/august/great-operators-good-administrators-lousy-planners.
Jr Krepinevich, The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers (New Haven ; Yale University Press, 2023), https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300271584, p. 19.

27 Jr Krepinevich, The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers (New Haven ; Yale University Press, 2023), https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300271584, p. 19.

28 Formally titled as the Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year XXXX.

29 Mark Cancian Saxton Adam and Mark Cancian, “The Spectacular & Public Collapse of Navy Force Planning,” Breaking Defense, January 28, 2020, https://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/2020/01/the-spectacular-public-collapse-of-navy-force-planning/.As noted, “Planning for a 21st century Navy of unmanned vessels, distributed operations, and great power competition has collapsed. Trapped by a 355-ship force goal, a reduced budget, and a fixed counting methodology, the Navy can’t find a feasible solution to the difficult question of how its forces should be structured. As a result, the Navy postponed announcement of its new force structure assessment (FSA) from January to “the spring.” That means the navy will not be able to influence the 2021 budget year much, forfeiting a major opportunity to reshape the fleet and bring it in line with the national defense strategy.”

30 Mark T. Esper, “Chapter 7: The Politics of Building a Better Navy,” in A Sacred Oath: Memoirs of a Secretary of Defense During Extraordinary Times, First edition. (New York, NY: William Morrow, an imprint of HarperCollins Publishers, 2022), p. 200. Captain Scott Mobley, USN (Ret.), “How to Rebalance the Navy’s Strategic Culture | Proceedings – November 2022 Vol. 148/11/1,437,” U.S. Naval Institute, November 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/how-rebalance-navys-strategic-culture.

31 Captain Scott Mobley, USN (Ret.), “How to Rebalance the Navy’s Strategic Culture | Proceedings – November 2022 Vol. 148/11/1,437,” U.S. Naval Institute, November 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/how-rebalance-navys-strategic-culture.

32 Captain Gerald G. O’Rourke, USN (Ret.), “Great Operators, Good Administrators, Lousy Planners,” U.S. Naval Institute, August 1984, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1984/august/great-operators-good-administrators-lousy-planners.

33 O’Rourke, USN (Ret.), “Great Operators, Good Administrators, Lousy Planners.”

34 Jr Krepinevich, The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers (New Haven ; Yale University Press, 2023), https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300271584, p. 401.

35 Mark T. Esper, “Chapter 7: The Politics of Building a Better Navy,” in A Sacred Oath: Memoirs of a Secretary of Defense During Extraordinary Times, First edition. (New York, NY: William Morrow, an imprint of HarperCollins Publishers, 2022), p. 200.

36 Esper, “Chapter 7: The Politics of Building a Better Navy.”

37 Esper, “Chapter 7: The Politics of Building a Better Navy.”

38 Peter M. Swartz, William Rosenau, and Hannah Kates, “The Origins and Development of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2015),” 136 (Center for Naval Analyses, September 18, 2017), https://www.cna.org/reports/2017/origins-and-development-of-cooperative-strategy.

39 Rumelt, Richard P. Good Strategy Bad Strategy: The Difference and Why It Matters. Crown Publishing Group, Random House. New York. 2011.

40 Rob Rep. Wittman, [R-VA-1], “Congress Is Building a Stronger Fleet than the Navy,” Defense News, December 1, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/12/15/congress-is-building-a-stronger-fleet-than-the-navy/.

41 Clay Blair, Silent Victory: The U.s. Submarine War Against Japan., 1st edition (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975).

42 Robert Kagan, The Ghost at the Feast: America and the Collapse of World Order, 1900-1941, First edition. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2023), p. 468.

43 Leonard Dr. Wong and Stephen Dr. Gerras, “Changing Minds In The Army: Why It Is So Difficult and What To Do About It,” Monographs, Collaborative Studies, & IRPs, October 1, 2013, 48, p. 20.

The post Building a navy fighting machine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wagner fallout: Time to begin preparing for a post-Putin Russia

Oleksiy Goncharenko — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 20:48:03 +0000

The recent revolt by Russia’s Wagner Group was a short-lived affair but the repercussions continue to be felt throughout the Russian Federation and beyond. Perhaps the biggest single lesson from the aborted coup is the fragility of the Putin regime. For many years, the Kremlin has sought to present Vladimir Putin as a powerful and popular ruler exercising complete control over a loyal and disciplined power vertical. The Wagner uprising has now shattered this myth of Putin the strongman.

Ever since coming to power at the turn of the millennium, Putin has sought to portray himself as an uncompromising and macho leader. He has frequently employed vulgar slang when promising to dispatch his opponents, and has notoriously engaged in a series of PR stunts including posing topless on horseback and scuba-diving to “discover” ancient Greek urns. However, there was little sign of this tough guy persona during the early stages of the Wagner revolt in late June. As Wagner troops captured Rostov-on-Don and began to march on Moscow, the Russian dictator was nowhere to be seen. He did not appear until the second day of the mutiny, when he delivered a brief video address.

The Kremlin appears to recognize the seriousness of the situation, and has since embarked on an intensive post-putsch PR offensive designed to repair public perceptions of Putin. In the days following the Wagner drama, the Russian dictator has made a flurry of carefully choreographed appearances emphasizing national unity and regime stability. However, this sudden burst of activity has only served to highlight the damage done by Putin’s earlier absence. In a little over twenty-four hours, the Putin regime was exposed as significantly weaker than almost anybody had previously imagined. Despite the best efforts of the Kremlin propaganda machine, this fact is plain as day to both the international community and the Russian elite.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Nobody will have failed to notice that while Putin has continued to talk tough, he failed to crush the Wagner uprising and instead struck some kind of deal with Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his mutinous troops. Putin demonstrated a readiness to compromise despite the fact that Wagner fighters reportedly shot down a number of Russian aircraft and killed numerous Russian airmen. This indicated an apparent lack of concern for the lives of Russian servicemen at a time when tens of thousands of Russian soldiers have already been killed as a result of Putin’s fateful decision to invade Ukraine.

The brief Wagner uprising also revealed a remarkable shortage of Russian military strength and fighting spirit on the home front. Wagner troops were able to seize one of Russia’s largest cities, Rostov-on-Don, without a fight. Perhaps even more significantly, they were cheered and supported by crowds of locals. Wagner forces then advanced to within 200 kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed before choosing to turn back.

Meanwhile, there was no surge in street-level or elite support for Putin. Instead, pro-war propagandists fell largely silent as rumors swirled of establishment figures fleeing Moscow. For a brief period, Russia looked to be leaderless and defenseless. The immediate danger has now passed, but these stunning developments have changed attitudes toward Putin and his regime in fundamental ways.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

It would appear that history repeats itself. Just as in 1990 very few foresaw the looming collapse of the USSR, Russia now once again looks suddenly fragile. Unsurprisingly, this is regarded as good news in Ukraine, where any sign of Russian instability is welcomed. Attitudes elsewhere are not so clear-cut. Many international observers are openly alarmed by the potential demise of the Russian Federation in its current form. They worry about the fate of Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal, and also question the legitimacy of the many new states that could potentially emerge from the wreckage of Putin’s Russia.

These concerns mirror attitudes during the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union. Indeed, it is often forgotten that US President George Bush H. W. Bush came to Kyiv in the weeks before Ukraine’s August 1991 declaration of independence to argue against such a move in his “Chicken Kiev” speech. Many of today’s leaders share these fears over the potential disintegration of Russia. Nevertheless, the Wagner revolt has demonstrated that the Putin regime may well collapse due to its own internal weaknesses, regardless of the Western world’s wishes.

Elements of the international community, including in the West, also cling to the idea of reaching some kind of compromise and returning to business as usual with Russia. While it is obvious to almost everyone in Ukraine and in nearby countries including Poland and the Baltic states that Russia will only stop when it is decisively defeated, there are still many observers elsewhere who believe they can turn back the clock to 2021 or even 2013. They fondly recall a time when Vladimir Putin was the respected leader of a economically strong nation at the heart of global affairs, and dream of returning to this state of affairs. Such thinking is dangerously delusional.

In reality, there can be no way back to international respectability for Putin. As a result of the disastrous invasion of Ukraine, he will be an enemy of the entire Western world for as long as he remains in power. Crucially for the future of his regime, Putin is also clearly no longer able to guarantee domestic security or protect the interests of the Russian elite on the international stage.

As the international community assesses the fallout from the Wagner revolt, it no longer makes sense to be afraid of a new Russian collapse. On the contrary, the time has come to begin preparing for the possibility of a post-Putin Russia. Western policymakers should now be thinking seriously about how to make any future transition as smooth as possible. This means preparing for the emergence of a democratic Russia, and also exploring what a breakup of the current Russian Federation into a number of smaller states would mean for international security.

When similar processes were underway in the early 1990s, the international community prioritized stability above all else, paving the way for the eventual rise of a revisionist Russia under Putin. This time, a new Russian collapse should be managed in order to bring about a sustainable shift toward democracy. The experience of the past three decades has demonstrated that this is the only way to secure a durable peace. Today’s Western leaders must learn from the mistakes of their predecessors in order to avoid repeating them.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a member of the Ukrainian parliament with the European Solidarity party.

Wagner putsch is symptomatic of Russia’s ongoing imperial decline

Richard Cashman, Lesia Ogryzko — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 20:14:43 +0000

The attempted putsch by Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his Wagner troops in late June is perhaps best understood as a symptom of Russia’s ongoing imperial decline. Much like the invasion of Ukraine itself, it is part of a broader historical process that can be traced back to 1989 and the fall of the Soviet incarnation of the Russian Empire in Central and Eastern Europe.

Anyone looking to make sense of recent events in Russia should begin by noting that Prigozhin’s dramatic actions were not aimed at ending the war in Ukraine or steering Russia away from its increasingly totalitarian course. On the contrary, he sought to correct mistakes in the conduct of the invasion by effecting changes in the country’s military leadership.

This should come as no surprise. The vast majority of Prigozhin’s public statements about the invasion of Ukraine align him with prominent ultranationalists, which in the Russian context translates into imperial reactionaries. This group is demanding a fuller commitment to the war against Ukraine which, with Belarus, it sees as the core of Russia’s imperial heartlands. Ideally, this group wants to see full mobilization of Russia’s citizens and the country’s productive capacity for the war effort.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Prigozhin is not generally regarded as a member of Putin’s inner circle, but he is believed to have supporters within the Kremlin elite, some of whom may have backed or sympathized with his uprising. This support reflects widespread demands among members of the Russian establishment for national leadership that can arrest and reverse the process of imperial retreat which began in 1989.

It is also clear that Prigozhin enjoyed significant backing from ordinary Russians and, probably, ordinary soldiers. Support for Prigozhin amongst the Russian public is rooted in anger over the mismanagement of the invasion and endemic state corruption along with dissatisfaction over the prospect of increasing costs without identifiable gains in Ukraine.

The scale of public sympathy for the putsch could be seen in videos of Rostov-on-Don residents congratulating Wagner troops on capturing the city while bringing them food and water. It was also striking that Rostov-on-Don and its Southern Military District headquarters were seized without a fight, while Wagner troops were able to advance to within two hundred kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed, despite passing close to numerous Russian army bases. Prigozhin’s tough rhetoric and hawkish attacks on Russia’s military leadership clearly resonate widely among large numbers of ordinary Russians.

Prigozhin’s abruptly abandoned putsch reinforces the lesson that coups are relatively common in Russia, whereas genuine revolutions are not. Vladimir Putin and the clan which took control of Russia at the turn of the millennium in many ways see themselves as the heirs to the 1991 coup plotters who attempted but failed to prevent the unravelling of the USSR. Their own vulnerability to being overthrown in similar fashion has now been laid bare before the Russian public and the wider world.

The course of the war to date, including cross-border incursions by Ukrainian-backed Russian militias into Russia’s Belgorod and Bryansk regions, had already fractured the facade of monolithic strength so carefully projected by the Kremlin throughout Putin’s twenty-three-year reign. Prigozhin’s putsch has further exposed the brittleness of the regime and of the Russian state. It has highlighted the very real possibility of turmoil and transformation within the country, which so many observers previously thought impossible.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Policymakers around the world must now prepare for a range of dramatic scenarios in Putin’s Russia. This planning should involve studying the more than 100 nationalities within the Russian Federation, their cultures and political aspirations, as well as possible fracture lines between regional and business interests.

More specifically, governments must begin to plan for a post-Putin Russia. Putin’s elderly clan represents the last of the Soviet-era elites and their distinct embrace of Russia’s imperial consciousness. That imperial identity will not disappear overnight, but Putin’s obvious overreach in Ukraine and events like Prigozhin’s putsch are likely to engender a less certain sense of imperial destiny.

Putin has emerged from the Wagner putsch a significantly weakened figure, especially among members of the Russian establishment who once saw him as a guarantor of stability. He has also been embarrassed internationally and now looks a far less reliable partner for countries such as China, India, and Brazil that have so far sought to remain neutral over the invasion of Ukraine.

Moving forward, there will be considerable paranoia within the Russian establishment as suspicion swirls regarding potentially shifting loyalties. Rumors continue to circulate regarding measures targeting military and security service personnel who failed to oppose the Wagner uprising. The invasion of Ukraine has already seriously eroded trust within Russian society; Prigozhin’s actions and Putin’s timid response will intensify this negative trend.

Ukraine’s partners cannot control the processes set in train by the Wagner episode, but they can surge military support for Ukraine and embrace bolder policies that reflect the revealed weakness of the Putin regime. The fact that Putin was apparently prepared to strike a deal with Prigozhin further demonstrates that the Russian dictator is inclined to back down rather than escalate when confronted by a resolute opponent or faced with the prospect of possible defeat.

Prigozhin’s putsch was a brief but revealing event in modern Russian history. It hinted at deep-seated dissatisfaction among both the elite and the Russian public over the country’s inability to reclaim what it perceives as its imperial heartlands, and served as a reminder that the imperial Russian state is still collapsing.

The Russian decline that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall is ongoing, with Putin and his clan seeking but failing to reverse the settlement of 1991. This path has led to a war based on imperial fantasies that may now hasten the real end of empire. The Wagner putsch did not bring down Putin’s regime which seeks to maintain empire, but it may come to be seen as the beginning of its end.

Richard Cashman and Lesia Ogryzko are fellows at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

Putin’s Wagner weakness is a signal to support Ukraine’s counteroffensive

Taras Kuzio — Thu, 29 Jun 2023 20:57:02 +0000

The recent Wagner mutiny in Russia was a short-lived affair but it has succeeded in exposing the myth of Vladimir Putin as a formidable political strongman who will go to extremes to achieve his goals. In reality, Putin’s failure to punish mutinous troops who seized a major Russian city and marched on Moscow has revealed him as a weak leader who is more inclined to capitulate than escalate.

This makes a mockery of longstanding international concerns over “provoking Putin” that have done so much to slow down the flow of Western military aid to Ukraine over the past sixteen months. The Russian dictator’s feeble response to the Wagner rebellion should now serve as a strong signal to increase Western support for Ukraine’s current counteroffensive.

Putin’s handling of the Wagner mutiny compares unfavorably to the conduct of his predecessor in the Kremlin, Boris Yeltsin, and that of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Yeltsin famously led opposition to the failed coup in August 1991 that sealed the fate of the USSR. When the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Zelenskyy rejected offers to evacuate and instead announced that he was staying in Kyiv. In contrast, Putin was notably absent during the first day of the Wagner mutiny when Russia appeared to be in real danger. Subsequent attempts to minimize the damage via a series of carefully choreographed public appearances have merely served to highlight Putin’s earlier absence.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

In hindsight, none of this is surprising. Throughout his career, Putin has made a habit of backing down whenever he has found himself confronted by a determined adversary. In 2014, Putin occupied Crimea without a fight but then got cold feet when faced with fierce resistance in eastern Ukraine. Instead of pressing home his overwhelming military advantage and seizing the whole of eastern and southern Ukraine, he settled for less than half of the Donbas region. Likewise, Putin ordered no direct military response when Turkey shot down a Russian jet in 2015, and took no action three years later when clashes with US forces in Syria led to the heavy casualties among Russian Wagner troops.

Like a true bully, Putin only embarked on the full-scale invasion of Ukraine because he believed the country was an easy target. His intelligence agencies claimed the Ukrainian military would not fight back and assured him that most ordinary Ukrainians would welcome his invading army as liberators. Crucially, Putin was also confident the Western response would be as half-hearted as it had been in 2014 when he invaded Crimea and eastern Ukraine. These miscalculations have proven extremely costly for Russia.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Ukraine’s resolute resistance and the West’s powerful military support have placed Putin in a quandary. He has responded with empty bluster, declaring a series of meaningless red lines while refraining from any attacks on the NATO countries engaged in arming Ukraine. Throughout the war, Putin has used nuclear blackmail in a bid to intimidate Western leaders, but even this extreme measure is proving increasingly ineffective. In September 2022, he vowed to use nuclear weapons to defend recently annexed Ukrainian lands, declaring, “I’m not bluffing.” However, when Ukrainian forces called his bluff and continued to advance, he did not act on his earlier nuclear threats.

This lack of decisive leadership has contributed to the poor battlefield performance of the Russian army in Ukraine. Demoralized Russian troops have barely advanced since summer 2022, and spent more than ten months capturing the small city of Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine. Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin was at pains to state that his recent mutiny was against Russia’s army chiefs rather than Putin himself, but the Russian dictator must ultimately accept personal responsibility for the disastrous invasion. After all, he has stood by his failing commanders despite their obvious shortcomings, and has consistently placed loyalty above competence.

Putin’s emphasis on loyalty reflects his fear of domestic opposition. For much of his reign, he has been preoccupied with the idea of losing power through a popular uprising or palace coup. This has led to the elimination of all political opponents and the silencing of independent media in today’s Russia. It has also shaped the conduct of the current war, with Putin deeply reluctant to undertake a new round of mobilization that could further destabilize the situation inside Russia.

The Wagner mutiny demonstrated that these fears of a domestic uprising are entirely justified. Wagner troops were able to capture Rostov-on-Don without a fight and then advance virtually unopposed across Russia to within 200 kilometers of Moscow. Strikingly, thousands of ordinary Russians in Rostov-on-Don welcomed the Wagner takeover of the city and openly demonstrated their backing for the mutiny.

Meanwhile, there was little evidence of any surge in support for Putin, either among the public or within the ranks of the Russian military and security services. Putin’s obvious reluctance to hold Prigozhin or his troops accountable for their actions has now further undermined morale within the armed forces and raised the prospect of infighting engulfing Russia.

Putin’s toothless response to Prigozhin’s mutiny has sent a signal that he is far from the all-powerful ruler of Kremlin propaganda, and is in fact much weaker than previously imagined. Many within the Russian elite now recognize this reality and are growing increasingly alarmed over the fragility of the current regime. They understand that Putin has lost his legitimacy as a strongman ruler and is leading Russia toward an uncertain future of deepening domestic divisions and international isolation. Understandably, thoughts are now turning to the post-Putin era.

Western leaders should respond to the Wagner affair by doubling down on their military aid to Ukraine. Ever since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, misplaced concerns over possible Russian escalation have served to limit weapons deliveries to Kyiv, when a more decisive approach might have already ended the war. With Putin’s weakness now on display for all to see, the time has come to provide Ukraine with everything it needs to secure victory.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. His latest book is “Genocide and Fascism. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

With Russia’s most effective troops no longer playing a prominent role in the invasion, this will increase the options for Ukrainian commanders as they look to develop the country’s current summer counteroffensive. This may have particular significance for the frontline sector close to Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine, where Wagner units were instrumental in securing earlier Russian gains. Ukrainian forces have already made significant advances to the north and south of Bakhmut, and will now be looking to capitalize on the destabilizing impact of the Wagner rebellion in order to push further.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Ukraine’s military planners may also be encouraged to expand on earlier incursions into the Russian Federation itself. The Wagner mutiny exposed a shocking lack of military defenses inside Russia, with Russian army officials scrambling to assemble units and gather equipment from across the country. Prigozhin was able to seize the major Russian city of Rostov-on-Don without a fight, including the military headquarters of the entire Ukraine invasion. His troops then advanced virtually unopposed through the Russian heartlands before unilaterally deciding to end their march on Moscow less than two hundred kilometers from the capital city. In the space of a single day, an apparently defenseless Russia found itself on the brink of either civil war or collapse.

This remarkable state of affairs was possible because Putin has deployed the vast majority of Russia’s military potential to Ukraine. The Wagner revolt demonstrated conclusively that there are no more reserves to draw upon. Putin is already close to the maximum of his capacity and has very limited possibilities to escalate the invasion of Ukraine, even if he wished to do so.

This creates all manner of tempting opportunities for Ukraine, which has so far been careful to limit the scope of its military activities inside Russia, in part due to concerns voiced by Kyiv’s international partners. That may now change. In the weeks prior to the start of Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive, Ukrainian-backed Russian militias launched a number of cross-border raids from Ukraine into Russia’s Belgorod region. While these thrusts were largely symbolic, Ukraine could soon become more ambitious. With the Putin regime seemingly unable to defend itself and in no position to escalate, we may witness bolder Ukrainian military operations on Russian territory.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of the whole Wagner drama from a Ukrainian perspective was the obvious weakness and division it exposed within Russia. Any country fighting a major war needs unity, and today’s Russia is clearly not united. Members of the public in Rostov-on-Don and elsewhere appear to have enthusiastically backed the rebellion, while others were indifferent. The limited military presence inside Russia made no serious attempts to intervene, while there was little indication of any surge in public support for Putin or condemnation of Prigozhin. This is all a very long way from the propaganda image promoted by the Kremlin of a strong Russian state supported by a proudly patriotic populace.

The situation in Russia is not yet comparable to the mood in 1917 on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, but the Wagner mutiny is an extremely dangerous signal for Russian society. Any infighting is bad for morale, and the spectacle of Russia’s most successful military force turning against the country’s military leaders is particularly demoralizing. This will damage the fighting spirit of Russian troops in Ukraine while also seriously undermining Putin’s personal authority on the home front.

For Ukraine, the outlook is more promising. The Wagner mutiny was a brief affair, but it has led to the sidelining of Russia’s most effective fighting force while also highlighting the weaknesses and limitations of the Putin regime. This could create practical opportunities for Ukraine’s current counteroffensive, and will boost confidence in the country’s ultimate ability to achieve a decisive victory over Russia.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk is chairman of the Center for Defence Strategies and an advisor to the Ukrainian Government. He previously served as Ukraine’s minister of defense (2019–2020).

Depending on the exact nature of the agreement to end the mutiny, many Wagner fighters may well return to the frontlines, possibly integrated into the regular Russian army. However, their non-Wagner comrades and commanders will understandably treat them with extreme suspicion, limiting their impact on the battlefield. Whatever happens next, the days when Wagner troops led the Russian invasion of Ukraine look to be over.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

The revolt also highlighted the relative defenselessness of Russia itself. Wagner troops took almost a year to occupy the small Ukrainian city of Bakhmut but seized the nearly twenty times larger Russian city Rostov-on-Don without a fight in a matter of hours. Indeed, it is worth underlining that Rostov-on-Don is by far the biggest city captured by Russian troops since the start of Putin’s so-called “Special Military Operation” sixteen months ago. Russia’s lack of domestic defenses was further exposed by the unhindered progress of Prigozhin’s armored column, which advanced to within two hundred kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed before deciding to turn back.

While the immediate threat of a march on Moscow is now over, drastic measures are clearly required to bolster Russian domestic security. Putin knows the watching world has noted this vulnerability. He must now urgently take visible steps to prevent another ambitious Russian warlord or Ukrainian army commander from launching a new campaign inside his unprotected borders. Where will Putin find the necessary troops and equipment for this? With the vast majority of Russia’s military currently deployed in Ukraine, the answer to this question is both obvious and awkward. Russia will have no choice but to reduce its invasion force in order to address the country’s serious domestic security issues.

Russia’s vast military and state security apparatus will also now find itself engaged in the hunt for traitors and possible turncoats, which will inevitably distract attention and resources away from the task of defeating Ukraine. Infighting between the various different military clans has been a debilitating factor throughout the Russian invasion of Ukraine; this trend will now intensify as the Russian authorities look to settle scores with the many police chiefs, local officials, and military commanders who either stood aside or discreetly backed the Wagner mutiny.

Meanwhile, the mutiny has raised some fundamental questions over Putin’s continued ability to rule. He was notably absent during the initial hours of the crisis, only appearing the following morning in a brief video address to the nation. He also seems to have been sidelined in negotiations with Prigozhin, allowing Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka to take the lead. These are not the actions of a strongman ruler. As Atlantic Council Eurasia Center Senior Director and former US Ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst noted on CNN, “It’s like Prigozhin is the person who looked behind the screen at the Wizard of Oz and saw the great and terrible Oz was just this little frightened man. Putin has been diminished for all time by this affair.”

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

While these factors will all undermine the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the most important impact is likely to be on morale within the ranks of the Russian military. Demoralization was already a major issue for Putin’s invasion force, with a steady stream of video addresses on social media during the first half of 2023 testifying to widespread dissatisfaction among Russian troops over “human wave” attacks and catastrophic losses. These problems will now intensify as Russian troops question the loyalties of their leaders and the entire purpose of the invasion.

On the eve of the mutiny, Prigozhin published an explosive video address in which he accused the Kremlin of deliberately misleading the Russian public over its justifications for the war in Ukraine. The Wagner chief, whom many in Russia see as one of the few credible commentators within the establishment, dismissed key elements of the official Kremlin narrative—including claims that the invasion preempted an imminent NATO-backed Ukrainian offensive against Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine and Crimea. He also directly denied widespread Russian allegations that the Ukrainian military had been bombing eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region for eight years prior to the full-scale invasion. Instead, Prigozhin blamed the war on the personal ambitions of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and individual Russian oligarchs.

Such statements will inevitably undermine fighting spirit among Russian troops and cause many to question exactly what they are fighting for in Ukraine. This has long been an issue for the Russian authorities, who have struggled to articulate their war aims amid lurid but unsubstantiated claims of “Ukrainian Nazis” and “Western imperialists.” Prigozhin’s damning comments exposing the lies used to justify the war have now cast an unforgiving light on the Kremlin’s credibility problems and will further fuel discontent among the Russian troops who are fighting and dying on the frontlines.

The short-lived Wagner mutiny has also exposed deep divides within Russia’s military and security establishment that indicate remarkably low levels of loyalty to the Putin regime. There has been some speculation that Prigozhin received support from within the military when planning and executing his mutiny, given that he was able to capture Rostov-on-Don with such apparent ease despite the fact that the city serves as the headquarters of the entire Ukraine invasion. Prigozhin’s armored column of Wagner troops then travelled hundreds of kilometers through the heart of Russia without encountering any significant military resistance.

The remarkable initial success of the Wagner mutiny in seizing control of a major city and advancing on the capital has sent shock waves through Russia that will also be felt by Putin’s occupation forces in Ukraine. If Russian soldiers and commanders are not prepared to defend their own country, why should troops deployed to Ukraine sacrifice themselves for such an apparently dubious cause? If Prigozhin and his private army can go unpunished for declaring war on the Russian state, why should ordinary mobilized Russians feel obliged to follow suicidal orders in Ukraine?

For obvious reasons, the Kremlin will now attempt to downplay the significance of the short-lived Wagner mutiny. In reality, however, the ramifications of this unprecedented event will reverberate for some time to come and will shape Russia’s future, including the outcome of the war in Ukraine. One year ago, Putin was boasting of returning historically Russian lands and comparing himself to Peter the Great. Today, he looks far more like Czar Nicholas II, whose military failures and weak leadership sparked mutiny and the eventual collapse of the Russian Empire.

The Wagner mutiny is further proof that Putin’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine has left Russia divided, demoralized, and weakened. With his own personal authority now rapidly evaporating, the Russian dictator may soon face domestic problems so grave that they will overshadow even the prospect of defeat in Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

In over forty years, many realities have changed. US imports of Gulf energy supplies declined. By contrast, US exports to the region have expanded many times over. The parties and conditions that would likely pose a threat to US trade and other relationships with the Gulf are now largely located within the region. In the 1980s and early 1990s, it was the Iraq-Iran War and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Recently, it has been nonstate terrorist groups and Iran.

In addition, the countries with which the United States has friendly relations don’t depend on the United States to do the job of Gulf security for them. These countries do want Washington to be a reliable partner in support of their individual and collective defense efforts. This is also the goal of the United States. Through diplomacy and through working with the US private sector, Gulf countries’ militaries have been connected to military contacts with US companies and joint exercises conducted by the US Central Command. That fits what the Arab countries in the region need, and it fits what the US political system can accept.

This takes me back to the Iranian attacks on tankers and other commercial vessels in the final years of the Iran-Iraq War. I was the US ambassador to the United Arab Emirates at the time. Together with other US envoys to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, I was called back to Washington in early 1987 for consultations at the US State Department.

Interested in regular updates?

Sign up for the MENASource newsletter, highlighting pieces that follow democratic transitions and economic changes throughout the region.

The Kuwaiti government had formally requested that the United States put its flags on Kuwaiti oil tankers in order to gain the protection of US naval warships. The Kuwaitis promised to reimburse the United States handsomely for the flagging operation and to steadfastly maintain it was merely a commercial arrangement. Kuwait wished to shun any overt military alliance with the United States; for example, it did not even welcome US Navy ship visits. Indeed, the United States only had a small contingent of warships in the Gulf at the time, homeported in Manama, Bahrain. The answer from Washington was negative. The Kuwaitis then redirected their request to the Soviet Union.

When the group of US envoys and I gathered in the State Department, it was clear that the White House and top US politicians were still disinclined to make a major commitment to protect neutral-flag shipping in the Gulf, despite the unanimity among those of us coming from our posts in the region—we were in favor of some kind of positive response. After a half day of talks, we were told that then US President Ronald Reagan did not want to allow an opportunity for the Soviet Union to bring its military force into the Gulf. So, for that reason (however flawed it may be), Operation Earnest Will was born.

The United States committed to sending a military presence sufficient to protect neutral-flag commercial shipping without spending time quibbling over whether the GCC countries were actually neutral in the Iran-Iraq War. When I returned to Abu Dhabi, I received a warm welcome from Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, who was then the president of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and soon after from the rulers of the UAE’s other six emirates and from Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the minister of defense. At the time, the UAE was a confederation that granted only limited federal powers and separated military commands across Dubai and several other northern emirates. Even without actual authority outside Abu Dhabi, a young rising star in the Abu Dhabi military command, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed, along with Dubai’s Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, eventually became key contacts for me as the United States ramped up its military presence in the Gulf.

When I had arrived at my post in September 1986, the United States was limited to a mere four visits per year by its Navy warships and had very limited military relationships with the UAE emirates. By the time I left in October 1989, the United States had a large number of Navy ship visits, refueling and even making critical ship repairs at the large (and, at the time, new) port of Jebel Ali, as well as at established ports from Abu Dhabi to the city of Fujairah. The United States was also on its way to becoming a major supplier of military aircraft to the UAE. The rulers of the seven emirates were seeking joint military exercises as well as ship visits. Moreover, the leaders of these individual emirates had responded to the crisis of the tanker wars and various other demands by strengthening federal powers.

Because the United States responded to the GCC countries during their time of need (the so-called Tanker War), a strategic partnership formed—one that became the foundation for cooperation to reverse the Iraqi military occupation of Kuwait in 1990. The success of Operation Desert Storm gave the United States political credibility to bring GCC countries and other Arab countries to the Madrid Conference, a peace conference geared toward reviving the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, at the end of 1991. Those talks between Israel and the United States built upon peace between Egypt and Israel negotiated with the help of the United States at Camp David in September 1978 and the peace treaty between those two former military adversaries in March 1979. Camp David, the Madrid Conference, and Israel’s growing relationships with countries ranging from the UAE in the east and Morocco in the west laid the foundation for normalization. In a shrewd move, the Trump administration labeled this growing interaction as the “Abraham Accords.” The Biden administration has continued to play a role as a convenor and mediator.

As the Biden administration continues to play this role, it and Congress will find that the Arab countries of the GCC want to do their part when it comes to Gulf security. They are not expecting the United States to be the policeman of their neighborhood. Along with other key Arab and global leaders, they will welcome the United States as a partner in facing shared strategic interests.

Defense coalitions have historically been tricky, requiring skill and mid-course corrections. As the United States continues to work with the Gulf on security, expect blips, such as the report of a UAE withdrawal from the Combined Maritime Forces, a US-led maritime coalition. But if the United States shows that it is ready to work together with Gulf countries, Washington can get this partnership back on course. Read more about improving Gulf security frameworks in our latest report here.

David Mack is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, a former deputy assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, and a former US ambassador to the United Arab Emirates.

The post The way for the US to ensure Gulf security is through partnership, not policing appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The 5×5—Cyber conflict in international relations: A scholar’s perspective

Simon Handler — Tue, 20 Jun 2023 04:01:00 +0000

This article is part of The 5×5, a monthly series by the Cyber Statecraft Initiative, in which five featured experts answer five questions on a common theme, trend, or current event in the world of cyber. Interested in the 5×5 and want to see a particular topic, event, or question covered? Contact Simon Handler with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at SHandler@atlanticcouncil.org.

Over the past decade, scholarly debate over the topic of cyber conflict’s place in international relations has evolved significantly. The idea that cyber tools would fundamentally change the nature of war and warfare has largely given way to the idea that cyber conflict is merely a different way of doing the same old things, and primarily suited for engaging in an intelligence contest. Other, less settled questions range from whether cyber operations are useful tools of signaling to if these operations lead to escalation. These unsettled questions remain active in scholarly literature and, critically, inform policymaking approaches.

We brought together a group of leading scholars to provide insights on cyber conflict’s role in international relations, how the topic can best be taught to students, and how scholars and policymakers can better incorporate each other’s perspectives.

 #1 What, in your opinion, is the biggest misconception about cyber conflict’s role in international relations theory?

Andrew Dwyer, lecturer in information security, Department of Information Security, Royal Holloway, University of London; steering committee lead, Offensive Cyber Working Group:

“[The biggest misconception is] that cyberspace is malleable and controllable. The environment is often presented tangentially and, when it is, it is often about how people use the terrains of computation. I think that a lack of attention on how the environment ‘shapes’ people is one of the greatest missing parts of international relations thought. Simply, the environment and terrain have much more impact than is typically accounted for.”

Melissa Griffith, lecturer in technology and national security, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and the Alperovitch Institute for Cybersecurity Studies; non-resident research fellow, University of California, Berkeley’s Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity (CLTC):

“Much of the scholarship focused on the intersection between cyber conflict and international relations theory has concentrated on capturing the nature of the evolving cyber threat. This has led, in turn, to ongoing and vibrant debates over whether (a) deterrence strategies are feasible or valuable, (b) cyberspace favors the offense or defense, (c) cyber operations are useful tools for coercion, (d) cyberspace is escalatory, or (e) strategic competition in cyberspace is best understood as an intelligence contest, for example. While these are important areas of focus, they have previously overshadowed other lines of inquiry. Such as, why we see variation in how states respond in practice, a line of inquiry that requires leveraging international relations theories beyond those focused on grappling with what best captures the dynamics of this new threat space as a whole.”

Richard Harknett, professor & director, School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA); chair, Center for Cyber Strategy and Policy (CCSP), University of Cincinnati:

“[The biggest misconception is] that the most salient impact of cyber operations should be in conflict; that is, the equivalent of armed attack and warfighting. Much of cybersecurity studies, itself, has focused on the construct of cyber war and thus international relations theory has primarily treated ‘cyber’ as another form of war, when the majority of state cyber activity is actually a strategic attempt to gain relative power via an alternative to war. I argue from a realist-structuralist perspective that the most fascinating theoretical question is the interplay between states struggle for autonomy and the organizing principle of interconnectedness that defines the cyber strategic environment.”

Jenny Jun, research fellow, CyberAI Project, Center for Security and Emerging Technology; nonresident fellow, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council; Ph.D. candidate, Department of Political Science, Columbia University:

“It is much more useful to think that conflict and competition have cyber dimensions to them, rather than to think that cyber conflict occurs in isolation.”

Jon Lindsay, associate professor, School of Cybersecurity and Privacy, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology:

“The biggest misconception remains that cyber operations are a revolution in military affairs akin to the invention of nuclear weapons. Cyber ‘conflict’ is better understood as the digital dimension of intelligence competition, between both state and nonstate competitors, which is an increasingly important and still understudied dimension of international relations.”

Michael Poznansky, associate professor, Strategic & Operational Research Department, US Naval War College; core faculty member, Cyber & Innovation Policy Institute:

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed below are the author’s alone and do not represent those of the U.S. Naval War College, the Department of Navy, the Department of Defense, or any government entity.

“One potential misconception is that we need entirely new theoretical frameworks to understand cyber conflict. Are there are distinctive attributes of cyberspace that should give us pause from unthinkingly applying existing international relations theories to it? You bet. But the real task—which many have been doing and are continuing to do—is to figure out where we can apply existing theories, perhaps with certain modifications, and where novel frameworks are genuinely needed.”

#2 What would you like to see change about how cyber conflict is widely taught?

Dwyer: “As much as there is frequent discussion about ‘interdisciplinarity’ in the study of cyber conflict, all too often we teach through and in silos. That is, we teach ‘from’ an angle, whether that be international relations, computer science, psychology, and so on. I think this does a disservice to the study of cyber conflict. I am not claiming for a wholly radical empiricism here, but about one that is less grounded in theory as a starting place for exploration.”

Griffith: “Notably, in this field, perhaps far more so than others, there is no uniform or widely pursued approach across classrooms, as pointed out by Herr, Laudrian, and Smeets in ‘Mapping the Known Unknowns of Cybersecurity Education‘. That said, students entering this field armed with social science and policy leaning coursework should be comfortable engaging with technical and private sector reporting alongside academic, government, and legal documents. At risk of straying beyond the focus of this topic (i.e., theory), I favor introducing students first to core technical foundations and operational realities—what is cyberspace and how has it evolved; how, when, and which groups hack; and how, where, and when does defense play out—before turning to policy, strategy, or theoretical debates. In my experience, this approach allows subsequent discussions of systemic, international, national, and subnational questions to be firmly grounded in the realities of the space.”

Harknett: “Cybersecurity is not a technical problem, but a political, economic, organizational, and behavioral challenge in a technically fluid environment. Thus, how cyber insecurity can be reduced and state competition in and through cyberspace can be stabilized should be taught from multiple perspectives across the computing and social sciences and humanities. Basically, a more multidisciplinary integrated, rather than segmented, approach to courses and curriculum.”

Jun: “There should be a greater effort to integrate literature on cyber conflict as part of bigger international relations themes such as coercion, signaling, trade, etc., and move away from viewing dynamics in cyberspace as monolithic. In many international relations syllabi, cyber conflict often appears at the very end (if at all) in about week thirteen as a standalone module. Often, the discussion question then becomes, “To what extent is cyber different from all of the traditional stuff we learned so far?” This not only leads to overgeneralizations about cyberspace and cyber conflict, but also nudges students into viewing cyber as something separate and distinct from other major themes and dynamics in international relations.”

Lindsay: “Two things that would improve cybersecurity education would be 1) to situate it in the history of intelligence and covert action, and 2) to give more attention to the political economy of cyberspace, which fundamentally shapes the dynamics of cyber conflict.”

Poznansky: “My hunch is that cyber conflict is often included in many international relations courses as part of a module on emerging technologies alongside space, autonomous systems, quantum, and so forth. Because cyberspace has relevance for almost all aspects of modern statecraft—warfighting, coercion, commerce, diplomacy—a better approach may be to consciously integrate it into modules on all these broader topics. Stand-alone courses also have high upside by allowing for a deep dive, but infusing cyber throughout discussions of major international relations concepts would offer a better foundation.”

#3 What is a piece of literature on cyber conflict theory that you recommend aspiring policymakers read closely and why?

Dwyer: “I think one of the best and underacknowledged written pieces is by JD Work, ‘Balancing on the Rail – considering responsibility and restraint in the July 2021 Iran Railways incident.’ In this piece, Work examines an incident on Iranian railways in July 2021. The explication of responsibility and restraint in offensive cyber operations is a must-read for anyone interested in the area.”

Griffith: “Whether or not readers agree with them, Michael Fisherkeller, Emily Goldman, and Richard Harknett’s Cyber Persistence Theory (2022) sets the stage for a productive and ongoing theoretical debate over the structural conditions animating cyberspace. Though an exercise in theory development rather than policy prescription, the book is not merely of interest to academics. Echoes of the underlying logic can be found animating US Cyber Command’s Persistent Engagement and the UK National Cyber Force’s recently released, ‘Responsible Cyber Power in Practice,’ for example.”

Harknett: “As Alexander George correctly wrote to bridge the gap between policy and theory, it is the theoretician that must cross-over the bridge to meet policymakers on their own turf. Two recent books that do a good job at this are Max Smeets’ No Short Cuts: Why States Struggle to Develop a Military Cyber-Force and a just released edited book from Smeets and Robert Chesney, Deter, Disrupt, or Deceive, which examines the debate between those who posit cyberspace as strategic competition and those who view it as an intelligence contest and thus apply research from intelligence studies. Misconceiving this fundamental categorization would have profound impact on policy development, and thus grappling with the difference between the two perspectives is important.”

Jun: “Aspiring policymakers should be familiar with the arguments made in Cyber Persistence Theory by Goldman, Fischerkeller, and Harknett, as well as the back-and-forth debate leading up to the publication of this book in various journals and opinion pieces. Ideas laid out in this book embody much of the thinking behind the 2018 US government pivot towards Persistent Engagement and Defend Forward away from a strategy based on deterrence by punishment. Reading the book as well as the debate around it will allow an aspiring policymaker to trace how certain characterizations of cyberspace and its functions will lead to corresponding theoretical predictions, and how such assessments are translated into strategy documents by various agencies.”

Lindsay: “I highly recommend the new volume by Robert Chesney and Max Smeets exploring the debate over cyber as an intelligence contest or something else. I also recommend that international relations scholars become more familiar with the Workshop on the Economics of Information Security community, which produces fascinating papers every year.”

Poznansky: “I am going to cheat and highlight two. First is an article by Jordan Branch looking at how the military’s use of familiar metaphors to understand and describe cyberspace affected investments and policy decisions. Branch shows that the comparisons we invoke to understand new phenomena have real-world impacts. Second is a new book by Erica Lonergan and Shawn Lonergan on the dynamics of escalation in cyberspace. It tackles one of the most pressing issues in cyber conflict in a way that appeals to scholars and practitioners alike.”

The 5×5—Conflict in Ukraine’s information environment

The cyber strategy and operations of Hamas: Green flags and green hats

The 5×5—Non-state armed groups in cyber conflict

#4 How has the theory of cyber conflict evolved in the last five years and where do you see the field evolving in the next five years?

Dwyer: “Undoubtedly, the greatest transformation has been the demise of ‘cyber war’ and ‘cyber weapons’ in both theory and practice. This has steadily been replaced (albeit over much more than the past five years) by cyber conflict as an ‘intelligence contest.’ In many ways, this is a welcome development. For the next five years, one might ask what then is distinct about cyber conflict; is it simply a transplant of conventional intelligence-related activity with new tools? I would wager not, and I hope that the cyber conflict studies community examines the role that technology plays that does not simply reduce computation to a tool with none of its own agency.”

Griffith: “Two significant shifts stand out. One of the biggest was the pivot away from the early focus on war toward a recognition of the diversity of activity that occurs in the absence of and below the threshold of war. In the process, the theories and disciplines cyber conflict scholars brought to bear expanded beyond security studies approaches, which had largely dominated the field, to increasingly include intelligence studies, history, economics, law, etc. In the next five years, I hope to see that aperture continue to widen as we continue to move beyond those early ‘cyber war’ framings to an array of questions stemming from a diversity of disciplines and examining a greater diversity of countries.”

Harknett: “Along with the work above, Ben Buchanan’s The Hacker and the State and Daniel Moore’s Offensive Cyber Operations have begun to examine the operational space as it is, rather than how people thought it would be. I think there is a significant pivot away from the cyber war construct occurring. Of course, my own bias is that Cyber Persistence Theory as presented by myself, Emily Goldman and Michael Fischerkeller offers a foundational piece of theory that explains a lot of the shifting in state strategy and behavior. I think the utility of the constructs of initiative persistence, campaigning, and strategic competition, will garner debate and may emerge or will be challenged as further research with this focus develops.”

Jun: “In the past five years, there has been a shift away from efforts to study cyber deterrence to focus on the dynamics of cyber incidents and/or campaigns below the threshold of armed conflict that occur on a regular basis. The field is also becoming more methodologically diverse. In the next five years, the field is likely to focus on getting at the nuances of cyber activity occurring below the threshold of armed conflict. The scholarly community may seek to answer questions such as: when a state takes certain offensive or defensive actions in cyberspace, what do these actions signal, and how are they interpreted on the receiving side? How do we measure or evaluate the effectiveness of cyber campaigns? As other states acquire cyber capabilities and respond to cyber threats, what accounts for how their cyber strategies evolve?”

Lindsay: “In the last five years, the field has taken a decidedly empirical turn. Cyber is no longer an emerging technology. It has emerged. We have decades of data to explore. This empirical turn complements the theoretical emphasis on intelligence that I mentioned above.”

Poznansky: “There has been an explosion of work over the last few years devoted to better understanding what exactly cyberspace represents. Is it yet another arena of warfare with some new bells and whistles or is it more akin to an intelligence contest? How we understand the nature of cyberspace has major implications for how we theorize cyber conflict and, equally important, what sorts of policy implications we arrive at. There is much more to be done here.”

#5 How can scholars and policymakers of cyber conflict better incorporate perspectives from each other’s work?

Dwyer: “This is by far the hardest question; however, it is about understanding the needs and goals of both academics and policymakers. This simply requires 1) a firm commitment and foundation from policymakers to fund critical social science and humanities work that can sustain positive engagement and trust building; 2) recognition and support for academics in the translation of their work and impact in ways that are visible to their institutions; and 3) for academics not enter a room with preconceived notions of the solutions to policymakers’ problems.”

Griffith: “There are a variety of models at our disposal, but one approach of note is on full display in Robert Chesney and Max Smeets’ recent edited volume, Deter, Disrupt, or Deceive, which explicitly puts authors who disagree—and who spearhead emerging schools of thought—in direct conversation with each other. This volume represents the culmination of roughly four years of formal and informal debate and has actively sought to continue the conversation through an ongoing, global series of workshops in the wake of its publication. Another model can be found in the field-building work of the Cyber Conflict Studies Association in United States and the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative in Europe.”

Harknett: “Again, the bridge between policy and theory has never been easy to traverse, but one essential element is adopting an agreed upon lexicon. There is, currently, this interesting phenomena in which the UK’s National Cyber Mission Forces’ Responsible Cyber Power in Practice document and the US Defense Department’s approaches of cyber persistent engagement and defend forward, as well as the broader 2023 US National Cybersecurity Strategy, align with the logic of initiative persistence and the structural reasoning of cyber persistence theory, with growing focus on continuous campaigns and seizing the initiative, rather than legacy constructs such as deterrence threats. Although full lexicon consensus has yet to solidify, it will be interesting to observe whether it occurs overtime.”

Jun: “[Scholars and policymakers of cyber conflict can better incorporate perspectives from each other’s work with] more frequent conversations that raise good new policy-relevant research questions, efforts to ground theoretical and empirical research in what is actually going on, and efforts to turn conclusions from scholarly analysis into actionable policy agendas.”

Lindsay: “This question is tricky because there are several different groups on either side of the gap, and it is important for all of them to talk. On the policy side, there are government policymakers and intelligence professionals, but also the hugely important commercial sector. And on the academic side you have international relations scholars, computer scientists, and many other social scientists and engineers working in related areas. Cybersecurity is a pretty wicked interdisciplinary problem.”

Poznansky: “For scholars, being open to the possibility that many of the things we often bracket, in part because they can be hard to measure—bureaucratic politics, organizational culture, leadership, and so forth—is valuable. These factors probably explain more about cyber conflict than we care to admit. For practitioners, remaining open minded to debates that might sound purely academic in nature at first blush but in fact have immense practical relevance is also valuable. Whether cyberspace is mainly an arena for intelligence competition or warfighting—a debate, as mentioned, that is happening right now—matters for the prospect of developing norms, the utility of coercion, the dynamics of escalation, and more.”

Simon Handler is a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative within the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab). He is also the editor-in-chief of The 5×5, a series on trends and themes in cyber policy. Follow him on Twitter @SimonPHandler.

The Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, under the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), works at the nexus of geopolitics and cybersecurity to craft strategies to help shape the conduct of statecraft and to better inform and secure users of technology.

The post The 5×5—Cyber conflict in international relations: A scholar’s perspective appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Before embarking on arms control talks, Biden needs a nuclear deal with Congress

Robert Soofer — Wed, 14 Jun 2023 15:39:58 +0000

Arms control is entering its most uncertain period in decades. New START is set to expire in February 2026, and the ongoing war in Ukraine complicates any US-Russia negotiations toward a new agreement. Meanwhile, China could have 1,500 nuclear weapons by 2035 and has shown no real inclination to discuss limits. The Biden administration has said it will “engage in bilateral arms control discussions with Russia and with China without preconditions,” as US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan explained in a speech on June 2. However, there is a precondition the US side should set with itself before any bilateral agreement moves forward.

The White House and Congress currently disagree over the type and number of nuclear weapons required to deter nuclear-armed adversaries in the coming decade, including Russia and China, but also North Korea and potentially Iran. As long as this disagreement persists, it casts doubt on the viability of whatever the administration might agree to in bilateral talks—in particular, whether any new treaty could be ratified or survive a change in administrations. However, a bargain is available that bridges these differences, and it would strengthen the president’s hand in arms control negotiations, if the administration and Congress seize the opportunity.

2010 plans do not address 2030 threats

In his June 2 speech at the Arms Control Association annual forum, Sullivan called attention to the growing threats posed by China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. In doing so, he reaffirmed the warnings in the Biden administration’s National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review that as it approaches 2030, “the United States will need to deter two near-peer nuclear powers for the first time in its history.” To address this emerging challenge, the White House is continuing the nuclear modernization program begun by the Obama administration and reaffirmed by the Trump administration, though the Biden administration has canceled the development and deployment of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) proposed in the 2019 Nuclear Posture Review.

These 2010 modernization plans assumed a reset with Russia. And they did not envision the rapid expansion of Chinese conventional and nuclear capabilities or the “no limits” partnership between an aggressive Moscow and Beijing bent on upsetting the international world order. This begs the question, then, whether the current nuclear modernization program—which amounts to a one-for-one replacement of nuclear force levels established in the 2010 New START—will be sufficient against two nuclear great powers.

In March, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Jack Reed (D-RI) asked General Anthony Cotton, head of US Strategic Command, how the US nuclear command is adapting to this “new trilateral nuclear competition.” Cotton replied that the United States is “in an absolutely good place today with our [nuclear] systems… but the basis of which we did our modernization efforts was on a 2010 threat.”

The divide over more nuclear weapons

The threats have grown manifestly worse since 2010, but the administration has been ambivalent about them. According to Sullivan in his recent speech, “the United States does not need to increase our nuclear forces to outnumber the combined total of our competitors in order to successfully deter them.” Sullivan added that “effective deterrence means that we have a ‘better’ approach—not a ‘more’ approach.” This position is at odds with Republican leaders in the House and Senate armed services committees, who have advocated “higher numbers and new capabilities” for nuclear weapons.

There are practical limits to how quickly the United States could expand its nuclear capabilities to address the expansion of China’s nuclear forces. One option by the time New START expires in 2026 is to restore nuclear warheads to existing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) that were removed to accommodate the lower New START force limits (a process called “uploading”). Additional nuclear bombs and cruise missiles could be loaded onto heavy bombers, and bombers previously converted to conventional weapons use only can be made ready for nuclear operations.

Importantly, Sullivan said in his speech that “the type of limits the United States can agree to after [New START] expires will of course be impacted by the size and scale of China’s nuclear build-up.” The administration will require a sense of what additional nuclear forces may be needed beyond New START, both to ensure any negotiated limits provide the United States with headroom to deploy sufficient forces in the future, and because adjustments to US nuclear posture will likely take years to implement.

It is entirely conceivable that Russia and the United States could agree to new (modestly larger) nuclear force limits that consider US requirements to address China’s expanding nuclear capabilities and limit and reduce Russia’s regional nuclear weapons and new novel long-range systems that are not covered under New START. Such an approach might maintain limits (albeit somewhat higher than the current 1,550 warhead limit in New START) on all US and Russian nuclear forces while allowing the United States to address the problem of two nuclear peers.

The bargain the White House and Congress could strike

Sullivan was correct when he said that “responsibly enhancing our deterrent capabilities allows us to negotiate arms control from a position of strength and confidence.” But if “responsibly” implies a set policy of no new US nuclear capabilities or no expansion of US strategic nuclear forces, then Russia has no reason to come to the negotiating table. A big incentive for Moscow to negotiate is if it fears the United States will build up its own nuclear arsenal. Just as important, an arms control approach that does not include some augmented nuclear capabilities will be a non-starter for Republicans and some Democrats on Capitol Hill.

A bargain is required. The Biden administration could, for example, agree to develop the SLCM-N and prepare for a nuclear upload onto existing ICBMs and SLBMs. In exchange, congressional Republicans could lend public support to the administration’s efforts, hopefully fruitful but perhaps not, to secure a post–New START follow-on arms control framework or agreement. In such a deal, the arms control community would see the value in continued constraints on arms competition, while the deterrence community would welcome augmented nuclear capabilities to answer the growth in Chinese nuclear forces. Russia also would have an interest in limiting the potential expansion of US nuclear forces. This approach leaves out China for the time being, given its unwillingness to engage in a dialogue; but any future limits on Russian and US forces will have to take into account the likely expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal.

During the question-and-answer period following his speech, Sullivan spoke about the bipartisan US Senate support of the 2010 New START. He failed to mention, however, that the Obama administration’s commitment—insisted upon by Republican senators as part of the deal for New START—to modernize each leg of the nuclear triad enabled that consensus. It is worth demonstrating once more that nuclear deterrence and arms control go hand in hand.

Robert Soofer is a senior fellow in the Forward Defense program in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he leads its Nuclear Strategy Project. He formerly served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy and as a professional staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The post Before embarking on arms control talks, Biden needs a nuclear deal with Congress appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why Ukrainian NATO membership would actually be good for Russia

Leonid Gozman — Wed, 14 Jun 2023 07:42:05 +0000

Vladimir Putin claims one of the main goals of his Ukraine invasion is to prevent the country joining NATO. This objective may at first glance appear broadly reasonable, but on closer inspection, it actually goes directly against Russia’s own national interests.

The idea that Ukrainian NATO membership would pose a security threat to Russia ranks among Putin’s most enduring myths. In reality, however, no NATO member has ever threatened to attack Russia. On the contrary, Russia’s shared borders with NATO have always been strikingly calm and secure. Notably, this was also the case throughout the Soviet era and stands in contrast to some other Russian borders. If Ukraine joins NATO, it would significantly increase Russia’s own border security.

The interests of the Russian people are best served by a sustainable and lasting peace rather than wars of conquest. Ukraine’s NATO accession would strengthen the alliance and improve its ability to resist Russian aggression. This would greatly reduce the risk of a new war in Ukraine, as not even Putin is ready to enter into an open war with NATO. Instead, the Russian population would be much likelier to live peaceful lives.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Email
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Crucially, Ukrainian NATO membership would mean an end to dreams of restoring the Russian Empire. This would be good news for all Russians, who have no need of an empire. In today’s world, imperial ambitions bring crushing economic and moral burdens that hamper the development of a country and lead to stagnation.

It is also inaccurate to assume, as many currently do, that a majority of Russians share the same imperial aspirations promoted by Putin himself. In fact, during the years of the Soviet collapse, there were literally zero rallies calling on Moscow to prevent the various Soviet republics from securing independence, despite the fact that protests were possible at that time. Indeed, following the tragic events of January 1991 in Vilnius, when Soviet troops killed 13 Lithuanians, around a million people attended a massive rally in central Moscow demanding recognition of Lithuanian independence. These people took to the streets not in defense of empire but in support of freedom.

Back then, nobody saw the fall of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” as Putin would later state. According to polling data, the Russian public only began showing signs of “imperial nostalgia” some 15 years later in the mid-2000s. This change in mood was due to official propaganda rather than any deep-seated notions of imperial identity.

Far from marking a regrettable retreat from empire, the collapse of the Soviet Union was an undeniably positive development for Russia. Similarly, the current revival of imperialism in Russia poses an existential threat to the country’s future. Ukrainian NATO membership would be a big step toward abandoning the idea of empire entirely, and that would be a positive development for all Russians.

It is clearly in Russia’s interests to have stable, predictable, and non-aggressive neighbors. NATO member states represent exactly this kind of neighbor. If Ukraine joins the alliance, this would go a long way to allaying fears within Russia over possible future Ukrainian revenge after the current war ends.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Ukrainian accession to NATO would help raise living standards in the country by obliging the Ukrainian authorities to implement vital reforms. This would be particularly good news for Russia. Like any other country, Russia has an interest in the prosperity of neighboring states and stands to benefit from improved trade and other economic ties if Ukraine achieves a higher standard of living.

Joining NATO would also strengthen Ukraine’s democratic institutions. This would help demonstrate to the Russian public that democracy can thrive in the post-Soviet space. Russians are just as interested in personal freedoms and democratic values as anyone else, but they are bombarded with propaganda from the Kremlin convincing them that freedom and democracy are only possible in the West and will never take root inside Russia.

The Putin regime supports this incompatibility argument by pointing to various aspects of Russian society that allegedly make the country unsuitable for democracy, such as Russia’s dominant Slavic Orthodox culture. However, as a fellow predominantly Slavic Orthodox nation that many Russians view as extremely similar to their own country, Ukraine can debunk such arguments. Indeed, this is a key reason why the Kremlin views Ukrainian democracy as such a threat.

Unless Ukraine joins NATO, even the complete liberation of the country will not bring sustainable peace. Putin will not accept defeat and will inevitably attack again. This is exactly what Hitler would have done if the allies had not destroyed his criminal regime along with his war machine. Just as lasting peace was only possible after World War II due to the removal of the Nazi system, future peace in Eastern Europe will depend on the end of the Putin regime. This is clearly in the interests of the Russian people, and will be much more likely if Ukraine joins NATO. Membership of the alliance would provide Ukraine with long-term security, but the benefits to Russia itself would be no less profound.

Leonid Gozman is a Russian politician and commentator.

The post Michèle Flournoy and Wendy Anderson promote rapid software acquisition in Breaking Defense appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kakhovka dam collapse threatens Europe’s largest nuclear plant

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti — Thu, 08 Jun 2023 20:06:08 +0000

The blowing up of the Kakhovka dam in Russian-occupied southern Ukraine in the early hours of June 6 has produced a range of catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences. The resultant draining of the Kakhovka reservoir also creates significant risks for the nearby Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. The plant, which is the largest in Europe, is not believed to be in any immediate danger, but rapidly dropping water levels in the reservoir will make it difficult to access the water necessary to cool the plant’s six reactors.

Nuclear power plants work by splitting atoms to create tremendous heat, which turns turbines to generate electricity. The heat created is so extreme that advanced cooling systems are required to keep temperature levels under control and prevent a meltdown. The Fukushima disaster was the result of a cooling system failure when a tsunami caused by a major earthquake disabled the Japanese nuclear power plant’s cooling system and three reactors melted down from their own heat. By contrast, the 1986 Chornobyl disaster in Soviet Ukraine was due to human error that caused the graphite reactor cores to burn.

The Zaporizhzhia plant features VVER-1000 pressurized light water reactors. This means that a Chornobyl-style meltdown is not possible as there is no graphite to burn, but the risk of a cooling system failure is a grave concern. The plant has been carefully monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since it was first captured by Russian troops in March 2022 during the early weeks of the full-scale Russian invasion.

Since then, Russia has repeatedly struck the transmission lines that power the plant’s cooling systems, necessitating the use of back-up generators to keep the cooling system operational. Despite regular alarms over the close proximity of combat operations and the deployment of Russian troops at the plant, the risk of a nuclear disaster has been seen as present but never pressing due to numerous residual safety features. For example, the plant can run on its own power for short periods of time if power grid access and generators simultaneously fail. So far, this hasn’t happened.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Email
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

The Kakhovka dam collapse has now increased the risk of disaster. In addition to electricity, the plant needs large quantities of water to run its cooling system. The plant was built in the 1980s, decades after the Kakhovka dam was constructed, and features a design that relies on reservoir water for its cooling system. And although the plant’s six reactors have been turned off for more than eight months to reduce the likelihood of wartime nuclear accidents, it will still be a decade before the reactor fuel rods are cool enough to be moved into dry storage.

Water levels in the reservoir have plummeted since the blast on Tuesday morning. At this stage, nobody can say with any certainty how far the water levels will eventually drop before leveling out. The IAEA commented on June 7 that if water levels fall below 12.7 meters, the lowest level at which water can be pumped upstream to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, there are alternative options that can be used to source cooling system water. One day later, this point was reportedly reached. With the Kakhovka dam beyond repair and no clear way to stop it hemorrhaging water from the reservoir, it seems likely that external water sources will be necessary.

Eurasia Center events

Gen James E. Cartwright, USMC (ret.)

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

At present, IAEA officials say there is “no immediate risk” to the plant, while officials from Ukraine’s nuclear operator Energoatom have stated that water supplies stored close to the facility are sufficient for the next few months. However, others have noted that summer heat could speed evaporation and exhaust existing reserves far sooner.

The destruction of Kakhovka dam is widely viewed as the latest and most reckless in a series of attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure carried out by Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began almost sixteen months ago. While Moscow has officially denied destroying the dam, initial analysis points to Russian responsibility. A New York Times article citing engineering and munitions experts concluded that a “deliberate explosion” inside the Russian-controlled dam “most likely caused its collapse.” Meanwhile, independent experts have confirmed that the Cold War era dam, which was built to withstand a nuclear attack, would be extremely difficult to destroy via external bombardment, according to The Times.

In addition to the heightened risk to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the destruction of the dam has also unleashed an ecological disaster throughout the region. Tens of thousands of local residents whose homes have been flooded are in urgent need of care and shelter. Significant quantities of oil and chemicals have poured into the Dnipro River and must be contained, along with munitions. These are the most immediate challenges facing the Ukrainian authorities.

The risks posed to Europe’s largest nuclear power plant by the loss of access to reservoir water must also be addressed without delay before the situation becomes critical. Beyond this pressing logistical issue, the blowing up of the Kakhovka dam is also fueling speculation over whether Russia may be prepared to adopt similarly drastic measures at the Zaporizhzhia plant itself. With this in mind, the international community must send a clear message to Moscow that it will be held accountable for any further attempts to intimidate the world with the threat of nuclear disaster.

Suriya Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Operationalizing integrated deterrence: Applying joint force targeting across the competition continuum

Thu, 08 Jun 2023 17:30:21 +0000

download pdf

Introduction: Why the United States needs a new targeting model better suited for cooperation
Expanding the joint force’s competitive mindset
Operationalizing integrated deterrence: A new model for targeting and effects
Explaining the model of a modified targeting and effects process
I. Placement and access
II. Focused understanding
III. Options
Targeting throughout the competition continuum
Harnessing data to improve the targeting and effects process
Data
Sense
Make sense
Act
Using the competition space to prepare for high-end armed conflict
Shaping the environment
Shaping across the physical and virtual domains
Capability development
The way forward
Culture: Adapting the joint force’s mindset to global problems across the competition continuum
Incorporating all instruments of power
Embracing the global nature of problem sets
Technology and data: Building a resilient and holistic data architecture
Authorities, rules of engagement, and risk: Updating DOD guidelines and standards
Conclusion
About the authors

Introduction: Why the United States needs a new targeting model better suited for competition

In these times, business as usual at the department is not acceptable.

— Lloyd J. Austin, Secretary of Defense

Traditional joint force deterrence is no longer sufficient: a near-singular focus on armed conflict and platform-based capability development fails to deter strategic adversaries like China and Russia from their pursuit of strategic objectives while simultaneously increasing the risk of war. Simply owning the most advanced weaponry, while ceding ground in the competitive space left of conflict, is not enough to meet US deterrence needs, nor is it sufficient to ensure the joint force prevails in conflict. Expanding the joint force’s construct for targeting and effects generation will enable the Department of Defense (DOD) to more effectively deter future conflict while simultaneously shaping the environment to the joint force’s advantage in conflict should deterrence fail.

Why the twenty-first century security environment merits an updated approach

Today’s security threats span the competition continuum, cut across theaters and domains, and are intensified through the application of emerging technologies. The joint force faces challenges spanning the full competition continuum from high-end conflict to gray zone competition, including cyber threats and economic coercion, to cooperation. Technological advancements have changed the character of threats, the types of activities that the DOD can conduct, the speed at which it can act, and expanded its notion of physical and non-physical tools and effects. Specifically, the evolution of the cyber domain has enabled the joint force to gain access to non-physical spaces and generate options to achieve effects in a matter of milliseconds. The realities of twenty-first century competition drive the need to confront adversaries across a global contact layer to counter malign activities and proactively advance US strategic objectives. In other words, actions in one theater or domain can generate options and lead to outcomes in distant corners of the globe.

Moreover, the joint force faces a far more sophisticated adversary in China—qualitatively and quantitatively—than it did in countering violent extremist organizations over the past two decades. Strategic competition requires a significant mindset shift to effectively harness the effects of multiple instruments of power in a global, multi-domain, and coherent manner. DOD doctrine acknowledges this, but the department and joint force have yet to fully operationalize it.

While many activities executed along the competition continuum can enable success in conflict, specific operations, activities, and investments are necessary to ensure joint force superiority in direct combat, especially considering the criticality of combined arms warfare with allies and partners, as well as the seamless integration of multi-domain fires and effects. joint force activities must continually pursue positional advantage across the competition continuum to achieve the necessary balance between deterrence and conflict preparation. Yet, currently, the level of attention to and investment in preparation for armed conflict inhibits the joint force from leveraging the vast data, tools, and authorities at its disposal to prevent such conflict from occurring in the first place.

How joint force operations can meet an evolving threat landscape

The joint force must update its approach to targeting and effects generation to respond to the range of security challenges at hand, else it risks losing without going to war. Success across the full competition continuum will be enabled by the joint force’s ability to effectively harness data and a wide spectrum of tools and authorities with speed, precision, and lethality. This necessitates a deeper and more informed understanding of adversary capabilities, the operating environment, the interconnected nature of the physical and virtual domains, and the range of data sources available to operators. By “expanding its competitive mindset and competitive approach”¹ —to include and integrate tools, information, and actions that span the competition continuum—the joint force can exploit this understanding to apply the right effects to the right problems at the right times, advancing strategic objectives and maintaining informational, decisional, and combat dominance. An expanded competitive mindset will allow the joint force to view competition not as an inevitable march toward future conflict, but rather as a persistent effort to gain and maintain positional advantage across all domains.

The joint force is designed to excel at crisis response; it must make a deliberate mindset shift to plan prior to impending crisis (and prevent such scenarios from occurring in the first place). However, while the urgency of evolving the joint force’s targeting framework is evident across doctrine and policy,² the joint force has not yet taken to scale an assertive approach to dominating across the competitive space. Doctrine included in the DOD’s 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Joint Concept for Competing, for instance, make clear that the department and joint force are thinking about strategic competition more broadly, yet operationally—through authorities, combatant commands, and collaboration with different agencies and allies—DOD and the joint force have yet to fully realize integrated deterrence.

Explainer: Targeting and effects generation

Targeting: Traditional joint or dynamic targeting is “the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them.” In this paper, targeting is an enabler of options, characterized as a continuous activity that furthers the pursuit of objectives by addressing critical intelligence and operational requirements and shaping the environment through a multitude of proactive means. Targeting includes everything from illuminating human networks and key actors, to finding and fixing mobile capabilities, to identifying cyber access vectors and vulnerabilities.

Effects: While conventionally viewed as the “finish” of the targeting cycle—the kinetic fire or kill—effects generation here refers to the employment of instruments of national power (individually or in concert) to achieve a desired outcome. This ranges from traditional kinetic military fires to information operations, cyber tools, and electronic warfare, to targeted economic sanctions and law enforcement actions, to diplomatic démarche or other means of localized leverage.

What this report sets out to achieve

Operationally, the joint force has not adapted to an era of strategic competition, which requires targeting across theaters and domains, the entire competition continuum, and leveraging the range of data sources at its disposal. Doing so requires the joint force to stitch together the data, tools, and authorities needed to achieve global objectives—rather than viewing missions as constrained to a singular region or ends, as has been the status quo.

This report outlines a framework to leverage existing targeting models to more assertively and deliberately compete by: 1) incorporating an expanded use of military and interagency capabilities; 2) leveraging expansive public and private data and harnessing it for effect through emerging technologies; and 3) smartly balancing priorities and weight of effort related to competition and conflict preparation. The authors offer key action areas for implementation at scale.

Expanding the joint force’s competitive mindset

To achieve unity of effort, the joint force must seek opportunities to integrate its operations and activities in time, space, and purpose with the activities of interorganizational partners, proxies, and surrogates.

— Joint Concept for Competing³

While the Pentagon recognizes it must adopt a new mindset to prevail across the competition continuum, it continues to approach targeting and fires through a lens of armed conflict. Traditional approaches to targeting and fires still prevail across the joint force despite the recognition of a need to expand them. Traditionally, the joint force aligns “sensors to shooters” (i.e., targeting) to inflict damage on enemy personnel, materiel, or infrastructure (i.e., fires or effects generation). This sentiment is expressed through variations of the targeting cycle, whether it be the dynamic targeting kill chain (Find, Fix, Target, Track, Engage, Assess) or the Special Operations Forces-preferred cycle (Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate). These processes lend well to a temporal and kinetic approach to targeting and fires—exemplified by strikes on violent extremist organization (VEO) leadership networks or disabling mobile surface-to-air threats as part of a layered suppression of enemy air defenses effort—yet they are insufficient for generating the nonlethal and continuous effects necessary in today’s expansive security environment. This traditional approach to targeting and fires is incongruent with current DOD realities, given “most joint force activities occur in the context of cooperation and competition below armed conflict.”⁴

US Army Cyber Command hosts a town hall. Credit: US Army photo/ Candy Knight

As the DOD recognizes through its integrated deterrence concept, the joint force’s tool kit expands beyond the military arsenal, and solely relying on traditional approaches for targeting and effects is limiting. As articulated in the NDS, integrated deterrence campaigning calls for the joint force—in alignment with and often in a supporting role to other instruments of power found across the interagency—to execute “logically linked” activities to advance “strategy-aligned priorities over time” in order to counter or complicate competitors’ coercion across the globe.⁵ Linking activities across global campaigns require a high level of understanding of competitors’ intent and capabilities and their underlying geopolitical realities, enabled by prolonged access across multiple domains, which creates options to leverage multiple effects in achieving desired ends. For example, developing an understanding of how China’s coercive economic activities in Africa and Latin America support its broader global ambitions can inform the breadth (and complexity) of US response options. While the joint force typically excels at responding to crises, single-purpose platforms and the constant rotation of forces often prohibit the long-duration stare that integrated deterrence requires for proactive campaigning left of crisis.

Operationalizing integrated deterrence: A new model for targeting and effects

To achieve integrated deterrence, this paper outlines a model for operationalizing it. The joint force must meld the existing framework for joint targeting with a model that places a premium on gaining placement and access in a domain or region, enabling a focused understanding of an entity of interest, to facilitate a range of options for the joint force to execute in concert with other instruments of power, whether in a supported or supporting role. Each layer includes the concepts of persistence, local distinction, and global relevance, and can be in a near-constant state of change based on the sensing environment. For example, security cooperation with a partner in Southeast Asia requires access, understanding, and options that are: 1) persistent, to ensure ongoing understanding and to achieve effects over the long term; 2) locally distinct based on regional and local considerations; and 3) globally relevant, acknowledging that awareness and action related to one country affects global dynamics and goals. This layered model is represented in Figures 1 and 2 and further described below.

Integrated Deterrence Targeting. The figures above convey the elements of the joint targeting cycle and the dynamic targeting process (figure 1), with a philosophical and nonlinear pyramid approach to developing options for complex problems (figure 2). These two frameworks must be fused together to operationalize integrated deterrence. The joint force’s traditional targeting cycle must be informed by a foundation of situational awareness. Data, tools, and authorities are all necessary mechanisms to establish situational awareness.

Placement and access

virtual and/or physical proximity to an entity of interest

Focused understanding

situational awareness and perception of an entity (actor and/or location) and how it fits into broader geostrategic missions

Options

potential pathways forward to respond to a complex problem set and achieve outcomes, informed by focused understanding and placement and access

Explaining the model of a modified targeting and effects process

Adopting this layered model is critical for two reasons. First, the complex, global, and multi-domain problem sets the DOD faces today necessitate options that are similarly sophisticated in nature and cut across the competition continuum. By prioritizing a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of problem sets, the joint force is presented with a wider array of options to address key challenges. Such focused understanding is possible when the near-infinite amount of data available across the public and private sectors is transformed into usable information and, ultimately, intelligence.

Second, a new competitive mindset requires broadening the joint force’s tool kit beyond traditional military effects. The joint force has the authority to, and does, execute non-kinetic targeting, albeit insufficiently, yet it prioritizes kinetic fires as part of the traditional targeting cycle. Fusing kinetic and non-kinetic fires is critical not only from a deterrence perspective but also, more significantly, to enable victory in armed conflict. Yet, alone, the military instrument of power is insufficient for the problem sets germane to integrated deterrence. While the joint force has significantly advanced its organic non-kinetic capabilities, it primarily leverages kinetic effects, which neglects other instruments of power, disincentivizes creative thinking, and leads to poor integration with interagency partners.⁶ A high degree of awareness of the capabilities and authorities that other instruments of power bring to the table is critical such that they can be synchronized with, or amplified by, joint force activities at all echelons.

The process of generating placement and access, focused understanding, and options is not linear, and each stage can and should inform the others over time. Specific placement and access may be generated to understand a particular problem in a sophisticated manner such that novel options can be developed. Similarly, focused understanding may drive the need for additional or alternative access to close critical intelligence gaps and inform options. Likewise, commanders may demand options to address a particular problem, which in turn will inform the planning process to generate the necessary access and understanding. Below is an overview of the three foundational elements of the pyramid.

I. Placement and access

To develop the focused understanding required for integrated deterrence, the joint force cannot stare at problems from afar. Placement and access are foundational to developing an enhanced understanding of the problem sets facing the United States. Placement and access, however, does not necessarily mean physical proximity of the military to a particular interest area—it also encompasses virtual presence and can be developed by the joint force, interagency partners, and allied counterparts. It also implies some degree of usability, sustainability, and repeatability; simply visiting a location or gaining virtual access to a network does not equate to true placement and access. Rather, that access must be repeatable if it is temporal in nature, sustainable over operationally relevant time periods, and usable for alternate purposes such as data collection, security cooperation, or reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. Placement and access can be enhanced by leveraging data from a multitude of sources to enable the joint force insight into digital networks of value to access, or the nature of key partnerships required for physical access. Additionally, enhancing existing authorities and making them more flexible would allow units pursuing a mission set in one area to adapt and undertake additional mission sets that may be valuable for a broader or global mission set.

Evolving the joint force approach to placement and access will open a range of opportunities given the interconnected nature of global problem sets. For example, France’s historical security cooperation and counterterrorism activities in the Sahel region of West Africa, during the 2010s, could have also served as an access vector to increasing understanding of the growing threat of Russian private military corporations (PMC) like Wagner Group in the region. This physical proximity can enable a deeper understanding of Wagner’s activities in the region, potentially driving requirements for further physical or virtual access or informing options in line with global campaign plans to counter Russian malign influence. Critically, the joint force must explore means to creatively exploit access when mission convergences exist—units or platforms deployed for one purpose, such as countering VEO, may enable access vectors to support another mission, such as strategic competition, and vice versa. While clarity of primary and secondary objectives of missions would need to remain, the makeup of units and task forces, and the requisite authorities given to them, should be meaningfully considered to capitalize on mission convergences. Not only does this approach create efficiencies with respect to endeavors like security cooperation, but it also offers the opportunity to obfuscate strategic intentions.

II. Focused understanding

Focused understanding of an actor, environment, or relationship is required to solve complex problems, not only due to the sophisticated capabilities of strategic adversaries but also because integrated deterrence campaigns are global in nature. Transregional, multi-domain problems cannot be thoroughly addressed in compartmentalized and only localized ways. Rather, the joint force must stitch together regional understandings based on local access and conditions with broader knowledge informed by other global touch points. The roles of partners, both interagency and international, are critical in developing focused understanding. Not only do they enable multi-domain access, but they also provide unique perspectives. The vast amounts of commercial and government data can and should be harnessed and fused to improve focused understanding of actors and problem sets. While data from traditional sources is immensely valuable, open-source information—organized into actionable information—can drastically improve understanding of patterns and behavior. For example, social media data may help inform US forces of the presence of an adversarial force’s covert presence in a country that may be hard to identify or find evidence for using other means. Ultimately, the fusing of different data sources more consistently can help understanding across the competition continuum.

Building on the previous example, to address Wagner Group’s activities in the Sahel, the joint force should first understand how those activities tie into Russia’s global campaign to secure influence and create instability through expeditionary PMC activities. A holistic understanding of Wagner’s activities across the Sahel, Central Africa, Latin America, Syria, and Eastern Europe presents a more informed picture of the totality of the problem, as well as the associated pressure points, vulnerabilities, and opportunities. Moreover, the local US country team, elements of the intelligence community, French forces, and host-nation partners will all view the Wagner problem in different lights, which can enhance the joint force’s perspective and is necessary in developing viable options leveraging all instruments of power.

This combination of regional and global understanding, enabled by joint force and partner access and capabilities, ultimately informs a far greater range of options than is achieved strictly through a regional military lens, which has been the status quo. Critically, focused understanding better informs risk assessments at echelon, abating risk aversion frequently seen at higher levels of command authority that are farthest removed from the tactical edge.

III. Options

Senior leaders and commanders typically request a range of options to address problems, both to allow flexibility and enable sound decision-making in light of strategic priorities and risks. The Joint Concept for Competing calls for the joint force to:

Identify approaches that enable it to apply its military capabilities proactively, and differently in some cases, to gain influence, advantage, and leverage over adversaries to establish the necessary conditions to achieve strategic outcomes.

— Joint Concept for Competing⁷

While doctrinally this is clear, today’s traditional approach to targeting and competition limits the most effective suite of options from being generated. More-nuanced options may place the joint force in a supporting role to other departments and agencies: for example, conducting traditional manhunting activities (via military authorities) to enable a diplomatic action such as a démarche (via Department of State authorities). The level of sophistication required to achieve what the Joint Concept calls for, especially across activities below armed conflict, makes both risk and efficacy assessments challenging. It is far more difficult to quantify the effectiveness of a campaign to counter Chinese regional influence—for example, assessing long-duration efforts to obstruct effort by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to secure access, basing, and overflight—than it was to measure the success of kinetic drone strikes during the Global War on Terrorism. This challenge is met not only by prioritizing focused understanding but also by parlaying that understanding into a range of options that may be locally distinct but support global campaign plan objectives.

Ultimately, options for senior decision-makers are developed to achieve outcomes that are in service of more-aspirational objectives. Again, examining Wagner activity, a desired outcome of an operation could be to deny Wagner’s ability to securely communicate between several outstations across the Sahel. The aspirational objective is to critically degrade Wagner’s ability to conduct and sustain expeditionary activities globally.

Targeting throughout the competition continuum

This model for the generation of options for complex problems must be melded with an adaptation in the application of traditional joint force targeting processes. Joint targeting is not solely reliant on joint force tools, capabilities, and authorities; it can and should incorporate other instruments of power—by collaborating across departments and agencies—to bolster data and inform understanding, as well as “identify, develop, and affect targets to meet commander objectives.”⁸

Take, for example, a PRC network in Latin America that facilitates command and control of dual-use infrastructure. Here, data could be harnessed from the intelligence (e.g., National Security Agency) and diplomatic (e.g., Department of State Regional Security Office) instruments of power to identify a particular local criminal network that facilitates relevant PRC contracting activities. Host-nation law enforcement can then apply pressure on the criminal network to share information about the PRC actors with whom it engages routinely. Over time, this information can help generate several options to gain access to the objective network through Special Operations Forces-enabled cyber activities. Throughout, the military (e.g., Military Information Support Operations) and diplomatic (e.g., Department of State Global Engagement Center) instruments of power can expose malign PRC practices through information operations to positively shape narratives in line with strategic objectives. The joint targeting cycle could be leveraged multiple times for:

Employing traditional manhunting techniques to find and fix specific local criminal actors of interest, develop their pattern of life, then using non-kinetic fires to register their phones with specific networks that enable intelligence access to key digital data.
Leveraging data obtained through financial (e.g., Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control) instruments of power to target specific institutions that enable transactions between local criminal networks and the PRC. This data can be correlated with intelligence derived from the activities above, as well as populated to other portions of the joint force focused on countering PRC dual-use activities to further global understanding of their tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Conducting intelligence preparation of the cyber environment to find and fix key nodes that are vulnerable to offensive cyber fires (e.g., US Cyber Command), as well as to bolster and amplify information operations that counter local PRC propaganda strategies.

The myriad of joint targeting activities outlined above not only enable specific tactical actions but also inform or further placement and access that continuously matures the collective understanding of the operating environment. Given the nature of strategic competitors, much of this understanding can be exported to other locations to bolster awareness and enable the linking of activities in a logical way as outlined in the NDS. At the center of this process is data, and as stated by former Deputy Secretary of Defense David L. Norquist, “our ability to fight and win wars requires that we become world leaders in operationalizing and protecting our data resources at speed and scale.”⁹

Harnessing data to improve the targeting and effects process

Data is a strategic asset that must be operationalized in order to provide a lethal and effective joint force.

— DOD Data Strategy¹⁰

The joint force’s ability to leverage data at speed and scale, predicated on its adoption of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), enables this framework for targeting and effects generation. Data informs the nature of required access, feeds the focused understanding process, and enables the development of well-informed options that artfully balance desired outcomes with strategic risk. However, raw and unstructured data in isolation does not create a decisive advantage. Rather, it must be harnessed for effect, transforming data into both information and intelligence that is usable and accessible at the speed of relevance.

The US Space Command Joint Operations Center is responsible for integrating data and status from multiple operations centers, the services, and agencies to provide the commander with critical Command and Control capabilities. The capabilities are being increasingly leveraged by other services in support of joint global operations. Credit: US Space Command

While the importance of data is nothing new, the joint force must grapple with the explosion of available data spanning all domains, sectors, and sources. Technologies such as AI and machine learning (ML) present meaningful ways to navigate this near-infinite amount of data. The 2020 DOD Data Strategy envisions the department as a “data-centric organization that uses data at speed and scale for operational advantage and increased efficiency,” with particular focus on enabling all-domain operations, more rapid and informed decision-making, and organizational business analytics.¹¹ Moreover, AI makes determinations and finds data connections in ways humans alone cannot, encapsulating everything from making obvious connections more rapidly (e.g., using satellite data to geolocate battlefield equipment) to identifying valuable datasets overlooked by humans (e.g., how commercial shipping telemetry data can enable deeper understanding of the PRC’s fifth-generation [5G] infrastructure development in Africa).

Data

Data is obtained by a variety of automated or manual and physical or virtual means. Any entity that can obtain data is considered a sensor. Data becomes information once put into context prescribed with meaning by the observer. Often, the meaning prescribed by the observer can be adapted as understanding of the environment grows, making particular datasets more or less useful. The process by which information is transformed into intelligence is complex and combines both art and science as described in JP 2-0 Joint Intelligence:

Intelligence fuses and evaluates information from multiple sources to provide the most accurate assessment possible of the current state of the operating environment.
From current assessments, intelligence draws predictive estimates of the full range of potential alternative future states of the operating environment.
To inform decisions, intelligence illuminates how the operating environment may react to different friendly options under consideration.¹²

The flow from data to intelligence—known as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) cycle—is illustrated in Figure 3, overlaid with the targeting framework from Figure 2.

The automation of PED enhances and accelerates the path from raw data to actionable intelligence, or from “sensor to shooter.”

The nature of today’s security environment necessitates the execution of PED at greater speed and scale than is achievable by humans alone. Particularly, the operating environment below armed conflict—which encompasses most joint force activities—places a premium on scale. To effectively compete globally and deter China and Russia, large quantities of data must be triaged and transformed into intelligence to inform transregional and multi-domain activities that are logically linked. In contrast, armed conflict—the highest-risk joint force activity—places a premium on speed. Rapidly processing and disseminating targeting data, effectively integrating kinetic and non-kinetic fires against mobile targets, and incorporating virtual capabilities that can affect adversary nodes within milliseconds would be impossible without AI/ML and human-machine teaming. The Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concept describes the importance of this flow from data to intelligence based on the requirement for “joint force commanders to ‘sense,’ ‘make sense,’ and ‘act’ in the operational environment.”¹³ While this paper is not focused on the JADC2 and Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO) concepts, the employment of this paper’s updated targeting and effects process would support the more rapid implementation of JADO/JADC2 across the joint force.

Sense

The joint force must consider nearly all entities to be sensors, ranging from sensitive intelligence collection activities to open-source commercial datasets. Adopting a more competitive mindset requires the joint force to democratize data, allowing for a wide array of data-gathering streams to interact with AI algorithms trained to produce usable information. Much attention is placed on gathering data from the tactical edge, yet the edge can take many forms across physical and virtual spaces, regions, and domains. Critically, leveraging nonmilitary instruments of power, as well as allied and partner sensors, can both increase and diversify the data gathered. The role of commercial data is invaluable, with the private sector often having access to people, places, and things that are difficult, if not impossible, for overt government entities to replicate. However, while nontraditional data sources are crucial to building global situational awareness, the DOD does not currently have the communications infrastructure to integrate data from these various inputs at speed and scale—this change must be accelerated.

Make sense

Making sense of the operating environment correlates to the process depicted in Figure 2. The importance of AI/ML becomes paramount here, such that the joint force can achieve automation of prediction at speed and scale, while reserving judgment for human decision-makers on or in the loop. Ultimately, larger and more diverse datasets correlate to more sophisticated training of AI/ML algorithms, increasing the precision of predictive modeling to inform human decision-making. Analysis of the nature of adversary activities—and the subsequent options to address them—may look quite different when viewed through a whole-of-government versus strictly military lens. Furthermore, allies’ and partners’ perspectives on problem sets, especially those close to home, offer invaluable information to complement the joint force’s understanding of the operating environment.

Act

Taking action is a data-driven endeavor—not only in regard to the appropriate action but also the expected adversary reaction and the associated risks. Data-informed decision-making, given its bias toward empiricism, helps challenge assumptions, drive rigorous planning, and enable more-decentralized and potentially faster decision-making. Indeed, the focus of this framework is to utilize access-enabled understanding, coupled with sophisticated data-harnessing techniques, to ultimately provide commanders with a range of well-informed, data-driven options to act. It should be emphasized that to act does not signify finality of the process. As stated in the Joint Concept for Competing, “strategic competition is an enduring condition to be managed, not a problem to be solved.”US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, 7. In fact, the “act” could be a decision to develop further placement and access to address critical intelligence gaps, or to submit requirements to inform further capability development for an unaddressed operational need.

The process of sensing, making sense, and acting is continuous. The speed by which this process plays out is variable based on the nature of the domain, location along the continuum, commander’s intent, and both local and global risk considerations. Deliberate planning and preparation of the operating environment, to include the establishment of relationships and infrastructure, deployment of sensors, and data architecture, and other such activities are necessary to enable this process to occur with speed downstream. In particular, active conflict places a premium on achieving maximum speed for this process, which simultaneously necessitates extensive preparation and autonomy.

Using the competition space to prepare for high-end armed conflict

Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win.

— Sun Tzu, The Art of War¹⁴

Conflict preparation is the persistent, locally distinct, and global sensing of the target ecosystem. It is a dynamic process that constantly generates and updates the integrated targeting planning and execution decisions. Prevailing in armed conflict is the ultimate basis for the existence of the joint force, and places a significant premium on preparation to maintain a position of advantage, inform capability development, and hold adversaries at risk. Armed conflict exists on the far-right side of the competition continuum and represents the most consequential activity the joint force must prepare for and, when called upon, execute. While often referred to in sterilized terminology, a clear description of armed conflict—the application of violence to destroy an enemy’s will and means to resist—serves to highlight the care and attention that preparation for conflict requires. While any type of conflict requires serious attention, high-end armed conflict against a peer adversary represents the most potentially dangerous scenario for which the joint force must prepare. While the objective of integrated deterrence is to deter conflict from occurring in the first place, it is equally about shaping the environment to ensure joint force dominance should deterrence fail. As outlined in Joint Publication 3-0, “while commanders conduct activities of cooperation and adversarial competition, they are still preparing for armed conflict.”¹⁵

Trilateral exercises between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, Australian Defense Force, and US Navy support shared goals of peace and stability while enhancing regional security. Credit: US Navy/ Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Codie L. Soule

Conflict preparation is a balancing act. The joint force must weigh concerns of strategic risk and escalation management: “Tilting the competitive balance too far in one’s own favor will affect an adversary’s decision-making and behavior, but the effect may be vertical or horizontal escalation, not compliance.”¹⁶ Smartly preparing for conflict to create and maintain advantage over an adversary can be a campaign in its own right and must involve shaping activities as well as capability development. These activities will often nest within an overarching integrated deterrence campaign, but at times these endeavors may diverge, at which point the balance of priority and weight of effort must be considered. For example, winning a conflict to defend the Panama Canal would be a clear priority of the United States. However, preparation for such a conflict is not assigned the same weight of effort as, for example, the defense of Taiwan, which is being treated as a high-likelihood event by the Pentagon today.

The United States will not achieve a decisive warfighting advantage against a near-peer competitor through sheer mass or weapon systems alone—rather, the victor will be the military that stacks the deck in its advantage before conflict erupts. Russia’s current war in Ukraine highlights the severity of high-end armed conflict involving near-peer competitors. While great wartime effort is aimed at bolstering sustainment through industrial base and supply chain modernization, operational activities will eventually be curtailed to whatever pace can be sustained through resupply. The joint force’s future advantage will hinge on its ability to: 1) advantageously shape the environment and 2) field capabilities with greater speed, precision, and lethality than its adversary.

Shaping the environment

Shaping the environment is crucial to securing a position of advantage across multiple domains left of conflict. In the context of targeting and effects generation, activities to shape the environment must center around closing critical operational and intelligence gaps associated with a prioritized target list tied to operational plans. These activities are intended to enhance precision and lethality of engagement and shorten the kill chain once armed conflict begins. In line with the framework espoused in this report, focused understanding of the enemy’s order of battle, critical infrastructure, battle management tactics, techniques and procedures, and standard operating procedures is key to establishing and maintaining a prioritized target list. In this way, portions of the joint targeting cycle are accomplished prior to conflict, informing weaponeering recommendations across kinetic and non-kinetic effects, as well as the requirements necessary to develop new capabilities to counter enemy systems for which the joint force does not yet possess a solution.

Moreover, shaping activities can be geared toward increasing resiliency in the joint targeting process. Much attention is given to the challenges of contested, degraded, and operationally limited (CDO) environments and how they complicate traditional means by which the joint force projects combat power. Peer adversaries can contest environments in a multitude of ways such as anti-access/area denial capabilities, electromagnetic interference, countering space situational awareness, and defensive cyber operations. Shaping activities must prioritize alternate means of accomplishing warfighting functions given the potential for primary means to become denied or degraded. Ironically, the CDO nature of Russia’s war in Ukraine has led to a much more conventional and analogue fight than anticipated. This highlights the importance of bolstering resiliency through shaping operations, as peer adversary denial capabilities may effectively cancel out one another’s high-end platforms.

Shaping across the physical and virtual domains

As is the case throughout the competition continuum, the contact layer for armed conflict is both physical and virtual. Traditional physical targets include surface-to-air missile systems, radars, maritime vessels, and command posts, and they exist in quantities of hundreds or thousands; virtual targets include network nodes tied to communication systems, power infrastructure, situational awareness, and early warning, and they are quantified in the millions. When expanding the battlefield to the virtual domain, synchronization of kinetic and non-kinetic effects can lead to significant advantages across the joint warfighting functions¹⁷ and with regard to the principle of mass.

Gaining a competitive advantage traditionally depends on availability and posture: the forces available, and on what timeline, are determined by their current posture. In the physical world, this construct presents challenging time-distance problems when considering global conflicts, raising questions for both escalation management as well as force preservation. The virtual world can alter this paradigm by enabling virtual mass, leveraging cyber operations to hold adversary networks and capabilities at risk at unprecedented speed and scale. Even modest impact on adversary capabilities executed on this scale of mass and speed can complicate the enemy’s risk calculus and mitigate some risk associated with physical force flow into theater. Given the challenges of logistics and sustainment, efficiencies gained through the employment of virtual capabilities provide a significant advantage during a protracted conflict. Saying this, virtual capabilities are not a silver bullet and effects delivered through cyberspace are insufficient in isolation during armed conflict, and often require large up-front investment in time and resources.

The evolution of virtual targeting and effects, to include the integration with physical targeting and fires, drives a greater premium on shaping the environment prior to conflict. To hold millions of virtual targets at risk instantaneously necessitates significant preparation of the environment. Indeed, a multiyear campaign built around access and understanding—by, with, and through regional allies and partners—may be necessary to simply gain access to the right adversary networks. Development and installation of cyber capabilities would be executed in parallel, with the associated development and intelligence gaps feeding back into the overall campaign approach. Shaping campaigns can provide the decisive advantage once armed conflict begins, all while informing the joint force of its own potential vulnerabilities and thus allowing for continued defensive hardening in stride.

Capability development

While fielding innovative and advanced technologies is critical to maintaining a decisive battlefield advantage, technology (whether platform or software-based) does not on its own equate to capability.¹⁸ Rather, it is the combination of technology, tactics, and training that creates a true capability—for instance, the United States sells fifth-generation fighter jets to other nations, but those nations do not instantly gain the capability to execute low-observable deep strike operations. Technology development must be informed by an understanding of the operating environment, the capabilities of adversaries, and the nature by which the joint force executes operations. To that end, furthering capability development is an objective for the campaigning framework outlined in this paper.

Training AI/ML algorithms often emulates or requires real-world data, further underscoring the need for capability development to harness data for effect. While great strides have been made in emulation for training, the real world offers the most significant data, which is accessible through robust campaigning activities across the joint force in concert with interagency and international partners. The integration of emerging weapon system technology such as hypersonics, lasers, and space-based fires is equally critical. Capabilities such as JADC2 seek to establish the necessary datacentric architecture for seamless integration of information and effects, which span employment times from milliseconds to hours. However, without AI/ML-driven predictive capabilities in the loop, joint force commanders will be challenged to make appropriate targeting and weaponeering decisions amid a large-scale conflict, creating significant risk with respect to sustainment, logistics, and force protection. Without a similar distribution of situational awareness, authority, and capability to the tactical edge, the joint force will not be able to field a credible combat force in a CDO environment where being disconnected from higher headquarters is the norm.

Lastly, while security cooperation is a foundational activity underlying integrated deterrence, the execution of high-end combined arms warfare with allies and partners requires a great deal of specific investment. This includes years of combined training, exercises, and rehearsals to create a dependable capability, especially when factoring in the complexity of integrating emerging technology. Incorporating allies and partners into the joint force-led scheme of maneuver will be critical to maintaining an advantage in targeting and effects generation. However, information-sharing hurdles, disparate rules of engagement, authorities, and cultural considerations must be ironed out in advance of conflict such that the full force of allied firepower can be realized. Ensuring that key allies are fielding capabilities that are JADC2 compatible will be critical to achieving the shared situational awareness required for a common operating picture. Making strides of this nature and fielding a combat-credible combined force will not be accomplished through sporadic exercises, key leader engagements, or exchanges; the joint force must train with allies and partners in the same manner with which it trains internally.

In sum, high-end conflict with a peer adversary presents the most difficult and high-risk challenge, and it requires specific attention given the gravity of its nature. When adequately prioritized, preparation for armed conflict prescribes a unique set of requirements for the joint force and its partners to execute during cooperation and competition and across multiple domains and instruments of power, which at times may overlap or diverge from deterrence. Shaping activities of this nature fall expressly within the proposed proactive targeting and effects framework given that, in the event of war, “these capabilities will shape the environment to ensure combat dominance and our ability to end any conflict on our terms.”¹⁹

The way forward

If we don’t change – if we fail to adapt – we risk losing the certainty with which we have defended our national interests for decades. We risk losing a high-end fight.

— Gen Charles Q. Brown, Jr., US Air Force Chief of Staff²⁰

Implementing change is no easy task, especially when considering the massive scale of the joint force. Nonetheless, a tidal wave of contemporary strategies, guidance and policy documents, and service visions all speak to the urgent need for change. Culture—coupled with procedural and technological changes—will be key to enabling sustainable adoption of a new approach.

Culture: Adapting the joint force’s mindset to global problems across the competition continuum

First, to deter armed conflict the joint force must adopt and operationalize the competitive mindset shift outlined in recent strategic doctrine. While armed conflict is never desirable, regardless of scale, high-end warfare between nuclear-armed peer competitors is of such gravity that deterring it from ever occurring is crucial. General Mark A. Milley’s assertion that “traditional joint force deterrence” is “less effective,” alludes to the notion that owning the most sophisticated or greatest quantity of weaponry is inadequate on its own as a deterrent.²¹ Moreover, while an adversary’s belief in the joint force’s will to act is critical to deterrence, it cannot solely revolve around direct military force given escalation concerns. Rather, adopting a more proactive and creative approach to strategic competition can simultaneously deter malign behavior while complicating, confusing, and frustrating adversary decision-making. The spectrum of views on Russia’s war in Ukraine are informative in this regard: Some highlight US and NATO success in arming Ukraine in its valiant campaign to oppose Russia’s invasion, whereas others view the ongoing war as “a direct result of the West’s lack of resolve and failure to credibly deter Russia” from waging war on the European continent more broadly, regardless of NATO borders.²² This latter sentiment pushes the force to adopt cultural change in order to deter future conflicts. Of course, the United States cannot deter all conflicts from occurring. However, well-informed global campaign plans can and should inform the prioritization of operational activities tied to certain potential conflicts the joint force deliberately seeks to deter.

Incorporating all instruments of power

The joint force need not abandon its traditional strengths; rather, it ought to smartly evolve its approaches to incorporate all instruments of power to expand access, fuel understanding, and generate a range of options regardless of location within the competition continuum. Increased training and education on the nature of authorities and tools that the various instruments of power can bring to the fight is critical for joint leaders. In this way, entities like the State Department or Intelligence Community do not simply represent “concurrence” boxes that must be checked to get military operations approved. Rather, they can be incorporated as partners that offer unique access vectors, diverse understanding, and a variety of tools to support or be supported by military actions, whether at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels. As described in this framework, adopting this change bolsters the joint force’s capability to target within any domain, and similarly expands the nature of effects, fires, and actions available to achieve desired outcomes.

Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) exemplify this approach and could be scaled to enable joint targeting and effects generation. Scaling a similar approach to that of the JIATF, however, requires cultural adaptation. JIATFs are tailor-built to address singular problems and combine multiple instruments of power—and their accompanying authorities and capabilities—under a single chain of command to create unity of effort. However, unity of effort does not necessitate unity of command: The joint force can lead the integrated deterrence effort without being in charge, and it often does play a supporting role to its interagency counterparts. This requires senior leaders to establish a culture that moves beyond “coordination” and “deconfliction” and toward “collaboration.” Increased organizational trust, built upon real-world operational experiences, will increase trust both across departments and in the disparate datasets produced across the instruments of power, ultimately amplifying the predictive capabilities of the AI architecture this framework is reliant upon. Moving toward collaboration is similarly critical as it pertains to enhancing the aggregate power among allies and partners.

Embracing the global nature of problem sets

The joint force must also embrace the concept of a global, multi-domain contact layer. When viewing the world solely through the lens of armed conflict, the joint force focuses narrowly on Russia in Europe and the PRC in the Indo-Pacific. Targeting and effects generation in Latin America, Africa, or the Arctic are then insufficiently regarded as supporting, complementary, or niche efforts rather than as potential key components of integrated deterrence. Many operational efforts—such as security force assistance, building a partner’s combat capability, gaining access, and illuminating vulnerabilities of an adversary’s capabilities—require significant time and resource investments. Senior leaders must understand why, for example, a multiyear effort to gain placement and access in Equatorial Guinea fits within the global campaign to counter PRC malign influence; otherwise they will be less likely to resource it (in this case, Equatorial Guinea is a candidate for the establishment of what would be the PRC’s first Atlantic naval base).²³ As such, combatant commanders who lead global campaign plans, such as the global campaign plan for China, should prioritize regularly communicating their priorities to other combatant commands when activities take place in another geographic area of command. This is especially important when activity falls under the authority of a different combatant command.

Generating senior leader understanding is a by-product of cultivating a joint force that thinks with a competitive mindset. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph F. Dunford recognized, the United States “think[s] of being at peace or war…our adversaries don’t think that way.”²⁴ Altering the “peace or war” mentality to a deeper understanding of activities across the competition continuum—and adopting a strategy of proactive targeting harnessing all instruments of power—is necessary to simultaneously deter aggression and effectively prepare for conflict. Combatant command force structure changes; intergovernmental professional training, education, and exercises; and in-garrison and deployed intergovernmental cross-pollination are beyond the scope of this paper but are among concepts worth exploring to enable cultural changes at scale.

Technology and data: Building a resilient and holistic data architecture

The DOD must build a robust and extensive data architecture, fusing private sector data with government data, and build frameworks and standards to harness it into actionable information. Data fuels everything from access and understanding, to options, targeting, and analysis, to predictions and recommendations. For data to be usable, however, it must first be accessible. Accessibility must occur at echelon given the nature of CDO environments and the expectation that severed links between the tactical edge and higher headquarters elements will be the norm, not the exception.

The joint force needs a data architecture in line with, and as a central component of, the JADC2 concept that aggregates data from all sensors across all domains to enable a proactive framework for targeting and effect. The architecture must encompass the tactical edge, fusing commercial and government-procured data across a spectrum of classification levels. In line with the DoD Data Strategy, such an architecture must make data visible, accessible, understandable, linked, trustworthy, interoperable, and secure.²⁵ The DOD must involve the private sector in the process of building this architecture and consider how interoperability standards and technologies can be integrated and kept up to date. Not only will this help the joint force accelerate the PED cycle and act on intelligence, but it will also allow the joint force to operate across the scale of attribution to mitigate the operational and counterintelligence risks inherent to strategic competition.

Airmen from the 7th Reconnaissance Squadron communications flight conduct a satellite communications training course. Credit: US Air Force/ Senior Airman Ashley Richards

Moreover, the joint force must explore how classified intelligence can safely be used to facilitate AI/ML algorithmic training. Otherwise, it may inadvertently incur risk to sources, methods, or exquisite platforms. Alternatively, with the appropriate mechanisms, AI/ML algorithms can be trained to reach similar conclusions as classified analysis using only open-source data. This will greatly enhance the joint force’s ability to export capabilities to allies and partners without concern for security-sharing agreements or classification obstacles.

Authorities, rules of engagement, and risk: Updating DOD guidelines and standards

DOD guidelines and standards must be updated to harness all tools of national power and to enable combatant commands to prioritize global issues alongside their regional areas of responsibility. For distribution of data to achieve the desired effect, the joint force must explore changes in the distribution of authorities, rules of engagement, and the nature of assessing risk. While a lack of authorities is frequently cited as a barrier to accomplishing operational activities, it is often the cumbersome means by which to access existing authorities that stands in the way. If a joint force commander (JFC) can exercise kinetic strike authority at their level but require permission from several echelons higher to execute information operations, the JFC will increasingly rely on kinetic effects. Authorities often lack clear processes by which subordinate commanders can quickly access them. Similarly, when authorities are reserved at the highest echelons, the approval authority is farthest removed from the problem, lacks adequate understanding, and often leads to excessive risk aversion. This plays out with the array of authorities germane to the joint force and will only become more complex and burdensome when expanding the aperture to include other instruments of power. At a minimum, when the National Command Authority delegates authorities to combatant commanders, there ought to be a standardized and coherent process by which subordinate echelons of command can access them efficiently. Additionally, an effective JADO/JADC2 operating environment that collects, disseminates, and harnesses data requires more effective coordination across the US services and manufacturers. The development of standards must be pursued to advance capabilities that are interoperable across the joint force and with US allies. Doing so will help improve the speed and precision of the targeting cycle.

Second, streamlining the approach to accessing authorities goes hand in hand with updating the joint force’s rules of engagement. These concepts help mitigate the concerns around disparate joint force elements operating with degraded or nonexistent contact with higher headquarters elements. Rules of engagement allow for commanders to lead through intent instead of specific guidance, facilitating more rapid and creative localized targeting and effects generation. Distribution of authorities and associated rules of engagement could transform a unit’s guidance from “employ electronic warfare (EW) effects against Russian ORLAN-10s” to “disrupt Russian ISR below 5,000 feet AGL.” The former is prescriptive and limiting; the latter is intent based, provides greater flexibility, and informs the necessary capabilities for the tactical edge to operate autonomously for longer periods of time.

Finally, the department must rethink the way it assesses risk in light of integrated deterrence and a global contact layer. Making informed decisions on risk management is a key underpinning of this framework. Yet, risk assessments are traditionally conducted in a temporal manner: the risk associated with a particular activity, in a particular location, with a particular target. Risks associated with strategic competition are not, however, suited to traditional ways of thinking. Competing with adversaries across a global contact layer requires considering how local risk ties into strategic risk, whether that be transregional or trans-domain. This is further complicated by the imperative to effectively prepare the joint force for combat. If, for example, a particular PRC capability presented a significant problem for the joint force’s ability to execute a contingency response plan, significant investment may be required to mitigate the threat. This may lead to a scenario in which the joint force assumes greater risk elsewhere in the globe to gain access to locations where the PRC has proliferated similar capabilities to increase understanding and develop options for use during crisis. A similar situation could arise where the joint force makes the decision to reveal a capability it would otherwise hold in reserve to complicate an adversary’s decision-making and risk calculus, thus enhancing deterrence. Maturing the joint force’s ability to assess risk in this manner must begin with data-informed understanding, shared consciousness, and unity of effort across all instruments of power.

Conclusion

Cultivating a joint force that enables and supports a whole-of-government approach to integrated deterrence is a daunting yet achievable vision, requiring transformational leadership to achieve. “Humans are more important than hardware,” and how leaders harness the joint force’s enduring strategic advantage of human capital will dictate whether success is achieved.²⁶ This paper has outlined a vision to update the way the joint force conducts targeting and effects generation for an era of strategic competition. Evolving the joint force’s model for targeting and effects will require adopting a mindset shift that sees competition as key to setting the conditions for, and ideally avoiding, armed conflict. To truly operationalize integrated deterrence, the joint force must embrace targeting and effects across the competition continuum, leveraging the range of tools at its disposal across its domestic and international counterparts, and avoiding a solely military or kinetic lens. Moreover, through the power of AI, the DOD can harness data for effect and fuel the proactive, continuous, and global campaigning required for integrated deterrence.

About the authors

Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Department of Defense

Fellow

Justin M. Conelli

Senior US Air Force Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan National Security

Staff

Clementine G. Starling

Director, Forward Defense

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Staff

Julia Siegel

Associate Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, Intellectual Property—Patents, Patent Related Matters, Trademarks and Copyrights, 1 September 1998, this research paper is not copyrighted but is the property of the United States government.

1 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, February 2023, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23698400/20230213-joint-concept-for-competing-signed.pdf.

2 DOD guidance and Joint Doctrine, such as the integrated deterrence concept nested within the National Defense Strategy and the Joint Concept for Competing, recognize that security challenges facing the United States span the competition continuum. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, February 10, 2023, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23698400/20230213-joint-concept-for-competing-signed.pdf, and US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 2022, 8-11, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.

3 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, v.

4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfighting, Joint Publication 1 (JP 1), July 2019, II-13.

5 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 1.

6 Cesar Augusto Rodriguez, Timothy Charles Walton, and Hyong Chu, Putting the “FIL” into “DIME”: Growing Joint Understanding of the Instruments of Power, Joint Force Quarterly, April 2020, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1099537.pdf.

7 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, v.

8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Targeting, Joint Publication 3-60 (JP 3-60), September 2019, II-8 – 11-9.

9 Department of Defense, DOD Data Strategy, September 2020, i, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/08/2002514180/-1/-1/0/DOD-DATA-STRATEGY.PDF.

10 US Department of Defense, DoD Data Strategy, i.

11 US Department of Defense, DoD Data Strategy, 2.

12 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence, Joint Publication 2-0 (JP 2-0), May 2022, I-2.

13 US Department of Defense, Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) Strategy, March 2022, 4, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/17/2002958406/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-THE-JOINT-ALL-DOMAIN-COMMAND-AND-CONTROL-STRATEGY.PDF.

14 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 401.

15 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Campaigns and Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (JP 3-0), June 2022, xxx.

16 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, 22.

17 The joint warfighting functions include command and control, information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment.

18 Tate Nurkin, The Five Revolutions: Examining Defense Innovation in the Indo-Pacific Region, Atlantic Council, November 20, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Five-Revolutions-Report.pdf.

19 Department of Defense, Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy, October 2020, 1, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/02/2002510472/-1/-1/0/Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.PDF.

20 Charles Q. Brown, Accelerate Change or Lose, US Air Force, August 2020, https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/csaf/CSAF_22/CSAF_22_Strategic_Approach_Accelerate_Change_or_Lose_31_Aug_2020.pdf.

21 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing.

22 Liam Collins and Frank Sobchak, “U.S. Deterrence Failed in Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, February 20, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/20/ukraine-deterrence-failed-putin-invasion/.

23 David Vergun, “General Says China Is Seeking a Naval Base in West Africa,” US Department of Defense, March 17, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2969935/general-says-china-is-seeking-a-naval-base-in-west-africa/

24 Dunford: Challenges Require More Than ‘Buying New Hardware,’ Association of the United Stated Army, October 10, 2016, https://www.ausa.org/news/dunford-challenges-require-new-hardware.

25 US Department of Defense, DOD Data Strategy.

26 US Special Operations Command, “SOF Truths,” https://www.socom.mil/about/sof-truths.

The post Operationalizing integrated deterrence: Applying joint force targeting across the competition continuum appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive is a key moment but long-term resolve remains crucial

Tennyson Dearing — Tue, 06 Jun 2023 20:23:12 +0000

For the past few months, international anticipation has been building over Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive. But great expectations can be dangerous. Even after the spectacular military successes of 2022, the Ukrainian military will face major obstacles as it seeks to overcome a large Russian force that still occupies just under 20% of the country and is deeply entrenched along a front line stretching over 1000 km.

First, offensive warfare is hard. It’s even harder when done in towns and cities. According to John Spencer, chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute, this is because cities are tactically constraining. Built up areas offer plenty of ready-made cover above and below ground. Used well, defenders can surprise attackers with close range ambushes, turning single buildings into deadly fortresses.

This should ring alarm bells for Ukrainian military planners. True, open steppe and trenches have hosted much of the fighting in recent months. But from Donetsk and Luhansk in the east to Melitopol and Sevastopol in the south, the path to the complete liberation of Ukraine is thick with occupied cities. Russia will likely use these urban areas to dig in. And though Ukraine can control the tempo and direction of its counteroffensive, Ukrainian troops will still likely need to engage in urban warfare at regular intervals.

Ukraine still has good chances of advancing, of course. Its armed forces are nimble and highly motivated, and they’ve made a habit of surprising both Western analysts and their Russian adversaries. The Russians also face problems of their own. In defending occupied cities, they can be cut off from support and supplies. Ukrainians have been training to exploit these weaknesses. But even with larger troop formations and Western hardware, they will be swimming against the current.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Second, as well as tactical constraints, Ukraine has tighter than usual policy constraints. This is easy to forget. More than fifteen months since Russia’s full-scale invasion began, Ukraine’s balance sheet is a tally of hard-earned battlefield successes. However, these have come despite a handicap. Unlike Russia, Ukraine is fighting on home soil; this limits its capacity to make war.

This has a lot to do with civilians. In urban battles, attackers can lessen their casualties by bombarding defended buildings before boots-on-the-ground assaults. Yet unlike jungles or deserts, cities are not neutral. The presence of civilians changes what attackers may be prepared or permitted to do.

International law plays a role here. Under the Geneva Conventions, which both Ukraine and Russia are party to, warring states must take constant care to protect civilians and civilian objects. This doesn’t mean that collateral damage is always illegal, but losses should be in proportion to an expected military gain and not the work of indiscriminate targeting. Russia has ignored these laws on a scale that many regard as part of a wider genocide. Ukraine has not. This is a key reason why Ukrainian forces have not engaged in the wholesale shelling of occupied cities, and has also repeatedly warned civilians to take precautions, such as during the campaign to liberate Kherson late last year.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The high potential for civilian casualties will impact Ukraine’s coming counteroffensive. This will be particularly challenging in densely populated areas. While many local residents of affected towns and cities may choose to evacuate, some will inevitably stay put. Faced with a Russian adversary positioned behind or alongside significant numbers of Ukrainian civilians, Ukraine will be constrained in terms of how it attacks and maneuvers.

Russia has already forced Ukraine to accept war as the price of freedom, but it will not succeed in erasing Ukraine’s humanity. Military planners in Kyiv are therefore tasked with the gut-wrenching calculus of places and populations. They must decide where to fight and what it might cost. For now, these are guarded secrets. Yet it will surely be harder to liberate Ukraine than defend it.

With this in mind, international resolve is more crucial than ever. Since February 2022, support from Ukraine’s allies has played a key part in the fight against Russia’s invasion. Ongoing diplomatic efforts, intelligence sharing, and military assistance remain vital and must not be tied to short-term objectives. This is why any signs of overconfidence in the summer counteroffensive are troubling, because disappointment too easily leads to disillusionment.

In reality, a decisive Ukrainian military victory may still be far off. It will also be costly, but not nearly as costly as a premature peace. With many in the West already keen to see a return on investment, and with talk of a “high-water mark” for US aid gaining ground in some quarters, Ukraine needs systematic backing that stays the course. The coming Ukrainian counteroffensive is an important moment in the war, but it should not be seen as Ukraine’s last chance to achieve victory.

Tennyson Dearing is a policy officer at the Australian Department of Defence based in Paris. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Australian government.

Against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict, it is time to revisit assumptions in Norway about how armed conflict will evolve from today through 2042 and what that means for Norway’s defense technology priorities in relation to threats from Russia and beyond. The lessons of how Ukraine and Russia employ emergent technologies in a war that seems to have one boot in the past and one in the future should prompt deep introspection about Norway’s military operations.

Some of the key technological concepts raised in this examination will be familiar, but what differs is how they can be employed in disruptive ways. For example, military officers should consider whether to defend Norwegian territory with mechanized forces in depth at the border or whether to draw in an adversary’s land and naval forces to better destroy them on familiar ground with armed autonomous drones. Other issues are new, such as defining the responsible use of autonomously armed drones inside Norway’s northern territory during a wartime scenario with Russia or China. Many of these technological advances have roots in civilian innovations, such as artificial intelligence (AI) software and commercial drones. All of them require facing the uncomfortable aspects of disruption that require reappraisal of whether the way things were done in the past will be sufficient to confront the present and future world as it is, not as we wish. While Norway is a core member of NATO and will soon remake longstanding defense partnerships with Sweden and Finland, it should not shy away from its own technology-forward approach to national security.

Norway’s challenge—and opportunity

The challenge

Norway’s armed forces are historically small in number, yet this highly professional force has transformed in recent years to perform myriad twenty-first-century missions that are unique to the nation. As a NATO member, it must defend Europe’s longest coastline, patrol the skies over the stormy and strategically vital North Atlantic, and maintain a small but economically and culturally vital border with Russia. It must also jointly protect Arctic interests such as Svalbard and natural ocean resources, in addition to assuring cyber and electronic infrastructure. It also has a fresh mandate to reimagine defense cooperation with new Scandinavian NATO allies Sweden and Finland.

A B-52H Stratofortress assigned to the 23rd Expeditionary Bomb Squadron flies over Norway during a Bomber Task Force mission March 16, 2023. Credit: US Air Force/ Senior Airman Zachary Wright

The challenge for Norway today involves countering growing numbers of potential asymmetric threats in each of these areas posed by the new technologies changing warfare, while traditional military threats requiring highly capable conventional forces have not gone away. Furthermore, Russia’s military failures in Ukraine are no guarantee that future operations will not succeed or at least be catastrophically harmful to Norway. Russia will certainly reform its military after the war in Ukraine. Moscow will likely address many of the operational shortcomings exposed by the conflict and may even accelerate their technological transformation.

It is tempting to assess Norway’s current and future military by its budget or the number of active-duty troops or squadrons of fighter jets. After all, the force is half the size it was at the end of the Cold War.² Yet spending has more than doubled since then to reach historical highs as the force has incorporated more technology.³ It is unlikely that Norway’s military will grow in end strength to past peaks, which therefore requires a fresh way of thinking about military strength and the role that technology can play in it. Moreover, Norway’s growing population of ageing citizens may pose challenges to filling the ranks of the armed forces.⁴

The opportunity

Recent advancements in robotics, software, satellites, and autonomy place a new onus on Norway’s leaders to carefully consider the technological possibilities in areas such as robotic systems capable of supplanting human forces, powerful individual weapons to target aircraft and armored vehicles, and lower-cost commercial geospatial data. Technological asymmetries can be turned into advantages with the right policies and investment. As such, this review offers an opportunity to consider how the above challenges can be addressed with investment in new technological capabilities that link to current and near-future warfare trends. It reflects observations from the conflict in Ukraine, such as:

Commercial space is vital for situational awareness and communications.
Defending civilians requires hard power because laws and norms are insufficient.
Mobile phones and AI create new battlefield transparency and cognitive effects.
Civilian expertise in AI, drones, and software is central to tactical operations.

Norway must also contend with more than the threat of Russia. As NATO recently asserted at its Madrid Summit in 2022: “We face systemic competition from those, including the People’s Republic of China, who challenge our interests, security, and values and seek to undermine the rules-based international order.”⁵ Irrespective of recent public tension between Beijing and Moscow, China’s military interoperability with Russia continues to expand, particularly in the Arctic.⁶ China’s growing defense-industrial capabilities, particularly in autonomy, hypersonic missiles, offensive space capabilities, and advanced shipbuilding portend Russia-like consideration of Beijing’s strategic interests and how military presence, if not force, may be used.

Norway’s military posture today also embodies a useful tension between high-tech platforms and traditional defense. Fifth-generation F-35 fighters patrol Arctic skies flying tens of thousands of feet over small-unit, long-range reconnaissance foot patrols along the Russian-Norway border. This is a useful paradigm for understanding how emergent technologies can contribute to Norway’s security, but not at the expense of common sense or overreliance on vulnerable systems.

The following concepts reflect this realistic understanding of what is not only technologically possible, but politically or culturally feasible. At the same time, it should be clear that some of the ideas offer a path that will lead to clear departures from traditional ways of thinking about the Norwegian military and how it employs technology. It would be easy to discount the concepts discussed as too radical. Even with that categorical reaction, it is worth considering the rationale behind them because they address underlying truths that future conflict will be waged at machine speed, with increasing autonomy, and involve greater peril to civilian populations from cognitive and kinetic effects.

Norway’s solutions

Thinking clearly about the future of warfare and technology’s role in it requires imagination. Yet such thinking must also remain anchored to a central line of questioning. In this case, the crucial questions focus on threats, priorities, and operations:

What technology areas will create new or amplify existing threats to such an extent that they will affect the defense sector in the next ten to twenty years?
What technology areas should the defense sector emphasize in order to avoid weakened defence capabilities in relation to Russia in the next ten to twenty years?
What types of technology should the defense sector use to maximize interoperability with allies and partners for the next ten to twenty years?

U.S. Marines work together with the Norwegian Army to conduct offensive and defensive operations at the battalion and brigade-level during Exercise Reindeer II in Blåtind, Norway. Credit: US Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Timothy J. Lutz

These questions lead to the conclusion that, to prevail in a high- or mixed-intensity war with Russia over the next two decades, Norway should invest in next-generation situational awareness and targeting, as well as seek-and-destroy weapons systems capable of semi- or fully autonomous target selection.

The Norwegian flag waves in the wind in Trondheim, Norway, June 20, 2022. Credit: U.S. Marine Corps/ Cpl. Brendan Mullin

As an example, traditional mechanized armored forces are still vital to domestic and foreign military operations. Yet the introduction of Sweden and Finland as NATO members allows for a reconsideration of how Norway should defend Finnmark at a time when heavy armored vehicles are increasingly vulnerable to both long- and close-range weapons systems. Instead, small, fast-moving, lightly armored units equipped with short- and medium-range strike weapons like rocket artillery, as well as organic anti-air and anti-drone defense systems, can have the same or greater destructive capability at greater range, but with less exposure to Russian artillery or long-range missiles fired from within Russian territory than traditional units. In the air, fifth-generation fighters like the F-35 will jointly defend Scandinavian airspace with the aid of autonomous unmanned fighter and ground attack aircraft, while providing crucial data and sensing capabilities to ground and maritime forces. Norway’s naval forces will necessarily operate with squadrons of distributed manned and unmanned squadrons for surface and undersea missions given the growing lethality of Russian and Chinese anti-ship missiles.⁷ As part of a renewed Scandinavian defense, Norway could become a regional or European leader in such autonomous and human-machine teamed systems by partnering with US and other allied software, sensors, and robotics programs. This would represent a new specialization for the Forsvaret of the late 2020s and 2030s and complement Swedish and Finnish capabilities.

Threats 2022-2042: What technology areas will create new or amplify existing threats to such an extent that they will affect the defense sector in the next ten to twenty years?

There is a long list of military-oriented or specific defense technologies that will have a significant impact on the threat environment Norway faces. Some, such as synthetic biology or quantum computing, have the potential to be truly game-changing in the near future. Yet the following three military technology threats that fuse next-generation software, AI, and breakthrough hardware are already extremely consequential, whether Russia or another nation employs them:

Space-based surveillance, communications, and offensive systems;
Inexpensive autonomous armed drones and unmanned ground systems; and
Smartphones and AI-personalized cognitive and kinetic warfare.

Space data

This is a new era for commercial space-based data from small satellites that has major implications for future warfare. Precise and accurate information about imagery on Earth is now accessible and relatively affordable due to a new generation of inexpensive and ultimately disposable satellites. At the same time, advances in AI make processing this new wave of data much faster and more reliable. Recently, space-based surveillance has proven extremely effective for the Ukrainian military for establishing situational awareness and targeting their operations against Russian forces. Norway’s sensitive maritime oil and gas resources and infrastructure are likely one such target of persistent space-based surveillance. This space-based approach is also part of a solution to protecting those same commercial assets. The emerging market for data from space will make hiding—and defending—much more difficult in the 2020s and 2030s, as will small satellite constellations owned by nation states.⁸ As precision weapons like rocket artillery and armed drones proliferate, the ability to locate targets from space will become increasingly important, particularly in contested airspace.

With communications, the Starlink space-based internet connectivity platform shows the military effectiveness of small satellite alternatives to terrestrial networks during wartime.⁹ For Norway, this is both risk and opportunity. Defensive fortifications or movement of material, for example, will be detected immediately. At the same time, purchased satellite data offers near real-time access to information on Russian preparations and movement.

Robotic autonomy

The past three years revealed a growing profile for drones in warfare, from the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict¹⁰ to Ukraine’s present battlefields, even with the rudimentary level of control and semi-autonomy that exists today. Small and inexpensive drones can now be equipped with AI-powered target-recognition systems, as well. As drones move from surveillance roles to regularly attacking targets, this will only grow and evolve tactics. Russia’s experience in Ukraine with drones shows a willingness to regularly employ them in warfare, and its import of foreign-made drones such as Iran’s indicates Moscow will continue employing armed drones.¹¹ Many nations are proliferating drone systems, including China as a leading exporter. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s crowd-sourced and civilian-driven drone innovation shows a new leading technological edge, while its military flies Turkey’s TB2 drone that can operate largely autonomously.

Members of the Office of Naval Research, based out of Washington, D.C., launch the REMUS 600 autonomous underwater vehicle for mine search and identification operations off the coast of Bornholm Island in support of exercise Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) 2018, June 7. Credit: U.S Navy/ Chief Mass Communication Specialist America A. Henry

A mix of heterogenous robotic capabilities will be a staple of future conflicts. Armed ground systems are poised to emerge onto battlefields, as well, in a replication of the aerial drone evolution. The recent Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipeline explosions point to the sort of high-consequence strategic economic attack that an undersea robotic system might carry out in the future with greater autonomy and therefore stealth.¹² The significant shift ahead will involve systems operating without that control stations and high-bandwidth communications that are necessary today. To that end, NATO is reportedly preparing a strategy for the responsible use of autonomy, in another recognition of evolving robotic systems. Even if NATO members adhere to such guidelines, it is unclear whether states such as Russia or China will do so even as they develop and employ autonomous weapons systems.¹³

Smartphones and AI

Smartphones are ubiquitous on twenty-first-century battlefields, but their use has evolved during the past few years, leading to new tactical and strategic implications. There is a developing fusion of AI-powered image processing, scaling information, and cognitive campaigns using social media, and ever-more refined kinetic and electronic targeting capabilities honing in on mobile devices. Just as space-based surveillance creates new levels of operational transparency, the proliferation of high-quality smartphone cameras linked to cloud computing means that as soon as information is identified with a handheld device it can be shared across civilian or military networks, not just social media. In a recent example, Ukraine’s software developers have created apps that can alert citizens in real-time to air raids, while the government’s eVorog chat program enables registered users to rapidly report Russian equipment or personnel, data which is screened by AI.¹⁴

Just as smartphones are sensors, they are vectors of information—and disinformation. The contest to capture an individual’s attention and influence their emotional state or real-world actions is in effect an evolution toward cognitive warfare, which could see the precision targeting of individuals at scale using new AI systems.¹⁵ Among those systems are text-generating tools called large language models, which have the ability to churn out an unending stream of realistic, human-like writing on social media and elsewhere. The open-source LLM Bloom features forty-six languages and thirteen programming languages.¹⁶ Image generation and manipulation tools using AI are also proliferating as easy-to-use programs, with social media consumer apps offering a preview.¹⁷ In Ukraine, deep fakes quickly emerged in the conflict with a spoofed video of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky ordering Ukrainian forces to stand down.¹⁸ Both of these software capabilities will increasingly be managed by AI programs themselves, a form of autonomy that is going to influence everything from propaganda to civil discourse during conflict.

Priorities and interoperability 2022-2042: What technology areas should the defense sector emphasize in order to avoid weakened defense capabilities in relation to Russia over the next ten to twenty years and how might they reinforce interoperability with allies and partners?

The other side of risk from technologies changing warfare is opportunity. The same inventions and innovation that exacerbate current and future threats to Norway also indicate where to focus research and investment. This requires consideration of Russian military capability and investment plans, as well as a realistic assessment of their effective execution over the next two decades. Caution is needed, however, in assuming the failures of Russian forces in Ukraine¹⁹ will contribute to the failings of late 2020s and 2030s Russian military forces. While military reform of the past five years in Russia has proven to be hollow, it is also possible that the same mistakes will not be made again. Either way, there are enduring aspects to the threat Russia poses to Norwegian territory and Norwegian forces operating abroad in support of NATO: threatening Arctic and North Sea lines of communication (including Svalbard), air-defense denial zones over Scandinavia, seizing and holding territory in Finnmark through massed armor, medium- and long-range precision and area weapons fired from inside Russia, as well as cyberattacks and “gray zone” operations.

Each of the following priorities addresses these threats:

Autonomous aerial, maritime, and ground systems for rural or open territory (surveillance, logistics, attack);
Small unit anti-armor, anti-ship, and anti-air: Javelin in every closet; and
Commercial space access and support

Autonomy 3.0

In the era of software-driven warfare, the ability to mass large numbers of forces still rings true—even if it strikes a different note. Advances in robotics and AI-powered autonomous systems will enable nations to mass forces differently than in the past, and in ways that are difficult for conventional defenses to counter. It also opens new avenues for defense. Today’s swarm-capable munitions like the Naval Strike Missile already show the potential of such systems and preview how they might develop.
Consider that Norwegian military forces must cover over 385,000 square kilometers of territory and more than 25,000 kilometers of coastline. Using unmanned and largely autonomous systems to patrol Norwegian territory would allow for the judicious use of manned platforms such as F-35 fighters or Norway’s six Skjold-class missile ships. Many strategic areas in Arctic Scandinavia, such as Cap of the North where Finland, Norway, and Sweden share interests and territory, are sparsely populated yet constitute significant land and maritime portions of each country. With traditional mechanized forces, such an area is difficult to patrol, let alone defend. Using more numerous autonomous air, ground, and sea systems for joint or unilateral patrolling, logistics support, and deterrence would allow for extending that presence beyond what has been traditionally possible.

Take the example of Norwegian military patrols on oil and gas infrastructure in the wake of the Nord Stream pipeline attacks: this presents a resource challenge to the Forsvaret if this mission becomes an enduring one.²⁰ Such persistent surveillance and interdiction missions are well suited to autonomous maritime and air systems whose data is collected and sorted by AI onboard or on the ground. Yet current unmanned aerial systems (UAS) spending in the air domain, for example, is less than 1 percent of 2021-2028 Norwegian Defense Ministry forecasts, and land domain spending for UAS is under 5 percent.²¹

Similar explorations of operational trade-offs are underway with the US Marine Corps Force Design 2030 reforms.²² By giving up main battle tanks and some fighter aircraft, the Marine Corps seeks to reinvest those resources in smaller units of infantry supported by robotic and autonomous systems whose military capabilities are on par with the conventional weapons they replace. Moreover, it will allow Marines to operate near China, often without direct support from conventional US military resources, and deploy a new generation of unmanned platforms, such as the NMESIS robotic wheeled vehicle armed with Naval Strike Missiles or the Metal Shark autonomous ship armed with loitering munitions.²³

Norwegian Leopard tank crews from the Telemark Battalion prepare for a live-fire exercise in Rena, Norway. Credit: US Marines

One of the abiding defensive challenges is how to protect Finnmark and southern Norway from a Russian incursion in the north. In the case of such a scenario, a Brigade North defensive line in or south of Finnmark could be reinforced and patrolled with autonomous ground and air vehicles, which could be armed and tasked with deterring or interdicting Russian forces. Similarly, an ongoing challenge of regional resupply to Finnmark during wartime could be addressed with the new generation of autonomous cargo aircraft.²⁴ Similar tactics could be used with unmanned maritime surface and undersea systems along Norway’s extensive coastline for patrol and supply. Because such autonomous robotic platforms’ software can train in AI-powered synthetic environments, they can be readied for wartime use without requiring as much real-world training.²⁵ They also allow for reconsidering the composition of land units, such as the Norwegian Army’s Brigade North. Acknowledging the break with traditional conceptions of military force and the attendant operational ethics issues of weaponized autonomy, a shift by the Norwegian military to employ autonomous robotic systems compensating for its end strength would allow for a novel way to counter massed (or dispersed) Russian ground forces with less risk and greater precision.

However, robotic systems have their own logistical challenges and operational limits. Yet there is existing software and robotics expertise in Norwegian society, which could be developed as a national resource of expertise in developing robotics for austere environments. The likely growing use of autonomous weapons systems by Russia and China necessitates ensuring those nations will not take a lead that will be difficult to close operationally—or ethically.

Small unit combat capability

The iconic imagery of “St. Javelin” as a pop-culture meme in Ukraine underscores how significant soldier-portable anti-armor systems like the FGM-148 Javelin are in an era of persistent surveillance and targeting.²⁶ Indeed, the United States and NATO members supplied Ukraine some 17,000 Javelins in less than a week in March.²⁷ What advantage Russia had with its armored forces was radically reduced by the proliferation of these portable anti-armor weapons. Other models have been rushed to Ukraine, as well. Of course, most of these weapons were shipped hurriedly after Russia invaded Ukraine. Whether they would have had a deterrent effect on Moscow were they already in place is debatable. Yet it is undeniable that they would be able to thwart the free movement of spearhead armor units and harass supply columns. The same could be achieved in Norway, particularly in Finnmark, by acquiring highly portable and concealable anti-tank missiles like the Javelin so that Norwegian Army and Home Guard forces have access not to hundreds, but thousands of missiles and launchers.

The Norwegian military’s approach to territorial defense, beyond deploying in support of NATO in the Baltics, would be aligned with technology trendlines converging on small units that can find their own targets with their own drones and access to satellite imagery, then attack them with their own anti-armor or weapons systems before dispersing. These are not partisan tactics from the 1980s, but a networked approach to small-unit warfare that exploits an invading adversary’s need to consolidate force around seized terrain. Portable anti-air, anti-ship, and anti-drone systems could also be dispersed along similar lines to deny airspace access from lower-altitude threats from attack drones and helicopters, as well as close-air support jets. As a model, reforms by the US Marine Corps to increase the combat power of small units portends this nearly inevitable reform of combined arms forces in high-threat contested environments.²⁸

Geospatial data and communications

Geospatial data from civilian satellites for military operations are becoming increasingly affordable—and effective. From exposing Chinese government transformation of South China Sea reefs²⁹ into military facilities to documenting pre-invasion Russian troop movements and wartime human rights violations in Ukraine,³⁰ there is a revolution underway with commercial space satellites. Norway is already active in the military space domain, including Norwegian satellites carrying Arctic communications payloads for the US Space Force.³¹ The Svalbard Archipelago, one of the world’s most important collections of satellite ground stations, naturally positions Norway as a space-oriented nation.³² This new generation of satellites and data represents a new opportunity for this status to evolve with the technology.

While conventional military- or intelligence-grade satellites can cost hundreds of millions of kroner, it is no longer necessary to outright acquire them. Defense spending plans for military space—at less than 1 percent of 2021-2028 spending in the space domain³³ —are relatively small and may be insufficient given the high-bandwidth requirements of military systems of the late 2020s and 2030s. Commercial imagery or communications bandwidth is available with “space as a service,” as are other orbital services related to specific terrestrial sensing tasks. This is already an area of interest and investment for many NATO member militaries, including the United States.³⁴ As the economic value of space activity grows, so does its strategic value. Yet much of that value will come from geospatial data or bandwidth from commercial assets, such as Starlink has shown in Ukraine. To that end, Svalbard’s military importance is only going to grow. The severing of an undersea fibre-optic cable from Svalbard to mainland Norway in January 2022 indicates the potential strategic vulnerability there and its potential as a target from Russian forces or interests.³⁵

Conclusion

These are vital questions considering how new technologies like lower cost geospatial data, AI-powered information campaigns, increasingly powerful individual anti-armor and anti-air weapons, and autonomous vehicles and aircraft could be used to reimagine the defense of Norway, as well as support Forsvaret operations abroad. Russia may be the near-term focus, but these explorations are also applicable to other strategically important areas, such as the growing importance of Arctic trade routes to nations like China. Allies and partners are essential, not just operationally in the defense of Norway but in how the nation prepares for the unthinkable. There are also lessons to be drawn elsewhere regarding technology and transformation, such as the Force Design 2030 reform of the United States Marine Corps, and emerging concepts around the civilian-military composition of combat units using new capabilities like drones. The war in Ukraine offers myriad hard-won lessons, too, but it is important to remember that Russia in 2022 will be different than the Russia of 2032 or 2042. For all the focus on technology and the questions about the future of Norway’s defense, it is impossible to understand, and prepare for, the kinds of technologies that will shape future conflicts without remaining focused on the human experience of twenty-first century warfare.

This essay was originally written for the Norwegian Defense Commission, which is reviewing Norway’s security and defense policies of the next ten to twenty years.

About the author

Fellow

August Cole

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

1 “Will donate Hellfire missiles and night vision equipment to Ukraine,” Norway Ministry of Defence, August 9, 2022, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/donerer-hellfire-missiler-og-nattoptikk-til-ukraina/id2926713/.

2 “Armed forces personnel, total – Norway,” World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1?locations=NO.

3 “Armed forces personnel, total – Norway,” World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1?locations=NO.

4 “A historic shift: More elderly than children and teenagers,” Statistisk Sentralbyra, June 3, 2020, https://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/a-historic-shift-more-elderly-than-children-and-teenagers.

5 “Madrid Summit Declaration,” NATO, June 29, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_196951.htm.

6 “NATO head warns about Russian, Chinese interest in Arctic,” Voice of America, August 26, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/nato-head-warns-about-russian-chinese-interest-in-arctic/6718667.html.

7 Timothy Wright, “Russia’s ‘new’ anti-ship missile,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, July 18, 2022, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2022/07/russias-new-anti-ship-missile.

8 Nicholas Eftimiades, Small satellites: The implications for national security, Atlantic Council, May 5, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/small-satellites-the-implications-for-national-security/.

9 Christopher Woody, “The US Air Force is signing up for Starlink after watching it help Ukraine stay online amid Russia’s ongoing attacks,” Business Insider, August 8, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-air-force-contracts-with-starlink-as-it-helps-ukraine-2022-8.

10 Craig A. Reed and James P. Rife, “New wrinkles to drone warfare,” US Naval Institute, January 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/january/new-wrinkles-drone-warfare.

11 Yaroslav Trofimov and Dion Nissenbaum, “Russia’s use of Iranian Kamikaze drones creates new dangers for Ukrainian troops,” Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-use-of-iranian-kamikaze-drones-creates-new-dangers-for-ukrainian-troops-11663415140 ; Samuel Bendett and Jeffrey Edmonds, “Russian military autonomy in Ukraine four months in,” Center for Naval Analyses, July 2022, https://www.cna.org/reports/2022/07/russian-military-autonomy-in-ukraine-four-months-in.

12 Arne Delfs, Elena Mazneva, and Anna Shiryaevskaya, “Germany suspects sabotage hit Russia’s Nord Stream pipelines,” Bloomberg, September 27, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-27/nord-stream-probing-pressure-drop-at-second-russian-gas-link.

13 Steven Zeitchik, “The future of warfare could be a lot more grisly than Ukraine,” Washington Post, March 12, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/11/autonomous-weapons-geneva-un/.

14 Drew Harwell, “Instead of consumer software, Ukraine’s tech workers build apps of war,” Washington Post, March 24, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/24/ukraine-war-apps-russian-invasion/ ; Ylli Bajraktari, “The first networked war: Eric Schmidt’s Ukraine trip report,” Special Competitive Studies Project, September 13, 2022, https://scsp222.substack.com/p/the-first-networked-war-eric-schmidts.

15 August Cole and Herve Le Guyader, Cognitive: A 6th domain of operations?, NATO, April 2021, https://www.innovationhub-act.org/content/cognitive-warfare.

16 Bloom, https://huggingface.co/bigscience/bloom.

17 Hitoshi Nasu, “Deepfake technology in the age of information warfare,” Lieber Institute, March 1, 2022, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/deepfake-technology-age-information-warfare/.

18 Bobby Allyn, “Deepfake video of Zelenskyy could be ‘tip of the iceberg’ in info war, experts warn,” NPR, March 16, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/03/16/1087062648/deepfake-video-zelenskyy-experts-war-manipulation-ukraine-russia.

19 Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, “Not built for purpose: The Russian military’s ill-fated force design,” War on the Rocks, June 2, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/.

20 Nora Buli, “Norway to deploy military to protect its oil and gas installations,” Reuters, September 28, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/norway-beefs-up-security-across-oil-gas-sector-2022-09-28/.

21 Future acquisitions for Norwegian defence sector 2021-2028, Forsvars Department, April 2021, https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/09d83a5cbefd4fb68064e6ca871acccb/faf-2021-2028-engelsk-versjon-__.pdf.

22 Andrew Feickert, “New U.S. Marine Corps force design initiative: Force Design 2030,” Congressional Research Service, March 7, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11281.

23 Peter Ong, “Latest details on the USMC’s NMESIS and long range USV,” Naval News, June 22, 2022, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/06/latest-details-on-the-usmcs-nmesis-and-long-range-usv/.

24 Kelsey D. Atherton, “What DARPA wants in a new recon and delivery drone,” Popular Science, September 14, 2022, https://www.popsci.com/technology/darpa-ancillary-drone-project-goals/.

25 Gerard Andrews, “NVIDIA Omniverse Replicator generates synthetic training data for robots,” NVIDIA Developer, November 9, 2021, https://developer.nvidia.com/blog/generating-synthetic-datasets-isaac-sim-data-replicator/.

26 Leila Barghouty, “How the St. Javelin mem raised a million dollars for Ukraine,” Washington Post, September 18, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/18/ukraine-war-meme-fundraising/.

27 David Sanger, Eric Schmitt, Helene Cooper, Julian Barnes, and Kenneth Vogel, “Amid Ukraine: 17,000 anti-tank weapons in 6 days and a clandestine cybercorps,” New York Times, March 6, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/06/us/politics/us-ukraine-weapons.html.

28 Megan Eckstein, “Marines Force Design 2030 update refocuses on reconnaissance,” Defense News, May 9, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/05/09/marines-force-design-2030-update-refocuses-on-reconnaissance/.

29 “China island tracker,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/.

30 Sandra Erwin, “Commercial spy satellites put Russia’s Ukraine invasion in the public eye,” Space News, February 27, 2022, https://spacenews.com/satellite-imaging-companies-increase-profile-as-they-track-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/.

31 Josh Luckenbaugh, “JUST IN: Space Force partners with Norway to launch Arctic comms satellites,” National Defense, August 31, 2022, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/8/31/space-force-partners-with-norway-to-launch-arctic-comms-satellites

32 Johannes Dobson, “Arctic space,” Konsberg Magazine, February 2018, https://www.kongsberg.com/kmagazine/2018/2/arctic-space/.

33 Future acquisitions for Norwegian defence sector 2021-2028, Forsvars Department.

34 Emmi Yonekura, Brian Dolan, Moon Kim, Krista Romita Grocholski, Raza Khan, Yool Kim, Commercial Space Capabilities and Market Overview, RAND Corporation, 2022, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA500/RRA578-2/RAND_RRA578-2.pdf.

35 Dan Henrik Klausen and Knut Anders Finnset, «Brudd på sjøkabel på Svalbard – heller mot at mennesker står bak,» Troms og Finnmark, February 11, 2022, https://www.nrk.no/tromsogfinnmark/politiet-tror-det-er-en-menneskelig-arsak-bak-bruddet-pa-sjokabel-pa-svalbard-1.15850988#:~:text=Brudd%20på%20sjøkabel%20på%20Svalbard,Her%20kommer%20sjøkabelen%20i%20land.

The post Autonomy and asymmetry: The future of Norway’s defense 2022-2042 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Will the debt ceiling deal mean less for homeland security?

Thomas S. Warrick — Wed, 31 May 2023 19:00:12 +0000

What the new budget deal to raise the federal debt ceiling means for homeland security is only slowly coming into focus. Very few of the initial statements out of the White House or House Republican leadership about the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 mention what the new budget cap means for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or for homeland security more broadly. A close look, however, leaves reason for concern. DHS will be competing for fewer civilian budget dollars against the full range of the nation’s domestic needs and priorities. This puts the United States’ defenses at risk in areas where the threats are increasing, as in cybersecurity, border and immigration security, and domestic counterterrorism.

US President Joe Biden and House Speaker Kevin McCarthy deserve praise for avoiding a catastrophic default on the United States’ fiscal obligations that otherwise would have disrupted debt payments, Social Security payments to seniors, and the federal payroll that includes everyone who keeps the United States safe. Most commentators on the budget part of the deal have focused on the contrast between “defense spending,” where the agreement largely endorses the Biden administration’s requested increase for the Department of Defense, versus domestic programs, which are slated for a cut over the previous year’s levels. However, it is important to remember that DHS leads the defense of the United States against nonmilitary threats. DHS is responsible for border, aviation, and maritime security, as well as cybersecurity. It also helps protect critical infrastructure, oversees immigration, builds resilience, restores communities after disasters, and combats crimes of exploitation. As the third-largest cabinet department in the federal government, DHS’s budget is intrinsically linked to the security of the United States. However, DHS’s budget for fiscal year (FY) 2024 is not getting the same treatment as the budget for the Department of Defense (DOD).

When security is “nonsecurity”

The Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 classifies most of DHS’s budget as “nonsecurity.” This is paradoxical but true. Barring future changes to the deal, which are always possible, DHS will be in a zero-sum competition in the FY 2024 budget negotiations against other civilian programs such as nutrition programs for children, domestic law enforcement, housing programs, community grants programs, and national parks. Whereas the federal government should be spending more on cybersecurity, border and immigration security, and community programs to prevent violent extremism and domestic terrorism, the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 will make this harder because the overall pot of money for nondefense programs for FY 2024 will be less than in FY 2023. This appears to be the case even though more spending on cybersecurity and border security has strong bipartisan support.

The Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 follows the legislative language of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (the first of several debt ceiling deals in the Obama administration), which divided so-called “discretionary” federal spending into two different two-way splits. First, there is the “security category” and the “nonsecurity category.” The security category includes most of the budgets of the departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Veterans Affairs. It also includes the National Nuclear Security Administration, the intelligence community management account, and the so-called “150 account” for international programs such as military aid, development assistance, and overseas diplomatic operations. The nonsecurity category is essentially everything else, such as the departments of Justice, Health and Human Services, Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, and Interior.

Central to the 2011 budget deal was that it did not apply to nondiscretionary programs such as Social Security and fee-based programs such as citizenship and visa applications, which are not considered “discretionary” spending. Emergency spending, narrowly defined, was exempt from the budget caps, as was most of the war against al-Qaeda, which was categorized as “Overseas Contingency Operations” and exempt from the budget caps that began in 2011.

DHS will be competing for fewer civilian budget dollars against the full range of the nation’s domestic needs and priorities.

The second split in budget law, which originated in a budget deal in December 2013, is between the “revised security category” and the “revised nonsecurity category.” The revised security category includes only budget account 050, roughly 96 percent of which is the Department of Defense (budget code 051). About 3 percent is for nuclear programs run by the Department of Energy (code 053), and about 1 percent is for national defense-related programs at DHS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (mainly counterintelligence programs), and parts of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The main DHS programs funded under this revised security category (budget code 054) are extremely limited: emergency management functions of the Federal Emergency Management Agency on things like emergency communications systems and alternate sites the federal government could use in case of emergency or an extreme event such as a nuclear attack, as well as some functions of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.

Thus, since 2013, most of the budgets of DHS, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and foreign military assistance have been in the “security category” but have also paradoxically been in the “revised nonsecurity category.”

In the May 2023 budget deal, the $886.3 billion spending cap agreed to by the White House and the House Republican leadership for FY 2024 is only for the “revised security category.” Most of DHS, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and military assistance are lumped in with the $703.6 billion cap for “revised nonsecurity” civilian parts of the federal government. Of that, $703.6 billion, $121 billion is earmarked for veterans’ programs. After several other adjustments and offsets, as the White House calculates it, this leaves $637 billion for all other “revised nonsecurity” programs. This is a nominal cut of one billion dollars from what those departments got in the FY 2023 budget passed in December 2022. Because inflation in the past year was 4.9 percent, the effective budget cut to “revised nonsecurity programs” would be greater than one billion dollars. The House Republicans calculate an even greater cut, to $583 billion, by not including the adjustments and offsets.

Flash back to 2011 and forward to 2024

In 2011, the debate between the Obama administration and the Republicans in Congress could be simplified into the idea that Democrats wanted more spending on social programs in the “nonsecurity category,” while Republicans wanted more money spent on “security,” principally defense spending but also including homeland security.

The debate in 2023 does not break down so neatly. There is increasing, bipartisan agreement that the United States needs to be spending more on border and immigration security, and that waiting until the start of FY 2024 to address this shortfall is not going to enable the administration’s strategy to succeed. There is also bipartisan agreement that the federal government as a whole should spend more on cybersecurity. And as the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act showed, mental health and community grants to address the causes of school shootings have bipartisan support. There is also bipartisan support for military assistance to help Ukraine defend itself from Russian aggression and to help Taiwan build up its defenses to deter a possible Chinese invasion. These programs are all funded mostly or wholly from “revised nonsecurity” programs. It is not clear how these programs will fare in the budget environment created by the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023.

Commercial aviation and borders still need to be protected, even while cyber threats mount and increased quantities of fentanyl come through ports of entry.

Other departments and agencies can reallocate funds when priorities change, but not DHS. After DOD successfully led international efforts to take away the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’s territory in Iraq and Syria, the military was able to pivot to Asia, redeploying drones and personnel out of the Middle East to defend the Indo-Pacific. However, for DHS, as the 2023 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review made clear, threats seldom go away, even when the homeland faces new threats. Commercial aviation and borders still need to be protected, even while cyber threats mount and increased quantities of fentanyl come through ports of entry.

As valid as these concerns are, they are no reason to torpedo the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023. To the contrary, failure to pass the bill would gravely jeopardize national and homeland security, not to mention the economic security of the United States.

Nor do these concerns mean that other departments and agencies do not have their own justifications for increased resources in FY 2024. But the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 is not going to make it easier for homeland security. Congress needs to recognize this as it works toward the final budget for FY 2024, and, perhaps more urgently, when it considers whether to pass an emergency supplemental appropriations bill for border and immigration security. Congress needs to ensure, as it provided for military security in the “security category” of the Fiscal Responsibility Act, that DHS has the resources it needs to defend the nation against nonmilitary threats.

Thomas S. Warrick is the director of the Future of DHS project at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense program and a nonresident senior fellow and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. He is a former DHS deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy.

The post Will the debt ceiling deal mean less for homeland security? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The 5×5—Cross-community perspectives on cyber threat intelligence and policy

Simon Handler — Tue, 30 May 2023 04:01:00 +0000

A core objective of the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative is to shape policy in order to better secure users of technology by bringing together stakeholders from across disciplines. Cybersecurity is strengthened by ongoing collaboration and dialogue between policymakers and practitioners, including cyber threat intelligence analysts. Translating the skills, products, and values of these communities between each other can be challenging but there is prospective benefit, as it helps drive intelligence requirements and keeps policymakers abreast of the latest developments and realities regarding threats. For younger professionals, jumping from one community to another can appear to be a daunting challenge.

We brought together five individuals with experience from both the worlds of cyber threat intelligence and cyber policy to share their experiences, perspectives on the dynamics between the two communities, and advice to those interested in transitioning back and forth.

#1 What’s one bad piece of advice you hear for threat intelligence professionals interested in making a transition to working in cyber policy?

Winnona DeSombre Bernsen, nonresident fellow, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council:

“I have not heard bad pieces of advice specifically geared toward threat intelligence professionals, but I was told by someone once that if I wanted to break into policy, I could not focus on cyber. This is mostly untrue: the number of cyber policy jobs in both the public and the private sectors are growing rapidly, because so many policy problems touch cybersecurity. Defense acquisition? Water safety? Civil Rights? China policy? All of these issues (and many more!) touch upon cybersecurity in some way. However, cyber cannot be your only focus! As most threat intelligence professionals know, cybersecurity does not operate in a vacuum. A company’s security protocols are only as good as the least aware employee, and a nation-state’s targets in cyberspace usually are chosen to further geopolitical goals. Understanding the issues that are adjacent to cyber in a way that creates sound policy is important when making the transition.”

Sherry Huang, program fellow, Cyber Initiative and Special Projects, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation:

“I would not count this as advice, but the emphasis on getting cybersecurity certifications that is persistent in the cyber threat intelligence community is not directly helpful to working in the cyber policy space. Having technical knowledge and skills is always a plus, but in my view, having the ability to translate between policymakers and technical experts is even more valuable in the cyber policy space, and there is not a certification for that.”

Katie Nickels, nonresident senior fellow, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council; director of intelligence, Red Canary:

“I think there is a misconception that to work in cyber policy, you need to have spent time on Capitol Hill or at a think tank. I have found that to be untrue, and I think that misconception might make cybersecurity practitioners hesitant to weigh in on policy matters. The way I think of it is that cyber policy is the convergence of two fields: cybersecurity and policymaking. Whichever field is your primary one, you will have to learn about the other. Practitioners can absolutely learn about policy.”

Christopher Porter, nonresident senior fellow, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council:

“When intelligence professionals think about policy work, they often experience a feeling of personal control—‘now I get to make the decisions!’ So there is a temptation to start applying your own pet theories or desired policy outcomes and start working on persuasion. That is part of it, but in reality policymaking looks a lot like intelligence work in one key aspect—it is still a team sport. You have to have buy-in from a lot of stakeholders, many of whom will have different perspectives or intellectual approaches to the same problem. Even if you share the same goal, they may have very different tools. So just as intelligence is a team sport, policymaking is too. That is a reality that is not reflected in a lot of academic preparation, which emphasizes theoretical rather than practical policymaking.”

Robert Sheldon, director of public policy & strategy, Crowdstrike:

“I sometimes hear people treating technical career paths and policy career paths as binary–and I do not think that is the direction that we are headed as a community. People currently working in technical cybersecurity disciplines, including threat intelligence, should consider gaining exposure to policy work without fully transitioning and leaving their technical pursuits behind. This is a straightforward way to make ongoing, relevant contributions to a crowded cyber policy discourse.”

#2 What about working in threat intelligence best prepared you for a career in cyber policy, or vice versa?

Desombre Bernsen: “Threat intelligence gave me two key skills: the first is the ability to analyze a large-scale problem. Just like threat intelligence analysts, cyber policymakers must look through large systems to find chokepoints and potential vulnerabilities, while also making sure that the analytic judgments one makes about the system are sound. This skill enables one to craft recommendations that best fit the problem. The second skill is the ability to tailor briefings to different principal decisionmakers. Threat intelligence is consumed by network defenders and C-suite executives alike, so understanding at what level you are briefing is key. A chief information security officer does not care about implementing YARA rules, just like a network defender does not want their time wasted with a recommendation on altering their company-wide phishing policies. Being able to figure out what the principal cares about, and to tailor recommendations to the audience best able to action on them is applicable to the cyber policy field as well. When briefing a company or government agency, knowing their risk tolerance and organization mission, for example, helps tailor the briefing to help them understand what they can do about the problem.”

Huang: “Being a cyber threat intelligence analyst gave me exposure to a wide variety of issues that are top of mind for government and corporate clients. In a week, I could be writing about nation-state information operations, briefing clients on cybersecurity trends in a certain industry, and sorting through data dumps on dark web marketplaces. Knowing a bit about numerous cyber topics made it easier for me to identify interest areas that wanted to pursue in the cyber policy space and, more importantly, allows me to easily understand and interact with experts on different cyber policy issue areas, which is helpful in my current role.”

Nickels: “The ability to communicate complex information in an accessible way is a skill I learned from my threat intelligence career that has translated well to policy work. Threat intelligence is all about informing decisions, so there are many overlaps with writing to inform policy.”

Porter: “In Silicon Valley, it is typical to have a position like ‘chief solutions architect.’ I have spent most of my career in intelligence being the ‘chief problems architect.’ It is the nature of the job to look for threats, problems, and shortcomings. Policymakers have the inverse task—to imagine a better future and build it, even if that is not the path we are on currently. But still, I think policymakers need to keep in mind how their plans might fail or lead to unintended consequences. When it comes to cybersecurity, new policies almost never eliminate a threat, they only change its shape. Much like the end to Ghostbusters, you get to choose the kind of problem you are going to face, but not whether or not you face one. Anyone with a background in intelligence will be ready for that step, where you have to imagine second- and third-order implications beyond the first-order effect you are seeking to have.”

Sheldon: “Working as an analyst early in my career taught me a lot about analytical methods and rigor, evidence quality, and constructing arguments. Each of these competencies apply directly to policy work.”

#3 What realities of working in the threat intelligence world do you believe are overlooked by the cyber policy community?

Desombre Bernsen: “The cyber policy community has not yet realized that threat intelligence researchers and parts of the security community themselves—similarly to high level cyber policy decisionmakers—are targets of cyberespionage and digital transnational repression. North Korea, Russia, China, and Iran have all targeted researchers and members of civil society in cyberspace. Famously, North Korea would infect Western vulnerability researchers, likely to steal capabilities. In addition, threat intelligence researchers lack the government protections many policymakers have. Researchers that publicly lambast US adversaries can be targeted and threatened online by state-backed trolls. Protections for these individuals are few and far between—CISA just this year rolled out a program for protecting civil society members targeted by transnational repression, so I hope it gets expanded soon.”

Huang: “Most of the time, threat intelligence analysts (at least in the private sector) do not hear from clients after a report has gone out and do not have visibility into whether their analysis and recommendations are helpful or have real-world impact. Feedback, whether positive or constructive, can help analysts fine-tune their craft and improve future analysis.”

Nickels: “I think the cyber policy community largely considers threat intelligence to be information to be shared about breaches, often in the form of indicators like IP addresses. While that can be one aspect of it, they may not recognize that threat intelligence analysts consider much more than that. Broadly, threat intelligence is about using an understanding of how cyber threats work to make decisions. Under that broad definition, cyber policymakers have a significant need for threat intelligence—if policymakers do not know how the threats operate, they cannot determine how to create policies to help organizations better protect against them.”

Porter: “There are aspects of the work—such as attribution—that are more reliable and not as difficult as imagined. Conversely, there are critical functions, like putting together good trends data or linking together multiple different pieces of evidence, that can be very difficult and time-intensive but seem simple to those outside the profession. So there is always a little bit of education that needs to take place before getting into a substantive back-and-forth, where the cyber intelligence community needs to explain a little bit about how they are doing their work, and the strengths and limitations of that so that everyone has the same assumptions and understands one another’s perspective.”

Sheldon: “The policy community sometimes lacks understanding of the sources and methods that threat intelligence practitioners leverage in their analysis. This informs the overall quality of their work, the skill needed to produce it, timeliness, extensibility, the possibility for sharing, and so on. All of these are good reasons for the two communities to talk more about how they do their work.”

The 5×5—Minding the cyber talent gap

The 5×5—Strengthening the cyber workforce

Cyber 9/12 Strategy Challenge

#4 What is the biggest change in writing for a threat intelligence audience vs. policymakers?

Desombre Bernsen: “The scope is much broader. Threats to a corporate system are confined largely to the corporate system itself, but the world of geopolitics has far more players and many more first- and second-order effects of the policies you recommend.”

Huang: “Not having to be as diligent about confidence levels! Jokes aside, it is similar in that being precise in wording and being brief and to the point are appreciated by both audiences. However, I do find that a policy audience often cares more about the forward-looking aspect and the ‘so what?’”

Nickels: “The biggest difference is that when writing for policymakers, you are expected to express your opinion! As part of traditional intelligence doctrine, threat intelligence analysts avoid injecting personal opinions into their assessments and try to minimize the effects of their cognitive biases. Intelligence analysts might write about potential outcomes of a decision, but should not weigh in on which decision should be made. However, policymakers want to hear what you recommend. It can feel freeing to be able to share opinions, and it remains valuable to try to hedge against cognitive biases because it allows for sounder policy recommendations.”

Porter: “Threat intelligence professionals are going to be very interested in how the work gets done, as the culture—to some degree—borrows from academic work, in terms of rewarding reproducibility of results and sharing of information. But, strictly speaking, policymakers do not care about that. Their job is to link the findings in those reports to the broader strategic context. One really only need to show enough of how the intelligence work was done to give the policymaker confidence and help them use the intelligence appropriately without understating or overstating the case. The result is that for policy audiences you end up starting from the end of the story—instead of a blog post or white paper building up to a firm conclusion, you talk about the conclusion and, depending on the level of technical understanding and skepticism on the part of the policymaker, may or may not get into the story of how things were pieced together at all.”

Sheldon: “Good writing in both disciplines has much in common. Each should be concise, include assertions and evidence, provide context, and make unknowns clear. But there are perhaps fewer ‘product types’ relevant to core threat intelligence consumers and, in some settings, analysts can assume some fundamental knowledge base among their audience.”

#5 Where is one opportunity to work on policy while still in industry that most people miss?

Desombre Bernsen: “You absolutely can work on policy issues while working in threat intelligence! I cannot just choose one, but I highly recommend searching for non-resident fellowship programs in think tanks (ECCRI, Atlantic Council, etc.), speaking at conferences on threat trends and their policy implications, and doing more policy through corporate threat wargaming internally.”

Huang: “Volunteering at conferences that involve the cyber policy community, such as Policy@DEF CON and IGF-USA. These are great opportunities to support policy-focused discussions and to have deeper interactions with peers in the cyber policy space.”

Nickels: “In the United States, one commonly missed opportunity is to reach out to elected representatives with opinions on cybersecurity legislation. Cybersecurity practitioners can also be on the lookout for opportunities to provide comments that help shape proposed regulations affecting the industry. For example, the Commerce Department invited public comments to proposed changes to the Wassenaar Arrangement around export controls of security software, and cybersecurity practitioners weighed in on how they felt the changes would influence tool development.”

Porter: “That will vary greatly from company to company; almost universally though, you will have the opportunity to help your colleagues and future generations by providing mentorship and career development opportunities. Personnel is policy, so in addition to thinking about particular policies you might want to shape, think also about how you can shape the overall policymaking process by helping others make the most of their talents. It will take years, but, in the long run, those are the kinds of changes that are most lasting.”

Sheldon: “Regardless of your current role, you can read almost everything relevant to the policy discourse. National strategies, executive orders, bills, commission and think tank reports, and so on are all publicly available. Unfortunately, many in the policy community are only skimming, but reading these sources deeply and internalizing them is a great basis to distinguish yourself in a policy discussion. Also, there are more opportunities than ever to read and respond to Requests for Comment from the National Institute of Standards and Technology and other government agencies, and these frequently include very technical questions.”

The post The 5×5—Cross-community perspectives on cyber threat intelligence and policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Biden’s pick for joint chiefs chairman sends a message to China

Atlantic Council — Thu, 25 May 2023 16:52:32 +0000

JUST IN

Get ready for a change in the cockpit. Today, US President Joe Biden is nominating Air Force Gen. Charles Q. Brown as the next chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. If the Senate confirms him, the Air Force chief of staff will replace Army Gen. Mark Milley, whose term ends in the fall. What can we expect from this barrier-breaking fighter pilot as he takes over the joint force? Our experts are ready for takeoff.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

Clementine Starling (@StarlingCG): Director of the Forward Defense program in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Thom Shanker (@ThomShanker): Nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center and former Pentagon correspondent for the New York Times
Delharty Manson: Program assistant in the Forward Defense program

Memo to Beijing

This choice of Brown “shows how seriously the administration takes the intensification of competition with China,” Clementine tells us.
That’s because the joint force is now set to be led by an Air Force fighter pilot (Brown) and a Navy surface warfare officer (Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Christopher Grady), and any “potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific [is] likely an air and maritime fight,” Clementine says.
Thom points out that before taking the post as Air Force chief of staff, Brown served as commander of the Pacific Air Forces. “It is in managing, and countering, Chinese territorial and geopolitical aspirations that the nomination of General Brown truly could shape the future of American defense,” Thom tells us. “For any hot scenario involving the South China Sea or any land grab for Taiwan… General Brown brings a well-practiced set of essential skills.”

Subscribe to Fast Thinking email alerts

A closer look

Brown is set to become the second Black chairman of the joint chiefs, thirty years after Colin Powell had the role, and he would serve alongside the first Black secretary of defense, Lloyd Austin. The pick “will rightly be saluted as a milestone in shaping the face our military shows the world, and itself, in the years ahead,” Thom says. “While about 40 percent of active-duty personnel are people of color, the most prestigious leadership positions have been given most often to white guys.”
A deeper dive into Brown’s resumé reveals more of what he’d bring to the job, including “extensive operational experience as an F-16 pilot, meaning he’s acutely aware of the challenges of operating in contested environments like those in the Indo-Pacific and Europe,” Clementine says.
There’s also his more recent management experience of “manning, training, and equipping the force for different contingencies as the Air Force service chief,” Clementine notes, which requires difficult trade-offs. “He’s equipped to be chairman of the joint chiefs of staff because he’s used to making hard decisions where you have to take some risk.”

A manifesto for change

Brown’s 2020 Air Force strategy memo, provocatively titled “Accelerate Change or Lose,” offers a window into how the general “has sought to push the envelope on the US Air Force’s thinking,” Delharty says.
The strategy aims to puncture the idea that “US air dominance in a conflict is assured,” Delharty tells us. “He stresses that US adversaries are actively developing their own capabilities to directly contest and subvert perceived US strengths.”
And the memo shows that Brown was thinking beyond just the Air Force. “He cautions against allowing entire domains like space to become siloed to one service,” Delharty says. Brown advocates instead for the Joint All-Domain Command and Control concept, which aims to analyze data across the space, air, land, sea, and cyber domains so military leaders can make decisions.
If one is looking at Brown’s strategies to discern how he will lead now, Delharty says they “reveal him to be someone who is always looking toward the future operating environment.”

The post Biden’s pick for joint chiefs chairman sends a message to China appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Scowcroft Strategy Scorecard: Does the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review make the grade?

Atlantic Council — Wed, 24 May 2023 21:26:30 +0000

Scowcroft Strategy Scorecard:
Does the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review make the grade?

On April 20, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released the third Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). DHS calls the QHSR its “capstone strategy document,” setting out the short- and medium-term direction for the US government’s third-largest cabinet department. By law, the QHSR is a “review,” not a “strategy,” and so it devotes much of its ninety-two pages to a summary of DHS’s current activities and recent accomplishments, more than a pure strategy would contain. With these caveats in mind, experts with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense program read the 2023 QHSR and offered their assessment of its depth and importance for our latest scorecard.

Thomas Warrick

Senior fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security; director, Future of DHS Project

Given DHS’s size and the breadth of its missions—counterterrorism; law enforcement; cybersecurity; aviation, border, and maritime security; immigration; and infrastructure protection—the QHSR should be considered one of the most important strategic documents put out by a major US cabinet department. The QHSR, while subordinate to the Biden administration’s October 2022 National Security Strategy, should, in theory, be comparable to the Department of Defense (DOD) National Defense Strategy (NDS), which gets enormous attention in Washington and around the world.

The QHSR’s reality is rather different. No major news outlet covered the QHSR’s release on April 20. Only specialized news sites and a few others reported on it or on Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas’s speech the next day announcing the QHSR’s release along with DHS’s ninety-day “sprint” focusing on US nonmilitary vulnerabilities to China and establishing a DHS task force on uses and threats from artificial intelligence.

One reason for this lack of coverage may be that the QHSR, being a “review,” is more of a summary of DHS’s current activities and recent accomplishments. Lists of accomplishments seldom make news in today’s contentious Washington political scene. While the QHSR should educate the public about what DHS does, the people who need educating the most about DHS are probably the least likely to read ninety-two pages of government prose, even with pictures. Nevertheless, the QHSR is an important strategic road map to where the Biden administration and Mayorkas want to go.

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

This QHSR is distinctive in three ways. First, it exists—the Trump administration did not release a QHSR during its four years between January 2017 to January 2021. While the Trump administration never produced a QHSR, it had a coherent—and divisive—approach to immigration and domestic terrorism, much of which was led from the White House, not DHS. Second, the Biden administration promised during the campaign and afterwards a break with many of the Trump administration’s homeland security policies, especially on immigration and domestic terrorism, and the QHSR makes this very clear. Third, this QHSR intentionally returns to the tone and structure of the two Obama administration QHSRs, released in 2010 and 2014, with three changes from the Obama QHSRs:

showing how the threat landscape has changed since 2014,
highlighting the importance of partnerships to the Biden administration’s and Mayorkas’s model of the homeland security enterprise, and
recognizing a new mission area for DHS: combating crimes of exploitation and protecting victims.

DHS has long fought crimes of exploitation—this QHSR elevates the importance of this work and explicitly aligns DHS with the victims of such crimes. This will make it hard for future administrations to backslide from protecting exploited victims.

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

Just as the National Defense Strategy is primarily, though not exclusively, focused on military threats to the United States, the QHSR should bring equal focus and vigor on the nonmilitary threats to the United States. The third QHSR provides a good summary of today’s dynamic terrorism threats (both international and homegrown), the challenges and strains on what it calls our “broken” immigration system (Mayorkas goes so far as to call it “completely broken;” his critics would no doubt agree), cyber threats from criminals and hostile nation-states, crimes of exploitation, the threat from fentanyl and transnational organized crime, natural and man-made risks to critical infrastructure, and other challenges to homeland security. Of particular importance is elevating fentanyl, transnational organized crime, and crimes of exploitation to the strategic level—no longer are they issues of only crime. The third QHSR wants the United States to see these as strategic threats, requiring a more strategic response.

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

A sound strategy needs to define what “victory” looks like. In DOD’s mission space, victory is understandable: the goal is victory in war, coupled with deterrence and maintaining the peace at all other times. It’s a lot harder to define the end state in homeland security, and this QHSR, like many national security strategies of previous administrations of both parties, often uses phrases like “preventing and mitigating active threats” and “continue advancing national efforts” that give the direction but leave the ultimate goal fuzzy. There are few concrete end states against which this QHSR’s success or failure can be judged, but this is not unique to this QHSR or this administration.

For example, no responsible counterterrorism strategy would publicly set itself the goal of “no successful terrorist attacks.” The difficulty of detecting lone violent extremists and their ability to get semiautomatic assault rifles, coupled with political realities in the United States, mean that the QHSR needs—rightly—to point toward other approaches like community programs (see QHSR numbered page 8) needed to reduce active shooter events well below their levels in recent years, which would be a worthy goal. In cybersecurity, the QHSR describes the many innovative programs that the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has undertaken in the past two years, but mentions only at the end of the cybersecurity section (QHSR numbered page 35) the truly transformational National Cybersecurity Strategy’s effort to shift fundamental risks from end users to the tech companies that are best situated to build security into their hardware and software. This will fundamentally change the future of cybersecurity and is a worthy goal.

Clear lines of effort

Does the strategy outline several major lines of effort for achieving its objectives? Will following those lines of effort attain the defined goals? Does the strategy establish a clear set of priorities, or does it present a laundry list of activities?

The third QHSR, like its predecessors, makes clear which DHS components are responsible for which missions and lines of effort. Unlike DOD’s military services, which encompass different domains but serve a (mostly) unified strategic mission, DHS’s eight components are organized functionally, and thus contribute differently to the QHSR’s six mission areas:

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to aviation security (part of mission 1, counterterrorism and threat prevention).
CBP, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to land border security (mission 2, border security, but also part of mission 1) and immigration (mission 3).
The US Coast Guard (USCG) and CBP to maritime security (part of missions 1 and 2).
CISA, ICE, TSA (for pipelines), USCG (maritime cybersecurity) and the US Secret Service (USSS) to cybersecurity and fighting cybercrime (mission 4).
The Federal Emergency Management Agency and CISA to infrastructure protection and resilience (mission 5); however both CBP and USCG have a part of mission 5.
ICE, CBP, USSS, and USCIS to law enforcement (mission 6, combating crimes of exploitation and protecting victims, but also part of other missions).

While this QHSR, like its predecessors (and like similar strategic summaries of DHS’s missions during the Trump administration), contains extensive descriptions of DHS activities, this QHSR proves the aphorism that—unlike DOD, where missions end when a war is over and the military pivots (for example) from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific—at DHS, missions never go away. In this respect, the “new” mission 6 of combating crimes of exploitation and protecting victims is not at all new—it is the recognition of a mission DHS has had almost since its inception in 2003.

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

The QHSR is not a budget, but any DHS report on its missions raises the question whether DHS has the resources to succeed in those missions. Alignment between policy and resources is one of DHS’s greatest challenges.

After the October 2022 National Defense Strategy, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said in March 2023 that DOD’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 budget request was “the most strategy-driven request we’ve ever produced from the Department of Defense.” DOD is asking for $842 billion in FY 2024, $26 billion more than in FY 2023. A look at the China and Russia section of the NDS shows the link between DOD’s strategy and its budget request.

DHS cannot say the same thing about the third QHSR and DHS’s FY 2024 budget, which calls for a 1.1 percent increase over FY 2023. DHS officials understand this. The QHSR calls for more efforts and resources on cybersecurity; border and immigration security; community-based programs to prevent future mass shootings as happened in recent years in Uvalde, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, and elsewhere; and to head off threats to critical infrastructure from natural causes and nation-state adversaries.

The third QHSR does not have to quantify the resources required to achieve its goals, but it has rightly laid out this secretary’s road map for where DHS and the homeland security enterprise need to do more. One of the third QHSR’s most important benefits should be to focus a much-needed debate—inside the administration and with the Congress and the American people—over whether the United States is spending enough on homeland security.

Brigadier General Francis X. Taylor (ret.)

**Nonresident senior fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security**

Overall, DHS’s QHSR sets forth a comprehensive review of the challenges facing the homeland security enterprise. The program initiatives outlined in the report, if successful, will improve the security posture of the homeland. There are some concerns about whether there is sufficient political and popular support for the initiatives outlined in the report. In addition, DHS should consider an annual review of outcomes that have resulted from its initiatives to give US citizens a sense of how effective the department has been in improving security of the homeland. This report is a good start but needs annual reiteration that reflects sustained improvement in the United States’ overall security posture.

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

The QHSR sets forth in clear detail the myriad of threats that face the homeland and the challenges for the homeland security enterprise to effectively address those threats. The world continues to evolve, as does the threat environment since the creation of DHS and this QHSR reflects the complexity of the threat environment and DHS’s initiatives to address that environment in new and innovative ways.

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

The strategic context of the QHSR is sound and does not underplay the seriousness and challenges of the threat that faces the homeland security enterprise. The emphasis on partnerships to meet the challenges is an important underlying principle for DHS. Never has it been more important for DHS to strengthen and broaden its partnerships as the threat environment continues to change.

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

The QHSR clearly defines the programs undertaken to address each mission area to address the threats that face the US homeland, but the mere implementation of programs does not ensure effective outcomes.

Clear lines of effort

There are clear lines of effort that are identified in the QHSR. The core mission areas are addressed effectively, but it is not clear that the programs initiated are yet effective in achieving the goals of DHS. Time will tell what outcomes are achieved and how effective DHS has been in mitigating the threats to the homeland.

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

The QHSR fundamentally outlines the challenges that DHS must address to keep the homeland safe. It is not clear that there are sufficient resources to execute this mission as outlined in the QHSR. Congressional support of these initiatives and funding will be critical to DHS’s success.

Seth Stodder

**Nonresident senior fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security**

Like any strategy or planning document produced by a federal bureaucracy, the report on the 2023 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review inevitably provokes some trepidation from a potential reader, as such documents produced by Washington bureaucrats rarely last five seconds in an email inbox and never touch a printer.

But in all seriousness, this year’s QHSR is somewhat of a page-turner. It is the first one since 2014—almost a decade. And what a decade it has been! ISIS and Al Qaeda, while still threats, have taken a back seat to AR15-wielding white nationalist extremists in the minds of counterterrorism professionals. The sense of operational control of the border that US officials felt they had in 2010 seems like a quaint bygone era, as compared to the massive challenges the United States faces today at the US-Mexico border. The cyber threats are much more varied, with the rise of catastrophic ransomware attacks and the drumbeat of cyber threats to our critical infrastructure and our electoral system. Meanwhile, emerging technology presents opportunities and threats like nothing before—from the rising concerns about social media invasions of privacy, disinformation campaigns, and deep fakes, to the threat of quantum computing and the potentially civilization-altering challenge presented by artificial intelligence. Nation-state threats to the homeland from Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea have become far more serious since 2010. On the other hand, the ultimate challenge to the US homeland may be environmental, as the force and impact of global climate change and the likelihood of more deadly pandemics have become ever more severe.

The 2023 QHSR—and the evolving mission of DHS—aptly reflect the tectonic shifts happening in the global security environment overall and its implications for US homeland security. To be sure, the original five homeland security missions from the first QHSR Report in 2010 are still there: (1) preventing terrorism and enhancing security; (2) securing and managing US borders; (3) enforcing and administering US immigration laws; (4) safeguarding and securing cyberspace; and (5) ensuring resilience to disasters. But so many of the characters in the play have changed, or assumed greater or lesser prominence.

Suffice it to say, DHS has its hands full—with a sprawling and ever-more important set of missions, all of which requiring close partnerships with other federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal agencies, the domestic and global private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and the millions of Americans and other nationals who interact with DHS every single day. And this new QHSR ably reflects this massive and growing responsibility.

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

The key theme is the steadily evolving and, in some cases, radically changing and ever more complex threat picture, and the need for DHS and its components to evolve its missions and focus accordingly. This is expressed forcefully in the document. Unsurprisingly, most of the missions are the same—with one addition—as those stated in the previous QHSRs. But that does not necessarily warrant any effect on its score here as the missions of DHS and homeland security are what they are. Rather, it is the threat and broader strategic environment that has, in some cases, radically changed. And the 2023 QHSR articulates this extremely well.

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

The 2023 QHSR is extremely clear on the security environment facing the United States and, specifically, the US homeland. The QHSR also effectively nestles DHS and its six core missions neatly within the Biden administration’s broader strategic framework for the United States, as expressed in the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and other key documents. The analysis here is sound, and it does not rest on any specious or unfounded assumptions—either about the threat or the missions and capabilities of DHS.

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

The 2023 QHSR clearly sets forth various goals, backed up with various vignettes and descriptions of ongoing or past programs, initiatives, and other actions reflecting efforts in furtherance of goals. That said, the goals are for the most part relatively vague (e.g., “DHS must be a leader in the responsible use and adaptation of emerging technologies” or “DHS remains committed to facilitating and expanding naturalization pathways for new Americans”), without specifying any particular measurable outputs against which one might assess success or failure. However, one could argue the point of how does one know when the border is actually “secure” or under “operational control,” or when the asylum system is processing claims “fairly” or “efficiently?” And, from a fiscal standpoint, is there a way of knowing when increasing budgets hit a point of diminishing returns—where an additional dollar invested in, say, detection equipment or in efforts against drug smuggling might be better invested elsewhere, such as public health or education? It is hard to clearly find measurable goalposts for these from the QHSR.

Clear lines of effort

The QHSR—and previous DHS documents—have outlined the key missions and lines of effort, and the DHS operational components and management offices have (for the most part) worked out relatively delineated areas of focus meant to maximize unity of effort within DHS, while minimizing interagency conflict and rivalry. As is the nature of this kind of beast, the QHSR does have a bit of the whiff of a laundry list (or lists) of various component activities and success stories (albeit clean laundry, thankfully), but the lists are placed within an intelligently articulated framework of clear priorities. Again, as discussed above, it is difficult to discern measurable outputs or where the signposts are toward achieving mission goals and objectives—but the lines of effort are clearly stated.

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

This is somewhere between an unfair question and an incomplete one—in the sense that the QHSR is not meant to be a budgetary document, and indeed there is no sense here as to whether resources are remotely adequate to achieving the goals. Moreover, as noted above, some of the goals are so vague or total (e.g., “preventing labor exploitation”), that it is hard to assess—judging solely from the QHSR—exactly how these goals might be achieved, how success or progress toward the goals could be measured, or at what point diminishing returns might be reached for additional spending. So, it’s hard to grade this one—but it surely isn’t a perfect score.

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

This article is part of the Future of DHS Project by the Forward Defense program with financial support from Deloitte.

Belgorod raid sparks border alarm for Russia ahead of Ukrainian offensive

Peter Dickinson — Wed, 24 May 2023 00:48:53 +0000

Ukrainians woke up on Monday morning to the unexpected news of an unfolding military operation across the border in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast. The incursion was reportedly the work of two Ukraine-based Russian opposition militias, the Free Russia Legion and the Russian Volunteer Corps, who claimed the attack marked the start of a campaign to “liberate Russia.”

Further details remain confused, with conflicting information still circulating on Tuesday evening regarding the fate of the Russian militias. However, the mere fact of the incursion is itself noteworthy and may be part of Ukrainian shaping operations ahead of a widely anticipated counteroffensive. By exposing the weakness of Russia’s largely undefended borders, Ukraine could succeed in forcing Putin to reluctantly pull troops out of Ukraine in order to defend his own country.

At the official level, Ukraine has denied any involvement in the Belgorod border raid. However, while Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak declared that Ukraine “has nothing to do with it,” he could not resist mocking the Kremlin. “As you know, tanks are sold at any Russian military store, and underground guerrilla groups are composed of Russian citizens,” he tweeted in an obvious reference to the transparent lies employed by Vladimir Putin during the 2014 Russian military seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. These tongue-in-cheek comments were widely interpreted as confirmation that Ukraine was now using Russia’s own hybrid war playbook against the Putin regime.

Podolyak was not the only Ukrainian to revel in what many saw as Russia receiving a long overdue taste of its own medicine. As news of the Belgorod incursion spread, Ukrainian social media was flooded with memes proclaiming the establishment of the “Belgorod People’s Republic,” playing on earlier Kremlin disinformation about a “Ukrainian civil war,” and favorably comparing the speed of the Belgorod advance with the Russian army’s own glacial progress in eastern Ukraine.

Predictably, few in Russia saw the funny side. Instead, reactions ranged from anger and indignation on Kremlin TV to alarm over the apparent ease with which the Ukrainian-backed Russian militias were able to penetrate the border and enter the Russian federation. The outspoken leader of Russia’s mercenary Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, used the incident to launch another of his regular attacks on the Russian military establishment. “As far as I know, the military is not bothering with the strengthening of our borders,” he commented.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

While the Belgorod incursion has undoubtedly lifted Ukrainian spirits and plunged Russia into a minor panic, this was not just an example of Ukraine’s world-class trolling skills. The attack has very real implications for Russian national security and is a huge personal embarrassment for Vladimir Putin, who prides himself on his strongman image. After all, what kind of strongman ruler cannot even secure the borders of his own realm?

It is too early to predict the exact nature of the Russian response to events in Belgorod Oblast, but it seems inevitable that any reaction must necessarily include a strengthening of the entire Russia-Ukraine border. To achieve this, Moscow must find the additional soldiers and weapons systems to reinforce a frontier stretching for approximately one thousand kilometers beyond the front lines of the current military conflict.

At a time when the vast majority of the Russian military’s available forces have already been deployed in Ukraine, this will be no easy task. Indeed, British Defense Minister Ben Wallace claimed in February that 97% of the Russian army is already in Ukraine. Any efforts to bolster defenses along the Russian border with Ukraine will likely mean reducing this presence.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Russia’s military equipment shortages were recently laid bare by the country’s exceptionally modest Victory Day celebrations, with traditional parades canceled in a string of cities and a solitary tank taking part in the flagship event on Moscow’s Red Square. The manpower situation in the Russian army is unlikely to be much better. Russian losses during the first six months of the Ukraine invasion were so severe that Putin was forced to launch the country’s first mobilization since World War II in September 2022. However, many of the 300,000 extra troops mobilized late last year have already become casualties, with US officials estimating Russian losses since December at 100,000.

This poorly prepared, badly mauled, and increasingly demoralized Russian invasion force is currently bracing to face a major Ukrainian counteroffensive that has been under preparation for the past half year. Tens of thousands of fresh Ukrainian soldiers have undergone training in NATO countries, while Ukraine has received a wide array of new equipment including modern battle tanks, armored vehicles, and long-range cruise missiles. The last thing Russian commanders would want to do at this critical point in the invasion is withdraw soldiers from the front lines, but that is exactly what may now happen.

As Ukraine continues to set the stage for the coming offensive, shaping operations could include further border incursions designed to embarrass the Kremlin and force Russia to thin the ranks of its invasion army. Any attempts to penetrate deep inside Russia or establish bridgeheads on Russian territory would probably be frowned upon by Ukraine’s Western partners, but there is unlikely to be much opposition to additional destabilizing border raids.

This week’s Belgorod incident remains shrouded in mystery but it may come to be seen as a symbolically significant moment in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. For the past fifteen months, Russia has attacked Ukraine with impunity while assuming Ukraine would never dare to strike back inside Russia. That complacency has now been very publicly shattered, creating a serious security headache for the Kremlin. Leaving Russia’s borders largely undefended is no longer an option, but reinforcing them will inevitably weaken Putin’s army in Ukraine. Ukraine’s commanders may have just outsmarted their Russian counterparts yet again.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

As President Biden prepares to announce his choice for the next chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Major General Arnold Punaro, USMC (ret.) gives an inside look on what factors make for a successful chairman and the “unfinished business” of the reforms that led to the creation of the CJCS office. How has the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) sought to streamline the civilian-military chain of command and improve military advice and operations? To what extent has the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) been integrated into top-level management areas since the implementation of the GNA? And how have the shortcomings of civilian integration and the resulting structure affected the US military’s readiness, logistics planning, force capabilities, and resource allocation?

This issue brief considers these questions and more, ultimately suggesting that there is room for improvement to the existing GNA structure worth serious consideration in the coming years.

Evolution and shortcoming

The roles of the CJCS and Vice Chairman (VCJCS) have evolved in the last decade to require distinct yet complementary skillsets, encompassing greater operational, administrative, and budgetary challenges. As such, the author proposes the skillsets for the CJCS and VCJCS now include experience in institutional and managerial aspects of the defense establishment as well. Furthermore, a suitable CJCS should have a background in both strategic and operational issues, while the Vice Chairman (VCJCS) should have experience in technical and programmatic areas like procurement. Ultimately, the CJCS along with the VCJCS should fill the experience gap for presidents with limited military knowledge and provide the president with insight into the world of military operations, society, and culture. These are distinct skillsets, and while it may be overly simplistic to view these two roles as being those of “the operator” (the CJCS), and “the manager” (the VCJCS), using this general paradigm as a reference while selecting new occupants for these key positions is worth considering.

Key recommendations

Although assessments of the GNA are overwhelmingly positive in recent years, not every objective has been achieved and as a result key efforts on the management side have been disappointments. Therefore, the author concludes that improvements to the GNA structure include involving all members of the JCS in operational planning, delegating resource-allocation authority to the CJCS and VCJCS, reemphasizing the chain of command, reducing duplication between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff, improving the president’s relationship with the military, and reducing headquarters staff duplication. Service chiefs should have an increased role in linking and streamlining requirements, acquisition, and budgets.

About the author

Advisory Council member

Arnold Punaro

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

The post Roles of the chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Money talks: Here’s what the president’s budget says about the US military edge

Clementine G. Starling, Marek Jestrab, Julia Siegel — Tue, 16 May 2023 17:23:57 +0000

President Joe Biden’s National Security Strategy says that the United States has entered a “decisive decade” when it comes to competition with China. But the first comprehensive look at how the administration hopes to implement that strategy—Biden’s $886-billion request for defense-related activities in his fiscal year (FY) 2024 budget—may be insufficient to meet the moment.

The budget does hit the mark in some ways. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin called it “the most strategy-driven [budget] request” ever produced for defense. The proposal prioritizes investments needed to implement the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and necessarily accepts risk in other areas. And the request focuses on improving readiness, boosting procurement of the most-valued munitions, and modernizing—making clear that the United States is highly concerned with preventing war with China in the near term and deterring conflict more generally in the long term.

However, the 3 percent funding increase from FY23 to FY24 may be entirely offset by inflation or even signify a decline in buying power. That means painful trade-offs for the Department of Defense’s (DOD) force structure in personnel and platforms.

The strengths: Implementing the NDS

First, the budget reinforces the view that China is the pacing challenge for the United States. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative, a set of defense investments established by Congress in 2021 in response to China’s growing military power, received its largest investment. Moreover, research-and-development and procurement requests were the largest in DOD history.

The budget places an emphasis on modernization programs that were long deferred, including those for hypersonic weapons, space, cyber, contested logistics, and platforms built for contested environments—all of which will be valuable in deterring China. Modernizing the entire kill chain is also a focus of this budget, in its requests for investments in elements of the DOD’s Joint All-Domain Command and Control strategy, enhanced sensors, and electronic-warfare capabilities. In response to the rapid build-up of China’s nuclear forces, this budget continues to fully fund the revitalization of all legs of the nuclear triad along with nuclear command, control, and communication systems.

The budget has a focus on ensuring that the United States’ advantages endure, as demonstrated through the president’s requested funding for critical emerging technologies, supply-chain resiliency, and the defense workforce. An advantage in technology—especially in artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, directed energy, biotechnologies, and microelectronics—is necessary to keep up with the changing nature of warfare in the coming decade. Shoring up supply chains, specifically ones that are needed to produce defense systems such as metal-fabrication and battery supply chains, is necessary for national security. The budget request, by investing in the research and development of tech across the defense-industrial base, forms the foundation for a self-sustaining defense economy. And, as the all-volunteer force clocks its fiftieth year, the budget shows that the military is, at its core, a people business: The president recommends the largest pay raise for defense personnel in decades (5.2 percent) and notes that military families are key to readiness.

This budget signals an uptick in demand to the defense-industrial base, particularly through increased investment in the most-valued munitions and the execution of a multiyear procurement authority. A stable topline across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)—part of the budget request that reflects detailed budget projections over the next five years—provides predictability for industry. Last year, the FYDP provided less predictability because it did not pace inflation each year between 2024 and 2027. Even though its overall increase from FY23 may be offset by inflation, the FY24 request is stable, pacing inflation each year between 2025 and 2028. Last year’s budget also confused industry by not making clear which production lines should be maintained or expanded—but the FY24 budget request makes it clear. The FY24 budget also provides industry-stable procurement counts for the highest-valued aircraft and maritime platforms needed to deter China.

The challenges: Every budget requires trade-offs

How the president chooses to invest in the country’s defense reveals the strategic assumptions he and his leadership team are making about the future fight—and in what areas they are willing to accept risk. The FY24 budget assumes risk in capacity, specifically for the Air Force’s and Navy’s force structures.

The Pentagon is shifting its focus from land wars in the Middle East to deterring high-end conflict with China, and the budget reflects this. The Army and Marine Corps continue to execute previous plans, reinvesting savings from reductions in the number of troops to fund modernization efforts needed for the Indo-Pacific. These modernization efforts include investments in long-range fires, sensing, and air defense. Meanwhile, the Air Force continues trading aircraft capacity for capability—retiring aircraft faster than they can be replaced by deliveries of next-generation or more modern aircraft—resulting in a decrease of total aircraft inventory by 190 in FY24. While modernization (and, accordingly, the trading of legacy systems for advanced capabilities) is necessary for deterring future wars, such decisions inherently assume some level of risk. For example, the Navy’s reduction in battle-force-ship numbers, included in the FY24 request, has implications for the United States’ maritime competitive edge. The decision to truncate production of the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock impacts all combatant commanders, as these ships are foundational for the United States’ response to contingencies or crises around the globe. Moreover, in the event of a naval blockade of Taiwan, the United States would possibly lack the number of platforms it needs to deploy its response. The People’s Liberation Army Navy is numerically the largest in the world in terms of battle force ships (approximately 340) and is projected to grow to four hundred ships by 2025. In contrast, Biden’s budget request shows a flatlining US naval inventory.

This budget follows guidance from the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review to cancel the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) program, even though the program earned bipartisan support as part of the FY23 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the DOD Appropriations Act. In a tripolar-nuclear-threat environment, the SLCM-N program is a valued capability that is survivable, is prompt, and helps expand the United States’ nuclear deterrence. Expect Congress to push back once again on this misguided request.

What’s next?

As Congress continues hearings on the FY24 NDAA and DOD appropriations bill in the coming months, lawmakers will need to monitor inflation projections and adjudicate whether defense spending should increase above the rate of inflation. They will also need to arbitrate the DOD’s long-term force-structure plans and determine whether deterrence is enhanced by continuing the SLCM-N program. Most importantly, Congress should work to ensure that appropriations are on time so that the DOD is not disadvantaged by the constraints and inefficiencies of beginning nearly every fiscal year under the burden of a continuing resolution.

As Forward Defense’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption recommends, Congress should provide increased spending flexibility by spelling out fewer line items, so that the DOD can easily add novel technologies to the force without requiring a new program. The budget process must remain agile, especially given that the services formulate their requests two years before funding is received and their capability needs will evolve within that time.

If the United States is committed to setting up the DOD for an era of strategic competition, it must commit to increasing the defense budget above the rate of inflation to provide the capacity required while not sacrificing readiness and modernization. Otherwise, the US military risks eroding its military edge in the face of a modernized and capable China.

Clementine G. Starling is the director of the Forward Defense program at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Lieutenant Commander Marek Jestrab is the 2022-2023 senior US Navy fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. These views do not represent the US Navy or the Department of Defense.

Julia Siegel is an assistant director with Forward Defense.

This article is part of the 21st Century Security Project by the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice with financial support from Lockheed Martin.

The post Money talks: Here’s what the president’s budget says about the US military edge appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wagner chief’s rants highlight Russian infighting ahead of Ukraine offensive

Olivia Yanchik — Mon, 15 May 2023 13:51:14 +0000

The head of Russia’s Wagner mercenary group has launched a series of outspoken attacks on the country’s military leadership in recent weeks that point to mounting internal divisions within Putin’s invading army as it prepares to face a potentially decisive Ukrainian counteroffensive.

In one of his most recent rants, Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin mocked Russian Defense Ministry claims of a “redeployment to defensive positions” near to the hotly contested city of Bakhmut and warned that in reality, the front was in danger of collapsing. “The Defense Ministry’s attempts to cover up the situation will lead to a global tragedy for Russia,” he stated on May 12. “They must stop lying immediately.”

This was the latest in a series of public statements by Prigozhin accusing the Russian army and defense ministry of failing to provide his Wagner troops with sufficient front line support. He had earlier threatened to withdraw his forces from Bakhmut altogether due to alleged ammunition shortages.

In his many video addresses, Prigozhin has sought to burnish his own credentials as a straight-talking military man while attacking members of the Russian military establishment. Speaking in the wake of recent Russian retreats from the flanks around Bakhmut, he declared: “Soldiers should not die because of the absolute stupidity of their leadership.”

He also raised eyebrows last week by referring mockingly to a “happy grandpa,” which many assumed was a reference to Putin himself. This was clearly too much even for Prigozhin, who quickly released a new statement clarifying that the “grandpa” in question may have been a number of military leaders including chief of the Russian general staff Valery Gerasimov, but was most certainly not Putin.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Email
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Prigozhin’s public attacks on Russia’s military leadership reflect his rising profile and growing swagger. The Wagner mercenary group he leads first came into being nine years ago during the initial stages of Russia’s military invasion of eastern Ukraine, at a time when the Kremlin was eager to maintain a degree of plausible deniability. Subsequent roles in Syria and Africa allowed Wagner to expand significantly, but it was the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 that transformed the fortunes of the mercenary force and thrust it into the international limelight.

Over the past fifteen months of the Ukraine invasion, Wagner has emerged as the only group within the Russian military to meet or surpass expectations. While units of the regular army have been decimated and forced into a series of humiliating retreats, Wagner has achieved numerous grinding advances in eastern Ukraine. This has given Prigozhin the confidence and the clout to name and shame his superiors for their alleged shortcomings. Such attacks have only added to his popularity among Russian audiences.

Prigozhin’s criticisms are in a sense hypocritical, given the notoriously high casualty rates among his own soldiers. Indeed, the brutal tactics adopted by Wagner forces in the Battle of Bakhmut have led many to describe the battle as a “meat grinder.” According to US officials, around half of the estimated 20,000 Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine since December 2022 have been Wagner troops fighting in and around Bakhmut.

Ukrainian sources have also questioned the credibility of Prigozhin’s efforts to praise the valor of his Wagner forces while accusing regular Russian troops of abandoning their positions. “The first soldiers to flee were Wagner,” a Ukrainian commander who took part in early May engagements near Bakhmut told CNN. This and other similar accounts may indicate that Prigozhin is lashing out at the army high command from a position of weakness as Wagner’s earlier exploits risk being overshadowed by more recent setbacks.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Why has Putin not intervened to end the increasingly bitter public feud between Prigozhin and Russia’s military leadership? Some see it as a sign of the Russian dictator’s own growing weakness, while others argue that it may be a deliberate ploy to position the likes of Defense Minister Shoigu and army chief Gerasimov as scapegoats for a coming defeat. At the very least, Prigozhin’s attacks on military commanders serve to deflect the blame for the failing invasion away from Putin himself.

While Prigozhin’s headline-grabbing rants may help to protect Putin from criticism on the domestic front, they also risk further undermining morale among Russian forces in Ukraine. The issue of demoralization is already posing major challenges for Russian commanders, with more cases of desertion recorded in Russian military courts in the first four months of the current year than during the whole of 2022. Recent months have also seen a sharp rise in video addresses posted to social media by Russian soldiers complaining of suicidal “human wave” tactics and catastrophic battlefield losses.

With Ukraine expected to launch a major counteroffensive in the coming weeks, Russian military morale will likely soon face its stiffest test since the invasion began in February 2022. Major question marks remain over the ability of Russian troops to stand their ground, particularly given the Kremlin’s growing reliance on poorly trained conscripts drafted into the military late last year as part of Russia’s first mobilization since World War II.

These mobilized troops proved highly ineffective during Russia’s failed winter offensive, suffering high casualties while making almost no progress. They must now prepare for defensive operations against a Ukrainian force that has been training for the coming offensive for the past six months. Russia has also been digging in and preparing sophisticated defenses, but morale will be a huge factor during what many observers predict will be some of the most intense battles of the entire war. Prigozhin’s frequent public criticism of Russian troops and commanders is unlikely to boost fighting spirit at this critical moment for Putin’s invasion.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Email
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

At first glance, Russia’s annual Victory Day parade on May 9 was a non-event at best and an embarrassment at worst. Putin’s short speech held no surprises, while the presence of just one antique tank during the military parade itself could only be interpreted as evidence of the dire state of the Russian armed forces.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the event was the identity of the people selected to sit directly alongside Putin on the Red Square podium. While Victory Day marks the Soviet contribution to the defeat of Adolf Hitler, neither of the elderly gentlemen sitting alongside Putin actually fought against Nazi Germany. Instead, they were both veterans of the Soviet security services who had respectively participated in efforts to suppress Ukraine’s independence movement and crush Czechoslovakia’s 1960s anti-Soviet uprising.

To Putin’s right sat the 98-year-old Yuri Dvoikin, who volunteered for the Red Army during World War II but never actually made it to the front lines. Instead, after training as a sniper in 1944, he was dispatched by the Soviet secret police to Lviv in western Ukraine, where his job was to assist in the liquidation of the Ukrainian nationalist underground. The campaign against Ukraine’s independence movement was particularly brutal, with the Soviet authorities employing terror tactics and large-scale deportations. Although the Ukrainians were able to inflict significant casualties on Soviet forces, they were ultimately defeated by the early 1950s.

On Putin’s left sat the 88-year-old Gennady Zaitsev, who, like Dvoikin, never served in what Russia still refers to as the Great Patriotic War. He was drafted into the Red Army in 1953 and joined the KGB six years later after completing his military service. In 1968, he helped suppress the Prague Spring by, among other things, capturing the Czechoslovak Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the 1970s, KGB chief Yuri Andropov appointed Zaitsev to lead the elite Alfa anti-terrorist unit.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Putin did not have to sit between these two former secret policemen. Indeed, on Victory Day of all days, it would have been far more natural to appear alongside veterans of the war against Hitler’s Germany. It is therefore reasonable to assume that Putin’s choice of neighbors was a deliberate and symbolic move.

For many within the Russian and Ukrainian elites, Putin’s unspoken Victory Day message would have been crystal clear. The Russian dictator was signaling that despite widespread criticism of the Federal Security Service and its bungling role in the invasion of Ukraine, he continues to value his secret police and sees them as the linchpin of his authoritarian regime.

Putin was also signaling to Ukrainians and domestic critics of his invasion that he is willing to do whatever it takes to win. Soviet forces committed innumerable crimes in their suppression of the Ukrainian nationalist movement during the 1940s and 1950s. In 1968, they had no qualms about crushing a country that, like today’s Ukraine, sought to go its own way. By sitting alongside decorated veterans of these two criminal Soviet campaigns, Putin was indicating his approval of their actions and his readiness to embrace similar methods.

The good news is that Putin does not currently appear capable of replicating the bloody Soviet-era crackdowns in western Ukraine and Czechoslovakia. This was all too evident on Victory Day, with the lone T-34 tank rumbling across Red Square serving as the perfect metaphor for Russia’s reduced military might after suffering catastrophic losses in Ukraine. However, the Russian dictator remains defiant and is clearly keen to signal that he has no intention of backing down.

Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Comments
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Tuesday’s one-tank parade was the latest in a series of blows that had already cast a shadow over preparations for this year’s Victory Day celebrations. In the month preceding the holiday, more than twenty cities across Russia canceled plans to hold military parades. While security concerns were officially cited, these cancellations fueled speculation that Russia simply doesn’t have enough military equipment available to stage regional parades, with the vast majority of tanks and other vehicles having already been sent to Ukraine.

The complete cancellation of this year’s Immortal Regiment marches was an even bigger blow. This mass participation event, which sees members of the public marching through Russian towns and cities while displaying portraits of family members who served in the Red Army during World War II, has become an integral part of Russia’s Victory Day rituals over the past decade and has been endorsed by Putin himself. Nevertheless, the Kremlin decided to ban marches this year amid fears that family members of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine may seek to participate. With Russian officials still in denial over the disastrous consequences of the Ukraine invasion, the last thing the Kremlin wanted was for thousands of grieving relatives to gather in public and draw attention to the scale of the tragedy.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The negative optics surrounding this year’s Victory Day celebrations are personally damaging for Vladimir Putin, who has been instrumental in placing the holiday at the very heart of modern Russia’s national identity. It is often assumed that Victory Day has always dominated the Russian calendar, but this is simply not true. In fact, during the 46-year period between the end of World War II and the fall of the USSR, the Soviet authorities held just three Victory Day military parades. Other holidays such as May Day and the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution were considered far more significant.

It was not until Putin came to power at the turn of the millennium that Victory Day began to assume its current position as Russia’s most important public holiday. Over the past two decades, Putin has transformed Victory Day into the centerpiece of a pseudo-religious victory cult complete with its own sacred symbols, feast days, saints, and dogmas. The hysteria surrounding the holiday has come to be known as “Pobedobesie” or “victory mania,” with anyone who dares question the Kremlin’s highly sanitized version of World War II likely to be treated with the kind of severity once reserved for medieval heretics.

The veneration of Russia’s role in the defeat of Nazi Germany has proven extremely politically profitable for Putin. It has helped him rebuild Russian national pride following the humiliation of the 1990s, and has paved the way for a return to authoritarianism in today’s Russia by rehabilitating Stalin and minimizing the crimes of the Soviet era. Putin has also revived the lexicon of World War II as a convenient way to attack his enemies, with domestic and foreign opponents routinely branded as “fascists.” Indeed, in modern Russia the term “Nazi” has lost all meaning and has come to indicate anyone viewed as “anti-Putin.”

This toxic trend is most immediately apparent in relation to Ukraine. Kremlin leaders have spent years demonizing Ukrainians as “Nazis,” despite the complete absence of any actual far-right politicians in the Ukrainian government. Predictably, when Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he declared the “de-Nazification” of the country to be his chief war aim. The Russian dictator returned to this theme again during Tuesday’s Victory Day address, directly comparing his unprovoked attack on Ukraine to the struggle against Nazi Germany.

Putin’s endless appeals to the memory World War II are clearly designed to mobilize the Russian public in support of the current war, but they cannot completely disguise the grim realities of his rapidly unraveling Ukraine invasion. What was initially envisaged as three-day campaign to overthrow the Ukrainian government and seize control of the country has become the bloodiest European conflict since the days of Hitler and Stalin. Over the past fifteen months, Russian military losses have been so heavy that senior US intelligence officials are now openly questioning whether Putin’s army still retains the capacity to “sustain even modest offensive operations.” With a major Ukrainian counteroffensive expected to begin in the coming weeks, there is little cause for optimism in Moscow.

It is in some ways poetic that developments surrounding this year’s Victory Day holiday have brought Russian audiences closer to the unpalatable truth. From the cancellation of regional parades and public marches to the lack of tanks on Red Square, it is now becoming painfully obvious to the average Russian that things are not going according to plan in Ukraine. An event conceived as a propaganda spectacle to project the strength of the Putin regime has instead served to underline Russia’s growing weakness. Putin is often accused of living in the past, but this is one Victory Day he will wish to forget.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

The post Sec. Mark Esper and Sec. Deborah Lee James promote DoD budget flexibility and program management reform in Defense One appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The 5×5—Cryptocurrency hacking’s geopolitical and cyber implications

Simon Handler — Wed, 03 May 2023 04:01:00 +0000

In January 2023, a South Korean intelligence service and a team of US private investigators conducted an operation to interdict $100 million worth of stolen cryptocurrency before its hackers could successfully convert the haul into fiat currency. The operation was the culmination of a roughly seven-month hunt to trace and retrieve the funds, stolen in June 2022 from a US-based cryptocurrency company, Harmony. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) attributed the theft to a team of North Korean state-linked hackers—one in a string of massive cryptocurrency hauls aimed at funding the hermit kingdom’s illicit nuclear and missile programs. According to blockchain analysis firm Chainalysis, North Korean hackers stole roughly $1.7 billion worth of cryptocurrency in 2022—a large percentage of the approximately $3.8 billion stolen globally last year.

North Korea’s operations have brought attention to the risks surrounding cryptocurrencies and how state and non-state groups can leverage hacking operations against cryptocurrency wallets and exchanges to further their geopolitical objectives. We brought together a group of experts to explore cybersecurity implications of cryptocurrencies, and how the United States and its allies should approach this challenge.

#1 What are the cybersecurity risks of decentralized finance (DeFi) and cryptocurrencies? What are the cybersecurity risks to cryptocurrencies?

Eitan Danon, senior cybercrimes investigator, Chainalysis:

Disclaimer: Any views and opinions expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect the official position of Chainalysis.

“DeFi is one of the cryptocurrency ecosystem’s fastest-growing areas, and DeFi protocols accounted for 82.1 percent of all cryptocurrency stolen (totaling $3.1 billion) by hackers in 2022. One important way to mitigate against this trend is for protocols to undergo code audits for smart contracts. This would prevent hackers from exploiting vulnerabilities in protocols’ underlying code, especially for cross-chain bridges, a popular target for hackers that allows users to move funds across blockchains. As far as the risk to cryptocurrencies, the decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies increases their security by making it extraordinarily difficult for a hostile actor to take control of permissionless, public blockchains. Transactions associated with illicit activity continue to represent a minute portion (0.24 percent) of the total crypto[currency] market. On a fundamental level, cryptocurrency is a technology—like data encryption, generative artificial intelligence, and advanced biometrics—and thus a double-edged sword.”

Kimberly Donovan director, Economic Statecraft Initiative, and Ananya Kumar, associate director of digital currencies, GeoEconomics Center, Atlantic Council:

“We encourage policymakers to think about cybersecurity vulnerabilities of crypto-assets and services in two ways. The first factor is the threat of cyberattacks for issuers, exchanges, custodians, or wherever user assets are pooled and stored. Major cryptocurrency exchanges like Binance and FTX have had serious security breaches, which has led to millions of dollars being stolen. The second factor to consider is the use of crypto-assets and crypto-services in money-laundering. Often, attackers use cryptocurrencies to receive payments due to the ability to hide or obfuscate financial trails, often seen in the case of ransomware attacks. Certain kinds of crypto-services such as DeFi mixers and aggregators allow for a greater degree of anonymity to launder money for criminals, who are interested in hiding money and moving it quickly across borders.”

Giulia Fanti, assistant professor of electrical and computer engineering, Carnegie Mellon University:

“The primary cybersecurity risks (and benefits) posed by DeFi and cryptocurrencies are related to lack of centralized control, which is inherent to blockchain technology and the philosophy underlying it. Without centralized control, it is very difficult to control how these technologies are used, including for nefarious purposes. Ransomware, for example, enables the flow of money to cybercriminial organizations. The primary cybersecurity risks to cryptocurrencies on the other hand can occur at many levels. Cryptocurrencies are built on various layers of technology, ranging from an underlying peer-to-peer network to a distributed consensus mechanism to the applications that run atop the blockchain. Attacks on cryptocurrencies can happen at any of these layers. The most widely documented attacks—and those with the most significant financial repercussions—are happening at the application layer, usually exploiting vulnerabilities in smart contract code (or in some cases, private code supporting cryptocurrency wallets) to steal funds.”

Zara Perumal, chief technology officer, Overwatch Data:

“Decentralized means no one person or institution is in control. It also means that no one person can easily step in to enforce. In cases like Glupteba, fraudulent servers or data listed on a blockchain can be hard to take down in comparison to cloud hosted servers where companies can intervene. Cybersecurity risks to cryptocurrencies include endpoint risk, since there is not a centralized party to handle returning accounts as the standard ways of credential theft is a risk to cryptocurrency users. There is a bigger risk in cases like crypto[currency] lending, where one wallet or owner holds a lot of keys and is a large target. In 2022, there were numerous high-profile protocol attacks, including the Wormhole, Ronin, and BitMart attacks. These attacks highlight the risks associated with fundamental protocol vulnerabilities via blockchain, smart contracts or user interface.”

#2 What organizations are most active and capable of cryptocurrency hacking and what, if any, geopolitical impact does this enable for them?

Danon: “North Korea- and Russia-based actors remain on the forefront of crypto[currency] crime. North Korea-linked hackers, such as those in the Lazarus Group cybercrime syndicate, stole an estimated $1.7 billion in 2022 in crypto[currency] hacks that the United Nations and others have assessed the cash-strapped regime uses to fund its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles programs. Press reporting about Federation Tower East—a skyscraper in Moscow’s financial district housing more than a dozen companies that convert crypto[currency] to cash—has highlighted links between some of these companies to money laundering associated with the ransomware industry. Last year’s designations of Russia-based cryptocurrency exchanges Bitzlato and Garantex for laundering hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of crypto[currency] for Russia-based darknet markets and ransomware actors cast the magnitude of this problem into starker relief and shed light on a diverse constellation of cybercriminals. Although many pundits have correctly noted that Russia cannot ‘flip a switch’ and run its G20 economy on the blockchain, crypto[currency] can enable heavily sanctioned countries, such as Russia, North Korea, and others, to project power abroad while generating sorely needed revenue.”

Donovan and Kumar: “We see actors from North Korea, Iran, and Russia using both kinds of cybersecurity threats described above to gain access to money and move it around without compliance. Geopolitical implications include sanctioned state actors or state-sponsored actors using the technology to generate revenue and evade sanctions. Hacking and cyber vulnerabilities are not specific to the crypto-industry and exist across digital infrastructures, specifically payments architecture. These threats can lead to national security implications for the private and public entities accessing or relying on this architecture.”

Perumal: “Generally, there are state-sponsored hacking groups that are targeting cryptocurrencies for financial gain, but also those like the Lazarus Group that are disrupting the cryptocurrency industry. Next, criminal hacking groups may both use cryptocurrency to receive ransom payments or also attack on chain protocols. These groups may or may not be associated with a government or political agenda. Many actors are purely financially motivated, while other government actors may hack to attack adversaries without escalating to kinetic impact.”

#3 How are developments in technology shifting the cryptocurrency hacking landscape?

Danon: “The continued maturation of the blockchain analytics sector has made it harder for hackers and other illicit actors to move their ill-gotten funds undetected. The ability to visualize complex crypto[currency]-based money laundering networks, including across blockchains and smart contract transactions, has been invaluable in enabling financial institutions and crypto[currency] businesses to comply with anti-money laundering and know-your-customer requirements, and empowering governments to investigate suspicious activity. In some instances, hackers have chosen to let stolen funds lie dormant in personal wallets, as sleuths on crypto[currency] Twitter and in industry forums publicly track high-profile hacks and share addresses in real-time, complicating efforts to off-ramp stolen funds. In other instances, this has led some actors to question whether this transparency risks unnecessary scrutiny from authorities. For example, in late April, Hamas’s military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, publicly announced that it was ending its longstanding cryptocurrency donation program, citing successful government efforts to identify and prosecute donors.”

Donovan and Kumar: “Industry is responding and innovating in this space to develop technology to protect and/or trace cyber threats and cryptocurrency hacks. We are also seeing the law enforcement, regulatory, and other government communities develop the capability and expertise to investigate these types of cybercrimes. These communities are taking steps to make public the information gathered from their investigations, which further informs the private sector to safeguard against cyber operations as well as technology innovations to secure this space.”

Fanti: “They are not really. For the most part, hacks on cryptocurrencies are not increasing in frequency because of sophisticated new hacking techniques, but rather because of relatively mundane vulnerabilities in smart contracts. There has been some research on using cutting-edge tools such as deep reinforcement learning to try to gain funds from smart contracts and other users, particularly in the context of DeFi. However, it is unclear to what extent DeFi users are using such tools; on-chain records do not allow observers to definitively conclude whether such activity is happening.”

Perumal: “As the rate of ransomware attacks rises, cryptocurrency is more often used as a mechanism to pay ransoms. For both that and stolen cryptocurrency, defenders aim to track actors across the blockchain and threat actors increase their usage mixers and microtransactions to hide their tracks. A second trend is crypto-jacking and using cloud computing from small to large services to fund mining. The last development is not new. Sadly, phishing and social engineering for crypto[currency] logins is still a pervasive threat and there is no technical solution to easily address human error.”

Countering ransomware: Lessons from aircraft hijacking

Untangling the Russian web: Spies, proxies, and spectrums of Russian cyber behavior

Loose cobras: DPRK regime succession and uncertain control over offensive cyber capabilities

#4 What has been the approach of the United States and allied governments toward securing this space? How should they be approaching it?

Danon: “The US approach toward securing the space has centered on law enforcement actions, including asset seizures and takedowns with partners of darknet markets, such as Hydra Market and Genesis Market. Sanctions in the crypto[currency] space, which have dramatically accelerated since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last February, have generated awareness about crypto[currency] based money laundering. However, as is the case across a range of national security problems, the United States has at times over relied on sanctions, which are unlikely to change actors’ behavior in the absence of a comprehensive strategy. The United States and other governments committed to AML should continue to use available tools and data offered by companies like Chainalysis to disrupt and deter bad actors from abusing the international financial system through the blockchain. Given the blockchain’s borderless and unclassified nature, the United States should also pursue robust collaboration with other jurisdictions and in multilateral institutions.”

Donovan and Kumar: “The United States and its allies are actively involved in this space to prevent regulatory arbitrage and increase information sharing on cyber risks and threats. They have also increased communication with the public and private sectors to make them aware of cyber risks and threats, and are making information available to the public and industry to protect consumers against cybercrime. Government agencies and allies should continue to approach this issue by increasing public awareness of the threats and enabling industry innovation to protect against them.”

Fanti: “One area that I think needs more attention from a consumer protection standpoint is smart contract security. For example, there could be more baseline requirements and transparency in the smart contract ecosystem about the practices used to develop and audit smart contracts. Users currently have no standardized way to evaluate whether a smart contract was developed using secure software development practices or tested prior to deployment. Standards bodies could help set up baseline requirements, and marketplaces could be required to report such details. While such practices cannot guarantee that a smart contract is safe, they could help reduce the prevalence of some of the most common vulnerabilities.”

Perumal: “Two recent developments from the US government are the White House cybersecurity strategy and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) move to ‘secure by default.’ They both emphasize cooperation with the private sector to move security of this ecosystem to cloud providers. While the system is inherently decentralized, if mining or credential theft is happening on major technology platforms, these platforms have an opportunity to mitigate risk. The White House emphasized better tracing of transactions to “trace and interdict ransomware payments,” and CISA emphasizes designing software and crypto[currency] systems to be secure by default so smaller actors and users bear less of the defensive burden. At a high level, I like that this strategy moves protections to large technology players that can defend against state actors. I also like the focus on flexible frameworks that prioritize economics (e.g., cyber liability) to set the goal, but letting the market be flexible on the solution—as opposed to a prescriptive regulatory approach that cannot adapt to new technologies. In some of these cases, I think cost reduction may be a better lever than liability, which promotes fear on a balance sheet, however, I think the push toward financially motivated goals and flexible solutions is the right direction.”

#5 Has the balance of the threats between non-state vs. state actors against cryptocurrencies changed in the last five years? Should we be worried about the same entities as in 2018?

Danon: “Conventional categories of crypto[currency]-related crime, such as fraud shops, darknet markets, and child abuse material, are on the decline. Similarly, the threat from non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, remains extremely low relative to nation states, with actors such as North Korea and Russia continuing to leverage their technical sophistication to acquire and move cryptocurrency. With great power competition now dominating the policy agenda across many capitals, analysts should not overlook other ways in which states are exercising economic statecraft in the digital realm. For example, despite its crypto[currency] ban, China’s promotion of its permissioned, private blockchain, the Blockchain-based Service Network, and its central bank digital currency, the ‘digital yuan,’ deserve sustained research and analysis. Against the backdrop of China’s rise and the fallout from the war on Ukraine, it will also be instructive to monitor the efforts of Iran, Russia, and others to support non-dollar-pegged stablecoins and other initiatives aimed at eroding the dollar’s role as the international reserve currency.”

Donovan and Kumar: “More is publicly known now on the range of actors in this space than ever. Agencies such as CISA, FBI, and the Departments of Justice and the Treasury and others have made information available and provided a wide array of resources for people to get help or learn—such as stopransomware.gov. Private blockchain analytics firms have also enabled tracing and forensics, which in partnership with enforcement can prevent and punish cybercrime in the crypto[currency] space. Both the knowledge about ransomware and awareness of ransomware attacks have increased since 2018. As the popularity of Ransomware as a Service rises, both state and non-state actors can cause destruction. We should continue to be worried about cybercrime in general and remain agnostic of the actors.”

Perumal: “State actors continue to get more involved in this space. As cryptocurrencies and some digital currencies based on the blockchain become more mainstream, attacking it allows a more targeted geopolitical impact. In addition to attacks by governments (like Lazarus Group), a big recent development was China’s ban on cryptocurrency, which moved mining power from China to other parts of the world, especially the United States and Russia. This changed attack patterns and targets. At a high level, we should be worried about both financially-motivated and government-backed groups, but as the crypto[currency] market grows so does the sophistication of attacks and attackers.”

The post The 5×5—Cryptocurrency hacking’s geopolitical and cyber implications appeared first on Atlantic Council.

US strategy and force posture for an era of nuclear tripolarity

Keir Lieber, Daryl G. Press — Mon, 01 May 2023 19:47:25 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

Issue brief release

The term “nuclear tripolarity” describes a world in which China has joined the United States and Russia as a leading nuclear power. As China modernizes its existing nuclear forces and deploys new weapons, it is on track to roughly double its deployed nuclear arsenal in the next few years—from approximately 350 to 700 deliverable warheads. The US Department of Defense projects that China will go further, expanding its arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035.¹ At those force levels, China’s arsenal would be comparable to US and Russian deployed nuclear forces, currently capped at 1,550 by the New START Treaty.²

What are the consequences of emerging tripolarity for US nuclear strategy and force posture? If the United States retains its current approach to nuclear force planning, the growth of China’s arsenal (and the ongoing modernization of Russia’s nuclear weapons) will likely compel the United States to significantly increase its own arsenal. The easiest way to do so would be to upload one to two thousand additional warheads from US reserves onto existing delivery systems when the New START treaty expires in 2026. Unfortunately, a major increase in US forces would likely mark just another step in an intensifying arms competition among the three leading nuclear powers, since China and Russia would then feel pressure to respond.

Alternatively, if US leaders meet the challenge of emerging tripolarity by reevaluating core nuclear missions, assumptions, and planning principles, then the costs and risks of a new nuclear arms competition might be avoided. Specifically, the United States should reconsider its current prohibition on deliberately targeting enemy civilians with nuclear weapons—a policy that prohibits counter-city targeting even in retaliation for a major Chinese or Russian nuclear attack on the US homeland.³ The prohibition on deterrence through “countervalue” targeting—the common term for targeting civilian populations and infrastructure—is a hidden driver of US nuclear force requirements. It necessitates a large US arsenal that can absorb an enemy strike and subsequently destroy hundreds of hardened enemy military sites.⁴ In an era of rapid adversary nuclear enhancements, this “counterforce-only” approach to nuclear planning is a recipe for large nuclear requirements and a likely three-party arms race.⁵

Those who would abhor a return to countervalue nuclear targeting should consider that the current counterforce-only doctrine is a costly fiction. It is a fiction because the type of massive retaliatory strike the United States would launch if China or Russia attacked the US homeland would hit cities and kill millions of adversary civilians, even if formally aimed at military targets. The pure counterforce approach to targeting does not actually spare enemy civilians or cities, but it does expand US nuclear requirements. A more tailored approach to nuclear deterrence—one that threatens military targets in some scenarios, and cities in the most extreme circumstances—might not increase the risk to enemy civilians at all. It may pose a stronger deterrent than a counterforce-only approach, and it may offer the best means for avoiding a costly arms race in a tripolar world.

Russia’s Kh-47M2 Kinzhal is a dual-capable hypersonic weapon shown here on a MiG-31 interceptor. It is featured here in the 2018 Moscow Victory Day Parade. Image courtesy Russian Presidential Press and Information Office. http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57436.

To be clear, this report advocates for neither a “minimum deterrence” doctrine (which requires only the capabilities necessary for retaliation against cities), nor the current counterforce-only approach. Instead, the United States should tailor its deterrent threats to the circumstances. The best way to deter nuclear attacks by regional adversaries is probably the threat of retaliatory disarming strikes—meaning counterforce strikes designed to disable the enemy’s remaining nuclear forces.⁶ However, the best, simplest, and least destabilizing way to deter massive counter-city strikes on the US homeland by a leading nuclear power is to threaten retaliation in kind.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: First, it briefly describes the meaning and importance of emerging nuclear tripolarity. Second, it examines the foundations of US nuclear force requirements, including the core missions assigned to nuclear weapons and the principles used to guide force planning. Third, it explains why emerging tripolarity will require significant increases in US nuclear forces as long as core missions and planning principles remain in place. Fourth, it explains why the United States should consider an alternative, hybrid approach to nuclear policy—one that avoids the pitfalls of the current counterforce-only doctrine. Finally, it raises and refutes potential counterarguments.

The era of nuclear tripolarity

The first decades of the nuclear age were defined by the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and the emergence of nuclear bipolarity. The United States developed nuclear weapons in 1945, and the Soviets joined the nuclear club just four years later in 1949. It took more than a decade (until the early 1960s) for the Soviet Union to deploy a truly survivable retaliatory capability against the United States. However, the basic structure of the nuclear order—two superpowers, each with much greater nuclear capabilities than anyone else—survived the end of the Cold War and endures today.⁷

China developed nuclear weapons in 1964 but maintained a relatively small arsenal, in the low hundreds of warheads, until recently. Today, according to US government assessments, China is “accelerating the large-scale expansion of its nuclear forces” by modernizing its existing forces and developing new capabilities, particularly silo-based, road-mobile, and sea-launched ballistic missiles. The Pentagon’s 2021 report to Congress projected that by the end of the decade China could have as many intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as the United States and Russia. Predictions about the exact size and composition of China’s future nuclear arsenal of course remain uncertain, but what is clear is that China will soon be armed with hundreds of additional nuclear weapons that can be targeted at the United States.

The emergence of nuclear tripolarity is a fact, but its impact on US nuclear policy and force requirements is less clear. While some analysts conclude that deterrence will become somewhat more complicated in a tripolar world, others see a far greater risk that nuclear weapons will be used in a crisis or war as China upends the apparent stability of a bipolar nuclear world.⁸ In fact, some leading analysts urge the United States to exit the New START Treaty and deploy as many as 3,500 nuclear weapons to maintain a credible deterrent.⁹

It is important to note that the consequences of nuclear tripolarity cannot be adequately understood in isolation from other key changes in the global nuclear environment. One area in particular—rapid technological changes that are rendering nuclear forces increasingly vulnerable—will amplify the strategic impact of tripolarity. Specifically, the “new era of counterforce,” based on revolutionary improvements in the accuracy of nuclear and conventional weapons and the ability to track nuclear forces via remote sensing, will exacerbate competition among the major nuclear powers as these countries face growing threats to maintaining secure retaliatory arsenals.¹⁰ Although this paper primarily discusses the impact of emerging tripolarity, the interaction effects with technological change deserve further analysis. In order to understand how the changing strategic landscape will shape US nuclear force requirements, one must examine the core missions that those forces are meant to carry out.

The foundations of US nuclear requirements: missions and guidelines

The United States requires its nuclear forces to execute three central missions: (1) deter nuclear attacks against the United States and its allies; (2) assure US allies that their nuclear deterrence needs will be met; and (3) mitigate the consequences if nuclear deterrence fails.¹¹

The first mission, the core of US nuclear policy, is broader than it appears because it requires deterring attacks from a diverse set of adversaries in a wide range of circumstances. The US arsenal must reliably deter powerful rivals that themselves are armed with large and diverse nuclear forces, as well as regional adversaries that field small and potentially vulnerable nuclear arsenals. US strategists must also posture US nuclear forces to deter a wide range of nuclear attacks, from large-scale strikes on the US homeland, such as an attack on US cities or a disarming strike aimed at the US nuclear arsenal, to smaller nuclear attacks, including battlefield strikes or instances of coercive nuclear escalation.

An unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile was launched at 4:36 a.m. PST during an operational test Dec. 17, 2013, from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif. https://www.flickr.com/photos/usairforce/11469547345/in/photolist-itwqQi-cid6Z7-L6rgw3-2g8E4EW-iEuYgn-8DzH6e.

Recognizing the breadth of the core mission to deter nuclear attack is important because the targets the United States threatens to retaliate against in each case, and the forces available to execute those retaliatory strikes, would vary across those circumstances. Retaliation against a battlefield nuclear attack by a weak, poorly armed enemy might entail low-yield, highly accurate nuclear forces—either to punish or disarm the enemy. By contrast, retaliation after a strategic attack on the US homeland by a major nuclear rival might involve dozens of high-yield weapons drawn from whatever US forces survived the initial enemy strike. The key point is that an arsenal designed to deter nuclear attacks across a wide range of circumstances will require a range of capabilities.

The second mission for US nuclear forces—assurance—is principally an effort to convince allies that the US nuclear umbrella will succeed at the core deterrence mission. If allies lose faith that US deterrent efforts will succeed, they may pursue nuclear capabilities of their own or change their geopolitical alignment to reduce their exposure to nuclear attack. Viewed in this way, the assurance mission is important, but it does not create force structure requirements beyond the core deterrence mission. In some cases, allies may disagree with US planners about the nuclear capabilities (or posture or declaratory policy) that are needed to reliably deter nuclear attack. However, as long as the US nuclear force structure is well suited for the deterrence mission, assurance principally involves reaching agreement with US partners that US force structure, posture, and declaratory policies will in fact deter adversaries.¹²

Similarly, the requirements for the third mission—mitigating the consequences if deterrence fails—are roughly the same as the requirements for the first mission. For example, if North Korea uses nuclear weapons during a war on the Korean Peninsula, the United States may decide to “mitigate” the impact by conducting conventional and low-yield nuclear disarming strikes against Pyongyang’s remaining arsenal. The most relevant US nuclear capabilities for such strikes—such as B-61 bombs, low-yield warheads on Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and air-launched cruise missiles—are also, by definition, the weapons on which the United States implicitly relies to deter North Korean attacks in the first place. The most demanding counterforce mission (in terms of force structure) is likely the requirement to conduct effective counterforce strikes after absorbing a major Russian nuclear attack. Some important scenarios may create niche requirements for the third mission (i.e., “mitigate consequences”), but because of the way the United States limits its target selection (“counterforce-only”), the deterrence mission and the mitigation mission largely call on the same forces.

To some extent, US force requirements follow logically from the three missions described above—and principally from mission one. In reality, however, the missions merely shape the force. The actual requirements (that is, the precise numbers of weapons and their operational requirements) depend substantially on three additional planning principles.

First, the survivability of US nuclear forces is not permitted to depend upon an elevated nuclear alert status nor quick employment decisions by US leaders. The US arsenal is deliberately designed to be survivable even at peacetime alert levels. Although the United States maintains a “launch on warning” capability, its retaliatory ability does not depend on the quick launch of forces. Instead, the US arsenal is designed to “ride out” an enemy’s counterforce strike and subsequently inflict devastating retaliation. This is an aspect of US posture intended to reinforce deterrence and reduce the risk of nuclear accidents from false alarms. Not surprisingly, an approach to deterrence that rejects high alert levels or quick employment decisions is costly, requiring redundant capabilities and robust command and control arrangements to ensure that some retaliatory forces will always survive and remain usable after any plausible attack.

The second key planning principal that drives US nuclear force structure is the rejection of a “single-leg survivability” approach to deterrence. Although some commentators refer to the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force as the inherently survivable leg of the US nuclear triad, US planners have intentionally designed survivability into each element of the arsenal. For example, individual US ICBMs are vulnerable to Russian missile attacks, but the missiles are deployed in large enough numbers to make them survivable as a force. Even a major strike on US ICBM fields using current Russian weapons would leave many missiles intact and ready to retaliate. Previously, the US strategic bomber force was deployed in a dispersed manner, with enough aircraft on alert to ensure retaliation. Today’s force is concentrated at a small number of bases, although at times of heightened tension the aircraft can be alerted and dispersed. In short, the US nuclear triad is not merely designed to create flexible employment options—each leg enhances the survivability of the overall force.

Of the three core US nuclear planning principles, the third has the greatest impact on US nuclear force structure. As mentioned at the outset, the United States aims nuclear weapons solely at enemy military targets, not at their cities.¹³ In other words, the United States threatens to respond to any nuclear attack—even an unrestrained strike on US cities—by retaliating against enemy military forces.

At first glance, this US policy appears to create a dangerous asymmetry. Telling enemies that a devastating strike on US cities will trigger retaliation against adversary military targets seems like an underwhelming threat, thereby weakening deterrence. Although there may be some validity to that concern, the United States’ counterforce retaliatory doctrine is not as restrained as it sounds. Many adversary military targets are located inside urban areas. Furthermore, many enemy military targets would require nuclear ground bursts to destroy them. Ground bursts (as opposed to airbursts) would necessarily create large fallout plumes that would contaminate wide swaths of territory. In short, current US targeting doctrine does not directly threaten cities, but it does not protect enemy civilians either. The “counterforce-only” approach to US nuclear deterrence would do little—or perhaps nothing —to reduce civilian fatalities if there were a major nuclear war.

Although the counterforce-only approach to retaliation may not spare enemy populations, it does significantly increase US nuclear requirements. For example, if the US retaliatory posture were based on the threat to retaliate with one hundred high-yield warheads against enemy cities, a total force of one thousand US weapons might be sufficient to guarantee that at least one hundred would survive. However, a nuclear doctrine based on the threat to retaliate against hundreds of military targets, many of which are hardened and thus require multiple strikes, means that large numbers of US forces must survive an enemy attack. A peacetime US arsenal must be even bigger.

A U.S. Air Force B-52H Stratofortress assigned to Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana., lands at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, in support of a Bomber Task Force deployment, Feb. 8, 2021.
https://www.dvidshub.net/image/6527213/b-52-landing.

To be clear, there are reasonable arguments in favor of each of these guiding principles. However, for reasons described in the next section, if US planners continue to base US force structure requirements against the ability to execute the current missions—and do so according to current planning principles—the emergence of nuclear tripolarity will cause US nuclear requirements to grow significantly.

Force structure in the era of tripolarity

If the United States retains its current nuclear missions and planning principles, the pressures of tripolarity—exacerbated by the impact of rapidly changing technology on arsenal vulnerability—will require significant increases to US nuclear force structure.

Tripolarity—exemplified by the additional 350 Chinese ICBMs—raises new challenges for US nuclear planners. First, there is the possibility, however remote, that Russia and China might someday coordinate a joint nuclear disarming strike against US nuclear forces.¹⁴ Given the extraordinary risk involved in a nuclear disarming strike, and the extreme sensitivity of information that would need to be shared among the co-conspirators, the likelihood of a coordinated attack appears very low. That said, nuclear weapons deter best when countries are fully confident that their arsenals are survivable. Therefore, the possibility of an overwhelming joint attack does slightly increase the challenge for the US nuclear arsenal.

The second effect of nuclear tripolarity works through a subtler logic and presents a greater challenge for US nuclear planners—a problem often referred to as the “third man in.” Currently, the core US nuclear mission (“deter nuclear attack”) requires, among other things, the ability of US forces to survive any Russian nuclear disarming strike and subsequently inflict unacceptable damage on Russia’s military forces. In a tripolar era, however, the US ability to retaliate after a Russian attack would be limited by fears that China might subsequently strike the United States (i.e., after US forces had first been degraded by Russia and then expended in the US retaliatory strike). The third man in problem is not merely that a retaliatory strike on Russia would leave the United States vulnerable to China. Rather, the knowledge that the United States would be constrained in its retaliation might embolden Russia and China in the first place. In short, if the United States is vulnerable to the sequential strikes by Russia and China envisioned in a third man in scenario, it might be vulnerable to many types of nuclear coercion.

The third effect of tripolarity exacerbates the third man in problem. Nuclear forces take years to build, and they are designed to last for decades. As a result, force structure should be resilient against plausible political changes in international politics. In the coming decades, however, the geopolitical landscape may evolve in radically different directions. China and Russia might become close allies. Alternatively, China may reverse its recent authoritarian turn, liberalize, and move toward the West. Pessimists in Beijing may even worry about a third possibility: regime change in Moscow, opening the door to a US-Russian rapprochement. However, if each tripolar power feels compelled to build an arsenal able to survive an adversary’s attack, retaliate, and still be able to deter the third nuclear great power, the world will be primed for costly and destabilizing arms racing.

The pernicious effects of nuclear tripolarity are exacerbated by the other aspects of the deterrence landscape, described above. The revolutions in accuracy and remote sensing mean that all nuclear forces are becoming more vulnerable, magnifying the third man in problem.¹⁵ US planners remain understandably reluctant to base their nuclear deterrence strategy on single-leg survivability. They understand that submarines can sometimes be tracked—in fact, Soviet submarines were vulnerable during significant periods of the Cold War. In an era of unprecedented technological change, no delivery system—even whisper-quiet US nuclear submarines—will necessarily be survivable in the future.

The Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine USS Henry M. Jackson (SSBN 730) gets in position to receive a payload of supplies from an MV-22B Osprey in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands. (US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Devin M. Langer).

Possibly the biggest factor that exacerbates the problems of nuclear tripolarity is the US counterforce-only approach to deterrence. Maintaining a force that can survive a Russian attack and retaliate effectively against Moscow’s military forces—and then survive a Chinese attack and retaliate effectively against Beijing’s military—is a demanding mission. Furthermore, building the capabilities to carry out those counterforce strikes in such demanding circumstances (i.e., after absorbing massive disarming attacks) will necessitate a force that is so capable that it will undermine the peacetime survivability of Russia’s and China’s arsenals.

The implications of tripolarity on deterrence may seem esoteric to those outside the nuclear community, but they are well understood by US planners. Consequently, calls for increasing US nuclear forces are growing common. The easiest way to enhance US nuclear capabilities in the short term is to upload existing delivery systems with available warheads. The current Minuteman III ICBM force (four hundred missiles, with one warhead each) can accommodate an additional four hundred warheads, which would not enhance the survivability of the missiles but would increase the capability of any ICBMs that survived an enemy disarming strike.¹⁶ Similarly, the United States could increase the number of warheads on each Trident II missile, adding between five hundred and one thousand warheads across the eight to ten submarines typically at sea.¹⁷

Estimating the number of uploaded warheads required to absorb a Russian nuclear attack and retaliate, and then absorb a Chinese attack and retaliate, would require a complete force exchange analysis, which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, analysts who advocate for more US nuclear forces have a point: if the United States intends to retain its current nuclear missions and achieve them using traditional planning principles, the addition of one thousand Chinese warheads, potentially loaded on 350 modern ICBMs, would require a significant increase in US forces. At the same time, critics of a US nuclear buildup have a point too: given the substantial counterforce capabilities of the additional US weapons (and the geopolitical uncertainties inherent in tripolarity), it is likely that these US enhancements would trigger responses from Russia and China.

Is there an alternative approach to nuclear planning that would achieve core missions (deter, assure, and mitigate), continue to reject hair-trigger alert postures, and steer clear of the uncertainties of single-leg survivability?

A hybrid strategy for the era of nuclear tripolarity

The United States should consider an alternative approach to nuclear policy that avoids the pitfalls of the current counterforce-only strategy and the weaknesses of a pure minimum deterrence countervalue doctrine. This paper proposes an alternative hybrid approach, which retains and continues to gradually enhance existing counterforce capabilities to fulfill their current roles in US plans. The hybrid policy, however, would change its approach to deterring large-scale nuclear attacks on the US homeland by threatening punitive retaliatory strikes against enemy cities in those extreme circumstances.

The weaknesses of the current counterforce-only approach are described above. It requires a large and expanding force, thereby undermining future efforts to limit or reduce nuclear stockpiles; it may trigger a spiraling arms race among the United States, Russia, and China; and it may ironically provide a weaker deterrent.¹⁸ At the same time, the opposite approach—a pure countervalue strategy—has even greater limitations. Most importantly, a countervalue-only approach would limit US leaders to poor retaliatory options after a limited enemy nuclear attack—especially one that spared US and allied cities. US credibility—in the eyes of both allies and adversaries—would suffer as a result, with adverse consequences for proliferation and deterrence.

A hybrid strategy would avoid the negative consequences of both alternatives—leaving the United States with its current counterforce capabilities to provide credible retaliatory options across a wide range of circumstances (e.g., an adversary’s limited nuclear attack), all the while avoiding the need to build additional counterforce capabilities each time China or Russia enhances its nuclear arsenal.

Table 1 summarizes the current and hybrid approaches to nuclear deterrence. Regardless of which approach the United States chooses, the mission of deterring a nuclear attack can be accomplished in two ways: by threatening a retaliatory damage-limiting strike against the enemy’s nuclear forces, or by threatening a punitive retaliatory response designed to inflict pain. Where the strategies differ is in how each would execute a punitive response.

The current policy seeks to deter nuclear attacks by providing US leaders with two options for retaliation: First, the policy allows for counterforce strikes to degrade (or disarm entirely) an enemy’s forces after the enemy has used nuclear weapons against the United States or its allies. Second, if meaningful damage limitation is impossible, the United States can conduct retaliatory counterforce strikes to punish an enemy. The overarching goal is deterrence: the threat of disarming attacks, or punitive strikes against military targets, is intended to dissuade a potential adversary from conducting nuclear attacks in the first place.

The hybrid strategy would retain counterforce capabilities for damage limitation, but in case of direct attacks against US or allied urban areas, it would rely on countervalue threats for the purpose of punishment. In other words, against adversaries with potentially vulnerable arsenals (e.g., North Korea today; possibly Iran in the future), US nuclear deterrence would rest on the threat of retaliatory damage-limiting strikes—meaning counterforce attacks designed to disarm the adversary, if possible. (In this respect it would be identical to the current approach.) Against adversaries with forces too large for effective damage limitation, however, the hybrid strategy would base retaliatory plans—to deter the most extreme attacks—on threats of punitive countervalue retaliation.

Table 1: Comparing the current and alternative approaches to targeting

The hybrid strategy could be implemented at current and planned force levels. The hybrid approach requires the same damage-limitation capabilities as the counterforce-only strategy. In both cases, the United States requires nuclear and non-nuclear means for degrading (or disarming) the arsenals of small nuclear powers. Weapons like the B-61, low-yield Trident, the planned “long range standoff” (LRSO) cruise missile, and possibly the proposed nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) could play a role in this mission. Also, in both cases, the United States would retain (and enhance) the counterforce weapons that provide substantial damage limitation capabilities against larger nuclear adversaries. The higher-yield Trident, Minuteman III, and stealthy long-range bombers armed with LRSO missiles are well-suited to that role. Those counterforce capabilities, which have been force-sized against the Russian target set, would be more than adequate against China’s smaller force.¹⁹

Simply put, the switch from a counterforce-only approach to the hybrid strategy offered here affects US force requirements merely by changing the means by which the United States would inflict punishment after a catastrophic attack on the US homeland. Following the current strategy will drive the United States to acquire more warheads to target China’s new ICBMs and other new nuclear targets with whatever US force survived a Chinese first strike. Worse yet, the current strategy would require US planners to cover Russian military targets with the weapons that survived a Russian disarming strike, and still have enough forces remaining to survive a third man in attack from China before retaliating against Chinese military targets. The hybrid strategy, by contrast, rejects this excessively demanding approach to deterrence. It would simply warn Russia that a crippling nuclear attack on the US homeland will be met with a hundred (or so) weapons that will inflict massive punishment on Russian society. If China, for some inconceivable reason, wished to be the third man in for this catastrophe, the US arsenal will have a hundred or more warheads left to inflict massive harm on China’s society too.

To reiterate, the purpose of these threats is to deter the attacks in the first place. However, the goal of deterrence is easier to reach—and can be done with fewer forces—if the planning guidance abandons the counterforce-only approach.

Counterarguments

Critics of a hybrid deterrent approach might argue that the current US strategy already targets adversary civilians indirectly, and therefore solves the problem this paper identifies, in a politically acceptable fashion. Specifically, critics of a hybrid strategy argue that adversary “military” sites selected for nuclear retaliation include many targets located inside enemy cities. Thus, any adversary would suffer vast civilian casualties from US retaliation whether or not the US strike were technically limited to counterforce targets. Moreover, this critique explains why, allegedly, the United States will not need to arms race under tripolarity, since the deployment of additional Chinese weapons will not affect US requirements for punitive counterforce attacks. Given that the effect of these retaliatory counterforce strikes is intended to be punitive, the United States can plan to destroy the same number of (urban) military targets in Russia or China, regardless of how many new ICBMs or other weapons China deploys.

The problem with this critique (and the current counterforce-only strategy) is that it is an unstable solution built on sleight-of-hand: targeting cities, without targeting cities. As a result, the strategy is vulnerable to powerful critiques from both doves and hawks. The doves will assail the current strategy because the military targets inside cities do not meet the high legal bar for “proportionality,” because millions of civilians would inevitably die. These attacks on the current strategy are underway, evidenced by efforts to define the practice of nuclear deterrence (and nuclear weapons themselves) as illegal under international law.²⁰ Hawks will attack the contradictions in the current policy from the other side. US policy aims to deter nuclear attack by threatening to retaliate against enemy military targets, but with China’s buildup the United States does not have enough weapons to cover those targets. Therefore, the United States needs more. These attacks are also underway as seen in calls to upload US missiles and submarines in response to China’s new ICBMs.

An unarmed Trident II (D5LE) missile launches from Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS Maine (SSBN 741) off the coast of San Diego, California, Feb. 12, 2020. (US Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Thomas Gooley).

The better option is the hybrid approach: (1) maintain enough counterforce capability to provide the disarming and damage limiting options that US foreign policy commitments require, and (2) retain enough survivability to inflict devastating countervalue strikes—against one or two major adversaries—to deter the most extreme attacks on the US homeland. The legal battles to defend the practice of deterrence will ensue, just as they would with the current strategy. However, the hybrid approach is much less likely to trigger a costly and dangerous tripolar arms race.

A second criticism is that US allies and the international community would be appalled if the United States adopted a hybrid deterrence policy which explicitly incorporated countervalue targeting. Critics might contend that allied objections would weaken US alliances and undermine US standing as a leader in the rules-based order. However, for decades US policy rejected the claim that the humanitarian legal principles of distinction and proportionality applied to plans for nuclear deterrence. A major policy shift mandating that US nuclear doctrine adhere to those principles occurred only recently—during the administration of former US President Barack Obama in 2013.²¹ The United States was able to stake a claim to global leadership and promote the rules-based-order prior to 2013, and it could continue to do so today regardless of the details of its nuclear deterrence strategy. Debates over deterrence and law are political as much as they are legal, and key US allies depend on the US nuclear umbrella. They will accept the hybrid approach if they understand it is the best way to provide a credible deterrent while minimizing the risk of a nuclear arms race.

Conclusion

The strategic dynamics of a tripolar nuclear world are worrisome. If China’s nuclear expansion and modernization continue as expected, the US nuclear arsenal will also need to grow to satisfy current mission requirements. This in turn will lead China and Russia to worry about the vulnerability of their own arsenals, likely triggering additional arms buildups. Understood in this light, the United States must find a balance that addresses real challenges to critical nuclear deterrence missions yet avoids (if possible) actions that will trigger a costly and counterproductive arms race.

One promising path forward is to revisit and adapt fundamental nuclear planning principles—to address the constraints of a new era. Specifically, the United States should formulate a hybrid deterrent approach, which retains counterforce capabilities for some circumstances (e.g., deterring nuclear escalation during regional wars) while accepting that a counterforce-only doctrine is not well suited to deter major nuclear attacks on the US homeland. Adopting a hybrid approach would more effectively deter nuclear attacks on the US homeland or that of its allies, while also allowing the United States to avoid a new nuclear arms race.

If the United States were to move in the direction this paper suggests, it would raise important questions about how to square US nuclear policy with international law.²² Changing US doctrine to permit countervalue targeting for the most extreme contingencies might be justified by legal exemptions given for national “supreme emergency” or interpretations that allow for “belligerent reprisal.” Alternatively, a legal justification might be built on the distinction between what is necessary for planning (for the purpose of deterrence) versus actual execution (in case of nuclear war).²³ As others have noted, international humanitarian law was intended to moderate the conduct of war—not undermine policies designed to prevent war.²⁴ Ultimately, international humanitarian law, and the boundaries of its jurisdiction when those laws conflict with necessary action in the face of existential threats, has always been subject to interpretation and reinterpretation. Regardless, the first step involves the renewed analysis of fundamental strategic questions. The answers point to the need to change US policy to bolster deterrence and prevent a dangerous arms race.

Issue brief authors

Fellow

Keir Lieber

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

Fellow

Daryl G. Press

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Arms Control Defense Policy

Acknowledgement

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s work on nuclear and strategic force has been made possible by support from our partners, including Los Alamos National Laboratory, Northrop Grumman Corporation, Norwegian Ministry of Defense, the United States Department of Defense, the United States Department of Energy, as well as general support to the Scowcroft Center. The partners are not responsible for the content of this report, and the Scowcroft Center maintains a strict intellectual independence policy.

1 US Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2022, Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 98.

2 The New START treaty limits deployed strategic warheads at 1,550, but it counts each strategic bomber as a single “warhead.” Because bomber aircraft can carry multiple weapons, US and Russian nuclear forces can be slightly above 1,550 and still be compliant with the treaty. The treaty also does not address nuclear forces with a range below 5,000 kilometers. While Russia announced in February 2023 that it would suspend participation in New START inspections, both parties continue to appear to be in compliance with the treaty’s central limitations on deployed accountable strategic forces.

3 For debates on the legal status and policy wisdom of the current US prohibition on intentionally targeting civilians in nuclear reprisal, see Scott S. Sagan and Allen S. Weiner, “The Rule of Law and the Role of Strategy in U.S. Nuclear Doctrine,” International Security, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Spring 2021), pp. 126-166; Christopher A. Ford, et al., “Correspondence: Are Belligerent Reprisals Against Civilians Legal,” International Security, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Fall 2021), pp. 166-172; and Steve Fetter and Charles Glaser, “Legal, but Lethal: The Law of Armed Conflict and U.S. Nuclear Strategy,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Spring 2022), pp. 25-37.

4 These enemy military sites include but are not limited to nuclear targets.

5 Consistent with the nuclear literature, we divide nuclear targets into two broad categories: counterforce targets, which are military sites, and countervalue targets, which are civilian sites. Note that counterforce targeting (e.g., aiming at military sites) is often conflated with attacks intended to disarm (fully or partially) an enemy. In reality, one might strike counterforce targets for a wide range of reasons: to punish, to coerce, to disarm, and more. The distinction between target types and operational goals lies at the heart of the argument that follows.

6 See Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “Coercive Nuclear Campaigns in the 21st Century: Understanding Adversary Incentives and Options for Nuclear Escalation,” March 2013, Report Number 2013-001, Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC), pp. 46-48.

7 On the Soviet Union’s struggle to create a survivable retaliatory capability, and US efforts to delay that day from arriving, see Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020), pp. 41-51.

8 Then-USSTRATCOM Commander Admiral Richard Charles Richard stated, “We can start by rewriting deterrence theory… We have never faced two peer nuclear capable opponents at the same time who have to be deterred differently.” Theresa Hitchens, Breaking Defense, August 11, 2022. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., referring to “the general stability of [a] bipolar system,” writes, “China’s attainment of great-nuclear-power status will dramatically upset this delicate equilibrium.” Andrew F. Krepinevich, “The New Nuclear Age: How China’s Growing Nuclear Arsenal Threatens Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2022.

9 Frank C. Miller, “Outdated Nuclear Treaties Heighten the Risk of Nuclear War,” Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2022.

10 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence,” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Spring 2017), pp. 9-49.

11 US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, October 27, 2022, pp. 7-8.

12 Some analysts may claim that the second mission does occasionally require additional forces—i.e., beyond those needed for mission one—by pointing to instances in which US allies lobbied the United States to retain particular weapon systems in the arsenal. Japan, reportedly, advocated for the nuclear Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM-N) despite US assessments that it was unnecessary for deterrence. But these cases are better understood as disagreements among allies about what forces are required for mission one (i.e., deterrence), rather than about extra forces required for mission two. The debate between US and Japanese officials reportedly centered on whether US ICBMs and SLBMs would be credible against limited attacks on Japan, given the large yield of those weapons, and hence whether the ballistic missiles would reliably deter attacks on Japan—i.e., a debate over the requirements of deterrence.

13 Current US doctrine prohibits the deliberate targeting of civilians with nuclear weapons, so all US plans for nuclear employment exclusively target military objectives. According to the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States “will not intentionally target civilian populations or objects” with nuclear weapons. Official guidance also holds that all nuclear employment plans must “seek to minimize collateral damage” to civilians, even in retaliation for a nuclear strike against US or allied civilians. In short, US nuclear doctrine, strategy, legal commitments, and policy appear to prohibit deliberate countervalue targeting, meaning that all US nuclear options are fundamentally counterforce in nature.

14 This seems extremely unlikely to the authors, but it cannot be completely dismissed, as countries have in the past conspired to launch aggressive wars together.

15 On the revolutions in accuracy and sensing, see Lieber and Press, “The New Era of Counterforce.” These technological trends exacerbate the third man in problem because, in an era of high-accuracy and unprecedented sensing capabilities, an initial disarming strike will be expected to destroy a large fraction of a country’s retaliatory forces. Additionally, the dangers posed by the “third man’s” arsenal—which will be highly accurate itself and cued by advanced sensors—will constrain the victim’s retaliatory options more than if the “third man” had a blunt, unsophisticated arsenal.

16 Of the four hundred US Minuteman ICBMs currently deployed, two hundred are armed with Mk12A reentry vehicles; those missiles can each carry two additional warheads. The United States has fifty unused Minuteman silos which could be reloaded, but doing so would draw missiles away from the pool designated for testing, which would harm force readiness.

17 As the United States transitions from Ohio- to Columbia-class SSBNs, both the number of deployed submarines and the number of missiles per boat will drop.

18 For these and additional arguments, see Fetter and Glaser, “Legal, but Lethal,” pp. 31-35.

19 Unless the United States requires the ability to conduct substantial damage-limitation strikes against both China and Russia simultaneously, the increase in China’s ICBMs does not require additional counterforce capabilities for the United States.

20 See the analysis in Sagan and Weiner, “Rule of Law.”

21 Sagan and Wiener, “Rule of Law,” pp. 127-128.

22 Alternatively, the importance of adopting a nuclear policy that most effectively bolsters deterrence (i.e., the prevention of nuclear war) and avoids the dangers of a “no cities” approach may simply require the United States to no longer abide by current interpretations of international law in this area. As Fetter and Glaser write in reference to the Law of Armed Conflict, “[we] do not believe that the value of complying with the LOAC for its own sake warrants adopting a strategically inferior strategy.” Fetter and Glaser, “Legal, but Lethal,” p. 28.

23 Note that NATO’s nuclear sharing policy involves planning (for the purpose of deterrence) to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear members of the Nonproliferation Treaty—an action that would be illegal if executed. Similarly, a hybrid deterrence strategy would involve planning for actions that would only be executed if such extreme events had occurred (major nuclear strikes on the US homeland) as to nullify the context of existing international law.

24 Fetter and Glaser, “Legal, but Lethal,” pp., 27-28.

The post US strategy and force posture for an era of nuclear tripolarity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Iranian and Syrian factors shape Israeli response to Russia’s Ukraine invasion

Joseph Roche — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 19:55:35 +0000

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Israel has sought to minimize involvement in the war while attempting to maintain a neutral stance toward Russia. This posture reflects Israeli security priorities closer to home. However, strengthening ties between Russia and Iran along with pressure from the West may eventually force Israel to change its stance.

During the tenure of former Prime Minister Yair Lapid, Israel declined to join EU and US sanctions against Russia, opting instead to provide only humanitarian aid to Kyiv. The return of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in December 2022 did not significantly affect Israeli foreign policy toward Ukraine or Russia.

Israel’s reluctance to condemn Russia’s actions is first and foremost a strategic decision in order to avoid jeopardizing an unofficial agreement with Moscow that enables Israel to combat Iranian influence in Syria. Since its military intervention began in 2015, Russia has been among the dominant forces in Syria. Russia controls the Syrian sky and generally does not restrict Israeli fighter jets from conducting strikes on Iranian proxies. With this in mind, Israel does not want to risk alienating the Kremlin.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Email
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Russia’s recent geopolitical isolation has complicated the situation further by pushing Moscow toward Tehran. This growing military cooperation between Russia and Iran has sparked alarm in Israel amid fears that it could have significant negative consequences for the country’s national security.

Firstly, by providing Russia with weapons including drones, Iran is gaining important battlefield experience and improving its drone technology, potentially increasing the threat to Israel in the long run. Secondly, some observers fear that if Russia reduces its Syrian presence due to the invasion of Ukraine, it would give Iran more room to operate freely in Syria.

Not everyone is convinced. Omer Dostri, a specialist at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, does not think a complete Russian withdrawal from Syria is currently likely. He argues that Russia remains a major world power and can simultaneously engage in the war in Ukraine while also remaining in Syria. However, if Russia does significantly decrease its military presence in Syria, he argues that Israel might acutally enjoy more freedom of action and air control.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Israel’s greatest concern remains the possibility of Russia potentially helping Iran in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Yossi Melman, a senior analyst for the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, says Russia could do so either by lobbying for a relaxation of international restrictions or by directly providing nuclear material to Iran in exchange for weapons.

For now, Israel’s objective is to dissuade Russia and demonstrate that its aid to Iran is a waste of resources and finances. However, if Russia were to significantly increase its military and security assistance to Iran, particularly in the context of Iran’s presence in Syria, Israel would likely respond by rethinking its support for Ukraine and its approach to the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Potential Russian military aid to Iran could include ballistic missiles, fighter jets, and air defense systems. Additionally, recent reports indicate Moscow may be considering establishing production lines in Iran for certain Russian weapons.

Israel is also concerned that Russia could supply equipment to upgrade the Iranian nuclear program, although Moscow may be reluctant to do so due to its own strategic interests. Nevertheless, the prospect of such a scenario has caused considerable alarm in Israel, with experts acknowledging that it would be a game-changer for the country that would require a significant shift in its relations with Moscow.

The deepening partnership between Russia and Iran is likely to remain Israel’s key focus in the months ahead. If Russia suffers further military setbacks in Ukraine, there is a danger that Moscow’s increased reliance on Tehran could result in greater Iranian influence in Syria while also strengthening the country’s position during negotiations with the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, many in the West would like to see Israel play a larger role in efforts to support Ukraine. Although neither Russia nor Iran has crossed any red lines that would prompt a formal shift in Israel’s stance toward Ukraine, the longer the current war persists, the more Israel will be pressured by its Western allies to take an active role in opposing Russian aggression.

According to Dostri, the United States is already calling on Israel to support Ukraine more robustly. “At present, Israel is providing humanitarian and medical aid, as well as defensive support, such as helmets along with missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attack warning systems. Israel is also sharing intelligence related to the threat from Iran’s UAVs,“ he says. The US is reportedly urging Israel to take further steps, such as providing the Ukrainian army with anti-missile defense systems and potentially even attack drones.

With no end in sight to the Russian invasion, Israel will likely face further calls in the coming months to stand with the democratic world and back Ukraine. “Israel has to take a side and not sit on the fence because Israel’s main ally is the US, not Russia,“ notes Melman.

Joseph Roche is a journalist and former MENA junior analyst at Oxford Analytica. He holds a master’s degree in international history from The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva.

About the podcast

The Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalisation of contract warfare tells us about the world as we currently find it, but also about the future of the international system and about what war could look like in the coming decades.

Middle East Programs

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

Explore More

The post What Russian mercenaries tell us about Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes

Tiffany Vora — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 13:00:49 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

ISSUE BRIEF

The “United States Space Priorities Framework,” released in December 2021, confirmed the White House’s commitment to American leadership in space.¹ Space activities deliver immense benefits to humankind. For example, satellite imaging alone is crucial for improvements in daily life such as weather monitoring as well as for grand challenges like the fight against climate change. Such breakthrough discoveries in space pave the way for innovation and new economies on Earth. Exploration is at the cutting edge of this process: it expands humankind’s knowledge of the universe, transforming the unknown into the supremely challenging, expensive, risky, and promising. US allies and partners accelerate this transformation via scientific and technical achievements as well as processes, relationships, and a shared vision for space exploration. By integrating these allied capabilities, the United States and its allies and partners set the stage for safe and prosperous space geopolitics and economy in the decades to come.

However, harnessing the capabilities of US allies and partners for space exploration is complex, requiring the balance of relatively short-term progress with far-horizon strategy. Space exploration has changed since the US-Soviet space race of the 1960s. In today’s rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical environment, it is unclear whether the processes, relationships, and vision that previously enabled allied cooperation in space, epitomized by the International Space Station (ISS), will keep pace. Here, China is viewed as the preeminent competitor for exploration goals and capabilities—as well as the major competitor for long-term leadership in space.² This development drives fears of space militarization and weaponization, prompting protectionist legislation, investment screening, and industrial policies that can disrupt collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners.³ Further complication stems from the rise of commercial space, with opportunities and challenges due to the decentralization, democratization, and demonetization of technologies for robotic and crewed space exploration.

China is viewed as the preeminent competitor in space. Pictured here, the Shenzhou-14 has been used extensively by both the PLA and Chinese commercial sector. May 29, 2022. Source: China News Service

This paper serves as a primer for current US space exploration goals and capabilities that will be critical to achieving them. It highlights arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned to jointly accelerate space exploration while also benefitting life on Earth. This paper concludes with recommended actions—gleaned from interviews with international experts in space exploration—for the US government as well as allied and partner governments to increase the number and impact of global stakeholders in space exploration, to remove friction in collaboration, and to guide the future of space toward democratic values.

Current space exploration efforts

Over the next few decades, US and allied space exploration will integrate uncrewed (robotic) and crewed missions to achieve scientific discovery, technological advancement, economic benefits, national prestige, and planetary defense.

Concept art for NASA’s Gateway Program, includes elements from international partners and government partners. Credit : NASA

Uncrewed space exploration missions generally focus on expanding fundamental scientific knowledge and laying the foundation for future activities such as resource extraction. Collaborators include the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the European Space Agency (ESA) and member space agencies, and the space agencies of India, Japan, South Korea, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), with public-private partnerships delivering additional capabilities.⁴ Several missions to Mars will study the planet’s geology, atmosphere, and possible past or current life, with sample-return missions currently scheduled by NASA and the ESA for the early 2030s.⁵ The search for conditions suitable to life will be extended to other locations in the solar system, such as the moons of Jupiter and Saturn. Robotic missions will continue to increase understanding of the Sun, Mercury, Venus, the Moon, asteroids, Jupiter and its moons, and deep space. Observational studies of planets outside our solar system, black holes, comets, stars, and galaxies will be enabled by space telescopes and other imaging modalities. Uncrewed exploration goals are also being pursued by the China National Space Administration, with particular attention to its planned International Lunar Research Station.⁶ Note that important technological gaps in robotic space exploration—such as dust mitigation⁷ and space situational awareness⁸ —are being tackled by critical research and development by US partners and allies.

Crewed space exploration objectives for the United States and its allies and partners are encapsulated by the Moon to Mars roadmap,⁹ an integrated strategy that, over the next several decades, will synergize exploration goals in low-Earth orbit (LEO), cislunar space, and Mars. Within this roadmap, for which all timelines may shift, the Artemis program will return humans (including the first woman and person of color) to the Moon no earlier than 2025, with the long-term goal of establishing a sustainable human presence on the lunar surface.¹⁰ The Artemis program will use the heavy-lifter Space Launch System (SLS) and the Orion spacecraft to send astronauts and payloads to a space station in lunar orbit called the Gateway. From there, the Human Landing System will transport them to and from the Artemis Base Camp on the lunar surface (note that mission details are still being refined). The program involves crucial contributions from allied governments and industries. Hardware, software, and lessons learned from the Artemis program and other activities in LEO and on the ISS will lay the foundation for Mars:¹¹ human exploration (generally projected for the 2030s), scientific investigation, and eventual permanent settlement.¹² In particular, the Gateway serves important roles in infrastructure development (e.g., supply chains) and better understanding of the effects of extended deep-space missions on the human body—both crucial aspects of crewed space exploration.

NASA’s Artemis I rocket carrying the Orion research spacecraft, Wednesday from Launch Complex 39B at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Florida, Nov. 16, 2022. Source : Andrew Parlette

International partners are critical for the success of the Artemis program. They are providing expertise, technology, and funding across the spectrum from basic science and engineering to specific software and hardware mission deliverables. A few examples highlight the benefits of leveraging the capabilities of US allies and partners.¹³ The ESA is contributing to the construction and operation of the Gateway and the Orion service module. Canada is delivering several critical components of the Gateway,¹⁴ while Japan and the ESA are building important components of habitation modules. Navigation, tracking, and communication capabilities are key contributions from Australia; an ESA program will also provide lunar telecommunications and navigation.¹⁵ Other important hardware, subsystems, and expertise will be supplied by space agencies such as those of Italy¹⁶ and the United Kingdom. Moreover, allied companies are partners in the design, development, and deployment of capabilities underlying the Artemis program.

Today, US and allied cooperation in space rests on the Artemis Accords,¹⁷ a set of principles, guidelines, and best practices for peaceful civilian space exploration building on the Outer Space Treaty of 1967¹⁸ and subsequent policies. Key principles include peaceful operations, transparency, interoperability, and commitments to deconfliction and the collaborative management of orbital debris and space resources. The original group of eight signatories in 2020 has since expanded to twenty-three as of March 2023, with representation across the globe from the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific, and Africa.

Signatory nations host mature or developing industries directly or indirectly pertinent to space exploration (see Table 1), signaling strong potential for bilateral and multilateral collaboration. Notably, neither Russia nor China—the two largest competitors to allied space exploration—have signed, nor appear likely to sign, the Artemis Accords. Thus, it is imperative for the United States to follow through on its commitments to its allies and partners, demonstrating that it remains the partner of choice for open and transparent space exploration and scientific inquiry.

To project leadership in space exploration, the United States and its allies and partners ought to be first in returning humans to the Moon and landing astronauts on Mars. Most experts interviewed for this paper agreed that—with China and Russia also racing to these benchmarks—achieving these “firsts” is important for prestige, diplomacy, and establishing a strong foundation for a rules-based order in outer space, similar to that seen across traditional domains, with the goal of promoting long-term freedom and prosperity. Failure to achieve these “firsts” could arise due to Chinese achievements, insufficient allied funding and political will, geopolitical events, a catastrophic mission failure, or from the United States underutilizing the capabilities of its allies and partners, both in the public and private sectors. The latter becomes more likely due to protectionist policies, including caps on foreign contributions, and political interference in competition. Overall, early stakeholders in this new phase of space exploration will set the culture, norms, and standards that will underpin space activities for years to come—a major reason to strengthen the systems and processes that enable US-led collaboration with allies and partners.

Technological opportunities and challenges

There are numerous opportunities to facilitate, enrich, and expand collaboration in space exploration between the United States and its partners and allies. At the same time, important challenges hold back current efforts to harness allied capabilities, pointing to opportunities to improve collaboration in the coming years.

Allied opportunities in space exploration

Continuing to advance space exploration by both machines and humans requires costly, sophisticated, interdisciplinary technology development across sectors; this can only be done through the aggregate efforts of the United States and its allies and partners from start to finish.¹⁹ Such international cooperation, and cooperation between the public and private sectors, will not only overcome the major technical, logistical, and scientific challenges of space exploration, but also complement Earth-focused innovation initiatives in critical technologies (see Table 1).²⁰ For example, formal and informal strategies to leverage biotechnological advances for the expansion of bioeconomies²¹ have been formulated for the United States,²² Germany,²³ United Kingdom,²⁴ European Union,²⁵ India,²⁶ and others—including China.²⁷ Together, allied and partner space agencies play crucial roles as early funders of the science, engineering, and business development of space and space-adjacent products and services that will both benefit from and drive space exploration in the coming decades; they also serve as early (and often sole) clients for these products and services.

Autonomous robotic system²⁸ are an illustrative example of how collaboration around a major technology objective for space exploration can overcome a series of challenges and deliver benefits across both Earth and space. Such systems rely on sophisticated integration of sensors, robotics, microelectronics, imaging, and computation. Depending on the target application, they must withstand extremes in temperature, radiation, gravity, pressure, resource constraints, and other parameters. Autonomous operation is imperative because of the vast distances that signals must travel (the one-way time delay for operating a robot on the asteroid closest to Earth that may be suitable for mining, 16 Psyche, is at least ten minutes).²⁹ Trusted (cybersecure) autonomous robotic systems will be critical for resource extraction, safety, human health, and sustainability in space environments; related technology development is benefiting Earth-based applications such as mining, surgery, supply chains, and transportation. The European Space Resources Innovation Center—a partnership of the Luxembourg Space Agency, the Luxembourg Institute of Science and Technology, and the ESA—is running an incubation program for early projects around utilizing space resources,³⁰ a salient example of how public and private entities can cooperate to drive capabilities for exploration and commercialization. All experts interviewed for this paper agreed that the quicker pace, receptiveness to risk, and sensitivity to costs and markets of commercial endeavors can benefit public-private partnerships for space exploration.

Challenges to allied space exploration

Despite the affordances of international cooperation, systems and processes can make it difficult to harness allied capabilities. Protectionist activity by the United States and its allies and partners can arise when a single government has made large investments in research and development, hindering the transfer of technologies, personnel, information (including unclassified information), and data across borders. Many of the technologies shown in Table 1 appear on lists of critical, emerging, and breakthrough technologies from the United States,³¹ European Union,³² and other public and private organizations. This complicates collaboration, as many of these technologies are dual use and under intense Chinese scrutiny/competition, and are thus subject to export regulations—in some cases, even to US allies.

A lightweight simulator version of NASA’s Resource Prospector undergoes a mobility test in a regolith bin at the agency’s Kennedy Space center in Florida. The Resource Prospector mission aims to be the first mining expedition on another world. Source: NASA/Kim Shiflett

Notably, space exploration and the technology segments in Table 1 support concentrated, high-paying jobs with strong economic impact,³³ and are therefore subject to political protection from competition, from allies, and/or between the public and private sectors. For example, the US Congress’s NASA Authorization Act of 2010 called for the reuse in the SLS of components of the Space Shuttle, with reliance on legacy suppliers, infrastructure, and personnel.³⁴ The resulting SLS is not reusable, and a single launch may cost upward of $1 billion.³⁵ In contrast, SpaceX (one of several companies developing rockets) claims that its Starship is fully reusable, has a larger payload, has much lower development costs (which have been partially funded by NASA), and—controversially—may have operational costs of less than $10 million per launch within the next few years.³⁶ Several experts interviewed for this paper suggested that a healthy sense of competition between the public and private sectors could encourage government space agencies to support ambitious timelines and budgets while upholding their commitment to safety.

Harnessing allied space capabilities will be key for constraining duplication of efforts and optimizing value creation, resource sharing, technology transfer, and costs. Over time, the hardware, software, and data from exploration missions will support off-Earth communities of increasing size, complexity, and duration in LEO, cislunar space, the Moon, Mars, asteroids, and beyond—underscoring the importance of harnessing allied capabilities in these technology areas for space exploration today.

Table 1: Allied and partner offerings in key space exploration technologies

This table includes select nations with a strong history of space- and/or Earth-related success within a specific technological segment (examples labeled “Now”) and/or have burgeoning commercial sectors worth examining (examples labeled “Next”). Note: This table is not exhaustive.

Recommendations and conclusions

Harnessing allied capabilities is crucial for future space exploration, with major potential benefits to life on Earth as well. The US government, working alongside allied and partner governments, should therefore consider the following next steps:

Recommendation #1: US government actors—including Congress, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, the State Department including its Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, and the Defense Technology Security Administration in the Office of the Secretary of Defense—should reexamine and reform Export Administration Regulations. Priority should be given to potential reforms that strengthen the United States’ position as an orchestrator of complex international collaborations and supply chains, in contrast to a paradigm of the United States as a globally dominant, unilateral player. Support from executive- and ministerial-level offices is essential.

Effects include:

Promote removal of friction in international collaborations and public-private partnerships.
Enable reciprocity in cooperation (including data transfer and potential to bid).
Balance safety with risk.
Render attractive the inclusion of US companies and government bodies in allied workflows, supply chains, and markets, particularly for businesses in emerging technologies.
Support short-term economic and security goals as well as long-term diplomatic efforts, particularly with close allies and partners.

Recommendation #2: NASA and the National Space Council should collaborate with allied space agencies, both national and international, to identify opportunities to engage in space exploration at whatever level of contribution is individually appropriate, given the state of maturity of allied sectors (see Table 1) and geopolitics. For example, allies could contribute commodities or launch locations rather than mature costly software or hardware. Attention should be paid to maturing industries to identify opportunities for early relationships and processes that will accelerate space exploration.

Effects include:

Decentralization to improve the resilience of space exploration to disruptions in funding, supply chains, politics, and unexpected but highly impactful events.
Diplomacy and inspiration of young workers.
Expansion of the community of active stakeholders in space exploration aligned with democratic values, with the United States serving as the trusted partner.

Recommendation #3: The Office of Science and Technology Policy, Office of the Secretary of Commerce, Department of Defense, and other US interagency actors should identify and support synergies between technology development for space exploration and for Earth-focused innovation in critical technologies. New multistakeholder (cross-border) grants, fellowships, seed funding, and prizes should be modeled on current international efforts like XPRIZE and the Deep Space Food Challenge. Programs such as the NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts and the ESA Open Space Innovation Platform, which incubate early-stage innovations in space exploration, should be expanded to noncitizens.

Effects include:

Risk-mitigated financial support of early and maturing technologies for space exploration.
Exchange of human capital across public/private, international, Earth/space, and industry boundaries.

Recommendation #4: Through organizations like the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, international stakeholders in space exploration—including space agencies, companies, philanthropic groups, and nongovernmental organizations—should formulate an actionable, unified multilateral space strategy that goes beyond the Artemis Accords. For example, while the Artemis Accords recognize “the global benefits of space exploration and commerce,” they do not explicitly address commercial activity, and commercial enterprises are not signatories. Action is urgently needed, as it is conceivable that extraction and exploitation of lunar resources could begin in the very short term—in the mid 2020s. An expanded space strategy must include the commercial sector.

Effects include:

Identification of pathways to create/strengthen linkages among stakeholders and eliminate choke points that render exploration vulnerable to disruption and negative outcomes.
Establishment of rule of law and crisis-mitigation strategies spanning early crewed and uncrewed exploration missions through permanent human habitation off Earth, including commercial activity.

In conclusion, just as no one could have foreseen the precise progression from the Wright brothers’ first flight to today’s rapidly exploding telecommunications and space industrial ecosystems, one cannot expect to accurately predict the progression—or the ramifications—of today’s space exploration to tomorrow’s future. Nonetheless, international collaboration is certainly key to success. Now is the time to enhance the processes, relationships, and shared vision for space exploration, thereby expanding humankind’s knowledge of the universe, improving life on Earth, and setting the stage for a reliable, routine, and prosperous space economy for all.

Generously Sponsored By

About the author

Fellow

Tiffany Vora

Nonresident Fellow

GeoTech Center

Space Space Security

Watch the launch event

Harnessing allied space capabilities

A panel of experts explores how the United States can work with its allies and partners to achieve common security, commercial, and exploration objectives in outer space.

Europe & Eurasia National Security Security Partnerships Space

1 “United States Space Priorities Framework,” White House, December 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/united-states-space-priorities-framework-_-december-1-2021.pdf.

2 “China’s Space Program: A 2021 Perspective,” State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, January 28, 2022, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2022-01/28/content_78016843.htm.

3 “Rethinking Export Controls: Unintended Consequences and the New Technological Landscape,” Commentary series on expert controls, Center for a New American Security, accessed March 23, 2023, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/rethinking-export-controls-unintended-consequences-and-the-new-technological-landscape.

4 “Our Missions,” European Space Agency, accessed February 14, 2023, https://www.esa.int/ESA/Our_Missions; and Gary Daines, “Solar System Missions,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, March 11, 2015, http://www.nasa.gov/content/solar-missions-list.

5 Timothy Haltigin et al., “Rationale and Proposed Design for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Science Program,” Astrobiology 22, no. S1, June 2022, https://doi.org/10.1089/ast.2021.0122.

6 Andrew Jones, “China Outlines Pathway for Lunar and Deep Space Exploration,” SpaceNews, November 28, 2022, https://spacenews.com/china-outlines-pathway-for-lunar-and-deep-space-exploration/.

7 Scott Vangen et al., “International Space Exploration Coordination Group Assessment of Technology Gaps for Dust Mitigation for the Global Exploration Roadmap,” in AIAA SPACE 2016 (American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics), accessed March 23, 2023, https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2016-5423.

8 Daniel L. Oltrogge and Salvatore Alfano, “The Technical Challenges of Better Space Situational Awareness and Space Traffic Management,” Journal of Space Safety Engineering 6, no. 2 (June 1, 2019): 72–79, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsse.2019.05.004.

9 “Moon to Mars Objectives: Executive Summary,” NASA, September 2022, https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/m2m-objectives-exec-summary.pdf.

10 S. Creech, J. Guidi, and D. Elburn, “Artemis: An Overview of NASA’s Activities to Return Humans to the Moon,” 2022 IEEE Aerospace Conference (AERO), Big Sky, Montana, 2022, 1–7, https://doi.org/10.1109/AERO53065.2022.9843277.

11 Steve Mackwell, Lisa May, and Rick Zucker, “The Ninth Community Workshop for Achievability and Sustainability of Human Exploration of Mars (AM IX),” hosted by Explore Mars at The George Washington University, June 2022, https://www.exploremars.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/AM-9_Upload_v-1.pdf.

12 P. Kessler et al., “Artemis Deep Space Habitation: Enabling a Sustained Human Presence on the Moon and Beyond,” 2022 IEEE Aerospace Conference, 1–12, https://doi.org/10.1109/AERO53065.2022.9843393.

13 Here, country/agency designations simplify complex agreements between public and private entities, sometimes across borders, showcasing the need for processes and relations that enable allied cooperation.

14 Canadian Space Agency, “Canada’s Role in Moon Exploration,” Canadian Space Agency, February 28, 2019, https://www.asc-csa.gc.ca/eng/astronomy/moon-exploration/canada-role.asp.

15 “Moonlight,” ESA, accessed March 9, 2023, https://www.esa.int/Applications/Telecommunications_Integrated_Applications/Moonlight.

16 Fulvia Croci, “Artemis Mission: Signed Agreement Between ASI and NASA,” ASI (blog), Italian Space Agency, June 16, 2022, https://www.asi.it/en/2022/06/artemis-mission-signed-agreement-between-asi-and-nasa/.

17 “The Artemis Accords: Principles for Cooperation in the Civil Exploration and Use of the Moon, Mars, Comets, and Asteroids,” NASA, October 13, 2020, https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/img/Artemis-Accords-signed-13Oct2020.pdf.

18 “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” United Nations, 1967, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20610/volume-610-I-8843-English.pdf.

19 See “State Exploration and Innovation,” UN Office of Outer Space Affairs, annual reports on national space activities and innovation accessed March 9, 2023, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/topics/space-exploration-and-innovation.html.

20 “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” United Nations, 2015, https://sdgs.un.org/sites/default/files/publications/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf; and “Exploring Space Technologies for Sustainable Development,” UN Conference on Trade and Development, 2021, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/dtlstict2021d1_en.pdf.

21 “Report to the President: Biomanufacturing to Advance the Bioeconomy,” US President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, December 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/PCAST_Biomanufacturing-Report_Dec2022.pdf.

22 White House, “Executive Order on Advancing Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Innovation for a Sustainable, Safe, and Secure American Bioeconomy,” White House Briefing Room, September 12, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/09/12/executive-order-on-advancing-biotechnology-and-biomanufacturing-innovation-for-a-sustainable-safe-and-secure-american-bioeconomy/; and White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, “Bold Goals for U.S. Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing: Harnessing Research and Development to Further Societal Goals,” March 2023.

23 “National Bioeconomy Strategy,” German Federal Government, July 2020, https://www.bmel.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Publications/national-bioeconomy-strategy.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2.

24 “UK Innovation Strategy: Leading the Future by Creating It,” UK Department of Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy, July 22, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-innovation-strategy-leading-the-future-by-creating-it/uk-innovation-strategy-leading-the-future-by-creating-it-accessible-webpage.

25 Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (European Commission), European Bioeconomy Policy: Stocktaking and Future Developments: Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022), https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2777/997651.

26 Narayanan Suresh and Srinivas Rao Chandan, “India Bioeconomy Report 2022,” prepared for Biotechnology Industry Research Assistance Council by Association of Biotechnology Led Enterprises, June 2022, https://birac.nic.in/webcontent/1658318307_India_Bioeconomy_Report_2022.pdf.

27 Xu Zhang et al., “The Roadmap of Bioeconomy in China,” Engineering Biology 6, no. 4 (2022): 71–81, https://doi.org/10.1049/enb2.12026.

28 Issa A. D. Nesnas, Lorraine M. Fesq, and Richard A. Volpe, “Autonomy for Space Robots: Past, Present, and Future,” Current Robotics Reports 2, no. 3 (September 1, 2021): 251–63, https://doi.org/10.1007/s43154-021-00057-2.

29 Smiriti Srivastava et al., “Analysis of Technology, Economic, and Legislation Readiness Levels of Asteroid Mining Industry: A Base for the Future Space Resource Utilization Missions,” New Space 11, no. 1 (2022): 21–31, https://doi.org/10.1089/space.2021.0025.

30 “ESRIC: Start-up Support Programme,” ESRIC: European Space Resources Innovation Centre, accessed March 9, 2023, https://www.esric.lu/about-ssp.

31 “Critical and Emerging Technologies List Update,” Fast Track Action Subcommittee on Critical and Emerging Technologies of the National Science and Technology Council, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/02-2022-Critical-and-Emerging-Technologies-List-Update.pdf.

32 European Innovation Council, “Identification of Emerging Technologies and Breakthrough Innovations,” January 2022, https://eic.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-02/EIC-Emerging-Tech-and-Breakthrough-Innov-report-2022-1502-final.pdf.

33 Yittayih Zelalem, Joshua Drucker, and Zafer Sonmez, “NASA Economic Impact Report 2021,” Nathalie P. Voorhees Center for Neighborhood and Community Improvement, University of Illinois at Chicago, October 2022, https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/nasa_fy21_economic_impact_report_full.pdf.

34 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C. 18301 (2010).

35 “The Cost of SLS and Orion,” Planetary Society, accessed March 9, 2023, https://www.planetary.org/space-policy/cost-of-sls-and-orion.

36 Kate Duffy, “Elon Musk Says He’s ‘Highly Confident’ That SpaceX’s Starship Rocket Launches Will Cost Less than $10 Million within 2-3 Years,” Business Insider, February 11, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-spacex-starship-rocket-update-flight-cost-million-2022-2.

The post Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

Nicholas Eftimiades — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 13:00:31 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

ISSUE BRIEF

Introduction

Over the last two decades, the world entered a new paradigm in the use of space, namely the introduction of highly capable small satellites, just tens or hundreds of kilograms in size. This paradigm has forever changed how countries will employ space capabilities to achieve economic, scientific, and national security interests. As is so often the case, the telltale signs of this global paradigm shift were obvious to more than just a few individuals or industries. Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate began exploring the use of small satellites in the 1990s. The Air Force also established the Operationally Responsive Space program in 2007, which explored the potential use of small satellites. However, both research efforts had no impact on the US Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) satellite acquisition programs. The advancement of small satellites was largely driven by universities and small commercial start-up companies.¹

The introduction of commercial and government small satellites has democratized space for states and even individuals. Space remote sensing and communications satellites, once the exclusive domain of the United States and Soviet Union, can now provide space-based services to anyone with a credit card. Eighty-eight countries currently operate satellites, and the next decade will likely see the launch of tens of thousands of new satellites.² Commercial and government small satellites have changed outer space into a more contested, congested, and competitive environment.

The United States has shared space data with its allies since the dawn of the space age.³ Yet it also has a history of operating independently in space. Other domains of warfare and defense policy are more closely integrated between the United States and its allies and partners. The United States has military alliances with dozens of countries and strategic partnerships with many more.⁴ In recent years, there have been calls to coordinate with, or even integrate allied space capabilities into US national security space strategy and plans. In this regard, the US government has made significant advances. However, much work needs to be done. There is pressure on the United States to act quickly to increase national security space cooperation and integration, driven by rapidly increasing global capabilities and expanding threats from hostile nations and orbital debris.

This paper examines the potential strategic benefits to US national security of harnessing allied space capabilities and the current efforts to do so, as well as barriers to achieving success. The paper identifies pathways forward for cooperating with allies and strategic partners on their emerging space capabilities and the potential of integrating US and allied capabilities.

The security environment in space

The changing security environment in space is driving the United States and allies’ collective desire to cooperate in the national security space. Several recent statements and actions demonstrate potential adversaries’ plans and intentions to dominate the space domain. China and Russia have demonstrated offensive and defensive counterspace capabilities. In 2021, the two countries announced plans to build a joint International Lunar Research Station on the moon, although the path forward on this effort may have been impacted by the Russian invasion of the Ukraine.⁵ The US Space Force notes this action would give those nations control of cislunar space, an area of balanced gravity between the Earth and moon. The movement of potential adversaries to cislunar space changes the strategic environment by forcing the United States to maintain surveillance of that region of space. In addition, Russia and China have threatened to destroy entire US orbital regimes.⁶ China has also expressed its intention to be the world’s leading space power by 2045.⁷ In 2022, Chinese researcher Ren Yuanzhen of the Beijing Institute of Tracking and Telecommunications led a People’s Liberation Army study to counter SpaceX’s Starlink small satellite constellation. Ren boasted they had developed a solution to destroy thousands of satellites in the constellation.⁸

Russian MiG-31 ‘Foxhound’ supersonic interceptor jet carrying an anti-satellite weapon during the 2018 Victory Day Parade. Source: kremlin.ru

Benefits of collaborating in space

Collaborating may be defined as coordinating development programs and operational efforts of current or projected allied and partner space and related capabilities.⁹ US interests would be to ensure these programs and operational efforts support US national security space strategy and planning objectives. Allied nations’ interests are in leveraging extensive US space capabilities and establishing collective security. The United States, allies, and partners have a shared interest in establishing behavioral norms in space. Collaboration between allies in space capabilities would have numerous benefits, including the following.

Altering the calculus for offensive actions. A hostile nation or nonstate actor risks a stronger response from multiple nations when attacking a coalition (versus a single nation). If the United States and allies had interoperable or integrated space capabilities, then an attack on any single country’s space systems would no longer be solely against the United States and would have impact on the collaborating or integrated systems of allies and partners. Changing the calculus for offensive actions could lead to increased deterrence against foreign aggression: “Partner capabilities increase both resilience and the perceived cost to an adversary, when an attack on one partner is seen as an attack on all,” according to the US Air Force.¹⁰

Accessing geostrategic locations. Access to global geographic locations also provides access for ground-based space situational awareness (SSA); telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C); and increasing launch resilience. Ground-based SSA requires globally distributed telescopes and radar systems. Allied collection systems operating in Japan, Australia, and territories of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and others ensure all partners have access to global SSA data. Given that the United States has only two major space launch facilities, natural or manmade disasters could significantly erode the US ability to provide responsive space launch. Use of allied launch facilities could lessen US reliance on limited launch sites and thus mitigate that risk.

Burden-sharing in space. Allied investments in less costly smaller satellites, along with other space technologies, would increase their security and potentially reduce the financial burden on the United States to maintain space security. There have been positive developments in this realm, including Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy, which identified several new space systems the country intends to procure.¹¹ Given Russia’s military aggression and the success of Space-X’s Starlink satellites in supporting Ukraine, the European Union (EU) recently adopted the proposal to develop the Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnection, and Security by Satellites (IRISS) constellation to provide broadband connectivity via up to 170 satellites.¹² The system, with an expected deployment date in 2025, expects to employ quantum cryptography and be available to governments, institutions, and businesses (in 2027). Canada’s Department of National Defense is developing the Redwing optical microsat to provide space domain awareness (SDA).¹³

Establishing global norms and standards. The space domain lacks adequate rules of the road to regulate the behavior of spacefaring nations. As the United States and its allies and partners coordinate and perhaps integrate national security space systems, they also are in the position to shape norms and increase pressure on potential adversaries to accept global standards for acceptable space behavior.

Crisis management in space. Several allies have expressed the need to ensure their strategic autonomy—that is, not being wholly dependent on the United States and therefore free to act in their own interests. The EU’s IRISS “system aims to enhance European strategic autonomy, digital sovereignty, and competitiveness.”¹⁴ Still, institutions such as NATO and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue offer an avenue to explore collective options for crisis management in space by establishing agreed-upon terminology, codes of conduct, and response policies and procedures for emergencies or crises in the space domain.

Resiliency in the face of conflict. While seemingly unlikely, a conflict in the space domain would result in attrition of space-based services. Yet, unlike in other domains, a stockpile of space systems does not exist. The emerging commercial small satellite market now provides an opportunity for resiliency in space systems. Interoperable or integrated use of allied and US government and commercial space capabilities would provide improved resiliency in response to accident or attack.¹⁵

China and Russia have proposed constructing a Sino-Russo International Lunar Research Sation, a joint modular project proposed to strengthen international security cooperation and the monetization of space for both nations. Source: Mil.ru

Bolstering industrial partnerships and reducing supply chain vulnerabilities. If cybersecurity standards are put in place, integrating allied manufacturing capabilities could diversify the US supply chain and reduce existing vulnerabilities. As a first step, the space-industrial supply chain must transition away from China and toward US allies and partners, who would then be able to enhance their production capabilities by contributing to interoperable or integrated space and associated systems. However, despite a long record of international procurement collaboration between the United States and its allies and partners, the outcomes of past programs have often been mixed.¹⁶

Existing efforts toward allied integration

Collaboration does not merely mean standardization and interoperability. Rather, the effort to create an overall US and allied space vision is a necessary first step in integrating allied space capabilities in order to obtain interoperability. Through various partnerships and efforts, the US Space Force has led efforts with six allies and partners to create a unified vision for national security space cooperation.

Combined space operations vision 2031

In 2022, the United States, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom signed the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) Vision 2031, which aims to “generate and improve cooperation, coordination, and interoperability opportunities to sustain freedom of action in space, optimize resources, enhance mission assurance and resilience, and prevent conflict.” This shared vision establishes a framework to guide individual and collective efforts.¹⁷

CSpO participants’ shared-objectives effort is a framework to guide individual national and collective efforts:

Develop and operate resilient, interoperable architectures to enable space mission assurance and unity of effort.
Enhance command, control, and communications capabilities and other operational linkages among CSpO participants.
Foster responsible military behaviors, discourage irresponsible behavior, and avoid escalation.
Collaborate on strategic communications efforts.
Share intelligence and information.
Professionalize space cadres and training.¹⁸

Training to fight together

Since 2018, the United States has been integrating allies and partners into space warfighting plans, most notably through Operation Olympic Defender, a US effort to synchronize with spacefaring nations to deter hostile acts in space. The annual Schriever Wargame—designed to explore critical space issues and advance space support across domains—also allows select allies and partners to coordinate defense-related space activities with the United States. In August 2022, US Space Command conducted its Global Sentinel exercise, which serves as US Space Command’s premier security cooperation effort, with twenty-five participating countries. Over a one-week period, this series simulated scenarios focused on enhancing international partnerships, understanding procedures and capabilities, and integrating global SSA. These scenarios further allow participants to understand allies’ and partners’ capabilities and operating procedures, serving as a foundation for future collaboration.¹⁹

Multinational and joint military space operators stand for a photo in the Combined Space Operations Center after the safe return of NASA’s Commercial Crew Program Demonstration Mission 2. Source: US Air Force

To date, the joint training efforts between the United States and its allies have been limited to tabletop exercises, thereby restricting participants’ experience in real-world applications of offensive and defensive counterspace measures. Tabletop exercises do not test capabilities or demonstrate how well an ally or partner might perform in crises or conflict scenarios. Space capabilities are integrated into major military exercises conducted with allies but do not address offensive or defensive counterspace measures.²⁰

Challenges and barriers to integration

While the United States recognizes the value of working with allies and partners in the space domain, myriad hurdles stand in the way to fully realize the competitive advantage space alliances and partnerships offer.

In total, US allies could bring a significant fraction of US capabilities. A systemic problem is how to leverage those capabilities in a coherent way. Limited coordination limits the values of those allied capabilities. Those capabilities are only additive to United States if there is good integration and understanding on how they will have a contributing effect.²¹

Lack of strategy to execute the vision for space. While a shared vision exists among the defense establishments of select allies and partners, there is little in the way of strategy or planning to fully realize that vision. Perhaps the greatest problem with the US approach to working with its allies and partners in space is that there is no coherent strategy for integrating allied space capabilities. Several subject matter experts interviewed for this study noted US public statements around the value of and desire to integrate allies, yet no interviewee was able to identify an existing strategy or plan to do so at any level of US government.

Bureaucratic impediments. Collaborating with allies is far easier than integrating multinational space capabilities. Allied integration must be done through a national-level strategy, integrating what, to date, are largely disconnected efforts between the National Space Council, National Security Council, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, US Space Command, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Department of State. While each organization is credited with making strides in integrating allies (with varying degrees of success), the efforts are disjointed and lack connectivity and unified goals and strategy.²²

Mind the gap. Allies and partners are attempting to understand existing gaps in the US national security space architecture and the capabilities they could provide to fill those gaps. Ironically, the CSpO Vision 2031 states that allies will collaborate “through identification of gaps and collaborative opportunities.” With the onus almost exclusively placed on the ally or partner, interviewees noted nations’ repeated requests to the United States to identify capability gaps in its projected architectures. The lack of information is due to the sensitivity of US defense gaps, with classified information making it more feasible for allies and partners to provide add-on capabilities rather than fully integrating assets.

Some level of gap analysis should be done by the United States to identify the niche areas that allies and partners could fill in the national security space architecture. That analysis should cover a period of at least five to ten years, thereby allowing allies to budget, develop, and deploy capabilities. Identifying capability gaps as requested by allies would ensure a future interoperable or integrated architecture. Primary focus areas should include space situational awareness, on-orbit servicing, communications, positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT), and cybersecurity. Each of these areas are baseline capabilities that should be interoperable or integrated between the United States and its allies and partners.²³

Classification issues. There exists a widespread belief that the United States’ overclassification of intelligence is hindering US and allied space security. This issue has been publicly acknowledged by several senior US military leaders. Misclassification might be a better word to describe the problem. In addition, the US system for sharing intelligence is cumbersome, requiring an exception to the normal production processes to share intelligence with allies. Experts (including myself) note cases where sharing space-related intelligence with allies was difficult due solely to organizational culture, established processes, poorly administered policies, and other bureaucratic impediments.²⁴

The H-IIA rocket lifts off from the Tanegashima Space Center in Japan. The H-IIA has been supporting satellite launch missions as a major large-scale launch vehicle with high reliability. Source: NASA

Many of these classification-related problems have existed for decades—and the United States should not wait to figure out how to share information until its hand is forced by a crisis or war. There is an inability to share information, particularly information that can be integrated into a kill chain for weapon systems. The United States has integrated information-sharing systems in other warfighting environments, but as of yet, not in space. This lack of imagination even spreads down to the US combatant commands (COCOMs): allied integration would be enhanced if US COCOMs had joined with allied space personnel providing integrated PNT and communications.²⁵ Moreover, the US Space Force could deploy space attachés to select embassies, perhaps under the Office of Defense Cooperation, to further embed space security interests across the globe. ²⁶

Communications and data integration. After spending hundreds of millions of dollars to build the Joint Mission System to track satellites and space debris, the US Department of Defense still has no automated means to seamlessly integrate SSA data provided by allies into the US space surveillance system. One particularly high-level interview with a close ally called out the biggest issue as being communications, noting that it is impossible to discuss interoperable deterrence until this issue is addressed.²⁷

Fifteen NATO members recently signed a memorandum of understanding to launch a Space Center of Excellence in Toulouse, France. This body could provide a mechanism for data integration and operational coordination. The Toulouse center is in addition to the already operating NATO Space Centre at Allied Air Command in Ramstein, Germany, which serves as a single point for the requests and production of NATO space products.²⁸ As of February 2023, the US and Canadian governments are not founding members of the Toulouse Space Center effort.

Case study: US-Japanese space integration

While allied integration has seen success across other warfighting domains, the same cannot be said for the space domain.²⁹ Space collaboration with Japan is illustrative of the challenges in integrating efforts.

Overclassification of information related to US programs and operation capabilities makes allied integration even more difficult. For example, France and Japan have publicly stated their intentions to build geo satellites for space domain awareness. Currently, a strategy to coordinate those systems with the operating US geosynchronous space situational awareness program (GSSAP) does not exist, demonstrating a lack of plans for data sharing, burden sharing, or coordination of mission operations.³⁰ However, Japan and the United States have agreed that space domain awareness data will be shared between the Japan Air-Self Defense Force and US Space Command starting in federal year 2023.

In 2022, the government of Japan approached the United States about its interest in playing a role in the Space Development Agency’s “Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture,”³¹ as Japan intends to launch a similar constellation of satellites for missile defense purposes. However, the United States has been unresponsive to Japan on how it could achieve integration. This is partly because the United States maintains concerns about Japan’s level of information security, despite Japan’s commitment to “strengthen and reinforce information security practices and infrastructure.”³² Yet, Japan has the world’s third largest defense budget and is a spacefaring nation with launch infrastructure, years of experience, and advanced satellite manufacturing capabilities. In addition, Japan faces increasing threats from China and North Korea, providing incentive to expand its security relationship with the United States.³³ In 2010, the United States came to agreement with Japan to integrate SSA sensors into the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) PNT system.³⁴ However, to date, there is no plan on how to integrate the data.³⁵

Overclassification of US intelligence is hindering cooperation with allies and partners. Two controllers work in the Global Strategic Warning and Space Surveillance System Center. Source: US Air Force

Policy recommendations

There are several key actions the United States can take to integrate allies and partners into national security space efforts.

Recommendation #1: The US Space Force should conduct a gap analysis to guide allied investments into space capabilities, prioritizing capabilities such as SSA, on-orbit servicing, communications, PNT, and cybersecurity. This gap analysis should identify in which areas the United States wants to collaborate with allies, identify opportunities for interoperability, and which areas are open to integration of capabilities.

Recommendation #2: It would benefit the US Space Force to have an outside entity analyze its internal policies, procedures, bureaucratic obstacles, and human capital levels to determine why the effort to integrate allies has been so minimally effective.

Recommendation #3: The US National Space Council should lead an interagency working group to develop a US government integrated strategy that establishes goals for and metrics to assess US and allied space capabilities and integration efforts.

Recommendation #4: The US Department of Defense and Office of the Director of National Intelligence should form a working group to establish best practices for sharing classified information with allies.

Recommendation #5: US Space Command should develop real-world exercises with allies and partners to test SDA, electronic warfare, and space control capabilities—all of which will be critical to deterring and, if necessary, responding to future space conflicts.

Recommendation #6: The US Departments of Defense and State should work toward consistency of approach in terms of governance of space activities, including through establishment of multilateral engagement and national regulations to allow flexibility and transportability of launch access at short notice.

Recommendation #7: The National Security Council should lead an interagency effort to establish consistency of national regulations between allies and partners (comparable laws and/or standards) so that systems and operations are transferable and receive mutual recognition and acceptance.

Conclusion

The United States and its allies and partners are moving toward sharing SSA data, understanding each other’s policies and procedures, and collaborating on space operations. Still, much work needs to be done to expand collaboration and achieve interoperability (if desired) between rising space powers. Without a strong indication from the US government of what exactly it wants from its allies and partners—as well as what it is prepared to give in return—the United States will not be able to effectively harness the competitive advantages offered by allied space capabilities. It is incumbent on the United States and its allies to immediately embark on a way forward to jointly ensure a safe and secure environment in space. Failure to change current practices and act in a timely fashion will lead to increased space threats and diminished national and economic security.

Generously Sponsored By

About the author

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

Watch the launch event

Harnessing allied space capabilities

A panel of experts explores how the United States can work with its allies and partners to achieve common security, commercial, and exploration objectives in outer space.

Europe & Eurasia National Security Security Partnerships Space

1 The pioneer in small-satellite design and production at this time was Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. (SSTL) of Surrey University, United Kingdom.

2 Nicholas Eftimiades, “Small Satellites: The Implications for National Security,” Atlantic Council, May 5, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/small-satellites-the-implications-for-national-security/.

3 Examples include remote sensing and the global positioning system (GPS).

4 Claudette Roulo, “Alliances vs. Partnerships,” US Department of Defense, March 22, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/story/Article/1684641/alliances-vs-partnerships/.

5 “International Lunar Research Station Guide for Partnership”, Vol. 1.0, June 2021, http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6812150/content.html ; Andrew Jones, “China Seeks New Partners for Lunar and Deep Space Exploration,” Space News, September 8, 2022, https://spacenews.com/china-seeks-new-partners-for-lunar-and-deep-space-exploration/; and “International Lunar Research Station Guide for Partnership,” China National Space Administration, Vol. 1.0, June 2021, http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6812150/content.html.

6 Matthew Mowthorpe, “Space Resilience and the Importance of Multiple Orbits, The Space Review, January 3, 2023, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4504/1.

7 Ma Chi, “China Aims to Be World-leading Space Power by 2045,” China Daily (state-owned daily), November 17, 2017, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-11/17/content_34653486.htm.

8 Stephen Chen, “China Military Must Be Able to Destroy Elon Musk’s Starlink Satellites if hey Threaten National Security: Scientists,” South China Morning Post, May 25, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3178939/china-military-needs-defence-against-potential-starlink-threat.

9 Note that related capabilities could include software, sensors, SSA systems, ground stations, etc.

10 Curtis E. Lemay Center for Counterspace Operations, “Counterspace Operations,” US Air Force, Last Updated, January 25, 2021 https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-14/3-14-D05-SPACE-Counterspace-Ops.pdf.

11 National Security Strategy of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Provisional Translation, December 2022, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf.

12 Andrew Jones, “European Union to Build Its Own Satellite-internet Constellation,” Space.com, Future Publishing, March 1, 2023, https://www.space.com/european-union-satellite-internet-constellation-iriss.

13 David Pugliese, “Canadian Military Orders Space Surveillance Micro Satellite,” Space News, March 10, 2023.

14 “Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnection and Security by Satellites (IRISS) Constellation,” European Parliament (video), in Jones, “European Union to Build Its Own Satellite-internet Constellation,” Space.com, segment between 47 seconds and 55 seconds, https://cdn.jwplayer.com/previews/hMtl8Ak7.

15 B. Bragg, ed., “Allied/Commercial Capabilities to Enhance Resilience,” NSI Inc., December 2017, https://nsiteam.com/leveraging-allied-and-commercial-capabilities-to-enhance-resilience/.

16 A successful example of coordinated global defense production includes the F-35, which is produced by over 1,900 companies based in the United States and ten additional nations. See “A Trusted Partner to Europe: F-35 Global Partnership,” Lockheed Martin (video), https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/who-we-are/international/european-impact.html.

17 Theresa Hitchens, “US, Close Allies Sign ‘Call to Action’ in Space Defense,” Breaking Defense, February 22, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/02/us-close-allies-sign-call-to-action-in-space-defense/.

18 US Department of Defense, “Combined Space Operations Vision 2031,” February 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/22/2002942522/-1/-1/0/CSPO-VISION-2031.PDF.

19 “25 Nations Participate in Global Sentinel 22,” US Space Command, August 3, 2022, https://www.spacecom.mil/Newsroom/News/Article-Display/Article/3115832/25-nations-participate-in-global-sentinel-22.

20 For example, such military exercises include Balikatan, Cobra Gold, Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), Northern Edge, Saber Strike, and Talisman Sabre.

21 Off-the-record online interview by the author with a close US ally, November 30, 2022.

22 Interviewees noted difficulties in the US internal coordination efforts between the US Space Force’s conduct of international relations, US Department of Defense acquisition, and national and defense policy formulation.

23 Note that on-orbit servicing is not a baseline capability, but should eventually become one.

24 The author travelled with then-Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, who was pursuing establishment of an intelligence exchange with a foreign country; the effort had limited success because the ODNI was unable to get analysts to release data. Notably, intelligence community information systems use “No Foreign Dissemination” as a default setting in the production of intelligence products; foreign disclosure of intelligence requires additional effort. It also should be noted that interviews conducted for this study with US and allied officials did not uncover any instances where space or related systems (or a national interest) were damaged due to overclassification of space intelligence.

25 This is the case at US INDOPACOM. See “Space Force Presents Forces to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command,” Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, US Air Force (website), November 23, 2022, https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article/3227481/space-force-presents-forces-to-us-indo-pacific-command/.

26 Space Force already deploys a few liaison officers globally.

27 Off-the-record online interview by the author with a close US ally, December 5, 2022.

28 NATO, “NATO’s Approach to Space,” last updated February 16, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_175419.htm.

29 An example of integrated international military operations would be the NATO International Security Armed Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan. At its height, ISAF was more than 130,000 strong, with troops from fifty-one NATO and partner nations.

30 GSAP is a US geosynchronous space surveillance system, which operates like a space-based SSA system.

31 “The Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture” is a layered network of military satellites and supporting elements; the architecture was formerly known as the “National Defense Space Architecture.”

32 “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (‘2+2’),” Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100284739.pdf.

33 John Hill (deputy assistant secretary for space and missile defense, US Department of Defense), telephone interview with the author, January 2023.

34 QZSS operates at the same frequency and same timing as GPS. This service can be used in an integrated way with GPS for highly precise positioning. The additional US sensor is unknown.

35 Paul McLeary and Theresa Hitchens, “US, Japan to Ink Hosted Payload Pact to Monitor Sats,” Breaking Defense, August 5, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/08/us-japan-to-ink-hosted-payload-pact-to-monitor-sats/.

The post Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The NewSpace market: Capital, control, and commercialization

Robert Murray — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 13:00:07 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

ISSUE BRIEF

Commercial opportunities in space-based technologies are expanding rapidly. From satellite communications and Earth observation to space tourism and asteroid mining, the potential for businesses to capitalize on these emerging technologies is vast and known as “NewSpace.”¹

The NewSpace model is important for governments to understand because the dual-use nature of space, specifically its growing commercialization, will influence the types of space-based technologies that nations may leverage, and consequently, impact their national security paradigms. By capitalizing on the private sector’s agility and combining it with the essential research efforts and customer role played by the public sector, the NewSpace industry can play a critical function in addressing current and future national security challenges through public-private codevelopment.

As the NewSpace industry expands, the role of government is evolving from being the primary developer and operator of space assets to facilitating their commercialization, while still prioritizing key advancements. US and allied governments can capitalize on this competitive landscape by strategically investing in areas that align with their national security objectives. However, it is crucial for them to first understand and adapt to their changing roles within this dynamic environment.

Indeed, the benefits of the burgeoning NewSpace industry extend beyond the United States. International collaboration and competition in this area can lead to faster technological advancements and economic gains. The global NewSpace landscape is driving down costs, increasing access to space, and fostering innovation that can improve not only economic well-being, but also impact national security models.

To that end, this memo will examine the broad state of the space market, discuss the industry drivers, and propose recommendations for US and allied policymakers as they consider future government investments in those enabling space-based activities that support wider national security ambitions.

The commercial context

In recent years, the space industry has undergone significant commercialization (NewSpace) in which governments have partnered with private companies and invested more into the commercial space sector. NewSpace companies often carry many of the following characteristics.²

Figure 1: Characteristics of NewSpace Companies

NewSpace contrasts with the historical approach to space-based technologies, which typically involved a focus on standardization to ensure the reliability and quality of space components. This standardization was (and still is) essential for the safety of manned space flight, the longevity of systems, and the overall success of missions. Despite the increased collaboration between the public and private sectors, the failed January 2023 Virgin Galactic launch in the United Kingdom, the failed March 2023 Mitsubishi H3 launch in Japan, and the failed June 2022 Astra launch in the United States serve as clear reminders of the challenges associated with NewSpace technology.³

Today, when considering who is spending what on space-based technology research, US and allied governments can be viewed more as customers than as creators. This is in stark contrast to former US President John F. Kennedy’s famous 1962 speech launching the Apollo program, which put NASA at the forefront of driving the necessary technology and engineering needs.⁴ Indeed, the capital flows of research and development (R&D) from the US government relative to the private sector have shifted significantly since the era of Sputnik (1957), a pattern that also is evident across many allied nations (see Figure 2).⁵

Figure 2: Ratio of US R&D to gross domestic product, by source of funds for R&D (1953-2021)

For US space technology, this financial shift from public sector to private sector is arguably no surprise given the findings of a 2004 presidential commission on US space exploration, which recommended that:

NASA recognize and implement a far larger presence of private industry in space operations with the specific goal of allowing private industry to assume the primary role of providing services to NASA. NASA’s role must be limited to only those areas where there is irrefutable demonstration that government can perform the proposed activity.⁶

As a result of the commission’s findings, Congress created the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services Program, which sought to create new incentives to support the privatization of both upstream and downstream space activities.⁷ In short, the aim of this legislation was to create market forces that would enhance innovation while driving down costs through competition.

To do this, a new approach was developed to shape the relationship between NASA and its private contractors. Instead of being a supervisor, NASA became a partner and customer of these companies. This shift was reflected in the change of contract type, replacing cost-plus procurement with fixed-price payments for generic capabilities such as cargo delivery, disposal, or return, and crew transportation to low-Earth orbit (LEO).⁸ As a result, the risk was transferred from NASA to private firms, leading to less intensive government monitoring of cost-plus contracts and more encouragement of innovation.

Ripple effects

In recent years, the European Space Agency (ESA) has also prioritized commercialization activities. This, too, was an outcome of political and economic pressure to rethink European space policy to provide products and services for consumers, with a specific focus on downstream space activities. This policy shift toward greater commercialization was driven, in part, by those structural changes (i.e., competition) emerging from the United States (NASA).⁹

Likewise, in India—following a 2020 change in Indian space policy—private firms are no longer only suppliers to the government, but the government is now supporting and investing in them, similar to the NASA model.¹⁰ These and other shifts in public policy have shaped much of the market we have today.¹¹

However, this market arguably represents a challenge to government control over NewSpace firms and their technologies. NewSpace companies operate with more agility and flexibility than traditional government-led programs.¹² This rapid pace of innovation and commercial competition can make it difficult for governments to keep up with regulatory frameworks and oversight. Additionally, the increasing role of the private sector in space activities is arguably leading to a diffusion of state control, making it more challenging for governments to ensure the responsible use of space and manage potential security risks associated with dual-use technologies. Therefore, governments should look to partner, co-develop, and invest in NewSpace firms as alternative ways to influence the sector. Such an approach carries impacts not only on public-sector capital flows but also on national security paradigms.

This image from April 24, 2021, shows the SpaceX Crew Dragon Endeavour as it approached the International Space Station less than one day after launching from Kennedy Space Center in Florida. Source: NASA

The global space market

The space industry is a rapidly growing market that can bring about both commercial and national security benefits: the total sector was valued at $464 billion in 2022 and is expected to reach around $1.1 trillion by 2040, with a projected compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of around 7 percent.¹³ Of today’s total market, the commercial sector accounts for around 75 percent.¹⁴ To put this in perspective, the 2021 global aerospace industry saw the top ten earning companies generate a combined revenue of $417.15 billion.¹⁵ Breaking this down further, the United States is currently the largest market for both public and private space activity, holding a 32 percent market share, while Europe and the United Kingdom hold a combined 23 percent.¹⁶

However, Asia has experienced the most significant growth in this market over the last five years and now holds 25 percent of the market share.¹⁷ In terms of satellite launches, China has been the most active country in the region, with a total of sixty-four launches in 2022, placing it behind only the United States, which launched 87 times that year.¹⁸ Trailing China is India, which deployed over fifty satellites across four separate launches in 2022.¹⁹

In China and India alike, commercial firms are supported by both government R&D and public programs designed for national needs (including requisite contracts), as well as mature commercial markets that demand advanced satellite systems. What this translates to is an upstream market that relies on government funding to thrive, while the downstream market is more evenly distributed and does not require significant upfront investment or government contracts to sustain itself. This downstream market is currently driven by NewSpace demand for connectivity and location-based services, and its growth is influenced by demographic and regional economic trends, as well as government efforts to close the digital divide as governments finance satellite connectivity.²⁰

Challenges to and opportunities for NewSpace industry growth

The key challenges to NewSpace industry growth are the regulatory landscape and access to financing. This is evidenced by the European NewSpace ecosystem where, at a structural level, regulatory frameworks do not facilitate the scaling of the financial resources (public and/or private) necessary to match the political and commercial intent (demand) espoused by European political and business leaders. This mismatch between demand and financial firepower results in slower development and uptake of NewSpace opportunities despite significant engineering and entrepreneurial talent residing within Europe.²¹ Figure 3 shows the breakdown of global government investment in space technologies between 2020 and 2022 in real terms, and figure 4 shows how such expenditure relates to GDP, while figure 5 shows the global private sector space investment breakdown, which highlights a significant role for venture capital (VC) firms.²²

Noting that the United States accounts for almost half of the world’s available VC funds, while Europe only accounts for around 13 percent, it is evident that the sheer scale of investment from the United States enables NewSpace to flourish within the US market, while many allies and partners struggle to access private funding.²³ For Europe to embrace the NewSpace model, conditions must foster timely connections between both public and private finance and NewSpace opportunities.²⁴ That said, given the deep technology nature of NewSpace, and the long time horizons for venture capitalists to see a return, financing this sector writ large remains a challenge.

Figure 3: Government expenditure on space programs in 2020 and 2022, by major country (in billions of dollars)

Figure 4: Government space budget allocations for selected countries and economies (measured as a share of GDP in 2020)

Figure 5: Value of investments in space ventures worldwide from 2000 to 2021, by type (in billion U.S. dollars)

In addition to attracting financing, the business models of NewSpace companies rely on foundational technologies—often resourced by governments—to be in place. Such technologies include: access to low-cost launch capabilities; conditions for in-space manufacturing and resource extraction for space-based production; foundational research to support space-based energy collection, combined with reliable radiation shielding; and debris mitigation efforts in an increasingly busy orbital environment. This indicates that there is a persistent role for governments to actively invest in deep technologies to help foster the commercial markets that NewSpace can bring about. Only governments have the financial risk tolerance (a tolerance that takes one beyond risk and into uncertainty) to undertake such endeavors.

While each of these foundational technologies has limited profitability, together they form a self-sustaining system with enormous potential for profit when subsequently exploited through relatively cheap NewSpace technologies. Indeed, the economics of human space activities often mean that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. To that end, one might envisage how a potential self-reinforcing development cycle would support the space economy, with cheaper and more frequent rocket launches enabling short-term tourism and industrial and scientific experimentation, leading to demand for commercial space habitats, which would then create demand for resources in space. However, it is doubtful that this path will be easily achieved without government support.²⁵

In addition to traditional space-based areas of monitoring, observation, and communications, the sectors listed below offer further commercial opportunities NewSpace is likely to exploit.²⁶

Figure 6: Commercial opportunities for NewSpace companies

Allied advancements in NewSpace

While the above table represents a broad perspective, many US allies and partners are already at the leading edge of aggregating NewSpace technologies to take advantage of growing markets.

In Denmark, the government and private commercial actors are working on project BIFROST, with plans to launch in early 2024. BIFROST is a satellite-based system for advanced on-orbit image and signal analysis that aims to demonstrate artificial intelligence-based surveillance from space. The satellite will have versatile payloads on board to provide information on applied AI in space for Earth-observation missions—detecting ships, oil spills, and more. The main purpose of the mission is to establish: “a platform in space for gaining further experience in AI-based surveillance and sensor fusion using multiple on-board sensors. The satellite will also test means of communication between different satellites to achieve real-time access to intelligence data and demonstrate the feasibility of tactical Earth observation.”²⁷ Additionally, the mission will evaluate the capability of changing AI models during its lifespan to improve the surveillance system.²⁸

In Sweden and Germany, OHB (a German-based European technology company) is working with Swiss start-up ClearSpace SA for its space debris removal mission, ClearSpace-1. OHB will provide the propulsion subsystem and be responsible for the complete satellite assembly, integration, and testing. The mission is aimed at demonstrating the ability to remove space debris and establishing a new market for future in-orbit servicing. The mission will target a small satellite-sized object in space and be launched in 2025. Carrying a capture system payload—“Space Robot,” developed by the ESA and European industry—it will use AI to autonomously assess the target and match its motion, with capture taking place through robotic arms under ESA supervision. After capture, the combined object will be safely deorbited, reentering the atmosphere at the optimum angle to burn up.²⁹

In Belgium, entities such as Interuniversity Microelectronics Centre, aka imec, are at the leading edge of developing nanotechnology that is being commercialized for space. Imec’s Lens Free Imaging system is a new type of microscopic system that is not dependent on traditional optical technologies and fragile mechanical parts. Instead, it operates through the principle of digital holography, which allows images to be reconstructed afterward in software at any focal depth. This eliminates the need for mechanical focusing and the stage drift that occurs during time-lapse image acquisition, making it a more robust and compact system suitable for use in space.³⁰ Imec is also perfecting manufacturing in space leveraging microgravity, which minimizes “gravitational forces and enables the production of goods that either could not be produced on Earth or that can be made with superior quality. This is particularly relevant for applications such as drug compound production; target receptor discovery; the growth of larger, higher-quality crystals in solution; and the fabrication of silicon wafers or retinal implants using a layer-by-layer deposition processes,”³¹ all of which are enhanced in microgravity.

The SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket carrying the Dragon capsule lifts off from Launch Complex 39A at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Florida on July 14, 2022. Source: SpaceX

In the United Kingdom, collaboration between the agricultural and space sectors seeks to enhance societal resilience through more efficient and self-sustaining crop production. Research entities such as the Lincoln Institute for Agri-Food Technology is commercializing technologies on LEO satellites to improve the spatial positioning of robots in agriculture to enhance their precision weeding, nutrient deployment, and high-resolution soil sampling capabilities.³² Furthermore, UK start-ups such as Horizon Technologies have developed novel ways of creating signals intelligence focusing on specific parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, allowing the company to leverage meta data for both commercial and government clients. An important component to Horizon’s success is the reduction in productions costs combined with accessibility to space launches.

Across Europe, the ESA is conducting R&D to harness the sun’s solar power in space and distribute that energy to Earth. Under Project Solaris, space-based solar power is harvested sunlight from solar-power satellites in geostationary orbit, which is then converted into microwaves, and beamed down to Earth to generate electricity. For this to be successful, the satellites would need to be large (around several kilometers), and Earth-surface rectennas³³ would also need to be on a similar scale. Achieving such a feat would enhance Earth’s energy resilience, but would first require advancements in in-space manufacturing, photovoltaics, electronics, and beam forming.³⁴

The United States also partners with allied firms on foundational research to support upstream and downstream NewSpace technologies. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Space-Based Adaptive Communications Node (BACN) is a laser-enabled military internet that will orbit Earth. The Space-BACN will create a network that piggybacks on multiple private and public satellites that would have been launched regardless, using laser transceivers that are able to communicate with counterparts within 5,000 km. The satellite network will be able to offer high data rates and automatic rerouting of a message if a node is disabled, and it will be almost impossible to intercept transmissions. DARPA is working with Mynaric, a German firm, which designs heads for Space-BACN, and MBryonics, an Irish contractor, which uses electronic signals to alter light’s phase, with the aim of having a working prototype in space in 2025.³⁵

While US allies and partners offer a plethora of specific space-based commercial opportunities, the criteria for successful development remains constant: the combination of multiple technologies, reduction in production and maintenance costs, and safe access to operate in space. With that in mind, the US government can play two roles to help further expand this market:

Act as a reliable, adroit customer who can issue contracts quickly (noting that many NewSpace firms do not carry large amounts of working capital and therefore cannot wait months for contractual confirmation).
Continue to invest in deep technologies and develop those foundational upstream building blocks that NewSpace will seek to leverage.

Notably, however, some US executives are deliberately registering firms in allied jurisdictions and conducting all research and patenting there, too, to avoid the bureaucratic challenges of dealing with US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and, specifically, the tight controls associated with exporting NewSpace dual-use products for commercial use. This suggests two things: The first is that, while allies may lack financial firepower, they have jurisdictional strengths that can attract NewSpace firms to their shores; and the second is that US ITAR controls impacting dual-use technologies need to be updated to enable NewSpace firms to thrive. If such companies are blocked from selling to allied and partner markets, then the very model of dual-use becomes diminished and governments will be unable to benefit from the competition and iterative technology development that spill over from such commercial settings into the public sector. As Figure 2 shows, the US government does not currently invest enough in technologies relative to the private sector to enable such a stringent export controls program in the context of NewSpace. The two policies are incongruous: limited government R&D spending and excessive export controls.

Recommendations for US and allied policymakers

Taking all the above into account, US and allied policymakers should focus on enhancing regulations and financial resources. Governments need to continue to create the conditions for the NewSpace market to prosper by playing the roles of a nimble customer and deep technology investor, enabling NewSpace companies to quickly access government contracts, while also helping mature next-generation space-based technologies. This helps such companies grow, become competitive, and enhance the sector. Specifically, US and allied governments should consider the following.

Recommendation #1: US and allied governments must continue to provide a stable and progressive regulatory environment for the NewSpace industry. This includes providing a clear and predictable legal framework for commercial space activities, as well as ensuring that regulations are flexible and adaptable to the rapidly changing technology and business models of the industry. ITAR is one area that needs urgent reform, given the dual-use nature of many new space technologies. This problem is exemplified by US talent establishing next-generation space companies in Europe to avoid overly controlling and outdated ITAR constraints, according to interviews with industry participants.³⁶ Given the cross-cutting nature of ITAR, the US National Security Council should examine ITAR rules and their utility for dual-use technologies impacting NewSpace, assessing such rules from a holistic perspective covering defense, trade, and economics.

Recommendation #2: US and allied governments should maximize coinvestment with industry in R&D to support the codevelopment of new technologies and capabilities for both the public and private sectors. This includes funding for research into new propulsion systems, as well as materials and nanotechnologies that will enable more cost-effective and reliable access to space. To support such funding—and noting the challenge of private investment finding its way to allied entrepreneurs and engineers—the US government should consider establishing with allies and partners a new multilateral lending institution (MLI) focused on space technology to provide funding and other forms of support to companies in the commercial space industry. The MLI or “space bank” could provide loans, grants, loan guarantees, insurance, and other forms of financial assistance to companies engaged in commercial space activities, helping to mitigate the high costs and risks associated with space ventures. This could be modeled after any of the MLIs of which the United States is already a member.³⁷

Recommendation #3: Furthermore, the US government could provide tax credits and grants to NewSpace firms (US and allied) based on certain provisions that support wider government objectives—such as manufacturing locations, supply network participants, and expected labor market impacts.

Any such credits and grants should be complemented by leveraging a suitable financial vehicle to conduct direct investment to take equity in NewSpace firms both at home and abroad. Crucially, this should be conducted without the government owning any of the intellectual property, as this impacts export opportunities and thus undermines the dual-use model. Such an effort would go some way in minimizing the socialization of risk and the privatization of rewards, and could be a role for either In-Q-Tel and/or the Department of Defense’s new Office of Strategic Capital.³⁸

Recommendation #4: To further support such an approach, the US government might create a national space co-R&D center of excellence for government and industry to work hand in glove to drive the codevelopment of breakthrough technologies, taking inspiration from a conceptually similar UK model of designing government contracts to address specific problems and awarding them to capable small companies.³⁹

An increasing number of nations are launching an increasing number of space missions. United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket carries Cygnus cargo vessel OA-6 for commercial resupply services supporting the International Space Station. Credit: United States Air Force Flickr

Conclusion

NewSpace is making significant strides in developing cost-effective and innovative technologies for both public- and private-sector customers. This is important because it drives economic growth and can enhance national security through the delivery of new, cost-effective, and resilient technologies. Indeed, the NewSpace market is unquestionably growing, and governments, including the United States and its allies, have a critical role to play in shaping this market by acting as both customers and codevelopers with NewSpace firms. Such an approach allows governments to exert a degree of influence in the sector without constraining its creativity. However, this way of working may carry wider implications for national security paradigms in terms of dual-use technologies and public/private partnerships.

While use cases for NewSpace are almost limitless, multiple US allies and partners are already forging niche NewSpace areas of excellence that can bring about a degree of comparative advantage. To make best use of such opportunities, the United States should:

Keep its market as open as possible to encourage competition and thus drive innovation.
Provide specific programs and locations for codevelopment between allied academia, government, and industry without taking any intellectual property.
Act as a nimble customer.
Ensure there is a pragmatic balance between regulations that protect US space interests (i.e., ITAR) and those that unleash innovative dual-use endeavors.
Create new financial instruments with allies through an MLI bank to support the financial investment needed to help the private sector commercialize the next generation of breakthrough space-based technologies.

Generously Sponsored By

About the author

Robert Murray
Senior Lecturer and Director, Master of Science in Global Innovation and Leadership Program, Johns Hopkins University

Watch the launch event

Harnessing allied space capabilities

A panel of experts explores how the United States can work with its allies and partners to achieve common security, commercial, and exploration objectives in outer space.

Europe & Eurasia National Security Security Partnerships Space

1 Ken Davidian, “Definition of NewSpace,” New Space: The Journal of Space Entrepreneurship and Innovation 8, no. 2 (2020), https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/space.2020.29027.kda.

2 Roger Handberg, “Building the New Economy: ‘NewSpace’ and State Spaceports,” Technology in Society 39 (2014): 117–128, https://www-sciencedirect-com.iclibezp1.cc.ic.ac.uk/science/article/pii/S0160791X14000505.

3 Peggy Hollinger, “Virgin Orbit Pledges to Return for New UK Satellite Launch,” Financial Times, January 12, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/250b6742-a0a6-4a96-bca6-d7a61883a975; Tariq Malik, “Astra Rocket Suffers Major Failure during Launch, 2 NASA Satellites Lost,” Space.com, June 12, 2022, https://www.space.com/astra-rocket-launch-failure-nasa-hurricane-satellites-lost; “Mitsubishi/Rockets: Launch Failure Points to Drain on Resources,” Financial Times, March 7, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/30386ff6-eaea-442d-b285-82c19dbb1b19.

4 President John F. Kennedy, “Address at Rice University on the Nation’s Space Effort,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, September 12, 1962, https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/historic-speeches/address-at-rice-university-on-the-nations-space-effort.

5 Gary Anderson, John Jankowski, and Mark Boroush, “U.S. R&D Increased by $51 Billion in 2020 to $717 Billion; Estimate for 2021 Indicates Further Increase to $792 billion,” National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, January 4, 2023, https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf23320 and https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/eda—defence-data-2021—web—final.pdf

6 A Journey to Inspire, Innovate, and Discover, Report of the President’s Commission on the Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy, June 2004, https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/60736main_M2M_report_small.pdf.

7 The upstream market can be thought of as: satellite manufacturing; launch capabilities; and ground control stations. The downstream market can be thought of as: space-based operations and services provided, such as satellites and sensors.

8 Matthew Weinzierl, “Space, the Final Economic Frontier,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 32, no. 2 (Spring 2018): 173–192, https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.32.2.173.

9 Douglas K. R. Robinson and Mariana Mazzucato, “The Evolution of Mission-oriented Policies: Exploring Changing Market Creating Policies in the US and European Space Sector,” Research Policy 48, no. 4 (2019): 936-948, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2018.10.005.

10 “Indian Startups Join the Space Race,” Economist, November 24 2022, https://www.economist.com/business/2022/11/24/indian-startups-join-the-space-race.

11 Robinson and Mazzucato, “The Evolution of Mission-oriented Policies.”

12 Amritha Jayanti, “Starlink and the Russia-Ukraine War: A Case of Commercial Technology and Public Purpose,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, March 9, 2023, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/starlink-and-russia-ukraine-war-case-commercial-technology-and-public-purpose.

13 “Space Foundation Releases the Space Report 2022 Q2 Showing Growth of Global Space Economy,” Space Foundation News, July 27, 2022, https://www.spacefoundation.org/2022/07/27/the-space-report-2022-q2/; and “Space: Investing in the Final Frontier,” Morgan Stanley, July 24, 2020, https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/investing-in-space.

14 “Space Economy Report 2022,” Ninth Edition, Euroconsult, January 2023, https://digital-platform.euroconsult-ec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Space-Economy-2022_extract.pdf?t=63b47c80afdfe.

15 Erick Burgueño Salas, “Leading Aerospace and Defense Manufacturers Worldwide in 2021, Based on Revenue,” Statista, November 27, 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/257381/global-leading-aerospace-and-defense-manufacturers/.

16 “Space Economy Report 2022,” Ninth Edition, Euroconsult, January 2023, https://digital-platform.euroconsult-ec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Space-Economy-2022_extract.pdf?t=63b47c80afdfe.

17 “Space Economy Report 2022.”

18 Andrew Jones, “China Wants to Launch Over 200 Spacecraft in 2023,” Space.com, January 27, 2023, https://www.space.com/china-launch-200-spacecraft-2023.

19 2022: A Year of Many Firsts for Indian Space Sector,” World Is One News (WION), updated December 30, 2022, https://www.wionews.com/science/2022-a-year-of-many-firsts-for-indian-space-sector-heres-a-recap-548099; and “List of Satish Dhawan Space Centre Launches,” Wikipedia, accessed April 12, 2023, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Satish_Dhawan_Space_Centre_launches.

20 “Space Economy Report 2022.”

21 OECD Space Forum, Measuring the Economic Impact of the Space Sector, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, October 7, 2020, https://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/space-forum/measuring-economic-impact-space-sector.pdf.

22 “Space Industry Worldwide,” Statista, 2020, https://www.statista.com/study/59030/space-exploration/; and OECD Handbook on Measuring the Space Economy, Second Edition, OECD, July 12, 2022, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/8bfef437-en.pdf?expires=1678223695&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=34A62A18C888485A89F58BE6E5841B30.

23 “Value of Venture Capital Financing Worldwide in 2020 by Region,” Statista, April 13, 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1095957/global-venture-capita-funding-value-by-region/.

24 Matteo Tugnoli, Martin Sarret, and Marco Aliberti, European Access to Space: Business and Policy Perspectives on Micro Launchers (New York: Springer Cham, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78960-6.

25 Weinzierl, “Space, the Final Economic Frontier.”

26 James Black, Linda Slapakova, and Kevin Martin, Future Uses of Space Out to 2050, RAND Corporation, March 2, 2022, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA609-1.html.

27 “BIFROST: Danish Project with International Collaboration to Explore AI-based Surveillance Applications from Space,” Gatehouse Satcom (website), August 22, 2022, https://gatehousesatcom.com/bifrost-danish-project-with-international-collaboration-to-explore-ai-based-surveillance-applications-from-space/.

28 “Terma Delivers AI Model for Danish Surveillance Satellite Project,” Defence Industry Europe, January 28, 2023, https://defence-industry.eu/terma-delivers-ai-model-for-danish-surveillance-satellite-project/.

29 “OHB Sweden Contributes to ClearSpace-1 Mission,” December 8, 2020, OHB, https://www.ohb.de/en/news/2020/ohb-sweden-contributes-to-clearspace-1-mission.

30 “Imec Technology Taking Off to Space,” Imec (website), January 25, 2021, https://www.imec-int.com/en/articles/imec-technology-taking-space.

31 “Imec Technology Taking Off.”

32 “Lincoln Institute for Agri-Food Technology,” homepage accessed February 2023, https://www.lincoln.ac.uk/liat/.

33 A rectenna (rectifying antenna) is a special type of receiving antenna that is used for converting electromagnetic energy into direct current (DC) electricity.

34 “Wireless Power from Space,” European Space Agency, September 11, 2022, https://www.esa.int/ESA_Multimedia/Images/2022/11/Wireless_power_from_space.

35 “DARPA, Lasers and an Internet in Orbit,” Economist, February 8, 2023, https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2023/02/08/darpa-lasers-and-an-internet-in-orbit.

36 Author’s video interview with multiple American NewSpace executives, December 2022.

37 Rebecca Nelson, Multilateral Development Banks: U.S. Contributions FY2000-FY2020, Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2020, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RS20792.pdf.

38 In-Q-Tel is an independent, nonprofit strategic investor for the US intelligence community, created in 1999, https://www.iqt.org; The US Secretary of Defense created the Office of Strategic Capital (announced December 2022), https://www.cto.mil/osc/.

39 “Niteworks,” UK Ministry of Defence, March 28, 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/niteworks; and “UK MOD Front Line Commands Set to Benefit from New Decision Support Capability That Replaces Former Niteworks Service,” Qinetiq, June 4, 2021, https://www.qinetiq.com/en/news/futures-lab.

The post The NewSpace market: Capital, control, and commercialization appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Harnessing allied space capabilities

Robert Murray, Tiffany Vora, and Nicholas Eftimiades — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 13:00:00 +0000

DOWnLOAD PDF

The United States’ vast network of alliances and partnerships offers a competitive advantage—this is especially evident in outer space. Often characterized as a global commons, space holds value for all humankind across commercial, exploration, and security vectors. As technological advancements trigger a proliferation in spacefaring nations, the United States and its allies and partners are confronted with new challenges to and opportunities for collective action.

This series examines how US space strategy can recognize the comparative advantages of allies and partners in space and best harness allied capabilities:

Robert Murray examines the state of the commercial space market and key drivers, considering how government investments in enabling activities can support broader national imperatives.

Tiffany Vora analyzes current US space exploration goals and the capabilities that will be critical to achieving them, highlighting arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned for integration.

Nicholas Eftimiades assesses the potential benefits to US national security offered by allied integration, identifying pathways for cooperating with allies and partners on their space capabilities.

The way forward for US and allied coordination in space

Several common themes emerge across this series. First, outer space is characterized by a transforming landscape and market. Commercial tech advancements—including the introduction of small satellites, advancements in Earth observation and asteroid mining, and the rise of space tourism—drive the development of what Murray terms the “NewSpace” market. The way in which the United States and its allies do business in space is changing, with the private sector leading in capability development and the government becoming the consumer. The burgeoning space sector, totaling $464 billion in 2022, is attracting allies and adversaries alike to invest in and expand their space operations. Strategic competitors recognize they can now target US and allied commercial and national security imperatives from space.

Second, this increasingly competitive environment further accentuates the value of alliances and partnerships in space. As Vora highlights, US and allied cooperation in space today rests on the Artemis Accords, which advances shared principles for space activity, and is a key mechanism for the international transfer of expertise, technology, and funding. The US Department of Defense also houses the Combined Space Operations Vision 2031, which offers a framework to guide collective efforts with several allies, and a host of collaborative exercises and wargames. Eftimiades describes the cross-cutting benefits of this collaboration: it alters the decision calculus for hostile actors, threatening a response from a coalition of nations; offers the ability to share capabilities, responsibilities, and geostrategic locations; and creates consensus in setting the norms for responsible space behavior. Current collective efforts in the space domain are limited, albeit expanding, considering the benefit allies and partners bring to the table.

Third, in order to promote stronger collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners, it is necessary to address and overcome the barriers that stand in the way. Vora identifies protectionist policies and regulations that act as hurdles to the transfer of key technologies and information. Murray explains that lengthy government contract timelines, coupled with insufficient investment in technologies critical to NewSpace, hinder US and allied commercial advancement. Eftimiades argues that the United States has yet to articulate a strategy for space coordination, highlighting a lack in transparency with allies and partners on capability and data gaps.

The authors put forth ideas to pave the way forward for US and allied space development. Recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners include conducting gap analysis on where allied investments can complement existing US capabilities, establishing a “space bank” to support NewSpace actors, and formulating a US and allied strategy for space development, building upon the Artemis Accords. To maintain its competitive advantage in space, the United States cannot go at it alone.

Read the full papers:

The NewSpace market: Capital, control, and commercialization

By Robert Murray

Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes

By Tiffany Vora

Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

By Nicholas Eftimiades

Acknowledgements

To produce this report, the authors conducted a number of interviews and consultations. Listed below are some of the individuals consulted and whose insights informed this report. The analysis and recommendations presented in this report are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the individuals consulted. Moreover, the named individuals participated in a personal, not institutional, capacity.

Allen Antrobus, strategy director, air and space, Serco
John Beckner, chief executive officer, Horizon Technologies
Dr. Mariel Borowitz, associate professor, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology
Steven J. Butow, director, space portfolio, Defense Innovation Unit
Chris Carberry, chief executive officer and co-founder, Explore Mars
Darren Chua, EY space tech consulting partner and Oceania innovation leader, Ernst & Young Australia
Kenneth Fischer, director for business development North America, Thales Alenia Space
David Fogel, nonresident senior fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Dr. Yasuhito Fukushima, senior research fellow, National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan
Peter Garretson, senior fellow in defense studies, American Foreign Policy Council
Sqn Ldr Neal Henley, chief of staff, Joint Force Space Component, UK Space Command
John Hill, deputy assistant secretary of defense for space and missile defense, US Department of Defense
Komei Isozaki, Japan Chair fellow, Hudson Institute
Mat Kaplan, senior communications adviser, The Planetary Society
Cody Knipfer, director of government engagement, GXO, Inc.
Dr. Jerry Krasner, independent consultant, US Department of Defense
Massimiliano La Rosa, director, marketing, sales, and business, Thales Alenia Space
Ron Lopez, president and managing director, Astroscale U.S. Inc.
Douglas Loverro, president, Loverro Consulting, LLC; former deputy assistant secretary of defense for space policy, US Department of Defense
Russ Matijevich, chief innovation officer, Airbus U.S. Space & Defense, Inc.
Jacob Markish, vice president, strategy and corporate development, Thales North America
Brig Gen Bruce McClintock, USAF (ret.), lead, RAND Space Enterprise Initiative, RAND Corporation
Col Christopher Mulder, USAF, active-duty officer, US Air Force; 2020-2021 senior US Air Force fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Dr. Eliahu Niewood, vice president, Air and Space Forces Center, MITRE Corporation
Dr. Jana Robinson, managing director, Prague Security Studies Institute
Audrey Schaffer, director for space policy, National Security Council
Paul Szymanski, director, Space Strategies Center
Dr. Christian Willmes, doctor of philosophy, University of Oxford

Generously Sponsored By

About the authors

Robert Murray
Senior Lecturer and Director, Master of Science in Global Innovation and Leadership Program, Johns Hopkins University

Fellow

Tiffany Vora

Nonresident Fellow

GeoTech Center

Space Space Security

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

Watch the launch event

Harnessing allied space capabilities

A panel of experts explores how the United States can work with its allies and partners to achieve common security, commercial, and exploration objectives in outer space.

Europe & Eurasia National Security Security Partnerships Space

The post Harnessing allied space capabilities appeared first on Atlantic Council.

There can be no lasting peace with Russia until Ukraine liberates Crimea

Mariia Zolkina — Thu, 20 Apr 2023 18:55:01 +0000

As the world waits for Ukraine’s widely anticipated spring offensive, debate continues to rage over whether Ukrainian military objectives should include the de-occupation of Crimea. Some skeptics question if Ukraine has the military capabilities to successfully liberate the Russian-occupied peninsula; others claim Crimea’s personal importance to Putin make it a red line for the Russian dictator that could spark a nuclear escalation. These concerns are understandable but shortsighted. Crucially, they fail to recognize Crimea’s status as the decisive battlefield in the current war. Put simply, there can be no lasting peace with Russia until Ukraine liberates Crimea.

Today’s debate over Crimea reflects the success of Russian efforts since 2014 to convince the international community that the occupied Ukrainian peninsula is a “special case” and not directly related to Russian aggression on the Ukrainian mainland. Indeed, prior to last year’s full-scale invasion, long-running international efforts to resolve the war in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region had excluded any discussion of Crimea, fueling perceptions that the ongoing occupation of the peninsula was a separate issue entirely.

In the years following the military occupation of Crimea, Putin regime officials frequently declared the issue to be closed. Meanwhile, Kremlin propagandists insisted that the occupied Ukrainian province was now an indivisible part of the Russian Federation. These efforts proved effective. Even after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, many international observers have persisted in affording Crimea a different status to other occupied parts of the country.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Those who view Crimea as a red line for Vladimir Putin often stress the symbolic importance of the peninsula. They note that the seizure of Crimea ranks as by far the most significant achievement of Putin’s entire reign and therefore plays a key role in his claim to a place among Russia’s greatest rulers. Many also believe continued Russian control over the peninsula is necessary in order to soften the blow of looming military defeat on mainland Ukraine. As long as Putin has Crimea, they argue, he can still convince domestic audiences in Russia that the core objectives of his invasion have been reached.

The other most frequent argument against the de-occupation of Crimea is fear of provoking a Russian nuclear response. Since launching the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin has frequently engaged in nuclear saber-rattling. This has included specific threats to use nuclear weapons in defense of Russian territory, with Putin stating in September 2022, “I’m not bluffing.”

While the impact of this saber-rattling appears to be diminishing, Putin knows Western leaders cannot completely ignore his nuclear blackmail, particularly as Russia has repeatedly emphasized that it views Crimea as Russian sovereign territory. If the possibility of a Ukrainian military campaign to liberate Crimea becomes more realistic in the coming months, the Kremlin is likely to dramatically increase its nuclear rhetoric.

At present, there appears to be a lack of consensus among Ukraine’s Western partners over how best to react to Russia’s nuclear intimidation tactics. While senior figures from NATO, the US, and the EU have all publicly warned Moscow of grave consequences, separate statements from various European capitals indicate some Western governments are eager to avoid a further escalation in nuclear tensions at almost any price. This is a fundamental miscalculation that risks legitimizing nuclear blackmail as a foreign policy tool. If Russian nuclear threats succeed in preventing the liberation of Crimea, the Kremlin will inevitably employ the same approach to consolidate control over other regions of Ukraine currently under Russian occupation. A dangerous precedent will have been established with disastrous consequences for the future of international security.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Ukraine’s political and military leaders have been extremely clear that without the liberation of Crimea, no sustainable peace with Russia is possible. They argue that as long as Crimea is under Russian occupation, it will serve as a base for future military operations and pose a threat to the whole of southern Ukraine. Even if Ukraine succeeds in de-occupying all of the regions currently under Russian control in the south and east of the country, Russian-occupied Crimea would continue to represent a dagger pointed at the heart of Ukrainian statehood.

Furthermore, free navigation of the Black Sea cannot be restored while Crimea is under Russian occupation. Using Crimea as its base, the Russian Navy has imposed a Black Sea blockade that has had a devastating impact on the Ukrainian economy. This blockade prevents the resumption of vital merchant shipping from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, while also undermining the security of other Black Sea countries. Moscow’s current efforts to manipulate the terms and conditions of the UN-brokered grain agreement illustrate the futility of negotiating any compromise deals with Russia while the Kremlin retains the ability to impose its will by force. As long as Russia occupies Crimea, Black Sea shipping will be severely restricted and Ukraine will remain trapped in economic crisis.

It is worth noting that the de-occupation of Crimea could take a number of different forms and may involve a combination of military and diplomatic tools. One of the possible alternatives to a large-scale Ukrainian land operation would be the methodical destruction of Russian logistical chains and military infrastructure in Crimea along with precision strikes on military storage facilities and bases across the peninsula. This could render the continued occupation of Crimea unfeasible and force Russia to retreat. Similar tactics have already succeeded in forcing Russia to withdraw from Kherson and the right bank of the Dnipro River, despite Putin’s loud declarations that Russia had come to the region “forever.”

If Ukraine’s international partners are serious about securing a lasting peace, they should first acknowledge the central importance of de-occupying Crimea and provide Ukraine with the tools to do so. This is the only way to decisively defeat Russia and end the war. It is also the best way to prevent further reckless nuclear blackmail.

Kyiv is determined to complete the de-occupation of the whole country including Crimea, and Ukrainian military planners are convinced this is a realistic objective. However, a bloody land campaign to liberate the peninsula could still be avoided if Ukraine’s spring offensive achieves its immediate goals on the mainland, and if the Ukrainian military receives long-range missile capabilities from its international partners that would enable them to strike targets throughout occupied Crimea. This would leave a weakened Russia with little choice but to begin serious negotiations. At present, that is not the case. Until Russia recognizes the need to withdraw from Crimea and the rest of Ukraine, peace will remain elusive.

Mariia Zolkina is a research fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science and head of regional security and conflict studies at the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in Kyiv.

Putin cancels Victory Day parades as Ukraine invasion continues to unravel

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 13 Apr 2023 20:40:08 +0000

With Russia’s annual Victory Day celebrations less than one month away, the Kremlin has taken the highly unusual step of canceling a number of military parades in regional capitals. Scheduled parades to mark the World War II Soviet victory over Nazi Germany have been called off in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts, which both border Ukraine. Victory Day celebrations in Russian-occupied Crimea have also reportedly been scrapped.

The cancellations are officially due to security concerns related to the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, numerous commentators have speculated that Moscow is also increasingly short of tanks and is understandably eager to avoid highlighting the scale of the losses suffered by the Russian army in Ukraine. Whether the real reason is security issues or equipment shortages, the decision to cancel this year’s Victory Day parades represents a painful blow for Vladimir Putin that hints at the grim reality behind Moscow’s upbeat propaganda portrayals of his faltering Ukraine invasion.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Email
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Russia’s annual Victory Day celebrations are closely associated with Putin personally. Throughout his reign, he has placed the Soviet World War II experience at the heart of efforts to rebuild Russian national pride following the perceived humiliations of the 1990s. Putin has transformed traditional Russian reverence for the Soviet war effort into a quasi-religious victory cult complete with its own dogmas, feast days, and heretics. Victory Day itself has become by far the biggest holiday of the year, with the defeat of Nazi Germany elevated above all other events and achievements as the defining moment in Russian history.

This victory cult has long set the tone in Russian politics and public life. Domestic and foreign opponents of the Putin regime are routinely attacked as “fascists,” with all manner of current affairs issues viewed through the polarizing prism of World War II. This trend is nowhere more evident than in the official Russian approach toward Ukraine. For years, the Ukrainian authorities have been groundlessly branded as “Nazis,” while the current invasion of the country is portrayed as a modern-day continuation of the fight against Adolf Hitler.

The significance of Victory Day for national identity in Putin’s Russia and the holiday’s close associations with the war in Ukraine make this year’s parade cancellations especially embarrassing. Other public celebrations could be postponed or abandoned without much fuss, but failure to mark Victory Day points to serious problems that are difficult to disguise even in Russia’s tightly controlled information environment. While Kremlin propagandists continue to insist the invasion of Ukraine is going according to plan, the apparent inability of the authorities to guarantee security inside Russia during this most important of national holidays would suggest otherwise.

Eurasia Center events

Public Event Wed, April 12, 2023 • 1:00 pm ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

While traditional Victory Day events will not take place on May 9 in some Russian regional capitals, the country’s main holiday parade in Moscow is set to proceed as planned. However, Putin will likely have little to celebrate. In recent months, his invasion has met with a series of setbacks on both the military and diplomatic fronts that leave the prospect of victory more distant than ever.

In Ukraine, Russian efforts to launch a major offensive fell flat during the first three months of 2023, with the Russian military securing only nominal gains despite suffering catastrophic losses in both men and equipment. High casualty rates and a reliance on suicidal “human wave” attacks have led to plummeting morale among Putin’s invading army, with recently mobilized troops particularly prone to demoralization. Since the beginning of the year, dozens of videos have been posted to social media featuring groups of Russian soldiers addressing Putin and other state officials while complaining of poor conditions, cannon fodder tactics, and heavy losses. This is fueling doubts over the Russian army’s ability to mount major offensive operations.

Meanwhile, Russia’s winter bombing campaign against Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure appears to have ended in failure. Putin had hoped to destroy the Ukrainian energy grid and freeze Ukrainians into submission, but a combination of creativity and enhanced air defenses enabled Ukraine to keep the lights on. In a sign that the worst of the crisis is now over, Ukraine resumed electricity exports to neighboring European countries in early April.

Nor is there any indication that Western support for Ukraine is in danger of weakening. On the contrary, during the first three months of 2023, Ukraine’s partners expanded their military aid to include previously taboo items such as modern battle tanks and Soviet era fighter jets. Putin still hopes he can outlast the West in Ukraine, but international opposition to his invasion currently appears to be stronger than ever. Indeed, this continued Western resolve was the key message behind US President Joe Biden’s February visit to Kyiv.

There was further bad news in March when the International Criminal Court in The Hague charged Putin with war crimes over his role in the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. While the Russian dictator is not expected to appear in court anytime soon, the indictment is a serious blow to Putin’s prestige that undermines his status both domestically and on the international stage. Weeks later, Finland joined NATO in a move that more than doubled the length of Russia’s shared borders with the military alliance. Even Xi Jinping’s much-hyped visit to Moscow failed to lift the mood, with the Chinese leader offering plenty of platitudes but little in the way of concrete support.

These unfavorable circumstances will make Putin’s job all the more difficult as he attempts to strike the right note in this year’s Victory Day address. With little to look forward to, he is likely to seek inspiration from the glories of the past. However, comparisons between World War II and Russia’s present predicament may not prove very flattering. At the height of the Nazi advance in late 1941, Moscow famously staged the annual October Revolution parade on Red Square with the might of the invading German army located a mere few miles away. In contrast, Putin is evidently now unable to defend Russia against the far more modest threat posed by a country he expected to conquer in just three days. Throughout the Putin era, Victory Day has served to showcase Russia’s resurgent strength, but this year’s holiday may become a symbol of his regime’s growing weakness.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption interim report

Eric Lofgren*, Whitney M. McNamara, and Peter Modigliani — Wed, 12 Apr 2023 14:49:18 +0000

Co-chairs: The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD,
& The Hon. Deborah Lee James

Commission director: Stephen Rodriguez

Program director: Clementine G. Starling

Commission staff: Mark J. Massa, Delharty M. Manson II, and Jacob Mezey

Download PDF

Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption: Interim Report Launch

Former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and former Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James discuss a new report on the challenges the United States faces in maintaining its technological and military advantage over its adversaries and what adaptations Congress, the Pentagon, and the defense sector should make to increase the pace of innovation adoption.

Defense Industry Defense Policy Defense Technologies National Security

Commissioners

The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD, Board Director, Atlantic Council; 27th Secretary of Defense; Co-Chair, Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption
The Hon. Deborah Lee James, Board Director, Atlantic Council; 23rd Secretary of the Air Force; Co-Chair, Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption
Ambassador Barbara Barrett, Board Director, Atlantic Council; 25th Secretary of the Air Force
General James E. Cartwright, USMC (ret.), Board Director, Atlantic Council; 8th Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Frank A. Finelli, Managing Director, The Carlyle Group
The Hon. Michèle Flournoy, Co-founder and Managing Partner, WestExec Advisors; Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, US Department of Defense
Scott Frederick, Managing Partner, Sands Capital
The Hon. James “Hondo” Geurts, Distinguished Fellow, Business Executives for National Security; Former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, US Department of Defense
Peter Levine, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Defense Analyses; Former Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, US Department of Defense
The Hon. Ellen M. Lord, Former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, US Department of Defense
Major General Arnold L. Punaro, USMC (ret.), CEO, The Punaro Group; Member, Advisory Council, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Nick Sinai, Senior Advisor, Insight Partners; Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs and Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School
Josh Wolfe, Co-founder and Managing Partner, Lux Capital
The Hon. Robert O. Work, Senior Counselor for Defense and Distinguished Senior Fellow for Defense and National Security, Center for a New American Security; 32nd US Deputy Secretary of Defense

Industry commissioners

Steven Escaravage, Executive Vice President and AI Lead, Booz Allen Hamilton
Wendy R. Anderson, Senior Vice President, Palantir Technologies
Prashant Bhuyan, Founder and CEO, Accrete AI
Mark Brunner, President, Primer Federal, Primer AI
Colin Carroll, Director of Government Relations, Applied Intuition
Adam Hammer, Counselor, Schmidt Futures
Chris Lynch, CEO, Rebellion Defense
Mara Motherway, Senior Vice President, Peraton
Michael Niggel, CEO, ACT1 Federal
Doug Philippone, Co-founder, Snowpoint Ventures

Foreword
Overview

Recommendations:

Introduce a new capability portfolio model
Consolidate program elements
Reset reprogramming authorities
Modernize DoD to align with the 21st century industrial base
Strengthen alignment of capital markets to defense outcomes
Incentivize tech companies to do business with DoD
Modernize budget documents
Establish bridge fund for successfully demonstrated technologies
Scale the Space Development Agency model
Modernize DoD’s requirements system

Conclusions and next steps
Biographies
Acknowledgements
List of acronyms

Foreword

The US Department of Defense (DoD) needs to accelerate the adoption of cutting-edge technology from the leading edge of the commercial and defense sectors. Doing so will enable the Pentagon to deliver high-impact operational solutions to the Warfighter in a much timelier manner. That is why we are co-chairing the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, which has released this interim report.

In our time serving in the Defense Department, we have found that the United States does not have an innovation problem, but rather an innovation adoption problem. That is to say, our Nation leads in many emerging technologies relevant to defense and security—from artificial intelligence and directed energy to quantum information technology and beyond. But the DoD struggles to identify, adopt, integrate, and field these technologies into military applications.

The persistence of this challenge is not for lack of trying. The Air Force’s Rapid Capabilities Office has cut through bureaucratic constraints to accelerate even the most complicated major acquisitions. The Defense Innovation Unit stands out for expanding the range of firms involved in innovation for national security purposes. Army Futures Command has accelerated modernization in ground forces through its cross-functional team model. The new Office of Strategic Capital has a promising new approach to engaging capital markets in support of national security goals.

But the growing national security challenges facing our country and the threat they pose to the rules-based international order require actionable reform across the DoD. We and a group of distinguished Commissioners, with decades of service between us in government, the private sector, and capital markets, believe that time is running out to do so. The United States faces simultaneous competition with two nuclear-armed, autocratic great-power rivals. Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and China’s revanchism not only spur urgent geopolitical considerations, but also cast into sharp relief the US industrial base’s ability to produce and field innovative technologies at scale.

To address the DoD’s innovation adoption challenge in light of the urgency of the geopolitical environment we face, this interim report advances ten policy recommendations for Congress and the Pentagon, focusing on the three key areas of reforming acquisition; overcoming barriers to innovation; and revising specific Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution structures.

To that end, the DoD should adapt the way it conducts its acquisition programs to provide additional flexibility in the year of execution, and Congress can authorize that flexibility. We recommend that five DoD program executive offices be empowered to operate in a portfolio model so that they can more easily shift funding among possible products that meet their mission needs. Congress should appropriate money to DoD with fewer but larger discrete budget line items and reset reprogramming authorities so that acquisition professionals have greater flexibility.

To better leverage innovation in the commercial sector, Congress should restore at least the traditional ratio of procurement funding to other defense spending, and the DoD should more intentionally engage a much broader innovation base. Allocating a higher percentage of the DoD’s budget to procurement will clearly signal a larger market to nontraditional defense firms.

Additionally, the deputy secretary of defense, with the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) as a direct report, should take a leadership role in aligning and harnessing stakeholders within the Pentagon and the existing defense industrial base for the twenty-first century. The DIU should be resourced and empowered to broaden the defense ecosystem by robustly engaging start-ups, nontraditional vendors, and capital market players.

The DoD must develop approaches to more rapidly validate its needs for commercial capabilities, rather than waiting years after identifying a key capability to write a requirement and submit a budget request. The DoD should both reform the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to operate more swiftly and develop a military need validation system outside of JCIDS for mature commercial capabilities. Congress and the DoD should expand both eligibility for, and the award size of, Small Business Innovation Research grants. To provide additional mechanisms for rapidly matching key capabilities with funding, they should also provide funds to procure capabilities successfully demonstrated in exercises.

As the 2022 National Security Strategy states, we are living through a “decisive decade,” a sentiment shared by the previous administration as well. Congress and the DoD must seize this opportunity to enact near-term changes that will help get our service members the capabilities they need to defend our country and its interests.

The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD

27th US Secretary of Defense

The Hon. Deborah Lee James

23rd US Secretary of the Air Force

* Eric Lofgren served as a project author until February 2023, when he transitioned to a position in government service. All of his contributions were made before his transition to that role.

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Introduction
The Vilnius summit and the war in Ukraine
Strengthening deterrence and defense at Vilnius
Addressing the nuclear dimension of NATO deterrence
A new defense investment pledge at Vilnius
Addressing China at the Vilnius summit
NATO’s other critical decisions at Vilnius
Conclusion

Overview

Mission statement

Accelerate the DoD’s ability to adopt cutting-edge technology from commercial and defense sectors and deliver high-impact operational solutions to the Warfighters.

Enterprise challenges

The DoD faces the following enterprise challenges in adopting defense innovations:

1. Outdated R&D model

The DoD’s requirements and acquisition processes were designed for a time when the DoD was the largest funder of global research and development (R&D). By 2020, however, the federal government’s share of national R&D had fallen below 20 percent, and yet its processes have not adapted to this new leader-to-follower reality. Today, while the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), national and service laboratories, and universities continue to innovate, many of the most critical technologies are driven by the commercial sector. The DoD struggles to adopt commercial technology at a relevant speed. Innovations from noncommercial R&D organizations are infrequently tied to a commercialization and adoption pipeline. Traditional prime contractors orient their independent R&D (IRAD) toward near-term defense requirements that are prescriptive relative to solutions rather than broadly defining warfighter gaps that allow applications of advanced technologies. As a result, the DoD is unable to effectively apply leading technologies to its weapon systems.

2. Long timelines and inflexible execution

Too often, the DoD delivers systems to meet requirements defined more than a decade earlier. It is difficult to insert new technology to effectively respond to dynamic adversary threats, technological opportunities, advances in warfighting concepts, or macroeconomic and supply-chain disruptions, especially within fiscal years. Hardware-centric models ineffectively integrate rapid software updates.

3. Fewer companies providing defense solutions

The DoD’s industrial base has shrunk by 40 percent over the past decade, due to both consolidation and exit. This decline stems from multiple causes, including a pivot to fewer more-complex major systems, long timelines, complex regulations, and the high compliance cost of doing business with the DoD. Many start-up, commercial, and international businesses are unable or unwilling to enter the DoD ecosystem. As a result, reduced competitive pressure has increased costs and decreased adoption of innovation.

4. Valleys of death

The DoD spends billions annually on research and prototypes, yet only a small percentage transitions to production contracts with revenue to sustain operations and scale output. Consequently, one must question why the DoD continues to fund so many defense research organizations when most technology innovation comes from the commercial sector. Long timelines for contracts and funding, program constraints, and a disconnected ecosystem are among the transition challenges for companies that have developed viable products or services.

5. Hamstrung workforce

The DoD acquisition workforce is subject to a bureaucratic culture of excessive compliance and oversight, a challenging environment for innovation. Creative problem-solving and measured risk-taking are not often rewarded, and too few individuals with an industry background agree to take senior leadership roles at the DoD.

6. Program-centric acquisition

Defining requirements, securing budgets, and acquiring capabilities are done for hundreds of individual programs. The DoD invests a significant percentage of its funds in complex major systems for which prime contractors offer closed, propriety solutions. This impedes interoperability and responsiveness to changes in operations, threats, and technologies. Open-system architectures with well-defined interface control documents are rarely adopted, which constrains the ability to insert innovative technology.

7. Cumbersome reporting from DoD to Congress

Budget justification documents run dozens of volumes and tens of thousands of pages. Document format, detail, and supporting information is inconsistent among military services and agencies. This impedes Congress’s ability to understand program objectives in a timely manner. In turn, Congress does not trust that delegated decisions will consistently result in more rapid technology adoption.

8. Limited understanding of emerging technology

The DoD struggles to effectively leverage critical emerging technologies (like biotechnology and quantum information technology) due to a lack of understanding of their state-of-the-art applications among those who generate requirements and draft requests for proposals. As these technologies mature, the DoD is challenged to have meaningful conversations about how to adopt, leverage, and defend against these technologies.

Top recommendations

To address these challenges, the Commission recommends that DoD leaders, congressional defense committees, and other executive branch agencies take the following ten high-priority actions to accelerate DoD innovation adoption:

Introduce a new capability portfolio model
Consolidate program elements
Reset reprogramming authorities
Modernize the DoD to align with the twenty-first century industrial base
Strengthen alignment of capital markets to defense outcomes
Incentivize tech companies to do business with the DoD
Modernize budget documents
Establish bridge fund for successfully demonstrated technologies
Scale the Space Development Agency model
Modernize the DoD’s requirements system

Recommendation 1: The DoD and Congress empower and resource five Program Executive Officers (PEOs) to operate via a new capability portfolio model in 2024.

Addresses challenges 2, 4, and 6.

Congress authorizes in the FY24 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and/or the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) implements via a memo empowering five PEO portfolios to operate via a new capability portfolio model. Component acquisition executives from the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Special Operations Command, and a defense agency will each select a PEO portfolio.
Service requirements organizations capture portfolio requirements in a concise, high-level document that provides overarching, joint, enduring capability needs and key mission impact measures that focus on warfighter-informed needs and mission outcomes. The Joint Staff validates the portfolio requirements within thirty days. The portfolio requirements document enables leaner program requirements and shapes future research and prototypes.
Selected PEOs negotiate with congressional defense appropriations staff the consolidation of at least 20 percent of the smallest budget line items within their portfolios. This enables reprogramming flexibility to meet evolving, warfighter-informed requirements. These merged budget accounts must provide Congress with sufficient visibility of major elements within each.
Selected PEOs develop a set of portfolio strategies, processes, road maps, contracts, infrastructure, and architectures to enable programs to leverage for greater speed and success. Portfolio contracting strategies will look beyond individual contracts or programs to promote a robust industrial base by enabling continuous competition, iterative development, supply chain risk mitigation, greater participation of nontraditional companies, commercial service acquisition, and economies of scale.
Selected PEOs may lay out plans to decompose large programs into modular acquisitions; leverage common platforms, components, and services; and maximize use of commercial solutions and DoD research. Portfolios will scale and align prototyping, experimentation, and testing infrastructure. They will invest in a common suite of engineering tools, platforms, and strategies to enable interoperability, cybersecurity, and resiliency.
PEOs require portfolio leaders to actively engage the DoD’s R&D community, industry, and academia to communicate joint-warfighter portfolio needs and business opportunities, scout technologies, engage companies, and drive novel solutions to address portfolio needs.
Congress appropriates at least $20 million to each portfolio per year for three years to enable PEOs to implement the new model with appropriate staff, analytic tools, and strategies. The five PEOs work out the details for others to adopt. In time, the department will realize savings and return on investment through greater program efficiencies and mission impact.
PEOs provide the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Congress a short annual report to share insight into the new portfolio model progress, including issues, successes, and inputs to scale adoption.

Success measure: By the end of 2023, five PEO portfolios are identified to operate via the new portfolio model. By the end of 2024, these portfolios begin operating with clear direction, leadership support, and initial implementation plans.

Notional example: A command-and-control PEO shapes a portfolio strategy that invests in a software factory and enterprise services as a common infrastructure, with smaller programs tapping a diverse vendor base to regularly and iteratively deliver a suite of applications that work together seamlessly.

Recommendation 2: Acquisition executives propose consolidated program elements to congressional staff and negotiate what can be included in the FY 2024 Appropriations Act joint explanatory statement.

Addresses challenges 2, 6, and 7.

The deputy secretary of defense (DepSecDef) directs acquisition executives to propose a list of program elements (PEs) and budget line items (BLIs) to consolidate. This will simplify budget submissions and enable greater flexibility within the year of execution to respond to rapid changes in warfighter needs and technology advancement within capability or mission portfolios.
- Determine criteria for consolidation, such as BLIs and PEs under $20 million, software-defined technologies, and supply chain-affected efforts.
- Determine constructs for consolidation, such as capability areas, mission areas, and organizational alignment.
Reduce BLI and PE count from more than 1,700 today in the investment accounts by at least 200 BLI and PEs each year, starting with the FY 2024 markup, for three years to enable cost-schedule-performance trade-offs, including the prototyping and fielding of novel systems that meet defined capability or mission areas.
Allow PEOs, warfighters, and other DoD stakeholders to provide input to acquisition executives. Senior leadership in the resourcing process should propose the items to be consolidated and negotiate with congressional staff in advance of FY 2024 appropriations.
Identify line items that enable opportunistic efforts to insert technologies into existing weapons programs without requiring a new start. Identify best practices for broadly justifying activities within a capability set.

Success measure: The number of BLIs in the investment accounts is reduced by at least 200 in time for the passage of regular appropriations in FY 2024.

Notional example: A PEO identifies a novel technology from DARPA or industry to integrate into one of its programs to improve performance and accelerate capability delivery. With investment funds spread across fewer budget accounts, the PEO is able to reprogram funds from a lower-priority development within the year of execution.

Recommendation 3: Congressional appropriations committees reset reprogramming authorities to historical norms in their FY 2024 joint explanatory statements.

Addresses challenges 2 and 7.

Appropriations committees write into FY 2024 joint explanatory statements the following changes:
- Current reprogramming thresholds will be maintained, but above-threshold actions will revert from congressional prior approval to the historical norm of congressional notification with a thirty-day window for briefing or rejection. This streamlines the process and enables greater reprogramming while still providing Congress “veto authority” to block reprogramming actions they oppose. Prior approval will remain in place for items omitted, deleted, or specifically reduced; general transfer authorities; or above threshold new starts.
An alternative approach: Raise reprogramming thresholds from the lesser of $10 million or 20 percent to at least $40 million for Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and $100 million for procurement appropriation titles. Historical norms for reprogramming thresholds were $15 million for RDT&E and $40 million for procurement yet were progressively lowered to this historically low threshold. This change would revert thresholds to account for decades of inflation.
- Letter notifications for new starts will be “for the fiscal year,” not “for the entire effort.” This enables programs greater flexibility to start small programs while Congress retains the right to veto any new starts it opposes.

Success measure: Recommended language is included in the FY 2024 Appropriations Act joint explanatory statement by the time regular appropriations are passed.

Notional example: An acquisition program is “early to need” for procurement funds due to delays in finalizing development. Another program desperately seeks additional funds to accelerate and scale production of its weapon system. Service leadership decides to reprogram $50M in procurement funds between the programs to optimize investments.

Recommendation 4: Congress directs the DoD to elevate the DIU to a direct report to DepSecDef and resource it effectively to align and harness the nontraditional defense industrial base for the twenty-first century no later than six months of the enactment of this act.

Addresses challenges 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8.

Re-align DIU as a direct report to DepSecDef with the necessary staffing and resources to engage start-ups, nontraditional vendors, and capital market players in aligning capability requirements to harness solutions from the twenty-first-century industrial base per the 2022 National Defense Strategy.
- DIU’s expanded role should complement existing efforts in USD(R&E) and USD(A&S) in terms of traditional industrial policy and technology scouting, respectively, by better connecting the nontraditional industry and its resources, intelligence, and technologies to the needs of the warfighter.
  - DIU, USD(R&E), USD(A&S), and service partners should regularly integrate their efforts, in communicating to the industrial base the department’s needs, planned investments, and business opportunities. In addition, they should share among themselves what is being discovered in industry that aligns with the department’s missions.
  - In its expanded role, DIU should be resourced to regularly engage with acquisition organizations (PEOs, program offices), science and technology (S&T) organizations (labs, DARPA), and combatant commands to share the insights it gets from nontraditional industry players throughout the DoD. Additionally, DIU will communicate back to industry where it can align its technologies to the needs of the warfighter as communicated by acquisition organizations and combatant commands.
  - Prioritization for expanded staffing for DIU should be for new billets from the services over funding for contractors. The billets would be priority assignments, selected from relevant PEOs and service acquisition executives (SAEs).
  - DIU should track the intelligence, insights, and inputs it receives from industry trade associations, venture capitalists (VCs), private equity firms, primes, nontraditional defense companies (NDCs), Other Transaction (OT) Consortia, and innovation hubs. This information should be interoperable with USD(R&E)’s existing repository of research and intelligence for the department’s needs.
- DIU, USD(A&S), and SAEs charter a team, including joint warfighter perspectives, to streamline processes, reviews, and documents for acquiring commercial solutions. The team will reinforce “buy before build” commercial practices in the early phases of programs by baking it into acquisition strategy templates and program reviews. It will also collaborate with defense industry, capital markets, and Congress to develop a broader set of rapid funding tools and approaches to demand signals consistent with the speed of commercial innovation cycles. It will publish an initial commercial pathway or guide by December 2023, with a comprehensive version in 2024.
  - Joint Staff and service requirements organizations develop a rapid “military need validation” process, involving feedback from the warfighter, for commercial solutions in lieu of traditional Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) requirements documents. This new process will enable hundreds or even thousands of commercial solutions to be validated by empowered, distributed officials, and not subject to the JCIDS process managed by the Joint Staff and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).
  - The Defense Acquisition University and related organizations should modernize guidance and training for commercial acquisition, to include:
    - Collaborating with industry, traditional and otherwise, in the early phases of an acquisition program to inform concepts, alternatives, and designs. The focus should be on feeding into mission objectives, not market research for system specifications.
      - Contracting strategies focused on commercial solutions (e.g., Commercial Solutions Openings, Other Transactions, Federal Acquisition Regulation Parts 12 and 13).
      - Testing, experimentation, exercises, rapid deliveries, and iteration.
      - Scaling programs like DIU’s Immersive Commercial Acquisition Program.

Success measures: Higher number of DIU projects that transition to a program of record; increased number of vendors entering the federal market and competing for contracts; better alignment of capital market investment and lending to DoD missions; alignment of DoD R&D and prime IRAD funds to help a wider number of entrants across the Valley of Death; increased transparency with the industrial base on DoD’s priorities; a commercial pathway, guidance, and training enabling workforce to rapidly and successfully acquire commercial solutions; increased transparency and collaboration within the department on tech-related initiatives and intelligence; resources saved and efficiencies gained from central repository information from traditional and nontraditional industrial base like market intelligence, technology landscape analysis and due diligence on vendors.

Notional example: Expanded engagement with nontraditional industrial base helps DIU identify the commercial sector’s leader in autonomous software for ground vehicles and through the streamlined, well-defined process for rapid acquisition, the Army begins adopting it across its fleet of logistics vehicles on CONUS bases.

In their quarterly engagement, the US Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) talks to DIU about its desire to procure better mission planning tools at the edge. DIU identifies and provides three viable commercial options for demonstrations. Before presenting them to MCWL, DIU leverages VC firm relationships to get existing due diligence on the potential vendors and discovers one of them draws components of its chips from China. DIU finds an alternative.

In its engagements with capital market players, DIU discovers there are several critical bottlenecks in the quantum computing supply chain due to either a severe lack of redundancy or routing through adversary nations. DIU flags this to R&E, the Office of Strategic Capital, and A&S Industrial Policy to determine how to address this. As part of this, DIU and OSC engage with capital market players to inform them this is now a department priority, helping to direct capital market funding toward these enabling technologies critical to the US broader tech competition vis-à-vis China.

Recommendation 5: Strengthen existing capital market programs and create new pathways for mission-critical technologies.

Addresses challenges 1, 3, 4, and 8.

US capital markets represent a critical yet underutilized strategic advantage for the DoD. To better leverage vast capital market resources for defense innovation and mission outcomes, the DoD should broaden programs through which capital market-backed companies can participate and create new pathways for DoD program offices to leverage capital market funding for mission-critical technologies.

Congress directs in legislation the Small Business Agency (SBA), in coordination with the General Services Administration (GSA), to enhance the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) grants program no later than six months after enactment.

To better scale SBIRs, the SBA should:

Generate direct to Phase III SBIR grants in which early successful performers in Phase I can be fast-tracked to more-flexible contract vehicles, for which performers have exemptions from SBA size standards for procurement; no limits on dollar size of procurement; the right to receive sole-source funding agreements; and the ability to pursue flexible ways to add value to an end user, whether that be research, R&D, services, products, production, or any combination thereof.
Direct the SBIR offices of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps to pilot a Strategic Funding Increase (STRATFI) program to help bridge the Valley of Death between Phase II and Phase III SBIR grants, no later than twelve months after designated. Service pilots would replicate the STRATFI program in that SBIR funding ($15 million) would receive matched funding from customers ($15 million) and private funding (up to $30 million).

To increase competition and widen the aperture of firms competing for SBIR grants, the SBA should:

Remove the barrier preventing companies with more than 50 percent backing by VCs or other capital market players to compete for SBIR grants. Small businesses often rely on VC funding to cover the costs of operating as they work to commercialize their products and generate sufficient revenue to sustain their business. This is particularly true in the case of software development, where highly skilled software engineers are the single most expensive operating cost. Placing strict limitations on the ability of these small businesses to compete for SBIR grants is contrary to the SBIR program goal of supporting scientific excellence and technological innovation.
Remove the barrier preventing companies that meet the requirements of being a small business, but are publicly traded, to compete for SBIR grants. Small, high-tech R&D firms go public to continue their ability to raise funds for their capital-intensive technologies. By disallowing them from competing for SBIR grants, the DoD is limiting technology competition among some of the most technology-proficient corners of the industrial base.

To drive deep tech adoption, OSC should develop tools for leveraging external capital market funding for pilot projects to service R&D organizations in FY 2024, with a formalization plan in conjunction with the president’s FY 2025 budget request.

OSC to be given expanded authorities to access capital markets to develop revenue, investment, and credit approaches for defense programs contracting with small-, mid-, and large-cap companies. As an initial step, direct $15 million of external capital market funding to the R&D organization of each military branch to pilot projects that identify two
novel use cases in one or more of R&E’s deep-tech priority areas of quantum technology, biotechnology, or advanced materials that could be leveraged to achieve service-specific missions. The period of performance would be eighteen months. Service end users would provide matched funding of up to 25 percent of total outside funding to pilot these projects.
This would assist in directing capital market funding to the DoD’s mission, providing additional R&D funding and incentives for deep-tech companies to commercialize their technologies, and creating optimization loops that connect technology to warfighter use cases that can help turn basic research into relevant products and services. Lastly, exposure to deep-tech applications would allow service end users to better understand emerging technologies’ applications to future defense requirements. This will help accelerate the well-aligned adoption of these capabilities to meet services’ unique missions at the speed of relevance.
R&D leads will report to DIU’s director and USD(R&E) no more than 180 days past the period of performance on the pilot’s utility, lessons learned, and challenges DoD would face if technology were to be adopted at scale.

Success measures: Meaningful increase in capital market funding for defense-related companies; increased number of companies crossing Valley of Death and program offices integrating commercially developed technology to speed innovation milestones; increased number of production contracts from nontraditional vendors, with more vendors competing for each contract; increased touchpoints between cutting-edge tech and the warfighter/end users; and the identification of specific tech adoption challenges that can be addressed ahead of requirements process for more-seamless tech adoption and integration.

Notional examples: 1) A majority VC-backed company demonstrates a novel capability that provides an advantage over a near-peer adversary and is fast-tracked to SBIR Phase III, through which the firm begins production at scale and crosses the Valley of Death. 2) A publicly traded deep-tech company that qualifies as a small business, now allowed to compete for SBIR grants, begins to develop the foundation of a quantum network for the US military. 3) The army discovers through a biotech pilot project that an advanced material it hoped to put into a program of record does not provide meaningful benefit for the cost and pursues another alternative. 4) The navy uses its OSC pilot to buy hours of time on a quantum computer provided over the cloud, through which the navy discovers the quantum computer’s utility in improving logistics and maintenance. However, the navy does not know how to manage the data being generated and needs an extra data scientist to oversee the process. The navy begins to generate a data governance process, forms a new billet to manage it, and begins determining the best acquisition pathway in anticipation of purchasing quantum computing as a service.

Recommendation 6: Congress, OSD, and SAEs increase incentives and reduce barriers for leading technology companies to do business with the DoD by September 2024.

Addresses challenges 1 and 3.

Increase incentives

Production Contracts. The DoD and Congress in future defense budgets rebalance the ratio of RDT&E and Procurement funding to historical norms over the past thirty years. From 1990 to 2019, the ratio was 39 percent to 61 percent, respectively. This would provide more than $20 billion in additional procurement funds to acquire production quantities faster, leverage commercial R&D, and fuel a broader market for leading technology firms. Increasing production and lowering barriers to entry will attract venture capital firms and bring private research and development funding to the defense market. As most of USD(R&E)’s fourteen critical technologies are commercially driven, this rebalance would enable faster fielding of warfighter priorities.
Set Precedent. USD(A&S) and SAEs report the number of large contracts (i.e., more than $50 million) awarded to start-ups and NDCs annually to measure and convey the trends of the DoD investing in these companies beyond small SBIR awards.
Innovation Funds. USD(R&E) and services include start-ups and NDCs as part of selection criteria for congressionally directed innovation funds.
Show Support. USD(A&S) and SAEs scale the direction, goals, and guidance for working with small and disadvantaged businesses to include technology start-ups and NDCs. Include NDCs as part of the small-business integration working group being established for FY23 NDAA Section 874.
Broaden Access to Capital Markets. Congress and USD(A&S) modernize the use of Defense Production Act Title III and credit loan authorities available to other agencies and departments to dynamically access capital, embrace commercial terms, and strengthen the domestic industrial base capabilities, based on lessons learned from COVID and the war in Ukraine. This use could include purchase commitments and loan guarantees, similar to how the Export-Import Bank works with US companies overseas, to increase incentives and reduce risk for companies seeking to scale production of critical technologies.

Decrease barriers

Congress should raise the cost accounting standards (CAS) threshold to at least $100 million; revise the commercial item exemption in 48 CFR 9903.201-1(b)(6); and make related CAS reforms as recommended by the Section 809 Panel to reduce compliance costs, which are the biggest barrier to entry in defense.
DoD, GSA, and Office of Management and Budget invest in modernizing SAM.gov and related DoD websites that publish contract opportunities to improve user design, alerts, DoD-industry collaboration, processes, and status. Many find SAM.gov onerous to use.

Fully resource and drive the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency to streamline processes, increase staffing, and pursue novel approaches to reduce the large backlog of individual and facility security clearances that impose long delays on contractors to begin work or scale.
USD(A&S) and SAEs assign visible leaders for SBIR, OT (including OT Consortia), Middle Tier of Acquisitions, and Commercial Solutions Openings to champion adoption; set vision; simplify processes; curate leading strategies; and improve guidance, training, structures, and direction to continuously improve adoption. Update policies and guidelines to ensure efforts conducted under OTs count for past performance and small disadvantaged business goals to incentivize industry and government use.
USD(A&S), USD(R&E), and services establish a team to map and improve processes to scale successful research and prototypes into new or existing acquisition programs. This includes requirements, acquisition, budget, contracting, engineering, and testing, among others.

USD(A&S) and SAEs establish a working group, to include primes and NDCs, to explore how to incentivize primes to better leverage technology start-up companies. The objective is to fuel disruptive defense innovation from novel tech companies and leverage the primes to scale integration and production of weapon systems to create an enduring battlefield advantage.

Success measure: USD(A&S) reports an increase in the number of new companies in the industrial base by 5 percent, offsetting the recent trend of 5 percent decrease annually. At least ten NDCs are awarded contracts of more than $50 million that address validated defense requirements. Defense primes significantly increase partnerships, subcontracts, and acquisitions of start-ups and NDCs to integrate their technologies into weapon systems.

Notional example: A leading technology company with viable solutions for defense that historically avoided defense contracts is now receptive (with board support) to pursue contracts given the higher CAS thresholds, reduced unique compliance requirements, and improved clearance processes.

Recommendation 7: USD comptroller proposes streamlined budget justification and chief digital and artificial intelligence officer (CDAO) modernizes supporting details in congressionally accessible information system for the president’s FY 2026 budget request.

Addresses challenge 7.

USD comptroller proposes a format for streamlining budget justification documents in the investment accounts, focusing on cogent six-page program overviews at the BLI/PE level (R-1 and P-1) with hyperlinks to supporting details.
- Seek implementation for the president’s FY 2026 budget request.
CDAO leads the effort to create a query tool and dashboard tied to Advana’s backend data that delivers insight down to the existing level of justification material, allowing for more frequent updates.
- This tool should be capable of replicating Financial Management Regulation Volume 2B, Chapters 4 and 5 presentations.
- Prototype early access to congressional staff with the president’s FY 2025 budget request, in addition to the traditional format.
- This tool should seek to incorporate budget execution data such as quarterly DD1416s and contract obligations as data integration improves.

Success measure: Congressional staff use the new information system for their budgetary and program analysis; staff desires expansion into other accounts, including Operations and Maintenance and Military Personnel.

Notional example: Congressional staff can find up-to-date information on DoD program activities without having DoD officials provide the information directly to a committee.

Recommendation 8: Tying experimentation to acquisition outcomes: Scaling and accelerating successful demonstrations

Addresses challenges 1, 4, and 8.

The DoD and industry invest significant time, funding, and resources to conduct operational exercises that experiment and demonstrate emerging capabilities and technologies in an operationally relevant environment. Even after a major exercise in which senior commanders agree on the success of demonstrated capabilities and demand to acquire these at scale, there is often a two- to four-year lag time for DoD to formally define requirements, secure funding, and shape acquisition and contract strategies. For example, even successful capabilities selected by USD(R&E)’s Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve (RDER) still must go through the Program Objective Memorandum and Deputy Secretary’s Management Action Group processes to begin scaling.

Congress to pilot providing $250 million to scale operationally relevant technologies demonstrated at operational exercises that address the preeminent challenge of deterring the People’s Republic of China, such as RDER. The funds will facilitate the acceleration and scaling of novel capabilities into the hands of the warfighter at the speed of relevance, help vendors cross the Valley of Death, and incentivize new nontraditional companies to work with the DoD. This will significantly shorten the traditionally long lag times for successful vendors to receive funding while the DoD finalizes requirements, funding, and contracts. The associated funds would be particularly useful for the technology needed to integrate military forces that will revolve around digital tools and other foundational “middleware” technologies that sometimes fall in the seams of traditional major hardware-centric acquisition.

The fund should:

Be allocated in FY 2024 spending bill to specific programs or initiatives no later than 180 days from completion of the exercise on discovered solutions.
Be limited to five or fewer high-potential capabilities to ensure they are properly resourced to meaningfully scale.
Be directly allocated to an acquisition organization, such as a program executive office, to rapidly acquire capabilities that have demonstrated success in order to address priority operational risks or opportunities.
Use Defense Production Act Title III or adapt authorities available to other agencies and departments to provide credit guarantees or other funding approaches in support of technology and capability providers.

Success measures: Increased number of technologies and capabilities demonstrated successfully that are transitioned at scale to the warfighter; increased number of vendors incentivized to demonstrate at exercises.

Notional example: A company demonstrates a swarm of small undersea intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance drones at the Rim of the Pacific 2024 exercise. The firm is awarded a low-rate initial production contract within sixty days and deploys its capability with the navy in 2025.

Recommendation 9: USD(A&S) and acquisition executives propose realigning existing organizations to adopt the Space Development Agency (SDA) model, and Congress grants additional enabling authorities to those organizations in FY25 NDAA.

Addresses challenges 2 and 4.

USD(A&S) and SAEs charter a small team to build out a model, structure, key elements, and a framework replicating the SDA and lessons learned from rapid acquisition.
- SDA provides an early model for preemptive disruption within the Space Force. The disruptive units should focus on current technologies from the labs and industry that can be quickly fielded and scaled within existing rapid acquisition authorities. Mature defense and commercial capabilities, along with broader portfolio requirements, can shape a streamlined process. This model builds upon successful organizations like the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, Big Safari, and Special Operations Command’s acquisition and SOFWERX organizations.
Service leadership identifies priority capability areas that are ripe for disruption—ones where the current operational model is outmoded for the digital age and/or where novel technologies offer radically different operational capabilities at greater speed and scale to achieve mission priorities.
Each identified service and defense agency employs an SDA model to a priority capability area and repurposes organizations, funding, and resources to implement.
- Identify the right charismatic leader who embodies these characteristics: high technical acumen, proven product manager, well-defined vision, extensive personal network in warfighting and industry communities, commitment to a five-year tenure, and an intangible “wild card” quality. Provide statutory protections to extend top cover beyond the length of time of political appointees for the new organizations to disrupt entrenched mindsets on major systems, operations, and force structures employed for decades.
DoD leaders continually discuss and iterate on the new model with key stakeholder organizations across the DoD and congressional defense committees.

Success measure: Congressional buy-in, with a small set of targeted projects identified for each organization and underway in FY 2024 to prepare for rapid scaling in FY 2025 with capabilities initially fielded by FY 2027.

Notional example: Navy leadership, in its commitment to autonomous systems, bundles PEO Unmanned and Small Combatants, Task Force 59, Unmanned Task Force, and the director of unmanned systems into a new naval autonomy organization with authorities and flexibilities similar to SDA and related rapid-innovation organizations.

Recommendation 10: Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) and services establish a team to collaboratively modernize JCIDS and service requirements processes by September 2024.

Addresses challenges 2, 4, and.

The DoD’s JCIDS is a complex, disjointed bureaucracy across Joint Staff and the services. The DoD requires a streamlined, tailored requirements framework and processes that iterate operational needs and threats with technology solutions, while also aligning requirements, acquisition, and budget systems.

VCJCS and services charter a team or multiple teams to modernize DoD’s requirements enterprise to include:

Design a requirements framework that better incorporates bottom-up capability requirements from the warfighter and addresses joint strategic capability concerns. It must align service/agency and JROC core processes while allowing some tailoring and flexibility.
Enable a requirements system that breaks from the mindset of locking down all requirements up front to a dynamic model that enables software-intensive commercial solutions and emerging technologies that meet changing or evolving warfighting needs to iteratively shape capability developments.
Overhaul, streamline, and tailor requirements documents based on capability size, urgency, product vs. service, and hardware vs. software. Develop new process to rapidly validate the military utility of a commercial solution instead of the traditional JCIDS.
Aggressively streamline capability requirement development, coordination, and approval timelines from operational commands, through component commands, and Joint Staff. Impose tripwires for exceeding six months for software and twelve months for hardware to get senior leader involvement.
Develop enduring overarching requirements for capability portfolios. Include a set of mission impact measures to focus investments and acquisitions to continuously improve.
Retire the outmoded DoD Architecture Framework and focus on application programming interfaces per DepSecDef’s data decree, architectures, and standards to enable interoperability. Strike the right balance between enterprise, service, and portfolio orchestration with flexibility for program and industry solutions.
Modernize the analysis of alternatives processes to enable a more streamlined and iterative approach that values prototypes, experiments, minimum viable products, and commercial solutions with warfighter and other user feedback over lengthy headquarters staff analysis.
Better integrate threat and technology assessments early and throughout the process.
The team must include external change management experts and collaborate with industry (traditional and nontraditional) and the DoD S&T community to get their input and feedback on providing options to inform DoD requirements.
Develop a career path, structure, and improved training for DoD requirements managers.
Publish new policies, guidance, and templates in dynamic online formats instead of five-hundred-page PDFs.
Congress directs the Government Accountability Office to assess the DoD’s requirements management processes, policies, and practices to include timelines; alignment to the DoD
budget and acquisition processes, mission outcomes, portfolio management; and harnessing commercial technologies.
The Senate Armed Services Committee and/or House Armed Services Committee hold hearings with the VCJCS and the service chiefs on modernizing DoD requirements processes to enable greater speed, agility, and innovation.

Success measure: Joint Staff and service stakeholder organizations collaboratively develop a modern approach to managing defense requirements. The new requirements system integrates the key elements outlined above by September 2024.

Notional example: The Air Force establishes an uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) portfolio requirements document that aggressively streamlines all future UAS requirements, bakes in interoperability standards, and enables many novel commercial solutions.

Conclusions and next steps

This interim report is focused on providing elected officials and senior DoD leaders with actionable recommendations that can be enacted promptly. The Commission discussed and acknowledged broader, strategic matters that will take time to flesh out and implement. These include establishing a more fulsome capital market engagement strategy, harnessing a modern workforce, and exploring digital transformations of enterprise systems to enable broader reforms and opportunities. The Commission’s final report, which is planned for September 2023, will expand upon these ten recommendations to include a broader set of reforms to strengthen defense innovation adoption. It will include case studies that highlight successes in adopting dual-use technologies within short time frames. After all, living through the “decisive decade” means that Americans deserve decisive capabilities to provide for the common defense, in this decade.

Biographies

The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD

Board Director and Co-Chair of the Commission, Atlantic Council; 27th US Secretary of Defense

The Honorable Mark T. Esper is a partner and board member of the venture capital firm Red Cell Partners and a board director at the Atlantic Council. He was sworn in as the 27th Secretary of Defense on July 23, 2019, and served in that capacity until November 9, 2020. He previously served as acting secretary of defense from June 24, 2019, to July 15, 2019. Esper was confirmed as the 23rd secretary of the US Army in November 2017.

In the private sector, Esper was vice president for government relations at the Raytheon Company.

He earlier served concurrently as executive vice president of the US Chamber of Commerce’s Global Intellectual Property Center and as vice president for European and Eurasian affairs from 2008 to 2010. From 2006 to 2007, He was chief operating officer and executive vice president of defense and international affairs at the Aerospace Industries Association.

In addition to his work in the private sector, Esper served in a range of positions on Capitol Hill and in the Defense Department. He served as legislative director and senior policy advisor to former Senator Chuck Hagel. He was a senior professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations and Senate Governmental Affairs committees, policy director for the House Armed Services Committee, and national security advisor for former Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist. During the President George W. Bush administration, he served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for negotiations policy at the Pentagon. He was national policy director to the late Senator Fred Thompson for his 2008 presidential campaign and was a Senate-appointed commissioner on the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 

Esper began his career in the US Army. He is a 1986 graduate of the United States Military Academy and received his commission in the infantry. Upon completion of Ranger and Pathfinder training, he served in the 101st Airborne Division and participated in the 1990-91 Gulf War with the “Screaming Eagles.” He later commanded a rifle company in the 3-325 Airborne Battalion Combat Team in Vicenza, Italy. He retired from the army in 2007 after spending ten years on active duty and eleven years in the National Guard and Army Reserve. After leaving active duty, he served as chief of staff at the Heritage Foundation think tank.

He is a recipient of the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service. Among his many military awards and decorations are the Legion of Merit, a Bronze Star Medal, the Kuwait Liberation Medal, Kuwait Liberation Medal-Saudi Arabia, and the Combat Infantryman Badge. Esper holds a PhD from the George Washington University.

The Hon. Deborah Lee James

Board Director and Co-Chair of the Commission, Atlantic Council; 23rd US Secretary of the Air Force

The Honorable Deborah Lee James is chair of the Defense Business Board and board director at the Atlantic Council. Previously, she served as the twenty-third secretary of the US Air Force and was responsible for the affairs of the Department of the Air Force, including the organizing, training, equipping, and providing for the welfare of its nearly 660,000 active-duty, National Guard, Reserve, and civilian airmen and their families. She also oversaw the Air Force’s annual budget of more than $139 billion. James has thirty years of senior homeland and national security experience in the federal government and the private sector.

Prior to her Air Force position, James served as president of Science Applications International Corporation’s (SAIC’s) technical and engineering sector, where she was responsible for 8,700 employees and more than $2 billion in revenue.

For twelve years, James held a variety of positions with SAIC, including senior vice president and director of homeland security. From 2000 to 2001, she was executive vice president and chief operating officer at Business Executives for National Security, and from 1998 to 2000 she was vice president of international operations and marketing at United Technologies. During the Bill Clinton administration, from 1993 to 1998, James served in the Pentagon as assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs. In that position, she was senior advisor to the secretary of defense on all matters pertaining to the 1.8 million National Guard and Reserve personnel worldwide. In addition to working extensively with Congress, state governors, the business community, military associations, and international officials on National Guard and Reserve component issues, James oversaw a $10 billion budget and supervised a one-hundred-plus-person staff. Prior to her Senate confirmation in 1993, she served as an assistant to the assistant secretary of defense for legislative affairs.

From 1983 to 1993, James worked as a professional staff member on the House Armed Services Committee, where she served as a senior advisor to the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee, the NATO Burden Sharing Panel, and the chairman’s Member Services team.

James earned a BA in comparative area studies from Duke University and an MA in international affairs from Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs.

Eric Lofgren

Professional Staff Member, Seapower and Acquisition Lead, US Senate Committee on Armed Services; Author, Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, Atlantic Council

Eric Lofgren is a professional staff member and the seapower and acquisition lead for the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services. His work on this Commission was completed while he was a research fellow at the Center for Government Contracting in the George Mason University (GMU) School of Business, where he performed research, wrote, and led initiatives on business, policy, regulatory, and other issues in government contracting.

He manages the daily blog Acquisition Talk and produces the Acquisition Talk podcast, on which he interviews leading experts in the field. Lofgren was an emergent ventures fellow at GMU’s Mercatus Center. Prior to joining GMU, he was a senior analyst at Technomics Inc., supporting the Defense Department’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office. He has also supported government analyses for the Government Accountability Office, Naval Sea Systems Command, Canada Public Works, and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Cost and Economics.

Whitney M. McNamara

Vice President, Beacon Global Strategies; Author, Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, Atlantic Council

Whitney McNamara is a vice president at Beacon Global Strategies. Prior to that, McNamara worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, where she served as the S&T portfolio lead at the Defense Innovation Board, whose mission is to provide the secretary of defense, deputy secretary of defense, and other senior leaders with recommendations on emerging technologies and innovative approaches that DoD should adopt to ensure US technological and military dominance.

Before that, McNamara was an emerging technologies policy subject matter expert supporting the Department of Defense’s Chief Information Officer (CIO). Prior to that, she was a senior analyst at national security think tank the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, focusing on emerging technologies, future operating concepts, and informationized warfare in the context of long-term technological and military competition with great powers.

Peter Modigliani

Defense Acquisition Lead,MITRE Corporation; Author, Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, Atlantic Council

Peter Modigliani is a defense acquisition leader within the MITRE Corporation enabling the DoD and intelligence community to deliver innovative solutions with greater speed and agility. He works with acquisition and CIO executives, program managers, the Section 809 Panel, congressional staffs, industry, and academia to shape acquisition reforms, strategic initiatives, and major program strategies.

Modigliani champions digitally transforming the acquisition enterprise to modernize and accelerate operations. He launched MITRE’s digital acquisition platform, AiDA. Prior to MITRE, Modigliani was an Air Force program manager for C4ISR programs and an assistant vice president with Alion Science and Technology, supporting the Air Force Acquisition Executive’s Information Dominance division.

Stephen Rodriguez

Senior Advisor and Study Director of the Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Stephen Rodriguez is a senior advisor with the Forward Defense program at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and founding partner of One Defense, a next-generation strategic advisory firm that leverages machine learning to identify advanced software and hardware commercial capabilities and accelerate their transition into the defense industrial base. He is also a venture partner at Refinery Ventures, an early-scale fund investing in dual-use technologies across the country. Rodriguez began his career at Booz Allen Hamilton supporting its national security practice.

In his capacity as an expert on game-theoretic applications, he supported the US intelligence community, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security as a lead architect for wargames. He subsequently was a vice president at Sentia Group, an artificial intelligence company, and served as chief marketing officer for NCL Holdings, an international defense corporation. Rodriguez serves as a board director or board advisor of ten venture-backed companies—Duco, Edgybees, Hatch Apps, HighSide, Omelas, Uniken, Ursa Major Technologies, Vantage Robotics, War on the Rocks, and Zignal Labs—as well as the nonprofit organizations Public Spend Forum and Training Leaders International. He is also senior innovation advisor at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Clementine G. Starling

Director, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Clementine G. Starling is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program and a resident fellow within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In her role, she shapes the Center’s US defense research agenda, leads Forward Defense’s team of nine staff and forty fellows, and produces thought leadership on US security strategies and the evolving character of warfare. Her research focuses on long-term US thinking on issues like China’s and Russia’s defense strategies, space security, defense industry, and emerging technology. Prior to launching Forward Defense, Starling served as deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security team, specializing in European security policy and NATO.

From 2016, she supported NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division at two NATO summits (Brussels and London) and organized and managed three senior Atlantic Council task forces on US force posture in Europe, military mobility, and US defense innovation adoption. During her time at the Atlantic Council, Starling has written numerous reports and commentary on US space strategy, deterrence, operational concepts, coalition warfare, and US-Europe relations. She regularly serves as a panelist and moderator at public conferences. Among the outlets that have featured her analysis and commentary are Defense One, Defense News, RealClearDefense, the National Interest, SpaceNews, NATO’s Joint Air and Space Power Conference, the BBC, National Public Radio, ABC News, and Government Matters, among others. Starling was named the 2022 Herbert Roback scholar by the US National Academy of Public Administration. She also served as the 2020 Security and Defense fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy. Originally from the United Kingdom, Starling previously worked in the UK Parliament focusing on technology, defense, Middle East security, and Ukraine. She also supported the Britain Stronger in Europe campaign, championing for the United Kingdom to remain within the European Union. She graduated with honors from the London School of Economics with a BS in international relations and history and is an MA candidate in security studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

Mark J. Massa is an associate director in the Forward Defense program. His work focuses on nuclear deterrence strategy and policy. He holds an MA in security studies and a BSFS in science, technology, and international affairs from Georgetown University.

Delharty M. Manson II is a program assistant in the Forward Defense program. His work focuses on defense innovation and operational concepts. He holds a BA in public policy from the College of William & Mary.

Jacob Mezey is a program assistant in the Forward Defense program. His work focuses on nuclear security, space security, and defense innovation. He holds a BA in history from Yale University.

Acknowledgments

This interim report was written and prepared with the support and input of its authors, Commissioners on the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, and the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

This effort was conducted under the supervision of Commission Director Stephen Rodriguez, Forward Defense Director Clementine Starling, and Forward Defense Associate Director Mark J. Massa. Thank you to Julia Siegel and Christian Trotti for earlier contributions. Special thanks to Atlantic Council CEO Fred Kempe and Barry Pavel for their support of this effort.

This effort has been made possible through the generous support of Booz Allen Hamilton as the Foundational Sponsor as well as sponsorship from Accrete AI, ACT1 Federal, Applied Intuition, Palantir, Peraton, Primer AI, Rebellion Defense, Schmidt Futures, and Snowpoint Ventures.

Foundational sponsor

List of acronyms

ATR: Above threshold reprogramming
BLI: Budget line item
CAS: Cost Accounting Standards
CDAO: Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer
DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DepSecDef: Deputy Secretary of Defense
DIU: Defense Innovation Unit
DoD: US Department of Defense
FFRDC: Federally Funded Research and Development Center
GSA: General Services Administration
IRAD: Independent research & development
JCIDS: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
JROC: Joint Requirements Oversight Council
MCWL: US Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
NDAA: National Defense Authorization Act
NDC: Nontraditional defense companies
OSC: Office of Strategic Capital
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense

OT: Other transaction
PE: Program elements
PEO: Program executive officer / office
RDER: Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve
RDT&E: Research, development, testing, and evaluation
S&T: Science and technology
SAE: Service acquisition executive
SBA: Small Business Agency
SBIR: Small Business Innovation Research program
SDA: Space Development Agency
SOCOM: US Special Operations Command
STRATFI: Strategic Funding Increase
UAS: Uncrewed aerial system
USD(A&S): Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
USD(R&E): Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
USD: Under Secretary of Defense
VC: Venture capital / venture capitalist
VCJCS: Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The post Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption interim report appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Defining success for NATO’s Vilnius summit: A primer

Charles Barry and Christopher Skaluba — Tue, 11 Apr 2023 22:03:21 +0000

Success at NATO’s Vilnius summit will require:

Ensuring Ukraine is in as strong a position as possible—politically, militarily, and territorially—to prevail in its war with Russia
Strengthening Ukraine’s relationship with NATO, including by defining a measurable path to membership
Following through on commitments made at NATO’s Madrid summit for a larger number of more ready forces to build deterrence for NATO territory
Enhancing NATO’s nuclear deterrence while more intently integrating its nuclear and conventional deterrence strategies
Committing to increased defense spending, potentially by redefining the target of 2 percent of GDP as a floor, not a ceiling
Taking concrete steps to confront the systemic challenge from China through intensified transatlantic-transpacific cooperation
Welcoming Sweden as a formal member of NATO, quickly integrating Finland and Sweden into core Alliance business, and choosing a new cardinal direction for NATO partnerships
Extending NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s tenure, or replacing him with a candidate who can confidently manage a wartime alliance while communicating a vision for NATO’s next era

Introduction

When a Vilnius summit was agreed two years ago,¹ much of the NATO community anticipated an undramatic gathering, nestled between a monumental 2022 meeting in Madrid to unveil the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept and NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary summit in 2024. While Madrid did, in fact, prove historic with Russia’s war in Ukraine as a backdrop and with Finland and Sweden formally invited to join ranks, the agenda for Vilnius is shaping up to be equally important—grappling, like Madrid, with a devastating war of immense destruction in the heart of Europe, but in a setting just a few dozen miles from the border of Russia-aligned Belarus, where the Kremlin plans to station nuclear arms.²

A successful NATO summit in July requires significant progress on a host of NATO’s political and military priorities, especially those enumerated at Madrid. Yet the first condition for success will be tied to Ukraine’s progress in driving invading Russian forces from its territory so that Kyiv is able to negotiate a permanent peace with Russia. Such a scenario—fully realized or tangibly in the offing—depends on ramped-up military support to Kyiv from the United States and its allies, including more operational flexibility for Ukrainian forces to target Russian firing systems inside Russia.

Getting to Vilnius with all allies unified behind the goal of enabling Ukraine’s victory is the foremost strategic priority for the Alliance. An equal, related goal is to underwrite NATO’s political credibility as a champion and guarantor of the democratic values of its members. NATO is not the sole organization nurturing the liberal global order, but it is a crucial one.

Getting to Vilnius with all allies unified behind the goal of enabling Ukraine’s victory is the foremost strategic priority for the Alliance.

NATO at Vilnius must also take purposeful steps to close the gap between collective defense requirements and available capabilities. With Moscow’s revanchist intentions clearer today than at any time since the end of the Cold War, committing to a new defense investment pledge³ beyond 2024 by updating the controversial 2 percent guideline adopted at the 2014 Wales Summit is critical. The stocks of arms and matériel flowing to Ukraine must be replenished such that NATO’s collective defense is not weakened. Investing in emerging technologies to stay ahead of strategic competitors is just as important.

Considerable resources will be needed to implement NATO’s ambitious Concept for Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA), including new regional plans. Focus on NATO’s Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC) will require emphasis at Vilnius as well, as will the nuclear dimension of NATO’s deterrence strategy. No less important are the resilience of civil infrastructure, military mobility, cyber networks, and logistics.

China also must be high on the Vilnius agenda. Xi Jinping has centralized unprecedented, open-ended power behind Beijing’s growing footprint in Europe and close alignment with the Kremlin. Chinese ownership of European infrastructure and active diplomatic pressure on allies are key concerns, as is China’s increasingly explicit support for the Kremlin’s territorial ambitions in Ukraine.⁴ The inclusion of NATO’s Indo-Pacific partners in the summit agenda must move from symbolism to practical measures.

Alliance leaders expect Sweden at the table as a full Alliance member in Vilnius: both Hungary⁵ and Turkey⁶ approved Finland’s accession in March, while delaying action on Swedish accession amid their ongoing political objections. Whether or not a negotiated way ahead on Sweden is agreed by the time of the Vilnius gathering, the summit should fast-track the ability of Finland and Sweden to participate in core Alliance business, to include operational and defense planning activities aimed at increasing Nordic-Baltic security.

The other side of that coin is redefining NATO partnership initiatives as Finland and Sweden graduate to membership, including defining clearer paths to membership for aspirants, especially Ukraine. Options for a new partnership concept could include renewed focus on neutral European states like Switzerland, Austria, and Ireland or intensifying relationships with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea.

Heads of state and government must also choose a new secretary general to replace Jens Stoltenberg—or choose to extend his role. Given Stoltenberg’s remarkable tenure, which started just after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea, the choice will be a profound one.

The Vilnius summit and the war in Ukraine

NATO is not at war in Ukraine but is unquestionably a stakeholder in the conflict. The Alliance has declared its staunch solidarity with Kyiv. Its leaders have backed President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s goal of wresting all seized Ukrainian territory from Russian control, his justified demands for rebuilding Ukraine’s infrastructure and society, and his calls to hold Russia and its war criminals accountable. The Western world has rejected Russia’s aggression in every NATO and European Union forum and in three overwhelming United Nations General Assembly resolutions,⁷ even amid concerns about the sympathies of the Global South.⁸ NATO has been a vital platform for consensus and coordination among its allies and partners in all dimensions—military, economic, and diplomatic—working alongside the European Union and Group of Seven in unprecedented ways to support Ukraine in an integrated manner.

As a point of fact, no forces under NATO command have ever been stationed in Ukraine and no NATO operation has been conducted there. These truths make for a useful, arms-length counterfactual that the war is solely a conflict between Ukraine and Russia. That individual NATO allies, however, are supporting Ukraine with planning, intelligence, and matériel in a highly coordinated fashion makes NATO’s absence from the battlefield a distinction without a difference to Moscow. Zelenskyy himself has declared Ukraine a “de facto” member of the Alliance.⁹ And the Pentagon-initiated Ukraine Defense Contact Group is primarily a forum for NATO allies and partners. However unfairly, these dynamics invite the Kremlin to gaslight its sympathizers, terrorizing Ukraine while, contrary to verifiable facts, laughably¹⁰ declaring itself the victim of menacing Western aggression.

To date, unwavering Western unity in support of Ukraine has been the strategic key to success on the battlefield. Getting to Vilnius with that solidarity intact is a top priority. The longer the war rages, the more sensitive Western leaders will become to the imperative of public support. Vladimir Putin is counting on outlasting Western patience for support to Ukraine amid rising economic pressures, Kremlin-instigated energy volatility, persistent disinformation campaigns, and the uncertainty of elections in democratic societies. Thus, the most urgent requirement for NATO leaders is to commit to a quick end to the war by helping Ukraine win.

Some of the original caution in providing material support to Ukraine in fear of a Russian escalatory response has given way to a stream of increasingly impactful battlefield contributions, a dramatic and positive trend. To the credit of Ukraine’s backers, as the contours of the war have changed, so has the willingness of allies to increase support. Nevertheless, leaders continue to weigh, often for too long, the balance between providing more advanced weapons—or more tactical flexibility in battlefield employment of those weapons—and keeping all allies on-side. Greater stress must be placed on faster delivery of support, particularly lethal systems.

New Atlanticist

May 18, 2022

Dashboard: Tracking the Western response to the war in Ukraine

By Atlantic Council

Explore the Atlantic Council’s interactive trackers for how the world has responded by sending humanitarian and military aid, redeploying forces, and hammering Russia’s economy.

Economic Sanctions Economy & Business

Ukraine’s immediate imperative is to stop the bombardment of its cities and critical infrastructure while giving its battlefield forces the wherewithal to combat attacking or entrenched Russian positions. That means disrupting or destroying Russian firing systems, many of which are inside Russian territory or at sea. The campaign to silence fires from beyond the battlefield must be undertaken, using precision to minimize collateral damage and the risk of escalation. Ramping up nonlethal support to Ukrainian forces is another top priority. More of such resources can be funded and supplied by NATO without risk of being formally drawn into the war.

When NATO leaders meet in Vilnius the delicate issue of Ukrainian membership will be in the air.¹¹ That Ukraine has demonstrated heroic commitment to Euro-Atlantic collective defense is unquestioned. NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Summit commitment¹² that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members of NATO” is a black eye for the Alliance’s credibility that needs to be addressed in a meaningful way. It is not practical for NATO to commit to Article 5 protection until the war ends positively for Kyiv. Yet NATO must signal how a postwar Ukraine will be defended against future Russian aggression until full membership is realized.

NATO should craft a strong commitment to draw Ukraine permanently closer to the Alliance, with measurable criteria for joining along the lines of membership action plans¹³ for past applicants. Moreover, a well-resourced, multiyear assistance program should map out the transformation of Ukraine’s defense establishment with NATO combat systems, standards, training, logistics, accountability, and interoperability. Annual NATO-Ukrainian exercises should be added to NATO’s calendar, and Ukraine should be a full participant in NATO cyber-defense regimes.¹⁴

Lastly, NATO allies and Kyiv must unite on clearer immediate and long-term strategic war aims and how to obtain them. A silent divergence has existed between Kyiv’s objective—shared by the majority of allies—of pushing Russian forces out of all Ukrainian territory, and a growing number of members who are becoming more equivocal about that central goal. Vilnius provides a venue for leaders to take stock and define a clearer common vision of genuine, lasting peace.

The bottom line is that success in Vilnius will require that Ukraine be in as strong a position as possible—politically, militarily, territorially—for NATO to effectively address the rest of its agenda. Moreover, strengthening Ukraine’s relationship to NATO, including by defining a measurable path to membership, is an essential criterion for success.

Strengthening deterrence and defense at Vilnius

After Ukraine, strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defense will be the most pressing business for heads of state and government in Vilnius. Consensus endorsement on major implementation steps must be reached in pursuit of leaders’ Madrid commitments.

Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 impressed Alliance commanders with the urgent need to transform NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. Change was pursued steadily thereafter, but the senseless February 2022 attack on Ukraine—which made tangible heretofore theoretical threats to nearby NATO territory—galvanized political support and brought dramatic progress. A wholly transformed NATO force posture was drawn up by military leaders in the wake of Russia’s invasion and approved at Madrid in June 2022. Showing concrete progress on these groundbreaking Madrid decisions is a prerequisite for success at Vilnius.

The Madrid-Vilnius nexus marks, in a real sense, the end of the post-Cold War period for the Alliance.

What nations hope to accomplish at Vilnius is the first tranche of the Madrid-directed adaptation of the NATO Force Structure,¹⁵ a posture that is markedly larger and more combat-credible than the previous one based around the NATO Response Force (NRF).

The Madrid-Vilnius nexus marks, in a real sense, the end of the post-Cold War period for the Alliance. For the past thirty years, NATO had steadily moved away from a heavy, forward force posture on the Alliance’s eastern borders to smaller forces at lower readiness levels oriented on crisis response operations beyond NATO territory, Afghanistan most prominently. Forward-deployed forces did not materialize again until 2014, when Russia seized Crimea; thereafter, only rotational battlegroups or “trip wire” forces were positioned on NATO’s eastern frontier. The size, response times, and rotational nature of the NRF epitomized this approach, with little force depth or sustainment capacity to speak of.

Decisions at Vilnius will be the critical steps toward implementing the long-term adaptation of the Alliance’s deterrence and defense posture. The NATO Force Model¹⁶ (NFM) is a new framework to focus allied force structure contributions on robust deterrence and defense, as well as NATO’s other core tasks of crisis response and cooperative security. The NFM provides a marked expansion of NATO’s readiness posture. It calls on nations to earmark several hundred thousand troops across all domains arrayed in a graduated readiness scheme. The NFM calls for several hundred thousand additional troops and supporting capabilities at varying readiness levels, including an Allied Reaction Force (ARF).¹⁷ Indeed, the NFM is reminiscent of NATO’s Cold War posture, appropriately reflecting the reemergence of an openly hostile Russia. However, given NATO’s recent struggles with readiness at lower quantity thresholds, there is ample skepticism about the ability of allies to realize the vision for the NFM.

The backbone of the Madrid adaptation is the Concept for Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA). The concept and supporting plans concentrate on 360-degree force employment to deter and defend today. Underpinning DDA, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is drafting a cluster of plans, including an overarching strategic plan for the defense of NATO territory supported by regional plans and subordinate domain-specific plans. The regional plans will be an especially important deliverable at Vilnius. They will break new ground by assigning forces to specific missions in specific regions of the Alliance, enabling assigned forces to improve effectiveness by gaining close familiarity with the challenges inherent to defending specific terrain. To be credible, these new plans must be based on real-world scenarios, include significant contributions from the United States, give SACEUR increased flexibility to more forces, and be backed by forces that are clearly defined.

To strengthen deterrence against Russia in NATO’s east and southeast, Alliance leaders are expected to endorse the agreed expansion of eight existing battlegroups to brigade-size forces, while considering the establishment of division headquarters to coordinate operations of these framework-nation brigades with host nation forces.¹⁸ In addition, some command and control enhancements, either at the NATO Command Structure (NCS) or NATO Force Structure (NFS) level or both, will be required as well.

A tandem concept to DDA is NATO’s Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC), a framework for developing future deterrence and defense requirements. NWCC is intended to guide members in providing and resourcing the forces necessary for collective defense and crisis response contingencies looking ahead twenty years.¹⁹ NWCC is meant to ensure that the Alliance is not neglecting emerging threats while addressing current ones. Whether NATO can fully realize visions for DDA and NWCC without significant further defense spending is a question NATO leaders will need to wrestle with at the Vilnius summit and beyond.

Key plans for NATO’s adaptation

1. Concept for Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA)
2. Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC)

At their meeting in February 2023 NATO defense ministers agreed a new political guidance 2023 (PG 23) to commence the next cycle of NATO’s Defense Planning Process (NDPP).²⁰ PG 23 constitutes top-level instructions for all aspects of NATO defense planning over the next four years. It provides the context for NATO military commanders to define the minimum capability requirement (MCR) to fulfill a specified level of ambition intended to satisfy NATO’s three core tasks: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. Requirements are apportioned among member states along with readiness levels and other critical measures, including the resilience of forces and sustainment capacity. In Vilnius, Alliance leaders will have a first opportunity to commit their nations to this new level of ambition.

Success in Vilnius will be marked by tangible achievements in the adaptation of NATO’s new force model. That means following through on the Madrid commitment to provide much larger and more ready forces to meet NATO’s level of ambition regarding its core tasks, especially collective defense, and to show credible progress on regional plans to include the assignment of NATO forces to specific territory. Allies will need to increase the present level of forward presence and be prepared to reinforce it further. Whether NATO forces are broadly deployable without major investment in readiness remains a concern such that success at this summit will be defined by the ability of allies to credibly resource these ambitious short- and long-term planning requirements.

Addressing the nuclear dimension of NATO deterrence

Nuclear risks will loom large at Vilnius for three reasons. First, persistent nuclear saber-rattling by the Kremlin, including recent promises to station nuclear weapons in Belarus, is raising concerns that Putin is willing to violate the taboo of nuclear weapon employment. It is difficult to determine how real the prospect of nuclear weapons use is from either public statements or the ambiguous wording of relevant Russian doctrine.²¹ Nevertheless, the routine and casual references to nuclear weapons must be met with strong opposition from NATO leaders. The aftermath of Russian nuclear weapon employment, including through the instigation of a deliberate nuclear event/accident, is something NATO must be prepared for, including both the military and nonmilitary implications for the Alliance. Nuclear use by Russia would trigger a series of actions for NATO and member states—such as bolstering NATO’s conventional posture; changing allied nuclear readiness posture; addressing humanitarian consequences of a nuclear attack; coordinating diplomatic condemnation in international fora; supporting chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense of the Ukrainian military so it can stay in the fight; and planning for a potential rapid military response—that must be planned for in advance.

Second, Russia has suspended its participation in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) of 2010, its last remaining nuclear weapons treaty with the United States. Putin links renewed participation in the treaty to the lifting of Western sanctions triggered by Russia’s war against Ukraine—a condition external to the treaty.²² New START is set to expire in February 2026 and discussions on an extension have yet to take place.²³ Should the treaty formally lapse, the existing gap in nuclear weapons verification will go on indefinitely²⁴ and further raise the nuclear stakes for the Alliance. Moreover, without the treaty limits in place, Russia could quickly expand its nuclear capacity through MIRV warheads or other capabilities. Given that a postconflict Russia is likely to be more reliant on nuclear deterrence while it rearms conventionally, NATO should expect a period of increasing nuclear belligerence and coercion from Moscow.

Third, the expansion of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, including the introduction of both intercontinental- and theater-range hypersonic missile systems as well as a variety of dual-capable intermediate-range missiles that can be launched from air, land, and sea²⁵ create an imperative for NATO leaders to reexamine the Alliance’s nuclear capabilities. Effective deterrence requires sustained investment in systems modernization, readiness of military units, survivability and flexibility of its forces, and exercise of NATO’s complex political-military nuclear decision-making process.

NATO needs the active participation of all allies in urgently committing to enhancing its nuclear deterrence while … integrating its nuclear and conventional deterrence strategies.

The combination of these factors—as well as the reality of China’s growing nuclear capabilities—make it clear that NATO needs the active participation of all allies in urgently committing to enhancing its nuclear deterrence while more intently integrating its nuclear and conventional deterrence strategies. This should include increasing literacy on nuclear issues, developing assertive diplomatic messaging, and enhancing NATO’s nuclear capability, to include modernizing nuclear command and control systems; instituting robust and reliable systems of indications and warning; and reevaluating whether the current posture is sufficient to deter Russia now and into an uncertain future.

Success in Vilnius will require incorporation of most or all these ideas to increase deterrence of an openly hostile, nuclear Russia whose deployed conventional capabilities are proving insufficient in Ukraine. NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group should meet on the margins of the summit itself,²⁶ where allies should commit to a series of actions that will reduce the potential for Russian miscalculation and enhance the overall credibility and effectiveness of NATO’s nuclear deterrent force.

A new defense investment pledge at Vilnius

NATO agreed at its Wales Summit in 2014 to a defense investment pledge committing all allies to “aim” to increase defense budgets to 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2024, while additionally mandating that 20 percent of defense spending be invested in major equipment and research and development. The wisdom of this pledge is a matter of debate in NATO circles. Proponents look at the demonstrable progress in allied defense spending since 2014 and see a successful initiative. Detractors see the investment pledge as politically divisive, both unattainable and inconsequential for many allies, and believe defense spending increases have been driven by aggressive Russian actions rather than by the nonbinding Wales language.

Redefining 2 percent as a floor, rather than as a ceiling, is one idea that is gaining traction.

While only seven of thirty allies met or exceeded the 2 percent goal by the end of 2022 according to the Secretary General’s Annual Report 2022 (SGAR 22), member states did far better on equipment expenditure, with only four of 30 falling short, none by very much.²⁷ These achievements were buoyed by a decade of moderate to strong economic performance and low inflation. However, the return of large-scale war to Europe by the decree of the Kremlin is a significant factor as well. Defense spending among European members on NATO’s frontier with Russia is clearly outpacing member states in other regions of the continent.

Looking ahead, a possible recession in Europe related to growing inflation, persistent energy volatility, and the resources needed to rebuild Ukraine will again generate pressure to shrink defense spending. At the same time, the persistence of a brutal conflict on NATO’s borders—to include the need to replenish NATO matériel stocks given to Ukraine—and the determined revisionist actions of Russia and China are heightening awareness of the need to invest in deterrence. This last point is where NATO leaders should focus, even as economic realities and the controversial experience of the Wales commitment will limit the ceiling for a new spending pledge in Vilnius.

The Wales framework was driven by concerns from Washington about imbalances in spending between the United States and its European allies. Those concerns persist. In Ukraine, for instance, the US government has funded about $50 billion in security assistance. All others in the fifty-nation Ukraine Defense Contact Group have contributed approximately $15 billion.²⁸ Nevertheless, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the tragic consequences for Europe mean the Vilnius debate on defense spending is starting from a higher floor and taking place in a more focused context than in Wales. NATO leaders should use these advantages to keep a positive trajectory on defense spending tied to credibly fulfilling DDA requirements. The war in Ukraine is a stark reminder that the failure to invest in adequate deterrence will drive security costs far beyond even healthy increases in annual defense budgets.

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 16, 2022

Visualizing the NATO Strategic Concept: Five ways to look at the Alliance’s future

By Atlantic Council experts

We asked our experts: With so much happening in the global arena, what topics will be featured in NATO’s Strategic Concept – and how should the Alliance think about addressing them?

Climate Change & Climate Action Cybersecurity

Success in Vilnius will require a commitment to increase defense spending as a necessary step to credibly implementing DDA requirements. Redefining 2 percent as a floor, rather than as a ceiling, is one idea that is gaining traction, although it will come with challenges to political cohesiveness when some allies inevitably miss the mark. Whatever the new benchmark, success in Vilnius will require NATO leaders to fully understand the costs of ambitious plans like DDA and NWCC and publicly commit to resourcing them. Success will also require agreement on the Madrid initiative to expand annual contributions to common funding related to improving defense and deterrence.

Addressing China at the Vilnius summit

China represents a new challenge to the Alliance. NATO leaders first registered their concern in December 2019.²⁹ Since then, they elaborated their apprehensions in summit declarations of 2021 (Brussels) and 2022 (Madrid), as well as in the new NATO Strategic Concept and in the secretary general’s NATO 2030 expert’s study. While China is not yet viewed broadly as a military threat to Europe, its actions are nonetheless destabilizing to transatlantic security and are driving the Alliance into active consultation.

Four concerns for NATO regarding China

1. Growing control of critical European infrastructure
2. Ongoing influence operations
3. Expanding security cooperation with Russia
4. Challenges to the rules-based international order

Xi’s leadership of China has triggered four primary security concerns for the transatlantic community: growing Chinese control of critical European infrastructure under the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); Chinese influence operations undermining NATO and European political cohesion; China’s expanding security cooperation with Russia, including support for the Kremlin’s territorial ambitions in Ukraine; and Xi’s announced challenge to the current rules-based international order. Each of these concerns also animates debates in the European Union about China, offering a promising opportunity for collaboration with the United States.

China’s control over the critical civilian infrastructure on which Alliance operations depend will be a primary concern at Vilnius. China has accumulated ownership stakes in twelve European ports, including the two largest, Rotterdam and Antwerp, and the massive Greek port of Piraeus.³⁰ Recent negotiations for part-ownership of Hamburg’s port may now be complete, alongside growing investment in Germany’s inland rail-river terminus at Duisburg.³¹ China’s extensive infrastructure holdings create the possibility of interfering with NATO, European Union, or national transport operations. China’s typical acquisition strategy involves significant Chinese lending to the host government to improve facilities. Financially desperate countries across Asia, Africa, and now Europe have invited Beijing’s debt-diplomacy exploitation.³²

Chinese state-owned firms Huawei and ZTE have gained substantial penetration in Europe’s 5G telecommunications sector. China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law requires Chinese companies to provide subscriber information to PRC intelligence agencies when directed.³³ Generalized concerns over spyware and specific apprehensions about this law have caused a growing number of NATO allies to avoid Huawei systems, with both the European Union and NATO avoiding Chinese 5G equipment on their primary networks and encouraging their members to do likewise.³⁴ Divesting massive networks of such hardware can take years and incur high costs, as Germany is finding out as it prepares to strip Huawei components from its telecom networks.³⁵

China’s control over the critical civilian infrastructure on which Alliance operations depend will be a primary concern at Vilnius.

Another concern has been Beijing’s political influence across Europe, notably in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In 2012, China launched its “China-CEE” or 17+1 program with a secretariat in Beijing and offices in each CEE country. Cultural centers were set up in CEE countries and Chinese tourism increased. However, when Lithuania opened trade relations with Taiwan, it precipitated a major diplomatic row with Beijing. In 2022, Lithuania and later Latvia and Estonia quit the 17+1 arrangement (while Greece has since joined). Some European countries (e.g., Hungary, Croatia) have succumbed to China’s BRI allure while others have tasted the pressure and rejected it. There is growing evidence that Europeans, tiring of China’s “wolf-warrior” diplomacy and hidden motives, are becoming more inclined to view Beijing skeptically.

The China-Russia “no limits” partnership has been watched closely since its rollout in 2022. The agreement has drawn Moscow and Beijing closer together in their mutual opposition to the United States and its allies.³⁶ The relationship also is based on common political, economic, and military interests. China is buying more Russian energy while Western sanctions are in place and allowing Russia the wherewithal to sustain its revanchist agenda. Nonetheless, there have been signs that Beijing could have a moderating influence on Moscow with respect to Ukraine, such as in November 2022, when Xi told German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz that nuclear weapons should not be used in the conflict. Any possibility that Moscow and Beijing would fall out over Ukraine, however, was controverted when Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Moscow³⁷ on the first anniversary of the invasion amid rumors³⁸ that China would supply Russia weapons to sustain the war. Xi’s follow-on visit to Moscow,³⁹ punctuated by a Beijing-proposed framework⁴⁰ for ending the conflict on terms favorable to the Kremlin, further clarified the depth of the partnership.

Xi’s “Chinese Dream”⁴¹ global agenda is perceived in the West as a rising challenge to the rules-based international order long underwritten by the United Nations and Brenton Wood institutions but also anchored by NATO. That order must be protected from disruption as China’s influence grows, even as these foundational institutions must remain open to adapting to emerging geopolitical realities.⁴²

In Vilnius, NATO will include a session with its Indo-Pacific partners: Australia, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand. A key topic of interest will be the potential for conflict with China over Taiwan, the most critical flash point in US-China relations. A Vilnius discussion on China should include thinking through the security implications for both the European and Indo-Pacific theaters of a US-China conflict over Taiwan. Moreover, NATO should discuss with its Indo-Pacific partners opportunities to include other nations in the region in dialogues with NATO, such as the Philippines, a US treaty ally.⁴³

Success in Vilnius will require NATO leaders to take the next concrete steps in confronting the systemic challenge from China through intensified transatlantic-transpacific cooperation. Including NATO’s Indo-Pacific partners, while important symbolically, needs to be oriented around understanding the challenges of growing Russo-Sino alignment and the military, economic, and industrial implications of a war over Taiwan. To develop collective resilience strategies for mitigation, Allies should address the risks of Chinese investment in civilian infrastructure and share experiences about issues such as intellectual property theft, supply chain risks, and disinformation.

Allies will have other pressing business at the Vilnius summit, none more important than the formal accession of Sweden to NATO.

NATO’s other critical decisions at Vilnius

Allies will have other pressing business at the Vilnius summit, none more important than the formal accession of Sweden to NATO after Finland’s admission to full membership on April 4. The Alliance must overcome the gamesmanship of Turkey and Hungary, who have yet to approve Sweden’s accession, both for political reasons. Most observers believe that Swedish membership is a matter of when, not if, and there is reason to believe that an agreement between Ankara and Stockholm—the crux of the holdup—can be achieved in time for the Vilnius summit.⁴⁴ Fast-tracked involvement in the core operational and defense planning activities of the Alliance—for example, contributions to NATO Enhanced Forward Presence missions, assignment of forces for regional plans, and full integration into the NATO Defense Planning Process—should be a priority for new member Finland and, once its membership is formalized, Sweden.

Finland and Sweden have been the strongest NATO partners, outpacing even other “enhanced opportunity partners”⁴⁵ because of geographic proximity and close operational planning with the Alliance after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. As Finland and Sweden graduate to membership, NATO will have fresh opportunities to energize its remaining 38 partnerships⁴⁶ but should choose a central focus for the future of partnerships. For example, as discussed previously, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific partners in the face of growing Sino-Russian cooperation and to better address security concerns related to China has merit. In this vein, NATO should examine the potential for a new partnership with the Philippines, a US defense treaty ally that has renewed its bilateral security and basing cooperation with Washington because of its concerns about China’s regional assertiveness. Alternatively, deepening partnerships with Switzerland, Austria,⁴⁷ and Ireland is politically important within Europe. Identifying a pathway to membership for Ukraine was addressed earlier in this paper, and similar considerations for aspirants Georgia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldova, and Kosovo can help deter further Russian threats to these countries.

Issue Brief

Aug 22, 2022

Sweden and Finland are on their way to NATO membership. Here’s what needs to happen next.

By John R. Deni

In response to Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, Finland and Sweden took the historic step of applying to join NATO. Both nations will bring modern capabilities that will help defend against malign actors. As Finland and Sweden’s membership is forthcoming, Alliance leaders, NATO watchers, and transatlantic security experts need to consider how to fully integrate the new allies, include them in operational plans, and best enhance defense of a longer border with Russia.

Europe & Eurasia National Security

Finally, choosing the next secretary general to replace Stoltenberg—or to again extend his tenure—demands serious reflection in wartime.⁴⁸ Stoltenberg would leave a significant legacy, having guided NATO through the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, multiple difficult political crises, and now the Russian war in Ukraine. Replacing his level-headedness, diplomatic skill, message discipline, and management acumen will be no easy task. The next secretary general must have a talent for managing NATO from the start in wartime, and a vision for the next era of the Alliance once the war in Ukraine is justly concluded.

Success in Vilnius will see Sweden welcomed as a formal member of NATO and Finland and Sweden quickly integrated into core Alliance business. It will require NATO to settle on a new cardinal direction for its partnerships while reinforcing its catalog of partnerships globally. It will require extending Stoltenberg, or replacing him with a candidate that can confidently manage a wartime alliance while communicating a vision for NATO’s next era.

Conclusion

Success at NATO’s Vilnius summit will require progress and achievement across the range of complex topics addressed in this report as well as a collection of lower-priority issues.

Above all, allies must be unwavering in their determination to end Russia’s aggression against Ukraine as soon as possible, and return Europe to a just and lasting peace. That will require more assertive actions by Ukrainian forces on the battlefield, backed by more aggressive political and material support from NATO allies. The Kremlin must see no alternative beyond withdrawal to its own borders and acceptance of Ukraine’s recognized sovereign territory. In this circumstance, NATO will have reaffirmed its vital role as a champion of the liberal world order.

The Kremlin must see no alternative beyond withdrawal to its own borders and acceptance of Ukraine’s recognized sovereign territory. Then, NATO will have reaffirmed its vital role as a champion of the liberal world order.

Nearly as important is NATO’s commitment to strengthening defense and deterrence of Alliance territory through the New Force Model. That commitment must encompass a new defense investment pledge geared to credibly resourcing DDA requirements, with an emphasis on higher readiness, replenishing depleted stocks, and resilience. Thinking about the emerging capabilities needed for developing NATO’s Warfighting Capstone Concept will be important too.

The Vilnius summit must see NATO take its next concrete steps in identifying opportunities for transatlantic-transpacific cooperation in confronting the systemic challenge from China, including the worrying prospect of intensifying Russo-Sino cooperation. A successful summit will also see Sweden’s formal accession to NATO, a new cardinal orientation for partnerships, and a consensus decision about the next secretary general.

NATO is as united and strong as it has been in many decades as it works hard to end the gravest threat to European peace since the end of the Cold War. The Vilnius summit will be successful if it capitalizes on this unity and energy to take decisive action to restore peace, rebuild deterrence, and prepare for the challenges of the next era.

Charles Barry is a visiting research fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Since 1990, he has assisted senior US and NATO officials in developing three NATO Strategic Concepts and preparing for 14 NATO summits. These views are his own and do not reflect those of the US Department of Defense or the National Defense University.

Christopher Skaluba is the director of the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and formerly the principal director for European and NATO policy and the principal director for strategy and force development in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Staff

Christopher Skaluba

Director

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Security & Defense

Report Mar 16, 2023

The future of NATO C4ISR: Assessment and recommendations after Madrid

By Gordon B. “Skip” Davis Jr.

Current C4ISR capabilities, concepts, policies, and processes do not meet all of the Alliance’s needs. While much has been done to improve NATO C4ISR over the past decade, much work remains.

China Conflict

New Atlanticist Feb 24, 2023

Experts react: How a year of war in Europe remade NATO, and what comes next

By Atlantic Council experts

The war has undeniably re-invigorated NATO. But just how much has changed? Our experts weigh in on the state of the Alliance and where allies should go from here.

Conflict Crisis Management

Report Feb 2, 2023

Implementing NATO’s Strategic Concept on China

By Hans Binnendijk and Daniel S. Hamilton

Allies made it clear that they consider Russia their most immediate and direct threat. Yet they also made headlines by addressing challenges emanating from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

China Europe & Eurasia

Explore more

1 NATO Brussels Summit Communique, NATO, June 14, 2021, Paragraph 79, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_185000.htm

2 See Lukashenka’s statement of March 31, 2023: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belarus-lukashenko-says-russian-nuclear-arms-needed-deter-threats-west-2023-03-31/

3 See Paragraph 19 of NATO ‘s Madrid Summit Declaration (June 29, 2022), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_196951.htm

4 See BBC online article (March 20, 2023) “Ukraine War: What Support is China Giving Russia?” https://www.bbc.com/news/60571253. BBC describes China’s evasion of sanctions to provide Russia with advanced technology for weapons systems and other non-lethal support. It also speculates on impending overt or covert weapons transfers. Politico also reports on Chinese body armor components found on battlefields (March 28, 2023) “China-linked Russian Body Armor is Landing on the Battlefield in Ukraine,” https://www.politico.com/news/2023/03/28/russian-body-armor-china-00089114 China’s diplomatic rhetoric neither condemn Russia’s invasion nor calls for its withdrawal to Russia’s legal borders. See Al Jazeera online article (February 24, 2023) “All You Need to Know About China’s Plan for Russia-Ukraine Talks,” https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/24/all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-plan-for-russia-ukraine-war

5 Petr Tůma “Hungary Has Approved Finland Joining NATO. But its Delays Raise Deeper Concerns,” March 28, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/hungary-has-approved-finland-joining-nato-but-its-delays-raise-deeper-concerns/

6 See the Atlantic Council’s “Experts React: Turkey Moves to Approve Finland’s NATO Membership. Where Does That Leave Sweden?” March 18, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-turkey-moves-to-approve-finlands-nato-membership-where-does-that-leave-sweden/

7 On March 2, 2022 the UNGA adopted a resolution 141 – 5 condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (see UNGA resolution condemning Russia-Ukraine war voting 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293918/unga-resolution-condemning-russia-ukraine-war-voting/ On March 24, 2022 the UNGA voted 140 – 5 demanding civilian protection and humanitarian access in Ukraine (see Ukraine: General Assembly passes resolution demanding aid access, by large majority, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114632 On October 12, 2022 the UNGA in emergency session voted 143 – 5 Condemning the Russian Federation’s Annexation of 4 Eastern Ukrainian Regions (see With 143 Votes in Favour, 5 Against, General Assembly Adopts Resolution Condemning Russian Federation’s Annexation of Four Eastern Ukraine Regions, https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12458.doc.htm)

8 Liz Sly, “A Global Divide on the Ukraine War is Deepening” The Washington Post, February 23, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/22/global-south-russia-war-divided/

9 Robbie Gramer, Jack Detsch, and Amy Mackinnon, “After Putin’s Land Grab, Zelensky Wants to Fast-Track NATO Membership,” Foreign Policy, September 30, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/30/russia-ukraine-nato-membership-zelensky/

10 Juliana Kim, “Russia’s Foreign Minister Gets Laughed At Over Ukraine Remarks at a Global Conference,” National Public Radio, March 4, 2023, https://www.npr.org/2023/03/04/1161128415/russia-foreign-minister-lavrov-laughed-at

11 Lili Bayer, “NATO Treats Fine Line on Ukraine Membership,” Politico, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-nato-membership-dmytro-kuleba-jens-stoltenberg-russia-war-military-assistance/

12 See NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Statement, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm

13 See NATO’s Membership Action Plan, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37356.htm

14 A parallel European Union assistance program should extend to postwar mine clearing and reconstruction, restarting a vibrant Ukrainian economy, and assisting with the reforms essential to an enduring democracy.

15 See NATO Force Structure, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69718.htm The NATO Force Structure is comprised of national and multinational forces nations provide to the Alliance for each specific exercise or operation, at various readiness levels. The new NATO Force Model is a major expansion of the forces being maintained by nations at high readiness levels.

16 See NATO’s Force Model, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220629-infographic-new-nato-force-model.pdf

17 In contrast, the current NRF concept is to rapidly deploy up to 40,000, with initial elements deploying within 15 days. See NATO Response Force, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49755.htm. Also, see “The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2022,” pg. 31, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_212795.htm

18 Each battle group that will expand to brigade size as conditions warrant is a multinational force organized and led by a framework nation (i.e., a lead NATO Ally). Four of the eight battlegroups were agreed in 2017, which were deployed to Poland and the three Baltic states. NATO agreed to four additional battlegroups in 2022, which are being deployed to Bulgaria, Hungary, Romaina and Slovakia. See “NATO’s Military Presence in the East of the Alliance,” https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm Division level headquarters will be activated as required to coordinate these forces with the forces of each respective host nations.

19 DDA is an ACO concept for the here and now; NWCC is an ACT concept for future force development. Both concepts were approved by NATO in 2020. They will each influence resource decisions at the Vilnius summit.

20 See NATO’s Defense Planning Process at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49202.htm

21 Kaushal Sidharth and Sam Cranny-Evans, “Russia’s Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons and Its Views of Limited Nuclear War,” RUSI Commentary, Royal United Services Institute, June 21, 2022, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-nonstrategic-nuclear-weapons-and-its-views-limited-nuclear-war

22 A meeting of New START’s implementing body, the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC), had been set for late 2022 in Cairo to get inspections back on track. Russia canceled just days beforehand, citing US sanctions related to Russia’s war against Ukraine, a matter unrelated to the parties’ legal compliance obligations. Moscow has not responded to US attempts to schedule a new BCC meeting in early 2023.

23 US Department of State, Report to Congress on Implementation of the New Start Treaty, Annual Report, January 13, 2023, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/2022-New-START-Implementation-Report.pdf

24 Rose Gottemoeller, “Resuming New START Inspections Must Be a Critical Goal of Upcoming US-Russia Talks,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 23, 2022, https://thebulletin.org/2022/11/resuming-new-start-inspections-must-be-a-critical-goal-of-upcoming-us-russia-talks/

25 A War Zone online article listed and described new Russian nuclear capabilities: see Joseph Trevithick, “Here’s the Six Super Weapons Putin Unveiled in Fiery Address,” updated June 30, 2019, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/18906/heres-the-six-super-weapons-putin-unveiled-during-fiery-address

26 See “Nuclear Planning Group,” NATO (open website), May 9, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50069.htm

27 See the list of allied spending in Table 3 on page 159 as well as Graph 3 on page 155 in NATO Secretary General’s 2022 Annual Report, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_212795.htm

28 See the Council on Foreign Relations article by Jonathan Masters and Will Merrow updated 22 February 2023: https://www.csis.org/analysis/aid-ukraine-explained-six-charts The U.S. has, by January 2023, committed to $46.6 billion in military aid (and $76.8 billion in aid overall, including financial and humanitarian aid). The top 20 other military aid providers committed $17.4 billion; however, they roughly equaled or exceeded the United States in aggregate financial and humanitarian aid (EU included). See https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts

29 See NATO’s London Leaders Meeting Declaration, December 4, 2019, Paragraph 6, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm

30 The PRC does not appear to hold a comprehensive list of its overseas port investments. However, a National Public Radio (NPR) article notes an OECD study that maps twelve Chinese investment ports in Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Netherlands. (Other studies describe Chinese stakes in additional ports in Italy and Portugal.) See Johanna Karkissis, “Chinese Firms Now Hold Stakes in Over a Dozen European Ports,” in China Unbound series, NPR, October 9, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/10/09/642587456/chinese-firms-now-hold-stakes-in-over-a-dozen-european-ports

31 Karkissis, “Chinese Firms Now Hold Stakes,” NPR; see also John Xie, “China’s Global Network of Shipping Ports Reveal Beijing’s Strategy,” Voice of America, September 13, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/6224958.html

32 Franklin D. Kramer, China and the New Globalization, Atlantic Council, January 20, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/china-and-the-new-globalization/

33 See Bonnie Girard in The Diplomat. February 23, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/the-real-danger-of-chinas-national-intelligence-law/

34 Oliver Noyan, “EU Countries Keep Different Approaches to Huawei on 5G Rollout,” EurActiv, May 19, 2021, https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/eu-countries-keep-different-approaches-to-huawei-on-5g-rollout/

35 Philip Alvares de Souza Soares, Dana Heide, Moritz Koch, and Dietmar Neuer, “Government Plans to Ban Huawei and ZTE in the German Network,” Handelsblatt, March 7, 2023 [in German] https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/5g-netz-regierung-plant-verbot-von-huawei-und-zte-im-deutschen-netz/29019480.html

36 Hans Binnendijk and Daniel S. Hamilton, Implementing NATO’s Strategic Concept on China, Section D, Atlantic Council, February 2, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/implementing-natos-strategic-concept-on-china/

37 Amy Hawkins and Andrew Roth, “China and Russia Deepen Ties as Top Diplomat Tells Putin Crisis is ‘Opportunity,'” The Guardian, February 22, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/22/china-russia-reaffirm-close-ties-putin-meets-top-diplomat-wang-yi

38 “NATO Chief Urges China Not to Back Russia’s War in Ukraine,” CBS News, February 22, 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-ukraine-nato-chief-urges-china-not-to-back-russia-war/

39 “Putin, Xi Pledge Friendship but Talks Yield No Ukraine Breakthrough,” Reuters, March 24, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-meets-dear-friend-xi-kremlin-ukraine-war-grinds-2023-03-20/

40 See “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis,” https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230224_11030713.html

41 Xi first described the Chinese Dream shortly after assuming power in 2012. He associates the Dream with the national rejuvenation he sees as returning China to a dominant position in world affairs, including security. See https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-22726375

42 Henry Kissinger, “The Evolution of International Order,” and “Where Do We Go From Here?,” in Kissinger’s World Order (New York: Penguin Press, 2014).

43 Olivia Cretella, “NATO and the Philippines: The First Step Towards a Strategic Partnership,” Commentary, NATO Association of Canada (website), November 8, 2021, https://natoassociation.ca/nato-and-the-philippines-the-first-step-towards-a-strategic-partnership/

44 “Turkey’s NATO Talks with Sweden and Finland to Resume on March 9,” Reuters, February 27, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/turkeys-nato-talks-with-sweden-finland-resume-march-9-2023-02-27/

45 See NATO’s Partnership Interoperability Initiative, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132726.htm

46 NATO will have 38 partner nations (and 32 member nations) once Sweden joins Finland in matriculating to membership status. Note: 3 memberships – Afghanistan, Belarus, and Russia are presently suspended by the NAC for security reasons.

47 Liam Hoare, “Austria – It’s Time to Join NATO,” Politico, March 3, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/austria-its-time-to-join-nato-russias-invasion-ukraine-leopard-2-tanks-gas-membership-raiffeisen-bank-kronospan-and-egger/

48 Lili Bayer, “A Wartime NATO Struggles to Replace its Chief,” Politico, April 5, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/war-nato-struggle-replace-jensstoltenberg-ursula-von-der-leyen/

The post Defining success for NATO’s Vilnius summit: A primer appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Belarus accuses Ukraine of plotting terrorist attack

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 07 Apr 2023 18:23:57 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Belarus accuses Ukraine of plotting terrorist attack against Russian consulate

On April 4, Belarusian state-controlled TV channel ONT aired a documentary titled “Loud failures of the Ukrainian special services in Belarus. Gaspar did not get in touch.” Reports from Belarus’ State Security Committee (KGB) informed much of the program, which asserted that, under the leadership of Ukrainian special services, a network of Russian and Belarusian citizens planned several terrorist attacks in the Belarusian city of Grodno. The alleged perpetrators reportedly planned to target several facilities, including the Consulate General of Russia, a military enlistment office opposite Zhiliber Park, a military unit in southern Grodno, and two oil depots.

The KGB claimed that Vyacheslav Rozum, an alleged employee of the Main Directorate of Intelligence in the Ukrainian defense ministry, planned the attacks. Ukrainian authorities had not commented on the accusations at the time of writing. According to the documentary, Rozum asked Russian citizen Daniil Krinari, known as Kovalevsky, to form a network of people to carry out terrorist acts. Krinari was reportedly arrested in Grodno in December 2022 and extradited to Russia at the request of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). He was charged in Russia for cooperating with Ukraine and acting in the interests of Ukraine. The Belarusian KGB asserted that, before his extradition, Krinari managed to recruit at least two people, Russian citizen Alexei Kulikov and Belarusian citizen Vadim Patsenko. Kulikov had allegedly fled Russia in 2022 to avoid conscription and moved to Belarus.

The ONT documentary includes interviews with Kulikov and Patsenko, who argue that Rozum asked them to take photos and videos of the target facilities in Grodno. Moreover, Patsenko argued that Vyacheslav tasked him with blowing up an oil depot with a drone. The program claims Ukrainian special services promised Kulikov and Patsenko $10,000 each. While Patsenko and Kulikov allege that Ukrainian security services were involved in the operation, the ONT program does not include concrete evidence to prove this claim.

The documentary also contains an interview with Nikolai Shvets, the main suspect behind a February 26, 2023, attack on an AWACS A-50 Russian military aircraft at Machulishchy airfield in Belarus. Shvets is reported to be a Russian-Ukrainian dual citizen and served in the Ukrainian army. In the ONT interview, he claimed he was working with a person from the Ukrainian security service while planning the sabotage. The Belarusian independent media outlet Nasha Niva reported that Maxim Lopatin, one of arrested suspects in the Machulishchy attack, had a broken jaw when he filmed the ONT doumentary. Nasha Niva suggested that he was possibly beaten by Belarusian law enforcement authorities. Belarus arrested more than twenty people in connection to the February aircraft incident and announced on April 3 that the suspects were charged with committing an act of terrorism, for which the maximum sentence is capital punishment. However, the ONT program again provides no concrete evidence linking Shvets to Ukrainian security services.

In addition, the ONT documentary aired on the same day that Alyaksandr Lukashenka met Sergey Naryshkin, the head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, in Minsk to discuss joint counterterrorism measures undertaken by Belarus and Russia.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Identifying potential host sites for Russian tactical nuclear weapons

On March 28, Belarus confirmed it would accept Russian tactical nuclear weapons. The announcement came after Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on March 25 plans to store tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, promising to build a nuclear weapons storage facility in the country. Putin made the comments after the United Kingdom said it would supply Ukraine with ammunition containing depleted uranium. “The heavy metal is used in weapons because it can penetrate tanks and armour more easily due to its density, amongst other properties,” Reutersreported. On April 4, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu reported the transfer of Iskander-M tactical missiles, which are nuclear capable and have been utilized by the Russian military against Ukraine.

Two days after the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, on February 26, 2022, Belarus approved via referendum constitutional amendments to remove the country’s non-nuclear status. The constitutional change allows Belarus to host nuclear weapons for foreign states.

Amidst the speculation surrounding Russia’s nuclear deployment to Belarus, the most pressing questions concern the potential location of airfields capable of nuclear deployment and which type of equipment is nuclear capable in terms of maintenance and modernization efforts.

Along with the confirmed transfer of the Iskander-M missiles (a mobile, short-range ballistic missile system with a range of up to 500 kilometers), Sukhoi Su-25 fighter jets are also a top contender in the Russian and Belarusian aviation arsenals. This aircraft is capable of carrying two nuclear bombs, which the Russian military categorizes as “special aviation bombs.” In June 2022, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka personally called on Putin to help upgrade and retrofit the Belarusian Su-25 fleet to be nuclear-capable. This resulted in a long-term project to enable Belarusian nuclear capabilities, legalize hosting Russian nuclear technology and nuclear-capable craft, enable joint-training programs for aviation sorties, and direct training for Belarusian pilots.

In conjunction with the Su-25’s capabilities against Ukraine’s current air defence networks and Russia’s non-strategic nuclear policy, Belarus’ acceptance of Russian tactical nuclear weapons can be viewed as escalatory. Video footage showed the Su-25’s capacity to evade Ukraine’s man-portable air defence system (MANPAD).

https://twitter.com/ua_ridna_vilna/status/1569048817110077445

Video footage from the cockpit of a SU-25 aircraft demonstrating its maneuverability and evasion of MANPAD systems. (Source: ua_ridna_vilna/archive)

On April 2, the Russian envoy to Minsk announced that the nuclear weapons deployment would occur along Belarus’ western border. The exact location has not been specified, but Belarus has a number of bases along its western border, including Osovtsy, Ross, and Bereza. However, Lida is a primary staging base for the Belarusian fleet of SU-25s, and open-source researchers have confirmed a large presence of the aircraft on the base. Currently, Osovtsy is not one of the highly utilized bases in Belarus, but its proximity to the western border, especially in terms of proximity to Poland and the northern border of Ukraine, makes it a primary location to watch for potential signs of development, land-clearing operations, and heightened military activity.

Map showing Belarus’ western border and highlighting the locations of the Lida, Ross, and Osovtsy airbases. (Source: DFRLab via Google Maps)

—Kateryna Halstead, Research Assistant, Bologna, Italy

Individuals linked to Russian army form ‘angry patriots club’

On April 1, former Russian army commander Igor Strelkov (also known as Igor Girkin) published a video announcing the formation of the “angry patriots club” (Клуб рассерженных патриотов). According to Strelkov, the club aims “to help Russian armed forces” and “meet the stormy wind that will soon whip our faces as one team.” In the video, Strelkov says that Russia “is moving toward military defeat” because “we got into a long, protracted war for which our economy turned out to be completely unprepared. Neither the army nor the political system was ready for it.” In a Telegram post, Strelkov said the club “was created two weeks ago. So far, organizational issues have not been resolved publicly.” Strelkov previously played a crucial role in forming a separatist movement in the Donbas region.

The video also featured a statement from Pavel Gubarev, who in 2014 proclaimed himself the commander of the Donbas People’s Militia. In the video, he says, “We are angry that we are going from one defeat to another, and nothing changes.” He called the system in Russia “thievish and corrupt” and said the Russian elite are “elite in catastrophe.”

The video further featured Vladimir Grubnik, who in 2015 was arrested in Ukraine in connection to an explosion near a Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) building in Odesa; in 2019, he was part of a prisoner exchange and returned to the Russian forces in Donbas. Grubnik said that defeat would lead to Russia falling apart.

Vladimir Kucherenko, an Odesa-born Russian propagandist better known by his pen name Maksim Kalashnikov, said, “We are not afraid to criticize the actions of the government. Why? Because it can somehow help victory. Otherwise, they will do nothing, they will not move.” He called the Russian elite “looters,” “resource grabbers,” and “corrupts.” He predicted the war would turn into “carnage to death” and that the “corrupt Russian elites” would organize a coup that would “betray the country” by agreeing to Russia’s “separation” and “giving up of nuclear arms” in order to “earn the forgiveness of the West.” In 2015, the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture included Kucherenko in the list of Russians “threatening national security.”

Another figure in the video is Maksim Klimov, a pro-Kremlin military expert, who said, “The authorities do not know the real situation.” He added, “They do not hear nor see what is happening in the special military operation zone.” Klimov also did not rule out Russia’s defeat.

The video gained some traction online, garnering 177,000 views on YouTube at the time of writing and 623,600 views and 2,500 shares on Strekov’s Telegram channel. According to TGStat, most of the shares on Telegram came from private accounts. Many Ukrainian media outlets reported on the newly founded club. The DFRLab did not identify any mainstream Russian media outlets reporting on the club besides Kommersant, a Kremlin-approved media outlet focused on business.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Resident Fellow, Riga, Latvia

Russian propaganda reaches Ukrainian users via Facebook ads

This week, the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security (CSCIS) and Ukrainian civil society members reported that Facebook advertising campaigns are being used to spread negative content about Ukraine. The ads range from posts that claim “Romania wants to annex Ukrainian territories” to videos that claim “This is the end. There are no men to fight for Ukraine.” While these campaigns were quickly de-platformed and the pages sharing them were banned, the DFRLab was able to investigate some of the ads via the Facebook Ad Library. The DFRLab previously reported on Facebook ads promoting pro-Russia disinformation to Ukrainian users.

The ads included links to the website luxurybigisland.net, with some ads sharing variations of the URL, such as luxurybigisland.net/rbk or luxurybigisland.net/pravda. The website was built using the Russian website builder Tilda, and its the landing page featured German text that translates to, “Nothing that can’t be removed. We care for your textiles as gently as possible with the utmost care, iron and steam, so that you can enjoy your clothes for a long time. We care.” The same phrase appeared on the now-defunct Tilda-made website google-seo-top.com and the website of a German textile care company. Registration data for luxurybigisland.net is redacted, but WhoIs data for google-seo-top.com shows that the website was registered in Russia. Both luxurybigisland.net and google-seo-top.com include metadata, shown in Google results, that states, in German, “the USA are against the entire world.”

A composite image of a Google search result showing google-seo-top.com (top) and an archive of luxurybigisland.net (bottom) sharing an identical German phrase in their metadata. (Source: Google/Google cache, top; Luxurybigisland.net/archive, bottom)

One URL shared in the ads, luxurybigisland.net/pravda, remained online at the time of writing. The URL redirects to a forged article mimicking the Ukrainian news outlet Pravda. The article shared in the ads never appeared on the authentic Pravda website, but its byline cited a genuine journalist working at the outlet. The DFRLab confirmed the article was a forgery by reviewing the journalist’s author page on the authentic Pravda website, reviewing Pravda’s archived section, conducting a Google search for the forged headline, and then a more specific website search via Google.

Visually the forged website is identical to the authentic one and even features links to contact information copied from the original website. However, the forged website’s image format is different. The text of the forged article claims that the Ukrainian economy is heavily damaged and that “continuation of the war will lead to even greater losses in the economy.” The data shared in the article appears to be copied from multiple media sources and is not false, but the article’s framing contains pro-Russian sentiments as it calls for Ukraine’s surrender.

A second forged article, discovered by CSCIS, was shared on the now-offline URL luxurybigisland.net/RBK. The article mimicked the website of the reputable Ukrainian outlet RBC.

Meta itself has taken – and continues to take – action against similar cross-platform, pro-Russia networks that push users to websites designed to impersonate legitimate news organizations. The DFRLab could not tie its identified assets to those previous Meta actions, but there is some probability that they were related given the similarity of behavior.

A Facebook page with “Cripto” in its name shared some of the ads. The DFRLab identified another Facebook page with the word Cripto in the name sharing pro-Kremlin narratives via Facebook ads. The ads pushed a false story claiming there was a “riot in Kyiv over losses.” CSCIS previously debunked another narrative pushed by a similarly named page that also fomented anti-Ukrainian military sentiment.

A composite image of two ads from pages with “cripto” in the name. The first, at left, is the Facebook page identified by the DFRLab, while the second, at right, is an earlier ad previously identified by CSCIS. (Source: Cripto ukijed, left; Cripto nucergeq, right)

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Poland and Ukraine sign cooperation deal for production of tank shells

During Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Poland, Polish manufacturer Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa and Ukroboronprom signed a cooperation agreement for the joint production of 125-mm tank ammunition. The agreement assumes that the deployment of new production lines will be in Polish cities and the agreement indicates that they plan to produce a large amount of ammunition for 125-mm guns. The decision to start production in Poland was made due to the high risks of Russian missile attacks on production facilities if they were to be based in Ukraine. In place of locating the production in the country, the Ukrainian side will provide technologies and highly qualified specialists with experience in production. This will be the second factory that will produce 125-mm tank shells.

The supply of shells is of particular importance to Ukrainian forces, which are preparing a counter-offensive in southern and eastern Ukraine as heavy fighting with the Russian army continues in the Bakhmut and Donetsk regions.

Separately, German manufacturer Rheinmetall is building a service center for Western military equipment used by Ukraine’s armed forces in Romania, Reuters reported on April 2. The construction for the center is already underway in the Romanian city of Satu Mare, close to the country’s border with Ukraine. The hub is expected to open later this month.

This development is happening against the background of diplomatic activity and statements. Ukraine is not ready to sign any peace agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin, but the war could end as early as this year, according to an April 5 interview with Ukraine’s Minister of Defense Oleksii Rezniko, who said, “I think this war will end soon. Of course, I would like it not to start, but I personally believe in this year as a year of victory.”

Rezniko also commented on a statement made in March by Czech Republic President Petr Pavel, who claimed that Ukraine had only one chance to conduct a successful counter-offensive this year. “I think that the president of the Czech Republic now speaks more like a military man than a politician, and the logic of the military is such that they constantly calculate the worst options. But even if this is his assessment, it is subjective, and he still lays down useful for us. The message is that European countries should unite more powerfully and strengthen assistance to Ukraine,” said Reznikov. Later, Andriy Sybiha, an adviser to Zelenskyy, told the Financial Times that Kyiv is willing to discuss the future of Crimea with Moscow if its forces reach the border of the Russian-occupied peninsula.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

The post Russian War Report: Belarus accuses Ukraine of plotting terrorist attack appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Pressuring Ukraine into a premature peace would only encourage Putin

Andriy Zagorodnyuk — Mon, 03 Apr 2023 18:40:15 +0000

With the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine now in its second year, the international debate continues over where the war is going and how it might end. While nobody would dispute that peace is desperately needed, there are still deep divisions over how this might best be achieved and what a potential future peace could look like.

Over the past year, there has been growing recognition throughout the democratic world that unless Putin is decisively defeated, any peace will be temporary in nature and the threat of further Russian aggression will remain. Nevertheless, many commentators continue to advocate for a compromise with the Kremlin that would allow Moscow to secure certain gains from its invasion of Ukraine in exchange for an end to hostilities.

Arguments in favor of a compromise peace are typically positioned in pragmatic terms as a “realist” approach to resolving the conflict. However, supporters of a negotiated settlement often appear to underestimate the revisionist realities and imperial ambitions underpinning the aggressive foreign policy of the Russian Federation.

One example of this troubling trend was the recent publication “Avoiding a Long War” by Samuel Charap and Miranda Priebe. This important report offered valuable analysis of the debate over how to end the war, but also contained some proposals that illustrate the potential dangers of pursuing a premature peace. In a March 7 letter to the Financial Times, the authors asserted that I had mischaracterized their report and created a false binary between supporting Ukraine’s resistance and engaging in “immediate and unconditional negotiations.” I respectfully disagree.

The authors claim not to argue that Ukraine’s willingness to talk should be made a condition for receiving aid, but the report itself appears fairly unambiguous on this issue. “The United States could decide to condition future military aid on a Ukrainian commitment to negotiations,” it states. “Setting conditions on aid to Ukraine would address a primary source of Kyiv’s optimism that may be prolonging the war: a belief that Western aid will continue indefinitely or grow in quality and quantity.”

The idea of compelling Ukraine to negotiate with Russia by conditioning military aid is problematic. Any such steps would inevitably encourage Russia to continue hostilities and would strengthen the already existing conviction in Moscow that Western support for Ukraine is a temporary phenomenon. Putin’s belief that Russia can ultimately outlast the West is no secret and has been widely commented on. Imposing any kind of limits on military support for Ukraine or linking this aid to negotiations would further convince Putin that he is right to question Western resolve.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

One of the key positions shared by this report and many other arguments in favor of a compromise settlement is the notion that negotiations are inevitable as neither Russia nor Ukraine can realistically achieve a decisive military victory. This seems excessively pessimistic from a Ukrainian perspective, particularly in light of the Ukrainian army’s stellar achievements over the past year and the shocking performance of the Russian military.

Such thinking indicates that the lessons of recent history have not yet been fully digested. On the eve of the Russian invasion, most international analysts dramatically underestimated Ukraine’s military capabilities and expected Kyiv to fall in a matter of days. With the war now in its fourteenth month, Ukraine has already liberated around half the territory seized by Russia since February 24, 2022. Is the idea of further Ukrainian successes really so far-fetched?

Arguments that negotiations are inevitable also overlook Russia’s own apparent intransigence. At this stage, there is nothing to suggest the Kremlin has any genuine interest in reaching a lasting settlement. On the contrary, Moscow continues to insist Ukraine acknowledge the loss of approximately 20% of the country’s territory along with millions of Ukrainian citizens. This is not a serious negotiating position; it is a call for Ukraine’s capitulation. Anyone who suggests Russia’s demands could serve as the basis for a lasting peace is deluding themselves. Anyone arguing for Ukraine to accept such terms is inviting more war.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Instead of exploring ways to push Ukraine back to the negotiating table, the international debate should be focusing primarily on measures to pressure Russia into ending its invasion. These measures could include expanded military aid for Ukraine, additional sanctions against Russia, and international war crimes litigation.

Compelling the victim to offer concessions may appear the route of least resistance, but this would only bring short-term relief. Russia would be emboldened by any gains in Ukraine and would soon renew its aggressive behavior. This would pose an immediate threat to the rest of Ukraine itself, and to a number of additional countries including Moldova, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Belarus.

Other authoritarian regimes would also note Russia’s success in Ukraine and draw the obvious conclusions for their own foreign policies. A negotiated settlement at Ukraine’s expense would make the world a far less stable and more dangerous place for many years to come.

For Ukraine, continued resistance is not merely an alternative to an unpalatable peace. Nobody wants peace more than the Ukrainians themselves, but they also recognize that a premature peace would mean abandoning millions of their compatriots to the horrors of permanent Russian occupation while placing the entire existence of Ukraine as an independent state in doubt.

Arguments in favor of peace are certainly welcome and deserve to be heard. However, they risk doing more harm than good if they fail to acknowledge the Putin regime’s commitment to destroying the Ukrainian state, and the grave threats this poses to the future of international security.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk is chairman of the Center for Defence Strategies and Ukraine’s former minister of defense (2019–2020).

In this context, Pakistan cannot afford complacency regarding its growing terrorism threat. The TTP’s operational capacity has grown significantly following the takeover of the Afghan Taliban next door, and it along with peer militant groups present an existential threat to Pakistan’s security and the stability of its neighborhood.

To understand how Islamabad should respond to this heightened threat, South Asia Center Distinguished Fellow Shuja Nawaz led a series of conversations with experts about fighting terrorism and militancy in Pakistan.

The interviews have been categorized into three segments:

State security, cross-border dynamics, and law enforcement, featuring Sen. Mushahid Hussain, Lt. Gen. Aamer Riaz, and IGP Naveed Khan.
Society, human security, and government-people social contract, featuring Dr. Farhat Taj, MP Mohsin Dawar, and Dr. Madiha Afzal.
A conversation with Inspector General Police Tariq Parvez, former inspector general of police and the first coordinator of the National Counter Terrorism Authority of Pakistan (NACTA).

Part I

State security, cross-border dynamics, and law enforcement

Featuring

Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed is a current Pakistani Senator and Chairman of the Senate Defence Committee. A graduate of the Georgetown Master of Science in Foreign Service (MSFS) program (Class of 1975), Senator Hussain Sayed has a distinguished career in the Pakistan public service as a four-time elected senator from the Islamabad Federal Capital. His public service career also includes positions as the Chairman of the Prime Minister’s Task Force on Central Asia (1992), Leader of Pakistan’s Delegation to the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva (1993), Special Assistant to the Prime Minister (handling relations with the U.S. & Central Asia) (1993), and Minister for Information, Culture & Tourism (1997-1999).

Lt. Gen. Aamer Riaz (Retd) was commissioned in the Pakistan Army in 1984. He commanded two corps, one on the western border and one on the eastern border and held various higher staff assignments, namely, Chief of Staff of a corps and Director, General Military Operations Directorate at GHQ. Lt. Gen. Riaz held instructional assignments at various military institutions and also remained president of National Defence University Islamabad. During his service, he remained engaged in military diplomacy to bring peace and stability in the region. Lt. Gen. Riaz has had speaking engagements at several civil and military institutions. Lt. Gen. Riaz is also a member of the board of governors of a newly established National University of Security Sciences, NUSS.

Inspector General Naveed Khan was born in Kohat, Pakistan in 1950. He graduated from Punjab University (Lahore) and joined the Police Service of Pakistan in 1972. Khan served as the Head of several district and divisional Police forces, provincial and federal intelligence agencies in KPK and as Commandant of Paramilitary force (Frontier Constabulary). He spent 5 years in the Middle East as a diplomat. His last posting before retirement in August 2010 was the Inspector General of Police, KPK province where he headed a 75,000 strong police force in the most difficult period during the height of Taliban militancy.

Return to top

Part II

Society, human security, and government-people social contract

Featuring

Dr. Farhat Taj has a Ph.D. degree in Sociology of Law. She is associate professor at the University of Tromso, Norway. She has also worked as Assistant Director, Colleges and as Planning Officer (education) in the government of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. She successfully led three field research projects (2011, 2011 and 2012) for the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, IDMC Geneva, on conflict-driven displacement in the northwest of Pakistan. Dr. Taj also conducted independent research funded by the Norwegian Writers Association and Fritt Ord. The research is reported in her books, Taliban and Anti-Taliban (2011) and The Real Pashtun Question (forthcoming 2016).

Mohsin Javed Dawar is a Member of the National Assembly of Pakistan from North Waziristan, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the National Assembly of Pakistan, and Central Chairman in the National Democratic Movement. He is the co-founder of the human rights movement Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM). He has formerly served as president of the National Youth Organisation (NYO) and the Pashtun Students Federation (PSF), the allied wings of the Awami National Party (ANP). From 11 to 14 March 2022, he was part of the Pashtun National Jirga, which was held in Bannu to discuss the critical issues faced by Pashtuns in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Dr. Madiha Afzal is a David M. Rubenstein Fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC. Her research lies at the intersection of political economy, development, and security, with a focus on Pakistan. She previously worked as an assistant professor of public policy at the University of Maryland, College Park. Dr. Afzal is the author of “Pakistan Under Siege: Extremism, Society, and the State,” published by the Brookings Institution Press in 2018. She has also published several journal articles, book chapters, policy reports, and essays.

Return to top

Part III

A conversation with Inspector General Police Tariq Parvez on the rise of terrorism and militancy in Pakistan

Tariq Parvez joined the Police Service of Pakistan in the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police in 1973 and retired in the rank of Inspector General of Police in 2008, from the post of Director General of Federal Investigation Agency, Pakistan. Terrorism in the name of religion started in Pakistan, on a sustained basis in 1990 from Punjab. Parvez dealt with the phenomenon indirectly as DIG of Gujranwala, Bahawalpur, and Lahore from 1993 to 1997. In 1997, he was posted as Executive Head of Counter Terrorism Department Punjab, thus dealing directly with extremism and terrorism. He was awarded Sitara e Imtiaz by the President of Pakistan in 2004 for services in the field of CT. Parvez was posted as the Director General of the Federal Investigation Agency from 2005 to 2008 and dealt with terrorism at the national level. After retirement he was tasked to establish the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) and appointed its first National Coordinator. Presently he is a member of NACTA’s committee of experts as well as President, Advisory Board, National Initiative against Organized Crime.

Shuja Nawaz: In light of the recent attack on the Peshawar mosque, the bombing that killed large numbers of people, I wanted to ask you whether you see a similarity in the way the government is approaching this incident, as it handled the nine-year-old incident when the army public school in Peshawar was attacked and many lives were lost. Subsequently, attacks took place in Balochistan also where up to sixty people in one attack were killed. Do you see a similarity?

Tariq Parvez: Before I respond to your question specifically, I would like to give a brief overview of the context. 2009 was the worst year ever in Pakistan in terms of terrorist attacks in a year. Ever since then, there was a consistent and significant decline in the number of terrorist attacks over 2009-2020. In fact, the number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan decreased by almost 95 percent during these years. Then in 2021, we witnessed a reversal in this trend. For the first time in ten years, the terrorist attacks in 2021 were more than the terrorist attacks in the preceding year, i.e., 2020. A cause for further concern was that during 2022 this trend continued and the realization that this was not a short-term development, but a more sustained trend.

I wasn’t surprised by this reversal of trend. Why? For two reasons. Number one, that while we got the short-term objectives right in countering terrorism, we erred in terms of formulating long-term policies and responses to the terrorist threat. The result was, that while we succeeded in effectively dealing with the terrorist threat in the short term, from 2009 to 2020, this effectiveness could not be sustained. The reasons were two-fold. One, the counter-terrorism effort was, primarily, military led, with the civilian institutions playing a secondary role. This was an ad-hoc approach because, for the long-term solution to succeed, you should let the civilian institutions, whose role it is to counter terrorism, play their role. That was one weak area in our earlier response. The second weak area was that our entire focus was on kinetic actions. Of course, eliminating these militant networks is required, and kinetic actions are a very important part of counter-terrorism, but that doesn’t mean that the non-dynamic part, the ideological part, the part that deals with the factors that breed terrorism, should be ignored. We chose only the kinetic approach. So while the TTP, the main terrorist organization in Pakistan, went down and was cleared from the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) it wasn’t eliminated. Its ideology continued to resonate with segments of our society, because we had ignored addressing the non-kinetic dimension. And as soon as it got an opportunity to come up, it did.

One important factor for the recent resurgence of terrorism by TTP in Pakistan was the change of its leadership. The TTP leader Mullah Fazlullah was killed in a reported drone attack in June 2018. He was succeeded by a leader from the Mehsud tribe again, Mufti Noor-Wali Mehsud. He focused on uniting the TTP factions. The TTP had become a fragmented organization with about twenty factions and they all were fighting each other. In fact, it was easier for the government to deal with factions, but now after two years of his efforts, he brought back all the factions and hence we are confronted with a united TTP once again. That is one factor, is important for the resurgence of terrorism, and more important than this unification is the takeover by the Taliban in Afghanistan which helped the TTP in two ways. One, it was a huge morale booster: the TTP morale had been low. They were down in the dumps. Suddenly they stood up and said, “well if the Taliban can defeat the American army and its allies, we can do it also.” Number two, their main safe haven was Afghanistan and so they got a very important sanctuary which was not there earlier. Now they can move freely, and they have active assistance also. That is the basic reason why we see the resurgence.

Coming back to your question on the response of the Pakistani state, one of the weak areas of the response now is the Pakistan state itself is in a very weak position compared with 2009. Today we have political instability, we have an economic meltdown, and we have these security issues.

Coming back to your question on the response of the Pakistani state, one of the weak areas of the response now is the Pakistan state itself is in a very weak position compared with 2009. Today we have political instability, we have an economic meltdown, and we have these security issues.

Unless the government is completely focused on dealing with the terrorism and is not consumed by these issues of economic survival, or political partisanship, the terrorists may survive for long. They take economic and political chaos in Pakistan as an opportunity. We need to act comprehensively against them, focusing equally on kinetic and non-kinetic measures, to defeat them in the long term. We have to drain the swamp that breeds them.

SN: What non-kinetic actions need to be taken?

TP: Non-kinetic actions means two or three things. Number one, countering the narrative of the TTP. Unless the narrative of the TTP resonates with the roots of the TTP and within their strongholds, they’re not likely to get volunteers. We didn’t do anything to counter that ideology. That is one area of a non-kinetic aspect that we ignored. A second area is that we took a very important decision of merging Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province with FATA districts. FATA was a stronghold of the terrorists. The feedback which I have gotten from the people there about the commitments made to the people of the FATA in terms of investments for their development were not fulfilled. So what has happened is that while we have formally and institutionally made former FATA part of the KP province, we did not follow up with the promises which we made, and the result of that is resentment amongst the local population which provides fertile ground for the TTP.

Another factor that I think was a policy decision to open negotiations with the TPP. I think that was an ill-advised move, not well thought out. It was probably not inclusive. By inclusive, I mean having all points of views of the local inhabitants contributing to it. It was confined to a very small group of people who decided to go ahead with it. I remember police officers in Swat told me they were informing the government that there were reports by the local inhabitants of sighting Taliban, although in small groups, in their villages. It was pointed out that it may be a planned return of the Taliban to their villages in Swat. No one paid any heed to these police reports. And then the Taliban told the locals that “we are coming here as the result of an agreement. We have been allowed to leave Afghanistan and come back to our homes in the villages in Pakistan.” They expressed their surprise that the local police were not told about this agreement. The police weren’t aware of it, the local people weren’t aware of it.

We were told by the decision makers that “they are Pakistanis, who had left their homes as a result of the military operations against the terrorists, and they have to come back to their country.” They are Pakistanis, certainly, but they are criminals, they are terrorists. I think we were in too much of a hurry or trying to be too generous in taking them back. But thank God, thank God the people of Swat protested in a very powerful way, against the return of these members of TTP back to their homes and villages. As a result of these massive public protests against the return of the TTP members, the government was forced to give up the repatriation and resettlement plan of these Afghanistan based TTP members.

SN: What are the ties between the TTP and Punjabi militant organizations?

TP: Before the TTP came into existence in 2007, we used to have two terrorist organizations based in Punjab, v.i.z. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, which was focused exclusively on targeting Shias, and Jaish-e-Mohammed, which was Punjab-based and with strong roots in South Punjab. In fact, that was the mother organization that fed other jihadist Islamist militant groups. After the emergence of the TTP, militancy in Pakistan became predominantly, if not primarily, a Pakhtun phenomenon. And the Punjabis slowly slid into the background. Maybe there are some factions which did fight in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban against the Coalition forces. But, I think the link now is much weaker than it was. In fact, this is a very important point that you raise. The TTP might be looking for ties in the Punjab, to expand its activities to the biggest province of Pakistan, instead of confining itself to Pakhtun communities.

The militant organizations which held anti-Shia agendas have gone into the background. But those elements of militancy in Afghanistan who are anti-Shia are looking for alternative sources of support.

Another important point I would like to highlight is the anti-Shia sentiment in Pakistan. The militant organizations which held anti-Shia agendas have gone into the background. But those elements of militancy in Afghanistan who are anti-Shia are looking for alternative sources of support. In Afghanistan, the Islamic State-Khorasan has a strongly anti-Shia agenda and is looking for allies in Pakistan. In the years ahead, we might witness a resurgence of sectarian terrorism in Punjab, through a liaison between the Afghanistan-based IS-K and anti-Shia militants, spread over into many religiously motivated terrorist organizations like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Mohammad, even TTP, because all these militant organizations belong to the Sunni subsect of Deobandis, which has streaks of anti-Shiaism.

SN: So, who needs to coordinate the fight against militancy and terrorism inside Pakistan? Will it be NACTA?

TP: Absolutely. In fact, that was the original rationale for NACTA. Based on my own experience, I found that one weak area of counter-terrorism was that the provinces were acting in silos. The federal government, its Intelligence Bureau (IB), and the provinces, were not in touch with each other. ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) and IB were not partnering or sharing information. There was no formal structure for collaboration. Whatever happened was sort of informal, on a friendly basis or whatever. That is why I proposed that there should be an organization which gives unity to the anti-terrorism effort, and that has to be a civilian institution. I remember people used to ask me, you are setting up NACTA, what if the military doesn’t cooperate? My reply was that the basic problem is the lack of coordination between the civilian agencies. Even the provinces are not talking to each other. So in the first place let the civilian intelligence bureau, and other civilian agencies share that information, and then after the ISI would also join in.

The main point that I want to make is that the need of NACTA is based on the fact that there is no oversight body to inform the government about the implementation of the various policy layers. I don’t know who is supposed to do it.

A twenty-point National Action Plan to counter terrorism was formally launched after the Peshawar public school incident in December 2014. It was expressly stated in the National Action Plan that for every point (twenty in all, I was a member of that committee so I know), specific action plans will be drawn up with specific measurable objectives. And for that the PM (prime minister) of Pakistan at that time, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, set up thirteen committees. But no follow-up occurred, because NACTA could not play an effective role due to various reasons.

Second, while the set of players for kinetic action are the military and the criminal justice system, for non-kinetic measures, a different set of players is needed, maybe headed by media experts, IT (information technology) specialists, development experts, religious leaders, youth leaders, education experts, etc. Carrying out the non-kinetic aspect of counter-terrorism through military or police is not likely to be effective, because it is not their expertise or field. So if there is a civilian organization that would give greater importance to this effort, then let us move forward with that.

A lot of initiatives to win the hearts and minds of youth are being taken in Balochistan, but when I meet the Baloch youth, they care about the disappearances.

A lot of initiatives to win the hearts and minds of youth are being taken in Balochistan, but when I meet the Baloch youth, they care about the disappearances. They forget the good part, but they remember that so-and-so’s brother was picked up, so-and-so has been killed. We have to take these views into account.

I think NACTA is the way forward, although at present I don’t think an all-powerful interior minister is going to let it go. But I remember the day you told me that the DG-ISI (director-general, Inter-Services Intelligence) had said to you that if NACTA reports to the prime minister, we will cooperate. I hope that comes to pass.

Return to top

Moderated by

Fellow

Shuja Nawaz

Distinguished Fellow

South Asia Center

Security & Defense Politics & Diplomacy

About Shuja Nawaz Other Pakistan Experts

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

Webster in China-Russia Report: Putin to put tactical nukes in Belarus, with PRC’s apparent approval

mzandi — Sun, 26 Mar 2023 19:11:15 +0000

Original source

The post Webster in China-Russia Report: Putin to put tactical nukes in Belarus, with PRC’s apparent approval appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Defeating the Wagner Group

Alia Brahimi — Thu, 23 Mar 2023 14:39:42 +0000

In Season 1, Episode 1 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi speaks with the author and former mercenary Dr. Sean McFate about his three-pronged strategy for defeating the Wagner Group. They also discuss internal dynamics within the Kremlin-linked private military company, the dangerously outsized influence of its leader in the war in Ukraine, and Sean’s argument that there’s nothing more unconventional today than a conventional war– and that this is borne out by the way that Russia is fighting in Ukraine.

“There’s this natural schism, between for-profit and not-for-profit warriors. Let’s just widen that schism in the Russian instance.”

Sean McFate, author and former mercenary

Find the Guns For Hire podcast on the app of your choice

About the podcast

Middle East Programs

Explore More

The post Defeating the Wagner Group appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The 5×5—Conflict in Ukraine’s information environment

Simon Handler — Wed, 22 Mar 2023 04:01:00 +0000

Just over one year ago, on February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of neighboring Ukraine. The ensuing conflict, Europe’s largest since World War II, has not only besieged Ukraine physically, but also through the information environment. Through kinetic, cyber, and influence operations, Russia has placed Ukraine’s digital and physical information infrastructure—including its cell towers, networks, data, and the ideas that traverse them—in its crosshairs as it seeks to cripple Ukraine’s defenses and bring its population under Russian control.

Given the privately owned underpinnings of the cyber and information domains by technology companies, a range of local and global companies have played a significant role in defending the information environment in Ukraine. From Ukrainian telecommunications operators to global cloud and satellite internet providers, the private sector has been woven into Ukrainian defense and resilience. For example, Google’s Threat Analysis Group reported having disrupted over 1,950 instances in 2022 of Russian information operations aimed at degrading support for Ukraine, undermining its government, and building support for the war within Russia. The present conflict in Ukraine offers lessons for states as well as private companies on why public-private cooperation is essential to building resilience in this space, and how these entities can work together more effectively.

We brought together a group of experts to provide insights on the war being waged through the Ukrainian information environment and take away lessons for the United States and its allies for the future.

#1 How has conflict in the information environment associated with the war in Ukraine compared to your prior expectations?

Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Baltics, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council:

“As the war in Ukraine started, everyone was expecting to see Russia conducting offensive information influence operations targeting Europe. Yes, we have identified and researched Russia’s coordinated information influence campaigns on Meta’s platforms and Telegram. These campaigns targeted primarily European countries, and their execution was unprofessional, sloppy, and without much engagement on respective platforms.”

Silas Cutler, senior director for cyber threat research, Institute for Security and Technology (IST):

“A remarkable aspect of this conflict has been how Ukraine has maintained communication with the rest of the world. In the days leading up to the conflict, there was a significant concern that Russia would disrupt Ukraine’s ability to report on events as they unfolded. Instead of losing communication, Ukraine has thrived while continuously highlighting through social media its ingenuity within the conflict space. Both the mobilization of its technical workforce through the volunteer IT_Army and its ability to leverage consumer technology, such as drones, have shown the incredible resilience and creativity of the Ukrainian people.”

Roman Osadchuk, research associate, Eurasia, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council:

“The information environment was chaotic and tense even before the invasion, as Russia waged a hybrid war since at least the annexation of Crimea and war in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. Therefore, the after-invasion dynamic did not bring significant surprises, but intensified tension and resistance from Ukrainian civil society and government toward Russia’s attempts to explain its unprovoked invasion and muddle the water around its war crimes. The only things that exceeded expectations were the abuse of fact-checking toolbox WarOnFakes and the intensified globalization of the Kremlin’s attempts to tailor messages about the war to their favor globally.”

Emma Schroeder, associate director, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council:

“The information environment has been a central space and pathway throughout which this war is being fought. Russian forces are reaching through that space to attack and spread misinformation, as well as attacking the physical infrastructure underpinning this environment. The behavior, while novel in its scale, is the continuation of Russian strategy in Crimea, and is very much living up to expectations set in that context. What has surpassed expectations is the effectiveness of Ukrainian defenses, in coordination with allies and private sector partners. The degree to which the international community has sprung forward to provide aid and assistance is incredible, especially in the information environment where such global involvement can be so immediate and transformative.”

Gavin Wilde, senior fellow, Technology and International Affairs Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:

“The volume and intensity of cyber and information operations has roughly been in line with my prior expectations, though the degree of private and commercial activity was something that I might not have predicted a year ago. From self-selecting out of the Russian market to swarming to defend Ukrainian networks and infrastructure, the outpouring of support from Western technology and cybersecurity firms was not on my bingo card. Sustaining it and modeling for similar crises are now key.”

#2 What risks do private companies assume in offering support or partnership to states engaged in active conflict?

Aleksejeva: “Fewer and fewer businesses are betting on Russia’s successful economical future. Additionally, supporting Russia in this conflict in any way is morally unacceptable for most Western companies. Chinese and Iranian companies are different. As for Ukraine, supporting it is morally encouraged, but is limited by many practicalities, such as supply chain disruptions amid Russia’s attacks.”

Cutler: “By providing support during conflict, companies risk becoming a target themselves. Technology companies such as Microsoft, SentinelOne, and Cloudflare, which have publicly reported their support for Ukraine, have been historically targeted by Russian cyber operations and are already familiar with the increased risk. Organizations with pre-conflict commercial relationships may fall under new scrutiny by nationally-aligned hacktivist groups such as Killnet. This support for one side over the other—whether actual or perceived—may result in additional risk.”

Osadchuk: “An important risk of continuing business as usual [in Russia] is that it may damage a company’s public image and test its declared values, since the continuation of paying taxes within the country-aggressor makes the private company a sponsor of these actions. Another risk for a private company is financial, since the companies that leave a particular market are losing their profits, but this is incomparable to human suffering and losses caused by the aggression. In the case of a Russian invasion, one of the ways to stop the war is to cut funding for and, thus, undermine the Russian war machine and support Ukraine.”

Schroeder: “Private companies have long provided goods and services to combatants outside of the information environment. The international legal framework restricting combatants to targeting ‘military objects’ provides normative protection, as objects are defined as those ‘whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage’ in a manner proportional to the military gain foreseen by the operation. This definition, however, is still subject to the realities of conflict, wherein combatants will make those decisions to their own best advantage. In the information environment, this question becomes more complicated, as cyber products and services often do not fall neatly within standard categories and where private companies themselves own and operate the very infrastructure over and through which combatants engage. The United States and its allies, whether on a unilateral of supranational basis, work to better define the boundaries of civilian ‘participation’ in war and conflict, as the very nature of the space means that their involvement will only increase.”

Wilde: “On one hand, it is important not to falsely mirror onto others the constraints of international legal and normative frameworks around armed conflict to which responsible states strive to adhere. Like Russia, some states show no scruples about violating these frameworks in letter or spirit, and seem unlikely to be inhibited by claims of neutrality from companies offering support to victimized states. That said, clarity about where goods and services might be used for civilian versus military objectives is advisable to avoid the thresholds of ‘direct participation’ in war outlined in International Humanitarian Law.”

#3 What useful lessons should the United States and its allies take away from the successes and/or failures of cyber and information operations in Ukraine?

Aleksejeva: “As for cyber operations, so far, we have not seen successful disruptions achieved by Russia of Ukraine and its Western allies. Yes, we are seeing constant attacks, but cyber defense is much more developed on both sides than before 2014. As for information operations, the United States and its allies should become less self-centered and have a clear view of Russia’s influence activities in the so-called Global South where much of the narratives are rooted in anti-Western sentiment.”

Cutler: “Prior to the start of the conflict, it was strongly believed that a cyber operation, specifically against energy and communication sectors, would act as a precursor to kinetic action. While a WannaCry or NotPetya-scale attack did not occur, the AcidRain attack against the Viasat satellite communication network and other attacks targeting Ukraine’s energy sector highlight that cyber operations of varying effectiveness will play a role in the lead up to a military conflict.”

Osadchuk: “First, cyber operations coordinate with other attack types, like kinetic operations on the ground, disinformation, and influence operations. Therefore, cyberattacks might be a precursor of an upcoming missile strike, information operation, or any other action in the physical and informational dimensions, so allies could use cyber to model and analyze multi-domain operations. Finally, preparation for and resilience to information and cyber operations are vital in mitigating the consequences of such attacks; thus, updating defense doctrines and improving cyber infrastructure and social resilience are necessary.”

Schroeder: “Expectations for operations in this environment have exposed clear fractures in the ways that different communities define as success in a wartime operation. Specifically, there is a tendency to equate success with direct or kinetic battlefield impact. One of the biggest lessons that has been both a success and a failure throughout this war is the role that this environment can play. Those at war, from ancient to modern times, have leveraged every asset at their disposal and chosen the tool they see as the best fit for each challenge that arises—cyber is no different. While there is ongoing debate surrounding this question, if cyber operations have not been effective on a battlefield, that does not mean that cyber is ineffective, just that expectations were misplaced. Understanding the myriad roles that cyber can and does play in defense, national security, and conflict is key to creating an effective cross-domain force.

Wilde: “Foremost is the need to check the assumption that these operations can have decisive utility, particularly in a kinetic wartime context. Moscow placed great faith in its ability to convert widespread digital and societal disruption into geopolitical advantage, only to find years of effort backfiring catastrophically. In other contexts, better trained and resourced militaries might be able to blend cyber and information operations into combined arms campaigns more effectively to achieve discrete objectives. However, it is worth reevaluating the degree to which we assume offensive cyber and information operations can reliably be counted on to play pivotal roles in hot war.”

A parallel terrain: Public-private defense of the Ukrainian information environment

Untangling the Russian web: Spies, proxies, and spectrums of Russian cyber behavior

Hackers, Hoodies, and Helmets: Technology and the changing face of Russian private military contractors

#4 How do comparisons to other domains of conflict help and/or hurt understanding of conflict in the information domain?

Aleksejeva: “Unlike conventional warfare, information warfare uses information and psychological operations during peace time as well. By masking behind sock puppet or anonymous social media accounts, information influence operations might be perceived as legitimate internal issues that polarize society. A country might be unaware that it is under attack. At the same time, as the goal of conventional warfare is to break an adversary’s defense line, information warfare fights societal resilience by breaking its unity. ‘Divide and rule’ is one of the basic information warfare strategies.”

Cutler: “When looking at the role of cyber in this conflict, I think it is critical to examine the history of Hacktivist movements. This can be incredibly useful for understanding the influences and capabilities of groups like the IT_Army and Killnet.”

Osadchuk: “The information domain sometimes reflects the kinetic events on the ground, so comparing these two is helpful and could serve as a behavior predictor. For instance, when the Armed Forces of Ukraine liberate new territories, they also expose war crimes, civilian casualties, and damages inflicted by occupation forces. In reaction to these revelations, the Kremlin propaganda machine usually launches multiple campaigns to distance themselves, blame the victim, or even denounce allegations as staged to muddy the waters for certain observers.”

Schroeder: “It is often tricky to carry comparisons over different environments and context, but the practice persists because, well, that is just what people do—look for patterns. The ability to carry over patterns and lessons is essential, especially in new environments and with the constant developments of new tools and technologies. Where these comparisons cause problems is when they are used not as a starting point, but as a predetermined answer.”

Wilde: “It is problematic, in my view, to consider information a warfighting ‘domain,’ particularly because its physical and metaphorical boundaries are endlessly vague and evolving—certainly relative to air, land, sea, and space. The complexities and contingencies in the information environment are infinitely more than those in the latter domains. However talented we may be at collecting and analyzing millions of relevant datapoints with advanced technology, these capabilities may lend us a false sense of our ability to control or subvert the information environment during wartime—from hearts and minds to bits and bytes.”

#5 What conditions might make the current conflict exceptional and not generalizable?

Aleksejeva: “This war is neither ideological nor a war for territories and resources. Russia does not have any ideology that backs up its invasion of Ukraine. It also has a hard time maintaining control of its occupied territories. Instead, Russia has many disinformation-based narratives or stories that justify the invasion to as many Russian citizens as possible including Kremlin officials. Narratives are general and diverse enough, so everyone can find an explanation of the current invasion—be it the alleged rebirth of Nazism in Ukraine, the fight against US hegemony, or the alleged historical right to bring Ukraine back to Russia’s sphere of influence. Though local, the war has global impact and makes countries around the world pick sides. Online and social media platforms, machine translation tools, and big data products provide a great opportunity to bombard any internet user in any part of the world with pro-Russia massaging often tailored to echo historical, racial, and economic resentments especially rooted in colonial past.”

Cutler: “During the Gulf War, CNN and other cable news networks were able to provide live coverage of military action as it was unfolding. Now, real-time information from conflict areas is more broadly accessible. Telegram and social media have directly shaped the information and narratives from the conflict zone.”

Osadchuk: “The main difference is the enormous amount of war content, ranging from professional pictures and amateur videos after missile strikes to drone footage of artillery salvos and bodycam footage of fighting in the frontline trenches—all making this conflict the most documented. Second, this war demonstrates the need for drones, satellite imagery, and open-source intelligence for successful operations, which distances it from previous conflicts and wars. Finally, it is exceptional due to the participation of Ukrainian civil society in developing applications, like the one alerting people about incoming shelling or helping find shelter; launching crowdfunding campaigns for vehicles, medical equipment, and even satellite image services; and debunking Russian disinformation on social media.”

Schroeder: “One of the key lessons we can take from this war is the centrality of the global private sector to conflict in and through the information environment. From expedited construction of cloud infrastructure for the Ukrainian government to Ukrainian telecommunications companies defending and restoring services along the front lines to distributed satellite devices, providing flexible connectivity to civilians and soldiers alike, private companies have undoubtedly played an important role in shaping both the capabilities of the Ukrainian state and the information battlespace itself. While we do not entirely understand the incentives that drove these actions, an undeniable motivation that will be difficult to replicate in other contexts is the combination of Russian outright aggression and comparative economic weakness. Companies and their directors felt motivated to act due to the first and, likely, free to act due to the second. Private sector centrality is unlikely to diminish and, in future conflicts, it will be imperative for combatants to understand the opportunities and dependencies that exist in this space within their own unique context.”

Wilde: “My sense is that post-war, transatlantic dynamics—from shared norms to politico-military ties—lent significant tailwinds to marshal resource and support to Ukraine (though not as quickly or amply from some quarters as I had hoped). The shared memory of the fight for self-determination in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s to early 1990s still has deep resonance among the publics and capitals of the West. These are unique dynamics, and the degree to which they could be replicated in other theaters of potential conflict is a pretty open question.”

DFRLab confirms aerial strikes on industrial plants north of Bakhmut

The post The 5×5—Conflict in Ukraine’s information environment appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: DFRLab confirms aerial strikes on industrial plants north of Bakhmut

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 17 Mar 2023 14:07:42 +0000

Security

Battle for Vuhledar highlights tensions between Wagner and Russian defense ministry

Tracking narratives

Russian channels amplify Quran desecration video

International response

European allies train Ukrainian forces on tank operation

DFRLab confirms aerial strikes on industrial plants north of Bakhmut

Russian armed forces continue their offensive inside the contested city of Bakhmut. At the time of writing, the western part of Bakhmut remained under Ukrainian control, with the Bakhmutka River acting as a buffer zone between the artillery and infantry forces deployed on either side of the waterway. Russian missile and aerial strikes targeted intermediary positions to push back Ukrainian armed forces, from Yahidne in the north towards Bakhmut industrial plants.

The DFRLab collected open-source satellite imagery dating back to the first two weeks of March to document missile strikes on an industrial plant in the north of Bakhmut. The imagery was collected from the European Space Agency’s Sentinel hub using images provided by satellite constellation Sentinel-2.

Analysis of the damage inflicted on buildings in the area reveals that potential missiles struck buildings belonging to two different industrial plants. The easternmost plant is the Bakhmut non-ferrous metals factory.

Satellite imagery showed the factory’s main building was destroyed, with a second building damaged. Traces of burns on the roof of the building can be seen from an explosion. This building belongs to the Makiivka metal construction plant.

Sentinel-2 satellite imagery north of Bakhmut released on March 4, 2023, annotated by the DFRLab. (Source: DFRLab via ESA/Sentinel-2, Ukraine Control Map)

Sentinel-2 satellite imagery north of Bakhmut released on March 14, 2023, with DFRLab annotations. Dark spots on the bottom show a damaged building belonging to the metal construction factory. Destroyed houses seen in the top left part of the image are where the non-ferrous metal factory once stood. (Source: DFRLab via ESA/Sentinel-2, Ukraine Control Map)

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Battle for Vuhledar highlights tensions between Wagner and Russian defense ministry

Eastern Ukraine continues to be a key arena for clashes as Russian forces attempt to advance in the directions of Vuhledar and Bakhmut. Ukrainian forces are using remote mining near Vuhledar, according to a March 16 report from UK defense intelligence. The remote anti-armor mine system (RAAMS) makes it possible to create an anti-tank minefield up to seventeen kilometers away from the firing unit. The United Kingdom reported that Ukraine was also firing the mines behind advancing Russian forces, leading to additional losses in the event of a retreat. The United Kingdom also reported that there is a “realistic possibility” that Russia’s push for Vuhledar is driven by the Russian defense ministry’s desire to produce better results than Wagner, who are driving Russia’s tactical progress towards Bakhmut.

The UK report supports the DFRLab’s analysis that the ongoing offensive operations in eastern Ukraine are provoking a competition between the different military units, particularly Wagner and the Russian defense ministry. In the direction of Bakhmut, Wagner’s forces continue to be the primary units fighting within the city. However, the combat has been difficult, and the urban environment makes progress challenging. In addition, Chechen forces in Bakhmut continue to fight alongside the Ukrainian army against Russian positions.

Russian forces are also having issues restoring tanks, according to a report published by Ukrainian outlet Defense Express. The 103rd armored repair plant in Russia has reportedly not been able to restore T-62 tanks under the terms originally contracted, which would have required the plant to restore twenty-two to twenty-three tanks per month. According to Defense Express, however, the real capacity of the plant is likely around seven tanks per month. On March 6, UK defense intelligence reported that Russia was deploying outdated T-62 tanks to the battlefield due to major losses in armored equipment.

Acts of sabotage against occupying Russian forces continue in the direction of Kherson. On March 11, the Telegram channel of the pro-Ukraine resistance movement Atesh reported that its members blew up a railway line in the Kherson region, between Radensk and Abrykosivka. This appears to be an attempt by Atesh partisans to impede logistics for the Russian troops deployed in the area.

Ukraine has also reported new arrests of alleged Russian infiltrators. On March 16, the Security Service of Ukraine reported the detention of two women accused of tracking the movement of Ukrainian equipment in the interest of Russian intelligence. The women also allegedly photographed the results of attacks on Ukrainian facilities. One of the women reportedly worked as a nurse in Ukraine’s territorial defense combat unit.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian channels amplify Quran desecration video

Footage emerged online on March 15 showing the burning of the Islamic holy book, the Quran. Russian social media channels shared the one minute and six second video, accusing Ukrainian soldiers of being behind the desecration. The video sparked a wave of reactions on social media, particularly on Twitter, where a TikTok version of the video went viral. The TikTok video has since been removed.

The video is difficult to analyze and cannot be verified. It does not show the faces of the alleged Ukrainian soldiers. The people in the video are speaking broken Ukrainian and use a Russian military knife, said Oleg Nikolenko, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s foreign ministry.

A screenshot of the video, published in the Readovka Telegram channel on March 15, shows a knife allegedly used by the Russian army. (Source: Readovkanews/archive)

The video was denounced as a provocation by Said Imagilov, Mufti of the Spiritual Administration of Ukraine’s Muslims, as well as the Ukrainian military and Ukrainian officials.

Ukraine’s army has Muslim soldiers in its ranks, and Imagilov is an active participant on the frontlines defending Kyiv. The Ukrainian army is also supported by several Chechen units, the most well-known of which are the two volunteer battalions, the Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion and the Sheikh Mansur Battalion. Chechens are among the most active defenders of Bakhmut, with their Adam special unit operating behind Russian army defense lines.

The provenance of the video remains unknown.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

European allies train Ukrainian forces on tank operation

Ukraine’s Western allies are continuing to help strengthen Kyiv’s defense against Russia by training Ukrainian troops on tank operation and trench warfare. Thierry Breton, European Commissioner for Internal Market, is visiting EU countries in a bid to shore up more ammunition for Ukraine. His first visit was to Bulgaria. This visit came as the Slovak news outlet Pravda published data on March 15 showing that, in the year since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Slovakia has doubled its ammunition production and plans to double it again from current levels.

Meanwhile, Greece and the United States agreed to a deal that will see the US transfer 300 M2 Bradley fighting vehicles to the Greek army as part of a modernization program, according to Greek media reports on March 10. Greece is expected to send Ukraine BMP-1 vehicles and M113 armored carriers in exchange for the purchase of the Bradleys.

On March 13, Spain’s Ministry of Defense announced that ten Ukrainian crews completed training in Spain on operating Leopard 2 tanks. Along with fifty-five servicemen, fifteen Ukrainian technicians also received training. According to El Periódico, “These fifty-five soldiers – some professionals and other reservists – were already on the front line, and their four-week training lasted twelve hours a day.”

In addition, the German army announced it was training Ukrainian troops on the Leopard 2 tanks in Germany. “Training on the weapon systems is not just about how to use it, but also about tactics so that the Ukrainians can achieve the greatest possible effect against their opponents,” said Colonel Heiko Diehl.

Ukrainian servicemen in the United Kingdom also completed training in conducting trench combat in realistic conditions. The program was led by the 5th Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment of the 1st Brigade of the Australian Defense Forces.

Earlier this week, Polish President Andrzej Duda announced that his country would send Ukraine thirty MiG 29 fighter jets. These are essential as Russia strives to achieve air dominance and has increased its aerial strikes throughout Ukraine. On March 14, a video emerged on Twitter showing Ukrainian soldiers taking part in trainings in the French military camp of Canjuers in the south of the country. The soldiers were reportedly training with the AMX-10RC armored personnel carriers. Minister of the Armed Forces of France Sebastien Lecornu confirmed during a defense commission hearing on March 15 that the carriers are already being delivered to Ukraine.

On March 15, the Israeli government approved licenses to export electronic warfare equipment to Ukraine that will help counter Iranian drones.

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

The post Russian War Report: DFRLab confirms aerial strikes on industrial plants north of Bakhmut appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Building a shared lexicon for the National Cybersecurity Strategy

the Cyber Statecraft Initiative — Thu, 16 Mar 2023 12:00:00 +0000

The 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy, released on March 3, represents the ambitions of the Biden Administration to chart a course within and through the cyber domain, staking out a critical set of questions and themes. These ambitions are reflected within the strategy’s pillars and titled sections, but also key words and phrases scattered throughout the document. As we and others have said, the success of this strategy will hinge largely on the practical implementation of its boldest ideas. The details of that implementation will depend on how the administration chooses to interpret or define many of the key terms found within the strategy.

To begin the creation of a shared lexicon to interpret these terms and the policy questions and implications that flow from each, this series identifies seven terms used throughout the strategy that represent pivotal ideas and priorities of this administration: “best-positioned actors,” “realign incentives,” “shift liability,” “build in security,” “modernize federal systems,” “privacy,” and “norms of responsible state behavior.” This article digs into the meaning behind these phrases and how they serve as waypoints in debates over the future of cybersecurity policy.

Strategy terms

“Best-positioned actors”

Throughout the National Cybersecurity Strategy, there are various iterations of the idea of “best-positioned actors” to describe and delineate the private actors expected, or at the least encouraged, to play a larger role in building and reinforcing a secure cyberspace. The repetition of this term represents a larger trend within the 2023 NCS: the central role of the private sector. The prior strategy certainly represented a step in this process, but its successor signals a more fundamental move toward addressing the significant role of private sector players in shaping cybersecurity.

According to this strategy, a keystone in this effort will be increased responsibility by the “best positioned actors” within the private sector. But what does this term mean? At its most basic level, a best-positioned company is one whose product(s) or service(s) represents a considerable portion of a key structural point identified within a pillar of US cyber strategy and, therefore, a company whose manner of operation will be decisive in determining cybersecurity outcomes for a large number of users. The strategy explains that “protecting data and assuring the reliability of critical systems must be the responsibility of the owners and operators of the systems that hold our data and make our society function, as well as of the technology providers that build and service these systems.” Though specific sectors or companies are not tied to this category in the strategy, the definition appears to include primarily the owners and operators of both traditional physical infrastructure, especially critical infrastructure, as well as digital infrastructure, like cloud computing services. It may also point to entities who operate as crucial intermediary nodes in the software stack or software development life cycle, whose privileged positions allow the implementation of security protections for downstream resources at scale, such as operating systems, app stores, browsers, and code-hosting platforms.

The strategy appears to distinguish these best-positioned actors as a sub-set within the category of actors whose action, or inaction, has the greatest potential consequences. The strategy further stipulates that a company’s resourcing partially determines its designation as best-positioned. This distinction reflects an issue throughout the digital ecosystem, where an entity responsible for a critical product or service might have insufficient resources, might fall under what Cyber Statecraft Initiative Senior Fellow Wendy Nather terms the “cyber poverty line,” to act as a best-positioned actor. Such entities may not be “best positioned,” but are important to the security and resilience if the products or services they are responsible for are depended on by a significant proportion of technology users or would, if compromised, create a large blast radius of effect because they play a connecting role within a large number of other products and services.

The strategy’s emphasis on shifting responsibility is crucial to reducing the impact of security failures on users and serves to support many of the other concepts around “build-in security,” “privacy,” and “realign incentives.” As a result, who that responsibility shifts to, the “best-positioned actors,” will have material influence on the outcomes of these policies. Establishing a common understanding of what companies fall within that category is imperative.

“Realign incentives”

Another term found throughout the National Cybersecurity Strategy—particularly within Pillar Three (Shape Market Forces)—is various iterations of “incentivizing responsibility.” It describes how the US government can shape the security ecosystem by motivating actors—chiefly the private sector owners, producers, and operators of critical technologies—toward a sense of heightened responsibility in securing US digital infrastructure. The previous strategy discussed incentives at a very high level—how to incentivize investments, innovation, and so on—but lacked a coherent sense of objective. The 2023 strategy moves closer to stating a goal but still falls short of actualizing a plan to achieve it. The repetition of this term represents a larger trend within the 2023 strategy: the desire to shift the onus of security failures away from users and onto the private sector. This term is a major driver to achieve the strategic objectives of the National Cyber Security Strategy.

These incentives are primarily divided into four categories: investment, procurement, regulation, and liability (discussed in Shifting Liability). Investment sits at the heart of Pillar Four (Invest in a Resilience Future), but this approach is common across the pillars. Using investment as an incentive includes creating or building upon existing funds and grant programs for critical and innovative technologies, especially those secure- and resilient-by-design (discussed further in Build in Security). Bridging investment and regulation is the strategy’s emphasis on using federal purchasing power to create positive incentives within the market to adopt stricter cybersecurity design standards.

More prominent throughout the strategy, however, is a regulatory approach that seeks to balance increased resilience with the realities of the free market. This inclusion is important—resilience investment is not maximally efficient. By design a resilient system may have multiple channels for the same information or control. Building resilience into a system may also involve costly engineering and research programs without adding new (and marketable) functionality, and they might even raise the cost of goods sold. Public policy can incentivize these less efficient investments and behaviors, but it may also need to mandate them, especially where markets are most dysfunctional or risk most concentrates. Regulatory tools are intrinsic to a properly functioning market and suffer abuse through neglect or overuse in equal measure.

The strategy hints that making security and resilience the preferred market choice requires making inadequate security approaches more difficult and costly. The strategy recognizes the critical role that private companies play in creating a secure and resilient cyber ecosystem—they are acknowledged even more frequently than allied and partner states. The various approaches to incentivizing responsibility illustrate the careful balancing act that a more robust public-private relationship will require, creating both opportunity and consequence for the private sector.

The strategy tasks the federal government with creating regulation responsibly, with “modern and nimble regulatory frameworks for cybersecurity tailored for each sector’s risk profile, harmonized to reduce duplication, complementary to public-private collaboration, and cognizant of the cost of implementation.” This specific and flexible approach is progress in the government’s approach to regulation, yet it raises questions as to the capability of the US government to create and regularly update a suite of regulatory statutes with sufficient agility. Finding specific and actionable ways to realign incentives and responsibilities will be essential to achieving the goals set by the 2023 strategy. However, to achieve this goal, it is essential to better identify both what these regulations seek to achieve and how to best design them to fit, bypassing the debate about Regulation: Friend or Foe.

“Shift liability”

The 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy has an entire subsection dedicated to software liability—one of the strategy’s most explicit endorsements of a specific, new policy mechanism to shift responsibility and realign incentives for better cybersecurity. Creating a clear framework for software products and service liability would incentivize vendors to uphold baseline standards for secure software development and production, to protect themselves from legal action in response to damages incurred by issues with their product.

In the US legal landscape, software, by itself, is rarely considered a product (in contrast to physical goods with embedded software, such as smart TVs or smart cars). This limits the ability of a user to bring claims under traditional product-liability law against the manufacturer in the event of a security flaw or other problem with the software. In addition, many software vendors disclaim liability by contract—when a consumer clicks “I Agree” on a software license to install a program, they often agree to a contract that forfeits their right to sue the maker. Indeed, the strategy explicitly calls out this tactic.

Taken in tandem, these facts mean that software manufacturers often can insulate themselves from legal liability caused by failures of their products, removing a strong incentive that has motivated physical-goods manufacturers to put their products through rigorous safety testing. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) retains broad enforcement powers against unfair and deceptive practices, which it has used to bring judgements against businesses for abysmal security failures, and certain authorities to regulate security practices in specific software-reliant sectors like the financial-services industry. However, a broader liability framework specific to software is conspicuously absent.

The strategy, recognizing that even the best-intentioned software manufacturers cannot anticipate all potential security vulnerabilities, leads with a safe harbor-based approach, in which software manufacturers are insulated from security-related product liability claims if they have adhered to a set of baseline secure development practices. This is a negligence liability standard—where manufacturers are held accountable only if they fail to meet an accepted baseline of adequate care—in contrast to a strict liability standard, in which manufacturers are liable for harms regardless of the precautions they took. The National Cybersecurity Strategy also makes explicit mention of the need to protect open-source developers from any form of liability for participating in open-source development, given that open-source software is more akin to free speech than to the offering of a final product. This recognition is both correct and important in light of the different paradigm within which open-source development operates and its incredibly common integration in most software products.

The strategy does not explicitly state whether such a standard should be enforced solely by an executive branch agency, such as the FTC, or whether the intent of the framework would be to allow individuals to directly sue software manufacturers whose products harmed them through a private right of action. The acknowledgement of the need to refine the software liability framework is a crucial step toward the strategy’s goals of realigning public-private incentives for security and resilience. The strategy is silent on whether existing federal authorities would be sufficient, through the FTC or even the Department of Justice’s Civil Cyber Fraud Initiative, or if a private right of action is still necessary (see here for more context on this distinction and liability as a cybersecurity policy issue). This could be a defining question, especially where it may involve congressional action to back up such a program versus merely sustain it.

“Build in security”

While discussing ways to shape market forces for improved security and resilience, the National Cybersecurity Strategy dedicates two sections of Pillar Three (Shape Market Forces) to adapt federal grants and other incentives to “build in security” throughout the cyber ecosystem. This is one of the more mature interpretations of the document’s focus on reshaping incentives and responsibilities to improve security. As far as individual technologies and products are concerned, vendor incentives to rush to market can leave security features as an afterthought or add on—worse, they can remove security considerations from design processes entirely. The implementation of secure-by-design technology is especially important in light of the interconnectedness of this space, as the integration of new technology alongside old systems can create points of weakness and transitive risk.

While much policymaking discussion considers how to punish or disincentivize poor practices, rewarding security incorporated at the outset of design is as useful. Software which is built to be difficult to compromise (versus layered with post-facto security features) can be easier, and sometimes cheaper, to defend in daily use and offer vendors and users both a more defensible product. These benefits are manifold when such standards are in place early in the development of an industry, as seen in the administration’s desire to implement a National Cyber-Informed Engineering Strategy for the new generation of clean energy infrastructure. The challenge will lie in whether the administration can define what it means to build in security (i.e., is it a set of specific practices, such as using memory-safe languages? or a set of process considerations which must be accounted for and documented?) with enough specificity to build policy incentive structures such as regulation around the concept.

The next logical step is to consider how to build in security not just for granular products but for systems writ large. The ever-increasing complexity of cloud infrastructure and other large-scale networked systems is an enormous strain on vendors and service providers, which have already gone to great lengths to engineer processes and software around navigating that complexity. Unchecked, those systems and their increasing importance will put users and government on their heels, forcing them to defend an extremely sophisticated and inherently insecure landscape.

Government is well-positioned to create incentives to help industry avoid race-to-the-bottom market pressures that lead towards insecurity and unmanaged complexity, and the strategy does well to tee up that priority even if it views the cyber landscape through a somewhat narrow product lens. Moving toward incentivizing secure design, architectural review processes, and buying down risk at the systems scale can convert “building in security” from an operational feature of federal funding to a strategic reshaping of the cyber landscape.

“Modernize federal systems”

Section Five within Pillar One (Defend Critical Infrastructure) of the National Cybersecurity Strategy focuses on modernizing what it terms the federal enterprise. The recognition of the federal civilian executive branch agencies (FCEB) as a singular enterprise from a security perspective is valuable and hints at broader themes for the Office of the National Cyber Director’s (ONCD) conception of modernization: streamlined points of contact, better coordinated security posturing and policymaking, and more evenly distributed and accessible resourcing and tooling among other gains.

At the most abstract level, modernization can be considered appropriately adjusting the federal enterprise to the challenges inherent in digital security: complexity, speed, and scale. Perhaps the most important contribution of the strategy here is the simple recognition that the federal government is outmatched—with infrastructure that has so far proven inadequate. The strategy’s approach to modernization commits to alleviating the government’s dependence on legacy systems that create too porous a foundation for US cybersecurity. Specific adaptations mentioned include the implementation of zero-trust architecture, a migration to cloud-based services, and progress toward “quantum-resistant cryptography-based environments.” Notably, “zero trust” remains a phrase of the moment after it did a starring turn in Executive Order 14028 and its use as a rhetorical catch-all for “modern” security tools and approaches has only increased.

The strategy directly appoints the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in coordination with Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), as the lead planner for FCEB cybersecurity planning and the custodian of shared services for constituent agencies. Though direct implementation plans are not laid out within this document, the specific tasking of the OMB to lead this process, assuming that the office receives the necessary resources, does create accountability and measurability for the pillar.

Another key component of FCEB modernization is a parallel workforce modernization. Any and all plans to create a modern, resilient federal cyber environment will require fostering a talented, diverse cyber workforce. The ONCD is spearheading this effort, and work on a workforce-specific strategy is underway. The National Cyber Strategy’s treatment of the cyber workforce provides a strong foundation for ONCD’s more detailed plan to address what is a significant problem for the US government. In that strategy, there is indeed opportunity to go further, not just to build the cyber workforce necessary for the problems of today, but to ensure that workforce development is conducted in parallel with government efforts to reshape its cyber environment into one that is more secure-by-design.

Modernization of federal systems is a gargantuan challenge, and one that will never be complete. To effectuate real change, modernization must become an engrained and cyclical process. This process does not have to mean the pursuit of the most cutting-edge technology for wholesale implementation across the FCEB, but must prioritize raising the baseline of security by targeting widespread dependencies and reduce risk for the most insecure and critical system components.

“Privacy”

One of the central themes of the inaugural National Cyber Director’s tenure was that cybersecurity must amount to more than creating an absence of threats. Securing the devices and services surrounding us should enable their use toward positive social, political, and economic ends. The security of data on these devices and running through these services is as much a question of protection against its appropriation and misuse by entities to whom it was entrusted as it is a question of preventing theft by malicious adversaries.

It is only a little surprising then, and very much welcome, to see the National Cybersecurity Strategy repeatedly highlight the importance of privacy as a key component of the United States’ cyber posture. Security and privacy are tightly intermeshed, as both a practical issue, where security features can function as guarantors of some privacy policies and protections, and as a policy issue—witness certain European Union (EU) member states agita over US surveillance and intelligence collection authorities as they impact the privacy of EU data and the perceived security of US-based cloud services. The inclusion of privacy is an overdue recognition of the fact that, if we succeed at preventing adversaries from stealing data from US networks, but then allow the same data to be freely bought and sold on the open web, we have gained little protection from espionage or targeting.

The recurring inclusion of privacy also marks an overdue move to collectively wield tools of both cybersecurity policy and corporate accountability in concert—taking the efforts of entities like the FTC, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and CISA together to drive change in private sector behavior. The strategy supports “legislative efforts to impose robust, clear limits on the ability to collect, use, transfer, and maintain personal data and provide strong protections for sensitive data like geolocation and health information,” but stops short of acknowledging that Congress’ ongoing failure to pass a comprehensive federal privacy law is harming US national cyber posture. Given such a law would likely include mandatory minimum-security standards for entities processing personal data, a privacy law would also provide new enforcement tools for the executive branch to penalize companies for poor security practices, going a long way towards creating incentives to fix some of the market failures identified by the administration throughout the strategy. The strategy also arrives as the intelligence community and Congress more publicly recognize the national security importance of data security and the risks posed by the widespread proliferation of surveillance tools.

Privacy has many definitions, but perhaps the most significant implied here is control over information and the right to exercise that control in the service of individual liberty. Strengthening users’ control over the data they produce, its use in digital technologies, and the integrity of those technologies against harm is a means of giving greater power back to users. These acknowledgments are fundamentally important—however, without going further, policy risks falling back into the broken “notice and choice” model of privacy, which has demonstrated its insufficiency in the proliferation of cookie banners under GDPR. The strategy would have gone further if it had acknowledged the need to preclude companies from collecting, processing, and reselling consumer data beyond the minimum required to deliver requested goods and services, which would more fundamentally limit the collection and propagation of Americans’ data.

The embrace of privacy as a key component of cyber posture is a large step, but the strategy still lacks concrete operational plans for implementing this vision. Hopefully, this is a sign of policy action still to come. Using this strategy as another important marker, policymakers should continue to address cybersecurity and privacy issues by bringing individual users back into the conversation and restoring a measure of ownership over their digital footprint along the way.

“Norms of responsible state behavior”

Within the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy, the drafters highlight the need for the United States and its likeminded allies and partners to work toward a free, fair, and open cyber domain aligned with US cyber norms and values. This concept, as a guiding principle for strategy, is not new, and indeed, was a central pillar of the 2018 strategy. The continued emphasis placed on norms and values-guided cyber strategy signals the ongoing importance of this conversation.

This strategy specifically calls out the Declaration of the Future of the Internet (DFI) as creating a foundation for “a common, democratic vision for an open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, and secure digital future.” The strategy also highlights the importance of international institutions and agreements in developing a framework and set of norms for this vision, including the United Nations (UN) Group of Governmental Experts and Open-Ended Working Group and the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime.

While there is agreement among the United States and allies on a set of cyber norms, these norms do not encompass all of state behavior in cyberspace. Important differences in approach might impede the level of cooperation sought by the United States and its allies. One such tension, briefly mentioned, is the question of data localization requirements. Pillar Five (Forge International Partnerships) discusses a series of goals surrounding international collaboration. These include counter-threat coalitions, partner capacity building, and supply chain security. This pillar also discusses many existing efforts toward enhancing international cooperation, yet lacks a clear, cohesive set of actions for moving the United States and the global cyber ecosystem toward an “open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet.” Without such a bridge, US allies and partners around the globe, especially those with immature or nonexistent relationships with the US government on cyber issues, might struggle to move toward the kind of cyber ecosystem the US government seeks to create.

As the US government builds on and operationalizes the strategy, the cyber norms and values used as its frame will require clear specification as more than just platitudes. The internet is not a topic merely of foreign policy, and there are opportunities throughout the document to better connect discussion of shifting responsibility and securing the internet together, including these important normative dimensions through domestic implementation. It is simple to claim the pursuit of a free, fair, open, and secure cyber domain. However, if norms are truly to serve as the foundation of cyber strategy, the US government must do more than allude—it must lead the way in integrating specific ideals into its strategy, operations, and tactics.

The post Building a shared lexicon for the National Cybersecurity Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Nesheiwat in Real Clear Energy: Twelve years after Fukushima, more US nuclear energy is a national security imperative

mzandi — Sun, 12 Mar 2023 18:18:46 +0000

The post Nesheiwat in Real Clear Energy: Twelve years after Fukushima, more US nuclear energy is a national security imperative appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig in the Wall Street Journal discussing strategies against nuclear-armed rivals

sodal — Tue, 07 Mar 2023 16:11:17 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 1, Scowcroft director Matthew Kroenig penned a Wall Street Journal op-ed discussing the compounded threat that nuclear-armed rivals Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China pose to the US. Kroenig highlights recent developments in each country’s nuclear programs and concludes with a call for the US to strengthen its own strategic forces to better compete against rivals.

Instead of pursuing 1990s-era fantasies about reducing the role of nuclear weapons, Washington needs to understand that, for the first time since the Cold War, it is entering a long-term strategic-arms competition. This time will be even more dangerous because the U.S. now faces multiple nuclear-armed rivals.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in the Wall Street Journal discussing strategies against nuclear-armed rivals appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The fourth inflection point: Testimony of Frederick Kempe to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Frederick Kempe — Wed, 01 Mar 2023 02:58:15 +0000

On Tuesday, Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe participated in a hearing of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence with other leaders of think tanks. Below is an edited version of his written testimony.

Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Himes, esteemed members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, thank you for the opportunity to testify on geopolitical threats, how to meet them, and the role of the intelligence community.

It is fitting that the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence should be convening this public session four days after the first anniversary of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s criminal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. It is also just a week after US President Joe Biden’s brave and potentially historic visit to Ukraine—I will come back to what I mean by “potentially.”

Putin’s war in Ukraine underscores three crucial and interlocking issues worth highlighting today.

First, we live at a historic inflection point, as crucial as the periods after World War I, World War II, and the Cold War, where US leadership alongside allies and partners—or the failure of US leadership—will have global and generational consequences. In short, we live at the fourth inflection point since World War I. Hence, our actions now should be informed by history’s lessons and thus a conviction that Ukraine’s war is at the same time a battle over what set of actors and principles will shape the global future.
Second, with the enormity of those stakes in mind, Putin’s ongoing war in Ukraine, along with its failure thus far to have achieved its ends, underscores both the strengths and weaknesses of the US intelligence community in navigating this defining moment. There is an urgent necessity to enhance the strengths and address the weaknesses, as the intelligence community is not appropriately organized or funded for this moment.
Most important for this committee, and for the United States more generally, is to understand, at such a defining moment, the dramatic and decisive connection between short-term decisions and actions and longer-term commitments and consequences. If the intelligence community has a glaring weakness, alongside the United States government and Congress more generally, it is in providing intelligence-driven, longer-term analytical frameworks within which one can more confidently understand and respond to the wealth of daily intelligence.

So first, let me address each of these three points, starting with the fourth inflection point for the United States since World War I.

The fourth inflection point

Biden was right when he said during his presidential campaign, and frequently since then, that we face an “inflection point” in history, where it will be decided what countries and values will shape the global system for the era ahead. I have been writing an Atlantic Council newsletter since 2016 called “Inflection Points,” having sensed and advocated that point of view before it became more popular.

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and the ongoing war that followed, brought into sharp relief a new era of strategic competition that had been unfolding for several years already.

How we manage this period now, in the face of external authoritarian threats and internal challenges to democracies worldwide, will be no less critical than US actions alongside allies and partners during the three previous inflection points, moments in history when the US role has had outsized consequences: after World War I, World War II, and the Cold War.

The lessons of history are clear on this.

After World War I—where nine million soldiers and five million civilians died—we collectively squandered a historic opportunity to create a better world through the tragic failure of postwar arrangements (the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations, among them), through the bitter continuation of European fissures, and through our own misguided isolationism. This resulted in the rise of fascism, the outbreak of World War II, and the Holocaust. World War II would be the deadliest conflict in human history, with an estimated seventy to eighty million fatalities, most of them among civilians.

After World War II, we as a country did something that was until that time aberrational in American history. We remained engaged in Europe and the world despite postwar fatigue and widespread isolationist sentiment. We introduced the Marshall Plan, providing economic assistance to restore the economic infrastructure of postwar Europe, and with our partners we constructed multilateral institutions to secure the future and, if possible, to prevent future great power conflicts: the United Nations, the Bretton Woods Institutions, NATO, and others.

Together with our allies, we constructed what came to be known as the international liberal order of institutions, rules, and practices that expanded democracy, prosperity, and security, and safeguarded our own freedoms and values. It brought us the longest, sustained period of major-power peace, prosperity, and democratic expansion in history.

In many respects, the Cold War was the World War III that never happened. Our triumph in that struggle between two competing ideologies and systems, without a shot being fired, was a credit not only to military deterrence and the remarkable unsung work of our intelligence agencies, but it was at the same time a victory of our national resilience, and our dynamic and magnetic democratic and free-market system and values. It was one of the greatest accomplishments of American international engagement and statecraft.

After the Cold War, our failures were not as dramatic as they were after World War I, but neither were our successes as great or architecturally ambitious as they were after World War II.

Initially, we were able to expand NATO, enlarge the European Union, and increase the number of people and countries who lived outside despotic rule with rising incomes and expanding rights.

It even appeared for a time that China would join the world of moderate and modernizing nations. However, as we see now, that period did not end up being the end of history but rather marked the beginning of a new strategic competition.

So, that leaves us with the post–post–Cold War period, though we should seek a better description for our era, where a contest is in full flower over who and what principles will define the global future.

Put most simply, there are three alternatives: the reinvigoration and perhaps reinvention of the liberal international order put in place after World War II, the replacement of that order over time by a Chinese-led illiberal order, or global chaos and incoherence, more along the lines of Putin’s law of the jungle than any rule of law.

As we meet today, we have a generational opportunity to shape the future that Putin’s potential failure presents us.

Last year at this time, it seemed democracies were in retreat and authoritarianism was on the rise following sixteen years during which Freedom House has tracked the relative decline of democracy globally. In early February of last year, shortly before the Beijing Winter Olympics, China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Putin entered a “no limits” strategic partnership that viewed US and Western leadership in irreversible decline.

The Ukraine war followed.

The past year, however, has been a challenging one for the world’s worst authoritarians: Putin, Xi, and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

They ended 2022 reeling from self-inflicted wounds, the consequences of hubris, overextension, and a gamble that US alliances would crumble in the face of a challenge. Russia’s war is failing, and its economy is imploding. China’s excessive authoritarianism, thoughtlessly provocative “wolf warrior diplomacy,” and botched COVID-19 response slowed its growth and alarmed international (particularly European) partners. And Iran’s rush to nuclear capability and draconian response to ongoing protests following the death of Mahsa Amini, have shown the ayatollah’s theocracy is on shakier ground than many experts have thought.

If Putin prevails, history has taught us that the necessity for other countries’ boots on the ground will grow.

At the beginning of my comments, I called Biden’s trip to Kyiv last week “potentially historic.” What I meant by that was that it would be historic depending on what follows now. For Ukraine to prevail would require a “surge” in support to Ukraine now to confront an unfolding Russian offensive.

Biden’s assurance to Ukraine that the United States would support its struggle “as long as it takes” is well-intentioned, but a war of attrition favors Moscow and endangers tens of thousands more Ukrainians and raises the prospect of US, Western, and Ukrainian war fatigue.

If we truly believe that the battle for the global future is being fought in Ukraine and by Ukrainians, then the money spent now from the United States and other allied budgets is a bargain compared to what we will all need to spend if Russian and Chinese ambitions advance.

If Putin prevails, history has taught us that the necessity for other countries’ boots on the ground will grow. As former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates (both honorary directors on the Atlantic Council’s Board of Directors) wrote in the Washington Post in January, “It is better to stop (Putin) now, before more is demanded of the United States and NATO as a whole.”

Lessons for US intelligence reform

That brings me to what this period tells us about US intelligence strengths and weaknesses—and what we should do to enhance the strengths and urgently address the weaknesses.

The Ukraine war has underscored intelligence triumphs and failures.

The United States did an extraordinary job of highlighting Putin’s war plans and ambitions and warning in advance of the very real danger of invasion. It was a notable break with past US policy and risked exposing US sources and methods. But it paid off spectacularly in robbing Putin of any guise of deniability and hammering home that this was a planned invasion, while allowing Ukraine to prepare. When US predictions proved to be accurate, it bolstered the international credibility of US intelligence. It also highlighted areas where intelligence sharing with US allies needed to be improved.

On the other hand, US intelligence did not foresee Russian military weaknesses and underestimated Ukraine’s defensive capabilities and resilience. Threat assessment is never easy, but it is crucial to prepare for future threats.

One of the questions this committee is seeking to address is whether the intelligence community is organized and funded appropriately to address current and future threats. The short answer is: not by a long shot.

The immediate post–Cold War era proved a difficult adjustment period, but the United States intelligence community successfully transformed itself in the aftermath of 9/11 to meet the needs of the war on terror and support two decades of sustained combat operations.

US intelligence operates at a faster tempo, and its analysis is more integrated with operations than ever before. Furthermore, its ability to find and track threats all over the world, as well as to support military operations, is breathtaking. We see how that applies even outside of a war-on-terror context in the war in Ukraine, where US intelligence has been critical for supporting Ukraine’s military operations and planning.

However, despite this success in the past two decades, the intelligence community must transform again. While potentially useful adaptations and improvements from the post-9/11 era should not be discarded, the intelligence community must adjust and even hearken back to some of its strengths and features during the half-century long competition with the Soviets during the Cold War.

This transformation must begin with human capital, including some fundamental changes in how the intelligence community hires and manages its personnel, as well as the kind of expertise it fosters.

Before I joined the Atlantic Council, I served for more than a quarter of a century as a journalist at the Wall Street Journal. Drawing from that experience, I can tell you that there is a substantial difference between looking for a reporter who is highly skilled at dashing off a few quick lines of breaking news versus one who is a deeply knowledgeable on a subject and capable of conveying ample context and comprehension of a complex issue.

We need more of the latter in the intelligence community. We need more analysts who can think at the strategic level and marshal in-depth knowledge of our adversaries, including long-term trends and drivers of their economies, societies, political systems, militaries, goals, and intentions; and their strengths and weaknesses.

With that type of analysis, the US government might have been less surprised, for example, by the Russian military’s poor performance in Ukraine. We might have been less surprised by China’s turn from biding its time and hiding its strength to a full-range global competitor that has little interest in human rights, a free press, or respecting democracy in Hong Kong. The immense difficulty of spying in China—where the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) lost between eighteen and twenty operatives in one disastrous two-year period, from 2010 to 2012—demonstrates this. However, with China becoming ever more ambitious and brazen on the world stage, the need for strong intelligence and deep, thoughtful analysis is more pronounced than ever. We need fewer analysts focusing on rapid reaction to operational and tactical-level issues.

My understanding is that the intelligence community has changed its personnel practices in recent years to emphasize general analytic and writing skills over depth of knowledge or time working on a particular portfolio. I have heard that many intelligence community organizations are actively discouraging people from developing much of a specialty on any particular portfolio or spending too much time developing their experience on one topic, in order to be able to quickly move people around to cover emerging crises and conflicts.

This has even been driving some of the deep experts into early retirement or second careers. I am all for flexibility, but I firmly believe we quickly need to reverse that trend and start growing long-term experts on the key countries and issues for strategic competition—and even hire some external experts in the meantime if that is what it takes to ensure that knowledge base is readily available.

Congress should also work with the director of national intelligence (DNI) to grant greater professional freedom to talented intelligence officers. Toward this end, they should seek to make security clearances completely interchangeable. Family obligations, opportunities for promotion, and a desire to learn new skill sets can drive talented intelligence officers to other intelligence agencies, just as those factors would influence a lawyer, teacher, nurse, or bankers in the same way. That is something we ought to embrace. However, the eighteen intelligence community agencies have varying systems for background checks, no uniform policy on polygraphs, and inconsistent additional requirements, all of which means that officers often cannot easily move to another agency, despite already having access to much of the same information and systems.

It also means that prospective employees, such as recent college graduates, need to have a separate application process for every agency to which they want to apply to work. Here, Congress can help. It should create a single common background check and standardized set of hiring requirements for all intelligence community officers. If an agency, for whatever reason, determines additional requirements are necessary for employment at that agency, it should be required to obtain the DNI’s approval to include them as part of the hiring process.

Moreover, some organizational changes are necessary for this era of strategic competition. Some of them are already happening, with the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) having established centers focused on China. This is a positive development, but we need to start looking beyond the obvious.

For example, my Atlantic Council colleague Jonathan Panikoff, a former intelligence officer, has argued the US Department of Commerce now needs its own intelligence officers to help it keep up with its international trade and export control responsibilities, particularly vis-à-vis China. When the war on terror was our primary focus, it would have seemed foolish to advocate for an intelligence element at the Department of Commerce; today, it should be a top priority, as much of our future security depends on countering China’s threats to our technology and innovation base.

In addition, the intelligence community needs to become more effective at navigating public-private partnerships to address many of the challenges it will face in the years ahead. For example, we saw the impact of COVID-19 on supply chains and the importance of supply chains to US national security, including economic security, given that nowadays we cannot realistically separate the two. But the intelligence community does not have the background or expertise to meaningfully address these challenges in the near or medium term by itself. Instead, the United States should better partner with private-sector companies already deeply involved in this work. Doing so will come at a cost but one whose premium will be far less than trying to reinvent the wheel. There are major corporations, such as Intel, that have over a thousand people just working on supply chain issues. We cannot and should not try to duplicate this effort. We do not have the time to learn or train—it is an issue that must be addressed immediately, and the expertise and knowledge required is extensive. And even if we could recruit on our own, doing so would not be a good use of time or resources as the US government would be competing against the many private-sector companies that can offer both incentives and salaries the government cannot.

As well, we should mitigate the extent to which the director of national intelligence is subject to the whims of politics. To help address that, the DNI should have a fixed, five-year term, renewable once. There is no perfect way to ensure a president will not choose someone who would be unacceptable to a president of a different party in the future if the DNI has a five-year, fixed term—and that is why the president’s prerogative to dismiss the individual should be retained—but the political price for doing so should be high.

The simplest option is to replicate the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) model but for a five-year term, rather than a ten-year term. Only one FBI director has ever completed a full ten-year term, so a five-year renewable term might be more realistic anyways.

It is essential that the US intelligence community does more to improve cooperation and collaboration with allies.

We also need to improve cohesion among those involved in intelligence, and the most important step to take toward this end is to strengthen cohesion with our allies on intelligence matters.

Inside the US intelligence community, it appears to me that we have made strides toward improving cohesion. While not perfect, nearly two decades after the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and the establishment of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence that law created, we have organized a true US intelligence community in a way that did not previously exist.

My sense, however, is that we have not matched these important domestic steps to achieve cohesion with similar progress on coordination with allies, even our closest ones. It is essential that the US intelligence community does more to improve cooperation and collaboration with allies. My organization published a paper on this very subject a few months ago, authored by a former US DIA senior executive and a retired British military intelligence officer. Entitled “Beyond NOFORN: Solutions for increased intelligence sharing among allies,” the piece offers several policy recommendations to reduce barriers to cooperation. I will not recount all the details here, but I recommend it to you and your staffs.

Ultimately, I think what will be necessary is a change in incentives for intelligence leadership and the workforce to make more progress on how we share intelligence with allies. For change to come, it will require engagement from you in the form of oversight, or even legislation, if it is not going to come from within the intelligence community.

In addition, Congress can take action to improve oversight of efforts to strengthen the intelligence community.

Congress should ensure there is a much greater emphasis on sharing unclassified assessments with the public. Decisions relevant to strategic competition are made every day by people without security clearances, in multiple sectors. I humbly ask you to ensure the intelligence community remembers that, and that they see institutions like the Atlantic Council conducting analysis on national security issues not as competitors but as eager audiences and even potential partners in their difficult and important work.

Holding these open hearings in parallel with the intelligence community’s Worldwide Threats hearing is perhaps just one step toward greater engagement between the intelligence community and the public. It would be even more helpful to mandate some form of engagement between the content of Worldwide Threats briefs and non-government assessments. I think there is ample evidence to suggest that think tanks, for example, and the US intelligence community can learn from each other and thereby ensure a better-informed public on key issues pertaining to strategic competition.

Overall, the intelligence community should accelerate and deepen its reorganization and realignment for strategic competition, with a particular focus on revising its approach to human capital and adding an intelligence element to the Department of Commerce. The intelligence community should also be encouraged and enabled to improve cohesion with allies, and oversight efforts should promote more opportunities for intelligence community engagement with experts and analytic institutions outside the government.

Stepping up to strategic competition

In closing, and this was my third point, we need a change of attitude and an acknowledgment that we are facing a historic inflection point where we face a peer authoritarian competitor in the form of China and peer authoritarian disruptor in the form of Russia that is unprecedented in our history. As with any competition, when your opponent changes or improves their game, you need to respond.

There was a period of time where our often-disabling political polarization, when our failures to institute reforms to strengthen our capabilities and address our weaknesses, were the unharmful indulgences of a necessarily messy democratic system.

If the intelligence community has a weakness, alongside the United States government and Congress more generally, it is in providing intelligence-driven, longer term analytical frameworks within which one can more confidently understand and respond to emerging challenges.

The risks of inaction are growing alongside the urgency for common cause in the face of the fourth inflection point of the period between World War I and today. History has taught us the long-term and tragic cost of our failures and the benefits of constructive, concerted, and intelligence-driven international engagement.

The post The fourth inflection point: Testimony of Frederick Kempe to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Tech innovation helps Ukraine even the odds against Russia’s military might

Mykhailo Fedorov — Tue, 28 Feb 2023 22:50:23 +0000

For more than a year, Ukraine has been fighting for its life against a military superpower that enjoys overwhelming advantages in terms of funding, weapons, and manpower. One of the few areas were Ukraine has managed to stay consistently ahead of Russia is in the use of innovative military technologies.

Today’s Ukraine is often described as a testing ground for new military technologies, but it is important to stress that Ukrainians are active participants in this process who are in many instances leading the way with new innovations. The scale of Russia’s invasion and the intensity of the fighting mean that concepts can often go from the drawing board to the battlefield in a matter of months or sometimes even days. Luckily, Ukraine has the tech talent and flexibility to make the most of these conditions.

With the war now entering its second year, it is clear that military tech offers the best solutions to the threats created by Russia’s invasion. After all, success in modern warfare depends primarily on data and technology, not on the number of 1960s tanks you can deploy or your willingness to use infantry as cannon fodder.

Russian preparations for the current full-scale invasion of Ukraine have been underway for much of the past two decades and have focused on traditional military thinking with an emphasis on armor, artillery, and air power. In contrast, the rapidly modernizing Ukrainian military has achieved a technological leap in less than twelve months. Since the invasion began, Ukraine has demonstrated a readiness to innovate that the more conservative Russian military simply cannot match.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Modern weapons supplied by Ukraine’s international partners have played a crucial role in the Ukrainian military’s battlefield victories during the first year of the war. Likewise, Western countries have also supported Ukraine with a range of tech solutions and assistance. At the same time, Ukrainians have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to develop and adapt new technologies suited to the specific circumstances of Russia’s ongoing invasion. Ukraine has used everthing from drones and satellite imagery to artificial intelligence and situational awareness tools in order to inflict maximum damage on Russian forces while preserving the lives of Ukrainian service personnel and civilians.

Drones deserve special attention as the greatest game-changers of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Thanks to the widespread and skillful use of air reconnaissance drones, the Ukrainian military has been able to monitor vast frontline areas and coordinate artillery. Meanwhile, strike drones have made it possible to hit enemy positions directly.

The critical role of drones on the battlefield has helped fuel a wartime boom in domestic production. Over the past six months, the number of Ukrainian companies producing UAVs has increased more than fivefold. This expansion will continue. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine is fast evolving into the world’s first war of robots. In order to win, Ukraine needs large quantities of drones in every conceivable category.

This helps to explain the thinking behind the decision to launch the Army of Drones initiative. This joint project within the framework of the UNITED24 fundraising platform involves the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the State Special Communications Service, and the Ministry of Digital Transformation. Within the space of six months, the Army of Drones initiative resulted in the acquisition of over 1,700 drones worth tens of millions of dollars. This was possible thanks to donations from individuals and businesses in 76 countries.

Ukraine is currently developing its own new types of drones to meet the challenges of the Russian invasion. For example, Ukraine is producing new kinds of naval drone to help the country guard against frequent missile attacks launched from Russian warships. Ukrainian tech innovators are making significant progress in the development of maritime drones that cost hundreds of thousands of dollars and can potentially target and deter or disable warships costing many millions.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Ukrainian IT specialists are creating software products to enhance the wartime performance of the country’s armed forces. One good example is Delta, a comprehensive situational awareness system developed by the Innovation Center within Ukraine’s Defense Ministry. This tool could be best described as “Google maps for the military.” It provides real-time views of the battlefield in line with NATO standards by integrating data from a variety of sources including aerial reconnaissance, satellite images, and drone footage.

Such systems allow the Ukrainian military to become increasingly data-driven. This enables Ukrainian commanders to adapt rapidly to circumstances and change tactics as required. The system saves lives and ammunition while highlighting potential opportunities for Ukraine to exploit. This approach has already proven its effectiveness in the defense of Kyiv and during the successful counteroffensives to liberate Kharkiv Oblast and Kherson.

Ukraine has also launched a special chatbot that allows members of the public to report on the movements of enemy troops and military hardware. Integrated within the widely used Diia app, this tool has attracted over 460,000 Ukrainian users. The reports they provide have helped to destroy dozens of Russian military positions along with tanks and artillery.

In addition to developing its own military technologies, Ukraine has also proven extremely adept at taking existing tech solutions and adapting them to wartime conditions. One prominent example is Starlink, which has changed the course of the war and become part of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. Satellite communication is one of Ukraine’s competitive advantages, providing connections on the frontlines and throughout liberated regions of the country while also functioning during blackouts. Since the start of the Russian invasion, Ukraine has received over 30,000 Starlink terminals.

Ukraine’s effective use of military technologies has led some observers to suggest that the country could become a “second Israel.” This is a flattering comparison, but in reality, Ukraine has arguably even greater potential. Within the next few years, Ukraine is on track to become a nation with top tier military tech solutions.

Crucial decisions setting Ukraine on this trajectory have already been made. In 2023, efforts will focus on the development of a military tech ecosystem with a vibrant startup sector alongwide a strong research and development component. There are already clear indications of progress, such as the recent creation of strike drone battalions within the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The war unleashed by Russia in February 2022 has now entered its second year. Putin had expected an easy victory. Instead, his faltering invasion has highlighted Ukraine’s incredible bravery while also showcasing the country’s technological sophistication. Ukrainians have demonstrated their ability to defeat one of the world’s mightiest armies using a combination of raw courage and modern innovation. This remarkable success offers lessons for military strategy and security policy that will be studied for decades to come.

Mykhailo Fedorov is Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation.

The US military has relied on satellites for more than thirty years. From Global Positioning System-enabled, precision-guided munitions that helped the US military destroy Iraqi tanks to spy satellites that helped track down al-Qaeda training camps, space assets were a crucial part of the first Gulf War and war on terror.

China and Russia recognize how much the US military depends on satellites. Both have developed a wide range of ASAT capabilities that can disable or destroy US space assets. These capabilities include electronic warfare, cyber operations, jamming, directed energy, and destructive kinetic ASAT weapons. China also possesses commercial and scientific satellites with maneuvering capabilities that could serve as ASATs by violently colliding with US space assets.

To mitigate the threat from adversary ASATs, the US Space Development Agency is bolstering space resiliency by purchasing hundreds of small (and cheap) low-Earth orbit satellites. Rather than relying on large, expensive geosynchronous-orbit satellites, this new approach will require any adversary seeking to disrupt US space capabilities to knock out not just a few exquisite satellites but a few hundred small satellites.

By announcing CASR, the United States is beginning to take steps to improve its resilience even more: Rather than relying on government-owned space assets numbering in the hundreds, the United States is hoping to enlist massive commercial satellite constellations numbering in the tens of thousands for use in emergencies.

Commercial satellites have proven their utility for security purposes during the war in Ukraine. SpaceX’s Starlink is providing the Ukrainian military with high-speed internet, allowing forces to stay in contact with each other and with Ukrainian high command. It also allows units to deploy weapons systems such as precision-guided artillery, drones, and loitering munitions. Commercial satellites have also tracked the Russian military buildup and revealed Russian atrocities in the Ukrainian cities of Izyum and Bucha. The Ukraine example shows that a civil reserve satellite fleet would thus not only increase resiliency but also expand capabilities that the US military can draw upon in times of crisis.

A civil reserve fleet is not a new concept. The US Air Force has the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, which allows the United States to expand its capacity quickly during wars or national emergencies. In twenty-first-century warfare, militaries are exceedingly reliant on a stream of satellite-provided data and services. A civil reserve satellite fleet will ensure that stream remains steady.

In setting up a civil reserve satellite fleet, the US government should do the following:

Create a preferential contract award system for private-sector participants in the program.
Create fixed payment structures for the services private-sector participants provide.
Indemnify companies for financial losses sustained as a result of participation.

These steps would create financial carrots for satellite operators while simultaneously lowering risk, incentivizing them to participate. The payments and preferential contract awards that this program would provide can serve as crucial support for many smaller satellite and launch companies; with the US government serving as an anchor client, space companies would have the time and capital they need to grow a civilian client base. That could make the difference between commercial success or failure.

Corporations should participate in the following ways:

Maintain a significant percentage of satellite constellations capable of providing communications and intelligence-gathering services on short demand to the US military.
Commit to providing the US government with access to satellite networks if called upon during a conflict or emergency.

Doing so would provide the US military with the resiliency it needs to deter aggression in space, and, should deterrence fail, fight and win.

The US government and corporations should work together in the following ways:

Create common software and hardware standards to allow communication between government and commercial satellites and receivers.
Assign specific roles to participating commercial satellites in the event of crisis.
Conduct military exercises using commercial satellites to improve the efficiency of the system and demonstrate its capabilities to adversaries.

Unlike many other technologies that the military procures, commercial satellites have already proven their utility. The United States should prioritize formalizing its relationship with satellite providers so that, should an emergency arise, the satellites of the civil reserve fleet will be ready to immediately and seamlessly support US warfighters.

Aidan Poling is a research analyst at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. In fall 2022, he was a young global professional in the Forward Defense practice at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The post How a fleet of private satellites can help secure the US military’s future appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The 5×5—Strengthening the cyber workforce

Simon Handler — Thu, 23 Feb 2023 05:01:00 +0000

On July 19, 2022, the White House convened leaders from industry, government, and academia at its a National Cyber Workforce and Education Summit. In his remarks at the Summit, recently departed National Cyber Director Chris Inglis committed to developing a National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy with input from relevant stakeholders to align government resources and efforts toward addressing the many challenges in this area. Among these challenges is finding sufficient talent to fill the United States’ ever-growing number of openings for cyber-related roles across all sectors of the economy. According to research from CyberSeek, US employers posted 714,548 of these job openings in the year leading up to April 2022. While many of the vacancies are oriented toward individuals who are savvy in the more technical aspects of cybersecurity, more organizations are searching for multidisciplinary talent, ranging from international affairs to project management and everything in between.

While we await the White House’s National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy, we brought together a group of experts to provide insights into bolstering the cyber workforces of the United States and its allies.

#1 What is one assumption about the cyber workforce that is holding the cyber community back?

Nelson Abbott, senior director, advanced program operations, NPower:

“‘We cannot find good talent.’ This sentiment is, in my opinion, a result of companies not broadening their talent acquisition strategies. You will not meet the increasing demand for cyber talent by using the same talent pipelines that are not increasing their output to market.”

Richard Harris, principal cybersecurity policy engineer, MITRE Corporation:

“One problematic assumption is that the market, academia, or government alone can solve the problem of cyber workforce shortages. Developing cyber workforces at the right time, in the right quantities, and with the right skills requires purposeful and persistent public, private, and academic partnerships.”

Ayan Islam, director, cyber workforce, Office of the National Cyber Director:

“There is an assumption that there is a single pathway into the cyber workforce when there are many pathways to recruit cyber workforce talent. To open the job pipeline to those for whom a career in cyber or a related field would be out of reach, new pathways need to be created. We need to fully leverage the potential for community colleges to contribute to the workforce, grow work-based learning programs such as apprenticeships, and further explore non-traditional training opportunities. While some exist today, we need many more pathways to allow for more entrants and career changers into the cyber workforce and to demystify those pathways.”

Eric Novotny, Hurst professor of international relations, emeritus, School of International Service, American University:

“One assumption that I have noticed in employment advertising is the posting of entry-level positions in which the Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) certification is listed as necessary or desirable. This certification, as is well-known in the community, is a cybersecurity management certification that requires five years of experience in the domain. It may be that human resources representatives do not understand the levels or purpose of cybersecurity certifications. Some organizations may lose qualified job candidates if desired certifications are not aligned with job requirements.”

Merili Soosalu, partner leader and regional coordinator for Latin America and the Caribbean, EU Cyber Resilience for Development Project (Cyber4Dev), Information System Authority of Estonia (RIA):

“Cybersecurity as a topic is on its way to the mainstream. In the more and more digitalized world, cybersecurity is an integral aspect that cannot be overlooked. This should also be reflected in the outlooks of cyber careers that do not only mean highly experienced technical skills but rather a variety of professions and skillsets from the areas of project management and communications to the highly skilled blue- and red-team competencies.”

#2 What government or industry-led programs have had an outsized positive impact on workforce development efforts?

Abbott: “I am of the opinion that there have not been ‘outsized’ positive impacts. There are a lot of great companies and organizations doing good work (NPower, Per Scholas, etc.), but they do not have the capacity to meet the exponential growth in demand for talent. The recent cybersecurity sprint was good to develop interest in that alternative hiring model, but it is still too early to see what the measurable results are.”

Harris: “Some of the most successful workforce development programs have been in local communities. These programs were the result of local businesses, governments, and academic institutions putting their heads together to meet cybersecurity and other technical skill needs. While these efforts help keep people in their communities, they also support workforce mobility where these same skills are in demand outside of the local community.”

Islam: “With over seven hundred thousand (approximately 756,000 as of December 2022, per CyberSeek.org) vacancies in cybersecurity positions across the United States, these numbers constitute a national security risk and must be tackled aggressively. Therefore, it is important for government, industry, education, and training providers to all contribute to workforce development efforts, and work in tandem to address our growing needs. For example, the Office of National Cyber Director hosted a National Cyber Workforce and Education Summit at the White House last summer with government and private sector partners to discuss building the United States’ cyber workforce, increasing skill-based pathways to cyber careers, and equipping Americans to thrive in our increasingly digital society. The event resulted in many new commitments. A cybersecurity apprenticeship sprint was also announced at the Summit, which led to an increase in private-sector participation in the Department of Labor’s apprenticeship program, with 194 new registered participants and over seven thousand apprentices getting jobs.”

Novotny: “Sponsored events to attract new talent into the field, such as Cyber 9/12, AvengerCon, and various Capture the Flag (CTF) exercises are invaluable for stimulating interest in cybersecurity and exposing students and young professionals to executives and experts in the field.”

Soosalu: “In Estonia in recent years, many positive initiatives have been developed for different age groups. For instance, for adults looking to change their careers to information technology (IT), the Kood/Jõhvi, an international coding school, was created and top IT specialists should enter to the job market in the coming months. A private initiative called Unicorn Squad was created in 2018 to popularize technology education among girls. These initiatives, to name some, will hopefully show positive effects in the coming years. The Estonian State Systems Authority, responsible for national cybersecurity, prioritizes the knowledge development of cyber incidents of critical sectors by regularly organizing joint exercises between the national Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) and the IT teams of different critical service providers.”

#3 Are there any issues or challenges in workforce development have been overstated or immaterial?

Abbott: “‘Anyone can do cyber.’ While it is true that there is a much broader spectrum of roles in cyber than most people realize (non-technical; governance, risk management, and compliance; policy; etc.), these still require a strong working knowledge of information technology and networking concepts.”

Harris: “Many people need to move beyond wringing their hands about cyber workforce shortages or hoping that someone else will solve the problem. Organizations can start at the grassroots level and proactively develop partnerships and plans that result in a tangible workforce development achievement at whatever level is feasible, and then build on that success.”

Islam: “Actually, what is understated and greatly material to the issue and challenge in cyber workforce development is the lack of appropriate resourcing and C-suite appreciation with security program investments. There is still a disconnect in recognizing that cybersecurity is a foundational business risk and not a one-time, niche issue. Without proper investments on the people side of security programs, we will continue to see the same issues or challenges in tackling cybersecurity threats.”

Novotny: “There are some misconceptions that cybersecurity is an exclusively IT-driven, technical field. That is certainly true for some roles and responsibilities, but cybersecurity solutions also embrace people and processes, as well as technology. Professionals with highly developed technical skills will need to include management and people skills in their career development.”

Soosalu: “Today, all studies show that the IT sector, cybersecurity in particular, lacks a qualified workforce. Therefore, all challenges are real and need to be tackled.”

The 5×5—Minding the cyber talent gap

Cyber 9/12 Strategy Challenge

The Cyber Moonshot

#4 How can different types of organizations better assess their cyber talent needs?

Abbott: “By 1) moving from credential-based job descriptions to competency-based job descriptions; 2) better communicating between hiring managers and talent-acquisition teams; 3) changing job descriptions to remove bias and non-negotiable requirements to encourage more candidates to apply; and 4) considering internal upskilling programs and backfilling entry-level roles with new talent.”

Harris: “The National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Framework is an awesome baseline reference for understanding workforce positions and skills. Organizations, however, must do the work to understand their current and future cyber talent needs, then leverage the NICE Framework, or a similar guide, to connect those business needs with the right positions and skill paths, and build a workforce development plan.”

Islam: “A growing number of organizations are taking advantage of skill-based and aptitude assessments to allow for diverse and multidisciplinary candidates to join the cyber workforce. However, skill-based training and hiring practices are still necessary. Any solution must be inclusive of historically untapped talent, including underserved areas and neurodivergent populations. A cybersecurity career should be within reach for any American who wishes to pursue it, and skills-based training and hiring practices enable inclusive outcomes, give workers a fair shot, and keep the economy strong.”

Novotny: “The size of the existing IT and cybersecurity internal infrastructure plays a huge role here. Medium and small enterprises will have a more difficult time justifying a large cybersecurity staff in most cases. For these organizations, where many cybersecurity functions are outsourced, the skills shift to management and procurement, rather than technical operations, such as staffing a security operations center. In the government sector, having different standards and compliance rules than in the private sector also drives different necessary skill sets. On the other hand, I would argue that any organization that has network operations and valuable information assets to protect has similar security requirements in principle.”

Soosalu: “For assessing needs, some forms of standards are needed. In the European Union, the new European Cybersecurity Skills Framework (ECSF) was created to become a useful tool to help identify the profiles and skills that are most needed and valued. This will help create a European framework for recognizing skills and training programs.”

#5 How have cyber workforce needs shifted in the past five years, and where do you see them going from here?

Abbott: “They have only increased, and almost doubled in 2022. More companies are taking cybersecurity seriously, and are now realizing the importance of having those individuals on their teams. I fear that the demand for cyber talent will only continue unless employers start to create new solutions instead of relying on old habits when it comes to talent acquisition.”

Harris: “Rapid technological change like the current artificial intelligence revolution, and increasingly complex risk dynamics exemplified by greater cyber-physical convergence, require cyber workforces and individuals to embrace continuous learning throughout their careers. More attention needs to be paid to developing interesting and flexible cyber career paths and investing in more career progression training and education.”

Islam: “We need to broaden our thinking about the importance of cyber across occupations and professions in our interconnected society. There are many occupations and professions that have not traditionally required in-depth cybersecurity knowledge or training, but whose work relies on the use of cyber technologies. Greater attention should be paid to ensuring that cybersecurity training and education are part of the professional preparation of these workers.”

Novotny: “Several broad trends are noticeable in workforce requirements that have changed over time. First, as more sectors of the economy are identified as critical infrastructure, professionals that have industry sector experience are in higher demand. Second, the cyber threat intelligence business—in both government and in the private sector—has opened job opportunities for young professionals with language and international relations education. Third, there is an apparent fusion of traditional cybersecurity needs with a growing concern about misinformation, social media, and privacy. A few years ago, these latter issues were largely separate from the cybersecurity domain. That is not the case today.”

Soosalu: “Estonia was the target of one of the first ever national cyberattacks in 2007, and therefore cybersecurity as an issue is not new to our general public. However, being one of the most digitalized countries in the world, Estonia relies heavily on its digital services and needs to both create awareness and invest in being as cyber resilient as possible. The lack of a skilled workforce is clearly a vector of risk. Compared to the period of past five years, the legislation has evolved. Today, many more sectors are obliged to follow information and cybersecurity standards, hire information security officers, and invest budget into dealing with cybersecurity. The topic of cybersecurity is here to stay, and we will need to do our outmost to create interested and competent workforce for these profiles. Hopefully, the initiatives named above (Question #2) will help to contribute to this, and we see soon more women and more IT and cyber enthusiasts in the job market.”

The post The 5×5—Strengthening the cyber workforce appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Warrick on TRT World

Atlantic Council — Tue, 21 Feb 2023 17:03:30 +0000

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

On February 4, FD Nonresident Senior Fellow Tom Warrick appeared on TRT World to discuss the aftermath of the United States’ downing of a Chinese Spy balloon.

Fellow

Thomas S. Warrick

Forward Defense Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

National Security Terrorism

The post Warrick on TRT World appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Eftimiades on NDT News

Atlantic Council — Tue, 21 Feb 2023 17:03:28 +0000

On February 7, FD Nonresident Senior Fellow Nicholas Eftimiades presented his cautioning views to NDT News on the Chinese spy balloon, arguing that the balloon could be used to intercept radio communications and thus poses a national security risk.

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

The post Eftimiades on NDT News appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Eftimiades on France 24 News

Atlantic Council — Tue, 21 Feb 2023 17:03:27 +0000

On February 3, FD Nonresident Senior Fellow Nicholas Eftimiades was interviewed by France 24 News on the recent incursion by a Chinese spy balloon into the United States.

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

The post Eftimiades on France 24 News appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Eftimiades in TIME

Atlantic Council — Thu, 16 Feb 2023 20:03:34 +0000

On February 16, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Nicholas Eftimiades published an article in TIME magazine to discuss the reasons China may have deployed a spy balloon over the United States and the implications for the relationship between the two countries. Eftimiades suggested that the balloon may have been designed to intercept high frequency radio communications or satellite downlink data.

Beijing badly miscalculated by violating US airspace, particularly on the eve of Secretary of State Blinken’s visit.

Nicholas Eftimiades

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

The post Eftimiades in TIME appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Rich Outzen joins WION to discuss the Chinese surveillance balloon

Grady Wilson — Thu, 16 Feb 2023 19:17:33 +0000

The post Rich Outzen joins WION to discuss the Chinese surveillance balloon appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What US adversaries are learning from the balloon and UFO saga

Jennifer A. Counter — Wed, 15 Feb 2023 11:06:41 +0000

Citizens are understandably concerned about the recent downing of a Chinese spy balloon and three other unidentified objects traveling over North American airspace. For countries in North America, long protected by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the thought—let alone an actual instance—of a foreign incursion is jarring. It is just not a part of our history. However, three things are even more concerning: the lack of US government clarity on what is happening, the possible threat to North America in the medium to long term from China or other actors, and how the reactions to these objects say more about “us” than “them.”

What is going on?

Conspiracy theories are a part of the human condition. We fill in gaps of knowledge with stories, suspicions, and fears to create a whole understanding of what is happening around us. The government’s delayed notification to the American public early this month about a large balloon, in some instances visible to the naked eye, and the lack of urgency to remove it from US airspace naturally led knowledgeable and unknowledgeable people to fill in the gaps. Perhaps the balloon was for weather observation (as the Chinese government proclaimed) or to collect signals intelligence or to collect imagery intelligence or just a test to see if the United States would identify its presence. All those theories were bandied about, but no one really knew—and US government spokespeople and leaders were unable or unwilling to provide clarity in a timely manner.

The shootdown of three additional flying objects only adds to the growing hysteria, especially since the US government is providing even less information. A basic tenet of the communications profession is to provide information in a timely and accurate manner and to answer questions honestly and as thoroughly as possible. Key US spokespeople’s answers to reasonable questions from journalists have lacked transparency, detail, and timeliness.

Those spokespeople have yet to address concerns about why these objects are suddenly being observed all of a sudden, outside of generic descriptions of turning up the sensitivity of radar systems. And they failed in their responsibility by not immediately and fully discrediting the notion that the three additional flying objects are UFOs made by alien life—allowing the belief to take flight among the public. For spokespeople not to emphasize a far more likely scenario of a foreign or commercial source for these objects is also telling and should be a concern. “What is going on here?” is a valid question and one the US government is obligated to answer.

What’s the threat?

The reality is that every single one of us is tracked as we make our way through daily life. Our mobile phones track our location and digital activities. Our vehicles send back a wide range of information to car manufacturers, including location and maintenance information. Closed-circuit television cameras capture our activities outside of the home. And yes, foreign countries have satellites above our heads that collect imagery, signals, and weather data, among other information. To be fair, the United States collects a vast amount of information on foreigners—far more than can ever be effectively used or analyzed—and it is something that those of us from the intelligence community (as I did during my time in government) use to inform policymakers on potential happenings abroad.

The balloon and three other objects feel different because they are different. Rather than unobtrusive collection that we can neither see nor easily conceptualize, balloons or large drones are something that we can envision over our local areas. We can see and feel the threat. The slow response by US and Canadian officials makes the public question their competence and commitment to keeping the homeland safe. If the balloon was able to go from China to the Montana area, linger for days, and then make its way to the Carolinas, what else is going on? The public is owed an explanation.

In the interim, the additional collection of information about US military facilities, US and Canadian communications, and general imagery of the United States and Canada informs intelligence professionals in China and potentially other adversary countries. After all, if the three yet-to-be-identified flying objects were of a commercial nature, the company that owns them would likely have obtained proper clearances to fly their drone or other object from a regulator such as the US Federal Aviation Administration. One can reasonably deduce that a foreign power is involved.

Is this about us?

So why use a balloon or large drone over North America that was undoubtedly going to be discovered? Because it allows an adversary to see how the United States will respond. Will it sit back and ignore a potential threat? This would provide an adversary some additional avenues for data collection or attack during a time of conflict. Will it simply shoot the items down to remove the threat? That would signal the strength of the US air-defense system and allow adversaries to gauge the response time for military decision-making. The US government response has shown that there may be gaps in airspace defense and intra-government coordination, and a disconnect between how Americans view foreign aircraft overhead versus how Washington may view the encroachment.

It also provides an adversary with insights on how the public will emotionally and politically react. Will politicians on opposite sides bicker and quarrel instead of establishing new requirements for a military response? Will the US president or Canadian prime minister take the issue seriously and implement a severe response on the diplomatic front? We still don’t have the entirety of the story around the three additional flying objects like we do about the surveillance balloon. However, we do know that there was a segment of the population that jumped to irrational conclusions, including that aliens are walking among us. This could be a wonderful conspiracy theory for adversaries to foster in order to divide some segments of North American society against their government and fellow citizens. From an influence or information operations perspective, a simple balloon with likely simple collection capabilities can provide benefits for years to come.

Jennifer A. Counter is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice and a vice president at Orbis Operations, where she advises friendly foreign governments on national-security matters. She previously served in the US State Department and as a US Air Force intelligence officer.

The post What US adversaries are learning from the balloon and UFO saga appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s new offensive will test the morale of Putin’s mobilized masses

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 14 Feb 2023 21:53:57 +0000

As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine approaches the one-year mark, speculation is mounting that Moscow will soon launch a major new offensive. Indeed, some commentators believe this offensive may already have begun, with reports emerging in recent days of Russian troops attempting to advance at numerous points along a frontline stretching hundreds of kilometers across southern and eastern Ukraine.

This widely anticipated offensive is an attempt by Moscow to regain the initiative following months of battlefield defeats and humiliating retreats in Ukraine that have undermined Russia’s reputation as a military superpower. Vladimir Putin is now desperate to demonstrate that his invasion is back on track and has reportedly massed huge reserves for a new push to overwhelm Ukraine’s defenses. However, after a year of catastrophic losses that has left many of Russia’s most prestigious military units seriously depleted, doubts remain over the ability of untested replacement troops to carry out large-scale offensive operations.

Initial indications are not encouraging for the Kremlin, to say the least. Thousands of Russian soldiers including elite marines and special forces troops are believed to have been killed in late January and early February during a badly bungled attempt to storm the town of Vuhledar in eastern Ukraine. The failed attack sparked widespread dismay and anger among pro-Kremlin military bloggers, with many accusing Russian army chiefs of incompetence. The disaster contributed to what British military intelligence said was likely to be “the highest rate of Russian casualties since the first week of the invasion.”

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

One of the key reasons behind the sharp recent rise in casualties is Russia’s growing reliance on mobilized personnel with limited military training. In September 2022, Vladimir Putin responded to escalating losses in Ukraine by launching Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. Most of the approximately 300,000 men who were mobilized last year have now been deployed to Ukraine. The arrival of these additional numbers helped Russia to blunt Ukraine’s advances during the winter months, but it is unclear whether mobilized troops will prove as effective in an offensive capacity.

Many mobilized Russians appear to be less than enthusiastic about their new role as the shock troops of Putin’s faltering invasion. Since the first week of February, a growing number of video appeals have been published on social media featuring groups of mobilized soldiers complaining about everything from a lack of basic military equipment to the suicidal orders of their superiors. In one fairly typical video, the wives and mothers of mobilized soldiers from Tatarstan claim their men are being used as “cannon fodder” in Ukraine.

With hundreds of thousands of mobilized Russians expected to take part in Putin’s big offensive, this emerging trend could pose a significant threat to the Kremlin. If current casualty rates are any indication, the coming attack could result in unprecedented loss of life and spark a complete collapse in morale among Russia’s already demoralized mobilized troops. This would make life very difficult for the Russian army in Ukraine, which would find itself confronted by a breakdown in discipline that would severely limit its ability to stage offensive operations. Nor is there any guarantee that the problems would stop there. Russia’s own experience in 1917 is a reminder of the unpredictable consequences that can follow when an army in wartime stops taking orders.

Eurasia Center events

The view from London: Doug Klain

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

It is still premature to speak of mutinous mobilized soldiers, of course. Nevertheless, maintaining military discipline may be the biggest single challenge currently facing the Putin regime. At present, the Russian dictator appears in little danger domestically, with independent polling by the Levada Center continuing to identify strong Russian public support for the war in Ukraine. While some question the validity of this data, there is no escaping the near complete absence of any genuine anti-war activity in today’s Russia. One year since the invasion began, most opponents have chosen to remain silent or have left Russia altogether.

Likewise, Putin seems to have weathered the worst of the economic storm brought on by Western sanctions. The Russian economy has been hard-hit by measures imposed over the past year, but the damage has been significantly less than anticipated and is certainly far from fatal. This may change if the country’s economic outlook continues to worsen, but at this stage there is no indication that shrinking incomes or the departure of Western brands from Russian stores will fuel protests anytime soon. While members of the Russian elite are also feeling the pinch, most owe their positions to Putin and see no realistic alternative to the current status quo, however imperfect.

The relative calm on Putin’s home front contrasts sharply with the precarious position of his army in Ukraine. Putin had initially anticipated a quick and triumphant campaign that would confirm Russia’s Great Power status and extinguish Ukrainian statehood once and for all. Instead, he finds himself embroiled in the biggest European conflict since World War II with his battered army in increasing disarray and his hopes of military success dwindling.

In order to snatch a victory of sorts from the jaws of defeat, Putin must now rely on the overwhelming numbers provided by mass mobilization. This is a tried and tested Russian tactic, but it also carries considerable risks. Sending thousands of untrained men to fight against battle-hardened and highly motivated Ukrainian troops could result in the kind of carnage that breaks armies. If that happens, the fallout would likely reverberate throughout Russia and destabilize the entire regime. Putin may then find that saving his invasion is the least of his worries.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

PLA planners misjudged the risk that the United States would track the balloon, but they had reason for false confidence. According to US military officials, the United States failed to detect at least three approaches by these platforms in the past several years. Furthermore, planners may have felt confident that even if the US government were to identify the balloon as a foreign platform, it would be unable to attribute it to China. The PLA would have noted the lack of any protest following previous undetected approaches, and a congressionally mandated intelligence assessment of unidentified aerial phenomena in 2021 suggested that the US was in the dark. The assessment stated only that some aerial phenomena “may be technologies deployed by China, Russia, another nation, or a non-governmental entity.”

Lost in bureaucratic stovepipes

PLA officers may also have failed to take Blinken’s visit into consideration because of stovepipes within the Chinese national security system. The visit was part of a carefully choreographed series of exchanges that both Chinese leader Xi Jinping and the Biden administration had worked assiduously to set up, and for the civilian foreign-affairs bureaucracy it was one of the most important events of the year. But the PLA had little direct involvement, partly due to Beijing’s disinterest in strengthening bilateral military channels, and most senior officers were probably only peripherally aware of the preparations. The balloon’s course may also have been decided before the timing of the visit was confirmed and shared with the PLA, and we do not know how much maneuvering capacity the platform has. A Foreign Ministry spokesman implied in mid-January that Blinken’s itinerary was still being ironed out.

Xi’s absolute control over the PLA and insistence on strict obedience rules out any deliberate attempt by the PLA to defy his intentions or sabotage a diplomatic engagement in which he planned to take part. But the incident does reveal limitations in the effectiveness and scope of the Central National Security Commission (NSC), the main mechanism Xi created to synchronize national security across the civilian and military systems. China’s NSC is one of the few bodies that brings together party, state, and military leaders to address national security affairs. Previously published member lists suggest that Blinken’s counterpart Wang Yi and the chief of the PLA’s Joint Staff Department, who should have had general visibility into the balloon program, sit together on the NSC.

Deconflicting military and foreign-policy initiatives is hard in any system, but the inauspicious timing of the balloon overflight is a useful data point that suggests shortcomings in China’s NSC and other coordination mechanisms. Xi’s nebulous definition of national security to encompass social, ideological, and cultural aspects alongside military, diplomatic, and economic factors may detract from the NSC’s ability to focus on coordinating the external aspects of China’s national-security policies.

Why to expect more missteps

One of the most important underlying drivers of poorly timed and uncoordinated PLA activities is the extraordinarily rapid growth in the scope and scale of its operations. Unlike the US military, the PLA’s leaders and staff officers are frequently operating for the first time in new areas of the world, with novel platforms, and in new domains, some of which involve unexpected political ramifications. Some of their most diplomatically damaging missteps have occurred when operating new platforms in new ways: the 2007 anti-satellite missile test that generated hazardous space debris, the 2011 test flight of the J-20 stealth fighter that marred another cabinet-level visit, and the surveillance balloon.

Most senior PLA officers also have had relatively little experience with operations that involve extensive international political or diplomatic considerations. Joel Wuthnow at National Defense University found in 2021 that no four-star PLA officer had been stationed abroad, compared with 58 percent of US four-stars who had served in a foreign country. PLA army officers also continue to occupy the lion’s share of senior positions and they are less likely to have been involved in politically charged interactions with foreign military forces than their navy and air force colleagues. For example, the PLA’s Joint Staff Department is the natural locus for coordinating its operational activities with overall foreign policies, and current chief Liu Zhenli served almost thirty-nine of the prior forty years of his career in domestic army units and the army headquarters.

Beijing’s botched operation has injected a volatile note into bilateral relations at the beginning of a year that is likely to see further strain given the reported plans of US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy to visit Taiwan. But it may also serve as a useful cautionary lesson for Xi and the rest of China’s leadership. The embarrassing exposure may reinforce concerns in Xi’s mind not only about the capabilities of PLA platforms but about his military’s capacity to correctly gauge the risks of high-stakes operations. It may also bolster his appraisal of US intelligence capabilities a year after Chinese officials were reportedly skeptical of US warnings about Russia’s plans to invade Ukraine. With the prospect of more Sino-US confrontations on the horizon, a reminder of the inherent uncertainties of aggressive military actions could be the silver lining on an otherwise destabilizing incident.

Mark Parker Young is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, a principal analyst at Mandiant, and a former US deputy national intelligence officer for East Asia.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.

The post China’s balloon blunder shows the shortcomings of its national security apparatus appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The view from European capitals on Zelenskyy’s trip across the continent

Atlantic Council experts — Thu, 09 Feb 2023 23:04:21 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy zipped from London to Paris to Brussels this week in his second trip abroad since Russia’s full-scale invasion of his country nearly a year ago. His message to leaders and lawmakers was that their military aid so far to his country has been substantial, but is not enough to repel Russia’s brutal invasion. More is needed, Zelenskyy urged.

What came of his meetings with UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak in London, and with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Paris? Will European lawmakers now support hastening Ukraine’s entry into the EU? Will Western tanks beget fighter jets? Below, our experts on the inner workings of European politics break down the meaning of Zelenskyy’s trip and what to expect next from each capital.

Click to jump to an expert reaction

The view from Paris: Marie Jourdain

The view from Brussels: Dave Keating

The view from Berlin: Jörn Fleck

The view from Kyiv: Peter Dickinson

The view from London

Itinerary: arrival at London Stansted airport on Wednesday, speech at Westminster Hall, meetings with King Charles III and Sunak, visit with Ukrainian forces training with the British military in Dorset

Zelenskyy’s surprise visit to London underscored that Britain stands out as one of the few Western European powers able to marshal both the resources and political will to substantially aid Ukraine in pursuit of outright victory over Russia—something Sunak aptly identifies as an explicit shared goal of his government.

Sunak’s statement that “nothing is off the table” shows that the United Kingdom is not letting up after announcing it will send Challenger tanks to Ukraine—now set to deploy on the battlefield in March. Along with sanctions and an “immediate surge” of equipment that will surely aid a coming Ukrainian offensive, what really stands out is the United Kingdom’s plan to train twenty thousand Ukrainian soldiers and marines. This kind of NATO-style training is one of the keys to Ukraine’s success in consistently outmaneuvering a numerically superior but professionally inferior Russian army.

British politicians may well be trying to outdo each other in just how much they can support Ukraine. Within hours of Zelenskyy’s visit concluding, former Prime Minister Boris Johnson called for the transfer of Typhoon fighter jets for Ukraine to make use of the newly announced training for Ukrainian pilots on NATO fighters. (The suggestion was quickly identified by some experts as less likely to help, since Typhoons are ill-equipped for fighting conditions in Ukraine.) Still, Britain’s military, financial, and rhetorical support is meeting the moment as Ukrainians prepare for what may be a decisive next few months, facing down a likely Russian offensive while preparing their own.

—Doug Klain, a London-based nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Find him on Twitter @DougKlain

The view from Paris

Itinerary: arrival at Paris Orly airport on Wednesday night, dinner meeting at the Elysee Palace with Macron and Scholz, flight Thursday morning with Macron to Brussels

Zelenskyy could not skip Paris in his European tour, and his message Wednesday was clear: Ukraine has weaponry needs, and France has capabilities.

In recent weeks, French strategic communication has evolved regarding the delivery of military equipment to Ukraine. Paris is now more assertive, even as the drivers of the decision about military aid have not changed. The aim is still to avoid escalation, match the Ukrainian operational needs, and preserve French national capacities. But France’s recent decision to send AMX 10-RC armored vehicles is not only significant for what it might change on the battlefield, but also because they were presented in official statements as “tanks,” in part to encourage other allies to move forward with their own tank deliveries to Ukraine. This move reveals that France does not now view these deliveries as unacceptably escalatory and suggests that France is considering Ukrainian requests to send additional weapons that were excluded before. However, it does not mean Paris will actually send its Leclerc tanks, which are very limited in number, unlike the German-designed tanks. Nor does it mean France is any closer to sending Rafale or Mirage jets, even as Zelenskyy’s visit aimed to push French leaders in that direction, as did the visit ten days earlier by Ruslan Stefanchuk, speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, who addressed the French National Assembly with a similar message. On jets, Paris’s hesitation is similar to the Biden administration’s thinking: questions about constraints on training, maintenance of the jets, and how they will be used.

Zelenskyy’s quick visit is a reminder that, for Paris, what is at play is not only the necessity for Ukraine to prevail and European stability to be restored, but also the credibility of France as a reliable European military partner able to lead. For Ukraine, it is key to have the continuous support of France when it comes not only to the war but for its future in Europe.

—Marie Jourdain, visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a former staffer for the French Ministry of Defense’s Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy

The view from Brussels

Itinerary: arrival Thursday morning at Melsbroek military airport, where met by Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo, President of the European Council Charles Michel, and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen; address to European Parliament; meeting with twenty-seven European Union (EU) heads of state

While Zelenskyy was mainly focused on weapons delivery during his visits to London and Paris, in Brussels his main message was one of European unity. Ukraine’s place is in the EU, he said, and “a free Europe cannot be imagined without a free Ukraine.” During a joint press conference, Zelenskyy told Michel that he wants to see accession talks with Ukraine begin this year. That requires unanimity among all twenty-seven member states, Michel reminded him. The reality is that EU accession is a long process and, as von der Leyen said Thursday, it has to be “a merit-based process.” There can be no fast track for Ukraine simply out of sympathy. Otherwise, the message sent to the Western Balkans is, “You can only join the European Union if you’re at war.”

The difference between this visit and Zelenskyy’s visits to London and Washington was perhaps best represented by his choice of language. When speaking to the US Congress and British Parliament, Zelensky spoke in English. In all his appearances in Brussels, he spoke only Ukrainian—even though English would have been the natural choice as it is the main working language of the EU. He explained why at his press conference. “The Ukrainian language is part of the European discussion.” Hearing Ukrainian “will be common practice when Ukraine will be part of the European Union.” In the United States and United Kingdom, he was a guest and spoke his hosts’ language. In the EU, he wants to be home.

—Dave Keating, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and the Brussels correspondent for France 24

The view from Berlin

Itinerary: no stop scheduled

The absence of Berlin among Zelenskyy’s European tour isn’t exactly a snub, as some might have it. Scholz joined Macron and Zelenskyy in Paris, and the last-minute addition of the French capital was likely a concerted effort by Zelenskyy to lock Macron into more meaningful military support than France has thus far provided. For its part, Germany is still the leading EU member state in terms of gross military and financial aid to Ukraine, despite its dithering and delaying on tanks. And following Scholz’s decision to provide Leopard 2 tanks and to let other allies do the same, Ukrainian-German relations seem to be on the up again. A constructive visit by the new German defense minister, Boris Pistorius, to Kyiv a few days ago seems to have underscored this.

The choice to go to Paris, not Berlin, then likely has more to do with what the Ukrainian president hopes to get from France than what he is not getting from Germany. Macron has thus far escaped the fever-pitch of criticism Scholz has faced for his handling of assistance to Ukraine, and Zelenskyy’s visit was paired with an interview in a French daily in which he expressed his confidence that Macron had fully come around to the threat from Putin and Russia—having shown impatience with the French leader in the past for his diplomatic outreach to Putin. Combined with Zelenskyy’s time constraints and the potential for more French support, a preference for Paris over Belin makes strategic sense.

—Jörn Fleck, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

The view from Kyiv

Itinerary: return to Ukraine TBA

Zelenskyy’s whirlwind European tour has not produced any immediate breakthroughs in terms of military aid, but Kyiv audiences have been encouraged by positive signals in London, Paris, and Brussels that indicate Ukraine will eventually receive the tools it needs to defeat Russia. There remains considerable frustration in Ukraine over the slow pace of the decision-making process, but the statements that have accompanied Zelenskyy’s visit underline the recent shift toward abandoning earlier red lines and supplying new categories of weapons and equipment. While many Ukrainians have been highly critical of the overcautious approach adopted by many Western leaders, the key message now seems to be that “nothing is off the table” when it comes to arming Ukraine.

Zelenskyy’s triumphant trip has also underlined the continued strength of international support for Ukraine. This is important at a time when Ukrainians are acutely aware of Russian efforts to weaken Western resolve. Russian President Vladimir Putin hopes the West will eventually lose interest in Ukraine and is counting on war-weary Western leaders to pressure Kyiv into accepting a compromise peace that would allow Russia to retain its Ukrainian territorial gains. In this context, the rapturous applause that followed Zelenskyy from Westminster Hall to the European Parliament was particularly welcome. Many Ukrainians noted gleefully that these scenes must have made for particularly grim viewing in the Putin bunker.

—Peter Dickinson, editor of UkraineAlert

The post The view from European capitals on Zelenskyy’s trip across the continent appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wald in The Hill: A misguided emissions rule could expose sensitive work by our military and scientific institutions

mzandi — Mon, 06 Feb 2023 20:05:01 +0000

The post Wald in The Hill: A misguided emissions rule could expose sensitive work by our military and scientific institutions appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukrainians are united in rejection of any compromise with the Kremlin

Mariia Zolkina — Mon, 06 Feb 2023 16:13:07 +0000

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine will pass the one-year mark in the coming weeks with no end in sight to what is already the largest European conflict since World War II. Vladimir Putin initially envisaged a small, victorious war that would extinguish Ukrainian independence and force the country back into the Kremlin orbit. Instead, his armies have suffered a series of disastrous defeats that have shattered Russia’s reputation as a military superpower.

Despite the difficulties encountered in Ukraine, Putin has little choice but to continue with his invasion. The Russian dictator knows that unless he is able to rescue the situation, his regime may not survive. However, following the setbacks of the past year, many commentators now question Russia’s ability to achieve its military objectives.

With Putin’s army dangerously depleted by months of punishing losses in both men and armor, it is unclear whether Russia is currently capable of large-scale offensive operations. While major new advances cannot be ruled out, the Kremlin appears to be pinning significant hopes on weakening Ukraine’s will to resist while undermining international support for the country. The end goal is a compromise peace that would allow Russia to secure its current territorial gains in Ukraine while providing vital breathing space to rebuild Putin’s battered military.

For now, there is little indication that this strategy will work. While calls for a negotiated peace continue to surface sporadically in the international media, there appears to be a growing consensus among Western leaders that Russia must be defeated in order to secure a sustainable peace. This deepening commitment to a Ukrainian victory was evident in the first weeks of 2023, with news of expanded military aid for Kyiv including modern tanks and a list of other items that had previously been ruled out by Ukraine’s Western partners as excessively provocative.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Nor is there any indication that Ukraine is ready to admit defeat. On the contrary, as the first anniversary of the invasion approaches, it is increasingly clear that Russia has failed to break the morale of the Ukrainian population. Neither the shock of the initial invasion nor the brutality of Russia’s advancing army has succeeded in forcing Ukraine into submission. More recently, the Ukrainian public has withstood a nationwide Russian bombing campaign against residential and infrastructure targets designed to deprive people of access to essential amenities including heating, light, and water during the freezing winter months.

Moscow’s terror tactics appear to have backfired, strengthening Ukraine’s resolve while serving to convince the Ukrainian population that they will never be safe unless Russia is decisively defeated. Crucially, Ukrainians now view military victory over Russia as an entirely realistic outcome. Thanks to a string of battlefield successes in the second half of 2022, Ukrainians overwhelmingly believe in their country’s ultimate victory.

A comprehensive nationwide survey conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Razumkov Center in mid-December 2022 illustrates this faith in Ukrainian victory while also highlighting nationwide opposition to any compromises with the Kremlin. The poll found that 93 percent of respondents expect Ukraine to win the war, while just three percent expressed doubts. This reflects the growing sense of confidence generated by the successful September 2022 Kharkiv counter-offensive and the November liberation of Kherson, the only regional capital occupied by Russia. By the end of 2022, Ukrainian forces had liberated around 50 percent of the land seized by Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion ten months earlier.

The survey also offered importance insights into Ukrainian perceptions of victory. Perhaps the most significant finding was that Ukrainians are not ready to accept a return to the status quo on the eve of the full-scale invasion, when Russia already occupied Crimea and parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions in eastern Ukraine. Instead, a commanding majority of Ukrainians are convinced that only the full restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity within the country’s internationally recognized borders can bring peace.

There is very little appetite for the kind of territorial concessions and land-for-peace deals periodically proposed by international commentators. Just eight percent of surveyed Ukrainians said they would be prepared to accept the ongoing Russian occupation of Crimea in order to end the war.

It is worth emphasizing that opposition to any kind of negotiated peace with Putin’s Russia is broadly consistent across Ukraine. For much of the post-Soviet period until the onset of Russian aggression in 2014, Ukraine experienced pronounced regional splits on issues of national memory and the country’s future geopolitical trajectory. However, support for any kind of economic or political integration with Russia has dramatically declined since 2014. Putin’s full-scale invasion in 2022 has had an even more dramatic unifying impact on Ukraine and has brought the country together in opposition to Russia.

Over the past year, regions of southern and eastern Ukraine where pro-Kremlin Ukrainian politicians still enjoyed some support after 2014 have found themselves on the frontlines of the Russian invasion and have suffered disproportionately. Putin’s advancing army has reduced dozens of largely Russian-speaking towns and cities to rubble throughout the south and east of the country, killing thousands of civilians and subjecting millions more to forced deportation. Understandably, this has led to a fundamental reappraisal of attitudes toward Russia.

Opinions on Ukraine’s future security stance have also been transformed by the war. In the not-so-distant past, the issue of possible Ukrainian NATO membership was one of the most divisive on the country’s domestic political agenda. After Russia’s full-scale invasion, that is no longer the case. Majorities in every single region of Ukraine now firmly support the idea of joining NATO. If NATO membership is not possible in the short-term, the next best option is viewed as security alliances with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Central European countries such as Poland, as well as strengthening Ukraine’s own defense capacity.

Ukrainians in all parts of the country now resoundingly reject the once popular notion of geopolitical neutrality, with only 8.5 percent still in favor. This drastic change in mood is not difficult to fathom. Ukrainians have simply lost faith in Russia’s reliability as a neighbor and recognize that even a decisive victory in the current war will not end the existential threat coming from the Kremlin.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Anyone seeking to promote a negotiated peace must reckon with Ukrainian public opinion. After all, Ukraine is a robust democracy with a strong record of grassroots mobilization including two separate post-Soviet revolutions. Any attempt to impose a Kremlin-friendly compromise on the country would likely meet with strong resistance, even if accompanied by threats to end Western military aid.

Ukrainians will not let entire regions of their country be used as bargaining chips to appease Moscow’s imperial ambitions; nor will they condemn millions of their compatriots to the genocidal horrors of permanent Russian occupation. Instead, there is agreement across Ukraine that the whole country, including Crimea, must be liberated in order to achieve a meaningful peace.

Most Ukrainians view the Russian invasion as an old-fashioned imperial war of colonial conquest designed to wipe Ukraine off the map of Europe and force Ukrainians to abandon their national identity. They recognize the futility of negotiating with a leader who compares himself to Russian Czar Peter the Great and openly denies Ukraine’s right to exist. Instead, they will fight on for as long as it takes.

The international community appears to have reached a similar conclusion but continues to hesitate over sending Ukraine the weapons it needs in order to secure victory. With each successive delay, the war is prolonged and the price of defeating Putin rises higher.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Name
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

The Russian cyberattack of January 2022 was not unprecedented. On the contrary, Ukraine has been persistently targeted since the onset of Russian aggression with the seizure of Crimea in spring 2014. One year later, Ukraine was the scene of the world’s first major cyberattack on a national energy system. In summer 2017, Ukraine was hit by what many commentators regard as the largest cyberattack in history. These high profile incidents were accompanied by a steady flow of smaller but nonetheless significant attacks.

Following the launch of Russia’s full-scale invasion one year ago, cyberattacks have frequently preceded or accompanied more conventional military operations. For example, prior to the Russian airstrike campaign against Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, Ukrainian energy companies experienced months of mounting cyberattacks.

These tactics are an attractive option for Russia in its undeclared war against the West. While more conventional acts of aggression would likely provoke an overwhelming reaction, cyberattacks exist in a military grey zone that makes them a convenient choice for the Kremlin as it seeks to cause maximum mayhem in Europe and North America without risking a direct military response. Russia may not be ready to use tanks and missiles against the West, but Moscow will have fewer reservations about deploying the cyberwarfare tactics honed in Ukraine.

In addition to disrupting and disabling government bodies and vital infrastructure, Russian cyberattacks in Ukraine have also sought to manipulate public opinion and spread malware via compromised email accounts. The Ukrainian authorities have found that it is crucial to coordinate efforts with the public and share information with a wide range of stakeholders in order to counter attacks in a timely manner.

The effects of cyberattacks targeting Ukraine have already been felt far beyond the country’s borders. One attack on the satellite communication system used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces during the initial stages of the Russian invasion caused significant disruption for thousands of users across the European Union including private individuals and companies. Given the borderless nature of the digital landscape, similar scenarios are inevitable as cyberwarfare capabilities continue to expand.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

From a Russian perspective, cyberwarfare is particularly appealing as it requires fewer human resources than traditional military operations. While Moscow is struggling to find enough men and military equipment to compensate for the devastating losses suffered in Ukraine during the first year of the invasion, the Kremlin should have no trouble finding enough people with the tech skills to launch cyber offensives against a wide range of countries in addition to Ukraine.

Russia can draw from a large pool of potential recruits including volunteers motivated by Kremlin propaganda positioning the invasion of Ukraine as part of a civilizational struggle against the West. Numerous individual attacks against Western targets have already been carried out by such networks.

At the same time, Ukraine’s experience over the past year has underlined that cyberattacks require both time and knowledge to prepare. This helps explain why there have been fewer high-complexity cyber offensives following the initial failure of Russia’s invasion strategy in spring 2022. Russia simply did not expect Ukraine to withstand the first big wave of cyberattacks and did not have sufficient plans in place for such an eventuality.

Ukraine has already carried out extensive studies of Russian cyberwarfare. Thanks to this powerful experience, we have increasing confidence in our ability to withstand further attacks. However, in order to maximize defensive capabilities, the entire Western world must work together. This must be done with a sense of urgency. The Putin regime is desperately seeking ways to regain the initiative in Ukraine and may attempt bold new offensives on the cyber front. Even if Russia is defeated, it is only a matter of time before other authoritarian regimes attempt to wage cyberwars against the West.

The democratic world must adapt its military doctrines without delay to address cyberspace-based threats. Cyberattacks must be treated in the same manner as conventional military aggression and should be subject to the same uncompromising responses. Efforts must also be made to prevent authoritarian regimes from accessing technologies that could subsequently be weaponized against the West.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is in many ways the world’s first cyberwar but it will not be the last. In the interests of global security, Russia must be defeated on the cyber front as well as on the battlefields of Ukraine.

Yurii Shchyhol is head of Ukraine’s State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection.

Dakota Cary, nonresident fellow, Global China Hub, Atlantic Council; consultant, Krebs Stamos Group:

“China’s use of the 2021 Microsoft Exchange Server vulnerability to access email servers captures the essence of modern Chinese hacking operations. A small number of teams exploited a vulnerability in a critical system to collecting intelligence on their targets. After the vulnerability became public and their operation’s stealth was compromised, the number of hacking teams using the vulnerability exploded. China has established a mature operational segmentation and capabilities-sharing system, allowing teams to quickly distribute and use a vulnerability after its use was compromised.”

John Costello, former chief of staff, Office of the National Cyber Director:

“No. China’s approach has evolved too quickly; its actors too heterogenous and many. What has remained consistent over time is the principal focus of China’s cyber operations, which, in general, is the economic viability and growth of China’s domestic industry and advancement of its scientific research, development, and modernization efforts. China does conduct what some would call ‘legitimate’ cyber operations, but these are vastly overshadowed by campaigns that are clearly intended to obtain intellectual property, non-public research, or place Chinese interests in an advantageous economic position.”

Bulelani Jili, nonresident fellow, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council:

“What is unique is how the party-state promotes surveillance technology and cyber operations abroad. It utilizes diplomatic exchanges, law enforcement cooperation, and training programs in the Global South. These initiatives not only advance the promotion of surveillance technologies and cyber tools but also support the government’s goals with regard to international norm-making in multilateral and regional institutions.”

Adam Kozy, independent analyst; CEO and founder, SinaCyber; former official with the FBI’s Cyber Team and Crowdstrike’s Asia-Pacific Analysis Team:

“There is not one typical example of Chinese cyber operations in my opinion, as operations have evolved over time and are uneven in their distribution of tooling, access to the vulnerability supply chain, and organization. However, one individual who typifies how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has co-opted domestic hacking talent for state-driven espionage purposes is Tan Dailin (谭戴林/aka WickedRose) of WICKED PANDA/APT41 fame. He first began as a patriotic hacker during his time at university in 2000-2002, conducting defacements during the US-Sino hacker war, but was talent spotted by his local People’s Liberation Army (PLA) branch, the Chengdu Military Region Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (TRB) and asked to compete in a hackathon. This was followed by an “internship” where he and his fellow hackers at the NCPH group taught attack/defense courses and appear to have played a role in the 2003-2006 initial Titan Rain attacks probing US and UK government systems. Tan and his friends continued to do contract work for gaming firms, hacking a variety of South Korean, Japanese, and US gaming firms, which gave them experience with high-level vulnerabilities that are able to manipulate at the kernel level and also afforded them stolen gaming certificates allowing their malware to evade antivirus detection. After a brief period where he was reportedly arrested by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) for hacking other domestic Chinese groups, he reemerged with several new contracting entities that have been noted to work for the Ministry of State Security (MSS) in Chengdu. Tan has essentially made a very comfortable living out of being a cyber mercenary for the Chinese state, using his legacy hacking network to constantly improve and upgrade tools, develop new intrusion techniques, and stay relevant for over twenty years.”

Jen Roberts, program assistant, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council:

“While no one case study stands out to typify a “Chinese” model, Chinese cyber operations blend components of espionage and entrepreneurship and capitalize on China’s pervasiveness in the international economy. One example of this is the Nortel/Huawei example where espionage, at least in part, caused the collapse of the Canadian telecommunications company.”

#2 What role do non-state actors play in China’s approach to cyber operations?

Cary: “Chinese security services still have a marked preference for using contracted hacking teams. These groups often raise money from committing criminal acts, in addition to work on behalf of intelligence agencies. Whereas in the United States, the government may purchase vulnerabilities to use on an offensive mission or hire a few companies to conduct cyber defense on a network, the US government does not hire firms to conduct specific offensive operations. In China, the government may hire teams for both offensive and defensive work, including offensive hacking operations.”

Costello: “Non-state actors play a myriad number of roles. Most notably, Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation indictments show clear evidence of contractual relationships between the MSS and non-state actors conducting cyber intelligence operations. Less conventional, Chinese hacktivists have on occasion played a limited but substantive role in certain cases, such as cyberattacks against South Korea’s Lotte group during the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system kerfuffle in 2017. Hypothetically, China’s military strategy calls for a cyber defense militia; but the contours or reality of mobilization, training, and reliability are unclear. China’s concept of ‘people’s war’ in cyberspace—a familiar adoption of Maoist jargon for new concepts—has been discussed but has yet to be seen in practice in any meaningful form.”

Jili: “State investment and procurement of public security systems from private firms are driving the development of China’s surveillance ecosystem. Accordingly, private firm work and collaboration with the state are scaling Beijing’s means to conduct surveillance operations on targeted domestic populations that are perceived threats to regime stability. Crucially, given the financial incentives to collaborate with Beijing, private companies have limited reasons not to support state security prerogatives.”

Kozy: “This question has the issue of mirroring bias. We tend to view things from a United States and Western lens when evaluating whether someone is a state actor or not, because we have very defined lines around what an offensive cyber operator can do acting on behalf of the US government. China has thrived in this grey area, relying on patriotic hackers with tacit state approval at times, hackers with criminal businesses, as well as growing its domestic ability to recruit talented researchers from the private sector and universities. The CCP has historically compelled individuals who would be considered traditionally non-state-affiliated actors to aid campaigns when necessary. Under an authoritarian regime like the CCP, any individual who is in China or ethnically Chinese can become a state actor very quickly. Actors like Tan Dailin do constitute a different type of threat because the CCP effectively co-opts their talents, while turning a blind eye to their criminal, for-profit side businesses that are illegal and have worldwide impact.”

Roberts: “Chinese non-state actors are very involved in Chinese cyber operations. A wide variety of non-state entities, such as contractors and technology conglomerates (Alibaba, Huawei, etc.), have worked in tandem with the CCP on a variety of research, development, and execution of cyber operations. This relationship is fortified by Chinese disclosure laws and repercussions of violating them. While Russia’s relationship with non-state actors relies on the opaqueness of non-state groups’ relationships with the government, China’s relationship with non-state entities is much more transparent.”

#3 How do China’s cyber operations differ from those of other states in the region?

Cary: “China has the most hackers and bureaucrats on payroll in Asia. Its operations are not different in kind nor process, but scale. While Vietnam’s or India’s cyber operators are able to have some effect in China, they are not operating at the scale at which China is operating. The most significant differentiator—which is still only speculation—is that China likely collects from the backbone of the Internet via agreements or compromise of telecommunication giants like Huawei, China Unicom, etc., as well as accessing undersea cables.”

Costello: “Scale. The scale of China’s cyber operations dwarfs those of other countries in the region—the complexity and sheer range of targeting, and the number of domestic technology companies whose increasingly global reach may be utilized for intelligence gain and influence. As China’s influence and global reach expands, so too does its self-perceived need to protect and further expand its interests. Cyber serves as a low-risk and often successful tool to accomplish this in economic and security realms.”

Jili: “While most regional and global players’ cyber operations have a domestic bent, Beijing also actively promotes surveillance technology and practices abroad through diplomatic exchanges, law enforcement cooperation, and training programs. These efforts not only advance the proliferation of Chinese public security systems, but they also support the government’s goals concerning international norm-making in multilateral and regional institutions.”

Kozy: “China is by far the most aggressive cyber power in its region. It can be debated that Russian cyber operatives are still more advanced in terms of sophistication, but China aggressively conducts computer network exploitations against all of its regional neighbors with specific advanced persistent threat (APT) groups across the PLA and MSS having regional focuses. Some of its neighbors such as India, Vietnam, Japan, and South Korea have advanced capabilities of their own to combat this, but there are regular public references to successful Chinese cyber campaigns against these countries despite significant defensive spending. Regional countries without cyber capabilities likely have long-standing compromises of critical systems.”

Roberts: “China has a talent for extracting intellectual property and conducting large-scale espionage. While other threat actors in the region, like North Korea, also conduct espionage operations, North Korea’s primary focus is on operations that prioritize fiscal extraction to fund regime activity, while China seems much more intent on collecting data for a variety of purposes. Despite differing capacities, sophistication, and types of operations, the end goals for both states are not all that different—political survival.”

China’s surveillance ecosystem and the global spread of its tools

The 5×5—Russia’s cyber statecraft

The 5×5—The state of cybersecurity in the Middle East

#4 How have China’s offensive cyber operations changed since 2018?

Cary: “China’s emphasis on developing its domestic pipeline of software vulnerabilities is paying off. China has passed policies that co-opt private research on behalf of the security services, support public software vulnerability competitions, and invest in technology to automate software vulnerability discovery. Together, as outlined by Microsoft’s Threat Intelligence Center’s 2022 analysis, China is combining these forces to use more software vulnerabilities now than ever before.”

Costello: “China’s cyber operations have unsurprisingly grown in scale and sophistication. Actors are less ‘noisy’ and China’s tactical approach to cyber operations appears to have evolved towards more scalable operations, namely supply-chain attacks and targeting service providers. These tactics have the advantage of improving the return on investment for an operation or campaign, as they allow compromise of all customers who use the product or service while minimizing risk of discovery. Supply chain attacks or compromise through third-party services can also be more difficult to detect and identify. China’s cyber landscape is not homogenous, and there remains great variability in sophistication across the range of Chinese actors.

As reported by the Director of National Intelligence in the last few years, China has increasingly turned towards targeting US critical infrastructure, particular natural gas pipelines. This is an evolution, though whether it is ‘learning by doing,’ operational preparation of the battlespace, or nascent ventures by a more operationally-focused Strategic Support Force (reorganization into a Space and Cyber Corps from 2015-17) is unclear. Time will most certainly tell.”

Jili: “Since 2018, the party-state has been more active in utilizing platforms like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), an emerging markets organization, and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) to promote digital infrastructure products and investments in the Global South. Principally, through multilateral platforms like FOCAC, Beijing has promoted resolutions to increase aid and cooperation in areas like cybersecurity and cyber operations.”

Kozy: “Intrusions from China have continued unabated since 2018, with a select number of Chinese APTs having periods of inactivity due to COVID-19 shutdowns. The Cyber Security Law and National Intelligence Law, both enacted in 2017, provided additional legal authority for China’s intelligence services to access data and co-opt Chinese companies for use in vaguely worded national security investigations. Of note is China’s efforts to increase the number of domestic cybersecurity conferences and nationally recognized cybersecurity universities as part of ongoing recruitment pipelines for cyber talent. Though there was increased focus from the Western cybersecurity community on MSS-affiliated contractors after the formation of the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) in 2015, more PLA-affiliated APT groups have emerged since the pandemic with new tactics, techniques, and procedures. The new PLASSF organization means these entities may be compromising high-value targets and then assessing them for use for offensive cyber operations in wartime scenarios or cyber espionage operations.”

Roberts: “Since 2018, Chinese offensive cyber operations have increased in scale. China has reinvigorated its workforce capacity-building efforts to increase the overall quantity and quality of workers. It has tightened its legal regime, cracking down on external vulnerability disclosure. It has also begun significantly investing in disinformation campaigns, especially against Taiwan. This is evident by the Chinese influence in Taiwan’s 2018 and 2020 elections.”

#5 What domestic entities, partnerships, or roles exist in China’s model of cyber operations model that are not present in the United States or Western Europe?

Cary: “China’s emphasis on contracted hackers coincides with divergent levels of trust between the central government and some provincial-level MSS hacking teams. Some researchers maintain that one contracted hacking team pwns targets inside China to do internal security prior to visits by central government leaders. While there is scant evidence that these attitudes and beliefs make their way into operations against foreign targets, they do likely impact the distribution of responsibilities and operations in a way not seen in mature democracies. The politicization of intelligence services is particularly risky in China’s political system.”

Costello: “The extralegal influence of the CCP cannot be overstated. Though the National Security Law, National Intelligence Law, and other laws ostensibly establish a legal foundation for China’s security apparatus, the reality is that the party is not bound strictly to these laws—and they only demonstrate a public indicator of what power it may possess. The lack of any independent judiciary suggests unchecked power of the CCP to co-opt or compel assistance from any citizen or company for which it almost certainly has near-total leverage. While the suspicion of Chinese organizations can be overblown, the idea that the CCP has the power to utilize not each but any organization is sobering and the root of many of these concerns. The lack of rigorous rule of law, in these limited circumstances, is certainly a competitive advantage in the intelligence sphere.”

Jili: “Beijing has nurtured a tech industry and environment that actively support the party-state’s aims to bolster government surveillance and cyber capabilities. From large firms to startups, many companies work with the state to conduct vulnerability research, develop threat detection capabilities, and produce security and intelligence products. While these private firms rely on Chinese venture capital and state loans, they have grown to service a global customer base.”

Kozy: “Starting with the 2015 control of WooYun, China’s largest vulnerability site, the CCP has gained an incredible amount of control of the vulnerability supply chain within China, which affords its cyber actors access to high-value vulnerabilities for use in their campaigns. The aforementioned 2017 laws also made it easier for Chinese authorities to prevent domestic researchers from competing in cyber conferences overseas and improved access to companies doing vulnerability research in China. The CCP’s public crackdowns on Jack Ma, Ant Financial, and many others have shown that the CCP fears the influence its tech firms have and has quickly moved to keep its tech giants loyal to the party; a stark contrast to the relationships that the United States and European Union have with tech giants like Google, Facebook, etc.”

Roberts: “While corporate-government partnerships exist everywhere, what separates the United States and Western Europe from China is the scope and scale of the connective tissue that exists between the two entities. In China, this relationship has more explicit requirements in the cyber domain, especially when it comes to vulnerability disclosure.”

The post The 5×5—China’s cyber operations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Remembering the ‘utterly relentless’ Ash Carter

Wendy R. Anderson — Fri, 20 Jan 2023 02:34:09 +0000

As I sat in Washington National Cathedral at former US Secretary of Defense Ash Carter’s memorial last week, I was as shocked and heartbroken as I was when I learned of his passing in the early morning hours of October 25, 2022. I kept thinking about his laser-focused, penetrating mind, the kinetic way he engaged in the world, the seemingly limitless energy from which he made things manifest in time and space. He was utterly relentless, indefatigable. And now… silence. In that silence, we in the national security community are trying to find our way.

There is nothing in my professional life for which I am more grateful, and prouder, than the years I spent with Ash as his chief of staff at the United States Department of Defense. And there is not a community for which I am more grateful than the people with whom we served.

Those who knew Ash, who also served as an Atlantic Council board member and honorary director, knew his brilliance. His intellect was formidable, crackled like lightning, exposing gaps in our thinking that we hadn’t before seen. The only two people I ever witnessed win an argument with him were Christine Fox, then director of the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, and Sandy Winnefeld, then vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, usually after sparring sessions that were as exhausting as they were enlightening. Not only was Ash the smartest person in every room, he was also clear, unambiguous, demanding, and relentless in solving complex problems of consequence.

The rigor Ash applied to national security problems was impressive; his execution, almost always flawless. There was something singularly unique about his sensibility: firmly grounded in history, oriented toward the future, committed at the DNA level to producing enduring outcomes. It’s exceedingly rare for a person to be that smart and discerning, and to execute that effectively in the real world, all for the good of a nation. Ash had it all in equal quantities.

Former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter has died at the age of 68.

In 2017, he spoke at the @AtlanticCouncil about how he viewed the job of US defense secretary. pic.twitter.com/24Lkcq11fR
— Atlantic Council (@AtlanticCouncil) October 25, 2022

It would have mattered to Ash that US President Joe Biden, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, every cabinet secretary of a national-security agency, members of Congress, titans of industry, and countless academics (from scientists to artists) attended his service. What would have mattered more to Ash was the attendance of the dozens of people he—for four decades—mentored and taught, from former staff to his former and current students at the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government.

But what would have mattered to Ash the most was the presence of wheelchair-bound veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, their families, and Gold Star families. Many don’t know how big Ash’s heart was. That heart manifest most palpably in his commitment to our service members and grief-stricken Gold Star families. I lost count of how many dignified transfers, in which fallen military members are returned to the United States, he and his wife, Stephanie, attended. Few knew just how much time he spent with devastated families. Other than Stephanie (the love of his life) and his children, this special community of service members, wounded warriors, and military families was his north star.

He once said, on a long trip to the Asia-Pacific region, that his father died young. I’ve thought of this often. It certainly seems to have determined how he set his internal rheostat to live one way—fast and with purpose. That intensity crafted the clarity with which he observed and assessed things and grew the heart with which he completely pursued the security of this country and, most of all, the safety of those fighting to protect it.

He was a man in a hurry. And how lucky we were to know him.

Wendy R. Anderson is the senior vice president for national security at Palantir Technologies. She served as chief of staff to Ash Carter when he was deputy US secretary of defense.

The post Remembering the ‘utterly relentless’ Ash Carter appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Cohen on Bloomberg Radio: On War in Ukraine and China

Atlantic Council — Tue, 17 Jan 2023 17:02:49 +0000

The post Cohen on Bloomberg Radio: On War in Ukraine and China appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin is preparing for a long war

Alexander Motyl — Wed, 04 Jan 2023 01:37:20 +0000

Vladimir Putin has just admitted Russia is in serious trouble. A comparison of his recent New Year address with the speech he delivered just one year earlier reveals a dramatic change in tone, focus, and language that hints at mounting alarm behind the scenes in the Kremlin over the rapidly unraveling invasion of Ukraine. Gone, too, was the Moscow skyline setting that typically serves as the backdrop for this keynote annual address. Instead, a somber-looking Putin spoke while flanked by rows of soldiers in uniform.

This symbolism matters. In modern Russia, the head of state’s New Year speech is an important tradition that seeks to set the tone for the coming year. On this occasion, the mood Putin sought to convey was of a country facing the prospect of a long and difficult war. After months spent downplaying the invasion of Ukraine as a “Special Military Operation,” he was now belatedly acknowledging the severity of the situation.

Subscribe to UkraineAlert

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Name
First Last
Email*
Phone
This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Back on December 31, 2021, Putin had been far more upbeat. “We are united in the hope that changes for the better lie ahead,” he said. “As we ring in the New Year, we hope that it will bring new opportunities for us. Of course, we hope luck will be on our side, but we understand that making our dreams reality primarily depends on us.” The final line of his address was downright soppy: “May love fill every heart and inspire us all to achieve our goals and scale the greatest heights. For the sake of our loved ones and for the sake of our only country, our great Motherland.”

Could this really have been the same Vladimir Putin who was already planning to unleash a full-scale invasion of Ukraine and plunge Europe into its largest conflict since World War II? In fact, despite the massive Russian military build-up on Ukraine’s borders in late 2021 and Moscow’s visibly worsening relations with the West, neither of these important developments was mentioned at all.

What a difference a year makes. In a nine-minute New Year speech that was reportedly the longest of his 22-year reign, Putin marked the arrival of 2023 by lashing out at the Western world and warning that the fate of Russia was at stake. “The West lied about peace,” Putin declared. “It was preparing for aggression, and now they are cynically using Ukraine and its people to weaken and split Russia. We have never allowed this, and never will allow anybody to do this to us.”

Domestic opponents were also targeted. In an apparent reference to the large numbers of military-age Russian men who chose to flee the country in the second half of 2022 rather than join the invasion, he noted that the past twelve months had “put a lot of things in their place, clearly separating courage and heroism from betrayal and cowardice.”

The speech concluded on a defiant and ominous note, with Putin indicating that Russia’s survival as an independent state was now under threat. “Together, we will overcome all difficulties and preserve our country’s greatness and independence,” he said. “We will triumph, for our families and for Russia.”

There was no frivolous talk of love, trust, and hope as in December 2021. No dreamy wishes, no hopeful expectations. This time, Putin was sounding the alarm bell. Naturally, the West was at fault and the Russian dictator himself bore absolutely no responsibility for the mess his country currently finds itself in.

Eurasia Center events