Defense Technologies - Atlantic Council

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Today’s Ukraine is often described as a testing ground for new military technologies, but it is important to stress that Ukrainians are active participants in this process who are in many instances leading the way with new innovations ranging from combat drones to artillery apps. This ethos is exemplified by initiatives such as BRAVE1, which was launched by the Ukrainian authorities in 2023 as a hub for cooperation between state, military, and private sector developers to address defense issues and create cutting-edge military technologies. BRAVE1 has dramatically cut down the amount of time and paperwork required for private sector tech companies to begin working directly with the military; according to Ukraine’s defense minister, this waiting period has been reduced from two years to just one-and-a-half months.

One example of Ukrainian tech innovation for the military is the Geographic Information System for Artillery (GIS Arta) tool developed in Ukraine in the years prior to Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion. This system, which some have dubbed the “Uber for artillery,” optimizes across variables like target type, position, and range to assign “fire missions” to available artillery units. Battlefield insights of this nature have helped Ukraine to compensate for its significant artillery hardware disadvantage. The effectiveness of tools like GIS Arta has caught the attention of Western military planners, with a senior Pentagon official saying Ukraine’s use of technology in the current war is a “wake-up call.”

Alongside intensifying cooperation with the state and the military, members of Ukraine’s tech sector are also taking a proactive approach on the digital front of the war with Russia. A decentralized IT army, consisting of over 250,000 IT volunteers at its peak, has been formed to counter Russian digital threats. Moreover, the country’s underground hacktivist groups have shown an impressive level of digital ingenuity. For example, Ukraine’s IT army claims to have targeted critical Russian infrastructure such as railways and the electricity grid.

Ukraine’s tech industry has been a major asset in the fightback against Russia’s invasion, providing a much-needed economic boost while strengthening the country’s cyber defenses and supplying the Ukrainian military with the innovative edge to counter Russia’s overwhelming advantages in manpower and military equipment.

This experience could also be critical to Ukraine’s coming postwar recovery. The Ukrainian tech industry looks set to emerge from the war stronger than ever with a significantly enhanced global reputation. Crucially, the unique experience gained by Ukrainian tech companies in the defense tech sector will likely position Ukraine as a potential industry leader, with countries around the world eager to learn from Ukrainian specialists and access Ukrainian military tech solutions. This could serve as a key driver of economic growth for many years to come, while also improving Ukrainian national security.

David Kirichenko is an editor at Euromaidan Press, an online English language media outlet in Ukraine. He tweets @DVKirichenko.

Michael Allen

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

China Cybersecurity

The post Allen in the Wall Street Journal on US efforts to simultaneously deter Russia and China appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig in Foreign Policy on Machiavelli’s Art of War

sodal — Tue, 18 Jul 2023 15:24:54 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On July 16, Scowcroft Vice President and Director Matthew Kroenig was featured in Foreign Policy’s 2023 Summer Reading List, recommending Niccolò Machiavelli’s Art of War. Despite it being published in the 16th century, Kroenig argues that it has contemporary relevance in its discussion of emerging technologies that will revolutionize security, militaries, and war. After all, the famed political thinker faced the same issues surrounding firearms and artillery that modern militaries face with artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and hypersonic missiles.

If one of the world’s greatest minds could not fully appreciate the transformative effects of gunpowder on the battlefield, then it is likely that we, too, lack sufficient imagination to fully conceptualize the disruptive wars to which we will bear witness in our futures.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in Foreign Policy on Machiavelli’s Art of War appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Oleksii Reznikov: Ukraine’s defense doctrine will define country’s future

Oleksii Reznikov — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 18:49:23 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has recently initiated a national debate over the creation of a Ukrainian Doctrine that will shape the future development of the country. I am confident that defense policy will be at the heart of this national dialogue and see a number of key points that are worth underlining.

The first point to note is the global nature of Ukrainian security. For decades to come, the entire world will live by the rules established by the outcome of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin has demonstrated its readiness to weaponize everything from energy resources and food supplies to cyberspace and social media. Moscow has engaged in nuclear blackmail, interfered with maritime freedoms, and called into question the very idea of territorial integrity. These challenges are not local or even regional in scope; they are global threats that resonate equally around the world.

How we respond to these issues in Ukraine will define the international security climate. Any attempts to address the Russian invasion on a purely local level by freezing the conflict or forcing Ukraine into territorial concessions will result in failure and will only fuel further international instability. Instead, we must acknowledge that the threats posed by Russia are global in character and demand a global response.

The second key point is the need to define Ukraine’s position in regional and global security systems. In simple terms, the desired trajectory should include security guarantees followed by full NATO accession, with internal transformations taking place in parallel that implement the best lessons from Ukraine’s wartime experience and enable the country to acquire the necessary domestic defense capabilities. These processes can and must be advanced during the current active phase of the war.

The third key point is the need to develop a defense doctrine that meets the security expectations of both Ukraine and the country’s partners. It is now clear that Ukraine is capable of serving as a shield on Europe’s eastern frontier. Indeed, Ukraine is currently carrying out NATO’s core mission of defending Europe against Russian military aggression. At the same time, over the past eighteen months Ukraine has received direct and indirect military aid worth more than the country’s entire defense budget since the restoration of Ukrainian independence in 1991. Without continued external assistance, Ukraine will not be able to carry out rapid rearmament or acquire the kind of defense capabilities it needs. The best solution would be to move toward greater reliance on internal resources while maintaining strong levels of international support.

Clearly, Ukraine’s partners will be reluctant to invest in a security model that differs significantly from established NATO standards, or one that conflicts with their own military, industrial, or economic interests. Finding the right balance between strengthening Ukraine’s domestic defense sector capabilities and optimizing international cooperation will be crucial.

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Efforts to develop a practical vision for Ukraine’s army of the future have been underway since June 2022, when I ordered a capacity review. These findings, coupled with Ukraine’s unique wartime experience, form the basis of a concept paper on the transformation of Ukraine’s defense sector submitted to Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal at the beginning of June 2023. The next stage will involve consultations to coordinate interagency efforts required to create the right legislative framework and ensure effective cooperation between different government bodies. This synergy will be the key to success.

Russia’s invasion has underlined that defense is an investment not an expense. For instance, strengthening Ukraine’s naval capabilities will help guarantee maritime security in the Black Sea and Azov Sea, which secures vital income from trade. Likewise, failure to provide adequate security measures will leave Ukraine unable to rebuild and trapped in costly wartime insecurity. All of Ukraine’s security policy decisions must reflect these fundamental truths.

Complex defense capabilities revolve around three main factors: people, weapons, and financial resources. Each has their own planning specifics. Successful weapons and financing policies take years to plan; when it comes to human resources, it often takes a generation or longer to get it right.

Ukraine is now looking to coordinate the country’s defense sector transformation under conditions of extreme uncertainty. We know the current war will end in Ukrainian victory, but we do not know when this will be. This makes it difficult to begin the process of optimizing the range of weapons in use by the Ukrainian armed forces. After all, in order to defeat Russia, Ukraine needs to receive as many weapons as it can, and needs to get them as quickly as possible.

We also don’t know exactly when Ukraine’s partners will make the final decision to fully integrate the country into the Euro-Atlantic security community. This is fundamental. It is one thing to reform the Ukrainian military as part of a collective defense strategy in cooperation with partners; it is quite another to build defense capabilities in relative isolation with some external support.

One of my main requests to our partners is therefore to make a decision on Ukraine’s NATO accession as soon as possible. This will make it far easier for all parties to conduct long-term defense planning. If a decision is not forthcoming, Ukraine’s partners will be obliged to include the country’s security needs in their own planning on a bilateral and multilateral basis.

A further priority for Ukraine’s defense doctrine is the de-Sovietization of defense policy and planning. This needs to be addressed in a practical manner that goes beyond mere slogans. Eighteen months ago, many military analysts believed a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine would mean a fight between a large Soviet army against a small Soviet army. In reality, it soon became clear that the Ukrainian army had undergone significant change. However, the same cannot be said for the broader state systems underpinning Ukrainian defense policy. A wide range of political, social, and economic changes are still needed.

For example, the system of registration for military service is still linked in the Soviet fashion with place of work or study. This means that entrepreneurs along with the self-employed and unemployed are often outside the system. Far-reaching changes are needed in order to establish and maintain the right kind of reserve and effectively mobilize the country’s human, material, and financial resources. Efforts to overcome quality problems with quantity must be set aside. In conditions of resource scarcity, such an approach is suicidal.

The human dimension of future Ukrainian defense is a professional army. This must be based on the transparent logic of a military career and an extensive social protection package, relying on well-trained reserves formed of all men liable for military service and of women on a voluntary basis (with the exception of those categories of women who are liable for military service).

The registration of people liable for military service should be fully digitized. This process is underway. We also need to implement separate training policies for different groups in order to create a genuine rather than nominal reserve. This should look to maximize citizen engagement by improving the motivation system.

Statements about there being seven million Ukrainians liable for military service are meaningless if the country is not capable of structuring the reserve in ways that make efficient use of these people. Similarly, declarations that anyone subject to military service must complete their compulsory period in uniform do little to help the state capitalize on existing resources. Instead, basic training should be supplemented by the development of specific groups within the country’s military reserve forces. This should include a combat reserve consisting of those with combat experience; a territorial reserve for territorial defense units; an operational reserve of military veterans without combat experience; a mobilization reserve of those who previously passed through basic training; and a general reserve register featuring individuals with no prior military training.

The development of an efficient reserve is only possible in conjuction with an effective Heroes Policy, which has been identified as a priority by President Zelenskyy. This is a good example of the need for interagency synergies and is also an area where a sense of justice must serve as a cornerstone. Meanwhile, the task of managing military registration should be taken away from the General Staff and the Land Forces Command. Instead, it is necessary to establish a separate and tailored agency within the Ministry of Defense.

Similar efforts are required for the civil reserve. Over the past eighteen months of Russia’s full-scale invasion, it has become clear that a significant portion of the almost one million Ukrainian men and women in uniform perform purely civilian functions. It makes no sense to bunch all of these people together with the military until the end of hostilities. Instead, a more nuanced approach is required. When society sees that the state seeks to engage people in defense tasks as rationally and reasonably as possible, we will witness a decline in negative phenomena associated with military service. After all, many of those who seek to avoid military service do so in order to escape perceived uncertainty, injustice, and abuses.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

A new mobilization and reserve policy will require a new regulatory framework. This will involve comprehensive legislative changes. The entire mobilization system for central and local authorities, enterprises, and institutions should undergo revision, with mobilization tasks in their current form abolished. In its place, the emphasis should be on practical needs and common sense. Training for reservists should be synchronized with real life requirements and skills, with citizens aware of opportunities at the level of school leaver, university undergraduate, employee, or entrepreneur.

Professional military education and career management must be developed according to NATO principles and standards to ensure interoperability. At the same time, all training and education should be adjusted to reflect Ukraine’s unrivalled combat experience. This is the country’s unique advantage and should shape Ukraine’s defense doctrine as much as possible.

Work is already underway on the transformation of Ukraine’s military education system, with a concept approved by the government in December 2022. Over the coming decade, Ukraine’s military education will be fully integrated into the broader European military education environment in terms of both form and content. A separate element here is military-patriotic education. At the moment, this is governed by two laws and a presidential decree which contain a number of apparent conflicts and contradictions. We must achieve a clearer division of tasks and harmonization.

Ukraine’s entire defense doctrine should be underpinned by solid economic foundations. At present, the Ukrainian defense industry is not capable of meeting the demands of the military, but the sector has huge potential. Indeed, if managed correctly, a highly profitable Ukrainian defense industry could realistically become a major engine driving the country toward the goal of a one trillion dollar GDP.

I have repeatedly stated my position that self-sufficiency in the defense sector is a core component of genuine national sovereignty. Moving forward, Ukraine should be aiming to produce as much as possible itself. Once again, Ukraine’s unique combat experience creates exciting opportunities in this area. In order to make the most of the country’s experience and its industrial capabilities, a new defense industry development strategy is required. This should take international defense sector trends into account while also focusing on other economic factors and Ukraine’s specific strengths.

The time has come to turn away from the old Soviet model governed by unprofitability and resource consumption. Instead, Ukraine must strive to become a global defense sector leader and an attractive international partner. This will require a unified center capable of establishing and implementing policy, with exceedingly flexible R&D assets responding rapidly to the latest requirements. Procurement should be synchronized with budget planning, while efforts must be made to move away from lingering problems relating to blurred responsibilities. Efforts in this direction are already underway and must continue.

The overall objective of Ukraine’s defense doctrine is to defend the state against any possible threat. This requires new approaches to everything from managing mobilization and maintaining an effective reserve, to reforming the defense industry and boosting domestic production at every level. The country’s needs will inevitably evolve over time. Five years after victory in the current war, will Ukraine need a mobilization reserve of 500,000 or two million? This is why scalability is so critical.

In the defense sector, Ukraine has huge untapped potential and much to offer the international community. In the drone sector alone, Ukraine is at the cutting edge of current innovations and is well-placed to remain a key source of solutions for European and other markets. This military tech prowess will help open doors to new cooperation that are currently closed. Ukraine can build on its experience and expertize to become a major player in the global defense industry, but this requires solid foundations and a strong domestic sector.

Every day, our defenders are bringing victory closer. This progress is taking place in a rapidly changing world, and is contributing to these changes. Ukraine must be ready to capitalize on the opportunities this creates in ways that guarantee the safety of all Ukrainians while enabling the country to prosper.

Oleksii Reznikov is Ukraine’s Minister of Defense.

Bruce Stubbs — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 13:00:00 +0000

Key terminology
The navy’s approach to strategy development and force planning
The sources of the problem
Problem definition
Key issues shaping problem solution
Recommendations
First recommendation: Establish a new assistant secretary of the navy
Second recommendation: stand-up the navy strategy cell
Third recommendation: Stand-up the force planning directorate
Resourcing the recommendations
Conclusion
About the author

Key terminology

This paper uses five key terms. The first two, force design and force development, are precise US Navy terms that are not interchangeable.

Force design is the innovation and the determination of future Navy ships, aircraft, and weapon systems, along with a warfighting concept for a twenty-year and beyond timeframe. Force development is the adaptation and modernization of Navy in-service ships, aircraft, and weapon systems, along with a warfighting concept within a two-to-seven-year timeframe. The difference between these two official Navy terms may seem arcane: force design is all about the future force, and force development is all about the current force. However, both address Navy requirements based on an appraisal of US security needs, and then choose naval capabilities (along with a warfighting concept) to meet those requirements within fiscal limitations.

The following terms are also important for the reader’s comprehension.

Force planning is the more commonly understood term—used in place of force design and force development—and is used across Congress, defense media, academia, and industry. While force planning is not an official Navy term, the term is used in this paper to encompass both force development and force design.
Force structure is used by the Congress to mean the number and types of combat units the Navy can generate and sustain, as well as to represent the Navy’s combat capability.
Budget is an informal and shortened expression to encapsulate all Navy activities in the Defense Department’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system, especially the programming activity.

The navy’s approach to strategy development and force planning

The US Navy’s approach to strategy development and force planning in 2023 is not working. Strategy development is on life support and force planning uses an incremental approach of buying marginally better and more expensive versions of the same platforms the Navy has relied upon for decades. In effect, it is producing the Navy’s force structure one ship class at a time, without reference to an overall Navy strategy and force plan to field an integrated, aligned, and synchronized “Navy fighting machine.”¹ Moreover, this approach is delivering an unaffordable fleet over too long a procurement time. Proposals for developing new capabilities are viewed as threats to in-service platforms and programs, thereby blocking innovation.

Navy F/A-18E Super Hornets prepare to launch from the USS Harry S. Truman in support of Exercise Trident Juncture 18. Credit: US Navy, Navy Petty Officer 3rd Class Adelola Tinubu.

Congress, defense media, defense analysts, the Defense Department, and independent US government agencies have all found fault with the US Navy’s strategy development and force planning. Most notably, Congress has expressed its dissatisfaction.

In December 2017, Congress mandated a Navy with 355 crewed ships, a goal based on the Navy’s 2016 Force Structure Assessment (FSA) and, in February 2020, Representative Joe Courtney (D-CT) complained to then Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper about, “the lack of a shipbuilding plan and the [Donald] Trump administration not delivering a strategy to build a 355-ship Navy.”² In December 2021, Congress mandated the Navy to submit the Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report on its force structure plans for the near, middle, and far terms to meet the combatant commanders’ requirements using Defense Department-approved scenarios.³ However, Congress reacted with little enthusiasm for the Navy’s thirty-year shipbuilding plan for fiscal year 2023 (FY2023), despite its being the first such report from the Navy to Congress in more than three years, and was similarly unimpressed by the following year’s iteration. This has led Congress to mandate the establishment of an independent National Commission on the Future of the Navy in December 2022 to determine the size and force mix of the fleet by mid-2025.⁴

This litany of events—particularly the unprecedented direction for the Navy to submit the Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report, the establishment of an independent National Commission on the Future of the Navy, and the assignment to the commandant of the Marine Corps of sole responsibility to develop amphibious warfare ships requirements—indicates Congress’ displeasure with Navy force planning. Moreover, the inability of the Department of Defense (DoD) and Navy leaders to consistently state how many ships the Navy needs to meet its requirements may be a driving factor in Congress’ decision to legislate these unprecedented mandates. During the first seven months of 2022, DoD leaders suggested five different targets for the objective size of the Navy—316, 327, 367, 373, and five hundred.⁵ In addition, the use of three options in both the FY2023 and FY2024 thirty-year shipbuilding plan—rather than a single projection—handicaps congressional understanding of the Joe Biden administration’s goals concerning the future size and composition of the Navy, and assessing the Navy’s proposed FY2024 shipbuilding budget, five-year shipbuilding plan, and thirty-year shipbuilding plan. Moreover, to follow its mantra of providing best military advice to civilian leadership, the Navy must have a preferred option for what it needs to get the job done, and, most importantly, must assess the risk to the United States if it does not get the resources it needs (see Table 2).

As Dr. Scott Mobley pointed out in his November 2022 Proceedings essay, the Navy largely focuses on programming and budget to develop the means for strategy while “devaluing the strategic underpinnings for rationalizing and justifying those means.”⁶

Navy force planning uses a piecemeal approach—“buying at the margin [fewer, but] better [and more expensive] versions of the same [type] of platforms [the Navy] has relied upon for decades”—that is delivering an unaffordable fleet over too long a procurement time.⁷ Navy force planning almost always occurs in a resource-constrained environment imposing a zero-sum approach, in which proposals for new capabilities are frequently viewed as threats to in-service platforms, thereby blocking innovation. At the end of the day, the Navy’s new platforms, weapons, and systems are quite similar to what is already in the fleet.

The preponderance of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) platform and capability staffs each focus on a single platform or capability. No one looks at all the platforms and capabilities as an integrated, collective whole. No single staff entity ensures all these individual platform and capability staffs are integrated by a well-articulated, comprehensive strategy and warfighting concept to achieve the required strategy-force match.

The Navy cannot create a lasting OPNAV organizational structure to ensure its strategy drives its force planning and its budget in that order. OPNAV cannot conduct its business “with strategic intent” at all times in its key processes. Because it operates within the Defense Department’s mandated five-year Future Years Defense Program and is focused on the budget, OPNAV tends to concentrate on numerous process-centric products, which, coupled with cascading short-term urgent projects, frequently sees its strategic guidance displaced, or even lost, in the sausage making.

The continuing need to reconcile the interface between the Navy’s strategy with its mid-range to long-range forecasts, and between the Navy’s budget and its short-term timelines and all-consuming fiscal pressures, has eluded OPNAV. Numerous OPNAV reorganizations since the early 1980s underscore this observation. As a 2010 Center for Naval Analyses study highlighted: “successive CNOs have sought to make [OPNAV] responsive to their needs—chief among which is usually construction of a balanced and integrated program and budget.”⁸ They failed and, as a result, the Navy continues to address its force requirements incrementally, which frustrates innovation, alarms Congress, and delivers fewer, more expensive, and almost always bigger platforms. The various uncrewed surface vessels and aircraft may break the bigger-is-better paradigm, yet they are arriving too slowly.

The sources of the problem

The causes of the Navy’s problem with its approach to strategy development and force planning are numerous and diverse.

Divergent CNO proclivities prevent strategic consistency

Effective force planning suffers from insufficient strategic consistency between chiefs of naval operations (CNOs). The historical record suggests these service chiefs seem to believe they must differentiate themselves from their predecessors, with their own distinct, separate strategy—or what is typically a strategic, aspirational plan rather than a strategy with ends, ways, and means. As Dr. Peter Haynes explained in his book, Toward a New Maritime Strategy:

In the political climate of Washington, a place that demands constant change and where only new ideas can be ensured a hearing, strategic statements have a shelf life. Navy leaders have to replace or update their ideas or risk being seen as too slow in responding to changes in the domestic political or international security environments.⁹

Assuredly, senior Navy leaders would agree that, regardless of who is the CNO, the Navy has enduring institutional objectives and the benefits of consistency would be enormous for strategy development and force planning. There would be: assured continuity of strategic direction over the fielding of major platforms and weapons systems; no requirement for an incoming CNO to craft a “new” Navy strategic direction from whole cloth; unity of effort on the Navy’s way ahead based on organizational agreement hammered out at four-star updates; a consistent Navy message for strategic communications; and reduction in false starts and nonproductive efforts (see Table 1).

The service needs each CNO to build upon what has gone on before so that the Navy can benefit from continuous unity of effort over time. The service also needs a consistent planning process, and not a completely new version to accompany the incoming CNO’s new strategy. The challenge is to sustain consensus in a planning and acquisition process that runs a decade or more, and is instigated by a CNO who typically serves a four-year tenure.

OPNAV’s budget process dominates strategy and force planning

OPNAV remains focused on the budget as its overarching and defining process, believing strategy can be generated during the budget process. This narrow focus constrains the development of long-range strategies and plans to address transcendent challenges and opportunities. There is an irreconcilable difference between the needs of the budget process and the strategy-development process.

In a 2021 interview, a former deputy director of the Integration of Capabilities and Resources Directorate (OPNAV N8), Irv Blickstein, provided an explanation of why the budget process dominates. First, it is impossible to follow literally the linear prescript of strategy, requirements, and budget. If a strategy is unaffordable, then capability trade-offs must be made. The budgeteers knew that just opining about strategy would not carry the day for funding. Instead, the Navy needed analysis to show the effectiveness of its programs and the validity of its arguments. As deputy programmer in OPNAV in the early 1980s, Blickstein noted:

I had no relationship with anybody in OP-06 [Plans, Policies and Operations Directorate]. And you’d think, well you’re building a [budget] and they’re in charge of the Maritime Strategy, shouldn’t you guys be talking all the time? The answer is yes, but did the Maritime Strategy have an impact on our programming work? It really didn’t…Historically, there was no relationship between strategists and programmers, but I think it would be a good thing to have.¹⁰

In June 2015, the Naval Postgraduate School published a report on strategy’s role to drive the Navy’s budget process. The report’s principal findings stated that the “Navy has failed to ensure that strategy and policy priorities drive [budget] development and execution.” Specifically, within OPNAV, the budget process “eclipses strategy” and “is substituted for, and is often equated to, strategy.”¹¹ The report noted that the Integration of Capabilities and Resources Directorate, a directorate that acts essentially as OPNAV’s Chief Financial Officer, “wields most of the intra-bureaucratic authority and power when it comes to the making and implementation of strategy” and that the Operations, Plans, and Strategy Directorate (OPNAV N3/N5), with its strategy staff, does not “play meaningful role in strategy development and execution.” During his tenure as CNO (2015–2019), Admiral John Richardson attempted to change this attitude. His efforts did not succeed.

Currently, there are significant alignment issues among the budget process, strategy development, and long-range planning processes. The budget process focuses on a five-year period and emphasizes the application of quantitative analysis, which is effective for near-term resource decisions. However, with no clear-cut beginning or end to its annual cycle, the budget process dominates all OPNAV planning activities and “tends simply to encourage the continuation of programs already under way” and discourage “the development of fresh new alternatives.”¹² The Navy needs to avoid defaulting to budget execution to develop its strategy. All strategies are shaped and informed by available resources, but the budget should serve the strategy—not the other way around.

Currently,the responsibility to manage the Navy’s force-planning ecosystem is dispersed throughout OPNAV. The Warfighting Development Directorate (OPNAV N7) addresses force design. The Integration of Capabilities and Resources Directorate (OPNAV N8) addresses the quantitative means to support force design and development, and the Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities Directorate (OPNAV N9) addresses force development and force design. The CNO’s Commanders Action Group provides the terms of reference—strategic guidance—for force design and force development. The Naval Warfare Development Center produces warfighting concepts, such as the current Distributed Maritime Operations (See Figure 1).

Each of these responsibilities must occur, but they are uncoordinated. No directorate integrates these force-planning efforts along with the ongoing production of new ships, aircraft, and weapons to produce a unified Navy fighting machine. As a result, decisions about production of new forces and modernization of in-service forces directly shape decisions about determining future platforms and capabilities, and vice versa. This interrelationship among force development, force design, and the production of new platforms and capabilities demands alignment, integration, and synchronization into a comprehensive process—not as individual platforms and capabilities—along with a shared understanding of the future security environment and a common warfighting concept to deter and defeat future adversaries in specific time periods.

Furthermore, this dispersion of force-planning responsibility has harmful consequences. In February 2022, OPNAV sponsored a workshop, titled the Force Design Sprint, to assess the Navy’s force-design posture. At the conclusion, a senior N7 leader informed the author that the workshop determined, “everyone in OPNAV was in charge [of force design], but no one was in charge.” It was an astonishing discovery for a military service to declare no one in OPNAV actually held responsibility for force design, with its focus on future ships, aircraft, and weapon systems, along with warfighting concepts for the twenty-plus-year time horizon.

Insufficient strategic guidance misdirects force planning

The Navy lacks sufficient and coherent guidance to ensure strategy shapes its budget and warfighting concepts. It has no classified strategy to facilitate an unambiguous expression of its ends, ways, and means. It has no codified assessment of both the current and future security environments to provide baseline understandings of them and set conditions for effective concept-driven, threat-informed capability development. Another missing document is a warfighting concept for the 2040s timeframe. The result is that, in 2023, specialized N9 staffs are planning the next-generation platforms without the benefit of a common set of capstone strategic guidance. (See Figure 1a)

Navy platform communities distort force planning

Internecine warfare by the Navy’s three platform communities (its surface, aviation, and submarine communities) severely unbalances the Navy as a whole. Expected in theory to rise above their individual platform advocacy and warfare concerns, the communities are all too susceptible to pressures and rivalries from the others. Each warfare community produces an unclassified strategic guidance document with little regard for how the other communities interact and cooperate to generate a unified Navy fighting machine.

Problem definition

In response to this criticism, CNO Admiral Michael Gilday reassigned force-design responsibilities to N7 and focused its efforts on 2045, as outlined in the CNO’s 2022 Navigation Plan.¹³ However, the Navy has largely already decided upon a 2045 force design and, moreover, the Navy is full speed ahead on its implementation. The year 2045 is only about twenty years away, well within the service life for the ongoing production of new ships, aircraft, and weapon systems. CNO Gilday has approved the Navy’s future direction for its next generation of platforms and capabilities, which N9 has developed with the priority order of acquisition as the next-generation aircraft first, the next-generation destroyer second, and the next-generation attack submarine third.¹⁴ This prioritization seems to cement the aircraft carriers as the Navy’s warfighting center of gravity, rather than precision weapons launched from a variety of air, surface, and subsurface platforms.

The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson prepares for flight operations in the Arabian Gulf. Credit: US Navy/ Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Alex King.

The long-term problem confronting Navy strategy development and force planning is larger than reassigning force-design responsibility to N7. The Navy needs to address the problem of how it conducts and organizes for strategy development and force planning in toto, not as disparate processes. Based on this paper’s assessment of the Navy’s strategy development and force planning posture, the Navy faces a three-part problem.¹⁵

Part one: How does the Navy produce “a force structure, now and in the future, of the right size and the right composition (force mix) to achieve the nation’s security goals, in light of the security environment and resource constraints” and avoid a strategy-force mismatch?¹⁶
Part two: How does the Navy ensure its strategy—based upon codified current and future assessments of the security environments, along with associated warfighting concepts—drives force-planning decisions in its budget process, and not have those decisions made by default?
Part three: How does the Navy ensure its force-planning activities include revision of existing warfighting concepts and development of new ones that fully integrate all platforms to produce a single, lethal Navy fighting machine?

Key issues shaping problem solution

Several key issues significantly influence the formulation of recommendations to improve Navy strategy development and force planning.

Organizing OPNAV for effective strategy development

Given the enduring nature of developing, maintaining, updating, and iterating capstone strategic guidance, a dedicated strategy staff (to include responsibility for long-range planning) must have continuity and longevity. Because this guidance is so central to the Navy’s future, their production cannot be an on-again-off-again process. The key is for the CNO to select its director and have confidence in its staff. Once a strategy staff is up and running, the Navy needs to keep it in place. If the CNO is unhappy with its product, he or she should certainly bring in their own selectee to run the show, but the organization itself needs to retain its role, rather than being shoved aside and replaced with a new, favorite staff group.

Avoiding a federated organization to conduct force planning

OPNAV is using a federated organizational construct, which is problematic for conducting force planning. This construct attempts to achieve simultaneously decentralization of responsibilities and unity of effort. It supposedly unites, under a central entity, diverse responsibilities along with distinctive, associated processes, but with the responsibilities still controlled by different and independent entities. It is aspirational and relies on goodwill to meet mission in lieu of a hierarchical structure with authorities to make hard decisions and not focus on achieving consensus. Given the importance of successful force planning to the Navy, the organizing model to follow is a dedicated entity reporting directly to the CNO, such as the Navy Strategic Systems Programs and Naval Nuclear Propulsion, which, respectively, have cradle-to-grave responsibility for sea-launched nuclear-deterrent capabilities and for the Navy’s nuclear propulsion. The Navy needs to borrow a page from these two organizational successes and establish a dedicated, single entity responsible for all matters pertaining to force planning. The CNO’s force-planning responsibilities are so vast in scope, so complex, and so critical, that the Navy cannot disaggregate them across the OPNAV staff or employ a federated construct. It needs to establish a dedicated entity reporting directly to the CNO.

Providing CNO’s direct oversight of force planning and strategy

Only the CNO and the vice chief of naval operations (VCNO), with the authority vested in their offices, can ensure OPNAV maintains a strategic focus. They alone can focus the staff to keep the Navy’s strategic direction front and center, to drive force planning and the budget. The vice admirals who are the deputy chiefs of naval operations leading the seven major functional directorates cannot do it individually; they are challenged enough to meet the urgent demands of the budget process and the press of their daily business.

Understanding defense-analysis limitations to support force planning

Quantifiable defense analysis makes a strong contribution to force planning, especially in the near and middle terms, by understanding trade-offs among platforms and weapons systems. Defense analysis—operations research, campaign analysis, and systems analysis—has restricted relevancy to force planning with its long-range focus of twenty or more years into the future. Defense-analysis methods require certainty of data before they can productively yield reliable certainty in answers. The Navy’s current force-structure assessment methodology, which uses these quantifiable defense analysis tools, will be hard pressed to generate useful data about the long term. Its processes require data for modeling that are simply unavailable twenty years from now—hence, the need for a strong component of risk analysis, wargames, red teams, and alternative-futures work.

Incorporating net assessment capability to support force planning

Force planning requires long-range comparative assessment of trends, key competitions, risks, opportunities, and future prospects of Navy capability. Net assessment provides this comparison of red-blue interaction, using qualitative and quantitative factors across alternative future scenarios. The Navy cannot predict the future with certainty. However, net assessments generate a spectrum of needed capabilities for the Navy to draw upon. The Navy needs this capability because its reliance on campaign analysis, systems analysis, and operations research is grossly unbalanced. The Navy needs to conduct force planning based upon an assessment of the future security environment, and then use tools such as strategic wargames, emulations, expert-panel reports, and net assessment to build a strategy and a warfighting concept, and derive required capabilities. Once that is done, the quantifiable tools can refine the types and number of capabilities.

Clarifying N7 and N9’s force-planning roles

Force planning encompasses force design (i.e., the future fleet) and force development (i.e., the current fleet). CNO Gilday reassigned force-design responsibility from N9 to N7 in July 2022. In reality, N9 will likely continue to conduct force-design responsibility as it determinines the next generation of platforms for operational employment in the 2040s. Given all the approved and funded N9 force-design activity to plan the 2040s Navy, N7’s force planning responsibilities are far from clear.

Incorporating the secretary of the Navy into force planning

Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro has signaled caution and unease with Navy force planning, and wants a realistic approach to understand the total cost and impact of the next-generation destroyer, attack submarine, and crewed/uncrewed aircraft. He wants to test new technologies for these platforms before any production. Given the Navy’s uneven track record in planning and delivering surface ships, along with the issue of affordability to fund an immense recapitalization, his caution is warranted.

Evaluating new technologies and concepts for force planning

The Navy is replacing in-service platforms with newer, follow-on versions, with the exception of uncrewed platforms. This is significant because strong platform attachment may be preventing the Navy from embracing new technologies and warfighting concepts. More importantly, such a possible attitude may prevent the Navy from understanding the changing character of war at sea. For example, because of the convergence of technologies, by 2045 the air and surface domains might become so significantly transparent that, in the competition between the “finder” and the “hider,” the finder might well dominate. If this is correct, surface ships and even aircraft will be increasingly vulnerable to continuous enemy tracking, targeting, and long-range attacks, thereby ending their role—or, at a minimum, severely limiting it—as the principal means of conventional naval power projection. Such an outcome has enormous consequences for the design of a 2045 Navy fleet.

A fast-response cutter sails near a US sail drone explorer in the Gulf of Aqaba during the International Maritime Exercise/Cutlass Express (IMX) 2022. Credit: US Army/ Cpl. DeAndre Dawkins

Communicating Navy force-structure requirements

Given the December 2022 establishment of the National Commission on the Future of the Navy and the new reporting requirement for a Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report in December 2021, the Navy’s strategic-communications capability appears to have had little effect in countering the criticism of its force-planning efforts. The Navy’s strategic communications require an adjustment.

Recommendations

The overarching intent of these recommendations is to link OPNAV’s strategy, analysis, and budget processes. This is a challenge, as the work among the budgeteers, analysts, planners, and strategists is so different. Producing a budget is incremental work that “involves a great deal of analysis and negotiation, over and over again, year after year” and requires “orthodox bureaucratic labor.” Conversely, producing a strategy or a warfighting concept demands “unorthodox leaps of thought—of drawing exceptional inferences from exercises, war games, technology, intelligence, and events.”¹⁷

Historically, with a few notable exceptions, effectively linking these two groups has eluded OPNAV. Consequently, the recommendations address eliminating this gap by consolidating force-planning functions under the direct and strategic oversight of the CNO and VCNO to ensure the linkage between these two groups is maintained. In effect, force planning becomes OPNAV’s center of gravity, with the production of the budget in support.

The logic behind these recommendations is straightforward. The recommendations are governed by an overarching objective to ensure that the Navy’s strategy and policy priorities drive its force planning and budget, not the other way around. The Navy needs to build its forces and capabilities to implement the CNO’s recommended strategy. Force planning begins with that strategy, but the force-planning staff does not create that strategy; the origins of that strategy reside in the CNO’s personal domain, drawing upon higher-level guidance such as the National Defense Strategy. Using the CNO’s strategy, the force-planning staff determines the naval tasks required, and the problems and impediments—such as geography and the adversary’s capabilities—in the current and future security environment that must be surmounted. This activity, in turn, drives the development of warfighting concepts, which leads to the discovery of required naval forces and capabilities and their associated attributes (i.e., operational requirements). Finally, force planning calculates the number and mix of forces and capabilities required to achieve the strategy.¹⁸ The following recommendations make this logic a reality.

The eleven primary documents written by the proposed Navy Strategy Cell and the Force Planning Directorate would not be carved in stone and immutable like the Ten Commandants. In the final analysis, they would be the CNO’s documents. Vitally, they would be developed through the active participation of the Navy’s four-star leadership to identify the biggest challenges to the service’s continued relevancy and contribution to national security, and to devise a coherent approach to overcoming them, which the Navy senior leaders would hammer out and support. The purpose of this effort is to define how the Navy will move forward over successive five-year increments of the budget-planning process, with its senior leaders sharing and agreeing to a common approach. It is all about institutionalizing a force-planning process that can endure over decades from first inception to acquisition to initial operational employment, all managed by relatively short-tenured senior leaders.

Obviously, as the threat, budget, technology, and higher-level policy change, the CNO would update these documents on an annual basis, such as the process the Navy employed in the 1930s with at least nineteen major iterations to its War Plan Orange, and in the 1980s with several successive versions of the Maritime Strategy. Full participation of serving four-star and selected three-star admirals in this process will be vital, because, without question, one of these flag officers will become the next or subsequent CNO. If this participation does not occur, the probability for false starts and radical course changes will greatly increase as CNOs change.

First recommendation: Establish a new Assistant Secretary of the Navy

The secretary of the Navy should establish an assistant secretary of the Navy for strategy, concepts, and capabilities (ASN/SC&C) to assist the uniformed Navy (See Figure 2). The standing up of this position would deliver that assistance without needing another management layer. Instead, it offers enormous, impactful benefits by providing the secretary of the Navy the means to ensure:

Alignment of both Navy and Marine Corps resources, activities, and capabilities with the strategic military objectives and force planning goals of the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy;
Synchronization of Navy and Marine Corps force planning by integrating their efforts at the service-chief level, as well as at developmental level between the Navy’s Naval Warfighting Development Center and the Marine Corps’ Warfighting Laboratory;¹⁹
The establishment of a strategy-focused counterpart to the assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development, and acquisition (ASN/RDA), and a vital interface with the assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans and capabilities (ASD/SPC);²⁰
The development of a single Navy Department strategy, vis à vis the three separate strategies of the department, Navy, and Marine Corps;
Reform of Navy force-planning activities, reinvigoration of Navy strategic expertise, and the promotion of a strategy-centric culture in both the secretariat and OPNAV; and²¹
A resolution of protracted issues and problems bedeviling Navy strategy development and force planning.

The final benefit has immense implications, and requires elaboration. The number of issues and problems confronting Navy strategy development and force planning seem almost enduring, foster significant congressional concern, and underscore the compelling need for great secretariat and OPNAV integration. On its own, the Navy has been unable to solve, correct, or mitigate these issues and challenges. Examples of such issues and problems that substantiate the services of a new assistant secretary are as follows.

Increasing affordability of platform

In June 2021, then acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Harker signed a memo addressing Navy funding priorities in its fiscal year 2023 planning cycle to match fiscal guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Navy cannot afford to simultaneously develop the next generation of air, surface, and subsurface platforms and must prioritize these [three] programs, balancing the cost of developing next-generation capabilities against maintaining current capabilities. As part of the budget [program objective memorandum 2023], the Navy should prioritize one of [these three] capabilities and rephase the other two after an assessment of operational, financial, and technical risk.²²

However, it was not until January 2023 that the Navy explicitly admitted that it could not afford all three major acquisition programs simultaneously, when the Navy announced that the order of acquisition as first is Next Generations Air Dominance (NGADS), then Next-Generation Guided-Missile Destroyer program (DDG(X)), and finally the Next-Generation Attack Submarine program (SSN(X)).²³

PACIFIC OCEAN (Jan. 4, 2011) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Stockdale (DDG 106) pulls alongside the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) during a refueling at sea. Platforms like the Arleigh Burke can provide provided much of the same support offered by carriers in mixed battlegroups and run far cheaper in comparrison. Credit: US Navy/ Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Travis K. Mendoza.

Navy platforms keep getting bigger and more expensive

Strong platform attachment may be preventing the Navy from embracing new technologies and concepts, and consequently replacing in-service platforms with newer, follow-on versions. Navy force planning uses an incremental approach—“buying at the margin [fewer, but] better [and more expensive] versions of the same [type] of platforms [the Navy] has relied upon for decades”—that is delivering an unaffordable fleet over too long a procurement time.²⁴

The San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Anchorage (LPD 23), the littoral combat ship USS Coronado (LCS 4), the joint high-speed vessel USNS Millinocket (JHSV 3) and the Military Sealift Command mobile landing platform USNS Montford Point (MLP 1) transit in formation off the coast of Southern California as part of Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise 2014. Some of these platforms are showing their costly age in in the 2020s. Credit: US Navy/ Chief Mass Communication Specialist Mark C. Schultz.

Proposals for new capabilities can be viewed as threats to in-service platforms, thereby blocking innovation. Quite often, the Navy’s new platforms, weapons, and systems are quite familiar to what is already in the fleet. The DDG(X) is the large surface-combatant replacement for the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers, currently still being procured by the Navy. A November 2022 Congressional Budget Office report on the Navy’s FY-2023 thirty-year shipbuilding plan states, “the Navy has indicated that the initial [DDG(X)] design prescribes a displacement of 13,500 tons,” about 39 percent greater than the 9,700-ton Flight III DDG-51 design.²⁵ There are media reports that actual displacement may be closer to fifteen thousand tons, which would make them comparable to a World War II heavy cruiser.

Technological developments are changing the character of warfare.

The principal means of conventional naval power projection are transforming, and this has enormous consequences for the design of a 2045 Navy fleet. According to US strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., a disruptive shift is occurring from “precision-warfare regimes” to an emerging one based on “a new military revolution” incorporating “artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing, synthetic biology, and quantum computing, as well as military-driven technologies, including directed energy and hypersonic weapons.”²⁶ Krepinevich cautions that, too often, the US military gets the cart before the horse by fielding capabilities based on new technologies and not addressing “how these new capabilities would maintain their effectiveness” as a technological revolution matured, as was the case with the Navy’s next-generation cruiser.²⁷ Unfortunately, as of May 2023, such strategic-planning documents do not exist for the US Navy.

Ineffective strategic communications

The Navy’s poor strategic-communications practices are exemplified by its annual, unclassified thirty-year shipbuilding plan.²⁸ The plan fulfilled its purpose, but it was devoid of even a summary of a rigorous, unclassified, analytical rationale to make the case for a larger, more lethal Navy. With that, political leadership could understand the Navy’s defense role and support its claims upon the nation’s resources. It was a missed opportunity to strategically communicate the Navy’s case for resources to one of the Navy’s most important audiences.²⁹ The Navy does not know how to communicate its force requirements consistently. The best construct for Navy strategic communications is to use platforms. Right now, the Navy is using platform attributes—such as “Ensure Delivery,” which conjures images of Domino’s Pizza or Amazon delivery services—to communicate its requirements to Congress and the American people. Aircraft and ship types are not abstract; they are real things that people can easily visualize when they hear their names—submarine, destroyer, aircraft carrier, and jet fighter, among others.

An a-strategic Navy culture

Strategy is not an institutional Navy value; the service values operational and technocratic expertise above all. Indeed, one telling example illustrates this attitude. Unlike the five other armed services, the Navy does not formally board its selectees to attend the war colleges as students; in effect, the Navy assigns whoever is available. The Navy largely focuses on programming and budget to develop the means for strategy, while “devaluing the strategic underpinnings for rationalizing and justifying those means.³⁰ Regrettably, the Navy has become, “a technocracy—a technologically centered bureaucracy,” with the CNO and OPNAV staff acting as the “Navy’s lead programmers and budgeters, incentivizing a career system that rewarded officers who acquired the technical skills needed for these roles,” but not incentivizing a career path for strategists.³¹

A prescient 1984 US Naval Institute Proceedings essay encapsulated the Navy’s astrategic culture: “The finest personal accolade an officer can receive is, ‘He’s a great operator.’”³² However, the essay identified a major shortcoming these “great operators” have: they experience, “great difficulty comprehending or even identifying—long-term problems” and are, “convinced that only short-term problems are real, and that continued solutions to each in turn will eliminate or indefinitely postpone the distant ones.”³³ As a consequence of this attitude, the Navy cannot determine a lasting OPNAV organizational structure to ensure its strategy drives its force planning and its budget, in that order. On its own, the Navy cannot sustain its strategy enterprise over the long haul. Underscoring this assessment is the current lack of capstone strategic and force-planning guidance. The Navy does not have:

A classified version of a combined “2020 Advantage at Sea” and “2022 Navigation Plan” to facilitate a clear and unambiguous expression of Navy ends, ways, and means along with such topics as strategic assumptions, risk, capacity, concepts, and threats;
A classified assessment of the current and future security environments to provide baseline understandings of operating environments, setting conditions for effective concept-driven, threat-informed capability development;
A classified warfighting concept for the 2040s timeframe;
A classified red-blue net assessment at the strategic level;
A classified description of a red-blue war; and
A classified Navy long-range plan.

Competition among the Navy platform communities

The internecine warfare between the Navy’s three platform communities (the surface, aviation, and submarine communities) can severely unbalance the Navy as a whole. For example, the aviation tribe focuses on strike from the air; the submarine tribe on strike from the subsurface; the surface tribe on strike from the surface; and the amphibious tribe on strike across the beach. All the while, it is unclear if anyone is asking two fundamental questions: “What are we trying to do? And how can we accomplish this in a far more effective way than we can at present?”³⁴ Invariably, there is a competition among tribes for manpower and funding, resulting in disagreements over strategy and the allocation of resources. Reaching consensus among them has always been difficult, and remains a fundamental service chief responsibility.

As defense secretary, Mark T. Esper rejected the Navy’s force plans.

They seemed to be a product of internal Navy logrolling among the various tribes— surface, subsurface, aviation, etc.—to keep their share of the Navy budget largely unchanged. Insiders were confirming this to me.
— Mark T. Esper³⁵

Esper wanted more attack submarines and a mix of light aircraft carriers (large-deck amphibious ships with F-35B aircraft) for more operational choices and affordability.³⁶ He did not want a plan bounded by past warfighting constructs and irrelevant to a future fight with China.³⁷ Because the naval-warfare tribes could not give him what he wanted, he directed Deputy Secretary of Defense David Norquist in the spring of 2020 to lead a new force-structure assessment study to maintain naval dominance.

A U.S. Navy MH-60 Sea Hawk prepares to land aboard the Wasp-Class Amphibious Assault Ship USS Bataan (LHD 5) during a strait transit exercise part of Amphibious Squadron/MEU Integration Training (PMINT), Jan. 28, 2023. Credit: US Marine Corps/ Cpl. Michele Clarke.

Each warfare community produces an unclassified strategic guidance document—the aviation community has Navy Aviation Vision 2030–2035, the submarine community Commander’s Intent 4.0, and the surface community has Surface Warfare: The Competitive Edge. Each document, for the most part, encompasses community strategy, planning, policy, and vision topics about operations, capabilities, and personnel. There is little in each document about how that community interacts and cooperates with the other two to generate a unified Navy fighting machine. The lack of stated cooperation among the aviation, surface, and submarine-warfare communities in these documents is palpable. The three communities act like a true team of rivals whose intra-service actions have contributed substantively to the establishment of the National Commission on the Future of the Navy.

To resolve these and other such issues and problems challenges, the secretary of the Navy’s role in strategy development and force planning needs to be strengthened by the services of this new assistant secretary.

Second recommendation: Stand up the Navy strategy cell

The CNO should repurpose his Commander’s Action Group as the Navy Strategy Cell to produce the Navy’s capstone strategic guidance and to monitor its implementation by this one, central, and empowered staff entity reporting directly to the CNO (See Figure 2).

All CNOs understand that their most important responsibility as a service chief is to identify the biggest challenges to the Navy’s continued relevancy and contribution to national security, and to devise a coherent approach to overcoming them. This fundamental role serves as the basis for this recommendation. A 2010 Center for Naval Analyses report bluntly stated that developing and implementing such guidance “for the Navy is the CNO’s number 1 job.”³⁸ Indeed, from what many senior OPNAV veterans have privately communicated to the author, if this responsibility is not “totally owned by CNO,” OPNAV has no strategic focus. They believe the CNO most important responsibility is identifying the biggest challenges to the Navy’s continued relevancy and contribution to national security, and devising a coherent approach to overcoming them.

Already working directly for the CNO, the Commander’s Action Group produces strategic documents such as the annual posture statements, congressional testimony, keynote speeches, and the 2022 Navigation Plan. Building upon this foundation, the proposed Navy Strategy Cell would be uniquely positioned to describe preferred outcomes for the whole Navy. OPNAV’s seven directorates, on the other hand, tend to focus on the outcomes of individual supporting programs. With expansion, empowerment, and augmentation, the Navy Strategy Cell would:

Enable the CNO to break away from the budget and programming processes that dominate so much of OPNAV’s time and thinking, and increase his or her focus on realistic and effective strategies and concepts for fighting at and from the sea;
Strengthen the CNO’s ability to align and coordinate the activities of Navy organizations; communicate with a single Navy voice to external and internal audiences; and assess Navy policies, budgets, plans, and programs, and the resultant allocation of scarce resources; and
Ensure capstone strategic documents reflect a consistent and aligned set of principles, concepts, and tenets regarding the Navy’s fundamental role in implementing national policy, as well as the CNO’s direction.

This recommendation mirrors what most corporate chief executive officers do, which is to make their capstone strategy functions a direct report to the chief executive officer. Consequently, this is no longer a lead role for N3/N5. Every CNO requires the direct support of a staff to provide a coherent, contemporary, authoritative body of Navy strategic thinking—comprehensive in scope—that they can use to help conceptualize, develop, coordinate, maintain, communicate, refine, and assess their thinking. The CNO needs to be optimally assisted and supported by a small, dedicated strategy staff, which is a corporate best practice. The production of capstone strategic guidance and other strategic documents requires a close relationship and physical proximity to the CNO, with no interlocutors. It is a one-on-one relationship between the CNO and, in effect, their “chief strategist” residing in the Navy Strategy Cell. The one-on-one relationship is needed to:

Implement explicit CNO guidance, not guidance altered by OPNAV directorate agendas;
Provide unfiltered advice, especially alternative views to CNO; and
Do it quickly and with a minimum of interference from others.

Capstone strategic guidance describes how CNO intends to overcome “the biggest challenges to the Navy’s continued relevancy and contribution to national security”³⁹ across different timeframes and security environments. These documents require significant CNO involvement, visibility, and signature. They provide overarching direction to the service for planning, programming, and budgeting future forces, force planning, and operational employment, and convey fundamental principles about the application of naval power to achieve national policy goals. They drive all subordinate force-planning efforts and connect the Navy’s annual budget submissions and investment plans with the Navy’s key priorities. These documents are truly primus inter pares. They are consequential and substantive, must be derived from national and joint policy and strategy, and reflect a comprehensive, global view informed by the Navy’s current and future capabilities. The Navy Strategy Cell would draft for the CNO’s signature classified and unclassified versions of these four documents that comprise the Navy’s capstone strategic guidance (i.e., its “crown jewels”).

Assessments of Current and Future Security Environments (classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist).
The Navy Strategy (classified version does not currently exist).
Navy Long-Range Plan (classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist).
CNO’s Annual Budget Guidance (classified).

Third recommendation: Stand up the force-planning directorate

The CNO should consolidate all OPNAV force-planning responsibilities into a new Force-Planning Directorate under a vice admiral reporting to the VCNO and disestablish N7 (See Figure 2).

The unprecedented wakeup call from Congress, when it established an independent National Commission on the Future of the Navy, is sufficient reason to consolidate Navy force-planning efforts under one roof and reform them.

The Navy’s current federated organizational construct to force planning is ineffective. It is unclear in 2023 what OPNAV staff element acts as the central entity to coordinate all OPNAV force-planning efforts conducted by decentralized and independent staff elements. The functions of force planning are expansive, complex, and critical, as Congress just reminded the Navy. In recognition of the weakness of the federated approach, the Navy should follow its own successful examples of non-federated entities reporting directly to the CNO—the Strategic Systems Programs and Naval Nuclear Propulsion—and consolidate all matters pertaining to force planning into a new and dedicated single entity.

This single, dedicated Force-Planning Directorate would have the authority, staffing, and analytical means, to align, integrate, and synchronize the force-planning efforts into a comprehensive whole-of-Navy strategic plan. The relationship among force development and force design, as well their connection to the production of new ships, aircraft, and weapons systems, demands alignment, integration, and synchronization into a comprehensive force-planning blueprint.

This Force-Planning Directorate would have the authority, personnel, and analytical means to align, integrate, and synchronize all force-planning efforts to produce a Navy fighting machine. The new directorate would assess and integrate the future operational environment, emerging threats, and technologies to develop and deliver concepts, requirements, and future force designs, and support delivery of modernization solutions. Most importantly, it would position the Navy for the future by setting strategic direction, integrating the Navy’s future force-modernization enterprise, aligning resources to priorities, and maintaining accountability for modernization solutions.

The budget dominates all OPNAV activities. The only way to guarantee the budget supports and serves the needs of Navy strategy and force planning is to ensure the CNO or VCNO has direct oversight via a dedicated senior leader who has no other writ. The director of the new Force-Planning Directorate should report to the CNO via the VCNO. A Force-Planning Directorate addressing force design with its long-range time horizons and long-range results will not survive in an environment dominated by short-term results unless OPNAV clearly understands that the Force-Planning Directorate is working directly for the CNO, and that the OPNAV directorates have a supporting relationship to this new staff. As the Navy historical record documents, anything less than a direct report will repeat OPNAV’s past mistakes and failed attempts.

The Force-Planning Directorate would draft for the CNO’s signature classified and unclassified version of these seven documents.

Warfighting concepts (current and future): Classified and unclassified versions do not exist for the 2045 timeframe. A classified version for the current timeframe exists (i.e., distributed maritime operations), but not an unclassified version. The Naval Warfare Development Center would support the development of these service-level concepts.
Red-blue net assessment: Classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist.
Description of a red-blue war (current and future): Classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist.
Force Structure Assessment: Unclassified versions do not currently exist. The June 2023 Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report will provide a classified version.
Navy force planning blueprint (current and future): Classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist.
Thirty-year shipbuilding plan: An unclassified version exists.
Battle force ship assessment and requirement report: A classified version exists. The June 2023 version of this report could potentially serve as a classified Force Structure Assessment.

The Warfighting Concepts would establish a baseline understanding to set conditions for effective concept-driven, threat-informed force planning, in order to produce a Navy Force Planning Blueprint. It would be based on a common understanding of the current and future security environments and a shared articulation of how the Navy fights as a whole, and not merely as a collection of individual classes of platforms. It would be the Navy’s comprehensive plan—not a strategy—to integrate, align, and synchronize all its force-planning efforts, including the efforts of force development and force planning along with the ongoing production of new ships, aircraft, and weapons systems to produce the Navy fighting machine (i.e., a unified combination of air, surface, and subsurface Navy lethality). Figure 2a depicts the consolidated production of the Navy’s eleven key strategic guidance documents from numerous OPNAV organizational elements to just two.

Establishment of this new Force-Planning Directorate topples the budget process as OPNAV’s dominant process. Force planning would become OPNAV’s center of gravity, with the budget in support, and no longer the other way around. It turns over the proverbial apple cart, with force planning reporting directly to the CNO and leading a strategic-centric staff dialogue, as opposed to a budget-centric dialogue. This reversal will generate strong resistance from N8 and N9 in particular. Because the Force Planning Directorate will be the primus inter pares, and as the other OPNAV directorates are all headed by a vice admiral, the new Force-Planning Directorate must likewise be headed by a vice admiral or else be doomed to failure.

This new Force-Planning Directorate requires the capability to conduct Navy net assessments for strategic analysis of red-blue interactions for informed and realistic plans. Net assessments (along with defense analysis) are diagnostic means, whereas force planning is a prescriptive means. The two belong together; if not, dysfunction will continue to hamstring efforts. This capability does not currently exist in OPNAV, and would require new personnel resources.

Resourcing the recommendations

The resources to make these recommendations real are readily available; it is just a matter of resetting priorities. The Navy is under heavy congressional fire for its strategy-development and force-planning efforts. Correcting this situation for the long term is surely one of the Navy’s highest priorities.

Given these circumstances, can the Navy say, for example, that the large number of officers assigned to the front office of its three-star leaders is more important than staffing its capability for strategy development and force planning? Again, it is a matter of priorities. If staffing these front offices is more important than retrieving control of force planning from the National Commission on the Future of the Navy, then so be it. It is simply a matter of priorities, and making the tough choices that many leaders say they like to do. Here is another opportunity.

For the reasons presented in this paper, leadership of the Navy Strategy Cell and Force-Planning Directorate requires senior flag officers. Disestablishing the N7 directorate would provide the vice admiral billet to lead the Force-Planning Directorate and a rear admiral billet to head the Navy Strategy Cell. The majority of N7’s functions can return to OPNAV N3/N5 and a portion of N7’s functions can relocate to staff the Navy Strategy Cell and the Force-Planning Directorate.

While there are no perfect organizational frameworks, there are organizational frameworks that better align a greater number of common functions, as outlined in these recommendations. A strategy office reporting to the corporate chief executive officer—in the Navy’s case, the CNO—is a proven practice, and a direct-report senior leader responsible for all Navy force planning is no different than having the Naval Nuclear Propulsion and Nuclear Weapons Program/Strategic Systems Programs as direct reports.

The emphasis of the proposals in this white paper is on strategy-development and force-planning reinvigoration and reasonable consolidation of similar functions, given the centrality of Navy strategy and force planning to all other OPNAV responsibilities. Force planning, if done properly with strategy in the lead and with its capstone strategic-guidance documents, will generate enormous benefits.

Conclusion

Congress has lost patience and confidence in the Navy. There is no way to sugarcoat this action. It is nothing less than a strong condemnation of the Navy’s approach to strategy development and force planning. When US Representative Rob Wittman (R-VA) in December 2022 penned his scathing commentary in Defense News, he was on target in stating, “if the Navy refuses to learn lessons from this year, it will be doomed to repeat them.”⁴⁰

The warning signs have been evident for years. However, much like the Navy’s Bureau of Ordnance’s stubborn, twenty-one-month resistance in World War II to correct three major defects of the Mark 14 torpedo, the Navy since the end of the Cold War has neglected its strategy enterprise and resisted effective force planning.⁴¹ It has repeatedly failed to understand and act on the mismatch between OPNAV’s robust organization for building the budget and its ineffective organization for developing and implementing Navy strategy.

The Navy needs to think and act like it did in the 1920s and 1930s, when it prepared to confront the Imperial Japanese Navy. The US Navy’s strategy, future security environment, and warfighting concept were all reflected in nineteen iterations to its War Plan Orange and updates to the Rainbow series of war plans. The Naval War College focused its curriculum and wargames throughout the 1930s on defeating the Imperial Japanese Navy, and almost every Navy flag officer was a war-college graduate. While far from perfect, the Navy of the past shared a common view of what a war with Imperial Japan entailed and clearly understood logistics were a top-tier priority for warfare across the vast distances of the Pacific. Likewise, in 2023, the Navy needs the same level of focus and preparation as its predecessor, and the proposed Navy Strategy Cell and Force Planning Directorate will help ensure it is ready for whatever lies ahead.

The author would like to be more of an optimist than a realist, but the Navy continues to allow mistakes to go uncorrected decade after decade. It is, like Winston Churchill stated, a “long dismal catalogue of the fruitlessness of experience and the confirmed unteachability of mankind.”⁴² It is foolish to believe that the Navy will change on its own to conduct more effective strategy development and force planning.⁴³ The only way the Navy will change is for Congress to direct it, or else the Navy will continue with its flawed ways.

About the author

Bruce Stubbs

As a member of the Senior Executive Service for the Department of the Navy, Bruce Stubbs served on the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) staff from June 2011 to September 2022 as the Director of Strategy and Strategic Concepts (OPNAV N7), the Director of Strategy (OPNAV N3/5), and the Deputy Director of Strategy and Policy (OPNAV N3/5). Prior to those assignments, he served on the Secretary of the Navy’s immediate staff from June 2008 to May 2011 with responsibility for the coordination and implementation of Maritime Domain Awareness programs, policies, and related issues across the Defense Department.

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

1 Borrowed from, Bradley A. Fiske, The Navy as a Fighting Machine (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1916). He wrote the Navy, “must first determine the units of the force and their relation to each other: it must, in other words, design the machine.” Its use herein represents the ultimate objective of Navy force planning, i.e., an integrated combination of air, surface, sub-surface, and cyberspace lethality for the Navy to fight as a unified whole.

2 Mac [R-TX-13] Rep. Thornberry, “H.R.2810 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018,” Pub. L. No. 115–91 (2017), http://www.congress.gov/; Mark T. Esper, “Chapter 7: The Politics of Building a Better Navy,” in A Sacred Oath: Memoirs of a Secretary of Defense During Extraordinary Times, First edition. (New York, NY: William Morrow, an imprint of HarperCollins Publishers, 2022), p.196.

3 Please see section 1017 of, Rick [R-FL] Sen. Scott, “S.1605 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022,” Pub. L. No. 117–81 (2021), http://www.congress.gov/.

4 Section 1092 of, Peter A. [D-OR-4] Rep. DeFazio, “H.R.7776 – James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023,” Pub. L. No. 117–263 (2022), http://www.congress.gov/.

5 Lara Seligman, Lee Hudson, and Paul McLeary, “Inside the Pentagon Slugfest over the Future of the Fleet,” POLITICO, July 24, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/24/pentagon-slugfest-navy-fleet-00047551.For further background see, Sam LaGrone, “Lack of Future Fleet Plans, Public Strategy Hurting Navy’s Bottom Line in Upcoming Defense Bills,” USNI News, June 18, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/06/18/lack-of-future-fleet-plans-public-strategy-hurting-navys-bottom-line-in-upcoming-defense-bills; Sam LaGrone, “Navy Lacks ‘Clear Theory of Victory’ Needed to Build New Fleet, Experts Tell House Panel,” USNI News, June 4, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/06/04/navy-lacks-clear-theory-of-victory-needed-to-build-new-fleet-experts-tell-house-panel; Mark Cancian Saxton Adam and Mark Cancian, “The Spectacular & Public Collapse of Navy Force Planning,” Breaking Defense, January 28, 2020, https://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/2020/01/the-spectacular-public-collapse-of-navy-force-planning/.

6 Captain Scott Mobley, US Navy, Retired, “How to Rebalance the Navy’s Strategic Culture | Proceedings – November 2022 Vol. 148/11/1,437,” U.S. Naval Institute, November 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/how-rebalance-navys-strategic-culture.

7 Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare, First edition. (New York, NY: Hachette Books, Hachette Book Group, 2020).

8 Peter M. Swartz and Michael C. Markowitz, “Organizing OPNAV (1970 – 2009),” January 1, 2010, https://www.cna.org/reports/2010/organizing-opnav-1970-to-2009.

9 Peter D. Haynes, Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2015), p. 246.

10 Dimitry Filipoff, “Irv Blickstein on Programming the POM and Strategizing the Budget | Center for International Maritime Security,” 1980s Maritime Strategy Series (blog), March 26, 2021, https://cimsec.org/irv-blickstein-on-programming-the-pom-and-strategizing-the-budget/.

11 Dr. James A. Russell et al., “Navy Strategy Development: Strategy in the 21st Century,” Naval Research Program (Naval Postgraduate School in support of OPNAV N3/ N5, n.d.), https://news.usni.org/2015/07/24/document-naval-post-graudate-school-study-on-u-s-navy-strategy-development.

12 Commander Gordon G. Riggle, “Looking to the Long Run,” U.S. Naval Institute, September 1980, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1980/september/looking-long-run.

13 CNO Admiral Mike Gilday, “Chief of Naval Operations Navigation Plan 2022,” CNO Navigation Plan (US Navy, July 22, 2023). .

14 Sam LaGrone, “CNO Gilday: Next-Generation Air Dominance Will Come Ahead of DDG(X) Destroyer,” USNI News, January 18, 2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/01/18/cno-gilday-next-generation-air-dominance-will-come-ahead-of-ddgx-destroyer.

15 A Navy problem statement can either be posed as a question about how to solve an issue or as a negative statement.

16 Mackubin Thomas Ownes, “Force Planning: The Crossroads of Strategy and the Political Process – Foreign Policy Research Institute,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 1, 2015, https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/07/force-planning-the-crossroads-of-strategy-and-the-political-process/.

17 Thomas Hone, Private memorandum to author, March 9, 2023.

18 Mackubin Thomas Ownes, “Force Planning: The Crossroads of Strategy and the Political Process – Foreign Policy Research Institute,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 1, 2015, https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/07/force-planning-the-crossroads-of-strategy-and-the-political-process/.

19 The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory generates and examines threat-informed, operating concepts and capabilities and provides analytically-supported recommendations to inform subsequent force design and development activities.

20 Captain Scott Mobley, Retired, “How to Rebalance the Navy’s Strategic Culture | Proceedings – November 2022 Vol. 148/11/1,437,” U.S. Naval Institute, November 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/how-rebalance-navys-strategic-culture..

21 Mobley, Retired, “How to Rebalance the Navy’s Strategic Culture | Proceedings – November 2022 Vol. 148/11/1,437.”

22 Megan Eckstein, “Memo Reveals US Navy Must Pick between Future Destroyer, Fighter or Sub for FY23 Plan,” Defense News, June 8, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/06/08/memo-navy-will-have-to-pick-between-its-future-destroyer-fighter-and-sub-in-fiscal-2023-planning/.

23 Sam LaGrone, “CNO Gilday: Next-Generation Air Dominance Will Come Ahead of DDG(X) Destroyer,” USNI News, January 18, 2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/01/18/cno-gilday-next-generation-air-dominance-will-come-ahead-of-ddgx-destroyer.

24 Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare, First edition. (New York, NY: Hachette Books, Hachette Book Group, 2020).

25 Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy DDG(X) Next-Generation Destroyer Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” In Focus (Congressional Research Service, March 23, 2023), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11679.

26 Captain Gerald G. O’Rourke, USN (Ret.), “Great Operators, Good Administrators, Lousy Planners,” U.S. Naval Institute, August 1984, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1984/august/great-operators-good-administrators-lousy-planners.
Jr Krepinevich, The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers (New Haven ; Yale University Press, 2023), https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300271584, p. 19.

27 Jr Krepinevich, The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers (New Haven ; Yale University Press, 2023), https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300271584, p. 19.

28 Formally titled as the Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year XXXX.

29 Mark Cancian Saxton Adam and Mark Cancian, “The Spectacular & Public Collapse of Navy Force Planning,” Breaking Defense, January 28, 2020, https://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/2020/01/the-spectacular-public-collapse-of-navy-force-planning/.As noted, “Planning for a 21st century Navy of unmanned vessels, distributed operations, and great power competition has collapsed. Trapped by a 355-ship force goal, a reduced budget, and a fixed counting methodology, the Navy can’t find a feasible solution to the difficult question of how its forces should be structured. As a result, the Navy postponed announcement of its new force structure assessment (FSA) from January to “the spring.” That means the navy will not be able to influence the 2021 budget year much, forfeiting a major opportunity to reshape the fleet and bring it in line with the national defense strategy.”

30 Mark T. Esper, “Chapter 7: The Politics of Building a Better Navy,” in A Sacred Oath: Memoirs of a Secretary of Defense During Extraordinary Times, First edition. (New York, NY: William Morrow, an imprint of HarperCollins Publishers, 2022), p. 200. Captain Scott Mobley, USN (Ret.), “How to Rebalance the Navy’s Strategic Culture | Proceedings – November 2022 Vol. 148/11/1,437,” U.S. Naval Institute, November 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/how-rebalance-navys-strategic-culture.

31 Captain Scott Mobley, USN (Ret.), “How to Rebalance the Navy’s Strategic Culture | Proceedings – November 2022 Vol. 148/11/1,437,” U.S. Naval Institute, November 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/how-rebalance-navys-strategic-culture.

32 Captain Gerald G. O’Rourke, USN (Ret.), “Great Operators, Good Administrators, Lousy Planners,” U.S. Naval Institute, August 1984, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1984/august/great-operators-good-administrators-lousy-planners.

33 O’Rourke, USN (Ret.), “Great Operators, Good Administrators, Lousy Planners.”

34 Jr Krepinevich, The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers (New Haven ; Yale University Press, 2023), https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300271584, p. 401.

35 Mark T. Esper, “Chapter 7: The Politics of Building a Better Navy,” in A Sacred Oath: Memoirs of a Secretary of Defense During Extraordinary Times, First edition. (New York, NY: William Morrow, an imprint of HarperCollins Publishers, 2022), p. 200.

36 Esper, “Chapter 7: The Politics of Building a Better Navy.”

37 Esper, “Chapter 7: The Politics of Building a Better Navy.”

38 Peter M. Swartz, William Rosenau, and Hannah Kates, “The Origins and Development of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2015),” 136 (Center for Naval Analyses, September 18, 2017), https://www.cna.org/reports/2017/origins-and-development-of-cooperative-strategy.

39 Rumelt, Richard P. Good Strategy Bad Strategy: The Difference and Why It Matters. Crown Publishing Group, Random House. New York. 2011.

40 Rob Rep. Wittman, [R-VA-1], “Congress Is Building a Stronger Fleet than the Navy,” Defense News, December 1, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/12/15/congress-is-building-a-stronger-fleet-than-the-navy/.

41 Clay Blair, Silent Victory: The U.s. Submarine War Against Japan., 1st edition (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975).

42 Robert Kagan, The Ghost at the Feast: America and the Collapse of World Order, 1900-1941, First edition. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2023), p. 468.

43 Leonard Dr. Wong and Stephen Dr. Gerras, “Changing Minds In The Army: Why It Is So Difficult and What To Do About It,” Monographs, Collaborative Studies, & IRPs, October 1, 2013, 48, p. 20.

The post Building a navy fighting machine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How Ukraine can pin down Russia in Crimea without a land campaign

John B. Barranco — Mon, 26 Jun 2023 13:44:45 +0000

Crimea is the location that most often captures international attention when it comes to Ukraine’s fight to regain all its lost territory. But it would be militarily foolish for Ukraine, as part of the counteroffensive that is now underway, to charge into the Russian-occupied peninsula. Instead, there are ways for the Ukrainians to render Crimea strategically irrelevant militarily to their Russian foes.

By initially attacking along a broad front, the Ukrainians can probe Russian lines and hide their true objective until they determine the weakest point to strike. Once the Ukrainians reach Russia’s multi-layered defensive fortifications, the most challenging phase of the counteroffensive will begin.

Ukrainian combat engineers will need to go through the slow and deadly process of clearing mines and blowing up tank obstacles under the cover of infantry and creeping artillery barrages. While the United States recently sent Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs), mine rollers, and demolition equipment for obstacle clearing, Ukraine will need much more to break through the Russian defenses.

If the Ukrainians can exploit the advantage of their superior tanks supplied by NATO members, they can drive deep into the rear area of Russian-occupied territory and split the Russian force in two with a combination of armor and HIMARS strikes guided by unmanned aircraft systems. This would enable the Ukrainian military to break the land bridge that Russia has created by occupying a continuous swath of Ukrainian territory from the Russian border to Crimea.

If Ukraine can breach the Russian defensive line of obstacles and minefields in two or three locations, it could provide multiple axes of advance to exploit and keep the Russians off balance, or allow the Ukrainians to at least feint in one or more spots and tie down Russian defenders. At the same time, Ukrainian tanks could rapidly move to exploit their success before the Russians recognize these advances, and could ideally penetrate the Russian rear area before they can deploy their reserves. This scenario would offer the Ukrainians the best chance they have had thus far in this war to liberate large swaths of occupied territory. But it would also in all likelihood be a long battle with significant casualties.

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It is unlikely that this counteroffensive will result in the liberation of Crimea. The narrow isthmus that connects the peninsula to the mainland of Ukraine makes it the most easily defensible piece of Russian-occupied territory. Because the Ukrainian military lacks an amphibious capability, the Russians can concentrate all their forces there, making any attempt at a southward advance extraordinarily deadly.

Yet the Ukrainians are savvy enough to realize that the actual value of Crimea to the Russians is the port of Sevastopol, despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claims of solidarity with the largely Russian-speaking population of the peninsula.

Ukraine has the ability to render the strategic value of Crimea moot and make Russia’s Black Sea Fleet pay a high price every time it attempts to leave the port of Sevastopol. Ukraine can achieve this by deploying advanced naval mines offensively as effectively as they did defensively close to the Ukrainian port city of Odesa; and by employing their Neptune anti-ship missiles as they have done to deadly effect in the past.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The addition of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine’s arsenal will provide another weapon to strike Russia’s naval base in Sevastopol and is a welcome change in US policy. Although still a fourth-generation aircraft and susceptible to Russia’s S-400 surface-to-air missile system, the F-16 is superior to anything the Ukrainian Air Force currently operates as a fighter or an air-to-ground attack aircraft.

Unlike the MiG-29, Su-27, Su-24, and Su-25 of the Ukrainian Air Force, the F-16 can carry the entire range of US and NATO laser-guided and GPS-guided air-to-ground ordnance, which will be vital for striking Russian targets deep in occupied territory including Crimea while avoiding collateral damage and civilian casualties. Additionally, its superior radar and ability to employ the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and AIM-9X Sidewinder make it superior to Russia’s Mig-29 and Su-27 in aerial combat. But since it will take three to four months to transition Ukrainian pilots to the F-16, these fighters will not play a significant role in the current counteroffensive.

The Ukrainians have demonstrated their commitment to their cause through superior leadership, morale, and courage under fire. At the same time, Russia’s shift to prepared defenses may allow them to shore up the flagging confidence of their largely conscripted army. While the current Ukrainian counteroffensive is a welcome step toward victory in this war, it will be one of many campaigns over the course of what will likely be a long and arduous struggle.

Col. John B. Barranco (Ret.) was the 2021-22 US Marine Corps senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is currently executive vice president of Potomac International Partners.

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – A conversation on Western efforts to establish security guarantees for Ukraine and strategies to prepare for a productive NATO Summit in July.

NATO Security & Defense Security Partnerships Ukraine

If Ukraine’s friends want to see faster progress in the recently launched counteroffensive, they should look in the mirror, said Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former secretary general of NATO: “So far we have provided weapons for Ukraine just to survive. Now [the] time has come to provide weapons for Ukraine to win.”

Rasmussen spoke at an Atlantic Council Front Page discussion with Andriy Yermak, head of the Office of the President of Ukraine. Yermak added that aside from seeking more and better weapons, the people of Ukraine are keeping a close eye on next month’s NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. They “expect that Ukraine will be invited to NATO,” Yermak said. If not, they will feel a “very, very strong demotivation” on the battlefield, Yermak argued.

Yermak and Rasmussen have delivered a plan to Ukraine’s supporters called the Kyiv Security Compact. It includes large-scale weapons transfers, enhanced intelligence sharing, and support to Ukraine’s defense industry so that it can more independently produce weapons and ammunition.

With both security guarantees and NATO membership potentially on the table in Vilnius, Rasmussen clarified that “these security guarantees will not replace Ukrainian membership [in] NATO.” They will, however, “build the bridge and will allow Ukraine to defend itself until it is covered by NATO’s Article 5.”

Below are more highlights from the conversation on Ukraine’s road to NATO membership and Western efforts to establish security guarantees, moderated by John E. Herbst, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Battlefield needs

The “incremental, step-by-step approach” by Ukraine’s supporters, Rasmussen argued, won’t help achieve victory. “You have to surprise and overwhelm your adversary,” he said. “So that’s why we need to use the big hammer to put a quick end to this conflict.”
That big hammer, according to Rasmussen, should be forged from battle tanks, longer-range missiles, and eventually fighter jets. Yermak added that long-range missiles—including the oft-discussed Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMs)—are certainly on Ukraine’s wish list. He believes a decision on long-range missiles will be reached with supporters in the “very, very near future.”
To get around the obstacles blocking the supply of advanced weapons systems, Rasmussen said it would take “determined political leadership” to break the habit of taking long periods of time to decide what to send—and of incrementally providing support. In the meantime, Russian President Vladimir Putin “has exploited our long decision-making processes to fortify Russian defenses,” he warned.

Joining the club

One of the arguments against admitting Ukraine as a NATO member is that it is currently at war. Rasmussen argued that making NATO membership dependent on the cessation of hostilities gives “Putin an incentive to continue the war.”
Plus, there’s precedent: West Germany joined the Alliance in 1955, and Article 5 covered its territory—not that of East Germany. “We could use exactly the same formula when it comes to Ukraine,” Rasmussen proposed. But doing so would still require “careful consideration,” he explained, as there will be “outstanding questions” about how Article 5 applies to areas such as the Donbas and Crimea.
For Ukraine’s path to NATO, Rasmussen backed the removal of the membership action plan (MAP) requirement, saying that “Ukraine already fulfills all the criteria within the MAP” because it has “demonstrated such efficiency on the battlefield.” Yermak also said that he believes Ukraine “has already passed all exams” and “is passing them every day [on the] battlefield.”
Rasmussen predicted that “there will be no consensus” on NATO membership for Ukraine at the Vilnius summit. But compromise is still possible: “The second-best option,” he said, would be to outline Ukraine’s path to NATO membership clearly. That would include removing the need for a MAP, pledging to review NATO’s enlargement at the 2024 summit, and establishing a NATO-Ukraine Council to identify what Kyiv needs to do before it can join the Alliance.
The current lack of clarity surrounding Ukraine’s path to NATO membership is dangerous, Yermak argued: It is precisely in that “gray zone” that “Russia has the advantages,” he said.

What’s at stake

Rasmussen said that NATO membership for Ukraine would help tell Putin that he “cannot stop this process” and that NATO’s door is open for Ukraine—and “[Putin is] not the doorman.”
“Simply restoring the status quo [is] not [an] option,” Yermak said, explaining that any Western uncertainty about the outcome of this war will amount to a Russian victory. “It will reinforce the Kremlin’s narratives of Russia fighting against an Alliance expansion in Ukraine—and winning.”
And with Russian presidential elections slated for next year, that narrative would only strengthen support for Putin’s regime, Yermak added, both at home and across the Global South countries that are watching Russia closely.
Ultimately, an invitation to join NATO would be a “supporting element” in a quicker Ukrainian victory, Yermak said. “I am sure about it.”

Katherine Walla is the associate director for editorial at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

The post Will Ukraine join NATO? Here’s a top Ukrainian official and former NATO leader’s game plan for the Vilnius summit. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Turkish-Ukrainian defense partnership in a new geopolitical realm

Can Kasapoglu — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 12:02:04 +0000

In his 2021 Atlantic Council article, Ukraine’s top diplomat, Dmytro Kuleba, argued that Ukraine and Turkey should pursue a coherent vision for security of the Black Sea together. Kuleba emphasized the need for NATO to see the Ukrainian-Turkish defense partnership as a valuable driver that can contribute to the region’s stability.

Less than a year later, the Russian aggression against Ukraine at NATO’s doorstep underscored the importance of Kuleba’s words. When the dust settles, the international community may, for the first time, witness what a real post-Soviet Russia looks like. The Turkish-Ukrainian strategic partnership would mark a promising window of opportunity for Western military industries in the post-Soviet space.

Think geopolitically: Turkey and Ukraine can rejuvenate European military resiliency

In early February 2022, three weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Kyiv to meet his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Welcoming Erdoğan’s visit, Zelenskyy focused on defense and aviation industry collaboration during the talks, describing cooperation in these segments “as a driving force” behind the bilateral strategic partnership. The objective, he stated, is to implement high-value, specific projects; establish joint ventures; and facilitate the exchange of expertise and technology. During the visit, Turkey and Ukraine agreed to coproduce Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones in Ukraine.

As the ideas promoting a “political NATO” have sunk without a trace following the Russian aggression at the Alliance’s east, NATO is fast rolling back to its Cold War roots. NATO’s present Strategic Concept document, adopted at the Alliance’s 2022 Madrid summit, considers Russia a direct threat to the allied nations in Europe. The paradigm laid out at the Erdoğan-Zelenskyy summit is thus gaining more ground. At present and for the foreseeable future, NATO members’ capacity and their capabilities have become the prime question. Notably, in a few years, NATO members Turkey and Poland, as well as the Alliance’s partner Ukraine, will likely field among the largest armed forces across Europe.

Corvettes, drones, and more

Following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Turkey and Ukraine have discovered shared geopolitical interests in Black Sea security. While Ankara has not adopted a pronounced anti-Russia stance in the region, Turkey’s contributions to rebuild Ukraine’s navy, which has lost most of its platforms following the Russian aggression against Crimea, speak volumes.

Kyiv has opted to procure MILGEM/Ada-class corvettes from Ankara. According to the manufacturer, STM, Ada-class corvettes are designed to conduct a broad array of operations, including the determination, location, classification, identification, and destruction of underwater, air, and surface targets, as well as to provide naval gunfire support. Patrol and maritime surveillance missions, as well as infrastructure and coastal protection, also fall under the MILGEM/Ada-class corvettes’ mission portfolio.

The Turkish-Ukrainian corvette deal aims to manufacture four platforms based on the MILGEM/Ada-class design philosophy with the goal of rebuilding Ukraine’s battered navy. Manifesting the predominant trend in Turkish-Ukrainian joint defense ventures, the deal extends to coproduction arrangements between the two nations. Ukraine is the first country to which Turkey has granted coproduction privileges for the corvette baseline in question. Finally, the Ukrainian Navy’s Ada-class surface vessels can potentially introduce yet another critical weaponry to Kyiv’s arsenal. While Ukraine had initially planned to equip its new corvettes with Neptune missiles, with the Ukrainian defense industry currently overstretched, Turkey might soon advance its offer of the ATMACA anti-ship cruise missile to Kyiv. Albeit significant in defense-technological scale, these capability-building efforts will translate into a warfighting edge in the long run.

Besides strategic partnerships in the maritime domain, another key segment of Turkish-Ukrainian defense cooperation is drone warfare. Following its successful combat record in different conflict zones of the world, the “Pantsir-killer drone” Bayraktar TB2 has shown its combat capabilities against the Russian columns, particularly in the opening stages of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. More importantly, at a time when the West offered help to Zelenskyy’s government to evacuate Kyiv, the Bayraktar TB2 drones’ successes were not solely about combat capabilities but also political warfare and keeping the morale high among the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ ranks.

Nowadays, the Turkish-Ukrainian strategic partnership in drone warfare is setting sail to new horizons. The joint production of Turkey’s rising strategic drone Akinci (Raider), as well as the unmanned turbofan-engine aircraft Kizilelma (Red Apple), mark the perfect marriage between Ankara and Kyiv in defense technology.

Ukraine brings a significant amount of defense industrial innovation know-how to the table. When matched with Turkey’s cutting edge in smart systems and drone warfare assets, the Turkish-Ukrainian strategic partnership is a true source of synergy. The Akinci drone’s first batch is powered by Ukrainian Ivchenko-Progress engines. Similarly, the Kizilelma baseline will use two different Ukrainian Motor Sich engines in various variants. The initial units fly with AI-25TLT turbofan engines. The following batches will be powered by the afterburner-capable AI-322F engines which will upgrade the unmanned aircraft to a transonic platform. These examples showcase the growing trust between the parties and could help strengthen cooperation among the Black Sea nations.

Last, Turkish defense company Baykar’s drone-manufacturing plant marks what Turkish-Ukrainian defense cooperation will look like in the future. The factory will turn operational within two years. Above all, Ukraine will become a TB2 producer nation soon. The project is also significant as it will boost the Turkish-Ukrainian strategic partnership and unveils new opportunities for joint research and development (R&D) activity.

A different European security architecture when the dust settles

At present, and perhaps in the history of mankind, NATO is the most successful political-military alliance in the world. Official writings consider NATO’s flexibility and its ability to adapt to changing defense landscapes to be the underlying reason behind the Alliance’s successful record so far. Nevertheless, the Alliance has to cope with a grim imbalance. Most member states cannot field combat-proven militaries for large-scale operations. Notably, merely two allied nations—the United States and Turkey—have ground forces that outnumber the Russian Western Military District. Worse, the armed forces of two-thirds of the allied nations are outmanned alone by Russia’s airborne branch (VDV), which employed some forty-five thousand before the invasion of Ukraine.

The Turkish Armed Forces have extensive combat experience and increasingly depend on indigenously produced weapon systems. In 2022, the annual turnover of the Turkish defense industry reached $12 billion. This marked an impressive 20 percent increase from 2021. Remarkably, turnover per capita rose to $150,000 in 2022, 12 percent more than the previous year. Around $4.5 billion of the $12 billion revenue came from exports, translating to an annual increase of 37 percent. Imports accounted for approximately $2.7 billion of the total turnover. Between 2021 and 2022, R&D expenditure hit $2 billion, and financial initiatives for R&D projects increased by 21 percent. In 2022, the Turkish defense industry employed 81,132 people, 7 percent more than in 2021.

Over the past twelve to eighteen months, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have come to operate a wide array of Western weaponry ranging from Javelin anti-tank missiles and Leopard 2 main battle tanks to Patriot air and missile defense systems and Stinger man-portable air-defense systems. More is on the way. This is a dramatic reversal of European—and US—reticence to provide lethal aid to Ukraine early in the war.

A sustainable model, based on technology exchange, co-development, and mutual trust between combat-experienced near-peers, is deepening of the decade-long bilateral defense relationship between Ukraine and Turkey.

Can Kasapoglu is a non-resident senior fellow at Hudson Institute, and the director of the Security & Defense Research Program at Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) in Istanbul. Follow him on Twitter @ckasapoglu1.

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Prospects for an improved US-Turkish strategic relationship

Lt. Gen. (ret.) Nihat Kökmen — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 12:02:01 +0000

Could Turkey return to the F-35 program with the potential sale by the United States of a modernization package for its F-16s and potential sale of billions of dollars’ worth of F-16V aircraft? Can progress on this issue serve as a step toward reestablishing a strategic partnership between the United States and Turkey? And how could it transform the political and military relationship between Turkey and the United States?

As I reflect on these questions, I am reminded of the late 1940s and early 1950s, a time when Turkish-US relations were at their peak. During this period, close to fifteen thousand Turkish Armed Forces personnel participated in the Korean War, demonstrating Turkey’s commitment to its alliance with the United States. The sacrifices were significant: 721 Turkish soldiers were killed and 2,147 wounded in the war. In February 1952, a little over a year before an armistice brought an end to the war, Turkey became a member of NATO. Many refer to Turkey’s participation in the Korean War as the “cost” of joining the Alliance.

In addition to the deepening political and economic relations between Turkey and the United States during that era, the two countries were also engaged in robust military cooperation, particularly in aviation. Admittedly, there were times when the political environment was fraught with tension. Some prominent examples include the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, crises involving Cyprus in 1964 and 1974, the 1975-78 US arms embargo on Turkey, and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, which caused a strain in the friendly atmosphere, even interrupting it. Nevertheless, through prudent diplomacy, mindful of ever-changing realities and alliance interests, sagacious minds prevailed. Relations were eventually restored, and strategic-level contacts were established in both civilian and military spheres.

Ties between Turkey and the United States, already strained over the 2016 coup attempt and US criticism on ties between Turkey and Russia, fell further in 2019 over the war in Syria and Turkey’s purchase of a Russian missile system.

Impact of the war in Syria

Turkey has borne some of the burden of the consequences of the war in Syria since its start in 2011. According to the United Nations, Turkey hosts some 3.6 million registered Syrian refugees. The large number of refugees has not only shifted the demographics in the border region, it has also added a crippling economic burden. Turkey has also faced cross-border terrorist attacks by Kurdish terrorist groups.

As a consequence of US policy miscalculations, northern Syria has become even more unstable with the presence of terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which the United States and the European Union (EU) consider to be a foreign terrorist organization.

Despite requests from Turkey, neither the United States nor the EU consider the PYD and YPG to be terrorist organizations. The United States first started providing support to the YPG and PYD in 2014 to assist them in their fight against the Islamic State in Syria. While the threat posed by the Islamic State in the region has effectively disappeared, the United States maintains its support to the PYD and YPG, which have been key partners of the US-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. The PYD and YPG also serve as the backbone of the coalition-created Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Despite Turkey providing Interpol and other senior US officials detailed allegations of terrorist acts by the PYD and YPG, aid to the terrorist organizations has not ceased, rather it has increased.

This support has caused significant harm to bilateral relations between the United States and Turkey. Early 2023 visits by the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and US Central Command (CENTCOM) commander to the region, although described as troop visits, have also contributed to rising tensions between the two countries. Ankara views these activities as part of an attempt by the United States to establish a satellite Kurdish statelet in eastern Syria, similar to what was tried in northern Iraq.

Missile defense

In 2013, NATO responded to Turkey’s request for ballistic missile defense by temporarily deploying systems such as the Patriot and SAMP-T from five allied countries to the region on a rotational basis with command and control located in Allied Air Command at Ramstein Air Base in Germany.

However, following Turkey’s 2018-19 operation against the YPG and PYD in northern Syria to safeguard its own security, the systems provided by the allied countries, with the exception of the Patriot system from Spain, were withdrawn. Despite ongoing discussions during bilateral meetings between the Turkish Ministry of National Defense and the Chief of General Staff at NATO headquarters, the allied countries that had previously deployed their systems declined to redeploy them citing various reasons.

In 2018, Turkey launched an effort to manufacture its own long-range regional air defense system called Siper. The war in Syria added a sense of urgency to this mission and a thorough review of alternatives, including the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system, was conducted at the request of the Air Force Command. The United States declined to meet the terms of a Turkish request for the Patriots. A 2018 attempt by Turkey to buy the SAMP-T from a Franco-Italian consortium also ground to a halt due to French objections. Turkey eventually opted to procure the S-400 system from Russia despite US opposition to the deal.

The procurement of the Russian S-400 system, coupled with US support to the YPG and PYD in Syria, proved to be the breaking point in the already strained US-Turkey relations.

As the Turkish military representative to NATO in Brussels at that time, I personally experienced not only the reactions of my US counterparts but also the questions and concerns raised by other representatives about the procurement of the S-400 system. Naturally, each country viewed the issue from their own perspective, which was closely tied to their respective policies and interests. However, recurring concerns centered on the compatibility of the Russian S-400 system with NATO’s integrated air defense system and the difficulty of safeguarding the intellectual property and sensitive information pertaining to the F-35 aircraft. Furthermore, there were frequent inquiries about why Turkey chose to procure such a system from Russia, a country that ranked as the top threat in NATO assessments since 2014.

Turkey faces a backlash

Following the S-400 purchase, the US Department of Defense removed Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019. And in 2020, the United States imposed sanctions on Turkey’s Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) pursuant to Section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).

Turkey had been a joint producer of the F-35 program, having signed a memorandum of understanding with the US government on January 26, 2007. Turkey had also paid for and completed the first package of pilot and ground personnel training. The justification for its removal was based on the claim that the use of the S-400 in the same environment as the F-35 could potentially lead to the theft of high-tech aircraft system information.

As a result of Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program, six F-35A aircraft that were produced for Turkey were confiscated and stored in hangars, and the personnel in training were sent back home. Negotiations are still ongoing regarding the repayment of the $1.25 billion that Turkey had previously paid for the program.

Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program led to a need to review the force structure of the Turkish Air Force, as relations between the Turkey and the United States became strained. It was decided to extend the lifespan of the F-4 aircraft that were originally planned to be phased out. Additionally, Turkey decided to acquire forty F-16V aircraft from the United States to meet its urgent air combat needs. The procurement by Turkey of seventy-nine modernization kits to boost the capabilities of its existing F-16 aircraft was also discussed.

A turning point?

Based on recent statements and evaluations made by Turkey and the United States, there appears to be a relatively positive atmosphere in administration circles. US President Joe Biden, who has not been very receptive to improving bilateral relations, has been supportive of Turkey’s request to procure aircraft and modernization kits. This support was especially visible in face-to-face meetings at the level of heads of state, such as the 2019 NATO summit and the Group of Twenty meeting in Rome in 2021. Yet, some members of the US Congress are dragging their feet regarding the implementation of these procurements.

It must be noted that even if the deal is approved today, delivery would take between three to five years in the best-case scenario. Nevertheless, reaching common ground can still be considered significant progress.

Rethinking the fate of the S-400 system, which was delivered in 2019, is of critical importance to resolving issues between Turkey and the United States. Regarding the S-400 systems that were stored in depots following some tests, I believe that a solution can be found involving either the frameworks proposed since then or by simply keeping the systems in storage.

A recent statement by Haluk Görgün, CEO of the Turkish defense firm Aselsan Elektronik Sanayi, is noteworthy. Görgün said that “with the development of UMBHSS-SIPER, we no longer need the S-300/S-400s.” Until the Siper system fully matures, though, SAMP-T might be a medium-term solution as well.

Removal of this obstacle may encourage members of Congress who are against Turkey to reconsider their positions on the supply of F-16Vs and modernization kits. With the establishment of such a positive climate, it is possible that Turkey could revive interest in its return to the F-35 program.

If Turkey can procure forty F-16V aircraft and modernization kits in sufficient numbers, it can easily embrace the motto “Leader in Its Region, Effective in Its Continent” that was popular in the early 2000s. A possible future return to the F-35 program might also lead to the reutilization of production capabilities that the Turkish defense industry lost after Turkey was removed from the program, the establishment of regional engine depot maintenance capability for domestic and allied use, and provide experience relevant to further development of the Turkish National Combat Aircraft (MMU).

Given Turkey’s formidable air force; its strategic location in a region with key transportation, energy, and hydrocarbon resources; and improving relations with Israel, the United States can again view it as a reliable and strong strategic ally. With the right mindset, Turkish and US state authorities can still turn back time.

The way ahead

The resolution of issues related to the S-400, PYD, and YPG is key to mending relations between Turkey and the United States. Ideally, this must be followed by the approval of the sale of F-16Vs, the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, and a return to the F-35 program.

Addressing Turkey’s security concerns is a prerequisite for successful and sustainable cooperation between strategic partners in the Middle East. This would allow for stability to be achieved in Syria, curtail the activities of foreign actors operating in the region, and encourage Syrian refugees currently residing in Turkey to return to Syria. Combined, these developments would drastically reduce the threats to Turkey’s security. In addition, it would have positive implications for peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean region, and it may also allow for the safe transport of natural gas extracted in the region to Europe via Turkey.

The United States, which has always prioritized Israel’s security in its Middle East policy, should also consider Turkey’s positive contributions to regional stability in the process of normalizing relations.

A partnership with Turkey is crucial for balancing China’s increasing economic and military strength in the Asia-Pacific region, especially as Russia’s position in the world has diminished as a consequence of its ongoing war in Ukraine. Turkey is located at a critical crossroads of the Middle East and the Caucasus. In the long run, Turkey’s strategic ties to Central Asia will also be an important asset for NATO. Hence, the United States must accept the importance of Turkey to NATO’s policy in these regions as an undeniable reality.

The Turkish-US relationship has had its bad days in the past. However, consultations resulted in the recognition of the significance of this strategic partnership, leading to a resumption of political and military relations. Now, similarly, I am hopeful that the US approach toward the support it provides to the PYD and YPG can be resolved in good faith alongside the S-400 issue.

Despite some members of Congress attempting to impose restrictions on Turkey similar to the 1975 arms embargo, I believe that the Biden administration will soon approve the supply of F-16V aircraft and the modernization package. This could potentially create a favorable atmosphere for Turkey’s return to the F-35 program as well, thereby removing obstacles to the development of bilateral political relations and a strengthened Turkish-US strategic partnership.

Turkish Air Force Lt. Gen. (ret.) Nihat Kökmen served as Turkey’s military representative to NATO from 2017 to 2019. Between 2001 and 2004, he served as the air plans officer at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. He currently serves as Executive and Supervisory Board member at the Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM).

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Michèle Flournoy and Wendy Anderson promote rapid software acquisition in Breaking Defense

Atlantic Council — Tue, 13 Jun 2023 12:59:00 +0000

On June, two members of the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, former US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy and Palantir Senior Vice President Wendy Anderson, co-wrote an article in Breaking Defense discussing adopting and leveraging innovative software across the Department of Defense. In their op-ed, Flournoy and Anderson highlighted one of the recommendations from the Commission’s interim report for Congress to authorize funding for scaling operationally relevant and mature commercial technology demonstrated in major exercises, such as Rim of the Pacific.

Gen James E. Cartwright, USMC (ret.)

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Operationalizing integrated deterrence: Applying joint force targeting across the competition continuum

Thu, 08 Jun 2023 17:30:21 +0000

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Introduction: Why the United States needs a new targeting model better suited for cooperation
Expanding the joint force’s competitive mindset
Operationalizing integrated deterrence: A new model for targeting and effects
Explaining the model of a modified targeting and effects process
I. Placement and access
II. Focused understanding
III. Options
Targeting throughout the competition continuum
Harnessing data to improve the targeting and effects process
Data
Sense
Make sense
Act
Using the competition space to prepare for high-end armed conflict
Shaping the environment
Shaping across the physical and virtual domains
Capability development
The way forward
Culture: Adapting the joint force’s mindset to global problems across the competition continuum
Incorporating all instruments of power
Embracing the global nature of problem sets
Technology and data: Building a resilient and holistic data architecture
Authorities, rules of engagement, and risk: Updating DOD guidelines and standards
Conclusion
About the authors

Introduction: Why the United States needs a new targeting model better suited for competition

In these times, business as usual at the department is not acceptable.

— Lloyd J. Austin, Secretary of Defense

Traditional joint force deterrence is no longer sufficient: a near-singular focus on armed conflict and platform-based capability development fails to deter strategic adversaries like China and Russia from their pursuit of strategic objectives while simultaneously increasing the risk of war. Simply owning the most advanced weaponry, while ceding ground in the competitive space left of conflict, is not enough to meet US deterrence needs, nor is it sufficient to ensure the joint force prevails in conflict. Expanding the joint force’s construct for targeting and effects generation will enable the Department of Defense (DOD) to more effectively deter future conflict while simultaneously shaping the environment to the joint force’s advantage in conflict should deterrence fail.

Why the twenty-first century security environment merits an updated approach

Today’s security threats span the competition continuum, cut across theaters and domains, and are intensified through the application of emerging technologies. The joint force faces challenges spanning the full competition continuum from high-end conflict to gray zone competition, including cyber threats and economic coercion, to cooperation. Technological advancements have changed the character of threats, the types of activities that the DOD can conduct, the speed at which it can act, and expanded its notion of physical and non-physical tools and effects. Specifically, the evolution of the cyber domain has enabled the joint force to gain access to non-physical spaces and generate options to achieve effects in a matter of milliseconds. The realities of twenty-first century competition drive the need to confront adversaries across a global contact layer to counter malign activities and proactively advance US strategic objectives. In other words, actions in one theater or domain can generate options and lead to outcomes in distant corners of the globe.

Moreover, the joint force faces a far more sophisticated adversary in China—qualitatively and quantitatively—than it did in countering violent extremist organizations over the past two decades. Strategic competition requires a significant mindset shift to effectively harness the effects of multiple instruments of power in a global, multi-domain, and coherent manner. DOD doctrine acknowledges this, but the department and joint force have yet to fully operationalize it.

While many activities executed along the competition continuum can enable success in conflict, specific operations, activities, and investments are necessary to ensure joint force superiority in direct combat, especially considering the criticality of combined arms warfare with allies and partners, as well as the seamless integration of multi-domain fires and effects. joint force activities must continually pursue positional advantage across the competition continuum to achieve the necessary balance between deterrence and conflict preparation. Yet, currently, the level of attention to and investment in preparation for armed conflict inhibits the joint force from leveraging the vast data, tools, and authorities at its disposal to prevent such conflict from occurring in the first place.

How joint force operations can meet an evolving threat landscape

The joint force must update its approach to targeting and effects generation to respond to the range of security challenges at hand, else it risks losing without going to war. Success across the full competition continuum will be enabled by the joint force’s ability to effectively harness data and a wide spectrum of tools and authorities with speed, precision, and lethality. This necessitates a deeper and more informed understanding of adversary capabilities, the operating environment, the interconnected nature of the physical and virtual domains, and the range of data sources available to operators. By “expanding its competitive mindset and competitive approach”¹ —to include and integrate tools, information, and actions that span the competition continuum—the joint force can exploit this understanding to apply the right effects to the right problems at the right times, advancing strategic objectives and maintaining informational, decisional, and combat dominance. An expanded competitive mindset will allow the joint force to view competition not as an inevitable march toward future conflict, but rather as a persistent effort to gain and maintain positional advantage across all domains.

The joint force is designed to excel at crisis response; it must make a deliberate mindset shift to plan prior to impending crisis (and prevent such scenarios from occurring in the first place). However, while the urgency of evolving the joint force’s targeting framework is evident across doctrine and policy,² the joint force has not yet taken to scale an assertive approach to dominating across the competitive space. Doctrine included in the DOD’s 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Joint Concept for Competing, for instance, make clear that the department and joint force are thinking about strategic competition more broadly, yet operationally—through authorities, combatant commands, and collaboration with different agencies and allies—DOD and the joint force have yet to fully realize integrated deterrence.

Explainer: Targeting and effects generation

Targeting: Traditional joint or dynamic targeting is “the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them.” In this paper, targeting is an enabler of options, characterized as a continuous activity that furthers the pursuit of objectives by addressing critical intelligence and operational requirements and shaping the environment through a multitude of proactive means. Targeting includes everything from illuminating human networks and key actors, to finding and fixing mobile capabilities, to identifying cyber access vectors and vulnerabilities.

Effects: While conventionally viewed as the “finish” of the targeting cycle—the kinetic fire or kill—effects generation here refers to the employment of instruments of national power (individually or in concert) to achieve a desired outcome. This ranges from traditional kinetic military fires to information operations, cyber tools, and electronic warfare, to targeted economic sanctions and law enforcement actions, to diplomatic démarche or other means of localized leverage.

What this report sets out to achieve

Operationally, the joint force has not adapted to an era of strategic competition, which requires targeting across theaters and domains, the entire competition continuum, and leveraging the range of data sources at its disposal. Doing so requires the joint force to stitch together the data, tools, and authorities needed to achieve global objectives—rather than viewing missions as constrained to a singular region or ends, as has been the status quo.

This report outlines a framework to leverage existing targeting models to more assertively and deliberately compete by: 1) incorporating an expanded use of military and interagency capabilities; 2) leveraging expansive public and private data and harnessing it for effect through emerging technologies; and 3) smartly balancing priorities and weight of effort related to competition and conflict preparation. The authors offer key action areas for implementation at scale.

Expanding the joint force’s competitive mindset

To achieve unity of effort, the joint force must seek opportunities to integrate its operations and activities in time, space, and purpose with the activities of interorganizational partners, proxies, and surrogates.

— Joint Concept for Competing³

While the Pentagon recognizes it must adopt a new mindset to prevail across the competition continuum, it continues to approach targeting and fires through a lens of armed conflict. Traditional approaches to targeting and fires still prevail across the joint force despite the recognition of a need to expand them. Traditionally, the joint force aligns “sensors to shooters” (i.e., targeting) to inflict damage on enemy personnel, materiel, or infrastructure (i.e., fires or effects generation). This sentiment is expressed through variations of the targeting cycle, whether it be the dynamic targeting kill chain (Find, Fix, Target, Track, Engage, Assess) or the Special Operations Forces-preferred cycle (Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate). These processes lend well to a temporal and kinetic approach to targeting and fires—exemplified by strikes on violent extremist organization (VEO) leadership networks or disabling mobile surface-to-air threats as part of a layered suppression of enemy air defenses effort—yet they are insufficient for generating the nonlethal and continuous effects necessary in today’s expansive security environment. This traditional approach to targeting and fires is incongruent with current DOD realities, given “most joint force activities occur in the context of cooperation and competition below armed conflict.”⁴

US Army Cyber Command hosts a town hall. Credit: US Army photo/ Candy Knight

As the DOD recognizes through its integrated deterrence concept, the joint force’s tool kit expands beyond the military arsenal, and solely relying on traditional approaches for targeting and effects is limiting. As articulated in the NDS, integrated deterrence campaigning calls for the joint force—in alignment with and often in a supporting role to other instruments of power found across the interagency—to execute “logically linked” activities to advance “strategy-aligned priorities over time” in order to counter or complicate competitors’ coercion across the globe.⁵ Linking activities across global campaigns require a high level of understanding of competitors’ intent and capabilities and their underlying geopolitical realities, enabled by prolonged access across multiple domains, which creates options to leverage multiple effects in achieving desired ends. For example, developing an understanding of how China’s coercive economic activities in Africa and Latin America support its broader global ambitions can inform the breadth (and complexity) of US response options. While the joint force typically excels at responding to crises, single-purpose platforms and the constant rotation of forces often prohibit the long-duration stare that integrated deterrence requires for proactive campaigning left of crisis.

Operationalizing integrated deterrence: A new model for targeting and effects

To achieve integrated deterrence, this paper outlines a model for operationalizing it. The joint force must meld the existing framework for joint targeting with a model that places a premium on gaining placement and access in a domain or region, enabling a focused understanding of an entity of interest, to facilitate a range of options for the joint force to execute in concert with other instruments of power, whether in a supported or supporting role. Each layer includes the concepts of persistence, local distinction, and global relevance, and can be in a near-constant state of change based on the sensing environment. For example, security cooperation with a partner in Southeast Asia requires access, understanding, and options that are: 1) persistent, to ensure ongoing understanding and to achieve effects over the long term; 2) locally distinct based on regional and local considerations; and 3) globally relevant, acknowledging that awareness and action related to one country affects global dynamics and goals. This layered model is represented in Figures 1 and 2 and further described below.

Integrated Deterrence Targeting. The figures above convey the elements of the joint targeting cycle and the dynamic targeting process (figure 1), with a philosophical and nonlinear pyramid approach to developing options for complex problems (figure 2). These two frameworks must be fused together to operationalize integrated deterrence. The joint force’s traditional targeting cycle must be informed by a foundation of situational awareness. Data, tools, and authorities are all necessary mechanisms to establish situational awareness.

Placement and access

virtual and/or physical proximity to an entity of interest

Focused understanding

situational awareness and perception of an entity (actor and/or location) and how it fits into broader geostrategic missions

Options

potential pathways forward to respond to a complex problem set and achieve outcomes, informed by focused understanding and placement and access

Explaining the model of a modified targeting and effects process

Adopting this layered model is critical for two reasons. First, the complex, global, and multi-domain problem sets the DOD faces today necessitate options that are similarly sophisticated in nature and cut across the competition continuum. By prioritizing a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of problem sets, the joint force is presented with a wider array of options to address key challenges. Such focused understanding is possible when the near-infinite amount of data available across the public and private sectors is transformed into usable information and, ultimately, intelligence.

Second, a new competitive mindset requires broadening the joint force’s tool kit beyond traditional military effects. The joint force has the authority to, and does, execute non-kinetic targeting, albeit insufficiently, yet it prioritizes kinetic fires as part of the traditional targeting cycle. Fusing kinetic and non-kinetic fires is critical not only from a deterrence perspective but also, more significantly, to enable victory in armed conflict. Yet, alone, the military instrument of power is insufficient for the problem sets germane to integrated deterrence. While the joint force has significantly advanced its organic non-kinetic capabilities, it primarily leverages kinetic effects, which neglects other instruments of power, disincentivizes creative thinking, and leads to poor integration with interagency partners.⁶ A high degree of awareness of the capabilities and authorities that other instruments of power bring to the table is critical such that they can be synchronized with, or amplified by, joint force activities at all echelons.

The process of generating placement and access, focused understanding, and options is not linear, and each stage can and should inform the others over time. Specific placement and access may be generated to understand a particular problem in a sophisticated manner such that novel options can be developed. Similarly, focused understanding may drive the need for additional or alternative access to close critical intelligence gaps and inform options. Likewise, commanders may demand options to address a particular problem, which in turn will inform the planning process to generate the necessary access and understanding. Below is an overview of the three foundational elements of the pyramid.

I. Placement and access

To develop the focused understanding required for integrated deterrence, the joint force cannot stare at problems from afar. Placement and access are foundational to developing an enhanced understanding of the problem sets facing the United States. Placement and access, however, does not necessarily mean physical proximity of the military to a particular interest area—it also encompasses virtual presence and can be developed by the joint force, interagency partners, and allied counterparts. It also implies some degree of usability, sustainability, and repeatability; simply visiting a location or gaining virtual access to a network does not equate to true placement and access. Rather, that access must be repeatable if it is temporal in nature, sustainable over operationally relevant time periods, and usable for alternate purposes such as data collection, security cooperation, or reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. Placement and access can be enhanced by leveraging data from a multitude of sources to enable the joint force insight into digital networks of value to access, or the nature of key partnerships required for physical access. Additionally, enhancing existing authorities and making them more flexible would allow units pursuing a mission set in one area to adapt and undertake additional mission sets that may be valuable for a broader or global mission set.

Evolving the joint force approach to placement and access will open a range of opportunities given the interconnected nature of global problem sets. For example, France’s historical security cooperation and counterterrorism activities in the Sahel region of West Africa, during the 2010s, could have also served as an access vector to increasing understanding of the growing threat of Russian private military corporations (PMC) like Wagner Group in the region. This physical proximity can enable a deeper understanding of Wagner’s activities in the region, potentially driving requirements for further physical or virtual access or informing options in line with global campaign plans to counter Russian malign influence. Critically, the joint force must explore means to creatively exploit access when mission convergences exist—units or platforms deployed for one purpose, such as countering VEO, may enable access vectors to support another mission, such as strategic competition, and vice versa. While clarity of primary and secondary objectives of missions would need to remain, the makeup of units and task forces, and the requisite authorities given to them, should be meaningfully considered to capitalize on mission convergences. Not only does this approach create efficiencies with respect to endeavors like security cooperation, but it also offers the opportunity to obfuscate strategic intentions.

II. Focused understanding

Focused understanding of an actor, environment, or relationship is required to solve complex problems, not only due to the sophisticated capabilities of strategic adversaries but also because integrated deterrence campaigns are global in nature. Transregional, multi-domain problems cannot be thoroughly addressed in compartmentalized and only localized ways. Rather, the joint force must stitch together regional understandings based on local access and conditions with broader knowledge informed by other global touch points. The roles of partners, both interagency and international, are critical in developing focused understanding. Not only do they enable multi-domain access, but they also provide unique perspectives. The vast amounts of commercial and government data can and should be harnessed and fused to improve focused understanding of actors and problem sets. While data from traditional sources is immensely valuable, open-source information—organized into actionable information—can drastically improve understanding of patterns and behavior. For example, social media data may help inform US forces of the presence of an adversarial force’s covert presence in a country that may be hard to identify or find evidence for using other means. Ultimately, the fusing of different data sources more consistently can help understanding across the competition continuum.

Building on the previous example, to address Wagner Group’s activities in the Sahel, the joint force should first understand how those activities tie into Russia’s global campaign to secure influence and create instability through expeditionary PMC activities. A holistic understanding of Wagner’s activities across the Sahel, Central Africa, Latin America, Syria, and Eastern Europe presents a more informed picture of the totality of the problem, as well as the associated pressure points, vulnerabilities, and opportunities. Moreover, the local US country team, elements of the intelligence community, French forces, and host-nation partners will all view the Wagner problem in different lights, which can enhance the joint force’s perspective and is necessary in developing viable options leveraging all instruments of power.

This combination of regional and global understanding, enabled by joint force and partner access and capabilities, ultimately informs a far greater range of options than is achieved strictly through a regional military lens, which has been the status quo. Critically, focused understanding better informs risk assessments at echelon, abating risk aversion frequently seen at higher levels of command authority that are farthest removed from the tactical edge.

III. Options

Senior leaders and commanders typically request a range of options to address problems, both to allow flexibility and enable sound decision-making in light of strategic priorities and risks. The Joint Concept for Competing calls for the joint force to:

Identify approaches that enable it to apply its military capabilities proactively, and differently in some cases, to gain influence, advantage, and leverage over adversaries to establish the necessary conditions to achieve strategic outcomes.

— Joint Concept for Competing⁷

While doctrinally this is clear, today’s traditional approach to targeting and competition limits the most effective suite of options from being generated. More-nuanced options may place the joint force in a supporting role to other departments and agencies: for example, conducting traditional manhunting activities (via military authorities) to enable a diplomatic action such as a démarche (via Department of State authorities). The level of sophistication required to achieve what the Joint Concept calls for, especially across activities below armed conflict, makes both risk and efficacy assessments challenging. It is far more difficult to quantify the effectiveness of a campaign to counter Chinese regional influence—for example, assessing long-duration efforts to obstruct effort by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to secure access, basing, and overflight—than it was to measure the success of kinetic drone strikes during the Global War on Terrorism. This challenge is met not only by prioritizing focused understanding but also by parlaying that understanding into a range of options that may be locally distinct but support global campaign plan objectives.

Ultimately, options for senior decision-makers are developed to achieve outcomes that are in service of more-aspirational objectives. Again, examining Wagner activity, a desired outcome of an operation could be to deny Wagner’s ability to securely communicate between several outstations across the Sahel. The aspirational objective is to critically degrade Wagner’s ability to conduct and sustain expeditionary activities globally.

Targeting throughout the competition continuum

This model for the generation of options for complex problems must be melded with an adaptation in the application of traditional joint force targeting processes. Joint targeting is not solely reliant on joint force tools, capabilities, and authorities; it can and should incorporate other instruments of power—by collaborating across departments and agencies—to bolster data and inform understanding, as well as “identify, develop, and affect targets to meet commander objectives.”⁸

Take, for example, a PRC network in Latin America that facilitates command and control of dual-use infrastructure. Here, data could be harnessed from the intelligence (e.g., National Security Agency) and diplomatic (e.g., Department of State Regional Security Office) instruments of power to identify a particular local criminal network that facilitates relevant PRC contracting activities. Host-nation law enforcement can then apply pressure on the criminal network to share information about the PRC actors with whom it engages routinely. Over time, this information can help generate several options to gain access to the objective network through Special Operations Forces-enabled cyber activities. Throughout, the military (e.g., Military Information Support Operations) and diplomatic (e.g., Department of State Global Engagement Center) instruments of power can expose malign PRC practices through information operations to positively shape narratives in line with strategic objectives. The joint targeting cycle could be leveraged multiple times for:

Employing traditional manhunting techniques to find and fix specific local criminal actors of interest, develop their pattern of life, then using non-kinetic fires to register their phones with specific networks that enable intelligence access to key digital data.
Leveraging data obtained through financial (e.g., Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control) instruments of power to target specific institutions that enable transactions between local criminal networks and the PRC. This data can be correlated with intelligence derived from the activities above, as well as populated to other portions of the joint force focused on countering PRC dual-use activities to further global understanding of their tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Conducting intelligence preparation of the cyber environment to find and fix key nodes that are vulnerable to offensive cyber fires (e.g., US Cyber Command), as well as to bolster and amplify information operations that counter local PRC propaganda strategies.

The myriad of joint targeting activities outlined above not only enable specific tactical actions but also inform or further placement and access that continuously matures the collective understanding of the operating environment. Given the nature of strategic competitors, much of this understanding can be exported to other locations to bolster awareness and enable the linking of activities in a logical way as outlined in the NDS. At the center of this process is data, and as stated by former Deputy Secretary of Defense David L. Norquist, “our ability to fight and win wars requires that we become world leaders in operationalizing and protecting our data resources at speed and scale.”⁹

Harnessing data to improve the targeting and effects process

Data is a strategic asset that must be operationalized in order to provide a lethal and effective joint force.

— DOD Data Strategy¹⁰

The joint force’s ability to leverage data at speed and scale, predicated on its adoption of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), enables this framework for targeting and effects generation. Data informs the nature of required access, feeds the focused understanding process, and enables the development of well-informed options that artfully balance desired outcomes with strategic risk. However, raw and unstructured data in isolation does not create a decisive advantage. Rather, it must be harnessed for effect, transforming data into both information and intelligence that is usable and accessible at the speed of relevance.

The US Space Command Joint Operations Center is responsible for integrating data and status from multiple operations centers, the services, and agencies to provide the commander with critical Command and Control capabilities. The capabilities are being increasingly leveraged by other services in support of joint global operations. Credit: US Space Command

While the importance of data is nothing new, the joint force must grapple with the explosion of available data spanning all domains, sectors, and sources. Technologies such as AI and machine learning (ML) present meaningful ways to navigate this near-infinite amount of data. The 2020 DOD Data Strategy envisions the department as a “data-centric organization that uses data at speed and scale for operational advantage and increased efficiency,” with particular focus on enabling all-domain operations, more rapid and informed decision-making, and organizational business analytics.¹¹ Moreover, AI makes determinations and finds data connections in ways humans alone cannot, encapsulating everything from making obvious connections more rapidly (e.g., using satellite data to geolocate battlefield equipment) to identifying valuable datasets overlooked by humans (e.g., how commercial shipping telemetry data can enable deeper understanding of the PRC’s fifth-generation [5G] infrastructure development in Africa).

Data

Data is obtained by a variety of automated or manual and physical or virtual means. Any entity that can obtain data is considered a sensor. Data becomes information once put into context prescribed with meaning by the observer. Often, the meaning prescribed by the observer can be adapted as understanding of the environment grows, making particular datasets more or less useful. The process by which information is transformed into intelligence is complex and combines both art and science as described in JP 2-0 Joint Intelligence:

Intelligence fuses and evaluates information from multiple sources to provide the most accurate assessment possible of the current state of the operating environment.
From current assessments, intelligence draws predictive estimates of the full range of potential alternative future states of the operating environment.
To inform decisions, intelligence illuminates how the operating environment may react to different friendly options under consideration.¹²

The flow from data to intelligence—known as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) cycle—is illustrated in Figure 3, overlaid with the targeting framework from Figure 2.

The automation of PED enhances and accelerates the path from raw data to actionable intelligence, or from “sensor to shooter.”

The nature of today’s security environment necessitates the execution of PED at greater speed and scale than is achievable by humans alone. Particularly, the operating environment below armed conflict—which encompasses most joint force activities—places a premium on scale. To effectively compete globally and deter China and Russia, large quantities of data must be triaged and transformed into intelligence to inform transregional and multi-domain activities that are logically linked. In contrast, armed conflict—the highest-risk joint force activity—places a premium on speed. Rapidly processing and disseminating targeting data, effectively integrating kinetic and non-kinetic fires against mobile targets, and incorporating virtual capabilities that can affect adversary nodes within milliseconds would be impossible without AI/ML and human-machine teaming. The Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concept describes the importance of this flow from data to intelligence based on the requirement for “joint force commanders to ‘sense,’ ‘make sense,’ and ‘act’ in the operational environment.”¹³ While this paper is not focused on the JADC2 and Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO) concepts, the employment of this paper’s updated targeting and effects process would support the more rapid implementation of JADO/JADC2 across the joint force.

Sense

The joint force must consider nearly all entities to be sensors, ranging from sensitive intelligence collection activities to open-source commercial datasets. Adopting a more competitive mindset requires the joint force to democratize data, allowing for a wide array of data-gathering streams to interact with AI algorithms trained to produce usable information. Much attention is placed on gathering data from the tactical edge, yet the edge can take many forms across physical and virtual spaces, regions, and domains. Critically, leveraging nonmilitary instruments of power, as well as allied and partner sensors, can both increase and diversify the data gathered. The role of commercial data is invaluable, with the private sector often having access to people, places, and things that are difficult, if not impossible, for overt government entities to replicate. However, while nontraditional data sources are crucial to building global situational awareness, the DOD does not currently have the communications infrastructure to integrate data from these various inputs at speed and scale—this change must be accelerated.

Make sense

Making sense of the operating environment correlates to the process depicted in Figure 2. The importance of AI/ML becomes paramount here, such that the joint force can achieve automation of prediction at speed and scale, while reserving judgment for human decision-makers on or in the loop. Ultimately, larger and more diverse datasets correlate to more sophisticated training of AI/ML algorithms, increasing the precision of predictive modeling to inform human decision-making. Analysis of the nature of adversary activities—and the subsequent options to address them—may look quite different when viewed through a whole-of-government versus strictly military lens. Furthermore, allies’ and partners’ perspectives on problem sets, especially those close to home, offer invaluable information to complement the joint force’s understanding of the operating environment.

Act

Taking action is a data-driven endeavor—not only in regard to the appropriate action but also the expected adversary reaction and the associated risks. Data-informed decision-making, given its bias toward empiricism, helps challenge assumptions, drive rigorous planning, and enable more-decentralized and potentially faster decision-making. Indeed, the focus of this framework is to utilize access-enabled understanding, coupled with sophisticated data-harnessing techniques, to ultimately provide commanders with a range of well-informed, data-driven options to act. It should be emphasized that to act does not signify finality of the process. As stated in the Joint Concept for Competing, “strategic competition is an enduring condition to be managed, not a problem to be solved.”US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, 7. In fact, the “act” could be a decision to develop further placement and access to address critical intelligence gaps, or to submit requirements to inform further capability development for an unaddressed operational need.

The process of sensing, making sense, and acting is continuous. The speed by which this process plays out is variable based on the nature of the domain, location along the continuum, commander’s intent, and both local and global risk considerations. Deliberate planning and preparation of the operating environment, to include the establishment of relationships and infrastructure, deployment of sensors, and data architecture, and other such activities are necessary to enable this process to occur with speed downstream. In particular, active conflict places a premium on achieving maximum speed for this process, which simultaneously necessitates extensive preparation and autonomy.

Using the competition space to prepare for high-end armed conflict

Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win.

— Sun Tzu, The Art of War¹⁴

Conflict preparation is the persistent, locally distinct, and global sensing of the target ecosystem. It is a dynamic process that constantly generates and updates the integrated targeting planning and execution decisions. Prevailing in armed conflict is the ultimate basis for the existence of the joint force, and places a significant premium on preparation to maintain a position of advantage, inform capability development, and hold adversaries at risk. Armed conflict exists on the far-right side of the competition continuum and represents the most consequential activity the joint force must prepare for and, when called upon, execute. While often referred to in sterilized terminology, a clear description of armed conflict—the application of violence to destroy an enemy’s will and means to resist—serves to highlight the care and attention that preparation for conflict requires. While any type of conflict requires serious attention, high-end armed conflict against a peer adversary represents the most potentially dangerous scenario for which the joint force must prepare. While the objective of integrated deterrence is to deter conflict from occurring in the first place, it is equally about shaping the environment to ensure joint force dominance should deterrence fail. As outlined in Joint Publication 3-0, “while commanders conduct activities of cooperation and adversarial competition, they are still preparing for armed conflict.”¹⁵

Trilateral exercises between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, Australian Defense Force, and US Navy support shared goals of peace and stability while enhancing regional security. Credit: US Navy/ Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Codie L. Soule

Conflict preparation is a balancing act. The joint force must weigh concerns of strategic risk and escalation management: “Tilting the competitive balance too far in one’s own favor will affect an adversary’s decision-making and behavior, but the effect may be vertical or horizontal escalation, not compliance.”¹⁶ Smartly preparing for conflict to create and maintain advantage over an adversary can be a campaign in its own right and must involve shaping activities as well as capability development. These activities will often nest within an overarching integrated deterrence campaign, but at times these endeavors may diverge, at which point the balance of priority and weight of effort must be considered. For example, winning a conflict to defend the Panama Canal would be a clear priority of the United States. However, preparation for such a conflict is not assigned the same weight of effort as, for example, the defense of Taiwan, which is being treated as a high-likelihood event by the Pentagon today.

The United States will not achieve a decisive warfighting advantage against a near-peer competitor through sheer mass or weapon systems alone—rather, the victor will be the military that stacks the deck in its advantage before conflict erupts. Russia’s current war in Ukraine highlights the severity of high-end armed conflict involving near-peer competitors. While great wartime effort is aimed at bolstering sustainment through industrial base and supply chain modernization, operational activities will eventually be curtailed to whatever pace can be sustained through resupply. The joint force’s future advantage will hinge on its ability to: 1) advantageously shape the environment and 2) field capabilities with greater speed, precision, and lethality than its adversary.

Shaping the environment

Shaping the environment is crucial to securing a position of advantage across multiple domains left of conflict. In the context of targeting and effects generation, activities to shape the environment must center around closing critical operational and intelligence gaps associated with a prioritized target list tied to operational plans. These activities are intended to enhance precision and lethality of engagement and shorten the kill chain once armed conflict begins. In line with the framework espoused in this report, focused understanding of the enemy’s order of battle, critical infrastructure, battle management tactics, techniques and procedures, and standard operating procedures is key to establishing and maintaining a prioritized target list. In this way, portions of the joint targeting cycle are accomplished prior to conflict, informing weaponeering recommendations across kinetic and non-kinetic effects, as well as the requirements necessary to develop new capabilities to counter enemy systems for which the joint force does not yet possess a solution.

Moreover, shaping activities can be geared toward increasing resiliency in the joint targeting process. Much attention is given to the challenges of contested, degraded, and operationally limited (CDO) environments and how they complicate traditional means by which the joint force projects combat power. Peer adversaries can contest environments in a multitude of ways such as anti-access/area denial capabilities, electromagnetic interference, countering space situational awareness, and defensive cyber operations. Shaping activities must prioritize alternate means of accomplishing warfighting functions given the potential for primary means to become denied or degraded. Ironically, the CDO nature of Russia’s war in Ukraine has led to a much more conventional and analogue fight than anticipated. This highlights the importance of bolstering resiliency through shaping operations, as peer adversary denial capabilities may effectively cancel out one another’s high-end platforms.

Shaping across the physical and virtual domains

As is the case throughout the competition continuum, the contact layer for armed conflict is both physical and virtual. Traditional physical targets include surface-to-air missile systems, radars, maritime vessels, and command posts, and they exist in quantities of hundreds or thousands; virtual targets include network nodes tied to communication systems, power infrastructure, situational awareness, and early warning, and they are quantified in the millions. When expanding the battlefield to the virtual domain, synchronization of kinetic and non-kinetic effects can lead to significant advantages across the joint warfighting functions¹⁷ and with regard to the principle of mass.

Gaining a competitive advantage traditionally depends on availability and posture: the forces available, and on what timeline, are determined by their current posture. In the physical world, this construct presents challenging time-distance problems when considering global conflicts, raising questions for both escalation management as well as force preservation. The virtual world can alter this paradigm by enabling virtual mass, leveraging cyber operations to hold adversary networks and capabilities at risk at unprecedented speed and scale. Even modest impact on adversary capabilities executed on this scale of mass and speed can complicate the enemy’s risk calculus and mitigate some risk associated with physical force flow into theater. Given the challenges of logistics and sustainment, efficiencies gained through the employment of virtual capabilities provide a significant advantage during a protracted conflict. Saying this, virtual capabilities are not a silver bullet and effects delivered through cyberspace are insufficient in isolation during armed conflict, and often require large up-front investment in time and resources.

The evolution of virtual targeting and effects, to include the integration with physical targeting and fires, drives a greater premium on shaping the environment prior to conflict. To hold millions of virtual targets at risk instantaneously necessitates significant preparation of the environment. Indeed, a multiyear campaign built around access and understanding—by, with, and through regional allies and partners—may be necessary to simply gain access to the right adversary networks. Development and installation of cyber capabilities would be executed in parallel, with the associated development and intelligence gaps feeding back into the overall campaign approach. Shaping campaigns can provide the decisive advantage once armed conflict begins, all while informing the joint force of its own potential vulnerabilities and thus allowing for continued defensive hardening in stride.

Capability development

While fielding innovative and advanced technologies is critical to maintaining a decisive battlefield advantage, technology (whether platform or software-based) does not on its own equate to capability.¹⁸ Rather, it is the combination of technology, tactics, and training that creates a true capability—for instance, the United States sells fifth-generation fighter jets to other nations, but those nations do not instantly gain the capability to execute low-observable deep strike operations. Technology development must be informed by an understanding of the operating environment, the capabilities of adversaries, and the nature by which the joint force executes operations. To that end, furthering capability development is an objective for the campaigning framework outlined in this paper.

Training AI/ML algorithms often emulates or requires real-world data, further underscoring the need for capability development to harness data for effect. While great strides have been made in emulation for training, the real world offers the most significant data, which is accessible through robust campaigning activities across the joint force in concert with interagency and international partners. The integration of emerging weapon system technology such as hypersonics, lasers, and space-based fires is equally critical. Capabilities such as JADC2 seek to establish the necessary datacentric architecture for seamless integration of information and effects, which span employment times from milliseconds to hours. However, without AI/ML-driven predictive capabilities in the loop, joint force commanders will be challenged to make appropriate targeting and weaponeering decisions amid a large-scale conflict, creating significant risk with respect to sustainment, logistics, and force protection. Without a similar distribution of situational awareness, authority, and capability to the tactical edge, the joint force will not be able to field a credible combat force in a CDO environment where being disconnected from higher headquarters is the norm.

Lastly, while security cooperation is a foundational activity underlying integrated deterrence, the execution of high-end combined arms warfare with allies and partners requires a great deal of specific investment. This includes years of combined training, exercises, and rehearsals to create a dependable capability, especially when factoring in the complexity of integrating emerging technology. Incorporating allies and partners into the joint force-led scheme of maneuver will be critical to maintaining an advantage in targeting and effects generation. However, information-sharing hurdles, disparate rules of engagement, authorities, and cultural considerations must be ironed out in advance of conflict such that the full force of allied firepower can be realized. Ensuring that key allies are fielding capabilities that are JADC2 compatible will be critical to achieving the shared situational awareness required for a common operating picture. Making strides of this nature and fielding a combat-credible combined force will not be accomplished through sporadic exercises, key leader engagements, or exchanges; the joint force must train with allies and partners in the same manner with which it trains internally.

In sum, high-end conflict with a peer adversary presents the most difficult and high-risk challenge, and it requires specific attention given the gravity of its nature. When adequately prioritized, preparation for armed conflict prescribes a unique set of requirements for the joint force and its partners to execute during cooperation and competition and across multiple domains and instruments of power, which at times may overlap or diverge from deterrence. Shaping activities of this nature fall expressly within the proposed proactive targeting and effects framework given that, in the event of war, “these capabilities will shape the environment to ensure combat dominance and our ability to end any conflict on our terms.”¹⁹

The way forward

If we don’t change – if we fail to adapt – we risk losing the certainty with which we have defended our national interests for decades. We risk losing a high-end fight.

— Gen Charles Q. Brown, Jr., US Air Force Chief of Staff²⁰

Implementing change is no easy task, especially when considering the massive scale of the joint force. Nonetheless, a tidal wave of contemporary strategies, guidance and policy documents, and service visions all speak to the urgent need for change. Culture—coupled with procedural and technological changes—will be key to enabling sustainable adoption of a new approach.

Culture: Adapting the joint force’s mindset to global problems across the competition continuum

First, to deter armed conflict the joint force must adopt and operationalize the competitive mindset shift outlined in recent strategic doctrine. While armed conflict is never desirable, regardless of scale, high-end warfare between nuclear-armed peer competitors is of such gravity that deterring it from ever occurring is crucial. General Mark A. Milley’s assertion that “traditional joint force deterrence” is “less effective,” alludes to the notion that owning the most sophisticated or greatest quantity of weaponry is inadequate on its own as a deterrent.²¹ Moreover, while an adversary’s belief in the joint force’s will to act is critical to deterrence, it cannot solely revolve around direct military force given escalation concerns. Rather, adopting a more proactive and creative approach to strategic competition can simultaneously deter malign behavior while complicating, confusing, and frustrating adversary decision-making. The spectrum of views on Russia’s war in Ukraine are informative in this regard: Some highlight US and NATO success in arming Ukraine in its valiant campaign to oppose Russia’s invasion, whereas others view the ongoing war as “a direct result of the West’s lack of resolve and failure to credibly deter Russia” from waging war on the European continent more broadly, regardless of NATO borders.²² This latter sentiment pushes the force to adopt cultural change in order to deter future conflicts. Of course, the United States cannot deter all conflicts from occurring. However, well-informed global campaign plans can and should inform the prioritization of operational activities tied to certain potential conflicts the joint force deliberately seeks to deter.

Incorporating all instruments of power

The joint force need not abandon its traditional strengths; rather, it ought to smartly evolve its approaches to incorporate all instruments of power to expand access, fuel understanding, and generate a range of options regardless of location within the competition continuum. Increased training and education on the nature of authorities and tools that the various instruments of power can bring to the fight is critical for joint leaders. In this way, entities like the State Department or Intelligence Community do not simply represent “concurrence” boxes that must be checked to get military operations approved. Rather, they can be incorporated as partners that offer unique access vectors, diverse understanding, and a variety of tools to support or be supported by military actions, whether at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels. As described in this framework, adopting this change bolsters the joint force’s capability to target within any domain, and similarly expands the nature of effects, fires, and actions available to achieve desired outcomes.

Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) exemplify this approach and could be scaled to enable joint targeting and effects generation. Scaling a similar approach to that of the JIATF, however, requires cultural adaptation. JIATFs are tailor-built to address singular problems and combine multiple instruments of power—and their accompanying authorities and capabilities—under a single chain of command to create unity of effort. However, unity of effort does not necessitate unity of command: The joint force can lead the integrated deterrence effort without being in charge, and it often does play a supporting role to its interagency counterparts. This requires senior leaders to establish a culture that moves beyond “coordination” and “deconfliction” and toward “collaboration.” Increased organizational trust, built upon real-world operational experiences, will increase trust both across departments and in the disparate datasets produced across the instruments of power, ultimately amplifying the predictive capabilities of the AI architecture this framework is reliant upon. Moving toward collaboration is similarly critical as it pertains to enhancing the aggregate power among allies and partners.

Embracing the global nature of problem sets

The joint force must also embrace the concept of a global, multi-domain contact layer. When viewing the world solely through the lens of armed conflict, the joint force focuses narrowly on Russia in Europe and the PRC in the Indo-Pacific. Targeting and effects generation in Latin America, Africa, or the Arctic are then insufficiently regarded as supporting, complementary, or niche efforts rather than as potential key components of integrated deterrence. Many operational efforts—such as security force assistance, building a partner’s combat capability, gaining access, and illuminating vulnerabilities of an adversary’s capabilities—require significant time and resource investments. Senior leaders must understand why, for example, a multiyear effort to gain placement and access in Equatorial Guinea fits within the global campaign to counter PRC malign influence; otherwise they will be less likely to resource it (in this case, Equatorial Guinea is a candidate for the establishment of what would be the PRC’s first Atlantic naval base).²³ As such, combatant commanders who lead global campaign plans, such as the global campaign plan for China, should prioritize regularly communicating their priorities to other combatant commands when activities take place in another geographic area of command. This is especially important when activity falls under the authority of a different combatant command.

Generating senior leader understanding is a by-product of cultivating a joint force that thinks with a competitive mindset. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph F. Dunford recognized, the United States “think[s] of being at peace or war…our adversaries don’t think that way.”²⁴ Altering the “peace or war” mentality to a deeper understanding of activities across the competition continuum—and adopting a strategy of proactive targeting harnessing all instruments of power—is necessary to simultaneously deter aggression and effectively prepare for conflict. Combatant command force structure changes; intergovernmental professional training, education, and exercises; and in-garrison and deployed intergovernmental cross-pollination are beyond the scope of this paper but are among concepts worth exploring to enable cultural changes at scale.

Technology and data: Building a resilient and holistic data architecture

The DOD must build a robust and extensive data architecture, fusing private sector data with government data, and build frameworks and standards to harness it into actionable information. Data fuels everything from access and understanding, to options, targeting, and analysis, to predictions and recommendations. For data to be usable, however, it must first be accessible. Accessibility must occur at echelon given the nature of CDO environments and the expectation that severed links between the tactical edge and higher headquarters elements will be the norm, not the exception.

The joint force needs a data architecture in line with, and as a central component of, the JADC2 concept that aggregates data from all sensors across all domains to enable a proactive framework for targeting and effect. The architecture must encompass the tactical edge, fusing commercial and government-procured data across a spectrum of classification levels. In line with the DoD Data Strategy, such an architecture must make data visible, accessible, understandable, linked, trustworthy, interoperable, and secure.²⁵ The DOD must involve the private sector in the process of building this architecture and consider how interoperability standards and technologies can be integrated and kept up to date. Not only will this help the joint force accelerate the PED cycle and act on intelligence, but it will also allow the joint force to operate across the scale of attribution to mitigate the operational and counterintelligence risks inherent to strategic competition.

Airmen from the 7th Reconnaissance Squadron communications flight conduct a satellite communications training course. Credit: US Air Force/ Senior Airman Ashley Richards

Moreover, the joint force must explore how classified intelligence can safely be used to facilitate AI/ML algorithmic training. Otherwise, it may inadvertently incur risk to sources, methods, or exquisite platforms. Alternatively, with the appropriate mechanisms, AI/ML algorithms can be trained to reach similar conclusions as classified analysis using only open-source data. This will greatly enhance the joint force’s ability to export capabilities to allies and partners without concern for security-sharing agreements or classification obstacles.

Authorities, rules of engagement, and risk: Updating DOD guidelines and standards

DOD guidelines and standards must be updated to harness all tools of national power and to enable combatant commands to prioritize global issues alongside their regional areas of responsibility. For distribution of data to achieve the desired effect, the joint force must explore changes in the distribution of authorities, rules of engagement, and the nature of assessing risk. While a lack of authorities is frequently cited as a barrier to accomplishing operational activities, it is often the cumbersome means by which to access existing authorities that stands in the way. If a joint force commander (JFC) can exercise kinetic strike authority at their level but require permission from several echelons higher to execute information operations, the JFC will increasingly rely on kinetic effects. Authorities often lack clear processes by which subordinate commanders can quickly access them. Similarly, when authorities are reserved at the highest echelons, the approval authority is farthest removed from the problem, lacks adequate understanding, and often leads to excessive risk aversion. This plays out with the array of authorities germane to the joint force and will only become more complex and burdensome when expanding the aperture to include other instruments of power. At a minimum, when the National Command Authority delegates authorities to combatant commanders, there ought to be a standardized and coherent process by which subordinate echelons of command can access them efficiently. Additionally, an effective JADO/JADC2 operating environment that collects, disseminates, and harnesses data requires more effective coordination across the US services and manufacturers. The development of standards must be pursued to advance capabilities that are interoperable across the joint force and with US allies. Doing so will help improve the speed and precision of the targeting cycle.

Second, streamlining the approach to accessing authorities goes hand in hand with updating the joint force’s rules of engagement. These concepts help mitigate the concerns around disparate joint force elements operating with degraded or nonexistent contact with higher headquarters elements. Rules of engagement allow for commanders to lead through intent instead of specific guidance, facilitating more rapid and creative localized targeting and effects generation. Distribution of authorities and associated rules of engagement could transform a unit’s guidance from “employ electronic warfare (EW) effects against Russian ORLAN-10s” to “disrupt Russian ISR below 5,000 feet AGL.” The former is prescriptive and limiting; the latter is intent based, provides greater flexibility, and informs the necessary capabilities for the tactical edge to operate autonomously for longer periods of time.

Finally, the department must rethink the way it assesses risk in light of integrated deterrence and a global contact layer. Making informed decisions on risk management is a key underpinning of this framework. Yet, risk assessments are traditionally conducted in a temporal manner: the risk associated with a particular activity, in a particular location, with a particular target. Risks associated with strategic competition are not, however, suited to traditional ways of thinking. Competing with adversaries across a global contact layer requires considering how local risk ties into strategic risk, whether that be transregional or trans-domain. This is further complicated by the imperative to effectively prepare the joint force for combat. If, for example, a particular PRC capability presented a significant problem for the joint force’s ability to execute a contingency response plan, significant investment may be required to mitigate the threat. This may lead to a scenario in which the joint force assumes greater risk elsewhere in the globe to gain access to locations where the PRC has proliferated similar capabilities to increase understanding and develop options for use during crisis. A similar situation could arise where the joint force makes the decision to reveal a capability it would otherwise hold in reserve to complicate an adversary’s decision-making and risk calculus, thus enhancing deterrence. Maturing the joint force’s ability to assess risk in this manner must begin with data-informed understanding, shared consciousness, and unity of effort across all instruments of power.

Conclusion

Cultivating a joint force that enables and supports a whole-of-government approach to integrated deterrence is a daunting yet achievable vision, requiring transformational leadership to achieve. “Humans are more important than hardware,” and how leaders harness the joint force’s enduring strategic advantage of human capital will dictate whether success is achieved.²⁶ This paper has outlined a vision to update the way the joint force conducts targeting and effects generation for an era of strategic competition. Evolving the joint force’s model for targeting and effects will require adopting a mindset shift that sees competition as key to setting the conditions for, and ideally avoiding, armed conflict. To truly operationalize integrated deterrence, the joint force must embrace targeting and effects across the competition continuum, leveraging the range of tools at its disposal across its domestic and international counterparts, and avoiding a solely military or kinetic lens. Moreover, through the power of AI, the DOD can harness data for effect and fuel the proactive, continuous, and global campaigning required for integrated deterrence.

About the authors

Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Department of Defense

Fellow

Justin M. Conelli

Senior US Air Force Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan National Security

Staff

Clementine G. Starling

Director, Forward Defense

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Staff

Julia Siegel

Associate Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, Intellectual Property—Patents, Patent Related Matters, Trademarks and Copyrights, 1 September 1998, this research paper is not copyrighted but is the property of the United States government.

1 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, February 2023, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23698400/20230213-joint-concept-for-competing-signed.pdf.

2 DOD guidance and Joint Doctrine, such as the integrated deterrence concept nested within the National Defense Strategy and the Joint Concept for Competing, recognize that security challenges facing the United States span the competition continuum. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, February 10, 2023, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23698400/20230213-joint-concept-for-competing-signed.pdf, and US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 2022, 8-11, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.

3 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, v.

4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfighting, Joint Publication 1 (JP 1), July 2019, II-13.

5 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 1.

6 Cesar Augusto Rodriguez, Timothy Charles Walton, and Hyong Chu, Putting the “FIL” into “DIME”: Growing Joint Understanding of the Instruments of Power, Joint Force Quarterly, April 2020, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1099537.pdf.

7 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, v.

8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Targeting, Joint Publication 3-60 (JP 3-60), September 2019, II-8 – 11-9.

9 Department of Defense, DOD Data Strategy, September 2020, i, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/08/2002514180/-1/-1/0/DOD-DATA-STRATEGY.PDF.

10 US Department of Defense, DoD Data Strategy, i.

11 US Department of Defense, DoD Data Strategy, 2.

12 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence, Joint Publication 2-0 (JP 2-0), May 2022, I-2.

13 US Department of Defense, Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) Strategy, March 2022, 4, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/17/2002958406/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-THE-JOINT-ALL-DOMAIN-COMMAND-AND-CONTROL-STRATEGY.PDF.

14 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 401.

15 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Campaigns and Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (JP 3-0), June 2022, xxx.

16 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, 22.

17 The joint warfighting functions include command and control, information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment.

18 Tate Nurkin, The Five Revolutions: Examining Defense Innovation in the Indo-Pacific Region, Atlantic Council, November 20, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Five-Revolutions-Report.pdf.

19 Department of Defense, Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy, October 2020, 1, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/02/2002510472/-1/-1/0/Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.PDF.

20 Charles Q. Brown, Accelerate Change or Lose, US Air Force, August 2020, https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/csaf/CSAF_22/CSAF_22_Strategic_Approach_Accelerate_Change_or_Lose_31_Aug_2020.pdf.

21 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing.

22 Liam Collins and Frank Sobchak, “U.S. Deterrence Failed in Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, February 20, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/20/ukraine-deterrence-failed-putin-invasion/.

23 David Vergun, “General Says China Is Seeking a Naval Base in West Africa,” US Department of Defense, March 17, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2969935/general-says-china-is-seeking-a-naval-base-in-west-africa/

24 Dunford: Challenges Require More Than ‘Buying New Hardware,’ Association of the United Stated Army, October 10, 2016, https://www.ausa.org/news/dunford-challenges-require-new-hardware.

25 US Department of Defense, DOD Data Strategy.

26 US Special Operations Command, “SOF Truths,” https://www.socom.mil/about/sof-truths.

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Restocking US and allies’ arsenals starts with getting industry involved at the NATO summit

Giedrimas Jeglinskas and Viltaute Zarembaite — Thu, 08 Jun 2023 13:45:11 +0000

Defense industry chief executive officers and the leaders of NATO members and partner countries need to have an urgent discussion about insufficient stockpiles of ammunition and equipment. The NATO Leaders’ Summit July 11-12 in Vilnius, Lithuania, is a perfect opportunity to bring them together.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg summed up the problem last week. “So far allies have depleted stocks to be able to support Ukraine—that’s not a sustainable path so we need to ramp up production to fill these new and more ambitious targets,” he explained. The will to support Ukraine for “as long as it takes” is there, but the capacity to deliver support while also defending NATO members is also needed.

According to the Kiel Institute, Ukraine has received more than seventy billion dollars in military aid since Russia’s full-scale invasion started on February 24, 2022. While this figure is large and the aid has contributed to Ukraine’s ability to resist and later repel the Russian invasion, Ukrainian forces need more ammunition and equipment to finish the job. However, the countries supporting Ukraine are struggling to produce enough vital defense materiel. Ukraine is burning through ammunition a lot faster than NATO countries currently manufacture it.

Massive industrial bottlenecks in manufacturing of artillery shells and related equipment, if unresolved, threaten to undermine efforts to help the Ukrainians push out the invaders. Stoltenberg has dubbed it a “race of logistics,” and more than Ukraine’s future is at stake. The readiness of US and allied militaries is put at risk by ineffectively designed supply chains, cumbersome process-focused procurement, and political wrangling. This incapacity to replenish allies’ ammunition stocks and equipment undermines the deterrence posture of NATO as a whole.

Similarly, the US defense industry has been slow to deliver enough munitions to Taiwan as it faces increased saber-rattling from the People’s Republic of China. A recent report by Seth G. Jones at the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that, in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the United States would deplete certain long-range munitions in less than a week. As allies such as Australia and Japan start to ramp up defense spending, the US defense industry will need to deliver more weapons to meet the increasing demand.

In Europe, the defense industry revival is not fairing any better. In May, after weeks of negotiations, the European Union (EU) announced a one-billion-euro initiative to procure ammunition for Ukraine “via the European Union industry and Norway.” This initiative, however, has faced multiple stumbling blocks and delays as certain countries have prioritized defending the interests of national industries and using protectionist measures to purchase ammunition only from European companies. EU leaders appear to have decided to move forward, but it is clear that both the structure of the initiative and its lack of scale will not solve the long-term underinvestment issues in Europe. This is despite the level of ambition outlined in the EU’s Strategic Compass for Security and Defense last year and important progress made on the issue since.

What can be done?

Looking to history, the urgency and unity shown as allied—primarily US—industry mass produced equipment for World War II is nowhere to be found in today’s production process. The Atlantic Council’s Thomas S. Warrick recently advocated for “the Department of Defense to shift procurement to a wartime footing.” However, even short of this proposal, the United States and its allies and partners can nonetheless launch a coordinated effort to overcome industrial and bureaucratic constraints. It also must include both the governments and heads of industry responsible for stocking any future arsenal of democracy.

Representatives from the defense industry have already been invited by NATO to participate in a meeting of defense ministers in Brussels later this month. However, more is needed. The Vilnius summit in July is an important opportunity to further advance engagement with the defense industry, which NATO can do by holding an official side event for government officials to meet with the chief executive officers of the defense industry. Here they could all get on the same page about the true urgency of inadequate defense value chains. Defense contractors would benefit from direct awareness-raising conversations at the highest political level. In exchange, policymakers would benefit from hearing directly from defense contractors about what policies are necessary to streamline their production processes.

This would be taking a page out of Japan’s playbook. On the eve of last month’s Group of Seven (G7) Hiroshima summit, seven of the world’s largest semiconductor makers met with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in Tokyo to discuss plans to significantly increase Japan’s chipmaking capabilities. The unprecedented meeting demonstrated a concerted effort between the private and public sectors to reshape global commercial supply chains as tensions with China continue to grow.

Productive collaboration with the defense industry is essential not only for replenishing stockpiles and maintaining a steady supply of armaments, but also for addressing a wider range of future concerns, spanning from information sharing to cybersecurity and resilience. Developing a strong partnership with the defense industry will be vital for advancing in these areas. So, where might this collaboration start?

First, NATO’s Vilnius summit will be the second time in a row when Asia-Pacific partners are participating, offering opportunities to look into diversifying supply chains across Europe and North America and into the Indo-Pacific.

Second, allies need to rethink process-centered procurement, which avoids rather than manages risk and consumes massive financial and time resources rather than promptly delivering what is necessary. Anyone who has ever dealt with the notorious procurement schemes will agree that change is impossible without forceful political will. In Vilnius, heads of the defense industry and NATO member states could commit to pursue new and specific orders and deliverables, the fulfillment of which could help reorganize or override currently inefficient procurement processes.

Third, to truly empower NATO’s innovation efforts, such as the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic and the NATO Innovation Fund, industry leaders must commit to advancing these nascent initiatives. As disruptive technologies mature and become essential for future defense capabilities, a closer collaboration between the private sector and governments is needed to bridge the investment gaps and avoid the “valleys of death,” in which small but high-potential companies are left in limbo between initial development and production. In order to maintain technological edge and bring more companies and innovation into the defense space, NATO needs to boost investment in cutting-edge technologies and make its innovation cycle more efficient and robust.

The task of rebuilding the arsenal of democracy is a complex multi-stakeholder endeavor. What is required is a robust no-nonsense collaboration between an industry that can deliver and governments that can lead with political decisions to enable relevant industrial policies. Vilnius is a great place to start.

Giedrimas Jeglinskas is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He was previously assistant secretary general for executive management at NATO and deputy minister of defense of the Republic of Lithuania.

Viltaute Zarembaite is a visiting fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is also a career diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania. These views are her own and do not reflect those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania.

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Export controls: A surprising key to strengthening UK-US military collaboration

Deborah Cheverton — Wed, 07 Jun 2023 15:06:15 +0000

UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak arrived in Washington Tuesday night for talks with US President Joe Biden. According to the White House, discussions will focus on shared economic and security challenges including energy security, the climate crisis, and Ukraine. Both leaders are fresh off the Group of Seven (G7) Summit in Japan where these issues got a thorough airing, and these talks should be an opportunity to go deeper into the details on a bilateral basis. While Ukraine will likely grab the headlines from a national security perspective, another important, albeit under-the-radar issue should also be on the agenda: export controls reform.

Export controls are often thought of for their role in preventing the transfer of arms and other sensitive technologies to malign actors, or as a foreign policy tool used alongside economic sanctions to punish illegal activity. This was the angle taken at the G7 with specific reference to Russia and China, but that viewpoint obscures a different problem. The United States’ closest allies have been quietly frustrated for decades that the indiscriminate and extraterritorial application of these same export controls, in particular the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), seriously hinders efforts to share technologies and collaborate with allies on capability development projects. This is due to the costly and time-consuming processes associated with ITAR compliance. But this isn’t just a time-versus-cost-versus-quality issue for program managers to deal with. It’s much bigger than that. As William Greenwalt, a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, has said, “US government security policies related to export controls no longer support long-term national security interests and if not modified will likely result in the US military falling further behind in the competition with China.” ITAR was enacted during the Cold War, at a time when the United States enjoyed such technological and industrial dominance over its potential adversaries that it could afford to go it alone, write off allied contributions to military capability development, and absorb the consequences in time and cost when they did choose to partner up. None of those things are true anymore.

The Department of Defense has long recognized that it no longer holds complete technological advantage and recent administrations of both parties have promoted the critical role of allies and partners in their national security strategies. Yet ITAR directly prevents the United States from accessing some of the best allied technology and indirectly reduces the military capabilities of its allies. For example, the UK government estimated in 2017 that it costs UK companies almost half a billion dollars a year to comply with ITAR. That’s effectively a 0.7 percent tax levied by the United States on the national defense budget of a close ally, and money which could be far better spent on increased readiness or on more advanced capabilities that would benefit the United States. After all, depending on exchange rate fluctuations and production lot, half a billion dollars equates to four or five F-35B fighter jets. Even worse, that figure only covers those companies that have the resources and risk appetite to work with the United States in the first place. So-called “ITAR taint,” the risk that any technical cooperation with US entities will lead to the loss of control over their technology, prevents some non-US companies from engaging at all. Data is anecdotal as it mainly comes down to internal bidding decisions by individual companies, but it seems that small and medium size enterprises are especially affected. These are exactly the sort of cutting-edge companies that the United States needs in its corner on everything from quantum computing to materials science.

A focus for discussions at the White House

You would think that with such an obvious downside it would be an easy fix, but no. Unfortunately for the Department of Defense, it doesn’t own ITAR policy or its implementation. The State Department does, and it does not feel the pain of delayed programs and degraded technological advantage. Despite the efforts of many talented and hardworking officials who have dedicated their careers to keeping the United States’ most critical technological advancements out of enemy hands, the organizational incentives are not structured to support the pace or flexibility that modern technology and the current geostrategic and security situation demand. The outdated systems State Department officials are working within have become a mechanism of national self-harm and, at the end of the day, it is the warfighter that loses out.

The good news is that the right people in the legislative and executive branches of the US government are starting to take notice of the problem, particularly in the context of the nuclear submarine deal involving Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, known as AUKUS. To date, much of the press about AUKUS has been on the trilateral effort to support Australia in acquiring conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines under Pillar One of the agreement. Arguably though, it is the wider cooperation in critical technologies such as artificial intelligence, autonomy, cyber, and electronic warfare envisaged under Pillar Two that represents the real generational opportunity. Behind the scenes, officials and politicians in all three nations are realizing that Pillar Two just won’t stand with ITAR as it’s currently enforced. This is driving unprecedented interest on Capitol Hill, where congressional Republicans in the House and Senate are leading efforts to force the State Department to address the problem. They are advancing the fantastically named Truncating Onerous Regulations for Partners and Enhancing Deterrence Operations (TORPEDO) Act. To quote Senator Jim Risch (R-Idaho), the ranking member of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, this legislation “aims to speed up the implementation process by reforming the US regulatory system so we can cooperate in a timely and efficient manner on the capabilities we and our partners need.” This is extremely welcome, but in the complicated world of export controls reform the story begins with legislation but it doesn’t end there. Previous attempts at reform, such as the 2016 legal expansion of the National Technology Industrial Base and the 2022 Open General License pilot program, have stumbled on implementation issues which can only be fixed from within the State Department and will require coordinated action between the executive and legislative branches.

This is where Sunak and Biden should focus their discussions. With his reputation for pragmatism, Sunak should easily avoid the temptation to request a blanket ITAR exemption for the United Kingdom as this would be politically unpalatable and counterproductive. Biden, with his flagship foreign policy initiative in the balance, should commit to work with Congress on a bounded and enforceable exemption under the Arms Export Controls Act for AUKUS nations, and then incentivize the State Department to make it work in practice. Collaboration with longstanding allies and partners is critical to the United States’ success in combating the increasingly dynamic threat posed by its adversaries. To let that flounder on account of an out-of-date and inappropriately enforced export control regime should be an unacceptable outcome for all involved.

Deborah Cheverton is a visiting senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Cheverton is a career civil servant from the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MOD), where she has spent almost fifteen years working across a range of policy and delivery areas with a particular focus on science and technology policy, industrial strategy, capability development, and international collaboration. She writes here in her personal capacity as an Atlantic Council fellow, not in an official government capacity. Her views are her own.

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Is China preparing for a post-Putin Russia?

Anders Åslund — Tue, 06 Jun 2023 21:05:22 +0000

One of the greatest mysteries of the Russo-Ukrainian War is China’s actual policy. While China moves cautiously, it appears to be gradually distancing itself from Vladimir Putin. A little-noticed fact is that Chinese President Xi Jinping is cultivating Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin in quite a blatant fashion.

Just two weeks before Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he extracted a commitment from Xi Jinping of “friendship without limits” at their meeting during the Beijing Olympics. However, some significant limits have since became evident. China has apparently refused to deliver arms and sanctioned technology to Russia. China has also abstained on half a dozen United Nations General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

In February 2023, China presented its own twelve-point peace plan to end the war in Ukraine. Supporters of Ukraine have complained that this plan does not condemn Russia or call for a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine, but in fact the first point of China’s plan reads: “Respecting the sovereignty of all countries. Universally recognized international law, including the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, must be strictly observed. The sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all countries must be effectively upheld.” Implicitly, China suggests that Russia has to withdraw its troops from Ukraine.

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Both Xi and Putin have limited public appearances and abstained from traveling because of their fears of Covid-19, and Putin has become ever more isolated because of his war of aggression against Ukraine. Therefore, it was perceived as a great event when Xi Jinping went on an official three-day visit to Russia in March 2023. It was Xi’s first international meeting since his re-election as president during the 2023 National People’s Congress, and it offered Putin a rare break in his international isolation.

While we don’t know what the two leaders said in their long private meetings, nothing seems to have gone right for Putin. His big official project was a large second “Power of Siberia” gas pipeline from western Siberia to China, but Xi clearly said no, limiting Russia’s possibilities to export gas to China for the foreseeable future. Nor does Xi appear to have approved of arms or sensitive technology sales to Russia. Curiously, Xi had a separate meeting with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, contrary to strict Chinese protocol.

As a follow up, Chinese Prime Minister Li Qiang invited Mishustin, his Russian counterpart, to Beijing for an official visit in late May. Mishustin is the highest-ranking Russian official to visit China since the start of the Ukraine invasion in February 2022. On the second day of his visit, Xi Jinping received Mishustin at the Great Hall of the People, once again completely beyond the ordinary bounds of Chinese and Russian protocol.

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If there is a greater stickler of protocol than the Chinese leaders, it is probably Putin. In spite of all the greetings to and from Putin that Xi and Mishustin exchanged, the obvious question arises: Why was Mishustin invited and not Putin? This cannot have gone down well with the Russian leader.

Putin appears to have given his response. Mishustin is one of thirteen permanent members of the Security Council, Russia’s highest policy-making body which meets about every tenth day, always chaired by Putin. Usually all but one or two of the permanent members are present. Mishustin attended on May 15, the last meeting before his trip to China, but he was missing both on May 26 and June 2 after his return from his triumphant visit. Reasons for absence from a Security Council meeting are never officially given.

This old-style Kremlinology is perhaps the best evidence we have that China may be looking beyond Putin and seeking to cultivate alternative relationships in Russia. Such objective observations are better than dubious rumors and can potentially tell us a lot. First of all, it seems clear that China’s “friendship without limits” with Russia actually has many limits, as indicated above. China is presumably more afraid of US and EU secondary sanctions than interested in supporting Russia in its war against Ukraine.

Second, China does claim that universally recognized international law, including the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, must be strictly observed, which means that it opposes Russia’s invasion in principle. Third, the Chinese have indicated distrust in Putin and they may be looking to Mishustin as a credible alternative. Whether this is realistic is not all that relevant.

Fourth, by apparently excluding Mishustin from his two most recent Security Council meetings, Putin has indicated that he has paid attention and dislikes these recent developments. The standard procedure would have seen Putin calling Mishustin to the Security Council to report what he had learned in China.

Mishustin has carefully avoided saying anything in public about the war in Ukraine or his visit to China. His father is considered to have served in the KGB, and he has been both the head of the Russian tax service and a wealthy investment banker. Mishustin is often overlooked in analysis of power dynamics in today’s Russia, but his relationships with both Putin and China should be watched carefully.

Anders Åslund and Andrius Kubilius have just published the book “Reconstruction, Reform, and EU Accession for Ukraine.”

Ukraine’s experience of international negotiations since the eve of the Russian invasion also demonstrates the benefits of adopting a straightforward approach rooted in shared values and common goals. A good example of this principle in practice is the Ramstein Format, which unites 50 countries based on a readiness to act against Russian aggression. Thanks to Ramstein, Ukraine has been able to secure critical military aid in an efficient manner through close coordination with a large number of partners. While individual participating countries all have their own particular agendas and national interests, Ukraine has managed to keep the focus fixed firmly on the overriding need to defeat Russia.

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One of the main factors behind Ukraine’s successful diplomacy has been perseverance. In terms of acquiring new weapons systems and other forms of military aid, Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov has adopted a strategy of demonstrating a willingness to negotiate while proceeding in parallel with the necessary technical preparations. As a result, Ukraine has typically been ready to act once political decisions have been reacted and the right moment has arrived. Time and again, Reznikov and his colleagues in the Ukrainian government have been told by the country’s partners that certain new categories of military aid simply cannot be supplied. However, with sufficient patience and perseverance, the impossible has repeatedly become possible.

Similarly, it has often been best to adopt an incremental approach to negotiations rather than trying to achieve comprehensive breakthroughs immediately. Many of the steps Ukraine has been calling on its partners to make represent major foreign policy watersheds that cannot be taken lightly or rushed. However, it has often proved possible to move from one step to the next and build momentum toward ever more significant decisions.

This incremental approach can be seen in the expansion of military aid to Ukraine. In the weeks prior to Russia’s February 2022 invasion, many countries questioned the wisdom of supplying the Ukrainian military with hand-held anti-tank weapons. Over the past fifteen months, the range of weapons being delivered to Ukraine has evolved dramatically to include artillery, air defense, tanks, and cruise missiles. Perhaps the best single example of the incremental approach was the creation of a “tank coalition” to provide Ukraine with Leopard 2 main battle tanks. It took months of negotiations and many small steps such as agreements on training and maintenance before Germany finally gave the green light to supply Ukraine with Leopards.

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The clarity of Ukraine’s position on peace talks has helped the country to consolidate international support. While some international politicians and commentators continue to argue that negotiations between Ukraine and Russia are inevitable, Ukraine has insisted on the complete liberation of all Ukrainian territory and provided compelling arguments to justify this stance. The consistency of Ukraine’s position has helped to gradually win over the country’s partners. While many European leaders spoke earlier of the need to avoid isolating or humiliating Russia, there is now a growing consensus throughout the West that Russia must be defeated.

With the war still far from over, Ukraine seems set to remain on a steep diplomatic learning curve. One increasingly important focus is long-term defense planning. Ukrainian security needs to become a central pillar of the broader security strategies adopted by NATO and the EU. At present, NATO’s strategic concept until 2030 identifies Russia as “the most significant and immediate threat to the security of allies, as well as peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.” Ukraine’s unique experience of confronting Russian aggression in all its forms can make a major contribution to countering this threat.

Rather than seeking to push Ukraine into some form of compromise with Russia, the international emphasis should now be firmly on pressuring Russia to end its invasion. This could include providing expanded military aid to Ukraine, imposing additional sanctions on Russia, and pursuing international war crimes litigation. Ukrainian officials will be looking to advance all three of these objectives, and will be utilizing diplomatic skills honed in the exceptional circumstances created by Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Yuna Potomkina is an advisor to the Ukrainian Minister of Defense.

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What might a Crimean offensive look like? The Ukrainian military may well conduct sophisticated shaping operations using drones, artillery strikes, and special operations forces. A successful crossing of the Dnipro and advance to the isthmus would also shake the resolve and fighting spirit of Russian defenders.

There may, however, be a better way. Past invasions, while successful, often proved extremely costly. The British and French lost 165,000 men during the mid-nineteenth century Crimean War, for example. Given its high losses to date, Ukraine will seek to achieve its strategic objectives while preserving as much of its armed strength and physical infrastructure as possible. Bitter fighting on the Crimean peninsula would also take a heavy toll on civilians. Accordingly, cutting Crimea off from Russia and starving it of military support could achieve Ukrainian war aims at much lower cost.

This approach would see the bulk of Ukraine’s new mobile brigades massing near Dnipro, a major road and rail hub in southeastern Ukraine well outside Russian artillery range, before rupturing the front and driving for Zaporizhzhia. From there, the operational objective would be the capture of Melitopol and the severing of the land bridge from Russia to Crimea.

The open, flat terrain of southern Ukraine and the region’s relatively good road network create favorable conditions for mobile operations and logistical resupply. Supporting efforts would include maintaining pressure on Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine to hold Russian forces in place there.

If a thrust to sever Russia’s land bridge proved successful, two options could then be considered. One would be to wheel westward and isolate Russian troops in the Kherson region. Alternatively, Ukrainian forces could turn to the east and attempt to recover Mariupol, which has been occupied by Russia since May 2022.

In either case, seizing Melitopol would cause a crisis among Russian political and military leaders, as Russian forces in the south and east would be cut off from each other, rendering a coherent defense at the operational level impossible. This would dramatically undermine Russian morale and encourage further international support for Ukraine.

If mounted in June, Ukraine’s counteroffensive could potentially be concluded by summer’s end, leaving the Crimean Bridge as the only remaining option for ground resupply of Russian forces in Crimea. Campaign success, however, would bring Ukrainian long-range missiles within range of the bridge, which would also be vulnerable to drone attacks.

Meanwhile, resupply of Russian forces in Crimea by air and sea would become precarious, as ports and airfields would now be vulnerable to drone, missile, and rocket artillery strikes. In short, Crimea would be effectively isolated. Regained Ukrainian control of the North Crimean Canal, Crimea’s principal water supply, would only add to Russia’s logistical woes.

If Ukraine’s counteroffensive makes good progress in the south, the Russian Black Sea Fleet will likely find that it cannot remain in Crimea. With its home port of Sevastopol in range of Ukrainian rocket artillery, the fleet would be forced to withdraw to Novorossiysk on the Russian Black Sea coast, a much poorer anchorage with fewer facilities for naval units.

Putin would probably react to such unprecedented setbacks by reviving threats to respond with nuclear weapons, while simultaneously demanding international intervention in the form of diplomatic pressure on Kyiv for a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement that would leave him in possession of at least some Ukrainian territory. However, Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling has lost much of its impact through overuse, and because China has made it clear that nuclear weapons must be off the table.

As for salvation through diplomacy, major Ukrainian advances on the ground this summer could bring ultimate victory within sight and encourage Ukraine to carry on. If Ukrainian troops are making progress, the country’s leaders will not be in the mood to negotiate and throw away hard-won success at the conference table, however much pressure comes from outside. Allies and partners like the British, the Poles, the Nordics, and the Baltic nations can be counted on to offset other dissenting voices and to reinforce Ukrainian battlefield gains.

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Are the Ukrainian armed forces capable of bringing this off? A number of variables will come into play. Adequate quantities of fuel, spare parts, artillery, and air defense munitions along with other classes of supply must be available.

As with the Kharkiv offensive in September 2022, operational security and successful deception operations will be critical. The Ukrainian General Staff must be capable of true operational art. They must be able to sequence combined arms battles and engagements in time and space and across multiple domains to achieve decisive battlefield results. The Russians, too, must cooperate by continuing to demonstrate flawed generalship, low morale, and an inability to synchronize combat power at points of decision.

In war, of course, the future remains uncharted territory. But all signs point to a clear opportunity for the Ukrainian counteroffensive to succeed. In spite of heavy casualties, continuous combat, and an unending rain of missiles on its civilian infrastructure, Ukraine has managed to generate fresh, well-equipped, and well-trained reserves in large numbers. Talented commanders have come to the fore, vetted by years of experience fighting the Russians.

The Ukrainian General Staff is not likely to accept the risks inherent in major operations of this sort without confidence that its logistics are in place and its planning is sound. Furthermore, Ukrainian commanders must be encouraged by what they see across the front lines. Facing them are a shattered Russian army that has taken enormous losses in tanks, troops, and munitions; an ineffective Russian air force; and a Russian Black Sea Fleet that can do little but shelter in its anchorage. No outstanding Russian commanders have emerged from the carnage of the past 15 months. One must assume the Russians are currently waiting for Ukraine’s attack with low confidence and a sense of foreboding.

Subsequent phases of the campaign will seek, through diplomacy, continued sanctions, and military force, to liberate Ukraine entirely. Recent moves, such as the UK’s provision of Storm Shadow cruise missiles and other long-range munitions, are changing the military calculus. So, too, will the long-delayed decision to train Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 fighter jet. Putin is counting on support for Ukraine to degrade as allies and partners tire. In fact, Ukraine grows stronger while Russia increasingly turns to obsolete equipment and ever-more reluctant conscripts.

As we are often told, no plan survives contact with the enemy. There will likely be the occasional tactical miscue or operational hiccup during the coming counteroffensive, but a careful assessment suggests the odds are heavily in favor of Ukraine. More savage fighting lies ahead, but the end of the war may gradually be coming into view, and it looks very promising from Ukraine’s perspective.

Richard D. Hooker Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. He previously served as Dean of the NATO Defense College and as Special Assistant to the US President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia with the National Security Council.

The strengths: Implementing the NDS

First, the budget reinforces the view that China is the pacing challenge for the United States. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative, a set of defense investments established by Congress in 2021 in response to China’s growing military power, received its largest investment. Moreover, research-and-development and procurement requests were the largest in DOD history.

The budget places an emphasis on modernization programs that were long deferred, including those for hypersonic weapons, space, cyber, contested logistics, and platforms built for contested environments—all of which will be valuable in deterring China. Modernizing the entire kill chain is also a focus of this budget, in its requests for investments in elements of the DOD’s Joint All-Domain Command and Control strategy, enhanced sensors, and electronic-warfare capabilities. In response to the rapid build-up of China’s nuclear forces, this budget continues to fully fund the revitalization of all legs of the nuclear triad along with nuclear command, control, and communication systems.

The budget has a focus on ensuring that the United States’ advantages endure, as demonstrated through the president’s requested funding for critical emerging technologies, supply-chain resiliency, and the defense workforce. An advantage in technology—especially in artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, directed energy, biotechnologies, and microelectronics—is necessary to keep up with the changing nature of warfare in the coming decade. Shoring up supply chains, specifically ones that are needed to produce defense systems such as metal-fabrication and battery supply chains, is necessary for national security. The budget request, by investing in the research and development of tech across the defense-industrial base, forms the foundation for a self-sustaining defense economy. And, as the all-volunteer force clocks its fiftieth year, the budget shows that the military is, at its core, a people business: The president recommends the largest pay raise for defense personnel in decades (5.2 percent) and notes that military families are key to readiness.

This budget signals an uptick in demand to the defense-industrial base, particularly through increased investment in the most-valued munitions and the execution of a multiyear procurement authority. A stable topline across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)—part of the budget request that reflects detailed budget projections over the next five years—provides predictability for industry. Last year, the FYDP provided less predictability because it did not pace inflation each year between 2024 and 2027. Even though its overall increase from FY23 may be offset by inflation, the FY24 request is stable, pacing inflation each year between 2025 and 2028. Last year’s budget also confused industry by not making clear which production lines should be maintained or expanded—but the FY24 budget request makes it clear. The FY24 budget also provides industry-stable procurement counts for the highest-valued aircraft and maritime platforms needed to deter China.

The challenges: Every budget requires trade-offs

How the president chooses to invest in the country’s defense reveals the strategic assumptions he and his leadership team are making about the future fight—and in what areas they are willing to accept risk. The FY24 budget assumes risk in capacity, specifically for the Air Force’s and Navy’s force structures.

The Pentagon is shifting its focus from land wars in the Middle East to deterring high-end conflict with China, and the budget reflects this. The Army and Marine Corps continue to execute previous plans, reinvesting savings from reductions in the number of troops to fund modernization efforts needed for the Indo-Pacific. These modernization efforts include investments in long-range fires, sensing, and air defense. Meanwhile, the Air Force continues trading aircraft capacity for capability—retiring aircraft faster than they can be replaced by deliveries of next-generation or more modern aircraft—resulting in a decrease of total aircraft inventory by 190 in FY24. While modernization (and, accordingly, the trading of legacy systems for advanced capabilities) is necessary for deterring future wars, such decisions inherently assume some level of risk. For example, the Navy’s reduction in battle-force-ship numbers, included in the FY24 request, has implications for the United States’ maritime competitive edge. The decision to truncate production of the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock impacts all combatant commanders, as these ships are foundational for the United States’ response to contingencies or crises around the globe. Moreover, in the event of a naval blockade of Taiwan, the United States would possibly lack the number of platforms it needs to deploy its response. The People’s Liberation Army Navy is numerically the largest in the world in terms of battle force ships (approximately 340) and is projected to grow to four hundred ships by 2025. In contrast, Biden’s budget request shows a flatlining US naval inventory.

This budget follows guidance from the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review to cancel the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) program, even though the program earned bipartisan support as part of the FY23 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the DOD Appropriations Act. In a tripolar-nuclear-threat environment, the SLCM-N program is a valued capability that is survivable, is prompt, and helps expand the United States’ nuclear deterrence. Expect Congress to push back once again on this misguided request.

What’s next?

As Congress continues hearings on the FY24 NDAA and DOD appropriations bill in the coming months, lawmakers will need to monitor inflation projections and adjudicate whether defense spending should increase above the rate of inflation. They will also need to arbitrate the DOD’s long-term force-structure plans and determine whether deterrence is enhanced by continuing the SLCM-N program. Most importantly, Congress should work to ensure that appropriations are on time so that the DOD is not disadvantaged by the constraints and inefficiencies of beginning nearly every fiscal year under the burden of a continuing resolution.

As Forward Defense’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption recommends, Congress should provide increased spending flexibility by spelling out fewer line items, so that the DOD can easily add novel technologies to the force without requiring a new program. The budget process must remain agile, especially given that the services formulate their requests two years before funding is received and their capability needs will evolve within that time.

If the United States is committed to setting up the DOD for an era of strategic competition, it must commit to increasing the defense budget above the rate of inflation to provide the capacity required while not sacrificing readiness and modernization. Otherwise, the US military risks eroding its military edge in the face of a modernized and capable China.

Clementine G. Starling is the director of the Forward Defense program at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Lieutenant Commander Marek Jestrab is the 2022-2023 senior US Navy fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. These views do not represent the US Navy or the Department of Defense.

Julia Siegel is an assistant director with Forward Defense.

This article is part of the 21st Century Security Project by the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice with financial support from Lockheed Martin.

The post Money talks: Here’s what the president’s budget says about the US military edge appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Sec. Mark Esper and Sec. Deborah Lee James promote DoD budget flexibility and program management reform in Defense One

Atlantic Council — Mon, 08 May 2023 19:51:38 +0000

On May 8, Sec. Mark Esper and Sec. Deborah Lee James, Co-Chairs of the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, co-wrote an article in Defense One discussing two key recommendations from the Commission’s recently released interim report. First, DoD needs more flexibility to reprogram funds within fiscal years without congressional approval. Second, DoD program managers should have fewer but larger portfolios so they can shift resources and technologies, threats, and priorities evolve.

The post Sec. Mark Esper and Sec. Deborah Lee James promote DoD budget flexibility and program management reform in Defense One appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Iranian and Syrian factors shape Israeli response to Russia’s Ukraine invasion

Joseph Roche — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 19:55:35 +0000

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Israel has sought to minimize involvement in the war while attempting to maintain a neutral stance toward Russia. This posture reflects Israeli security priorities closer to home. However, strengthening ties between Russia and Iran along with pressure from the West may eventually force Israel to change its stance.

During the tenure of former Prime Minister Yair Lapid, Israel declined to join EU and US sanctions against Russia, opting instead to provide only humanitarian aid to Kyiv. The return of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in December 2022 did not significantly affect Israeli foreign policy toward Ukraine or Russia.

Israel’s reluctance to condemn Russia’s actions is first and foremost a strategic decision in order to avoid jeopardizing an unofficial agreement with Moscow that enables Israel to combat Iranian influence in Syria. Since its military intervention began in 2015, Russia has been among the dominant forces in Syria. Russia controls the Syrian sky and generally does not restrict Israeli fighter jets from conducting strikes on Iranian proxies. With this in mind, Israel does not want to risk alienating the Kremlin.

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Russia’s recent geopolitical isolation has complicated the situation further by pushing Moscow toward Tehran. This growing military cooperation between Russia and Iran has sparked alarm in Israel amid fears that it could have significant negative consequences for the country’s national security.

Firstly, by providing Russia with weapons including drones, Iran is gaining important battlefield experience and improving its drone technology, potentially increasing the threat to Israel in the long run. Secondly, some observers fear that if Russia reduces its Syrian presence due to the invasion of Ukraine, it would give Iran more room to operate freely in Syria.

Not everyone is convinced. Omer Dostri, a specialist at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, does not think a complete Russian withdrawal from Syria is currently likely. He argues that Russia remains a major world power and can simultaneously engage in the war in Ukraine while also remaining in Syria. However, if Russia does significantly decrease its military presence in Syria, he argues that Israel might acutally enjoy more freedom of action and air control.

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Israel’s greatest concern remains the possibility of Russia potentially helping Iran in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Yossi Melman, a senior analyst for the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, says Russia could do so either by lobbying for a relaxation of international restrictions or by directly providing nuclear material to Iran in exchange for weapons.

For now, Israel’s objective is to dissuade Russia and demonstrate that its aid to Iran is a waste of resources and finances. However, if Russia were to significantly increase its military and security assistance to Iran, particularly in the context of Iran’s presence in Syria, Israel would likely respond by rethinking its support for Ukraine and its approach to the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Potential Russian military aid to Iran could include ballistic missiles, fighter jets, and air defense systems. Additionally, recent reports indicate Moscow may be considering establishing production lines in Iran for certain Russian weapons.

Israel is also concerned that Russia could supply equipment to upgrade the Iranian nuclear program, although Moscow may be reluctant to do so due to its own strategic interests. Nevertheless, the prospect of such a scenario has caused considerable alarm in Israel, with experts acknowledging that it would be a game-changer for the country that would require a significant shift in its relations with Moscow.

The deepening partnership between Russia and Iran is likely to remain Israel’s key focus in the months ahead. If Russia suffers further military setbacks in Ukraine, there is a danger that Moscow’s increased reliance on Tehran could result in greater Iranian influence in Syria while also strengthening the country’s position during negotiations with the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, many in the West would like to see Israel play a larger role in efforts to support Ukraine. Although neither Russia nor Iran has crossed any red lines that would prompt a formal shift in Israel’s stance toward Ukraine, the longer the current war persists, the more Israel will be pressured by its Western allies to take an active role in opposing Russian aggression.

According to Dostri, the United States is already calling on Israel to support Ukraine more robustly. “At present, Israel is providing humanitarian and medical aid, as well as defensive support, such as helmets along with missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attack warning systems. Israel is also sharing intelligence related to the threat from Iran’s UAVs,“ he says. The US is reportedly urging Israel to take further steps, such as providing the Ukrainian army with anti-missile defense systems and potentially even attack drones.

With no end in sight to the Russian invasion, Israel will likely face further calls in the coming months to stand with the democratic world and back Ukraine. “Israel has to take a side and not sit on the fence because Israel’s main ally is the US, not Russia,“ notes Melman.

Joseph Roche is a journalist and former MENA junior analyst at Oxford Analytica. He holds a master’s degree in international history from The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva.

The “United States Space Priorities Framework,” released in December 2021, confirmed the White House’s commitment to American leadership in space.¹ Space activities deliver immense benefits to humankind. For example, satellite imaging alone is crucial for improvements in daily life such as weather monitoring as well as for grand challenges like the fight against climate change. Such breakthrough discoveries in space pave the way for innovation and new economies on Earth. Exploration is at the cutting edge of this process: it expands humankind’s knowledge of the universe, transforming the unknown into the supremely challenging, expensive, risky, and promising. US allies and partners accelerate this transformation via scientific and technical achievements as well as processes, relationships, and a shared vision for space exploration. By integrating these allied capabilities, the United States and its allies and partners set the stage for safe and prosperous space geopolitics and economy in the decades to come.

However, harnessing the capabilities of US allies and partners for space exploration is complex, requiring the balance of relatively short-term progress with far-horizon strategy. Space exploration has changed since the US-Soviet space race of the 1960s. In today’s rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical environment, it is unclear whether the processes, relationships, and vision that previously enabled allied cooperation in space, epitomized by the International Space Station (ISS), will keep pace. Here, China is viewed as the preeminent competitor for exploration goals and capabilities—as well as the major competitor for long-term leadership in space.² This development drives fears of space militarization and weaponization, prompting protectionist legislation, investment screening, and industrial policies that can disrupt collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners.³ Further complication stems from the rise of commercial space, with opportunities and challenges due to the decentralization, democratization, and demonetization of technologies for robotic and crewed space exploration.

China is viewed as the preeminent competitor in space. Pictured here, the Shenzhou-14 has been used extensively by both the PLA and Chinese commercial sector. May 29, 2022. Source: China News Service

This paper serves as a primer for current US space exploration goals and capabilities that will be critical to achieving them. It highlights arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned to jointly accelerate space exploration while also benefitting life on Earth. This paper concludes with recommended actions—gleaned from interviews with international experts in space exploration—for the US government as well as allied and partner governments to increase the number and impact of global stakeholders in space exploration, to remove friction in collaboration, and to guide the future of space toward democratic values.

Current space exploration efforts

Over the next few decades, US and allied space exploration will integrate uncrewed (robotic) and crewed missions to achieve scientific discovery, technological advancement, economic benefits, national prestige, and planetary defense.

Concept art for NASA’s Gateway Program, includes elements from international partners and government partners. Credit : NASA

Uncrewed space exploration missions generally focus on expanding fundamental scientific knowledge and laying the foundation for future activities such as resource extraction. Collaborators include the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the European Space Agency (ESA) and member space agencies, and the space agencies of India, Japan, South Korea, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), with public-private partnerships delivering additional capabilities.⁴ Several missions to Mars will study the planet’s geology, atmosphere, and possible past or current life, with sample-return missions currently scheduled by NASA and the ESA for the early 2030s.⁵ The search for conditions suitable to life will be extended to other locations in the solar system, such as the moons of Jupiter and Saturn. Robotic missions will continue to increase understanding of the Sun, Mercury, Venus, the Moon, asteroids, Jupiter and its moons, and deep space. Observational studies of planets outside our solar system, black holes, comets, stars, and galaxies will be enabled by space telescopes and other imaging modalities. Uncrewed exploration goals are also being pursued by the China National Space Administration, with particular attention to its planned International Lunar Research Station.⁶ Note that important technological gaps in robotic space exploration—such as dust mitigation⁷ and space situational awareness⁸ —are being tackled by critical research and development by US partners and allies.

Crewed space exploration objectives for the United States and its allies and partners are encapsulated by the Moon to Mars roadmap,⁹ an integrated strategy that, over the next several decades, will synergize exploration goals in low-Earth orbit (LEO), cislunar space, and Mars. Within this roadmap, for which all timelines may shift, the Artemis program will return humans (including the first woman and person of color) to the Moon no earlier than 2025, with the long-term goal of establishing a sustainable human presence on the lunar surface.¹⁰ The Artemis program will use the heavy-lifter Space Launch System (SLS) and the Orion spacecraft to send astronauts and payloads to a space station in lunar orbit called the Gateway. From there, the Human Landing System will transport them to and from the Artemis Base Camp on the lunar surface (note that mission details are still being refined). The program involves crucial contributions from allied governments and industries. Hardware, software, and lessons learned from the Artemis program and other activities in LEO and on the ISS will lay the foundation for Mars:¹¹ human exploration (generally projected for the 2030s), scientific investigation, and eventual permanent settlement.¹² In particular, the Gateway serves important roles in infrastructure development (e.g., supply chains) and better understanding of the effects of extended deep-space missions on the human body—both crucial aspects of crewed space exploration.

NASA’s Artemis I rocket carrying the Orion research spacecraft, Wednesday from Launch Complex 39B at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Florida, Nov. 16, 2022. Source : Andrew Parlette

International partners are critical for the success of the Artemis program. They are providing expertise, technology, and funding across the spectrum from basic science and engineering to specific software and hardware mission deliverables. A few examples highlight the benefits of leveraging the capabilities of US allies and partners.¹³ The ESA is contributing to the construction and operation of the Gateway and the Orion service module. Canada is delivering several critical components of the Gateway,¹⁴ while Japan and the ESA are building important components of habitation modules. Navigation, tracking, and communication capabilities are key contributions from Australia; an ESA program will also provide lunar telecommunications and navigation.¹⁵ Other important hardware, subsystems, and expertise will be supplied by space agencies such as those of Italy¹⁶ and the United Kingdom. Moreover, allied companies are partners in the design, development, and deployment of capabilities underlying the Artemis program.

Today, US and allied cooperation in space rests on the Artemis Accords,¹⁷ a set of principles, guidelines, and best practices for peaceful civilian space exploration building on the Outer Space Treaty of 1967¹⁸ and subsequent policies. Key principles include peaceful operations, transparency, interoperability, and commitments to deconfliction and the collaborative management of orbital debris and space resources. The original group of eight signatories in 2020 has since expanded to twenty-three as of March 2023, with representation across the globe from the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific, and Africa.

Signatory nations host mature or developing industries directly or indirectly pertinent to space exploration (see Table 1), signaling strong potential for bilateral and multilateral collaboration. Notably, neither Russia nor China—the two largest competitors to allied space exploration—have signed, nor appear likely to sign, the Artemis Accords. Thus, it is imperative for the United States to follow through on its commitments to its allies and partners, demonstrating that it remains the partner of choice for open and transparent space exploration and scientific inquiry.

To project leadership in space exploration, the United States and its allies and partners ought to be first in returning humans to the Moon and landing astronauts on Mars. Most experts interviewed for this paper agreed that—with China and Russia also racing to these benchmarks—achieving these “firsts” is important for prestige, diplomacy, and establishing a strong foundation for a rules-based order in outer space, similar to that seen across traditional domains, with the goal of promoting long-term freedom and prosperity. Failure to achieve these “firsts” could arise due to Chinese achievements, insufficient allied funding and political will, geopolitical events, a catastrophic mission failure, or from the United States underutilizing the capabilities of its allies and partners, both in the public and private sectors. The latter becomes more likely due to protectionist policies, including caps on foreign contributions, and political interference in competition. Overall, early stakeholders in this new phase of space exploration will set the culture, norms, and standards that will underpin space activities for years to come—a major reason to strengthen the systems and processes that enable US-led collaboration with allies and partners.

Technological opportunities and challenges

There are numerous opportunities to facilitate, enrich, and expand collaboration in space exploration between the United States and its partners and allies. At the same time, important challenges hold back current efforts to harness allied capabilities, pointing to opportunities to improve collaboration in the coming years.

Allied opportunities in space exploration

Continuing to advance space exploration by both machines and humans requires costly, sophisticated, interdisciplinary technology development across sectors; this can only be done through the aggregate efforts of the United States and its allies and partners from start to finish.¹⁹ Such international cooperation, and cooperation between the public and private sectors, will not only overcome the major technical, logistical, and scientific challenges of space exploration, but also complement Earth-focused innovation initiatives in critical technologies (see Table 1).²⁰ For example, formal and informal strategies to leverage biotechnological advances for the expansion of bioeconomies²¹ have been formulated for the United States,²² Germany,²³ United Kingdom,²⁴ European Union,²⁵ India,²⁶ and others—including China.²⁷ Together, allied and partner space agencies play crucial roles as early funders of the science, engineering, and business development of space and space-adjacent products and services that will both benefit from and drive space exploration in the coming decades; they also serve as early (and often sole) clients for these products and services.

Autonomous robotic system²⁸ are an illustrative example of how collaboration around a major technology objective for space exploration can overcome a series of challenges and deliver benefits across both Earth and space. Such systems rely on sophisticated integration of sensors, robotics, microelectronics, imaging, and computation. Depending on the target application, they must withstand extremes in temperature, radiation, gravity, pressure, resource constraints, and other parameters. Autonomous operation is imperative because of the vast distances that signals must travel (the one-way time delay for operating a robot on the asteroid closest to Earth that may be suitable for mining, 16 Psyche, is at least ten minutes).²⁹ Trusted (cybersecure) autonomous robotic systems will be critical for resource extraction, safety, human health, and sustainability in space environments; related technology development is benefiting Earth-based applications such as mining, surgery, supply chains, and transportation. The European Space Resources Innovation Center—a partnership of the Luxembourg Space Agency, the Luxembourg Institute of Science and Technology, and the ESA—is running an incubation program for early projects around utilizing space resources,³⁰ a salient example of how public and private entities can cooperate to drive capabilities for exploration and commercialization. All experts interviewed for this paper agreed that the quicker pace, receptiveness to risk, and sensitivity to costs and markets of commercial endeavors can benefit public-private partnerships for space exploration.

Challenges to allied space exploration

Despite the affordances of international cooperation, systems and processes can make it difficult to harness allied capabilities. Protectionist activity by the United States and its allies and partners can arise when a single government has made large investments in research and development, hindering the transfer of technologies, personnel, information (including unclassified information), and data across borders. Many of the technologies shown in Table 1 appear on lists of critical, emerging, and breakthrough technologies from the United States,³¹ European Union,³² and other public and private organizations. This complicates collaboration, as many of these technologies are dual use and under intense Chinese scrutiny/competition, and are thus subject to export regulations—in some cases, even to US allies.

A lightweight simulator version of NASA’s Resource Prospector undergoes a mobility test in a regolith bin at the agency’s Kennedy Space center in Florida. The Resource Prospector mission aims to be the first mining expedition on another world. Source: NASA/Kim Shiflett

Notably, space exploration and the technology segments in Table 1 support concentrated, high-paying jobs with strong economic impact,³³ and are therefore subject to political protection from competition, from allies, and/or between the public and private sectors. For example, the US Congress’s NASA Authorization Act of 2010 called for the reuse in the SLS of components of the Space Shuttle, with reliance on legacy suppliers, infrastructure, and personnel.³⁴ The resulting SLS is not reusable, and a single launch may cost upward of $1 billion.³⁵ In contrast, SpaceX (one of several companies developing rockets) claims that its Starship is fully reusable, has a larger payload, has much lower development costs (which have been partially funded by NASA), and—controversially—may have operational costs of less than $10 million per launch within the next few years.³⁶ Several experts interviewed for this paper suggested that a healthy sense of competition between the public and private sectors could encourage government space agencies to support ambitious timelines and budgets while upholding their commitment to safety.

Harnessing allied space capabilities will be key for constraining duplication of efforts and optimizing value creation, resource sharing, technology transfer, and costs. Over time, the hardware, software, and data from exploration missions will support off-Earth communities of increasing size, complexity, and duration in LEO, cislunar space, the Moon, Mars, asteroids, and beyond—underscoring the importance of harnessing allied capabilities in these technology areas for space exploration today.

Table 1: Allied and partner offerings in key space exploration technologies

This table includes select nations with a strong history of space- and/or Earth-related success within a specific technological segment (examples labeled “Now”) and/or have burgeoning commercial sectors worth examining (examples labeled “Next”). Note: This table is not exhaustive.

Recommendations and conclusions

Harnessing allied capabilities is crucial for future space exploration, with major potential benefits to life on Earth as well. The US government, working alongside allied and partner governments, should therefore consider the following next steps:

Recommendation #1: US government actors—including Congress, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, the State Department including its Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, and the Defense Technology Security Administration in the Office of the Secretary of Defense—should reexamine and reform Export Administration Regulations. Priority should be given to potential reforms that strengthen the United States’ position as an orchestrator of complex international collaborations and supply chains, in contrast to a paradigm of the United States as a globally dominant, unilateral player. Support from executive- and ministerial-level offices is essential.

Effects include:

Promote removal of friction in international collaborations and public-private partnerships.
Enable reciprocity in cooperation (including data transfer and potential to bid).
Balance safety with risk.
Render attractive the inclusion of US companies and government bodies in allied workflows, supply chains, and markets, particularly for businesses in emerging technologies.
Support short-term economic and security goals as well as long-term diplomatic efforts, particularly with close allies and partners.

Recommendation #2: NASA and the National Space Council should collaborate with allied space agencies, both national and international, to identify opportunities to engage in space exploration at whatever level of contribution is individually appropriate, given the state of maturity of allied sectors (see Table 1) and geopolitics. For example, allies could contribute commodities or launch locations rather than mature costly software or hardware. Attention should be paid to maturing industries to identify opportunities for early relationships and processes that will accelerate space exploration.

Effects include:

Decentralization to improve the resilience of space exploration to disruptions in funding, supply chains, politics, and unexpected but highly impactful events.
Diplomacy and inspiration of young workers.
Expansion of the community of active stakeholders in space exploration aligned with democratic values, with the United States serving as the trusted partner.

Recommendation #3: The Office of Science and Technology Policy, Office of the Secretary of Commerce, Department of Defense, and other US interagency actors should identify and support synergies between technology development for space exploration and for Earth-focused innovation in critical technologies. New multistakeholder (cross-border) grants, fellowships, seed funding, and prizes should be modeled on current international efforts like XPRIZE and the Deep Space Food Challenge. Programs such as the NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts and the ESA Open Space Innovation Platform, which incubate early-stage innovations in space exploration, should be expanded to noncitizens.

Effects include:

Risk-mitigated financial support of early and maturing technologies for space exploration.
Exchange of human capital across public/private, international, Earth/space, and industry boundaries.

Recommendation #4: Through organizations like the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, international stakeholders in space exploration—including space agencies, companies, philanthropic groups, and nongovernmental organizations—should formulate an actionable, unified multilateral space strategy that goes beyond the Artemis Accords. For example, while the Artemis Accords recognize “the global benefits of space exploration and commerce,” they do not explicitly address commercial activity, and commercial enterprises are not signatories. Action is urgently needed, as it is conceivable that extraction and exploitation of lunar resources could begin in the very short term—in the mid 2020s. An expanded space strategy must include the commercial sector.

Effects include:

Identification of pathways to create/strengthen linkages among stakeholders and eliminate choke points that render exploration vulnerable to disruption and negative outcomes.
Establishment of rule of law and crisis-mitigation strategies spanning early crewed and uncrewed exploration missions through permanent human habitation off Earth, including commercial activity.

In conclusion, just as no one could have foreseen the precise progression from the Wright brothers’ first flight to today’s rapidly exploding telecommunications and space industrial ecosystems, one cannot expect to accurately predict the progression—or the ramifications—of today’s space exploration to tomorrow’s future. Nonetheless, international collaboration is certainly key to success. Now is the time to enhance the processes, relationships, and shared vision for space exploration, thereby expanding humankind’s knowledge of the universe, improving life on Earth, and setting the stage for a reliable, routine, and prosperous space economy for all.

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1 “United States Space Priorities Framework,” White House, December 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/united-states-space-priorities-framework-_-december-1-2021.pdf.

2 “China’s Space Program: A 2021 Perspective,” State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, January 28, 2022, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2022-01/28/content_78016843.htm.

3 “Rethinking Export Controls: Unintended Consequences and the New Technological Landscape,” Commentary series on expert controls, Center for a New American Security, accessed March 23, 2023, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/rethinking-export-controls-unintended-consequences-and-the-new-technological-landscape.

4 “Our Missions,” European Space Agency, accessed February 14, 2023, https://www.esa.int/ESA/Our_Missions; and Gary Daines, “Solar System Missions,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, March 11, 2015, http://www.nasa.gov/content/solar-missions-list.

5 Timothy Haltigin et al., “Rationale and Proposed Design for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Science Program,” Astrobiology 22, no. S1, June 2022, https://doi.org/10.1089/ast.2021.0122.

6 Andrew Jones, “China Outlines Pathway for Lunar and Deep Space Exploration,” SpaceNews, November 28, 2022, https://spacenews.com/china-outlines-pathway-for-lunar-and-deep-space-exploration/.

7 Scott Vangen et al., “International Space Exploration Coordination Group Assessment of Technology Gaps for Dust Mitigation for the Global Exploration Roadmap,” in AIAA SPACE 2016 (American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics), accessed March 23, 2023, https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2016-5423.

8 Daniel L. Oltrogge and Salvatore Alfano, “The Technical Challenges of Better Space Situational Awareness and Space Traffic Management,” Journal of Space Safety Engineering 6, no. 2 (June 1, 2019): 72–79, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsse.2019.05.004.

9 “Moon to Mars Objectives: Executive Summary,” NASA, September 2022, https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/m2m-objectives-exec-summary.pdf.

10 S. Creech, J. Guidi, and D. Elburn, “Artemis: An Overview of NASA’s Activities to Return Humans to the Moon,” 2022 IEEE Aerospace Conference (AERO), Big Sky, Montana, 2022, 1–7, https://doi.org/10.1109/AERO53065.2022.9843277.

11 Steve Mackwell, Lisa May, and Rick Zucker, “The Ninth Community Workshop for Achievability and Sustainability of Human Exploration of Mars (AM IX),” hosted by Explore Mars at The George Washington University, June 2022, https://www.exploremars.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/AM-9_Upload_v-1.pdf.

12 P. Kessler et al., “Artemis Deep Space Habitation: Enabling a Sustained Human Presence on the Moon and Beyond,” 2022 IEEE Aerospace Conference, 1–12, https://doi.org/10.1109/AERO53065.2022.9843393.

13 Here, country/agency designations simplify complex agreements between public and private entities, sometimes across borders, showcasing the need for processes and relations that enable allied cooperation.

14 Canadian Space Agency, “Canada’s Role in Moon Exploration,” Canadian Space Agency, February 28, 2019, https://www.asc-csa.gc.ca/eng/astronomy/moon-exploration/canada-role.asp.

15 “Moonlight,” ESA, accessed March 9, 2023, https://www.esa.int/Applications/Telecommunications_Integrated_Applications/Moonlight.

16 Fulvia Croci, “Artemis Mission: Signed Agreement Between ASI and NASA,” ASI (blog), Italian Space Agency, June 16, 2022, https://www.asi.it/en/2022/06/artemis-mission-signed-agreement-between-asi-and-nasa/.

17 “The Artemis Accords: Principles for Cooperation in the Civil Exploration and Use of the Moon, Mars, Comets, and Asteroids,” NASA, October 13, 2020, https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/img/Artemis-Accords-signed-13Oct2020.pdf.

18 “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” United Nations, 1967, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20610/volume-610-I-8843-English.pdf.

19 See “State Exploration and Innovation,” UN Office of Outer Space Affairs, annual reports on national space activities and innovation accessed March 9, 2023, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/topics/space-exploration-and-innovation.html.

20 “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” United Nations, 2015, https://sdgs.un.org/sites/default/files/publications/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf; and “Exploring Space Technologies for Sustainable Development,” UN Conference on Trade and Development, 2021, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/dtlstict2021d1_en.pdf.

21 “Report to the President: Biomanufacturing to Advance the Bioeconomy,” US President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, December 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/PCAST_Biomanufacturing-Report_Dec2022.pdf.

22 White House, “Executive Order on Advancing Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Innovation for a Sustainable, Safe, and Secure American Bioeconomy,” White House Briefing Room, September 12, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/09/12/executive-order-on-advancing-biotechnology-and-biomanufacturing-innovation-for-a-sustainable-safe-and-secure-american-bioeconomy/; and White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, “Bold Goals for U.S. Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing: Harnessing Research and Development to Further Societal Goals,” March 2023.

23 “National Bioeconomy Strategy,” German Federal Government, July 2020, https://www.bmel.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Publications/national-bioeconomy-strategy.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2.

24 “UK Innovation Strategy: Leading the Future by Creating It,” UK Department of Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy, July 22, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-innovation-strategy-leading-the-future-by-creating-it/uk-innovation-strategy-leading-the-future-by-creating-it-accessible-webpage.

25 Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (European Commission), European Bioeconomy Policy: Stocktaking and Future Developments: Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022), https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2777/997651.

26 Narayanan Suresh and Srinivas Rao Chandan, “India Bioeconomy Report 2022,” prepared for Biotechnology Industry Research Assistance Council by Association of Biotechnology Led Enterprises, June 2022, https://birac.nic.in/webcontent/1658318307_India_Bioeconomy_Report_2022.pdf.

27 Xu Zhang et al., “The Roadmap of Bioeconomy in China,” Engineering Biology 6, no. 4 (2022): 71–81, https://doi.org/10.1049/enb2.12026.

28 Issa A. D. Nesnas, Lorraine M. Fesq, and Richard A. Volpe, “Autonomy for Space Robots: Past, Present, and Future,” Current Robotics Reports 2, no. 3 (September 1, 2021): 251–63, https://doi.org/10.1007/s43154-021-00057-2.

29 Smiriti Srivastava et al., “Analysis of Technology, Economic, and Legislation Readiness Levels of Asteroid Mining Industry: A Base for the Future Space Resource Utilization Missions,” New Space 11, no. 1 (2022): 21–31, https://doi.org/10.1089/space.2021.0025.

30 “ESRIC: Start-up Support Programme,” ESRIC: European Space Resources Innovation Centre, accessed March 9, 2023, https://www.esric.lu/about-ssp.

31 “Critical and Emerging Technologies List Update,” Fast Track Action Subcommittee on Critical and Emerging Technologies of the National Science and Technology Council, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/02-2022-Critical-and-Emerging-Technologies-List-Update.pdf.

32 European Innovation Council, “Identification of Emerging Technologies and Breakthrough Innovations,” January 2022, https://eic.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-02/EIC-Emerging-Tech-and-Breakthrough-Innov-report-2022-1502-final.pdf.

33 Yittayih Zelalem, Joshua Drucker, and Zafer Sonmez, “NASA Economic Impact Report 2021,” Nathalie P. Voorhees Center for Neighborhood and Community Improvement, University of Illinois at Chicago, October 2022, https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/nasa_fy21_economic_impact_report_full.pdf.

34 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C. 18301 (2010).

35 “The Cost of SLS and Orion,” Planetary Society, accessed March 9, 2023, https://www.planetary.org/space-policy/cost-of-sls-and-orion.

36 Kate Duffy, “Elon Musk Says He’s ‘Highly Confident’ That SpaceX’s Starship Rocket Launches Will Cost Less than $10 Million within 2-3 Years,” Business Insider, February 11, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-spacex-starship-rocket-update-flight-cost-million-2022-2.

The post Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

Nicholas Eftimiades — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 13:00:31 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

ISSUE BRIEF

Introduction

Over the last two decades, the world entered a new paradigm in the use of space, namely the introduction of highly capable small satellites, just tens or hundreds of kilograms in size. This paradigm has forever changed how countries will employ space capabilities to achieve economic, scientific, and national security interests. As is so often the case, the telltale signs of this global paradigm shift were obvious to more than just a few individuals or industries. Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate began exploring the use of small satellites in the 1990s. The Air Force also established the Operationally Responsive Space program in 2007, which explored the potential use of small satellites. However, both research efforts had no impact on the US Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) satellite acquisition programs. The advancement of small satellites was largely driven by universities and small commercial start-up companies.¹

The introduction of commercial and government small satellites has democratized space for states and even individuals. Space remote sensing and communications satellites, once the exclusive domain of the United States and Soviet Union, can now provide space-based services to anyone with a credit card. Eighty-eight countries currently operate satellites, and the next decade will likely see the launch of tens of thousands of new satellites.² Commercial and government small satellites have changed outer space into a more contested, congested, and competitive environment.

The United States has shared space data with its allies since the dawn of the space age.³ Yet it also has a history of operating independently in space. Other domains of warfare and defense policy are more closely integrated between the United States and its allies and partners. The United States has military alliances with dozens of countries and strategic partnerships with many more.⁴ In recent years, there have been calls to coordinate with, or even integrate allied space capabilities into US national security space strategy and plans. In this regard, the US government has made significant advances. However, much work needs to be done. There is pressure on the United States to act quickly to increase national security space cooperation and integration, driven by rapidly increasing global capabilities and expanding threats from hostile nations and orbital debris.

This paper examines the potential strategic benefits to US national security of harnessing allied space capabilities and the current efforts to do so, as well as barriers to achieving success. The paper identifies pathways forward for cooperating with allies and strategic partners on their emerging space capabilities and the potential of integrating US and allied capabilities.

The security environment in space

The changing security environment in space is driving the United States and allies’ collective desire to cooperate in the national security space. Several recent statements and actions demonstrate potential adversaries’ plans and intentions to dominate the space domain. China and Russia have demonstrated offensive and defensive counterspace capabilities. In 2021, the two countries announced plans to build a joint International Lunar Research Station on the moon, although the path forward on this effort may have been impacted by the Russian invasion of the Ukraine.⁵ The US Space Force notes this action would give those nations control of cislunar space, an area of balanced gravity between the Earth and moon. The movement of potential adversaries to cislunar space changes the strategic environment by forcing the United States to maintain surveillance of that region of space. In addition, Russia and China have threatened to destroy entire US orbital regimes.⁶ China has also expressed its intention to be the world’s leading space power by 2045.⁷ In 2022, Chinese researcher Ren Yuanzhen of the Beijing Institute of Tracking and Telecommunications led a People’s Liberation Army study to counter SpaceX’s Starlink small satellite constellation. Ren boasted they had developed a solution to destroy thousands of satellites in the constellation.⁸

Russian MiG-31 ‘Foxhound’ supersonic interceptor jet carrying an anti-satellite weapon during the 2018 Victory Day Parade. Source: kremlin.ru

Benefits of collaborating in space

Collaborating may be defined as coordinating development programs and operational efforts of current or projected allied and partner space and related capabilities.⁹ US interests would be to ensure these programs and operational efforts support US national security space strategy and planning objectives. Allied nations’ interests are in leveraging extensive US space capabilities and establishing collective security. The United States, allies, and partners have a shared interest in establishing behavioral norms in space. Collaboration between allies in space capabilities would have numerous benefits, including the following.

Altering the calculus for offensive actions. A hostile nation or nonstate actor risks a stronger response from multiple nations when attacking a coalition (versus a single nation). If the United States and allies had interoperable or integrated space capabilities, then an attack on any single country’s space systems would no longer be solely against the United States and would have impact on the collaborating or integrated systems of allies and partners. Changing the calculus for offensive actions could lead to increased deterrence against foreign aggression: “Partner capabilities increase both resilience and the perceived cost to an adversary, when an attack on one partner is seen as an attack on all,” according to the US Air Force.¹⁰

Accessing geostrategic locations. Access to global geographic locations also provides access for ground-based space situational awareness (SSA); telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C); and increasing launch resilience. Ground-based SSA requires globally distributed telescopes and radar systems. Allied collection systems operating in Japan, Australia, and territories of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and others ensure all partners have access to global SSA data. Given that the United States has only two major space launch facilities, natural or manmade disasters could significantly erode the US ability to provide responsive space launch. Use of allied launch facilities could lessen US reliance on limited launch sites and thus mitigate that risk.

Burden-sharing in space. Allied investments in less costly smaller satellites, along with other space technologies, would increase their security and potentially reduce the financial burden on the United States to maintain space security. There have been positive developments in this realm, including Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy, which identified several new space systems the country intends to procure.¹¹ Given Russia’s military aggression and the success of Space-X’s Starlink satellites in supporting Ukraine, the European Union (EU) recently adopted the proposal to develop the Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnection, and Security by Satellites (IRISS) constellation to provide broadband connectivity via up to 170 satellites.¹² The system, with an expected deployment date in 2025, expects to employ quantum cryptography and be available to governments, institutions, and businesses (in 2027). Canada’s Department of National Defense is developing the Redwing optical microsat to provide space domain awareness (SDA).¹³

Establishing global norms and standards. The space domain lacks adequate rules of the road to regulate the behavior of spacefaring nations. As the United States and its allies and partners coordinate and perhaps integrate national security space systems, they also are in the position to shape norms and increase pressure on potential adversaries to accept global standards for acceptable space behavior.

Crisis management in space. Several allies have expressed the need to ensure their strategic autonomy—that is, not being wholly dependent on the United States and therefore free to act in their own interests. The EU’s IRISS “system aims to enhance European strategic autonomy, digital sovereignty, and competitiveness.”¹⁴ Still, institutions such as NATO and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue offer an avenue to explore collective options for crisis management in space by establishing agreed-upon terminology, codes of conduct, and response policies and procedures for emergencies or crises in the space domain.

Resiliency in the face of conflict. While seemingly unlikely, a conflict in the space domain would result in attrition of space-based services. Yet, unlike in other domains, a stockpile of space systems does not exist. The emerging commercial small satellite market now provides an opportunity for resiliency in space systems. Interoperable or integrated use of allied and US government and commercial space capabilities would provide improved resiliency in response to accident or attack.¹⁵

China and Russia have proposed constructing a Sino-Russo International Lunar Research Sation, a joint modular project proposed to strengthen international security cooperation and the monetization of space for both nations. Source: Mil.ru

Bolstering industrial partnerships and reducing supply chain vulnerabilities. If cybersecurity standards are put in place, integrating allied manufacturing capabilities could diversify the US supply chain and reduce existing vulnerabilities. As a first step, the space-industrial supply chain must transition away from China and toward US allies and partners, who would then be able to enhance their production capabilities by contributing to interoperable or integrated space and associated systems. However, despite a long record of international procurement collaboration between the United States and its allies and partners, the outcomes of past programs have often been mixed.¹⁶

Existing efforts toward allied integration

Collaboration does not merely mean standardization and interoperability. Rather, the effort to create an overall US and allied space vision is a necessary first step in integrating allied space capabilities in order to obtain interoperability. Through various partnerships and efforts, the US Space Force has led efforts with six allies and partners to create a unified vision for national security space cooperation.

Combined space operations vision 2031

In 2022, the United States, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom signed the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) Vision 2031, which aims to “generate and improve cooperation, coordination, and interoperability opportunities to sustain freedom of action in space, optimize resources, enhance mission assurance and resilience, and prevent conflict.” This shared vision establishes a framework to guide individual and collective efforts.¹⁷

CSpO participants’ shared-objectives effort is a framework to guide individual national and collective efforts:

Develop and operate resilient, interoperable architectures to enable space mission assurance and unity of effort.
Enhance command, control, and communications capabilities and other operational linkages among CSpO participants.
Foster responsible military behaviors, discourage irresponsible behavior, and avoid escalation.
Collaborate on strategic communications efforts.
Share intelligence and information.
Professionalize space cadres and training.¹⁸

Training to fight together

Since 2018, the United States has been integrating allies and partners into space warfighting plans, most notably through Operation Olympic Defender, a US effort to synchronize with spacefaring nations to deter hostile acts in space. The annual Schriever Wargame—designed to explore critical space issues and advance space support across domains—also allows select allies and partners to coordinate defense-related space activities with the United States. In August 2022, US Space Command conducted its Global Sentinel exercise, which serves as US Space Command’s premier security cooperation effort, with twenty-five participating countries. Over a one-week period, this series simulated scenarios focused on enhancing international partnerships, understanding procedures and capabilities, and integrating global SSA. These scenarios further allow participants to understand allies’ and partners’ capabilities and operating procedures, serving as a foundation for future collaboration.¹⁹

Multinational and joint military space operators stand for a photo in the Combined Space Operations Center after the safe return of NASA’s Commercial Crew Program Demonstration Mission 2. Source: US Air Force

To date, the joint training efforts between the United States and its allies have been limited to tabletop exercises, thereby restricting participants’ experience in real-world applications of offensive and defensive counterspace measures. Tabletop exercises do not test capabilities or demonstrate how well an ally or partner might perform in crises or conflict scenarios. Space capabilities are integrated into major military exercises conducted with allies but do not address offensive or defensive counterspace measures.²⁰

Challenges and barriers to integration

While the United States recognizes the value of working with allies and partners in the space domain, myriad hurdles stand in the way to fully realize the competitive advantage space alliances and partnerships offer.

In total, US allies could bring a significant fraction of US capabilities. A systemic problem is how to leverage those capabilities in a coherent way. Limited coordination limits the values of those allied capabilities. Those capabilities are only additive to United States if there is good integration and understanding on how they will have a contributing effect.²¹

Lack of strategy to execute the vision for space. While a shared vision exists among the defense establishments of select allies and partners, there is little in the way of strategy or planning to fully realize that vision. Perhaps the greatest problem with the US approach to working with its allies and partners in space is that there is no coherent strategy for integrating allied space capabilities. Several subject matter experts interviewed for this study noted US public statements around the value of and desire to integrate allies, yet no interviewee was able to identify an existing strategy or plan to do so at any level of US government.

Bureaucratic impediments. Collaborating with allies is far easier than integrating multinational space capabilities. Allied integration must be done through a national-level strategy, integrating what, to date, are largely disconnected efforts between the National Space Council, National Security Council, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, US Space Command, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Department of State. While each organization is credited with making strides in integrating allies (with varying degrees of success), the efforts are disjointed and lack connectivity and unified goals and strategy.²²

Mind the gap. Allies and partners are attempting to understand existing gaps in the US national security space architecture and the capabilities they could provide to fill those gaps. Ironically, the CSpO Vision 2031 states that allies will collaborate “through identification of gaps and collaborative opportunities.” With the onus almost exclusively placed on the ally or partner, interviewees noted nations’ repeated requests to the United States to identify capability gaps in its projected architectures. The lack of information is due to the sensitivity of US defense gaps, with classified information making it more feasible for allies and partners to provide add-on capabilities rather than fully integrating assets.

Some level of gap analysis should be done by the United States to identify the niche areas that allies and partners could fill in the national security space architecture. That analysis should cover a period of at least five to ten years, thereby allowing allies to budget, develop, and deploy capabilities. Identifying capability gaps as requested by allies would ensure a future interoperable or integrated architecture. Primary focus areas should include space situational awareness, on-orbit servicing, communications, positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT), and cybersecurity. Each of these areas are baseline capabilities that should be interoperable or integrated between the United States and its allies and partners.²³

Classification issues. There exists a widespread belief that the United States’ overclassification of intelligence is hindering US and allied space security. This issue has been publicly acknowledged by several senior US military leaders. Misclassification might be a better word to describe the problem. In addition, the US system for sharing intelligence is cumbersome, requiring an exception to the normal production processes to share intelligence with allies. Experts (including myself) note cases where sharing space-related intelligence with allies was difficult due solely to organizational culture, established processes, poorly administered policies, and other bureaucratic impediments.²⁴

The H-IIA rocket lifts off from the Tanegashima Space Center in Japan. The H-IIA has been supporting satellite launch missions as a major large-scale launch vehicle with high reliability. Source: NASA

Many of these classification-related problems have existed for decades—and the United States should not wait to figure out how to share information until its hand is forced by a crisis or war. There is an inability to share information, particularly information that can be integrated into a kill chain for weapon systems. The United States has integrated information-sharing systems in other warfighting environments, but as of yet, not in space. This lack of imagination even spreads down to the US combatant commands (COCOMs): allied integration would be enhanced if US COCOMs had joined with allied space personnel providing integrated PNT and communications.²⁵ Moreover, the US Space Force could deploy space attachés to select embassies, perhaps under the Office of Defense Cooperation, to further embed space security interests across the globe. ²⁶

Communications and data integration. After spending hundreds of millions of dollars to build the Joint Mission System to track satellites and space debris, the US Department of Defense still has no automated means to seamlessly integrate SSA data provided by allies into the US space surveillance system. One particularly high-level interview with a close ally called out the biggest issue as being communications, noting that it is impossible to discuss interoperable deterrence until this issue is addressed.²⁷

Fifteen NATO members recently signed a memorandum of understanding to launch a Space Center of Excellence in Toulouse, France. This body could provide a mechanism for data integration and operational coordination. The Toulouse center is in addition to the already operating NATO Space Centre at Allied Air Command in Ramstein, Germany, which serves as a single point for the requests and production of NATO space products.²⁸ As of February 2023, the US and Canadian governments are not founding members of the Toulouse Space Center effort.

Case study: US-Japanese space integration

While allied integration has seen success across other warfighting domains, the same cannot be said for the space domain.²⁹ Space collaboration with Japan is illustrative of the challenges in integrating efforts.

Overclassification of information related to US programs and operation capabilities makes allied integration even more difficult. For example, France and Japan have publicly stated their intentions to build geo satellites for space domain awareness. Currently, a strategy to coordinate those systems with the operating US geosynchronous space situational awareness program (GSSAP) does not exist, demonstrating a lack of plans for data sharing, burden sharing, or coordination of mission operations.³⁰ However, Japan and the United States have agreed that space domain awareness data will be shared between the Japan Air-Self Defense Force and US Space Command starting in federal year 2023.

In 2022, the government of Japan approached the United States about its interest in playing a role in the Space Development Agency’s “Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture,”³¹ as Japan intends to launch a similar constellation of satellites for missile defense purposes. However, the United States has been unresponsive to Japan on how it could achieve integration. This is partly because the United States maintains concerns about Japan’s level of information security, despite Japan’s commitment to “strengthen and reinforce information security practices and infrastructure.”³² Yet, Japan has the world’s third largest defense budget and is a spacefaring nation with launch infrastructure, years of experience, and advanced satellite manufacturing capabilities. In addition, Japan faces increasing threats from China and North Korea, providing incentive to expand its security relationship with the United States.³³ In 2010, the United States came to agreement with Japan to integrate SSA sensors into the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) PNT system.³⁴ However, to date, there is no plan on how to integrate the data.³⁵

Overclassification of US intelligence is hindering cooperation with allies and partners. Two controllers work in the Global Strategic Warning and Space Surveillance System Center. Source: US Air Force

Policy recommendations

There are several key actions the United States can take to integrate allies and partners into national security space efforts.

Recommendation #1: The US Space Force should conduct a gap analysis to guide allied investments into space capabilities, prioritizing capabilities such as SSA, on-orbit servicing, communications, PNT, and cybersecurity. This gap analysis should identify in which areas the United States wants to collaborate with allies, identify opportunities for interoperability, and which areas are open to integration of capabilities.

Recommendation #2: It would benefit the US Space Force to have an outside entity analyze its internal policies, procedures, bureaucratic obstacles, and human capital levels to determine why the effort to integrate allies has been so minimally effective.

Recommendation #3: The US National Space Council should lead an interagency working group to develop a US government integrated strategy that establishes goals for and metrics to assess US and allied space capabilities and integration efforts.

Recommendation #4: The US Department of Defense and Office of the Director of National Intelligence should form a working group to establish best practices for sharing classified information with allies.

Recommendation #5: US Space Command should develop real-world exercises with allies and partners to test SDA, electronic warfare, and space control capabilities—all of which will be critical to deterring and, if necessary, responding to future space conflicts.

Recommendation #6: The US Departments of Defense and State should work toward consistency of approach in terms of governance of space activities, including through establishment of multilateral engagement and national regulations to allow flexibility and transportability of launch access at short notice.

Recommendation #7: The National Security Council should lead an interagency effort to establish consistency of national regulations between allies and partners (comparable laws and/or standards) so that systems and operations are transferable and receive mutual recognition and acceptance.

Conclusion

The United States and its allies and partners are moving toward sharing SSA data, understanding each other’s policies and procedures, and collaborating on space operations. Still, much work needs to be done to expand collaboration and achieve interoperability (if desired) between rising space powers. Without a strong indication from the US government of what exactly it wants from its allies and partners—as well as what it is prepared to give in return—the United States will not be able to effectively harness the competitive advantages offered by allied space capabilities. It is incumbent on the United States and its allies to immediately embark on a way forward to jointly ensure a safe and secure environment in space. Failure to change current practices and act in a timely fashion will lead to increased space threats and diminished national and economic security.

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Nicholas Eftimiades

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

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Harnessing allied space capabilities

A panel of experts explores how the United States can work with its allies and partners to achieve common security, commercial, and exploration objectives in outer space.

Europe & Eurasia National Security Security Partnerships Space

1 The pioneer in small-satellite design and production at this time was Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. (SSTL) of Surrey University, United Kingdom.

2 Nicholas Eftimiades, “Small Satellites: The Implications for National Security,” Atlantic Council, May 5, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/small-satellites-the-implications-for-national-security/.

3 Examples include remote sensing and the global positioning system (GPS).

4 Claudette Roulo, “Alliances vs. Partnerships,” US Department of Defense, March 22, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/story/Article/1684641/alliances-vs-partnerships/.

5 “International Lunar Research Station Guide for Partnership”, Vol. 1.0, June 2021, http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6812150/content.html ; Andrew Jones, “China Seeks New Partners for Lunar and Deep Space Exploration,” Space News, September 8, 2022, https://spacenews.com/china-seeks-new-partners-for-lunar-and-deep-space-exploration/; and “International Lunar Research Station Guide for Partnership,” China National Space Administration, Vol. 1.0, June 2021, http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6812150/content.html.

6 Matthew Mowthorpe, “Space Resilience and the Importance of Multiple Orbits, The Space Review, January 3, 2023, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4504/1.

7 Ma Chi, “China Aims to Be World-leading Space Power by 2045,” China Daily (state-owned daily), November 17, 2017, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-11/17/content_34653486.htm.

8 Stephen Chen, “China Military Must Be Able to Destroy Elon Musk’s Starlink Satellites if hey Threaten National Security: Scientists,” South China Morning Post, May 25, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3178939/china-military-needs-defence-against-potential-starlink-threat.

9 Note that related capabilities could include software, sensors, SSA systems, ground stations, etc.

10 Curtis E. Lemay Center for Counterspace Operations, “Counterspace Operations,” US Air Force, Last Updated, January 25, 2021 https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-14/3-14-D05-SPACE-Counterspace-Ops.pdf.

11 National Security Strategy of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Provisional Translation, December 2022, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf.

12 Andrew Jones, “European Union to Build Its Own Satellite-internet Constellation,” Space.com, Future Publishing, March 1, 2023, https://www.space.com/european-union-satellite-internet-constellation-iriss.

13 David Pugliese, “Canadian Military Orders Space Surveillance Micro Satellite,” Space News, March 10, 2023.

14 “Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnection and Security by Satellites (IRISS) Constellation,” European Parliament (video), in Jones, “European Union to Build Its Own Satellite-internet Constellation,” Space.com, segment between 47 seconds and 55 seconds, https://cdn.jwplayer.com/previews/hMtl8Ak7.

15 B. Bragg, ed., “Allied/Commercial Capabilities to Enhance Resilience,” NSI Inc., December 2017, https://nsiteam.com/leveraging-allied-and-commercial-capabilities-to-enhance-resilience/.

16 A successful example of coordinated global defense production includes the F-35, which is produced by over 1,900 companies based in the United States and ten additional nations. See “A Trusted Partner to Europe: F-35 Global Partnership,” Lockheed Martin (video), https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/who-we-are/international/european-impact.html.

17 Theresa Hitchens, “US, Close Allies Sign ‘Call to Action’ in Space Defense,” Breaking Defense, February 22, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/02/us-close-allies-sign-call-to-action-in-space-defense/.

18 US Department of Defense, “Combined Space Operations Vision 2031,” February 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/22/2002942522/-1/-1/0/CSPO-VISION-2031.PDF.

19 “25 Nations Participate in Global Sentinel 22,” US Space Command, August 3, 2022, https://www.spacecom.mil/Newsroom/News/Article-Display/Article/3115832/25-nations-participate-in-global-sentinel-22.

20 For example, such military exercises include Balikatan, Cobra Gold, Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), Northern Edge, Saber Strike, and Talisman Sabre.

21 Off-the-record online interview by the author with a close US ally, November 30, 2022.

22 Interviewees noted difficulties in the US internal coordination efforts between the US Space Force’s conduct of international relations, US Department of Defense acquisition, and national and defense policy formulation.

23 Note that on-orbit servicing is not a baseline capability, but should eventually become one.

24 The author travelled with then-Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, who was pursuing establishment of an intelligence exchange with a foreign country; the effort had limited success because the ODNI was unable to get analysts to release data. Notably, intelligence community information systems use “No Foreign Dissemination” as a default setting in the production of intelligence products; foreign disclosure of intelligence requires additional effort. It also should be noted that interviews conducted for this study with US and allied officials did not uncover any instances where space or related systems (or a national interest) were damaged due to overclassification of space intelligence.

25 This is the case at US INDOPACOM. See “Space Force Presents Forces to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command,” Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, US Air Force (website), November 23, 2022, https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article/3227481/space-force-presents-forces-to-us-indo-pacific-command/.

26 Space Force already deploys a few liaison officers globally.

27 Off-the-record online interview by the author with a close US ally, December 5, 2022.

28 NATO, “NATO’s Approach to Space,” last updated February 16, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_175419.htm.

29 An example of integrated international military operations would be the NATO International Security Armed Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan. At its height, ISAF was more than 130,000 strong, with troops from fifty-one NATO and partner nations.

30 GSAP is a US geosynchronous space surveillance system, which operates like a space-based SSA system.

31 “The Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture” is a layered network of military satellites and supporting elements; the architecture was formerly known as the “National Defense Space Architecture.”

32 “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (‘2+2’),” Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100284739.pdf.

33 John Hill (deputy assistant secretary for space and missile defense, US Department of Defense), telephone interview with the author, January 2023.

34 QZSS operates at the same frequency and same timing as GPS. This service can be used in an integrated way with GPS for highly precise positioning. The additional US sensor is unknown.

35 Paul McLeary and Theresa Hitchens, “US, Japan to Ink Hosted Payload Pact to Monitor Sats,” Breaking Defense, August 5, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/08/us-japan-to-ink-hosted-payload-pact-to-monitor-sats/.

The post Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The NewSpace market: Capital, control, and commercialization

Robert Murray — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 13:00:07 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

ISSUE BRIEF

Commercial opportunities in space-based technologies are expanding rapidly. From satellite communications and Earth observation to space tourism and asteroid mining, the potential for businesses to capitalize on these emerging technologies is vast and known as “NewSpace.”¹

The NewSpace model is important for governments to understand because the dual-use nature of space, specifically its growing commercialization, will influence the types of space-based technologies that nations may leverage, and consequently, impact their national security paradigms. By capitalizing on the private sector’s agility and combining it with the essential research efforts and customer role played by the public sector, the NewSpace industry can play a critical function in addressing current and future national security challenges through public-private codevelopment.

As the NewSpace industry expands, the role of government is evolving from being the primary developer and operator of space assets to facilitating their commercialization, while still prioritizing key advancements. US and allied governments can capitalize on this competitive landscape by strategically investing in areas that align with their national security objectives. However, it is crucial for them to first understand and adapt to their changing roles within this dynamic environment.

Indeed, the benefits of the burgeoning NewSpace industry extend beyond the United States. International collaboration and competition in this area can lead to faster technological advancements and economic gains. The global NewSpace landscape is driving down costs, increasing access to space, and fostering innovation that can improve not only economic well-being, but also impact national security models.

To that end, this memo will examine the broad state of the space market, discuss the industry drivers, and propose recommendations for US and allied policymakers as they consider future government investments in those enabling space-based activities that support wider national security ambitions.

The commercial context

In recent years, the space industry has undergone significant commercialization (NewSpace) in which governments have partnered with private companies and invested more into the commercial space sector. NewSpace companies often carry many of the following characteristics.²

Figure 1: Characteristics of NewSpace Companies

NewSpace contrasts with the historical approach to space-based technologies, which typically involved a focus on standardization to ensure the reliability and quality of space components. This standardization was (and still is) essential for the safety of manned space flight, the longevity of systems, and the overall success of missions. Despite the increased collaboration between the public and private sectors, the failed January 2023 Virgin Galactic launch in the United Kingdom, the failed March 2023 Mitsubishi H3 launch in Japan, and the failed June 2022 Astra launch in the United States serve as clear reminders of the challenges associated with NewSpace technology.³

Today, when considering who is spending what on space-based technology research, US and allied governments can be viewed more as customers than as creators. This is in stark contrast to former US President John F. Kennedy’s famous 1962 speech launching the Apollo program, which put NASA at the forefront of driving the necessary technology and engineering needs.⁴ Indeed, the capital flows of research and development (R&D) from the US government relative to the private sector have shifted significantly since the era of Sputnik (1957), a pattern that also is evident across many allied nations (see Figure 2).⁵

Figure 2: Ratio of US R&D to gross domestic product, by source of funds for R&D (1953-2021)

For US space technology, this financial shift from public sector to private sector is arguably no surprise given the findings of a 2004 presidential commission on US space exploration, which recommended that:

NASA recognize and implement a far larger presence of private industry in space operations with the specific goal of allowing private industry to assume the primary role of providing services to NASA. NASA’s role must be limited to only those areas where there is irrefutable demonstration that government can perform the proposed activity.⁶

As a result of the commission’s findings, Congress created the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services Program, which sought to create new incentives to support the privatization of both upstream and downstream space activities.⁷ In short, the aim of this legislation was to create market forces that would enhance innovation while driving down costs through competition.

To do this, a new approach was developed to shape the relationship between NASA and its private contractors. Instead of being a supervisor, NASA became a partner and customer of these companies. This shift was reflected in the change of contract type, replacing cost-plus procurement with fixed-price payments for generic capabilities such as cargo delivery, disposal, or return, and crew transportation to low-Earth orbit (LEO).⁸ As a result, the risk was transferred from NASA to private firms, leading to less intensive government monitoring of cost-plus contracts and more encouragement of innovation.

Ripple effects

In recent years, the European Space Agency (ESA) has also prioritized commercialization activities. This, too, was an outcome of political and economic pressure to rethink European space policy to provide products and services for consumers, with a specific focus on downstream space activities. This policy shift toward greater commercialization was driven, in part, by those structural changes (i.e., competition) emerging from the United States (NASA).⁹

Likewise, in India—following a 2020 change in Indian space policy—private firms are no longer only suppliers to the government, but the government is now supporting and investing in them, similar to the NASA model.¹⁰ These and other shifts in public policy have shaped much of the market we have today.¹¹

However, this market arguably represents a challenge to government control over NewSpace firms and their technologies. NewSpace companies operate with more agility and flexibility than traditional government-led programs.¹² This rapid pace of innovation and commercial competition can make it difficult for governments to keep up with regulatory frameworks and oversight. Additionally, the increasing role of the private sector in space activities is arguably leading to a diffusion of state control, making it more challenging for governments to ensure the responsible use of space and manage potential security risks associated with dual-use technologies. Therefore, governments should look to partner, co-develop, and invest in NewSpace firms as alternative ways to influence the sector. Such an approach carries impacts not only on public-sector capital flows but also on national security paradigms.

This image from April 24, 2021, shows the SpaceX Crew Dragon Endeavour as it approached the International Space Station less than one day after launching from Kennedy Space Center in Florida. Source: NASA

The global space market

The space industry is a rapidly growing market that can bring about both commercial and national security benefits: the total sector was valued at $464 billion in 2022 and is expected to reach around $1.1 trillion by 2040, with a projected compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of around 7 percent.¹³ Of today’s total market, the commercial sector accounts for around 75 percent.¹⁴ To put this in perspective, the 2021 global aerospace industry saw the top ten earning companies generate a combined revenue of $417.15 billion.¹⁵ Breaking this down further, the United States is currently the largest market for both public and private space activity, holding a 32 percent market share, while Europe and the United Kingdom hold a combined 23 percent.¹⁶

However, Asia has experienced the most significant growth in this market over the last five years and now holds 25 percent of the market share.¹⁷ In terms of satellite launches, China has been the most active country in the region, with a total of sixty-four launches in 2022, placing it behind only the United States, which launched 87 times that year.¹⁸ Trailing China is India, which deployed over fifty satellites across four separate launches in 2022.¹⁹

In China and India alike, commercial firms are supported by both government R&D and public programs designed for national needs (including requisite contracts), as well as mature commercial markets that demand advanced satellite systems. What this translates to is an upstream market that relies on government funding to thrive, while the downstream market is more evenly distributed and does not require significant upfront investment or government contracts to sustain itself. This downstream market is currently driven by NewSpace demand for connectivity and location-based services, and its growth is influenced by demographic and regional economic trends, as well as government efforts to close the digital divide as governments finance satellite connectivity.²⁰

Challenges to and opportunities for NewSpace industry growth

The key challenges to NewSpace industry growth are the regulatory landscape and access to financing. This is evidenced by the European NewSpace ecosystem where, at a structural level, regulatory frameworks do not facilitate the scaling of the financial resources (public and/or private) necessary to match the political and commercial intent (demand) espoused by European political and business leaders. This mismatch between demand and financial firepower results in slower development and uptake of NewSpace opportunities despite significant engineering and entrepreneurial talent residing within Europe.²¹ Figure 3 shows the breakdown of global government investment in space technologies between 2020 and 2022 in real terms, and figure 4 shows how such expenditure relates to GDP, while figure 5 shows the global private sector space investment breakdown, which highlights a significant role for venture capital (VC) firms.²²

Noting that the United States accounts for almost half of the world’s available VC funds, while Europe only accounts for around 13 percent, it is evident that the sheer scale of investment from the United States enables NewSpace to flourish within the US market, while many allies and partners struggle to access private funding.²³ For Europe to embrace the NewSpace model, conditions must foster timely connections between both public and private finance and NewSpace opportunities.²⁴ That said, given the deep technology nature of NewSpace, and the long time horizons for venture capitalists to see a return, financing this sector writ large remains a challenge.

Figure 3: Government expenditure on space programs in 2020 and 2022, by major country (in billions of dollars)

Figure 4: Government space budget allocations for selected countries and economies (measured as a share of GDP in 2020)

Figure 5: Value of investments in space ventures worldwide from 2000 to 2021, by type (in billion U.S. dollars)

In addition to attracting financing, the business models of NewSpace companies rely on foundational technologies—often resourced by governments—to be in place. Such technologies include: access to low-cost launch capabilities; conditions for in-space manufacturing and resource extraction for space-based production; foundational research to support space-based energy collection, combined with reliable radiation shielding; and debris mitigation efforts in an increasingly busy orbital environment. This indicates that there is a persistent role for governments to actively invest in deep technologies to help foster the commercial markets that NewSpace can bring about. Only governments have the financial risk tolerance (a tolerance that takes one beyond risk and into uncertainty) to undertake such endeavors.

While each of these foundational technologies has limited profitability, together they form a self-sustaining system with enormous potential for profit when subsequently exploited through relatively cheap NewSpace technologies. Indeed, the economics of human space activities often mean that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. To that end, one might envisage how a potential self-reinforcing development cycle would support the space economy, with cheaper and more frequent rocket launches enabling short-term tourism and industrial and scientific experimentation, leading to demand for commercial space habitats, which would then create demand for resources in space. However, it is doubtful that this path will be easily achieved without government support.²⁵

In addition to traditional space-based areas of monitoring, observation, and communications, the sectors listed below offer further commercial opportunities NewSpace is likely to exploit.²⁶

Figure 6: Commercial opportunities for NewSpace companies

Allied advancements in NewSpace

While the above table represents a broad perspective, many US allies and partners are already at the leading edge of aggregating NewSpace technologies to take advantage of growing markets.

In Denmark, the government and private commercial actors are working on project BIFROST, with plans to launch in early 2024. BIFROST is a satellite-based system for advanced on-orbit image and signal analysis that aims to demonstrate artificial intelligence-based surveillance from space. The satellite will have versatile payloads on board to provide information on applied AI in space for Earth-observation missions—detecting ships, oil spills, and more. The main purpose of the mission is to establish: “a platform in space for gaining further experience in AI-based surveillance and sensor fusion using multiple on-board sensors. The satellite will also test means of communication between different satellites to achieve real-time access to intelligence data and demonstrate the feasibility of tactical Earth observation.”²⁷ Additionally, the mission will evaluate the capability of changing AI models during its lifespan to improve the surveillance system.²⁸

In Sweden and Germany, OHB (a German-based European technology company) is working with Swiss start-up ClearSpace SA for its space debris removal mission, ClearSpace-1. OHB will provide the propulsion subsystem and be responsible for the complete satellite assembly, integration, and testing. The mission is aimed at demonstrating the ability to remove space debris and establishing a new market for future in-orbit servicing. The mission will target a small satellite-sized object in space and be launched in 2025. Carrying a capture system payload—“Space Robot,” developed by the ESA and European industry—it will use AI to autonomously assess the target and match its motion, with capture taking place through robotic arms under ESA supervision. After capture, the combined object will be safely deorbited, reentering the atmosphere at the optimum angle to burn up.²⁹

In Belgium, entities such as Interuniversity Microelectronics Centre, aka imec, are at the leading edge of developing nanotechnology that is being commercialized for space. Imec’s Lens Free Imaging system is a new type of microscopic system that is not dependent on traditional optical technologies and fragile mechanical parts. Instead, it operates through the principle of digital holography, which allows images to be reconstructed afterward in software at any focal depth. This eliminates the need for mechanical focusing and the stage drift that occurs during time-lapse image acquisition, making it a more robust and compact system suitable for use in space.³⁰ Imec is also perfecting manufacturing in space leveraging microgravity, which minimizes “gravitational forces and enables the production of goods that either could not be produced on Earth or that can be made with superior quality. This is particularly relevant for applications such as drug compound production; target receptor discovery; the growth of larger, higher-quality crystals in solution; and the fabrication of silicon wafers or retinal implants using a layer-by-layer deposition processes,”³¹ all of which are enhanced in microgravity.

The SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket carrying the Dragon capsule lifts off from Launch Complex 39A at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Florida on July 14, 2022. Source: SpaceX

In the United Kingdom, collaboration between the agricultural and space sectors seeks to enhance societal resilience through more efficient and self-sustaining crop production. Research entities such as the Lincoln Institute for Agri-Food Technology is commercializing technologies on LEO satellites to improve the spatial positioning of robots in agriculture to enhance their precision weeding, nutrient deployment, and high-resolution soil sampling capabilities.³² Furthermore, UK start-ups such as Horizon Technologies have developed novel ways of creating signals intelligence focusing on specific parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, allowing the company to leverage meta data for both commercial and government clients. An important component to Horizon’s success is the reduction in productions costs combined with accessibility to space launches.

Across Europe, the ESA is conducting R&D to harness the sun’s solar power in space and distribute that energy to Earth. Under Project Solaris, space-based solar power is harvested sunlight from solar-power satellites in geostationary orbit, which is then converted into microwaves, and beamed down to Earth to generate electricity. For this to be successful, the satellites would need to be large (around several kilometers), and Earth-surface rectennas³³ would also need to be on a similar scale. Achieving such a feat would enhance Earth’s energy resilience, but would first require advancements in in-space manufacturing, photovoltaics, electronics, and beam forming.³⁴

The United States also partners with allied firms on foundational research to support upstream and downstream NewSpace technologies. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Space-Based Adaptive Communications Node (BACN) is a laser-enabled military internet that will orbit Earth. The Space-BACN will create a network that piggybacks on multiple private and public satellites that would have been launched regardless, using laser transceivers that are able to communicate with counterparts within 5,000 km. The satellite network will be able to offer high data rates and automatic rerouting of a message if a node is disabled, and it will be almost impossible to intercept transmissions. DARPA is working with Mynaric, a German firm, which designs heads for Space-BACN, and MBryonics, an Irish contractor, which uses electronic signals to alter light’s phase, with the aim of having a working prototype in space in 2025.³⁵

While US allies and partners offer a plethora of specific space-based commercial opportunities, the criteria for successful development remains constant: the combination of multiple technologies, reduction in production and maintenance costs, and safe access to operate in space. With that in mind, the US government can play two roles to help further expand this market:

Act as a reliable, adroit customer who can issue contracts quickly (noting that many NewSpace firms do not carry large amounts of working capital and therefore cannot wait months for contractual confirmation).
Continue to invest in deep technologies and develop those foundational upstream building blocks that NewSpace will seek to leverage.

Notably, however, some US executives are deliberately registering firms in allied jurisdictions and conducting all research and patenting there, too, to avoid the bureaucratic challenges of dealing with US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and, specifically, the tight controls associated with exporting NewSpace dual-use products for commercial use. This suggests two things: The first is that, while allies may lack financial firepower, they have jurisdictional strengths that can attract NewSpace firms to their shores; and the second is that US ITAR controls impacting dual-use technologies need to be updated to enable NewSpace firms to thrive. If such companies are blocked from selling to allied and partner markets, then the very model of dual-use becomes diminished and governments will be unable to benefit from the competition and iterative technology development that spill over from such commercial settings into the public sector. As Figure 2 shows, the US government does not currently invest enough in technologies relative to the private sector to enable such a stringent export controls program in the context of NewSpace. The two policies are incongruous: limited government R&D spending and excessive export controls.

Recommendations for US and allied policymakers

Taking all the above into account, US and allied policymakers should focus on enhancing regulations and financial resources. Governments need to continue to create the conditions for the NewSpace market to prosper by playing the roles of a nimble customer and deep technology investor, enabling NewSpace companies to quickly access government contracts, while also helping mature next-generation space-based technologies. This helps such companies grow, become competitive, and enhance the sector. Specifically, US and allied governments should consider the following.

Recommendation #1: US and allied governments must continue to provide a stable and progressive regulatory environment for the NewSpace industry. This includes providing a clear and predictable legal framework for commercial space activities, as well as ensuring that regulations are flexible and adaptable to the rapidly changing technology and business models of the industry. ITAR is one area that needs urgent reform, given the dual-use nature of many new space technologies. This problem is exemplified by US talent establishing next-generation space companies in Europe to avoid overly controlling and outdated ITAR constraints, according to interviews with industry participants.³⁶ Given the cross-cutting nature of ITAR, the US National Security Council should examine ITAR rules and their utility for dual-use technologies impacting NewSpace, assessing such rules from a holistic perspective covering defense, trade, and economics.

Recommendation #2: US and allied governments should maximize coinvestment with industry in R&D to support the codevelopment of new technologies and capabilities for both the public and private sectors. This includes funding for research into new propulsion systems, as well as materials and nanotechnologies that will enable more cost-effective and reliable access to space. To support such funding—and noting the challenge of private investment finding its way to allied entrepreneurs and engineers—the US government should consider establishing with allies and partners a new multilateral lending institution (MLI) focused on space technology to provide funding and other forms of support to companies in the commercial space industry. The MLI or “space bank” could provide loans, grants, loan guarantees, insurance, and other forms of financial assistance to companies engaged in commercial space activities, helping to mitigate the high costs and risks associated with space ventures. This could be modeled after any of the MLIs of which the United States is already a member.³⁷

Recommendation #3: Furthermore, the US government could provide tax credits and grants to NewSpace firms (US and allied) based on certain provisions that support wider government objectives—such as manufacturing locations, supply network participants, and expected labor market impacts.

Any such credits and grants should be complemented by leveraging a suitable financial vehicle to conduct direct investment to take equity in NewSpace firms both at home and abroad. Crucially, this should be conducted without the government owning any of the intellectual property, as this impacts export opportunities and thus undermines the dual-use model. Such an effort would go some way in minimizing the socialization of risk and the privatization of rewards, and could be a role for either In-Q-Tel and/or the Department of Defense’s new Office of Strategic Capital.³⁸

Recommendation #4: To further support such an approach, the US government might create a national space co-R&D center of excellence for government and industry to work hand in glove to drive the codevelopment of breakthrough technologies, taking inspiration from a conceptually similar UK model of designing government contracts to address specific problems and awarding them to capable small companies.³⁹

An increasing number of nations are launching an increasing number of space missions. United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket carries Cygnus cargo vessel OA-6 for commercial resupply services supporting the International Space Station. Credit: United States Air Force Flickr

Conclusion

NewSpace is making significant strides in developing cost-effective and innovative technologies for both public- and private-sector customers. This is important because it drives economic growth and can enhance national security through the delivery of new, cost-effective, and resilient technologies. Indeed, the NewSpace market is unquestionably growing, and governments, including the United States and its allies, have a critical role to play in shaping this market by acting as both customers and codevelopers with NewSpace firms. Such an approach allows governments to exert a degree of influence in the sector without constraining its creativity. However, this way of working may carry wider implications for national security paradigms in terms of dual-use technologies and public/private partnerships.

While use cases for NewSpace are almost limitless, multiple US allies and partners are already forging niche NewSpace areas of excellence that can bring about a degree of comparative advantage. To make best use of such opportunities, the United States should:

Keep its market as open as possible to encourage competition and thus drive innovation.
Provide specific programs and locations for codevelopment between allied academia, government, and industry without taking any intellectual property.
Act as a nimble customer.
Ensure there is a pragmatic balance between regulations that protect US space interests (i.e., ITAR) and those that unleash innovative dual-use endeavors.
Create new financial instruments with allies through an MLI bank to support the financial investment needed to help the private sector commercialize the next generation of breakthrough space-based technologies.

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About the author

Robert Murray
Senior Lecturer and Director, Master of Science in Global Innovation and Leadership Program, Johns Hopkins University

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Harnessing allied space capabilities

A panel of experts explores how the United States can work with its allies and partners to achieve common security, commercial, and exploration objectives in outer space.

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1 Ken Davidian, “Definition of NewSpace,” New Space: The Journal of Space Entrepreneurship and Innovation 8, no. 2 (2020), https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/space.2020.29027.kda.

2 Roger Handberg, “Building the New Economy: ‘NewSpace’ and State Spaceports,” Technology in Society 39 (2014): 117–128, https://www-sciencedirect-com.iclibezp1.cc.ic.ac.uk/science/article/pii/S0160791X14000505.

3 Peggy Hollinger, “Virgin Orbit Pledges to Return for New UK Satellite Launch,” Financial Times, January 12, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/250b6742-a0a6-4a96-bca6-d7a61883a975; Tariq Malik, “Astra Rocket Suffers Major Failure during Launch, 2 NASA Satellites Lost,” Space.com, June 12, 2022, https://www.space.com/astra-rocket-launch-failure-nasa-hurricane-satellites-lost; “Mitsubishi/Rockets: Launch Failure Points to Drain on Resources,” Financial Times, March 7, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/30386ff6-eaea-442d-b285-82c19dbb1b19.

4 President John F. Kennedy, “Address at Rice University on the Nation’s Space Effort,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, September 12, 1962, https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/historic-speeches/address-at-rice-university-on-the-nations-space-effort.

5 Gary Anderson, John Jankowski, and Mark Boroush, “U.S. R&D Increased by $51 Billion in 2020 to $717 Billion; Estimate for 2021 Indicates Further Increase to $792 billion,” National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, January 4, 2023, https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf23320 and https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/eda—defence-data-2021—web—final.pdf

6 A Journey to Inspire, Innovate, and Discover, Report of the President’s Commission on the Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy, June 2004, https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/60736main_M2M_report_small.pdf.

7 The upstream market can be thought of as: satellite manufacturing; launch capabilities; and ground control stations. The downstream market can be thought of as: space-based operations and services provided, such as satellites and sensors.

8 Matthew Weinzierl, “Space, the Final Economic Frontier,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 32, no. 2 (Spring 2018): 173–192, https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.32.2.173.

9 Douglas K. R. Robinson and Mariana Mazzucato, “The Evolution of Mission-oriented Policies: Exploring Changing Market Creating Policies in the US and European Space Sector,” Research Policy 48, no. 4 (2019): 936-948, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2018.10.005.

10 “Indian Startups Join the Space Race,” Economist, November 24 2022, https://www.economist.com/business/2022/11/24/indian-startups-join-the-space-race.

11 Robinson and Mazzucato, “The Evolution of Mission-oriented Policies.”

12 Amritha Jayanti, “Starlink and the Russia-Ukraine War: A Case of Commercial Technology and Public Purpose,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, March 9, 2023, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/starlink-and-russia-ukraine-war-case-commercial-technology-and-public-purpose.

13 “Space Foundation Releases the Space Report 2022 Q2 Showing Growth of Global Space Economy,” Space Foundation News, July 27, 2022, https://www.spacefoundation.org/2022/07/27/the-space-report-2022-q2/; and “Space: Investing in the Final Frontier,” Morgan Stanley, July 24, 2020, https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/investing-in-space.

14 “Space Economy Report 2022,” Ninth Edition, Euroconsult, January 2023, https://digital-platform.euroconsult-ec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Space-Economy-2022_extract.pdf?t=63b47c80afdfe.

15 Erick Burgueño Salas, “Leading Aerospace and Defense Manufacturers Worldwide in 2021, Based on Revenue,” Statista, November 27, 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/257381/global-leading-aerospace-and-defense-manufacturers/.

16 “Space Economy Report 2022,” Ninth Edition, Euroconsult, January 2023, https://digital-platform.euroconsult-ec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Space-Economy-2022_extract.pdf?t=63b47c80afdfe.

17 “Space Economy Report 2022.”

18 Andrew Jones, “China Wants to Launch Over 200 Spacecraft in 2023,” Space.com, January 27, 2023, https://www.space.com/china-launch-200-spacecraft-2023.

19 2022: A Year of Many Firsts for Indian Space Sector,” World Is One News (WION), updated December 30, 2022, https://www.wionews.com/science/2022-a-year-of-many-firsts-for-indian-space-sector-heres-a-recap-548099; and “List of Satish Dhawan Space Centre Launches,” Wikipedia, accessed April 12, 2023, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Satish_Dhawan_Space_Centre_launches.

20 “Space Economy Report 2022.”

21 OECD Space Forum, Measuring the Economic Impact of the Space Sector, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, October 7, 2020, https://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/space-forum/measuring-economic-impact-space-sector.pdf.

22 “Space Industry Worldwide,” Statista, 2020, https://www.statista.com/study/59030/space-exploration/; and OECD Handbook on Measuring the Space Economy, Second Edition, OECD, July 12, 2022, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/8bfef437-en.pdf?expires=1678223695&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=34A62A18C888485A89F58BE6E5841B30.

23 “Value of Venture Capital Financing Worldwide in 2020 by Region,” Statista, April 13, 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1095957/global-venture-capita-funding-value-by-region/.

24 Matteo Tugnoli, Martin Sarret, and Marco Aliberti, European Access to Space: Business and Policy Perspectives on Micro Launchers (New York: Springer Cham, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78960-6.

25 Weinzierl, “Space, the Final Economic Frontier.”

26 James Black, Linda Slapakova, and Kevin Martin, Future Uses of Space Out to 2050, RAND Corporation, March 2, 2022, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA609-1.html.

27 “BIFROST: Danish Project with International Collaboration to Explore AI-based Surveillance Applications from Space,” Gatehouse Satcom (website), August 22, 2022, https://gatehousesatcom.com/bifrost-danish-project-with-international-collaboration-to-explore-ai-based-surveillance-applications-from-space/.

28 “Terma Delivers AI Model for Danish Surveillance Satellite Project,” Defence Industry Europe, January 28, 2023, https://defence-industry.eu/terma-delivers-ai-model-for-danish-surveillance-satellite-project/.

29 “OHB Sweden Contributes to ClearSpace-1 Mission,” December 8, 2020, OHB, https://www.ohb.de/en/news/2020/ohb-sweden-contributes-to-clearspace-1-mission.

30 “Imec Technology Taking Off to Space,” Imec (website), January 25, 2021, https://www.imec-int.com/en/articles/imec-technology-taking-space.

31 “Imec Technology Taking Off.”

32 “Lincoln Institute for Agri-Food Technology,” homepage accessed February 2023, https://www.lincoln.ac.uk/liat/.

33 A rectenna (rectifying antenna) is a special type of receiving antenna that is used for converting electromagnetic energy into direct current (DC) electricity.

34 “Wireless Power from Space,” European Space Agency, September 11, 2022, https://www.esa.int/ESA_Multimedia/Images/2022/11/Wireless_power_from_space.

35 “DARPA, Lasers and an Internet in Orbit,” Economist, February 8, 2023, https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2023/02/08/darpa-lasers-and-an-internet-in-orbit.

36 Author’s video interview with multiple American NewSpace executives, December 2022.

37 Rebecca Nelson, Multilateral Development Banks: U.S. Contributions FY2000-FY2020, Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2020, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RS20792.pdf.

38 In-Q-Tel is an independent, nonprofit strategic investor for the US intelligence community, created in 1999, https://www.iqt.org; The US Secretary of Defense created the Office of Strategic Capital (announced December 2022), https://www.cto.mil/osc/.

39 “Niteworks,” UK Ministry of Defence, March 28, 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/niteworks; and “UK MOD Front Line Commands Set to Benefit from New Decision Support Capability That Replaces Former Niteworks Service,” Qinetiq, June 4, 2021, https://www.qinetiq.com/en/news/futures-lab.

The post The NewSpace market: Capital, control, and commercialization appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Harnessing allied space capabilities

Robert Murray, Tiffany Vora, and Nicholas Eftimiades — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 13:00:00 +0000

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The United States’ vast network of alliances and partnerships offers a competitive advantage—this is especially evident in outer space. Often characterized as a global commons, space holds value for all humankind across commercial, exploration, and security vectors. As technological advancements trigger a proliferation in spacefaring nations, the United States and its allies and partners are confronted with new challenges to and opportunities for collective action.

This series examines how US space strategy can recognize the comparative advantages of allies and partners in space and best harness allied capabilities:

Robert Murray examines the state of the commercial space market and key drivers, considering how government investments in enabling activities can support broader national imperatives.

Tiffany Vora analyzes current US space exploration goals and the capabilities that will be critical to achieving them, highlighting arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned for integration.

Nicholas Eftimiades assesses the potential benefits to US national security offered by allied integration, identifying pathways for cooperating with allies and partners on their space capabilities.

The way forward for US and allied coordination in space

Several common themes emerge across this series. First, outer space is characterized by a transforming landscape and market. Commercial tech advancements—including the introduction of small satellites, advancements in Earth observation and asteroid mining, and the rise of space tourism—drive the development of what Murray terms the “NewSpace” market. The way in which the United States and its allies do business in space is changing, with the private sector leading in capability development and the government becoming the consumer. The burgeoning space sector, totaling $464 billion in 2022, is attracting allies and adversaries alike to invest in and expand their space operations. Strategic competitors recognize they can now target US and allied commercial and national security imperatives from space.

Second, this increasingly competitive environment further accentuates the value of alliances and partnerships in space. As Vora highlights, US and allied cooperation in space today rests on the Artemis Accords, which advances shared principles for space activity, and is a key mechanism for the international transfer of expertise, technology, and funding. The US Department of Defense also houses the Combined Space Operations Vision 2031, which offers a framework to guide collective efforts with several allies, and a host of collaborative exercises and wargames. Eftimiades describes the cross-cutting benefits of this collaboration: it alters the decision calculus for hostile actors, threatening a response from a coalition of nations; offers the ability to share capabilities, responsibilities, and geostrategic locations; and creates consensus in setting the norms for responsible space behavior. Current collective efforts in the space domain are limited, albeit expanding, considering the benefit allies and partners bring to the table.

Third, in order to promote stronger collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners, it is necessary to address and overcome the barriers that stand in the way. Vora identifies protectionist policies and regulations that act as hurdles to the transfer of key technologies and information. Murray explains that lengthy government contract timelines, coupled with insufficient investment in technologies critical to NewSpace, hinder US and allied commercial advancement. Eftimiades argues that the United States has yet to articulate a strategy for space coordination, highlighting a lack in transparency with allies and partners on capability and data gaps.

The authors put forth ideas to pave the way forward for US and allied space development. Recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners include conducting gap analysis on where allied investments can complement existing US capabilities, establishing a “space bank” to support NewSpace actors, and formulating a US and allied strategy for space development, building upon the Artemis Accords. To maintain its competitive advantage in space, the United States cannot go at it alone.

Read the full papers:

The NewSpace market: Capital, control, and commercialization

By Robert Murray

Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes

By Tiffany Vora

Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

By Nicholas Eftimiades

Acknowledgements

To produce this report, the authors conducted a number of interviews and consultations. Listed below are some of the individuals consulted and whose insights informed this report. The analysis and recommendations presented in this report are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the individuals consulted. Moreover, the named individuals participated in a personal, not institutional, capacity.

Allen Antrobus, strategy director, air and space, Serco
John Beckner, chief executive officer, Horizon Technologies
Dr. Mariel Borowitz, associate professor, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology
Steven J. Butow, director, space portfolio, Defense Innovation Unit
Chris Carberry, chief executive officer and co-founder, Explore Mars
Darren Chua, EY space tech consulting partner and Oceania innovation leader, Ernst & Young Australia
Kenneth Fischer, director for business development North America, Thales Alenia Space
David Fogel, nonresident senior fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Dr. Yasuhito Fukushima, senior research fellow, National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan
Peter Garretson, senior fellow in defense studies, American Foreign Policy Council
Sqn Ldr Neal Henley, chief of staff, Joint Force Space Component, UK Space Command
John Hill, deputy assistant secretary of defense for space and missile defense, US Department of Defense
Komei Isozaki, Japan Chair fellow, Hudson Institute
Mat Kaplan, senior communications adviser, The Planetary Society
Cody Knipfer, director of government engagement, GXO, Inc.
Dr. Jerry Krasner, independent consultant, US Department of Defense
Massimiliano La Rosa, director, marketing, sales, and business, Thales Alenia Space
Ron Lopez, president and managing director, Astroscale U.S. Inc.
Douglas Loverro, president, Loverro Consulting, LLC; former deputy assistant secretary of defense for space policy, US Department of Defense
Russ Matijevich, chief innovation officer, Airbus U.S. Space & Defense, Inc.
Jacob Markish, vice president, strategy and corporate development, Thales North America
Brig Gen Bruce McClintock, USAF (ret.), lead, RAND Space Enterprise Initiative, RAND Corporation
Col Christopher Mulder, USAF, active-duty officer, US Air Force; 2020-2021 senior US Air Force fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Dr. Eliahu Niewood, vice president, Air and Space Forces Center, MITRE Corporation
Dr. Jana Robinson, managing director, Prague Security Studies Institute
Audrey Schaffer, director for space policy, National Security Council
Paul Szymanski, director, Space Strategies Center
Dr. Christian Willmes, doctor of philosophy, University of Oxford

Generously Sponsored By

About the authors

Robert Murray
Senior Lecturer and Director, Master of Science in Global Innovation and Leadership Program, Johns Hopkins University

Fellow

Tiffany Vora

Nonresident Fellow

GeoTech Center

Space Space Security

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

Watch the launch event

Harnessing allied space capabilities

A panel of experts explores how the United States can work with its allies and partners to achieve common security, commercial, and exploration objectives in outer space.

Europe & Eurasia National Security Security Partnerships Space

I. The Russian conventional threat
II. NATO priorities
A. Mobility
B. Sustainment
C. Engaging the private sector during conflict
D. Low-cost defense planning—unmanned vehicles and land mines
E. Command and control
F. Resources
III. Conclusion
IV. About the author

The post Harnessing allied space capabilities appeared first on Atlantic Council.

NATO deterrence and defense: Military priorities for the Vilnius Summit

Franklin D. Kramer — Tue, 18 Apr 2023 08:59:38 +0000

At the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s July summit in Vilnius, the focus will necessarily be on support to Ukraine. But as NATO’s Strategic Concept makes clear, the Alliance also needs to respond to a broader set of challenges, with those arising from Russia particularly acute. This issue brief focuses on the conventional military threat from Russia, and sets forth six priority actions that NATO should undertake to enhance its deterrent and defense posture.

In summary, the report recommends:

enhancing NATO’s mobility capability to meet the force-posture goals established at the Madrid summit through a combination of prepositioning; regular division, brigade, and air-wing forward training and exercises; establishment of new training areas; and increased host-nation support;
establishing a sustainment initiative so that NATO maintains stocks sufficient to fight an extended-duration conflict, and that the defense industry has the capability to replenish such stocks in a timely manner;
establishing effective relationships with key private-sector companies that will engage in operational activities during a conflict, initially focused on cybersecurity for critical infrastructure, ensuring the continuity of information technology and communications networks and the utilization of private-sector space capabilities;
establishing through the Defense Planning Process requirements for low-cost unmanned air and maritime vehicles, including with artificial-intelligence (AI) capabilities, and reviewing the potential role of mines as a deterrent capability;
revising NATO’s command-and-control structures at Joint Forces Command Brunssum and Joint Forces Command Naples to be regional commands capable of directing high-intensity warfare and focused on the east/north and the south, respectively; and utilizing currently available commercial technology to establish the capability for prompt command and control of multidomain operations; and
establishing the requisite funding to achieve the foregoing, including a pledge by NATO nations of 2.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) as a floor for defense spending and supporting the European Union (EU) creation of an EU security and defense budget focused on mobility, sustainment, and critical-infrastructure resilience.

I. The Russian conventional threat

NATO’s Strategic Concept is clear as to the nature of the threat that Russia poses.

The Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. It seeks to establish spheres of influence and direct control through coercion, subversion, aggression and annexation. It uses conventional, cyber and hybrid means against us and our partners. Its coercive military posture, rhetoric and proven willingness to use force to pursue its political goals undermine the rules-based international order…In the High North, its capability to disrupt Allied reinforcements and freedom of navigation across the North Atlantic is a strategic challenge to the Alliance. Moscow’s military build-up, including in the Baltic, Black and Mediterranean Sea regions, along with its military integration with Belarus, challenge our security and interests.¹

The nature of the conventional threat that the Alliance faces is, of course, affected by Russia’s engagement in its war against Ukraine. On the one hand, the threat might turn real in the near term. While Russia has not attacked into NATO territory, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been clear that Russia views the ongoing conflict as one in which NATO is involved.

During an interview aired on the state-owned Rossia-1 channel to commemorate the one- year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Putin claimed that by “sending tens of billions of dollars in weapons to Ukraine” the North Atlantic Alliance was taking part in the war.
He further accused the West of having “one goal: to disband the former Soviet Union and its fundamental part…the Russian Federation.”²

Whether any such escalation would occur—and how—is not knowable, including what Russia might do if Ukraine becomes more successful in retaking its territory.

A limiting factor, of course, is that the Russian military being heavily engaged in the fight against Ukraine reduces not only its current capability against NATO, but also its capabilities for the future, as noted in the recent Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community.

Moscow’s military forces have suffered losses during the Ukraine conflict that will require years of rebuilding and leave them less capable of posing a conventional military threat to European security…Heavy losses to its ground forces and the large-scale expenditures of precision-guided munitions during the conflict have degraded Moscow’s ground and air-based conventional capabilities.³

Nonetheless, Russia could determine that a direct attack into NATO territory is necessary to disrupt NATO’s support to Ukraine, particularly if Russia’s position in the war deteriorates. Moreover, as demonstrated by Russia’s proposed “treaties” presented prior to its attack against Ukraine, Russia seeks to dominate the security of NATO’s eastern members.⁴ Under a calculus similar to that which led to the attack on Ukraine, Russia could, for example, attack the Baltic states or Poland. While Russia’s conventional capabilities have been degraded, they can be reconstituted over time. Additionally, Russia has other nonconventional capabilities, which it might conclude enhance its prospects if it did decide to attack NATO territory.

As part of such an attack, critical infrastructure would likely be targeted. As the US Intelligence Community has stated, “Russia is particularly focused on improving its ability to target critical infrastructure, including underwater cables and industrial control systems, in the United States as well as in allied and partner countries, because compromising such infrastructure improves and demonstrates its ability to damage infrastructure during a crisis.”⁵
Russia has recently announced that it will place tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, and might use the threat of such weapons to constrain a NATO response to an attack.⁶

To sum up, Russia is a near-, medium-, and longer-term threat. Its willingness to go to war against Ukraine underscores that it might act on its stated concerns regarding NATO. Accordingly, the recommendations below are intended to enhance NATO’s deterrent and defense posture, both to reduce the probability of a conflict with Russia and to ensure a successful outcome if such a conflict occurs.

II. NATO priorities

In conjunction with the issuance of NATO’s new Strategic Concept at the June 2022 Madrid summit, NATO agreed to a “New NATO Force Model.” While only in outline form, the new force-model presentation states that NATO will be able to provide “well over 100,000 Tier 1 forces” in “up to 10 days” and “around 200,000 Tier 2 forces” in “around 10-30 days.”⁷ The discussion below sets forth six priority actions necessary to accomplish the goals of the new force model.

A. Mobility

NATO has not currently provided a breakdown of the composition of either Tier 1 or Tier 2 forces. However, NATO’s military authorities, led by the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (SACEUR), are presumably doing a detailed mobility analysis as part of effectuating those force goal requirements. Such a review should be utilized to develop the requirements for transportation (e.g., rail cars required, bridges that need to be reinforced), logistical coordination (e.g., time-phased rail and road movements), and finances (costs associated with achieving mobility requirements). The specifics can then be broken down and passed to nations via the Defense Planning Process, and to the European Union through the existing coordination mechanisms supporting military mobility.

In addition to the specifics from such a review, three operational considerations provide a basis for NATO actions to enhance mobility that should be approved at Vilnius.

First, prepositioning equipment forward significantly reduces mobility requirements, which can be quite substantial—particularly for heavy forces. By way of example, an armored brigade combat team moving in the United States can require on the order of six hundred rail cars.“⁸ While other NATO heavy brigades are generally smaller, they would likewise require significant movement and other logistical support including, for example, sufficient rail cars and heavy-equipment transporters, as well as theater-wide coordination of movements.

The NATO military authorities developing the force model can reduce the logistical burden, and speed the availability of forward forces, by including the establishment of substantial amounts of prepositioned materiel in the eastern portion of the Alliance as a key element in planning. In particular, while the United States already has six prepositioned sets of equipment in Europe, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom should each undertake prepositioning in the east, which will enhance their ability to have their forces ready for combat in accordance with the requirements of the new force model.⁹ By way of example, the United Kingdom’s recent Integrated Review Refresh provides for only one brigade to be sent forward in the event of a conflict with Russia, but appropriate prepositioning would allow for at least one more to be quickly available.¹⁰

Second, forces that are already forward deployed for training would obviously have a positive impact on mobility requirements in the event of a conflict. Some useful steps have been taken—including the establishment of enhanced forward brigades now present in eight countries—but the actual number of forces forward deployed by European countries is still relatively modest.¹¹

The United Kingdom, “[i]mmediately after Russia attacked Ukraine…very rapidly deploy[ed]…three Army battlegroups across Europe: tanks to Scandinavia, infantry and cavalry to Estonia and Poland, and battlefield helicopters and paratroops to the Balkans.”¹² However, a “typical Battlegroup…could contain about 600 men,” so the deployment is far from what would be needed in a conflict.¹³
France has an approximately five-hundred person force in Romania as part of its leadership of the newly established multinational enhanced forward brigade of approximately eight hundred in that country, and has also deployed additional forces of about six hundred in exercises with the brigade.¹⁴ This is an entirely worthwhile effort, but insufficient for the requirements of a conflict.

NATO should consistently increase the number of forces in the east by establishing regularized regional training schedules of larger force components—both land and air—for non-eastern countries, by having eastern countries establish useful training ranges, and providing effective host-nation support to facilitate such activities.

While the United States maintains substantial permanent and rotational forces in eastern Europe,¹⁵ increasing the capacity of other NATO members to be able to likewise maintain larger forward forces will require both restructuring of militaries to add to active duty forces, and additional resources to support such forces as well as their forward deployment.

At present—and for the foreseeable future—the British Army is unable to maintain a continuous rotational presence of an entire armoured brigade outside the UK without announcing mobilisation. Its 3rd Division, intended for operations in the European theatre, will only complete the process of restructuring and modernisation by 2030, and will consist of two armoured and one reconnaissance & artillery brigade combat teams. That is why London is unable to assign a specific brigade to Estonia, but can only offer individual subunits.¹⁶

It is not only the United Kingdom facing such limitations.

The German Army will not have one fully equipped brigade available until 2023, when it will be on duty with NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). The Bundeswehr will only have one fully modernised division available by 2027, and a further two by 2031. It would thus only be able to permanently deploy one brigade in Lithuania on a rotational basis by around 2026. Canada also has the problem of deploying an entire brigade without prior mobilisation, as its peacetime armed forces consist of only three mechanised brigades.¹⁷

To support expanded forward training, the issue of infrastructure for training also needs prompt, high-level attention. While substantial upgrades to infrastructure, including a facility for prepositioned stocks, are taking place in Poland, and there are ongoing enhancements to airfields in Romania, much of the existing infrastructure in the east cannot support brigade-level activities and remediation plans are insufficient.¹⁸ NATO needs to determine what is required in the southeast and especially in the Baltics, which could be the initial locus of a conflict but where host-nation support is currently insufficient.

An earlier Atlantic Council report identified a need for the Baltic countries to improve rail lines “connecting with key military bases and likely staging areas” and to enhance the “ability of roads and bridges…to accommodate heavy vehicles.”¹⁹ The same study noted the limited capacity of Baltic nation training areas to conduct brigade-level training, as well as live-fire exercises.²⁰

None of the Baltic states is in a position to provide the infrastructure necessary to station such [brigade] forces in the near future. The training grounds and barracks infrastructure is insufficient and needs to be significantly developed. Lithuania has declared that it will complete the relevant investments by 2026. Estonia, as agreed with London, will develop its military infrastructure so that it can accommodate an entire brigade. In Latvia too, the NATO battlegroup is making full use of the military installations there; Latvia has taken steps to expand them. The problems of inadequate housing for soldiers and the too small military training grounds in the Baltic states are not new. The military infrastructure has been undergoing a process of modernisation for years there, but the scale of requirements remains very high.²¹

NATO should continue to utilize its own common-funded Security Investment Programme budget to support such efforts.²² That budget was recently increased to one billion euros, but further increases are warranted.²³ Likewise, national funding comparable to the US European Deterrence Initiative (which is planned at $3.6 billion for fiscal year (FY) 2024) should similarly be directed by other non-eastern NATO members.²⁴ Moreover, as more fully discussed below, the European Union should establish a security and defense budget, with one key component being increased funding for NATO mobility requirements.

B. Sustainment

The duration of the Russia-Ukraine war has brought home the necessity for NATO to have the capability to engage in an extended conventional conflict. While the current focus has understandably been on ensuring Ukraine’s ability to continue fighting, an effective deterrent and defense posture for NATO is also dependent on a sufficient capability to engage in conflict over an extended period.²⁵ However, NATO nations have long suffered from significant underinvestment, and munitions stocks and other materiel are at entirely insufficient levels. A study by the European Union highlighted that “years of defence underspending…has led to an accumulation of gaps and shortfalls in the collective military inventories as well as reduced industrial production capacity.”²⁶

At Vilnius, NATO needs to take three steps to acquire the necessary sustainment capabilities.

First, NATO needs to establish a mandatory sustainment target for nations. A reasonable goal would be to have sufficient stocks of key weapons and associated logistical support on hand to be able to undertake an effective defense for a one-year period. The NATO military authorities, led by SACEUR, can establish goals based on analytic reviews and wargaming of such matters as rates of fire, expected losses, and required maintenance. Given that NATO nations are currently so substantially lacking in terms of sustainment, it will be important to set priorities with a focus on the most critical requirements. Not everything will be able to be acquired as promptly as would be desirable. Once overall prioritized goals are established, national goals can then be transmitted to individual nations through the Defense Planning Process.

Second, NATO needs to take steps to increase defense industry capabilities. Certain useful actions to that end are already being undertaken, including in the context of supporting Ukraine. Among other efforts, the European Union through the European Defence Agency has agreed on joint funding for expanded ammunition production:

Eighteen states sign[ed]…the European Defence Agency (EDA) project arrangement for the collaborative procurement of ammunition to aid Ukraine and replenish Member States’ national stockpiles. The project opens the way for EU Member States and Norway to proceed along two paths: a two-year, fast-track procedure for 155mm [millimeter] artillery rounds and a seven-year project to acquire multiple ammunition types.²⁷

As the seven-year effort to acquire multiple ammunition types suggests, multiyear procurements are crucial for industry to be able to undertake the investments necessary to support NATO’s enhanced requirements for sustainment.

The US Congress has similarly authorized multiyear procurements by the Defense Department (DoD), which the DoD has utilized in establishing its acquisition plans to be funded by the proposed FY2024 budget.

This budget leverages unprecedented use of multi-year procurement (MYP) authorities provided by Congress to deliver critical munitions affordably, while bolstering our inventories and providing a more predictable demand signal to the industry. This strategy will facilitate industrial production efficiencies because the industry would be incentivized to organize in a more cost-effective manner.“²⁸

Other nations, such as France and Germany, which are undertaking major defense-spending increases, should likewise utilize multiyear procurements.²⁹

Third, multinational consortiums should be organized to combine spending on key equipment and materiel that the NATO military authorities designate as areas of highest priority. NATO already organizes a number of common efforts, ranging from acquiring high-end capabilities to establishing key logistical efforts, such as multinational ammunition warehousing.“³⁰ Future such activities should be undertaken, as much as is practicable, in coordination with the European Union, which, as noted above, has undertaken similar efforts through the European Defense Agency.³¹

C. Engaging the private sector during conflict

In the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, private-sector companies have been instrumental in coordinating with the Ukraine government to provide operational cybersecurity capabilities and help maintain Ukraine’s access to the Internet.³² The resultant continuity of operations has occurred despite significant Russian cyber and kinetic attacks.³³

Those operational and coordinated activities by the private sector demonstrate that there is a “sixth domain” in warfare—in addition to the five recognized domains of land, maritime, air, cyber, and space.“³⁴ Specifically, the private sector’s “sphere of activities” in wartime is itself a sixth domain, and it needs to be included as part of warfighting constructs, plans, preparations, and actions if NATO and its nations are to prevail in future conflicts.³⁵

NATO needs to take the following actions to establish effective coordination with the private sector.

First, contrary to the expectations of many, cyber defense has proven quite effective for Ukraine in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. That has largely been true because capable private-sector companies have been engaged with the Ukraine government in effectuating the cyber defense effort.³⁶ NATO needs to ensure that its member nations have likewise organized highly capable cybersecurity support from the private sector for those critical infrastructure necessary for effective military operations—which will generally involve the electric grid, pipelines, air, rail, and ports, as well as the information and communications networks themselves. NATO does not have the regulatory authority to require such actions, but the obligations can be included as part of the Defense Planning Process—and can then be harmonized with European Union and national cybersecurity regulations, including the European Union’s recent network and information security (NIS2) directive which nations are required to comply with by October 2024.³⁷

Second, a focused effort needs to be undertaken with respect to undersea cables. Transatlantic cables are instrumental to connectivity between North America and Europe, and undersea cables also support connectivity between the United Kingdom and Europe, as well as across the Baltic Sea.³⁸ As noted above, “Russia is particularly focused on improving its ability to target critical infrastructure, including underwater cables.” In a conflict, undersea cables would be expected targets, both through cyberattacks and physical attacks, including at onshore cable landing points. Justin Sherman and John Arquilla have each set forth a variety of recommendations to enhance undersea cable resilience.³⁹ At the Vilnius summit, NATO’s Joint Task Force—Norfolk, which has responsibility for maritime operations should be tasked to work with Allied Command Transformation—and key nations including the United States, France, and the United Kingdom that have significant undersea capabilities—to develop the necessary plans to enhance the resilience of undersea cables.

Third, plans for the use of private-sector space assets need to be established. In the Ukraine conflict, the use of Starlink terminals has proved indispensable.⁴⁰ A variety of possible technical arrangements, particularly those focused on low-Earth-orbit satellites, can be utilized to support wartime activities, and NATO planning needs to evaluate and then organize those of important value. This includes both establishing contractual arrangements and, as appropriate, enacting legislation that ensures the availability of the necessary assets. In the United States, the Defense Production Act, which covers the provision of services, may provide the necessary legislative framework, but NATO and member nations should undertake a comprehensive review to determine what may be required.⁴¹

Fourth, plans and exercises need to be developed and undertaken with the private sector. While ad hoc arrangements—such as those put in place in Ukraine—can obviously be useful, an organized planning and exercising effort will be far superior.

Fifth, NATO needs to determine what role capabilities such as those provided by US Cyber Command’s “hunt forward” will play in achieving the resilience of critical infrastructure.⁴² The United States through Cyber Command—as well as other nations with significant cyber capabilities such as the United Kingdom, France, and Estonia—need to work with SACEUR to determine how offensive operations should be integrated with defensive actions to achieve the requisite degree of resilience designed to protect key critical infrastructure operated by the private sector.

D. Low-cost defense planning—unmanned vehicles and land mines

As noted above, NATO military capabilities have suffered from years of underinvestment by nations. While budgets have been increased, resource constraints are still significant. Accordingly, NATO and its nations should look carefully at low-cost capabilities that can substantially enhance deterrence and defense. Unmanned vehicles and land mines both offer promise.

1. Unmanned vehicles

The use of unmanned vehicles—both air and maritime—in the Russia-Ukraine war has highlighted their value for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); for targeting; and for attack.⁴³ Unlike high-end and costly capabilities—exemplified by US unmanned air systems including the Gray Eagle ($127 million per copy), Reaper ($28 million per copy), and Global Hawk ($141 million per copy)—the unmanned vehicles utilized in Ukraine have been less sophisticated and cheaper.⁴⁴ However, as the conduct of the war and the discussion below elaborate, inexpensive unmanned vehicles based on available commercial technology can deliver a high degree of capability for both surveillance and attack.⁴⁵ As is already the case for Ukraine, low-cost unmanned vehicles should become an important element of NATO’s deterrent and defense strategy.

A useful starting point to illustrate the value of low-cost unmanned vehicles based on commercial technology comes from two task forces established by US Central Command.

The Air Force’s Task Force 99 was “established in October at al-Udeid air base in Qatar, [and] aims to test commercially-available small, high-altitude drones linked by [a] mesh network.”⁴⁶

[It] looks for new ways to deploy robotic platforms for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and other missions…“not just tracking objects in the air, but… finding things that could be on the ground…and how those could be a threat.”⁴⁷

The unit “recently concluded its first operational experiment, a successful test of using small drones for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance roles.”⁴⁸

Central Command’s Task Force 59 has accomplished similar achievements in the maritime arena.

The Navy stood up TF 59 in September 2021…[in a] turn to the private sector [and]… [w]ithin a month, the new unit had begun deploying unmanned, unarmed, camera-laden sea drones linked by artificial intelligence into the Persian Gulf…

TF 59 has since conducted exercises with Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Israel, and has deployed some two dozen drones—among them [private-sector] Saildrones, MARTAC Mantas T12s, T38 Devil Rays—with the goal that regional navies will contribute 80 such devices by the end of 2023.⁴⁹

As these efforts demonstrate, currently available commercial technologies cannot only provide highly useful ISR, but such activities can be effectively integrated among nations—avoiding many of the issues that often face coordination of activities involving classified systems.

As useful as the ongoing efforts are, the potential for use of unmanned vehicles is much greater, as Thomas Hamilton and David Ochmanek have described.

[An] approach…to employ large numbers of relatively low-cost, attritable—low-cost, reusable, and ultimately expendable—unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to perform a variety of tasks in support of joint force defensive campaigns…[S]uch an approach… could allow land-based forces to generate and sustain airpower without relying on fixed base infrastructure, such as runways and maintenance facilities.⁵⁰

The Hamilton and Ochmanek analysis is built around unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) being “employ[ed] in contested zones to create a targeting mesh—a net of UAVs that work together.”⁵¹ Their analysis focused on how such a network could be utilized to stop an attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) across the Taiwan Strait, but the approach is equally applicable to an attack by Russia against NATO nations, as the “object of a targeting mesh is to be able to guide a missile on to a specific [target],” which, of course, applies as much to Russian military assets as to those of the PRC.⁵²

While Hamilton and Ochmanek’s conclusions are analytic, ongoing developments such as those with Task Forces 99 and 59 underscore that the capabilities they describe are well within the reach of a commercially based effort. For example, the UAVs for the targeting mesh would have “comparatively simple sensors based on commercial technology,” and “[c]ommunication within the mesh…is provided by millimeter-wave (MMW) radio, a technology already widely used for 5G communications.”⁵³ T.X. Hammes has likewise described the ability of commercial drones to provide “affordable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and attack” including the potential for the commercial sector to “appl[y] advanced manufacturing techniques” that could lead to an “exponential drop in the cost of precision-guidance technologies.”⁵⁴

Undertaking an effort—for example, by a consortium led by the United States and working closely with the commercial sector—to build effective yet inexpensive unmanned vehicles such as for a targeting mesh and precision-strike drones as critical capabilities for NATO should be an agreed outcome of the Vilnius summit.

2. Landmines

NATO needs to evaluate whether landmines would be an important capability to be utilized in the context of a high-intensity conflict with Russia—and also an important element of deterrence.

Landmines have proven valuable as part of the Ukrainian military’s combined-arms approach. One example involved a “three-week fight in the town of Vuhledar in southern Ukraine.”⁵⁵

The Ukraine military] had prepared a kill zone farther along a dirt road that the [Russian] tanks were rumbling down…

Anti-tank teams hi[d] in tree lines along the fields…armed with American infrared- guided Javelins and Ukrainian laser-guided Stugna-P missiles…Farther away, artillery batteries were ready. The dirt road had been left free of mines, while the fields all about were seeded with them, so as to entice the Russians to advance while preventing tanks from turning around once the trap was sprung.

The column of tanks becomes most vulnerable…after the shooting starts and drivers panic and try to turn around—by driving onto the mine-laden shoulder of the road. Blown-up vehicles then act as impediments, slowing or stalling the column. At that point, Ukrainian artillery opens fire, blowing up more armor and killing soldiers who clamber out of disabled machines.⁵⁶

Landmines can also have deterrent value. Colonel John B. Barranco has described how Ukraine could use landmines as a “planned border wall” if Russian forces were expelled, either as a “continuous mine barrier along the entire border, or one focused on crucial terrain that channels potential invading forces onto the ground of Ukraine’s choosing.”⁵⁷

For NATO, there could be substantial deterrent value in a border wall for the Baltic countries and Poland (and Finland now that it is a member) that utilizes mine barriers. South Korea utilizes just such mine barriers as an important element of combined deterrence and defense with the United States on the Korean peninsula.⁵⁸

A decision to utilize landmines as part of NATO deterrence and defense would raise significant geopolitical issues. Currently, all NATO nations other than the United States are parties to the landmine treaty, which bars the use of such mines.

The launcher of such a mine must have direct visual contact with the location upon triggering it, [while]…mines banned by [the treaty] involve explosives set off by the proximity of—or contact with—the target.⁵⁹

Moreover, the United States, because of a policy decision by the Joseph Biden administration, has limited its involvement in landmine use to only Korea.⁶⁰

There is no doubt that indiscriminate use of landmines can be devastating to civilian populations; precisely that problem has arisen in Ukraine as a result of their use by Russia.⁶¹ However, a Russian attack against NATO nations would undoubtedly cause enormous harm to civilians, as Russian attacks on Ukrainian cities have demonstrated—and the placement of landmines at the border might well be a valuable deterrent factor.

The nature of the security environment in Europe has significantly changed since the broad adoption of the landmines treaty. At Vilnius, NATO should generate a review of whether or not—and under what conditions—landmines should become part of its defense.

E. Command and control

NATO’s existing command-and-control arrangements have not been organized for a high-intensity conflict against Russia. At the Vilnius summit, NATO military authorities will present regional plans that include responding to such a contingency. As part of implementing those plans, NATO should revise the command structures at JFC Brunssum and JFC Naples to enhance the Alliance’s operational capabilities for high-intensity conflict with Russia; and promote nations’ adoption of commercially available technology that can provide for effective multidomain tactical operations.

1. Revised command structures

In the years since Russia’s illegal seizure of Crimea, NATO has undertaken a series of initiatives to upgrade its warfighting capabilities, including increasing the size of the NATO Response Force, establishing a NATO Readiness Initiative, and developing Graduated Response Plans.⁶² However, none of those efforts involved the development of a fully articulated war plan for high-intensity conflict including the required command and control. To support the regional plans that will be presented at Vilnius and the force requirements of the New NATO Force Model, NATO military authorities need to review the command-and-control capabilities of the joint-force commands, and determine how operational control below the SACEUR should best be effectuated.

Key issues include the appropriate division of labor among the JFCs; whether there should be a new “Northern Command” as Finland became a NATO member before Vilnius, and Sweden might as well; what should be the relationship between JFC Norfolk and the two European-based commands; and whether the JFCs need internal restructuring or strengthening to accomplish the goals of the new force model.

The principle of unity of command suggests several answers to those issues.

First, in a conflict with Russia, there will be continuous interactive operations among and between the nations and militaries in and around the Baltic Sea. Maintaining unity of command suggests, therefore, that JFC Brunssum be organized to have responsibility for both sides of the Baltic Sea, as well as its waters. Or, to describe it in another way, JFC Brunssum would have both an eastern and northern focus.
Second, JFC Naples would have responsibility for wartime activities in and around the Mediterranean Sea, including those on land or in the air from Portugal through Turkey. Moreover, given its maritime and geographical focus, JFC Naples should have responsibility for naval activities in the Black Sea, though Romania, and probably Bulgaria, should fall within JFC Brunssum’s land-based area of responsibility (AOR). National forces moving from JFC Naples’ AOR to JFC Brunssum’s AOR would transfer to command under JFC Brunssum.
Third, JFC Norfolk should maintain maritime command in the Atlantic, but forces once on land or in the Baltic or Mediterranean Seas should fall under the command of JFC Brunssum or JFC Naples, respectively.
Fourth, NATO military authorities should be tasked to recommend any required restructuring and/or strengthening of JFC Brunssum, JFC Naples, and JFC Norfolk. Concomitantly, there should be a review of existing NATO command capabilities below the JFCs. For example, there are currently nine deployable NATO headquarters, but the manpower and financial resources for at least most of those headquarters would be better focused on the requirements for deterring and defending against Russia.⁶³

2. Commercially based ISR and targeting for multidomain tactical operations

NATO’s Strategic Concept underscores multidomain operations as a centerpiece of high-intensity warfare.

We will individually and collectively deliver the full range of forces, capabilities, plans, resources, assets and infrastructure needed for deterrence and defence, including for high- intensity, multi-domain warfighting…⁶⁴

To accomplish effective multidomain operations, NATO needs “to exponentially improve the quality and speed of shared awareness, decision-making, and action,” as a recent report by retired Major General Gordon Davis states.⁶⁵ Nations have understood the need for such improvements, and are accordingly engaged in developing the requisite capabilities including, for example, the effort by the United States focused on Joint All-Domain Command and Control.⁶⁶

NATO and nations could, however, substantially—and promptly—advance capabilities in this arena by the utilization of commercially available technology. The possibilities are exemplified by two systems—GIS Arta and the Delta Situational Awareness System—developed by Ukraine in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. The systems integrate information from multiple ISR sources, increasing battlespace awareness, and allow for prompt targeting by weapons networked with the ISR information. They are discussed below partly to show their own value but, much more importantly, to demonstrate what is possible using commercially available technology.

The Delta Situational Awareness Systems “provides a comprehensive picture of the current battle space displayed and summarised on a user-friendly digital map by collecting data from sensors and open and secret sources.”⁶⁷ It “integrates real-time intelligence data from multiple sources and provides real-time monitoring of the battlefield for commanders of different levels.”⁶⁸

A key aspect of Delta is that it utilizes available commercial technology to provide the information to users as the “system…is ready to use on laptops, tablets or mobile phones.”⁶⁹

The result is illustrated on an interactive map which locates enemy forces and gives troops on the ground a crucial advantage. The system is, simply put, a real-time command-and-control centre that brings Ukrainian forces cutting-edge capability in the network-centric environment of modern warfare.⁷⁰

GIS Arta is another Ukrainian system, also based on commercial technology, that allows for coordinated targeting.

Forward observers, unmanned aerial systems, or other scout elements can share their observations of an enemy target’s location in real time over an encrypted network. These networks are multiband, and can utilize satellite, internet, and radio protocols across a number of devices readily available to all [Ukrainian] echelons.⁷¹

GIS Arta “allows for immediate verification of a target, and a kill decision can be made in record time at a command team’s [tactical operations center]” to provide targeting orders to multiple components and systems.

The request for fire goes out to whatever element is the most available. The ubiquity of GIS Arta’s interfaces, being scalable down to an individual smartphone, means that the targeting assignment can be given to everything from the most sophisticated Multiple Rocket Launcher System to the lowest-tech ambush crews on Ukraine’s Territorial Defense Force…Simultaneous fires from multiple vectors can be placed if deemed necessary, providing a joint-strike capability.⁷²

Each of Delta and GIS Arta appears capable of effectuating important aspects of multidomain warfare. They appear to be the kind of systems that would fit as part of a “federated architecture [that] would retain local connectivity through mobile, ad hoc networks composed of nodes sharing data in multiple directions over short ranges.”⁷³ However, the point is not necessarily to acquire those systems—that needs expert evaluation. Rather, at the Vilnius summit, NATO military authorities should be tasked with establishing a consortium to develop and make available such commercially based systems—including, but not limited to, a review of the value of Delta and GIS Arta—for utilization by nations on the high-intensity battlefield.

F. Resources

Acquiring the capabilities necessary for success in high-intensity warfare will require sustained higher levels of spending than NATO nations have undertaken since the end of the Cold War. To accomplish that objective, three initiatives should be agreed upon at the Vilnius summit.

First, NATO should agree that nations should spend at least 2.5 percent of GDP on defense instead of the 2-percent goal previously agreed. The United Kingdom has established such an aspiration, and Estonia has recommended such a requirement for all allies.⁷⁴ While only the United States, Poland, and Greece currently meet the 2.5-percent target, a number of nations— including France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, which have larger militaries—have increased, or set plans to increase, budgets.⁷⁵ It will be important for those additional budgetary amounts to be utilized to meet the requirements necessary to achieve the objectives of the New NATO Force Model.

Second, as discussed above, NATO should help develop—and nations should undertake to acquire—lower-cost, but still highly effective, systems based on commercial technologies. Exquisite and more costly systems will certainly continue to have consequential value, but they will be out of the reach of many nations. Those nations, however, can still provide effective capabilities utilizing lower-cost systems built around commercial capabilities. NATO should include the utilization of such lower-cost technologies as a focus of its implementation efforts.

Third, the EU could accomplish a great deal through the creation of a regularized EU security and defense budget focused on mobility, sustainment, and critical-infrastructure resilience. The EU has already taken steps that set a basis for establishing such a budget. It recently added 616 million euros to its spending on military mobility.⁷⁶ Through its European Peace Facility, it has provided 3.6 billion euros in funding for Ukraine, including to support contributions of military materiel by EU member nations.⁷⁷ Moreover, as noted above, it has established a funding mechanism for the acquisition of ammunition by EU members.

While each of these are valuable actions, regularizing such expenditures at significantly higher levels through an EU security and defense budget is called for, in light of the threat posed by Russia. The need is clear enough.

“In the context of the original mobility plan, the European Commission proposed a budget of approximately 6.5 billion euros. However, that proposal was reduced to 1.69 billion euros in the enacted budget, far from what would have been necessary prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and even less so now.”⁷⁸ The planned 616 million euros hardly remedy this substantial deficiency.
In terms of sustainment, in addition to the plans for ammunition, the EU should provide budgetary support for key weapons systems needed for high-intensity conflict, including “anti-armor capabilities and man-portable and medium-range air defenses, unmanned aerial vehicles for both sensing and attack, long-range fires, and precision-guided munitions.”⁷⁹
The EU recently issued “important directives requiring that nations enhance the resilience of their critical infrastructure…[b]ut implementing the directives will require significant fiscal expenditures.”⁸⁰ The EU is currently developing the Cyber Solidarity Act whose “purpose is to establish a ‘cyber reserve’ made of private trusted providers that would qualify with certification and would support responses to significant cyber-attacks.”⁸¹ If the legislation is enacted, that would establish a “budget that provides complementary fiscal support for following the new directives, rather than leaving those responsibilities solely to nations.”⁸²

III. Conclusion

At the Vilnius summit, NATO should take steps to enhance its deterrence and defense capabilities to meet the challenges presented by the Russian conventional military threat. Key areas include mobility, sustainment, private-sector interaction, unmanned vehicles, artificial intelligence, mines, command and control, and ensuring adequate resources. Undertaking the required actions will reduce the probability of conflict, but ensure that NATO will prevail if conflict does arise.

IV. About the author

Board director

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Cybersecurity Defense Policy

Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished fellow and board director of the Atlantic Council. Mr. Kramer has served as a senior political appointee in two administrations, including as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. At the Department of Defense, Mr. Kramer was in charge of the formulation and implementation of international defense and political-military policy, with worldwide responsibilities including NATO and Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

In the nonprofit world, Mr. Kramer has been a senior fellow at CNA; chairman of the board of the World Affairs Council of Washington, DC; a distinguished research fellow at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy of the National Defense University; and an adjunct professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs of The George Washington University. Mr. Kramer’s areas of focus include defense, both conventional and hybrid; China, including managing competition, military power, and China-Taiwan-US relations; NATO and Russia; cyber including resilience and international issues; irregular conflict and counterinsurgency; and innovation and national security.

Mr. Kramer has written extensively; in addition to the current report, his publications include: on China, Priorities for a Transatlantic China Strategy, Managed Competition: Meeting China’s Challenge in a Multi-vector World, and The China Plan: A Transatlantic Blueprint for Strategic Competition (chapters on economics and on “one-world” cooperation); on trade, Free but Secure Trade; on global defense challenges, Transformative Priorities for National Defense and Deterrence Assurance: Why NATO Needs a Plan for the Indo-Pacific Region; on NATO and Russia, NATO Priorities: Initial Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War, Defending Ukraine: US Must Offer Military Support not just Economic Threats, NATO Priorities after the Brussels Summit, Meeting the Russian Hybrid Challenge, and Meeting the Russian Conventional Challenge; on cyber and resilience, We Need a Cybersecurity Paradigm Change, Cybersecurity for Small and Medium Enterprises and Academia, NATO Needs Continuous Responses in Cyberspace, Effective Resilience and National Strategy: Lessons from the Pandemic and Requirements for Key Critical Infrastructures, Cybersecurity: Changing the Model, Cyber and Deterrence: The Military-Civil Nexus in High-End Conflict, and Cyber, Extended Deterrence, and NATO; on innovation and technology, Innovation, Leadership, and National Security; and on counterinsurgency, Civil Power in Irregular Conflict (principal editor and co-author of the policy chapter) and Irregular Conflict, the Department of Defense and International Security Reform.

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

Explore the Initiative

Report Mar 16, 2023

The future of NATO C4ISR: Assessment and recommendations after Madrid

By Gordon B. “Skip” Davis Jr.

Current C4ISR capabilities, concepts, policies, and processes do not meet all of the Alliance’s needs. While much has been done to improve NATO C4ISR over the past decade, much work remains.

China Conflict

In-Depth Research & Reports May 12, 2021

Falling in: The deterrent value of Host Nation Support in the Baltic Sea region

By Kathleen McInnis and Connor McPartland

Host Nation Support plays a vital, yet often overlooked, role in enabling NATO’s overall deterrence strategy for the Baltic Sea region.

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

Report Apr 22, 2020

Moving out: A comprehensive assessment of European military mobility

By Task Force Co-Chairs: General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, USA (Ret.) and Ambassador Colleen B. Bell

Military mobility is the logical and critical next step to enhancing the twenty-first-century conventional deterrence posture throughout Europe, an essential part of the formula for keeping the peace.

Europe & Eurasia European Union

1 “Strategic Concept,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2022, 4, https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept.

2 Aitor Hernández-Morales, “Putin Accuses NATO of Participating in Ukraine Conflict,” Politico, February 26, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-accuse-nato-participate-ukraine-conflict-war-russia.

3 “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 6, 2023, 14, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2023-Unclassified-Report.pdf.

4 Steven Pifer, “Russia’s Draft Agreements with NATO and the United States: Intended for Rejection?” Brookings, December 21, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/12/21/russias-draft-agreements-with-nato-and-the-united-states-intended-for-rejection.

5 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” 15.

6 James Gregory, “Putin: Russia to Station Nuclear Weapons in Belarus,” BBC News, March 26, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65077687. Another uncertainty is whether the declared China-Russia “no limits” agreement would translate into significant support from China in the context of a Russian attack against NATO. Chinese actions could include weapons supply, cyberattacks, disinformation, and restrictions on trade, including key minerals and/or components. However, multiple commentators have noted that China has not offered “no limits” support to Russia in the Russia-Ukraine war. See: Andrew S. Erickson, “Friends with ‘No Limits?’ A Year into War in Ukraine, History Still Constrains Sino-Russian Relations,” Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, February 21, 2023, https://fairbank.fas.harvard.edu/research/blog/sino-russian-relations. The Vilnius summit should ask the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, as part of that command’s foresight analysis, to evaluate the potential for, and possible nature of, China’s involvement in a Russian attack against NATO.

7 “New NATO Force Model,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220629-infographic-new-nato-force-model.pdf.

8 Defense Transportation: The Army Should Take Action to Better Ensure Adequate Rail Support to Combatant Commanders,” US Government Accountability Office, August 2021, 1, https://www.gao.gov/assets/720/716278.pdf.

9 Christopher Gardner, “USACE Supports Readiness in Europe by Modernizing Army’s Prepositioned Stock Facilities,” US Army, September 7, 2022, https://www.army.mil/article/259992/usace_supports_readiness_in_europe_by_modernizing_armys_prepositioned_stock_facilities.

10 “Integrated Review Refresh 2023,” HM Government, March 2023, 40, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1145586/11857435_NS_IR_Refresh_2023_Supply_AllPages_Revision_7_WEB_PDF.pdf.

11 “NATO’s Military Presence in the East of the Alliance,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last updated December 21, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm.

12 Ben Barry, “Can the British Army Still March to the Sound of the Guns?” International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 6, 2023, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2023/02/can-the-british-army-still-march-to-the-sound-of-the-guns.

13 “Formations,” British Army, last visited March 20, 2023, http://www.armedforces.co.uk/army/listings/l0014.html.

14 Luiza Ilie and John Irish, “With Troops in Romania, France Seeks to Capitalise on Military Ties,” Reuters, January 27, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/with-troops-romania-france-seeks-capitalise-military-ties-2023-01-27; “US, French Troops in Romania Hold NATO Military Drills,” Associated Press, February 9, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/nato-politics-romania-government-e2d0466e727284f8b89f0d1e44eebc3d.

15 “Fact Sheet: U.S. Defense Contributions to Europe,” US Department of Defense, June 29, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3078056/fact-sheet-us-defense-contributions-to-europe.

16 Jacek Tarociński and Justyna Gotkowska, “Expectations Versus Reality: NATO Brigades in the Baltic States?” OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, December 6, 2022, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2022-12-06/expectations-versus-reality-nato-brigades-baltic-states.

17 Ibid.

18 Christopher Gardner, “U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Construction Project in Poland Will Further Enhance NATO Readiness in Region,” US Army, April 20, 2022, https://www.army.mil/article/255841/u_s_army_corps_of_engineers_construction_project_in_poland_will_further_enhance_nato_readiness_in_region; “Allied Air Forces Work Together to Improve Romanian Air Base,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, January 3, 2023, https://ac.nato.int/archive/2023/NATO_Infra_eAP_ROU.

19 Kathleen J. McInnis and Connor McPartland, Falling in: The Deterrent Value of Host Nation Support in the
Baltic Sea Region, Atlantic Council, May 2021, 16–18, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Falling-In_Deterrent-Value-of-HNS-in-the-Baltic.pdf.

20 Ibid.

21 Tarociński and Gotkowska, “Expectations Versus Reality.”

22 “Funding NATO,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 22, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm.

23 “NATO Agrees 2023 Budgets, Reflecting Higher Ambitions for the New Security Reality,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, December 14, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_210091.htm.

24 “Department of Defense Releases the President’s Fiscal Year 2024 Defense Budget,” Department of Defense, press release, March 13, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3326875/department-of-defense-releases-the-presidents-fiscal-year-2024-defense-budget.

25 Seth G. Jones, “Empty Bins in a Wartime Environment,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2023, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-01/230119_Jones_Empty_Bins.pdf.

26 “Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward,” European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, May 18, 2022, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:c0a8dcda-d7bf-11ec-a95f-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.

27 “EDA Brings Together 24 Countries for Common Procurement of Ammunition,” European Defence Agency, March 20, 2023, https://eda.europa.eu/news-and-events/news/2023/03/20/eda-brings-together-18-countries-for-common-procurement-of-ammunition.

28 Department of Defense Releases the President’s Fiscal Year 2024 Defense Budget.” MYPs in the FY2024 budget request include: Naval Strike Missile, RIM-174 Standard Missile, Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile—Extended Range.

29 Clea Caulcutt, “Macron Proposes Major Boost to French Defense Spending amid Ukraine War,” Politico, January 20, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-ukraine-war-volodymyr-zelenskyy-major-boost-to-french-defense-spending; German Defence Minister Pushes for 10 Bln Euro Budget Increase—Spiegel,” Reuters, February 10, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/german-defence-minister-pushes-10-bln-euro-budget-increase-spiegel-2023-02-10.

30 Multinational Capability Cooperation,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, February 20, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_163289.htm; “Multinational Projects,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last visited March 28, 2023, https://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2013_06/20130604_130604-mb-multinational-projects.pdf; “NATO, More Allies Join NATO’s Multinational Ammunition Warehousing Initiative,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 17, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_209075.htm.

31 All Activities,” European Defence Agency, last visited March 28, 2023, https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities.

32 Irene Sanchez Cozar and Jose Ignacio Torreblanca, “Ukraine One Year on: When Tech Companies Go to War,” European Council on Foreign Relations, March 7, 2023, https://ecfr.eu/article/ukraine-one-year-on-when-tech-companies-go-to-war.

33 David Cattler and Daniel Black, “The Myth of the Missing Cyberwar,” Foreign Affairs, April 6, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-04-06/myth-missing-cyberwar.

34 Multi-Domains Operations Conference—What We Are Learning,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 8, 2022, https://www.act.nato.int/articles/multi-domains-operations-lessons-learned.

35 Christine H. Fox and Emelia S. Probasco, “Big Tech Goes to War,” Foreign Affairs, October 19, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/big-tech-goes-war. The role of the private sector is also discussed in: Emma Schroeder and Sean Dack, A Parallel Terrain: Public-Private Defense of the Ukrainian Information Environment, Atlantic Council, 2023,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/a-parallel-terrain-public-private-defense-of-the-ukrainian-information-environment.

36 See, e.g.: Schroeder and Dack, A Parallel Terrain, 14.

37 DIRECTIVE (EU) 2022/2555 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 14 December 2022
on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022L2555&qid=1672747885309&from=EN

38 Stanley Reed, “A Widening Web of Undersea Cables Connects Britain to Green Energy,” New York Times, January 4, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/04/business/britain-electricity-norway-cables.html; Lukas Trakimavičius, “The Hidden Threat to Baltic Undersea Power Cables,” NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence, December 2021, https://www.enseccoe.org/data/public/uploads/2021/12/the-hidden-threat-to-baltic-undersea-power-cables-final.pdf.

39 Justin Sherman, Cyber Defense Across the Ocean Floor, Atlantic Council, September 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Cyber-defense-across-the-ocean-floor-The-geopolitics-of-submarine-cable-security.pdf; John Arquilla, “Securing the Undersea Cable Network,” Hoover, 2023, https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/Arquilla_SecuringUnderseaCable_FINAL_0.pdf.

40 Sam Skove, “How Elon Musk’s Starlink Is Still Helping Ukraine’s Defenders,” Defense One, March 2023, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2023/03/black-swan-starlinks-unexpected-boon-ukraines-defenders/383514.

41 The Defense Production Act in the United States covers the provision of services, and can be used as one basis for ensuring continuity of private-sector satellite support in the event of a conflict. “Defense Production Act (DPA),” US Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-03/Defense_Production_Act_2018.pdf. DPA Section 101(a) provides: “The President is authorized…(2) to allocate materials, services, and facilities in such manner, upon such conditions, and to such extent as he shall deem necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense.” (Emphasis added.)

42 Suzanne Smalley, “Nakasone Says Cyber Command Did Nine ‘Hunt Forward’ Ops Last Year, Including in Ukraine,” Cyberscoop, May 4, 2022, https://cyberscoop.com/nakasone-persistent-engagement-hunt-forward-nine-teams-ukraine.

43 T.X. Hammes, “Game-changers: Implications of the Russo-Ukraine War for the Future of Ground Warfare,” Atlantic Council (April 2023), 7, 9-10, 11- 14, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Game-Changers-or-Little-Change-Lessons-for-Land-War-in-Ukraine-.pdf

44 John R. Hoehn and Paul K. Kerr, “Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Current and Potential Programs,” Congressional Research Service, July 28, 2022, 6, 7, 11, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R47067.pdf.

45 “Ukraine Is Betting on Drones to Strike Deep into Russia,” Economist, March 20, 2023, https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/03/20/ukraine-is-betting-on-drones-to-strike-deep-into-russia.

46 Jared Szuba, “US Top Middle East Commander Tests New Model of Deterring Iran,” Al-Monitor, January 3, 2023,
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/12/us-top-middle-east-commander-tests-new-model-deterring-iran.

47 John Harper, “US Central Command’s New Task Force 99 Begins Drone Operations in Middle East,” Defensescoop, February 13, 2023, https://defensescoop.com/2023/02/13/us-central-commands-new-task-force-99-begins-drone-operations-in-middle-east.

48 Chris Gordon, “Air Force’s Task Force 99 Conducts First Successful Drone Tests,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, February 27, 2023, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/air-forces-task-force-99-conducts-first-successful-drone-tests.

49 Jared Szuba, “US Top Middle East Commander Tests New Model of Deterring Iran.”

50 Thomas Hamilton and David A. Ochmanek, “Operating Low-Cost, Reusable Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Contested Environments,” RAND, 2020, iii, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4407.html.

51 Ibid.

52 David Hambling, “Low-Tech, Unkillable ‘Mesh’ of Targeting Drones Could Help Destroy a Chinese Fleet Invading Taiwan,” Forbes, September 21, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2021/09/21/low-tech-targeting-mesh-drones-could-tip-the-odds-against-a-chinese-fleet-invading-taiwan/?sh=2cf199084b45.

53 Ibid.

54 T.X. Hammes, “Game-changers: Implications of the Russo-Ukraine War for the Future of Ground Warfare,” Atlantic Council (April 2023), 9, 13, 16, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Game-Changers-or-Little-Change-Lessons-for-Land-War-in-Ukraine-.pdf

55 Andrew Kramer, “In an Epic Battle of Tanks, Russia Was Routed, Repeating Earlier Mistakes,” New York Times, March 1, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/01/world/europe/ukraine-russia-tanks.html.

56 Ibid.

57 John B. Barranco, Safe Distance: Why Ukraine Should Embrace the US Position and Deploy Land Mines Responsibly, Atlantic Council, May 17, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/safe-distance-why-ukraine-should-embrace-land-mines.

58 “U.S. Military Reinstitutes Its Landmine Ban—Except for Korea,” Associated Press, June 21, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/06/21/1106367928/us-landmine-ban-trump-korea-ukraine-russia-ottowa-treaty.

59 Jussi Rosendahl, “Finland Developing Horrific Jumping Land Mine to Deter Russian or Other Land Invasions,” Reuters, March 8, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/finland-develops-horrific-jumping-land-mine-to-deter-russia-invasions-2018-3.

60 “U.S. Military Reinstitutes Its Landmine Ban—Except for Korea.”

61 Rich Wordsworth, “Russia Has Turned Eastern Ukraine into a Giant Minefield,” Wired, December 21, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/russian-landmines-ukraine-psychological-warfare.

62 “Readiness Action Plan,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, September 1, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_119353.htm.

63 “Rapidly Deployable Corps,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 22, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50088.htm.

64 “Strategic Concept,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2022, 6, https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept.

65 Gordon B. “Skip” Davis Jr., The Future of NATO C4ISR, Atlantic Council, March 2023, 5, 26, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/The-future-of-NATO-C4ISR-Assessment-and-recommendations-after-Madrid.pdf.

66 “Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) Strategy,” US Department of Defense, March 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/17/2002958406/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-THE-JOINT-ALL-DOMAIN-COMMAND-AND-CONTROL-STRATEGY.PDF.

67 Oscar Rosengren, “Network-Centric Warfare in Ukraine: The Delta System,” Grey Dynamics, February 3, 2023, https://greydynamics.com/network-centric-warfare-in-ukraine-the-delta-system.

68 “Ukraine to Implement Delta Situation Awareness System in Defense Forces,” EuroMaidan Press, February 4, 2023, https://euromaidanpress.com/2023/02/04/ukraine-to-implement-delta-situation-awareness-system-in-defense-forces.

69 Rosengren, “Network-Centric Warfare in Ukraine.”

70 Ibid.

71 Mark Bruno, “‘Uber For Artillery’—What Is Ukraine’s GIS Arta System?” Moloch, August 24, 2022, https://themoloch.com/conflict/uber-for-artillery-what-is-ukraines-gis-arta-system.

72 Ibid. While there are some differences in open reporting about the time for execution and the degree of accuracy of GIS Arta, it appears that from the receipt of information to the firing of weapons takes no more than about two minutes, and may take as little as one minute—and that accuracy appears to be within about five-six meters, and perhaps as little as two meters.

73 Chris Dougherty, “Confronting Chaos: A New Concept for Information Advantage,” War on the Rocks, September 9, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/09/confronting-chaos-a-new-concept-for-information-advantage.

74 “Integrated Review Refresh 2023,” 3; “Estonia’s New Coalition Wants NATO Allies to Spend 2.5% GDP on Defense,” EER News, March 10, 2023, https://news.err.ee/1608911333/estonia-s-new-coalition-wants-nato-allies-to-spend-2-5-gdp-on-defense.

75 “Defence Spending Pledges by NATO Members Since Russia Invaded Ukraine,” UK Parliament, August 11, 2022, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/defence-spending-pledges-by-nato-members-since-russia-invaded-ukraine.

76 “EU Transport Infrastructure: Speeding-Up Investment in Military Mobility,” European Commission, December 21, 2022, https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-transport-infrastructure-speeding-investment-military-mobility-2022-12-21_en.

77 “Ukraine: Council Agrees on Further Military Support under the European Peace Facility,” Council of the European Union, press release, February 2, 2023, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/02/ukraine-council-agrees-on-further-military-support-under-the-european-peace-facility.

78 Franklin D. Kramer, Sweden Has a Chance to Transform European Security—Even Before It Officially Joins NATO, Atlantic Council, January 30, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/sweden-has-a-chance-to-transform-european-security-even-before-it-officially-joins-nato.

79 Franklin D. Kramer and Barry Pavel, NATO Priorities: Initial Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War, Atlantic Council, June 13, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/nato-priorities-initial-lessons-from-the-russia-ukraine-war.

80 Kramer, Sweden Has a Chance to Transform European Security—Even Before It Officially Joins NATO.

81 Luca Bertuzzi, What to expect from the EU’s Cyber Solidarity Act, EURACTIV.com (March 7, 2023), https://www.euractiv.com/section/cybersecurity/news/what-to-expect-from-the-eus-cyber-solidarity-act/

82 Franklin D. Kramer and Barry Pavel, NATO Priorities

The post NATO deterrence and defense: Military priorities for the Vilnius Summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Clementine Starling and Stephen Rodriguez write op-ed in Defense News on the Atlantic Council Commission Defense Innovation Adoption’s interim report

Atlantic Council — Mon, 17 Apr 2023 13:56:00 +0000

Forward Defense Director Clementine Starling and FD Senior Advisor Stephen Rodriguez emphasize that the United States does not have an innovation adoption, but the US Department of Defense has an innovation adoption problem. To address this, they discuss in this Defense News piece the findings and key recommendations of the Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption’s interim report. They argue that in order to accelerate adoption of critical technologies at the Pentagon, Congress and DoD will need to work hand-in-hand to provide greater flexibility to defense procurement.

ORIGINAL sOURCE

Innovation is a defining characteristic and competitive advantage of the United States — both of the vaunted private sector as well as the rich history of the U.S. military. Yet increasingly, our men and women in uniform are going to war with technology that lags behind not only Russia and China, but their civilian peers.
Quoted from Defense News

Read the Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption’s interim report.

Staff

Clementine G. Starling

Director, Forward Defense

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Fellow

Stephen Rodriguez

Senior Advisor

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

Public Event Wed, April 12, 2023 • 1:00 pm ET

The post Clementine Starling and Stephen Rodriguez write op-ed in Defense News on the Atlantic Council Commission Defense Innovation Adoption’s interim report appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption interim report

Eric Lofgren*, Whitney M. McNamara, and Peter Modigliani — Wed, 12 Apr 2023 14:49:18 +0000

Co-chairs: The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD,
& The Hon. Deborah Lee James

Commission director: Stephen Rodriguez

Program director: Clementine G. Starling

Commission staff: Mark J. Massa, Delharty M. Manson II, and Jacob Mezey

Download PDF

Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption: Interim Report Launch

Former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and former Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James discuss a new report on the challenges the United States faces in maintaining its technological and military advantage over its adversaries and what adaptations Congress, the Pentagon, and the defense sector should make to increase the pace of innovation adoption.

Defense Industry Defense Policy Defense Technologies National Security

Commissioners

The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD, Board Director, Atlantic Council; 27th Secretary of Defense; Co-Chair, Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption
The Hon. Deborah Lee James, Board Director, Atlantic Council; 23rd Secretary of the Air Force; Co-Chair, Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption
Ambassador Barbara Barrett, Board Director, Atlantic Council; 25th Secretary of the Air Force
General James E. Cartwright, USMC (ret.), Board Director, Atlantic Council; 8th Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Frank A. Finelli, Managing Director, The Carlyle Group
The Hon. Michèle Flournoy, Co-founder and Managing Partner, WestExec Advisors; Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, US Department of Defense
Scott Frederick, Managing Partner, Sands Capital
The Hon. James “Hondo” Geurts, Distinguished Fellow, Business Executives for National Security; Former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, US Department of Defense
Peter Levine, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Defense Analyses; Former Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, US Department of Defense
The Hon. Ellen M. Lord, Former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, US Department of Defense
Major General Arnold L. Punaro, USMC (ret.), CEO, The Punaro Group; Member, Advisory Council, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Nick Sinai, Senior Advisor, Insight Partners; Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs and Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School
Josh Wolfe, Co-founder and Managing Partner, Lux Capital
The Hon. Robert O. Work, Senior Counselor for Defense and Distinguished Senior Fellow for Defense and National Security, Center for a New American Security; 32nd US Deputy Secretary of Defense

Industry commissioners

Steven Escaravage, Executive Vice President and AI Lead, Booz Allen Hamilton
Wendy R. Anderson, Senior Vice President, Palantir Technologies
Prashant Bhuyan, Founder and CEO, Accrete AI
Mark Brunner, President, Primer Federal, Primer AI
Colin Carroll, Director of Government Relations, Applied Intuition
Adam Hammer, Counselor, Schmidt Futures
Chris Lynch, CEO, Rebellion Defense
Mara Motherway, Senior Vice President, Peraton
Michael Niggel, CEO, ACT1 Federal
Doug Philippone, Co-founder, Snowpoint Ventures

Foreword
Overview

Recommendations:

Introduce a new capability portfolio model
Consolidate program elements
Reset reprogramming authorities
Modernize DoD to align with the 21st century industrial base
Strengthen alignment of capital markets to defense outcomes
Incentivize tech companies to do business with DoD
Modernize budget documents
Establish bridge fund for successfully demonstrated technologies
Scale the Space Development Agency model
Modernize DoD’s requirements system

Conclusions and next steps
Biographies
Acknowledgements
List of acronyms

Foreword

The US Department of Defense (DoD) needs to accelerate the adoption of cutting-edge technology from the leading edge of the commercial and defense sectors. Doing so will enable the Pentagon to deliver high-impact operational solutions to the Warfighter in a much timelier manner. That is why we are co-chairing the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, which has released this interim report.

In our time serving in the Defense Department, we have found that the United States does not have an innovation problem, but rather an innovation adoption problem. That is to say, our Nation leads in many emerging technologies relevant to defense and security—from artificial intelligence and directed energy to quantum information technology and beyond. But the DoD struggles to identify, adopt, integrate, and field these technologies into military applications.

The persistence of this challenge is not for lack of trying. The Air Force’s Rapid Capabilities Office has cut through bureaucratic constraints to accelerate even the most complicated major acquisitions. The Defense Innovation Unit stands out for expanding the range of firms involved in innovation for national security purposes. Army Futures Command has accelerated modernization in ground forces through its cross-functional team model. The new Office of Strategic Capital has a promising new approach to engaging capital markets in support of national security goals.

But the growing national security challenges facing our country and the threat they pose to the rules-based international order require actionable reform across the DoD. We and a group of distinguished Commissioners, with decades of service between us in government, the private sector, and capital markets, believe that time is running out to do so. The United States faces simultaneous competition with two nuclear-armed, autocratic great-power rivals. Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and China’s revanchism not only spur urgent geopolitical considerations, but also cast into sharp relief the US industrial base’s ability to produce and field innovative technologies at scale.

To address the DoD’s innovation adoption challenge in light of the urgency of the geopolitical environment we face, this interim report advances ten policy recommendations for Congress and the Pentagon, focusing on the three key areas of reforming acquisition; overcoming barriers to innovation; and revising specific Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution structures.

To that end, the DoD should adapt the way it conducts its acquisition programs to provide additional flexibility in the year of execution, and Congress can authorize that flexibility. We recommend that five DoD program executive offices be empowered to operate in a portfolio model so that they can more easily shift funding among possible products that meet their mission needs. Congress should appropriate money to DoD with fewer but larger discrete budget line items and reset reprogramming authorities so that acquisition professionals have greater flexibility.

To better leverage innovation in the commercial sector, Congress should restore at least the traditional ratio of procurement funding to other defense spending, and the DoD should more intentionally engage a much broader innovation base. Allocating a higher percentage of the DoD’s budget to procurement will clearly signal a larger market to nontraditional defense firms.

Additionally, the deputy secretary of defense, with the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) as a direct report, should take a leadership role in aligning and harnessing stakeholders within the Pentagon and the existing defense industrial base for the twenty-first century. The DIU should be resourced and empowered to broaden the defense ecosystem by robustly engaging start-ups, nontraditional vendors, and capital market players.

The DoD must develop approaches to more rapidly validate its needs for commercial capabilities, rather than waiting years after identifying a key capability to write a requirement and submit a budget request. The DoD should both reform the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to operate more swiftly and develop a military need validation system outside of JCIDS for mature commercial capabilities. Congress and the DoD should expand both eligibility for, and the award size of, Small Business Innovation Research grants. To provide additional mechanisms for rapidly matching key capabilities with funding, they should also provide funds to procure capabilities successfully demonstrated in exercises.

As the 2022 National Security Strategy states, we are living through a “decisive decade,” a sentiment shared by the previous administration as well. Congress and the DoD must seize this opportunity to enact near-term changes that will help get our service members the capabilities they need to defend our country and its interests.

The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD

27th US Secretary of Defense

The Hon. Deborah Lee James

23rd US Secretary of the Air Force

* Eric Lofgren served as a project author until February 2023, when he transitioned to a position in government service. All of his contributions were made before his transition to that role.

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Overview

Mission statement

Accelerate the DoD’s ability to adopt cutting-edge technology from commercial and defense sectors and deliver high-impact operational solutions to the Warfighters.

Enterprise challenges

The DoD faces the following enterprise challenges in adopting defense innovations:

1. Outdated R&D model

The DoD’s requirements and acquisition processes were designed for a time when the DoD was the largest funder of global research and development (R&D). By 2020, however, the federal government’s share of national R&D had fallen below 20 percent, and yet its processes have not adapted to this new leader-to-follower reality. Today, while the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), national and service laboratories, and universities continue to innovate, many of the most critical technologies are driven by the commercial sector. The DoD struggles to adopt commercial technology at a relevant speed. Innovations from noncommercial R&D organizations are infrequently tied to a commercialization and adoption pipeline. Traditional prime contractors orient their independent R&D (IRAD) toward near-term defense requirements that are prescriptive relative to solutions rather than broadly defining warfighter gaps that allow applications of advanced technologies. As a result, the DoD is unable to effectively apply leading technologies to its weapon systems.

2. Long timelines and inflexible execution

Too often, the DoD delivers systems to meet requirements defined more than a decade earlier. It is difficult to insert new technology to effectively respond to dynamic adversary threats, technological opportunities, advances in warfighting concepts, or macroeconomic and supply-chain disruptions, especially within fiscal years. Hardware-centric models ineffectively integrate rapid software updates.

3. Fewer companies providing defense solutions

The DoD’s industrial base has shrunk by 40 percent over the past decade, due to both consolidation and exit. This decline stems from multiple causes, including a pivot to fewer more-complex major systems, long timelines, complex regulations, and the high compliance cost of doing business with the DoD. Many start-up, commercial, and international businesses are unable or unwilling to enter the DoD ecosystem. As a result, reduced competitive pressure has increased costs and decreased adoption of innovation.

4. Valleys of death

The DoD spends billions annually on research and prototypes, yet only a small percentage transitions to production contracts with revenue to sustain operations and scale output. Consequently, one must question why the DoD continues to fund so many defense research organizations when most technology innovation comes from the commercial sector. Long timelines for contracts and funding, program constraints, and a disconnected ecosystem are among the transition challenges for companies that have developed viable products or services.

5. Hamstrung workforce

The DoD acquisition workforce is subject to a bureaucratic culture of excessive compliance and oversight, a challenging environment for innovation. Creative problem-solving and measured risk-taking are not often rewarded, and too few individuals with an industry background agree to take senior leadership roles at the DoD.

6. Program-centric acquisition

Defining requirements, securing budgets, and acquiring capabilities are done for hundreds of individual programs. The DoD invests a significant percentage of its funds in complex major systems for which prime contractors offer closed, propriety solutions. This impedes interoperability and responsiveness to changes in operations, threats, and technologies. Open-system architectures with well-defined interface control documents are rarely adopted, which constrains the ability to insert innovative technology.

7. Cumbersome reporting from DoD to Congress

Budget justification documents run dozens of volumes and tens of thousands of pages. Document format, detail, and supporting information is inconsistent among military services and agencies. This impedes Congress’s ability to understand program objectives in a timely manner. In turn, Congress does not trust that delegated decisions will consistently result in more rapid technology adoption.

8. Limited understanding of emerging technology

The DoD struggles to effectively leverage critical emerging technologies (like biotechnology and quantum information technology) due to a lack of understanding of their state-of-the-art applications among those who generate requirements and draft requests for proposals. As these technologies mature, the DoD is challenged to have meaningful conversations about how to adopt, leverage, and defend against these technologies.

Top recommendations

To address these challenges, the Commission recommends that DoD leaders, congressional defense committees, and other executive branch agencies take the following ten high-priority actions to accelerate DoD innovation adoption:

Introduce a new capability portfolio model
Consolidate program elements
Reset reprogramming authorities
Modernize the DoD to align with the twenty-first century industrial base
Strengthen alignment of capital markets to defense outcomes
Incentivize tech companies to do business with the DoD
Modernize budget documents
Establish bridge fund for successfully demonstrated technologies
Scale the Space Development Agency model
Modernize the DoD’s requirements system

Recommendation 1: The DoD and Congress empower and resource five Program Executive Officers (PEOs) to operate via a new capability portfolio model in 2024.

Addresses challenges 2, 4, and 6.

Congress authorizes in the FY24 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and/or the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) implements via a memo empowering five PEO portfolios to operate via a new capability portfolio model. Component acquisition executives from the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Special Operations Command, and a defense agency will each select a PEO portfolio.
Service requirements organizations capture portfolio requirements in a concise, high-level document that provides overarching, joint, enduring capability needs and key mission impact measures that focus on warfighter-informed needs and mission outcomes. The Joint Staff validates the portfolio requirements within thirty days. The portfolio requirements document enables leaner program requirements and shapes future research and prototypes.
Selected PEOs negotiate with congressional defense appropriations staff the consolidation of at least 20 percent of the smallest budget line items within their portfolios. This enables reprogramming flexibility to meet evolving, warfighter-informed requirements. These merged budget accounts must provide Congress with sufficient visibility of major elements within each.
Selected PEOs develop a set of portfolio strategies, processes, road maps, contracts, infrastructure, and architectures to enable programs to leverage for greater speed and success. Portfolio contracting strategies will look beyond individual contracts or programs to promote a robust industrial base by enabling continuous competition, iterative development, supply chain risk mitigation, greater participation of nontraditional companies, commercial service acquisition, and economies of scale.
Selected PEOs may lay out plans to decompose large programs into modular acquisitions; leverage common platforms, components, and services; and maximize use of commercial solutions and DoD research. Portfolios will scale and align prototyping, experimentation, and testing infrastructure. They will invest in a common suite of engineering tools, platforms, and strategies to enable interoperability, cybersecurity, and resiliency.
PEOs require portfolio leaders to actively engage the DoD’s R&D community, industry, and academia to communicate joint-warfighter portfolio needs and business opportunities, scout technologies, engage companies, and drive novel solutions to address portfolio needs.
Congress appropriates at least $20 million to each portfolio per year for three years to enable PEOs to implement the new model with appropriate staff, analytic tools, and strategies. The five PEOs work out the details for others to adopt. In time, the department will realize savings and return on investment through greater program efficiencies and mission impact.
PEOs provide the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Congress a short annual report to share insight into the new portfolio model progress, including issues, successes, and inputs to scale adoption.

Success measure: By the end of 2023, five PEO portfolios are identified to operate via the new portfolio model. By the end of 2024, these portfolios begin operating with clear direction, leadership support, and initial implementation plans.

Notional example: A command-and-control PEO shapes a portfolio strategy that invests in a software factory and enterprise services as a common infrastructure, with smaller programs tapping a diverse vendor base to regularly and iteratively deliver a suite of applications that work together seamlessly.

Recommendation 2: Acquisition executives propose consolidated program elements to congressional staff and negotiate what can be included in the FY 2024 Appropriations Act joint explanatory statement.

Addresses challenges 2, 6, and 7.

The deputy secretary of defense (DepSecDef) directs acquisition executives to propose a list of program elements (PEs) and budget line items (BLIs) to consolidate. This will simplify budget submissions and enable greater flexibility within the year of execution to respond to rapid changes in warfighter needs and technology advancement within capability or mission portfolios.
- Determine criteria for consolidation, such as BLIs and PEs under $20 million, software-defined technologies, and supply chain-affected efforts.
- Determine constructs for consolidation, such as capability areas, mission areas, and organizational alignment.
Reduce BLI and PE count from more than 1,700 today in the investment accounts by at least 200 BLI and PEs each year, starting with the FY 2024 markup, for three years to enable cost-schedule-performance trade-offs, including the prototyping and fielding of novel systems that meet defined capability or mission areas.
Allow PEOs, warfighters, and other DoD stakeholders to provide input to acquisition executives. Senior leadership in the resourcing process should propose the items to be consolidated and negotiate with congressional staff in advance of FY 2024 appropriations.
Identify line items that enable opportunistic efforts to insert technologies into existing weapons programs without requiring a new start. Identify best practices for broadly justifying activities within a capability set.

Success measure: The number of BLIs in the investment accounts is reduced by at least 200 in time for the passage of regular appropriations in FY 2024.

Notional example: A PEO identifies a novel technology from DARPA or industry to integrate into one of its programs to improve performance and accelerate capability delivery. With investment funds spread across fewer budget accounts, the PEO is able to reprogram funds from a lower-priority development within the year of execution.

Recommendation 3: Congressional appropriations committees reset reprogramming authorities to historical norms in their FY 2024 joint explanatory statements.

Addresses challenges 2 and 7.

Appropriations committees write into FY 2024 joint explanatory statements the following changes:
- Current reprogramming thresholds will be maintained, but above-threshold actions will revert from congressional prior approval to the historical norm of congressional notification with a thirty-day window for briefing or rejection. This streamlines the process and enables greater reprogramming while still providing Congress “veto authority” to block reprogramming actions they oppose. Prior approval will remain in place for items omitted, deleted, or specifically reduced; general transfer authorities; or above threshold new starts.
An alternative approach: Raise reprogramming thresholds from the lesser of $10 million or 20 percent to at least $40 million for Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and $100 million for procurement appropriation titles. Historical norms for reprogramming thresholds were $15 million for RDT&E and $40 million for procurement yet were progressively lowered to this historically low threshold. This change would revert thresholds to account for decades of inflation.
- Letter notifications for new starts will be “for the fiscal year,” not “for the entire effort.” This enables programs greater flexibility to start small programs while Congress retains the right to veto any new starts it opposes.

Success measure: Recommended language is included in the FY 2024 Appropriations Act joint explanatory statement by the time regular appropriations are passed.

Notional example: An acquisition program is “early to need” for procurement funds due to delays in finalizing development. Another program desperately seeks additional funds to accelerate and scale production of its weapon system. Service leadership decides to reprogram $50M in procurement funds between the programs to optimize investments.

Recommendation 4: Congress directs the DoD to elevate the DIU to a direct report to DepSecDef and resource it effectively to align and harness the nontraditional defense industrial base for the twenty-first century no later than six months of the enactment of this act.

Addresses challenges 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8.

Re-align DIU as a direct report to DepSecDef with the necessary staffing and resources to engage start-ups, nontraditional vendors, and capital market players in aligning capability requirements to harness solutions from the twenty-first-century industrial base per the 2022 National Defense Strategy.
- DIU’s expanded role should complement existing efforts in USD(R&E) and USD(A&S) in terms of traditional industrial policy and technology scouting, respectively, by better connecting the nontraditional industry and its resources, intelligence, and technologies to the needs of the warfighter.
  - DIU, USD(R&E), USD(A&S), and service partners should regularly integrate their efforts, in communicating to the industrial base the department’s needs, planned investments, and business opportunities. In addition, they should share among themselves what is being discovered in industry that aligns with the department’s missions.
  - In its expanded role, DIU should be resourced to regularly engage with acquisition organizations (PEOs, program offices), science and technology (S&T) organizations (labs, DARPA), and combatant commands to share the insights it gets from nontraditional industry players throughout the DoD. Additionally, DIU will communicate back to industry where it can align its technologies to the needs of the warfighter as communicated by acquisition organizations and combatant commands.
  - Prioritization for expanded staffing for DIU should be for new billets from the services over funding for contractors. The billets would be priority assignments, selected from relevant PEOs and service acquisition executives (SAEs).
  - DIU should track the intelligence, insights, and inputs it receives from industry trade associations, venture capitalists (VCs), private equity firms, primes, nontraditional defense companies (NDCs), Other Transaction (OT) Consortia, and innovation hubs. This information should be interoperable with USD(R&E)’s existing repository of research and intelligence for the department’s needs.
- DIU, USD(A&S), and SAEs charter a team, including joint warfighter perspectives, to streamline processes, reviews, and documents for acquiring commercial solutions. The team will reinforce “buy before build” commercial practices in the early phases of programs by baking it into acquisition strategy templates and program reviews. It will also collaborate with defense industry, capital markets, and Congress to develop a broader set of rapid funding tools and approaches to demand signals consistent with the speed of commercial innovation cycles. It will publish an initial commercial pathway or guide by December 2023, with a comprehensive version in 2024.
  - Joint Staff and service requirements organizations develop a rapid “military need validation” process, involving feedback from the warfighter, for commercial solutions in lieu of traditional Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) requirements documents. This new process will enable hundreds or even thousands of commercial solutions to be validated by empowered, distributed officials, and not subject to the JCIDS process managed by the Joint Staff and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).
  - The Defense Acquisition University and related organizations should modernize guidance and training for commercial acquisition, to include:
    - Collaborating with industry, traditional and otherwise, in the early phases of an acquisition program to inform concepts, alternatives, and designs. The focus should be on feeding into mission objectives, not market research for system specifications.
      - Contracting strategies focused on commercial solutions (e.g., Commercial Solutions Openings, Other Transactions, Federal Acquisition Regulation Parts 12 and 13).
      - Testing, experimentation, exercises, rapid deliveries, and iteration.
      - Scaling programs like DIU’s Immersive Commercial Acquisition Program.

Success measures: Higher number of DIU projects that transition to a program of record; increased number of vendors entering the federal market and competing for contracts; better alignment of capital market investment and lending to DoD missions; alignment of DoD R&D and prime IRAD funds to help a wider number of entrants across the Valley of Death; increased transparency with the industrial base on DoD’s priorities; a commercial pathway, guidance, and training enabling workforce to rapidly and successfully acquire commercial solutions; increased transparency and collaboration within the department on tech-related initiatives and intelligence; resources saved and efficiencies gained from central repository information from traditional and nontraditional industrial base like market intelligence, technology landscape analysis and due diligence on vendors.

Notional example: Expanded engagement with nontraditional industrial base helps DIU identify the commercial sector’s leader in autonomous software for ground vehicles and through the streamlined, well-defined process for rapid acquisition, the Army begins adopting it across its fleet of logistics vehicles on CONUS bases.

In their quarterly engagement, the US Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) talks to DIU about its desire to procure better mission planning tools at the edge. DIU identifies and provides three viable commercial options for demonstrations. Before presenting them to MCWL, DIU leverages VC firm relationships to get existing due diligence on the potential vendors and discovers one of them draws components of its chips from China. DIU finds an alternative.

In its engagements with capital market players, DIU discovers there are several critical bottlenecks in the quantum computing supply chain due to either a severe lack of redundancy or routing through adversary nations. DIU flags this to R&E, the Office of Strategic Capital, and A&S Industrial Policy to determine how to address this. As part of this, DIU and OSC engage with capital market players to inform them this is now a department priority, helping to direct capital market funding toward these enabling technologies critical to the US broader tech competition vis-à-vis China.

Recommendation 5: Strengthen existing capital market programs and create new pathways for mission-critical technologies.

Addresses challenges 1, 3, 4, and 8.

US capital markets represent a critical yet underutilized strategic advantage for the DoD. To better leverage vast capital market resources for defense innovation and mission outcomes, the DoD should broaden programs through which capital market-backed companies can participate and create new pathways for DoD program offices to leverage capital market funding for mission-critical technologies.

Congress directs in legislation the Small Business Agency (SBA), in coordination with the General Services Administration (GSA), to enhance the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) grants program no later than six months after enactment.

To better scale SBIRs, the SBA should:

Generate direct to Phase III SBIR grants in which early successful performers in Phase I can be fast-tracked to more-flexible contract vehicles, for which performers have exemptions from SBA size standards for procurement; no limits on dollar size of procurement; the right to receive sole-source funding agreements; and the ability to pursue flexible ways to add value to an end user, whether that be research, R&D, services, products, production, or any combination thereof.
Direct the SBIR offices of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps to pilot a Strategic Funding Increase (STRATFI) program to help bridge the Valley of Death between Phase II and Phase III SBIR grants, no later than twelve months after designated. Service pilots would replicate the STRATFI program in that SBIR funding ($15 million) would receive matched funding from customers ($15 million) and private funding (up to $30 million).

To increase competition and widen the aperture of firms competing for SBIR grants, the SBA should:

Remove the barrier preventing companies with more than 50 percent backing by VCs or other capital market players to compete for SBIR grants. Small businesses often rely on VC funding to cover the costs of operating as they work to commercialize their products and generate sufficient revenue to sustain their business. This is particularly true in the case of software development, where highly skilled software engineers are the single most expensive operating cost. Placing strict limitations on the ability of these small businesses to compete for SBIR grants is contrary to the SBIR program goal of supporting scientific excellence and technological innovation.
Remove the barrier preventing companies that meet the requirements of being a small business, but are publicly traded, to compete for SBIR grants. Small, high-tech R&D firms go public to continue their ability to raise funds for their capital-intensive technologies. By disallowing them from competing for SBIR grants, the DoD is limiting technology competition among some of the most technology-proficient corners of the industrial base.

To drive deep tech adoption, OSC should develop tools for leveraging external capital market funding for pilot projects to service R&D organizations in FY 2024, with a formalization plan in conjunction with the president’s FY 2025 budget request.

OSC to be given expanded authorities to access capital markets to develop revenue, investment, and credit approaches for defense programs contracting with small-, mid-, and large-cap companies. As an initial step, direct $15 million of external capital market funding to the R&D organization of each military branch to pilot projects that identify two
novel use cases in one or more of R&E’s deep-tech priority areas of quantum technology, biotechnology, or advanced materials that could be leveraged to achieve service-specific missions. The period of performance would be eighteen months. Service end users would provide matched funding of up to 25 percent of total outside funding to pilot these projects.
This would assist in directing capital market funding to the DoD’s mission, providing additional R&D funding and incentives for deep-tech companies to commercialize their technologies, and creating optimization loops that connect technology to warfighter use cases that can help turn basic research into relevant products and services. Lastly, exposure to deep-tech applications would allow service end users to better understand emerging technologies’ applications to future defense requirements. This will help accelerate the well-aligned adoption of these capabilities to meet services’ unique missions at the speed of relevance.
R&D leads will report to DIU’s director and USD(R&E) no more than 180 days past the period of performance on the pilot’s utility, lessons learned, and challenges DoD would face if technology were to be adopted at scale.

Success measures: Meaningful increase in capital market funding for defense-related companies; increased number of companies crossing Valley of Death and program offices integrating commercially developed technology to speed innovation milestones; increased number of production contracts from nontraditional vendors, with more vendors competing for each contract; increased touchpoints between cutting-edge tech and the warfighter/end users; and the identification of specific tech adoption challenges that can be addressed ahead of requirements process for more-seamless tech adoption and integration.

Notional examples: 1) A majority VC-backed company demonstrates a novel capability that provides an advantage over a near-peer adversary and is fast-tracked to SBIR Phase III, through which the firm begins production at scale and crosses the Valley of Death. 2) A publicly traded deep-tech company that qualifies as a small business, now allowed to compete for SBIR grants, begins to develop the foundation of a quantum network for the US military. 3) The army discovers through a biotech pilot project that an advanced material it hoped to put into a program of record does not provide meaningful benefit for the cost and pursues another alternative. 4) The navy uses its OSC pilot to buy hours of time on a quantum computer provided over the cloud, through which the navy discovers the quantum computer’s utility in improving logistics and maintenance. However, the navy does not know how to manage the data being generated and needs an extra data scientist to oversee the process. The navy begins to generate a data governance process, forms a new billet to manage it, and begins determining the best acquisition pathway in anticipation of purchasing quantum computing as a service.

Recommendation 6: Congress, OSD, and SAEs increase incentives and reduce barriers for leading technology companies to do business with the DoD by September 2024.

Addresses challenges 1 and 3.

Increase incentives

Production Contracts. The DoD and Congress in future defense budgets rebalance the ratio of RDT&E and Procurement funding to historical norms over the past thirty years. From 1990 to 2019, the ratio was 39 percent to 61 percent, respectively. This would provide more than $20 billion in additional procurement funds to acquire production quantities faster, leverage commercial R&D, and fuel a broader market for leading technology firms. Increasing production and lowering barriers to entry will attract venture capital firms and bring private research and development funding to the defense market. As most of USD(R&E)’s fourteen critical technologies are commercially driven, this rebalance would enable faster fielding of warfighter priorities.
Set Precedent. USD(A&S) and SAEs report the number of large contracts (i.e., more than $50 million) awarded to start-ups and NDCs annually to measure and convey the trends of the DoD investing in these companies beyond small SBIR awards.
Innovation Funds. USD(R&E) and services include start-ups and NDCs as part of selection criteria for congressionally directed innovation funds.
Show Support. USD(A&S) and SAEs scale the direction, goals, and guidance for working with small and disadvantaged businesses to include technology start-ups and NDCs. Include NDCs as part of the small-business integration working group being established for FY23 NDAA Section 874.
Broaden Access to Capital Markets. Congress and USD(A&S) modernize the use of Defense Production Act Title III and credit loan authorities available to other agencies and departments to dynamically access capital, embrace commercial terms, and strengthen the domestic industrial base capabilities, based on lessons learned from COVID and the war in Ukraine. This use could include purchase commitments and loan guarantees, similar to how the Export-Import Bank works with US companies overseas, to increase incentives and reduce risk for companies seeking to scale production of critical technologies.

Decrease barriers

Congress should raise the cost accounting standards (CAS) threshold to at least $100 million; revise the commercial item exemption in 48 CFR 9903.201-1(b)(6); and make related CAS reforms as recommended by the Section 809 Panel to reduce compliance costs, which are the biggest barrier to entry in defense.
DoD, GSA, and Office of Management and Budget invest in modernizing SAM.gov and related DoD websites that publish contract opportunities to improve user design, alerts, DoD-industry collaboration, processes, and status. Many find SAM.gov onerous to use.

Fully resource and drive the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency to streamline processes, increase staffing, and pursue novel approaches to reduce the large backlog of individual and facility security clearances that impose long delays on contractors to begin work or scale.
USD(A&S) and SAEs assign visible leaders for SBIR, OT (including OT Consortia), Middle Tier of Acquisitions, and Commercial Solutions Openings to champion adoption; set vision; simplify processes; curate leading strategies; and improve guidance, training, structures, and direction to continuously improve adoption. Update policies and guidelines to ensure efforts conducted under OTs count for past performance and small disadvantaged business goals to incentivize industry and government use.
USD(A&S), USD(R&E), and services establish a team to map and improve processes to scale successful research and prototypes into new or existing acquisition programs. This includes requirements, acquisition, budget, contracting, engineering, and testing, among others.

USD(A&S) and SAEs establish a working group, to include primes and NDCs, to explore how to incentivize primes to better leverage technology start-up companies. The objective is to fuel disruptive defense innovation from novel tech companies and leverage the primes to scale integration and production of weapon systems to create an enduring battlefield advantage.

Success measure: USD(A&S) reports an increase in the number of new companies in the industrial base by 5 percent, offsetting the recent trend of 5 percent decrease annually. At least ten NDCs are awarded contracts of more than $50 million that address validated defense requirements. Defense primes significantly increase partnerships, subcontracts, and acquisitions of start-ups and NDCs to integrate their technologies into weapon systems.

Notional example: A leading technology company with viable solutions for defense that historically avoided defense contracts is now receptive (with board support) to pursue contracts given the higher CAS thresholds, reduced unique compliance requirements, and improved clearance processes.

Recommendation 7: USD comptroller proposes streamlined budget justification and chief digital and artificial intelligence officer (CDAO) modernizes supporting details in congressionally accessible information system for the president’s FY 2026 budget request.

Addresses challenge 7.

USD comptroller proposes a format for streamlining budget justification documents in the investment accounts, focusing on cogent six-page program overviews at the BLI/PE level (R-1 and P-1) with hyperlinks to supporting details.
- Seek implementation for the president’s FY 2026 budget request.
CDAO leads the effort to create a query tool and dashboard tied to Advana’s backend data that delivers insight down to the existing level of justification material, allowing for more frequent updates.
- This tool should be capable of replicating Financial Management Regulation Volume 2B, Chapters 4 and 5 presentations.
- Prototype early access to congressional staff with the president’s FY 2025 budget request, in addition to the traditional format.
- This tool should seek to incorporate budget execution data such as quarterly DD1416s and contract obligations as data integration improves.

Success measure: Congressional staff use the new information system for their budgetary and program analysis; staff desires expansion into other accounts, including Operations and Maintenance and Military Personnel.

Notional example: Congressional staff can find up-to-date information on DoD program activities without having DoD officials provide the information directly to a committee.

Recommendation 8: Tying experimentation to acquisition outcomes: Scaling and accelerating successful demonstrations

Addresses challenges 1, 4, and 8.

The DoD and industry invest significant time, funding, and resources to conduct operational exercises that experiment and demonstrate emerging capabilities and technologies in an operationally relevant environment. Even after a major exercise in which senior commanders agree on the success of demonstrated capabilities and demand to acquire these at scale, there is often a two- to four-year lag time for DoD to formally define requirements, secure funding, and shape acquisition and contract strategies. For example, even successful capabilities selected by USD(R&E)’s Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve (RDER) still must go through the Program Objective Memorandum and Deputy Secretary’s Management Action Group processes to begin scaling.

Congress to pilot providing $250 million to scale operationally relevant technologies demonstrated at operational exercises that address the preeminent challenge of deterring the People’s Republic of China, such as RDER. The funds will facilitate the acceleration and scaling of novel capabilities into the hands of the warfighter at the speed of relevance, help vendors cross the Valley of Death, and incentivize new nontraditional companies to work with the DoD. This will significantly shorten the traditionally long lag times for successful vendors to receive funding while the DoD finalizes requirements, funding, and contracts. The associated funds would be particularly useful for the technology needed to integrate military forces that will revolve around digital tools and other foundational “middleware” technologies that sometimes fall in the seams of traditional major hardware-centric acquisition.

The fund should:

Be allocated in FY 2024 spending bill to specific programs or initiatives no later than 180 days from completion of the exercise on discovered solutions.
Be limited to five or fewer high-potential capabilities to ensure they are properly resourced to meaningfully scale.
Be directly allocated to an acquisition organization, such as a program executive office, to rapidly acquire capabilities that have demonstrated success in order to address priority operational risks or opportunities.
Use Defense Production Act Title III or adapt authorities available to other agencies and departments to provide credit guarantees or other funding approaches in support of technology and capability providers.

Success measures: Increased number of technologies and capabilities demonstrated successfully that are transitioned at scale to the warfighter; increased number of vendors incentivized to demonstrate at exercises.

Notional example: A company demonstrates a swarm of small undersea intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance drones at the Rim of the Pacific 2024 exercise. The firm is awarded a low-rate initial production contract within sixty days and deploys its capability with the navy in 2025.

Recommendation 9: USD(A&S) and acquisition executives propose realigning existing organizations to adopt the Space Development Agency (SDA) model, and Congress grants additional enabling authorities to those organizations in FY25 NDAA.

Addresses challenges 2 and 4.

USD(A&S) and SAEs charter a small team to build out a model, structure, key elements, and a framework replicating the SDA and lessons learned from rapid acquisition.
- SDA provides an early model for preemptive disruption within the Space Force. The disruptive units should focus on current technologies from the labs and industry that can be quickly fielded and scaled within existing rapid acquisition authorities. Mature defense and commercial capabilities, along with broader portfolio requirements, can shape a streamlined process. This model builds upon successful organizations like the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, Big Safari, and Special Operations Command’s acquisition and SOFWERX organizations.
Service leadership identifies priority capability areas that are ripe for disruption—ones where the current operational model is outmoded for the digital age and/or where novel technologies offer radically different operational capabilities at greater speed and scale to achieve mission priorities.
Each identified service and defense agency employs an SDA model to a priority capability area and repurposes organizations, funding, and resources to implement.
- Identify the right charismatic leader who embodies these characteristics: high technical acumen, proven product manager, well-defined vision, extensive personal network in warfighting and industry communities, commitment to a five-year tenure, and an intangible “wild card” quality. Provide statutory protections to extend top cover beyond the length of time of political appointees for the new organizations to disrupt entrenched mindsets on major systems, operations, and force structures employed for decades.
DoD leaders continually discuss and iterate on the new model with key stakeholder organizations across the DoD and congressional defense committees.

Success measure: Congressional buy-in, with a small set of targeted projects identified for each organization and underway in FY 2024 to prepare for rapid scaling in FY 2025 with capabilities initially fielded by FY 2027.

Notional example: Navy leadership, in its commitment to autonomous systems, bundles PEO Unmanned and Small Combatants, Task Force 59, Unmanned Task Force, and the director of unmanned systems into a new naval autonomy organization with authorities and flexibilities similar to SDA and related rapid-innovation organizations.

Recommendation 10: Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) and services establish a team to collaboratively modernize JCIDS and service requirements processes by September 2024.

Addresses challenges 2, 4, and.

The DoD’s JCIDS is a complex, disjointed bureaucracy across Joint Staff and the services. The DoD requires a streamlined, tailored requirements framework and processes that iterate operational needs and threats with technology solutions, while also aligning requirements, acquisition, and budget systems.

VCJCS and services charter a team or multiple teams to modernize DoD’s requirements enterprise to include:

Design a requirements framework that better incorporates bottom-up capability requirements from the warfighter and addresses joint strategic capability concerns. It must align service/agency and JROC core processes while allowing some tailoring and flexibility.
Enable a requirements system that breaks from the mindset of locking down all requirements up front to a dynamic model that enables software-intensive commercial solutions and emerging technologies that meet changing or evolving warfighting needs to iteratively shape capability developments.
Overhaul, streamline, and tailor requirements documents based on capability size, urgency, product vs. service, and hardware vs. software. Develop new process to rapidly validate the military utility of a commercial solution instead of the traditional JCIDS.
Aggressively streamline capability requirement development, coordination, and approval timelines from operational commands, through component commands, and Joint Staff. Impose tripwires for exceeding six months for software and twelve months for hardware to get senior leader involvement.
Develop enduring overarching requirements for capability portfolios. Include a set of mission impact measures to focus investments and acquisitions to continuously improve.
Retire the outmoded DoD Architecture Framework and focus on application programming interfaces per DepSecDef’s data decree, architectures, and standards to enable interoperability. Strike the right balance between enterprise, service, and portfolio orchestration with flexibility for program and industry solutions.
Modernize the analysis of alternatives processes to enable a more streamlined and iterative approach that values prototypes, experiments, minimum viable products, and commercial solutions with warfighter and other user feedback over lengthy headquarters staff analysis.
Better integrate threat and technology assessments early and throughout the process.
The team must include external change management experts and collaborate with industry (traditional and nontraditional) and the DoD S&T community to get their input and feedback on providing options to inform DoD requirements.
Develop a career path, structure, and improved training for DoD requirements managers.
Publish new policies, guidance, and templates in dynamic online formats instead of five-hundred-page PDFs.
Congress directs the Government Accountability Office to assess the DoD’s requirements management processes, policies, and practices to include timelines; alignment to the DoD
budget and acquisition processes, mission outcomes, portfolio management; and harnessing commercial technologies.
The Senate Armed Services Committee and/or House Armed Services Committee hold hearings with the VCJCS and the service chiefs on modernizing DoD requirements processes to enable greater speed, agility, and innovation.

Success measure: Joint Staff and service stakeholder organizations collaboratively develop a modern approach to managing defense requirements. The new requirements system integrates the key elements outlined above by September 2024.

Notional example: The Air Force establishes an uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) portfolio requirements document that aggressively streamlines all future UAS requirements, bakes in interoperability standards, and enables many novel commercial solutions.

Conclusions and next steps

This interim report is focused on providing elected officials and senior DoD leaders with actionable recommendations that can be enacted promptly. The Commission discussed and acknowledged broader, strategic matters that will take time to flesh out and implement. These include establishing a more fulsome capital market engagement strategy, harnessing a modern workforce, and exploring digital transformations of enterprise systems to enable broader reforms and opportunities. The Commission’s final report, which is planned for September 2023, will expand upon these ten recommendations to include a broader set of reforms to strengthen defense innovation adoption. It will include case studies that highlight successes in adopting dual-use technologies within short time frames. After all, living through the “decisive decade” means that Americans deserve decisive capabilities to provide for the common defense, in this decade.

Biographies

The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD

Board Director and Co-Chair of the Commission, Atlantic Council; 27th US Secretary of Defense

The Honorable Mark T. Esper is a partner and board member of the venture capital firm Red Cell Partners and a board director at the Atlantic Council. He was sworn in as the 27th Secretary of Defense on July 23, 2019, and served in that capacity until November 9, 2020. He previously served as acting secretary of defense from June 24, 2019, to July 15, 2019. Esper was confirmed as the 23rd secretary of the US Army in November 2017.

In the private sector, Esper was vice president for government relations at the Raytheon Company.

He earlier served concurrently as executive vice president of the US Chamber of Commerce’s Global Intellectual Property Center and as vice president for European and Eurasian affairs from 2008 to 2010. From 2006 to 2007, He was chief operating officer and executive vice president of defense and international affairs at the Aerospace Industries Association.

In addition to his work in the private sector, Esper served in a range of positions on Capitol Hill and in the Defense Department. He served as legislative director and senior policy advisor to former Senator Chuck Hagel. He was a senior professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations and Senate Governmental Affairs committees, policy director for the House Armed Services Committee, and national security advisor for former Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist. During the President George W. Bush administration, he served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for negotiations policy at the Pentagon. He was national policy director to the late Senator Fred Thompson for his 2008 presidential campaign and was a Senate-appointed commissioner on the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 

Esper began his career in the US Army. He is a 1986 graduate of the United States Military Academy and received his commission in the infantry. Upon completion of Ranger and Pathfinder training, he served in the 101st Airborne Division and participated in the 1990-91 Gulf War with the “Screaming Eagles.” He later commanded a rifle company in the 3-325 Airborne Battalion Combat Team in Vicenza, Italy. He retired from the army in 2007 after spending ten years on active duty and eleven years in the National Guard and Army Reserve. After leaving active duty, he served as chief of staff at the Heritage Foundation think tank.

He is a recipient of the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service. Among his many military awards and decorations are the Legion of Merit, a Bronze Star Medal, the Kuwait Liberation Medal, Kuwait Liberation Medal-Saudi Arabia, and the Combat Infantryman Badge. Esper holds a PhD from the George Washington University.

The Hon. Deborah Lee James

Board Director and Co-Chair of the Commission, Atlantic Council; 23rd US Secretary of the Air Force

The Honorable Deborah Lee James is chair of the Defense Business Board and board director at the Atlantic Council. Previously, she served as the twenty-third secretary of the US Air Force and was responsible for the affairs of the Department of the Air Force, including the organizing, training, equipping, and providing for the welfare of its nearly 660,000 active-duty, National Guard, Reserve, and civilian airmen and their families. She also oversaw the Air Force’s annual budget of more than $139 billion. James has thirty years of senior homeland and national security experience in the federal government and the private sector.

Prior to her Air Force position, James served as president of Science Applications International Corporation’s (SAIC’s) technical and engineering sector, where she was responsible for 8,700 employees and more than $2 billion in revenue.

For twelve years, James held a variety of positions with SAIC, including senior vice president and director of homeland security. From 2000 to 2001, she was executive vice president and chief operating officer at Business Executives for National Security, and from 1998 to 2000 she was vice president of international operations and marketing at United Technologies. During the Bill Clinton administration, from 1993 to 1998, James served in the Pentagon as assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs. In that position, she was senior advisor to the secretary of defense on all matters pertaining to the 1.8 million National Guard and Reserve personnel worldwide. In addition to working extensively with Congress, state governors, the business community, military associations, and international officials on National Guard and Reserve component issues, James oversaw a $10 billion budget and supervised a one-hundred-plus-person staff. Prior to her Senate confirmation in 1993, she served as an assistant to the assistant secretary of defense for legislative affairs.

From 1983 to 1993, James worked as a professional staff member on the House Armed Services Committee, where she served as a senior advisor to the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee, the NATO Burden Sharing Panel, and the chairman’s Member Services team.

James earned a BA in comparative area studies from Duke University and an MA in international affairs from Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs.

Eric Lofgren

Professional Staff Member, Seapower and Acquisition Lead, US Senate Committee on Armed Services; Author, Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, Atlantic Council

Eric Lofgren is a professional staff member and the seapower and acquisition lead for the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services. His work on this Commission was completed while he was a research fellow at the Center for Government Contracting in the George Mason University (GMU) School of Business, where he performed research, wrote, and led initiatives on business, policy, regulatory, and other issues in government contracting.

He manages the daily blog Acquisition Talk and produces the Acquisition Talk podcast, on which he interviews leading experts in the field. Lofgren was an emergent ventures fellow at GMU’s Mercatus Center. Prior to joining GMU, he was a senior analyst at Technomics Inc., supporting the Defense Department’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office. He has also supported government analyses for the Government Accountability Office, Naval Sea Systems Command, Canada Public Works, and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Cost and Economics.

Whitney M. McNamara

Vice President, Beacon Global Strategies; Author, Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, Atlantic Council

Whitney McNamara is a vice president at Beacon Global Strategies. Prior to that, McNamara worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, where she served as the S&T portfolio lead at the Defense Innovation Board, whose mission is to provide the secretary of defense, deputy secretary of defense, and other senior leaders with recommendations on emerging technologies and innovative approaches that DoD should adopt to ensure US technological and military dominance.

Before that, McNamara was an emerging technologies policy subject matter expert supporting the Department of Defense’s Chief Information Officer (CIO). Prior to that, she was a senior analyst at national security think tank the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, focusing on emerging technologies, future operating concepts, and informationized warfare in the context of long-term technological and military competition with great powers.

Peter Modigliani

Defense Acquisition Lead,MITRE Corporation; Author, Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, Atlantic Council

Peter Modigliani is a defense acquisition leader within the MITRE Corporation enabling the DoD and intelligence community to deliver innovative solutions with greater speed and agility. He works with acquisition and CIO executives, program managers, the Section 809 Panel, congressional staffs, industry, and academia to shape acquisition reforms, strategic initiatives, and major program strategies.

Modigliani champions digitally transforming the acquisition enterprise to modernize and accelerate operations. He launched MITRE’s digital acquisition platform, AiDA. Prior to MITRE, Modigliani was an Air Force program manager for C4ISR programs and an assistant vice president with Alion Science and Technology, supporting the Air Force Acquisition Executive’s Information Dominance division.

Stephen Rodriguez

Senior Advisor and Study Director of the Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Stephen Rodriguez is a senior advisor with the Forward Defense program at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and founding partner of One Defense, a next-generation strategic advisory firm that leverages machine learning to identify advanced software and hardware commercial capabilities and accelerate their transition into the defense industrial base. He is also a venture partner at Refinery Ventures, an early-scale fund investing in dual-use technologies across the country. Rodriguez began his career at Booz Allen Hamilton supporting its national security practice.

In his capacity as an expert on game-theoretic applications, he supported the US intelligence community, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security as a lead architect for wargames. He subsequently was a vice president at Sentia Group, an artificial intelligence company, and served as chief marketing officer for NCL Holdings, an international defense corporation. Rodriguez serves as a board director or board advisor of ten venture-backed companies—Duco, Edgybees, Hatch Apps, HighSide, Omelas, Uniken, Ursa Major Technologies, Vantage Robotics, War on the Rocks, and Zignal Labs—as well as the nonprofit organizations Public Spend Forum and Training Leaders International. He is also senior innovation advisor at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Clementine G. Starling

Director, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Clementine G. Starling is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program and a resident fellow within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In her role, she shapes the Center’s US defense research agenda, leads Forward Defense’s team of nine staff and forty fellows, and produces thought leadership on US security strategies and the evolving character of warfare. Her research focuses on long-term US thinking on issues like China’s and Russia’s defense strategies, space security, defense industry, and emerging technology. Prior to launching Forward Defense, Starling served as deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security team, specializing in European security policy and NATO.

From 2016, she supported NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division at two NATO summits (Brussels and London) and organized and managed three senior Atlantic Council task forces on US force posture in Europe, military mobility, and US defense innovation adoption. During her time at the Atlantic Council, Starling has written numerous reports and commentary on US space strategy, deterrence, operational concepts, coalition warfare, and US-Europe relations. She regularly serves as a panelist and moderator at public conferences. Among the outlets that have featured her analysis and commentary are Defense One, Defense News, RealClearDefense, the National Interest, SpaceNews, NATO’s Joint Air and Space Power Conference, the BBC, National Public Radio, ABC News, and Government Matters, among others. Starling was named the 2022 Herbert Roback scholar by the US National Academy of Public Administration. She also served as the 2020 Security and Defense fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy. Originally from the United Kingdom, Starling previously worked in the UK Parliament focusing on technology, defense, Middle East security, and Ukraine. She also supported the Britain Stronger in Europe campaign, championing for the United Kingdom to remain within the European Union. She graduated with honors from the London School of Economics with a BS in international relations and history and is an MA candidate in security studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

Mark J. Massa is an associate director in the Forward Defense program. His work focuses on nuclear deterrence strategy and policy. He holds an MA in security studies and a BSFS in science, technology, and international affairs from Georgetown University.

Delharty M. Manson II is a program assistant in the Forward Defense program. His work focuses on defense innovation and operational concepts. He holds a BA in public policy from the College of William & Mary.

Jacob Mezey is a program assistant in the Forward Defense program. His work focuses on nuclear security, space security, and defense innovation. He holds a BA in history from Yale University.

Acknowledgments

This interim report was written and prepared with the support and input of its authors, Commissioners on the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, and the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

This effort was conducted under the supervision of Commission Director Stephen Rodriguez, Forward Defense Director Clementine Starling, and Forward Defense Associate Director Mark J. Massa. Thank you to Julia Siegel and Christian Trotti for earlier contributions. Special thanks to Atlantic Council CEO Fred Kempe and Barry Pavel for their support of this effort.

This effort has been made possible through the generous support of Booz Allen Hamilton as the Foundational Sponsor as well as sponsorship from Accrete AI, ACT1 Federal, Applied Intuition, Palantir, Peraton, Primer AI, Rebellion Defense, Schmidt Futures, and Snowpoint Ventures.

Foundational sponsor

List of acronyms

ATR: Above threshold reprogramming
BLI: Budget line item
CAS: Cost Accounting Standards
CDAO: Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer
DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DepSecDef: Deputy Secretary of Defense
DIU: Defense Innovation Unit
DoD: US Department of Defense
FFRDC: Federally Funded Research and Development Center
GSA: General Services Administration
IRAD: Independent research & development
JCIDS: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
JROC: Joint Requirements Oversight Council
MCWL: US Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
NDAA: National Defense Authorization Act
NDC: Nontraditional defense companies
OSC: Office of Strategic Capital
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense

OT: Other transaction
PE: Program elements
PEO: Program executive officer / office
RDER: Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve
RDT&E: Research, development, testing, and evaluation
S&T: Science and technology
SAE: Service acquisition executive
SBA: Small Business Agency
SBIR: Small Business Innovation Research program
SDA: Space Development Agency
SOCOM: US Special Operations Command
STRATFI: Strategic Funding Increase
UAS: Uncrewed aerial system
USD(A&S): Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
USD(R&E): Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
USD: Under Secretary of Defense
VC: Venture capital / venture capitalist
VCJCS: Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The post Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption interim report appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Rich Outzen quoted in Middle East Eye on Turkey’s drone carrier

Grady Wilson — Mon, 10 Apr 2023 18:34:52 +0000

The post Rich Outzen quoted in Middle East Eye on Turkey’s drone carrier appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Belarus accuses Ukraine of plotting terrorist attack

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 07 Apr 2023 18:23:57 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Belarus accuses Ukraine of plotting terrorist attack against Russian consulate

On April 4, Belarusian state-controlled TV channel ONT aired a documentary titled “Loud failures of the Ukrainian special services in Belarus. Gaspar did not get in touch.” Reports from Belarus’ State Security Committee (KGB) informed much of the program, which asserted that, under the leadership of Ukrainian special services, a network of Russian and Belarusian citizens planned several terrorist attacks in the Belarusian city of Grodno. The alleged perpetrators reportedly planned to target several facilities, including the Consulate General of Russia, a military enlistment office opposite Zhiliber Park, a military unit in southern Grodno, and two oil depots.

The KGB claimed that Vyacheslav Rozum, an alleged employee of the Main Directorate of Intelligence in the Ukrainian defense ministry, planned the attacks. Ukrainian authorities had not commented on the accusations at the time of writing. According to the documentary, Rozum asked Russian citizen Daniil Krinari, known as Kovalevsky, to form a network of people to carry out terrorist acts. Krinari was reportedly arrested in Grodno in December 2022 and extradited to Russia at the request of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). He was charged in Russia for cooperating with Ukraine and acting in the interests of Ukraine. The Belarusian KGB asserted that, before his extradition, Krinari managed to recruit at least two people, Russian citizen Alexei Kulikov and Belarusian citizen Vadim Patsenko. Kulikov had allegedly fled Russia in 2022 to avoid conscription and moved to Belarus.

The ONT documentary includes interviews with Kulikov and Patsenko, who argue that Rozum asked them to take photos and videos of the target facilities in Grodno. Moreover, Patsenko argued that Vyacheslav tasked him with blowing up an oil depot with a drone. The program claims Ukrainian special services promised Kulikov and Patsenko $10,000 each. While Patsenko and Kulikov allege that Ukrainian security services were involved in the operation, the ONT program does not include concrete evidence to prove this claim.

The documentary also contains an interview with Nikolai Shvets, the main suspect behind a February 26, 2023, attack on an AWACS A-50 Russian military aircraft at Machulishchy airfield in Belarus. Shvets is reported to be a Russian-Ukrainian dual citizen and served in the Ukrainian army. In the ONT interview, he claimed he was working with a person from the Ukrainian security service while planning the sabotage. The Belarusian independent media outlet Nasha Niva reported that Maxim Lopatin, one of arrested suspects in the Machulishchy attack, had a broken jaw when he filmed the ONT doumentary. Nasha Niva suggested that he was possibly beaten by Belarusian law enforcement authorities. Belarus arrested more than twenty people in connection to the February aircraft incident and announced on April 3 that the suspects were charged with committing an act of terrorism, for which the maximum sentence is capital punishment. However, the ONT program again provides no concrete evidence linking Shvets to Ukrainian security services.

In addition, the ONT documentary aired on the same day that Alyaksandr Lukashenka met Sergey Naryshkin, the head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, in Minsk to discuss joint counterterrorism measures undertaken by Belarus and Russia.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Identifying potential host sites for Russian tactical nuclear weapons

On March 28, Belarus confirmed it would accept Russian tactical nuclear weapons. The announcement came after Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on March 25 plans to store tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, promising to build a nuclear weapons storage facility in the country. Putin made the comments after the United Kingdom said it would supply Ukraine with ammunition containing depleted uranium. “The heavy metal is used in weapons because it can penetrate tanks and armour more easily due to its density, amongst other properties,” Reutersreported. On April 4, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu reported the transfer of Iskander-M tactical missiles, which are nuclear capable and have been utilized by the Russian military against Ukraine.

Two days after the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, on February 26, 2022, Belarus approved via referendum constitutional amendments to remove the country’s non-nuclear status. The constitutional change allows Belarus to host nuclear weapons for foreign states.

Amidst the speculation surrounding Russia’s nuclear deployment to Belarus, the most pressing questions concern the potential location of airfields capable of nuclear deployment and which type of equipment is nuclear capable in terms of maintenance and modernization efforts.

Along with the confirmed transfer of the Iskander-M missiles (a mobile, short-range ballistic missile system with a range of up to 500 kilometers), Sukhoi Su-25 fighter jets are also a top contender in the Russian and Belarusian aviation arsenals. This aircraft is capable of carrying two nuclear bombs, which the Russian military categorizes as “special aviation bombs.” In June 2022, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka personally called on Putin to help upgrade and retrofit the Belarusian Su-25 fleet to be nuclear-capable. This resulted in a long-term project to enable Belarusian nuclear capabilities, legalize hosting Russian nuclear technology and nuclear-capable craft, enable joint-training programs for aviation sorties, and direct training for Belarusian pilots.

In conjunction with the Su-25’s capabilities against Ukraine’s current air defence networks and Russia’s non-strategic nuclear policy, Belarus’ acceptance of Russian tactical nuclear weapons can be viewed as escalatory. Video footage showed the Su-25’s capacity to evade Ukraine’s man-portable air defence system (MANPAD).

https://twitter.com/ua_ridna_vilna/status/1569048817110077445

Video footage from the cockpit of a SU-25 aircraft demonstrating its maneuverability and evasion of MANPAD systems. (Source: ua_ridna_vilna/archive)

On April 2, the Russian envoy to Minsk announced that the nuclear weapons deployment would occur along Belarus’ western border. The exact location has not been specified, but Belarus has a number of bases along its western border, including Osovtsy, Ross, and Bereza. However, Lida is a primary staging base for the Belarusian fleet of SU-25s, and open-source researchers have confirmed a large presence of the aircraft on the base. Currently, Osovtsy is not one of the highly utilized bases in Belarus, but its proximity to the western border, especially in terms of proximity to Poland and the northern border of Ukraine, makes it a primary location to watch for potential signs of development, land-clearing operations, and heightened military activity.

Map showing Belarus’ western border and highlighting the locations of the Lida, Ross, and Osovtsy airbases. (Source: DFRLab via Google Maps)

—Kateryna Halstead, Research Assistant, Bologna, Italy

Individuals linked to Russian army form ‘angry patriots club’

On April 1, former Russian army commander Igor Strelkov (also known as Igor Girkin) published a video announcing the formation of the “angry patriots club” (Клуб рассерженных патриотов). According to Strelkov, the club aims “to help Russian armed forces” and “meet the stormy wind that will soon whip our faces as one team.” In the video, Strelkov says that Russia “is moving toward military defeat” because “we got into a long, protracted war for which our economy turned out to be completely unprepared. Neither the army nor the political system was ready for it.” In a Telegram post, Strelkov said the club “was created two weeks ago. So far, organizational issues have not been resolved publicly.” Strelkov previously played a crucial role in forming a separatist movement in the Donbas region.

The video also featured a statement from Pavel Gubarev, who in 2014 proclaimed himself the commander of the Donbas People’s Militia. In the video, he says, “We are angry that we are going from one defeat to another, and nothing changes.” He called the system in Russia “thievish and corrupt” and said the Russian elite are “elite in catastrophe.”

The video further featured Vladimir Grubnik, who in 2015 was arrested in Ukraine in connection to an explosion near a Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) building in Odesa; in 2019, he was part of a prisoner exchange and returned to the Russian forces in Donbas. Grubnik said that defeat would lead to Russia falling apart.

Vladimir Kucherenko, an Odesa-born Russian propagandist better known by his pen name Maksim Kalashnikov, said, “We are not afraid to criticize the actions of the government. Why? Because it can somehow help victory. Otherwise, they will do nothing, they will not move.” He called the Russian elite “looters,” “resource grabbers,” and “corrupts.” He predicted the war would turn into “carnage to death” and that the “corrupt Russian elites” would organize a coup that would “betray the country” by agreeing to Russia’s “separation” and “giving up of nuclear arms” in order to “earn the forgiveness of the West.” In 2015, the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture included Kucherenko in the list of Russians “threatening national security.”

Another figure in the video is Maksim Klimov, a pro-Kremlin military expert, who said, “The authorities do not know the real situation.” He added, “They do not hear nor see what is happening in the special military operation zone.” Klimov also did not rule out Russia’s defeat.

The video gained some traction online, garnering 177,000 views on YouTube at the time of writing and 623,600 views and 2,500 shares on Strekov’s Telegram channel. According to TGStat, most of the shares on Telegram came from private accounts. Many Ukrainian media outlets reported on the newly founded club. The DFRLab did not identify any mainstream Russian media outlets reporting on the club besides Kommersant, a Kremlin-approved media outlet focused on business.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Resident Fellow, Riga, Latvia

Russian propaganda reaches Ukrainian users via Facebook ads

This week, the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security (CSCIS) and Ukrainian civil society members reported that Facebook advertising campaigns are being used to spread negative content about Ukraine. The ads range from posts that claim “Romania wants to annex Ukrainian territories” to videos that claim “This is the end. There are no men to fight for Ukraine.” While these campaigns were quickly de-platformed and the pages sharing them were banned, the DFRLab was able to investigate some of the ads via the Facebook Ad Library. The DFRLab previously reported on Facebook ads promoting pro-Russia disinformation to Ukrainian users.

The ads included links to the website luxurybigisland.net, with some ads sharing variations of the URL, such as luxurybigisland.net/rbk or luxurybigisland.net/pravda. The website was built using the Russian website builder Tilda, and its the landing page featured German text that translates to, “Nothing that can’t be removed. We care for your textiles as gently as possible with the utmost care, iron and steam, so that you can enjoy your clothes for a long time. We care.” The same phrase appeared on the now-defunct Tilda-made website google-seo-top.com and the website of a German textile care company. Registration data for luxurybigisland.net is redacted, but WhoIs data for google-seo-top.com shows that the website was registered in Russia. Both luxurybigisland.net and google-seo-top.com include metadata, shown in Google results, that states, in German, “the USA are against the entire world.”

A composite image of a Google search result showing google-seo-top.com (top) and an archive of luxurybigisland.net (bottom) sharing an identical German phrase in their metadata. (Source: Google/Google cache, top; Luxurybigisland.net/archive, bottom)

One URL shared in the ads, luxurybigisland.net/pravda, remained online at the time of writing. The URL redirects to a forged article mimicking the Ukrainian news outlet Pravda. The article shared in the ads never appeared on the authentic Pravda website, but its byline cited a genuine journalist working at the outlet. The DFRLab confirmed the article was a forgery by reviewing the journalist’s author page on the authentic Pravda website, reviewing Pravda’s archived section, conducting a Google search for the forged headline, and then a more specific website search via Google.

Visually the forged website is identical to the authentic one and even features links to contact information copied from the original website. However, the forged website’s image format is different. The text of the forged article claims that the Ukrainian economy is heavily damaged and that “continuation of the war will lead to even greater losses in the economy.” The data shared in the article appears to be copied from multiple media sources and is not false, but the article’s framing contains pro-Russian sentiments as it calls for Ukraine’s surrender.

A second forged article, discovered by CSCIS, was shared on the now-offline URL luxurybigisland.net/RBK. The article mimicked the website of the reputable Ukrainian outlet RBC.

Meta itself has taken – and continues to take – action against similar cross-platform, pro-Russia networks that push users to websites designed to impersonate legitimate news organizations. The DFRLab could not tie its identified assets to those previous Meta actions, but there is some probability that they were related given the similarity of behavior.

A Facebook page with “Cripto” in its name shared some of the ads. The DFRLab identified another Facebook page with the word Cripto in the name sharing pro-Kremlin narratives via Facebook ads. The ads pushed a false story claiming there was a “riot in Kyiv over losses.” CSCIS previously debunked another narrative pushed by a similarly named page that also fomented anti-Ukrainian military sentiment.

A composite image of two ads from pages with “cripto” in the name. The first, at left, is the Facebook page identified by the DFRLab, while the second, at right, is an earlier ad previously identified by CSCIS. (Source: Cripto ukijed, left; Cripto nucergeq, right)

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Poland and Ukraine sign cooperation deal for production of tank shells

During Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Poland, Polish manufacturer Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa and Ukroboronprom signed a cooperation agreement for the joint production of 125-mm tank ammunition. The agreement assumes that the deployment of new production lines will be in Polish cities and the agreement indicates that they plan to produce a large amount of ammunition for 125-mm guns. The decision to start production in Poland was made due to the high risks of Russian missile attacks on production facilities if they were to be based in Ukraine. In place of locating the production in the country, the Ukrainian side will provide technologies and highly qualified specialists with experience in production. This will be the second factory that will produce 125-mm tank shells.

The supply of shells is of particular importance to Ukrainian forces, which are preparing a counter-offensive in southern and eastern Ukraine as heavy fighting with the Russian army continues in the Bakhmut and Donetsk regions.

Separately, German manufacturer Rheinmetall is building a service center for Western military equipment used by Ukraine’s armed forces in Romania, Reuters reported on April 2. The construction for the center is already underway in the Romanian city of Satu Mare, close to the country’s border with Ukraine. The hub is expected to open later this month.

This development is happening against the background of diplomatic activity and statements. Ukraine is not ready to sign any peace agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin, but the war could end as early as this year, according to an April 5 interview with Ukraine’s Minister of Defense Oleksii Rezniko, who said, “I think this war will end soon. Of course, I would like it not to start, but I personally believe in this year as a year of victory.”

Rezniko also commented on a statement made in March by Czech Republic President Petr Pavel, who claimed that Ukraine had only one chance to conduct a successful counter-offensive this year. “I think that the president of the Czech Republic now speaks more like a military man than a politician, and the logic of the military is such that they constantly calculate the worst options. But even if this is his assessment, it is subjective, and he still lays down useful for us. The message is that European countries should unite more powerfully and strengthen assistance to Ukraine,” said Reznikov. Later, Andriy Sybiha, an adviser to Zelenskyy, told the Financial Times that Kyiv is willing to discuss the future of Crimea with Moscow if its forces reach the border of the Russian-occupied peninsula.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

The post Russian War Report: Belarus accuses Ukraine of plotting terrorist attack appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How to keep Western tech out of Russian weapons

Aleksander Cwalina — Tue, 04 Apr 2023 18:13:20 +0000

One prong of the Western response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been the designation of strong sanctions and export controls to punish Russian aggression and limit the Kremlin’s ability to effectively wage war. However, numerous recent reports have revealed that some Russian weapons continue to utilize components ostensibly coming from Western countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union.

A joint March 2023 International Partnership for Human Rights and Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO) report found Western components critical in the construction and maintenance of drones, missiles, and communications complexes in weapons used by Russia in Ukraine. Also in March, the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center convened a panel of experts for a virtual event to discuss how to stem the flow of dual-use technology to Russia. Moderated by Ambassador John Herbst, panelists described how sanctioned Western tech gets to Russia and offered concrete recommendations to better implement and enforce export bans on Moscow.

Panelists noted that companies and manufacturers could simply be unaware their products are entering the Russian market. Though distributors may believe they are selling dual-use components to non-sanctioned consumer markets, many components are resold through secondary markets such as Hong Kong or Turkey and end up in Russia. Urging more due diligence, Olena Tregub, executive director of NAKO, explained, “if a company has a client from Turkey, for example, it should ask if the product is for Russia. They should study the supply chain.”

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While the West should be lauded for the speed and breadth of sanctions and export controls imposed on Moscow, compliance offices are still catching up. “Western companies and countries still seem to be finding their footing when it comes to compliance, implementation, and maintenance of these restrictions,” said Jack Crawford, research analyst at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). According to Crawford, Western governments lack the capacity to effectively monitor and act against Russian sanctions evasion. This results in delays, not only in dealing with sanctions breaches but also in terms of identifying them in the first place.

As for the private sector, Sam Jones, president and co-founder of the Heartland Initiative, noted that investors and companies have increased responsibility when conducting business in respect to conflict-affected areas such as Ukraine. Jones said companies should be more diligent in determining the end use of their products, as outlined in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and argued that “companies would be well advised to take the findings in these reports seriously and consider the potential material risk in terms of future investments.”

Western companies and investors also do not always appear to recognize dual-use components as belonging to the same category as other heavily restricted military technology, such as cluster munitions and anti-personnel landmines. This puts dual-use components in a sanctions gray area. Jones suggested that future steps could include increased restrictions on dual-use components through conduct-based exclusion, which would target repurposed components in terms of how they are actually used and not through their intended use.

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Another key element in efforts to successfully control Russian access to critical Western tech is effective monitoring and enforcement of sanctions. This is an area in which governments can cooperate effectively with civil society, NGOs, and think tanks.

Benjamin Schmitt, senior fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Department of Physics and Astronomy and Kleinman Center for Energy Policy, noted that Western companies and NGOs “have easily available open-source intelligence tools at their fingertips, whether they’re commodity trading platforms or automatic identification system-based vessel tracking websites.” These tools empower watchdog organizations and risk assessment committees in governmental and non-governmental organizations to monitor malign transfers of products and technologies that would undermine sanctions efficacy.

Panelists pointed out that the implementation of sanctions oversight depends in large part on increased interoperability between business, government, and civil society powered by information exchange, open dialogue, and cooperation with emerging intelligence technology and organizations.

Schmitt cautioned that Western hesitancy toward sanctioning Western-based entities could be a real threat to an effective sanctions regime. He pointed out that Nord Stream AG, the company behind the Nord Stream 2 pipeline from Russia to Germany, evaded Western sanctions despite majority ownership by Russian state-owned Gazprom, because the company was based in Switzerland. Considering that Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine aims to fracture Western political and financial stability, it is key that Western countries work in concert and take every step possible to slow the Kremlin’s efforts to control Ukraine and threaten European security.

Tregub put it more bluntly: “War crimes are a Russian strategy. To implement this strategy, Russia needs to build weapons. Without Western components, Russia wouldn’t be able to accomplish its war aims.”

Aleksander Cwalina is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Disclaimer: The purpose of the International Partnership for Human Rights and NAKO report is to explain and illustrate how Western-made components are used by Russia to commit suspected war crimes in Ukraine. To achieve this, the report identifies several companies and governments who are believed to be involved in the manufacturing of components which have been acquired by the Russian military and are used in their military hardware. For the avoidance of doubt, the authors of the report do not allege any legal wrongdoing on the part of the companies who manufacture the components and do not suggest that they have any involvement in any sanctions evasion-related activity. Furthermore, the authors of the report do not impute that the companies which make the components are involved in directly or indirectly supplying the Russian military and/or Russian military customers in breach of any international (or their own domestic) laws or regulations restricting or prohibiting such action. Where a link is drawn between manufacturers and the weapons being used in suspected war crimes, this is done solely to highlight ethical and moral concerns. The existence of counterfeit components is a recognized global problem. The authors of the report recognize the possibility that components featuring the logos and/or branding of named entities may not have indeed been manufactured by said entities. However, given a) leaked Russian “shopping lists” showing the intent to acquire components manufactured by such companies in order to support its military, and b) the history of Soviet and Russian military procurement efforts targeting leading global technology companies, the authors of the report have worked on the assumption that the components they and third parties have identified are genuine.

What does the record of combat in the year since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine herald about the future character of ground war? Defense analysts are split on whether the conflict manifests transformative change or merely reinforces the verities of ground combat. On the one hand, the bulk of each side’s formations are armed with decades-old equipment and trained in Soviet-era tactics. However, both forces are adapting, and the Ukrainian military is demonstrating an impressive propensity to improvise and innovate. In particular, Russia was not prepared for Ukraine’s convergence of new capabilities in command and control, persistent surveillance, and massed, precision fires which are changing the game of ground warfare.

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Game-changers or little-changed? Implications of ground combat in Ukraine

Experts discuss what lessons policymakers should draw from land warfare in Ukraine and what adaptations the United States, as well as allies and partners, should make to their force posture and plans.

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Verities of ground combat

The Russo-Ukraine war has reinforced important continuities in military operations. These include the importance of preparation, logistics, and industrial capacity which are the core components needed to sustain a capable force. The war has also driven home the importance of both massed and precision fires. Cannon artillery has played a central role in the war, firing about two million rounds to date. Ukrainian forces have also adeptly employed long-range High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) to dramatically damage Russian ammunition resupply. Artillery fires have been, and will continue to be, crucial for supporting maneuver, degrading adversary communications and logistical capabilities, and destroying or suppressing adversary artillery. Consequently, the industrial capacity to produce the necessary ammunition, maintenance equipment, and systems to replace losses, will remain a defining feature of military preparedness.

Game-changers

The Ukrainian military has combined existing and new technologies to develop three capabilities that are dramatically altering the dynamics on the battlefield. First, Ukraine has developed truly connected, high-speed command and control. Second, Ukraine has access to near-persistent surveillance of the battlespace. Third, Ukraine’s skilled use of precision artillery, drones, and loitering munitions demonstrated how their smaller, lighter forces could defeat Russia’s offensive.

Recommendations

Recognize that these game-changing capabilities are giving new and powerful advantages to defenders in ground combat.
Structure and organize forces to operate in an environment of ubiquitous surveillance.
Prepare for ground combat in which large numbers of “semiautonomous” loitering munitions dominate the battlefield.
Recognize ground-based missiles and drones as key instruments of air power.
Engage the commercial sector as a key source of technology and innovation.

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About the author

T.X. Hammes

Distinguished Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Dr. Thomas X. Hammes joined Institute for National Strategic Studies in June 2009. His areas of expertise include future conflict, the changing character of war, military strategy, operational concepts, and insurgency. Dr. Hammes earned a Bachelor of Science from the Naval Academy in 1975 and holds a Masters of Historical Research and a Doctorate in Modern History from Oxford University. He is a Distinguished Graduate from the Canadian National Defence College. He has published three books: Deglobalization and International Security; The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century; and The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, the Corps’ Ethos, and the Korean War. He has also published over 160 articles. His publications have been used widely in staff and defense college curricula in the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and Singapore. Dr. Hammes has lectured extensively at leading academic and military institutions in the United States and abroad. Prior to his retirement from active duty, Dr. Hammes served 30 years in the Marine Corps to include command of an intelligence battalion, an infantry battalion and the Chemical Biological Response Force. He participated in military operations in Somalia and Iraq and trained insurgents in various locations.

DFRLab confirms aerial strikes on industrial plants north of Bakhmut

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The 5×5—Conflict in Ukraine’s information environment

Simon Handler — Wed, 22 Mar 2023 04:01:00 +0000

This article is part of The 5×5, a monthly series by the Cyber Statecraft Initiative, in which five featured experts answer five questions on a common theme, trend, or current event in the world of cyber. Interested in the 5×5 and want to see a particular topic, event, or question covered? Contact Simon Handler with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at SHandler@atlanticcouncil.org.

Just over one year ago, on February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of neighboring Ukraine. The ensuing conflict, Europe’s largest since World War II, has not only besieged Ukraine physically, but also through the information environment. Through kinetic, cyber, and influence operations, Russia has placed Ukraine’s digital and physical information infrastructure—including its cell towers, networks, data, and the ideas that traverse them—in its crosshairs as it seeks to cripple Ukraine’s defenses and bring its population under Russian control.

Given the privately owned underpinnings of the cyber and information domains by technology companies, a range of local and global companies have played a significant role in defending the information environment in Ukraine. From Ukrainian telecommunications operators to global cloud and satellite internet providers, the private sector has been woven into Ukrainian defense and resilience. For example, Google’s Threat Analysis Group reported having disrupted over 1,950 instances in 2022 of Russian information operations aimed at degrading support for Ukraine, undermining its government, and building support for the war within Russia. The present conflict in Ukraine offers lessons for states as well as private companies on why public-private cooperation is essential to building resilience in this space, and how these entities can work together more effectively.

We brought together a group of experts to provide insights on the war being waged through the Ukrainian information environment and take away lessons for the United States and its allies for the future.

#1 How has conflict in the information environment associated with the war in Ukraine compared to your prior expectations?

Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Baltics, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council:

“As the war in Ukraine started, everyone was expecting to see Russia conducting offensive information influence operations targeting Europe. Yes, we have identified and researched Russia’s coordinated information influence campaigns on Meta’s platforms and Telegram. These campaigns targeted primarily European countries, and their execution was unprofessional, sloppy, and without much engagement on respective platforms.”

Silas Cutler, senior director for cyber threat research, Institute for Security and Technology (IST):

“A remarkable aspect of this conflict has been how Ukraine has maintained communication with the rest of the world. In the days leading up to the conflict, there was a significant concern that Russia would disrupt Ukraine’s ability to report on events as they unfolded. Instead of losing communication, Ukraine has thrived while continuously highlighting through social media its ingenuity within the conflict space. Both the mobilization of its technical workforce through the volunteer IT_Army and its ability to leverage consumer technology, such as drones, have shown the incredible resilience and creativity of the Ukrainian people.”

Roman Osadchuk, research associate, Eurasia, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council:

“The information environment was chaotic and tense even before the invasion, as Russia waged a hybrid war since at least the annexation of Crimea and war in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. Therefore, the after-invasion dynamic did not bring significant surprises, but intensified tension and resistance from Ukrainian civil society and government toward Russia’s attempts to explain its unprovoked invasion and muddle the water around its war crimes. The only things that exceeded expectations were the abuse of fact-checking toolbox WarOnFakes and the intensified globalization of the Kremlin’s attempts to tailor messages about the war to their favor globally.”

Emma Schroeder, associate director, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council:

“The information environment has been a central space and pathway throughout which this war is being fought. Russian forces are reaching through that space to attack and spread misinformation, as well as attacking the physical infrastructure underpinning this environment. The behavior, while novel in its scale, is the continuation of Russian strategy in Crimea, and is very much living up to expectations set in that context. What has surpassed expectations is the effectiveness of Ukrainian defenses, in coordination with allies and private sector partners. The degree to which the international community has sprung forward to provide aid and assistance is incredible, especially in the information environment where such global involvement can be so immediate and transformative.”

Gavin Wilde, senior fellow, Technology and International Affairs Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:

“The volume and intensity of cyber and information operations has roughly been in line with my prior expectations, though the degree of private and commercial activity was something that I might not have predicted a year ago. From self-selecting out of the Russian market to swarming to defend Ukrainian networks and infrastructure, the outpouring of support from Western technology and cybersecurity firms was not on my bingo card. Sustaining it and modeling for similar crises are now key.”

#2 What risks do private companies assume in offering support or partnership to states engaged in active conflict?

Aleksejeva: “Fewer and fewer businesses are betting on Russia’s successful economical future. Additionally, supporting Russia in this conflict in any way is morally unacceptable for most Western companies. Chinese and Iranian companies are different. As for Ukraine, supporting it is morally encouraged, but is limited by many practicalities, such as supply chain disruptions amid Russia’s attacks.”

Cutler: “By providing support during conflict, companies risk becoming a target themselves. Technology companies such as Microsoft, SentinelOne, and Cloudflare, which have publicly reported their support for Ukraine, have been historically targeted by Russian cyber operations and are already familiar with the increased risk. Organizations with pre-conflict commercial relationships may fall under new scrutiny by nationally-aligned hacktivist groups such as Killnet. This support for one side over the other—whether actual or perceived—may result in additional risk.”

Osadchuk: “An important risk of continuing business as usual [in Russia] is that it may damage a company’s public image and test its declared values, since the continuation of paying taxes within the country-aggressor makes the private company a sponsor of these actions. Another risk for a private company is financial, since the companies that leave a particular market are losing their profits, but this is incomparable to human suffering and losses caused by the aggression. In the case of a Russian invasion, one of the ways to stop the war is to cut funding for and, thus, undermine the Russian war machine and support Ukraine.”

Schroeder: “Private companies have long provided goods and services to combatants outside of the information environment. The international legal framework restricting combatants to targeting ‘military objects’ provides normative protection, as objects are defined as those ‘whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage’ in a manner proportional to the military gain foreseen by the operation. This definition, however, is still subject to the realities of conflict, wherein combatants will make those decisions to their own best advantage. In the information environment, this question becomes more complicated, as cyber products and services often do not fall neatly within standard categories and where private companies themselves own and operate the very infrastructure over and through which combatants engage. The United States and its allies, whether on a unilateral of supranational basis, work to better define the boundaries of civilian ‘participation’ in war and conflict, as the very nature of the space means that their involvement will only increase.”

Wilde: “On one hand, it is important not to falsely mirror onto others the constraints of international legal and normative frameworks around armed conflict to which responsible states strive to adhere. Like Russia, some states show no scruples about violating these frameworks in letter or spirit, and seem unlikely to be inhibited by claims of neutrality from companies offering support to victimized states. That said, clarity about where goods and services might be used for civilian versus military objectives is advisable to avoid the thresholds of ‘direct participation’ in war outlined in International Humanitarian Law.”

#3 What useful lessons should the United States and its allies take away from the successes and/or failures of cyber and information operations in Ukraine?

Aleksejeva: “As for cyber operations, so far, we have not seen successful disruptions achieved by Russia of Ukraine and its Western allies. Yes, we are seeing constant attacks, but cyber defense is much more developed on both sides than before 2014. As for information operations, the United States and its allies should become less self-centered and have a clear view of Russia’s influence activities in the so-called Global South where much of the narratives are rooted in anti-Western sentiment.”

Cutler: “Prior to the start of the conflict, it was strongly believed that a cyber operation, specifically against energy and communication sectors, would act as a precursor to kinetic action. While a WannaCry or NotPetya-scale attack did not occur, the AcidRain attack against the Viasat satellite communication network and other attacks targeting Ukraine’s energy sector highlight that cyber operations of varying effectiveness will play a role in the lead up to a military conflict.”

Osadchuk: “First, cyber operations coordinate with other attack types, like kinetic operations on the ground, disinformation, and influence operations. Therefore, cyberattacks might be a precursor of an upcoming missile strike, information operation, or any other action in the physical and informational dimensions, so allies could use cyber to model and analyze multi-domain operations. Finally, preparation for and resilience to information and cyber operations are vital in mitigating the consequences of such attacks; thus, updating defense doctrines and improving cyber infrastructure and social resilience are necessary.”

Schroeder: “Expectations for operations in this environment have exposed clear fractures in the ways that different communities define as success in a wartime operation. Specifically, there is a tendency to equate success with direct or kinetic battlefield impact. One of the biggest lessons that has been both a success and a failure throughout this war is the role that this environment can play. Those at war, from ancient to modern times, have leveraged every asset at their disposal and chosen the tool they see as the best fit for each challenge that arises—cyber is no different. While there is ongoing debate surrounding this question, if cyber operations have not been effective on a battlefield, that does not mean that cyber is ineffective, just that expectations were misplaced. Understanding the myriad roles that cyber can and does play in defense, national security, and conflict is key to creating an effective cross-domain force.

Wilde: “Foremost is the need to check the assumption that these operations can have decisive utility, particularly in a kinetic wartime context. Moscow placed great faith in its ability to convert widespread digital and societal disruption into geopolitical advantage, only to find years of effort backfiring catastrophically. In other contexts, better trained and resourced militaries might be able to blend cyber and information operations into combined arms campaigns more effectively to achieve discrete objectives. However, it is worth reevaluating the degree to which we assume offensive cyber and information operations can reliably be counted on to play pivotal roles in hot war.”

A parallel terrain: Public-private defense of the Ukrainian information environment

Untangling the Russian web: Spies, proxies, and spectrums of Russian cyber behavior

Hackers, Hoodies, and Helmets: Technology and the changing face of Russian private military contractors

#4 How do comparisons to other domains of conflict help and/or hurt understanding of conflict in the information domain?

Aleksejeva: “Unlike conventional warfare, information warfare uses information and psychological operations during peace time as well. By masking behind sock puppet or anonymous social media accounts, information influence operations might be perceived as legitimate internal issues that polarize society. A country might be unaware that it is under attack. At the same time, as the goal of conventional warfare is to break an adversary’s defense line, information warfare fights societal resilience by breaking its unity. ‘Divide and rule’ is one of the basic information warfare strategies.”

Cutler: “When looking at the role of cyber in this conflict, I think it is critical to examine the history of Hacktivist movements. This can be incredibly useful for understanding the influences and capabilities of groups like the IT_Army and Killnet.”

Osadchuk: “The information domain sometimes reflects the kinetic events on the ground, so comparing these two is helpful and could serve as a behavior predictor. For instance, when the Armed Forces of Ukraine liberate new territories, they also expose war crimes, civilian casualties, and damages inflicted by occupation forces. In reaction to these revelations, the Kremlin propaganda machine usually launches multiple campaigns to distance themselves, blame the victim, or even denounce allegations as staged to muddy the waters for certain observers.”

Schroeder: “It is often tricky to carry comparisons over different environments and context, but the practice persists because, well, that is just what people do—look for patterns. The ability to carry over patterns and lessons is essential, especially in new environments and with the constant developments of new tools and technologies. Where these comparisons cause problems is when they are used not as a starting point, but as a predetermined answer.”

Wilde: “It is problematic, in my view, to consider information a warfighting ‘domain,’ particularly because its physical and metaphorical boundaries are endlessly vague and evolving—certainly relative to air, land, sea, and space. The complexities and contingencies in the information environment are infinitely more than those in the latter domains. However talented we may be at collecting and analyzing millions of relevant datapoints with advanced technology, these capabilities may lend us a false sense of our ability to control or subvert the information environment during wartime—from hearts and minds to bits and bytes.”

#5 What conditions might make the current conflict exceptional and not generalizable?

Aleksejeva: “This war is neither ideological nor a war for territories and resources. Russia does not have any ideology that backs up its invasion of Ukraine. It also has a hard time maintaining control of its occupied territories. Instead, Russia has many disinformation-based narratives or stories that justify the invasion to as many Russian citizens as possible including Kremlin officials. Narratives are general and diverse enough, so everyone can find an explanation of the current invasion—be it the alleged rebirth of Nazism in Ukraine, the fight against US hegemony, or the alleged historical right to bring Ukraine back to Russia’s sphere of influence. Though local, the war has global impact and makes countries around the world pick sides. Online and social media platforms, machine translation tools, and big data products provide a great opportunity to bombard any internet user in any part of the world with pro-Russia massaging often tailored to echo historical, racial, and economic resentments especially rooted in colonial past.”

Cutler: “During the Gulf War, CNN and other cable news networks were able to provide live coverage of military action as it was unfolding. Now, real-time information from conflict areas is more broadly accessible. Telegram and social media have directly shaped the information and narratives from the conflict zone.”

Osadchuk: “The main difference is the enormous amount of war content, ranging from professional pictures and amateur videos after missile strikes to drone footage of artillery salvos and bodycam footage of fighting in the frontline trenches—all making this conflict the most documented. Second, this war demonstrates the need for drones, satellite imagery, and open-source intelligence for successful operations, which distances it from previous conflicts and wars. Finally, it is exceptional due to the participation of Ukrainian civil society in developing applications, like the one alerting people about incoming shelling or helping find shelter; launching crowdfunding campaigns for vehicles, medical equipment, and even satellite image services; and debunking Russian disinformation on social media.”

Schroeder: “One of the key lessons we can take from this war is the centrality of the global private sector to conflict in and through the information environment. From expedited construction of cloud infrastructure for the Ukrainian government to Ukrainian telecommunications companies defending and restoring services along the front lines to distributed satellite devices, providing flexible connectivity to civilians and soldiers alike, private companies have undoubtedly played an important role in shaping both the capabilities of the Ukrainian state and the information battlespace itself. While we do not entirely understand the incentives that drove these actions, an undeniable motivation that will be difficult to replicate in other contexts is the combination of Russian outright aggression and comparative economic weakness. Companies and their directors felt motivated to act due to the first and, likely, free to act due to the second. Private sector centrality is unlikely to diminish and, in future conflicts, it will be imperative for combatants to understand the opportunities and dependencies that exist in this space within their own unique context.”

Wilde: “My sense is that post-war, transatlantic dynamics—from shared norms to politico-military ties—lent significant tailwinds to marshal resource and support to Ukraine (though not as quickly or amply from some quarters as I had hoped). The shared memory of the fight for self-determination in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s to early 1990s still has deep resonance among the publics and capitals of the West. These are unique dynamics, and the degree to which they could be replicated in other theaters of potential conflict is a pretty open question.”

Simon Handler is a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative within the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab). He is also the editor-in-chief of The 5×5, a series on trends and themes in cyber policy. Follow him on Twitter @SimonPHandler.

The Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, under the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), works at the nexus of geopolitics and cybersecurity to craft strategies to help shape the conduct of statecraft and to better inform and secure users of technology.

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Russian War Report: DFRLab confirms aerial strikes on industrial plants north of Bakhmut

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 17 Mar 2023 14:07:42 +0000

Security

Battle for Vuhledar highlights tensions between Wagner and Russian defense ministry

Tracking narratives

Russian channels amplify Quran desecration video

International response

European allies train Ukrainian forces on tank operation

DFRLab confirms aerial strikes on industrial plants north of Bakhmut

Russian armed forces continue their offensive inside the contested city of Bakhmut. At the time of writing, the western part of Bakhmut remained under Ukrainian control, with the Bakhmutka River acting as a buffer zone between the artillery and infantry forces deployed on either side of the waterway. Russian missile and aerial strikes targeted intermediary positions to push back Ukrainian armed forces, from Yahidne in the north towards Bakhmut industrial plants.

The DFRLab collected open-source satellite imagery dating back to the first two weeks of March to document missile strikes on an industrial plant in the north of Bakhmut. The imagery was collected from the European Space Agency’s Sentinel hub using images provided by satellite constellation Sentinel-2.

Analysis of the damage inflicted on buildings in the area reveals that potential missiles struck buildings belonging to two different industrial plants. The easternmost plant is the Bakhmut non-ferrous metals factory.

Satellite imagery showed the factory’s main building was destroyed, with a second building damaged. Traces of burns on the roof of the building can be seen from an explosion. This building belongs to the Makiivka metal construction plant.

Sentinel-2 satellite imagery north of Bakhmut released on March 4, 2023, annotated by the DFRLab. (Source: DFRLab via ESA/Sentinel-2, Ukraine Control Map)

Sentinel-2 satellite imagery north of Bakhmut released on March 14, 2023, with DFRLab annotations. Dark spots on the bottom show a damaged building belonging to the metal construction factory. Destroyed houses seen in the top left part of the image are where the non-ferrous metal factory once stood. (Source: DFRLab via ESA/Sentinel-2, Ukraine Control Map)

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Battle for Vuhledar highlights tensions between Wagner and Russian defense ministry

Eastern Ukraine continues to be a key arena for clashes as Russian forces attempt to advance in the directions of Vuhledar and Bakhmut. Ukrainian forces are using remote mining near Vuhledar, according to a March 16 report from UK defense intelligence. The remote anti-armor mine system (RAAMS) makes it possible to create an anti-tank minefield up to seventeen kilometers away from the firing unit. The United Kingdom reported that Ukraine was also firing the mines behind advancing Russian forces, leading to additional losses in the event of a retreat. The United Kingdom also reported that there is a “realistic possibility” that Russia’s push for Vuhledar is driven by the Russian defense ministry’s desire to produce better results than Wagner, who are driving Russia’s tactical progress towards Bakhmut.

The UK report supports the DFRLab’s analysis that the ongoing offensive operations in eastern Ukraine are provoking a competition between the different military units, particularly Wagner and the Russian defense ministry. In the direction of Bakhmut, Wagner’s forces continue to be the primary units fighting within the city. However, the combat has been difficult, and the urban environment makes progress challenging. In addition, Chechen forces in Bakhmut continue to fight alongside the Ukrainian army against Russian positions.

Russian forces are also having issues restoring tanks, according to a report published by Ukrainian outlet Defense Express. The 103rd armored repair plant in Russia has reportedly not been able to restore T-62 tanks under the terms originally contracted, which would have required the plant to restore twenty-two to twenty-three tanks per month. According to Defense Express, however, the real capacity of the plant is likely around seven tanks per month. On March 6, UK defense intelligence reported that Russia was deploying outdated T-62 tanks to the battlefield due to major losses in armored equipment.

Acts of sabotage against occupying Russian forces continue in the direction of Kherson. On March 11, the Telegram channel of the pro-Ukraine resistance movement Atesh reported that its members blew up a railway line in the Kherson region, between Radensk and Abrykosivka. This appears to be an attempt by Atesh partisans to impede logistics for the Russian troops deployed in the area.

Ukraine has also reported new arrests of alleged Russian infiltrators. On March 16, the Security Service of Ukraine reported the detention of two women accused of tracking the movement of Ukrainian equipment in the interest of Russian intelligence. The women also allegedly photographed the results of attacks on Ukrainian facilities. One of the women reportedly worked as a nurse in Ukraine’s territorial defense combat unit.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian channels amplify Quran desecration video

Footage emerged online on March 15 showing the burning of the Islamic holy book, the Quran. Russian social media channels shared the one minute and six second video, accusing Ukrainian soldiers of being behind the desecration. The video sparked a wave of reactions on social media, particularly on Twitter, where a TikTok version of the video went viral. The TikTok video has since been removed.

The video is difficult to analyze and cannot be verified. It does not show the faces of the alleged Ukrainian soldiers. The people in the video are speaking broken Ukrainian and use a Russian military knife, said Oleg Nikolenko, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s foreign ministry.

A screenshot of the video, published in the Readovka Telegram channel on March 15, shows a knife allegedly used by the Russian army. (Source: Readovkanews/archive)

The video was denounced as a provocation by Said Imagilov, Mufti of the Spiritual Administration of Ukraine’s Muslims, as well as the Ukrainian military and Ukrainian officials.

Ukraine’s army has Muslim soldiers in its ranks, and Imagilov is an active participant on the frontlines defending Kyiv. The Ukrainian army is also supported by several Chechen units, the most well-known of which are the two volunteer battalions, the Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion and the Sheikh Mansur Battalion. Chechens are among the most active defenders of Bakhmut, with their Adam special unit operating behind Russian army defense lines.

The provenance of the video remains unknown.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

European allies train Ukrainian forces on tank operation

Ukraine’s Western allies are continuing to help strengthen Kyiv’s defense against Russia by training Ukrainian troops on tank operation and trench warfare. Thierry Breton, European Commissioner for Internal Market, is visiting EU countries in a bid to shore up more ammunition for Ukraine. His first visit was to Bulgaria. This visit came as the Slovak news outlet Pravda published data on March 15 showing that, in the year since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Slovakia has doubled its ammunition production and plans to double it again from current levels.

Meanwhile, Greece and the United States agreed to a deal that will see the US transfer 300 M2 Bradley fighting vehicles to the Greek army as part of a modernization program, according to Greek media reports on March 10. Greece is expected to send Ukraine BMP-1 vehicles and M113 armored carriers in exchange for the purchase of the Bradleys.

On March 13, Spain’s Ministry of Defense announced that ten Ukrainian crews completed training in Spain on operating Leopard 2 tanks. Along with fifty-five servicemen, fifteen Ukrainian technicians also received training. According to El Periódico, “These fifty-five soldiers – some professionals and other reservists – were already on the front line, and their four-week training lasted twelve hours a day.”

In addition, the German army announced it was training Ukrainian troops on the Leopard 2 tanks in Germany. “Training on the weapon systems is not just about how to use it, but also about tactics so that the Ukrainians can achieve the greatest possible effect against their opponents,” said Colonel Heiko Diehl.

Ukrainian servicemen in the United Kingdom also completed training in conducting trench combat in realistic conditions. The program was led by the 5th Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment of the 1st Brigade of the Australian Defense Forces.

Earlier this week, Polish President Andrzej Duda announced that his country would send Ukraine thirty MiG 29 fighter jets. These are essential as Russia strives to achieve air dominance and has increased its aerial strikes throughout Ukraine. On March 14, a video emerged on Twitter showing Ukrainian soldiers taking part in trainings in the French military camp of Canjuers in the south of the country. The soldiers were reportedly training with the AMX-10RC armored personnel carriers. Minister of the Armed Forces of France Sebastien Lecornu confirmed during a defense commission hearing on March 15 that the carriers are already being delivered to Ukraine.

On March 15, the Israeli government approved licenses to export electronic warfare equipment to Ukraine that will help counter Iranian drones.

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

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How the war in Iraq changed the world—and what change could come next

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 17 Mar 2023 12:00:00 +0000

How the war in Iraq changed the world—and what change could come next

Twenty years on from the US invasion of the country, Iraq has fallen off the policymaking agenda in Washington, DC—cast aside in part as a result of the bitter experience of the war, the enormous human toll it exacted, and the passage of time. But looking forward twenty years and beyond, Iraqis need a great deal from their own leaders and those of their erstwhile liberators. A national reconciliation commission, a new constitution, and an economy less dependent on oil revenue are just some of the areas the experts at the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative highlight in this collection of reflections marking two decades since the US invasion.

What else will it take to transform Iraq into a prosperous, productive regional player? What can the United States do now, with twenty years’ worth of hindsight? And just how far-reaching were the effects of the war? Twenty-one experts from across the Atlantic Council take on these questions in a series of short essays and video interviews below.

Oula Kadhum on what March 20, 2003 was like for a young Iraqi

How the Iraq war changed…

Scroll and click through the carousel below to jump to a response:

The cause of democracy in the region

When the United States invaded Iraq two decades ago, one of the public justifications for the war was that it would help spread democracy throughout the Middle East. The invasion, of course, had the opposite effect: it unleashed a bloody sectarian conflict in Iraq, badly undermining the reputation of democracy in the region and America’s credibility in promoting it.

Yet the frictions between rulers and ruled that helped precipitate the US invasion of Iraq persist. The citizens of the region, increasingly educated and connected to the rest of the world, have twenty-first-century political aspirations, but continue to be ruled by unaccountable nineteenth-century-style autocrats. Absent a change, these frictions will continue to shape political developments in the region, often in cataclysmic fashion, over the next two decades.

The George W. Bush administration’s failures in Iraq severely set back the cause of democracy in the region. In the perceptions of Arab publics, democratization became synonymous with the exercise of American military power. Meanwhile, Iraq’s chaos strengthened the hand of the region’s autocrats: as inept or heavy-handed as their own rule might be, it paled in comparison to the breakdown of order and human slaughter in Iraq.

Citizens’ frustrations with their political leaders finally erupted in the Arab Spring of 2010 and 2011, but their protests failed to end autocracy in the region. Gulf monarchs were able to throw money at the problem, first to shore up their own rule and then other autocracies in the region. The Egyptian experiment with democracy proved short-lived; Tunisia’s endured far longer but also appears over. More broadly, the region has seen democratic backsliding in Lebanon and Israel as well.

The yawning gap between what citizens want and what they get from their governments remains. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators show that, on aggregate, states in the region are no more politically stable, effectively governed, accountable, or participatory than two decades ago. Unless political leaders address that gap, further Arab Spring-like protests—or even social revolution—are probable.

Having apparently gotten out of the business of invasion and occupation following the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States could play a new and constructive role here. It could both cajole and assist the region’s political leaders to improve governance for their citizens.

The United States exacerbated political tensions in the region two decades ago; now it has an opportunity to help ameliorate them.

—Stephen R. Grand is the author of Understanding Tahrir Square: What Transitions Elsewhere Can Teach Us About the Prospects for Arab Democracy. He is a nonresident senior fellow with the Council’s Middle East programs.

State sovereignty

Since the seventeenth century, more or less, world order has been based on the concept of state sovereignty: states are deemed to hold the monopoly of force within mutually recognized territories, and they are generally prohibited from intervening in one another’s domestic affairs. The invasion of Iraq challenged this standard in three important ways.

First, the fact of the war represented a direct attack on the sovereignty of the Iraqi state, which undermined the ban on aggressive war. While the Bush administration cast the invasion as a case of preemptive self-defense, it was widely seen as a preventive war of choice against a state that did not pose a clear and present danger. Moreover, the main exceptions to sovereignty that have developed over time, such as ongoing mass atrocities or United Nations authority, were not applicable in Iraq. Thus, the United States dealt a major blow to the rules-based international system of which it was one of the chief architects. This may have made more imaginable later crimes of aggression by other states.

Second, the means of the war, and especially the occupation, powered the reemergence of the private military industry. Driven by the need to sustain two long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US armed forces became dependent on military contractors, which sometimes involved authorizing paid civilians to kill. The US effort to (re)privatize warfare brought back into fashion the use of private military force, generating a multibillion-dollar industry that is here to stay. Over time the spread of private military companies could unspool the state’s exclusive claim to violence and hammer the foundations of the current international system.

Third, the consequences of the war led to the spectacular empowerment of armed nonstate actors in the region and beyond, who launched a full-frontal assault on the sovereignty of many states. The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, of course, emerged amid the brutal contestation of power in post-invasion Iraq and pursued its “caliphate” as an alternative (Sunni) political institution to rival the nation-state. While the threat has been contained, for now, in the Middle East, it is only beginning to gather force on the African continent. In addition, because Iran effectively won the war in Iraq, it was able to sponsor a deep bench of Shia nonstate groups which have eroded state sovereignty in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq itself.

The US invasion of Iraq left us a world with less respect for state sovereignty, more guns for hire, and a dizzying array of well-armed and determined nonstate groups.

—Alia Brahimi is a nonresident senior fellow of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and host of the Guns for Hire podcast.

Abbas Kadhim on the opportunities missed

US-Turkish ties

By launching a war on Turkey’s border, against Turkish advice, in a manner that prejudiced Turkish interests, the United States in 2003 upended a strategic understanding that had dominated bilateral relations for five decades.

During and immediately after the Cold War, Turkey and the United States shared a strategic vision centered on containing the Soviet Union and its proxies. In exchange for strategic cooperation, Washington provided aid, modulated criticisms of Turkish politics, and deferred to Ankara’s sensitivities regarding its geopolitical neighborhood. With notable exceptions (e.g., Turkish opposition to the Vietnam War and US opposition to Turkey’s 1974 Cyprus operation), consensus was the norm and aspiration of both sides. After close collaboration in the Balkans, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan from 1991 to 2001, though, Ankara became increasingly alarmed about the prospect of a new war in Iraq.

Bilateral relations deteriorated sharply after the Turkish parliament voted against allowing the United States to launch combat operations from Turkish soil. The war was longer, bloodier, and costlier than its planners had anticipated. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (known as the PKK and designated by the United States as a terrorist organization in 1997) ended a cease-fire in place since the 1999 capture of its founder, Abdullah Öcalan, and gained broad new freedom of movement and action in northern Iraq. US military aid to Turkey ended, while defense industrial cooperation and military-to-military contacts dropped. In July 2003 US soldiers detained and hooded a Turkish special forces team in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, on suspicions that they were colluding with insurgents. This event, coupled with Turkish anger over the bitter conduct and conclusion of the prewar negotiations, helped fuel a sustained rise in negative views about the United States among the Turkish public.

Sanctions and the war in Iraq damaged Turkish economic interests, though these would rebound from 2005 onward. The relationship of the US military to the PKK—first as tacit tolerance of PKK attacks into Turkey from northern Iraq despite the US presence, and later with employment of the PKK affiliate in Syria as a proxy force against the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)—rendered the frictions of 2003 permanent. That US forces train, equip, and operate with a PKK-linked militia along Turkey’s border today is fruit of the Iraq war, because US-PKK contacts were brokered in northern Iraq, and US indifference to Turkish security redlines traces back to 2003.

The story of US-Turkish estrangement can be told from other perspectives: that Ankara sought strategic independence for reasons broader than Iraq, that President Erdoğan’s anti-Westernism drove divergence, that the countries have fewer shared interests now. There may be truth in these arguments, though they are based largely on speculation and imputed motives. Yet they, too, cannot be viewed except through the lens of the 2003 Iraq War, which came as Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party was assuming power and greatly influenced his subsequent decision-making.

Many effects of the Iraq War have faded, but the strategic alienation of Turkey and the United States has not.

—Rich Outzen, a retired colonel, is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a geopolitical analyst and consultant currently serving private-sector clients as Dragoman LLC.

China’s rise

As George W. Bush took office in 2001, managing the US-China relationship was regarded as a top foreign policy concern. The administration’s focus shifted with 9/11 and a wartime footing—which in turn altered Beijing’s foreign policy and engagement in the Middle East.

A high point in US-China tension came in April with the Hainan Island Incident. The collision of a US signals intelligence aircraft and a Chinese interceptor jet resulted in one dead Chinese pilot and the detention of twenty-four US crew members, whose release followed US Ambassador Joseph Prueher’s delivery of the “letter of the two sorries.”

But after the September 11 attacks, the United States launched the global war on terrorism, and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq became the all-encompassing focal points. While that relieved pressure on China, the US decision to invade Iraq raised serious concerns in Beijing and elsewhere about the direction of global order under US leadership.

American willingness to attack a sovereign government with the stated goal of changing its regime set a worrisome precedent for authoritarian governments. Worries transformed into something else following the global financial crisis in 2008. Chinese leaders became even more wary of US leadership, with former Vice Premier Wang Qishan telling then-Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson after the financial crisis, “Look at your system, Hank. We aren’t sure we should be learning from you anymore.”

The war in Iraq was especially troubling for Chinese leaders. Few believed that the United States would engage in such a disastrous war over something as idealistic as democracy promotion in the Middle East. The dominant assumption was that the war was about maintaining control of global oil—and using that dominance to prevent China from rising to a peer competitor status. The so-called “Malacca Dilemma” became a feature of analysis in China’s strategic landscape: the idea that any power that could control the Strait of Malacca could control oil shipping to China, and therefore its economy. Since then, China has developed the world’s largest navy and invested in ports across the Indian Ocean region through its Maritime Silk Road Initiative. Its defense spending has increased fivefold this century, from $50 billion in 2001 to $270 billion in 2021, making it the second-largest defense spender in the Indo-Pacific region after Japan, and higher than the next thirteen Indo-Pacific countries combined.

Since the Iraq war, the Middle East has become a much greater focus in Chinese foreign policy. In addition to building up its own military, China began discussing security and strategic affairs with Middle East energy suppliers, conducting joint exercises, selling more varied weapons systems, and pursuing a regional presence that increasingly diverges or competes with US preferences.

Would China’s growing presence in the Middle East have followed the same trajectory had the United States not invaded Iraq? Possibly, although one could argue that the same sense of urgency would not have animated decision makers in the People’s Republic of China.

—Jonathan Fulton is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council and host of the China-MENA podcast. He is also an assistant professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi. Follow him on Twitter: @jonathandfulton.

The country’s readiness to meet climate challenges

Over the course of the last two decades, Iraq has become one of the five most vulnerable countries in the world to climate change. It has been affected by rising temperatures, insufficient and diminishing rainfall, intensified droughts that reduce access to water, sand and dust storms, and flooding. Iraq’s environmental ministry warns that the country may face dust storms for more than 270 days per year in the next twenty years.

While not the sole cause of environmental mismanagement in Iraq, the muhasasa system of power sharing has exacerbated and contributed to a culture of corruption and political patronage that has undermined efforts to protect the environment and to sustainably manage Iraq’s natural resources. Muhasasa is an official system that allocates Iraqi government positions and resources based on ethnic and sectarian identity. It may have been a good temporary compromise to promote stability in the early 2000s, but today it is widely viewed as a harmful legacy of the post-invasion occupation period.

In the context of protecting the environment, the muhasasa system has led to a situation where some government officials are appointed to their respective positions without the necessary skills or qualifications to manage resources efficiently or effectively. Forced ethnosectarian balancing has encouraged natural resource misuse for political or personal gain to the immediate detriment of average Iraqis. While muhasasa was intended to promote political stability and prevent marginalization of minority groups, in practice it has contributed to a culture of corruption and nepotism, and undermined efforts to promote good governance and sustainable development.

To address its acute climate challenges, Iraq needs to move away from the sectarian-based power sharing and toward a more inclusive, merit-based system of governance. It must strengthen its environmental regulations, commit itself to sustainable development, and better manage its natural resources for the country and as part of the global effort to mitigate climate change. The international community has a role to play here through supporting technical assistance, capacity building, and providing financial resources to help address these concerns along the way.

—Masoud Mostajabi is an associate director of the Middle East programs at the Atlantic Council.

Iran’s regional footprint

From the outset of the invasion of Iraq, the United States’ decision was built on several dubious premises that the administration masterfully overhyped to build support for its aspirations of removing Saddam Hussein by force. The last two decades have tragically shown the consequences of this decision—with high costs of blood and treasure and a serious blow to American credibility. But from a strategic standpoint, one particular miscalculation continues to create blowbacks to US regional security interests: top US policymakers willfully ignored the need for an adequate nation-rebuilding strategy, leaving a power vacuum that an expansionist Iran could fill.

With the removal of the Baathist regime, Iran finally saw the defeat of a rival it could not best after eight years of one of the region’s bloodiest wars. This cleared the path to influence Iraqi Shia leaders who had long relied on the Islamic theocracy next door for support. Even as some Shia learning centers in Najaf and Karbala challenged (once again) Qom, new opportunities of influence that never existed before opened up for Iran.

By infiltrating Iraq’s political institutions through appointed officials submissive to its regime’s wishes, Iran succeeded in two goals: deterring future threats of Iraqi hostilities and preventing the United States from using Iraqi territories as a platform to invade Iran. Through its Islamic Revolution Guards Corps Qods Force, Iran trained and supplied several militia groups that later officially penetrated Iraq’s security architecture through forces called Popular Mobilization Units, which have repeatedly carried out anti-American attacks. Nevertheless, those groups would eventually prove valuable to the United States in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)—yet even then Iran succeeded in appearing as the protector of Iraq’s sovereignty by immediately equipping the Popular Mobilization Units, unlike the delayed US response that arrived months later.

Regionally, Iran’s military leverage and political allies inside Iraq provided it with a strategic ground link to its network in Syria and Lebanon, where the Qods Force ultimately shifted the political power dynamics to Iran’s advantage, especially as they crucially strengthened engagement in recruiting volunteers to support Bashar al-Assad’s fighters in Syria. Through the land bridge that connects Iran to the Bekaa Valley, Iran has helped spread its weapons-trafficking and money-laundering capabilities while reinforcing an abusive dictatorship in Syria and a crippled state in Lebanon.

Twenty years ago, the United States went to liberate Iraq from its oppressive dictatorship. What it left behind is a void in governance and an alternative system that fell far short of what the United States wanted for Iraq. Meanwhile, the Iranian regime continues to base its identity on anti-Americanism while it gets closer to its political and ideological ambitions. With US sanctions having so far failed to halt Iran’s network of militia training and smuggling—and the attempt to revive the nuclear deal stalled, despite being the main focus of US Iran policy—the question remains: How long will the United States tolerate Iran’s regional ascendancy before it intensifies its efforts toward restraining it?

—Nour Dabboussi is a program assistant to the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs.

How governments counter terrorist financing

Without the experience of the war in Iraq, US and transatlantic economic statecraft would be less agile and less able to prevent terrorist financing. However, more work and continued international commitment is needed to ensure Iraq and its neighbors are able to strengthen and enforce their anti-money-laundering regimes to protect their economies from corruption and deny terrorists and other illicit actors from abusing the global financial system to raise, use, and move funds for their operations.

The tools of economic statecraft, including but not limited to sanctions, export controls, and controlling access to currency, became critical to US national security in the wake of 9/11 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Sanctions and other forms of economic pressure had been applied against the government of Iraq and illicit actors prior to 2003. However, economic pressure and the use of financial intelligence to combat terrorist financing became increasingly sophisticated as the war progressed. Since 2001, the State Department and Treasury have designated more than 500 individuals and entities for financially supporting terrorism in Iraq. Following the money and figuring out how terrorist networks raised, used, and moved funds was a critical aspect in understanding how they operated in Iraq and across the region. Information on terrorist financial networks and facilitators helped identify vulnerabilities for disruption, limiting their ability to fund and carry out terrorist attacks, procure weapons, pay salaries for fighters, and recruit.

Sanctioning the terrorist groups and financial facilitators operating in Iraq and across the region disrupted the groups’ financial flows and operational capabilities while protecting the US and global financial systems from abuse. Targets included al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group, among others. For example, the US Treasury recently sanctioned an Iraqi bank moving millions of dollars from the Revolutionary Guard Corps to Hezbollah, preventing terrorists from abusing the international financial system.

Notably, the fight against terrorist financing set in motion the expansion of the Department of the Treasury’s sanctions programs and helped the US government refine its sanctions framework and enforcement authorities and their broad application.

Equally important, the US government’s efforts and experience in countering the financing of terrorism increased engagement and coordination with foreign partners to protect the global financial system from abuse by illicit actors. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the inter-governmental body responsible for setting international anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist financing standards, strengthened and revised its standards, recommendations, and red flags to account for what the international community learned from the experience of combatting terrorist financing in Iraq. The United States and partner nations provided, and continue to provide, training and resources to build Iraq’s and its neighbors’ capabilities to meet FATF standards and address terrorist financing and money laundering issues domestically.

—Kim Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

—Maia Nikoladze is an assistant director at the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The United States

Perhaps no event since the end of the Cold War shaped American politics more than the invasion of Iraq. It is fair to say that without the Iraq war neither Donald Trump nor Barack Obama would likely have been president.

Weirdly, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is still almost a forbidden topic in GOP foreign policy circles. After the Bush years, a kind of collective-guilt omerta about the Iraq war took hold among Republicans. It was as if US-Iraqi history had started in 2005, or 2006, with Democrats and a few Republicans baying for a needed defeat. It never came. The 2007 surge, as David Petraeus’s counterinsurgency strategy came to be known, was the gutsiest political call by an American leader in my lifetime.

It happened also to be right when very little else about the war was: There were, of course, no weapons of mass destruction found. Iran did expand its power, massively. Iraq did not offer an example of democracy to the region: rather, it horrified the region. It became linked to al-Qaeda only after the invasion. The White House refused to take the insurgency seriously until it was very serious. Iraq pulled attention away from Afghanistan. And of course there were 4,431 Americans killed.

By 2016, the narrative favored by Republicans had become that the execution of the war was flawed. Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, was the villain in this story: But for Bremer’s incomprehensible decision to disband the Iraqi army and institute de-Baathification in early 2003, so the story went, the Iraq war could have succeeded. But in retrospect these decisions were defendable. Bremer was erring on the side of satiating the Shia majority, not the Sunni minority, and trying to reassure them that a decade after they were abandoned in 1991 the United States would deliver them political power. And the one real success of the Iraq war, beginning to end, is that the United States never faced a generalized Shia insurgency.

The other villain was Barack Obama, who played in the sequel. (Obama largely owed his electoral victory to the Iraq war, brilliantly using Hillary Clinton’s vote for the invasion to invalidate her experience and judgment and thus the main argument for her candidacy.) In this version of events, Obama’s precipitous decision to withdraw troops from Iraq in 2011 contributed to the country’s near-collapse three years later under the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). This was basically accurate. The withdrawal of US forces eliminated a key political counterweight from Iraq, and the main incentive for then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to hedge his sectarianism and friendliness with Iran. This accelerated political support for Sunni rejectionist movements like ISIS.

Both the Bremer narrative and the Obama narrative allowed George Bush’s Republican party to avoid revisiting the core questions of American power: intervention, exceptionalism, and its limits—precisely the same questions that had featured prominently in the 2006 and 2008 elections.

This was the broken market that Donald Trump exploited: that Republican voters’ views on Iraq after 2008 looked much like Democratic voters’, but the Republican establishment’s views did not. And it was no accident, in the 2016 presidential primaries, that the two candidates most willing to criticize the interventionism of the 2000s, Trump and Ted Cruz, were the ones who did best.

This debate remains critical. More than any other decision, Bush’s war created the contemporary Middle East. Above all that includes the unprecedented regional dominance of Iran, the power of the Arab Shia, and the constraints on American power in buttressing its traditional allies. That imbalance, combined with a decade-long sense that America is leaving the region and wants no more conflict, has led Sunni Arab states to look for their security in other places.

Especially in the wake of Russia’s war against Ukraine, which if anything has sharpened foreign policy divisions, the Republican party and the United States need a dialectic, not a purge; a discussion, not a proscription; and a reasonable synthesis of the lessons of Iraq. People want to vote for restraint and realism, as much as or more than they want to vote and pay for interventionism and idealism. Was the Iraq War a mistake? Let us start this debate there, and produce something better.

—Andrew L. Peek is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He was previously the senior director for European and Russian affairs at the National Security Council and the deputy assistant secretary for Iran and Iraq at the US Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.

Andrew Peek on the historical context of the 2003 invasion

US foreign policy

The US decision to invade Iraq twenty years ago was, to use the words of Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, a wily French statesman and diplomat of the Napoleonic era, “worse than a crime; it’s a mistake.”

While Saddam Hussein was a monster, and had ignored numerous United Nation-mandated commitments, the US-led effort in 2003 to topple him as president of Iraq was strategically unnecessary. It became the center of a failed mission in nation-building—one that has proved disastrous for US interests in the greater Middle East and beyond.

Iraq was at the center, but it was only one of four failed American interventions in the region. The others were Afghanistan, Libya, and, to a lesser extent, Syria. The operation to take down the Taliban was fast and efficient, but consolidation of a post-Taliban Afghanistan never occurred. Part of the reason for that was the United States’ war of choice in Iraq, which began less than eighteen months after Afghanistan. That sucked up most of the resources and attention for the rest of that decade. But the other reason for US failure in Afghanistan was that we were beguiled by the same siren song that misled us in Iraq: that we could overcome centuries of history and culture and create a stable society at least somewhat closer to US values. Failure on such a scale is not good for the prestige and influence of a superpower.

But that is not the end of it. There is also the domestic side. The misadventures in the greater Middle East were a failure not just of the US government but of the US foreign policy elite. It was a bipartisan affair. Neoconservative thinking dominated the Republican Party throughout the aughts, while liberal interventionism prevailed in the Democratic Party. They were all in for the utopian policies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria.

While the failures in the greater Middle East were widely understood even before the unnecessarily embarrassing 2021 departure from Afghanistan, there has never been a public reckoning. There was nothing like the Church Committee, which in the mid-1970s shined a very harsh light on US failures in Southeast Asia. Few prominent thinkers or officials have publicly acknowledged their failed policy choices. And the same figures who led us into those debacles are still widely quoted on all major foreign policy matters.

This has had the consequence in the United States of providing ground for the growth of neoisolationist thinking. In running for the presidency in 2016, Donald Trump was not wrong in pointing out the failures of elites in both parties in conducting foreign policy in the greater Middle East. Since then, populists on the right have used this insight to undermine the credibility of foreign policy experts. And like generals fighting the last war, they have applied their “insight” from the Middle East to the latest challenges to US interests, such as Moscow’s war on Ukraine.

In this reading, US support for Ukraine is comparable to US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and will result in failure. There is no analysis—simply dismissal—of the dangers that Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine poses to US security and economic prosperity. No recognition that, as Putin has stated numerous times, he wants to restore Kremlin political control over all the states that used to make up the Soviet Union—which includes NATO and European Union (EU) member states. In other words, he seeks to undermine NATO and the EU.

Furthermore, there’s no understanding that despite the presence of American troops, the United States’ local allies in Iraq and Afghanistan could not win—but without one NATO soldier on the battlefield, Ukraine is fighting Russia to a standstill. Indeed, Ukraine has destroyed between 30 percent and 50 percent of Moscow’s conventional military capability. These analogies with the Iraq war ignore the reality that if Putin takes control of Ukraine, the United States will likely spend far more in financial resources and perhaps American lives in defending its NATO allies.

These failures of understanding are not simply or mainly a consequence of US errors in the Middle East. Utopian thinking in the United States and especially Europe was a natural consequence of the absence of great-power war since 1945. Especially since the fall of the Soviet Union, people on both sides of the Atlantic got comfortable with the notion that Russia was no longer an adversary. And isolationism also has a long pedigree in US society. So it would be vastly oversimplifying to blame the confusion of today’s neoisolationists exclusively on US failures in the Middle East. But the strong US response to the challenge of a hostile Soviet Union was possible because a bipartisan approach on containment was endorsed by leaders of both parties. After the United States’ misadventures in Iraq, such endorsements carry less weight today. In US foreign policy as elsewhere, we still do not know what the ultimate impact of the decision to invade Iraq will be.

—John Herbst’s 31-year career in the US Foreign Service included time as US ambassador to Uzbekistan, other service in and with post-Soviet states, and his appointment as US ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006.

What Iraq needs now

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William F. Wechsler on the future of Iraq

A reconciliation commission to rebuild national unity

One of the most devastating shortcomings of the 2003 Iraq invasion was the dismantlement of state institutions and the weakening of the Baghdad central government. That structural vacuum of power and services forced Iraqis back into tribal, religious, and ethnic allegiances, contributing to the nation-state’s fragmentation and exacerbating divisive sectarian discourses and intercommunity tensions. A quota-based constitutional system only served to institutionalize and legitimize the ethnosectarian distribution of power.

Conflicting groups grew further apart over the past two decades and became more motivated by accumulating political positions, hefty oil incomes, and territorial and symbolic gains rather than collectively seeking to rebuild their balkanized nation. Iraqi youth, on the other hand—who campaigned in the name of “We Want a Homeland” [نريد_وطن#] during the 2019 Tishreen (October) protests—seem to have understood what political elites might be missing: the necessity for national reconciliation and memorialization.

The bombing of the al-Askari shrine in Samarra in 2006 unleashed the chaos trapped inside Pandora’s box and resulted in violent Sunni-Shia confrontations, which pushed the country to the brink of civil war. Today, political elites, aware of the fragility and precariousness of the political consensus, pretend the time of friction is over. My firsthand work in Iraqi prisons and camps, and the research projects I led in the country’s conflict zones off the beaten path, such as west of the Euphrates, in Zubair, and in rural areas in the Makhoul Basin, prove the absolute contrary.

A flagrant example of the sectarian ticking bomb that persists in Iraq is the mismanagement of the Sunni populations in the aftermath of the war against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Many pretended that ISIS fighters came from some fictional foreign entity and refused to face the fact that most of them, including their leader, were Iraqi-born and raised, which I observed as an eyewitness working with the International Committee of the Red Cross during the ISIS war in Nineveh and Salahuddin. Many people who were accomplices of the atrocities even engaged in rewriting the narrative altogether after 2017 in the name of national unity.

A number of Sunni populations in Iraq were mystified by their sudden loss of power with the toppling of Saddam Hussein and were in disbelief that the Shia they stigmatized as shrouguis—literally, “easterners,” a derogatory reference used by Sunni elites to refer to Shia Iraqis from the southeast—became the new lords of the land. Instead of engaging in meaningful mediation and reconciliation to work through these social changes, the majority parties preferred to bury their heads in the sand. This tendency led them to allow militia groups to displace and isolate the Sunni inhabitants of a key city like Samarra, to submerge under water the citizens of northern Kirkuk and Salaheddin, or to conceal the evidence incriminating Tikrit Sunnis during the Speicher massacre, in which ISIS fighters killed more than a thousand Iraqi military cadets, most of them Shia.

These are not isolated examples in a chaotic political and constitutional system in which many communities feel persistently misunderstood, including Kurds, Assyrians, Mandaeans, Baha’is, Afro-Iraqis, Turkmen—and even the Shia themselves. The only possible and plausible pathway for the country to be one again in the next twenty years is to engage in an excruciating but indispensable reconciliation process, through which responsibilities are determined, dignity is restored, and justice is served.

—Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

A new constitution

Iraq needs a new constitution. A good constitution spells out the framework and structure of government. It provides essential checks and balances to prevent dictators from coming to power. It helps protect the people’s rights. It has measures to prevent gridlock or the collapse of a functioning government.

Judged by these standards, the 2005 Iraqi constitutionis only a partial success.

However, complaints have built up since 2005: over the muhasasa system under which the established political parties divide up ministerial appointments; over the failure of Iraq’s government or other institutions to deliver basic services like electricity and water; over perceptions of excessive Iranian meddling in Iraq’s politics; and over the inability of the government to provide meaningful employment for millions of young Iraqis—or to foster a private sector capable of doing so. These grievances came to a head in the 2019 Tishreen protests in which more than 600 Iraqis died.

The United States invaded Iraq in 2003 in part to bring democracy to Iraq, so it is ironic that Iraq’s 2005 constitution was the product of mostly Iraqi political forces unleashed by the failure of the United States to ensure a democratic transition. It was expected that the Kurdish political parties, which had worked closely with the United States for years, would insist upon a federal republic to ensure their autonomy from a central government whose long-term character and leanings in 2005 were far from settled. Beyond this, however, the small number of Americans actually involved in advising the key Iraqi players in the constitutional process—in the room where it happened—actually had relatively little experience in constitutional mechanics or modern comparative constitutional practice. The American sins of commission during the first two years after Iraq’s liberation were replaced by sins of omission during the crucial months of negotiation of the 2005 constitution.

Genuine constitutional reform in Iraq is not likely to be accomplished directly through the parliament, given the interests of Iraq’s political parties and the parliament’s need to focus on legislative responsibilities. Instead, Iraqi civil society—including scholars, lawyers, religious and business leaders, and retired government officials and jurists—should initiate serious discussions about constitutional reform. Many of these voices were not heard when the 2005 constitution was adopted. Their effort can be far more open and transparent than the process was in 2005.

Foreign governments should have a minimal role, limited to supporting and encouraging Iraqi-led efforts, without trying to broker a particular outcome. International foundations, institutes, universities, and think tanks can offer outside expertise, particularly in comparative constitutional law and other kinds of technical assistance. But the overall effort needs to be Iraqi-led, with input from a broad spectrum of Iraqi voices.

While civil society discussions in Iraq could begin with considering amendments to the 2005 constitution, US experience may be relevant. The US Constitutional Convention convened in May 1787 to consider amendments to the Articles of Confederation decided to completely redesign the government, resulting in a Constitution that, with amendments, has been in force in the United States for more than 230 years. Sometimes it’s better to start over.

Iraq’s path to constitutional reform is not clear today, but there is a path nevertheless. Incremental reform is possible, but reform on a larger scale may achieve a more lasting result. The more promising outcome could be for a slate of candidates to run for office with the elements of the new constitution as their platform. A reform slate is not likely to gain an absolute majority, but if its base of support is broad enough, it may be able to gain support in a new parliament needed to send a revised constitution to the Iraqi people for their approval. A new constitution, done right, could propel Iraq towards a better future.

—Thomas S. Warrick led the State Department’s “Future of Iraq” project from 2002 to 2003, served in both Baghdad and Washington, and was director (acting) for Iraq political affairs from July 2006 to July 2007. He is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Thomas S. Warrick on the need for Iraqi-led constitutional reform

An economy diversified away from oil

The post-2003 political order, based on the muhasasa system of sectarian apportionment, came with the promise of a complete break with the past. The 2005 constitution, drafted by the new order, promised: “The State shall guarantee the reform of the Iraqi economy in accordance with modern economic principles to insure the full investment of its resources, diversification of its sources, and the encouragement and development of the private sector.”

As with other bold promises made, the economic promise was broken as soon as the constitution came into effect, as the political order pursued a decentralized and multiheaded evolution of the prior economic model, and persistently expanded the patrimonial role of the state as a redistributor of the country’s oil wealth in exchange for social acquiescence to its rule.

Over the last twenty years the economy developed significant structural imbalances, and was increasingly bedeviled by fundamental contradictions. Essentially, it was dependent on government spending directly through its provisioning of goods and services as well as public services, and indirectly on the spending of public-sector employees. However, this spending was almost entirely dependent on volatile oil revenues that the government had no control over; yet the spending was premised on ever-increasing oil prices.

The political order had the opportunity to correct course and honor the original promise during three major economic and financial crises, each more severe than the last and all a consequence of an oil-price crash: in 2007 to 2009, due to the global financial crisis; in 2014 to 2017, due to the conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham; and in 2020, due to the emergence of COVID-19. Yet, paradoxically, the political order doubled down on the policies that led to these crises as soon as oil prices recovered.

On the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, the political order—buoyed by the bounty of high, yet unsustainable, oil prices—is planning a budget that is expected to be the largest ever since 2003, to seek legitimacy from an increasingly alienated public. These plans will only deepen the economy’s structural imbalance and its fundamental contradictions, and as such could likely lead to even greater public alienation if an oil-price crash triggers yet another economic and financial crisis. Even if oil prices were to stay high, however, the country’s demographic pressures will in time create the conditions for a deeper rolling crisis.

—Ahmed Tabaqchali is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. An experienced capital markets professional, he is chief strategist of the AFC Iraq Fund.

Andrew Peek on the current state of Iraq and the US-Iraq relationship

An inclusive vision, representative of all its people

One of the enduring legacies of the 2003 invasion has been its deleterious effect on the many diverse ethnic and religious minority communities that make up the social fabric of Iraq. Yet it is that diversity and rich heritage that could now unlock a brighter future for the nation, if the political system can recognize and represent it.

Marginalized by an institutionally inscribed political system and few representative seats in parliament, Iraq’s minority communities have found themselves peripheralized by the state—and in the imaginations of the country’s future. Many have emigrated and now reside in diaspora, changing the ethnic and religious heterogeneity of Iraq.

Calculating the cultural toll of war goes beyond the destruction of shrines and artifacts, and the looting of museums and buildings: One of the biggest social and cultural losses for Iraq has been the exclusion of minority communities from the nation-building processes. This is a tragic state of affairs for Iraq, whose uniqueness, strength, and richness stems from its ancient histories and cultures, its religious, artistic, and musical traditions, and the languages that have contributed to its heritage and development. That heritage deserves to be protected and celebrated.

Until the day the muhasasa system is dismantled, and a new Iraq built on meritocracy can thrive, minority communities must be safeguarded and included in Iraq’s future. Yet, this can only be achieved through the protection of minorities’ rights in Iraq’s political life, and genuine and concerted effort to increase parliamentary seats and legal representation of minorities. Investment in areas destroyed by terrorism and conflict, more reparations for communities whose livelihoods and homes have been ruined, and more boots on the ground to protect communities and religious shrines should be a priority.

Twenty years of destruction, corruption, violence, and the subsequent emigration of many communities cannot be erased. Yet the twentieth anniversary of Iraq’s occupation ought to serve as a point of reflection for the kind of Iraq that Iraqis want now. There is certainly much hope in a new generation of Iraqis calling for new national visions, an end to muhasasa, more civil rights, and expanding economic opportunities.

Yet all of Iraq’s communities must be part of this conversation. A more inclusive Iraq that applauds its diversity and takes pride in difference could be the driving force needed to unify the nation.

—Oula Kadhum, a former nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, is a postdoctoral research fellow at Lunds University in Sweden and a fellow of international migration at the London School of Economics and Political Science in the United Kingdom.

Oula Kadhum on the reforms needed to reposition Iraq in the next twenty years

A new US Iraq policy focused on youth and education

As the global community reflects on the twentieth anniversary of the US-led invasion of Iraq and looks to the future, it is time for foreign policy toward Iraq to move beyond its traditional, security-heavy approach.

While security threats persist, including a potential resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), and should be a priority, US aid to Iraq has historically been ineffective and financially irresponsible. Humanitarian assistance, meanwhile, tends to focus on short-term issues like the response to COVID-19 and assisting displaced individuals. And while such aid can be beneficial, continuing with the traditional avenues of support is not a sustainable solution to rebuild Iraq. The United States and the international community must begin to focus on long-term solutions that address human security, development, infrastructure, education, and the economy. At the center of all these issues are two key variables that must be the focal point of policy: education and the youth population.

A 2019 UNICEF report estimates that a staggering 60 percent of Iraq’s population is under the age of twenty-five. Learning levels and access to education in Iraq remain among the lowest in the region. The great challenges these two facts pose can also be seen as a unique opportunity: to place its large youth population at the epicenter of Iraq’s future through policy that increases the number of educators and trains them, ensures sanitary and competent learning conditions, and increases access to education.

The benefits of a long-term investment in Iraq’s education system and youth population go beyond simply educating its citizens: It would be the first step in unlocking the human potential of Iraq. More education means more qualified professionals; more doctors would increase the quality and access to healthcare, an increase in engineers will ensure that the country’s infrastructure continues to develop, and additional business leaders and entrepreneurs will assist in growing the economy.

To truly rebuild Iraq, the United States and the international community can no longer view the country as only a security issue. Rather, this moment must be seen as an opportunity to empower bright Iraqi youths, who hope to lead in rebuilding their own country—providing them with a fair shot of again being a cradle of civilization.

—Hezha Barzani is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative. Follow him on Twitter @HezhaFB.

Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister Fuad Hussein reflects on the twentieth anniversary of the invasion

What the United States can do now

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Recommit to the cause of Iraqi freedom

It’s hard to believe that it has been twenty years since the US invasion of Iraq. As I sat waiting to launch my first mission on March 20, the war’s historical significance was not my primary thought. How I found myself flying on the first night of the war in Afghanistan and Iraq was. That thought was accompanied by the tightness in the pit of my stomach that I always got before launching into the unknown.

We didn’t debate the case for the war among ourselves. It has been discussed thoroughly since, and I don’t claim to have any new insight to offer on that topic. We were focused on not letting down our fellow Marines and accomplishing our mission: to remove Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship and replace it with a democracy that would give the people of Iraq the freedom that people everywhere deserve as their birthright.

Did we succeed? We certainly succeeded in rapidly destroying the Baathist regime and its military, the third largest in the world. The answer to the second question is less clear. On my second and third tours in Iraq, I saw the chaos from the al-Qaeda-fueled insurgency in 2005 and 2006 and the dramatic turnaround following the al-Anbar “Sunni Awakening” in 2006-2007. From afar, I watched the horrors that the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham inflicted on its people after US troops withdrew without a status-of-forces agreement.

Today, Iraq is rated “not free,” scoring twenty-nine out of one hundred in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2022 report. Although not up to Western liberal democracy standards, this is an improvement over 2002, when it received the lowest score possible and was listed as one of the eleven most repressive countries in the world. Moreover, Iraq’s 2022 score is vastly better than most of its neighbors: Iran scored fourteen, Syria scored one, and Afghanistan scored ten.

Despite Afghanistan being widely seen as “the good war” of the two post-9/11 conflicts, where the casus belli was clear, today it is Iraq, and not Afghanistan, that gives me hope that twenty years from now, on the fortieth anniversary, we will see our efforts to promote democracy in Iraq come entirely to fruition. We owe it to the 36,425 Americans killed and wounded there, the thousands of veterans who took their own lives, and the many more still struggling with post-traumatic stress disorder to stay engaged in Iraq and the region to try and make sure that they do.

—Col. John B. Barranco was the 2021-22 Senior US Marine Corps Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. These views are his own and do not represent those of the Department of Defense or Department of the Navy.

Balance confidence and humility

I officially swore into the military at Fort Hamilton, Brooklyn, on April 4, 2003, during the early stages of the US “shock and awe” campaign in Iraq. Having decided to join the Air Force following 9/11, the lengthy administrative process I’d endured to get to this point had been agonizing. I recall going through the in-processing line at Officer Training School on April 9, when an instructor whispered to us: “Coalition forces have taken Baghdad, stay motivated.” The thought that immediately went through my mind was: “I’m going to miss the wars.”

I had made the choice to pursue special operations and still had two years of training ahead of me. At the time, the war in Afghanistan seemed like it was nearing completion, and the swift overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq had me convinced that, by the time I was ready to deploy, there would be no fighting left. Little did I know that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with their expansions across the Middle East and Africa, would end up consuming a large majority of my twenty years of service, take the lives of many of my special operations teammates, and impact the health and well-being of a generation of US service members and their families.

It’s impossible to know how the war in Iraq shaped other US endeavors in the region. Did it take our focus from Afghanistan and put us on a path of increased escalation and investment there? Did it set conditions for the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham to take root many years later, setting off another expansive counterterrorism campaign?

More broadly, did it allow adversaries the time and space to study US capabilities and ultimately inform their strategies for malign influence? I often think of this today when I’m asked about what’s going to happen with the Russian war in Ukraine, or how prepared the United States is to defend Taiwan.

The United States needs the confidence to confront global challenges to peace and prosperity, but also the humility to know we get things wrong, and mistakes involving direct military intervention can be catastrophic. Given the escalatory risks associated with the security challenges in the world today, our pursuit of a balance of confidence and humility has never been more important.

—Lt. Col. Justin M. Conelli is the 2022-23 Senior US Air Force fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

William F. Wechsler on the current political discourse around Iraq

Recognize the successes as well as the failures

“Was the invasion of Iraq worth it?”

I’ve spent a great deal of my military and postmilitary career answering questions about Iraq, but this one—from a brigadier general in the audience—caught me off guard. It was 2018, seven years after the formal withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, and I found myself in front of a roomful of Army officers giving a talk on the future of US-Iraq security cooperation. By that time, such talks had become a little frustrating. The fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (aka the Islamic State group) demonstrated that Iraqi forces could rise to the immediate challenge; however, the conditions that led to their unceremonious collapse in 2014 had not much changed. As a result, there remained many questions about the best way to continue the security partnership to prevent future catastrophe.

The question I got that day, however, had little to do with how to partner with Iraqi forces. A co-presenter from Kurdistan jumped in immediately to answer the brigadier general’s question: the US invasion had removed Iraqi Kurdistan’s most significant threat—Saddam Hussein—and had provided opportunities for economic and political development it would not have had otherwise. Sensing a trap, I nonetheless walked right into it. While Iraqi Kurdistan was certainly in a better position, I pointed out that was not consistently so for the rest of Iraq. The US invasion had unleashed a sectarian free-for-all that allowed Sunni extremists, Shia militias, and their Iranian sponsors to fill the vacuum of oppression Saddam’s departure had left. Moreover, this vacuum had empowered Iran to challenge the United States and its partners regionally. So my answer was no, toppling Saddam likely did not outweigh the costs.

In previous years, the questions had been more policy-focused. For example, when I arrived at the Pentagon’s Iraq Intelligence Working Group in August 2002, the first question asked was how Iraq’s diverse ethnic and confessional demographics would affect military operations and enable—or impede—victory. By early 2003, the questions were about the larger effort to construct a new political order. Before long, we were asking how the confluence of Islamist terrorism, sectarian rivalries, and external intervention drove resistance to efforts to reconstruct Iraq.

In 2012, I became the US defense attaché in Baghdad, just after the last US service members withdrew. At first, the question I heard in this capacity was how to continue the reconstruction project with a limited military and civilian presence whose movement was often severely restricted in a sovereign, sometimes uncooperative, Iraq with frequent interference from Iran. Before I left, al-Qaeda had metastasized into the Islamic State group and the question became how to cooperate to prevent the group’s further expansion and liberate the territory it had seized. Meanwhile, Iran’s influence with the Iraqi government continued to grow.

In retrospect, the conditions I described in 2018 were accurate (and still largely hold today), but I wish I had given a more considered response. What I wish I had said was that a better question than “was it worth it” is: what have we learned about past failures to assess future opportunities? A prosperous Iraq that contributes to regional stability was not possible under Saddam. Now Iraq is an effective partner against Islamist extremists, and the Iraqi people, if not always their government, are in a position to push back on Iran in their own way, exposing Tehran for the despotic government it is. Moreover, Iraq’s hosting of discussions between Saudi Arabia and Iran was a catalyst to their recent normalization of relations.

The point is not to rationalize failure. Rather, the question now is: what have we learned from those failures to effectively capitalize on the success we have had, and how can we take advantage of the opportunities the current situation presents?

—C. Anthony Pfaff, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative and a research professor for strategy, the military profession, and ethic at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

Tony Pfaff on the future of US-Iraq relations

Remember the price of hubris

For me, the memories of those first days and weeks in Iraq remain quite clear. I remember calling my family from a satellite phone on the tarmac of Baghdad International Airport to let them know I was alive, late night meetings with Iraqi agents in safe houses, wrapping up Iraqi high-value targets, the fear amid firefights and the carnage on streets strewn with dead and mutilated bodies, and a confused Iraqi population that at the time did not know what to make of US forces who claimed to be liberating them from the regime of Saddam Hussein.

Upon arrival in Baghdad in early April, there were few signs of the resistance that would haunt the United States for decades to come. Yes, there were still combat operations underway, but that was against Iraqi military and paramilitary units. So, as we tracked down Iraqi regime targets one by one—members of the famed “deck of fifty-five cards” that US Central Command had dreamed up and distributed like we were trading baseball cards—we saw this as part of a new beginning.

Yet soon after, the wheels began to fall off. Orders came from Washington policy officials with absolutely zero substantive Middle East experience both to disband the Iraqi military and purge the future government of Baath party officials, which immediately put tens of thousands of hardened military officers, conscripts, and officials out of work and on the street. The CIA presence on the ground protested, but to no avail. I had never seen Charlie, my station chief, so angry, including face-to-face confrontations with senior figures in the Coalition Provisional Authority. Charlie—the most accomplished Arabist in the CIA’s history—sadly predicted the insurgency that was about to come. If only Washington had listened.

I rarely think of Iraq in terms of big-picture strategy. As a CIA operations officer, I was a surgical instrument of the US government, and I gladly answered the bell when called upon to do so. I am proud to have served with other CIA officers and special operations personnel who performed valiantly. I suppose I can defend the invasion on human rights grounds. It seems we forget that Saddam was one of the great war criminals in history, and Iraq has been freed from his depravity. Yet two numbers are haunting: 4,431, and 31,994. Those are the number of Americans killed and wounded in action, per official Department of Defense statistics.

War is a nasty business, and many times a terrible price is paid for hubris. The casualty figures noted above paint a stark picture of the historic intelligence failure that the analytic assessment that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction was. The CIA in particular suffered a credibility hit that has taken decades to recover from.

—Marc Polymeropoulos, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, served for twenty-six years at the CIA before retiring in 2019.

Thomas S. Warrick on the lessons to learn from the Iraq War

The post How the war in Iraq changed the world—and what change could come next appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In brief: C4ISR – A five-step guide to maintaining NATO’s comparative military edge over the coming decade

Transatlantic Security Initiative — Thu, 16 Mar 2023 14:11:14 +0000

Top lines

C4ISR, which stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, is the nervous system of the military.
NATO’s current C4ISR systems and thinking do not meet all of the Alliance’s needs. The relevance of such systems in the future will only grow. Mounting threats and challenges to NATO will raise requirements for better awareness, decision making, and rapid response.
NATO should seize the momentum and unity that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has generated, and use it to update its C4ISR.

WORTH A THOUSAND WORDS

C4ISR is the backbone on which NATO awareness, decisions, and action rely, yet the complexity of the system makes its modernization both difficult and essential.

Credit: NATO

THE DIAGNOSIS

Amid historical neglect and focus on crisis response, C4ISR capabilities for collective defense lag behind the level of ambition necessary for the currently volatile geopolitical environment.

With Russia’s war in Ukraine drastically changing the context of European security and defense, the speed of understanding, decision-making, and action among allies are more important than ever. NATO’s strength lies in its ability to collectively decide and act, organize, and integrate. However, the C4ISR capabilities that allow the allies to do that—and much more—remain under resourced and much less effective than required. While much has been done to improve NATO C4ISR over the past decade, much work remains.

NATO has a unique opportunity to leverage the current sense of unity, urgency and shared vision among allies to build the C4ISR architecture the Alliance needs for the future. The time to act is now, when the war in Ukraine is providing a treasure trove of lessons for the Alliance, ranging from the requirements to be ready from day one for any NATO mission (also called day zero readiness) to the important role the private industry plays in the security and resilience of any modern nation state. Early progress can also prepare the Alliance for emerging threats and challenges, such as China’s rise and climate change. The political decisions and level of ambition set by the June 2022 Madrid Summit Declaration and NATO 2022 Strategic Concept—the most important of which include those related to strengthening NATO deterrence and defense and increasing focus on innovation and emerging and disruptive technologies—will be guiding and shaping the requirements and development of the NATO C4ISR architecture of the future.

THE PRESCRIPTION

How to seize the moment

There are five critical steps transatlantic decision-makers can take to modernize NATO C4ISR and help the Alliance maintain its military edge against potential adversaries in an increasingly contested geopolitical environment. Improving NATO’s C4ISR capabilities will give NATO a relevant and credible nervous system equal to the challenges ahead.

Share more data and intelligence.

Shared data, information and intelligence are fuel for C4ISR. The uncomfortable truth is that data and intelligence sharing is not at the level it can or needs to be. This also means that the opportunity cost of not sharing sometimes can be enormous. With the right political will and tailored security measures, the vast amounts of data and intelligence collected by NATO and its member states could be better exploited for the benefit of collective security and defense.
Transform digitally.

Digital transformation, intended to address digitalization, connectivity, data frameworks and data management, is a nascent effort that is fundamental for strengthening security and defense and improving resilience. The digital revolution is intertwined with C4ISR architecture, because a more technologically advanced C4ISR edge can help the Alliance achieve significant increases in speed, security, and effectiveness in command and control, communications, data and intelligence analysis, decision-making, operations, and interoperability. Proceeding along this journey is particularly important as the Alliance is trying to shift to a new concept of operations, effective multi-domain operations, which entails the integration of kinetic and non-kinetic efforts, across all warfighting domains, at speed and scale.
Implement new concepts, policies, and plans to clarify C4ISR requirements.

To outthink and outpace potential adversaries, NATO must act now to develop the future C4ISR architecture it needs. Several efforts underway, such as the new NATO Force Model, Alliance Multi Domain Operations Concept, Allied Command Operations Command and Control (C2) assessment, and NATO’s Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) Vision 2030+, will directly influence future NATO C4ISR requirements. NATO must provide a definition for C4ISR in an allied context, build a shared understanding among allies around that definition, and ensure coherence in planning, capability and concept development.
Modernize, augment, and acquire capabilities to meet new C4ISR requirements.

There are a few practical steps NATO should take to maintain its technological and military edge in the future. This includes transforming existing C4ISR force structure, improving NATO’s ability to receive national and commercial space-based information, reducing gaps in integrated air and missile defense (IAMD), developing greater electronic warfare capabilities, and investing in and promoting innovation and adoption of emergent and disruptive technologies such as Artificial Intelligence, autonomy, space-based capabilities, and quantum computing.
Continue to invest in C4ISR interoperability, readiness, resilience, innovation, and adaptation.

NATO’s strength lies in its ability to collectively decide and act, organize, and integrate. NATO C4ISR forces and capabilities provide the interoperable structure and digital backbone into which member states plug for collective awareness, decision-making, and action. Investing in C4ISR readiness, resilience, and capabilities is a direct contribution to greater potential of the Alliance itself.

BOTTOM LINES

NATO needs a modern and well-defined C4ISR architecture to keep pace with the rapidly changing operational environment and achieve its mission of securing and defending its thirty allies and their interests. Ultimately, the question is not whether NATO will need to evolve and develop its C4ISR capabilities, but whether it can do so in time to meet the ever-growing threats to the Alliance. In its current state, NATO C4ISR will be severely challenged to guarantee the security and defense of the Alliance against the threats it expects to face over the coming decade.

Although C4ISR underpins the success of every NATO operation, its criticality remains underappreciated. However, transatlantic decision-makers right now have the perfect opportunity to implement the recommendations above and set forth the path for the necessary modernization of NATO’s C4ISR architecture. NATO stands stronger and more united than ever. Allied defense investments are rising. Additionally, the foundations of a future C4ISR architecture and its components are progressing in various stages of development and planning. NATO must prioritize C4ISR in light of these positive developments, helping it leapfrog from an underappreciated piece of the puzzle to a key enabler for the Alliance’s defense and deterrence.

Like what you read? Dive deep into our full report.

Report

Mar 16, 2023

The future of NATO C4ISR: Assessment and recommendations after Madrid

By Gordon B. “Skip” Davis Jr.

Current C4ISR capabilities, concepts, policies, and processes do not meet all of the Alliance’s needs. While much has been done to improve NATO C4ISR over the past decade, much work remains.

China Conflict

Related program

Foreword
Premise
Introduction
Threats and challenges shaping NATO C4ISR
Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war for NATO C4ISR and future needs
Multi-domain operations
Day zero readiness
NATO Intelligence Enterprise (NIE)
Persistence and survivability
Multidisciplinary intelligence and fusion
Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (TCPED)
Cyber
The role of private industry
Digitalization, connectivity, and Big Data
Decisions taken at the Madrid Summit and work underway affecting NATO C4ISR
Multi-domain warfighting
Digital Transformation
Strengthened deterrence and defense posture
Robust, resilient, and integrated command structure and enhanced C2 arrangements
Global awareness
Innovation and EDTs
Defense investment
Recommendations: Share, transform, implement, modernize and invest
1. Share more data and intelligence
2. Transform digitally
3. Implement new concepts, policies, and plans to clarify requirements for NATO C4ISR
4. Modernize, augment, and acquire capabilities to meet new C4ISR requirements
5. Continue to invest in NATO C4ISR interoperability, readiness, resilience, innovation, and adaptation
Conclusion
Glossary
About the author

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The post In brief: C4ISR – A five-step guide to maintaining NATO’s comparative military edge over the coming decade appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The future of NATO C4ISR: Assessment and recommendations after Madrid

Gordon B. “Skip” Davis Jr. — Thu, 16 Mar 2023 13:36:35 +0000

Foreword

Even as Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war in Ukraine rages, the transatlantic community is seeking to integrate lessons from the battlefield to adapt its defense planning for a rapidly changing world. Already, one lesson is clear: In a contested Europe, allies need to have better awareness of the operating environment. The speed and quality of decision-making and execution must improve. Effective and ethical NATO decision-making must be translated into operational effects. NATO must prioritize the modernization and integration of its command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture to keep pace with the rapidly changing operational environment.

While a complex concept, C4ISR is most easily understood as the “nervous system” of the military. It is essential to everyday operations, automatic responses, and the complicated processes inherent to large enterprises. Rapid and fundamental changes in our security environment—including the return of large-scale war in Europe, China’s growing global ambitions, climate change, and the transformative potential of emerging technologies—require an immediate and critical examination of NATO’s C4ISR architecture. Modernizing C4ISR is necessary to maintain a competitive advantage against state-based adversaries, other systemic challenges, and threats yet to materialize—all of which could overturn the rules-based international order NATO is dedicated to preserving.

The platform offered by NATO’s new Strategic Concept for strengthening defense and deterrence while leveraging emerging and disruptive technologies provides a unique window of opportunity for transatlantic decision-makers. It is NATO’s C4ISR capabilities that will enable a relevant and credible NATO “nervous system” equal to the challenges ahead.

To that end, this study by the Atlantic Council—the culmination of a year of research and interviews by NATO’s former deputy assistant secretary general for defense investment—offers a detailed roadmap to achieve this goal. This comprehensive report offers an expert treatment on the topic of C4ISR modernization to help transatlantic decision-makers, operational forces, the expert and policy community, and military technology watchers alike better understand the challenges and opportunities inherent to NATO’s C4ISR architecture. Importantly, it imagines the possibilities for C4ISR modernization through a series of thoughtfully considered recommendations.

Ultimately, the question is not whether NATO will need to evolve and develop its C4ISR capabilities, but whether it can do so in time to meet the gathering threats to the Alliance. I believe this extensive study skillfully sets forth the path for the necessary modernization of NATO’s C4ISR architecture.

Gen. James E. Cartwright, USMC (Ret.)
Board Director
Atlantic Council
Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Premise

NATO needs to urgently respond to changing requirements, leverage the potential of technology and innovation, and address critical issues to provide the command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture that Alliance leaders and forces need to maintain their comparative military advantage over the coming decade.

Current C4ISR capabilities, concepts, policies, and processes do not meet all of the Alliance’s needs. While much has been done to improve NATO C4ISR over the past decade, much work remains. Russia’s war in Ukraine and other threats and challenges, including from China and climate change, have added a sense of urgency to this task. Russian aggression, in particular, has tested some aspects of NATO C4ISR and provided initial lessons learned in terms of its strengths, vulnerabilities, and shortfalls.

NATO has a unique window of opportunity to leverage the current sense of urgency, newfound cohesion among allies, and an agreed vision to build the C4ISR architecture it needs for the future.

NATO needs to first provide a clarifying definition of C4ISR architecture, which does not currently exist. A defined C4ISR architecture would harmonize defense planning efforts across multiple domains, enable aggregation and assessment of related capability targets, and ensure greater coherence in concept and capability development.

The trajectory of NATO C4ISR is impacted by political ambitions. These include Digital Transformation, increasing resilience, understanding the security implications of climate change, reducing defense impacts on climate change (e.g., reducing the use of fossil fuels, energy consumption, carbon emissions, toxic waste, and contaminants), and raising the level of NATO common funding.

Political decisions and ambitions announced in the June 2022 Madrid Summit Declaration and NATO 2022 Strategic Concept—the most important of which include those related to strengthening deterrence and defense and increasing focus on innovation and emerging and disruptive technologies—will shape the NATO C4ISR architecture of the future.

Read our in-brief summary of the report

Executive Summary

Mar 16, 2023

In brief: C4ISR – A five-step guide to maintaining NATO’s comparative military edge over the coming decade

By Transatlantic Security Initiative

The Atlantic Council presents a five step guide to maintaining NATO’s comparative military edge over the coming decade.

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

Introduction

The context of European security and defense has drastically changed since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The war has upended conventional wisdom on Russia’s willingness to use violence, exposed the destructiveness of modern weapons and barbarity of an undisciplined force, and revealed Russian hubris and the limits of Russian power.

On the flip side, the war has strengthened the bond between NATO and the European Union (EU). NATO and EU leaders have taken an unprecedented level of coordinated decisions and actions to impose costs on Russia, defend Europe from further aggression, and support Ukraine in its battle for survival and independence. Alliance and EU leaders have also begun to seriously address other challenges affecting security, such as energy, climate change, and China.

Russia’s war has highlighted the power of united action while exposing the limits of Alliance adaptation to date and identifying vulnerabilities and shortfalls that allies and EU member states must address to ensure their security and defense.

More than ever, the speed of understanding, decision-making, and action are important in modern warfare. Russia has demonstrated on multiple occasions over the past fifteen years that it is capable of rapid decision-making, assembly, and maneuver that has arguably challenged NATO’s ability to respond at the speed of relevance. Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014, annual strategic exercises, and frequent combat readiness tests are all examples.

NATO has improved intelligence sharing and its defense posture since 2014, the year Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine and began its support to separatists in the Donbas. These improvements have enabled a cohesive and coherent NATO response to the Russian military buildup in 2021 and subsequent invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Whether NATO can effectively identify, prepare for, and defend against Russian aggression toward an ally anywhere in Europe without significant additional posture adjustments is in question.¹

NATO command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) structures, capabilities, and processes enable effective political and military awareness, decision-making, and action.² These capabilities encompass an array of land, air, maritime, cyber, and space systems, platforms, and applications that can be owned and operated by all thirty allies (which may soon be thirty-two with Finland and Sweden joining the Alliance),³ by a group of allies (e.g., multinational formations), or by single nations contributing to NATO missions, operations, and activities.

The time to act is now. NATO allies currently enjoy unprecedented cohesion, share an agreed and clear vision for the future, and are motivated by a common sense of urgency, all imbued by the ongoing Russian war on Ukraine.

Despite a growth in collective and national capabilities over the past ten years, NATO C4ISR capabilities remain under resourced, vulnerable, and much less effective than required. Supporting concepts, policies, and procedures related to NATO C4ISR need urgent revision. Many are under development. NATO is engaging industry and the broader private sector, but the latter’s role is not yet fully leveraged. In its current state, NATO C4ISR will be severely challenged to guarantee the security and defense of the Alliance against the threats and challenges it expects to face over the coming decade.⁴

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg displays the Strategic Concept booklet during his news conference at a NATO summit in Madrid, Spain June 29, 2022. REUTERS/Susana Vera

The time to act is now. NATO allies currently enjoy unprecedented cohesion, share an agreed and clear vision for the future, and are motivated by a common sense of urgency, all imbued by the ongoing Russian war on Ukraine. Defense investment is rising and the foundations of a future C4ISR architecture and its components are in various stages of development or planning.

NATO and national capabilities must be interoperable and more integrated within and across domains to deliver multidomain effects. The Alliance needs a modern and well-defined C4ISR architecture to achieve its ambition of securing and defending the Alliance and its interests. NATO must improve and further enable its C4ISR with common structure, policies, concepts, frameworks, standards, procedures, and connectivity. NATO must also modernize and integrate current capabilities and acquire new capabilities. Allies need to further increase sharing of data and intelligence, interoperability, and national contributions (forces, platforms, systems, people, and resources) to strengthen NATO C4ISR.

NATO C4ISR policy recommendations

To maintain a comparative advantage against potential adversaries and challengers, NATO allies must 1) share more data and intelligence; 2) transform digitally; 3) implement new concepts, policies, and plans to clarify C4ISR requirements; 4) modernize, augment, and acquire capabilities to meet new C4ISR requirements; and 5) continue to invest in C4ISR interoperability, readiness, resilience, innovation, and adaptation.

Threats and challenges shaping NATO C4ISR

Russia’s war against Ukraine is a major inflection point for NATO, which is in the midst of a long-term effort to improve its deterrence and defense. NATO’s response to Russian aggression has been to assure and defend allies, deter Russia, and support Ukraine. This response has included a surge in the employment of NATO-owned C4ISR forces such as the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Force (NAGSF);⁵ still at Initial Operational Capability and the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&CF).⁶ National joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (JISR) assets have contributed to Alliance shared awareness. NATO cooperation with the EU has led to a united front in communications and complementary actions by EU and non-EU allies on sanctions against Russia, energy security, and support to Ukraine.

Russia “poses the most significant and direct threat” to NATO,⁷ but there are other threats and challenges that the Alliance must also face or prepare for. Other threats identified by NATO include terrorism in all its forms, missiles from Iran, and cyber and hybrid attacks. All of these threats require constant vigilance, early warning, intelligence, rapid response, and defense and security capabilities enabled by NATO C4ISR.

Among the challenges identified by NATO, China and climate change are the most significant, along with regional instability and strategic shocks. China’s policies and its rising economic, financial, diplomatic, informational, and military power pose a multitude of challenges to NATO’s security, interests, and values. NATO C4ISR must enable shared awareness of China’s policies, actions, and growing military and civilian capabilities. NATO C4ISR must be resilient and respond to Chinese cyber and hybrid activities and favorably compete with Chinese technological advancements and norm-setting efforts.

With respect to climate, NATO C4ISR must contribute to awareness and understanding of the security implications of climate change and contribute to the reduction and mitigation of adverse impacts on climate. Similarly, NATO C4ISR must be able to contribute to anticipation and response related to regional instability and strategic shocks. The addition of crisis prevention to the previous core task of crisis management in the 2022 Strategic Concept highlights a NATO ambition to ensure sufficient awareness (only provided by an effective C4ISR architecture) to understand potential challenges in time to proactively shape, attenuate, or mitigate them.

Preparing for and facing the other threats and challenges listed above implies an ability to cooperate with a broad range of partner organizations and nations, including sharing information and intelligence, and an adequate level of interoperability for coordinated responses. Interaction and combined action with partners will both contribute to and set demands on NATO C4ISR.

Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war for NATO C4ISR and future needs

The ongoing Russian war in Ukraine is providing a treasure trove of lessons for NATO. NATO is still gathering, processing, and internalizing these lessons, but many are already evident. Some are already captured in reports and articles from journalists, academia, industry, and civilian and military leaders. After reviewing open sources and interviewing several NATO civilian and military leaders, I have assembled the following lessons as most relevant to the future development of NATO C4ISR.

Multi-domain operations

NATO C4ISR must be able to support multi-domain operations (MDO) and deliver multi-domain effects. Much work in connectivity, integration, and interoperability is needed.

The Russian war on Ukraine is the first of its scale in Europe in the twenty-first century. No other recent conflict in Europe—Russia’s war on Georgia in 2008 or Ukraine from 2014 to February 24, 2022—has involved a similar number of military forces or employed such destructive power. Russia and Ukraine have employed or leveraged capabilities in all five domains—air, land, maritime, cyberspace, and space. Russia has struggled with coordinating joint action, let alone achieving multi-domain effects. “Russia has definitely showed us how not to fight,” said Rear Adm. Nicholas Wheeler, director of NATO Headquarters C3 Staff (NHQC3S).⁸ Ukraine appears to have had more success leveraging multi-domain capabilities. Ukrainian forces have effectively targeted and engaged Russian land and maritime forces using limited multi-source intelligence, aerial drones, maneuver and fires units, and commercial space-based open-source intelligence (OSINT) services from a variety of private companies.

The Russian war in Ukraine is a likely catalyst for NATO leaders to hasten the development of an Alliance MDO Concept. Additionally, NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept highlights the importance of multi-domain forces and warfighting⁹ NATO has added cyber and space as operational domains over the past decade and has been working on an MDO concept for some time.¹⁰ Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and Allied Command Operations (ACO) delivered an Initial Alliance Concept for MDO in July 2022.¹¹ NATO’s “working definition” of MDO is “the orchestration of military activities, across all domains and environments, synchronized with non-military activities, to enable the Alliance to deliver converging effects at the speed of relevance.”¹²

According to Headquarters (HQ) Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) for Capability Development Lt. Gen. David Julazadeh, NATO leaders have directed the Strategic Commands to accelerate delivery and implementation of an Alliance MDO Concept.¹³

Day zero readiness

The scale of Russia’s military buildup and geographically broad and rapid employment of force against Ukraine have caused NATO civilian and military leaders to question whether the Alliance’s current plans and defense posture would have deterred or rapidly repelled a similar Russian assault against an ally, particularly a small nation.¹⁴ Could NATO respond with the speed, scale, and coherence needed to prevent initial success?

Day zero readiness

An informal NATO term referring to being mission-ready on the first day of a NATO mission (e.g. a network, a force, a headquarters).

Two ongoing efforts will help. First, a new Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR’s) Area of Responsibility (AOR)-Wide Strategic Plan (SASP) was approved earlier in 2022, but the underlying regional and subordinate strategic plans have yet to be completed and stitched together. Second, a new NATO Force Model approved at the Madrid Summit in June 2022 will address much of the speed, scale, and coherence lacking in current policies and posture by assigning a much larger number of forces (up to four hundred thousand) to regional plans.

Other efforts are in the works. The adapted command and control (C2) structure is not yet fit for purpose and ACO has been directed to conduct a comprehensive C2 assessment. NATO’s Air Command and Control System (ACCS) is woefully behind the times, and a transition plan to a future Air C2 system is in development. According to NATO Assistant Secretary General (ASG) for Operations Tom Goffus: “The NATO Crisis Response System [NCRS] was designed for out of area operations where NATO drives the timeline and has the luxury of time. Now we don’t have that time advantage.”¹⁵ The NCRS needs significant revision to enable day zero readiness for collective defense. Goffus is determined to drive such a revision.

The family of plans under development, the new NATO Force Model, and revised C2 structure and NCRS will influence future requirements for NATO C4ISR. NATO must review and update C4ISR requirements for standing defense and baseline activities, as well as exercise and enable rapid activation and deployment related to a short to no-notice collective defense scenario.

NATO Intelligence Enterprise (NIE)

The NATO Intelligence Enterprise (NIE) surged, adapted, and delivered the intelligence political and senior military leaders needed to respond to the Russian war in Ukraine.¹⁶ This is good news. The decisions post-2014 to establish the NATO HQ Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JISD), increase JISR capabilities, and improve NATO’s indicators and warnings (I&W) system have all been validated. The capabilities and processes were not always ideal, but holistically the NIE enabled cohesion, collective decision-making, an effective military response, and effective communications for aggression against a partner nation. The bad news is these outcomes are related to, but not sufficient for, defense against a peer adversary.

NIE’s ability to function and deliver in a collective defense, multi-domain, and high-intensity combat situation requires further improvements in the C4ISR architecture.

NATO-owned C4ISR capabilities like the Alliance Ground Surveillance¹⁷ (AGS) and Airborne Early Warning and Control System¹⁸ (AWACS) have proven their value in the current conflict in Ukraine, yet operations have exposed limitations in readiness, types of sensors, quantity of platforms, and connectivity.¹⁹ NATO ASG for Intelligence and Security David Cattler highlighted the positive: “NATO and nations contributed with data, platforms, and intelligence. The US shared and declassified intelligence in an unprecedented way and even small nations responded and contributed to specific requirements. Strategic and operational intelligence provided to allies was well coordinated between JISD and ACO.”²⁰ That said, personalities drove much of the success in overcoming standing C4ISR issues in terms of sharing, declassification, coordination procedures between NATO HQ and ACO, and related budgetary issues.²¹

NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) RQ-4D ”Phoenix” remotely piloted aircraft. Photo by NATO.

Persistence and survivability

One clear lesson from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, said former ACO DCOS Strategic Employment Maj. Gen. Philip Stewart, “is the need for persistent surveillance.”²² Persistent surveillance is fundamental for effective NATO deterrence and defense and crisis prevention and management because it provides military and political leaders the near-real-time awareness of threat I&W that enable timely decision-making and action. The ability to see and communicate the Russian buildup, invasion, and military action at the operational and tactical levels enabled shared awareness, decision-making, and response. The allies had the luxury of time in the case of Ukraine.

To ensure an effective response against a highly capable peer adversary, NATO needs persistent surveillance, which requires new structures, policies, processes, and capabilities. Persistent surveillance will likely demand a combination of assets from multiple domains. According to NATO ASG for Defense Investment (DI) Camille Grand, “The ability to use and fuse different tools will be critical to achieve persistent surveillance.”²³ Both Russian and Ukrainian combatants have employed a vast array of drones, from high and medium-altitude long-endurance platforms to small and very small systems, with an array of capabilities for a variety of missions (including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or ISR, and target acquisition). Increases in dedicated NATO and national capabilities from space, high, medium, and low altitude are needed to respond to strategic and operational intelligence requirements in a collective defense scenario.

One clear lesson from the Russian invasion of Ukraine is the need for persistent surveillance.
Former ACO DCOS Strategic Employment Maj. Gen. Philip Stewart

“The Alliance needs robust, in-depth, and survivable JISR platforms in the future,” Cattler said.²⁴ Survivability of NATO C4ISR in modern warfare against a peer adversary is a critical requirement. NATO-owned AGS RQ-4s and AWACS E3As have limited survivability in a contested environment. NATO and national tactical communications are vulnerable to adversary electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. Future solutions may come from a combination of greater sensor range, stealth characteristics, electronic countermeasures, other performance characteristics, or next generation communications systems. Survivability of non-deployable and deployable NATO C2 is another aspect highlighted by the destructive effect of missiles employed in the Russia-Ukraine war. Passive measures like dispersion, displacement, alternate locations, concealment, and degraded operational procedures are all being reviewed or planned. Active measures like air and missile defense planning and deployment to protect NATO C2, not so much. That said, NATO has increased its air and missile defense posture along its eastern flank in the form of short deployments of air and land assets under NATO’s Air Shielding mission.²⁵

Space-based intelligence (as well as other space-based services like communications, early warning, tracking, and guidance) offers a partial answer to the need for both persistent surveillance and survivability, as space-based capabilities are expected to expand rapidly in the coming years.²⁶ National, military, and commercial space-based intelligence (imagery, communications, and electronic signatures) has the potential to contribute greatly to persistent surveillance. NATO will be more and more interested in protection, durability, and survivability of space-based assets, which must be addressed by nations and industry. Redundancy in space-based sensors and assets and the decreasing cost of replacement and remote maintenance may offset some of the need for survivability.

Multidisciplinary intelligence and fusion

Imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT),²⁷ and OSINT played a key role in unmasking Russian intent and disinformation from the national to tactical level, as well as in targeting. Allies, NATO, Ukraine, and Russia have all exploited space-based data and information (imagery, signals, signatures) for intelligence analysis and production. Ukraine has combined commercially available space-based data and crowdsourced information (technically both part of OSINT) to effectively identify and engage key Russian targets (e.g., leadership, C2 and logistic nodes, and major platforms), refute Russian official narratives, and identify war crimes and war criminals.

There is a need for improvements in NATO’s multidisciplinary intelligence capabilities and ability to collect, fuse, and process such intelligence. The Alliance has powerful all-weather sensors in its NATO-owned AGS (Synthetic Aperture Radar, Ground Movement Target Indicator), but no electrical-optical (EO), infrared (IR), full-motion video (FMV), or SIGINT capabilities.²⁸ The latter capabilities are key for collective defense and a broad range of other crisis and security operations. NATO SIGINT (provided through national contributions) has contributed to strategic shared awareness and decision-making but is still too compartmentalized and often overclassified to be fused and used meaningfully at the operational and tactical levels. NATO has no NATO-owned SIGINT sensors or platforms, and its EW capabilities are a long-standing shortfall at the tactical level.

Two initiatives underway can partially address NATO’s need for SIGINT and OSINT. First, the Alliance Persistent Space Surveillance²⁹ (APSS) initiative set up in April 2022 and formally launched in February 2023 is a key step toward enabling NATO’s collection of national contributions and commercial contracting of space-based data, products, and services.³⁰ Second, the NATO Public Diplomacy Division’s (PDD) Information Environment Assessment (IEA) project (supported by JISD and ACT) is prototyping an artificial intelligence (AI) tool to help NATO professionals sort and analyze vast amounts of print, media, and online information.³¹ The APSS and IEA initiatives deserve expansion and acceleration in delivery to meet NATO’s current and future C4ISR needs.

Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (TCPED)

TCPED is the information management process that NATO and other military or government organizations use to synchronize intelligence and operational efforts to acquire and deliver intelligence in response to specific requirements.³² An effective and responsive TCPED process is fundamental to NATO’s ability to deliver timely and relevant intelligence in response to strategic political and operational military demands. The NIE’s response to the Russia-Ukraine crisis as well as observations of the combatants in the war have highlighted the need for vastly improved capacity for TCPED.

NATO’s TCPED process is operating at a level below its potential and short of strategic and operational need. Speed and efficiency of the TCPED process are already challenged by current levels of structure, data, assets, and analysts. According to NAEW&C Force Commander Maj. Gen. Tom Kunkel, “NATO leaves so much data on the cutting floor.”³³ Matters would only be worse if NATO were fully engaged in a modern conflict attempting to execute MDO.

AI and machine learning (ML) tools, along with improved data management and connectivity, could offer relatively cheap solutions (as opposed to major equipment programs) to vastly improve the speed, efficiency, and effectiveness of the NATO TCPED process (from the strategic to tactical levels).

You can’t cyber your way across a river.
Gen. Patrick Sanders, Chief of Britain’s General Staff

Cyber

The role of cyber in the Russia-Ukraine war has been surprising. Pre-invasion, leaders and analysts generally expected the Ukrainian government and military to succumb to the crippling effects of Russia’s “overwhelming” cyber capabilities. That has not happened.

According to Cattler, open sources reveal that Russia deployed destructive cyber malware against Ukrainian government and military C2, rendered systems inoperable, and sabotaged an Internet provider that both Ukrainian police and military depend on. All of this was evidence of “good cyber reconnaissance ahead of time by Russia,” he said.³⁴ However, he added, Russian cyber operations were “not coordinated with conventional ops” nor exploited.³⁵ The reasons are likely a mix of restraint on the part of Russia; a limited ability of Russia to coordinate cyber and other domain effects; the competence of Ukrainian military, government, and private citizens in restoring and protecting systems and services; and significant assistance to Ukraine from powerful private companies like SpaceX and Microsoft (see more on this later).

Locked Shields, cyber defence exercise organized by NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn, Estonia April 10, 2019. REUTERS/Ints Kalnins

There are also limits to cyber effects. Chief of Britain’s General Staff, Gen. Patrick Sanders, said: “You can’t cyber your way across a river.”³⁶ But you might be able to stop a river crossing (see more on this later). While cyber-related lessons from Russia’s war on Ukraine have yet to be comprehensively gathered, Cattler said: “Allies have recognized that cyberspace is contested at all times and cyber defense underpins the broader deterrence and defense posture.”³⁷ Cyberspace is an enabler of C4ISR and an operational domain for cyber operations, activities, and effects related to C4ISR. Cyber represents great potential and opportunities as well as risk and vulnerabilities. NATO must build cyber resilience in its C4ISR architecture and capabilities, leverage private sector expertise and services, and incorporate voluntary national contributions of cyber ISR.

The role of private industry

Private industry has played an outsized role in enabling the Ukrainian response to the Russian aggression, and providing security, resilience, communications, and intelligence to Ukraine and allies alike—all key elements and enablers of C4ISR. SpaceX’s decision to provide thousands of Starlink terminals to enable satellite communications and Internet services for Ukrainian private and public users has been a game changer.³⁸ Microsoft’s support to Ukraine and other countries under Russian cyberattack has enabled understanding of the threat, capabilities to secure data and networks and enable resilience, and provided a comprehensive strategy for response.³⁹ According to NATO ASG for Emerging Security Challenges David van Weel, Microsoft’s talent, expertise, and tools are critical for NATO cyber defense and data management.⁴⁰

Private companies like Maxar, BlackSky, and Planet (imagery) and HawkEye 360 (signals) are providing AI-enabled space-based services to Ukraine and NATO allies.⁴¹ Commercial data, information, and services provided to Ukraine and the allies have been used to confirm Russian military locations and actions (including atrocities and war crimes) and refute disinformation. According to Van Weel, one commercial AI tool is being prototyped by the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center⁴² (NIFC) to save hours of costly analyst time spent counting aircraft from massive amounts of collected imagery. This tool has enabled near-real-time analysis of Russian air assets and battle damage as well as cueing of changes to existing status.⁴³

NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) General Manager Ludwig Decamps offered that “perhaps we need to add industry as another domain of operations.”⁴⁴ Noting that NATO already depends on industry for critical services and innovative responses to military need, Decamps added: “How do we include in our planning to account for industry’s expertise, inherent responsibilities, and potential contributions?”⁴⁵ NATO engagement with industry includes a robust relationship through the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG),⁴⁶ which includes national industry delegations from all allies, and recently launched NATO initiatives like Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA)⁴⁷ and the NATO Innovation Fund.⁴⁸

There have been several NATO initiatives and policy efforts over the past five years to increase engagement with parts of the private sector that produce some of the most advanced and innovative technologies. Developed for commercial use, these technologies could also respond to defense requirements.

Until recently, many start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) rarely engaged with NATO for a variety of reasons, including lack of visibility of NATO needs, lack of experience in NATO procurement processes, concerns over the capital investment needed to compete, and a general view that NATO focused on large, complex systems that were the bailiwick of major primes or consortiums of traditional defense industry.⁴⁹

Local residents use a Starlink terminal, amid Russia’s attack on Ukraine, in Chasiv Yar, Donetsk region, Ukraine January 31, 2023. REUTERS/Oleksandr Ratushniak

NATO-Industry Forums (NIFs),⁵⁰ multinational cooperation in capability development,⁵¹ internal NATO HQ trials,⁵² ACT innovation initiatives,⁵³ NCIA industry key events,⁵⁴ and NATO policy efforts to address emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs)⁵⁵ are all examples of NATO engaging nontraditional industry partners to leverage their creative and innovation potential. Among this broad list of efforts, multinational cooperation in capability development has provided the most concrete, albeit still limited, results. DIANA, specifically, will focus on engaging and leveraging start-ups and SMEs, which until recently (prior to 2019) had been under-represented or less represented in NATO engagements with industry.⁵⁶

The importance of these initiatives in engaging the private sector and leveraging its technology, innovation, and expertise, including that of promising start-ups and SMEs, to develop creative solutions to NATO military problems at pace has only grown due to the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Digitalization, connectivity, and Big Data

Interrelated to many of the previous lessons identified are the importance of digitalization of information (including signals, print, and electronic media), connectivity (efficient, secure, robust, and resilient networks), common data frameworks (standard protocols and interfaces), and data management tools to enable data sharing and Big Data exploitation. More comprehensive intelligence analysis (as well as research in general) has long been hampered by several limitations: the number of documents or signals available in digital form, disconnected private and public data silos containing exploitable information, the lack of common protocols and interfaces to access and share data, and the lack of data management tools in general. While data management and cloud services have become the norm in the private sector, the public defense sector has been wary and slow to adopt. But necessity is the mother of invention and Ukraine is a particularly relevant proving ground.

A prominent example of digitally enabled C4ISR that has been used to rapidly target and destroy Russian forces is the Ukrainian-developed and British-enabled GIS Arta application.⁵⁷ Described as “Uber-style technology” providing situational awareness and rapid targeting, the system is fed by “real-time battlefield data from reconnaissance drones, rangefinders, smartphones, GPS [global positioning system] and NATO-donated radars.”⁵⁸ The system then identifies targets and “rapidly selects artillery, mortar, missile or combat drone units that are within range.”⁵⁹ Rapid calculation of firing options and alerting of firing units has cut the (Ukrainian) military’s targeting time from twenty minutes to one.⁶⁰

A prominent example of digitally enabled C4ISR that has been used to rapidly target and destroy Russian forces is the Ukrainian-developed and British-enabled GIS Arta application.

Microsoft’s ability to connect, secure, and exploit data globally is another example of effective Big Data management and exploitation. While digitalization is proceeding, NATO connectivity currently falls short of requirements to effectively link NATO HQ, commands, forces, other bodies, and nations in peacetime, let alone crisis or conflict. A common data framework is not yet operational, data management tools are rudimentary, and data sharing is far below potential. Former NATO Director General of the International Military Staff (DGIMS) Lt. Gen. Hans-Werner Wiermann advocated for a NATO digital backbone to enable connectivity and a military Internet of Things (IoT) to connect C2, systems, sensors, and shooters. The envisioned military IoT would support applications for all manner of military assessment, planning, coordination, and execution functions.⁶¹

As a result of impetus from the Russia-Ukraine war, other NATO efforts, and productive collaboration across NATO HQ and Strategic Commands, Wiermann’s ambition expanded to a more comprehensive Digital Transformation (DT) concept.⁶² This DT concept would address digitalization, connectivity, data frameworks, and management tools across the NATO Enterprise. According to Julazadeh, “The nascent NATO DT effort is similar to the US Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) effort, but a bit broader as it encompasses transforming people, processes, and technology. DT is recognized as a sine qua non component of NATO MDO.”⁶³ NATO DT will also enable the design of a future NATO C4ISR architecture.

This is not a complete list of lessons relating to C4ISR to be gained from the Russia-Ukraine war, but it provides a good starting point for identifying recommendations for the improvement and further development of NATO C4ISR. Other lessons related to NATO C4ISR, such as the variety of missions autonomous systems can perform, the importance of counter-unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) capabilities in protecting C4ISR, the importance of EW capabilities, and how to replicate aspects of Ukraine’s whole-of-society response to Russian aggression in a whole-of-enterprise NATO effort to adapt, modernize, and transform, will be included in this report’s final set of recommendations.

Russia-Ukraine war lessons for NATO C4ISR

• Multi-domain operations • Day zero readiness • NIE surged, adapted, and delivered • Persistence and survivability • Multidisciplinary intelligence and fusion • Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination • Cyber • Role of private industry • Digitalization, connectivity, and Big Data

In summary, NATO and the allies have gained valuable lessons related to C4ISR from the Alliance’s response to Russian aggression and from the employment of C4ISR capabilities by both Russia and Ukraine.

Decisions taken at the Madrid Summit and work underway affecting NATO C4ISR

Russian aggression and other threats and challenges, including from China and climate change, resulted in a historic NATO summit in Madrid in June 2022. A new NATO 2022 Strategic Concept was approved clearly delineating the threats and challenges facing the Alliance, revising NATO’s three core tasks (deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security), and laying out key lines of effort for adapting the Alliance politically and militarily for 2030 and beyond.⁶⁴ Political decisions and ambitions announced in the Summit Declaration and in the Strategic Concept, the most important of which include those related to achieving a strengthened deterrence and defense and an increased focus on innovation and EDTs, will shape the requirements and development of NATO’s C4ISR architecture.

Other political ambitions impacting the trajectory of NATO C4ISR include DT, increased resilience, understanding the security implications of climate change, reducing defense impacts on climate change (e.g., reducing the use of fossil fuels, energy consumption, carbon emissions, toxic waste and contaminants), and increasing the level of NATO common funding.

The following analysis summarizes decisions taken at the Madrid Summit, the expected follow-through on these decisions, and other ongoing adaptation efforts previously decided and impacting NATO C4ISR.

NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept broadly sets the context for C4ISR architecture and requirements in its description of threats and challenges expected over the coming decade, and the political guidance under NATO’s three revised core tasks.⁶⁵ The concept refers to decisions taken at and prior to the Madrid Summit and has critical implications for the enablement, development, and employment of NATO C4ISR..

Multi-domain warfighting

NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept sets an ambition for multi-domain warfighting and multi-domain forces.⁶⁶ NATO has taken an initial step toward this end by adopting a working definition for MDO (as previously noted).⁶⁷ To achieve NATO’s level of ambition with respect to multi-domain warfighting several more steps are required, such as an approved Alliance MDO Concept, revised Allied Joint Doctrine, improved awareness of threats and opportunities in all domains, upgrades and improvements in capabilities, and secure use of and access to cyberspace and space capabilities. Multi-domain warfighting also requires trained and educated leaders and professionals, trained and exercised forces in MDO, a data-centric approach, and, above all, a cultural shift and new mindset.⁶⁸

The level of effort will be demanding, but the expected outcome is worth the effort: greater shared understanding, collaboration, and synchronization of capabilities and activities across domains to achieve multi-domain effects. MDO concept development and implementation will be enabled by ACT’s Warfare Development Agenda, DT, and NATO initiatives related to innovation and EDTs. According to Julazadeh, HQ SACT DCOS for Capability Development, NATO leaders are pressing for accelerated delivery of an Alliance MDO Concept by 2023.⁶⁹ Given the breadth and complexity of MDO and the need for supporting studies this is a stretch goal for NATO’s Strategic Commands, but its approval and implementation will be revolutionary for the Alliance. Future C4ISR architecture and capabilities will have to be designed, optimized, integrated, and interoperable to support multi-domain warfighting and full-spectrum operations at the speed of relevance.

Digital Transformation

As mentioned earlier, DT is intended to address digitalization, connectivity, data frameworks, and data management tools across the NATO Enterprise. DT is intended to enable significant increases in speed, security, and effectiveness in C2, communications, data analysis, intelligence analysis and dissemination, decision-making, operations, and interoperability. Proceeding along this journey will make NATO more agile, resilient, and capable of seizing and maintaining the initiative in peacetime and conflict.

Much of the vision under development is not new and many strands have been under development for some time. Former NCIA General Manager Kevin Scheid was a strong advocate of digitally transforming NATO and had initiated an effort known as “NCIA’s digital endeavor” to modernize and improve the security of NATO’s communications and information infrastructure and services.⁷⁰ Wiermann, the former NATO DGIMS, advocated for development of a NATO digital backbone, which in his view would constitute the new NATO added value to nations in the information age.⁷¹

The current effort includes both initiatives and is broader and more ambitious. The effort will address the entire NATO Enterprise and include political approval by nations of a vision in fall 2022 and an implementation plan (ideally with resource assessment) by 2023.⁷² According to NHQC3S Deputy Director Marco Criscuolo, a three-step concurrent process (modernization, optimization, and transformation) is necessary to address the complexity and uncertainty of a DT journey.⁷³

NATO Digital Transformation Steps

1. Modernization 2. Optimization 3. Transformation

In brief, in step one—modernization—the current main effort includes continuing modernizing existing capabilities and resourcing ongoing programs and projects such as Information Technology Modernization and related network, data, and cybersecurity initiatives. Step two—optimization—includes reviewing and cohering the numerous and currently disconnected capability programs to build synergies, gain efficiencies, and develop better processes, including adopting current off-the-shelf capabilities. Step three—transformation—begins as NATO gains an understanding of the potential of related technologies and tools, starts to adopt them, then revises structures, processes, and capabilities, and builds in resilience (in cyber, space, and physical infrastructure).⁷⁴

DT will enable connectivity between data pools and access to and exploitation of data across the NATO Enterprise. NATO Enterprise coherence will be driven by top-down guidance and internalized principles (a whole-of-enterprise approach). DT will rely on a new organizational culture and mindset that is digitally savvy and data centric. It will also rely on greater engagement with industry to leverage its expertise and services, and greater integration and interoperability, the latter supported by the active setting and shaping of standards. DT will also rely on an agility in capability development and resource management (budgetary and human capital) and a modern approach to obsolescence management that do not currently exist.

DT will influence and enable the design of future C4ISR architecture and capabilities and improve the integration, connectivity, ability to manage and exploit Big Data, and the quality and speed of C4ISR processes.

Strengthened deterrence and defense posture

The Alliance’s decision to “strengthen our deterrence and defense posture to deny any potential adversary any possible opportunities for aggression”⁷⁵ is a major change in strategy and has multiple implications for future NATO C4ISR. In particular, the enhanced NATO posture will increase requirements for persistent surveillance and improved awareness of potential threats, a rapid and more effective intelligence process, a revised and robust C2 structure, and resilient and secure networks.

A strengthened posture will be enabled by a new NATO Force Model,⁷⁶ which will identify and assign around three hundred thousand allied forces at high readiness (ready to move in less than thirty days) to a family of NATO strategic and regional defense plans for the first time since the Cold War.

C4ISR assets from NATO and national services will be an integral part of the NATO Force Model and support the requirements in the SASP and family of regional and subordinate strategic plans. C4ISR architecture and capabilities must also support a strengthened integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) through improved ISR for shared awareness, early warning, and tracking, and improved air and surface-based C2 systems. Persistent surveillance is needed to support the Alliance’s I&W requirements. There will certainly be shortfalls in available assets and interoperability.

Strengthened IAMD is an important and new commitment associated with the 2022 Strategic Concept; it is a must to respond to the broad range of Russian air and missile capabilities, which can threaten allied populations, forces, and infrastructure from any direction given their ranges and mobility. Strengthened IAMD should include greater day zero connectivity and integration of existing IAMD-related C2 nodes, sensors, and effectors; new and improved IAMD capabilities; and an improved Air C2 system. The Air C2 system is already the focus of a transition effort by allies in conjunction with NCIA and ACO that seeks to address numerous shortfalls in the existing system while concurrently planning for the upgrades and development of an Air C2 system that can meet future needs. This transition effort should be accelerated. In particular, a strengthened IAMD should prioritize the ability to detect and defeat the broad range of tactical ballistic and cruise missiles in the current and future Russian inventory. This includes closing the low-altitude surveillance gap to detect and track cruise missiles across SACEUR’s AOR.

Ongoing planning, force generation, and future exercises will identify C4ISR shortfalls and refine future C4ISR requirements to meet the demands of an improved NATO posture, including persistent surveillance and strengthened IAMD.

New NATO Force Model

Robust, resilient, and integrated command structure and enhanced C2 arrangements

NATO leaders recognize that the strengthened deterrence and defense posture they envision must be enabled by an improved Alliance C2 structure, parts of which do not yet exist. ACO’s C2 structure currently includes one strategic headquarters (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; SHAPE), three joint force commands (JFCs) (Brunssum, Naples, and Norfolk), three service component commands (Air, Maritime, and Land Commands), a theater logistics command (Joint Support and Enabling Command), and several operational commands (e.g., Striking Forces NATO, the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force, and NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Force).

The existing structure was designed for maximum flexibility and options to respond to multiple crises of different scale and operational requirements, primarily outside SACEUR’s AOR. It was not optimized for collective defense. The JFCs do not have regional geographic boundaries or AORs. Maritime and Land Commands are neither manned nor trained for C2 of large-scale or AOR-wide operations. Staffs at strategic and operational levels lack critical expertise in key warfighting competencies (e.g., targeting, cyber defense and response, and space support).

Current ACO C2 structure and supporting command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems (i.e., the current Air Command Control System, Federated Mission Network, Land tactical C2) are not yet fit for modern multi-domain warfare against a peer adversary. Viable Joint, Land, and Maritime C2 structures for an AOR-wide defense accommodating two new allies in the north (Finland and Sweden) will be priorities to establish. According to International Military Staff (IMS) Director of Plans and Capabilities Maj. Gen. Karl Ford, “SHAPE is working on a C2 assessment which will identify the drivers of change, review current capabilities and shortfalls, and propose design principles for future NATO C2.”⁷⁷

The assessment will look at C2 in three time horizons in order to capture short, medium, and long-term NATO adaptation needs. First, NATO C2 here and now and how to achieve the Concept for the Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) with the current NATO Command Structure and thirty allies. This stage aims to respond to current NATO needs, within the current membership format. Second, decision-makers are exploring NATO C2 needs for a potential thirty-two-nation Alliance, which would operate based on an MDO Concept and with a DT plan in place. This stage represents a much-expanded level of ambition, with NATO C2 over a contiguous northern region able to coordinate and execute cross-domain effects increasingly enabled by DT. Finally, the third stage will include SACT’s vision of NATO C2 out to 2040 carrying out MDO and tailored to future challenges and threats that are expected to be increasingly persistent, boundless, and simultaneous from multiple state and non-state actors as well as from changes in the physical and social environment.⁷⁸ The third time horizon will be informed and enabled by the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC) and Warfare Development Agenda to get there.⁷⁹

The NATO Force Structure must also be reviewed. This includes assessing requirements, overlaps, and gaps, in some cases rationalized (numbers of tactical headquarters), in some cases reinforced (creating sufficient manpower and expertise for MDO and peer combat), aligned with plans, and integrated with the NATO Command Structure (i.e., ACO and JFCs). The 2022 Strategic Concept’s increased emphasis on resilience will require increased understanding and intelligence sharing of cyber and other related threats to civilian infrastructure. It will also require sustained investment to meet resilience targets (notably to improve cybersecurity and defense for NATO networks, national communications, transportation, health systems, and financial networks).

DT and increased cyber resilience will need to account for an enhanced NATO Command Structure integrated with a rationalized NATO Force Structure and connected to national forces associated with the new NATO Force Model and NATO plans.

Global awareness

Enhanced shared, situational, and global awareness are all referenced in the 2022 Strategic Concept.⁸⁰ The first, enhanced shared awareness, implies improved collective awareness enabled by better intelligence sharing and more effective NATO C4ISR to enable timely and relevant intelligence for political and military leaders. The second, situational awareness, likewise implies timely and relevant intelligence and the addition of persistent surveillance of threat indicators that can rapidly evolve and thus require rapid response. The third, global awareness, refers to the need to monitor and analyze data and intelligence related to global factors such as climate change, pandemics, and strategic shocks emanating from abroad that could affect the Alliance. Global awareness also applies to China and Russia and their related activities and influence across the globe that impact Alliance security, interests, and values.

NATO’s revised core tasks include deterrence by denial and crisis prevention. China and climate change are now characterized as long-term challenges. The revised tasks and long-term challenges will lead to new or revised strategic and operational intelligence requirements. Revised intelligence requirements will justify and generate a need for persistent, multidisciplinary, data-enabled, multi-domain NATO JISR and higher-quality and faster analysis to enable shared awareness, decision-making, and action at the speed of relevance (speed is more of a requirement for crisis and conflict than for long-term challenges).

Intelligence to enable awareness for crisis prevention and addressing long-term challenges will need to integrate inputs from a variety of national, regional, and organizational partners, and commercial providers (e.g., space industry, media, and data; computing; and network service and security providers). For example, broader NATO understanding of China would be enabled by financial, commercial, and science and technology data and analysis and greater information sharing with Indo-Pacific partners. NATO climate policy will require better analytics to understand and respond to the security implications of climate change and require greater NATO and national efforts to incorporate aspects of climate change mitigation in defense infrastructure and capability development (e.g., greater energy efficiency and use of sustainable energy sources, better monitoring of defense impacts on climate, reduced waste production, reduced carbon emissions, etc.).⁸¹

The approval of JISR Vision 2030+ by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in Spring 2022 will enable enhanced awareness, multi-domain warfighting, and other aspects of the 2022 Strategic Concept. Giorgio Cioni, director of Armament and Aerospace Capabilities in NATO’s Defense Investment Division, said the new JISR vision “includes a series of strategic outcomes, the overall purpose of which are to render JISR architecture more robust.”⁸²

Cioni said the strategic outcomes include: “1) increased investment in collection capabilities, looking beyond existing NATO-owned platforms and payloads (AGS and AWACS), achieving persistent surveillance through a combination of capabilities and services; 2) expanding the APSS initiative to collect and acquire space-based data, products, and services to improve NATO indicators & warnings and strategic anticipation; 3) improving PED [Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination] with capabilities and tools to ensure timely and efficient analysis; 4) achieving coherence and integration of different programs contributing to the NATO C4ISR network of sensors, C2 nodes and systems, and effectors; 5) review of the JISR TCPED process to ensure it can cope with more data and capabilities (sensors, platforms, AI and ML tools) and support decentralized MDO operations; 6) enhance the human element of ISR, ensuring training and education of leaders, operators, intelligence professionals involved in ISR or end users of its output.”⁸³

NATO’s level of ambition for global awareness will lead to much greater demands to provide persistent, multidisciplinary, data-enabled, and multi-domain NATO JISR. It will also instigate higher-quality and faster analysis which the new JISR Vision 2030+ and the existing JISR Capability Development Strategy should help NATO and its member states deliver.

NATO’s Nine Priority Technology Areas

Innovation and EDTs

NATO is currently focused on protecting and fostering adoption of EDTs in “nine priority technology areas:” AI, data, autonomy, quantum-enabled technologies, biotechnology, hypersonic technologies, space, novel materials and manufacturing, and energy and propulsion.⁸⁴ The 2022 Strategic Concept states NATO’s aims for innovation and EDTs.⁸⁵

NATO has always focused on innovation as a critical element of maintaining its technological edge. However, since 2018 it has redoubled internal efforts to develop policy and external work to engage industry and the private sector to capture the potential of innovative technologies, concepts, applications, and processes.

Advanced, rapidly developing technologies have captured the attention of NATO leaders and led to a series of policies and plans related to EDTs. At the 2021 Brussels Summit, for example, NATO leaders agreed to stand up DIANA and a NATO Innovation Fund.⁸⁶

According to Van Weel, NATO ASG for Emerging Security Challenges, the Alliance is learning how to promote innovation tailored to its needs. “We can create [a location and context to meet and discuss a particular topic], communicate what we want to achieve, and leverage civilian and commercial expertise,” he said.⁸⁷ Van Weel also explained that for DIANA, “nations will collectively agree on strategic guidance developed from end users.” The strategic guidance will include a set of prioritized defense needs developed by NATO Military Authorities (who set NATO defense requirements) and informed by the armaments community (consisting of the Conference of National Armaments Directors, or CNAD, and its subordinate structure, which are responsible for supporting capability delivery of NATO defense needs)⁸⁸ and the Science & Technology Organization (STO), which focuses on horizon scanning of technology developments and enabling collaboration in research and development (R&D).

This strategic guidance for DIANA will subsequently be transformed by the DIANA executive into challenge programs for the private sector. These challenge programs will articulate prioritized defense problems that will be shared with industry to seek potential solutions, much like how national security challenges are used by the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to guide US government investment in private sector technology. NATO engagements to date have demonstrated that two-way communications with high-tech enterprises are more than just an opportunity for NATO to communicate needs.⁸⁹ This dialogue also exposes business opportunities that commercial enterprise may not know exist. “Many private sector companies don’t know they can help in the defense and security field,” said Van Weel.⁹⁰

DIANA and the NATO Innovation Fund are being designed specifically to enable delivery of solutions versus simply to promote R&D. “DIANA will not just provide access to dual-use commercial solutions, but it will help mature them,” said Van Weel. “Start-ups need founders, venture capital, business coaching, networking, and solution iteration between end users and industry. DIANA will make sure there is a connection with defense primes. The end of program is to showcase to all allies what solutions have been identified to respond to the agreed problems. Go to the Conference of National Armaments Directors, etc. And the NATO Innovation Fund can come in and put equity into a start-up company to help it scale up.”⁹¹

NATO efforts to promote innovation and investment in EDTs will also help allies retain interoperability.⁹² Interoperability by design is to be baked into capability development supported by DIANA and the NATO Innovation Fund. National efforts in R&D are less likely to be so inspired. Market competition and differing levels of available funding and technology across the Alliance will continue to create gaps in compatibility and interoperability. Without increased commitment by allies to ensure NATO interoperability as a requirement in the development of advanced technology, gaps will persist or increase.

Most of the nine priority technology areas that NATO EDT efforts are focused on will enable improvements in NATO C4ISR and consequently improve the speed and effectiveness of NATO intelligence, decision-making, and operational processes. Here are key points for four priority technology areas most relevant to NATO C4ISR:

Expansion of AI and ML use cases and rapid adoption and scaling up of promising solutions will be critical for achieving NATO’s ambition for C4ISR.

AI, ML, and Big Data services and tools have already been identified for their potential to enable future NATO C4ISR.¹ A few AI and ML use cases as described earlier are already underway (e.g., IEA’s tool and NIFC’s aircraft counting tool). These use cases are trials or proofs of principle to demonstrate that technology can improve speed and quality of output and provide new capabilities that respond to unmet needs.

Autonomy promises cost-effective solutions across multiple domains which can increase endurance, reach, survivability, and performance of C4ISR in contested environments while reducing risk to operators.

Autonomy is a field of rapid development for NATO and involves land, maritime, and aerial systems.² It is significantly enabled by AI, ML, and Big Data services and tools. The NAGSF and future Alliance Future Surveillance and Control (AFSC) ³ are likely to be a subset of future aerial autonomous capabilities available to the Alliance. Land and maritime unmanned systems also promise great potential in delivering C4ISR capabilities. The NATO Maritime Unmanned Systems Initiative is a multinational effort and a splendid example of what collaboration between public and private sector approaches can achieve in terms of vision, capability development, and experimentation.⁴ NATO’s Project X (testing use cases for unmanned aircraft systems, or UAS, enabled by AI) is another excellent example of private-public collaboration and innovation.⁵ Finally, countering adversary UAS capabilities is crucial for battlefield success as has been demonstrated in conflicts from the Middle East to Ukraine. C-UAS capabilities are a growing field of NATO collaboration with the private sector. NATO is testing C-UAS interoperability standards with both military and commercial capabilities. ⁶

Quantum technology in computers, communications, and sensors promises revolutionary changes for NATO C4ISR. ⁷

Quantum computers will provide vastly improved processing speeds and capacity to enable data processing and exploitation to include decryption of current methods of secure communications. Quantum communications will enable improved security and unbreakable encryption. Quantum sensors will provide multispectral abilities to locate and identify objects previously undiscoverable due to cover and concealment, including objects in buildings or underground and submarines under water. Of these three applications of quantum technology, NATO has already begun R&D projects and tests related to quantum communications. ⁸

Exponential increases in space-based capabilities over the coming decade will impact C4ISR requirements and resilience and enable C4ISR architecture and capabilities.

Space-related technology is included in EDTs, but managed under a distinct NATO Space Policy, which recognizes the role of national contributions from space-faring nations, but also unique NATO space support requirements (i.e., communications, intelligence, early warning, targeting, positioning, navigation, and timing). ⁹ NATO has had its own satellite communications capability for years, but in 2020 a group of allies contracted NCIA to expand its transmission capacity and improve the capabilities of NATO ground stations. ¹⁰ More recently, NATO has established a Space Center at ACO’s Air Command (AIRCOM) in Germany, ¹¹ a Space Situational Awareness Capability at NATO HQ, ¹² and a Space Center of Excellence in France.¹³

Defense investment

NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept mentions the importance of fulfilling the 2014 Defense Investment Pledge,⁹³ which was created to ensure adequate investment in defense in support of an ambitious NATO Readiness Action Plan⁹⁴ agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit.⁹⁵ The NATO Readiness Action Plan and increased defense investment were meant to adapt NATO politically and militarily in response to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea earlier that year and its ongoing aggression against Ukraine. The pledge commits NATO allies to spend 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defense by 2024 and to ensure 20 percent of defense spending is allocated for “major new equipment, including research and development.”⁹⁶

In the 2022 Strategic Concept, allies further commit “to provide the full range of required capabilities,” “ensure that increased national defence expenditures and NATO common funding will be commensurate with the challenges of a more contested security order,” and “increase our investments in emerging and disruptive technologies to retain our interoperability and military edge.”⁹⁷ These new commitments are the sine qua non foundation for strengthening deterrence and defense and achieving the level of ambition NATO has set for adapting its political and military instruments of power to meet the threats and challenges of the coming decade.

NATO C4ISR structure and NATO-owned capabilities (e.g., AGS, AWACS, AFSC, JISR, Air C2 System, and Federated Mission Network) figure prominently in NATO’s current defense investment programs and projects. Capability targets for national C4ISR are likely to increase in NATO’s next defense planning cycle because of the new strategic environment and a new level of ambition to prepare for “high-intensity, multi-domain warfighting against nuclear-armed peer-competitors.”⁹⁸ Both NATO-owned and national capabilities will consequentially be the object of future increases in defense spending.

In addition to supporting the costs of NATO’s common military and civilian structure (i.e., manpower, operations, and sustainment), NATO common funding also supports collective defense investment in C4ISR capability development, which is of great political interest and subject to significant collective oversight and governance. Attempts to streamline and accelerate common-funded capability development and oversight have produced limited positive results to date. Low risk tolerance for early or any failure, detailed reporting requirements, and limited options for accelerated procurement are some of the main issues.⁹⁹ Upgrades of information technology (IT), which rapidly become obsolete, are taken as distinct collective decisions instead of being embedded in upfront requirements. Upgrades and modernization of major capabilities like NATO-owned AGS have been similarly delayed. Hence the need to review how NATO manages obsolescence in the modern age. The private sector provides ample examples of faster capability development and the NIAG has provided tailored advice on how to improve agility in acquisition.¹⁰⁰ Allies have not achieved the acceleration and expansion of common-funded capability development they desire, which has frustrated NATO military, civilian staff, and agencies involved. Further change is needed.

The biggest challenges will be in achieving the cultural shift and sustained sense of purpose needed to enable a whole-of-enterprise approach in the face of inevitable resistance to change and competing domestic and global challenges.

The NWCC, approved in 2021, managed by ACT, and supervised by the Allied Chiefs of Defense, should be a major driver of military innovation and investment over the coming decade, specifically concept and capability development.¹⁰¹ While details in open sources are scarce, the NWCC will be managed through a Warfare Development Agenda that includes imperatives (e.g., cognitive superiority, multi-domain command, integrated multi-domain defense) and principles (e.g., right people, data centric technology, day zero integration, persistent disruptive preparation) which are meant to influence national and NATO C4ISR development and delivery decisions.¹⁰² The ability to synchronize ACT’s Warfare Development Agenda across NATO and nations and with existing NATO defense planning and capability development processes will be a daunting task. ACT has a direct role in common-funded capability development but has not yet leveraged its authorities and abilities to support national and multinational capability development.

NATO ambition is high for its innovation and EDT adoption efforts, both of which are meant to direct investment into capability development that enables NATO’s military edge. Initial efforts like DIANA, the NATO Innovation Fund, use cases for AI, and ongoing work to develop strategies for individual EDTs are all promising. Engagement with industry and the broader private sector is strong and growing. Similar to DT efforts, success in NATO innovation efforts will rely on an agility in investing in capability development and resource management (budgetary and human capital) that does not exist within NATO’s current structure and processes. DIANA and the NATO Innovation Fund will offer alternative development and resourcing options to include bilateral, multilateral, and multinational programs. Scaling up solutions to provide NATO-wide enterprise capabilities would require common funding and be subject to NATO governance that has been historically resistant to higher risk and decentralized control. To achieve NATO’s level of ambition, the Alliance will need to embrace a whole-of-enterprise effort, ensure sustained commitment and investment, and change the way it currently does business with regard to common-funded capabilities.

Decisions taken at the Madrid Summit and work underway affecting NATO C4ISR

• Multi-domain warfighting • Digital Transformation • Strengthened deterrence and defense posture • Robust, resilient, and integrated command structure and enhanced C2 arrangements • Global awareness • Innovation and EDTs • Defense investment

Deductions from the Madrid Summit and other recent developments include the following. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept and recent policy decisions, including the political commitment to increase defense investment, have set the context for future NATO C4ISR. The foundation for future NATO C4ISR is being built through existing programs and initiatives, supporting concepts, assessments, and plans under development. The devil will be in the implementation of decisions taken and others still to be taken. The biggest challenges will be in achieving the cultural shift and sustained sense of purpose needed to enable a whole-of-enterprise approach in the face of inevitable resistance to change and competing domestic and global challenges.

The importance of investing in NATO C4ISR innovation. Photo by NCI Agency

Efforts are already underway to improve NATO C4ISR and more will follow as decisions taken at the Madrid Summit are implemented. Lessons and security implications from the Russia-Ukraine war for NATO C4ISR will and must be a priority for directing efforts and investment in C4ISR improvements, modernization, and future capability development. Due to its importance to effective Alliance security and defense, NATO C4ISR deserves special focus and effort to improve its multiple components (i.e., organizations, capabilities, networks, concepts, policies, processes, and people). NATO must change in several areas to maintain its technological and military edge and increase the likelihood of achieving the security and defense it deserves. The following recommendations build on positive momentum, leverage new concepts and initiatives, and offer suggestions for improvement, including adopting new efforts and approaches.

NATO C4ISR Policy Recommendations

To maintain a comparative advantage against potential adversaries and challengers, NATO and allies must 1) share more data and intelligence; 2) transform digitally; 3) implement new concepts, policies, and plans to clarify C4ISR requirements; 4) modernize, augment, and acquire capabilities to meet new C4ISR requirements; and 5) continue to invest in NATO C4ISR interoperability, readiness, resilience, innovation, and adaptation.

Sharing data and intelligence is first and foremost a matter of political will, as NATO relies on voluntary information sharing by its allies. Sharing requires trust in NATO, specifically that the Alliance can protect information shared. Sharing will always be a delicate subject, as not all nations trust NATO or one another to protect their shared data and intelligence in the face of aggressive espionage, cyber incidents, mishandling, and leaks. NATO and its member states collect vast amounts of data and intelligence that are not exploited for the benefit of collective security and defense or other Alliance aims.
Trust is enabled by modern and secure networks, a common data framework and standards respected by all, and an efficient and effective NIE, all of which act as guarantees that the information can be protected and effectively exploited by the Alliance. Much of this is in place, but two key elements require attention: political will (greater emphasis) and security (continued emphasis).

The NAC must commit politically to addressing obstacles and shortfalls in sharing. Shared data or shared intelligence do not appear in the 2022 Strategic Concept or Madrid Summit Declaration. Their absence may reflect a view of adequacy in current levels of sharing or discomfort in addressing the many national policy and technical issues that affect trust in NATO’s ability to protect data and intelligence.¹⁰³ Technical issues also inhibit interoperability, which must be addressed through greater emphasis on common standards (see sections 4 and 5 below). Shared data, information, and intelligence are fuel for C4ISR. Sharing is not at the level it can and needs to be to ensure NATO maintains its comparative military advantage.¹⁰⁴

Security, including cybersecurity, remains an issue. But cybersecurity, document security, and communications security are improving with policy emphasis, cyber adaptation efforts, improved security measures, and with improved supporting tools being put in place or planned for the future.

Officers analyze data coming in from the field at the trial control room during Unified Vision, NATO’s main event for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Photo by NATO.

A golden opportunity lies in the ability of NATO and its member states to tap into the potential of shared data and intelligence to exponentially improve the quality and speed of shared awareness, decision-making, and action. The opportunity cost of not sharing is enormous. For example, restricted sharing of intelligence on Russian violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty complicated NATO consensus from 2014 to 2018 on US findings that the Russian 9M729 (or SSC-8) missile constituted a violation of the treaty.¹⁰⁵ Earlier sharing of sensitive intelligence could have significantly accelerated common positions on Russian nuclear-capable missiles, leading to earlier decisions on mitigation and pressure on Russia to comply. By contrast, the early decision by the United States and other NATO allies to share sensitive intelligence on Russian intentions vis-à-vis Ukraine in early 2022 led to greater and timely shared awareness, clarity in communications, and timely consensus on decisions taken to assure and defend allies and deter Russia.¹⁰⁶ Here are basic, but critical, recommendations for NATO:

Implement the NATO Data Exploitation Framework Policy (DEFP) agreed by Alliance defense ministers in October 2021. While details on the DEFP are not widely known, it is fundamental to establishing a common data framework across the NATO Enterprise to enable Big Data sharing, exchange, and exploitation. NATO Military Authorities (NMAs) have begun the implementation process, but it will require a whole-of-enterprise approach, with commitment from the nations, NATO HQ, and common funding. NCIA expertise and support will be critical. NATO should leverage the NIAG and look to industry for expertise and enabling services, such as cloud computing and Big Data management.
Task the NIE in conjunction with NMAs to assess and recommend critical improvements needed to enhance intelligence-sharing procedures and tools, specifically:
- Mutually supporting strategic and operational intelligence management procedures for warfighting and crises,
- Intelligence functional services fit for MDO, and
- AI tools to assist in real-time exploitation of shared intelligence (including sorting, cueing, and other automated functions).
Set realistic and measurable objectives to share more data with metadata, information, and intelligence, both military and commercial, related to threats and challenges.

2. Transform digitally

DT is a nascent effort that is fundamental for strengthening security and defense and improving resilience. DT is a key enabler of MDO. In turn, effective MDO depend on multi-domain C4ISR. Multi-domain C4ISR is critical for delivering multi-domain effects through multi-domain awareness, decision-making, and action. Enabling multi-domain C4ISR should, therefore, be a particular focus of DT.

A DT vision was developed in fall 2022 and an implementation plan is expected in 2023.¹⁰⁷ The 2021 DEFP is a fundamental first step in the process. The DT vision and implementation plan constitute policy that will have to be followed by investment in infrastructure, capabilities, people, supporting policies, and governance processes. Standards in data exchange and connectivity will be particularly important for networks, weapons systems, platforms, equipment, and software. The US Department of Defense’s C4ISR/Electronic Warfare Modular Open Suite of Standards (CMOSS) provides a national example of an open standard approach that could be used to develop a similar NATO open standard approach allowing various national and commercial entities to design and develop interoperable capabilities.¹⁰⁸

NATO DT must be comprehensive in its objectives and enterprise wide in its application to achieve what NATO needs for shared awareness, decision-making, and action at the speed of relevance for multi-domain warfighting as well as for effective crisis prevention and management.¹⁰⁹ NATO is politically committed to transform digitally, and policy development is in progress. As the NATO consultation, command, and control (C3) staff and board are central to DT policy development, implementation of DT into current and future C3 capability efforts is almost a given. A similar sense of urgency and focus will be needed across the NATO Enterprise. Given current positive momentum, NATO should:

Ensure funding matches political ambition for and military (and Enterprise) requirements inherent to DT.
Ensure requirements for enabling multi-domain C4ISR are captured, resourced, and addressed as a priority.
Seek and leverage private sector expertise and capabilities. Large and small industries offer expertise and capabilities (services) related to DT.
Look long to enable transition to technologies and applications in NATO’s near-term horizon (i.e., the next six years), such as 6G networks and space-based capabilities and services.
Ensure a whole-of-enterprise approach to link DT policy development and implementation, including:
- Active collaboration between relevant NATO governance bodies (e.g., those covering C3, cyber defense, security, armaments, standards, budgeting and resourcing, IAMD policy, defense planning) and the Military Committee, and
- Collaboration within and among key staff management bodies (e.g., those responsible for communications, information and data management, cybersecurity, JISR, and innovation), including Strategic Commands, agencies, and perhaps Centers of Excellence where relevant.
Ensure the political focus and funding support to the NATO C3 community to achieve and accelerate the delivery of critical C3 capabilities such as Federated Mission Network and Information Technology Modernization, and a standing operational net for current operations and activities (day zero readiness).
Ensure implementation of DT is integrated into related ongoing lines of effort beyond C3, i.e., cyber defense adaptation, standards development, common-funded capability development, multinational capability development cooperation, and complex armaments programs (e.g., Air C2, AWACS, and AFSC).
Adapt existing service contracts and capability development plans, programs, and projects to include DT implementation guidance and standards.
Develop and implement a human capital development and management policy focused on hiring the right talent, and training and educating NATO civilian and military workforce and leaders to enable DT. Seek and leverage private sector expertise.

3. Implement new concepts, policies, and plans to clarify requirements for NATO C4ISR

NMAs determine C4ISR requirements through the NATO defense planning process (NDPP), and the NAC and allies decide how to meet those requirements through collective, multinational, and national capabilities. NATO’s C3 community plays a key role in determining the technical aspects of interoperable and secure C2, communications, and computers for NATO’s military and broader NATO Enterprise. With this as context, several efforts underway over the next year or the longer term will directly influence future NATO C4ISR requirements. The Alliance should leverage these efforts to clarify requirements and ensure coherence in the next NDPP cycle and future capability development and delivery to develop the future C4ISR architecture NATO needs.

First, the new NATO Force Model and alignment of forces with NATO’s new family of plans (SASP and regional and subordinate strategic plans) will identify C4ISR force and capability requirements. This effort is underway and will likely conclude at the June 2023 defense ministers’ meeting.¹¹⁰ These requirements could include new or revised NATO C4ISR structure. If force generation shortfalls reflect shortfalls in national inventories, then C4ISR capability requirements should increase.

Second, an Alliance MDO Concept will help define what NATO C4ISR must deliver to outthink and outpace potential adversaries and how NATO C4ISR will contribute to achieving multi-domain effects. The final Alliance MDO Concept is under development by the Strategic Commands and allies expect it to be delivered in 2023. Likewise, a DT implementation plan is expected in the first half of 2023.¹¹¹ DT is a fundamental condition for MDO and will set standards for digitalization, connectivity, and data exchange and exploitation that will affect current and future NATO C4ISR.

Third, NATO leaders have tasked ACO to produce a C2 Assessment to enable allied ministers to consider new requirements from NMAs and defense policy proposals (from relevant committees) by Spring 2023.¹¹² Adjustments to the NATO Command Structure over several time horizons will impact C4ISR requirements, specifically to enable effective AOR-wide C2 and multi-domain warfighting. The NATO Force Structure, which is composed of allied national and multinational forces and HQs, should also be part of proposals for change to execute SASP and support the new NATO Force Model. Additional or new C4ISR structure should be considered as well. The timing of the ministers’ decision in 2023 is fortuitous and will allow endorsed C4ISR-related requirements to be captured in the next NDPP cycle, specifically in the Minimum Capability Requirements (MCR) that NMAs will produce for NAC approval in 2024.

NATO’s Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR) Concept. Source: NATO

Fourth, over a longer term, the JISR component of NATO C4ISR is driven by several agreed documents and programs. Strategic outcomes of NATO’s JISR Vision 2030+, discussed earlier along with the JISR Capability Development Strategy, and JISR community stakeholder decisions will drive enhancements in JISR capabilities, including existing JISR programs and initiatives (e.g., AGS, APSS). JISR Vision 2030+ strategic outcomes will address NATO TCPED (structure, tools, and processes), human capital supporting JISR architecture, and overall coherence in JISR architecture.¹¹³

There is another effort not yet on NATO’s task list that merits attention. A clarifying definition for NATO C4ISR does not exist (as a whole versus in its subcomponents of C2, C3, or C4, and JISR). NATO Architecture Framework Version 4 provides guidance for developing, designing, and managing enterprise architectures.¹¹⁴ According to Paul Savereux, director of Defense Planning in NATO’s Defense Policy and Planning Division, NATO C4ISR capabilities are addressed in multiple planning domains of the NDPP but are neither aggregated nor treated as part of a single function.¹¹⁵

Achieving the full potential of NATO C4ISR and ensuring it is fit for multi-domain warfighting requires coherence in defense planning, capability, and concept development supported by a recognized and defined NATO C4ISR architecture. A defined C4ISR architecture would harmonize defense planning efforts across multiple domains, enable aggregation and assessment of related capability targets, and ensure greater coherence in concept and capability development. A common definition would assist in the development of common standards for the various components that comprise or enable C4ISR (including interfaces and data-sharing protocols).¹¹⁶ A common definition would also enable engagement with the private sector. Here are some recommendations for NATO to capitalize on current efforts and improve their collective outcomes relative to C4ISR. NATO should:

Define NATO C4ISR architecture to provide a shared understanding of what makes up NATO C4ISR in terms of capabilities (forces, systems, platforms, networks, applications) and enabling policies, concepts, standards, and processes.
- Author’s proposed definition: NATO C4ISR architecture is the whole of structures, organizations, systems, platforms, networks, applications, policies, concepts, and processes connecting decision-makers, operators, intelligence professionals, and capabilities in support of NATO shared awareness, decision-making, and execution in a multi-domain environment.
Include goals or objectives and operating principles for each of the key NATO-owned components of NATO C4ISR architecture that leverages existing elements and addresses gaps. This would allow for a methodical approach to determining effectiveness and progress over time of both components of NATO C4ISR and C4ISR architecture as a whole.
Ensure C4ISR requirements are rigorously collected from efforts to strengthen deterrence and defense through the NATO Force Model aligned with the SASP and family of plans, to conduct MDO, to digitally transform NATO, and to enhance C2.
Improvement of the TCPED process (a strategic outcome of JISR Vision 2030+) should be an early focus of DT and EDT efforts (e.g., related to AI, data, autonomy, and space) to enable speed and multidisciplinary intelligence fusion, and improvements in processing capacity and quality demanded for multi-domain warfighting.
Leverage existing NATO C4ISR forces and build upon their potential. Consider adjustments to NATO C4ISR forces (NAEW&CF and NAGSF) to enhance their effectiveness and contributions in support of the SASP and force generation related to the NATO Force Model.
- The NAEW&CF has two subordinate component commands, one of which (the British national component) is currently phasing out its E3Ds for higher performance E7s. The NAEW&CF could potentially command other nationally contributed C4ISR platforms or new NATO C4ISR forces. Similarly, the NAGSF has the potential to command additional JISR assets and platforms.
- NATO should review NAEW&CF and NAGSF manpower and operational requirements, and funding levels for operations and sustainment to support a higher level of baseline activities and missions in view of the new political ambition for strengthened deterrence and defense.
- NATO should ensure C4ISR coherence throughout the defense planning process.
- C4ISR elements contained in Political Guidance 2023 should be mapped and consolidated for future reference, e.g., through the delivery of MCR in 2024.
- C4ISR-related MCR should be the subject of multi-domain wargaming based on the SASP, the NATO Force Model, ACO C2 adjustments, and known NATO capability program milestones.
- NATO should ensure a method to aggregate and track C4ISR-related capability targets apportioned in 2025.
- Revised procedures for capturing C4ISR requirements will also enable biennial assessments of progress in achieving C4ISR-related targets.

4. Modernize, augment, and acquire capabilities to meet new C4ISR requirements

This category of recommendations is the most extensive and associated with practical delivery of what the Alliance needs to maintain its technological edge and comparative military advantage over the coming decade. The following recommendations are grouped by central themes.

(A) The first step must be ensuring coherence in concept and capability development. Such coherence does not yet exist. A recognized definition for NATO C4ISR architecture will help, but other steps must be taken to ensure 1) a whole-of-enterprise approach, 2) synergy between political and military efforts, and 3) greater agility and effectiveness in concept and capability development.

NATO must take a holistic approach to C4ISR concept and capability development. Cross-committee efforts related to C4ISR policy and capability development need a forcing function, including top-down guidance with clear responsibilities for lead, but also NATO Enterprise contribution to ensure coherence and synergy. NATO committee and military efforts supporting concept and capability development must be better connected and integrated.
Implementation of ACT’s Warfare Development Agenda should incorporate a coherent approach to C4ISR concept and capability development, enabled by a defined NATO C4ISR architecture.
The approach intended for DT (modernize, optimize, transform concurrently) is practical and inherently agile and offers an example of how C4ISR capabilities can be planned and developed in concurrent phases.

(B) According to NATO Deputy ASG for Defense Investment Robert Weaver, on October 2021 the CNAD agreed a NATO armaments policy on Achieving and Accelerating Capability Development and Delivery (A2CD2).¹¹⁷ Speed, agility, and effectiveness are at the heart of this policy, which aims to identify opportunities for accelerated delivery, pursue approaches with highest potential payoffs, and deliver results. Greater collaboration between the CNAD, Science & Technology Board, and Strategic Commands is the primary enabler of the policy’s aims. The policy includes ideas for increased multinational cooperation, leveraging testing and experimentation within NATO exercises to enable warfighter interaction with the private sector, wargaming and tabletop exercising of capability solutions, and improved collaboration in concept development.¹¹⁸

A soldier sits inside a Boeing AWACS reconnaissance plane. Photo by Johanna Geron via REUTERS.

ACT and ACO need to change how they currently support capability development to enable A2CD2 policy implementation. ACT currently focuses primarily on common-funded capability development and experimentation and lower technology readiness levels, which limits support to other approaches to capability development (i.e., national and multinational). ACO owns control, design, and funding of training and exercises, which offer the venue and opportunity for critical testing and experimentation of maturing technologies. However, ACO has ceded responsibility for operational testing and experimentation to ACT along with capability integration.

NATO leaders should encourage NMAs to take a broader role in supporting national and multinational capability development through operational experimentation efforts. NATO should ensure both authority and funding to do so.
NATO leaders should align appropriate responsibilities and focus within the Strategic Commands concerning operational testing and experimentation. Testing and experimentation opportunities are critical for enabling warfighter interaction with industry. They lead to industry refinements necessary for effective capability delivery. They also lead to warfighter awareness of new technology and applications and follow-on action to develop the concepts, plans, and procedures for effective integration. ACO Maritime Command’s collaboration with ACT, nations, and private industry in preparation for exercise Dynamic Messenger in September 2022 is a good example of operational testing and experimentation that deserves replication and institutionalization.¹¹⁹
NATO leaders should expand and ensure dedicated funding for biannual Unified Vision trials (long-standing ACO interoperability tests and experimentation supported by ACT, nations, and the JISR community) to include testing and experimentation of mature promising C4ISR capabilities and enablers.

(C) Modernize, augment, and build on existing C4ISR force structure. NATO’s AFSC program’s innovative approach of partnering closely with industry to replace AWACS by 2035 with C4ISR capabilities that are fit for the future offers an excellent example of innovation in action.

At the Madrid Summit, NATO leaders expressed their commitment to support the AFSC program into design and delivery and procure an advanced C4ISR platform in time for crew training to replace NATO E3As as they start to phase out in the early 2030s. “The fast-track approach will deliver an initial element of the AFSC capability in coherence with the agreed AFSC concept and with the subsequent stages of delivery of the selected technical solution,” said Cioni, director of Armament and Aerospace Capabilities in NATO’s Defense Investment Division.¹²⁰ The selected technical solution is yet to be determined and may consist of crewed and/or unmanned systems or a network of systems. Follow-through with political commitment and funding over the life of the AFSC program will be critical.

NAEW&CF and NAGSF have the potential to deliver more and to satisfy new requirements related to strengthened deterrence and defense. With respect to the NAGSF, NATO needs more platforms and sensor capabilities (such as IMINT/FMV/EO/IR and SIGINT) to enable effective support to its core tasks.

NATO should integrate national contributions on a permanent or rotational basis into the NAEW&CF and NAGSF based on NATO Force Model force generation to meet C4ISR requirements within NATO plans.
NATO should authorize and provide the funds for NAEW&CF and NAGSF commanders to leverage AI, ML, and Big Data management and exploitation tools. Such adoption must be in line with DT principles but will exploit the vast opportunities for improving image or signals recognition and classification, database management, maintenance, and planning for NAEW&CF and NAGSF. Such tools could also enable a sense and avoid capability for AGS.
NATO should upgrade, augment, resource, and fully exploit the NAGSF. The NAGSF has been effective and responsive but is still at Initial Operational Capability. NATO and nations should:
- Fund and accelerate infrastructure. Provide the required manpower to achieve Full Operational Capability.
- Fully leverage the analyst and operator training provided by the NAGSF.
- Fully leverage the NAGSF’s PED potential through full manning and rotation of national analysts as members or augmentees. Experience in the NAGSF provides an opportunity for national analysts to gain expertise for national employment and contribute to NATO intelligence requirements.¹²¹
- Fund the validated critical modernizations and upgrades required for current operations (especially Link 16, a standardized communications system used by the US military and its NATO allies, and secure communications accreditation).
- Plan now and fund the acquisition of sensors (IMINT and SIGINT) to upgrade AGS platforms and fill gaps in collection capability.
- Plan early to replace AGS RQ-4s at the end of their operational life span.
Fully fund AFSC development, including the fast-track approach, to ensure seamless delivery of the advanced C4ISR capabilities NATO needs for multi-domain warfighting beyond 2030.

(D) APSS needs political commitment and funding and deserves expansion. NATO-owned JISR platforms provide IMINT and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT).¹²² NATO exploits significant amounts of OSINT to include commercial satellite imagery. The APSS initiative will significantly enhance the ability to receive national and commercial space-based information (imagery, signals, electronic signatures). NATO relies on nations for a greater breadth of IMINT as well as SIGINT, human intelligence (HUMINT), and cyber intelligence (multi-source). Multi-discipline intelligence fusion is critical for confidence in the analysis that enables shared awareness, consensus decision-making, and action. Additional IMINT and SIGINT capabilities (NATO-owned or contributed by nations) are needed now and offer promising prospects for improving NATO C4ISR. NATO should:

Expand its APSS initiative to include all allies. In support of APSS, NATO should:
- Encourage national contributions and funding to meet strategic and operational intelligence requirements.
- Limit bureaucracy by keeping governance simple and lean, ideally supported by existing committee structure.
- Enable the NIE to fully exploit the multiple intelligence disciplines that space-based assets offer.
- Consider including national and commercial high-altitude platforms (balloons, airships, aircraft that operate in the stratosphere) that can contribute to persistent surveillance.
- Ensure space data collection, exchange, and exploitation requirements are part of DT.
- Ensure the space expertise required to exploit space-based C4ISR capabilities is established within the Strategic Commands (ACO and ACT).
Integrate IMINT and SIGINT capabilities into NATO C4ISR (multiple options—additional sensor payloads for existing platforms, national contributions augmenting existing forces, and new platforms with IMINT and SIGINT sensor payloads).
Develop and implement policy to normalize and integrate SIGINT (military and commercial) for operational and tactical use across NATO Command and Force Structures.

(E) Integration of NATO air and missile defense requires additional efforts to close gaps in sensors, Air C2, Ground C2, and Tactical Data Links (TDLs) between sensors, weapons, and C2 platforms. NATO IAMD requires a special focus due to its critical role in protection of NATO C2, forces, and populations. NATO IAMD relies on C4ISR capabilities to ensure operational sensing, decision-making, and action. The ground-based air defense (GBAD) C2 multinational cooperation project supported by the CNAD promises focused solutions to integrating disparate allied GBAD C2 systems at the brigade and battalion level.¹²³

A similar effort is needed to integrate Surface-Based Air and Missile Defense (SBAMD includes land and maritime systems) for area defense of NATO critical assets. NATO TDL standards are particularly important for NATO IAMD, yet not completely implemented by nations.¹²⁴ Select air and missile defense platforms (i.e., fifth-generation aircraft) are becoming more advanced and capable of serving simultaneously as sensors, C2 nodes, and effectors. Yet these advanced platforms cannot seamlessly share tactical data. NATO and national investment in TDL software and hardware is critical. Additional R&D is required for data sharing between fifth-generation aircraft. NATO should:

Connect existing ground radars and field additional surface or space-based sensors required across the Alliance to close the radar sensor gap for low-flying threats (below 5,000 feet).
Develop a NATO program for the network of sensors and C2 nodes needed to ensure shared early warning, tracking, and engagement of hypersonic threats.
Accelerate transition to a future Air C2 system fit for multi-domain warfighting and future threat and friendly capabilities.
Focus innovation and capability development efforts on integrating sensors, C2, and effectors at the higher tactical (above brigade) level and AOR wide.
- NATO needs political commitment and national action to ensure its TDL standards are implemented in national and NATO platforms.
- Nations must follow through with integration of Link 16 capability in appropriate land, maritime, and aerial platforms.
- NATO needs to prioritize Link 16 capability for the NAGSF in its modernization and upgrade efforts.
- Nations must follow through with integration of Link 22 in maritime systems to replace Link 11, ensure Link 16 compatibility, and improve overall interoperability.
- The United States needs to accelerate development of an interoperable TDL network between its fifth-generation aircraft and compatible with NATO TDLs.¹²⁵

(F) EW capabilities are central to modern warfare and a principal focus of peer adversaries due to their potential for asymmetric response to Alliance comparative advantages (i.e., high-performance C4ISR platforms, precision-guided missiles). EW capabilities support intelligence collection and targeting, disrupt or destroy C4ISR, and require specialized C2 for effective employment. EW offensive capabilities can be relatively low-cost and range from radars to jammers to direct energy weapons to missiles guided by electromagnetic (EM) seekers.

Protection from adversary offensive EW capabilities is critical for NATO C4ISR. NATO operational and tactical communication networks must be secure, survivable, and resilient in a contested environment. Low probability of intercept, low probability of detection, directional communications, and autonomous functions can support improved security, survivability, and resilience.¹²⁶ Self-organizing networks should be the aim with autonomous functions supported by AI and next generation network capabilities (i.e., 5G, 6G) and may require new waveforms enabled by new radio and antenna systems.¹²⁷

The NATO EW community is active in promoting policy, doctrine, and capability development, but has not gained the political attention and commitment needed to ensure development of NATO EW capabilities to the level needed for modern warfare.¹²⁸ NATO’s Joint Airpower Competence Center (JAPCC) has developed several recommendations for NATO action related to EW that could enhance NATO C4ISR effectiveness.¹²⁹ Building on JAPCC’s recommendations NATO should:

Establish a Strategic EW Operations Center to enable NATO C2 of and employment guidance for nationally contributed EW capabilities and assets and assist in doctrine and concept development and training.
Ensure modern warfare EW capability needs are prioritized in NATO defense planning. Specifically include a focused section in Political Guidance 2023 and ensure the development of appropriate MCR in 2024 (leveraging modern warfare lessons and ambitious wargaming).
Promote national and multinational capability development and delivery of prioritized EW capabilities that improve security, survivability, and resilience of C4ISR, including through NATO innovation initiatives.
Integrate EM operations in the Alliance MDO Concept and clarify policy and doctrine on how the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) fits into existing operational domains. (For example, should the EMS be merged into a single cyberspace-EMS domain?)
Develop a culture of EM signature awareness among all forces (especially land forces) and integrate EM signature monitoring, control, and mitigation into all (including C4ISR) new systems and capabilities.

(G) NATO recognizes the importance of investing in and promoting innovation and adoption of EDTs to retain its “technological and military edge.”¹³⁰ The DIANA and NATO Innovation Fund initiatives as explained earlier provide great promise in developing the “innovation ecosystem” and collaboration with private sector that is needed to identify, promote, and deliver solutions to NATO’s operational and business challenges.¹³¹ DIANA will focus on leveraging innovation and creative solutions from start-ups and SMEs, but will include the NIAG throughout its processes to ensure wider industry awareness and preparation of defense and aerospace primes for scaling up promising solutions when necessary.

Complementary efforts are needed in three areas to leverage the potential that innovation and EDTs offer. First, clarification of the role of NATO’s military in innovation could empower NMAs to focus on improving the quality and substance of their collective contributions, including NATO Enterprise-wide collaboration. Second, greater agility in common-funded capability development and resourcing is needed to modernize how NATO acquires C4ISR capabilities and services. Third, NCIA as a customer-funded agency should be leveraged by allies to provide greater support to national and multinational capabilities and services related to C4ISR.¹³² NATO should:

Formalize and improve contributions from NATO’s military to innovation.¹³³ Elements of which follow:
- NWCC includes future capability considerations that should be refined over time through dialogue with the Armaments Community and STO.
- The Warfare Development Agenda is meant to drive concept development and influence capability development but must be aligned with the NDPP.
- Military requirements can be better informed by engagement with industry, the Armaments Community, and the Science & Technology Board.
- Promotion of innovation challenges to military problem sets should be developed through greater involvement with the NATO Enterprise.
- Military advice and input into the strategic guidance for DIANA are critical for leveraging DIANA’s potential to address military problems and challenges.
- Support for testing and experimentation (including warfighter-industry interaction) of maturing technology and applications in NATO training and exercises needs greater focus.
- Concept development is not yet at pace to leverage maturing technology and applications to enable integration and effective employment.
Adopt agile capability development and resourcing principles for common-funded C4ISR capabilities and services.
- Revise how IT components of capabilities are addressed in requirements and acquisition to account ahead of time for cybersecurity, obsolescence replacement, upgrades, and modernization.
- Reduce complexity in requirements drafting and committee oversight but enforce schedules.
- Adopt modular approaches to design to enable interchangeability and interoperability among capabilities.
- Adopt advanced technology that is mature, available, and corresponds to need rapidly.
- Allow for an approach that includes early prototype testing and experimentation, small-scale purchases, building on success, and scaling up.
- Allow for the appropriate risk tolerance for failure and revision.
- Fully leverage NCIA’s potential support to national and multinational capability development and services related to C4ISR. Recent contracts for satellite communications, Strategic Space Situational Awareness System, and APSS are great examples of NCIA’s ability to leverage funding from single allies and groups of allies to provide capabilities and services that benefit the entire Alliance.

NATO Command Structure. Source: NATO

5. Continue to invest in NATO C4ISR interoperability, readiness, resilience, innovation, and adaptation

NATO’s value added to allies are its abilities to collectively decide and act, organize, and integrate. NATO provides the structural and digital backbone for nations to plug into, and develops common doctrine, concepts, procedures, and capabilities to enable interoperability and effective collective action. NATO nations have already increased defense spending by the equivalent of $350 billion since making their Defense Investment Pledge in 2014.¹³⁴ More billions of dollars are planned to be spent by 2024 and beyond as additional allies meet or exceed their defense spending goal of 2 percent of their GDP. As of June 30, 2022, eight allies exceed the 2 percent goal.¹³⁵ A total of nineteen allies have plans to do so by 2024 and five more plan to meet the goal shortly after 2024.¹³⁶

NATO-owned C4ISR forces (e.g., NAEW&CF and NAGSF) and capabilities ensure a guaranteed minimum level of shared data and intelligence that is rapidly employable to enable political and military shared awareness. NATO-owned assets have proven their value time and again in crisis and partially compensate for the lack of standing national C4ISR contributions. The C4 elements of NATO-owned C4ISR assets provide secure and interoperable C2 and secure computer and communications networks for political consultation and NATO military operations and activities (strategic to tactical).

NATO-owned C4ISR forces and capabilities are NATO’s added value to the Alliance, providing the interoperable structure and digital backbone into which national contributions plug for collective awareness, decision-making, and action. Investment in NATO-owned C4ISR forces and capabilities can only enhance the Alliance’s capability to observe, orient, decide, and act.

NATO C4ISR will reap the benefits of known and expected increases in defense spending. While the bulk of allied defense spending will go to national defense requirements, spending on increased readiness of national C4ISR forces (personnel, training, equipment, sustainment, and infrastructure), enhanced resilience (especially communications networks and transportation), and delivery of capabilities corresponding to allied C4ISR capability targets will all contribute to the potential of NATO C4ISR.

As this report has highlighted, there are several areas where national defense spending and common funding are needed to ensure NATO C4ISR is fit for modern warfare and the threats and challenges identified in NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept. The following recommendations are an elaboration of key investment recommendations previously mentioned. Allies should:

Invest in NATO interoperability and integration.
- Accelerate development of C4ISR-related equipment and connectivity standards to ensure nations’ disparate C4ISR systems and platforms (all types—C2, communications, computers, and ISR) can talk to each other and share real-time data and intelligence. This effort must address interoperability between national and proprietary cryptographic equipment and software.
- Ensure adequate NATO staff support to nations in standards development.
- Implement a NATO assessment mechanism to confirm the adoption of NATO standards by national and NATO C4ISR forces.
- Review and act on the implications of NATO military assessments of C4ISR interoperability.
- Leverage and support the potential of NATO’s JISR interoperability trials (United Vision) to test, experiment, and validate C4ISR systems.
- Adopt dual-use standards whenever possible to accelerate delivery of interoperable C4ISR capabilities or enablers.
Invest in NATO C4ISR force readiness and resilience. Review manpower and resilience (cybersecurity, communications, and infrastructure) requirements of the NAEW&CF and NAGSF for MDO.
- Invest in NATO C4ISR innovation and adaptation commensurate with NATO C4ISR’s prominent role in shared awareness, decision-making, and action.
- Include C4ISR challenges in the strategic guidance developed by nations for DIANA and the NATO Innovation Fund.
- Invest in human capital development and management of leaders, operators, and intelligence professionals involved in or supporting NATO C4ISR.
Invest in NATO C4ISR adaptation (and modernization) to meet the needs of the Alliance now and out to 2030 and beyond.
- Ensure funding for DT requirements that will enable and enhance NATO C4ISR.
- Plan for and invest in the modernization and future replacement of NAGSF platforms and systems.
- Ensure funding of NATO commitments to AFSC and a fast-track approach for an advanced platform replacement for AWACS aircraft.

Conclusion

NATO C4ISR capabilities have improved over the past decade but are not projected to meet future Alliance needs. Vulnerabilities and shortfalls persist, which are aggravated by a demanding security environment and an elevated level of NATO ambition agreed at the Madrid Summit. In particular, Russian aggression and other threats and challenges, including from terrorism, China, and climate change, raise requirements for speed and quality in NATO shared awareness, decision-making, and action. The latter are all enabled by NATO C4ISR.

The NATO 2022 Strategic Concept and recent policy decisions will set the context for future NATO C4ISR requirements. Future NATO defense planning and capability development of NATO C4ISR must respond to changing requirements and address critical issues. NATO has a unique window of opportunity over the next few years to leverage a newfound sense of cohesion and urgency among allies along with an agreed vision. Implementing recent NATO decisions, leveraging increases in defense investment, and exploiting proven or promising technologies present multiple opportunities to develop and deliver the C4ISR capabilities NATO forces need.

Five key efforts will maximize NATO’s ability to maintain its comparative military advantage over the coming decade: improving data and intelligence sharing, transforming digitally, clarifying C4ISR architecture and requirements, modernizing or acquiring C4ISR capabilities and enablers, and continuing to invest in the ingredients of NATO’s success for the past seven decades (i.e., interoperability, readiness, resilience, innovation, and adaptation).

Glossary

A2CD2

ACCS

ACO

ACT

AFSC

AGS

AIRCOM

AOR

APSS

ASG

AWACS

C4ISR

CMOSS

CNAD

COMINT

C-UAS

DCOS

DDA

DEFP

DGIMS

DIANA

EDTs

ELINT

EMS

FMV

GBAD

GDP

GPS

HUMINT

I&W

IAMD

IEA

IMINT

IMS

INF Treaty

IoT

ISR

JADC2

JAPCC

JFC

JIS

JISD

JISR

MASINT

MCR

MDO

NAC

NAEW&CF

NAGSF

NATO

NCIA

NCRS

NDPP

NHQC3S

NIAG

NIE

NIF

NIFC

NMAs

NSPA

NWCC

OSINT

PDD

PED

R&D

SACEUR

SACT

SASP

SBAMD

SHAPE

SIGINT

SMEs

STO

TCPED

TDL

UAS

Achieving and Accelerating Capability Development and Delivery

Air Command and Control System

Allied Command Operations

Allied Command Transformation

Alliance Future Surveillance and Control

Alliance Ground Surveillance

artificial intelligence

Air Command

Area of Responsibility

Alliance Persistent Space Surveillance

assistant secretary general

airborne early warning and control system

command and control

consultation, command, and control

command, control, communications, and computers

command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

C4ISR/Electronic Warfare Modular Open Suite of Standards

Conference of National Armaments Directors

communications intelligence

counter-unmanned aircraft system

Deputy Chief of Staff

Defense and Deterrence of the Euro-Atlantic Area

Data Exploitation Framework Policy

Director General of the International Military Staff

Defense Investment

Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic

Digital Transformation

emerging and disruptive technologies

electronic intelligence

electromagnetic

electromagnetic spectrum

electrical-optical

European Union

electronic warfare

full-motion video

ground-based air defense

gross domestic product

global positioning system

headquarters

human intelligence

indicators and warnings

integrated air and missile defense

Information Environment Assessment

imagery intelligence

International Military Staff

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

Internet of Things

infrared

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

information technology

Joint All Domain Command and Control

Joint Airpower Competence Center

joint force command

Joint Intelligence and Security

Joint Intelligence and Security Division

joint intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

measurement and signature intelligence

Minimum Capability Requirements

multi-domain operations

machine learning

North Atlantic Council

NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force

NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Force

North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Reconnaissance

NATO Communications and Information Agency

NATO Crisis Response System

NATO defense planning process

NATO Headquarters C3 Staff

NATO Industrial Advisory Group

NATO Intelligence Enterprise

NATO-Industry Forum

NATO Intelligence Fusion Center

NATO Military Authorities

NATO Support and Procurement Agency

NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept

open-source intelligence

Public Diplomacy Division

Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination

Research and development

Supreme Allied Commander Europe

Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility-Wide Strategic Plan

Surface-Based Air and Missile Defense

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

signals intelligence

small and medium-sized enterprises

Science & Technology Organization

Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination

Tactical Data Link

unmanned aircraft system

About the author

Gordon B. “Skip” Davis Jr. is currently a Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis. He recently served as NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment.

Prior to NATO, Skip served 37 years in the U.S. Army retiring as a Major General. Skip’s last military positions were as Director of Operations, U.S. European Command, Commander of Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, and Director of Operations and Intelligence for Allied Command Operations. Skip’s professional life included operational and institutional assignments interspersed with study and practice of international affairs and defense issues, primarily in Europe. Skip participated in operations with U.S., NATO, and UN forces in Europe, Africa, Middle East, and Central Asia. Skip brings practical experience and conceptual understanding of contemporary and emerging defense issues as well as executive-level experience in operations, intelligence, leader development, capability development, and policy development. Skip holds an undergraduate degree in nuclear physics and graduate degrees in international business, defense and military history, and strategic studies.

Mr. Davis and his wife Rita have two daughters, Stefania and Victoria, both of whom completed their undergraduate degrees in Italy. Stefania is a Captain in the U.S. Military Intelligence Corps serving at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Victoria is a graduate student completing a MBA in Performing Arts in Paris.

Issue Brief Jun 13, 2022

NATO priorities: Initial lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war

By Franklin D. Kramer, Barry Pavel

At the June 2022 NATO summit it will be important to implement four key operational priorities, each derived from initial lessons underscored by the Russia-Ukraine war, to maintain the Alliance’s long-term capacity for defense and deterrence.

Europe & Eurasia National Security

NATO 20/2020 Oct 14, 2020

Digitalize the enterprise

By Jeffrey Reynolds, Jeffrey Lightfoot

If NATO is to unlock new frontiers of innovation and harness emerging technology, digitalizing how it does business is the key.

Defense Technologies Digital Policy

Issue Brief Mar 9, 2022

Defending every inch of NATO territory: Force posture options for strengthening deterrence in Europe

By The Scowcroft Center Task Force on Deterrence and Force Posture

Deterrence in Europe can be enhanced through a range of US and NATO force posture enhancements.

Conflict Defense Policy

1 Scowcroft Center Task Force for Deterrence and Force Posture, Defending Every Inch of NATO Territory: Force Posture Options for Strengthening Deterrence in Europe, Atlantic Council, March 9, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/us-and-nato-force-posture-options/.

2 For this report, information technology (IT), including services, are included in the categories of “communications” and “computers.” While some countries include cyber as a related capability category (i.e., C5ISR), NATO treats cyber as an operational domain (cyberspace) and an enabling capability for C4ISR.

3 NATO, “NATO Allies Sign Protocols for Accession of Finland and Sweden,” last updated July 5, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_197763.htm.

4 NATO, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, June 29, 2022, 3-6, https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/#StrategicConcept.

5 NATO Air Command, “NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Force takes over critical infrastructure,” November 28, 2022, https://ac.nato.int/archive/2022/NAGSF_new_infra.

6 NATO Air Command, “NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control,” accessed February 16, 2023, https://ac.nato.int/missions/indications-and-warnings/AWACS.

7 NATO 2022 Strategic, “Strategic Environment,” 4.

8 Rear Adm. Nicholas Wheeler, interview by author, August 16, 2022.

9 NATO 2022 Strategic, 6.

10 Allied Command Transformation (ACT) began talks in June 2021. See Lieutenant Colonel Jose Diaz de Leon, “Understanding Multi-Domain Operations in NATO,” Three Swords Magazine 37 (2021), 92, https://www.jwc.nato.int/application/files/1516/3281/0425/issue37_21.pdf. During the author’s assignment to Allied Command Operations (ACO), from 2013 to 2015, staff officers in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Plans Directorate developed a draft definition and concept for MDO that was shared with senior SHAPE staff.

11 Allied Command Transformation (ACT), “Multi-Domain Operations: Enabling NATO to Out-Pace and Out-Think Its Adversaries,” July 29, 2022, https://www.act.nato.int/articles/multi-domain-operations-out-pacing-and-out-thinking-nato-adversaries.

12 Ibid.

13 Lt. Gen. David Julazadeh, interview by author, August 2, 2022.

14 The author defines defense posture as the whole of command and control (C2) structures, baseline activities for deterrence and defense, force readiness, responsiveness, reinforcement plans, and capabilities.

15 Tom Goffus, interview by author, July 15, 2022.

16 David Cattler, interview by author, July 13, 2022, and Maj. Gen. Philip Stewart, interview by author, July 11, 2022.

17 NATO, “Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS),” last updated July 20, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48892.htm.

18 Airforce Technology, “E-3 AWACS (Sentry) Airborne Early Warning and Control System,” June 25, 2020, https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/e3awacs/.

19 Stewart, interview and Brig. Gen. Houston Cantwell, interview by author, July 8, 2022.

20 Cattler, interview.

21 Ibid. and Stewart, interview.

22 Ibid. and Stewart, interview.

23 Camille Grand, interview by author, August 1, 2022.

24 Cattler, interview.

25 “Video: 5 Things You Should Know about NATO’s Air Shielding Mission,” SHAPE, August 19, 2022, https://shape.nato.int/news-archive/2022/video-5-things-you-should-know-about-natos-air-shielding-mission.

26 Mattia Olivari, “The Space Sector: Current Trends and Future Evolutions,” ISPI, December 11, 2021, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/space-sector-current-trends-and-future-evolutions-28602.

27 Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is composed of communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT).

28 NATO’s E-3A AWACS has a look down surveillance radar that collects measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), but not COMINT. See Airforce Technology, “E-3 AWACS (Sentry) Airborne Warning and Control System,” June 25, 2020, https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/e3awacs/.

29 NATO, “Alliance Persistent Surveillance from Space (APSS),” updated February 2023, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2023/2/pdf/230215-factsheet-apss.pdf.

30 NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) General Manager Ludwig Decamps, interview by author, July 21, 2022, and Director of Armament and Aerospace Capabilities in NATO’s Defense Investment Division Giorgio Cioni, interview by author, August 2, 2022.

31 Author’s personal knowledge from assignment at NATO Headquarters as deputy assistant secretary general (ASG) Defense Investment (DI).

32 NATO uses TCPED in internal documents and communications to refer to the key steps of its intelligence process. The five steps of NATO TCPED are equivalent to what the US Department of Defense describes as the six steps of the “intelligence process”: “planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback.” See Department of the Army et al., Joint Publication 2-01. Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, January 5, 2012, GL-10, https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp2_01.pdf.

33 Maj. Gen. Tom Kunkel, interview by author, August 4, 2022.

34 INSA (Intelligence & National Security Alliance), “Coffee and Conversation with David Cattler,” July 25, 2022, YouTube video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b5mJUtnNI88.

35 Ibid.

36 Daniel Michaels, “Lessons of Russia’s War in Ukraine: You Can’t Hide and Weapons Stockpiles Are Essential,” Wall Street Journal, July 4, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/lessons-of-russias-war-in-ukraine-you-cant-hide-and-weapons-stockpiles-are-essential-11656927182.

37 INSA, “Coffee and Conversation.”

38 Michael Sheetz, “Elon Musk’s SpaceX Sent Thousands of Starlink Satellite Internet Dishes to Ukraine, Company’s President Says,” CNBC, March 22, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/22/elon-musk-spacex-thousands-of-starlink-satellite-dishes-sent-to-ukraine.html.

39 Microsoft, Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War, June 22, 2022, 4, https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RE50KOK.

40 David van Weel, interview by author, August 18, 2022.

41 Tara Copp, “Satellite Firms Are Helping Debunk Russian Claims, Intel Chief Says,” Defense One, April 5, 2022, https://www.defenseone.com/business/2022/04/satellite-firms-helped-debunk-russian-claims-intel-chief-says/364060/.

42 NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre, “NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre,” accessed February 16, 2023, https://web.ifc.bices.org/.

43 Van Weel, interview.

44 Decamps, interview.

45 Ibid.

46 NATO, “NATO Communications and Information Agency,” https://www.ncia.nato.int/.

47 NATO, “NATO approves 2023 strategic direction for new innovation accelerator,” last updated December 21, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_210393.htm.

48 NATO, Brussels Summit Communiqué, press release, last updated July 1, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm; NATO, “NATO Launches Innovation Fund,” last updated June 30, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_197494.htm.

49 Author’s notes from NATO-Industry Forums (NIFs) 2018 and 2019 and post-NIF reports co-published by SACT and ASG DI internally after the event and edited by the author.

50 NIFs 2018, 2019, and 2021 specifically focused on innovation, emerging technologies, and inviting start-ups and SMEs. See references to NIFs 2019 and 2021 in NATO, “NATO-Industry Forum,” accessed October 3, 2022, https://www.act.nato.int/industryforum.

51 NATO, “Multinational Capability Cooperation,” last updated November 18, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_163289.htm.

52 While assigned to NATO HQ, the author sponsored, enabled, or was aware of several trials leveraging advanced technology in AI and data services to demonstrate private sector capabilities to assist in security or defense-related requirements such as: tracking COVID-19-related factors impacting allies, foreign investment in allied defense industry and critical infrastructure, and tracking and analyzing open-source information related to threats.

53 ACT, “Innovation Hub,” accessed October 2, 2022, https://www.innovationhub-act.org.

54 NATO Communications and Information Agency, “Our Key Events,” accessed October 2, 2002, https://www.ncia.nato.int/business/partnerships/key-events.html.

55 NATO, “NATO Sharpens Technological Edge with Innovation Initiatives,” last updated April 7, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_194587.htm.

56 Ibid.

57 Charlie Parker, “Uber-Style Technology Helped Ukraine to Destroy Russian Battalion,” Times, May 14, 2022, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/uk-assisted-uber-style-technology-helped-ukraine-to-destroy-russian-battalion-5pxnh6m9p.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 Lt. Gen. Hans-Werner Wiermann, interview by author, July 21, 2022.

62 Grand, interview.

63 John R. Hoehn, “Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2),” Congressional Research Service, updated January 21, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11493.pdf; Julazadeh, interview.

64 Atlantic Council Experts, “Our Experts Decipher NATO’s New Strategic Concept,” New Atlanticist, Atlantic Council, June 30, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/our-experts-decipher-natos-new-strategic-concept/.

65 NATO 2022 Strategic, 1.

66 NATO 2022 Strategic, 6.

67 “Multi-Domain Operations: Enabling NATO.”

68 Based on the author’s analysis of an unclassified document, not publicly released. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) – HQ SACT, “Bi-Strategic Command, Initial Alliance Concept for Multi-Domain Operations,” July 5, 2022.

69 Julazadeh, interview.

70 NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), “Digitally Transforming NATO: Our Work Explained,” March 19, 2019, https://www.ncia.nato.int/about-us/newsroom/digitally-transforming-nato-our-work-explained-.html.

71 Wiermann, interview.

72 Wheeler, interview.

73 Marco Criscuolo, interview by author, August 18, 2022.

74 Wiermann, interview; Criscuolo interview; and Grand, interview.

75 NATO 2022 Strategic, 6.

76 NATO, “New NATO Force Model,” June 29, 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220629-infographic-new-nato-force-model.pdf.

77 Maj. Gen. Karl Ford, interview by author, July 27, 2022.

78 Author’s notes from unclassified ACT brief “2021 NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept” to the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) in Partner Format, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, January 29, 2021.

79 NATO, “The Alliance’s Warfare Development Agenda: Achieving a 20-year Transformation,” March 29, 2022, https://www.act.nato.int/articles/wda-achieving-20-year-transformation; Ford, interview.

80 NATO 2022 Strategic, 5–7.

81 NATO, “Environment, Climate Change and Security,” last updated July 26, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_91048.htm.

82 Cioni, interview.

83 Ibid.

84 NATO, “NATO Sharpens.”

85 NATO 2022 Strategic, 7.

86 Brussels Summit Communiqué.

87 Van Weel, interview.

88 The CNAD and its seven Main Groups and over one hundred and fifty subordinate groups constitute NATO’s largest standing committee structure and one of its longest standing. The CNAD is supported by NATO’s DI Directorate. Collectively, the CNAD and DI Directorate are referred to as the NATO armaments community. See NATO, “Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD),” last updated January 17, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49160.htm.

89 NATO, “NATO Steps Up Engagement with Private Sector on Emerging Technologies,” last updated September 15, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_207258.htm.

90 Van Weel, interview.

91 Ibid.

92 NATO 2022 Strategic, 7, par. 24.

93 NATO, “Funding NATO,” last updated January 12, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm.

94 NATO, “Readiness Action Plan,” last updated September 1, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_119353.htm; NATO, “NATO Wales Summit Guide,” Newport, September 4-5, 2014, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20141008_140108-summitguidewales2014-eng.pdf.

95 NATO, “NATO Wales Summit 2014,” last updated September 5, 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/events_112136.htm.

96 NATO, “Deterrence and Defence,” last updated September 12, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_133127.htm. See section on “Investing in defence.”

97 NATO 2022 Strategic.

98 NATO 2022 Strategic, 6, par. 22.

99 Comments on NATO’s common-funded capability development governance model and progress are based on the author’s personal experience in NATO from 2018 to 2021. In 2018, a new governance model for common-funded capability development was adopted which was intended to empower NATO’s strategic commands and agencies to drive capability development, introduce acceptable risk tolerance measures, streamline governance processes, and satisfy allies’ appetite for control and cost-efficiency. Expected outcomes have been underwhelming. Learning has been steep, adaptation difficult, and control difficult for nations to release. The new governance model also controls common funding for IT and services (including cybersecurity), which require upgrades and modernization at speeds beyond which NATO processes can keep up.

100 NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG), “Industry Initiative for Agile Acquisition (I2A2),” February 15, 2021.

101 Rear Admiral John W. Tammen, “NATO’s Warfighting Capstone Concept: Anticipating the Changing Character of War,” NATO Review, July 9, 2021, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/07/09/natos-warfighting-capstone-concept-anticipating-the-changing-character-of-war/index.html.

102 Ibid.

103 NATO’s first ASG for Joint Intelligence and Security (JIS), Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven, noted the “ingrained tradition” of national civilian intelligence agencies to restrict intelligence sharing in a 2019 article at the end of his tenure. See Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven, “A New Era for NATO Intelligence,” NATO Review, October 29, 2019, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/10/29/a-new-era-for-nato-intelligence/index.html.

104 This is an uncomfortable truth acknowledged by current and past senior ACO intelligence officials (of which the author is one) and NATO’s first two ASGs for JIS: David Cattler and Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven. Maj. Gen. Matt Van Wagenen, interview by author, September 11, 2022; Stewart, interview; Cattler, interview; and Von Loringhoven, “A New Era.”

105 Despite numerous NATO consultations between 2014 and 2018 on the 9M729 or SSC-8 Russian missile (including when the author was an ACO presenter in 2014 and a NATO official in 2018), it was not until December 2018 that allies decided to unanimously endorse the US finding and presume the lack of an adequate Russian response as evidence of an Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty violation. Several allies prior to late 2018 were not ready to take US declarations at face value without the primary source intelligence behind the US position. While the INF Treaty was between the United States and the Soviet Union, European allies were directly implicated because the treaty-limited ranges provided security from attack of prohibited weapon systems. See NATO, “NATO and the INF Treaty,” last updated August 2, 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_166100.htm.

106 Stewart, interview; Cattler, interview; and Cioni, interview.

107 Wheeler, interview and Criscuolo, interview.

108 Sally Cole, “CMOSS: Building-Block Architecture Bring Speed, Cost Benefits,” Military Embedded Systems, November 29, 2021, https://militaryembedded.com/comms/communications/cmoss-building-block-architecture-brings-speed-cost-benefits.

109 The following Atlantic Council report explains the importance of enterprise-wide digitalization to improve shared awareness, decision-making, and action. Jeffrey Reynolds and Jeffrey Lightfoot, Digitalize the Enterprise, Atlantic Council, October 20, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/nato20-2020/digitalize-the-enterprise/.

110 Ford, interview.

111 Criscuolo, interview.

112 Ford, interview.

113 Per AJP-2.7, JISR architecture consists of the organizations, processes, and systems connecting collectors, databases, applications, producers, and consumers of intelligence and operational data in a joint environment. See NATO Standardization Office, NATO Standard, AJP 2.7, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Edition A, Version 1, July 11, 2016, 1–3,https://jadl.act.nato.int/ILIAS/data/testclient/lm_data/lm_152845/Linear/JISR04222102/sharedFiles/AJP27.pdf.

114 Architecture Capability Team, Consultation, Command & Control Board, NATO Architecture Framework, Version 4, NATO, January 2018, Document Version 2020.09, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/1/pdf/NAFv4_2020.09.pdf.

115 Paul Savereux, interview by author, July 29, 2022, and NATO, “NATO Defence Planning Process,” last updated March 31, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49202.htm.

116 Fabrice Fontanier, chair of NIAG C4ISR Community of Interest, notes to author, September 17, 2022.

117 Robert Weaver, interview by author, March 11, 2022.

118 Ibid.

119 NATO, “NATO Exercises with New Maritime Unmanned Systems,” last updated September 15, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_207293.htm.

120 Ibid.

121 Stewart, interview and Cantwell, interview.

122 NATO’s AGS RQ-4Ds are equipped with MP-RTIP ground surveillance radar that provides ground moving target indicator and synthetic aperture radar imagery. See Wikipedia, “Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program,” accessed July 29, 2022, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multi-Platform_Radar_Technology_Insertion_Program#Overview. NATO’s AWACS E-3s have look-down radar that essentially collects MASINT. See “E-3 AWACS.”

123 NATO, “Command and Control Capability for Surface Based Air and Missile Defence for the Battalion and Brigade Level (GBAD C2 Layer),” Factsheet, February 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/10/pdf/2110-factsheet-gbad-c2-layer.pdf.

124 Military Wiki, “Tactical Data Link,” accessed September 1, 2022 https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Tactical_Data_Link#TDL_standards_in_NATO.

125 Harry Lye, “Fifth-Generation Aircraft Share Bi-Directional Data in Military IoT First,“ Airforce Technology, December 15, 2020, https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/fifth-generation-aircraft-share-bi-directional-data-in-military-iot-first/.

126 Fontanier, notes to author.

127 Ibid.

128 Commander Malte von Spreckelsen, “Electronic Warfare – The Forgotten Discipline,” Journal of the JAPCC 27 (2018), 41–45, https://www.japcc.org/articles/electronic-warfare-the-forgotten-discipline/.

129 De Angelis et al., NATO ISTAR, 52; Von Spreckelsen, “Electronic Warfare”; and Major Erik Bamford and Commander Malte von Spreckelsen, “Future Command and Control of Electronic Warfare,” Journal of the JAPCC 28 (2019), 60–66, https://www.japcc.org/articles/future-command-and-control-of-electronic-warfare/

130 NATO 2022 Strategic, 7.

131 Van Weel, interview.

132 NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) is already involved in major C4ISR programs like AFSC, AWACS, and AGS. NCIA focuses almost overwhelmingly on common-funded capabilities and services but could provide support to multinational and national capability development given its charter and expertise.

133 Based on ideas discussed between the author and Lt. Gen. Hans-Werner Wiermann in February 2021.

134 NATO, “Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and US President Joe Biden at the start of the 2022 NATO Summit,” last updated June 29, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_197374.htm.

135 Katharina Buchholz, “Where NATO Defense Expenditure Stands in 2022 [Infographic],” Forbes, June 30, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/katharinabuchholz/2022/06/30/where-nato-defense-expenditure-stands-in-2022-infographic.

136 Patrick Goodenough, “Only 9 Out of 30 Allies Are Meeting NATO’s Defense Spending Goal,” CNSNews, June 30, 2022, https://www.cnsnews.com/article/international/patrick-goodenough/only-9-out-30-allies-are-meeting-natos-defense-spending.

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Improving Gulf security: A framework to enhance air, missile, and maritime defenses

The Gulf Security Task Force — Tue, 14 Mar 2023 20:00:00 +0000

This report is the final product of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative‘s Gulf Security Task Force, a team of experts whose US government experience includes senior roles at the Department of Defense, Department of State, White House, and Intelligence Community. The Task Force joined together to shape this new strategy, with an eye on sustainable success in protecting both US and allies in the Gulf. The views expressed in the report are those of the authors and not their respective institutions.

Looking at decades of US support and operations in the Gulf and recognizing a continued, arguably growing, air and maritime threat from Iran, the Atlantic Council Gulf Security Task Force developed a framework on how to best protect US and allies’ interests in this sensitive, always relevant region. The report provides US decision-makers with an updated, fact-based strategy for protecting its interests in the air and maritime domain from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea, while ensuring Gulf partners’ ability to assume this responsibility, with the assistance and leadership of the United States.

In this capstone report, “Improving Gulf Security: A Framework to Enhance Air, Missile, and Maritime Defenses“, the Gulf Security Task Force brings together their cross-section of expertise to address the nature of the threats and provide practical policy solutions for the development of an integrated air, missile, and maritime defense in the Gulf, that provides long-term, reliable protection for the US and our partners’ security in the region.

Competing Security Interests in the Arab Gulf

Authors

Michael S. Bell

Former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Middle East Affairs, National Security Council

Dr. Mike Bell is the Executive Director of the Jenny Craig Institute for the Study of War and Democracy. Commissioned in Armor following graduation from the US Military Academy at West Point, he is a combat veteran, historian, and strategist who has served at every level from platoon through theater army, as well as with US Central Command, the Joint Staff, the West Point faculty, and the National Defense University. As a civilian faculty member at the National Defense University, he also served details to the Office of the Secretary of State and as a National Security Council Senior Director and Special Assistant to the President of the United States. His monograph on the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was published by the Strategic Studies Institute.

Clarke Cooper

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, Middle East Programs, Atlantic Council
Former Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs

R. Clarke Cooper recently served as the assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State from 2019 to 2021. During his tenure, Cooper implemented reforms to streamline arms export licensing and improve government support to the US defense industry. By enabling security partnerships and through advocacy for burden sharing to counter shared threats, Cooper continued his advocacy for performance measures across United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions, women in active peacekeeping roles, and accountability measures for troop and police contributing countries. In 2021, Cooper was awarded the Superior Honor Award for interagency coordination and implementation of the security cooperation elements of the Abraham Accords.

Kirsten Fontenrose

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, Middle East Programs, Atlantic Council
Former Senior Director for the Gulf, National Security Council

Kirsten spent 2018 as Senior Director for the Gulf at the National Security Council, leading the development of U.S. policy toward nations of the GCC, Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan. Prior to this service at the White House, Kirsten spent a year in the private sector consulting on specialized projects in the national security space. Her interagency experience includes five years at the Department of State leading the Middle East and Africa team in the interagency Global Engagement Center. Prior to this, Kirsten worked with a field team studying foreign populations for the US Department of Defense Theater Special Operations Commands.

Greta Holtz

Chancellor, College of International Security Affairs National Defense University
Former US Charge d’Affaires in Qatar and former US Ambassador in Oman

Ambassador (Ret.) Greta C. Holtz enjoyed 35 years as a career diplomat with extensive experience in the Middle East region. She retired in April 2021 with the personal rank of Minister Counsellor. Ambassador Holtz served as Senior United States Coordinator for Operation Allies Refuge in Qatar from August – October 2021 and as Chargé d’affaires in Qatar from June 2020 until April 2021. She was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the State Department’s Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, and she was the Senior Foreign Policy Advisor (POLAD) to the Commanding General of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) from 2017-2019. She served as the United States Ambassador to the Sultanate of Oman from 2012 to 2015 and was the Vice-Chancellor at National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs from 2016 to 2017. Ambassador Holtz was Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and she ran the United States Provincial Reconstruction teams in Iraq from 2009-2010.

Richard LeBaron

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East programs, Atlantic Council Former US Ambassador to Kuwait

Ambassador (Ret.) Richard LeBaron is a career diplomat with over thirty years of experience abroad and in Washington. His most recent overseas posting was as deputy chief of mission at the US embassy in London from August 2007 to August 2010. Amb. LeBaron served as chargé d’affaires in London from February to August 2009. Previous to his assignment to London, Amb. LeBaron served as the US ambassador to Kuwait (2004 to 2007). From September 2001 to July 2004, Amb. LeBaron served as deputy chief of mission at the Embassy of the United States in Tel Aviv, Israel.

Fozzie Miller

Former Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East programs, Atlantic Council Former Commander, US Naval Forces Central Command/Combined Maritime Forces/US Fifth Fleet

In 2015, Vice Admiral (Ret.) John W. “Fozzie” Miller retired from the US Navy after serving as the Commander, US Naval Forces Central Command; Commander, Combined Maritime Forces; and Commander, US Fifth Fleet. Miller spent a considerable amount of his naval career focusing on the Middle East—beyond his role as Commander of the US Fifth Fleet, he also served as Deputy Commander to US Naval Forces Central Command/United States Fifth Fleet; Deputy Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J5); and Chief of Staff of US Central Command. In 2015, Miller received the Navy Distinguished Service Medal.

Daniel Vardiman

Senior US Navy Fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security (2021-2022), Atlantic Council *

Commander Daniel Vardiman was the intelligence lead for Expeditionary Strike Group Two from August 2019 through July 2021. In this role, he also served as the acting information warfare commander; supported staff certification, contingency operations, and integration with the Marines; participated in exercises in Europe and off the East Coast of the United States; and assisted with defense support to civil authorities. For his lieutenant commander milestone tour, he was the intelligence lead for Amphibious Squadron Six from June 2014 through June 2016, and on the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group and Wasp Amphibious Ready Group deploying to the US Fifth and Sixth Fleet areas of responsibility.

* The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not reflect those of the U.S. Navy or Department of Defense.

Brett McGurk sets out the ‘Biden doctrine’ for the Middle East

White House Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa, Brett McGurk, delivered remarks in support of “enabling an integrated air and maritime defense architecture in the region, something long talked about, which is now happening through innovative partnerships and new technologies,” at the Atlantic Council’s inaugural Rafik Hariri Awards, celebrating the tenth anniversary of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, in Washington on February 14, 2023.

full remarks

Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

The Atlantic Council’s work on Middle East security honors the legacy of Brent Scowcroft and his tireless efforts to build a new security architecture for the region. Our work in this area addresses the full range of security threats and challenges including the danger of interstate warfare, the role of terrorist groups and other nonstate actors, and the underlying security threats facing countries in the region.

Explore More

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What’s next for the US-UK-Australia submarine partnership?

Atlantic Council experts — Tue, 14 Mar 2023 16:30:12 +0000

On Monday, US President Joe Biden joined UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in San Diego. With a submarine parked behind them, they announced that the United States will sell at least three Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines to Australia in the early 2030s, with the United Kingdom and Australia building their own attack submarines with a shared design and technology in the years to follow. “I’m proud to be your shipmate,” Biden said, as he added long-awaited details to a partnership announced eighteen months ago.

Below, John T. Watts plumbs the depths of what it all means. Watts is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice, a former senior policy advisor to the US Office of the Secretary of Defense, and a former staff officer at the Australian Department of Defence.

What message does Monday’s announcement send to China?

China will no doubt see the announcement as part of a trend of growing military capabilities arrayed against it—and will likely react publicly in that framing. And there certainly is a rethinking of defense capabilities and their timelines in response to China’s growing assertiveness in the region, as Australia’s soon-to-be released National Strategic Review will likely articulate.

But I think it is a misleading framing in reality. Due to the strategic air-sea gap to the Australian mainland, submarines have always been one of its most vital strategic capabilities. The current Collins class are very capable, but they are aging and Australia has been seeking (and debating) suitable replacements for decades. Moreover, the timelines that these submarines are likely to come online will be too long to affect near-term contingencies, and the range the nuclear propulsion provides has more to do with Australia’s unique geographic realities (most conventional designs struggle to gain the range necessary for effective missions) than specifically on their attack capability.

Why does the accelerated timeline matter to Australia?

The Collins class first began construction in the 1990s, based on planning started in the 1970s, and Australia has been seeking suitable replacements for decades (and debating the requirements and options for longer). The Collins was originally envisioned to last for thirty years and begin decommissioning in 2025. When the previously agreed-to plan to replace them with a Barracuda-derived design began in 2016, the revised lifecycle saw them being extended into the 2030s. It can take a decade to design and construct a new submarine—even a less-complicated conventional design—so an accelerated time frame is needed just to meet planned lifecycle goals.

This new deal will do precisely that: create a new “AUKUS” sub that all three nations will use, based on a British design with US propulsion and combat systems, built in the United Kingdom and Australia. The initial timeline for that will not be until 2042, however. This creates a “capability gap.” The solution that has been devised through this agreement is for several Collins-class submarines to receive life-cycle extension refurbishments until at least three brand new Virginia-class submarines can be built in the United States for Australia in the 2030s.

Additionally, this capability gap will be covered by a “submarine rotational force” starting in the mid-to-late 2020s. That means the United States and United Kingdom will station submarines in Australia and help with training and the buildup of domestic capabilities. In doing so, it also creates new basing options for both countries into the Indo-Pacific—‘Indo’ being really important here, as the submarines will be based out of Perth and thus on the Indian Ocean. This is a big win for the United States and United Kingdom as well as for Australia.

Can the US industrial base keep up the pace to deliver these subs on time?

As AUKUS is a trilateral partnership, the question of shipyard capacity must be viewed in terms of all three nations. This question will be central to the current investigations and feasibility studies being undertaken by the three governments, and it will be a key driver of their proposed approach. Across the board, the defense industry (and Western production generally) has operated in recent years on just-in-time frameworks, leaving little redundancy or spare capacity. It will certainly be a key question, but if the requirement is vital enough, then solutions can be found.

Eighteen months in, what have we learned about this emerging partnership?

Very little. There has been little public insight into the deliberations to date. There is a huge amount of goodwill and strong personal relationships involved, but there are also a web of regulatory, process, and cultural challenges that will need to be resolved. That will take time by all three national governments and defense departments. What it shows is a desire to elevate current narrow formalized working arrangements (for example, Five Eyes information sharing) to a wider operational aperture to match the mindsets of the respective forces. What people also need to understand is that there are two elements of AUKUS. Pillar one focuses narrowly on the question of submarine capability, and it will remain the predominant focal point of energy and effort until plans proceed to the next stage. The greater potential, however, is pillar two, which seeks greater collaboration on a range of emerging technologies into the future. The benefit and value of AUKUS will be most evident in pillar two advancements long term, but the nature and details of that collaboration are likely not yet mature enough to comment on.

What can we expect to see next from this partnership?

Submarines and pillar one efforts will dominate the focus for the short term. We will likely start to see specific details about the plan to develop the submarine capability, such as what platform it will be based on, where it will be built and by whom, plans for sustainment and servicing, building of the nuclear capabilities requirement to service them within Australia, time frames, and so on. What I am most excited to hear about is how the three nations plan to build out the pillar two vision. But that will take more time.

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Former secretaries Mark Esper and Deborah Lee James publish op-ed in The Hill

Atlantic Council — Thu, 09 Mar 2023 18:00:00 +0000

On March 9, Mark T. Esper and Deborah Lee James, Atlantic Council Board Directors and Co-Chairs of the Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, published an op-ed in The Hill. They lay out ways that the Department of Defense can accelerate its ability to harness commercial technology in order to stay ahead of US adversaries. Access the article here or at the button above.

Quickly adopting cutting-edge technology, which is mostly found in the commercial sector, is the key to guaranteeing U.S. military dominance critical to deterring war and winning one if all else fails.

Mark Esper and Deborah Lee James. Originally published in The Hill.

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The US needs to reform security cooperation and arms transfer processes—not create new policies

R. Clarke Cooper — Thu, 09 Mar 2023 14:48:18 +0000

Around the world, the United States is the most common preferred partner, or “partner of choice,” for security cooperation, but it is not the only option. Dictatorial adversaries of democracy and freedom in Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran consistently seek opportunities for disruption wherever the United States might project power. The ready access to low-cost, but effective, commercially available technologies from China, Russia, and Iran render the appeal of working with these adversaries even more potent.

So, one wonders why the Biden administration would roll out a new, unnecessary, and potentially more cumbersome interpretation and implementation of Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) policy in late February—the same week as the one-year anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the same week that Russia officially announced withdrawal from the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the same week that China and Russia conducted military drills with South Africa, and the very same week that US industry competed against a flood of Chinese defense firms at the 2023 International Defense Exhibition hosted by the United Arab Emirates.

Arms transfers and security cooperation have long been important tools for policymakers in Washington and for ambassadors in the field to help implement US foreign policy. The consideration and fulfillment of security cooperation and security assistance, while led by the State Department, incorporates a broad and deep set of executive branch interagency processes and congressional review and oversight. Some of these processes are statutory mandates under the Arms Export Control Act and others are informal voluntary processes.

Both the Obama administration and the Trump administration, which I served in the State Department, recognized that rising global competition in a post–Cold War world required reforming Cold War bureaucratic practices, which which were based on the presumption of absolute technological superiority and no real near-peer competition. Both administrations in varying degrees sought to refine processes, provide greater transparency and predictability for US allies and partners, and, yes, actively advance US aerospace and defense industries as the preferred choice in a global market. The State Department drafted CAT policies in 2014 and 2018 that supported US interests and strategic ends, which yielded broadly similar approval and denial rates, revealing that neither administration was overly restrictive or wildly loose in arms transfers. Both the Obama and Trump administrations also worked to reduce bureaucracy, update the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and US Munitions List (USMIL), modernize export licensing platforms, decrease case review timelines, and address increasingly parochial and lengthy non-statutory congressional review periods.

The Biden administration’s long-deliberated 2023 CAT policy does indeed align with Biden-Harris campaign promises, and it does not come as a surprise to those of us who were consulted during the drafting process that human rights would be elevated among the categories of consideration. Also, no one would argue against the CAT consideration of human rights. In fact, it was the Trump administration that first articulated human rights as a consideration in the 2018 CAT policy.

The issue today, however, is not one of policy, but of the systems and layers of process in the implementation of arms transfers and security cooperation. US industry and foreign US security partners care less about a new policy but do care more how CAT processes may be measured, implemented, or further reformed to improve the efficacy of US security cooperation. As the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) recently noted, “The arms transfer process is too slow and impedes our ability to get critical capabilities delivered when and where they are needed the most.”

Such a statement from AIA was an extremely diplomatic response compared to the candid dismay uttered in the privacy of industry offices and board rooms of my clients at the defense consultancy I lead, but it does capture the essence of concern by operative security cooperation practitioners regardless of their respective diplomatic, military, or industry role. For the United States to remain a leader in a multipolar world, it must move away from a Cold War–style mindset that the United States is the only available option, cut down on an increasingly overlapping federal bureaucracy, be an advocate for US industry, and not introduce reforms that expand already layered processes that will impede security cooperation with stalwart allies and partners or put at risk US interests.

The United States must address the competitive environment it faces. It is true that the United States remains by far the greatest provider of direct security, via its global force posture and alliances. It is also true that the United States remains the single biggest provider of financial security assistance and defense equipment and training for countries around the world. But it is equally true that US competitors, even when tested by their own overreach, like Russia in Ukraine and China’s exploitive Belt and Road Initiative, have turned to arms sales and security assistance as key tools to build their own influence around the world and weaken the United States’.

The application of CAT should enhance and enable the defense capabilities of US allies and partners, but rolling out a new CAT policy minus implementation reform makes this more difficult and helps US adversaries. To best protect US interests and further enable US allies and partners to provide for their own defense, President Joe Biden should focus on fulfillment and augmentation of tangible CAT implementation reforms started by his two predecessors, who had interagency teams experienced in security cooperation and deterrence that sought to refine ITAR, update the USMIL, and foster US industry innovation. The ability for the United States to win friends and maintain its edge over its rivals is at stake.

R. Clarke Cooper is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, the president of defense consultancy Guard Hill House, LLC, a former assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State, and a former senior intelligence officer for the US Joint Special Operations Command.

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One year into the war, it’s time for Turkey to reconsider its Ukraine-Russia balancing act

Yevgeniya Gaber — Wed, 01 Mar 2023 19:56:37 +0000

As Russia gets increasingly weakened, Turkey faces a use-it-or-lose-it moment to show regional leadership and reengage with the West.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Turkey has opted for a delicate balancing act, which has appeared to be a risky but overall successful strategy. With interests that lie in both sides, Ankara has consistently supported Ukraine politically and militarily without alienating Russia economically.

Ukraine has played a crucial role in deterring the Kremlin’s military build-up in the Black Sea, which also poses a threat to Turkey. Thus, by supporting Ukraine, Turkey has been strengthening its own position in the region. At the same time, the Russian presence in Syria can also potentially create problems for Turkey by destabilizing the border areas and causing new refugee flows from Syria. Besides, Russia remains a major source of Turkey’s energy imports, economic benefits, and financial resources. These considerations have largely shaped Turkey’s desire to keep the channels for cooperation with Russia open.

However, a year after Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the benefits of such a balancing act for Turkey have reached their limits. The country now needs a new regional strategy—a bold, ambitious, and clear-eyed one.

Early leadership

Though occasionally warned by the United States and Europe about the implications of burgeoning trade with an increasingly sanctioned Russia, Turkey has won praise from Ukraine and the West for its firm refusal to recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea and for its insistence on the territorial integrity of Ukraine in its 1991 borders.

Turkey was also the first country to provide Ukraine with combat drones when other partners were still hesitant about their military aid. Ankara’s decision to close the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits for Russian warships also helped prevent escalation in the Black Sea.

At the same time, by maintaining close ties with “dear friend” Russian President Vladimir Putin, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a skillful diplomat and seasoned politician, managed to position Turkey as a pivotal mediator in the conflict, highlighting successes of his balancing act. This personal relationship allowed him to bring the Russian leader to the negotiation table, albeit with little practical results for ending the war.

Turkey-brokered diplomatic deals, such as the grain initiative or prisoner swaps—including as recently as January—helped to solve pressing humanitarian issues, though Ankara has been unable to broker a ceasefire or comprehensive peace talks. Above all, Erdoğan’s peace-talking and food diplomacy has strengthened Turkey’s posture in, and far beyond, the region.

This strategy had its obvious advantages for Turkey in the first months of the full-scale invasion, before Russia’s military weakened significantly at the hands of Ukrainian forces, the evidence of mass Russian atrocities in Ukraine started to emerge, and all hope for a peaceful resolution crumbled. The situation has dramatically changed ever since, but Turkey’s regional policy hasn’t.

A need for course correction

Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones had helped Ukraine in the early days of the war. However, with other allies stepping up their military support to Ukraine and rallying around Kyiv in coalitions to send tanks and advocate for sending jets, Turkey’s role has been overshadowed.

According to Oryx, an open-source intelligence research group, Turkey has sent military supplies to Ukraine beyond combat and reconnaisance drones, but Ankara’s desire to keep its military assistance to Ukraine low-profile, due to sensitivities with Russia, has created a distorted image of Turkey’s stance in this war, leading to accusations that Ankara is fence-sitting.

Despite Turkey’s status as the second-largest NATO army and Ankara’s diplomatic ambitions of a global power, it is not Turkey but smaller countries such as Poland and the Baltic states that have been the most vocal in condemning Russian atrocities in Ukraine and have taken the lead in international coalitions to deter Russian aggression in the region.

Turkey’s economic cooperation with Russia has allowed it to find some short-term solutions, but left a long-lasting negative impact on the public perception of Turkey in Ukraine and the West. According to a recent poll by the New Europe Center, the level of distrust of Erdoğan among Ukrainians has leaped from 19.5 percent in 2021 to 46.6 percent in 2022. The absence of high-profile visits of Turkish leadership to Kyiv or to de-occupied territories of Ukraine during the war has added to this sentiment.

From a purely pragmatic point of view, some economists have warned that deepening links with a declining Russian economy could drag Turkey into an “economic disaster.” Though Russia-Turkey trade doubled between 2021 and 2022, reaching $68.1 billion, Turkey’s largest market remains the European Union (EU) with $196.4 billion in trade in 2022, making Ankara’s relations with the European partners a key priority.

Dim prospects for a negotiated peace

The prospects of a negotiated peace with Putin’s regime, which Turkey has been long pushing for, are now unlikelier than ever. Besides, Putin has bluntly violated most of his previous commitments to Erdoğan. For example, Russia bombed the Odesa seaport, undermining the grain deal struck in Istanbul just the day before. Ukrainian officials have expressed concerns that Russia has been using commercial ships to carry weapons through the Bosphorus Strait, which experts recognize as a clear violation of the Montreux Convention. The officials also accused Russia of creating an explosion at the Olenivka prison after having rejected Turkey’s offer to evacuate fighters who surrendered at the Azovstal plant in May—some of the fighters were among the dozens of Ukrainian prisoners of war killed in the blast. Moreover, Russia has been blocking the work of Turkey-brokered grain corridors and obstructing navigation in the Black Sea—to no reaction from Ankara.

Turkey has never shied away from playing hard when its interests are at stake or its regional ambitions are challenged. Russia’s occupation of the Black Sea is undermining not only Turkey’s efforts to ease the global food crisis but also the Montreux regime—which grants commercial ships unrestricted access to the Turkish straits.

The grain deal, which allowed some agricultural exports from Ukrainian seaports when no other options were available, was certainly a success in the early months of invasion. However, now it is in a semi-defunct state and has given Moscow a de facto veto over the freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, turning the sea into a “Russian lake”—something Erdoğan had warned about long ago. One year into the war, it is time to address the root cause of the problem—which is Russian control of maritime routes—instead of focusing on technicalities of how to keep the deal alive. “If Russia won’t respond to diplomacy, then it is time for NATO to put a meaningful defensive naval presence into the Black Sea to protect merchant traffic going to and from Ukrainian ports,” says Yörük Işık from the Bosphorus Observer. This would not only emphasize Turkey’s role as a key NATO member in the Black Sea but also help to address a bigger problem: maintaining freedom of navigation and easing the food crisis in the Global South.

Time for Turkey to demonstrate regional leadership

Turkey has already benefited from Russia’s major failures in Ukraine. It has started to squeeze Russia out of the South Caucasus and gradually replace it as a security partner of the Turkic republics in Central Asia.

The defeat of Russia and emergence of a strong Ukraine with a well-trained, modern army would help deter Russian presence in the Black Sea without expanding permanent NATO presence. This strategic shift would also tilt the military balance in Ankara’s favor in Syria and the Mediterranean, where Russia has also been Turkey’s strategic rival.

Moscow’s overall weakening grip over the Turkic world, “from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China,” presents multiple opportunities for Turkey, which significantly exceed the benefits of situational—and highly risky—commercial deals with a declining Russian regime under Western sanctions. Unlike in the early 1990s, Ankara has now shifted the focus of its regional cooperation from broad Pan-Turkic ideas to pragmatic infrastructural and energy projects. Given the EU’s goal to bypass Russia in oil, gas, and transport corridors, Turkey’s regional activism would likely be welcomed by the EU and United States.

As the country continues to need substantial foreign investments and reconstruction aid in the wake of devastating earthquakes, it would be a good time for Turkey to mend ties with the West.

The ability to maintain momentum in a positive bilateral agenda with the United States, which was highlighted during US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent visit to Turkey, will among other things depend on Turkey’s readiness to recognize Russia as the major security threat and to step up efforts to prevent exports of dual-use products that could be used by Russian defense industries. During Blinken’s visit, Turkey’s chief diplomat publicly confirmed Ankara’s intent to cooperate as such.

A year ago, Turkey had the strategic vision to provide Ukraine with lethal weapons when some other countries were limiting their support to humanitarian aid and helmets. Turkey’s early leadership, among other factors, helped prevent Kyiv’s defeat.

Now, it is time for Turkey to develop a strategic vision for the region after Ukraine’s victory—when, ideally, rather than meeting with Putin, world leaders would watch him face trial for war crimes.

Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and at the Center in Modern Turkish Studies, Carleton University. Follow her on Twitter @GaberYevgeniya.

The post One year into the war, it’s time for Turkey to reconsider its Ukraine-Russia balancing act appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Tech innovation helps Ukraine even the odds against Russia’s military might

Mykhailo Fedorov — Tue, 28 Feb 2023 22:50:23 +0000

For more than a year, Ukraine has been fighting for its life against a military superpower that enjoys overwhelming advantages in terms of funding, weapons, and manpower. One of the few areas were Ukraine has managed to stay consistently ahead of Russia is in the use of innovative military technologies.

Today’s Ukraine is often described as a testing ground for new military technologies, but it is important to stress that Ukrainians are active participants in this process who are in many instances leading the way with new innovations. The scale of Russia’s invasion and the intensity of the fighting mean that concepts can often go from the drawing board to the battlefield in a matter of months or sometimes even days. Luckily, Ukraine has the tech talent and flexibility to make the most of these conditions.

With the war now entering its second year, it is clear that military tech offers the best solutions to the threats created by Russia’s invasion. After all, success in modern warfare depends primarily on data and technology, not on the number of 1960s tanks you can deploy or your willingness to use infantry as cannon fodder.

Russian preparations for the current full-scale invasion of Ukraine have been underway for much of the past two decades and have focused on traditional military thinking with an emphasis on armor, artillery, and air power. In contrast, the rapidly modernizing Ukrainian military has achieved a technological leap in less than twelve months. Since the invasion began, Ukraine has demonstrated a readiness to innovate that the more conservative Russian military simply cannot match.

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Modern weapons supplied by Ukraine’s international partners have played a crucial role in the Ukrainian military’s battlefield victories during the first year of the war. Likewise, Western countries have also supported Ukraine with a range of tech solutions and assistance. At the same time, Ukrainians have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to develop and adapt new technologies suited to the specific circumstances of Russia’s ongoing invasion. Ukraine has used everthing from drones and satellite imagery to artificial intelligence and situational awareness tools in order to inflict maximum damage on Russian forces while preserving the lives of Ukrainian service personnel and civilians.

Drones deserve special attention as the greatest game-changers of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Thanks to the widespread and skillful use of air reconnaissance drones, the Ukrainian military has been able to monitor vast frontline areas and coordinate artillery. Meanwhile, strike drones have made it possible to hit enemy positions directly.

The critical role of drones on the battlefield has helped fuel a wartime boom in domestic production. Over the past six months, the number of Ukrainian companies producing UAVs has increased more than fivefold. This expansion will continue. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine is fast evolving into the world’s first war of robots. In order to win, Ukraine needs large quantities of drones in every conceivable category.

This helps to explain the thinking behind the decision to launch the Army of Drones initiative. This joint project within the framework of the UNITED24 fundraising platform involves the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the State Special Communications Service, and the Ministry of Digital Transformation. Within the space of six months, the Army of Drones initiative resulted in the acquisition of over 1,700 drones worth tens of millions of dollars. This was possible thanks to donations from individuals and businesses in 76 countries.

Ukraine is currently developing its own new types of drones to meet the challenges of the Russian invasion. For example, Ukraine is producing new kinds of naval drone to help the country guard against frequent missile attacks launched from Russian warships. Ukrainian tech innovators are making significant progress in the development of maritime drones that cost hundreds of thousands of dollars and can potentially target and deter or disable warships costing many millions.

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Ukrainian IT specialists are creating software products to enhance the wartime performance of the country’s armed forces. One good example is Delta, a comprehensive situational awareness system developed by the Innovation Center within Ukraine’s Defense Ministry. This tool could be best described as “Google maps for the military.” It provides real-time views of the battlefield in line with NATO standards by integrating data from a variety of sources including aerial reconnaissance, satellite images, and drone footage.

Such systems allow the Ukrainian military to become increasingly data-driven. This enables Ukrainian commanders to adapt rapidly to circumstances and change tactics as required. The system saves lives and ammunition while highlighting potential opportunities for Ukraine to exploit. This approach has already proven its effectiveness in the defense of Kyiv and during the successful counteroffensives to liberate Kharkiv Oblast and Kherson.

Ukraine has also launched a special chatbot that allows members of the public to report on the movements of enemy troops and military hardware. Integrated within the widely used Diia app, this tool has attracted over 460,000 Ukrainian users. The reports they provide have helped to destroy dozens of Russian military positions along with tanks and artillery.

In addition to developing its own military technologies, Ukraine has also proven extremely adept at taking existing tech solutions and adapting them to wartime conditions. One prominent example is Starlink, which has changed the course of the war and become part of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. Satellite communication is one of Ukraine’s competitive advantages, providing connections on the frontlines and throughout liberated regions of the country while also functioning during blackouts. Since the start of the Russian invasion, Ukraine has received over 30,000 Starlink terminals.

Ukraine’s effective use of military technologies has led some observers to suggest that the country could become a “second Israel.” This is a flattering comparison, but in reality, Ukraine has arguably even greater potential. Within the next few years, Ukraine is on track to become a nation with top tier military tech solutions.

Crucial decisions setting Ukraine on this trajectory have already been made. In 2023, efforts will focus on the development of a military tech ecosystem with a vibrant startup sector alongwide a strong research and development component. There are already clear indications of progress, such as the recent creation of strike drone battalions within the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The war unleashed by Russia in February 2022 has now entered its second year. Putin had expected an easy victory. Instead, his faltering invasion has highlighted Ukraine’s incredible bravery while also showcasing the country’s technological sophistication. Ukrainians have demonstrated their ability to defeat one of the world’s mightiest armies using a combination of raw courage and modern innovation. This remarkable success offers lessons for military strategy and security policy that will be studied for decades to come.

Mykhailo Fedorov is Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation.

The US military has relied on satellites for more than thirty years. From Global Positioning System-enabled, precision-guided munitions that helped the US military destroy Iraqi tanks to spy satellites that helped track down al-Qaeda training camps, space assets were a crucial part of the first Gulf War and war on terror.

China and Russia recognize how much the US military depends on satellites. Both have developed a wide range of ASAT capabilities that can disable or destroy US space assets. These capabilities include electronic warfare, cyber operations, jamming, directed energy, and destructive kinetic ASAT weapons. China also possesses commercial and scientific satellites with maneuvering capabilities that could serve as ASATs by violently colliding with US space assets.

To mitigate the threat from adversary ASATs, the US Space Development Agency is bolstering space resiliency by purchasing hundreds of small (and cheap) low-Earth orbit satellites. Rather than relying on large, expensive geosynchronous-orbit satellites, this new approach will require any adversary seeking to disrupt US space capabilities to knock out not just a few exquisite satellites but a few hundred small satellites.

By announcing CASR, the United States is beginning to take steps to improve its resilience even more: Rather than relying on government-owned space assets numbering in the hundreds, the United States is hoping to enlist massive commercial satellite constellations numbering in the tens of thousands for use in emergencies.

Commercial satellites have proven their utility for security purposes during the war in Ukraine. SpaceX’s Starlink is providing the Ukrainian military with high-speed internet, allowing forces to stay in contact with each other and with Ukrainian high command. It also allows units to deploy weapons systems such as precision-guided artillery, drones, and loitering munitions. Commercial satellites have also tracked the Russian military buildup and revealed Russian atrocities in the Ukrainian cities of Izyum and Bucha. The Ukraine example shows that a civil reserve satellite fleet would thus not only increase resiliency but also expand capabilities that the US military can draw upon in times of crisis.

A civil reserve fleet is not a new concept. The US Air Force has the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, which allows the United States to expand its capacity quickly during wars or national emergencies. In twenty-first-century warfare, militaries are exceedingly reliant on a stream of satellite-provided data and services. A civil reserve satellite fleet will ensure that stream remains steady.

In setting up a civil reserve satellite fleet, the US government should do the following:

Create a preferential contract award system for private-sector participants in the program.
Create fixed payment structures for the services private-sector participants provide.
Indemnify companies for financial losses sustained as a result of participation.

These steps would create financial carrots for satellite operators while simultaneously lowering risk, incentivizing them to participate. The payments and preferential contract awards that this program would provide can serve as crucial support for many smaller satellite and launch companies; with the US government serving as an anchor client, space companies would have the time and capital they need to grow a civilian client base. That could make the difference between commercial success or failure.

Corporations should participate in the following ways:

Maintain a significant percentage of satellite constellations capable of providing communications and intelligence-gathering services on short demand to the US military.
Commit to providing the US government with access to satellite networks if called upon during a conflict or emergency.

Doing so would provide the US military with the resiliency it needs to deter aggression in space, and, should deterrence fail, fight and win.

The US government and corporations should work together in the following ways:

Create common software and hardware standards to allow communication between government and commercial satellites and receivers.
Assign specific roles to participating commercial satellites in the event of crisis.
Conduct military exercises using commercial satellites to improve the efficiency of the system and demonstrate its capabilities to adversaries.

Unlike many other technologies that the military procures, commercial satellites have already proven their utility. The United States should prioritize formalizing its relationship with satellite providers so that, should an emergency arise, the satellites of the civil reserve fleet will be ready to immediately and seamlessly support US warfighters.

Aidan Poling is a research analyst at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. In fall 2022, he was a young global professional in the Forward Defense practice at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The post How a fleet of private satellites can help secure the US military’s future appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A parallel terrain: Public-private defense of the Ukrainian information environment

Emma Schroeder and Sean Dack — Mon, 27 Feb 2023 05:01:00 +0000

Executive summary

In the year since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the conventional assault and advances into Ukrainian territory have been paralleled by a simultaneous invasion of the Ukrainian information environment. This environment, composed of cyber infrastructure, both digital and physical, and the data, networks, and ideas that flow through and across it, is more than a domain through which the combatants engage or a set of tools by which combatants interact—it is a parallel territory that Russia is intent on severing from the global environment and claiming for itself.

Russian assaults on the Ukrainian information environment are conducted against, and through, largely privately owned infrastructure, and Ukrainian defense in this space is likewise bound up in cooperative efforts with those infrastructure owners and other technology companies providing aid and assistance. The role of private companies in this conflict seems likely to grow, along with the scale, complexity, and criticality of the information infrastructure they operate.

Examining and mitigating the risks related to the involvement of private technology companies in the war in Ukraine is crucial and looking forward, the United States government must also examine the same questions with regard to its own security and defense:

What is the complete incentive structure behind a company’s decision to provide products or services to a state at war?
How dependent are states on the privately held portions of the information environment, including infrastructure, tools, knowledge, data, skills, and more, for their own national security and defense?
How can the public and private sectors work together better as partners to understand and prepare these areas of reliance during peace and across the continuum of conflict in a sustained, rather than ad hoc, nature?

Russia’s war against Ukraine is not over and similar aggressions are likely to occur in new contexts and with new actors in the future. By learning these lessons now and strengthening the government’s ability to work cooperatively with the private sector in and through the information space, the United States will be more effective and resilient against future threats.

Introduction

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 held none of the illusory cover of its 2014 operation; instead of “little green men” unclaimed by Moscow, Putin built up his forces on Ukraine’s border for the entire international community to see. His ambitions were clear: To remove and replace the elected government of Ukraine with a figurehead who would pull the country back under Russia’s hold, whether through literal absorption of the state or by subsuming the entire Ukrainian population under Russia’s political and information control. In the year since the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s defense has held back the Russian war machine with far greater strength than many thought possible in the early months of 2022. President Zelenskyy, the Ukrainian government, and the Ukrainian people have repeatedly repelled Russian attempts to topple the state, buttressed in part by the outpouring of assistance from not just allied states, but also local and transnational private sector companies.

Amidst the largest conventional land war in Europe since the fall of the Third Reich, both Russia and Ukraine have directed considerable effort toward the conflict’s information environment, defined as the physical and digital infrastructure over and through which information moves, the tools used to interact with that information, and information itself. This is not only a domain through which combatants engage, but a parallel territory that the Kremlin seeks to contest and claim. Russian efforts in this realm, to destroy or replace Ukraine’s underpinning infrastructure and inhibit the accessibility and reach of infrastructure and tools within the environment, are countered by a Ukrainian defense that prioritizes openness and accessibility.

The information environment, and all the components therein, is not a state or military dominated environment; it is largely owned, operated, and populated by private organizations and individuals around the globe. The Ukrainian information environment, referring to Ukrainian infrastructure operators, service providers, and users, is linked to and part of a global environment of state and non-state actors where the infrastructure and the terrain is largely private. Russian operations within the Ukrainian information environment are conducted against, and through, this privately owned infrastructure, and the Ukrainian defense is likewise bound up in cooperative efforts with those infrastructure owners and other technology companies that are providing aid and assistance. These efforts have contributed materially, and in some cases uniquely, to Ukraine’s defense.

The centrality of this environment to the conduct of this war, raises important questions about the degree to which states and societies are dependent on information infrastructure and functionalities owned and operated by private actors, and especially transnational private actors. Although private sector involvement in the war in Ukraine has generally been positive, the fact that the conduct of war and other responsibilities in the realm of statehood are reliant on private actors leads to new challenges for these companies, for the Ukrainian government, and for the United States and allies.

The United States government must improve its understanding of, and facility for, joint public-private action to contest over and through the information environment. The recommendations in this report are intended to facilitate the ability of US technology companies to send necessary aid to Ukraine, ensure that the US government has a complete picture of US private-sector involvement in the war in Ukraine, and contribute more effectively to the resilience of the Ukrainian information environment. First, the US government should issue a directive providing assurance and clarification as to the legality of private sector cyber, information, capacity building, and technical aid to Ukraine. Second, a task force pulling from agencies and offices across government should coordinate to track past, current, and future aid from the private sector in these areas to create a better map of US collaboration with Ukraine across the public and private sectors. Third, the US government should increase its facilitation of private technology aid by providing logistical and financial support.

These recommendations, focused on Ukraine’s defense, are borne of and provoke larger questions that will only become more important to tackle. The information environment and attempts to control it have long been a facet of conflict, but the centrality of privately owned and operated technology—and the primacy of some private sector security capabilities in relation to all but a handful of states—pose increasingly novel challenges to the United States and allied policymaking communities. Especially in future conflicts, the risks associated with private sector action in defense of, or directly against, a combatant could be significantly greater and multifaceted, rendering existing cooperative models insufficient.

The Russian information offensive

The Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs defines information space—of which cyberspace is a part—as “the sphere of activity connected with the formation, creation, conversion, transfer, use, and storage of information and which has an effect on individual and social consciousness, the information infrastructure, and information itself.¹ Isolating the Ukrainian information space is key to both the short- and long-term plans of the Russian government. In the short term, the Kremlin pursues efforts to control both the flow and content of communications across the occupied areas.² In the longer term, occupation of the information environment represents an integral step in Russian plans to occupy and claim control over the Ukrainian population.

In distinct opposition to the global nature of the information environment, over the past decade or so, the Kremlin has produced successive legislation “to impose ‘sovereignty’ over the infrastructure, content, and data traversing Russia’s ‘information space,’” creating a sectioned-off portion of the internet now known as RuNet.³ Within this space, the Russian government has greater control over what information Russian citizens see and a greater ability to monitor what Russian citizens do online.⁴ This exclusionary interpretation is an exercise in regime security against what the Kremlin perceives as constant Western information warfare against it.⁵ As Gavin Wilde, senior fellow with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes, the Russian government views the information environment “as an ecosystem to be decisively dominated.”⁶

To the Kremlin, domination of the information environment in Ukraine is an essential step toward pulling the nation into its fold and under its control. Just as Putin views information domination as critical to his regime’s exercise of power within Russia, in Ukraine, Russian forces systematically conduct offensives against the Ukrainian information environment in an attempt to create a similar model of influence and control that would further enable physical domination. This strategy is evident across the Kremlin’s efforts to weaken the Ukrainian state for the last decade at least. In the 2014 and 2022 invasions, occupied, annexed, and newly “independent” regions of Ukraine were variously cut off from the wider information space and pulled into the restricted Russian information space.

The Crimean precedent – 2014

The Russian invasion of Ukraine did not begin in 2022, but in 2014. Examining this earlier Russian incursion illustrates the pattern of Russian offensive behavior in and through the information environment going back nearly a decade—a combination of physical, cyber, financial, and informational maneuvers that largely target or move through private information infrastructure. In 2014, although obfuscated behind a carefully constructed veil of legitimacy, Russian forces specifically targeted Ukrainian information infrastructure to separate the Crimean population from the Ukrainian information environment, and thereby the global information environment, and filled that vacuum with Russian infrastructure and information.

The Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 was a direct response to the year-long Euromaidan Revolution, which took place across Ukraine in protest of then-President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to spurn closer relations with the European Union and ignore growing calls to counter Russian influence and corruption within the Ukrainian government. These protests were organized, mobilized, and sustained partially through coordination, information exchange, and message amplification over social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Ustream—as well as traditional media.⁷ In February 2014, after Yanukovych fled to Russia, the Ukrainian parliament established a new acting government and announced that elections for a new president would be held in May. Tensions immediately heightened, as Russian forces began operating in Crimea with the approval of Federal Assembly of Russia at the request of “President” Yanukovych, although Putin denied that they were anything other than “local self-defense forces.”⁸ On March 21, Putin signed the annexation of Crimea.⁹

During the February 2014 invasion of Crimea, the seizure and co-option of Ukrainian physical information infrastructure was a priority. Reportedly, among the first targets of Russian special forces was the Simferopol Internet Exchange Point (IXP), a network facility that enables internet traffic exchange.¹⁰ Ukraine’s state-owned telecommunications company Ukrtelecom reported that armed men seized its offices in Crimea and tampered with fiber-optic internet and telephone cables.¹¹ Following the raid, the company lost the “technical capacity to provide connection between the peninsula and the rest of Ukraine and probably across the peninsula, too.”¹² Around the same time, the head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), Valentyn Nalivaichenko, reported that the mobile phones of Ukrainian parliament members, including his own, were blocked from connecting through Ukrtelecom networks in Crimea.¹³

Over the next three years, and through the “progressive centralization of routing paths and monopolization of Internet Service market in Crimea … the topology of Crimean networks has evolved to a singular state where paths bound to the peninsula converge to two ISPs (Rosetelecom and Fiord),” owned and operated by Russia.¹⁴ Russian forces manipulated the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)—the system that helps connects user traffic flowing from ISPs to the wider internet—modifying routes to force Crimean internet traffic through Russian systems, “drawing a kind of ‘digital frontline’ consistent with the military one.”¹⁵ Residents of Crimea found their choices increasingly limited, until their internet service could only route through Russia, instead of Ukraine, subject to the same level of censorship and internet controls as in Russia. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) monitored communications from residents of Crimea, both within the peninsula and with people in Ukraine and beyond.¹⁶ Collaboration between ISPs operating in Crimea through Russian servers and the FSB appears to be a crucial piece of this wider monitoring effort. This claim was partially confirmed by a 2018 Russian decree that forbade internet providers from publicly sharing any information regarding their cooperation with “the authorized state bodies carrying out search and investigative activities to ensure the security of the Russian Federation.”¹⁷

From March to June 2014, Russian state-owned telecom company Rostelcom began and completed construction of the Kerch Strait cable, measuring 46 kilometers (about 28.5 miles) and costing somewhere between $11 and $25 million, to connect the Crimean internet with the Russian RuNet.¹⁸ Rostelcom, using a local agent in Crimea called Miranda Media, became the main transit network for several Crimean internet service providers (ISPs), including KCT, ACS-Group, CrimeaCom, and CRELCOM in a short period of time.¹⁹ There was a slower transition of customers from the Ukrainian company Datagroup to Russian ISPs, but nonetheless, the number of Datagroup customers in Crimea greatly decreased throughout 2014. According to one ISP interviewed by Romain Fontugne, Ksenia Ermoshina, and Emile Aben, “the Kerch Strait cable was used first of all for voice communication … The traffic capacity of this cable was rather weak for commercial communications.”²⁰ But by the end of 2017, remnant usage of Ukrainian ISPs had virtually disappeared, following the completion of a second, better internet cable through the Kerch Strait and a series of restrictions placed on Russian social media platforms, news outlets, and a major search engine by Ukrainian President Poroshenko.²¹The combination of the new restrictions, and the improved service of Russian ISPs encouraged more Crimeans to move away from Ukrainian ISPs.

Russia’s efforts to control the information environment within Crimea, and the Russian government’s ability to monitor communications and restrict access to non-Russian approved servers, severely curtailed freedom of expression and belief—earning the region zero out of four in this category from Freedom House.²² Through physical, and formerly private, information infrastructure, Russia was able to largely take control of the information environment within Crimea.

A parallel occupation – 2022

Digital information infrastructure

Just as in 2014, one of the first priorities of invading Russian forces in 2022 was the assault of key Ukrainian information infrastructure, including digital infrastructure. Before, during, and following the invasion, Russian and Russian-aligned forces targeted Ukrainian digital infrastructure through cyber operations, ranging in type, target, and sophistication. Through some combination of Ukrainian preparedness, partner intervention, and Russian planning shortfalls, among other factors, large-scale cyber operations disrupting Ukrainian critical infrastructure, such as those seen previously in 2015 with BlackEnergy and NotPetya, did not materialize.²³ This could be because such cyber operations require significant time and resources, and similar ends can be more cheaply achieved through direct, physical means. Russian cyber operators, however, have not been idle.

Preceding the physical invasion, there was a spate of activity attributed to both Russian and Russian-aligned organizations targeting a combination of state and private organizations.²⁴ From January 13 to 14, for example, hackers briefly took control of seventy Ukrainian government websites, including the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, adding threatening messages to the top of these official sites.²⁵ The following day, January 15, Microsoft’s Threat Intelligence Center reported the discovery of wiper malware, disguised as ransomware, in dozens of Ukrainian government systems, including agencies which “provide critical executive branch or emergency response function,” and an information technology firm that services those agencies.²⁶ A month later, on February 15, Russian hackers targeted several websites with distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, forcing Ukrainian defense ministry and armed forces websites, as well as those of PrivatBank and Oschadbank, offline.²⁷ Around the same time, according to Microsoft’s special report on Ukraine, “likely” Russian actors were discovered in the networks of unidentified critical infrastructure in Odessa and Sumy.²⁸ The day before the invasion, cybersecurity companies ESET and Symantec reported that a new destructive wiper was spreading across Ukrainian, Latvian, and Lithuanian networks, as a second round of DDoS attacks again took down a spate of government and financial institution websites.“²⁹ This activity centered around information—with defacements sending a clear threat to the Ukrainian government and population, DDoS attacks impairing accurate communication, and wiper malware degrading Ukrainian data—and gaining access to Ukrainian data for Russia. Although many of these operations targeted Ukrainian government networks, the attacks moved through or against privately operated infrastructure and, notably, the first public notification and detailing of several of these operations was undertaken by transnational technology companies.

After February 24, Russian cyber activity continued and the targets included a number of private information infrastructure operators. A March hack of Ukrtelecom—Ukraine’s largest landline operator, which also provides internet and mobile services to civilians and the Ukrainian government and military—resulted in a collapse of the company’s network to just 13 percent capacity, the most severe disruption in service the firm recorded since the invasion began.³⁰ Another such operation targeted Triolan—a Ukrainian telecommunications provider—on February 24 in tandem with the physical offensive and a second time on March 9. These incursions on the Triolan network took down key nodes and caused widespread service outages. Following the March 9 attack, the company was able to restore service, but these efforts were complicated by the need to physically access some of the equipment located in active conflict zones.³¹ These attacks against Ukraine-based information infrastructure companies caused service outages that were concurrent with the physical invasion and afterwards, restricted communications among Ukrainians and impeded the population’s ability to respond to current and truthful information.

This unacceptable cyberattack is yet another example of Russia’s continued pattern of irresponsible behaviour in cyberspace, which also formed an integral part of its illegal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine.¹

Council of the European Union

These types of operations, however, were not restricted to Ukraine-based information infrastructure. A significant opening salvo in Russia’s invasion was a cyber operation directed against ViaSat, a private American-based satellite internet company that provides services to users throughout the world, including the Ukrainian military.³² Instead of targeting the satellites in orbit, Russia targeted the modems in ViaSat’s KA-SAT satellite broadband network that connected users with the internet.³³ Specifically, Russia exploited a “misconfiguration in a VPN [virtual private network] appliance to gain remote access to the trusted management segment of the KA-SAT network.”³⁴ From there, the attackers were able to move laterally though the network to the segment used to manage and operate the broader system.³⁵ They then “overwrote key data in flash memory on the modems,” making it impossible for the modems to access the broader network.³⁶ Overall, the effects of the hack were short-lived, with ViaSat reporting the restoration of connectivity within a few days after shipping approximately 30,000 new modems to affected customers.³⁷

SentinelOne, a cybersecurity firm, identified the malware used to wipe the modems and routers of the information they needed to operate.³⁸ The firm assessed “with medium-confidence“ that AcidRain, the malware used in the attack, had ”developmental similarities” with an older malware, VPNFilter, that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the US Department of Justice have previously linked to the Russian government.³⁹ The United States, United Kingdom, and European Union all subsequently attributed the ViaSat hack to Russian-state backed actors.⁴⁰

The effectiveness of the operation is debated, although the logic of the attack is straightforward. Russia wanted to constrain, or preferably eliminate, an important channel of communication for the Ukrainian military during the initial stages of the invasion. Traditional, land-based radios, which the Ukrainian military relies on for most of their communications, only work over a limited geographic range, therefore making it more difficult to use advanced, long-range weapons systems.⁴¹ It should be expected that landline and conventional telephony would suffer outages during the opening phases of the war and struggle to keep up with rapidly moving forces.

Initially, it was widely reported that the Russian strike on ViaSat was effective. On March 15, a senior Ukrainian cybersecurity official, Viktor Zhora, was quoted saying that the attack on ViaSat caused “a really huge loss in communications in the very beginning of the war.⁴² When asked follow-up questions about his quote, Zhora said at the time that he was unable to elaborate, leading journalists and industry experts to believe that the attack had impacted the Ukrainian military’s ability to communicate.⁴³ However, several months later, on September 26, Zhora revised his initial comments, stating that the hack would have impacted military communications if satellite communications had been the Ukrainian military’s principal medium of communication. However, Zhora stated that the Ukrainian military instead relies on landlines for communication, with satellites as a back-up method. He went on to say that “in the case land lines were destroyed, that could be a serious issue in the first hours of war.”⁴⁴ The tension, and potential contradictions, in Zhora’s comments underlines the inherent complications in analyzing cyber operations during war: long-term consequences can be difficult to infer from short-term effects, and countries seek to actively control the narratives surrounding conflict.

The effectiveness of the ViaSat hack boils down to how the Ukrainian military communicates, and how adaptable it was in the early hours of the invasion. However, it is apparent how such a hack could impact military effectiveness. If Russia, or any other belligerent, was able to simultaneously disrupt satellite communications while also jamming or destroying landlines, forces on the frontlines would be at best poorly connected with their superiors. In such a scenario, an army would be cut off from commanders in other locations and would not be able to report back or receive new directives; they would be stranded until communications could be restored.

The ViaSat hack had a military objective: to disrupt Ukrainian military access to satellite communications. But the effects were not limited to this objective. The operation had spillover effects that rippled across Europe. In Germany, nearly 6,000 wind turbines were taken offline, with roughly 2,000 of those turbines remaining offline for nearly a month after the initial hack due to the loss of remote connectivity.⁴⁵ In France, modems used by emergency services vehicles, including firetrucks and ambulances, were also affected.⁴⁶

ViaSat is not a purely military target. It is a civilian firm that counts the Ukrainian military as a customer. The targeting of civilian infrastructure with dual civilian and military capability and use has occurred throughout history and has been the center of debate in international law, especially when there are cross-border spillover effects in non-combatant countries. Both the principle of proportionality and international humanitarian law require the aggressor to target only military objects, defined as objects “whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage” in a manner proportional to the military gain foreseen by the operation. ⁴⁷ What this means in practice, however, is that the aggressor determines whether they deem a target to be a military object and a beneficial target and, therefore, what is legitimate. Konstantin Vorontsov, the Head of the Russian Delegation to the United Nations, attempted to justify Russian actions in October 2022 by saying that the use of civilian space infrastructure to aid the Ukrainian war effort may be a violation of the Outer Space Treaty, thereby rendering this infrastructure a legitimate military target.⁴⁸ Similar operations like that against ViaSat are likely to be the new norm in modern warfare. As Mauro Vignati, the adviser on new digital technologies of warfare at the Red Cross, said in November 2022, insofar as private companies own and operate the information infrastructure of the domain, including infrastructure acting as military assets, “when war start[s], those companies, they are inside the battlefield.”⁴⁹

Physical information infrastructure

In February 2022, as Russian forces moved to seize airfields and key physical assets in Ukraine, they simultaneously assaulted the physical information infrastructure operating within and beneath the Ukrainian information environment. Russian forces targeted this infrastructure, largely privately operated, by taking control of assets where possible and destroying them where not, including through a series of Russian air strikes targeting Ukrainian servers, cables, and cell phone towers.⁵⁰ As of June 2022, about 15 percent of Ukrainian information infrastructure had been damaged or destroyed; by July, 12.2 percent of homes had lost access to mobile communication services, 11 percent of base stations for mobile operators were out of service, and approximately 20 percent of the country’s telecommunications infrastructure was damaged or destroyed.⁵¹ By August “the number of users connecting to the Internet in Ukraine [had] shrunk by at least 16 percent nationwide.”⁵²

In some areas of Ukraine, digital blackouts were enforced by Russian troops to cut the local population off from the highly contested information space. In Mariupol, the last cell tower connecting the city with the outside world was tirelessly tended by two Kyivstar engineers, who kept it alive with backup generators that they manually refilled with gasoline. Once the Russians entered the city, however, the Ukrainian soldiers who had been protecting the cell tower location left to engage with the enemy, leaving the Kyivstar engineers alone to tend to their charge. For three days the engineers withstood the bombing of the city until March 21, when Russian troops disconnected the tower and it went silent.⁵³

Russian forces coerced Ukrainian occupied territories onto Russian ISPs, once again through Rostelcom’s local agent Miranda Media, and onto Russian mobile service providers.⁵⁴ Information infrastructure in Ukraine is made up of overlapping networks of mobile service and ISPs, a legacy of the country’s complicated post-Soviet modernization process. This complexity may have been a boon for its resilience. Russian forces, observed digital-rights researcher Samuel Woodhams, “couldn’t go into one office and take down a whole region … There were hundreds of these offices and the actual hardware was quite geographically separated.⁵⁵ Across eastern Ukraine, including Kherson, Mlitopol, and Mariupol, the Russians aimed to subjugate the physical territory, constituent populations, and Ukrainian information space. In Kherson, Russian forces entered the offices of a Ukrainian ISP and at gunpoint, forced staff to transfer control to them.⁵⁶

Russian bombardment of telecommunications antennas in Kiev (Attribution: Mvs.gov.ua)

Routing the internet and communications access of occupied territories through Russia meant that Moscow could suppress communications to and from these occupied areas, especially through social media and Ukrainian news sites, sever access to essential services in Ukraine, and flood the populations with its own propaganda, as was proved in Crimea in 2014. Moving forward, Russia could use this dependency to “disconnect, throttle, or restrict access to the internet” in occupied territories, cutting off the occupied population from the Ukrainian government and the wider Ukrainian and international community.⁵⁷

The Kremlin’s primary purpose in the invasion of Ukraine was and is to remove the Ukrainian government and, likely, install a pro-Russian puppet government to bring to an end an independent Ukraine.⁵⁸ Therefore, isolating the information environment of occupied populations, in concert with anti-Ukrainian government disinformation, such as the multiple false allegations that President Zelenskyy had fled the country and abandoned the Ukrainian people,⁵⁹ were a means to sway the allegiances, or at least dilute the active resistance, of the Ukrainian people.⁶⁰ Without connectivity to alternative outlets, the occupying Russians could promote false and largely uncontested claims about the progress of the war. In early May 2022 for example, when Kherson lost connectivity for three days, the deputy of the Kherson Regional Council, Serhiy Khlan, reported that the Russians “began to spread propaganda that they were in fact winning and had captured almost all of Mykolaiv.”⁶¹

Russia used its assault on the information environment to undermine the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and its ability to fulfill its governmental duties to the Ukrainian people. Whether through complete connectivity blackouts or through the restrictions imposed by Russian networks, the Russians blocked any communications from the Ukrainian government to occupied populations—not least President Zelenskyy’s June 13, 2022 address, intended most for those very populations, in which he promised to liberate all occupied Ukrainian land and reassured those populations that they had not been forgotten. Zelenskyy acknowledged the Russian barrier between himself and Ukrainians in occupied territories, saying, “They are trying to make people not just know nothing about Ukraine… They are trying to make them stop even thinking about returning to normal life, forcing them to reconcile.”⁶²

Isolating occupied populations from the Ukrainian information space is intended, in large part, said Stas Prybytko, the head of mobile broadband development within the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation, to “block them from communicating with their families in other cities and keep them from receiving truthful information.”⁶³ Throughout 2022, so much of what the international community knew about the war came—through Twitter, TikTok, Telegram, and more—from Ukrainians themselves. From videos of the indiscriminate Russian shelling of civilian neighborhoods to recordings tracking Russian troop movements, Ukrainians used their personal devices to capture and communicate the progress of the war directly to living rooms, board rooms, and government offices around the world.⁶⁴The power of this distributed information collection and open-source intelligence relies upon mobile and internet access. The accounts that were shared after Ukrainian towns and cities were liberated from Russian occupation lay bare just how much suffering, arrest, torture, and murder was kept hidden from international view by the purposeful isolation of the information environment and the constant surveillance of Ukrainians’ personal devices.⁶⁵ The war in Ukraine has highlighted the growing impact of distributed open source intelligence during the conduct of war that is carried out by civilians in Ukraine and by the wider open source research community though various social media and messaging platforms.⁶⁶

Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian news outlets justified a war of aggression against Ukraine

Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin employs information operations to erode global confidence in Ukraine

Russian operations against, especially transnational, digital infrastructure companies can mostly be categorized as disruption, degradation, and information gathering, which saw Russian or Russian-aligned hackers moving in and through the Ukrainian information environment. The attacks against Ukrainian physical infrastructure, however, are of a slightly different character. Invading forces employed physically mediated cyberattacks, a method defined by Herb Lin as “attacks that compromise cyber functionality through the use of or the threat of physical force” to pursue the complete destruction or seizure and occupation of this infrastructure.⁶⁷ Both ends begin with the same purpose: to create a vacuum of information between the Ukrainian government, the Ukrainian people, and the global population, effectively ending the connection between the Ukrainian information environment and the global environment. But the seizure of this infrastructure takes things a step beyond: to occupy the Ukrainian information environment and pull its infrastructure and its people into an isolated, controlled Russian information space.

Reclaiming the Ukrainian information environment

Preparation of the environment

The Russian assault on the Ukrainian information environment is far from unanswered. Russian efforts have been countered by the Ukrainian government in concert with allied states and with technology companies located both within and outside Ukraine. Russia’s aim to pull occupied Ukrainian territory onto Russian networks to be controlled and monitored has been well understood, and Ukraine has been hardening its information infrastructure since the initial 2014 invasion. Ukraine released its Cyber Security Strategy in 2016, which laid out the government’s priorities in this space, including the defense against the range of active cyber threats they face, with an emphasis on the “cyber protection of information infrastructure.”⁶⁸ The government initially focused on centralizing its networks in Kyiv to make it more difficult “for Russian hackers to penetrate computers that store critical data and provide services such as pension benefits, or to use formerly government-run networks in the occupied territories to launch cyberattacks on Kyiv.”⁶⁹

As part of its digitalization and security efforts, the Ukrainian government also sought out new partners, both public and private, to build and bolster its threat detection and response capabilities. Before and since the 2022 invasion, the Ukrainian government has worked with partner governments and an array of technology companies around the world to create resilience through increased connectivity and digitalization.

Bolstering Ukrainian connectivity

Since the 2014 invasion and annexation of Crimea, Ukraine-serving telecommunications operators have developed plans to prepare for future Russian aggression. Lifecell, the third largest Ukrainian mobile telephone operator, prepared its network for an anticipated Russian attack. The company shifted their office archives, documentation, and critical network equipment from eastern to western Ukraine, where it would be better insulated from violence, added additional network redundancy, and increased the coordination and response capabilities of their staff.⁷⁰ Similarly, Kyivstar and Vodafone Ukraine increased their network bandwidth to withstand extreme demand. In October 2021, these three companies initiated an infrastructure sharing agreement to expand LTE (Long Term Evolution) networks into rural Ukraine and, in cooperation with the Ukrainian government, expanded the 4G telecommunications network to bring “mobile network coverage to an estimated 91.6 per cent of the population.”⁷¹

The expansion and improvement of Ukrainian telecommunications continued through international partnerships as well. Datagroup, for example, announced a $20 million partnership in 2021 with Cisco, a US-based digital communications company, to modernize and expand the bandwidth of its extensive networks.⁷² Since the February 2022 invasion, Cisco has also worked with the French government to provide over $5 million of secure, wireless networking equipment and software, including firewalls, for free to the Ukrainian government.⁷³

This network expansion is an integral part of the Ukrainian government’s digitalization plans for the country, championed by President Zelenskyy. Rather than the invasion putting an end to these efforts, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov claimed that during the war “digitalization became the foundation of all our life. The economy continues to work … due to digitalization.⁷⁴ The digital provision of government services has created an alternate pathway for Ukrainians to engage in the economy and with their government. The flagship government initiative Diia, launched in February 2020, is a digital portal through which the 21.7 million Ukrainian users can access legal identification, make social services payments, register a business, and even register property damage from Russian missile strikes.⁷⁵ The Russian advance and consequent physical destruction that displaced Ukrainians means that the ability to provide government services through alternate and resilient means is more essential than ever, placing an additional premium on defending Ukrainian information infrastructure.

Backing up a government

As Russian forces built up along Ukraine’s borders, Ukrainian network centralization may have increased risk, despite the country’s improved defense capabilities. In preparation for the cyber and physical attacks against the country’s information infrastructure, Fedorov moved to amend Ukrainian data protection laws to allow the government to store and process data in the cloud and worked closely with several technology companies, including Microsoft, Amazon Web Services, and Google, to effect the transfer of critical government data to infrastructure hosted outside the country.⁷⁶ Cloud computing describes “a collection of technologies and organizational processes which enable ubiquitous, on-demand access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources.”⁷⁷ Cloud computing is dominated by the four hyperscalers—Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and Alibaba—that provide computing and storage at enterprise scale and are responsible for the operation and security of data centers all around the world, any of which could host customer data according to local laws and regulations.⁷⁸

According to its April 2022 Ukraine war report, Microsoft “committed at no charge a total of $107 million of technology services to support this effort” and renewed the relationship in November, promising to ensure that “government agencies, critical infrastructure and other sectors in Ukraine can continue to run their digital infrastructure and serve citizens through the Microsoft Cloud” at a value of about $100 million.⁷⁹ Amazon and Google have also committed to supporting cloud services for the Ukrainian government, for select companies, and for humanitarian organizations focused on aiding Ukraine.⁸⁰ In accordance with the Ukrainian government’s concerns, Russian missile attacks targeted the Ukrainian government’s main data center in Kyiv soon after the invasion, partially destroying the facility, and cyberattacks aggressively tested Ukrainian networks.⁸¹

Unlike other lines of aid provided by the international community to strengthen the defense of the Ukrainian information environment, cloud services are provided only by the private sector.⁸² While this aid has had a transformative effect on Ukrainian defense, that transformative quality has also raised concerns. Microsoft, in its special report on Ukraine, several times cites its cloud services as one of the determining factors that limited the effect of Russian cyber and kinetic attacks on Ukrainian government data centers, and details how their services, in particular, were instrumental in this defense.⁸³ In this same report, Microsoft claims to be most worried about those states and organizations that do not use cloud services, and provides corroborating data.⁸⁴ Microsoft and other technology companies offering their services at a reduced rate, or for free, are acting—at least in part—out of a belief in the rightness of the Ukrainian cause. However, they are still private companies with responsibilities to shareholders or board members, and they still must seek profit. Services provided, especially establishing information infrastructure like Cloud services, are likely to establish long-term business relationships with the Ukrainian government and potentially with other governments and clients, who see the effectiveness of those services illustrated through the defense of Ukraine.

Mounting an elastic defense

Working for wireless

Alongside and parallel to the Ukrainian efforts to defend and reclaim occupied physical territory is the fight for Ukrainian connectivity. Ukrainian telecommunications companies have been integral to preserving connectivity to the extent possible. In March 2022, Ukrainian telecom operators Kyivstar, Vodafone Ukraine, and Lifecell made the decision to provide free national mobile roaming services across mobile provider networks, creating redundancy and resilience in the mobile network to combat frequent service outages.⁸⁵ The free mobile service provided by these companies is valued at more than UAH 980 million (USD 26.8 million).⁸⁶ In addition, Kyivstar in July 2022 committed to the allocation of UAH 300 million (about USD 8.2 mil) for the modernization of Ukraine’s information infrastructure in cooperation with the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital transformation.⁸⁷ The statements that accompanied the commitments from Kyivstar and Lifecell—both headquartered in Ukraine—emphasized each company’s dedication to Ukrainian defense and their role in it, regardless of the short-term financial impact.⁸⁸ These are Ukrainian companies with Ukrainian infrastructure and Ukrainian customers, and their fate is tied inextricably to the outcome of this war.

As Russian forces advanced and attempted to seize control of information infrastructure, in at least one instance, Ukrainian internet and mobile service employees sabotaged their own equipment first. Facing threats of imprisonment and death from occupying Russians, employees in several Ukrtelecom facilities withstood pressure to share technical network details and instead deleted key files from the systems. According to Ukrtelecom Chief Executive Officer Yuriy Kurmaz, “The Russians tried to connect their control boards and some equipment to our networks, but they were not able to reconfigure it because we completely destroyed the software.”⁸⁹ Without functional infrastructure, Russian forces struggled to pull those areas onto Russian networks.

The destruction of telecommunications infrastructure has meant that these areas and many others along the war front are, in some areas, without reliable information infrastructure, either wireless or wired. While the Ukrainian government and a bevy of local and international private sector companies battle for control of on-the-ground internet and communications infrastructure, they also pursued new pathways to connectivity.

Searching for satellite

Two days after the invasion, Deputy Prime Minister Fedorov tweeted at Elon Musk, the Chief Executive Officer of SpaceX, that “while you try to colonize Mars — Russia try [sic] to occupy Ukraine! While your rockets successfully land from space — Russian rockets attack Ukrainian civil people! We ask you to provide Ukraine with Starlink stations and to address sane Russians to stand.”⁹⁰ Just another two days later, Fedorov confirmed the arrival of the first shipment of Starlink stations.⁹¹

Starlink, a network of low-orbit satellites working in constellations operated by SpaceX, relies on satellite receivers no larger than a backpack that are easily installed and transported. Because Russian targeting of cellular towers made communications coverage unreliable, says Fedorov, the government “made a decision to use satellite communication for such emergencies” from American companies like SpaceX.⁹² Starlink has proven more resilient than any other alternative throughout the war. Due to the low orbit of Starlink satellites, they can broadcast to their receivers at relatively higher power than satellites in higher orbits. There has been little reporting on successful Russian efforts to jam Starlink transmissions, and the Starlink base stations—the physical, earthbound infrastructure that communicates directly with the satellites—are located on NATO territory, ensuring any direct attack on them would be a significant escalation in the war.⁹³

Starlink has been employed across sectors almost since the war began. President Zelenskyy has used the devices himself when delivering addresses to the Ukrainian people, as well as to foreign governments and populations.⁹⁴ Fedorov has said that sustained missile strikes against energy and communication infrastructure have been effectively countered through the deployment of Starlink devices that can restore connection where it is most needed. He even called the system “an essential part of critical infrastructure.”⁹⁵

Starlink has also found direct military applications. The portability of these devices means that Ukrainian troops can often, though not always, stay connected to command elements and peer units while deployed.⁹⁶ Ukrainian soldiers have also used internet connections to coordinate attacks on Russian targets with artillery-battery commanders.⁹⁷ The Aerorozvidka, a specialist air reconnaissance unit within the Ukrainian military that conducts hundreds of information gathering missions every day, has used Starlink devices in areas of Ukraine without functional communications infrastructure to “monitor and coordinate unmanned aerial vehicles, enabling soldiers to fire anti-tank weapons with targeted precision.”⁹⁸ Reports have also suggested that a Starlink device was integrated into an unmanned surface vehicle discovered near Sevastopol, potentially used by the Ukrainian military for reconnaissance or even to carry and deliver munitions.⁹⁹ According to one Ukrainian soldier, “Starlink is our oxygen,” and were it to disappear, “our army would collapse into chaos.”¹⁰⁰

The initial package of Starlink devices included 3,667 terminals donated by SpaceX and 1,333 terminals purchased by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).¹⁰¹ SpaceX initially offered free Starlink service for all the devices, although the offer has already been walked back by Musk, and then reversed again. CNN obtained proof of a letter sent by Musk to the Pentagon in September 2022 stating that SpaceX would be unable to continue funding Starlink service in Ukraine. The letter requested that the Pentagon pay what would amount to “more than $120 million for the rest of the year and could cost close to $400 million for the next 12 months.” It also clarified that the vast majority of the 20,000 Starlink devices sent to Ukraine were financed at least in part by outside funders like the United States, United Kingdom, and Polish governments.¹⁰²

After the letter was sent, but before it became public, Musk got into a Twitter spat with Ukrainian diplomat Adrij Melnyk after the former wrote a tweet on October 3 proposing terms of peace between Russia and Ukraine. Musk’s proposal included Ukraine renouncing its claims to Crimea and pledging to remain neutral, with the only apparent concession from Russia a promise to ensure water supply in Crimea. The plan was rejected by the public poll Musk included in the tweet, and Melnyk replied and tagged Musk, saying “Fuck off is my very diplomatic reply to you @elonmusk.”¹⁰³ After CNN released the SpaceX letter to the Pentagon, Musk seemingly doubled down on his decision to reduce SpaceX funding at first. He responded on October 14 to a tweet summarizing the incident, justifying possible reduced SpaceX assistance stating, “We’re just following his [Melnyk’s] recommendation,” even though the letter was sent before the Twitter exchange. Musk then tweeted the following day, “The hell with it … even though Starlink is still losing money & other companies are getting billions of taxpayer $, we’ll just keep funding Ukraine govt for free.”¹⁰⁴ Two days later, in response to a Politico tweet reporting that the Pentagon was considering covering the Starlink service costs, Musk stated that “SpaceX has already withdrawn its request for funding.”¹⁰⁵ Musk’s characterization of SpaceX’s contribution to the war effort has sparked confusion and reprimand, with his public remarks often implying that his company is entirely footing the bill when in fact, tens of millions of dollars’ worth of terminals and service are being covered by several governments every month.

The Starlink saga, however, was not over yet. Several weeks later in late October, 1,300 Starlink terminals in Ukraine, purchased in March 2020 by a British company for use in Ukrainian combat-related operations, were disconnected, allegedly due to lack of funding, causing a communications outage for the Ukrainian military.¹⁰⁶ Although operation was restored, the entire narrative eroded confidence in SpaceX as a guarantor of flexible connectivity in Ukraine. In November 2022, Federov noted that while Ukraine has no intention of breaking off its relationship with Starlink, the government is exploring working with other satellite communications operators.¹⁰⁷ Starlink is not the only satellite communications network of its kind, but its competitors have not yet reached the same level of operation. Satellite communications company OneWeb, based in London with ties to the British military, is just now launching its satellite constellation, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine required the company to change its launch partner from Roscosmos to SpaceX.¹⁰⁸ The US Space Development Agency, within the United States Space Force, will launch the first low earth orbit satellites of the new National Defense Space Architecture in March 2023. Other more traditional satellite companies cannot provide the same flexibility as Starlink’s small, transportable receivers.

UA Support Forces use Starlink (Attribution: Mil.gov.ua)

With the market effectively cornered for the moment, SpaceX can dictate the terms, including the physical bounds, of Starlink’s operations, thereby wielding immense influence on the battlefield. Starlink devices used by advancing Ukrainian forces near the front, for example, have reported inconsistent reliability.¹⁰⁹ Indeed CNN reported on February 9^th that this bounding was a deliberate attempt to separate the devices from direct military use, as SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell explained “our intent was never to have them use it for offensive purposes.”¹¹⁰ The bounding decision, similar to the rationale behind the company’s decision to refuse to activate Starlink service in Crimea, was likely made to contain escalation, especially escalation by means of SpaceX devices.¹¹¹

But SpaceX is not the only satellite company making decisions to bound the area of operation of their products to avoid playing—or being perceived to play—a role in potential escalation. On March 16, 2022, Minister Fedorov tweeted at DJI, a Chinese drone producer, “@DJIGlobal are you sure you want to be a partner in these murders? Block your products that are helping russia to kill the Ukrainians!”¹¹² DJI responded directly to the tweet the same day, saying “If the Ukrainian government formally requests that DJI set up geofencing throughout Ukraine, we will arrange it,” but pointed out that such geofencing would inhibit all users of their product in Ukraine, not just Russians.¹¹³

While Russia continues to bombard the Ukrainian electrical grid, Starlink terminals have grown more expensive for new Ukrainian consumers, increasing from $385 earlier this year to $700, although it is unclear if this price increase also affected government purchasers.¹¹⁴ According to Andrew Cavalier, a technology industry analyst with ABI Research, the indispensability of the devices gives “Musk and Starlink a major head start [against its competitors] that its use in the Russia–Ukraine war will only consolidate.”¹¹⁵ Indeed, the valuation of SpaceX was $127 million in May 2022, and the company raised $2 billion in the first seven months of 2022.¹¹⁶ For SpaceX, the war in Ukraine has been an impressive showcase of Starlink’s capabilities and has proven the worth of its services to future customers. The company recently launched a new initiative, Starshield, intended to leverage “SpaceX’s Starlink technology and launch capability to support national security efforts. While Starlink is designed for consumer and commercial use, Starshield is designed for government use.”¹¹⁷ It is clear that SpaceX intends to capitalize on the very public success of its Starlink network in Ukraine.

Reclaiming Territory

The Russian assault is not over, but Ukraine has reclaimed “54 percent of the land Russia has captured since the beginning of the war” and the front line has remained relatively stable since November 2022.¹¹⁸ Videos and reports from reclaimed territory show the exultation of the liberated population. As Ukrainian military forces reclaim formerly occupied areas, the parallel reclamation of the information environment, by or with Ukrainian and transnational information infrastructure operators, follows quickly.

In newly liberated areas, Starlink terminals are often the first tool for establishing connectivity. In Kherson, the first regional capital that fell to the Russian invasion and reclaimed by Ukrainian troops on November 11, 2022, residents lined up in public spaces to connect to the internet through Starlink.¹¹⁹ The Ministry of Digital Transformation provided Starlink devices to the largest service providers, Vodaphone and Kyivstar, to facilitate communication while their engineers repaired the necessary infrastructure for reestablishing mobile and internet service.¹²⁰ A week after Kherson was recaptured, five Kyivstar base stations were made operational and Vodaphone had reestablished coverage over most of the city.¹²¹

Due to the importance of reclaiming the information space, operators are working just behind Ukrainian soldiers to reconnect populations in reclaimed territories to the Ukrainian and global information environment as quickly as possible, which means working in very dangerous conditions. In the Sumy region, a Ukrtelecom vehicle pulling up to a television tower drove over a land mine, injuring three of the passengers and killing the driver.¹²² Stanislav Prybytko, the head of the mobile broadband department in the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation, says “It’s still very dangerous to do this work, but we can’t wait to do this, because there are a lot of citizens in liberated villages who urgently need to connect.”¹²³ Prybytko and his eleven-person team have been central to the Ukrainian effort to stitch Ukrainian connectivity back together. The team works across a public-private collaborative, coordinating with various government officials and mobile service providers to repair critical nodes in the network and to reestablish communications and connectivity.¹²⁴ According to Ukrainian government figures, 80 percent of liberated settlements have partially restored internet connection, and more than 1,400 base stations have been rebuilt by Ukrainian mobile operators since April 2022.¹²⁵

Key Takeaways

The information environment is a key domain through which this war is being contested. The Russian government has demonstrated for over a decade the importance it places on control of the information environment, both domestically and as part of campaigns to expand the Russian sphere of influence abroad. Yet, despite this Russian focus, the Ukrainian government has demonstrated incredible resilience against physical assaults, cyberattacks, and disinformation campaigns against and within the Ukrainian information environment and has committed to further interlacing government services and digital platforms.

The centrality of this environment to the conduct of this war means that private actors are necessarily enmeshed in the conflict. As providers of products and services used for Ukrainian defense, these companies are an important part of the buttressing structure of that defense. The centrality of private companies in the conduct of the war in Ukraine brings to light new and increasingly important questions about what it means for companies to act as information infrastructure during wartime, including:

What is the complete incentive structure behind a company’s decision to provide products or services to a state at war?
How dependent are states on the privately held portions of the information environment, including infrastructure, tools, knowledge, data, skills, and more, for their own national security and defense?
How can the public and private sectors work together better as partners to understand and prepare these areas of reliance during peace and across the continuum of conflict in a sustained, rather than ad hoc, nature?

Incentives

The war in Ukraine spurred an exceptional degree of cooperation and aid from private companies within Ukraine and from around the globe. Much of public messaging around the private sector’s assistance of Ukrainian defense centers around the conviction of company leadership and staff that they were compelled by a responsibility to act. This is certainly one factor in their decision. But the depth of private actor involvement in this conflict demands a more nuanced understanding of the full picture of incentives and disincentives that drive a company’s decision to enter into new, or expand upon existing, business relationships with and in a country at war. What risks, for example, do companies undertake in a war in which Russia has already demonstrated its conviction that private companies are viable military targets? The ViaSat hack was a reminder of the uncertainty that surrounds the designation of dual-use technology, and the impact that such designations have in practice. What role did public recognition play in companies’ decisions to provide products and services, and how might this recognition influence future earnings potential? For example, while their remarks differed in tone, both Elon Musk on Twitter and Microsoft in its special report on Ukraine publicly claimed partial credit for the defense of Ukraine.

As the war continues into its second year, these questions are important to maintaining Ukraine’s cooperation with these entities. With a better understanding of existing and potential incentives, the companies, the United States, and its allies can make the decision to responsibly aid Ukraine much easier.

Dependencies

Private companies play an important role in armed conflict, operating much of the infrastructure that supports the information environment through which both state and non-state actors compete for control. The war in Ukraine has illustrated the willingness of private actors, from Ukrainian telecommunications companies to transnational cloud and satellite companies, to participate as partners in the defense of Ukraine. State dependence on privately held physical infrastructure is not unique to the information environment, but state dependence on infrastructure that is headquartered and operated extraterritorially is a particular feature.

Prior to and throughout the war, the Ukrainian government has coordinated successfully with local telecommunication companies to expand, preserve, and restore mobile, radio, and internet connectivity to its population. This connectivity preserved what Russia was attempting to dismantle—a free and open Ukrainian information environment through which the Ukrainian government and population can communicate and coordinate. The Ukrainian government has relied on these companies to provide service and connectivity, working alongside them before and during the war to improve infrastructure and to communicate priorities. These companies are truly engaging as partners in Ukrainian defense, especially because this information infrastructure is not just a medium through which Russia launches attacks but an environment that Russia is attempting to seize control of. This dependence has not been unidirectional—the companies themselves are inextricably linked to this conflict through their infrastructure, employees, and customers in Ukraine. Each is dependent to some degree on the other and during times of crisis, their incentives create a dynamic of mutual need.

The Ukrainian government has also relied on a variety of transnational companies though the provision of technology products or services and information infrastructure. As examined in this report, two areas where the involvement of these companies has been especially impactful are cloud services and satellite internet services. Cloud services have preserved data integrity and security by moving information to data centers distributed around the world, outside of Ukrainian territory and under the cyber-protection of those cloud service companies. Satellite services have enabled flexible and resilient connectivity, once again located and run primarily outside of Ukraine. These companies can provide essential services within the information environment and the physical environment of Ukraine, but are not fundamentally reliant on the integrity of the country. This dynamic is heightened by the fact that cloud service providers like Microsoft, Amazon Web Services, Google, and satellite internet service providers like Space X’s Starlink are operating within a market with global reach and very few competitors. While these companies and others have made the laudable decision to contribute to Ukrainian defense, the fact is that had they not, there are only a few, if any, other companies with comparable capabilities and infrastructure at scale. Additionally, there’s very little Ukraine or even the US government could have done to directly provide the same capabilities and infrastructure.

Coordination

Built into the discussions around dependency and incentives is the need for government and the private companies who own and operate information infrastructure to coordinate with each other from a more extensive foundation. While coordination with Ukrainian companies and some transnational companies emerged from sustained effort, many instances of private sector involvement were forged on an ad hoc basis and therefore could not be planned on in advance. The ad hoc approach can produce rapid results, as seen by Minister Fedorov’s tweet at Elon Musk and receipt of Starlink devices just days later. While this approach has been wielded by the Ukrainian government, and the Ministry for Digital Transformation in particular, to great effect, this very same example illustrates the complexity of transforming ad hoc aid into sustainable partnerships. Sustainability is especially important when states are facing threats outside of open war, across the continuum of insecurity and conflict where many of these capabilities and infrastructures will continue to be relied upon. Security and defense in the information environment requires states to work in coordination with a diverse range of local and transnational private actors.

Recommendations

Key recommendations from this paper ask the US government, in coordination with the Ukrainian government, to better understand the incentives that surround private sector involvement, to delineate states’ dependency on private information infrastructure, and to improve long-term public-private coordination through three pathways:

Define support parameters. Clarify how private technology companies can and should provide aid
Track support. Create a living database to track the patterns of technological aid to Ukraine from US private companies
Facilitate support requests. Add to the resilience of the Ukrainian information environment by facilitating US private aid.

Define support parameters

Private information infrastructure companies will continue to play a key role in this war. However, there are a number of unresolved questions regarding the decisions these companies are making about if, and how, to provide support to the Ukrainian government to sustain its defense. A significant barrier may be the lack of clarity about the risks of partnership in wartime, which may disincentivize action or may alter existing partnerships. Recent SpaceX statements surrounding the bounding of Starlink use is an example, at least in part, of just such a risk calculous in action. The US government and its allies should release a public directive clarifying how companies can ensure that their involvement is in line with US and international law—especially for dual-use technologies. Reaffirming, with consistent guidelines, how the United States defines civilian participation in times of war will be crucial for ensuring that such actions do not unintentionally legitimize private entities as belligerents and legitimate targets in wartime. At the direction of the National Security Advisor, the US Attorney General and Secretary of State, working through the Office of the Legal Advisor at the State Department, should issue public guidance on how US companies can provide essential aid to Ukraine while avoiding the designation of legitimate military target or combatant under the best available interpretation of prevailing law.

Track support

While a large amount of support for Ukraine has been given directly by or coordinated through governments, many private companies have started providing technological support directly to the Ukrainian government. Some private companies, especially those with offices or customers in Ukraine, got in touch directly with, or were contacted by, various Ukrainian government offices, often with specific requests depending on the company’s products and services.¹²⁶

However, the US government does not have a full and complete picture of this assistance, which limits the ability of US policymakers to track the implications of changing types of support or the nature of the conflict. Policymakers should have access to not only what kind of support is being provided by private US companies, but also the projected period of involvement, what types of support are being requested and denied by companies (in which case, where the US government may be able to act as an alternative provider), and what types of support are being supplied by private sector actors without a significant government equity or involvement. A more fulsome mapping of this assistance and its dependency structure would make it possible for policymakers and others to assess its impact and effectiveness. This data, were it or some version of it publicly available, would also help private companies providing the support to better understand how their contributions fit within the wider context of US assistance and to communicate the effect their products or services are having to stakeholders and shareholders. Such information may play a role in a company’s decision to partner or abstain in the future.

The US government should create a collaborative task force to track US-based private sector support to Ukraine. Because of the wide equities across the US government in this area, this team should be led by the State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy and include representatives from USAID, the Department of Defense’s Cyber Policy Office, the National Security Agency’s Collaboration Center, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security’s Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative. This task force should initially focus on creating a picture of public-private support to Ukraine from entities within the United States, but its remit could extend to work with allies and partners, creating a fulsome picture of international public-private support.

Facilitate support requests

Tracking the technical support that is requested, promised, and delivered to the Ukrainian government is an important first step toward gaining a better understanding of the evolving shape of the critical role that the private sector is increasingly playing in conflict. But closer tracking, perhaps by an associated body, could go further by acting as a process facilitator. Government offices and agencies have long been facilitators of private aid, but now states are increasingly able to interact with, and request support from, private companies directly, especially for smaller quantities or more specific products and services. While this pathway can be more direct and efficient, it also requires a near constant churn of request, provision, and renewal actions from private companies and Ukrainian government officials.

Private organizations have stepped into this breach, including the Cyber Defense Assistance Collaboration (CDAC), founded by Greg Rattray and Matthew Murray, now a part of the US-based non-profit CRDF Global. CDAC works with a number of US private technology companies, as well as the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine and the Ukrainian think tank Global Cyber Cooperative Center, to match the specific needs of Ukrainian government and state-owned enterprises with needed products and services offered by companies working in coordination.¹²⁷

The growth and reach of this effort demonstrate the potential impact that a government-housed, or even a government-sponsored mechanism, could have in increasing the capacity to facilitate requests from the Ukrainian government, decreasing the number of bureaucratic steps required by Ukrainian government officials while increasing the amount and quality of support they receive. In addition, government facilitation would ease progress toward the previously stated recommendations by building in clarity around what kind of support can be provided and putting facilitation and aid tracking within a single process. As discussed above, this facilitation should start with a focus on US public-private support, but can grow to work alongside similar allied efforts. This could include, for example, coordination with the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) program, which “enables Ukrainian agencies to access the services of commercial cybersecurity companies.”¹²⁸ Crucially, this task force, helmed by the State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy, would act as a facilitator, not as a restricting body. Its mission in this task would be to make connections and provide information.

In line with tracking, US government facilitation would enable government entities to communicate where assistance can be most useful, such as shoring up key vulnerabilities or ensuring that essential defense activities are not dependent on a single private sector entity, and ideally, avoiding dependency on a single source of private sector assistance. A company’s financial situation or philanthropic priorities are always subject to change, and the US government should be aware of such risks and create resilience through redundancy.

Central to this resilience will be the provision of support to bolster key nodes in the Ukrainian telecommunications infrastructure network against not just cyber attacks but also against physical assault, including things like firewalls, mine clearing equipment, and power generators. Aiding the Ukrainian government in the search for another reliable partner for satellite communication devices that offer similar flexibility as Starlink is also necessary, and a representative from the Pentagon has confirmed that such a process is underway, following Musk’s various and contradictory statements regarding the future of SpaceX’s aid to Ukraine back in October.¹²⁹ Regardless, the entire SpaceX experience illustrates the need to address single dependencies in advance whenever possible.

A roadblock to ensuring assistance redundancy is the financial ability of companies to provide products and services to the Ukrainian government without charge or to the degree necessary. While the US government does provide funding for private technological assistance (as in the Starlink example), creating a pool of funding that is tied to the aforementioned task force and overseen by the State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy, would enable increased flexibility for companies to cover areas of single dependence, even in instances that would require piecemeal rather than one-to-one redundancy. As previously discussed, many companies are providing support out of a belief that it is the right thing to do, both for their customers and as members of a global society. However, depending on whether that support is paid or provided for free, or publicly or privately given, a mechanism that provides government clarity on private sector support, tracks the landscape of US private support to Ukraine, and facilitates support requests would make it easier for companies to make the decision to start or continue to provide support when weighed against the costs and potential risks of offering assistance.

Looking forward and inward

The questions that have emerged from Ukraine’s experience of defense in and through the information environment are not limited to this context. Private companies have a role in armed conflict and that role seems likely to grow, along with the scale, complexity, and criticality of the information infrastructures they own and operate. Companies will, in some capacity, be participants in the battlespace. This is being demonstrated in real time, exposing gaps that the United States and its allies and partners must address in advance of future conflicts.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has created an environment in which both public and private assistance in support of Ukrainian information infrastructure is motivated by a common aversion toward Russian aggression, as well as a commitment to the stability and protection of the Ukrainian government and people. This war is not over and despite any hopes to the contrary, similar aggressions will occur in new contexts, and with new actors in the future. It is crucial that in conjunction with examining and mitigating the risks related to the involvement of private technology companies in the war in Ukraine, the US government also examines these questions regarding its own national security and defense.

The information environment is increasingly central to not just warfighting but also to the practice of governance and the daily life of populations around the world. Governments and populations live in part within that environment and therefore atop infrastructure that is owned and operated by the private sector. As adversaries seek to reshape the information environment to their own advantage, US and allied public and private sectors must confront the challenges of their existing interdependence. This includes defining in what form national security and defense plans in and through the information environment are dependent upon private companies, developing a better understanding of the differing incentive structures that guide private sector decision-making, and working in coordination with private companies to create a more resilient information infrastructure network through redundancy and diversification. It is difficult to know what forms future conflict and future adversaries will take, or the incentives that may exist for companies in those new contexts, but by better understanding the key role that private information and technology companies already play in this domain, the United States and allies can better prepare for future threats.

About the Authors

Emma Schroeder is an associate director with the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, within the Digital Forensic Research Lab, and leads the team’s work studying conflict in and through cyberspace. Her focus in this role is on developing statecraft and strategy for cyberspace that is useful for both policymakers and practitioners. Schroeder holds an MA in History of War from King’s College London’s War Studies Department and also attained her BA in International Relations & History from the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

Sean Dack was a Young Global Professional with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative during the fall of 2022. He is now a Researcher at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, where he focuses on the long-term strategic and economic implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Dack graduated from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in December 2022 with his MA in Strategic Studies and International Economics.

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Justin Sherman, Gregory Rattray, and Gavin Wilde for their comments on earlier drafts of this document, and Trey Herr and the Cyber Statecraft team for their support. The authors also thank all the participants, who shall remain anonymous, in multiple Chatham House Rule discussions and one-on-one conversations about the issue.

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1 ”The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Convention on International Information Security (2011), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/RUSSIAN-DRAFT-CONVENTION-ON-INTERNATIONAL-INFORMATION-SECURITY.pdf.

2 To learn more about Russian disinformation efforts against Ukraine and its allies, check out the Russian Narratives Reports from the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab: Nika Aleksejeva et al., Andy Carvin ed., “Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian News Outlets Justified a War of Aggression against Ukraine,” Atlantic Council, February 22, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/narrative-warfare/; Roman Osadchuk et al., Andy Carvin ed., “Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin Employs Information Operations to Erode Global Confidence in Ukraine,” Atlantic Council, February 22, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/undermining-ukraine/.

3 Previously, the term RuNet described Russian language portions of the global internet accessible anywhere in the world. However, since Russia passed a domestic internet law in May 2019, RuNet has come to refer to a technically isolated version of the internet that services users within the borders of Russia. Gavin Wilde and Justin Sherman, No Water’s Edge: Russia’s Information War and Regime Security, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 4, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/01/04/no-water-s-edge-russia-s-information-war-and-regime-security-pub-88644; Justin Sherman, Reassessing Runet: Russian Internet Isolation and Implications for Russian Cyber Behavior, Atlantic Council, July 7, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/reassessing-runet-russian-internet-isolation-and-implications-for-russian-cyber-behavior/.

4 Adam Satariano and Valerie Hopkins, “Russia, Blocked from the Global Internet, Plunges into Digital Isolation,” New York Times, March 7, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/07/technology/russia-ukraine-internet-isolation.html.

5 Gavin Wilde and Justin Sherman, No Water’s Edge: Russia’s Information War and Regime Security, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 4, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/01/04/no-water-s-edge-russia-s-information-war-and-regime-security-pub-88644; Stephen Blank, “Russian Information Warfare as Domestic Counterinsurgency,” American Foreign Policy Interests 35, no. 1 (2013): 31–44, https://doi.org/10.1080/10803920.2013.757946.

6 Gavin Wilde, Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Russia’s Unmet Expectations, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 12, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/12/cyber-operations-in-ukraine-russia-s-unmet-expectations-pub-88607.

7 Tetyana Bohdanova, “Unexpected Revolution: The Role of Social Media in Ukraine’s Euromaidan Uprising,” European View 13, no. 1: (2014), https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-014-0296-4; Megan MacDuffee Metzger, and Joshua A. Tucker. “Social Media and EuroMaidan: A Review Essay,” Slavic Review 76, no. 1 (2017): 169–91, doi:10.1017/slr.2017.16.

8 Jonathon Cosgrove, “The Russian Invasion of the Crimean Peninsula 2014–2015: A Post-Cold War Nuclear Crisis Case Study,” Johns Hopkins (2020), 11–13, https://www.jhuapl.edu/Content/documents/RussianInvasionCrimeanPeninsula.pdf.

9 Steven Pifer, Ukraine: Six Years after the Maidan, Brookings, February 21, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/02/21/ukraine-six-years-after-the-maidan/.

10 Kenneth Geers, ed., Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression Against Ukraine (Tallinn: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2015), 9; Keir Giles, “Russia and Its Neighbours: Old Attitudes, New Capabilities,” in Geers, Cyber War in Perspective, 25; ‘Кримські регіональні підрозділи ПАТ «Укртелеком» офіційно повідомляють про блокування невідомими декількох вузлів зв’язку на півострові’ [Ukrtelekom officially reports blocking of communications nodes on peninsula by unknown actors], Ukrtelekom, February 28, 2014, http://www.ukrtelecom.ua/presscenter/news/official?id=120327.

11 Pavel Polityuk and Jim Finkle, “Ukraine Says Communications Hit, MPs Phones Blocked,” Reuters, March 4, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-cybersecurity/ukraine-says-communications-hit-mps-phones-blocked-idINL6N0M12CF20140304.

12 Jen Weedon, “Beyond ‘Cyber War’: Russia’s Use of Strategic Cyber Espionage and Information Operations in Ukraine,” in Geers, Cyber War in Perspective, 76; Liisa Past, “Missing in Action: Rhetoric on Cyber Warfare,” in Geers, Cyber War in Perspective, 91; “Ukrtelecom’s Crimean Sub-Branches Officially Report that Unknown People Have Seized Several Telecommunications Nodes in the Crimea,” Ukrtelecom, February 28, 2014, http://en.ukrtelecom.ua/about/news?id=120467; “Feb. 28 Updates on the Crisis in Ukraine,” New York Times, February 28, 2014, https://archive.nytimes.com/thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/latest-updates-tensions-in-ukraine/?_r=0; “The Crimean Regional Units of PJSC ‘Ukrtelecom’ Officially Inform About the Blocking by Unknown Persons of Several Communication Nodes on the Peninsula,” Ukrtelecom, February 28, 2014, https://web.archive.org/web/20140305001208/, http://www.ukrtelecom.ua/presscenter/news/official?id=120327.

13 Polityuk and Finkle, “Ukraine Says Communications Hit”; John Leyden, “Cyber Battle Apparently under Way in Russia–Ukraine Conflict,” The Register, April 25, 2018, https://www.theregister.com/2014/03/04/ukraine_cyber_conflict/.

14 Fontugne, Ermoshina, and Aben, “The Internet in Crimea.”

15 Frédérick Douzet et al., “Measuring the Fragmentation of the Internet: The Case of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) During the Ukrainian Crisis,” 2020 12th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon), Tallinn, Estonia, May 26–29, 2020, 157-182, doi: 10.23919/CyCon49761.2020.9131726; Paul Mozur et al., “‘They Are Watching’: Inside Russia’s Vast Surveillance State,” New York Times, September 22, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/09/22/technology/russia-putin-surveillance-spying.html.

16 Yaropolk Brynykh and Anastasiia Lykholat, “Occupied Crimea: Victims and Oppressors,” Freedom House, August 30, 2018, https://freedomhouse.org/article/occupied-crimea-victims-and-oppressors.

17 Halya Coynash, “Internet Providers Forced to Conceal Total FSB Surveillance in Occupied Crimea and Russia,” Kyiv Post, February 2, 2018, https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/halya-coynash-internet-providers-forced-conceal-total-fsb-surveillance-occupied-crimea-russia.html.

18 Joseph Cox, “Russia Built an Underwater Cable to Bring Its Internet to Newly Annexed Crimea,” VICE, August 1, 2014, https://www.vice.com/en/article/ypw35k/russia-built-an-underwater-cable-to-bring-its-internet-to-newly-annexed-crimea.

19 Cox, “Russia Built an Underwater Cable.”

20 Romain Fontugne, Ksenia Ermoshina, and Emile Aben, “The Internet in Crimea: A Case Study on Routing Interregnum,” 2020 IFIP Networking Conference, Paris, France, June 22–25, 2020, https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03100247/document.

21 Sebastian Moss, “How Russia Took over the Internet in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine,” Data Center Dynamics, January 12, 2023, https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/analysis/how-russia-took-over-the-internet-in-crimea-and-eastern-ukraine/; “Ukraine: Freedom on the Net 2018 Country Report,” Freedom House, 2019, https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/freedom-net/2018.

22 “Crimea: Freedom in the World 2020 Country Report,” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/country/crimea/freedom-world/2020.

23 Kim Zetter, “Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid,” Wired, March 3, 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/; Andy Greenberg, “The Untold Story of Notpetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History,” Wired, August 22, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/.

24 “Special Report: Ukraine An Overview of Russia’s Cyberattack Activity in Ukraine,” Microsoft Digital Security Unit, April 27, 2022, https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RE4Vwwd; Kyle Fendorf and Jessie Miller, “Tracking Cyber Operations and Actors in the Russia–Ukraine War,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 24, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/blog/tracking-cyber-operations-and-actors-russia-ukraine-war.

25 Jakub Przetacznik and Simona Tarpova, “Russia’s War on Ukraine: Timeline of Cyber-Attacks,” European Parliament, June 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/733549/EPRS_BRI(2022)733549_EN.pdf; Catalin Cimpanu, “Hackers Deface Ukrainian Government Websites,” The Record, January 14, 2022, https://therecord.media/hackers-deface-ukrainian-government-websites/.

26 Tom Burt, “Malware Attacks Targeting Ukraine Government,” Microsoft, January 15, 2022, https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/01/15/mstic-malware-cyberattacks-ukraine-government/.

27 Roman Osadchuk, Russian Hybrid Threats Report: Evacuations Begin in Ukrainian Breakaway Regions, Atlantic Council, February 18, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-hybrid-threats-report-evacuations-begin-in-ukrainian-breakaway-regions/#cyberattack; Sean Lyngaas and Tim Lister, “Cyberattack Hits Websites of Ukraine Defense Ministry and Armed Forces,” CNN, February 15, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/15/world/ukraine-cyberattack-intl/index.html.

28 Microsoft, “Special Report Ukraine.”

29 ESET Research: Ukraine Hit by Destructive Attacks Before and During the Russian Invasion with HermeticWiper and IsaacWiper,” ESET, March 1, 2022, https://www.eset.com/int/about/newsroom/press-releases/research/eset-research-ukraine-hit-by-destructive-attacks-before-and-during-the-russian-invasion-with-hermet/; “Ukraine: Disk-Wiping Attacks Precede Russian Invasion,” Symantec Threat Hunter Team, February 24, 2022, https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ukraine-wiper-malware-russia; “Ukraine Computers Hit by Data-Wiping Software as Russia Launched Invasion,” Reuters, February 24, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-government-foreign-ministry-parliament-websites-down-2022-02-23/.

30 Britney Nguyen, “Telecom Workers in Occupied Parts of Ukraine Destroyed Software to Avoid Russian Control over Data and Communications,” Business Insider, June 22, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/telecom-workers-ukraine-destroyed-software-avoid-russian-control-2022-6; Net Blocks (@netblocks), “Confirmed: A major internet disruption has been registered across #Ukraine on national provider #Ukrtelecom; real-time network data show connectivity collapsing …,” Twitter, March 28, 2022, 10:38 a.m., https://twitter.com/netblocks/status/1508453511176065033; Net Blocks (@netblocks), “Update: Ukraine’s national internet provider Ukrtelecom has confirmed a cyberattack on its core infrastructure. Real-time network data show an ongoing and …,” Twitter, March 28, 2022 11:25 a.m., https://twitter.com/netblocks/status/1508465391244304389; Andrea Peterson, “Traffic at Major Ukrainian Internet Service Provider Ukrtelecom Disrupted,” The Record, March 28, 2022, https://therecord.media/traffic-at-major-ukrainian-internet-service-provider-ukrtelecom-disrupted/; James Andrew Lewis, Cyber War and Ukraine, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 10, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/cyber-war-and-ukraine.

31 Thomas Brewster, “As Russia Invaded, Hackers Broke into A Ukrainian Internet Provider. Then Did It Again As Bombs Rained Down,” Forbes, March 10, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/03/10/cyberattack-on-major-ukraine-internet-provider-causes-major-outages/?sh=51d16b9c6573.

32 “Global Communications: Services, Solutions and Satellite Internet,” ViaSat, accessed November 14, 2022, http://data.danetsoft.com/viasat.com; Matt Burgess, “A Mysterious Satellite Hack Has Victims Far beyond Ukraine,” Wired, March 23, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/viasat-internet-hack-ukraine-russia/.

33 Michael Kan, “ViaSat Hack Tied to Data-Wiping Malware Designed to Shut down Modems,” PCMag, March 31, 2022, https://www.pcmag.com/news/viasat-hack-tied-to-data-wiping-malware-designed-to-shut-down-modems.

34 “Ka-Sat Network Cyber Attack Overview,” ViaSat, September 12, 2022, https://news.viasat.com/blog/corporate/ka-sat-network-cyber-attack-overview.

35 Lee Mathews, “ViaSat Reveals How Russian Hackers Knocked Thousands of Ukrainians Offline,” Forbes, March 31, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2022/03/31/viasat-reveals-how-russian-hackers-knocked-thousands-of-ukrainians-offline/?sh=4683638b60d6; ViaSat, “Ka-Sat Network.”

36 ViaSat, “Ka-Sat Network.”

37 Andrea Valentina, “Why the Viasat Hack Still Echoes,” Aerospace America, November 2022, https://aerospaceamerica.aiaa.org/features/why-the-viasat-hack-still-echoes.

38 Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade and Max van Amerongen, “Acidrain: A Modem Wiper Rains down on Europe,” SentinelOne, April 1, 2022, https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/acidrain-a-modem-wiper-rains-down-on-europe/.

39 Guerrero-Saade and Van Amerongen, “Acidrain.”

40 Joe Uchill, “UK, US, and EU Attribute Viasat Hack Against Ukraine to Russia,” SC Media, June 23, 2022, https://www.scmagazine.com/analysis/threat-intelligence/uk-us-and-eu-attribute-viasat-hack-against-ukraine-to-russia; David E. Sanger and Kate Conger, “Russia Was Behind Cyberattack in Run-Up to Ukraine War, Investigation Finds,” New York Times, May 10, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/10/us/politics/russia-cyberattack-ukraine-war.html.

41 Kim Zetter, “ViaSat Hack ‘Did Not’ Have Huge Impact on Ukrainian Military Communications, Official Says,” Zero Day, September 26, 2022, https://zetter.substack.com/p/viasat-hack-did-not-have-huge-impact; “Satellite Outage Caused ‘Huge Loss in Communications’ at War’s Outset—Ukrainian Official,” Reuters, March 15, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/satellite-outage-caused-huge-loss-communications-wars-outset-ukrainian-official-2022-03-15/.

42 ”Reuters, “Satellite Outage.”

43 Sean Lyngaas, “US Satellite Operator Says Persistent Cyberattack at Beginning of Ukraine War Affected Tens of Thousands of Customers, CNN, March 30, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/30/politics/ukraine-cyberattack-viasat-satellite/index.html.

44 Zetter, “ViaSat Hack.”

45 Burgess, “A Mysterious Satellite Hack” Zetter, “ViaSat Hack”; Valentino, “Why the ViaSat Hack.”

46 Jurgita Lapienytė, “ViaSat Hack Impacted French Critical Services,” CyberNews, August 22, 2022, https://cybernews.com/news/viasat-hack-impacted-french-critical-services/.

47 International Committee of the Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1125 UNTS 3 (June 8, 1977), accessed January 18, 2023, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36b4.html; Zhanna L. Malekos Smith, “No ‘Bright-Line Rule’ Shines on Targeting Commercial Satellites,” The Hill, November 28, 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/3747182-no-bright-line-rule-shines-on-targeting-commercial-satellites/; Anaïs Maroonian, “Proportionality in International Humanitarian Law: A Principle and a Rule,” Lieber Institute West Point, October 24, 2022, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/proportionality-international-humanitarian-law-principle-rule/#:~:text=The%20rule%20of%20proportionality%20requires,destruction%20of%20a%20military%20objective; Travis Normand and Jessica Poarch, “4 Basic Principles,” The Law of Armed Conflict, January 1, 2017, https://loacblog.com/loac-basics/4-basic-principles/.

48 “Statement by Deputy Head of the Russian Delegation Mr. Konstantin Vorontsov at the Thematic Discussion on Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects) in the First Committee of the 77th Session of the Unga,” Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, October 26, 2022, https://russiaun.ru/en/news/261022_v.

49 Mauro Vignati, “LABScon Replay: Are Digital Technologies Eroding the Principle of Distinction in War?” SentinelOne, November 16, 2022, https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/are-digital-technologies-eroding-the-principle-of-distinction-in-war/.

50 Matt Burgess, “Russia Is Taking over Ukraine’s Internet,” Wired, June 15, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/ukraine-russia-internet-takeover/.

51 Nino Kuninidze et al., “Interim Assessment on Damages to Telecommunication Infrastructure and Resilience of the ICT Ecosystem in Ukraine.”

52 Adam Satariano and Scott Reinhard, “How Russia Took Over Ukraine’s Internet in Occupied Territories,” The New York Times, August 9, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/08/09/technology/ukraine-internet-russia-censorship.html; https://time.com/6222111/ukraine-internet-russia-reclaimed-territory/

53 Thomas Brewster, “The Last Days of Mariupol’s Internet,” Forbes, March 31, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/03/31/the-last-days-of-mariupols-internet/.

54 Matt Burgess, “Russia Is Taking over Ukraine’s Internet,” Wired, June 15, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/ukraine-russia-internet-takeover/; Satariano and Reinhard, “How Russia Took.”

55 ”Vera Bergengruen, “The Battle for Control over Ukraine’s Internet,” Time, October 18, 2022, https://time.com/6222111/ukraine-internet-russia-reclaimed-territory/.

56 Herbert Lin, “Russian Cyber Operations in the Invasion of Ukraine,” Cyber Defense Review (Fall 2022): 35, https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/Portals/6/Documents/2022_fall/02_Lin.pdf, Herb Lin, “The Emergence of Physically Mediated Cyberattacks?,” Lawfare, May 21, 2022, https://www.lawfareblog.com/emergence-physically-mediated-cyberattacks; “Invaders Use Blackmailing and Intimidation to Force Ukrainian Internet Service Providers to Connect to Russian Networks,” State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, May 13, 2022, https://cip.gov.ua/en/news/okupanti-shantazhem-i-pogrozami-zmushuyut-ukrayinskikh-provaideriv-pidklyuchatisya-do-rosiiskikh-merezh; Satariano and Reinhard, “How Russia Took.”

57 Gian M. Volpicelli, “How Ukraine’s Internet Can Fend off Russian Attacks,” Wired, March 1, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/internet-ukraine-russia-cyberattacks/; Satariano and Reinhard, “How Russia Took.”

58 David R. Marples, “Russia’s War Goals in Ukraine,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 64, no. 2–3 (March 2022): 207–219, https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2022.2107837.

59 David Klepper, “Russian Propaganda ‘Outgunned’ by Social Media Rebuttals,” AP News, March 4, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-volodymyr-zelenskyy-kyiv-technology-misinformation-5e884b85f8dbb54d16f5f10d105fe850; Marc Champion and Daryna Krasnolutska, “Ukraine’s TV Comedian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy Finds His Role as Wartime Leader,” Japan Times, June 7, 2022, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/02/26/world/volodymyr-zelenskyy-wartime-president/;“Российское Телевидение Сообщило Об ‘Бегстве Зеленского’ Из Киева, Но Умолчало Про Жертвы Среди Гражданских,” Агентство, October 10, 2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20221010195154/https://www.agents.media/propaganda-obstreli/.

60 To learn more about Russian disinformation efforts against Ukraine and its allies, check out the Russian Narratives Reports from the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab: Nika Aleksejeva et al., Andy Carvin ed., “Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian News Outlets Justified a War of Aggression against Ukraine,” Atlantic Council, February 22, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/narrative-warfare/; Roman Osadchuk et al., Andy Carvin ed., “Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin Employs Information Operations to Erode Global Confidence in Ukraine,” Atlantic Council, February 22, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/undermining-ukraine/.

61 Олександр Янковський, “‘Бояться Спротиву’. Для Чого РФ Захоплює Мобільний Зв’язок Та Інтернет На Херсонщині?,” Радіо Свобода, May 7, 2022, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/novyny-pryazovya-khersonshchyna-okupatsiya-rosiya-mobilnyy-zvyazok-internet/31838946.html.

62 Volodymyr Zelenskyy, “Tell People in the Occupied Territories about Ukraine, That the Ukrainian Army Will Definitely Come—Address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy,” President of Ukraine Official Website, June 13, 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/govorit-lyudyam-na-okupovanih-teritoriyah-pro-ukrayinu-pro-t-75801.

63 Satariano and Reinhard, “How Russia Took.”

64 Michael Sheldon, “Geolocating Russia’s Indiscriminate Shelling of Kharkiv,” DFRLab, March 1, 2022, https://medium.com/dfrlab/geolocating-russias-indiscriminate-shelling-of-kharkiv-deaccc830846; Michael Sheldon, “Kharkiv Neighborhood Experienced Ongoing Shelling Prior to February 28 Attack,” DFRLab, February 28, 2022, https://medium.com/dfrlab/kharkiv-neighborhood-experienced-ongoing-shelling-prior-to-february-28-attack-f767230ad6f6; https://maphub.net/Cen4infoRes/russian-ukraine-monitor; Michael Sheldon (@Michael1Sheldon), “Damage to civilian houses in the Zalyutino neighborhood of Kharkiv. https://t.me/c/1347456995/38991 …,” Twitter, February 27, 2022, 4:15 p.m., https://twitter.com/Michael1Sheldon/status/1498044130416594947; Michael Sheldon, “Missile Systems and Tanks Spotted in Russian Far East, Heading West,” DFRLab, January 27, 2022, https://medium.com/dfrlab/missile-systems-and-tanks-spotted-in-russian-far-east-heading-west-6d2a4fe7717a; Jay in Kyiv (@JayinKyiv), “Not yet 24 hours after Ukraine devastated Russian positions in Kherson, a massive Russian convoy is now leaving Melitopol to replace them. This is on Alekseev …,” Twitter, July 12, 2022, 7:50 a.m., https://twitter.com/JayinKyiv/status/1546824416218193921; “Eyes on Russia Map,” Centre for Information Resilience, https://eyesonrussia.org/.

65 Katerina Sergatskova, What You Should Know About Life in the Occupied Areas in Ukraine, Wilson Center, September 14, 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/what-you-should-know-about-life-occupied-areas-ukraine; Jonathan Landay, “Village near Kherson Rejoices at Russian Rout, Recalls Life under Occupation,” Reuters, November 12, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/village-near-kherson-rejoices-russian-rout-recalls-life-under-occupation-2022-11-11/.

66 Andrew Salerno-Garthwaite, “OSINT in Ukraine: Civilians in the Kill Chain and the Information Space,” Global Defence Technology 137 (2022), https://defence.nridigital.com/global_defence_technology_oct22/osint_in_ukraine; “How Has Open-Source Intelligence Influenced the War in Ukraine?” Economist, August 30, 2022, https://www.economist.com/ukraine-osint-pod; Gillian Tett, “Inside Ukraine’s Open-Source War,” Financial Times, July 22, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/297d3300-1a65-4793-982b-1ba2372241a3; Amy Zegart, “Open Secrets,” Foreign Affairs, January 7, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/open-secrets-ukraine-intelligence-revolution-amy-zegart?utm_source=twitter_posts&utm_campaign=tw_daily_soc&utm_medium=social.

67 Lin, “The Emergence.”

68 “Cyber Security Strategy of Ukraine,” Presidential Decree of Ukraine, March 15, 2016, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/NationalCyberSecurityStrategy_Ukraine.pdf.

69 Eric Geller, “Ukraine Prepares to Remove Data from Russia’s Reach,” POLITICO, February 22, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/02/22/ukraine-centralized-its-data-after-the-last-russian-invasion-now-it-may-need-to-evacuate-it-00010777.

70 Kuninidze et al., “Interim Assessment.”

71 Kuninidze et al., “Interim Assessment.”

72 “Datagroup to Invest $20 Million into a Large-Scale Network Modernization Project in Partnership with Cisco,” Datagroup, April 8, 2021, https://www.datagroup.ua/en/novyny/datagrup-investuye-20-mln-dolariv-u-masshtabnij-proyekt-iz-m-314.

73 Lauriane Giet, “Eutech4ukraine—Cisco’s Contribution to Bring Connectivity and Cybersecurity to Ukraine and Skills to Ukrainian Refugees,” Futurium, June 22, 2022, https://futurium.ec.europa.eu/en/digital-compass/tech4ukraine/your-support-ukraine/ciscos-contribution-bring-connectivity-and-cybersecurity-ukraine-and-skills-ukrainian-refugees; “Communiqué de Presse Solidarité Européenne Envers l’Ukraine: Nouveau Convoi d’Équipements Informatiques,” Government of France, May 25, 2022, https://minefi.hosting.augure.com/Augure_Minefi/r/ContenuEnLigne/Download?id=4FFB30F8-F59C-45A0-979E-379E3CEC18AF&filename=06%20-%20Solidarit%C3%A9%20europ%C3%A9enne%20envers%20l%E2%80%99Ukraine%20-%20nouveau%20convoi%20d%E2%80%99%C3%A9quipements%20informatiques.pdf.

74 ”Atlantic Council, “Ukraine’s Digital Resilience: A conversation with Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Mykhailo Fedorov,” December 2, 2022, YouTube video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vl75e0QU6uE.

75 “Digital Country—Official Website of Ukraine,” Ukraine Now (Government of Ukraine), accessed January 17, 2023, https://ukraine.ua/invest-trade/digitalization/; Atlantic Council, “Ukraine’s Digital Resilience.”

76 Brad Smith, “Extending Our Vital Technology Support for Ukraine,” Microsoft, November 3, 2022, https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/11/03/our-tech-support-ukraine/; “How Amazon Is Assisting in Ukraine,” Amazon, March 1, 2022, https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/community/amazons-assistance-in-ukraine; Phil Venables, “How Google Cloud Is Helping Those Affected by War in Ukraine,” Google, March 3, 2022, https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/how-google-cloud-is-helping-those-affected-by-war-in-ukraine.

77 Simon Handler, Lily Liu, and Trey Herr, Dude, Where’s My Cloud? A Guide for Wonks and Users, Atlantic Council, July 7, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/dude-wheres-my-cloud-a-guide-for-wonks-and-users/.

78 Handler, Liu, and Herr, “Dude, Where’s My Cloud?”

79 Brad Smith, “Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War,” Microsoft On the Issues, November 2, 2022, https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/06/22/defending-ukraine-early-lessons-from-the-cyber-war/; Smith, “Extending Our Vital Technology.”

80 Amazon, “How Amazon Is Assisting”; Sebastian Moss, “Ukraine Awards Microsoft and AWS Peace Prize for Cloud Services and Digital Support,” Data Center Dynamics, January 12, 2023, https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/ukraine-awards-microsoft-and-aws-peace-prize-for-cloud-services-digital-support/; Venables, “How Google Cloud”; Kent Walker, “Helping Ukraine,” Google, March 4, 2022, https://blog.google/inside-google/company-announcements/helping-ukraine/.

81 Catherine Stupp, “Ukraine Has Begun Moving Sensitive Data Outside Its Borders,” Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-has-begun-moving-sensitive-data-outside-its-borders-11655199002; Atlantic Council, “Ukraine’s Digital Resilience”; Smith, “Defending Ukraine.”

82 Nick Beecroft, Evaluating the International Support to Ukrainian Cyber Defense, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 3, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/11/03/evaluating-international-support-to-ukrainian-cyber-defense-pub-88322.

83 Smith, “Defending Ukraine,” 5, 6, 9.

84 Smith, “Defending Ukraine,” 3, 11.

85 Thomas Brewster, “Bombs and Hackers Are Battering Ukraine’s Internet Providers. ‘Hidden Heroes’ Risk Their Lives to Keep Their Country Online,” Forbes, March 15, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/03/15/internet-technicians-are-the-hidden-heroes-of-the-russia-ukraine-war/?sh=be5da1428844.

86 Kuninidze et al., “Interim Assessment,” 40.

87 Kuninidze et al., “Interim Assessment,”40; ““Київстар Виділяє 300 Мільйонів Гривень Для Відновлення Цифрової Інфраструктури України,” Київстар, July 4, 2022, https://kyivstar.ua/uk/mm/news-and-promotions/kyyivstar-vydilyaye-300-milyoniv-gryven-dlya-vidnovlennya-cyfrovoyi.

88 Київстар, “Київстар Виділяє”; “Mobile Connection Lifecell—Lifecell Ukraine,” Lifecell UA, accessed January 17, 2023, https://www.lifecell.ua/en/.

89 Ryan Gallagher, “Russia–Ukraine War: Telecom Workers Damage Own Equipment to Thwart Russia,” Bloomberg, June 21, 2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-21/ukrainian-telecom-workers-damage-own-equipment-to-thwart-russia.

90 Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), Twitter, February 26, 2022, 7:06 a.m., https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1497543633293266944?s=20&t=c9Uc7CDXEBr-e5-nd2hEtw.

91 Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), “Starlink — here. Thanks, @elonmusk,” Twitter, February 28, 2022, 3:19 p.m., https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1498392515262746630?s=20&t=vtCM9UqgWRkfxfrEHzYTGg.

92 Atlantic Council, “Ukraine’s Digital Resilience.”

93 “How Elon Musk’s Satellites Have Saved Ukraine and Changed Warfare,” Economist, January 5, 2023, https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/01/05/how-elon-musks-satellites-have-saved-ukraine-and-changed-warfare.

94 Alexander Freund, “Ukraine Using Starlink for Drone Strikes,” Deutsche Welle, March 27, 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-is-using-elon-musks-starlink-for-drone-strikes/a-61270528.

95 Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), “Over 100 cruise missiles attacked 🇺🇦 energy and communications infrastructure. But with Starlink we quickly restored the connection in critical areas. Starlink …,” Twitter, October 12, 2022 3:12 p.m., https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1580275214272802817.

96 Rishi Iyengar, “Why Ukraine Is Stuck with Elon (for Now),” Foreign Policy, November 22, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/22/ukraine-internet-starlink-elon-musk-russia-war/.

97 Economist, “How Elon Musk’s.”

98 Freund, “Ukraine Using Starlink”; Nick Allen and James Titcomb, “Elon Musk’s Starlink Helping Ukraine to Win the Drone War,” Telegraph, March 18, 2022, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/03/18/elon-musks-starlink-helping-ukraine-win-drone-war/; Charlie Parker, “Specialist Ukrainian Drone Unit Picks off Invading Russian Forces as They Sleep,” Times, March 18, 2022, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/specialist-drone-unit-picks-off-invading-forces-as-they-sleep-zlx3dj7bb.

99 Matthew Gault, “Mysterious Sea Drone Surfaces in Crimea,” Vice, September 26, 2022, https://www.vice.com/en/article/xgy4q7/mysterious-sea-drone-surfaces-in-crimea.

100 Economist, “How Elon Musk’s.”

101 Akash Sriram, “SpaceX, USAID Deliver 5,000 Satellite Internet Terminals to Ukraine Akash Sriram,” Reuters, April 6, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/technology/spacex-usaid-deliver-5000-satellite-internet-terminals-ukraine-2022-04-06/.

102 Alex Marquardt, “Exclusive: Musk’s Spacex Says It Can No Longer Pay for Critical Satellite Services in Ukraine, Asks Pentagon to Pick up the Tab,” CNN, October 14, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/13/politics/elon-musk-spacex-starlink-ukraine.

103 Elon Musk (@elonmusk), “Ukraine-Russia Peace: – Redo elections of annexed regions under UN supervision. Russia leaves if that is will of the people. – Crimea formally part of Russia, as it has been since 1783 (until …” Twitter, October 3, 2022 12:15 p.m., https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1576969255031296000; Andrij Melnyk (@MelnykAndrij), Twitter, October 3, 2022, 12:46 p.m., https://twitter.com/MelnykAndrij/status/1576977000178208768.

104 Elon Musk (@elonmusk), Twitter, October 14, 2022, 3:14 a.m., https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1580819437824839681; Elon Musk (@elonmusk), Twitter, October 15, 2022, 2:06 p.m., https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1581345747777179651.

105 Elon Musk (@elonmusk), Twitter, October 17, 2022, 3:52 p.m., https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1582097354576265217; Sawyer Merrit (@SawyerMerritt), “BREAKING: The Pentagon is considering paying for @SpaceX ‘s Starlink satellite network — which has been a lifeline for Ukraine — from a fund that has been used …,” Twitter, October 17, 2022, 3:09 p.m., https://twitter.com/SawyerMerritt/status/1582086349305262080.

106 Alex Marquardt and Sean Lyngaas, “Ukraine Suffered a Comms Outage When 1,300 SpaceX Satellite Units Went Offline over Funding Issues” CNN, November 7, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/04/politics/spacex-ukraine-elon-musk-starlink-internet-outage/; Iyengar, “Why Ukraine Is Stuck.”

107 Ryan Browne, “Ukraine Government Is Seeking Alternatives to Elon Musk’s Starlink, Vice PM Says,” CNBC, November 3, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/11/03/ukraine-government-seeking-alternatives-to-elon-musks-starlink.html.

108 William Harwood, “SpaceX Launches 40 OneWeb Broadband Satellites, Lighting up Overnight Sky,” CBS News, January 10, 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/spacex-launches-40-oneweb-broadband-satellites-in-overnight-spectacle/.

109 Marquardt and Lyngaas, “Ukraine Suffered”; Mehul Srivastava et al., “Ukrainian Forces Report Starlink Outages During Push Against Russia,” Financial Times, October 7, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/9a7b922b-2435-4ac7-acdb-0ec9a6dc8397.

110 Alex Marquardt and Kristin Fisher, “SpaceX admits blocking Ukrainian troops from using satellite technology,” CNN, February 9, https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/09/politics/spacex-ukrainian-troops-satellite-technology/index.html.

111 Charles R. Davis, “Elon Musk Blocked Ukraine from Using Starlink in Crimea over Concern that Putin Could Use Nuclear Weapons, Political Analyst Says,” Business Insider, October 11, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-blocks-starlink-in-crimea-amid-nuclear-fears-report-2022-10; Elon Musk (@elonmusk), Twitter, February 12, 2022, 4:00 p.m., https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1624876021433368578.

112 Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), “In 21 days of the war, russian troops has already killed 100 Ukrainian children. they are using DJI products in order to navigate their missile. @DJIGlobal are you sure you want to be a …,” Twitter, March 16, 2022, 8:14 a.m., https://twitter.com/fedorovmykhailo/status/1504068644195733504; Cat Zakrzewski, “4,000 Letters and Four Hours of Sleep: Ukrainian Leader Wages Digital War,” Washington Post, March 30, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/30/mykhailo-fedorov-ukraine-digital-front/.

113 DJI Global (@DJIGlobal), “Dear Vice Prime Minister Federov: All DJI products are designed for civilian use and do not meet military specifications. The visibility given by AeroScope and further Remote ID …,” Twitter, March 16, 2022, 5:42 p.m., https://twitter.com/DJIGlobal/status/1504206884240183297.

114 Mehul Srivastava and Roman Olearchyk, “Starlink Prices in Ukraine Nearly Double as Mobile Networks Falter,” Financial Times, November 29, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/f69b75cf-c36a-4ab3-9eb7-ad0aa00d230c.

115 Iyengar, “Why Ukraine Is Stuck.”

116 Michael Sheetz, “SpaceX Raises Another $250 Million in Equity, Lifts Total to $2 Billion in 2022,” CNBC, August 5, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/05/elon-musks-spacex-raises-250-million-in-equity.html.

117 “Starshield,” SpaceX, accessed January 17, 2023, https://www.spacex.com/starshield/; Micah Maidenberg and Drew FitzGerald, “Elon Musk’s Spacex Courts Military with New Starshield Project,” Wall Street Journal, December 8, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/elon-musks-spacex-courts-military-with-new-starshield-project-11670511020.

118 “Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” New York Times, February 14, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/world/europe/ukraine-maps.html#:~:text=Ukraine%20has%20reclaimed%2054%20percent,for%20the%20Study%20of%20War; Júlia Ledur, Laris Karklis, Ruby Mellen, Chris Alcantara, Aaron Steckelberg and Lauren Tierney, “Follow the 600-mile front line between Ukrainian and Russian forces,” The Washington Post, February 21, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2023/russia-ukraine-front-line-map/.

119 Jimmy Rushton (@JimmySecUK), “Ukrainian soldiers deploying a Starlink satellite internet system in liberated Kherson, allowing local residents to communicate with their relatives in other areas of Ukraine,” Twitter, November 12, 2022, 8:07 a.m., https://twitter.com/JimmySecUK/status/1591417328134402050; José Andrés (@chefjoseandres), “@elonmusk While I don’t agree with you about giving voice to people that brings the worst out of all of us, thanks for @SpaceXStarlink in Kherson, a city with no electricity, or in a train from …,” Twitter, November 20, 2022, 1:58 a.m., https://twitter.com/chefjoseandres/status/1594223613795762176.

120 Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), “Every front makes its contribution to the upcoming victory. These are Anatoliy, Viktor, Ivan and Andrii from @Vodafone_UA team, who work daily to restore mobile and Internet communications …,” Twitter, April 25, 2022, 1:13 p.m., https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1518639261624455168; Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), “Can you see a Starlink? But it’s here. While providers are repairing cable damages, Gostomel’s humanitarian headquarter works via the Starlink. Thanks to @SpaceX …,” Twitter, May 8, 2022, 9:48 a.m., https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1523298788794052615.

121 Thomas Brewster, “Ukraine’s Engineers Dodged Russian Mines to Get Kherson Back Online–with a Little Help from Elon Musk’s Satellites,” Forbes, November 18, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/11/18/ukraine-gets-kherson-online-after-russian-retreat-with-elon-musk-starlink-help/?sh=186e24b0ef1e.

122 Mark Didenko, ed., “Ukrtelecom Car Hits Landmine in Sumy Region, One Dead, Three Injured,” Yahoo!, October 2, 2022, https://www.yahoo.com/video/ukrtelecom-car-hits-landmine-sumy-104300649.html.

123 Vera Bergengruen, “The Battle for Control over Ukraine’s Internet,” Time, October 18, 2022, https://time.com/6222111/ukraine-internet-russia-reclaimed-territory/.

124 Bergengruen, “The Battle for Control over Ukraine’s Internet.”

125 Atlantic Council, “Ukraine’s Digital Resilience: A conversation with Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Mykhailo Fedorov,” December 2, 2022, YouTube video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vl75e0QU6uE; “Keeping connected: connectivity resilience in Ukraine,” EU4Digital, February 13, 2022, https://eufordigital.eu/keeping-connected-connectivity-resilience-in-ukraine/.

126 Greg Rattray, Geoff Brown, and Robert Taj Moore, “The Cyber Defense Assistance Imperative Lessons from Ukraine,” The Aspen Institute, February 16, 2023, https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Aspen-Digital_The-Cyber-Defense-Assistance-Imperative-Lessons-from-Ukraine.pdf, 8.

127 CRDF Global, “CRDF Global becomes Platform for Cyber Defense Assistance Collaborative (CDAC) for Ukraine,” News 19, November 14, 2022, https://whnt.com/business/press-releases/cision/20221114DC34776/crdf-global-becomes-platform-for-cyber-defense-assistance-collaborative-cdac-for-ukraine/; Dina Temple-Raston, “EXCLUSIVE: Rounding Up a Cyber Posse for Ukraine,” The Record, November 18, 2022, https://therecord.media/exclusive-rounding-up-a-cyber-posse-for-ukraine/; Rattray, Brown, and Moore, “The Cyber Defense Assistance Imperative Lessons from Ukraine.”

128 Beecroft, Evaluating the International Support.

129 Lee Hudson, “‘There’s Not Just SpaceX’: Pentagon Looks Beyond Starlink after Musk Says He May End Services in Ukraine,” POLITICO, October 14, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/10/14/starlink-ukraine-elon-musk-pentagon-00061896.

The post A parallel terrain: Public-private defense of the Ukrainian information environment appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: How a year of war in Europe remade NATO, and what comes next

Atlantic Council experts — Sat, 25 Feb 2023 02:22:01 +0000

What is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for? What should it do, and how? Will the Europeans spend more on defense? Will the United States stay committed? These were the questions bedeviling Brussels, Paris, Berlin, and Washington a year and a bit ago.

No more. When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine one year ago, an Alliance some had left for “brain dead,” in French President Emmanuel Macron’s 2019 phrasing, hit pause on its existential crisis and mobilized an unprecedented flow of military aid to Ukraine.

The shifts in the Alliance’s purpose, posture, and politics didn’t happen all at once. It took slow and imperfect consensus-building, and some of the plans announced over the past year are still to be implemented. But that the war re-invigorated NATO—with visible battlefield results—is undeniable. Just how much has changed? Below, Atlantic Council experts from the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Transatlantic Security Initiative weigh in on the state of NATO and where the allies should go from here.

Jump to an expert take

Christopher Skaluba: NATO acting without fingerprints is still NATO

Giedrimas Jeglinskas: NATO has found its footing in its year of living dangerously

Anca Agachi: NATO needs to bolster its resilience. Ukraine is a useful model.

Hans Binnendijk: The Alliance is neither obsolete nor brain-dead. Here are four agenda items to tackle now.

Iñigo Guevara: Eastern Europe unloads Soviet weapons—and the Soviet mindset

Wayne Schroeder: NATO should learn from Ukraine and contest Russia’s belligerence in the Black Sea and beyond

Alvina Ahmed: Overdue troop increases on NATO’s eastern flank need infrastructure and ammo to bear fruit

Ryan Arick: Prepare to face a Russia more reliant on unconventional warfare

Nuclear NATO: There’s a better way to respond to Russia’s threats

Russia’s nuclear arsenal, doctrine, and repeated threats are more than just one aspect of Moscow’s attack against the rules-based international system that NATO is key to upholding. Russia’s nuclear arsenal in fact underpins its entire strategy for combatting the threat it perceives from democracy and international norms. Fear that Russia would escalate its war to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine has deterred NATO members from providing certain weapons to Ukraine on certain timelines, and NATO allies have drawn red lines such as no “boots on the ground,” citing concerns about escalation.

At each stage of this war, we have seen Russia escalate its nuclear rhetoric to great success to deter NATO. Russian President Vladimir Putin says he is not bluffing, and experts point out that rhetoric and justification of nuclear use could be a precursor to nuclear employment. While the threat of nuclear war should not be underestimated, it should also not be overestimated. Throughout the war we have seen statement after bombastic statement from Putin and leaders in Moscow threatening nuclear use over NATO’s provision of certain arms to Ukraine, or Sweden and Finland’s sovereign decisions to seek to join the Alliance. Nor has Putin’s announcement to suspend Russia’s participation in the New START arms-control treaty actually changed the reality on the ground, since Russia had already been blocking US inspections and no negotiations were underway to replace New START when it expires in three years. What we have not seen is any indication that Russia is actually preparing to use its nuclear forces, and given the accurate intelligence NATO had prior to the invasion, we could expect to have forewarning.

NATO is adapting to this reality of conventional war enabled by nuclear weapons and is moving past the self-deterrence on display in the early months of the full-scale invasion. Even while NATO last June defined the circumstances in which it would use nuclear weapons as “extremely remote,” the Alliance has taken steps to improve its nuclear deterrent through ongoing modernization efforts, increased readiness through exercises, and public messaging condemning Russian nuclear threats. Ukraine is not deterred by Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Ukraine is fighting this fight for the entire Western world, but NATO is a nuclear alliance and must bolster its strategic deterrence.

Importantly, NATO needs to consider several next steps so as not to let the crisis go to waste, to overuse a phrase much beloved by the blob.

Suspend the NATO-Russia Founding Act: It is time for NATO to suspend its participation in the Founding Act, which, among other things, stipulates that NATO will not deploy permanent troops or nuclear weapons in new member states. Russia has violated the spirit of this agreement repeatedly, and its suspension would send a strong signal that Russia does not dictate how NATO defends itself and would remove what some view as an obstacle to large-scale force posture and nuclear changes
Expand the nuclear dual-capable aircraft (DCA) mission: There are eight NATO allies (plus Finland) that are procuring the F-35 joint strike fighter aircraft, which is already certified to be able to fly the DCA mission for NATO. NATO should allow Poland and Finland to participate in the nuclear-sharing mission, if they would like to, which would require no changes to the current basing of nuclear weapons and would allow greater flexibility of response and commitment across the Alliance.
Update NATO’s nuclear doctrine: It is no longer an “extremely remote” possibility that NATO would have to engage its nuclear forces. Right now, allies from the eastern flank worry about NATO’s commitment to respond to the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. NATO should update its doctrine to one of decisive response: Any nuclear use by Russia would lead to an in-kind response by NATO.
Integrate nuclear and conventional deterrence: In its Strategic Concept, NATO states that it will ensure “greater integration and coherence” of its forces across domains and levels of conflict. The Alliance must understand how Russia’s strategy integrates the potential for nuclear escalation at all levels of planning. The new family of plans being developed by NATO under the Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area need to integrate nuclear escalation. These must rest on a shared understanding of how Russia could escalate its war against Ukraine.
Exercise nuclear capabilities: As important as better planning is exercising. The militaries of NATO allies must be ready to operate in a degraded environment, whether due to nuclear weapons use, nuclear meltdowns of civilian infrastructure, or other weapons such as chemical agents that Russia has used several times to assassinate political dissidents.
Consider a dual-track approach: During the Cold War, NATO agreed to deploy US Pershing II nuclear ballistic missiles to Europe to reassure allies of the US commitment to the transatlantic nuclear umbrella and to provide negotiating leverage against the Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Then, as now, such posture changes by the United States and NATO could provide negotiating space and better secure Europe from Russia’s military threat, to include missile deployments and enhanced missile-defense capabilities that could be scaled up or down depending on the threat (which, to be clear, is high right now).
Pursue risk-reduction measures: Rather than focusing on arms control, which Putin has sought to take behind the barn and shoot dead for years, NATO can implement risk-reduction measures as part of an integrated approach to strategic deterrence. Such examples could include developing rules of the road for newer domains such as space and cyber, or by resuming efforts on the Cooperative Airspace Initiative to delineate safe behavior between NATO and Russian aircraft (however laughable this seems right now).
Increase nuclear literacy: Through war games, NATO can bolster political literacy regarding nuclear weapons, exploring scenarios in which Russia could employ nuclear weapons and NATO response options. Additionally, more attention must be paid to enhancing what French President Emmanuel Macron has referred to as “a true strategic culture among Europeans” through trainings, study, and growing the base of experts across the Alliance and its new potential members. This also would require better informing publics about NATO’s nuclear backbone and the grave threat from Russian and other revisionist nuclear states, including China, which is closely watching NATO’s response to Russia’s nuclear blackmail in Ukraine.

—Leah Scheunemann is the deputy director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative and a former official in the US Department of Defense and staffer on the Senate Armed Services Committee.

NATO acting without fingerprints is still NATO

At the inception of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, I preemptively warned about worrying too much about a lack of consensus at NATO in supporting Ukraine. On the one hand, given the remarkable unity among NATO allies over the past year, that warning seems gratuitous. A year into the war, NATO allies have shown remarkable unanimity and resolve in facing down Vladimir Putin, such that NATO’s role as an effective political actor in the crisis is indisputable.

On the other hand, the gritty operational work of arming and training Ukrainian forces, as well as providing them with planning and intelligence support, has been intentionally done outside of NATO auspices. There are various reasons for this. First is the desire to plausibly argue that NATO itself is not at war with Russia as a means of avoiding an escalatory dynamic. Second is the need to focus North Atlantic Council decisions on “defending every inch of NATO territory,” where there has been ample consensus related to defense planning, force posture, and readiness to buttress the Alliance’s eastern flank. Third, and most importantly, is the fact that arming and training the Ukrainian military by consensus was never a realistic option.

As we have seen in successive debates about sending weapons to Ukraine, different tolerances for risk among allies make finding consensus on these matters challenging, at least on the timelines needed for battlefield success. As the recent deliberations about the provision of Leopard tanks revealed, it’s hard enough to sort through these differences among a handful of allies. Finding consensus on contentious issues among thirty allies is not feasible—especially where some of them have no skin in the game or where spoilers like Hungary or Turkey could slow down decisions to gain leverage on other issues, in ways that would weaken Ukraine on the battlefield. This is the reality of a democratic organization with thirty members.

NATO nations, then, have worked bilaterally with Kyiv, and in coalitions of the willing like the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, to arm and train the Ukrainian military in ways that have avoided a requirement for consensus. Make no mistake, however: Even if the NATO flag is not flying over these efforts, NATO’s fingerprints are all over them. The ability to procure, train on, deploy, coordinate, and use weapons of all makes and models on a massive scale to successful effect in emergency circumstances is only possible because of the know-how and habits of cooperation NATO allies and partners have built over many decades of working together.

As we look to the Alliance’s future, the blueprint from its support for Ukraine is an attractive one. NATO’s ability to work effectively on three levels—strategically as a political actor, operationally in reinforcing its own territory, and tactically in arming Ukrainian forces—is showcasing the type of adaptability and creativity that will again be necessary when the next crisis comes. And that NATO can do NATO things altogether outside of NATO constraints is a next-level trick that will be handy too.

—Christopher Skaluba is the director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative and former principal director for European and NATO policy at the US Department of Defense.

NATO has found its footing in its year of living dangerously

The year of war has made many people more aware that we live in a fragmented and dangerous world but also has crystalized what must be done to defend freedom and ensure the prosperity of our democracies.

As Russia’s brutal war rages on, the Ukrainian people heroically persevere in protecting their land—and our democracies—from vile barbarism. The world, united in condemnation in the early days of the aggression, stands fragmented on action. While 141 out of 193 countries denounced the invasion at the March 2, 2022, United Nations General Assembly vote, just a few weeks later on April 7, only ninety-three voted to suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council. Others hide their tacit support for imperialism under a veil of “neutrality.” Only 36 percent of the world’s population lives in countries that condemned and imposed sanctions on Russia.

Even within the values-aligned Western democracies, political leaders must work extra hard to keep up the decisive popular support for Ukraine’s fight. Hobbled by local-level electoral infighting, a global energy crisis, and inflation-driven economic uncertainty, democratic leaders often tread a thin line when they try to push back on the populists and naysayers. As a result, the provision of vital weapons to Ukraine is still slowed down by made-up political excuses and industry’s incapacity.

But the dangerous year has also shifted the collective perception of reality. Both NATO and the European Union (EU), quintessential Western institutions, have been strengthened and made relevant by the war. For a bloc often accused of inaction, it’s been a year of unprecedented activity: multibillion-euro financial aid packages, nine rounds of sanctions, and a membership path for Ukraine to join the EU. NATO’s purpose has been reasserted, and the allies have massively augmented deterrence and defense of the eastern perimeter, while accession of Sweden and Finland appears imminent. Further talk of raising the bar on defense spending beyond the elusive 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) target is gathering speed.

The war is also causing a reckoning in Asia, where a saber-rattling China is closely watching the West’s response in Ukraine. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s recent visit to South Korea and Japan is symbolic but not accidental. Wealthy and technologically advanced democracies of the East are naturally aligned to NATO’s mission to defend freedom and preserve peace. Tokyo’s plans to double defense spending by 2027 are both an inspiration to the allies and a call to collaborate.

There is no substitute for a Ukrainian victory, which requires an urgent all-hands-on-deck approach among NATO allies and partners to supply what is needed now. Political will coupled with bold industrial policy are crucial ingredients required to capitalize on the opportunity to ensure the free world remains free, a fundamental element for future prosperity.

—Giedrimas Jeglinskas is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative and former assistant secretary general for executive management at NATO.

NATO needs to bolster its resilience. Ukraine is a useful model.

Even before the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine, NATO had been paying warranted attention to enhancing its resilience—the ability to absorb shocks and still keep fighting. However, with the start of the war, the conversation about resilience has been supercharged and brought back squarely to the realm of the concrete. In a Euro-Atlantic area that is no longer at peace, and where security is contested by state-based adversaries, the need to maintain, harness, and modernize allied resilience is not a theoretical exercise anymore. As the resistance of Ukrainian society against the invaders has shown, resilience can be the difference between fighting on and defeat, between reinforcement and retreat, between quite literally “keeping the lights on” or giving in to authoritarian darkness. NATO is now fully aware of the criticality of resilience to fulfilling its core tasks, as well as the dangers that are inherent when the Alliance’s interconnected, interdependent societies are exploited by autocratic challengers. The challenge, now, lies in implementation.

The new Strategic Concept elevated the topic and provided NATO with a mandate to “pursue a more robust, integrated and coherent approach to building national and Alliance-wide resilience against military and non-military threats,” and identify and mitigate strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies. This is a good start, but a difficult road lies ahead. Resilience is multi-sectoral, therefore complex; responsibilities are fragmented in the Euro-Atlantic area between national authorities, NATO, the EU, and the private sector; and ultimately, proving a counterfactual (that an incident did not or would not happen because of a certain effort) is an almost impossible task. While the new collective resilience plans and objectives are a welcome step forward, delivering tangible results will be essential.

What should we watch for? In the next months, in the run-up to the NATO Vilnius Summit and beyond, I expect a few discussions to gain particular importance: strategic vulnerabilities in supply chains and critical infrastructure; energy security, and especially reliable energy continuity for an enhanced allied forward presence; limiting the coercive and malign influence activities of state-based challengers, especially China; military mobility; and in the case of civil preparedness, understanding the private sector’s role and mapping dependencies on civil systems and technologies. It will also be crucial for NATO to get better at communicating how it fills existing gaps and does so in a unitary manner across the Alliance.

—Anca Agachi is the associate director and resident fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative.

The Alliance is neither obsolete nor brain-dead. Here are four agenda items to tackle now.

Today NATO is vital and coherent as it defends democracy in Europe. During this past year, under the able leadership of Stoltenberg, NATO nations were able to provide Ukraine with the weapons needed for defense, albeit on a “just in time” basis. In phase one, NATO nations provided Kyiv with man-portable relatively short-range anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons plus an array of older Soviet equipment, all of which could be quickly used by Ukrainian forces. This helped reverse Russia’s initial assault. In phase two, NATO nations transferred artillery and longer-range air defense systems to blunt Russia’s attacks in the east and reduce the damage of Russian strikes against Ukrainian cities. This too was relatively successful.

The third phase was politically more complicated because it involved more offensive weapons such as tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, assistance designed primarily to give Ukraine the chance to retake lost territory. It took time, but NATO nations ultimately made the right decisions. Tanks are on their way.

Now attention has turned to what might be called phase four, the provision of longer-range guided missiles (known as ATACMs) and advanced fighter aircraft needed to strike behind Russian lines in Ukraine but also capable of attacking targets in Russia itself. The Alliance is now balancing Ukraine’s requests for these phase four weapons against the risk of escalation.

Where does this leave NATO? What needs to be done next? There are four priority items on the Alliance’s agenda.

NATO must maintain its unity with regard to the war in Ukraine. Kyiv needs the opportunity to claim as large a victory as is possible, and that means providing more arms more quickly. Complete victory for Ukraine will not be easy militarily, as Russia has had time to prepare substantial defensive positions. Nor will it be easy politically because as Crimea becomes vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattack, Russia is likely to increase its threats to escalate.

NATO must accelerate its current efforts to enhance deterrence along its front lines with Russia. Defense spending is nearing the “2 percent of GDP” goal across the Alliance, and that goal may be increased at the next summit. Eight NATO battle groups have been forward-deployed, a minimum requirement that needs to be further augmented with additional rotation forces. The NATO readiness and mobility initiatives need to be fully implemented as does the new three-tier NATO Force Model. NATO’s nuclear deterrent also needs further strengthening. Since Russia has demonstrated military weakness in Ukraine, NATO must avoid the temptation to rein in these efforts—because Russia under Putin will surely reconstitute its military forces as quickly as it can. Europe must do the same.

Europe needs to take on greater strategic responsibility. This is no longer the old burden-sharing argument where the purpose of a greater European military contribution to the Alliance is to satisfy Washington. The purpose now is to ensure that Europe will be properly defended should the United States become involved in an Asian war.

NATO needs to help the United States manage Chinese assertiveness around the globe. NATO need not be a global cop, but it does have global responsibilities. The Alliance’s new guiding principles, as laid out in the 2022 Strategic Concept, make a clear case for NATO’s responsibilities in dealing with China. Now the Alliance needs to implement its own China policy.

—Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and former senior director for defense policy and arms control on the US National Security Council staff.

Eastern Europe unloads Soviet weapons—and the Soviet mindset

As Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure and population continue and intensify, NATO members’ resolve to provide more and better instruments to Ukraine deepens—from sleeping bags, helmets, and night vision equipment; to anti-tank and air-defense missiles; to heavy artillery and main battle tanks. Outdated Cold War-era Western weapon systems, designed to defeat the Soviet military machine, have finally found a new purpose in the defense of Ukraine. NATO’s defense doctrine, which favors intelligence, coordination, precision, and interoperability over brute force and numbers, has proven superior on the battlefield.

Yet this is not enough. As tons of Western equipment and wartime stocks head to Ukraine in the midst of the largest European mobilization since World War II, who would have thought that obsolete Soviet equipment, weapons, and ammunition would ever increase in market value? And yet that is what has happened. Former Warsaw Pact countries—most of which suffered under the Kremlin’s chokehold—and now NATO members have risen to meet Ukraine’s need for these munitions and mobilized in an overwhelming show of solidarity to their besieged neighbor and partner. The defense of Ukraine has triggered the final push for these countries to rid themselves of their remaining Soviet legacy systems, and with them whatever underlying mindset endured.

The incoming accession of Sweden and Finland will trigger the largest expansion in the Alliance’s military capability since 1999. However, as Putin and other autocrats continue to threaten free democracies, not just in Europe but around the world, NATO’s resolve and capability will continue to expand and strengthen. Extra-European regional partnerships—and maybe even new members—are likely to emerge on the horizon.

—Iñigo Guevara is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative.

NATO should learn from Ukraine and contest Russia’s belligerence in the Black Sea and beyond

The world is witnessing an expanding pattern of aggression and belligerence from Moscow unparalleled in our lifetimes. NATO’s support for Ukraine is absolutely critical, and it should be increased to include longer-range missiles, combat tactical aircraft, combat helicopters, armored vehicles, and a steady resupply of artillery and munitions. However, the broader issue facing NATO is defining the optimal security posture Europe will need in future decades. This posture should support a Europe that is, in the words of the late US President George H.W. Bush, “whole and free,” not one constantly imperiled by threats from Putin’s Russia.

Over the past fifteen years, Russia has engaged in kinetic warfare three times against NATO Partnership for Peace countries: In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia; in 2014 Russia invaded the Donbas and annexed Crimea; and in 2022 it launched its current full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia also provided military support to the brutal regime of Bashar al-Assad during the Syrian civil war, enabling Moscow to grow its military footprint in the region through long-term naval and air base leasing agreements with Damascus at facilities adjacent to the Mediterranean Sea, or as the Romans called it, Mare Nostrum: our sea. Russia has now threatened Moldova—also a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace—by conducting missile strikes against Ukraine that both the Moldovan and Romanian Ministers of Defense report have crossed Moldovan airspace.

The entire Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean region has the potential to become a zone for further conflict. This dynamic is occurring against the backdrop of Russia’s regional military modernization, including its development of improved anti-access/area denial, maritime, and tactical air capabilities.

To effectively deal with the challenge, NATO must revamp its defense spending goals. The 2014 “2/20” construct—under which members committed to spending 2 percent of GDP on defense and 20 percent of their annual defense expenditures on new equipment—must be replaced with one advocating real growth in defense spending. NATO should then promote national efforts to rebuild member stockpiles that have dwindled from supplying Ukraine with wartime munitions. Maritime security must become a higher priority for the Black Sea region, with an emphasis on cyber security, intelligence sharing, and resilience. NATO should work with Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania to develop a strategy increasing member maritime presence and provide for the construction of more naval vessels that comply with the Montreux Convention, which regulates the kind of ships that can pass through the Turkish straits connecting the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Top priority should be given to the development of a small NATO surface combatant stationed in these countries, along with the requisite basing and industrial infrastructure to support it.

Putin must not sense weakness in this region or be tempted to test NATO with further unprovoked aggression. A determined NATO offset strategy is the best way to deny him that objective.

—Wayne Schroeder is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative.

Overdue troop increases on NATO’s eastern flank need infrastructure and ammo to bear fruit

Russia’s illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine underscored the importance of reinforcing NATO’s force posture in Eastern Europe, a region subjected to Russia’s belligerence long before the war in Ukraine. In mid-2022, the number of troops under NATO command across the eastern flank reached 40,000; for comparison, in 2021, the number was 4,650. As a direct response to Russia’s invasion, the Alliance strengthened existing battle groups in the Baltic states and Poland, and set up new battle groups in Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, bringing the total to eight and doubling the number of troops previously deployed.

To better understand these developments, the Atlantic Council’s Forward Forces Tracker follows posture adjustments and new deployments from NATO allies and partners. At the NATO Summit in Madrid last summer, allies agreed on a new force model that would put over 300,000 troops at high readiness levels, up from 40,000. Furthermore, Germany pledged to add troops in Lithuania, to increase the size of the existing battle group from battalion to brigade level, and the United Kingdom pledged to have a battalion on standby ready to deploy on short notice to Estonia, where the United Kingdom plans to create a division headquarters. Moreover, the United States announced that it would set up a permanent base in Poland, the first US base on NATO’s eastern flank.

All these plans certainly seem promising, but will require several steps in the medium term to become reality:

Put more pressure on host nations to increase infrastructure spending. To ensure that the increased numbers of troops can be at high readiness in case of an attack from Russia or any other malign actor, the Alliance needs host nations to invest adequately in infrastructure to support rapid troop movements.
Increase defense production at home. Many allies are now starting to worry about their dwindling stockpiles. The Alliance needs to ask its member states to increase defense spending to prompt production of more ammunition in each member’s factories.

Russia has deployed advanced weapon systems, undertaken military exercises, and conducted cyberwarfare and information operations on NATO’s eastern flank over the last decade. The war in Ukraine highlighted the urgency and importance of bolstering NATO’s posture there.

—Alvina Ahmed is a program assistant at the Transatlantic Security Initiative.

Prepare to face a Russia more reliant on unconventional warfare

As part of its illegal war, Russia has not only sought to exhaust and overwhelm Ukraine militarily, but to weaken Ukrainian morale. As the world has witnessed over the last year, Russia complemented its conventional warfare with hybrid tactics—including the deliberate sabotage of energy supplies, perpetual information influence activities, cyber and economic warfare, and other methods—to destabilize and render Ukraine vulnerable, with great consequences for Europe.

As our colleagues at the Digital Forensic Research Lab noted this week in their reports on Russian information operations before and after the invasion, Russia has manipulated the information space to fan the flames in support of its war, posing a great challenge to transatlantic security. Russia falsely accused Ukraine of building chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons as an excuse to justify the invasion. One disinformation narrative pushed by Russia is that the United States transferred plutonium to Ukraine to build a dirty bomb. Other false claims include that Ukraine was “preparing a chemical disaster in Donbas” and was using ultrasonic weapons in the war. Russia’s state-sponsored media amplified these claims to build support for Russia and shift the blame to Ukraine. Russia’s strategies intentionally seek to convince NATO allies and partners to back down from their support with the ultimate goal of breaking NATO’s solidarity and effectiveness in its support for Ukraine.

Thanks to the incredible resilience and capability of Ukraine, Russia has not been successful in the information war. But Russia’s hybrid war spills over into other European nations, such as Moldova, where the Kremlin hopes to destabilize the pro-democratic and pro-EU government. It is critical for NATO allies and partners to recommit to their support for Ukraine and other targeted nations, as Russia will certainly continue to develop its hybrid warfare capabilities. In December, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative hosted a scenario-building exercise that examined potential futures for Russian development and use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. The exercise’s results suggest that Russia may continue to develop unconventional weapons to bolster regime stability and its weakening economic power, as a component of Moscow’s ongoing campaign to counter NATO’s conventional military superiority. We can expect the same to be true for Russia’s reliance on information warfare as well.

NATO must continue to invest in counter-hybrid responses. To do this, NATO should further prioritize joint intelligence capabilities, strengthen coordination among partners such as the EU and others, and reinforce counter-hybrid support teams. Greater collaboration of national resilience strategies will help promote greater cooperation in developing approaches that challenge Russian information and influence operations. The 2022 Strategic Concept provides the foundation for NATO to build a comprehensive strategy of countermeasures, along with associated strategies for implementation. These actions will position NATO not only to fully support Ukraine amid the war, but to better counter adversaries in future periods of conflict and crisis.

—Ryan Arick is an assistant director at the Transatlantic Security Initiative.

The post Experts react: How a year of war in Europe remade NATO, and what comes next appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Zeiten-when? Scholz needs to stop standing in the way of Germany’s foreign-policy turning point.

Noah DeMichele — Thu, 23 Feb 2023 21:38:51 +0000

Germany’s relationship with its own security looks fundamentally different one year after the war in Ukraine prompted Chancellor Olaf Scholz to announce a Zeitenwende, or turning point, before the Bundestag. The idea represented an about-face that promised greater investment in the German armed forces and a rethink of Berlin’s relationship with Moscow—raising hopes on both sides of the Atlantic. But as the meaning of Zeitenwende has grown to represent broader transformations to Berlin’s security, defense, and economic policies, the chancellor has routinely missed the mark and gotten in the way of his own big idea.

The Zeitenwende is the chancellor’s brainchild, yet he has been its major roadblock. Since announcing the speech, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) leader has habitually hesitated when faced with key decisions, best encapsulated by the Leopard 2 battle tank saga. Despite the international pressure, which eventually reached a fever pitch, for Germany to send its Leopards and approve European shipments to Ukraine, Scholz abdicated, only making Leopards contingent on US deliveries of less logistically viable Abrams tanks. Looking ahead, the early debate about fighter jets for Ukraine is following the same pattern. Scholz already appears to have labeled planes for Ukraine a red line.

The repeated public diplomacy disasters do Scholz and Germany a disservice. Navel-gazing in Berlin diverts attention away from the fact that Germany is, among European Union member countries, the largest supporter of Ukraine—supplying heavy machinery, Patriot missiles, and more. Despite that, international focus has landed on Germany’s delay in approving or providing critical materiel. During instances in which Germany is given the opportunity to advance the Zeitenwende agenda by displaying leadership from Berlin, Scholz squanders the moment acting only after maximum pressure is applied by governments in Washington, Tallinn, and everywhere in between. A true Zeitenwende will require Germany to lead from the front, not defer to a US decision for fear of Germany “going it alone.” The Leopards debate showcases this: Inaction on the highly desired Leopard tanks was Germany going it alone.

Nobody expects the sea change in German foreign-policy thinking that is Zeitenwende to happen overnight. Even so, Berlin should seize the opportunities it has to move the strategy forward and prove Germany’s willingness to be the leader in Europe.

Others in Berlin recognize this opportunity. Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, the Green Party’s first candidate for chancellor with a significant shot, has been the most outspoken voice in favor of transforming German security and projecting strength vis-à-vis Russia and China, as exemplified by her August speech to the New School in New York in which she called on Germany to “seize this transatlantic moment.” Elsewhere, SPD Chair Lars Klingbeil, in a new foreign-policy strategy paper for the party, recently advocated for Germany to take a strong leadership role in the world. German Economy Minister Robert Habeck, of the Green Party, has previously urged against “stupid trade” with China—showing a shift in German foreign-policy thinking away from the belief that economic ties with autocracies is the best way to bring about change.

This next generation of German policymakers is prepared to reinvigorate German foreign policy—that is a good sign for Zeitenwende hopefuls. In the meantime, Scholz needs to stop inhibiting the foreign-policy transformation. The first opportunity for the chancellor to recoup lost trust is ensuring the successful, swift delivery of the now-promised Leopards to Ukraine. The implementation cannot resemble the decision process. Yet Germany’s new defense minister, Boris Pistorius, was noncommittal on a delivery date for the Leopards in a February 16 interview with the Washington Post.

Scholz must also apply today’s lessons to challenges beyond Ukraine. Looking to Germany’s neighborhood, Scholz has emphasized the need for a strong and capable Europe that is not reliant solely on the United States for security. Yet, following the chancellor’s “you first, Washington” approach to sending tanks to Ukraine, countries such as Poland and the Baltic states will need reassurances that he is serious about reducing Europe’s reliance on the United States. In an effort to recover confidence in Germany’s European leadership abilities, Scholz should look for avenues for easy cooperation with his European neighbors. One easy win for Scholz and Pistorius could be coordinating with allies to refill tank stockpiles.

The Zeitenwende needs to look beyond Europe as well. The chancellor’s latest writing on the Zeitenwende pays little attention to China, while the development of Germany’s much anticipated national security strategy has reportedly been paused by the chancellery for being too sharp on Beijing after the strategy left Baerbock’s foreign ministry. To avoid falling into a renewed economic-dependence trap with China, Scholz should follow Baerbock’s lead in treating Beijing as a competitor, consistent with the renewed emphasis on German and European security prescribed by the Zeitenwende. You can bet this will be a topic of discussion when Scholz meets with US President Joe Biden at the White House on March 3.

The Zeitenwende is a process that will take time and require patience from Berlin’s allies. Yet, it is also one that requires clarity from Germany’s highest levels. At February’s Munich Security Conference, the chancellor remarked that Germany will assume the responsibility required of it in times like these. In the interest of turning words into action, a break from the ever-repeating cycle of hesitancy and seesawing would be a welcome development from the chancellery and will help ensure the Zeitenwende becomes reality.

Noah DeMichele was a fall 2022 young global professional with the Europe Center and is currently working on transatlantic relations at Bertelsmann Foundation North America.

The post Zeiten-when? Scholz needs to stop standing in the way of Germany’s foreign-policy turning point. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Invasion anniversary: Does Putin still have a pathway to victory in Ukraine?

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 23 Feb 2023 19:54:10 +0000

When Vladimir Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, he was expecting a brief and triumphant campaign that would extinguish Ukrainian independence and secure his place in Russian history among the country’s greatest rulers. One year on, it is now clear that his decision to invade was one of the biggest geopolitical blunders of the modern era.

Putin’s disastrous miscalculations reflect a leader increasingly detached from reality and surrounded by a shrinking circle of sycophants intent on telling him what he wants to hear. The delusional Russian dictator appears to have been convinced that Ukrainian military resistance would crumble in a matter of days and genuinely expected invading Russian troops to be welcomed as liberators. Instead, his own army has suffered catastrophic losses amid a series of battlefield defeats that have shattered Russia’s reputation as a military superpower.

The strength and tenacity of Ukraine’s national resistance has stunned Putin and made a mockery of his claims to be “returning historic Russian lands.” Nevertheless, as the war enters its second year, he shows no signs of abandoning his imperial ambitions. In recent months, Putin has moved to replenish the ranks of his depleted army by launching Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. Meanwhile, earlier attempts to shield the Russian public from the horrors of the invasion have been replaced by grim warnings to expect a long and bitter war.

While Putin continues to publicly insist he will achieve his objectives in Ukraine, many commentators are now questioning whether the Russian military retains the capability to mount large-scale offensive operations. Russia’s recent mobilization has generated an additional 300,000 troops, but much of this intake is poorly trained and appears prone to rapid demoralization. Moscow’s hopes of a collapse in international support for Ukraine also look unrealistic. Ukraine’s partners have begun 2023 by significantly expanding the range of weapons they are prepared to supply, while US President Joe Biden’s recent Kyiv visit was designed to send a strong signal of unwavering Western resolve.

Despite the setbacks of the past twelve months, Russia continues to enjoy considerable advantages over Ukraine in terms of both destructive power and sheer numbers. Could this eventually be enough to turn the tide in Moscow’s favor? As the invasion of Ukraine enters its second year, the Atlantic Council asked a range of experts whether Putin still has a pathway to victory in Ukraine.

Alyona Getmanchuk, Director, New Europe Center: Putin can still win if the West allows him to win. This could happen intentionally if Western leaders actively seek to avoid humiliating Putin, or less directly if Ukraine does receive the weapons it needs in time. We should be very clear that every single postponed political decision or delayed delivery of weapons brings Putin closer to victory. As Russia’s invasion passes the one-year mark, it is time to lift any remaining psychological barriers over the categories of weapons that can be sent to Ukraine. Putin is now completely committed to winning the war at all costs, but Ukraine’s international partners are still struggling to send just 10% of the available Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine despite a long and painful debate over the issue. This needs to change.

There should no longer be any illusions over the possibility of peace in Europe if Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is even partially successful. A fragile ceasefire or a compromise agreement imposed on Ukraine would reward Putin for his invasion and set the stage for the next war. The only way to secure a sustainable peace is via a decisive Ukrainian victory. It will then be up to the Kremlin propaganda machine to explain this defeat to the Russian public.

It is profoundly depressing to note that we are now entering the second year of a genocide in the heart of Europe with Russian victory still a possibility. The mere fact that this is even being discussed illustrates the utter inadequacy of the international reaction to Russian aggression. Clearly, a far tougher response is necessary if Putin is finally to be stopped.

Diane Francis, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council: Putin has no path to victory because Ukrainians will never surrender until Russia is expelled from their country. Last year’s invasion took Ukraine and the international community by surprise, but over the past 12 months the world’s strongest military coalition has taken shape to support Ukraine and enlarge NATO to prevent future incursions by Moscow. Russia’s armed forces have not won a major battle since last June. More than half of Putin’s initial invasion force of 190,000 men have been killed or wounded. Russian losses in tanks, armor, and aviation have been equally catastrophic.

Russia is now struggling to advance at Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine, where Putin’s generals sacrifice “human waves” of untrained conscripts and mercenaries and are still unable to break through Ukrainian defenses. Each side prepares new offensives, but Russia’s armed forces have been seriously degraded and impaired from doing so, according to the Institute for the Study of War.

Ukraine has already liberated around half of the land captured by Russia during the initial months of the invasion. Meanwhile, the Western world is currently more united behind Ukraine than ever and has recently agreed to provide new categories of weapons including tanks and long range missiles. Key factors such as support, time, money, motivation, and leadership all appear to be on Kyiv’s side. Perhaps most important of all, Ukrainians refuse to accept anything short of victory. As President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has stated, “Ukrainians are not ready to give away their land, to accept that these territories belong to Russia. This is our land.”

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Miriam Kosmehl, Senior Expert Eastern Europe, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Germany: As the war enters its second year, Putin still has a number of potential pathways to victory in Ukraine. A great deal will depend on whether Ukraine is provided with the military aid it needs to defeat Russia on the battlefield.

Putin is clearly preparing for a long war. The genocidal rhetoric on Russian TV and from senior Kremlin officials has not changed. He has also painted himself into a corner by declaring the “annexation” of four partially occupied Ukrainian regions, thereby creating major constitutional obstacles to any future peace process. Perhaps most importantly, it is now obvious that Putin is completely unconcerned by the scale of Russian losses in Ukraine and does not fear a domestic backlash.

While Russia’s military options in Ukraine currently appear limited, the Kremlin continues to communicate effectively to both Russian and international audiences. Tailored messages about food security resonate in Africa, while Russian charm offensives and anti-Western posturing have proved persuasive in Latin America and Asia.

If the alliance of liberal democracies that has formed around Ukraine over the past year limits its support to preventing a Ukrainian defeat, then the war will drag on. This will feed “Ukraine fatigue” and play into Putin’s hands. President Zelenskyy appears to understand this, which is why he has recently sought to increase the pressure on Ukraine’s allies by calling for greater urgency.

Western leaders need to understand that the idea of a compromise peace is an illusion. Putin only hints at a readiness for negotiations in order to weaken the West’s resolve and drive a wedge between Ukraine and its partners. In reality, Russia remains committed to Ukraine’s destruction as an independent state and as a separate nation.

Alexander Motyl, Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University-Newark: Everything depends on how Putin himself defines victory. Could Putin defeat Ukraine on the battlefield without massive casualties? Almost certainly not, as the Russian army is degraded, the Ukrainian army is performing well, and Ukraine’s Western-supplied weapons outclass Russia’s.

Could Putin win the war if he accepts enormous losses of up to a million men killed and wounded? This also seems unlikely, as Ukrainian battlefield skills and Western weapons should enable Ukraine to hold its own. In this second scenario, the main problem for Putin would probably be the Russian reaction. Would domestic audiences tolerate such catastrophic losses? Would the Russian elite not object? The probability of protests or a palace coup rises with every dead Russian soldier.

Alternatively, Putin could simply choose to define victory in terms other than Ukraine’s battlefield defeat. Victory could mean holding onto at least some of the Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia since February 24, 2022. This could be sold to the Russian public as a major advance for the Russian World. However, some Russians might question whether gaining control over relatively limited areas of devastated Ukrainian territory really warranted such huge sacrifices.

Putin’s best option may be to rebrand the war entirely and insist that Russia is actually fighting against Western (or more precisely American) imperialism rather than “Ukrainian Nazis”. This narrative is already being actively promoted and has in recent months begun to increasingly dominate Russian propaganda. It enables Putin to magically transform his “Special Military Operation” into a defensive action intended to forestall an imminent Western invasion of Russia via Ukraine. And since Russia still exists despite all Western efforts to destroy it, Putin can claim success and declare victory.

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council: Courtesy of Ukraine’s stunning defense, Putin has lost all paths to victory except through attrition, but this still poses a major threat. With superior numbers (however reluctant those troops are) and far greater resources, Putin can still realistically hope to outlast Ukraine if, as many fear, Western military support for Ukraine continues at its present pace or actually declines. Neither side currently enjoys a meaningful military advantage. This bloody stalemate favors Putin while Russia continues to pulverize Ukraine’s economy and energy sector.

Unless Western governments begin equipping Ukraine to actually win the war rather than simply not lose too badly, time is on Russia’s side. This is the tragic reality of the current situation. Russia’s sheer size may trump Ukraine’s resolve and dedication in the long run. If the watching world fails to step up its military and energy sector support to Ukraine, this inspiring, nascent democracy that is so eager to join with the West may well be ground slowly out of existence by the relentless brutality of Putin’s war machine. If Russia is allowed to erase Ukraine in part or in whole, the consequences for international security will be catastrophic.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Brian Mefford, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council: Like the Byzantine emperors who tried to restore the glory of Constantinople following the Fourth Crusade, Putin’s attempt to restore the Soviet Union is also destined for failure. In the most optimistic scenario for Putin, the overwhelming weight of the Russian military could yet achieve a Pyrrhic victory in which the bulk of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region might be taken, with areas south of the Dnipro also remaining under Russian occupation.

Some commentators argue that Russia always fights badly during the first year of a war but then mobilizes to win. However, this observation neglects the fact that Russia does so only when defending its own territory. Historically, Russia has almost always performed poorly when invading other countries.

Putin’s goal is still to install a puppet regime in Kyiv. However, he wasn’t able to do so a year ago with his best troops. This objective is even less feasible now with Ukraine armed to the teeth and his own military badly depleted. A more realistic scenario would see economic hardships created by the war fueling ethnic rivalries and regional secession within Russia. These factors could eventually accelerate the Balkanization of Russia into a dozen new countries. Putin dreamed of regime change in Ukraine, but he is now more likely to bring regime change to Russia itself.

Kristina Hook, Assistant Professor, Kennesaw State University: Putin’s imperial dreams against Ukraine and the global order have irreversibly shattered. Russian goals have deteriorated from boasts of “Kyiv in three days” to straining for smaller Ukrainian towns at the cost of thousands of soldiers. Putin cannot realistically hope to overcome catastrophic losses in troops, officers, or equipment. Nor can he repair what he really cares about, namely Russia’s global reputation under his leadership.

Now that Putin’s intention to subjugate Ukraine through massive civilian targeting is indisputable, democracies must remain resolved that no pathway back to “business as usual” with Russia exists. Encouragingly, even Western leaders who were slower to accept the permanent schisms caused by Russia’s full-scale invasion are now signaling their commitment to Ukrainian victory. Nevertheless, Putin must be prevented from snatching limited successes from the jaws of defeat. Western political courage to boost defense production and avoid incrementalism must match the historical significance of the moment.

On the information front, Western leaders must champion the strategic importance of Ukraine’s full victory to their constituents. This is vital as Putin excels in propaganda that blames the victims of his revanchism instead of his own strategic incompetence and callous cruelty. Finally, without judicial prosecution of Putin and the return of trafficked Ukrainians including children, a hollow victory would demonstrate to other authoritarians that they can operate without full accountability.

Michael Bociurkiw, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council: Let’s be blunt. Had former US President Barack Obama responded to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 with lethal weaponry for Ukraine instead of sanctions, Russian forces wouldn’t be in Ukraine at the moment. It was a miscalculation of historical proportions, the consequences of which Ukrainians and regional neighbors are forced to live with to this day.

Putin’s hopes of victory hinge on what happens between now and the next major Russian offensive. Russian forces are reportedly beefing up their air strength in Belarus and other areas close to Ukraine. Moscow, taking advantage of the gap before Western main battle tanks arrive, could succumb to the temptation to strike with a mix of waves of men, cruise missiles, modified Iranian-built drones, and cyber attacks.

The biggest challenge now is for the West to expedite shipments of ammunition, tanks, and missiles to the Ukrainian battlefront. It is regrettable that it took Western leaders so much time to send lethal weaponry to Ukraine; deliveries should now include missiles capable of striking legitimate military targets within Russia.

A huge obstacle to a victory for Putin in Ukraine is the irrepressible resilience of the Ukrainian people. Day in and day out over the past year, I’ve witnessed first-hand how the residents of Odesa and elsewhere in Ukraine have turned fear into anger and hopelessness into optimism. It is a response which, more than weaponry and sanctions, will deny Putin the ability to dictate the future arc of history.

Andreas Umland, Analyst, Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies: It is still possible to imagine a number of Russian military offensives with the potential to achieve victory. For instance, Russia could make an attempt to cut Ukraine off from vital supply lines of weapons flowing into the country across the western border with the EU. So far, there is little indication of any preparations for such an ambitious operation, which may indicate that it is simply beyond Russia’s current military capabilities.

Another option available to the Kremlin would be a mass killing event designed to shock Ukraine into surrender, such as the use of nuclear weapons or an orchestrated accident at a dam or nuclear power plant. However, desperate measures of this kind would be unlikely to break Ukrainian resistance and could easily have the opposite effect. This approach would also run the risk of stiffening Western resolve while alienating many of Russia’s remaining partners such as China and India.

With the war now entering its second year, Putin’s chances of achieving a decisive military victory are clearly fading. If the Russian army’s fortunes continue to deteriorate in the coming months, Ukraine and its international partners should brace themselves for massive pressure from Moscow as the Kremlin seeks to secure a ceasefire.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Leonardo CEO Alessandro Profumo on Italy’s role in unifying Europe and ‘selective decoupling’ from China

apavia — Thu, 23 Feb 2023 14:30:00 +0000

Alessandro Profumo, chief executive officer of Leonardo, one of Italy’s leading defense companies, joined the Atlantic Council for a discussion about emerging technologies, the future of transatlantic relations, decoupling from China, and the deep cultural affinity between the United States and Italy. As the war in Ukraine reaches the one-year mark and with Profumo’s tenure as CEO of Leonardo slated to end in May of this year, the CEO reflected on the state of the industry at a pivotal moment. Concerns are growing about diminished weapons stockpiles across the NATO alliance (with deliveries to Ukraine continuing). What does the US and allied defense industry’s response to this crisis reveal about the defense sector’s ability to ramp up production in a conflict?

Full interview

Featured quotes

Here are a few highlights from Profumo’s conversation with Matthew Kroenig, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

On emerging technologies

“We have to consider that there are some areas of the technological advancement where the civil world is more advanced—typically artificial intelligence, big data, simulation. But there are threats like hypersonic or direct energy weapons which are not civil, but we must invest in them as an industry.”

On the future of transatlantic relations

“A strong and unified Europe can be a pillar in defense of the Western value system. This is very important. Italy can be the bridge that connects all these elements.”

On the challenge posed by China and the possibility for the West to decouple its economy from Beijing’s

“Completely decoupling from China is not possible. We must manage selective decoupling. …It is important in any situation to diversify your sources of suppliers to ensure your survivability no matter what.”

On US-Italy relations

“The largest exporting sector is machinery, not fashion, because we can have the right solutions to specific problems with a tailor-made production capability. We are capable of finding solutions in very difficult situations.”

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Middle East Programs

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

The post Leonardo CEO Alessandro Profumo on Italy’s role in unifying Europe and ‘selective decoupling’ from China appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How Biden’s Ukraine trip was received in Kyiv and Moscow

Atlantic Council — Mon, 20 Feb 2023 17:21:02 +0000

JUST IN

That’s one way to celebrate Presidents’ Day. US President Joe Biden staged a surprise trip to Kyiv on Monday that included a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the presidential palace and a walk in central Kyiv as air-raid sirens blared. How was Biden’s trip viewed in Ukraine and Russia? What message does it send about US support for Ukraine? And how can Biden follow photo ops with military muscle? Our experts have the answers.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried): Weiser Family distinguished fellow and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia
Melinda Haring (@melindaharing): Nonresident senior fellow at the Eurasia Center
Oleh Shamshur (@Shamshur_O): Nonresident senior fellow at the Eurasia Center and former Ukrainian ambassador to the United States
Peter Dickinson (@Biz_Ukraine_Mag): Editor of UkraineAlert

The sounds of history

Dan says Biden’s dramatic trip to Kyiv “ranks with other great presidential moments of leadership in defense of freedom” best known for a single line delivered in Berlin: John F. Kennedy’s “Ich bin ein Berliner” and Ronald Reagan’s “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.”
In Biden’s case, the indelible memory may not be a line in a speech but the sound of air-raid sirens as he walked through Kyiv with Zelenskyy. Melinda described the visit as “pitch-perfect,” from the enthusiastic air-raid stroll to Biden’s blue and yellow tie—matching the Ukrainian flag.
While the visit was kept under strict secrecy until he was on the ground, much like other presidential trips to war zones, Dan says this undertaking was “much harder” than, for example, a Baghdad visit during the Iraq War, “where the US had massive military assets on the ground.”
Given the risks and logistical hurdles—including a nearly ten-hour train ride from Poland—the fact that Biden went forward with the trip “suggests he means what he says about supporting Ukraine for the long haul,” Dan says. “It’s a powerful and welcome message.”

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The view from Kyiv… and Moscow

Before official word got out, rumors started to spread through Kyiv that Biden was likely in town, Oleh tells us, given the large security presence. “Biden’s visit was one of those events when the emotional reaction of the Ukrainian governing class and the population was equally positive and even enthusiastic.”
In Moscow, the reaction was “predictably hysterical,” Oleh adds. Prominent pro-Kremlin journalist Sergei Mardan called it a “demonstrable humiliation of Russia.” And Peter points out that on state TV, “pundits discussing the visit attempted to spare Putin’s blushes by insisting that Moscow must have given Washington prior ‘security guarantees’ in order for the trip to go ahead.”
The mood was even darker on social media, where Oleh says Russians called “for new missile and bomb attacks against Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities. There is no doubt that Biden’s visit will be used by the Russian propaganda machine to fan even stronger the feelings of chauvinism and anti-American animosity already well-embedded with the majority of Russians.”

The great weapons debate

Biden used the Kyiv visit to announce an additional $460 million in artillery and other military equipment going to Ukraine, but that package did not include new systems Zelenskyy has requested such as long-range missiles known as ATACMS. This indicates that “discussion in Washington about the fighting range and power of weapons provided to Ukraine is still far from being over,” Oleh says.
Melinda points out that Biden’s visit “raised expectations” for more assistance to come, “but every additional large assistance package Congress authorizes will be hard-fought.”
While it is “remarkable” that US public support for backing Ukraine in a long fight has held steady—a recent Gallup poll found it at 65 percent—Melinda notes that “there are serious partisan differences between Republicans and Democrats, and we should only expect them to grow” as the 2024 US presidential campaign heats up.

The post How Biden’s Ukraine trip was received in Kyiv and Moscow appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Eftimiades in TIME

Atlantic Council — Thu, 16 Feb 2023 20:03:34 +0000

On February 16, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Nicholas Eftimiades published an article in TIME magazine to discuss the reasons China may have deployed a spy balloon over the United States and the implications for the relationship between the two countries. Eftimiades suggested that the balloon may have been designed to intercept high frequency radio communications or satellite downlink data.

Beijing badly miscalculated by violating US airspace, particularly on the eve of Secretary of State Blinken’s visit.

Nicholas Eftimiades

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

Wagner forces attempt to encircle Bakhmut and cut off vital Ukrainian supply routes

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Russian War Report: DFRLab confirms Russia’s push to encircle Bakhmut

Valentin Châtelet, Ruslan Trad, Kateryna Halstead, Nika Aleksejeva — Fri, 10 Feb 2023 17:38:29 +0000

Security

Alleged Russian agent captured as Moscow restarts offensives on the Kreminna-Svatove line

Tracking narratives

Russia claims ‘panicked West’ sent tanks to Ukraine

Media policy

New Russian maps redraw borders to include eastern Ukraine

Wagner forces attempt to encircle Bakhmut and cut off vital Ukrainian supply routes

After gaining control over Soledar in mid-January, Wagner Group soldiers are attempting to encircle Bakhmut. The DFRLab confirmed the progression of a bloc of forces that includes Wagner, the People’s Militia of the Donetsk People’s Republic, and Russian armed forces. At the end of January, Wagner shared a photo of its soldiers standing in front of a sign reading “Blahodatne” as evidence they had seized the village of the same name. On February 7, the Russian MoD also stated that it had seized Blahodatne. The small village is strategically located on the key Ukrainian E40 highway, which serves as a supply route to Krasna Hora and Bakhmut. A photo of a burning Russian tank geolocated by OSINT researcher @Neonhandrail suggests that attempts to cut off the supply route have thus far been unsuccessful.

Meanwhile on the southern flank, Russian armed forces are trying to consolidate their progression towards Ivanivske. Only one division of the Ukrainian army, the 30th Mechanized Brigade, has had to repel a Russian incursion on the road between Bakhmut and Sloviansk.

On Telegram, a post by WarDonbass speculated that Wagner could have gained control over two southern supply routes to Bakhmut. However, there is no evidence to support this claim. Inside the city of Bakhmut, footage released by the Georgian legion of the Ukrainian army indicates that Ukraine is strengthening its defensive positions.

Further south, the DFRLab geolocated footage published by the Telegram channel ColonelCassad, which was then reposted on Wagner’s own Telegram channel. Videos of drone strikes on the northern and eastern part of Marinka indicate a violent escalation on the southern flank. The footage also shows rubble where a hospital once stood.

Geolocated footage of Russian strikes on World War II Veteran Hospital (purple square) near the Osykova River, Mariinka, Donetsk oblast. Additional polygons identify ground features appearing in each image. (Source: ColonelCassad, left; Valentin Châtelet,/Google Earth, right)

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

Alleged Russian agent captured as Moscow restarts offensives on the Kreminna-Svatove line

Ukrainian military intelligence announced on February 6 the capture of a Russian agent who allegedly leaked information about Ukrainian military operations in “a strategically important sector of the front.” The suspect was an official in a Ukrainian military unit. He was allegedly recruited by Russia after the start of the invasion.

Elsewhere, the Russian army launched limited offensives on February 7 along the Kreminna-Svatove line. Russian forces have made gains in the Dvorichna area, northwest of Svatove. Units that have been spotted on this front include regular units, special intelligence units, regiments from the 144th and 3rd Motor Rifle Division, a regiment from the 90th Tank Division, and the 76th Airborne Division. On February 9, Ukrainian forces appear to have destroyed a Russian BMPT Terminator armored vehicle near Kreminna, according to a visual report published by the UNIAN Telegram channel. If confirmed, this would be the first documented loss of such a vehicle, which is only available in limited supply. Days earlier, on February 6, Russian pro-government media published footage showing how Russian units in the area used these vehicles in a local counter-offensive in Kreminna.

Russian forces continue to attack towns across Ukraine, with Russian channels reporting missile attacks in Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. On February 9, Ukrainian media reported that drones over Dnipro were downed.

Ukrainian parliament voted in favor of bills N8360 and N8361-d, which provide an exemption from taxes and duties for drones, thermal imagers, collimators, walkie-talkies, and night vision devices. Yaroslav Zhelezniak, deputy head of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Tax and Customs Policy, clarified on his Telegram channel that radios were added to the bills after appeals from volunteer organizations. The adopted bills will remove import restrictions, allowing for the express shipment of some military equipment.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia claims ‘panicked West’ sent tanks to Ukraine

Following the decision from Western allies to provide armored tanks to Ukraine, there has been an increase in Russian narratives opposing the decision. The state-owned news outlet RIA Novosti published an article aimed at ridiculing Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov. The article’s banner photo depicts Reznikov holding a model tank with the accompanying headline, “Germany handed over toy Leopard 2 to Ukraine.” The narrative appears aimed at casting doubt on the efficacy of Germany’s Leopard 2 tanks.

RIA NOVOSTI depicting Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov holding a model tank (right) alongside German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius (left) under the headline “Germany handed over toy Leopard 2 to Ukraine.” (Source: RIA Novosti/archive)

Along with the heightened focus from Russian media on the transfer of tanks, other narratives presented the latest military aid package as a reaction from a panicked West due to the successes of the Russian “special military operation.” The pro-Kremlin journal International Affairs referred to Germany’s decision to send in tanks as capitulation to external pressure and a rash political decision arising from the tensions caused by Russia’s military successes. In addition, Ukraine’s latest round of anti-corruption measures resulted in speculation about the possible resignation or dismissal of Defense Minister Reznikov. Major Kremlin-backed publications, including TASS, have directly followed the developments, highlighting corruption problems in Kyiv. Other narratives have outlined Reznikov’s alleged refusal to resign amid the corruption charges as a result of his purported blackmail capabilities against the top echelons of the Ukrainian military and defense leadership, while also casting into doubt Ukraine’s entire leadership and ability to function as a government.

—Kateryna Halstead, Research Assistant, Bologna, Italy

New Russian maps redraw borders to include eastern Ukraine

The Kremlin-approved media outlet RBC reported on February 8 that Russian bookstores are selling new maps that include Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts as part of Russia. The DFRLab found a version of this map for sale on the website of the Russian publishing company Atlas Print.

Atlas Print selling a “big wall map of Russia with new territories 3.00 x 1.60 m, laminated” for approximately USD $47. (Source: Atlas Print/archive)

Atlas Print Director Yuri Sukhanov spoke to RBC about how a bill in the Russian Duma “on countering extremist activity” prevented retailers from selling previous maps. The bill, which passed its first reading on December 20, 2022, stipulated that “extremist materials will include cartographic and other documents and images intended for distribution and public demonstration that dispute the territorial integrity of Russia.” The new maps appear to have been printed in response to the bill. According to Sukhanov, “There are large retail chains that are ready to sell only updated maps with the new borders of Russia.”

On September 23, 2022, Russia launched rigged referendums in Ukraine’s Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Russian President Vladimir Putin then signed decrees to recognize Kherson and Zaporizhzhia as independent and held a ceremony to incorporate all four oblasts into Russian territory. The newly printed maps do not correspond with the reality on the ground. On November 12, 2022, Ukraine forced Russian troops out of Kherson as it regained control over the area.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Research Fellow, Riga, Latvia

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What to make of the strikes in Iran? Watch these three indicators.

Jonathan Panikoff — Thu, 02 Feb 2023 17:41:18 +0000

Iran’s official version of Saturday’s events is fairly straightforward. Three armed drones penetrated Iranian airspace seeking to attack a “workshop,” but one of the drones was “destroyed by Iranian air defense” systems and the other two caught by “defense traps.” The incident happened in Isfahan, the third most populous city in Iran, located approximately two hundred miles south of Tehran. All told, the result was minimal damage to the roof of the “workshop.” But Iran’s attempts to minimize the strike should not obscure its potentially large ramifications.

No one has yet claimed responsibility for the attack and there is a reasonable chance that no one will—publicly. But multiple media reports are highlighting previous suspected Israeli attacks on Iran, a reflection of the long shadow war between the two countries, and other reports are already explicitly identifying Israel as responsible.

It is quite possible the “workshop”—which is probably an Iranian defense ministry ammunition facility—was not the target. Next to the warehouse is the Iran Space Research Center, an agency that has cooperated previously with the country’s ballistic missile program—and is sanctioned by the United States. Israeli journalist Barak Ravid on Sunday reported that Iran’s “missile program” was the target and according to a source, “four different areas in the building were accurately targeted and the goal was achieved.”

The attack happened around the same time as Iranian television said that an oil refinery fire had broken out in Tabriz, about three hundred miles northwest of Tehran, and not far away a 5.9 magnitude earthquake shook the country’s far northwest province of West Azerbaijan. At least one report claimed the Tabriz facility may also have been attacked by drones.

As more details about the attack emerge, the biggest unknown is how Iran views the impact of this incident and how it will respond. In trying to begin to determine that, three indicators are worth watching.

First, will the attacks change Iranian plans related to their military facilities? This is among the most difficult assessments for various intelligence agencies. But just as Iran has done with much of its nuclear program, a decision by Iran to immediately harden its military production and storage facilities—or to increase the pace or scale, or alter the location of those currently being built—would indicate that the attacks had modified the thinking of Iranian defense leaders. Tehran may now believe that current facilities are insufficient and at greater risk for future attacks than it views as acceptable.

Second, Iran’s official media statements notwithstanding, did the attack in fact cause physical destruction that impacts the country’s development, production, or storage capabilities of ammunition or ballistic missiles? Ravid’s reported statement that the drone mission was achieved obviously runs counter to Iran’s claim of minimal damage. Which is true? That will be tough to ascertain without more details as to the specific target. But a clear decrease in the development, production, or transfer of critical military hardware by Iran would be an indicator that the attacks had a bigger impact than Iran is letting on. Conversely, if things are largely business as usual, it might suggest that the attacks were ultimately not as successful as Israel hoped in destroying or significantly disrupting whatever the ultimate targets.

Of course, the potential indicators related to both Iranian planning and the physical destruction do not discount an alternative possibility. The attacks may be less about specifically eliminating Iran’s facilities at Isfahan and more about testing the capacity to use drones against a target and Iran’s responses to such an attack. It is worth noting, for instance, that the explosion in Isfahan was relatively small. If this was in fact an Israeli test run, we should expect that at some point in the future—whether a few months or a few years—Israel will stage an operation with similar characteristics but in a different city and against a different type of target.

Finally, is Iran taking steps that suggest it plans to retailiate? While Iran often views responding to attacks as necessary to restore deterrence, it is notoriously patient. As a result, the absence of an immediate response cannot be, by default, read as Tehran viewing the incident as insignificant. Just a few weeks ago, for example, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi once again publicly promised to avenge the killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani that occurred over three years ago. But while Iran has lethal drones, a response by it should not be expected to look exactly the same as the attack. Iran’s asymmetric efforts go back decades as Tehran often looks to execute terrorist attacks globally against Israeli or Jewish targets. In June of last year, Turkish officials thwarted an Iranian plot to attack Israelis visiting Istanbul. In 2012, Iran sought to assassinate senior Israeli officials in India and Kenya. And Iran’s most infamous terrorist attack occurred almost three decades ago in 1994, when it bombed a Jewish community center in Argentina, killing eighty five and injuring more than three hundred people.

There are other methods of responding, as well. Iran’s cyber capabilities have greatly improved, for instance, and its 2020 cyberattack against Israel’s water system highlights a possible alternative. Regardless of method, Iran undertakes significant time and effort developing its attacks. Thus, if Tehran expends the energy to advance one in response to this incident, it also suggests that Iran considers this drone attack more damaging than it is letting on.

The truth is, it is too early to say exactly how Iran views this attack—or what exactly it was designed to do. But while it will take some patience, looking for the aforementioned indicators will start to help answer these questions.

Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and the former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East.

The views expressed in this publication are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the intelligence community, or any other US government agency.

The post What to make of the strikes in Iran? Watch these three indicators. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Boris Johnson: Stop worrying about Putin and ‘focus entirely on Ukraine’

Katherine Walla — Thu, 02 Feb 2023 01:16:31 +0000

Former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson wants the West to stop tiptoeing around Russian President Vladimir Putin’s threats and narratives.

“How can we seriously worry about provoking him when we have seen what he will do without the slightest provocation?” he asked at an Atlantic Council event on Wednesday. “We need to stop focusing on Putin and focus entirely on Ukraine” as it continues to fight for its sovereignty, European security, and democratic values.

That focus, Johnson urged, entails equipping Ukraine with “the stuff they need.” That includes Ukrainian requests for long-range missile systems, more armored vehicles, and fighter planes.

And what about escalation? Putin “won’t use nuclear weapons,” Johnson argued, because in such a case, China would likely draw back its support; India, African countries, and Latin American countries would likely turn against Russia; and the Russian people would face steep economic consequences. Not to mention, a nuclear strike wouldn’t end the war, and “the Ukrainians will probably fight on and win anyway,” he said.

Below are more highlights from the conversation, moderated by Atlantic Council Eurasia Center Senior Director John Herbst, a former US ambassador to Ukraine, as they discussed holding Russia accountable for war crimes, Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership, and more.

Weapons, stat

If allies can equip Ukraine with what it needs to win the war quickly, Johnson explained, they would save countless lives. But they would also “lift the threat of aggression” in places such as Georgia, Moldova, the Baltic states, and Eastern Europe—and end the risk of further disruption to the economy, energy supply, and food system.
By contrast, if allies fail to help Ukraine “win decisively,” that would ensure that Putin remains a threat to all those countries and regions—meaning that Americans will continue incurring costs for generations to help secure Europe, Johnson said. He warned those concerned about costs not to be “penny wise and pound foolish, or cent wise and dollar foolish, however you would put it here.”
Johnson said he doesn’t think it would take long to train Ukrainians up on Western fighter jets, as they “have proved themselves able to use our technology to massively destructive effect.” He also pushed back against critics who say that helping Ukraine drains Western arsenals, asking if there is any point in deploying tanks and planes in secure places such as North Carolina or Alsace. “The Ukrainians could be using them now, exactly where [the weapons] are needed” to protect the West’s collective security, Johnson said.
Johnson, who served as prime minister during the war’s early months before resigning amid scandal in July, claimed that “it was because of Brexit” that the United Kingdom was able to make decisions and take approaches that were “distinct from the old EU [European Union] approach” on Ukraine. “If we’d stuck to that,” he said, “I don’t believe we would have delivered” next generation light anti-tank weapons (NLAWs).
In addition to equipping Ukraine, the country’s allies must help hold Russia accountable for its apparent war crimes, said Johnson, who remains a Conservative Party member of Parliament. “We should give every possible support to the Ukrainians” throughout the efforts to collect evidence and the legal process “to allow them to assemble the cases against those who have committed atrocities.” Johnson added that it is “essential” that any Ukrainians who may have committed war crimes “should be brought to justice as well.”

The nightmare that could have been

Johnson commended US “military and financial” support, saying that without the United States’ efforts, “Putin would have taken Kyiv in the blitzkrieg that he planned,” which could have brought a “terrible darkness” to a “young and entirely innocent European democracy.” If the Kremlin had succeeded in its invasion, that would have emboldened it to “increase the intimidation and threats toward every country and region on the fringes of the Soviet empire,” Johnson added.
The fall of Kyiv, explained Johnson, would have told China “all they need to know about [the West’s] reluctance to stand up for freedom and democracy” and it would signal to every “opportunist autocrat” that international borders are “fungible” and could “be changed by force.”
Johnson warned that China is still watching how this invasion unfolds: “This is a dry run for Xi Jinping… [China wants] to see how it will go” because it has “objectives of [its] own.”

NATO’s “mistake”

Johnson reflected on how, before Russia’s invasion last February, there wasn’t a clear consensus among NATO allies about Ukraine’s membership—an ambiguity that Putin ultimately exploited. “We made a mistake,” Johnson explained, in telling Ukraine that NATO membership “was [in] the cards” without offering “any kind of real security guarantees.” Putin used that reassurance of membership “as a pretext” for invasion, Johnson said.
Johnson looked back at the argument that Ukrainian membership would provoke Russian aggression, calling it “now transparently absurd.” He pointed out that Russian aggression has unfolded even despite NATO’s “failure” to admit Ukraine into the Alliance. “Not having Ukraine in NATO produced the worst war in Europe [in] eighty years,” he said.
Now, Putin has “demolished any objections to Ukrainian membership,” Johnson explained. While he said he doesn’t believe that Ukraine “should be admitted forthwith” into NATO, he explained that “once the Ukrainians have won” the war, they should “begin the process of induction, both to NATO and of course to the EU.”

Katherine Walla is an associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

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Russia’s cyberwar against Ukraine offers vital lessons for the West

Yurii Shchyhol — Tue, 31 Jan 2023 17:47:28 +0000

Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is fast approaching the one-year mark, but the attack actually started more than a month before columns of Russian tanks began pouring across the border on February 24, 2022. In the middle of January, Russia launched a massive cyberattack that targeted more than 20 Ukrainian government institutions in a bid to cripple the country’s ability to withstand Moscow’s looming military assault.

The January 14 attack failed to deal a critical blow to Ukraine’s digital infrastructure, but it was an indication that the cyber front would play an important role in the coming war. One year on, it is no longer possible to separate cyberattacks from other aspects of Russian aggression. Indeed, Ukrainian officials are currently seeking to convince the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague to investigate whether Russian cyberattacks could constitute war crimes.

Analysis of the Russian cyberwarfare tactics used in Ukraine over the past year has identified clear links between conventional and cyber operations. Ukraine’s experience in countering these cyber threats can provide valuable lessons for the international community while offering a glimpse into a future where wars will be waged both by conventional means and increasingly in the borderless realm of cyberspace.

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The Russian cyberattack of January 2022 was not unprecedented. On the contrary, Ukraine has been persistently targeted since the onset of Russian aggression with the seizure of Crimea in spring 2014. One year later, Ukraine was the scene of the world’s first major cyberattack on a national energy system. In summer 2017, Ukraine was hit by what many commentators regard as the largest cyberattack in history. These high profile incidents were accompanied by a steady flow of smaller but nonetheless significant attacks.

Following the launch of Russia’s full-scale invasion one year ago, cyberattacks have frequently preceded or accompanied more conventional military operations. For example, prior to the Russian airstrike campaign against Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, Ukrainian energy companies experienced months of mounting cyberattacks.

These tactics are an attractive option for Russia in its undeclared war against the West. While more conventional acts of aggression would likely provoke an overwhelming reaction, cyberattacks exist in a military grey zone that makes them a convenient choice for the Kremlin as it seeks to cause maximum mayhem in Europe and North America without risking a direct military response. Russia may not be ready to use tanks and missiles against the West, but Moscow will have fewer reservations about deploying the cyberwarfare tactics honed in Ukraine.

In addition to disrupting and disabling government bodies and vital infrastructure, Russian cyberattacks in Ukraine have also sought to manipulate public opinion and spread malware via compromised email accounts. The Ukrainian authorities have found that it is crucial to coordinate efforts with the public and share information with a wide range of stakeholders in order to counter attacks in a timely manner.

The effects of cyberattacks targeting Ukraine have already been felt far beyond the country’s borders. One attack on the satellite communication system used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces during the initial stages of the Russian invasion caused significant disruption for thousands of users across the European Union including private individuals and companies. Given the borderless nature of the digital landscape, similar scenarios are inevitable as cyberwarfare capabilities continue to expand.

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From a Russian perspective, cyberwarfare is particularly appealing as it requires fewer human resources than traditional military operations. While Moscow is struggling to find enough men and military equipment to compensate for the devastating losses suffered in Ukraine during the first year of the invasion, the Kremlin should have no trouble finding enough people with the tech skills to launch cyber offensives against a wide range of countries in addition to Ukraine.

Russia can draw from a large pool of potential recruits including volunteers motivated by Kremlin propaganda positioning the invasion of Ukraine as part of a civilizational struggle against the West. Numerous individual attacks against Western targets have already been carried out by such networks.

At the same time, Ukraine’s experience over the past year has underlined that cyberattacks require both time and knowledge to prepare. This helps explain why there have been fewer high-complexity cyber offensives following the initial failure of Russia’s invasion strategy in spring 2022. Russia simply did not expect Ukraine to withstand the first big wave of cyberattacks and did not have sufficient plans in place for such an eventuality.

Ukraine has already carried out extensive studies of Russian cyberwarfare. Thanks to this powerful experience, we have increasing confidence in our ability to withstand further attacks. However, in order to maximize defensive capabilities, the entire Western world must work together. This must be done with a sense of urgency. The Putin regime is desperately seeking ways to regain the initiative in Ukraine and may attempt bold new offensives on the cyber front. Even if Russia is defeated, it is only a matter of time before other authoritarian regimes attempt to wage cyberwars against the West.

The democratic world must adapt its military doctrines without delay to address cyberspace-based threats. Cyberattacks must be treated in the same manner as conventional military aggression and should be subject to the same uncompromising responses. Efforts must also be made to prevent authoritarian regimes from accessing technologies that could subsequently be weaponized against the West.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is in many ways the world’s first cyberwar but it will not be the last. In the interests of global security, Russia must be defeated on the cyber front as well as on the battlefields of Ukraine.

Yurii Shchyhol is head of Ukraine’s State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection.

Thomas S. Warrick

Forward Defense Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

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What Western tanks will mean for Ukraine

Atlantic Council — Wed, 25 Jan 2023 17:49:49 +0000

JUST IN

Tanks for the help. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced today that Berlin will send Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine—and allow other European nations to send their own. President Joe Biden then announced that the United States will in turn send its own M1 Abrams tanks. What difference will these deliveries make on the battlefield as Russia’s invasion nears the one-year mark? What does Germany’s move, after much delay, signal about its approach to the war effort? Our experts are rumbling in.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

John Herbst (@JohnEdHerbst): Senior director of the Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine
Chris Skaluba (@ACScowcroft): Director of the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and former principal director for European and NATO policy at the US Defense Department
Leah Scheunemann (@LeahScheun): Deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and former Pentagon official focused on international security policy and Senate Armed Services Committee professional staff member
Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried): Weiser family distinguished fellow and former US ambassador to Poland

Treads on the ground

The tanks are a “significant step forward” in the race to arm Ukraine, John tells us, and the timing is critical.
With Russia making “minor gains” near Bakhmut and Soledar in eastern Ukraine, as well as launching “small offensive operations in the Zaporizhzhia region,” John says, “the tanks will help Ukraine defend its positions with fewer casualties in both locations. They will also prove invaluable if Moscow launches a major offensive from Belarus or elsewhere this year—something that Ukraine’s intelligence services expect.”
And if the promised tanks arrive in the next few months (which is no sure thing), they could be a part of Ukraine’s next big push, John adds: “On the flat terrain in Ukraine’s east and south, they could spearhead the counteroffensive.”
Those will need to be Leopards, because the thirty-one pledged US Abrams tanks won’t be arriving soon. Leah points out that the Abrams will be drawn from the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, “which is on a longer timeline and a pot intentionally meant to secure Ukraine over the long term. This isn’t the decisive assistance needed for spring offensives.”
But Leah says these delays should not be cause for concern in Kyiv. They are, rather, a signal of US long-term backing: “This package could take months to arrive, will take months to train on, and would likely include sustainment and repair assistance for the future—further solidifying the promise of US support for Ukraine’s victory.”
In recent weeks, the intensifying public squabbling over whether to send the tanks had exposed divisions in the West. “Ukraine clearly believed that the tactical advantages the tanks will provide on the battlefield were worth the risk of public infighting among Ukraine’s supporters,” Chris says. “It looks like that bet has paid out.”

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‘Zeitenwende’ zeitgeist

The pressure was greatest on Germany, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and allied countries—particularly Poland, Dan points out—pressing for the Leopards. In Dan’s view, “the Germans were working through the collapse of their long-held assumptions about Russia, namely that dialogue was always the answer and cooperation was achievable.”
While the outside pressure mattered, Dan says Berlin acted because “Germans could see for themselves what Putin’s Russia has become: a bloodthirsty aggressor bent on conquest and killing.”
The move signifies a new approach to Russia across the West, Dan argues: “That policy starts with support for Ukraine on the battlefield and in the future, and realism about Russia as an adversary that needs to be contained and weakened so it can no longer start wars or otherwise commit aggression.”

The next ask

The tanks are welcome, but “Zelenskyy will no doubt return to his successful playbook to pressure allies for more,” such as longer-range artillery and fighter jets, Chris says.
That dynamic contributed to Germany’s “brake-pumping,” Chris said, based on Berlin’s “misguided belief” that it could control whether the war escalates. “The intensity of this most recent debate suggests Zelenskyy’s balancing act will only become more difficult as he keeps pushing for help.” And any serious disagreement among allies represents a “strategic victory for the Kremlin,” he adds.
Long-range artillery and missiles—with a range up to three hundred kilometers—“would enable a fast and successful counteroffensive,” John says, by enabling Ukraine to hit Russian logistical centers that are set up just outside the current artillery range.
“At some point, Washington will likely relent and send these systems,” John tells us. “But the delay only increases the cost for Ukraine in casualties and lengthens the war. The United States can and should do better.”

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The West reaps multiple benefits from backing Ukraine against Russia

Taras Kuzio — Thu, 12 Jan 2023 16:43:23 +0000

As it continues to fight against Russia’s ongoing invasion, Ukraine is often depicted as being heavily reliant on Western military and economic support. However, this relationship is not as one-sided as it might initially appear. Western backing has indeed been crucial in helping Ukraine defend itself, but the democratic world also reaps a wide range of benefits from supporting the Ukrainian war effort.

Critics of Western support for Ukraine tend to view this aid through a one-dimensional lens. They see only costs and risks while ignoring a number of obvious advantages.

The most important of these advantages are being won on the battlefield. In short, Ukraine is steadily destroying Russia’s military potential. This dramatically reduces the threat posed to NATO’s eastern flank. In time, it should allow the Western world to focus its attention on China.

During the initial period of his presidency, Joe Biden is believed to have felt that the US should “park Russia” in order to concentrate on the far more serious foreign policy challenge posed by Beijing. Ukraine’s military success is now helping to remove this dilemma.

Defeat in Ukraine would relegate Russia from the ranks of the world’s military superpowers and leave Moscow facing years of rebuilding before it could once again menace the wider region. Crucially, by supporting Ukraine, the West is able to dramatically reduce Russia’s military potential without committing any of its own troops or sustaining casualties.

Backing Ukraine today makes a lot more strategic sense than allowing Putin to advance and facing a significantly strengthened Russian military at a later date. As former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates wrote recently in The Washington Post, “The way to avoid confrontation with Russia in the future is to help Ukraine push back the invader now. This is the lesson of history that should guide us, and it lends urgency to the actions that must be taken, before it is too late.”

If this lesson is ignored and Ukraine is defeated, Russia will almost certainly go further and attack NATO member countries such as the Baltic nations, Finland, or Poland. At that point, it will no longer be possible to avoid significant NATO casualties.

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The international response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also reshaped the geopolitical landscape far from the battlefield. Since February 2022, it has reinvigorated the West as a political force.

The war has given NATO renewed purpose and brought about the further enlargement of the military alliance in Scandinavia with the recent membership applications of Sweden and Finland. The EU is also more united than ever and has now overcome a prolonged crisis of confidence brought about by the rise of populist nationalist movements.

In the energy sector, Putin’s genocidal invasion has finally forced a deeply reluctant Europe to confront its debilitating dependency on Russian oil and gas. This has greatly improved European security and robbed the Kremlin of its ability to blackmail Europe with weaponized energy exports. It now looks likely that the era of corrupt energy sector collaboration with the Kremlin is now drawing to a close, in Europe at least.

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Western support for Ukraine is bringing a variety of practical military gains. While Ukraine’s Western partners provide Ukraine with vital battlefield intelligence, Ukraine returns the favor by offering equally valuable intelligence on the quality and effectiveness of Russian troops, military equipment, and tactics. The events of the past ten months have confirmed that pre-war perceptions of the Russian army were wildly inaccurate. Thanks to Ukraine’s unique experience and insights, Western military planners now have a far more credible picture of Moscow’s true military capabilities.

Ukraine’s MacGyver-like ability to adapt and deploy NATO weapons using Soviet-era platforms could prove extremely useful to the alliance in future conflicts. Ukrainian troops have proven quick to learn how to use Western weapons, often requiring far shorter training periods than those allocated to Western troops.

The innovative use of digital technologies by the Ukrainian military also offers invaluable lessons for their Western counterparts. Ukraine’s widespread deployment of Elon Musk’s Starlink system in front line locations is unprecedented in modern warfare and offers rare insights for all NATO countries.

Similarly, the war in Ukraine is highlighting the increasingly critical role of drone technologies. This is building on the experience of the Second Karabakh War in 2020, when Israeli and Turkish drones played an important part in Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia.

Russia failed to invest sufficient resources into the development of military drones and has been forced to rely on relatively unsophisticated Iranian drones. In contrast, Ukraine enjoys a strong military partnership with Turkey that includes a deepening drone component. Turkey’s Bayraktar drones gained iconic status during the early stages of the Russian invasion. The company has since confirmed plans to build a manufacturing plant in Ukraine.

In addition to these Turkish drones, Ukraine’s powerful volunteer movement and tech-savvy military have created a myriad of drone solutions to address the challenges of today’s battlefield. Ukraine’s rapidly evolving drone technologies are extremely interesting to Western military planners and will be studied in great detail for years to come.

Ever since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, Ukrainian forces have fused courageous fighting spirit with advanced intelligence and innovative use of battle management software. “Tenacity, will, and harnessing the latest technology give the Ukrainians a decisive advantage,” noted General Mark Milley, the current US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The relationship between Ukraine and the country’s Western partners is very much a two-way street bringing significant benefits and strategic advantages to both sides. While Ukraine is receiving critical military and economic support, the Western world is benefiting from improved security along with important intelligence and unique battlefield experience. There is clearly a strong moral case for standing with Ukraine, but it is worth underlining that the strategic argument is equally convincing.

Taras Kuzio is professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the forthcoming “Russia’s War and Genocide Against Ukrainians.”

Justin Conelli: What another Patriot battery will do for Ukraine

Once again, the weapons are welcome but too long delayed

The news this week that the United States, France, and Germany are providing light armor to Ukraine—not tanks—is a welcome but late step that continues the pattern of Western arms supplies from the three countries to Ukraine. Going back to last winter before Moscow launched its massive invasion, all three countries have hesitated before sending Ukraine the weapons it needs. That started with Javelins and Stingers, and continued with MiG fighters, anti-ship missiles, longer-range artillery (to eighty-five kilometers), and Patriots and other air-defense systems.

The good news is that supply is becoming more sophisticated. But the slow pace means that the war lasts longer than necessary and desirable. The Biden administration needs to state that its clear objective is to help Ukraine make the Russian presence in Ukraine untenable. The smart way to do that is to provide Kyiv the still longer-range artillery, missiles and drones (to three hundred kilometers), tanks, and aircraft (F-16s) enabling Ukraine to sever the land bridge to Crimea and thereby force a Russian retreat from southern Ukraine, making it extremely difficult for Russia to supply its military and more in Crimea.

—John Herbst is the senior director of the Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

France leads the way in European security—and could strain relations with Germany

The announcement of France supplying AMX-10 RC light tanks following a phone call between the French and Ukrainian presidents came at a surprising time given that the visit by the French minister of defense to Kyiv just a few days ago provided the opportunity for such an announcement. The French decision and communication in that regard sends clear signals on the evolving French policy in support of Ukraine: Since last February, France has supported Ukraine in all dimensions (including helping to organize the “Standing with the Ukrainian People” conference in Paris) but, to many observers, the military component was falling short. There was little communication around defense issues and limited deliveries, although France did send critical Caesar howitzers and helped fund the European Peace Facility—which has backed the Ukrainian armed forces.

It is not only significant that France decided to go forward with delivering such military gear without other Western partners (its announcement coming a day ahead of Germany and the United States), but that France emphasized that it is indeed sending tanks. (Whether AMX-10 RCs are actually tanks is an open question for military experts.)

The delivery may not be the decisive military move to allow Ukraine to face the expected Russian offensive in spring. Instead, it is much more a political move: Coming a few weeks before the French-German Summit, the signal is not good for the two countries’ relationship. It is too soon to tell the impact of French leadership in Europe, but France, more than Germany, seized the importance to demonstrate that a European country can also lead the way forward. Demonstrating its reliability as a partner behind Ukraine is a prerequisite to have its voice heard when the time comes to design a new European security architecture along with Ukraine and NATO allies.

—Marie Jourdain is a visiting fellow at the Europe Center and previously worked for the French Ministry of Defense’s Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy.

Berlin’s hand was forced by Washington and Paris

The German government’s decision to join the United States and France in providing infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine follows a familiar pattern in Berlin’s support for Kyiv—better late than never. The commitment to send a significant number of Marder tanks finally does away with one of Germany’s biggest phantom debates—largely conducted with itself—about the escalation potential of tank deliveries vis-à-vis Moscow. One can only hope Thursday’s coordinated action will focus minds in Germany on what Ukraine actually needs to push back Russia’s aggression. The addition of one Patriot system to the package—one of the more valuable and rare assets of the German armed forces—and talk of more Gepard anti-aircraft guns that have proven effective against Russian drones are a strong sign in the right direction too.

But allies should still temper expectations of a fundamentally new quality of German leadership from the decision to deliver Marders and Patriots amid Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s proclaimed Zeitenwende policy shift. Scholz can say his government stuck to the much-repeated principle of Germany not moving alone and only in conjunction with allies. But in Thursday’s announcement, Berlin once again looked like its hand was forced by Washington and Paris and it did the right, overdue thing only when left with no other options. Voices among Scholz’s Green and liberal coalition partners acknowledge that the Marders should have gone to Kyiv last spring. The strategic and mentality shifts a successful Zeitenwende will require have yet to fully materialize. Or to put it in terms of Scholz’s 2021 domestic campaign promise—that’s not (yet) the German leadership any of his allies ordered.

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Europe Center.

What another Patriot battery will do for Ukraine

Germany’s recent commitment to provide a Patriot missile battery to Ukraine comes at a time when air-defense capabilities represent Kyiv’s most pressing near-term requirement for Western support. The ruthless Russian strike campaign targeting critical infrastructure and key resources is enacting a terrible toll on Ukraine and its civilian population, which will only accelerate as brutal winter conditions continue to set it. The barrage of ballistic missile and drone strikes not only terrorizes population centers, it also serves to deplete Ukrainian air-defense munition stocks, with Russia often enjoying the asymmetric advantage of relatively cheap loitering munitions being intercepted by very expensive air-defense missiles.

On the front lines in the Donbas, slow attritional warfare is taking place across more entrenched and defensible positions than previously seen. As Ukrainian air-defense capabilities continue to dwindle, Kyiv will have to make difficult prioritization decisions to either protect cities from Russian strategic bombardment or defend front-line positions. This type of prioritization could allow for more damaging operations by Russian Aerospace Forces in areas left vulnerable by the lack of air defenses. The Patriot missile battery provided by Germany, coupled with the one from the United States (along with a steady supply of munitions), will be critical to Ukraine protecting its cities and securing hard-won positional gains while simultaneously defending against localized offensive operations by Russian forces.

—Justin Conelli is the senior US Air Force fellow in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice.

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Transforming from arms importer to trendsetter: Assessing the growth of Turkey’s defense industries

Can Kasapoglu — Thu, 22 Dec 2022 16:54:08 +0000

Turkey, over the last few years, has built a robust defense sector that has enabled more freedom of space for the Turkish Armed Forces in pursuing Ankara’s policies. Additionally, it has expanded exports that have grown the country’s geopolitical outreach and defense diplomacy capacity.

In the 2000s, the Turkish government registered a visible leap in its defense modernization efforts. By 2004, marking a milestone, Turkey’s Executive Committee of Defense Industries canceled several acquisition projects worth US$11 billion in total. The main idea was encouraging more national industrial involvement in conventional war-fighting assets. Since then, Turkish military-industrial capacity has been on a steady and reliable growth route.

Ankara’s defense modernization strategic plans from 2012 to 2021 boosted national industries’ involvement in ambitious projects. A 2018 to 2022 defense industry sectoral strategy document set the sky-is-the-limit objective of “technology and sub-systems ownership to facilitate a sustainable defense industry” to further the country’s newly developing strategic autonomy efforts. An updated 2019-2023 strategic plan prioritizes, for the first time, the generation of an elite workforce and technological transformation to enable future techno-scientific breakthroughs.

Drone warfare offers a solid example in this respect. Turkish drones, specifically Baykar’s Bayraktar TB-2, marked a significant footprint in the Russia-Ukraine War. Turkey is also contributing to rebuilding Ukraine’s navy with indigenous Ada-class MILGEM corvettes, and supporting the Ukrainian army with Kirpi MRAP (mine-resistant and ambush-protected) fighting vehicles.

Moreover, drone sales have helped the country improve ties with Turkic states such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, and even establish new ties with various other countries such as Poland, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia.

Overall, Turkish industries can now design, produce, modernize, and export—at varying levels of domestic contribution—some core conventional arms and equipment such as corvettes, fire support systems, unmanned aircraft systems, gliding munitions for drones, joint-direct attack munitions, across-the-spectrum land warfare platforms (except for main battle tanks), grenade launchers, and tactical anti-material rifles. On the other hand, the defense sector demands international cooperation, marking the limits of independence, at least at the time being, on strategic weapons and high-end arms, such as exo-atmospheric ballistic missile defense, fifth-generation tactical military aviation, air-independent propulsion submarines, and space-based assets. The country’s sensor and radar infrastructure is deeply integrated into NATO architecture and connected through a web of data links to the transatlantic network. Turkish defense modernization plans cannot quickly alter this critical sensor architecture given Turkey’s current shortfalls in high-tech command-control nodes, algorithmic warfare capacity, and battle networks. In these areas, Turkish military capacity will keep relying on NATO capabilities for the foreseeable future. When it comes to drone warfare, however, Turkish unmanned systems proliferation is a pioneering force for the rest of the allies, especially in the eastern flank.

Enter the Powerhouse

The driving success behind the Turkish defense technological and industrial base is not merely about weapon systems proliferation, not even drone proliferation on its own. In essence, the country’s defense economics remain in good shape despite the Covid-19 pandemic’s shrinking effects.

Between 2020 and 2021, defense revenue increased by almost 15 percent, while the revenue coming from foreign contracts went up by 42 percent. Some figures optimistically suggest that this number might be as high as 48 percent. As for certain actors, first and foremost Baykar, foreign contracts constitute more than 90 percent of the revenue, marking an impressive outlook.

Most importantly, the volume of research and development activities, the main force that drives the technological edge of the defense industry, recently increased by 30 percent. Furthermore, in 2021, the industry employed over seventy-five thousand people. In other words, the Turkish defense technology generation has a sharp and reliable base. Therefore, despite the negative effects of the pandemic, the industry recovered quickly and revenue climbed back to pre-pandemic levels. Most of the growth in the country’s defense industry came from land platforms (with revenue of $2.347 billion, followed by the weaponry & ammunition and missile segments. The two latter categories showed a significant increase compared with 2020. The highest number of transactions was made in the civil aviation and weaponry & ammunition segments. Since 2020, Turkey also made progress in terms of reducing its defense imports (with a reduction of 4.58 percent) while maintaining somewhat stable export levels. This was a difficult balance to strike, especially given the disruptive impact that the pandemic had on global production and supply chains. The most sensational segment, namely drone warfare assets, is fast rising too. Together, Tusaş and Baykar, the two primary drone makers, secured more than $1 billion in exports in 2021, though the former has a broader export portfolio.

Turkish drone warfare solutions are growing large in diversity and concepts of operations flexibility. Akinci of Baykar, for example, is a high-end system with a heavy combat payload capacity, including cruise missile certification. Aksungur of Tusaş, on the other hand, can be equipped with anti-submarine warfare and maritime patrol assets. The country is offering other solutions too, such as the anti-radiation loitering munitions of Lentatek, Kargu, and the soon-to-be-unveiled turbofan-engine loyal wingman Kizilelma, along with a rising naval unmanned surface combat fleet.

In early 2022, Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) announced that the industry will be upscaling and catalyzing ongoing indigenous projects to shield the country from potential external sanctions.

Even more importantly, the nation’s defense industry is expanding with a growing number of stakeholders, making it a more diverse effort. The number of projects in the industry has reached 750, made by over 1,500 local defense firms. In 2022, Turkey reached a record defense export volume of over $3 billion and might come close to $4 billion by the end of the year, making the country’s export volume comparable to some European nations’ overall defense budgets. Finally, clients are diversifying. The number of customers in the defense export portfolio has reached 170 countries. The Turkish weapons market is also a lucrative one for foreign suppliers. Despite the pandemic, defense spending is steady. Open-source works reveal that in 2018, Ankara spent some $12.98 billion in defense, ranking it seventh within NATO and eighteenth in the world. In 2021, even amid the global health crisis, Turkey spent more than $15 billion on defense and military projects. Moreover, its indigenous defense industries reported a turnover of more than $10 billion.

Marking the critical mass: Limits and prospects

The affordability of Turkish arms, flexibility of Turkey’s arms exports policy, and the country’s willingness to run technology transfers remain Turkey’s advantages compared with its Western competitors.

The technological and industrial base of Turkey’s defense sector has reached a critical mass in some ways. Still, given present defense economics trends and the sophistication of technological knowledge, Turkey’s defense ecosystem will continue to rely on bilateral and multilateral collaboration. The direction of Turkey’s fifth-generation airpower, as well as long-range and high-altitude air and missile defense weapon systems, thus remains to be seen.

Can Kasapoglu is a non-resident senior fellow at Hudson Institute, and the director of the Security & Defense Research Program at Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) in Istanbul. Follow him on Twitter @ckasapoglu1.

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Scoping the gray zone: Defining terms and policy priorities for engaging competitors below the threshold of conflict

Atlantic Council's Gray Zone Task Force — Thu, 22 Dec 2022 12:28:35 +0000

TO: US National Security Community

FROM: Atlantic Council’s Gray Zone Task Force

DATE: December 22, 2022

SUBJECT: Scoping the gray zone: Defining terms and policy priorities for engaging competitors below the threshold of conflict

In October, the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice convened current and former practitioners and other experts for a private workshop under its Adding Color to the Gray Zone project, which seeks to advance a US and allied strategic framework for hybrid conflict. Participants discussed what actions should and should not be encompassed by the term “gray zone,” the value in defining the gray zone and hybrid conflict, and the most pressing issues for the United States to address in this realm.

Strategic context

Through hybrid conflict or warfare, US adversaries are blurring the lines between peace and war, in a space often referred to as the gray zone. Without firing a single bullet, US adversaries are striking at the fibers of US and allied societies, economies, and governments to test confidence in systems that underwrite both the US constitutional republic and the US-led, rules-based international order. Gray zone competition is a critical and practical element of twenty-first-century security. The ability of the United States to defend against gray zone threats and leverage its advantages for national imperatives will affect its competitive edge in the coming years. There is much debate, however, around what the gray zone and hybrid conflict or warfare signify. While reaching agreement on this terminology is a critical first step for any strategy, it serves only as the early pages of any strategy, and US adversaries are chapters ahead in their respective playbooks.

The value of defining key terms

While definitions for the gray zone and hybrid conflict or warfare are critical for stakeholder synchronization and coordination, reaching consensus on such terminology is neither practical nor worth the effort beyond a common critical mass accomplished through working definitions versus absolute ones. This analysis adopts the following working definitions:

The gray zone is the space in which defensive and offensive activity occurs above the level of cooperation and below the threshold of armed conflict. Gray zone operations, activities, and actions (OAA) are often, but not always, clandestine, covert, unofficial, or outside accepted norms of behavior. Gray zone OAA are aimed at undermining the security of the target entity or projecting the national or organizational interest of the initiator but without triggering active armed conflict. While the gray zone can be thought of chronologically (i.e., after peace, before active hostilities), it is referred to spatially to reflect that this is not necessarily the case. In fact, gray zone activity can occur during active armed conflict between actors.
Hybrid conflict (also referred to as hybrid warfare) is a subset of statecraft that uses the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) levers of national power across the competition continuum, including cooperation, competition (including gray zone OAA), deterrence, and armed conflict for the purposes of achieving national security objective(s) against a state or non-state actor(s). DIME has expanded to include financial, intelligence, law, and development levers, with acronyms such as MIDFIELD and DIMEFIL created to account for this. The continued use of DIME bridges the gap between past and present generations of practitioners and remains consistent with the security community’s default verbiage.

These working definitions are meant to offer a meeting point for further discussion, as the task force recognizes and welcomes debate about what is and is not considered gray zone OAA or hybrid conflict. Providing an 80 percent solution allows us to go beyond definitions and begin tackling the tougher and more substantive question of how the United States and its allies and partners act and respond in the gray zone.

According to these definitions, one might argue that few methods do not fall under the gray zone; everything from political speeches and economic policies to legal agreements and information operations, all the way up to arms sales and active armed conflict, may fall under the umbrella of hybrid conflict. This broad lens, however, deliberately offers a strategic shift in the way in which security threats are viewed. Given that security today is shaped by conventional military threats as well as unconventional military and nonmilitary threats, it compels us to redefine what is meant by conflict and consider it as a spectrum persisting well beyond the physical battlefield, threatening not just the lives of American warfighters but also the American way of life. In a sense, the gray zone can be viewed as a distinct (and limitless) domain, with hybrid conflict the activity that falls within this realm. This does not indicate a novelty in the nature of warfare so much as how war is characterized.

This characterization is another area where a strategic competitor like China is ahead of the United States. Chinese doctrinal literature like Unrestricted Warfare and concepts such as the “Three Warfares” have characterized conflict with the United States in this way for nearly thirty years. It is also consistent with theater campaign plans, which provide guidance to US geographic combatant commanders for coordinating Phase Zero activities shaping the battlespace, and ironically, with Sun Tzu’s quote that “every battle is won before it is ever fought.”

Putting definitions into context

What falls within the gray zone? Put simply, it depends. Gray zone activity persists in a delta of norms, wherein the United States, its allies, and its adversaries are all playing by distinct sets of rules and thus work under different thresholds for conflict.

Beyond lexicon, policymakers need to consider the real-world applications of the gray zone terminology, recognizing that target (who or what is being targeted) and intent (what end state the actor is aiming to accomplish) are two key variables in the gray zone equation, and they affect whether actions are characterized as gray zone activity or ordinary statecraft. Identical policy actions might be classified differently depending on whether they intentionally coerce or deter a specific target. For example, when is policy categorized as purely economic versus coercive? While US government investment requires promise of at least breaking even, China subsidizes its private sector even when a deal is projected to lose money—the former policy satisfies economic interests, whereas the latter points to an ulterior motive.

Furthermore, whether an act is classified as hybrid often depends on where one sits: The US government commonly views its own actions as statecraft while cataloging the same or similar actions conducted by adversaries as hybrid conflict. For example, the 2022 National Defense Strategy characterizes only competitor approaches as falling within the gray zone, even while referencing comparable US and allied methods. Similarly, the enemy always gets a vote, and while the United States may consider certain actions as operational preparation of the environment, competitors may view them as acts of aggression, hostility, or even war. In parallel, the way in which the United States defines and acts in the gray zone affects whether allies and partners follow suit. Definitional and values-driven consensus can ensure like-minded nations and organizations are on the same page when it comes to hybrid conflict.

Key priorities in the gray zone

Countering Chinese and Russian malign activities and deterring aggression. Specific priorities in the gray zone should be framed around the broader strategic goal of preventing and responding to Chinese and Russian hybrid threats. China and Russia are the United States’ key strategic competitors, and nowhere is this more evident than in the gray zone. China leverages hybrid activity to protect its brand of authoritarianism (for example, power projection through its Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure projects), whereas Russia aims to weaken NATO and command its near abroad (e.g., the use of unmarked “Little Green Men” to seize Crimea in 2014). Both China and Russia have long leveraged gray zone activity to inflict significant information, influence, intelligence, and technical losses on the United States and allies. How they manifest hybrid conflict, however, differs: Russia fuses military and nonmilitary methods to sow chaos, while China’s approach is far more pervasive and employs continuous nonmilitary operations to offset US military superiority. The United States’ recognition of a broadening paradigm from legacy traditional deterrence of its adversaries to increased focus on information and influence is central to the integrated deterrence mandated by the US National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy.

Adapting to the information age. Emerging technologies continue to revolutionize how people and nations receive and consume information, necessarily changing the way in which information activity is conducted in the gray zone. Technological advancements are transforming both the hybrid threats facing the United States and the tools at its disposal. For example, for all its good, technological innovation has also caused supply chain sensitivities vulnerable to adversarial exploitation including through industrial espionage, intellectual property theft, and cyberattacks. US entities need to become more creative in anticipating such threats and solving for them, such as through obfuscating data and reducing an adversary’s confidence. Another example is found in open-source intelligence (OSINT). With the proliferation of social media, OSINT can be just as critical as classified sources and methods of intelligence—yet the US government’s traditional bias toward classified intelligence is hindering its ability to stay ahead in the information domain. This space is ripe for public-private partnership, as vulnerabilities are not necessarily housed in US government entities but rather in assets and infrastructure not traditionally or organically protected by the government or military (e.g., social media platforms).

Involving economic policies and institutions. Any discussion of the gray zone is incomplete without adequate consideration of economic policies and their key stakeholders. Economic strategy is a key component of strategic competition, with industrial policy, debt financing, and sovereign debt policy being among the policies leveraged by China and Russia to meet their own strategic ends. Furthermore, US adversaries are targeting the commercial sector, shifting much of the impetus for action on economic and private sector actors that should play a leading role in the gray zone. Civil and commercial partnerships will be a cornerstone of a US response in the gray zone, and the private sector must be strengthened against economic coercion and intellectual property theft or risk weakening the US strategic approach.

The way forward

Gray zone threats are a whole-of-nation problem and should prompt a whole-of-nation response. While the United States currently views the gray zone largely through a military or intelligence framework, and a defensive one at that, other US departments and agencies, commercial stakeholders, and international entities have a major—in some cases leading—role to play.[1] A cohesive US strategy, perhaps coordinated by an entity independent of practitioner equities, is necessary to synchronize and optimize US government and commercial actors and their efforts in this space.

Such a strategy must be well resourced and well articulated. The United States should look past traditional military personnel to build out its hybrid response, creating new paradigms that do not necessarily adhere to the legacy system(s) but involve relevant stakeholders who can view the adversary without political and/or military bias. Moreover, the United States should update the training of its diplomatic corps to ensure its cadre understands the inner workings of key institutions central to their job description. Additionally, communicating with and educating a public audience will be a foundational requirement for gray zone efforts, as society at large must recognize that the United States is routinely fighting in the gray zone and citizens must understand the ways in which they play a role. This approach has precedence in World Wars I and II, and even the Cold War. Consistent and synchronized messaging across the government will help maintain the effectiveness and credibility of the messaging needed to deter adversaries from using hybrid methods.

The Atlantic Council’s Gray Zone Task Force consists of technical and policy experts, former government officials, and private sector executives. These individuals leverage their deep knowledge and extensive experience in impacted and impactful industries to examine adversarial acts in the gray zone and determine how the United States and its allies and partners can leverage hybrid tactics to meet their own strategic ends.

Explore Adding Color to the Gray Zone

Adding color to the gray zone: Establishing a strategic framework for hybrid conflict

Investigating nontraditional and hybrid threats across the competition continuum, proposing a US and allied approach to acting, reacting, and prevailing in the gray zone throughout an era of strategic competition.

John Herbst: A powerful message sent to Moscow, with one awkward moment

The post Scoping the gray zone: Defining terms and policy priorities for engaging competitors below the threshold of conflict appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: The lasting impact of Zelenskyy’s Washington visit

Atlantic Council experts — Wed, 21 Dec 2022 13:43:36 +0000

He’s the talk of this town. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who has captivated the world by rallying his country against a Russian invasion, visited Washington on Wednesday—his first trip out of the country in three hundred days of war. With stops at the White House and the Capitol, what messages did Zelenskyy send to US President Joe Biden, members of Congress, and the American people? What does this trip mean for him and for Ukraine? Here’s your expert guide to this historic visit. We’ll continue updating it as contributions roll in.

Watch Zelenskyy’s address to Congress

Click to jump to an expert reaction:

Analysis of Zelenskyy’s appearances at the White House and Congress

Rachel Rizzo: Don’t expect a shift from Biden on long-range weapons

Melinda Haring: Zelenskyy’s shrewd speech should make an impression on Congress

Doug Klain: Zelenskyy strikes another contrast with Putin on the world stage

Yevgeniya Gaber: In the global war for democracy, Ukraine’s patriots need American Patriots

Analysis ahead of Zelenskyy’s arrival in Washington

John Herbst: Zelenskyy wants more advanced weapons and explicit support for a Ukrainian victory

Daniel Fried: The visit shows why the US is still the leader of the Free World

Melinda Haring: An attempt to ‘defuse the problem’ at the White House

Andriy Zagorodnyuk: A courageous Zelenskyy arrives at a pivotal moment in the war

Peter Dickinson: A plan to consolidate US support for a long struggle

Ian Brzezinski: A time for Washington to shed its exaggerated fear of escalation

Matthew Kroenig: Ukraine wants to be able to shoot the archer, not just the arrows

A powerful message sent to Moscow, with one awkward moment

Zelenskyy’s visit was a success for presidents Biden and Zelenskyy and strengthened the US-Ukraine relationship. With this visit, Ukraine received the Patriot air-defense system, the most advanced weapon system that the United States has yet to provide. This served as a clear message to Moscow that US investment in Ukraine’s defense will only grow. Zelenskyy’s cordial meeting with Biden and enthusiastically received address to Congress further underscored this.

At the same time, the visit also made clear the ongoing nuances in the bilateral relationship. The decision to provide Patriots is very important, but the United States is still reluctant to provide the longer range artillery, tanks, and fighter jets that would expedite Ukraine’s victory. That victory is very much in US interests, because Vladimir Putin’s revisionist objectives go beyond Ukraine and threaten NATO allies. Biden’s one awkward moment during this visit came in the press conference when he was trying to explain why the United States would not provide offensive weapons. Zelenskyy came to the United States to enhance his relationship with Biden, so he did not directly challenge him on this; but in his congressional address he made a low-key pitch for more advanced weapons.

Many commentators are referring to Zelenskyy’s visit as an historic one. That is true only if Ukraine wins this war. Ukraine will win if US support for Ukraine does not wane; and that victory will come faster if the White House decides to send the weapons Ukraine is requesting. Zelenskyy’s visit was certainly a contribution to such an outcome.

—John Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

Don’t expect a shift from Biden on long-range weapons

Zelenskyy comes to Washington at the right time: The 118^th Congress (with Republicans at the helm at the House of Representatives) commences on January 3, and the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion is just around the corner. To be clear, he deserved a hero’s welcome, and he got one. Zelenskyy hoped for two things during his visit: to thank the American people and ensure continued unity within the next Congress in terms of military and financial support to Ukraine, and to convince the Biden administration to send increasingly lethal weaponry, including the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).

During his visit, the Biden administration formally announced the shipment of the Patriot missile-defense system to Ukraine, which is good news (and something the Ukrainians have sought over the last few months). But the aim of the United States—to both support Ukraine while ensuring the United States and NATO don’t get pulled into a broader war—will continue to preclude the shipment of the sort of weaponry Zelenskyy really wants. At a White House press conference alongside Zelenskyy, Biden said about Ukraine: “I’ve never seen NATO and the EU more united about anything at all, and I see no sign of there being any change.” However, when asked about the ATACMS, Biden said that NATO is “not looking to go to war with Russia” and that that specific weaponry could shatter NATO unity. That should give us at least somewhat of a clear sense of where the Biden administration is (and has been) drawing the line in terms of support. I don’t expect that to change significantly in the coming months.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Europe Center.

Zelenskyy’s shrewd speech should make an impression on Congress

Zelenskyy and Biden are the undisputed leaders of the free world. While Biden is a clunky speaker, his deep empathy and support for Ukraine will be his presidential legacy.

Zelenskyy is not a fluent speaker of English. Nevertheless he both delivered off-the-cuff remarks with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and gave prepared remarks before Congress in English. Zelenskyy’s prepared remarks were shrewd: He thanked Congress repeatedly, reminded them that the fight for Ukraine is not just Kyiv’s problem, and dangled red meat in front of Republicans as he warned than Iran’s provision of drones for Russian use in Ukraine cannot be overlooked—or Tehran will threaten other allies.

Zelenskyy and his team know that Congress and the American people control the purse. In his remarks with Biden, he thanked the American people first and repeatedly thanked Americans for their sacrifice and appealed to their decency.

His speech before Congress wasn’t his best—but blame the speechwriters. His historical references fell flat, but he did manage to elicit laughter at least once.

Zelenskyy was at his best when he teased Congress and said Ukrainian soldiers are more than capable of using American tanks and planes, and said directly that all US assistance is “not charity” and it’s used “in the most responsible way.”

In sum, Zelenskyy guaranteed that US assistance will continue “as long as it takes,” as Biden has repeatedly pledged, and undercut skeptical arguments on the American right.

—Melinda Haring is the deputy director of the Eurasia Center.

Zelenskyy strikes another contrast with Putin on the world stage

The key takeaway from Zelenskyy’s historic visit to Washington—his first time leaving Ukraine since the February invasion—is that Ukrainians do not stand alone in their fight for survival. The images of Zelenskyy being embraced in the White House by Biden stand in stark contrast to Putin’s recent public appearances with the dictator he propped up in Belarus and the propagandists convincing more Russians to die in Ukraine.

Despite fears that a Republican-led US House could stall further aid, support for Ukraine remains bipartisan and overwhelmingly popular with the American public. Perhaps Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell said it best on Wednesday: “Continuing our support for Ukraine is morally right, but it is not only that. It is also a direct investment in cold, hard, American interests.” It was important for Congress, and Americans, to finally hear first-hand from Zelenskyy why their support matters.

Washington has provided historic and nation-saving aid to Ukraine, now totaling more than one hundred billion dollars. But the United States still needs to step up—both by catching up with other nations by rightly recognizing Russia’s crimes in Ukraine as genocide, but also by showing that giving Ukraine the weapons it needs to win won’t provoke Moscow into starting a new war on top of the one it’s already losing. Ukraine is asking for critical weapons and armor, and allies such as Germany can be nudged in the right direction by a strong example from the United States, which continues to limit Kyiv’s ability to end this war sooner. For fear of provoking Putin, the White House said earlier this year it wouldn’t send HIMARS—the game-changing system with which one Ukrainian officer earned a medal, which he sent with Zelenskyy to give to Biden as a thanks. All that’s happened since the United States sent HIMARS is that Ukraine’s victories on the battlefield are more numerous.

—Doug Klain is a nonresident fellow at the Eurasia Center.

In the global war for democracy, Ukraine’s patriots need American Patriots

Three hundred days into the war, the situation in Ukraine has approached a use-it-or-lose-it moment. With Russian massive attacks on critical infrastructure, millions of Ukrainians struggling to survive through the cold winter, and Ukrainian armed forces holding the front line despite the overwhelming Russian firepower, the war has entered a new phase. So far, Ukrainians have proved to be super effective and efficient in using the limited arsenal of arms supplied by their partners, oftentimes outperforming expectations and showing miracles of creativity and resilience. Reaching one hundred thousand Russian casualties and taking back more than a half of the initially occupied territories speaks for itself.

However, all miracles have their limits, and the reality is grim. Though undertrained and underequipped, thousands of Russian soldiers have been mobilized in an ambitious plan to increase its military to 1.5 million. Despite international pressure, Russia has bolstered its attack capabilities with new batches of Iranian drones (and, potentially, ballistic missiles) and created multiple new units in Belarus to renew its assault on Ukraine from the north. To deter future waves of Russian aggression, let alone to start the counter-offensive, Ukrainian armed forces critically need to boost their air and missile defense, get longer-range weapons, and increase their rear-area attack capabilities.

Neither Ukraine nor the world can afford the luxury of a protracted or postponed conflict. While Russia cannot obviously win this war on the battlefield, Ukraine’s victory is possible. Yet it is not irreversible, as the Kremlin is still strong enough to maintain its terror on Ukrainian cities, continue killing civilians, and disrupt international supply chains. Zelenskyy’s key message was clear: the only force that can put an end to the Russian war on global peace and security is Ukrainian patriots. But to succeed in defending global freedoms, they must be backed by American “Patriots”—the advanced air-defense system—defending Ukrainian cities.

Rallying the support of the American people and the US Congress remains crucial to ensure the victory of the democratic world. The display of the battle flag from Bakhmut in the US House chamber is a good reminder of where the front line of the global war for democracy runs.

—Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and was previously a foreign-policy advisor to the prime minister of Ukraine.

Watch Zelenskyy at the White House

Zelenskyy wants more advanced weapons and explicit support for a Ukrainian victory

It looks like Zelenskyy is coming to DC as the Biden administration officially announces that it is—finally—sending advanced Patriot air-defense systems to Ukraine. In light of the massive Russian bombardment of Ukrainian infrastructure designed to make life in the winter intolerable, the Patriots are well worth Zelenskyy’s visit, although the leak last week of the Patriot decision makes this a bit of an anticlimax. The visit gives Zelenskyy and Biden the chance to sit down and talk about the war, and Zelenskyy the opportunity to address Congress and thank the American people for the massive support that has made it possible for Ukraine to withstand the Russian invasion. But Zelenskyy would like the Biden administration to publicly express its support for a Ukrainian victory in this war and to provide the more advanced weapons systems—accurate artillery and missiles with a range up to three hundred kilometers (186 miles), tanks, and fighter jets—that would enable Ukraine to take back all of its territory more quickly. Unfortunately, hesitation in the White House makes that outcome, which would serve American interests, a long shot.

—John Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

The visit shows why the US is still the leader of the Free World

While in Washington, Zelenskyy will probably urge intensified US assistance to cope with Russia’s ongoing attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure and more deliveries of powerful weapons to defend his country, such as air defenses, longer-range accurate artillery and missiles, and possibly tanks and aircraft. The omnibus spending bill that Congress is considering and may pass this week contains nearly $45 billion of additional assistance, and Zelenskyy may hope that his address can help get that assistance over the line.

But he’s also after something more important: Ukrainians look to the United States as the leader of the Free World without irony or mixed feelings. They know that US support—in deed as well as word—has thwarted Putin’s plans of national extermination and given Ukraine a fighting chance to win this war of survival. They didn’t get the memo about supposed US disengagement, decline, or indifference. Zelenskyy is coming to Washington, not to Brussels, Paris, Berlin, or London, because when the chips are down, it’s the United States that has the power to make the difference in matters of war and peace. He knows this as much as Winston Churchill did in 1940, as Adolf Hitler battered Britain.

Like Churchill, Zelenskyy also knows that some in the United States, a few on the left and more on the Donald Trump-aligned right, reject the Biden administration’s commitment to Ukraine and to the Free World generally. Whether they are called neo-isolationists, America-firsters, or “realists,” they are willing, sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly, to do a sphere-of-influences deal with Putin that would force Ukraine to surrender people and land to Russia, indifferent to the human and strategic disaster this would mean for Ukrainians and, soon thereafter, for others in Europe and for ourselves, as Putin consolidated such a prize and prepared his next aggression.

Zelenskyy is also coming to warn the United States against bad deals with dictators. He will not just thank the United States and the American people for their support. He will extoll our support for freedom over the past century, seeking to help us recall our best strategic traditions of helping those fighting for their freedom and ours.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

An attempt to ‘defuse the problem’ at the White House

Zelenskyy is taking a much-deserved victory lap in Washington today and is here to rally Congress to do more. Zelenskyy is not only commander in chief, he’s also communicator in chief. With his pitch-perfect performance and gravelly voice, there’s no one more convincing in Kyiv than the Ukrainian president. He’s also coming to defuse the problem at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. The White House remains convinced that Ukraine can’t win and that sending long-range missiles and planes would escalate the conflict. Zelenskyy is coming to change minds and burst the myth of these self-created limitations. He’s also coming to rally the world to give more and do more for Ukraine during the holiday season. His visit underscores the physical courage, conviction, and gravitas he has become known for around the world—the opposite of Vladimir Putin—since the war began.

—Melinda Haring is the deputy director of the Eurasia Center.

A courageous Zelenskyy arrives at a pivotal moment in the war

In the foreign affairs community, a first visit is very symbolic. The full-scale war marked a new era in Ukraine, so the fact Zelenskyy’s first visit after February 24 is to the United States underlines the decisive US role in Ukraine’s resistance. The United States is a crucial ally of Ukraine; it is a driver of the Ramstein format for international defense cooperation, provides most of the essential military assistance, supplies economic help, and deters Russian nuclear threats.

Until now, all post-February communication between US and Ukrainian leaders has been via calls and virtual meetings. That communication cannot replace in-person meetings. Thus, the visit had to occur at the earliest convenience, which was very difficult from a security perspective. Traveling around Ukraine and now abroad, Zelenskyy is showing he is ahead of Russia. He is demonstrating his commitment to personal presence, involvement, and initiative. The fact that Zelenskyy is making this trip, and his earlier trip to Bakhmut (perhaps the most dangerous place on our planet today), speaks to his courage.

The trip is necessary after the US midterm elections and just before Christmas. As the world enters a new year, US and Ukrainian leaders will outline their essential plans for 2023. Next year will be crucial for this war with the right amount of support. It may mark the war’s end, with Ukraine able to push Russian occupants out of its territory. It will also be a year of commencing legal trials against Putin and his government and claiming damages. Thus, next year’s events may seriously damage and even end Putin’s regime. Today Putin’s plans are not working out, his troops have retreated from over half of the initially occupied territory, and he is desperate. To recover the lost initiative, he is planning a new mobilization and another offensive in the first quarter of 2023. That makes it critical for Ukraine to secure the right amount of military assistance.

—Andriy Zagorodnyuk is a distinguished fellow at the Eurasia Center and a former minister of defense of Ukraine.

A plan to consolidate US support for a long struggle

Zelenskyy’s decision to visit the United States on what is his first wartime trip abroad highlights the critical importance of continued US support for the Ukrainian war effort. Following a relatively favorable outcome during the recent US midterm elections, there are no major concerns in Kyiv over the strength of the United States’ commitment to Ukraine. Nevertheless, there is an eagerness to win over skeptics within the Republican Party and consolidate US backing for what promises to be a protracted struggle.

Zelenskyy is well aware of his own star quality and knows that a personal presence in Washington will resonate with members of Congress and wider US audiences. One of the most important aspects of his wartime leadership has been his ability to rally international support. He is clearly hoping that such a high-profile visit to the United States will succeed in securing the political support Ukraine needs to continue fighting through 2023.

The visit will also send a powerful message to Ukraine’s other allies and to Russia that the United States stands firmly with Ukraine and will continue to do so in the coming year. This is crucial at a time when the Kremlin hopes to secure a ceasefire in order to rearm and is looking for signs that the West may be ready to compromise. Ukrainian leaders understand the importance of demonstrating to Moscow that such hopes are futile. Nothing could make this clearer than the fanfare of an official visit to the United States.

—Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert section.

A time for Washington to shed its exaggerated fear of escalation

Zelenskyy’s dramatic visit to Washington occurs as the war has entered a crossroads, one that will determine if the war will decisively follow the path of Kyiv’s recent battlefield successes or bog down into a long-term, violent stalemate with immeasurable costs to Ukraine as well as growing economic burdens on the West.

The Biden administration has reportedly approved giving Ukraine Patriot air-defense systems to help defend against Putin’s indiscriminate missile barrages. Zelenskyy will express gratitude for that, but Kyiv also seeks offensive capabilities to push Russian forces off of Ukraine’s territory—tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, aircraft, and longer-range artillery and missiles. All of those are required in short order to bring this war to a just and decisive end.

Toward that end, Zelenskyy will have to convince Washington to shed its exaggerated fear that a swift Ukrainian victory would cause Russia to escalate the war with nuclear weapons. Face-to-face meetings with Biden provide the most direct opportunity to make that case. That and an address to a joint session of Congress provide a global podium through which to immediately increase the US and Western commitment to Ukraine’s battle for survival.

—Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and previously served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.

Ukraine wants to be able to shoot the archer, not just the arrows

Zelenskyy’s surprise visit to Washington comes with huge risks and opportunities. Zelenskyy is the Winston Churchill of our time, and his personal wartime leadership has been an essential ingredient to Ukraine’s successful defense in the face of Putin’s war of aggression. Coming to Washington entails operational dangers to his personal safety; getting him in and out of Kyiv unharmed will be no easy task. And there are huge risks to Ukraine’s wartime effort if anything were to go wrong. It is doubtful that a successor would be nearly as charismatic or effective.

But the visit also brings huge potential opportunity. US aid and arms have been the other essential ingredient to Ukraine’s wartime success, and he hopes to get more of both with an in-person appeal to the US president, Congress, and people. With a planned prime-time address, Zelenskyy will attempt to persuade the American public and a new Congress that they benefit from supporting Ukraine. At the White House, Zelenskyy will attempt to convince Biden that he should lift arbitrary restrictions on weapons sales and give Kyiv the weapons it needs to shoot the archer, not just the arrows.

It should be a straightforward case to make. The United States’ greatest national security challenge is that, for the first time in its history, it faces two near-peer nuclear armed adversaries, Russia and China. By arming Ukraine, the United States can significantly blunt the Russian military threat without risking American lives. Here is hoping Zelenskyy’s trip, and the Ukrainian war effort, succeed.

—Matthew Kroenig is the acting director of the Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and a former US Department of Defense and intelligence community official.

The post Experts react: The lasting impact of Zelenskyy’s Washington visit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Taiwan: The key to containing China in the Indo-Pacific

John B. Barranco — Mon, 05 Dec 2022 16:41:25 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

REPORT RELEASE

2021-22 Senior US Marine Corps Fellow

China is the pacing challenge for the United States, posing the most consequential global threat to US and allied security. As China flexes its military and economic muscles, Beijing’s increasingly coercive behavior tests the defense of its neighbors—and none more so than Taiwan. Much of the United States’ ability to prevent Chinese power projection in the Indo-Pacific hinges upon its relationship with Taiwan. This paper proposes a US strategy for strengthening the relationship between Taiwan and the United States in order to deter Chinese military aggression in the Indo-Pacific.

Taiwan as a flashpoint for Sino-US tensions

Taiwan offers a key strategic link, both within the Indo-Pacific and on the global stage. The island is strategically situated in the middle of the first island chain off the East Asian coast, making it geo-strategically important to Chinese military ambitions. Taiwan is also the primary supplier of semiconductors (which are used to make microchips underwriting advanced military systems) to the United States and its allies, winning Taipei a spot as a major player in the global economy.

While Taiwan is not a formal US ally due to the “One China” policy—recognizing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legal government of China—Taiwan still falls under the US security umbrella. However, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s desire to reunify Taiwan is clear, and efforts to test Taiwanese and US resolve on this issue are increasingly bold. Security analysts often point to a potential Taiwan conflict scenario, positing that a failure to deter Chinese aggression could escalate into a war with global consequences.

China as the pacing threat

When China entered the World Trade Organization in 2001, the threat posed by Beijing was still unrecognized by leadership in Washington, DC. Since then, China’s voice on the global stage has only gotten louder: The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) naval fleet exceeds the size of the US Navy, and China’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy allows it to rapidly develop artificial intelligence, machine learning, and other emerging technologies for military purposes. Moreover, Beijing’s annual economic growth rate has been three-to-four times that of the United States over the past two decades, and Chinese gross domestic product is projected to surpass that of the United States by 2030.

However, the China challenge is not just military or economic in nature—it is also ideological, posing a serious threat to the US-led rules-based global order. The 2018 National Defense Strategy recognized this for the first time, offering a strategic shift and reaching bipartisan consensus by identifying China as a major revisionist rival acting counter US interests.

Major elements of the strategy

In this report, John Barranco identifies the interests of key players in the Indo-Pacific region, which then flow into his strategic plan. Particularly, he identifies the following as key goals of the United States and China:

The United States aims to preserve and revitalize the US-led, rules-based global system, as well as to prevent the rise of regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region and Europe.

China seeks to overthrow the traditional balance of power, supplanting the United States as the world’s preeminent power, and ensure regime stability through both domestic policy successes and establishing regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific.

China sees Taiwan as central to achieving all its interests. Therefore, the United States ought to consider this lens when crafting strategies to deter China and understand how the defense of Taiwan fits into its own plans.

The way forward for US-Taiwanese relations

The goals of this strategy are to contain China in the Indo-Pacific, deter China from attacking Taiwan, and, if necessary, deny it from taking Taiwan upon attack. To achieve these objectives, the United States must bring Taiwan into the fold, tying it more closely with potential allies and partners diplomatically, economically, and defensively. US strategy can do so in myriad ways, to include:

Strengthening regional security and trade relations with Taiwan;
Accelerating and realigning US force posture in the Indo-Pacific; and
Increasing bilateral US-Taiwanese military cooperation through joint military exercises.

An effective strategy for containing China in the Indo-Pacific must include consideration of Taiwan’s role in the region. Read the full strategy for more details on the path ahead.

About the author

Former fellow

John B. Barranco

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Americas Iraq

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Iran’s export of drones to Russia will lead to more proliferation and threaten US partners

Seth J. Frantzman — Fri, 18 Nov 2022 14:00:08 +0000

Russia’s increasing use of Iranian drones in the war in Ukraine has spotlighted the danger that Iran’s drones pose globally and regionally. The outcome may be an expanded Iranian drone program, increased proliferation of the drones, and knowledge sharing between Moscow and Tehran that adversely affects Western partners in and outside the Middle East.

Moscow’s acquisition of Iranian military technology, specifically unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), represents a new chapter in Iran-Russia relations. It reverses several decades in which Iran sought technology transfers from Russia and other more advanced military powers.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February, it has relied on various stand-off weapons. This appears to be linked to Moscow’s desire not to risk using its air force over Ukraine, and a preference for cheaper munitions, such as artillery, to decimate portions of Ukraine. UAVs, or drones, present a way for Moscow to exploit a niche in military technology. Russia began looking into acquiring Iranian drones starting in June, according to US assessments. Whereas drones were once primarily used for surveillance or targeted air strikes, usually by Western countries, now Iran has become a drone warfare pioneer.

For Russia, Iran’s drones represent affordable off-the-shelf weapons it can expend in Ukraine. Iran, meanwhile, gains by finding a new market for its systems and seeing them being used in large numbers. No other country has used Iran’s drones in such quantity. Nevertheless there is still debate within Iran about the efficacy of the exports to Russia.

Iran’s drones fill a unique niche for Russia in the realm of kamikaze drones or what are also called loitering munitions. These weapons are launched from a canister or rack that can be mounted on a truck, with the drone having a warhead encased within its body. Unlike more expensive drones, such as the US Reaper, the Iranian Shahed 136 is built for a one-way mission. The drone is slightly larger than a person and looks like a flying delta-wing. These Iranian drones may have a person controlling them, but often they fly via a pre-programmed route of waypoints and then slam into a target.

Iran makes other types of drones that may also be exported to Russia. These include the Shahed 129, which is designed to look like a US Predator drone, and the Shahed 191, which looks like a delta-wing, similar to a US Sentinel spy drone. It’s not clear if either of these would meet Russia’s needs or if Russia will opt for other types of kamikaze-style drones. Ukraine had said earlier this year that Iran has transferred 2,400 drones to Russia, but it is difficult to estimate the total number transferred by the end of the year. Iran has maintained it sent the drones before the war began.

Iran has used drones since the 1980s, partly to compensate for a lack of new warplanes after the fall of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi’s regime and during its eight-year war with Iraq. Iran’s cities were targeted by Iraq during that conflict and drones became a way for Iran to confront Iraq and later to project power around the region. Over the years, Tehran built families of drones, increasing their range and adding munitions. Much has been written on aspects of Iran’s drone program as it proliferated over the years.

Why kamikaze drones meet Russia’s needs

While Iran has tried to reverse engineer downed American drones, its real success has been using loitering munitions flown on one-way kamikaze missions, like a cruise missile. Similar types of drones and cruise missiles were used in the attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq facility in 2019, which have been attributed to Iran or Iran-backed militias. Iranian-style drones have also been used in Yemen by Houthi rebels since 2015. With ranges of more than 1,000 km and a warhead of several dozen pounds, the Shahed-136—the type used in Ukraine by Russia—can wreak havoc on infrastructure and civilians. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has accused Iran of training “Russian terrorists” to use the drones.

As a customer for Iran, Russia matters more than militias because it’s a nation state and a major power.

Tehran has also exported drones to militias. It moved drones to Iraq during the war on the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), increasing the capabilities of Popular Mobilizations Forces (PMFs). Beginning in at least 2016, they were used over the Persian Gulf to harass US naval ships. Later, in 2018, Iran targeted Israel with drones flown from Syria, Iraq, and later from Iran itself, and exported drone technology to the Gaza Strip. This illustrates the expanding circle of Iran’s drone capabilities. Drones were also used by proxies in Lebanon and separately in Iraq and Syria, where they have threatened US forces operating against ISIS. In July 2021, Iranian drones were also involved in an attack on a commercial ship, killing two people in the Gulf of Oman. Additionally, Iran inaugurated a drone factory in Tajikistan over the last year. Each of these extensions represents a new level of success or capability.

Drones were once a Middle East-centric issue, with Israel, the US, and several Gulf states already working to counter the growing drone threat. Now Iran’s drone exports to Russia have led to concerns in the West. To some extent, drones have superseded Iran’s advancing nuclear program as a concern for Western partners.

Implications of Iranian drones in Russian hands

There are several possible outcomes for Iran’s drone exports to Russia. One is that Iran’s drones won’t win the war in Ukraine, thereby illustrating their limitations over time. Ukrainian air defenses are already shooting down the drones in large numbers. Iran will likely study how Western air defense responds to the drones and try to recalibrate them based on their failure rate. Attrition of the drones may encourage Russia and Iran to work more closely. For instance, a video purporting to show a future scenario in which a swarm of Shahed 136 drones attacked the Shaybah energy facility in Saudi Arabia was published in early November. This shows how Iran’s experience in Ukraine might boomerang back to the Middle East.

Iran’s drones could also be a threat to European countries, especially if any conflict grows beyond Ukraine. The major implication for European countries today is that they get to see how the weapon systems they supply to Ukraine measure up against drones. Germany and other European states have already been able to get a look at how anti-aircraft systems are performing and they will learn more over the coming months and be able to analyze successes and failures.

In the meantime, the Iran-Russia drone alliance will provide much-needed cash or cash-in-kind infusions for Iran, which remains under heavy US sanctions. Additionally, Iran-Russia knowledge sharing on technology may improve the Shahed 136 or similar drones that Iran may export. Similarly, expertise gained in Ukraine poses a threat to the US, Israel, the Gulf, and other partner forces in the Middle East. In a like manner, Iran is increasingly standardizing the assembly of drones, streamlining them to become more lethal and efficient. Finally, Iran is likely to find more markets for its drones among nation states, with possible links to China for procurement of drone components.

Iran’s supply of drones to Russia has been one of the major surprises of Moscow’s war on Ukraine. The use of a new type of unmanned technology, which is employed in a unique way by Moscow, has broad implications for Iran’s drone program and the way the drone threat may be perceived in the Middle East and Europe.

Seth J. Frantzman is the author of Drone Wars: Pioneers, Killing Machines, Artificial Intelligence and the Battle for the Future. He has a PhD from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a journalist and researcher covering Middle East security issues and defense topics.

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Designing domestic and multilateral strategies for maintaining technological superiority

Peter Engelke, Emily Weinstein — Wed, 16 Nov 2022 02:23:53 +0000

TO: Technology Policy Strategists

FROM: Peter Engelke and Emily Weinstein

DATE: November 16, 2022

SUBJECT: Designing domestic and multilateral strategies for maintaining technological superiority

This fall, the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Global China Hub convened experts and officials in a private workshop to discuss how the United States, in conjunction with allies and partners, might design strategies to maintain technological superiority over China. The workshop explored the necessary components of a competitive strategy via both “protect” and “run faster” policies. This memo draws from insights gathered during the workshop to give policy makers a better understanding of the potential tools in the strategic arsenal.

Strategic context

The United States is currently engaged in a protracted competition with the People’s Republic of China. Although this competition is multifaceted, much is centered around which state will acquire or maintain technological superiority over the other. Dialogue regarding emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, and more focuses on acquiring or maintaining first-mover advantage in both the military and economic realms. Both US and Chinese leadership fear an overreliance on the other state for access to critical technologies and components. Moreover, this tech-focused competition has spillover consequences for the rest of the world. The sizes of the US and Chinese economies, as well as their dominant positions in global supply chains, have raised the international community’s concerns regarding the trajectory and impacts of this bilateral competition.

To craft an effective response to this technological competition with China, the United States must ensure that its strategy includes elements of both “protect” and “run faster” (or “promote”) policies. These two elements must work in tandem, as policy levers on the “protect” side like export controls and sanctions are likely to cause inefficiencies that must be addressed using “run faster” industrial policies. Moreover, many policies are more effective when pushed through multilateral channels rather than implemented unilaterally. As such, policymakers should work to balance the “run faster” and “protect” efforts on both the domestic and international stages.

As policymakers in the United States and allied countries have begun to grapple with the challenge posed by China’s quest for technology dominance, elements of coherent strategy have started to emerge. The Biden administration has had productive conversations with allies and partners in various multilateral forums like the US-EU Technology and Trade Council (TTC) and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) on subjects ranging from technology standards to investment screening, export controls, investment opportunities, and more.¹ More recently, industrial policies like the CHIPS and Science Act, in conjunction with new tailored controls on high-end semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing items, demonstrates an attempt to exercise both “run faster” and “protect” policies. Although it is too soon to judge the effectiveness of these complementary policies, they are indeed a strong start at a comprehensive strategy to maintain technological dominance over China.

Key components of a comprehensive tech strategy

At minimum, the following four concepts are key aspects of a technology strategy that should be deployed to maintain technological superiority over China. Many if not all of these tools can and should be used in conjunction with one another. Policymakers in the United States should encourage allies to make use of similar tools within their domestic authorities, if not via multilateral pathways when possible and available.

Protecting US and allied technology and technological lead

1. Intelligence

Intelligence is always a crucial part of any competitive strategy. In the context of US-China technology competition, intelligence and counterintelligence will both play critical roles in protecting, monitoring, and keeping up-to-date with our competition.

On the intelligence front, a competitive technology strategy will require the US intelligence community to extend and deepen the tools and resources it has to properly monitor technology progress in China. The US intelligence community has historically relied on classified sources and materials to conduct science and technology (S&T) intelligence. However, much of this information now exists in open-source venues like academic publications, conference proceedings, and more. The reason is straightforward in that scientific inquiry is collaborative, frequently transnational, and very often a public enterprise. As such, the US intelligence community will have to augment its approaches to gathering and evaluating S&T intelligence, as many of the important early indicators and even warnings come from outside the classified space altogether—the arena in which the intelligence community always has invested its assets the most and upon which it has placed the greatest interpretive weight.² The United States Congress has recognized this challenge specifically with respect to monitoring and assessing China’s rising technological capabilities. Although heavily redacted, an unclassified report published in 2020 by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence said flatly that “open source intelligence (OSINT) will become increasingly indispensable to the formulation of analytic products” vis-à-vis competition with China, including in the tech space.³

Workshop participants echoed such concerns, stressing the importance of gathering intelligence, when possible, via open sources and in conjunction with allies and partners in Europe and Asia. Many of these countries may have unique access to the leading Chinese research institutions and companies working at the cutting edge, particularly if US scientists, engineers, and technology firms find it increasingly difficult to collaborate in China going forward due to an unfavorable political climate.

In addition, a competitive strategy should include elements of counterintelligence to ensure that we can secure and protect our intellectual property. This is especially critical in the context of China, a country that has relied on legal, illegal, and extralegal means of acquiring US and other foreign intellectual property to benefit its own technology development efforts.⁴ Much has been done in this space over the past two administrations, particularly in the academic realm. The Trump administration ramped up efforts to scrutinize academic collaborations with China via measures like the former China Initiative under the Department of Justice. In this context, the concerns around Chinese talent programs and China’s efforts to take advantage of the United States’ free and open academic environment are indeed legitimate and deserve significant attention from the counterintelligence experts. However, these concerns must be addressed in a tailored and targeted fashion to avoid overly scrutinizing academics of Chinese heritage or ethnicity. As we address further down, in order to effectively compete with China, the United States must do its best to ensure that we can attract and maintain the best S&T talent from around the world, including from China.

2. Trade controls

Trade controls such as export controls and sanctions have been at the forefront of US competitive “protect” strategies for the past five years. These policy maneuvers, often deployed to prevent China from gaining access to US capital or technology, can be powerful tools to cut China off from the resources it needs to execute Beijing’s goals. However, if the United States wants to effectively compete using trade controls, policymakers must work to tailor these controls as specifically as possible to avoid any potential long-term consequences that might arise, especially unintended economic harm to companies operating in sectors deemed relevant to national security.

This year, both the Biden administration and Congress have been mulling over options, including legislation, to restrict US tech-related investments into China, based on the premise that Chinese access to America’s critical technologies, possibly transferred via US investment in Chinese technology companies, poses a national security risk.⁵ In this context, the Atlantic Council workshop participants repeatedly stressed the downside consequences to restrictive export control and sanctions, warning of the economic harm that might await US firms should policies be poorly designed. Experts assert that export control policies, among many other things, ought to be narrowly targeted at transactions having the highest national security risks and be developed collaboratively with both affected private-sector actors and foreign allies and partners.⁶

Moreover, policymakers should design policies that consider both “protect” measures like export controls and sanctions and “run faster” policies like financial incentives to help ensure that US firms are not adversely affected. For example, the CHIPS and Science Act will provide $52.7 billion for US semiconductor research and development (R&D), manufacturing, and workforce development.⁷ This revenue may ease market impacts on US firms from export controls and sanctions. American semiconductor firms Nvidia and Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) assert that recent US semiconductor export controls risk their sales to the massive Chinese market.⁸

Trade controls also should be multilateral efforts whenever possible. In the context of export controls, unilateral policies have proven to be ineffective over time and often lead to unintentional consequences. Take the US satellite industry for example, where a unilateral US policy implemented in 1999 brought the total US market share of global satellite exports down from 75 percent in 1995 to just 25 percent ten years later.⁹ Convincing like-minded countries to jump on board with trade controls such as export controls will allow the US and its allies and partners to have greater reach and impact, and will also increase the strategic delay imposed upon China with these controls. Where the effectiveness of unilateral controls eventually erodes over time as technology evolves and supply chains shift, multilateral controls in conjunction with allies and partners can force China’s development curve backwards in a more comprehensive fashion.

Running faster and promoting innovation

3. Governance

Governance, and the role of government in industry, should be at the forefront of strategists’ minds when thinking about competing with China. For decades, federal, state, and local governments in the United States have worked alongside the private sector and research institutions, including the United States’ world-best university system, to promote innovation across numerous sectors. The federal government has made strategic investments in R&D, for example through Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) investments in basic R&D at the nation’s universities, and has set other parameters that have helped create and sustain the US innovation ecosystem, for example through its H-1B visa program that encourages recruitment of highly skilled scientific and engineering talent from abroad. When done well, innovation ecosystems that combine smart public policies and investments with open and tolerant business environments are best at growing a nation’s innovative capacity.¹⁰

Countries like China have challenged many preconceived notions regarding the roles that government should play in building and sustaining innovation ecosystems. China has made significant strides in building an ecosystem and in upgrading its technological development capabilities, many of which evolved organically.¹¹ The greater part of Chinese innovation has surfaced thanks in large part to Chinese government initiatives, policies, incentives, and more. For instance, in AI, China has made massive strides—particularly in AI education—thanks to national- and provincial-level policies and support.¹² Whether China can sustain the vibrancy of its tech-innovation ecosystem, given the government’s recent heavy-handed crackdown on the tech sector, is an open question, with Chinese entrepreneurs voicing concerns that the crackdown has had a permanent chilling effect on start-up investment and associated risk-taking.¹³

Regardless of China’s trajectory, the United States not only will need to retain the core capabilities of its tech-innovation ecosystem but strengthen them as well. Federal, state, and local governments will need to continue to invest in and otherwise boost basic R&D, high-quality twenty-first century infrastructure, and broad-based education and skills training. Immigration policies to encourage high-skilled in-migration will need to be retained and strengthened.¹⁴ In the context of competition with China, the United States may need to inject some financial support into private companies in order to adequately prepare them to compete with Chinese firms that are often heavily subsidized or don’t have the same fiduciary responsibilities. In this case, this “promote” approach by US government to step in and level the competitive playing field may yield results.

Improving this system also will require innovations in the processes of governance itself. On the domestic side, policymakers should reconsider how best to evaluate the impacts of new technology policies, whether those policies are in the protect or promote categories. At the Atlantic Council workshop, several participants argued that the US government needs to create a testing mechanism, wherein proposed legislation and new regulations would be vetted through an interagency, whole-of-government, or even whole-of-society process. The basic idea was to devise a kind of experimental forum under the aegis of the White House that would allow new legislation and regulations to be assessed from multiple points on the economy-security spectrum, by representatives not only of multiple departments and agencies within the government but also from affected industries and sectors outside of it.

On the foreign policy side, US leadership needs to invest in multilateral solutions to technology governance challenges. The United States is well equipped to build bridges with allies and partners in the technology space. As noted in the trade controls section, US policymakers can and should convince allies to work in unison to counter the threat from China, ensure a level tech playing field, and address novel issues from emerging technologies. The Biden administration’s two important trade initiatives, the US-EU TTC and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), do in fact “aim to strengthen US economic ties with allies and key trading partners and make progress on rules for the digital economy, technology, labor, and environmental standards, as well as supply chain resilience,” according to the authors of a recent Atlantic Council report.¹⁵ Although both of these initiatives have a significant level of participation from allied and partner countries, both also have some way to go before they facilitate commonly accepted regulatory approaches to technology governance and the technical standards that go with them.¹⁶

4. Talent

As briefly mentioned in the above section, talent is a central component of any successful tech-innovation ecosystem. In order to “run faster,” the United States needs to make sure that it is home to the best and brightest S&T talent. This will require a multifaceted effort that tackles both immigration and education reform. Although often contentious, these pieces represent two key components of a comprehensive strategy that can keep us ahead of China.

On the education side, much still needs to be done to level the playing field in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education across US states. Although the decentralized nature of the US education system indeed has its strengths, it also caused a rift between those with access to more resources—often in wealthier and more urban and suburban regions—and those without, often in poorer areas, including but not limited to more rural areas. Efforts are currently underway to remedy this gap. Proposed US legislation like the Rural STEM Education Act are positive steps forward at the K-12 level.¹⁷ Countries—both allies and adversaries alike—are working to incorporate technical education into curricula at earlier grades. If the United States wants to keep up, more is needed to close this gap.

We are witnessing similar phenomena in higher education as well. Over the next few years, China is projected to graduate more STEM PhDs than the United States, and although questions of quality versus quantity are warranted, this is a clear example of the Chinese government’s blunt force strategy bearing fruit.¹⁸ To effectively compete with China in higher education, the US government needs to incorporate immigration and research security reform into its competition strategy. On the immigration front, working to speed up long-standing backlogs in the visa process would be hugely beneficial. In addition, the US government could think through more ways to modernize our immigration system to improve our innovative capacity by introducing, for instance, easier paths for foreign entrepreneurs to set up companies in the United States. Furthermore, it will be critical for any talent-related strategy to reiterate our policies of nonxenophobia, as many scientists and researchers—particularly but not limited to those of Chinese ethnicity—are increasingly wary of US research security policies in the aftermath of the Department of Justice’s China Initiative.¹⁹

Emily Weinstein is a Research Fellow at The Georgetown University Center for Security and Emerging Technology and a Nonresident Fellow at the Global China Hub.

Peter Engelke is Deputy Director and Senior Fellow for Foresight at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at Global Energy Center.

1 “Fact Sheet: U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council Establishes Economic and Technology Policies & Initiatives,” White House Briefing Room, May 16, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/16/fact-sheet-u-s-eu-trade-and-technology-council-establishes-economic-and-technology-policies-initiatives/; and “Quad Principles on Technology Design, Development, Governance, and Use,” White House Briefing Room, September 24, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/quad-principles-on-technology-design-development-governance-and-use/.

2 Tarun Chhabra et al., “Open-Source Intelligence for S&T Analysis,” Analysis, Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service, September 2020, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/open-source-intelligence-for-st-analysis/.

3 US House Permanent Select Com., The China Deep Dive: A Report on the Intelligence Community’s Capabilities and Competencies with Respect to the People’s Republic of China, Redacted Summary, September 29, 2020, 29, https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hpsci_china_deep_dive_redacted_summary_9.29.20.pdf.

4 William Hannas and Huey-Meei Chang, China’s Access to Foreign AI Technology, Analysis, CSET, Georgetown University Walsh School, September 2019, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/chinas-access-to-foreign-ai- technology/.

5 Jennifer Jacobs and Daniel Flatley, “Biden Weighing Actions to Curb US Investment in China Tech,” Bloomberg, September 2, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-03/biden-weighing-actions-to-curb-us- investment-in-china-tech.

6 For a lengthy treatment of these and similar considerations, see Sarah Bauerle Danzman and Emily Kilcrease, “Sand in the Silicon: Designing an Outbound Investment Controls Mechanism,” Atlantic Council, September 14, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/sand-in-the-silicon-designing-an- outbound-investment-controls-mechanism/.

7 “Fact Sheet: CHIPS and Science Act Will Lower Costs, Create Jobs, Strengthen Supply Chains, and Counter China,” White House Briefing Room, August 9, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lower-costs-create-jobs-strengthen-supply-chains-and-counter-china/.

8 Cheng Ting-Fang, “US Tightens Export Rules to China, hitting Nvidia and AMD,” Nikkei Asia, updated September 1, 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Tech/Semiconductors/U.S.-tightens-chip-export-rules-to-China-hitting-Nvidia-and-AMD; and Debby Wu and Ian King, “Chip Exports to China at Risk on New US Rules, Sparking Selloff,” Bloomberg, Updated September 1, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-01/nvidia-gets-limited-licenses-for-ai-chip-exports-to-china.

9 Tim Hwang and Emily S. Weinstein, Decoupling in Strategic Technologies: From Satellites to Artificial Intelligence, Analysis, CSET, Georgetown University Walsh School, July 2022, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/decoupling-in-strategic-technologies/.

10 The US innovation ecosystem is reviewed by Peter Engelke and Robert A. Manning in Keeping America’s Innovative Edge, Atlantic Council, April 4, 2017, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research- reports/report/keeping-america-s-innovative-edge-2/. Global innovation ecosystems are reviewed by Manning and Engelke in The Global Innovation Sweepstakes: A Quest to Win the Future,” Atlantic Council, June 26, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-global-innovation-sweepstakes-a-quest-to-win- the-future-2/.

11 Emily S. Weinstein, “Beijing’s ‘Re-innovation’ Strategy Is Key Element of U.S.-China Competition,” TechStream, Brookings Institution, January 6, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/beijings-re-innovation- strategy-is-key-element-of-u-s-china-competition/.

12 Dahlia Peterson, Kayla Goode, and Diana Gehlhaus, AI Education in China and the United States: A Comparative Assessment, Analysis, CSET, Georgetown University Walsh School, September 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/ai-education-in-china-and-the-united-states/.

13 Coco Liu, Zheping Huang, and Sarah Zheng, “China’s Tech Giants Lost Their Swagger and May Never Get It Back,” Bloomberg, June 23, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-23/china-tech-crackdown- eases-but-startups-worry-xi-may-up-regulatory-pressure.

14 See Peter Engelke and Robert A. Manning, Keeping America’s Innovative Edge, Atlantic Council, April 2017, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/keeping-america-s-innovative-edge-2/.

15 Clete R. Willems and Niels Graham, TTC, IPEF, and the Road to an Indo-Pacific Trade Deal: A New Model, Atlantic Council, September 27, 2022, 10, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/ttc- ipef-and-the-road-to-an-indo-pacific-trade-deal-a-new-model/.

16 Willems and Graham, TTC, IPEF, and the Road to an Indo-Pacific Trade Deal.

17 Rural STEM Education Research Act, H. R. 210, 117th Cong. (2021), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th- congress/house-bill/210/text.

18 Remco Zwetsloot et al., “China is Fast Outpacing U.S. STEM PhD Growth,” Data Brief, CSET, Georgetown University Walsh School, August 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/china-is-fast-outpacing-u-s-stem- phd-growth/.

19 Eliot Chen, “America’s Brain Drain,” Wire China, October 9, 2022, https://www.thewirechina.com/2022/10/09/chinese-scientists-in-america/.

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Does the Biden administration’s National Defense Strategy make the grade?

Atlantic Council — Tue, 08 Nov 2022 12:00:00 +0000

Does the Biden administration’s National Defense Strategy make the grade?

Last month, the Pentagon released its National Defense Strategy (NDS), a chance for the Biden administration to single out the biggest threats on the world stage and lay out how the US military will counter them. Experts from the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security pulled out their red pens to grade the strategy on five separate criteria. Below are their full assessments for the latest edition of the Scowcroft Strategy Scorecard.

Don’t miss our other expert analysis of the NDS—eight things you need to know about the strategy, and a full markup of the document.

Clementine Starling

Director, Forward Defense practice, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

This is a fine strategy that builds on the central challenges presented by strategic competition and laid out in the 2018 NDS, with its own twist. The strengths of the strategy lie in its characterization of the threat environment—its clear elevation of China as the most dangerous long-term challenge to US security, placing of allies as a center of gravity, and broadening of security to feature climate change and gray-zone threats more prominently. The strategy calls out the right priorities to adapt the Department of Defense (DOD) to meet the moment from a concepts, capabilities, and technology perspective. However, the strategy’s success will depend on resolving ambiguities in its lines of effort and setting clear implementation guidelines that can be matched with necessary resources.

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

This strategy is not entirely distinct from the last NDS, rather it builds on the major themes of great-power/strategic competition laid out in the 2018 NDS while emphasizing China, gray-zone threats, and layered deterrence slightly differently. What distinguishes this strategy is its clear elevation of China as the top strategic challenge facing the United States. Rather than putting China and Russia on equal footing, it clarifies Russia as an “acute” threat—immediate and fierce—but not a “pacing” competitor like China, which is described as an all-domain and pervasive challenge. In addition, the strategy advances two concepts, “integrated deterrence” and “campaigning,” as the ways in which it will pursue its goals. While the framing is new, the two concepts are defined ambiguously and the substance does not appear to be particularly novel. Overall, this strategy is not wildly distinct from years past, but there is a healthy progression from the previous strategy to this one, which is what one should want from long-term strategic documents.

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

The strategic context outlined in the strategy is sound. The document characterizes “strategic competition” with China, and to a lesser extent Russia, as being the defining feature of security in the next decade. It rightly broadens the scope of security threats to include a greater emphasis on climate change and gray-zone threats as having potentially decisive effects on the strategic environment. In a laudable attempt to prioritize China as “the most comprehensive and serious challenge” to US national security, the NDS has made certain assumptions that diminish other threats—notably, the assumption that Russia is a less severe long-term threat to the United States. The strategy risks underselling the longevity of the Russian threat and its destabilizing potential beyond Europe. That said, the NDS owns and “accept[s] measured risk” from this deprioritization. The other assumption baked into the document (and the National Security Strategy) is that the United States has a “decisive decade” in which to make strides toward its goals. Unfortunately, this timeframe may be unrealistically long to effectively deter China from invading Taiwan. US adversaries have a vote, and Xi Jinping has made clear his goal of making China’s forces more capable by 2027.

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

The strategy does a decent job of outlining its goals, though some of the goals are so broadly defined that they could be interpreted in different ways and will therefore be harder to measure. The NDS outlines four top-level goals: “defend the homeland,” “deter strategic attacks against the United States, our Allies, and our partners,” “deter aggression and be prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary,” and “building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.” I appreciate that this is a much shorter list than the eleven objectives laid out in the prior NDS, though because they are fewer, they are not as well defined. The latter two goals could mean different things to different people: It will be hard to measure success if the defense community doesn’t all agree what kind or level of “aggression” the United States is trying to deter or what precisely a “resilient” defense ecosystem should look like.

Clear lines of effort

Does the strategy outline several major lines of effort for achieving its objectives? Will following those lines of effort attain the defined goals? Does the strategy establish a clear set of priorities, or does it present a laundry list of activities?

The strategy falls down in the lack of clarity of its lines of effort. It advances its concepts of “integrated deterrence,” “campaigning,” and “building enduring advantages” as the three core approaches for achieving its goals, yet—even while elaborated on in supplementary fact sheets—they are still ambiguously defined and not well understood. This leaves room for multiple interpretations, which will make it challenging to set tasks and measure implementation.

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

DOD proposed a $773 billion defense budget in fiscal year 2023, an increase of about $30 billion above 2022. However, adjusting for inflation, that would represent a funding decrease. As high inflation erodes US defense buying power, the vast array of goals laid out in the strategy will be hard to achieve with the resources available. We will have to see what the fiscal year 2024 budget holds and whether it matches the level of ambition laid out in this strategy.

Michael Groen

Nonresident senior fellow, Forward Defense practice, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security; retired US Marine Corps lieutenant general; former director of the Department of Defense’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center

While postulated as the strategy for a “decisive decade,” the 2022 NDS lacks a decisive articulation of how the United States intends to win the competition with China. Most promising is a “campaigning” approach, which has great potential to be effective if applied with discipline and accountability, and in an integrated way. While the strategy offers some promising methodologies, it is indecisive in its articulation of ends and means. This gap, and the reactive tone of the strategy writ large, misses the opportunity to press the great advantages the US defense ecosystem already has to compete and win.

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

This NDS emerges in an environment of rapid digital transformation for the United States, its opponents, and the global defense ecosystem. While many aspects of transformation are present in the strategy, it falls short of the necessary and distinctive clarion call that would focus DOD on the competition with rapidly modernizing opponents, both large and small. The articulation of distinctive methodologies (“integrated deterrence,” “campaigning,” and “enduring advantages”) is sound, but these don’t add up to the kind of call for transformation required by this historic moment.

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

The 2022 NDS carries forward a familiar litany of threats. It is well-articulated—but it is always disconcerting to read how US opponents seemingly gain advantage from emerging trends while the United States, somehow, does not. Dwelling on threats, it cedes the initiative to US opponents. By not calling out the contextual advantages for the United States and its allies, it misses an opportunity for a positive, forward-looking strategy that transitions from industrial age defense processes to transformational capabilities.

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

The strategy does not do a lot of specific goal-setting. On the optimistic side, the articulation of a “campaigning” strategy does provide a methodology for addressing DOD goals as they become clear. Campaigning potentially sets the table for a focus on achieving goals and “sprints” toward the enduring advantages the strategy hopes to capitalize on. DOD culture remains fixated on legacy hardware-based processes, an approach that is strategically untenable in an era of software-based capabilities. The NDS missed an opportunity to set goals for addressing the transformation of internal processes, cultures, and legacies.

Clear lines of effort

The three clearly articulated lines of effort provide the ways of strategy, even if they are not complemented by ends or means. The articulation of ”Transforming the Foundation” of the future force is encouraging and truly necessary to achieve technological change at scale. Clearly articulated capability goals within lines of effort regarding US competition with China would have added focus and heft to the strategy.

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

Implementation of the NDS is feasible. Lacking ends and means, it is a no-fail proposition. The strategy does leave the services to wrestle with competing demands for recruiting, modernization, readiness, digital transformation, and competition. We will certainly see a rapidly modernizing threat environment from actors large and small that will drive the US military to transform. Against that backdrop, the US defense ecosystem has keen advantages over its adversaries and competitors in innovation, resources, and high-quality talent. It will be critical for joint and service-based implementation strategies to bring these advantages to bear.

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and its allies and partners. The Center’s Scowcroft Strategy Initiative serves to directly advance this core mission and embody its namesake’s commitment to strategic thinking. Toward this end, the initiative releases report cards analyzing the key strategies developed by the United States, its allies and partners, and multilateral bodies such as NATO. Through this analysis, the initiative aims to help leaders, strategists, and other decisionmakers hone their strategic thinking in pursuit of a rules-based international system that fosters peace, prosperity, and freedom for decades to come.

Strengthening deterrence with SLCM-N

John R. Harvey and Robert Soofer — Sat, 05 Nov 2022 15:52:03 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

ISSUE BRIEF

The Biden administration has recently released its 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, which assesses the nuclear threats facing the United States. A top priority challenge named by the 2022 NPR is reinforcing deterrence against the potential for Russian and Chinese limited nuclear aggression, including using low-yield nuclear weapons. However, the NPR announces the administration’s decision to cancel a program specifically designed to counter that threat, the nuclear-armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N). Former nuclear deterrence policymakers John R. Harvey and Robert Soofer, from Democratic and Republican administrations, respectively, argue that the SLCM-N is needed to address a gap in US nuclear deterrence capabilities created by Russia’s and China’s continuing efforts to maintain and expand regional nuclear forces.

The old is new again

SLCM-Ns are nuclear-armed cruise missiles capable of being launched from naval vessels, including submarines. During the Cold War, SLCMs were one of a variety of theater nuclear munitions that the United States deployed; these weapons were retired in 2010 as the security environment improved.

Faced with a deteriorating security situation, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review supported the development of a modernized SLCM-N following aggressive Russian behavior. While many nuclear strategists and Members of Congress have lent support to the notion that supplemental US capabilities are necessary to deter limited nuclear use, some question the SLCM-N as redundant, expensive, and potentially disruptive to the US Navy.

A unique role

The SLCM-N would provide a highly survivable US regional nuclear presence. This is crucial given the increasing emphasis in Russian nuclear doctrine on exercising a limited nuclear first strike and China’s expanding nuclear arsenal. SLCM-N has advantages in presence, survivability, and promptness in responding to potential limited nuclear aggression that current US systems lack.

Key takeaways

While the Biden administration has elected to cancel the SLCM-N in its 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, Congress should maintain at least research and development funding for this capability for the following reasons:

Fielding SLCM-N is not radical but rather a return to nuclear form
Renewed nuclear threats posed by Russia and China make theater nuclear weapons more necessary
SLCM-N provides unique capabilities that air launched nuclear weapons cannot
SLCM-N is affordable, since it can harness legacy technologies or benefit from other programs in progress
Impacts on the submarine force would be manageable

About the authors

John R. Harvey

Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, US Department of Defense

Robert Soofer

Senior associate, Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Former deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy, US Department of Defense

The post Strengthening deterrence with SLCM-N appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In brief: A ten-step guide to transforming intelligence sharing with US allies

Transatlantic Security Initiative — Thu, 03 Nov 2022 16:40:49 +0000

Top lines

The US intelligence community should entirely remove the NOFORN (Not for Release to Foreign Nationals) caveat—which restricts sharing classified information with any foreign nationals—for personnel from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom working in US intelligence agencies.
Allies should make sharing easier by developing joint requirements to collect intelligence. If they start from the same questions, sharing the answers may be easier.
Open-source intelligence is the way of the future and will help overcome burdens to sharing information.

THE DIAGNOSIS

Enhancing intelligence sharing is a perennial issue, so why the focus now? The war in Ukraine has proven an inflection point not just for the transatlantic community, but also for the sharing of intelligence within that community. As the US-led counterterrorism response after the 9/11 attacks also demonstrated, political will and a shared threat assessment can spur states to surge intelligence sharing—even with non-traditional partners. As an entity that exists to provide strategic warning, the US intelligence community can no longer afford to wait for crises to remove critical barriers to information sharing.

Simultaneously, technological advances in information management are changing the way the intelligence community must function if it is to remain relevant. Emerging disruptive technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning, coupled with the sheer volume of data now available, mean there is a great opportunity to automate the foreign disclosure process.

THE PRESCRIPTION

With the right political will, there are steps the intelligence community and intelligence officers can take to revamp their policies, processes, and culture in order to share more intelligence with allies and partners.

Remove the NOFORN caveat for Five Eyes representatives in US agencies.

For personnel from Five Eyes (FVEY) allies—Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom—who are working in US intelligence agencies, the removal of the NOFORN caveat would ensure that they have full access to as much information as possible and thus that they can fulfill their responsibilities completely and efficiently.
Adopt “Releasable to FVEY” as the default classification for finished intelligence products.

Empower the US director of national intelligence with greater authority to oversee the intelligence sharing process across the intelligence community, and create a centralized clearinghouse function within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Similarly empower the undersecretary of defense for intelligence and security within the Department of Defense. By centralizing authority in these positions and releasing intelligence to the other Five Eyes allies, the intelligence community can begin to make sharing information, not classifying it, the default.
Devise a template to define and standardize intelligence sharing classifications.

This process could be streamlined through a template attached to every finished intelligence product that notes the question the intelligence answers, specifies which allies to share the intelligence with, and includes any caveats.
Classify single-source reporting at the NOFORN level on rare occasions, and adopt a common referencing system for single-source intelligence reports.

Currently, single-source reporting—such as intelligence gathered by satellite or human assets—is often classified at the NOFORN level by default. This should be the exception, not the rule, and only occur when actually needed to protect sources and methods.
Develop joint intelligence requirements with allies.

Developing requirements together would result in releasable collection plans and shareable finished intelligence. It would also contribute to more even burden-sharing and optimize collection capabilities.
Explore AI and machine learning applications to automate the foreign disclosure process.
Maximize the use of open-source intelligence to enable increased sharing with allies without risking sources and methods.

This will require greater integration of open-source intelligence (and resources committed to it) by US intelligence agencies.
Establish and sustain a network of officers committed to facilitating intelligence sharing.

Increase embeds, liaisons, and exchange personnel. A formalized cadre of officers in senior grades in the intelligence community and across Five Eyes agencies could ease information sharing. Requiring intelligence professionals to attend a Five Eyes officer certification program as a prerequisite to promotion would instill these values early.
Change the risk calculus of intelligence sharing at the analytical level.

Analysts at the working level assume most of the risk for deciding which intelligence to share, a heavy burden that discourages release because of the potential for serious penalties both for the individual analyst (who could lose their security clearance or job) and US national security (if information that shouldn’t be released is). Enhanced education and training, greater risk assumption at the leadership level, and the support of a greater network of foreign disclosure professionals would remedy this.
Undertake a comprehensive review of policy guidance to remove policy constraints, encourage intelligence sharing, and ensure a uniform approach.

BOTTOM LINES

The difficulties—bureaucratic, cultural, and legal—of sharing information plague not only the intelligence community but also other government agencies and private industry. Similar barriers prevent government agencies from sharing classified military information with each other or with private industry. Companies struggle to share commercially sensitive information. Moreover, these barriers are slowing the pace of Western technological innovation. This has wide-ranging defense implications, and some of the recommendations above could be applied in this scope as well.

Intelligence is at its core about trust. For the recommendations above to be implemented, both intelligence providers and consumers must prove they can protect the information itself and, even more critically, the sources and methods required to obtain it. A comprehensive counterintelligence strategy, more frequent security training and education, and more consistent protocols will go a long way in ensuring the success of the policies outlined above.

Like what you read? Dive deep into our full report.

Issue Brief

Oct 31, 2022

Beyond NOFORN: Solutions for increased intelligence sharing among allies

By AVM Sean Corbett, CB MBE and James Danoy

Intelligence sharing is a perennial issue, but modern solutions exist to balance enhancing cooperation with key allies with providing decision advantage to policymakers.

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

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