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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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None of this has prevented Putin from using the NATO issue as a smokescreen for his imperial ambitions. For years, he has skillfully exploited anti-Western sentiment and widespread international suspicion of US foreign policy to distract from Russia’s own acts of international aggression. This tactic has proved remarkably successful; in the seventeen months since Russian troops began the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a wide range of academics, commentators, and politicians around the world have all echoed Putin in blaming NATO for provoking the war. They have continued to do so even as Putin himself has compared his invasion to the imperial conquests of eighteenth-century Russian Czar Peter the Great.

The fact that so many prominent personalities remain ready to accept Russia’s dishonest NATO narrative is evidence of fundamental misconceptions regarding the role of the Alliance and the nature of its post-Cold War enlargement. NATO is routinely depicted by critics as an expansionist military institution seeking to impose Western dominance, but this is entirely at odds with the growth of the Alliance over the past three decades. Nobody has ever been forced to join NATO; instead, every single new member since 1991 has asked for membership and has been obliged to meet a series of strict standards in order to qualify. Indeed, the loaded term “NATO expansion” may itself be misleading, as unlike Russia, the Alliance only ever expands on a voluntary basis. It is also worth underlining that while Putin plays the victim card and complains of being encircled, fear of Russian aggression has been by far the leading cause of all new membership applications.

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine now approaching the one-and-a-half-year mark, it is time to retire the NATO narrative. Putin has demonstrated that he is not at all threatened by the growing presence of the Alliance on Russia’s northwestern border, and is increasingly open about his imperial agenda in Ukraine. It is this Russian imperialism that poses a grave threat to international security, not the defensive guarantees offered by NATO.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

At the same time, a closer look reveals some important progress. Berlin’s China strategy avoids some of the biggest mistakes of its recently released national security counterpart. Most notably, it makes a more explicit assessment of the strengths and assets Germany can bring to bear in a more contentious Sino-German relationship. These are inevitably intertwined with EU competences, from the leverage the European single market affords Germany, to a proposed anti-coercion instrument and the new foreign subsidies regulation, to competition policy tools, tech regulation, and raw materials initiatives. Reflecting a recent government drive toward greater diversification, the document dedicates a separate chapter to “global partnerships”—from Africa and Central Asia to Latin America—and a proactive EU trade policy. In contrast to the national security strategy, it also makes explicit efforts to improve whole-of-government coordination, installs a regular (if somewhat vague) reporting mechanism on the strategy’s implementation, and highlights the need to strengthen expertise on China in the government and policy community more broadly.

—Jӧrn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

With this strategy, Germany has put the Merkel-era naiveté toward China to rest. It highlights the need for Germany to become more resilient, invest in greater China competence, defend the global order, and engage with like-minded partners in order to outcompete China. The strategy also has a particular European component and takes a whole-of-government approach by increasing intergovernmental coordination on China. Not everybody in government, business, or academia will agree with the strategy, but it cements the slow shift that has taken place in German strategic thinking, which hopefully will continue.

—Roderick Kefferpütz is a nonresident senior fellow in the Europe Center and the director of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union office in Brussels.

The document confirms Germany’s adoption of a tougher approach toward a “changed” China under Xi Jinping. It underscores that Berlin will reduce dependencies and better protect its interests in the bilateral relationship even as Germany values continued engagement with Beijing to tackle global challenges. The question is whether this unvarnished take on the need for a transformed German approach to China will be matched with actionable government policies.

Notable elements include the conclusion that Beijing seeks to leverage economic and technological dependence on China to achieve political ends and that Berlin, in coordination with its EU partners, must commit to a “de-risking” strategy to reduce vulnerabilities across critical sectors and supply chains. Beijing has made clear its distaste for the “de-risking” terminology first employed by von der Leyen in March and which US and European leaders have since adopted, viewing it as just another version of “decoupling” that US allies may find more palatable to the ear. Indeed, the Chinese embassy in Berlin responded today that “forcibly ‘de-risking’ based on ideological prejudice and competition anxiety will only be counterproductive.”

—David O. Shullman is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a former US deputy national intelligence officer for East Asia.

2. How involved militarily is Germany in the Indo-Pacific now, and what does this strategy tell us about how that will change?

The strategy takes an incredible leap forward! This is a welcome change from the national security strategy, which hardly mentioned the Indo-Pacific at all. In the China strategy, Germany is starting to take a “one-theater” approach to China, linking the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. On several occasions, the strategy notes the challenge posed by the Sino-Russian relationship and explicitly mentions that “developments in the Indo-Pacific can have a direct impact on Euro-Atlantic security.” In this context, Germany wants to increase its presence as a security actor, aiming to expand military cooperation and arms exports in the Indo-Pacific.

—Roderick Kefferpütz

3. How does Germany’s China approach compare with that of its European neighbors and the United States?

One notable aspect of Berlin’s new strategy is how extensively and explicitly it’s tied into the EU’s overall approach to China, signaling to Chinese leaders that they may be facing a less favorable environment—at least in Berlin—for trying to create divisions within the EU and undermine a stronger and more unified approach toward China. Germany’s strategy uses multiple sections to lay out how its approach is embedded within a broader EU strategy and articulate a vision for strengthening the EU’s capacity for contending with China.

Many of the elements of Germany’s strategy for dealing with China as a “partner, competitor, and systemic rival” echo the recommendations that von der Leyen laid out earlier this year, such as enhancing domestic economic competitiveness and resilience and strengthening coordination with like-minded partners.

—Colleen Cottle is the deputy director of the Global China Hub and a former Central Intelligence Agency official.

The released strategy suggests divisions within the government over what role the transatlantic relationship plays when it comes to China. Earlier versions of the strategy mentioned the transatlantic relationship roughly twice as much and stated that the transatlantic partnership “plays a decisive role in a successful China policy.” This has been artificially toned down and reworded to “coordination with Germany’s closest partners is fundamental to our foreign policy; this also applies to our policy-making with and vis-à-vis China. Both the transatlantic alliance and the close partnership built on trust with the United States, including in the G7, is of tremendous importance for the EU and for Germany.”

The earlier leak also highlighted that “Germany, the EU and our valued partners are in a global systemic competition with China,” while the published version says “China has entered a geopolitical rivalry with the United States,” indirectly suggesting that Germany is standing on the sidelines. But this is not the case, as the strategy makes clear.

Germany takes a leadership role in this strategy by taking a networked, allies-based perspective. The strategy notes that its China policy is part of a joint EU policy on China, aims to Europeanize Germany’s approach to China, and even highlights that countries wishing to join the EU should align their approach to China with the bloc’s. Germany defines the China challenge in the context of different regions of the world and at the level of global institutions, regularly identifying valuable partners in this regard.

—Roderick Kefferpütz

4. What do we expect the reaction to be in Beijing?

Chinese leaders will note the call for German companies to “internalize” risk calculations as they consider current and future investments in China—indicating that the government may not bail them out in the event of geopolitical events, such as a crisis over Taiwan. The strategy includes language on the role that export controls and investment screening play in ensuring economic engagement with China does not bolster its military capabilities—highlighting concerns around Beijing’s military-civil fusion strategy—or “encourage systematic human rights violations in China.”

Beijing will also take note of the strategy’s call for stepped up engagement with Taiwan and welcoming of its greater participation in international fora, albeit while still reaffirming Germany’s one-China policy. The strategy mentions Germany’s growing security role in the Indo-Pacific, along with the need for differences over Taiwan to be settled peacefully. Importantly, the document also highlights that China is a “systemic rival” that seeks to upend the rules-based international order.

Chinese leaders, however, will remain hopeful that the strategy’s tough rhetoric will not be matched by government action. The lack of specifics on binding requirements to curtail German economic dependence on China, restrict outbound investment, or adopt tougher export control measures will bolster such hopes. Beijing will view the document’s reiteration of the need for continued economic engagement, combined with the fact that China remains Germany’s top trading partner and companies like BASF and Volkswagen have pledged to expand investment in China, as indicators that it retains leverage to prevent Berlin from aligning with Washington’s more hardline China policies. Beijing will also be attentive to the apparent daylight between those in government advocating for a tougher China policy and Scholz himself, who visited Beijing in November accompanied by a sizable business delegation and recently expressed the view that the government has a limited role in any de-risking policy.

Beijing is betting that, despite the strong rhetoric here, government inaction and economic realities in Germany will offer opportunities to steer Berlin back toward the more pro-China position of years past.

—David Shullman

Beijing will be watching closely to see how this strategy translates into concrete action. It will also be looking for opportunities to try to soften or slow roll any disadvantageous measures by leveraging German companies’ continued strong reliance on the Chinese market—a shortcoming identified in this strategy—and Berlin’s desire for continued cooperation with China in areas like climate change, sustainable development, global health, and broadly defined “economic and trade relations,” as laid out in the strategy.

—Colleen Cottle

The post Is Germany shifting its approach on China? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

After Wagner: Could the Russian army now turn against Putin?

Mercedes Sapuppo — Thu, 13 Jul 2023 20:52:09 +0000

The Wagner mutiny in late June was a brief affair, but it is casting a long shadow over Putin’s Russia. In less than forty-eight hours, Wagner chief Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his troops succeeded in shattering the carefully constructed myth of Putin the strongman, while exposing the weakness at the heart of his regime. Although the immediate danger has passed, many now believe it is only a matter of time before the Russian dictator faces new threats to his authority. However, with all genuine political opposition inside Russia long since eliminated, the real question is: Who could realistically challenge Putin?

It is easy to understand why many observers believe Putin is currently weaker than at any time in his entire twenty-three-year reign. During their short-lived uprising, Wagner forces managed to capture one of Russia’s largest cities, Rostov-on-Don, without a fight. A column of Wagner troops then advanced across Russia virtually unopposed, coming to within 200 kilometers of Moscow before choosing to turn back. As the drama unfolded, neither the Russian establishment nor the public rallied around Putin, who was conspicuously absent. Instead, there were widespread reports of panic across the country, while crowds in Rostov actively cheered Wagner troops.

The exact nature of the deal that ended the mutiny remains unclear, but the few details that are publicly known have done little to repair the damage done to Putin’s reputation. Neither Wagner leader Prigozhin nor his soldiers have been arrested or otherwise punished for their revolt, despite the fact that they downed a number of Russian aircraft and killed Russian servicemen. Instead, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has recently confirmed that Putin personally met with Prigozhin and dozens of other Wagner commanders just five days after the mutiny. Remarkably, Peskov revealed that Putin spoke about future job opportunities during his three-hour discussion with the leaders of the mutiny.

Putin’s apparent readiness to compromise has created the impression of a vulnerable dictator who lacks both the support and the military strength to follow through on his earlier vow to “crush” the mutiny. This has led to widespread speculation that the Wagner revolt may now inspire other anti-regime uprisings. In a 9 July interview with ABC News, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy suggested the Wagner mutiny might serve as a catalyst for further domestic destabilization in Russia. “There is a signal that there might be another mutiny in Russia, a revolution,” he noted. “More than that, there are many people who might support such a mutiny.”

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Who could lead the next uprising? One obvious candidate is Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. Like Wagner chief Prigozhin, Kadyrov enjoys a high degree of autonomy and has large numbers of troops under his personal command. With the Kremlin’s blessing, he rules Chechnya as his personal fiefdom. He also has a long history of clashes with Russian governmental institutions and has joined Prigozhin in criticizing the conduct of the war in Ukraine. However, Kadyrov was ultimately one of the few prominent figures to publicly back Putin during the Wagner mutiny, and also sent Chechen fighters to Rostov-on-Don.

Kadyrov’s eagerness to support Putin was telling. While he might have the manpower and independence to take action challenging Putin’s power, it is not clear that he sees any advantage in doing so. Secure in his autonomy, Kadyrov may have calculated that it would be more beneficial to preserve his place in the current system than to back a risky rebellion with uncertain prospects.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

A more substantial challenge to the Putin regime may yet emerge from within the ranks of Russia’s increasingly disgruntled military. The Kremlin’s meek response to the Wagner mutiny has exacerbated already declining morale among Russian troops and commanders currently serving in Ukraine.

For more than half a year, a steady stream of video addresses posted to social media by Russian soldiers complaining of suicidal orders and catastrophic losses have pointed to growing demoralization. Meanwhile, recent developments indicate that dissatisfaction with the Kremlin has now reached the level of senior commanders. A July 13 report in the Wall Street Journal claimed that numerous high-ranking officers including top Russian general Sergei Surovikin had been detained in the wake of the Wagner revolt. Surovikin, who formerly commanded the Russian invasion of Ukraine, is reportedly still being held and interrogated in Moscow over possible links to the mutiny.

In a further sign of mounting tension within Putin’s military, a senior Russian commander in charge of forces based in southern Ukraine claimed on July 12 that he had been suddenly dismissed from his post after raising the alarm over the mismanagement of the invasion. In a recorded audio statement, General Ivan Popov accused Russia’s military leadership of “treacherously and vilely decapitating the army at the most difficult and tense moment.”

Popov’s explosive accusations suggest that many in the Kremlin prefer to silence critics within the Russian military rather than address uncomfortable truths about the war in Ukraine. Unless this problematic approach is abandoned, it is likely to fuel further anger among front line commanders and troops as casualties continue to mount amid Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive.

If disgruntled officers and demoralized soldiers from the regular Russian army do turn against the Putin regime, they may be joined by thousands of former Wagner fighters along with members of Russia’s many other private military companies. These mercenary formations typically enjoy a significant degree of operational independence from the Kremlin and will have noted with interest the precedent set by the apparent lack of negative consequences following the Wagner mutiny.

For more than two decades, Vladimir Putin has ruthlessly suppressed any potential sources of domestic opposition to his rule. With the Russian media muzzled and his political opponents imprisoned, exiled, or dead, the force most capable of mounting a serious challenge to the regime is the Russian military. Putin has been careful to keep loyalists in top positions, but as the invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel, there are growing indications of disaffection among both commanders and troops. With Russian generals now reportedly being detained and dismissed, the scale of the threat should not be underestimated. In the months ahead, this may lead to fresh challenges to Putin’s rule that will dwarf the Wagner mutiny.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Many in Ukraine expressed frustration over the failure to secure a clear signal over NATO membership, but others argued that expectations had been unrealistically high and noted that the annual gathering in Lithuania brought plenty of good news for Ukraine. The Atlantic Council invited a number of Ukrainian commentators to share their assessment of the Vilnius summit.

Danylo Lubkivsky, Director, Kyiv Security Forum: The NATO summit in Vilnius calls for sober assessment. The alliance has clearly failed to seize the strategic initiative or achieve a political breakthrough. Naturally, this has provoked a wave of disappointment and concern.

Unlike the Ukrainian military, NATO leaders still appear to trapped in defensive thinking. This is unfortunate as Western caution only encourages the enemy. Gradual provision of arms prolongs the war and increases the number of casualties. Far from protecting NATO members, ambiguity over Ukraine’s future membership serves to undermine the alliance’s international authority.

Despite these reservations, I do not think there was much for Russia to cheer in Vilnius. The summit demonstrated that while there is no consensus over Ukraine’s NATO ambitions, the entire Western world remains firm and unwavering in its support for the Ukrainian war effort. This message will have been well understood in Moscow.

Attention must now turn toward next year’s summit in Washington DC. This jubilee summit marking 75 years of NATO will take place against a backdrop of the 2024 US presidential election campaign. The historic nature of the summit may work in Ukraine’s favor, creating a climate for historic decisions. After Vilnius, it is clear that the Ukrainian authorities must work consistently with all partners to secure a positive outcome next summer. Ultimately, much will also depend on the Ukrainian military and its ability to create the conditions for NATO accession by succeeding on the battlefield.

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Olena Halushka, Board Member, Anti-Corruption Action Center (AntAC): Many practical steps were taken during the Vilnius summit to strengthen Ukraine’s war effort. These included new commitments to supply weapons, F-16 jet fighter training for Ukrainian pilots, and the establishment of the NATO-Ukraine Council.

However, Kyiv’s key goal was to receive an official invitation to join NATO. Based on the understanding that full NATO membership would not be possible as long as hostilities continue, Ukrainians saw no legal or practical obstacles to issuing an invitation and beginning the accession process. Instead, the summit declaration made vague references to membership “when allies agree and conditions are met.” This was disappointing but not discouraging. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg called this year’s Vilnius summit historic for Sweden. We now hope next year’s summit in Washington DC will finally make history for Ukraine, too.

Oleksiy Goncharenko, Ukrainian MP, European Solidarity Party: This was definitely not an historic summit from a Ukrainian perspective. While Ukraine dominated the summit agenda, NATO leaders chose not to take the bold step of officially inviting Ukraine to join the alliance. It is somewhat ironic that 15 years ago at the NATO summit in Bucharest, the United States was leading the push to offer Ukraine membership. This year, the roles were reversed.

The language adopted in the summit communique was not strong enough. This was a big mistake as the only language Vladimir Putin understands is strength. Instead, NATO leaders opted for the language of caution and hesitation.

There were also some reasons for optimism in Vilnius. The communique included the word “invitation” and also acknowledged that Ukraine can sidestep the Membership Action Plan (MAP) stage of the accession process, which is good news. We must now focus our efforts on securing an historic breakthrough at next year’s summit in the US. Further failure could have a profoundly negative impact on Ukrainian public opinion at a time when Ukrainians overwhelmingly back the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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Volodymyr Dubovyk, Associate Professor, Odesa Mechnikov National University: I did not have high expectations for the summit and did not think it was likely to become a breakthrough moment in Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership, so I cannot say I was particularly disappointed. At the same time, it is clear that the wording of the final communique was not good. It was reminiscent of the vague language used in Bucharest back in 2008, and reflected the widely acknowledged lack of agreement among NATO allies over Ukrainian membership. Some of the passages from the communique, such as the references to interoperability between Ukraine and the alliance, gave the impression that the dramatic events of the past year and a half had not happened at all.

Having said that, my main concern was that tension over the NATO membership issue could damage ongoing military, political, and financial support for Ukraine in its war of liberation. This did not happen. There was some evidence of emotions flying high, with President Zelenskyy’s angry tweet on the way to the summit provoking a defensive reaction from some allies, but the overall mood was one of constructive cooperation and partnership.

Iuliia Mendel, former press secretary to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy: Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians demonstrate their commitment to Ukrainian democracy and independence every day as they defend the country along the front lines of the war with Russia. This NATO summit was an opportunity to send a positive signal to them that their sacrifices are acknowledged and appreciated. Unfortunately, the summit communique was too vague to send a clear message.

Instead of decisive action, I saw a lot of bureaucratic discussion. This was frustrating, especially as an invitation would not have meant immediate Ukrainian accession to NATO. It would not have triggered Article 5 or plunged NATO into a war with Russia. Ukrainians find this approach hard to stomach. For us, NATO is a matter of national survival, not a box-ticking exercise.

There are two main reasons for the diplomatic compromises we witnessed in Vilnius. Firstly, some Western leaders are still concerned that issuing Ukraine with an invitation to join NATO could lead to an escalation and expansion of the current war. Secondly, there are also legitimate reservations over Ukraine’s readiness for membership, particularly in terms of the country’s domestic reform agenda.

Despite the disappointment of the Vilnius summit, I remain confident that Ukraine has earned the right to join NATO and will achieve membership sooner or later. Nevertheless, there is no denying that an important opportunity to demonstrate international support for Ukraine has been missed.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

But the deployment has not prevented Azerbaijan from continuing to try to expel ethnic Armenians from what’s left of Nagorno-Karabakh. Last December, a group of Azerbaijanis set up a roadblock along the Lachin Corridor claiming to advocate for environmental rights in the region. But the roadblock in effect slowed the flow of goods into Nagorno-Karabakh, creating a humanitarian crisis. The United States and the EU, as well as Human Rights Watch and others, have called for Azerbaijan to unblock the Lachin Corridor. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has ordered Azerbaijan to do the same.

Instead, Azerbaijan solidified the blockade by installing an armed checkpoint at the mouth of the Lachin Corridor, thus effectively seizing control over it. The move was further condemned by the United States and EU, and led Armenia to seek renewed intervention from the ICJ. Russia issued tepid statements and then replaced its peacekeeping force commander in Nagorno-Karabakh. But such a fundamental change in the regime over the Lachin Corridor could not possibly exist without approval—however tacit—from the Kremlin. Video footage taken last month purports to show Russian peacekeepers accompanying Azerbaijani forces to install a concrete barrier near the checkpoint and hoist an Azerbaijani flag in adjacent Armenian territory.

Since the blockade began, traffic along the Lachin Corridor has been reduced to an all-time low. This makes it more difficult for essential humanitarian aid to pass into Nagorno-Karabakh. In the last seven months, Nagorno-Karabakh has turned into an open-air prison, with ethnic Armenian inhabitants increasingly deprived of food and medicine, and energy resources almost entirely drained. They may soon be forced to flee their ancestral homeland for good just to survive.

What the United States should—and shouldn’t—do

In May, Aliyev demanded the surrender of Nagorno-Karabakh authorities, suggesting that he might offer them amnesty should they accept Azerbaijani rule. Oddly, the US State Department praised Aliyev’s remarks on amnesty, glossing over other parts of his speech in which he threatened violence if the authorities did not surrender: “[E]veryone knows perfectly well that we have all the opportunities to carry out any operation in that region today… Either they will bend their necks and come themselves or things will develop differently now.”

But Washington’s seemingly tactful acquiescence to Azerbaijan’s growing aggression against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in fact hurts US efforts to curb malign Russian influence and end Moscow’s war on Ukraine. The Russo-Azeri pact provides for enhanced economic ties, including in the gas and energy sectors, and has proven successful in helping preemptively circumvent Western sanctions against Russia. A deal between Baku and Brussels in July 2022 to double the flow of gas to Europe to wean it off Russian gas was soon followed by a deal in November 2022 between Baku and Moscow to increase gas imports from Russia to enable Azerbaijan to meet its new obligations to Europe.

In May, Russia and Iran agreed to complete a railroad that would link Russia to the Persian Gulf through Azerbaijan, thus providing a route through which Iran can directly send Russia more weapons and drones. One week later, during a summit of the Eurasian Economic Union, in which Aliyev participated as a guest for the first time, Putin stated that cooperation on developing this North-South railway is carried out “in close partnership with Azerbaijan.” Baku knows it can play both sides because it has backing from Moscow, while the West is blinded by non-Russian energy imports and dreams of regional stability.

If the West seeks to reduce tensions in the South Caucasus, it needs to step up its pressure on Azerbaijan. In the short term, this might include the threat of sanctions in response to further military action against Armenia and the continued refusal to unblock the Lachin Corridor, as well as lending support to Russia. By law, Azerbaijan cannot receive US military or foreign assistance unless it eschews military force to solve its disputes with Armenia, but the White House keeps letting Azerbaijan off the hook by waiving Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act and sending millions of dollars in military aid to Baku. Washington should treat Baku’s actions against Armenia as attempts at coercion, just as it does with Russian aggression against Ukraine.

For its part, Armenia has sought to unwind some of its security arrangements with Russia. Yerevan has refused to host CSTO military drills, send a representative to serve as CSTO deputy secretary general, sign a CSTO declaration to provide defense aid to Armenia, or accept the deployment of a CSTO monitoring mission in lieu of the EU-led mission. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has even threatened to terminate or freeze Armenia’s CSTO membership.

Even so, the West cannot reasonably expect Armenia to leave the CSTO and break with Russia without significantly helping Armenia diversify and mitigate its security, energy, and economic reliance on the Kremlin. As part of this, the United States may want to consider inviting Armenia to become a Major Non-NATO Ally. Washington should provide training and equipment to enhance Armenia’s defense capabilities and help it develop a more robust and independent security apparatus. The United States could also push forward on the prospect of building a small modular nuclear power plant in Armenia, providing an incentive for Armenia to decide against partnering with Russia on energy.

The West has stepped up its diplomatic efforts to facilitate a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which is good, but these efforts should not come at the cost of abetting the unfolding humanitarian disaster in Nagorno-Karabakh. Now is the time to compel Baku to cease its bellicose rhetoric and consent to an international presence in Nagorno-Karabakh to mediate dialogue with residents there and promote a more meaningful transition from war to lasting peace.

Sheila Paylan is a human rights lawyer and former legal advisor to the United Nations. She is currently a senior fellow in international law at the Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia.

The post Why deepening Russia-Azerbaijan ties should worry the United States appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Europe needs a nuclear deterrent of its own

Jacques Lanxade, Denis MacShane, Margarita Mathiopoulos, and Klaus Naumann — Wed, 12 Jul 2023 01:19:45 +0000

Sixteen months after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, Europe, and Germany in particular, have changed profoundly. Now as NATO leaders meet in Vilnius, it is vital for the Alliance’s European members led by Berlin to build on the transformation in their approach to security that they have been forced to adopt because of the war.

The war in Ukraine exposed bluntly once more the appalling state of European defense capabilities—as seen in former Yugoslav republics in the late 1990s—and how Europe still depends on the United States to fight a war on its own continent.

Under US President Joe Biden, Washington has demonstrated its indispensability to NATO and European security at the very moment of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But the present situation is unsustainable.

To stay safe against Russian and other aggression in the future, Europe will need a convincing conventional and nuclear deterrent of its own, and Germany will be key. The invasion of February 24, 2022 opened many eyes, but the biggest awakening took place in Germany.

Moscow’s assault on a European neighbor caused an epiphany in Berlin’s decades-long, complacent foreign and energy policy, as well as in its free-riding security and defense posture under Washington’s nuclear and NATO’s conventional umbrella. Chancellor Olaf Scholz understood the urgency for his country as he declared in his famous speech a Zeitenwende (time for change) for Germany’s foreign, security, defense, and energy policy, which was well received in Europe and the United States. Scholz pledged a one hundred billion euro special fund to rebuild the German armed forces that had decayed under the sixteen-year-long chancellorship of his predecessor, Angela Merkel. Berlin’s selfish post-1989 mantra—essentially “make peace without spending money for weapons”—became history almost overnight.

Today Germany is one of Ukraine’s biggest weapons providers after the United States. It is about to increase its defense budget of fifty-one billion euros to fifty-three billion euros. But Berlin needs to understand that the moment of truth has arrived for the Euro-Atlantic community of democracies.

After the US presidential election next year—no matter who makes it into the White House—Europe will need its own capabilities to defend European territory and borders from an outside aggressor. If Donald Trump returns to the White House or another Republican president takes office, we could see a shrinking of defense support for NATO, as the US military may concentrate its forces toward Asia and the Indo-Pacific.

Former US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis admitted during his confirmation hearing in 2017 that the US military is not strong enough to meet the challenges it faces around the globe. Or in the words of Elbridge A. Colby, former deputy assistant secretary of defense, “if we have to leave Europe exposed, so be it… Asia is more important than Europe.”

Therefore, to make Europe safe for peace and democracy in the future, NATO needs to strengthen its conventional and nuclear pillars. Russia’s aggression today against Ukraine and tomorrow perhaps against Poland or the Baltic states makes the Europeanization of NATO imperative. In the words of former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger: “Europe has to play a special role in American thinking… But I could understand in a modified arrangement that Europe could play a more important role in some areas. I am not offended by autonomy in my definition of it.”

For the past twenty years, US presidents from both the Democratic and Republican parties have been asking European allies to take burden-sharing seriously. Here are four ways to start:

It is imperative to strengthen the competitiveness and innovativeness of Europe’s military technological and industrial complex and to harmonize its procurement base. Buying off-the-shelf US equipment can go hand-in-hand with buying European equipment—and this should apply to all NATO members.
Not only must NATO forces be interoperable—allowing them to use each other’s platforms seamlessly while fighting alongside each other—but this should extend to potential future NATO members like Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.
For the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, a permanent increase of their defense spending to beyond the NATO target of 2 percent of gross domestic product should be seen as an obligation. Emerging from the Vilnius summit, where a new push is under way to get all allies beyond 2 percent, it is the responsibility of the biggest European economies to upgrade their conventional forces in order to protect European soil—when Washington might be too busy in Asia.
Europe needs a credible nuclear deterrent of its own, under NATO command. Only a trilateral British, French, and German nuclear umbrella, combined with a US umbrella, all under the command and control of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) will be a credible deterrent for Russia. This would require that France and Germany find a solution for equipping their joint Future Combat Air System—a new generation of advanced fighter jets—and the German F-35 dual capable aircraft with French nuclear weapons. Germany would not have its own nuclear weapons, so this arrangement would not violate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NATO command structure must be tailored in such a way that Europe can fight a conflict in which neither Americans nor Canadians may wish to get involved, while taking advantage of NATO commands and systems. To this end the deputy SACEUR has to be European, and a headquarters-based Combined Joint Task Force must serve as his or her operational command.

Today it is clear that the main threat to European security does not come from Russia’s conventional forces, but from its tactical nuclear weapons and its sophisticated hybrid warfare. For Germany to be a full and equally strong part of a new European pillar of NATO, it needs to break the ultimate taboo and accept that a wider shared European nuclear deterrence should now be part of Berlin’s Zeitenwende defense thinking.

Of course, an outcry will arise: A stronger nuclear role for Germany will sound unthinkable to many. But so was Russia’s full-scale invasion and war in Europe only last year.

There have been strategic debates in Bonn since the 1950s about whether the Article 5 joint defense pact would really be implemented by Washington in case of an attack—whether a US president would sacrifice New York for Berlin or New Orleans for Munich. Today 62 percent of Germans are in favor of spending more money to modernize the Bundeswehr properly so that it can defend its country. Meanwhile, 47 percent of Germans agree with their government’s heavy support of the Ukrainian military—with another 16 percent wanting it to go further.

This, then, is the moment to start a debate in Berlin, Paris, and London about a trilateral French, British, and German nuclear European Defense Initiative, and the responsibility of those three powers to protect Europe if Article 5 is invoked in a worst-case-scenario.

Adm. Jacques Lanxade was joint chief of staff of the French Armed Forces and served as a defense advisor to French President Francois Mitterrand.

Denis MacShane is a former UK minister of Europe and a former UK delegate to the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO.

Margarita Mathiopoulos is a defense expert and professor emerita of US foreign policy and international security at Potsdam University. She also served as a foreign policy advisor to the former chairman of the German Free Democratic Party, Guido Westerwelle.

Gen. Klaus Naumann served as chairman of the military committee of NATO and joint chief of staff of the German Armed Forces.

A German language version of this article first appeared in Handelsblatt. It is printed here with the authors’ and publisher’s permission.

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Four big takeaways from the new Czech national security strategy

Petr Tůma — Mon, 10 Jul 2023 16:19:32 +0000

With Russia’s brutal attempt to redraw borders by force, Europe underwent a massive tremor. Moscow’s desecration of the rules-based world order woke up the continent from its geopolitical sleepwalking. Security and defense are beginning to be taken seriously again. Adjusting to the new geopolitical reality, several European countries have drafted new security strategies and similar documents, including France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Germany. One can add here the European Union (EU) and NATO strategic outlooks from last year.

Now the Czechs have joined the swarm. On June 28, the government in Prague approved a new national security strategy, replacing the previous strategy from 2015. Though perhaps less weighty than papers presented by major European powers, it is worth paying attention to the Czech strategy. As highlighted by Martin Povejšil, the Czech foreign ministry’s director general for security and multilateral issues, the new document is “addressing threats and risks in the most open and direct way, compared to other countries.” This directness offers a refreshingly realistic assessment of the current security environment and helps to explain the ongoing European strategizing momentum.

Drafting the thirty-seven-page document took nine months, and the work was coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), leaving a clear mark on the text. There were discussions in the past about whether the MFA should be the penholder, considering that an important part of the document dealt with internal security and also the defense ministry does the work in France and some other countries. The increasing impact of external factors on internal security has assuaged these doubts. Still, it appears to have been a thoroughly intergovernmental effort that included a number of ministries and collected inputs from parliament, the president’s office, and nongovernmental organizations.

The security strategy has a twofold purpose: First, it is meant to be the starting point and binding guidance for further work on security for the whole public sector, from ministries to municipalities. Second, the strategy should also become a “StratCom” tool to communicate major security-related messages to the Czech population, as well as to Czechia’s friends and adversaries. The language, structure, and content of the document reflect this purpose.

There are four distinctive features of the new national security strategy to note.

1. ‘Czechia is not secure’

The document is built on the foundational acknowledgment that “Czechia is not secure,” not due to an internal threat but because of the deteriorating international context. The text gets as far as admitting the possibility that the country “could become part of an armed conflict.” Some may consider this statement overblown, yet it’s deliberate. The risk of open aggression against Czechia remains low but is currently the highest since the end of the Cold War. An effective defense against new security challenges starts with admitting them and forsaking the state of security unconsciousness.

The new strategy wants to contribute to the strategic awakening, the whole of society becoming conscious of current threats. When Karel Řehka, the chief of the general staff of the Czech army, stated in February that he can’t rule out a war between Russia and NATO, which would lead to a partial mobilization, he shocked many of his compatriots. This document puts additional weight behind the seriousness of the situation for Czechs.

2. It’s direct about Russia and China

Compared to previous Czech security strategies (2003, 2011, 2015), the current one is more direct in pointing out the threats and risks.

If the strategy from 2015—which is still partly oriented by the post-9/11 paradigm of the war on terrorism—speaks indirectly about some states seeking the revision of the existing international order, the current document, reminiscent of the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, denotes Russia as “the biggest immediate and long-standing direct threat to the security of Europe and to the international rules-based order.” And it will remain so—one can read a few lines lower—“unless Russia goes through a fundamental and deep transformation, political as well as social, no matter what outcome the war in Ukraine may have.” Czechia and its neighbors have a particular reason to worry, given the assumption that Moscow “continues to treat Central Europe as its natural sphere of influence.” That’s why it’s important for the EU to engage in a serious reconsideration of its relations with Russia, which some member states are still reluctant to support.

China is described as a country that represents “a fundamental systemic challenge globally and is attempting to change the existing international order.” There were reportedly some discussions about whether to explicitly designate China as a “threat.” In the end, the text avoids creating a new precedent and keeps closer to the language used by the EU and NATO allies. The document highlights that Beijing “continues with massive arming… engages in cyber espionage, seeks to control global data flows, and uses diverse forms of socio-economic coercion and other hybrid interference tools.” One can easily identify Beijing where the text describes—without attribution—other major dangers and risks. Interestingly, the paragraph after China’s portrayal begins as follows: “Yet another long-term threat comes from…” Logically, what was discussed just before—China—could be interpreted also as a long-term threat.

Other threats mentioned are North Korea’s nuclear program, Iran’s malign activities in the region, lasting conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, and uncontrolled migration. The document also points out the security challenges related to climate change, instability in the Western Balkans, and—importantly—the risks of declining democracy and rule of law in any EU member state.

3. A whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach is needed

The new strategy is distinguished by its holistic approach to security. The country’s defense is no longer just the responsibility of the military and a few other relevant government bodies. The document advances the idea that all the ministries and the public sector should be involved, along with business and civil society. Indeed, all citizens should be somehow engaged, as they are not only security consumers but its contributors and creators. It’s the government’s role to prepare people for this task.

To paraphrase a French anthropologist Marcel Mauss—one of the godfathers of modern sociology and anthropology—national security appears here as “total social fact,” even if different players are engaged at different levels.

Given the whole-of-society dimension of national security, the strategy makes an effort to present an easy-to-read text accessible to the broader public, hoping to generate a public debate. Czechia’s more integrated approach appears to have more in common with the German strategy, compared to, for example, France’s 2022 strategic review, which is more focused on the military (and a military-minded audience). On the other hand, Prague’s new security strategy is closer to the French strategy in that both seem unified and clearer in their priorities compared with the German document, in which one can easily identify different voices of the three coalition partners, making it a bit more of a patchwork.

4. The focus is unity, not autonomy

If the new strategy is realistic in the assessment of threats, it also reflects the values-based policies Czechia is now championing. There’s now a broad consensus in Prague toward restoring former President Václav Havel’s legacy of values-consistent foreign policy, from Prime Minister Petr Fiala’s coalition government to new President Petr Pavel and the leaders of both chambers of parliament.

The strategy repeatedly emphasizes Czech NATO and EU membership as key to ensuring the country’s security, especially while the “role of the [United Nations] as a protector of the order keeps losing traction.” The document alludes to the need for reinforcement of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy while highlighting complementarity with NATO and the Alliance’s key role in collective defense.

Those following the debate about EU “strategic autonomy” won’t be surprised that the concept, put to the forefront by French President Emmanuel Macron, isn’t mentioned. Instead of “strategic autonomy,” which can imply greater European separation from the United States, Prague prefers to talk about “strategic unity” within the EU and, importantly, across the Atlantic.

There’s more to come

The new Czech security outlook will be complemented by other strategic documents, including a defense strategy, foreign policy concept, and reviews of approaches toward China, Russia, and energy security. This should be done by early 2025, when the foreign ministry, in coordination with the national security adviser, will review the implementation of the current security strategy, as stipulated by the relevant government resolution.

Yet, even the new strategy alone makes it clear Prague is taking a bolder approach to national security, and it presents yet another indicator of a tectonic shift in Europe’s politics. It likely won’t be the last. Expect more countries in Central and Eastern Europe to step up and take on a more proactive approach as well. As an appetizer, one could refer to Lithuania’s bold Indo-Pacific strategy, released July 5.

Petr Tůma is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a Czech career diplomat with an expertise on Europe, Middle East, and transatlantic relations. He previously worked at the Czech Embassy in Washington, DC. His views are his own.

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Oleksii Reznikov: Ukraine’s defense doctrine will define country’s future

Oleksii Reznikov — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 18:49:23 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has recently initiated a national debate over the creation of a Ukrainian Doctrine that will shape the future development of the country. I am confident that defense policy will be at the heart of this national dialogue and see a number of key points that are worth underlining.

The first point to note is the global nature of Ukrainian security. For decades to come, the entire world will live by the rules established by the outcome of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin has demonstrated its readiness to weaponize everything from energy resources and food supplies to cyberspace and social media. Moscow has engaged in nuclear blackmail, interfered with maritime freedoms, and called into question the very idea of territorial integrity. These challenges are not local or even regional in scope; they are global threats that resonate equally around the world.

How we respond to these issues in Ukraine will define the international security climate. Any attempts to address the Russian invasion on a purely local level by freezing the conflict or forcing Ukraine into territorial concessions will result in failure and will only fuel further international instability. Instead, we must acknowledge that the threats posed by Russia are global in character and demand a global response.

The second key point is the need to define Ukraine’s position in regional and global security systems. In simple terms, the desired trajectory should include security guarantees followed by full NATO accession, with internal transformations taking place in parallel that implement the best lessons from Ukraine’s wartime experience and enable the country to acquire the necessary domestic defense capabilities. These processes can and must be advanced during the current active phase of the war.

The third key point is the need to develop a defense doctrine that meets the security expectations of both Ukraine and the country’s partners. It is now clear that Ukraine is capable of serving as a shield on Europe’s eastern frontier. Indeed, Ukraine is currently carrying out NATO’s core mission of defending Europe against Russian military aggression. At the same time, over the past eighteen months Ukraine has received direct and indirect military aid worth more than the country’s entire defense budget since the restoration of Ukrainian independence in 1991. Without continued external assistance, Ukraine will not be able to carry out rapid rearmament or acquire the kind of defense capabilities it needs. The best solution would be to move toward greater reliance on internal resources while maintaining strong levels of international support.

Clearly, Ukraine’s partners will be reluctant to invest in a security model that differs significantly from established NATO standards, or one that conflicts with their own military, industrial, or economic interests. Finding the right balance between strengthening Ukraine’s domestic defense sector capabilities and optimizing international cooperation will be crucial.

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Efforts to develop a practical vision for Ukraine’s army of the future have been underway since June 2022, when I ordered a capacity review. These findings, coupled with Ukraine’s unique wartime experience, form the basis of a concept paper on the transformation of Ukraine’s defense sector submitted to Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal at the beginning of June 2023. The next stage will involve consultations to coordinate interagency efforts required to create the right legislative framework and ensure effective cooperation between different government bodies. This synergy will be the key to success.

Russia’s invasion has underlined that defense is an investment not an expense. For instance, strengthening Ukraine’s naval capabilities will help guarantee maritime security in the Black Sea and Azov Sea, which secures vital income from trade. Likewise, failure to provide adequate security measures will leave Ukraine unable to rebuild and trapped in costly wartime insecurity. All of Ukraine’s security policy decisions must reflect these fundamental truths.

Complex defense capabilities revolve around three main factors: people, weapons, and financial resources. Each has their own planning specifics. Successful weapons and financing policies take years to plan; when it comes to human resources, it often takes a generation or longer to get it right.

Ukraine is now looking to coordinate the country’s defense sector transformation under conditions of extreme uncertainty. We know the current war will end in Ukrainian victory, but we do not know when this will be. This makes it difficult to begin the process of optimizing the range of weapons in use by the Ukrainian armed forces. After all, in order to defeat Russia, Ukraine needs to receive as many weapons as it can, and needs to get them as quickly as possible.

We also don’t know exactly when Ukraine’s partners will make the final decision to fully integrate the country into the Euro-Atlantic security community. This is fundamental. It is one thing to reform the Ukrainian military as part of a collective defense strategy in cooperation with partners; it is quite another to build defense capabilities in relative isolation with some external support.

One of my main requests to our partners is therefore to make a decision on Ukraine’s NATO accession as soon as possible. This will make it far easier for all parties to conduct long-term defense planning. If a decision is not forthcoming, Ukraine’s partners will be obliged to include the country’s security needs in their own planning on a bilateral and multilateral basis.

A further priority for Ukraine’s defense doctrine is the de-Sovietization of defense policy and planning. This needs to be addressed in a practical manner that goes beyond mere slogans. Eighteen months ago, many military analysts believed a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine would mean a fight between a large Soviet army against a small Soviet army. In reality, it soon became clear that the Ukrainian army had undergone significant change. However, the same cannot be said for the broader state systems underpinning Ukrainian defense policy. A wide range of political, social, and economic changes are still needed.

For example, the system of registration for military service is still linked in the Soviet fashion with place of work or study. This means that entrepreneurs along with the self-employed and unemployed are often outside the system. Far-reaching changes are needed in order to establish and maintain the right kind of reserve and effectively mobilize the country’s human, material, and financial resources. Efforts to overcome quality problems with quantity must be set aside. In conditions of resource scarcity, such an approach is suicidal.

The human dimension of future Ukrainian defense is a professional army. This must be based on the transparent logic of a military career and an extensive social protection package, relying on well-trained reserves formed of all men liable for military service and of women on a voluntary basis (with the exception of those categories of women who are liable for military service).

The registration of people liable for military service should be fully digitized. This process is underway. We also need to implement separate training policies for different groups in order to create a genuine rather than nominal reserve. This should look to maximize citizen engagement by improving the motivation system.

Statements about there being seven million Ukrainians liable for military service are meaningless if the country is not capable of structuring the reserve in ways that make efficient use of these people. Similarly, declarations that anyone subject to military service must complete their compulsory period in uniform do little to help the state capitalize on existing resources. Instead, basic training should be supplemented by the development of specific groups within the country’s military reserve forces. This should include a combat reserve consisting of those with combat experience; a territorial reserve for territorial defense units; an operational reserve of military veterans without combat experience; a mobilization reserve of those who previously passed through basic training; and a general reserve register featuring individuals with no prior military training.

The development of an efficient reserve is only possible in conjuction with an effective Heroes Policy, which has been identified as a priority by President Zelenskyy. This is a good example of the need for interagency synergies and is also an area where a sense of justice must serve as a cornerstone. Meanwhile, the task of managing military registration should be taken away from the General Staff and the Land Forces Command. Instead, it is necessary to establish a separate and tailored agency within the Ministry of Defense.

Similar efforts are required for the civil reserve. Over the past eighteen months of Russia’s full-scale invasion, it has become clear that a significant portion of the almost one million Ukrainian men and women in uniform perform purely civilian functions. It makes no sense to bunch all of these people together with the military until the end of hostilities. Instead, a more nuanced approach is required. When society sees that the state seeks to engage people in defense tasks as rationally and reasonably as possible, we will witness a decline in negative phenomena associated with military service. After all, many of those who seek to avoid military service do so in order to escape perceived uncertainty, injustice, and abuses.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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A new mobilization and reserve policy will require a new regulatory framework. This will involve comprehensive legislative changes. The entire mobilization system for central and local authorities, enterprises, and institutions should undergo revision, with mobilization tasks in their current form abolished. In its place, the emphasis should be on practical needs and common sense. Training for reservists should be synchronized with real life requirements and skills, with citizens aware of opportunities at the level of school leaver, university undergraduate, employee, or entrepreneur.

Professional military education and career management must be developed according to NATO principles and standards to ensure interoperability. At the same time, all training and education should be adjusted to reflect Ukraine’s unrivalled combat experience. This is the country’s unique advantage and should shape Ukraine’s defense doctrine as much as possible.

Work is already underway on the transformation of Ukraine’s military education system, with a concept approved by the government in December 2022. Over the coming decade, Ukraine’s military education will be fully integrated into the broader European military education environment in terms of both form and content. A separate element here is military-patriotic education. At the moment, this is governed by two laws and a presidential decree which contain a number of apparent conflicts and contradictions. We must achieve a clearer division of tasks and harmonization.

Ukraine’s entire defense doctrine should be underpinned by solid economic foundations. At present, the Ukrainian defense industry is not capable of meeting the demands of the military, but the sector has huge potential. Indeed, if managed correctly, a highly profitable Ukrainian defense industry could realistically become a major engine driving the country toward the goal of a one trillion dollar GDP.

I have repeatedly stated my position that self-sufficiency in the defense sector is a core component of genuine national sovereignty. Moving forward, Ukraine should be aiming to produce as much as possible itself. Once again, Ukraine’s unique combat experience creates exciting opportunities in this area. In order to make the most of the country’s experience and its industrial capabilities, a new defense industry development strategy is required. This should take international defense sector trends into account while also focusing on other economic factors and Ukraine’s specific strengths.

The time has come to turn away from the old Soviet model governed by unprofitability and resource consumption. Instead, Ukraine must strive to become a global defense sector leader and an attractive international partner. This will require a unified center capable of establishing and implementing policy, with exceedingly flexible R&D assets responding rapidly to the latest requirements. Procurement should be synchronized with budget planning, while efforts must be made to move away from lingering problems relating to blurred responsibilities. Efforts in this direction are already underway and must continue.

The overall objective of Ukraine’s defense doctrine is to defend the state against any possible threat. This requires new approaches to everything from managing mobilization and maintaining an effective reserve, to reforming the defense industry and boosting domestic production at every level. The country’s needs will inevitably evolve over time. Five years after victory in the current war, will Ukraine need a mobilization reserve of 500,000 or two million? This is why scalability is so critical.

In the defense sector, Ukraine has huge untapped potential and much to offer the international community. In the drone sector alone, Ukraine is at the cutting edge of current innovations and is well-placed to remain a key source of solutions for European and other markets. This military tech prowess will help open doors to new cooperation that are currently closed. Ukraine can build on its experience and expertize to become a major player in the global defense industry, but this requires solid foundations and a strong domestic sector.

Every day, our defenders are bringing victory closer. This progress is taking place in a rapidly changing world, and is contributing to these changes. Ukraine must be ready to capitalize on the opportunities this creates in ways that guarantee the safety of all Ukrainians while enabling the country to prosper.

Oleksii Reznikov is Ukraine’s Minister of Defense.

Force design is the innovation and the determination of future Navy ships, aircraft, and weapon systems, along with a warfighting concept for a twenty-year and beyond timeframe. Force development is the adaptation and modernization of Navy in-service ships, aircraft, and weapon systems, along with a warfighting concept within a two-to-seven-year timeframe. The difference between these two official Navy terms may seem arcane: force design is all about the future force, and force development is all about the current force. However, both address Navy requirements based on an appraisal of US security needs, and then choose naval capabilities (along with a warfighting concept) to meet those requirements within fiscal limitations.

The following terms are also important for the reader’s comprehension.

Force planning is the more commonly understood term—used in place of force design and force development—and is used across Congress, defense media, academia, and industry. While force planning is not an official Navy term, the term is used in this paper to encompass both force development and force design.
Force structure is used by the Congress to mean the number and types of combat units the Navy can generate and sustain, as well as to represent the Navy’s combat capability.
Budget is an informal and shortened expression to encapsulate all Navy activities in the Defense Department’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system, especially the programming activity.

The navy’s approach to strategy development and force planning

The US Navy’s approach to strategy development and force planning in 2023 is not working. Strategy development is on life support and force planning uses an incremental approach of buying marginally better and more expensive versions of the same platforms the Navy has relied upon for decades. In effect, it is producing the Navy’s force structure one ship class at a time, without reference to an overall Navy strategy and force plan to field an integrated, aligned, and synchronized “Navy fighting machine.”¹ Moreover, this approach is delivering an unaffordable fleet over too long a procurement time. Proposals for developing new capabilities are viewed as threats to in-service platforms and programs, thereby blocking innovation.

Navy F/A-18E Super Hornets prepare to launch from the USS Harry S. Truman in support of Exercise Trident Juncture 18. Credit: US Navy, Navy Petty Officer 3rd Class Adelola Tinubu.

Congress, defense media, defense analysts, the Defense Department, and independent US government agencies have all found fault with the US Navy’s strategy development and force planning. Most notably, Congress has expressed its dissatisfaction.

In December 2017, Congress mandated a Navy with 355 crewed ships, a goal based on the Navy’s 2016 Force Structure Assessment (FSA) and, in February 2020, Representative Joe Courtney (D-CT) complained to then Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper about, “the lack of a shipbuilding plan and the [Donald] Trump administration not delivering a strategy to build a 355-ship Navy.”² In December 2021, Congress mandated the Navy to submit the Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report on its force structure plans for the near, middle, and far terms to meet the combatant commanders’ requirements using Defense Department-approved scenarios.³ However, Congress reacted with little enthusiasm for the Navy’s thirty-year shipbuilding plan for fiscal year 2023 (FY2023), despite its being the first such report from the Navy to Congress in more than three years, and was similarly unimpressed by the following year’s iteration. This has led Congress to mandate the establishment of an independent National Commission on the Future of the Navy in December 2022 to determine the size and force mix of the fleet by mid-2025.⁴

This litany of events—particularly the unprecedented direction for the Navy to submit the Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report, the establishment of an independent National Commission on the Future of the Navy, and the assignment to the commandant of the Marine Corps of sole responsibility to develop amphibious warfare ships requirements—indicates Congress’ displeasure with Navy force planning. Moreover, the inability of the Department of Defense (DoD) and Navy leaders to consistently state how many ships the Navy needs to meet its requirements may be a driving factor in Congress’ decision to legislate these unprecedented mandates. During the first seven months of 2022, DoD leaders suggested five different targets for the objective size of the Navy—316, 327, 367, 373, and five hundred.⁵ In addition, the use of three options in both the FY2023 and FY2024 thirty-year shipbuilding plan—rather than a single projection—handicaps congressional understanding of the Joe Biden administration’s goals concerning the future size and composition of the Navy, and assessing the Navy’s proposed FY2024 shipbuilding budget, five-year shipbuilding plan, and thirty-year shipbuilding plan. Moreover, to follow its mantra of providing best military advice to civilian leadership, the Navy must have a preferred option for what it needs to get the job done, and, most importantly, must assess the risk to the United States if it does not get the resources it needs (see Table 2).

As Dr. Scott Mobley pointed out in his November 2022 Proceedings essay, the Navy largely focuses on programming and budget to develop the means for strategy while “devaluing the strategic underpinnings for rationalizing and justifying those means.”⁶

Navy force planning uses a piecemeal approach—“buying at the margin [fewer, but] better [and more expensive] versions of the same [type] of platforms [the Navy] has relied upon for decades”—that is delivering an unaffordable fleet over too long a procurement time.⁷ Navy force planning almost always occurs in a resource-constrained environment imposing a zero-sum approach, in which proposals for new capabilities are frequently viewed as threats to in-service platforms, thereby blocking innovation. At the end of the day, the Navy’s new platforms, weapons, and systems are quite similar to what is already in the fleet.

The preponderance of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) platform and capability staffs each focus on a single platform or capability. No one looks at all the platforms and capabilities as an integrated, collective whole. No single staff entity ensures all these individual platform and capability staffs are integrated by a well-articulated, comprehensive strategy and warfighting concept to achieve the required strategy-force match.

The Navy cannot create a lasting OPNAV organizational structure to ensure its strategy drives its force planning and its budget in that order. OPNAV cannot conduct its business “with strategic intent” at all times in its key processes. Because it operates within the Defense Department’s mandated five-year Future Years Defense Program and is focused on the budget, OPNAV tends to concentrate on numerous process-centric products, which, coupled with cascading short-term urgent projects, frequently sees its strategic guidance displaced, or even lost, in the sausage making.

The continuing need to reconcile the interface between the Navy’s strategy with its mid-range to long-range forecasts, and between the Navy’s budget and its short-term timelines and all-consuming fiscal pressures, has eluded OPNAV. Numerous OPNAV reorganizations since the early 1980s underscore this observation. As a 2010 Center for Naval Analyses study highlighted: “successive CNOs have sought to make [OPNAV] responsive to their needs—chief among which is usually construction of a balanced and integrated program and budget.”⁸ They failed and, as a result, the Navy continues to address its force requirements incrementally, which frustrates innovation, alarms Congress, and delivers fewer, more expensive, and almost always bigger platforms. The various uncrewed surface vessels and aircraft may break the bigger-is-better paradigm, yet they are arriving too slowly.

The sources of the problem

The causes of the Navy’s problem with its approach to strategy development and force planning are numerous and diverse.

Divergent CNO proclivities prevent strategic consistency

Effective force planning suffers from insufficient strategic consistency between chiefs of naval operations (CNOs). The historical record suggests these service chiefs seem to believe they must differentiate themselves from their predecessors, with their own distinct, separate strategy—or what is typically a strategic, aspirational plan rather than a strategy with ends, ways, and means. As Dr. Peter Haynes explained in his book, Toward a New Maritime Strategy:

In the political climate of Washington, a place that demands constant change and where only new ideas can be ensured a hearing, strategic statements have a shelf life. Navy leaders have to replace or update their ideas or risk being seen as too slow in responding to changes in the domestic political or international security environments.⁹

Assuredly, senior Navy leaders would agree that, regardless of who is the CNO, the Navy has enduring institutional objectives and the benefits of consistency would be enormous for strategy development and force planning. There would be: assured continuity of strategic direction over the fielding of major platforms and weapons systems; no requirement for an incoming CNO to craft a “new” Navy strategic direction from whole cloth; unity of effort on the Navy’s way ahead based on organizational agreement hammered out at four-star updates; a consistent Navy message for strategic communications; and reduction in false starts and nonproductive efforts (see Table 1).

The service needs each CNO to build upon what has gone on before so that the Navy can benefit from continuous unity of effort over time. The service also needs a consistent planning process, and not a completely new version to accompany the incoming CNO’s new strategy. The challenge is to sustain consensus in a planning and acquisition process that runs a decade or more, and is instigated by a CNO who typically serves a four-year tenure.

OPNAV’s budget process dominates strategy and force planning

OPNAV remains focused on the budget as its overarching and defining process, believing strategy can be generated during the budget process. This narrow focus constrains the development of long-range strategies and plans to address transcendent challenges and opportunities. There is an irreconcilable difference between the needs of the budget process and the strategy-development process.

In a 2021 interview, a former deputy director of the Integration of Capabilities and Resources Directorate (OPNAV N8), Irv Blickstein, provided an explanation of why the budget process dominates. First, it is impossible to follow literally the linear prescript of strategy, requirements, and budget. If a strategy is unaffordable, then capability trade-offs must be made. The budgeteers knew that just opining about strategy would not carry the day for funding. Instead, the Navy needed analysis to show the effectiveness of its programs and the validity of its arguments. As deputy programmer in OPNAV in the early 1980s, Blickstein noted:

I had no relationship with anybody in OP-06 [Plans, Policies and Operations Directorate]. And you’d think, well you’re building a [budget] and they’re in charge of the Maritime Strategy, shouldn’t you guys be talking all the time? The answer is yes, but did the Maritime Strategy have an impact on our programming work? It really didn’t…Historically, there was no relationship between strategists and programmers, but I think it would be a good thing to have.¹⁰

In June 2015, the Naval Postgraduate School published a report on strategy’s role to drive the Navy’s budget process. The report’s principal findings stated that the “Navy has failed to ensure that strategy and policy priorities drive [budget] development and execution.” Specifically, within OPNAV, the budget process “eclipses strategy” and “is substituted for, and is often equated to, strategy.”¹¹ The report noted that the Integration of Capabilities and Resources Directorate, a directorate that acts essentially as OPNAV’s Chief Financial Officer, “wields most of the intra-bureaucratic authority and power when it comes to the making and implementation of strategy” and that the Operations, Plans, and Strategy Directorate (OPNAV N3/N5), with its strategy staff, does not “play meaningful role in strategy development and execution.” During his tenure as CNO (2015–2019), Admiral John Richardson attempted to change this attitude. His efforts did not succeed.

Currently, there are significant alignment issues among the budget process, strategy development, and long-range planning processes. The budget process focuses on a five-year period and emphasizes the application of quantitative analysis, which is effective for near-term resource decisions. However, with no clear-cut beginning or end to its annual cycle, the budget process dominates all OPNAV planning activities and “tends simply to encourage the continuation of programs already under way” and discourage “the development of fresh new alternatives.”¹² The Navy needs to avoid defaulting to budget execution to develop its strategy. All strategies are shaped and informed by available resources, but the budget should serve the strategy—not the other way around.

Currently,the responsibility to manage the Navy’s force-planning ecosystem is dispersed throughout OPNAV. The Warfighting Development Directorate (OPNAV N7) addresses force design. The Integration of Capabilities and Resources Directorate (OPNAV N8) addresses the quantitative means to support force design and development, and the Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities Directorate (OPNAV N9) addresses force development and force design. The CNO’s Commanders Action Group provides the terms of reference—strategic guidance—for force design and force development. The Naval Warfare Development Center produces warfighting concepts, such as the current Distributed Maritime Operations (See Figure 1).

Each of these responsibilities must occur, but they are uncoordinated. No directorate integrates these force-planning efforts along with the ongoing production of new ships, aircraft, and weapons to produce a unified Navy fighting machine. As a result, decisions about production of new forces and modernization of in-service forces directly shape decisions about determining future platforms and capabilities, and vice versa. This interrelationship among force development, force design, and the production of new platforms and capabilities demands alignment, integration, and synchronization into a comprehensive process—not as individual platforms and capabilities—along with a shared understanding of the future security environment and a common warfighting concept to deter and defeat future adversaries in specific time periods.

Furthermore, this dispersion of force-planning responsibility has harmful consequences. In February 2022, OPNAV sponsored a workshop, titled the Force Design Sprint, to assess the Navy’s force-design posture. At the conclusion, a senior N7 leader informed the author that the workshop determined, “everyone in OPNAV was in charge [of force design], but no one was in charge.” It was an astonishing discovery for a military service to declare no one in OPNAV actually held responsibility for force design, with its focus on future ships, aircraft, and weapon systems, along with warfighting concepts for the twenty-plus-year time horizon.

Insufficient strategic guidance misdirects force planning

The Navy lacks sufficient and coherent guidance to ensure strategy shapes its budget and warfighting concepts. It has no classified strategy to facilitate an unambiguous expression of its ends, ways, and means. It has no codified assessment of both the current and future security environments to provide baseline understandings of them and set conditions for effective concept-driven, threat-informed capability development. Another missing document is a warfighting concept for the 2040s timeframe. The result is that, in 2023, specialized N9 staffs are planning the next-generation platforms without the benefit of a common set of capstone strategic guidance. (See Figure 1a)

Navy platform communities distort force planning

Internecine warfare by the Navy’s three platform communities (its surface, aviation, and submarine communities) severely unbalances the Navy as a whole. Expected in theory to rise above their individual platform advocacy and warfare concerns, the communities are all too susceptible to pressures and rivalries from the others. Each warfare community produces an unclassified strategic guidance document with little regard for how the other communities interact and cooperate to generate a unified Navy fighting machine.

Problem definition

In response to this criticism, CNO Admiral Michael Gilday reassigned force-design responsibilities to N7 and focused its efforts on 2045, as outlined in the CNO’s 2022 Navigation Plan.¹³ However, the Navy has largely already decided upon a 2045 force design and, moreover, the Navy is full speed ahead on its implementation. The year 2045 is only about twenty years away, well within the service life for the ongoing production of new ships, aircraft, and weapon systems. CNO Gilday has approved the Navy’s future direction for its next generation of platforms and capabilities, which N9 has developed with the priority order of acquisition as the next-generation aircraft first, the next-generation destroyer second, and the next-generation attack submarine third.¹⁴ This prioritization seems to cement the aircraft carriers as the Navy’s warfighting center of gravity, rather than precision weapons launched from a variety of air, surface, and subsurface platforms.

The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson prepares for flight operations in the Arabian Gulf. Credit: US Navy/ Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Alex King.

The long-term problem confronting Navy strategy development and force planning is larger than reassigning force-design responsibility to N7. The Navy needs to address the problem of how it conducts and organizes for strategy development and force planning in toto, not as disparate processes. Based on this paper’s assessment of the Navy’s strategy development and force planning posture, the Navy faces a three-part problem.¹⁵

Part one: How does the Navy produce “a force structure, now and in the future, of the right size and the right composition (force mix) to achieve the nation’s security goals, in light of the security environment and resource constraints” and avoid a strategy-force mismatch?¹⁶
Part two: How does the Navy ensure its strategy—based upon codified current and future assessments of the security environments, along with associated warfighting concepts—drives force-planning decisions in its budget process, and not have those decisions made by default?
Part three: How does the Navy ensure its force-planning activities include revision of existing warfighting concepts and development of new ones that fully integrate all platforms to produce a single, lethal Navy fighting machine?

Key issues shaping problem solution

Several key issues significantly influence the formulation of recommendations to improve Navy strategy development and force planning.

Organizing OPNAV for effective strategy development

Given the enduring nature of developing, maintaining, updating, and iterating capstone strategic guidance, a dedicated strategy staff (to include responsibility for long-range planning) must have continuity and longevity. Because this guidance is so central to the Navy’s future, their production cannot be an on-again-off-again process. The key is for the CNO to select its director and have confidence in its staff. Once a strategy staff is up and running, the Navy needs to keep it in place. If the CNO is unhappy with its product, he or she should certainly bring in their own selectee to run the show, but the organization itself needs to retain its role, rather than being shoved aside and replaced with a new, favorite staff group.

Avoiding a federated organization to conduct force planning

OPNAV is using a federated organizational construct, which is problematic for conducting force planning. This construct attempts to achieve simultaneously decentralization of responsibilities and unity of effort. It supposedly unites, under a central entity, diverse responsibilities along with distinctive, associated processes, but with the responsibilities still controlled by different and independent entities. It is aspirational and relies on goodwill to meet mission in lieu of a hierarchical structure with authorities to make hard decisions and not focus on achieving consensus. Given the importance of successful force planning to the Navy, the organizing model to follow is a dedicated entity reporting directly to the CNO, such as the Navy Strategic Systems Programs and Naval Nuclear Propulsion, which, respectively, have cradle-to-grave responsibility for sea-launched nuclear-deterrent capabilities and for the Navy’s nuclear propulsion. The Navy needs to borrow a page from these two organizational successes and establish a dedicated, single entity responsible for all matters pertaining to force planning. The CNO’s force-planning responsibilities are so vast in scope, so complex, and so critical, that the Navy cannot disaggregate them across the OPNAV staff or employ a federated construct. It needs to establish a dedicated entity reporting directly to the CNO.

Providing CNO’s direct oversight of force planning and strategy

Only the CNO and the vice chief of naval operations (VCNO), with the authority vested in their offices, can ensure OPNAV maintains a strategic focus. They alone can focus the staff to keep the Navy’s strategic direction front and center, to drive force planning and the budget. The vice admirals who are the deputy chiefs of naval operations leading the seven major functional directorates cannot do it individually; they are challenged enough to meet the urgent demands of the budget process and the press of their daily business.

Understanding defense-analysis limitations to support force planning

Quantifiable defense analysis makes a strong contribution to force planning, especially in the near and middle terms, by understanding trade-offs among platforms and weapons systems. Defense analysis—operations research, campaign analysis, and systems analysis—has restricted relevancy to force planning with its long-range focus of twenty or more years into the future. Defense-analysis methods require certainty of data before they can productively yield reliable certainty in answers. The Navy’s current force-structure assessment methodology, which uses these quantifiable defense analysis tools, will be hard pressed to generate useful data about the long term. Its processes require data for modeling that are simply unavailable twenty years from now—hence, the need for a strong component of risk analysis, wargames, red teams, and alternative-futures work.

Incorporating net assessment capability to support force planning

Force planning requires long-range comparative assessment of trends, key competitions, risks, opportunities, and future prospects of Navy capability. Net assessment provides this comparison of red-blue interaction, using qualitative and quantitative factors across alternative future scenarios. The Navy cannot predict the future with certainty. However, net assessments generate a spectrum of needed capabilities for the Navy to draw upon. The Navy needs this capability because its reliance on campaign analysis, systems analysis, and operations research is grossly unbalanced. The Navy needs to conduct force planning based upon an assessment of the future security environment, and then use tools such as strategic wargames, emulations, expert-panel reports, and net assessment to build a strategy and a warfighting concept, and derive required capabilities. Once that is done, the quantifiable tools can refine the types and number of capabilities.

Clarifying N7 and N9’s force-planning roles

Force planning encompasses force design (i.e., the future fleet) and force development (i.e., the current fleet). CNO Gilday reassigned force-design responsibility from N9 to N7 in July 2022. In reality, N9 will likely continue to conduct force-design responsibility as it determinines the next generation of platforms for operational employment in the 2040s. Given all the approved and funded N9 force-design activity to plan the 2040s Navy, N7’s force planning responsibilities are far from clear.

Incorporating the secretary of the Navy into force planning

Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro has signaled caution and unease with Navy force planning, and wants a realistic approach to understand the total cost and impact of the next-generation destroyer, attack submarine, and crewed/uncrewed aircraft. He wants to test new technologies for these platforms before any production. Given the Navy’s uneven track record in planning and delivering surface ships, along with the issue of affordability to fund an immense recapitalization, his caution is warranted.

Evaluating new technologies and concepts for force planning

The Navy is replacing in-service platforms with newer, follow-on versions, with the exception of uncrewed platforms. This is significant because strong platform attachment may be preventing the Navy from embracing new technologies and warfighting concepts. More importantly, such a possible attitude may prevent the Navy from understanding the changing character of war at sea. For example, because of the convergence of technologies, by 2045 the air and surface domains might become so significantly transparent that, in the competition between the “finder” and the “hider,” the finder might well dominate. If this is correct, surface ships and even aircraft will be increasingly vulnerable to continuous enemy tracking, targeting, and long-range attacks, thereby ending their role—or, at a minimum, severely limiting it—as the principal means of conventional naval power projection. Such an outcome has enormous consequences for the design of a 2045 Navy fleet.

A fast-response cutter sails near a US sail drone explorer in the Gulf of Aqaba during the International Maritime Exercise/Cutlass Express (IMX) 2022. Credit: US Army/ Cpl. DeAndre Dawkins

Communicating Navy force-structure requirements

Given the December 2022 establishment of the National Commission on the Future of the Navy and the new reporting requirement for a Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report in December 2021, the Navy’s strategic-communications capability appears to have had little effect in countering the criticism of its force-planning efforts. The Navy’s strategic communications require an adjustment.

Recommendations

The overarching intent of these recommendations is to link OPNAV’s strategy, analysis, and budget processes. This is a challenge, as the work among the budgeteers, analysts, planners, and strategists is so different. Producing a budget is incremental work that “involves a great deal of analysis and negotiation, over and over again, year after year” and requires “orthodox bureaucratic labor.” Conversely, producing a strategy or a warfighting concept demands “unorthodox leaps of thought—of drawing exceptional inferences from exercises, war games, technology, intelligence, and events.”¹⁷

Historically, with a few notable exceptions, effectively linking these two groups has eluded OPNAV. Consequently, the recommendations address eliminating this gap by consolidating force-planning functions under the direct and strategic oversight of the CNO and VCNO to ensure the linkage between these two groups is maintained. In effect, force planning becomes OPNAV’s center of gravity, with the production of the budget in support.

The logic behind these recommendations is straightforward. The recommendations are governed by an overarching objective to ensure that the Navy’s strategy and policy priorities drive its force planning and budget, not the other way around. The Navy needs to build its forces and capabilities to implement the CNO’s recommended strategy. Force planning begins with that strategy, but the force-planning staff does not create that strategy; the origins of that strategy reside in the CNO’s personal domain, drawing upon higher-level guidance such as the National Defense Strategy. Using the CNO’s strategy, the force-planning staff determines the naval tasks required, and the problems and impediments—such as geography and the adversary’s capabilities—in the current and future security environment that must be surmounted. This activity, in turn, drives the development of warfighting concepts, which leads to the discovery of required naval forces and capabilities and their associated attributes (i.e., operational requirements). Finally, force planning calculates the number and mix of forces and capabilities required to achieve the strategy.¹⁸ The following recommendations make this logic a reality.

The eleven primary documents written by the proposed Navy Strategy Cell and the Force Planning Directorate would not be carved in stone and immutable like the Ten Commandants. In the final analysis, they would be the CNO’s documents. Vitally, they would be developed through the active participation of the Navy’s four-star leadership to identify the biggest challenges to the service’s continued relevancy and contribution to national security, and to devise a coherent approach to overcoming them, which the Navy senior leaders would hammer out and support. The purpose of this effort is to define how the Navy will move forward over successive five-year increments of the budget-planning process, with its senior leaders sharing and agreeing to a common approach. It is all about institutionalizing a force-planning process that can endure over decades from first inception to acquisition to initial operational employment, all managed by relatively short-tenured senior leaders.

Obviously, as the threat, budget, technology, and higher-level policy change, the CNO would update these documents on an annual basis, such as the process the Navy employed in the 1930s with at least nineteen major iterations to its War Plan Orange, and in the 1980s with several successive versions of the Maritime Strategy. Full participation of serving four-star and selected three-star admirals in this process will be vital, because, without question, one of these flag officers will become the next or subsequent CNO. If this participation does not occur, the probability for false starts and radical course changes will greatly increase as CNOs change.

First recommendation: Establish a new Assistant Secretary of the Navy

The secretary of the Navy should establish an assistant secretary of the Navy for strategy, concepts, and capabilities (ASN/SC&C) to assist the uniformed Navy (See Figure 2). The standing up of this position would deliver that assistance without needing another management layer. Instead, it offers enormous, impactful benefits by providing the secretary of the Navy the means to ensure:

Alignment of both Navy and Marine Corps resources, activities, and capabilities with the strategic military objectives and force planning goals of the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy;
Synchronization of Navy and Marine Corps force planning by integrating their efforts at the service-chief level, as well as at developmental level between the Navy’s Naval Warfighting Development Center and the Marine Corps’ Warfighting Laboratory;¹⁹
The establishment of a strategy-focused counterpart to the assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development, and acquisition (ASN/RDA), and a vital interface with the assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans and capabilities (ASD/SPC);²⁰
The development of a single Navy Department strategy, vis à vis the three separate strategies of the department, Navy, and Marine Corps;
Reform of Navy force-planning activities, reinvigoration of Navy strategic expertise, and the promotion of a strategy-centric culture in both the secretariat and OPNAV; and²¹
A resolution of protracted issues and problems bedeviling Navy strategy development and force planning.

The final benefit has immense implications, and requires elaboration. The number of issues and problems confronting Navy strategy development and force planning seem almost enduring, foster significant congressional concern, and underscore the compelling need for great secretariat and OPNAV integration. On its own, the Navy has been unable to solve, correct, or mitigate these issues and challenges. Examples of such issues and problems that substantiate the services of a new assistant secretary are as follows.

Increasing affordability of platform

In June 2021, then acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Harker signed a memo addressing Navy funding priorities in its fiscal year 2023 planning cycle to match fiscal guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Navy cannot afford to simultaneously develop the next generation of air, surface, and subsurface platforms and must prioritize these [three] programs, balancing the cost of developing next-generation capabilities against maintaining current capabilities. As part of the budget [program objective memorandum 2023], the Navy should prioritize one of [these three] capabilities and rephase the other two after an assessment of operational, financial, and technical risk.²²

However, it was not until January 2023 that the Navy explicitly admitted that it could not afford all three major acquisition programs simultaneously, when the Navy announced that the order of acquisition as first is Next Generations Air Dominance (NGADS), then Next-Generation Guided-Missile Destroyer program (DDG(X)), and finally the Next-Generation Attack Submarine program (SSN(X)).²³

PACIFIC OCEAN (Jan. 4, 2011) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Stockdale (DDG 106) pulls alongside the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) during a refueling at sea. Platforms like the Arleigh Burke can provide provided much of the same support offered by carriers in mixed battlegroups and run far cheaper in comparrison. Credit: US Navy/ Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Travis K. Mendoza.

Navy platforms keep getting bigger and more expensive

Strong platform attachment may be preventing the Navy from embracing new technologies and concepts, and consequently replacing in-service platforms with newer, follow-on versions. Navy force planning uses an incremental approach—“buying at the margin [fewer, but] better [and more expensive] versions of the same [type] of platforms [the Navy] has relied upon for decades”—that is delivering an unaffordable fleet over too long a procurement time.²⁴

The San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Anchorage (LPD 23), the littoral combat ship USS Coronado (LCS 4), the joint high-speed vessel USNS Millinocket (JHSV 3) and the Military Sealift Command mobile landing platform USNS Montford Point (MLP 1) transit in formation off the coast of Southern California as part of Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise 2014. Some of these platforms are showing their costly age in in the 2020s. Credit: US Navy/ Chief Mass Communication Specialist Mark C. Schultz.

Proposals for new capabilities can be viewed as threats to in-service platforms, thereby blocking innovation. Quite often, the Navy’s new platforms, weapons, and systems are quite familiar to what is already in the fleet. The DDG(X) is the large surface-combatant replacement for the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers, currently still being procured by the Navy. A November 2022 Congressional Budget Office report on the Navy’s FY-2023 thirty-year shipbuilding plan states, “the Navy has indicated that the initial [DDG(X)] design prescribes a displacement of 13,500 tons,” about 39 percent greater than the 9,700-ton Flight III DDG-51 design.²⁵ There are media reports that actual displacement may be closer to fifteen thousand tons, which would make them comparable to a World War II heavy cruiser.

Technological developments are changing the character of warfare.

The principal means of conventional naval power projection are transforming, and this has enormous consequences for the design of a 2045 Navy fleet. According to US strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., a disruptive shift is occurring from “precision-warfare regimes” to an emerging one based on “a new military revolution” incorporating “artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing, synthetic biology, and quantum computing, as well as military-driven technologies, including directed energy and hypersonic weapons.”²⁶ Krepinevich cautions that, too often, the US military gets the cart before the horse by fielding capabilities based on new technologies and not addressing “how these new capabilities would maintain their effectiveness” as a technological revolution matured, as was the case with the Navy’s next-generation cruiser.²⁷ Unfortunately, as of May 2023, such strategic-planning documents do not exist for the US Navy.

Ineffective strategic communications

The Navy’s poor strategic-communications practices are exemplified by its annual, unclassified thirty-year shipbuilding plan.²⁸ The plan fulfilled its purpose, but it was devoid of even a summary of a rigorous, unclassified, analytical rationale to make the case for a larger, more lethal Navy. With that, political leadership could understand the Navy’s defense role and support its claims upon the nation’s resources. It was a missed opportunity to strategically communicate the Navy’s case for resources to one of the Navy’s most important audiences.²⁹ The Navy does not know how to communicate its force requirements consistently. The best construct for Navy strategic communications is to use platforms. Right now, the Navy is using platform attributes—such as “Ensure Delivery,” which conjures images of Domino’s Pizza or Amazon delivery services—to communicate its requirements to Congress and the American people. Aircraft and ship types are not abstract; they are real things that people can easily visualize when they hear their names—submarine, destroyer, aircraft carrier, and jet fighter, among others.

An a-strategic Navy culture

Strategy is not an institutional Navy value; the service values operational and technocratic expertise above all. Indeed, one telling example illustrates this attitude. Unlike the five other armed services, the Navy does not formally board its selectees to attend the war colleges as students; in effect, the Navy assigns whoever is available. The Navy largely focuses on programming and budget to develop the means for strategy, while “devaluing the strategic underpinnings for rationalizing and justifying those means.³⁰ Regrettably, the Navy has become, “a technocracy—a technologically centered bureaucracy,” with the CNO and OPNAV staff acting as the “Navy’s lead programmers and budgeters, incentivizing a career system that rewarded officers who acquired the technical skills needed for these roles,” but not incentivizing a career path for strategists.³¹

A prescient 1984 US Naval Institute Proceedings essay encapsulated the Navy’s astrategic culture: “The finest personal accolade an officer can receive is, ‘He’s a great operator.’”³² However, the essay identified a major shortcoming these “great operators” have: they experience, “great difficulty comprehending or even identifying—long-term problems” and are, “convinced that only short-term problems are real, and that continued solutions to each in turn will eliminate or indefinitely postpone the distant ones.”³³ As a consequence of this attitude, the Navy cannot determine a lasting OPNAV organizational structure to ensure its strategy drives its force planning and its budget, in that order. On its own, the Navy cannot sustain its strategy enterprise over the long haul. Underscoring this assessment is the current lack of capstone strategic and force-planning guidance. The Navy does not have:

A classified version of a combined “2020 Advantage at Sea” and “2022 Navigation Plan” to facilitate a clear and unambiguous expression of Navy ends, ways, and means along with such topics as strategic assumptions, risk, capacity, concepts, and threats;
A classified assessment of the current and future security environments to provide baseline understandings of operating environments, setting conditions for effective concept-driven, threat-informed capability development;
A classified warfighting concept for the 2040s timeframe;
A classified red-blue net assessment at the strategic level;
A classified description of a red-blue war; and
A classified Navy long-range plan.

Competition among the Navy platform communities

The internecine warfare between the Navy’s three platform communities (the surface, aviation, and submarine communities) can severely unbalance the Navy as a whole. For example, the aviation tribe focuses on strike from the air; the submarine tribe on strike from the subsurface; the surface tribe on strike from the surface; and the amphibious tribe on strike across the beach. All the while, it is unclear if anyone is asking two fundamental questions: “What are we trying to do? And how can we accomplish this in a far more effective way than we can at present?”³⁴ Invariably, there is a competition among tribes for manpower and funding, resulting in disagreements over strategy and the allocation of resources. Reaching consensus among them has always been difficult, and remains a fundamental service chief responsibility.

As defense secretary, Mark T. Esper rejected the Navy’s force plans.

They seemed to be a product of internal Navy logrolling among the various tribes— surface, subsurface, aviation, etc.—to keep their share of the Navy budget largely unchanged. Insiders were confirming this to me.
— Mark T. Esper³⁵

Esper wanted more attack submarines and a mix of light aircraft carriers (large-deck amphibious ships with F-35B aircraft) for more operational choices and affordability.³⁶ He did not want a plan bounded by past warfighting constructs and irrelevant to a future fight with China.³⁷ Because the naval-warfare tribes could not give him what he wanted, he directed Deputy Secretary of Defense David Norquist in the spring of 2020 to lead a new force-structure assessment study to maintain naval dominance.

A U.S. Navy MH-60 Sea Hawk prepares to land aboard the Wasp-Class Amphibious Assault Ship USS Bataan (LHD 5) during a strait transit exercise part of Amphibious Squadron/MEU Integration Training (PMINT), Jan. 28, 2023. Credit: US Marine Corps/ Cpl. Michele Clarke.

Each warfare community produces an unclassified strategic guidance document—the aviation community has Navy Aviation Vision 2030–2035, the submarine community Commander’s Intent 4.0, and the surface community has Surface Warfare: The Competitive Edge. Each document, for the most part, encompasses community strategy, planning, policy, and vision topics about operations, capabilities, and personnel. There is little in each document about how that community interacts and cooperates with the other two to generate a unified Navy fighting machine. The lack of stated cooperation among the aviation, surface, and submarine-warfare communities in these documents is palpable. The three communities act like a true team of rivals whose intra-service actions have contributed substantively to the establishment of the National Commission on the Future of the Navy.

To resolve these and other such issues and problems challenges, the secretary of the Navy’s role in strategy development and force planning needs to be strengthened by the services of this new assistant secretary.

Second recommendation: Stand up the Navy strategy cell

The CNO should repurpose his Commander’s Action Group as the Navy Strategy Cell to produce the Navy’s capstone strategic guidance and to monitor its implementation by this one, central, and empowered staff entity reporting directly to the CNO (See Figure 2).

All CNOs understand that their most important responsibility as a service chief is to identify the biggest challenges to the Navy’s continued relevancy and contribution to national security, and to devise a coherent approach to overcoming them. This fundamental role serves as the basis for this recommendation. A 2010 Center for Naval Analyses report bluntly stated that developing and implementing such guidance “for the Navy is the CNO’s number 1 job.”³⁸ Indeed, from what many senior OPNAV veterans have privately communicated to the author, if this responsibility is not “totally owned by CNO,” OPNAV has no strategic focus. They believe the CNO most important responsibility is identifying the biggest challenges to the Navy’s continued relevancy and contribution to national security, and devising a coherent approach to overcoming them.

Already working directly for the CNO, the Commander’s Action Group produces strategic documents such as the annual posture statements, congressional testimony, keynote speeches, and the 2022 Navigation Plan. Building upon this foundation, the proposed Navy Strategy Cell would be uniquely positioned to describe preferred outcomes for the whole Navy. OPNAV’s seven directorates, on the other hand, tend to focus on the outcomes of individual supporting programs. With expansion, empowerment, and augmentation, the Navy Strategy Cell would:

Enable the CNO to break away from the budget and programming processes that dominate so much of OPNAV’s time and thinking, and increase his or her focus on realistic and effective strategies and concepts for fighting at and from the sea;
Strengthen the CNO’s ability to align and coordinate the activities of Navy organizations; communicate with a single Navy voice to external and internal audiences; and assess Navy policies, budgets, plans, and programs, and the resultant allocation of scarce resources; and
Ensure capstone strategic documents reflect a consistent and aligned set of principles, concepts, and tenets regarding the Navy’s fundamental role in implementing national policy, as well as the CNO’s direction.

This recommendation mirrors what most corporate chief executive officers do, which is to make their capstone strategy functions a direct report to the chief executive officer. Consequently, this is no longer a lead role for N3/N5. Every CNO requires the direct support of a staff to provide a coherent, contemporary, authoritative body of Navy strategic thinking—comprehensive in scope—that they can use to help conceptualize, develop, coordinate, maintain, communicate, refine, and assess their thinking. The CNO needs to be optimally assisted and supported by a small, dedicated strategy staff, which is a corporate best practice. The production of capstone strategic guidance and other strategic documents requires a close relationship and physical proximity to the CNO, with no interlocutors. It is a one-on-one relationship between the CNO and, in effect, their “chief strategist” residing in the Navy Strategy Cell. The one-on-one relationship is needed to:

Implement explicit CNO guidance, not guidance altered by OPNAV directorate agendas;
Provide unfiltered advice, especially alternative views to CNO; and
Do it quickly and with a minimum of interference from others.

Capstone strategic guidance describes how CNO intends to overcome “the biggest challenges to the Navy’s continued relevancy and contribution to national security”³⁹ across different timeframes and security environments. These documents require significant CNO involvement, visibility, and signature. They provide overarching direction to the service for planning, programming, and budgeting future forces, force planning, and operational employment, and convey fundamental principles about the application of naval power to achieve national policy goals. They drive all subordinate force-planning efforts and connect the Navy’s annual budget submissions and investment plans with the Navy’s key priorities. These documents are truly primus inter pares. They are consequential and substantive, must be derived from national and joint policy and strategy, and reflect a comprehensive, global view informed by the Navy’s current and future capabilities. The Navy Strategy Cell would draft for the CNO’s signature classified and unclassified versions of these four documents that comprise the Navy’s capstone strategic guidance (i.e., its “crown jewels”).

Assessments of Current and Future Security Environments (classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist).
The Navy Strategy (classified version does not currently exist).
Navy Long-Range Plan (classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist).
CNO’s Annual Budget Guidance (classified).

Third recommendation: Stand up the force-planning directorate

The CNO should consolidate all OPNAV force-planning responsibilities into a new Force-Planning Directorate under a vice admiral reporting to the VCNO and disestablish N7 (See Figure 2).

The unprecedented wakeup call from Congress, when it established an independent National Commission on the Future of the Navy, is sufficient reason to consolidate Navy force-planning efforts under one roof and reform them.

The Navy’s current federated organizational construct to force planning is ineffective. It is unclear in 2023 what OPNAV staff element acts as the central entity to coordinate all OPNAV force-planning efforts conducted by decentralized and independent staff elements. The functions of force planning are expansive, complex, and critical, as Congress just reminded the Navy. In recognition of the weakness of the federated approach, the Navy should follow its own successful examples of non-federated entities reporting directly to the CNO—the Strategic Systems Programs and Naval Nuclear Propulsion—and consolidate all matters pertaining to force planning into a new and dedicated single entity.

This single, dedicated Force-Planning Directorate would have the authority, staffing, and analytical means, to align, integrate, and synchronize the force-planning efforts into a comprehensive whole-of-Navy strategic plan. The relationship among force development and force design, as well their connection to the production of new ships, aircraft, and weapons systems, demands alignment, integration, and synchronization into a comprehensive force-planning blueprint.

This Force-Planning Directorate would have the authority, personnel, and analytical means to align, integrate, and synchronize all force-planning efforts to produce a Navy fighting machine. The new directorate would assess and integrate the future operational environment, emerging threats, and technologies to develop and deliver concepts, requirements, and future force designs, and support delivery of modernization solutions. Most importantly, it would position the Navy for the future by setting strategic direction, integrating the Navy’s future force-modernization enterprise, aligning resources to priorities, and maintaining accountability for modernization solutions.

The budget dominates all OPNAV activities. The only way to guarantee the budget supports and serves the needs of Navy strategy and force planning is to ensure the CNO or VCNO has direct oversight via a dedicated senior leader who has no other writ. The director of the new Force-Planning Directorate should report to the CNO via the VCNO. A Force-Planning Directorate addressing force design with its long-range time horizons and long-range results will not survive in an environment dominated by short-term results unless OPNAV clearly understands that the Force-Planning Directorate is working directly for the CNO, and that the OPNAV directorates have a supporting relationship to this new staff. As the Navy historical record documents, anything less than a direct report will repeat OPNAV’s past mistakes and failed attempts.

The Force-Planning Directorate would draft for the CNO’s signature classified and unclassified version of these seven documents.

Warfighting concepts (current and future): Classified and unclassified versions do not exist for the 2045 timeframe. A classified version for the current timeframe exists (i.e., distributed maritime operations), but not an unclassified version. The Naval Warfare Development Center would support the development of these service-level concepts.
Red-blue net assessment: Classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist.
Description of a red-blue war (current and future): Classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist.
Force Structure Assessment: Unclassified versions do not currently exist. The June 2023 Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report will provide a classified version.
Navy force planning blueprint (current and future): Classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist.
Thirty-year shipbuilding plan: An unclassified version exists.
Battle force ship assessment and requirement report: A classified version exists. The June 2023 version of this report could potentially serve as a classified Force Structure Assessment.

The Warfighting Concepts would establish a baseline understanding to set conditions for effective concept-driven, threat-informed force planning, in order to produce a Navy Force Planning Blueprint. It would be based on a common understanding of the current and future security environments and a shared articulation of how the Navy fights as a whole, and not merely as a collection of individual classes of platforms. It would be the Navy’s comprehensive plan—not a strategy—to integrate, align, and synchronize all its force-planning efforts, including the efforts of force development and force planning along with the ongoing production of new ships, aircraft, and weapons systems to produce the Navy fighting machine (i.e., a unified combination of air, surface, and subsurface Navy lethality). Figure 2a depicts the consolidated production of the Navy’s eleven key strategic guidance documents from numerous OPNAV organizational elements to just two.

Establishment of this new Force-Planning Directorate topples the budget process as OPNAV’s dominant process. Force planning would become OPNAV’s center of gravity, with the budget in support, and no longer the other way around. It turns over the proverbial apple cart, with force planning reporting directly to the CNO and leading a strategic-centric staff dialogue, as opposed to a budget-centric dialogue. This reversal will generate strong resistance from N8 and N9 in particular. Because the Force Planning Directorate will be the primus inter pares, and as the other OPNAV directorates are all headed by a vice admiral, the new Force-Planning Directorate must likewise be headed by a vice admiral or else be doomed to failure.

This new Force-Planning Directorate requires the capability to conduct Navy net assessments for strategic analysis of red-blue interactions for informed and realistic plans. Net assessments (along with defense analysis) are diagnostic means, whereas force planning is a prescriptive means. The two belong together; if not, dysfunction will continue to hamstring efforts. This capability does not currently exist in OPNAV, and would require new personnel resources.

Resourcing the recommendations

The resources to make these recommendations real are readily available; it is just a matter of resetting priorities. The Navy is under heavy congressional fire for its strategy-development and force-planning efforts. Correcting this situation for the long term is surely one of the Navy’s highest priorities.

Given these circumstances, can the Navy say, for example, that the large number of officers assigned to the front office of its three-star leaders is more important than staffing its capability for strategy development and force planning? Again, it is a matter of priorities. If staffing these front offices is more important than retrieving control of force planning from the National Commission on the Future of the Navy, then so be it. It is simply a matter of priorities, and making the tough choices that many leaders say they like to do. Here is another opportunity.

For the reasons presented in this paper, leadership of the Navy Strategy Cell and Force-Planning Directorate requires senior flag officers. Disestablishing the N7 directorate would provide the vice admiral billet to lead the Force-Planning Directorate and a rear admiral billet to head the Navy Strategy Cell. The majority of N7’s functions can return to OPNAV N3/N5 and a portion of N7’s functions can relocate to staff the Navy Strategy Cell and the Force-Planning Directorate.

While there are no perfect organizational frameworks, there are organizational frameworks that better align a greater number of common functions, as outlined in these recommendations. A strategy office reporting to the corporate chief executive officer—in the Navy’s case, the CNO—is a proven practice, and a direct-report senior leader responsible for all Navy force planning is no different than having the Naval Nuclear Propulsion and Nuclear Weapons Program/Strategic Systems Programs as direct reports.

The emphasis of the proposals in this white paper is on strategy-development and force-planning reinvigoration and reasonable consolidation of similar functions, given the centrality of Navy strategy and force planning to all other OPNAV responsibilities. Force planning, if done properly with strategy in the lead and with its capstone strategic-guidance documents, will generate enormous benefits.

Conclusion

Congress has lost patience and confidence in the Navy. There is no way to sugarcoat this action. It is nothing less than a strong condemnation of the Navy’s approach to strategy development and force planning. When US Representative Rob Wittman (R-VA) in December 2022 penned his scathing commentary in Defense News, he was on target in stating, “if the Navy refuses to learn lessons from this year, it will be doomed to repeat them.”⁴⁰

The warning signs have been evident for years. However, much like the Navy’s Bureau of Ordnance’s stubborn, twenty-one-month resistance in World War II to correct three major defects of the Mark 14 torpedo, the Navy since the end of the Cold War has neglected its strategy enterprise and resisted effective force planning.⁴¹ It has repeatedly failed to understand and act on the mismatch between OPNAV’s robust organization for building the budget and its ineffective organization for developing and implementing Navy strategy.

The Navy needs to think and act like it did in the 1920s and 1930s, when it prepared to confront the Imperial Japanese Navy. The US Navy’s strategy, future security environment, and warfighting concept were all reflected in nineteen iterations to its War Plan Orange and updates to the Rainbow series of war plans. The Naval War College focused its curriculum and wargames throughout the 1930s on defeating the Imperial Japanese Navy, and almost every Navy flag officer was a war-college graduate. While far from perfect, the Navy of the past shared a common view of what a war with Imperial Japan entailed and clearly understood logistics were a top-tier priority for warfare across the vast distances of the Pacific. Likewise, in 2023, the Navy needs the same level of focus and preparation as its predecessor, and the proposed Navy Strategy Cell and Force Planning Directorate will help ensure it is ready for whatever lies ahead.

The author would like to be more of an optimist than a realist, but the Navy continues to allow mistakes to go uncorrected decade after decade. It is, like Winston Churchill stated, a “long dismal catalogue of the fruitlessness of experience and the confirmed unteachability of mankind.”⁴² It is foolish to believe that the Navy will change on its own to conduct more effective strategy development and force planning.⁴³ The only way the Navy will change is for Congress to direct it, or else the Navy will continue with its flawed ways.

About the author

Bruce Stubbs

As a member of the Senior Executive Service for the Department of the Navy, Bruce Stubbs served on the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) staff from June 2011 to September 2022 as the Director of Strategy and Strategic Concepts (OPNAV N7), the Director of Strategy (OPNAV N3/5), and the Deputy Director of Strategy and Policy (OPNAV N3/5). Prior to those assignments, he served on the Secretary of the Navy’s immediate staff from June 2008 to May 2011 with responsibility for the coordination and implementation of Maritime Domain Awareness programs, policies, and related issues across the Defense Department.

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

1 Borrowed from, Bradley A. Fiske, The Navy as a Fighting Machine (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1916). He wrote the Navy, “must first determine the units of the force and their relation to each other: it must, in other words, design the machine.” Its use herein represents the ultimate objective of Navy force planning, i.e., an integrated combination of air, surface, sub-surface, and cyberspace lethality for the Navy to fight as a unified whole.

2 Mac [R-TX-13] Rep. Thornberry, “H.R.2810 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018,” Pub. L. No. 115–91 (2017), http://www.congress.gov/; Mark T. Esper, “Chapter 7: The Politics of Building a Better Navy,” in A Sacred Oath: Memoirs of a Secretary of Defense During Extraordinary Times, First edition. (New York, NY: William Morrow, an imprint of HarperCollins Publishers, 2022), p.196.

3 Please see section 1017 of, Rick [R-FL] Sen. Scott, “S.1605 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022,” Pub. L. No. 117–81 (2021), http://www.congress.gov/.

4 Section 1092 of, Peter A. [D-OR-4] Rep. DeFazio, “H.R.7776 – James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023,” Pub. L. No. 117–263 (2022), http://www.congress.gov/.

5 Lara Seligman, Lee Hudson, and Paul McLeary, “Inside the Pentagon Slugfest over the Future of the Fleet,” POLITICO, July 24, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/24/pentagon-slugfest-navy-fleet-00047551.For further background see, Sam LaGrone, “Lack of Future Fleet Plans, Public Strategy Hurting Navy’s Bottom Line in Upcoming Defense Bills,” USNI News, June 18, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/06/18/lack-of-future-fleet-plans-public-strategy-hurting-navys-bottom-line-in-upcoming-defense-bills; Sam LaGrone, “Navy Lacks ‘Clear Theory of Victory’ Needed to Build New Fleet, Experts Tell House Panel,” USNI News, June 4, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/06/04/navy-lacks-clear-theory-of-victory-needed-to-build-new-fleet-experts-tell-house-panel; Mark Cancian Saxton Adam and Mark Cancian, “The Spectacular & Public Collapse of Navy Force Planning,” Breaking Defense, January 28, 2020, https://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/2020/01/the-spectacular-public-collapse-of-navy-force-planning/.

6 Captain Scott Mobley, US Navy, Retired, “How to Rebalance the Navy’s Strategic Culture | Proceedings – November 2022 Vol. 148/11/1,437,” U.S. Naval Institute, November 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/how-rebalance-navys-strategic-culture.

7 Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare, First edition. (New York, NY: Hachette Books, Hachette Book Group, 2020).

8 Peter M. Swartz and Michael C. Markowitz, “Organizing OPNAV (1970 – 2009),” January 1, 2010, https://www.cna.org/reports/2010/organizing-opnav-1970-to-2009.

9 Peter D. Haynes, Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2015), p. 246.

10 Dimitry Filipoff, “Irv Blickstein on Programming the POM and Strategizing the Budget | Center for International Maritime Security,” 1980s Maritime Strategy Series (blog), March 26, 2021, https://cimsec.org/irv-blickstein-on-programming-the-pom-and-strategizing-the-budget/.

11 Dr. James A. Russell et al., “Navy Strategy Development: Strategy in the 21st Century,” Naval Research Program (Naval Postgraduate School in support of OPNAV N3/ N5, n.d.), https://news.usni.org/2015/07/24/document-naval-post-graudate-school-study-on-u-s-navy-strategy-development.

12 Commander Gordon G. Riggle, “Looking to the Long Run,” U.S. Naval Institute, September 1980, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1980/september/looking-long-run.

13 CNO Admiral Mike Gilday, “Chief of Naval Operations Navigation Plan 2022,” CNO Navigation Plan (US Navy, July 22, 2023). .

14 Sam LaGrone, “CNO Gilday: Next-Generation Air Dominance Will Come Ahead of DDG(X) Destroyer,” USNI News, January 18, 2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/01/18/cno-gilday-next-generation-air-dominance-will-come-ahead-of-ddgx-destroyer.

15 A Navy problem statement can either be posed as a question about how to solve an issue or as a negative statement.

16 Mackubin Thomas Ownes, “Force Planning: The Crossroads of Strategy and the Political Process – Foreign Policy Research Institute,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 1, 2015, https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/07/force-planning-the-crossroads-of-strategy-and-the-political-process/.

17 Thomas Hone, Private memorandum to author, March 9, 2023.

18 Mackubin Thomas Ownes, “Force Planning: The Crossroads of Strategy and the Political Process – Foreign Policy Research Institute,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 1, 2015, https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/07/force-planning-the-crossroads-of-strategy-and-the-political-process/.

19 The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory generates and examines threat-informed, operating concepts and capabilities and provides analytically-supported recommendations to inform subsequent force design and development activities.

20 Captain Scott Mobley, Retired, “How to Rebalance the Navy’s Strategic Culture | Proceedings – November 2022 Vol. 148/11/1,437,” U.S. Naval Institute, November 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/how-rebalance-navys-strategic-culture..

21 Mobley, Retired, “How to Rebalance the Navy’s Strategic Culture | Proceedings – November 2022 Vol. 148/11/1,437.”

22 Megan Eckstein, “Memo Reveals US Navy Must Pick between Future Destroyer, Fighter or Sub for FY23 Plan,” Defense News, June 8, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/06/08/memo-navy-will-have-to-pick-between-its-future-destroyer-fighter-and-sub-in-fiscal-2023-planning/.

23 Sam LaGrone, “CNO Gilday: Next-Generation Air Dominance Will Come Ahead of DDG(X) Destroyer,” USNI News, January 18, 2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/01/18/cno-gilday-next-generation-air-dominance-will-come-ahead-of-ddgx-destroyer.

24 Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare, First edition. (New York, NY: Hachette Books, Hachette Book Group, 2020).

25 Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy DDG(X) Next-Generation Destroyer Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” In Focus (Congressional Research Service, March 23, 2023), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11679.

26 Captain Gerald G. O’Rourke, USN (Ret.), “Great Operators, Good Administrators, Lousy Planners,” U.S. Naval Institute, August 1984, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1984/august/great-operators-good-administrators-lousy-planners.
Jr Krepinevich, The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers (New Haven ; Yale University Press, 2023), https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300271584, p. 19.

27 Jr Krepinevich, The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers (New Haven ; Yale University Press, 2023), https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300271584, p. 19.

28 Formally titled as the Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year XXXX.

29 Mark Cancian Saxton Adam and Mark Cancian, “The Spectacular & Public Collapse of Navy Force Planning,” Breaking Defense, January 28, 2020, https://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/2020/01/the-spectacular-public-collapse-of-navy-force-planning/.As noted, “Planning for a 21st century Navy of unmanned vessels, distributed operations, and great power competition has collapsed. Trapped by a 355-ship force goal, a reduced budget, and a fixed counting methodology, the Navy can’t find a feasible solution to the difficult question of how its forces should be structured. As a result, the Navy postponed announcement of its new force structure assessment (FSA) from January to “the spring.” That means the navy will not be able to influence the 2021 budget year much, forfeiting a major opportunity to reshape the fleet and bring it in line with the national defense strategy.”

30 Mark T. Esper, “Chapter 7: The Politics of Building a Better Navy,” in A Sacred Oath: Memoirs of a Secretary of Defense During Extraordinary Times, First edition. (New York, NY: William Morrow, an imprint of HarperCollins Publishers, 2022), p. 200. Captain Scott Mobley, USN (Ret.), “How to Rebalance the Navy’s Strategic Culture | Proceedings – November 2022 Vol. 148/11/1,437,” U.S. Naval Institute, November 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/how-rebalance-navys-strategic-culture.

31 Captain Scott Mobley, USN (Ret.), “How to Rebalance the Navy’s Strategic Culture | Proceedings – November 2022 Vol. 148/11/1,437,” U.S. Naval Institute, November 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/how-rebalance-navys-strategic-culture.

32 Captain Gerald G. O’Rourke, USN (Ret.), “Great Operators, Good Administrators, Lousy Planners,” U.S. Naval Institute, August 1984, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1984/august/great-operators-good-administrators-lousy-planners.

33 O’Rourke, USN (Ret.), “Great Operators, Good Administrators, Lousy Planners.”

34 Jr Krepinevich, The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers (New Haven ; Yale University Press, 2023), https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300271584, p. 401.

35 Mark T. Esper, “Chapter 7: The Politics of Building a Better Navy,” in A Sacred Oath: Memoirs of a Secretary of Defense During Extraordinary Times, First edition. (New York, NY: William Morrow, an imprint of HarperCollins Publishers, 2022), p. 200.

36 Esper, “Chapter 7: The Politics of Building a Better Navy.”

37 Esper, “Chapter 7: The Politics of Building a Better Navy.”

38 Peter M. Swartz, William Rosenau, and Hannah Kates, “The Origins and Development of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2015),” 136 (Center for Naval Analyses, September 18, 2017), https://www.cna.org/reports/2017/origins-and-development-of-cooperative-strategy.

39 Rumelt, Richard P. Good Strategy Bad Strategy: The Difference and Why It Matters. Crown Publishing Group, Random House. New York. 2011.

40 Rob Rep. Wittman, [R-VA-1], “Congress Is Building a Stronger Fleet than the Navy,” Defense News, December 1, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/12/15/congress-is-building-a-stronger-fleet-than-the-navy/.

41 Clay Blair, Silent Victory: The U.s. Submarine War Against Japan., 1st edition (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975).

42 Robert Kagan, The Ghost at the Feast: America and the Collapse of World Order, 1900-1941, First edition. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2023), p. 468.

43 Leonard Dr. Wong and Stephen Dr. Gerras, “Changing Minds In The Army: Why It Is So Difficult and What To Do About It,” Monographs, Collaborative Studies, & IRPs, October 1, 2013, 48, p. 20.

The post Building a navy fighting machine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Four scenarios for Russia’s future after the Wagner Group mutiny

Jeffrey Cimmino — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 10:00:00 +0000

This article was updated on July 6.

The extraordinary march of Wagner Group leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s forces to within a couple hours of Moscow ended abruptly on June 24. But Prigozhin’s decision to stand down and move to Belarus will not be the end of the story.

While the immediate crisis for Russian President Vladimir Putin may dissipate, what scenarios should US and allied officials prepare for in the coming days, weeks, months, and beyond? Here are four possible paths for Russia’s future.

1. A weakened Putin rules

Putin restores order and effectively reduces the ability of Prigozhin and the Wagner Group to challenge his rule. Prigozhin stays in Belarus with a diminished force, while other Wagner fighters go home or join the ranks of the regular Russian armed forces.

Nevertheless, even if Putin remains in power for the foreseeable future, the façade of order and stability that he has constructed over two decades in power has been shattered, with Russia’s would-be tsar showing himself to be vulnerable to competing actors. Quick action to sideline Prigozhin dissuades potential internal challengers from following Wagner’s example, but Putin still needs to pay extra attention to keep different oligarchical interests and power brokers in line.

Russia’s internal dynamics will also shape, and be shaped by, the war effort in Ukraine. Overcoming the mutiny and preventing severe immediate challenges to his authority allows Putin to refocus to some degree on the war effort.

In this scenario, Putin is better positioned to concentrate his security forces on preventing major gains for the Ukrainian counteroffensive. The rapidity with which the crisis was resolved, as well as the lack of successor crises within Russia, means that any effect on Russian soldiers’ morale is limited. Ukraine could still make some important gains in this counteroffensive, but its forces will receive less help from internal disarray in Russia.

The United States and its NATO allies see Putin as weak and potentially vulnerable, though they still must contend with him as Russia’s leader. Still, seeing his weakness, they are willing to continue supplying Ukraine and keep up the pressure on Moscow, with new weapons systems (e.g., long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS) possibly on the horizon.

Meanwhile, a weakened Putin grows more dependent on China, further reifying Russia’s status as China’s junior partner. China does not want to lose its primary strategic partner, and this scenario offers Beijing greater predictability, insofar as it is able to continue engaging with Putin. Chinese leader Xi Jinping may take note of Prigozhin’s mutiny and consider threats to his, and his party’s, rule in China; however, he also could feel reassured by how quickly the crisis passed.

2. A new regime rises

In the summer of 1991, Kremlin hardliners attempted a coup against Soviet President and General Secretary of the Communist Party Mikhail Gorbachev. The coup failed, but Gorbachev was weakened and out of power by the end of the year.

In this scenario, Putin suffers a similar fate. The Prigozhin challenge is sidestepped for the moment, but Putin’s political position is irreparable and rapidly deteriorates. Internal competitors line up, consolidating strength and waiting for the right opportunity to strike.

Faced with internal threats, Putin is distracted from the Ukraine war effort and even has to reallocate security forces to deal with his competitors. At the same time, the counteroffensive picks up steam. Ukrainian forces break through weak points in Russia’s lines, retaking substantial ground and severing the land bridge that Russia has created by occupying Ukrainian territory from the Russian border to Crimea. Morale flags among Russian troops, and disgruntled soldiers stream back into Russia, angry with the country’s political leadership for sending them to fight a bloody, failing war.

At this point, Putin’s adversaries strike. Perhaps Prigozhin and the Wagner Group reconstitute in Belarus and conduct another march on Moscow. In addition, or alternatively, other nationalist forces take advantage of discontented troops to build their own miniature armies outside the purview of the state. Regardless of the precise mechanism, political and military elites turn on Putin, who is killed or forced into “retirement.”

Even though chaos appears imminent, a new regime consolidates power quickly, preventing a civil war and restoring order in a post-Putin era. The war in Ukraine does not end immediately, but the exigencies of establishing order reduce the likelihood of any significant new Russian offensives in the near or medium terms, and the new regime instead focuses on salvaging some gains from the war while maintaining stability at home.

The United States and NATO adjust to this new reality, sizing up a new authoritarian regime. There might be an opportunity to ease tensions if a long-term peace agreement or ceasefire is reached in Ukraine, though a comprehensive thaw in relations is unlikely. Tough talk about the West may continue in propaganda outlets, but Russia’s weakened conventional military forces undermine its credibility to present a hard-power threat to NATO allies. Still dealing with the aftereffects of a power transition at home, the new regime is disinclined to conduct provocations abroad and instead could seek stability in its relations with external powers. Nevertheless, the behavior of the new Russian leadership is not wholly predictable, and NATO prepares to deter and defend against potential acts of aggression by the new regime.

This scenario presents unwelcome uncertainty for China, which must navigate relations with a post-Putin regime. The new regime may remain generally aligned with China, recognizing its need to rely more heavily on its foremost strategic partner. On the other hand, absent the strong Xi-Putin partnership, it is plausible that the new leadership chafes at being the junior partner vis-à-vis Beijing and the relationship between the two countries weakens, albeit while retaining a common distaste for the United States.

3. The tempest arrives

As in the previous scenario, there is a temporary pause in tensions, followed by a descent into civil war. Putin’s adversaries are emboldened by his apparent weakness, which is exacerbated by a deteriorating situation on the battlefield in Ukraine. In this case, however, no competitor is strong enough to consolidate power.

Russia fractures into competing power blocs. This could mean Putin retains power and loyalists in some parts of Russia, even as Prigozhin and nationalist leaders develop quasi-fiefdoms elsewhere. Further complicating this scenario would be the rise of secessionist movements that further divide Russia.

As one of the United States’ foremost geopolitical competitors fragments, this scenario raises other questions.

For example, what happens to Russia’s nuclear weapons? Russia has thousands of nuclear warheads, and a civil war opens up opportunities for different actors to take advantage of the chaos and access those weapons. Eager to avoid this proliferation, the United States and NATO seek to contain the civil war within Russia’s borders.

As for the war in Ukraine, an enduring civil war results in Russian lines quickly collapsing as command-and-control disintegrates. Competing power players vie for the loyalty of embittered but battle-hardened soldiers returning to Russia.

This scenario is particularly bad for China, as it witnesses its premier strategic partner reduced to disarray. Moreover, it compounds China’s regional nuclear proliferation concerns, while also creating instability at its border and a potential influx of refugees. China now needs to allocate substantial resources to securing a lengthy border that it previously did not have to worry too much about. Russia’s energy industry also suffers, meaning Beijing cannot rely on Moscow as much to meet its exorbitant energy demands and must look elsewhere. Furthermore, in this scenario especially, Beijing might become even more cautious regarding an invasion of Taiwan as it witnesses the regime-threatening internal instability that can be wrought by invasions gone awry.

4. Reformers seize the moment

A final scenario worth considering is the possibility of a reform-minded regime coming to power in Moscow. As in the previous two scenarios, the temporary reprieve in tensions following Wagner’s mutiny gives way to renewed challenges to Putin’s rule, accelerated by a declining situation on the battlefield.

Putin manages to keep power through the March 2024 Russian presidential election, which is marked by fraud and widely recognized among the populace as illegitimate. In this case, a more democratically inclined opposition, perhaps associated with Alexei Navalny, seizes the opportunity and manages to cultivate sufficient popular support, with rallies and protests across Russia promoting change. Under intense pressure, Kremlin elites express sympathy with the reformers, and Putin ultimately decides to step down. A reformist leader wins the ensuing constitutionally mandated presidential election.* After assuming and consolidating power, the new government seeks a quick end to the war in Ukraine, while focusing on implementing anti-corruption and political reforms in Russia.

For the United States and NATO, this scenario increases the likelihood of Russia becoming a more responsible member of the international system and reducing military tensions between the Alliance and Moscow. That said, change will not happen overnight, and a reform-minded Russia will have to wrestle with deeply entrenched corruption and economic issues. China, for its part, finds this scenario disastrous, as it faces a nuclear-armed state on its border that is ideologically more sympathetic to the West.

These scenarios do not exhaust all possibilities, but they account for four plausible futures US and allied policymakers should consider in their strategic planning. A scenario in which a reform-minded opposition comes to power is the least plausible, as Russia has long proven resistant to extensive political reforms, and it is unclear that there is a movement sufficiently organized and with broad enough support to take advantage of a power vacuum. The first scenario is the closest to the status quo, and Putin has been remarkably resilient as a leader; on the other hand, Putin has also never appeared weaker, and external pressure wrought by Ukrainian success on the battlefield could help to facilitate his downfall.

Jeffrey Cimmino is the deputy director of operations and a fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

This article was updated to clarify the circumstances under which a reformist leader could come to power in scenario four.

The post Four scenarios for Russia’s future after the Wagner Group mutiny appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wagner drama drags Belarus deeper into Russia’s wartime turbulence

Hanna Liubakova — Wed, 28 Jun 2023 22:06:15 +0000

Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka appears eager to take full credit for his role in countering Russia’s short-lived but hugely significant recent Wagner rebellion. Speaking on June 27 just days after the uprising came to an abrupt end, Lukashenka provided a detailed and highly flattering account of negotiations with Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin that contrasted his own strong leadership with Russian ruler Vladimir Putin’s apparent indecisiveness.

This was a bold move by Lukashenka, who has been heavily dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival ever since Russia intervened to prop up his regime during a wave of Belarusian pro-democracy protests in the second half of 2020. Clearly, Lukashenka feels emboldened by Putin’s apparent weakness and sees the Wagner affair as an opportunity to burnish his own credentials as both a wise ruler and a skilled negotiator.

Lukashenka’s version of events is certainly convenient but may not be entirely accurate. In reality, he is more likely to have served as a messenger for Putin. The Russian dictator had good reason to avoid any direct talks with rebel leader Prigozhin, who he had publicly branded as a traitor. It is also probably no coincidence that Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rather than Lukashenka announced news of Prigozhin’s subsequent departure for Belarus. This has reinforced perceptions of Belarus as a vassal state of Russia that serves as a place of exile for disgraced members of the Kremlin elite. Indeed, Putin himself went even further and offered thousands of Wagner troops who participated in the rebellion the choice of relocating to Belarus if they wish.

It is not yet clear whether significant numbers of Wagner fighters will accept Putin’s invitation and move to Belarus. For now, Lukashenka claims to have offered Wagner the use of an abandoned military base. He has hinted that Wagner troops may serve in a training capacity for his own military, praising their performance in Ukraine and hailing them as “the most prepared unit in the Russian army.”

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Many ordinary Belarusians do not share Lukashenka’s enthusiasm and worry that the potential arrival of Wagner fighters will drag Belarus further into the turmoil engulfing Putin’s Russia. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, research has consistently found that the overwhelming majority of Belarusians oppose any involvement in the war. Belarusian railway workers and other activists have sabotaged the movement of Russian troops and military equipment across the country, while Belarusian military volunteers have joined the fight against Russia inside Ukraine.

News that Belarus may now serve as a place of exile for large numbers of Wagner fighters is certain to deepen existing concerns over the country’s role as a junior partner in Russia’s faltering invasion of Ukraine. Lukashenka granted Putin permission to use Belarus as a springboard for an attempt to seize Kyiv during the initial stages of the war in early 2022. He continues to supply Russia with military equipment and ammunition, while also allowing Russian troops to train at Belarusian bases. Most recently, Belarus has reportedly begun the process of receiving Russian nuclear weapons.

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The delivery of Russian nukes and the proposal to host Wagner forces underscore the significance of Belarus in Putin’s regional strategy. The continued presence of Lukashenka in Minsk gives Moscow options in its confrontation with the West and enables the Kremlin to enhance its influence in the wider region. This appears to suit Lukashenka, who knows the Kremlin is unlikely to abandon him as long as he remains indispensable to the Russian war effort.

The outlook for Belarus as a whole is less promising. If large numbers of Wagner troops begin arriving in the country, this will dramatically increase Russia’s overall military presence and spark renewed speculation over a possible fresh Russian offensive from Belarusian territory to capture the Ukrainian capital. This would force Ukraine to strengthen its defenses along the country’s northern border and could potentially make Belarus a target.

The stationing of Wagner units in Belarus would also cause alarm bells to ring in nearby European Union and NATO member states such as Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Many of these countries have already taken steps to increase border security with Belarus. The arrival of Russia’s most effective and battle-hardened military units in the country would likely lead to a new iron curtain and the further isolation of the Belarusian population from their European neighbors.

In all likelihood, Lukashenka probably had very little say in the decision to use Belarus as a place of exile for mutinous Wagner forces. At the same time, he may view these troops as a means of protecting himself against any form of domestic opposition. Lukashenka remains vulnerable to the kind of widespread anti-regime protests that swept the country in 2020, and is well aware that his decision to involve Belarus in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is deeply unpopular. Having thousands of Wagner fighters on hand might be the perfect insurance against an uprising aiming to topple his regime.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. She tweets @HannaLiubakova.

The Baltic Sea as a ‘NATO lake’

The strategic impact of NATO’s enlargement to include Sweden and Finland will indeed be profound. The Baltic Sea will be almost entirely surrounded by Alliance members except for Russia, making it in effect a “NATO lake” with dramatically enhanced deterrence capabilities and security for the Nordic and the Baltic countries. Though Kaliningrad will remain as a Russian exclave—and a heavily weaponized one at that—the Russian room for any anti-access/area denial maneuvers in the Baltic Sea will be minimal. Instead, the main strategic tension with Russia is likely to move further north to the Kola Peninsula and the northeastern parts of the Nordic Arctic region known as Nordkalotten, or the “cap of the North.”

This area can be expected to draw a considerable amount of Alliance attention and resources away from the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap and will thus come at the expense of the western parts of the High North and Arctic; that is, Greenland, the Faroe Islands—both part of the Kingdom of Denmark—Iceland, and the Norwegian coast.

The greatest impact of this new balance in “Nordic NATO” will likely be felt in Denmark: the small ally that has been known as an activist star within NATO, always ready to embark on new operations, whether in faraway corners of the world or in battlegroups closer to home.

Over the years, Denmark has shown an impressively high tolerance for losses, as witnessed in its contribution to the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan, where the country suffered the highest number of fatalities per capita among NATO members.

The good news, as seen from Copenhagen, is that Denmark will no longer be a frontline state as NATO’s border moves east. When Sweden joins NATO, the strategic task of guarding the entrance to the Baltic Straits will no longer fall exclusively on Danish shoulders. In addition, the second-largest Swedish city, Gothenburg, will likely become a main transit port on the Scandinavian west coast, reducing the role of the Danish port city of Esbjerg, which has been undergoing a costly and extensive upgrade in the last few years.

More defense spending, more influence

Another factor is defense spending. Sweden is currently investing heavily in its military; this is much needed after decades of relentless and irresponsible cuts. Sweden’s ambition now is to reach NATO’s minimum budgetary requirement for defense spending of 2 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) by 2026.

Finland, on the other hand, easily meets the 2 percent requirement. With a history of war with its great power neighbor, Finland takes national defense seriously and never even contemplated following the rest of Europe’s post-Cold War disarmament trend.

Both newcomers bring substantial capabilities, especially in maritime and air defense. NATO will, for instance, gain a new fleet of Swedish submarines as well as JAS 39 Gripen fighter jets, in addition to Finnish F-35 fighter jets. Jointly, the Nordic militaries will assemble a substantial force on NATO’s northern flank and in the entire Nordic-Baltic region, ranging from the southern parts of the Baltic Sea all the way to the High North and the Arctic.

With this development, however, the old Nordic allies risk being downgraded to a secondary role as NATO and the United States turn their focus to the two new allies, whose vast territory and strategic location dominate the region.

Again, this could especially affect Denmark, and the trouble here is to some extent of its own making. While its three neighbors (Iceland has no national military) already meet the 2 percent requirement (Finland) or have ambitious and realistic plans to reach that target within the next few years (Sweden and Norway), Denmark’s defense budget currently amounts to only 1.38 percent of its GDP.

After receiving a harsh treatment in the NATO Defense Planning Capability Review 2021/2022, Denmark moved the date for reaching the 2 percent requirement up to 2030, three years sooner than the previous target—and six years after the 2024 deadline agreed upon at the 2014 Wales summit. Along with Slovenia, Denmark is listed as having the latest target date in the Alliance for meeting the current budgetary requirement.

This problem is far from new, though. Former US President Donald Trump famously criticized Denmark’s insufficient military spending, and variations of that theme have been repeated over the years since. In response, the then-prime minister and current foreign minister of Denmark, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, argued that what really matters is the actual content of this defense spending, not the exact amount.

Rasmussen and others have also suggested that the many years of Danish contributions at the forefront—such as fighting in Afghanistan, combatting international terrorism elsewhere, upholding deterrence in NATO’s battle groups in Estonia and Latvia, and participating in the Baltic air policing mission—should be considered in the overall evaluation of Denmark’s commitment to the Alliance.

In addition, right before Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen’s visit to the White House earlier this month, a creative solution to the 2 percent dilemma was found by including Danish military support to Ukraine in the defense budget. (Frederiksen is rumored to be a top candidate to replace Jens Stoltenberg as NATO’s next secretary general; that her country meets the budgetary requirement would certainly not hurt any such ambitions). Danish support for Ukraine is high; the country trains Ukrainian pilots, has donated Leopard tanks to Ukraine, and may soon donate F-16 fighter jets, as well.

Billions of Danish kroner will now be spent to restore Denmark’s military and align national capabilities with NATO’s requirements. That includes dealing with the challenges which have accumulated on the home front while the Danish military has been deployed overseas. Worn-out properties and recruitment difficulties are among these challenges. Denmark also has yet to deliver the heavy infantry brigade that it has promised NATO for some time now (and to provide it with crucial air defense systems).

That Finland and—hopefully—Sweden will join the NATO Vilnius Summit in July as two strong new allies is great news for regional security and for NATO. However, while celebrating this historic event, the old Nordic allies’ many years of loyal service and fearless contributions should not be forgotten, neither at NATO headquarters nor in the White House.

Ann-Sofie Dahl is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Transatlantic Security Initiative. Though a native Swede, she is a long-time resident of Copenhagen, where she does research on security and defense, including previously at the Center for Military Studies (from 2013 to 2016). Dahl is a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences.

The post Finland and Sweden’s NATO entries are a mixed blessing for the old Nordic allies appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukrainians have good reason to cheer Russia’s Wagner rebellion

Andriy Zagorodnyuk — Tue, 27 Jun 2023 10:38:50 +0000

As the Wagner mutiny unfolded in Russia over the weekend, Ukrainian social media was flooded with memes about popcorn as millions of Ukrainians settled down to enjoy the spectacle. This gleeful reaction was perhaps predictable, given the unimaginable horror and suffering Russia has brought to Ukraine over the past sixteen months, but there may also be a number of good practical reasons for Ukrainians to cheer Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s short-lived revolt. The exact terms of the deal that caused the Wagner warlord to call off his mutiny are not entirely clear and may still be subject to revision, but it is already safe to say that the affair has left Russia weakened and demoralized in ways that favor Ukraine.

The first point to note is that the drama is likely to continue. As Russia’s neighbors can all testify, Vladimir Putin does not honor agreements. He is also notorious for never forgiving traitors. Whatever happens next, we will almost certainly witness the end of Wagner as an independent military force. Individual units will either be broken up, exiled to Belarus, or integrated into the regular Russian army. Putin and his military chiefs simply cannot run the risk of allowing the mercenary group to maintain its powerful military potential.

This will have a considerable impact on the invasion of Ukraine. Wagner troops were responsible for virtually all of Russia’s modest advances over the past year, including the much-hyped seizure of Bakhmut. Wagner’s success was largely down to a distinctive and brutal military doctrine heavily dependent on human wave tactics. These shock troops will find life very different in the ranks of the regular Russian military. Russian generals will view all former Wagner fighters with suspicion and will be reluctant to give them prominent offensive roles. This is a sensible security response to recent events, but it will undermine the Russian military’s already extremely limited ability to advance in Ukraine.

With Russia’s most effective troops no longer playing a prominent role in the invasion, this will increase the options for Ukrainian commanders as they look to develop the country’s current summer counteroffensive. This may have particular significance for the frontline sector close to Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine, where Wagner units were instrumental in securing earlier Russian gains. Ukrainian forces have already made significant advances to the north and south of Bakhmut, and will now be looking to capitalize on the destabilizing impact of the Wagner rebellion in order to push further.

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Ukraine’s military planners may also be encouraged to expand on earlier incursions into the Russian Federation itself. The Wagner mutiny exposed a shocking lack of military defenses inside Russia, with Russian army officials scrambling to assemble units and gather equipment from across the country. Prigozhin was able to seize the major Russian city of Rostov-on-Don without a fight, including the military headquarters of the entire Ukraine invasion. His troops then advanced virtually unopposed through the Russian heartlands before unilaterally deciding to end their march on Moscow less than two hundred kilometers from the capital city. In the space of a single day, an apparently defenseless Russia found itself on the brink of either civil war or collapse.

This remarkable state of affairs was possible because Putin has deployed the vast majority of Russia’s military potential to Ukraine. The Wagner revolt demonstrated conclusively that there are no more reserves to draw upon. Putin is already close to the maximum of his capacity and has very limited possibilities to escalate the invasion of Ukraine, even if he wished to do so.

This creates all manner of tempting opportunities for Ukraine, which has so far been careful to limit the scope of its military activities inside Russia, in part due to concerns voiced by Kyiv’s international partners. That may now change. In the weeks prior to the start of Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive, Ukrainian-backed Russian militias launched a number of cross-border raids from Ukraine into Russia’s Belgorod region. While these thrusts were largely symbolic, Ukraine could soon become more ambitious. With the Putin regime seemingly unable to defend itself and in no position to escalate, we may witness bolder Ukrainian military operations on Russian territory.

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Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of the whole Wagner drama from a Ukrainian perspective was the obvious weakness and division it exposed within Russia. Any country fighting a major war needs unity, and today’s Russia is clearly not united. Members of the public in Rostov-on-Don and elsewhere appear to have enthusiastically backed the rebellion, while others were indifferent. The limited military presence inside Russia made no serious attempts to intervene, while there was little indication of any surge in public support for Putin or condemnation of Prigozhin. This is all a very long way from the propaganda image promoted by the Kremlin of a strong Russian state supported by a proudly patriotic populace.

The situation in Russia is not yet comparable to the mood in 1917 on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, but the Wagner mutiny is an extremely dangerous signal for Russian society. Any infighting is bad for morale, and the spectacle of Russia’s most successful military force turning against the country’s military leaders is particularly demoralizing. This will damage the fighting spirit of Russian troops in Ukraine while also seriously undermining Putin’s personal authority on the home front.

For Ukraine, the outlook is more promising. The Wagner mutiny was a brief affair, but it has led to the sidelining of Russia’s most effective fighting force while also highlighting the weaknesses and limitations of the Putin regime. This could create practical opportunities for Ukraine’s current counteroffensive, and will boost confidence in the country’s ultimate ability to achieve a decisive victory over Russia.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk is chairman of the Center for Defence Strategies and an advisor to the Ukrainian Government. He previously served as Ukraine’s minister of defense (2019–2020).

If the Ukrainians can exploit the advantage of their superior tanks supplied by NATO members, they can drive deep into the rear area of Russian-occupied territory and split the Russian force in two with a combination of armor and HIMARS strikes guided by unmanned aircraft systems. This would enable the Ukrainian military to break the land bridge that Russia has created by occupying a continuous swath of Ukrainian territory from the Russian border to Crimea.

If Ukraine can breach the Russian defensive line of obstacles and minefields in two or three locations, it could provide multiple axes of advance to exploit and keep the Russians off balance, or allow the Ukrainians to at least feint in one or more spots and tie down Russian defenders. At the same time, Ukrainian tanks could rapidly move to exploit their success before the Russians recognize these advances, and could ideally penetrate the Russian rear area before they can deploy their reserves. This scenario would offer the Ukrainians the best chance they have had thus far in this war to liberate large swaths of occupied territory. But it would also in all likelihood be a long battle with significant casualties.

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It is unlikely that this counteroffensive will result in the liberation of Crimea. The narrow isthmus that connects the peninsula to the mainland of Ukraine makes it the most easily defensible piece of Russian-occupied territory. Because the Ukrainian military lacks an amphibious capability, the Russians can concentrate all their forces there, making any attempt at a southward advance extraordinarily deadly.

Yet the Ukrainians are savvy enough to realize that the actual value of Crimea to the Russians is the port of Sevastopol, despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claims of solidarity with the largely Russian-speaking population of the peninsula.

Ukraine has the ability to render the strategic value of Crimea moot and make Russia’s Black Sea Fleet pay a high price every time it attempts to leave the port of Sevastopol. Ukraine can achieve this by deploying advanced naval mines offensively as effectively as they did defensively close to the Ukrainian port city of Odesa; and by employing their Neptune anti-ship missiles as they have done to deadly effect in the past.

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The addition of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine’s arsenal will provide another weapon to strike Russia’s naval base in Sevastopol and is a welcome change in US policy. Although still a fourth-generation aircraft and susceptible to Russia’s S-400 surface-to-air missile system, the F-16 is superior to anything the Ukrainian Air Force currently operates as a fighter or an air-to-ground attack aircraft.

Unlike the MiG-29, Su-27, Su-24, and Su-25 of the Ukrainian Air Force, the F-16 can carry the entire range of US and NATO laser-guided and GPS-guided air-to-ground ordnance, which will be vital for striking Russian targets deep in occupied territory including Crimea while avoiding collateral damage and civilian casualties. Additionally, its superior radar and ability to employ the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and AIM-9X Sidewinder make it superior to Russia’s Mig-29 and Su-27 in aerial combat. But since it will take three to four months to transition Ukrainian pilots to the F-16, these fighters will not play a significant role in the current counteroffensive.

The Ukrainians have demonstrated their commitment to their cause through superior leadership, morale, and courage under fire. At the same time, Russia’s shift to prepared defenses may allow them to shore up the flagging confidence of their largely conscripted army. While the current Ukrainian counteroffensive is a welcome step toward victory in this war, it will be one of many campaigns over the course of what will likely be a long and arduous struggle.

Col. John B. Barranco (Ret.) was the 2021-22 US Marine Corps senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is currently executive vice president of Potomac International Partners.

Short-lived Wagner mutiny will undermine Russia’s Ukraine invasion

Peter Dickinson — Sun, 25 Jun 2023 23:13:23 +0000

As suddenly as it had begun twenty-four hours earlier, Wagner chief Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s rebellion against Russia’s military leadership came to an abrupt end on Saturday evening. The details of the deal struck between Prigozhin and the Kremlin remain murky, but the Russian warlord appears to have emerged from the drama relatively unscathed, at least for now.

The same cannot be said for Vladimir Putin, who has been very publicly humiliated by the affair and now looks weaker than at any point in his twenty-three-year reign. While the mutiny itself was remarkably brief, the consequences are likely to be profound, with serious repercussions in particular for the already faltering Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The most obvious practical consequence of the Wagner mutiny is a weakening of Russia’s force posture inside Ukraine. More than twenty thousand Wagner troops reportedly withdrew from Ukraine to participate in the revolt, representing around five percent of the entire Russian invasion force. Crucially, these were by far the most effective fighting units in the Russian military and had been responsible for almost all of the advances achieved over the past year.

Depending on the exact nature of the agreement to end the mutiny, many Wagner fighters may well return to the frontlines, possibly integrated into the regular Russian army. However, their non-Wagner comrades and commanders will understandably treat them with extreme suspicion, limiting their impact on the battlefield. Whatever happens next, the days when Wagner troops led the Russian invasion of Ukraine look to be over.

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The revolt also highlighted the relative defenselessness of Russia itself. Wagner troops took almost a year to occupy the small Ukrainian city of Bakhmut but seized the nearly twenty times larger Russian city Rostov-on-Don without a fight in a matter of hours. Indeed, it is worth underlining that Rostov-on-Don is by far the biggest city captured by Russian troops since the start of Putin’s so-called “Special Military Operation” sixteen months ago. Russia’s lack of domestic defenses was further exposed by the unhindered progress of Prigozhin’s armored column, which advanced to within two hundred kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed before deciding to turn back.

While the immediate threat of a march on Moscow is now over, drastic measures are clearly required to bolster Russian domestic security. Putin knows the watching world has noted this vulnerability. He must now urgently take visible steps to prevent another ambitious Russian warlord or Ukrainian army commander from launching a new campaign inside his unprotected borders. Where will Putin find the necessary troops and equipment for this? With the vast majority of Russia’s military currently deployed in Ukraine, the answer to this question is both obvious and awkward. Russia will have no choice but to reduce its invasion force in order to address the country’s serious domestic security issues.

Russia’s vast military and state security apparatus will also now find itself engaged in the hunt for traitors and possible turncoats, which will inevitably distract attention and resources away from the task of defeating Ukraine. Infighting between the various different military clans has been a debilitating factor throughout the Russian invasion of Ukraine; this trend will now intensify as the Russian authorities look to settle scores with the many police chiefs, local officials, and military commanders who either stood aside or discreetly backed the Wagner mutiny.

Meanwhile, the mutiny has raised some fundamental questions over Putin’s continued ability to rule. He was notably absent during the initial hours of the crisis, only appearing the following morning in a brief video address to the nation. He also seems to have been sidelined in negotiations with Prigozhin, allowing Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka to take the lead. These are not the actions of a strongman ruler. As Atlantic Council Eurasia Center Senior Director and former US Ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst noted on CNN, “It’s like Prigozhin is the person who looked behind the screen at the Wizard of Oz and saw the great and terrible Oz was just this little frightened man. Putin has been diminished for all time by this affair.”

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Brian Whitmore: If Prigozhin doesn’t pay a heavy price, Putin’s regime is in serious danger

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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While these factors will all undermine the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the most important impact is likely to be on morale within the ranks of the Russian military. Demoralization was already a major issue for Putin’s invasion force, with a steady stream of video addresses on social media during the first half of 2023 testifying to widespread dissatisfaction among Russian troops over “human wave” attacks and catastrophic losses. These problems will now intensify as Russian troops question the loyalties of their leaders and the entire purpose of the invasion.

On the eve of the mutiny, Prigozhin published an explosive video address in which he accused the Kremlin of deliberately misleading the Russian public over its justifications for the war in Ukraine. The Wagner chief, whom many in Russia see as one of the few credible commentators within the establishment, dismissed key elements of the official Kremlin narrative—including claims that the invasion preempted an imminent NATO-backed Ukrainian offensive against Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine and Crimea. He also directly denied widespread Russian allegations that the Ukrainian military had been bombing eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region for eight years prior to the full-scale invasion. Instead, Prigozhin blamed the war on the personal ambitions of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and individual Russian oligarchs.

Such statements will inevitably undermine fighting spirit among Russian troops and cause many to question exactly what they are fighting for in Ukraine. This has long been an issue for the Russian authorities, who have struggled to articulate their war aims amid lurid but unsubstantiated claims of “Ukrainian Nazis” and “Western imperialists.” Prigozhin’s damning comments exposing the lies used to justify the war have now cast an unforgiving light on the Kremlin’s credibility problems and will further fuel discontent among the Russian troops who are fighting and dying on the frontlines.

The short-lived Wagner mutiny has also exposed deep divides within Russia’s military and security establishment that indicate remarkably low levels of loyalty to the Putin regime. There has been some speculation that Prigozhin received support from within the military when planning and executing his mutiny, given that he was able to capture Rostov-on-Don with such apparent ease despite the fact that the city serves as the headquarters of the entire Ukraine invasion. Prigozhin’s armored column of Wagner troops then travelled hundreds of kilometers through the heart of Russia without encountering any significant military resistance.

The remarkable initial success of the Wagner mutiny in seizing control of a major city and advancing on the capital has sent shock waves through Russia that will also be felt by Putin’s occupation forces in Ukraine. If Russian soldiers and commanders are not prepared to defend their own country, why should troops deployed to Ukraine sacrifice themselves for such an apparently dubious cause? If Prigozhin and his private army can go unpunished for declaring war on the Russian state, why should ordinary mobilized Russians feel obliged to follow suicidal orders in Ukraine?

For obvious reasons, the Kremlin will now attempt to downplay the significance of the short-lived Wagner mutiny. In reality, however, the ramifications of this unprecedented event will reverberate for some time to come and will shape Russia’s future, including the outcome of the war in Ukraine. One year ago, Putin was boasting of returning historically Russian lands and comparing himself to Peter the Great. Today, he looks far more like Czar Nicholas II, whose military failures and weak leadership sparked mutiny and the eventual collapse of the Russian Empire.

The Wagner mutiny is further proof that Putin’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine has left Russia divided, demoralized, and weakened. With his own personal authority now rapidly evaporating, the Russian dictator may soon face domestic problems so grave that they will overshadow even the prospect of defeat in Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Olga Khakova: Russian instability further endangers Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

Yevgeniya Gaber: The Russian colossus is standing on feet of clay

Daniel Fried: Is it 1917 or 1991?

Ariel Cohen: Frankenstein’s monster cooks up a coup

Doug Klain: In the mutiny’s aftermath, Russia’s soldiers face a crisis of trust

Hanna Liubakova: For Lukashenka, a short-term win that could undermine his long-term standing in Belarus

John “Buss” Barranco: Ukraine can take advantage of Russian confusion

William F. Wechsler: “When you strike at a king, you must kill him.”

John K. Culver: A stumbling Russia means greater isolation for China

Joseph Webster: Prigozhin is the devil Beijing doesn’t know

Rama Yade: Without Wagner, Putin loses a substantial part of his African foothold

Jacob Mezey: What does Prigozhin’s coup attempt mean for Ukraine’s counteroffensive?

Vladislav Davidzon: This is the start of the end of the war

If Prigozhin doesn’t pay a heavy price, Putin’s regime is in serious danger

Prigozhin’s rebellion needs to be viewed in several contexts. First, the war against Ukraine has divided the Russian elite into two factions—hawks who want nothing short of the conquest of Kyiv and a military parade on the Khreshchatyk and kleptocrats who want to go back to the pre-February 24, 2022 world. Neither of these things are going to happen, so nobody is happy. Of these two factions, the hawks are by far the more powerful and the more serious threat to the regime. This has put Putin in a very precarious position regardless of how Prigozhin’s rebellion is resolved.

Second, Prigozhin’s rebellion also illustrates the perils of Putin’s “venture-capital foreign policy,” which outsources key tasks to nominally private-sector actors outside the normal chain of command. The Russian system is based not on institutions but on informal patronage networks with Putin as the ultimate arbiter. When Putin is strong, this approach works, to a point. But when Putin is weakened, it can spin out of control.

Third, Prigozhin’s kryshas in this informal system appear to be abandoning him. General Sergei Surovikin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov have already disavowed him. It is also hard to imagine another alleged ally, Rosgvardia leader Viktor Zolotov, siding with Prigozhin over Putin. This probably accounts for Prigozhin’s tactical retreat. But even if the immediate crisis is resolved, its underlying cause will continue to weaken the regime.

Fourth, if Prigozhin doesn’t pay a heavy price for his rebellion, it will put the Putin regime in serious danger. This is because political change comes to Russia when three factors are present: a divided elite (check), a dissatisfied public (check), and an absence of fear. If fear is removed from the equation, then the regime will be in peril.

Finally, this crisis will further undermine Russia’s warfighting capabilities in Ukraine just as Kyiv is ramping up its counteroffensive. The Russian elite is not behaving like it expects to win this war.

—Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and founder and host of the Power Vertical Podcast.

Russian instability further endangers Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

Despite the internal power struggle, Prigozhin and Putin are unified by their dedication to the continued assault on Ukraine, including crimes against humanity at scale, albeit through diverging approaches. This shared interest is of particular concern, as Ukraine is once again raising alarms about the ticking time bomb of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant’s unsafe conditions. Russia’s leadership instability is heightening these risks and could lead to contradictory or unclear orders for the plant’s illegal occupiers. Moreover, Russia has been emboldened by the weak response by the West to their destruction of the Kakhovka dam, and the absence of unity in calling out Russia’s culpability in the horrific incident, notwithstanding ample evidence pointing to Russia. Zaporizhzhia’s safety can only be guaranteed when the Russians give up control of the plant, which they are unequipped to manage. The international community must prioritize securing this transfer in order to prevent a looming catastrophe.

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center (GEC). She leads GEC’s portfolio on synchronizing climate and energy security efforts through transatlantic cooperation.

The Russian colossus is standing on feet of clay

Prigozhin’s mutiny has exposed Russia’s major defense blind spots and highlighted Putin’s weakening grip on power. The Kremlin’s strongman turned out to be a strawman; and a colossus of Russian military power appeared to be standing on feet of clay.

While this may sound reassuring to Ukrainians, who may have an easier time fighting against a demotivated army of conscripts and convicts rather than against well-paid professional mercenaries, Kyiv and the West must nevertheless face a sobering reality.

It took sixteen months of fighting, three successful Ukrainian counteroffensives (in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson), and occasional raids by pro-Ukrainian Russian groups into the Belgorod region to ruin the myth of Russian military power. It required the flagship cruiser Moskva to be sunk, Ukraine to spend months waiting for Western weapons and EU candidate status, and Finland to join NATO before the West began to question the credibility of the Kremlin’s “red lines.”

While the West has spent months trying to de-escalate, save Putin’s face, mitigate nuclear threats, and avoid provoking Russia, a rival warlord with a criminal past showed how easy it was to overtake the Russian military’s initiative and paralyze state structures. In its current state, Russia is likely to face an internal power struggle with more destabilization in sight. Putin will most likely use Prigozhin to present himself as the “best out of the worst,” and to redirect public attention from internal turmoil to more violence in Ukraine, including new acts of ecocide and nuclear saber-rattling. This must not be allowed.

The West’s choice is not between two Russian war criminals, who are equally engaged in the crimes of genocide and mass murder in Ukraine, Syria, and Africa. The choice is between maintaining illusions of European stability and taking the steps that are necessary to secure it. These include abandoning self-deterrence, developing a clear-eyed Russia strategy, and equipping Ukraine to win the war, with full-fledged NATO membership as a key element of Kyiv’s long-term victory.

The Russian colossus, as it is now, is likely to collapse sooner rather than later. Ukraine is the only country in the region that can protect NATO from its ruins when it finally falls apart.

—Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey. She worked as a foreign policy advisor to the prime minister of Ukraine from February to December 2021.

Is it 1917 or 1991?

What does the fast and apparently ended Prigozhin mutiny mean for Putin and for Russia’s war against Ukraine? Was it a 1917 moment or a miserable failure like the attempted coup against the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991?

In terms of numbers of forces available, Prigozhin didn’t stand a chance. Putin commands the regular Russian army and airforce, the National Guard, and other armed groups theoretically at government command. But Tsar Nicholas II also had a preponderance of force when he fell in February 1917; so did the Provisional Government when it fell to Lenin’s Bolsheviks in November 1917. The problem the tsar and Provisional Government leader Alexander Kerensky faced was not the availability of forces in theory but forces in practice. The tsarist regime was decrepit, hollowed out by many things, but especially by its failure in World War I. Kerensky’s government stuck with that war and also failed. By the time they were overthrown, the tsar and Kerensky had lost the confidence of Russian society and huge portions of the state they nominally commanded.

That was Putin’s problem: Prigozhin mounted a mutiny in protest of another failing Russian war, Putin’s war against Ukraine.

And now Prigozhin has announced he is turning around his forces short of Moscow. He seems to have worked out some sort of deal.

But a deal with whom and for what? Does this deal include a change of Russia’s military leadership that had been prosecuting the Russo-Ukrainian War that Putin launched? Prigozhin has been attacking Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov for their failures in Ukraine. But why would Putin cave to pressure by accepting such demands? What does that do to Putin’s authority? It’s Putin’s war in any case.

Whatever arrangements Prigozhin has extracted, Putin’s authority is diminished, as was Gorbachev’s after Boris Yeltsin defeated the 1991 coup attempt. And this is worse: In 1991 the coup failed. But Prigozhin seems to have pulled off something.

Russia’s war against Ukraine has not been going well, and Prigozhin’s attack on it as unjustified and incompetently led is now stronger than ever.

It may not be a 1917 moment for Russia. But the hot breath of failure is coming closer to Putin.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former US ambassador to Poland.

Frankenstein’s monster cooks up a coup

In his effort to bypass Russia’s regular military and governance structures, while personally dipping into the country’s military budget, it appears that Putin has created a monster that threatened the very foundations of his security services–based regime, and possibly the scope of his personal power.

Prigozhin, once known as “Putin’s cook” and head of the private military Wagner Group, demonstrated that he can run circles around Shoigu and Gerasimov. He and his Wagner military company quickly captured Rostov-on-Don, a large Russian city in the south, which is the headquarters of the Russian southern military district. Wagner then rapidly extended their control all the way up to Voronezh and to the boundaries of the Moscow region—850 kilometers.

During Wagner’s lightning advance, Russian ground forces failed to oppose them, and only minimal aerial attacks were conducted against them.

For a moment it appeared that Putin had left Moscow and Prigozhin might enter the city and finish off a coup despite the lack of outright support from any representatives of the Russian ruling circles. Yet, many Russian leaders, including the powerful Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev refrained from criticizing Prigozhin, suggesting that he may have at least some support at the highest echelons of power.

And then Prigozhin stopped. He turned around his troops, amid claims of a deal brokered by Lukashenka. Putin’s press secretary Dmitri Peskov confirmed that the criminal charges of incitement to armed rebellion against Prigozhin would be dropped, he would be allowed to move to Belarus (and pursue his African business), and the Wagner members would be pardoned.

The Wagner rebellion is the most serious challenge to the Russian state’s foundations since 1993, when the Supreme Soviet rebelled against Boris Yeltsin, who brought in tanks to suppress the attempted coup.

Prigozhin has demonstrated just how weak the Putin regime is and how the Russian president’s own “chef” could potentially put nuclear-armed Russia into the hands of a fragile and extremely dangerous dictatorship of former KGB officers and hardened criminals—Vory v Zakone.

Russia’s international stature, and its future military performance in Ukraine, are likely to suffer from these events, as will Putin’s power.

—Ariel Cohen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

In the mutiny’s aftermath, Russia’s soldiers face a crisis of trust

Plainly, it’s difficult to tell what on earth happened in Prigozhin’s supposed twenty-four-hour rebellion, now apparently called off after negotiations with the Belarusian strongman Lukashenka. How Putin and his elites rally to reassert dominance after an open challenge will prove decisive for determining what comes next and whether Russian forces substantially waver in the battlefield in Ukraine. Authoritarian regimes like Putin’s rely on creating a sense of invulnerability, and challenges from warlords like Prigozhin call that myth into question.

While Prigozhin claims he called on his forces to stand down to avoid spilling Russian blood, it’s likely that the Wagner Group chief received significant concessions personally or serious enhancements to Wagner’s role in the war effort. At the end of the day, this “rebellion” was purportedly about a disagreement over how best to prosecute Russia’s unprovoked war of annihilation against Ukraine.

If Prigozhin’s challenge does indeed come to a speedy conclusion with Wagner returning to the front, Kyiv may not get the all-out chaos it was likely hoping to exploit for battlefield gains. But even so, the fact that a significant portion of Moscow’s fighting force is not apparently loyal to Russia and can be swayed will have real impact on the battlefield, with Russian army forces having to question to an even greater extent than before just how much they can trust those they’re supposed to be fighting alongside.

Putin’s regime may have survived Prigozhin’s challenge, but almost every aspect of this episode indicates that the Russian system is more brittle than ever. This all occurred because Russia is performing disastrously in its war—and Ukraine’s main effort in the counteroffensive is still to come.

—Doug Klain is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, where he focuses on Russia’s war on Ukraine, authoritarianism in Russia, and Ukraine’s democracy-building process.

For Lukashenka, a short-term win that could undermine his long-term standing in Belarus

In a stunning turn of events on Saturday, Lukashenka said he had negotiated with Prigozhin an end to the movement of his mercenary troops inside Russia in order to deescalate the situation.

Prigozhin himself confirmed the turning back of the Wagner columns of the mercenaries and returning them to field camps in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine.

While Lukashenka’s position could be strengthened by this unexpected mediation, in the longer term, his regime will face the repercussions of the insurrection led by the Wagner paramilitary group.

The growing demotivation and demoralization regarding Russia’s actions may raise concerns among the power vertical, military, and elite circles within Belarus. Such chaotic developments in the neighboring country will lead to questioning Lukashenka’s policies and decision making. With Putin’s authority weakened, the regime in Minsk may find itself with reduced backing and support from Russia.

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Lukashenka has declared unwavering loyalty to the Kremlin, allowing attacks and using Belarusian territory as a training ground, disregarding the will of most Belarusians.

Lukashenka placed a risky bet on Russia’s swift victory in the war against Ukraine, essentially banking everything on that outcome. Pro-regime propaganda in Belarus claimed the notion that Russia was incapable of losing. However, this strategy could potentially have negative consequences. Prigozhin’s armed rebellion indicates a political crisis within Russia and shatters the myth of Russia’s invincibility and overwhelming power.

The Belarusian democratic forces and the Kalinouski regiment fighting in Ukraine against the Russian troops used these chaotic developments to appeal to the elites and the military to side with them. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Lukashenka’s rival in the disputed 2020 election, has stated once again that this is an opportunity to free Belarus from dictatorship. The Wagner insurrection will become yet another argument for her to present Russia as a source of instability and conflict. It appeals to Belarusians who want to keep away from the war against Ukraine.

—Hanna Liubakova is a freelance journalist and researcher from Belarus. She is currently a journalist with Outriders, an international multimedia platform that produces in-depth multimedia and interactive reporting and focuses on solutions journalism.

Ukraine can take advantage of Russian confusion

Is the Wagner Group marching on Moscow or heading back to the front? Is Prigozhin attempting a coup d’etat, part of a false flag operation to allow Putin to purge his failing military leadership, or is he trying to change the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense, as he claims, perhaps to prevent them from absorbing his private militia into the Russian Army? It is impossible to know for sure, but we do know that the recent turn of events in Russia could not come at a better time for Ukraine.

Ukraine’s best chance for a successful counteroffensive is to attack deep behind the current Russian front line and force the Russians to fall back from their six hundred miles of layered defense-in-depth fighting positions to prevent Ukraine from cutting Russia off from its supply lines. It is unlikely even the most audacious among the Ukrainian military leadership ever envisioned launching an attack on Russia’s Southern Military District headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, where Russia’s war in Ukraine is being run, but that is precisely what the Wagner Group’s sudden rebellion has done.

Whatever Prigozhin’s real motivations are, or the outcome of his revolt and then apparent about-face, a few things remain clear: Massive amounts of confusion have been sown in Russia’s rear area, and whatever confidence rank and file Russian soldiers had left in their leadership is gone. Once an army loses confidence in its leaders, morale collapses and the will to fight goes with it. The Wagner Group will almost certainly be gone soon as well, and it was the most effective unit fighting for the Russians in Ukraine, admittedly a low bar. Whether it is absorbed into the Russian army or disbanded, its members reassigned piecemeal to various units, remains to be seen. Still, it is hard to imagine Prigozhin holding onto his private army or his life.

—John “Buss” Barranco was the 2021-22 senior US Marine Corps fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

“When you strike at a king, you must kill him.”

Some things are constants in this changing world, and one of them is that only a relatively small number of people make all of the important decisions in Russia, and they each have lots of money, lots of guns, or both. At certain points in history, these elites compete among themselves to determine who leads, resulting in one person in charge, some dead, and the others falling into line. Recent events should be understood as the latest episode in this centuries-long storyline.

But today’s agreement that halted the immediate Wagner threat to Moscow and consigned Prigozhin to Belarus is not likely to be the end of this story, but just the beginning. On the surface it may appear to be a victory for Putin, but he has been weakened by both the very fact that it occurred and the reality that it was resolved only through a negotiated compromise rather than a public demonstration of physical power. The military, historically the institution most esteemed by the Russian people, has been humiliated once again under Putin and shown to be corrupt, ineffective, and led by lackeys. As has been the case since his failure to take Kyiv last year, Putin’s primary focus must be to secure his standing, and thus his survival, among that small number of Russians who matter, with shows of strength. Thus, those who stubbornly hope for a negotiated resolution to Putin’s war in Ukraine will continue to be disappointed. As for Prigozhin, he will need to reflect on Ralph Waldo Emerson’s famous admonition, “when you strike at a king, you must kill him.” Indeed, for the time being he may want to steer clear of any upper-floor windows, as in recent years Putin’s adversaries tend to be especially clumsy around them. In any case, as this story continues to develop, the people behind the 2017 movie The Death of Stalin should be busy taking notes in case there’s soon need for a sequel.

—William F. Wechsler is the senior director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. His most recent government position was US deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combating terrorism.

A stumbling Russia means greater isolation for China

Chinese President Xi Jinping is famous for proclaiming that “the world is undergoing changes unseen in a century!” Yet his prognostication probably didn’t include Putin’s former caterer and mercenary army founder/funder Yevgeniy Prigozhin directing an armed assault toward Moscow.

I hesitate to call relationships between autocrats “friendships,” but to the extent either Putin or Xi has friends, their bond is certainly stronger and more substantive than others. They seem to share a view of the world as straining against “American hegemony,” and poised to accelerate toward a multipolar order where both Russia and China can dominate respective spheres of influence free of “Western interference.” But Xi—being more traditionally Marxist—saw this new world emerging over the course of this century, while Putin undertook direct actions—in Georgia, Syria, Ukraine, and Ukraine again—to hasten changes and reassert Russia’s position as a great power. Beijing’s reaction can be summarized as “Bold! But strategically incompetent!”

But as I noted in a recent Atlantic Council publication, “Beijing has deep strategic interest in ensuring that Moscow—and Putin personally—remains a viable ally in blunting US power… Most importantly, Beijing has a strategic need to keep Russia from internal turmoil or international setbacks that could result in the rise of a regime that is hostile to China. One of the greatest gifts to Beijing of the Sino-Russian rapprochement [has been] a passive 4,200-kilometer border.”

In that context, China will support Putin if he remains in charge in Moscow. If Putin falls, Beijing will wait for the dust to settle and cultivate the new power structure, perhaps with a fresh chance to counsel that Russia extricate itself from Ukraine and refocus on long-term competition with the United States/Western alliance.

But for Xi and China, Russian internal turmoil and stumbles in the face of successful Western-backed Ukrainian military opposition and sanctions will further threaten greater isolation. A pragmatic option would be to reduce tensions with the United States and Europe, but Xi has proven to be more ideological than his recent predecessors. The loss of China’s main strategic partner is more likely to deepen strategic mistrust of the United States rather than greater diplomatic or economic accommodation.

—John K. Culver is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) senior intelligence officer with thirty-five years of experience as a leading analyst of East Asian affairs, including security, economic, and foreign-policy dimensions.

Prigozhin is the devil Beijing doesn’t know

While China has been preparing for a range of political and military outcomes amid the Ukrainian counteroffensive, it appears surprised by Prigozhin’s astonishing rebellion.

Beijing will seek to avoid taking any public side in the Russian domestic political struggle, at least explicitly. Still, authoritative state media such as the People’s Daily, are hinting that Beijing prefers that Putin prevail over Prigozhin. It’s not hard to understand why: Putin has been a reliable supporter of the relationship with China, has deep personal connections with the Chinese leadership, tacitly accepts Moscow’s “junior partnership” with Beijing, and has, up to now, largely maintained political stability within Russia.

Prigozhin is the devil Beijing doesn’t know. The head of the Wagner mercenary group has a mercurial (arguably volcanic) temperament which the Chinese leadership could find difficult to manage. Beijing was also likely troubled by his comment that Russia “needs to take a page out of North Korea’s book for a certain number of years,” as China can ill afford another nuclear-armed pariah state on its borders.

Beijing will struggle to find ways to assist Putin, however, although it appears, as of this writing, that he has prevailed over Prigozhin, who has reportedly accepted exile in Belarus.

People’s Republic of China (PRC) intelligence support for Putin seems risky and unlikely if Prigozhin resumes his apparent coup attempt. While Prigozhin has a complicated and often fraught relationship with the Russian security services, he appears to have ties with elements of the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service, as well as other elements of the force structures. Wagner Group’s stunning advance before Prigozhin’s about-face implies at least the tacit compliance of some figures in Russian military intelligence. Moreover, Wagner and the GRU shared a base in Russia’s Krasnodar district as late as 2020. Accordingly, if Chinese security services share intelligence with their Russian counterparts on anti-Putin coup plotters, they face a high probability of discovery and risk long-term damage to bilateral relations if an “anti-Putin” ascends to the power vertical in Russian politics. Moreover, sharing any intelligence on potential coup plotters would not only risk the compromise of methods and sources but also be an admission that PRC security services are spying within Russia.

If matters escalate again, Beijing might attempt to enable the Kremlin to rush troops back to Moscow from Central Asia, in a tacit, unspoken arrangement with Russia. Tajikistan hosts up to seven thousand Russian troops, while another five hundred are reportedly deployed to Kyrgyzstan (some troops have already been shifted to the front in Ukraine). China could offer security guarantees to Central Asian governments, indirectly enabling the Kremlin to further draw down in the region and shift forces to Moscow. This measure carries risks for the Kremlin and Zhongnanhai, however, and may be ineffectual. Putin’s fate will largely be determined by the loyalty of his subordinates, not the number of military personnel in Moscow.

If tensions between Putin and Prigozhin escalate again, Xi might decide that a direct or implied expression of support for Putin, perhaps through a phone call, is his best course of action. An intervention into Russian domestic politics would mark a bold step, however, and risks damaging bilateral relations with Putin’s eventual successor.

Unless it chooses to run significant risks, Beijing has little ability to influence events in Russia. Despite the considerable risks a Prigozhin regime would hold for the PRC, the Chinese leadership will likely observe events, rather than attempt to shape them.

—Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, where he leads the center’s efforts on Chinese energy security. Webster edits the China-Russia Report, an independent, non-partisan newsletter exploring developments in Sino-Russian relations.

Without Wagner, Putin loses a substantial part of his African foothold

Prigozhin has not been defeated yet. The way he decided to turn around to avoid bloodshed gives the impression that he controls not only the narrative, but also the future of Putin’s twenty-three-year hold on power. Should Putin leave Prigozhin out there without arresting him? What about his actions and influence in Africa, where he has ongoing military operations?

Undoubtedly this rebellion will impact the African theater, particularly Mali, Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, and Sudan where Wagner has settled its troops. Whereas until now the interests of the Russian government and the Wagner group aligned, it will now be necessary for these countries to do business with two Russian actors with rival interests. This rivalry will put their African allies in an awkward position.

Prigozhin’s uprising will lead to a clarification on the nature of Russia’s partnership with these African countries. Moscow, which knows how influential Wagner is in these countries, may be tempted to cut off its supplies on the continent. These governments born from military coups rely on Wagner mercenaries to keep their power and/or secure their countries against jihadist movements. Wagner made very profitable deals in Mali, Sudan, and CAR on everything from gold to coffee to sugar to diamonds.

The rebellion of Wagner’s boss and the need for Putin to show that he still has the situation under control could force Bamako and Bangui to distance themselves from Prigozhin in order to maintain their alliances with Moscow.

Indeed beyond Wagner, Moscow has become the leading exporter of arms in Africa, but also of wheat. Russian state-owned companies are also active in the mining, hydrocarbons, and even civil nuclear sectors. But if Russia seems to be a more reliable partner, what about Putin, whose power seems weakened?

Finally, Wagner’s most visible impact is actually on the information front: Prigozhin—who was closely tied with the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service—used CAR and Mali to foster anti-Western sentiment, gain sympathy for Putin, and fuel his propaganda via RIA FAN, the flagship of Prigozhin’s Patriot Media Group. Without this powerful tool, I’m not sure that the Russian influence will remain strong in these countries.

—Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

What does Prigozhin’s coup attempt mean for Ukraine’s counteroffensive?

How will Prigozhin’s brief mutiny against the Russian Ministry of Defense ultimately impact the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive? On the immediate frontline, many obstacles facing Ukrainian forces such as landmines, fortifications, and the Russian troops defending them will likely remain unchanged. However, Wagner’s disruption of Russia’s military command and logistics network may increase the possibility of a Ukrainian breakthrough on the battlefield.

Wagner’s seizure of the Southern Military District headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, which has largely served as the forward command center for the Russian war effort, will degrade the timely command and control of Russian forces. A confused or disrupted chain of command will significantly impact the Russian military’s ability to conduct an effective defense-in-depth and prevent a coordinated response to Ukrainian offensive efforts. Roadblocks set up by the Russian government, and even deliberate damage to the M4 highway, designed to contain the Wagner group, will also restrict its military’s ability to shift forces and supplies between fronts in Ukraine. Evidence that Wagner fired on military helicopters will require Russian aviation in the area to operate more cautiously and complicate their ability to strike Ukrainian forces. Reports that some Russian units did not oppose Wagner’s initial march may also lower Moscow’s confidence in the loyalty of its forces and officers. While Prigozhin’s rebellion ultimately may be short-lived, his actions will create weaknesses within the Russian military’s command structure which Ukraine can exploit on the battlefield.

—Jacob Mezey is a program assistant in the Forward Defense program in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

This is the start of the end of the war

The attempted coup d’etat that the Wagner mercenaries sprung on the Kremlin in the middle of the evening on Friday has come to a rather unexpected and dissatisfying conclusion. What looks like a backroom deal allegedly brokered by Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has turned the Wagner convoy around. The Wagner group had a serious battle plan with the Russian armed forces and security services seemingly unconsolidated enough to respond quickly. Prigozhin and the Kremlin both let loose the cry of war and stepped over their own self-proclaimed red lines before Prigozhin decided to fold the operation at seemingly the last moment. However, this rebellion has shown that the Putin regime was on its last legs (though they may now reconsolidate the power structures with Prigozhin holding a great deal more power than before).

That the rebel forces were even able to get as far as they did with little opposition and to take over Rostov-on-Don—which is also the headquarters of the Russian war against Ukraine—has shown the Putin regime to be weak and incoherent beyond all previous suppositions. It is hard to know how the Putin regime can regain its legitimacy after this. Putin had voiced his fears when he compared the situation to 1917, although 1905 may have been a better parallel. One way or the other, this is the payout stage of the gamble to invade Ukraine and this is the start of the end of the war. The Russian population and Putin’s elites had countenanced this war when it was far away—they will certainly think twice about doing so again after the conclusion of this farce.

—Vladislav Davidzon is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, based in France. Since 2018, he has served as a co-producer for a television series on the effects of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The post Experts react: What Russia’s Wagner Group rebellion means for Putin, Ukraine, China, and more appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s counteroffensive is a marathon not a blitzkrieg

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 17:44:48 +0000

Less than two weeks since he first confirmed that Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive was finally underway, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy already finds himself forced to hit back at criticism over the pace of military operations. “Some people believe this is a Hollywood movie and expect results now. It’s not,” he told the BBC on June 21. “Whatever some might want, including attempts to pressure us, with all due respect, we will advance on the battlefield the way we deem best.”

Zelenskyy’s comments reflect frustration in Kyiv over reports in the mainstream international media and widespread claims on social media platforms suggesting Ukraine’s counteroffensive is already floundering. Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak was one of many Ukrainian commentators to suggest this trend is part of a coordinated Kremlin disinformation operation. In a June 20 post, he accused Moscow of fueling media hysteria about the alleged failure of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in order to secure a ceasefire and “freeze the conflict at any cost.”

Kremlin-tied or Russia-friendly sources are likely to be behind at least some of the recent criticism over the initial pace of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. At the same time, negative assessments are also a consequence of the unrealistically high expectations that built up in the half-year period prior to the start of the campaign.

In the final months of 2022, the Ukrainian military stunned the watching world by liberating large areas of the country from Russian occupation. A lightning September offensive saw most of northeastern Ukraine’s Kharkiv region de-occupied, while a more methodical push in the south eventually resulted in the liberation of Kherson. These successes encouraged many to expect similarly rapid progress during the current campaign. In reality, Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive represents a far greater challenge in almost every sense.

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Ukraine must overcome a vast Russian invasion force strengthened by 300,000 mobilized troops that is dug in behind successive lines of sophisticated defensive fortifications stretching for over one thousand kilometers. They must do so without air superiority and while outgunned by Russian artillery at many points along the front. Nor can they count on the element of surprise. This incredibly ambitious task would challenge the world’s most powerful militaries. Understandably, Ukrainian commanders are adopting a methodical approach to the campaign.

Progress so far has been very slow but steady. During the first few weeks of the counteroffensive, Ukraine claims to have liberated at least eight settlements. While most represent sparsely populated frontline villages with little strategic value, the sight of the Ukrainian flag raised in liberated communities provides all Ukrainians with a massive morale boost. Meanwhile, the big battles still lie ahead.

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For now, the Ukrainian military is focusing on probing attacks at numerous points along the front in order to identify weaknesses and thin out Russian defenses. Ukraine is also carrying out a comprehensive campaign of airstrikes against Russian military and logistical targets deep inside occupied territory. Britain’s May 2023 decision to provide Ukraine with long-range Storm Shadow cruise missiles is playing an important role in these air attacks, making it possible to hit targets virtually anywhere in occupied Ukraine. For example, Storm Shadow missiles are believed to have been used in the June 22 attack on a strategically important bridge connecting Crimea with Russian-occupied southern Ukraine.

These tactics are reminiscent of the early stages of last year’s ultimately triumphant Ukrainian campaign to liberate Kherson. At the beginning of August 2022, Ukraine very publicly signaled the start of a counteroffensive to free the southern port city and surrounding region. Progress was initially slow, leading to widespread criticism and pessimistic forecasts. However, Ukraine’s strategy of systematically targeting key bridges across the Dnipro River which Russian troops relied upon for resupply eventually paid off. Hemmed in and cut off, Russian commanders ordered a humiliating retreat in early November.

While the Kherson counteroffensive was on a far smaller scale than the current operation, it offers perhaps the best guide to Ukraine’s current objectives and envisioned timeline. The campaign to liberate Kherson involved tens of thousands of troops and took approximately three months to complete. Today’s counteroffensive involves hundreds of thousands of troops on both sides, with an area equal to a medium-sized European country at stake. It may be months before Ukraine’s commanders feel the conditions are right to attempt a major push to achieve a comprehensive breakthrough.

Ukraine’s international partners seem to appreciate the need for patience and are now emphasizing a long-term commitment to Ukraine that goes far beyond the current counteroffensive. At the Ukraine Recovery Conference in London on June 21, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak reiterated his promise to “stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes.” Other Western leaders have made similar pledges in recent weeks.

These statements are particularly important at a time when Russian hopes of rescuing their faltering invasion increasingly hinge on a weakening of Western resolve and a reduction in support for Ukraine. Despite the many setbacks of the past sixteen months, Putin and other senior regime figures in Moscow are apparently still convinced they can ultimately outlast the democratic world in Ukraine. European and American leaders are attempting to dampen such expectations by signaling the strength of their commitment to Ukrainian victory.

As international anxiety grows over the perceived lack of progress in Ukraine’s big summer counteroffensive, it is vital that this message of Western unity and resolution remains clear and unambiguous. The campaign to defeat Russia’s invasion is a marathon not a blitzkrieg, but it has every chance of success as long as Ukraine and the country’s partners are unwavering in their commitment.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Q&A with General (retired) Wesley K. Clark

aozen — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 12:02:14 +0000

Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe Gen. (ret.) Wesley K. Clark looks back at the fundamentals of US-Turkish strategic cooperation in an interview with the Atlantic Council’s Rich Outzen.

Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY (DJ): You spent a lot of time working with the Turkish military at the tactical, operational, strategic, and political-military levels. What stands out as the key to success when working with this unique ally?

Gen. (ret.) Wesley K. Clark: Clarity of mission. Clarity of requirements. Clarity of the rules. This was actually the critical element in relationships with the Turkish military and at the higher levels. Don’t be slippery, don’t be vague, don’t leave the details undiscussed. Think it through. Lay it out. It’s a very engineering-centric approach. Not, let’s say, a soft science approach to military affairs. I think it was a very effective approach, and we were effective when we understood and worked in the same spirit.

DJ: A bit reminiscent of the Prussian approach to planning, perhaps? No nonsense?

Clark: It’s no nonsense, and it’s no backsliding on a commitment once given. So, we always understood that, you know. When you are working with Turkey, if you get the agreement they will follow through. You must also follow through. You will not be given the opportunity to back away from commitments, and this is the key with Turkey. Know what you’re doing, what you’re ultimately going after. Lay it out clearly, work it out in detail, and when you shake hands on it, it’s as good as gold.

DJ: Is it easier to work with the Turks on a multilateral and alliance basis than bilaterally?

Clark: The Turkish approach is consistent—this is the way the Turks are. Work is consistent both in an alliance and bilaterally. But the differences have been in the circumstances, the environment, the exogenous issues. Turkey has always been very sensitive about its internal security, going back to the creation really of modern Turkey. Some of the key concerns and issues go back to the founding by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Concern over the Aegean is one. We were trying to resolve cross tell [military information exchange between organizations at the same operational level] when I was a young major, then again when I came back eighteen years later.

We were working with different generations of equipment and personnel, but it was the same set of issues more or less. Turkish leadership has always been proud, nationalistic, cognizant of their heritage, and also the unique geography and position of their country.

DJ: Washington as a policy community in the post-Cold War period shifted from operating within formal alliance structures to more ad hoc or issue-based coalitions. Alliances can be cumbersome and bureaucratically challenging, but there is a payoff in terms of trust and institutional commitment. Turkey is a prime case of an ally that becomes more difficult the further afield we get from formal understandings. Has Washington lost the muscle memory, or the patience, for such alliances?

Clark: I think the Biden administration is getting very high marks for consultation. But, unfortunately, there’s a legacy that they picked up from the previous administration.

And, as you know, NATO was prepared to invoke Article 5 in support of the United States after 9/11, and the United States chose to primarily to work through a coalition of the willing rather than through NATO. We didn’t want to mess with this messy political stuff.

The policy decision was taken to work more unilaterally under the Bush administration. This was driven by [then US Defense] Secretary [Donald H.] Rumsfeld, rather than [then US] Secretary [of State Colin L.] Powell. [Rumsfeld] was a dominant leader who didn’t want to worry too much about the diplomatic niceties that were required. He wanted people who would follow easily rather than having to work out an agreement. That was his operating style, and I think that style is what drove serious problems in our relationship with Turkey, such as our inability to bring the 4^th Infantry Division through Turkey in 2003. It was astonishing—astonishingly ineptly managed by the United States and this has had consequences that have lasted for a long time.

DJ: This goes back perhaps to the issue of stating the end-state commitments up front. Ankara was pretty clear on their concerns over economic losses and destabilization in northern Iraq. This was portrayed in the US press as haggling or “bargaining at the souk,” but perhaps it had more to do with the engineering mentality you referred to earlier, and their prior experiences with regional instability.

Clark: This was a real problem we faced with the end of the Cold War, the problem of regional instability. Of course, we were focused on the Balkans, and in the Balkans, Turkey did a wonderful job with us. But at the same time, we were dealing with the legacy of the Gulf War and the problem of Operation Provide Comfort, where we depended greatly on the Turks and operated out of the base at İncirlik. Yet we were pursuing policies which promoted an independent Kurdistan, which was a threat to Turkey. So, you have to give the Turks credit for being able to handle an ambiguous and ambivalent situation. They were, at the time, happy to have the United States’ support, and we had overlapping interests. They certainly wanted to protect the Muslim community in the Balkans, as we did. I think they did more than they were ever given credit for officially in this, but at the same time they were very patient in putting up with the United States’ need to hem in Saddam [Hussein in Iraq].

During my time as NATO commander, we flew repetitive missions out of Turkey under Operation Northern Watch. We overflew Iraq, and in 1998 we began responding to radar lock-on with kinetic fire. Turkey was very accommodating with that. If you look at the balance of the relationship, they’ve been long-term excellent partners for the United States.

DJ: Turkey has developed impressive defense industrial relationships, operational reach, and power projection capabilities beyond its own border areas. It’s engaged in Africa, Central and South Asia, the Caucasus, and the Gulf as well as the Balkans. Is this a threat or an opportunity for the West?

Clark: I think it’s a great opportunity. It’s based on something fundamental that’s changed in Turkey, which is the development of Turkey’s home-grown engineering and higher education.

In the 1950s, when we first had our relationship with Turkey through NATO, and we were brought together as allies in Korea, Turkey was a much different place. It always had a cadre of good engineers and tools, but it was more isolated.

Turkish engineering today is working throughout the world. They were very effective in supporting us in Afghanistan. They’re working in the Middle East. They’re working in Africa. It’s a tremendous opportunity for the West to work with Turkish engineering in general, not just the military.

DJ: Lastly, what’s your fondest memory of the Turks or Turkey?

Clark: Great restaurants in Istanbul and having three kinds of lamb in the same meal, looking up and out at the beautiful architecture. I love looking at the city whenever I fly to or through Istanbul, and watching all the ships going through the Bosporus. You get a sense of the wonderful civilization, the dynamism, the economic development. The place is a testament to Turkish entrepreneurship and character, and I feel so blessed to have seen some of this in my lifetime.

General (Retired) Wesley K. Clark is a former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) who now serves as Chairman and CEO of Wesley K. Clark and Associates. He is a board director at the Atlantic Council and a member of the Defense Journal’s honorary advisory board.

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Q&A with General (retired) Philip M. Breedlove

aozen — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 12:02:13 +0000

Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe Gen. (ret.) Philip M. Breedlove looks back at his experience managing the US-Turkish defense relationship in an interview with the Atlantic Council’s Rich Outzen. General Breedlove was a key player in US-Turkish relations during a turbulent period.

Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY (DJ): You worked with the Turkish military a fair amount, interacting at both operational and political-military levels. What lessons did you learn about the Turks, the bilateral relationship, what works and what doesn’t work within it?

Gen. (ret.) Philip M. Breedlove: My career was bookended in a way by Turkey. Early in my career, I found myself at İncirlik [Air Base] a lot. During that time, I made a lot of very close associations and acquaintances. I got to know a lot of the Turkish leadership down there personally. I found them to be good, faithful, understanding partners.

When I came back as the three-star numbered Air Force commander [Third Air Force], İncirlik was home to one of my wings. I would conduct regular visits, and when our talks focused on the mission at hand in İncirlik, we had willing, wonderful partners. Yet we were starting to run into some of the difficulties associated with not being able to operate out of Turkey during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Then, of course, I was chosen to be SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe]. We were starting to see the front end of Washington’s friction with [Turkish] President [Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan, though I still found on the personal level that my interaction with Turkish peers was very good. Turkey had undergone a change of political philosophy in a few years, more clearly challenging the principle of Western alignment.

I found that as I related to the ambassadors and civilian officials, they were less warm than the officers perhaps, but they were very professional. Turkish statesmen are very professional; inside of that word is a lot of things [smiling]. They were insistent…really good at presenting their side of the story, and [had] an amazing sense of historical recall. They were adept at leading off conversations with historical precedents and anecdotes. They were professional and, yes, difficult.

DJ: What did you find to be the key challenges in dealing with allies within NATO, especially Turkey?

Breedlove: The first thing for [the United States] to remember in dealing with an ally, in this case Turkey, is that in an alliance it is a peer-peer relationship. We need Turkey geopolitically; the physics, the geography, the place that Turkey finds itself—we need them onside. We need them just like they need us; this is not a lopsided relationship. Their control of the Dardanelles and of access to the Black Sea—these are very important things, and even though we have drawn down our forces a bit at İncirlik, it remains an incredibly important airfield for anything you need to do in the Middle East. So, we have to start from that—geography and a peer relationship.

What causes the complications in working from that basis? Well you’ve got politics on both sides. In Turkey, you’ve got the politics of Erdoğan, very different from what preceded it. In the United States, all too often we take what should be bipartisan geopolitical and geostrategic issues and subject them to the priorities of domestic politics. We allow petty politics to dominate the geostrategic narrative. Recently, we’ve seen a bipartisan body formed in Congress to watch and attend to China policy and issues, to build effort across the aisle for something that works. Perhaps we need something like that for Turkey.

DJ: Domestic concerns in both countries impact the framing and conduct of bilateral relations. This is perhaps natural, but creates challenges for “relationship managers”—diplomats, military, bureaucrats, and others. Given your experience as one of the managers, how did you account for the role of domestic factors in foreign policy decisions?

Breedlove: In Turkey, before the [2016] coup attempt, the military had a different relationship with the government than after. The military was respected, but not only protected the people from external enemies, but from internal disorder as well. The attempted coup represented a major dislocation in civil-military relations, and prompted a redefinition and restructuring. Things have changed, and the United States needs to understand that—it won’t go back to a situation where the Turkish military drives the bilateral relationship. [We] also need to understand that some, but not all, problems go away if there is political change. We’ve had our own presidents who prompted allies to say, “If it weren’t for that guy, things would be great.” All governments have their challenging times, and we are certainly going through one of those now.

DJ: Turkey has developed important power projection capabilities in recent years and has demonstrated those in Libya, Syria, the Caucasus, and is engaged in Central and South Asia, the Balkans, Africa. This is a relatively new phenomenon. Do Turkey’s Western allies view this as a threat or an opportunity?

Breedlove: The question is one of coherent strategic action with allies. If growth of capabilities is accompanied by NATO solidarity and consultation with allies, the allies cheer. Whereas if capability growth is perceived as being driven by narrow or parochial interests, even partisan interests, many see it as destabilizing or nefarious. Taking the long view, Turkey was an ally before and will be an ally after the current period of tension within the Alliance, and we want Turkey to play that role as a capable and formidable partner. We’ll have to navigate through the present period, but again, allies of the United States have occasionally had to navigate difficult periods with our political leaders, too.

DJ: In an era of great-power competition, what are the keys to better alignment and cooperation between the United States and Turkey? Where are the opportunities?

Breedlove: This is a tough one. I suppose I understand portions of what Turkey is doing: they want to sell kit [military gear], they want to exercise influence abroad. Yet it still interests me that Ankara takes the stance it does with Russia. When you look north from Turkey and see what Russia is doing—immoral, inhumane, illegal military action in Ukraine—one would think that there would be a different approach to Russia. It would be easy to say just embrace our values and morals, but that card doesn’t play so well. The geostrategic security piece, looking at Russia’s destabilizing actions in the Black Sea and elsewhere on Turkey’s periphery, that’s where we have opportunity and work to do.

DJ: Several years ago, an argument was made in the State Department that Turkey had options with Russia, and if Washington insisted on pursuing regional policies in Turkey’s near neighborhood that contradicted Turkish interests, especially regarding the PKK [the anti-Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party] and YPG [PKK-affiliated People’s Defense Units], we would see Turkish cooperation with Russia. Not out of perfidy, but out of “naked practicality.” There were few takers for that argument at the time because there were few people that believed Turkey had the leverage and agility to do so.

Breedlove: I believed it. I was fairly vocal during that period of time. [US Defense Secretary] Lloyd Austin and I were peers at the time, commanders of the two combatant commands. I still count him as a friend; we agreed on about 90 percent of our views on strategy, but YPG was not one of those things. I argued more than once that we were aligning with a group for an immediate purpose that would ultimately cause us major problems over decades and generations with Turkey. This is another one of those occasions when I think politicians played an unhealthy role in deciding how to move forward, because it was all about how to win a war, and not win the peace afterwards.

DJ: Defense was traditionally the heart of US-Turkey bilateral relations: defense industry, military cooperation, regional cooperation. These have attenuated in recent years, and other sources of traction—bilateral trade, tourism, people-to-people contact—have not taken their place, lagging Europe, Russia, and other partners.

Breedlove: Yes, in military terms the contact has decreased. This is also a problem in the United States in terms of how the military relates to other Americans: fewer people serve, the military becomes sort of a family business for some and mysterious for others. A smaller military and less overseas basing have affected relations with Turkey.

Lack of people-to-people contact is one of the biggest problems we have. In my generation we had very close contact with our peers in the Turkish military, we maintained those relationships, and we were able to keep in touch and deepen mutual awareness and understanding over time. The reduced contact is not producing the same types of contacts and friendships at present—the informal relationships. The granular contact that we used to have at the middle rank and senior rank levels, joint exercises and training especially, we’ve lost it. That would be a place to start rebuilding.

The second place is the politicization of defense industrial products. The F35, the F16, and other defense sales all went south too quickly and without due concern for long-term effects. On the Turkish side, they messaged us hard that they wanted Patriots, but we couldn’t find our way to mutually acceptable terms until they had already concluded negotiations with Russia on the S-400, which set off an unfortunate chain of events. If the US side had shown a little more flexibility on meeting Turkish terms—similar to what was offered in the end but after decisions were made—and realizing that every deal is a new negotiation…if we had approached that differently, we might be in a very different place. Turkish industries are amazing and were going to be a big part of building F35s for countries all around the world.

Lack of close personal contacts, decreasing cooperation, and deficits of trust are all mutually reinforcing.

General (Retired) Philip M. Breedlove is a former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). He is a board director at the Atlantic Council.

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Turkish-Ukrainian defense partnership in a new geopolitical realm

Can Kasapoglu — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 12:02:04 +0000

In his 2021 Atlantic Council article, Ukraine’s top diplomat, Dmytro Kuleba, argued that Ukraine and Turkey should pursue a coherent vision for security of the Black Sea together. Kuleba emphasized the need for NATO to see the Ukrainian-Turkish defense partnership as a valuable driver that can contribute to the region’s stability.

Less than a year later, the Russian aggression against Ukraine at NATO’s doorstep underscored the importance of Kuleba’s words. When the dust settles, the international community may, for the first time, witness what a real post-Soviet Russia looks like. The Turkish-Ukrainian strategic partnership would mark a promising window of opportunity for Western military industries in the post-Soviet space.

Think geopolitically: Turkey and Ukraine can rejuvenate European military resiliency

In early February 2022, three weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Kyiv to meet his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Welcoming Erdoğan’s visit, Zelenskyy focused on defense and aviation industry collaboration during the talks, describing cooperation in these segments “as a driving force” behind the bilateral strategic partnership. The objective, he stated, is to implement high-value, specific projects; establish joint ventures; and facilitate the exchange of expertise and technology. During the visit, Turkey and Ukraine agreed to coproduce Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones in Ukraine.

As the ideas promoting a “political NATO” have sunk without a trace following the Russian aggression at the Alliance’s east, NATO is fast rolling back to its Cold War roots. NATO’s present Strategic Concept document, adopted at the Alliance’s 2022 Madrid summit, considers Russia a direct threat to the allied nations in Europe. The paradigm laid out at the Erdoğan-Zelenskyy summit is thus gaining more ground. At present and for the foreseeable future, NATO members’ capacity and their capabilities have become the prime question. Notably, in a few years, NATO members Turkey and Poland, as well as the Alliance’s partner Ukraine, will likely field among the largest armed forces across Europe.

Corvettes, drones, and more

Following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Turkey and Ukraine have discovered shared geopolitical interests in Black Sea security. While Ankara has not adopted a pronounced anti-Russia stance in the region, Turkey’s contributions to rebuild Ukraine’s navy, which has lost most of its platforms following the Russian aggression against Crimea, speak volumes.

Kyiv has opted to procure MILGEM/Ada-class corvettes from Ankara. According to the manufacturer, STM, Ada-class corvettes are designed to conduct a broad array of operations, including the determination, location, classification, identification, and destruction of underwater, air, and surface targets, as well as to provide naval gunfire support. Patrol and maritime surveillance missions, as well as infrastructure and coastal protection, also fall under the MILGEM/Ada-class corvettes’ mission portfolio.

The Turkish-Ukrainian corvette deal aims to manufacture four platforms based on the MILGEM/Ada-class design philosophy with the goal of rebuilding Ukraine’s battered navy. Manifesting the predominant trend in Turkish-Ukrainian joint defense ventures, the deal extends to coproduction arrangements between the two nations. Ukraine is the first country to which Turkey has granted coproduction privileges for the corvette baseline in question. Finally, the Ukrainian Navy’s Ada-class surface vessels can potentially introduce yet another critical weaponry to Kyiv’s arsenal. While Ukraine had initially planned to equip its new corvettes with Neptune missiles, with the Ukrainian defense industry currently overstretched, Turkey might soon advance its offer of the ATMACA anti-ship cruise missile to Kyiv. Albeit significant in defense-technological scale, these capability-building efforts will translate into a warfighting edge in the long run.

Besides strategic partnerships in the maritime domain, another key segment of Turkish-Ukrainian defense cooperation is drone warfare. Following its successful combat record in different conflict zones of the world, the “Pantsir-killer drone” Bayraktar TB2 has shown its combat capabilities against the Russian columns, particularly in the opening stages of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. More importantly, at a time when the West offered help to Zelenskyy’s government to evacuate Kyiv, the Bayraktar TB2 drones’ successes were not solely about combat capabilities but also political warfare and keeping the morale high among the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ ranks.

Nowadays, the Turkish-Ukrainian strategic partnership in drone warfare is setting sail to new horizons. The joint production of Turkey’s rising strategic drone Akinci (Raider), as well as the unmanned turbofan-engine aircraft Kizilelma (Red Apple), mark the perfect marriage between Ankara and Kyiv in defense technology.

Ukraine brings a significant amount of defense industrial innovation know-how to the table. When matched with Turkey’s cutting edge in smart systems and drone warfare assets, the Turkish-Ukrainian strategic partnership is a true source of synergy. The Akinci drone’s first batch is powered by Ukrainian Ivchenko-Progress engines. Similarly, the Kizilelma baseline will use two different Ukrainian Motor Sich engines in various variants. The initial units fly with AI-25TLT turbofan engines. The following batches will be powered by the afterburner-capable AI-322F engines which will upgrade the unmanned aircraft to a transonic platform. These examples showcase the growing trust between the parties and could help strengthen cooperation among the Black Sea nations.

Last, Turkish defense company Baykar’s drone-manufacturing plant marks what Turkish-Ukrainian defense cooperation will look like in the future. The factory will turn operational within two years. Above all, Ukraine will become a TB2 producer nation soon. The project is also significant as it will boost the Turkish-Ukrainian strategic partnership and unveils new opportunities for joint research and development (R&D) activity.

A different European security architecture when the dust settles

At present, and perhaps in the history of mankind, NATO is the most successful political-military alliance in the world. Official writings consider NATO’s flexibility and its ability to adapt to changing defense landscapes to be the underlying reason behind the Alliance’s successful record so far. Nevertheless, the Alliance has to cope with a grim imbalance. Most member states cannot field combat-proven militaries for large-scale operations. Notably, merely two allied nations—the United States and Turkey—have ground forces that outnumber the Russian Western Military District. Worse, the armed forces of two-thirds of the allied nations are outmanned alone by Russia’s airborne branch (VDV), which employed some forty-five thousand before the invasion of Ukraine.

The Turkish Armed Forces have extensive combat experience and increasingly depend on indigenously produced weapon systems. In 2022, the annual turnover of the Turkish defense industry reached $12 billion. This marked an impressive 20 percent increase from 2021. Remarkably, turnover per capita rose to $150,000 in 2022, 12 percent more than the previous year. Around $4.5 billion of the $12 billion revenue came from exports, translating to an annual increase of 37 percent. Imports accounted for approximately $2.7 billion of the total turnover. Between 2021 and 2022, R&D expenditure hit $2 billion, and financial initiatives for R&D projects increased by 21 percent. In 2022, the Turkish defense industry employed 81,132 people, 7 percent more than in 2021.

Over the past twelve to eighteen months, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have come to operate a wide array of Western weaponry ranging from Javelin anti-tank missiles and Leopard 2 main battle tanks to Patriot air and missile defense systems and Stinger man-portable air-defense systems. More is on the way. This is a dramatic reversal of European—and US—reticence to provide lethal aid to Ukraine early in the war.

A sustainable model, based on technology exchange, co-development, and mutual trust between combat-experienced near-peers, is deepening of the decade-long bilateral defense relationship between Ukraine and Turkey.

Can Kasapoglu is a non-resident senior fellow at Hudson Institute, and the director of the Security & Defense Research Program at Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) in Istanbul. Follow him on Twitter @ckasapoglu1.

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Prospects for an improved US-Turkish strategic relationship

Lt. Gen. (ret.) Nihat Kökmen — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 12:02:01 +0000

Could Turkey return to the F-35 program with the potential sale by the United States of a modernization package for its F-16s and potential sale of billions of dollars’ worth of F-16V aircraft? Can progress on this issue serve as a step toward reestablishing a strategic partnership between the United States and Turkey? And how could it transform the political and military relationship between Turkey and the United States?

As I reflect on these questions, I am reminded of the late 1940s and early 1950s, a time when Turkish-US relations were at their peak. During this period, close to fifteen thousand Turkish Armed Forces personnel participated in the Korean War, demonstrating Turkey’s commitment to its alliance with the United States. The sacrifices were significant: 721 Turkish soldiers were killed and 2,147 wounded in the war. In February 1952, a little over a year before an armistice brought an end to the war, Turkey became a member of NATO. Many refer to Turkey’s participation in the Korean War as the “cost” of joining the Alliance.

In addition to the deepening political and economic relations between Turkey and the United States during that era, the two countries were also engaged in robust military cooperation, particularly in aviation. Admittedly, there were times when the political environment was fraught with tension. Some prominent examples include the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, crises involving Cyprus in 1964 and 1974, the 1975-78 US arms embargo on Turkey, and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, which caused a strain in the friendly atmosphere, even interrupting it. Nevertheless, through prudent diplomacy, mindful of ever-changing realities and alliance interests, sagacious minds prevailed. Relations were eventually restored, and strategic-level contacts were established in both civilian and military spheres.

Ties between Turkey and the United States, already strained over the 2016 coup attempt and US criticism on ties between Turkey and Russia, fell further in 2019 over the war in Syria and Turkey’s purchase of a Russian missile system.

Impact of the war in Syria

Turkey has borne some of the burden of the consequences of the war in Syria since its start in 2011. According to the United Nations, Turkey hosts some 3.6 million registered Syrian refugees. The large number of refugees has not only shifted the demographics in the border region, it has also added a crippling economic burden. Turkey has also faced cross-border terrorist attacks by Kurdish terrorist groups.

As a consequence of US policy miscalculations, northern Syria has become even more unstable with the presence of terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which the United States and the European Union (EU) consider to be a foreign terrorist organization.

Despite requests from Turkey, neither the United States nor the EU consider the PYD and YPG to be terrorist organizations. The United States first started providing support to the YPG and PYD in 2014 to assist them in their fight against the Islamic State in Syria. While the threat posed by the Islamic State in the region has effectively disappeared, the United States maintains its support to the PYD and YPG, which have been key partners of the US-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. The PYD and YPG also serve as the backbone of the coalition-created Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Despite Turkey providing Interpol and other senior US officials detailed allegations of terrorist acts by the PYD and YPG, aid to the terrorist organizations has not ceased, rather it has increased.

This support has caused significant harm to bilateral relations between the United States and Turkey. Early 2023 visits by the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and US Central Command (CENTCOM) commander to the region, although described as troop visits, have also contributed to rising tensions between the two countries. Ankara views these activities as part of an attempt by the United States to establish a satellite Kurdish statelet in eastern Syria, similar to what was tried in northern Iraq.

Missile defense

In 2013, NATO responded to Turkey’s request for ballistic missile defense by temporarily deploying systems such as the Patriot and SAMP-T from five allied countries to the region on a rotational basis with command and control located in Allied Air Command at Ramstein Air Base in Germany.

However, following Turkey’s 2018-19 operation against the YPG and PYD in northern Syria to safeguard its own security, the systems provided by the allied countries, with the exception of the Patriot system from Spain, were withdrawn. Despite ongoing discussions during bilateral meetings between the Turkish Ministry of National Defense and the Chief of General Staff at NATO headquarters, the allied countries that had previously deployed their systems declined to redeploy them citing various reasons.

In 2018, Turkey launched an effort to manufacture its own long-range regional air defense system called Siper. The war in Syria added a sense of urgency to this mission and a thorough review of alternatives, including the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system, was conducted at the request of the Air Force Command. The United States declined to meet the terms of a Turkish request for the Patriots. A 2018 attempt by Turkey to buy the SAMP-T from a Franco-Italian consortium also ground to a halt due to French objections. Turkey eventually opted to procure the S-400 system from Russia despite US opposition to the deal.

The procurement of the Russian S-400 system, coupled with US support to the YPG and PYD in Syria, proved to be the breaking point in the already strained US-Turkey relations.

As the Turkish military representative to NATO in Brussels at that time, I personally experienced not only the reactions of my US counterparts but also the questions and concerns raised by other representatives about the procurement of the S-400 system. Naturally, each country viewed the issue from their own perspective, which was closely tied to their respective policies and interests. However, recurring concerns centered on the compatibility of the Russian S-400 system with NATO’s integrated air defense system and the difficulty of safeguarding the intellectual property and sensitive information pertaining to the F-35 aircraft. Furthermore, there were frequent inquiries about why Turkey chose to procure such a system from Russia, a country that ranked as the top threat in NATO assessments since 2014.

Turkey faces a backlash

Following the S-400 purchase, the US Department of Defense removed Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019. And in 2020, the United States imposed sanctions on Turkey’s Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) pursuant to Section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).

Turkey had been a joint producer of the F-35 program, having signed a memorandum of understanding with the US government on January 26, 2007. Turkey had also paid for and completed the first package of pilot and ground personnel training. The justification for its removal was based on the claim that the use of the S-400 in the same environment as the F-35 could potentially lead to the theft of high-tech aircraft system information.

As a result of Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program, six F-35A aircraft that were produced for Turkey were confiscated and stored in hangars, and the personnel in training were sent back home. Negotiations are still ongoing regarding the repayment of the $1.25 billion that Turkey had previously paid for the program.

Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program led to a need to review the force structure of the Turkish Air Force, as relations between the Turkey and the United States became strained. It was decided to extend the lifespan of the F-4 aircraft that were originally planned to be phased out. Additionally, Turkey decided to acquire forty F-16V aircraft from the United States to meet its urgent air combat needs. The procurement by Turkey of seventy-nine modernization kits to boost the capabilities of its existing F-16 aircraft was also discussed.

A turning point?

Based on recent statements and evaluations made by Turkey and the United States, there appears to be a relatively positive atmosphere in administration circles. US President Joe Biden, who has not been very receptive to improving bilateral relations, has been supportive of Turkey’s request to procure aircraft and modernization kits. This support was especially visible in face-to-face meetings at the level of heads of state, such as the 2019 NATO summit and the Group of Twenty meeting in Rome in 2021. Yet, some members of the US Congress are dragging their feet regarding the implementation of these procurements.

It must be noted that even if the deal is approved today, delivery would take between three to five years in the best-case scenario. Nevertheless, reaching common ground can still be considered significant progress.

Rethinking the fate of the S-400 system, which was delivered in 2019, is of critical importance to resolving issues between Turkey and the United States. Regarding the S-400 systems that were stored in depots following some tests, I believe that a solution can be found involving either the frameworks proposed since then or by simply keeping the systems in storage.

A recent statement by Haluk Görgün, CEO of the Turkish defense firm Aselsan Elektronik Sanayi, is noteworthy. Görgün said that “with the development of UMBHSS-SIPER, we no longer need the S-300/S-400s.” Until the Siper system fully matures, though, SAMP-T might be a medium-term solution as well.

Removal of this obstacle may encourage members of Congress who are against Turkey to reconsider their positions on the supply of F-16Vs and modernization kits. With the establishment of such a positive climate, it is possible that Turkey could revive interest in its return to the F-35 program.

If Turkey can procure forty F-16V aircraft and modernization kits in sufficient numbers, it can easily embrace the motto “Leader in Its Region, Effective in Its Continent” that was popular in the early 2000s. A possible future return to the F-35 program might also lead to the reutilization of production capabilities that the Turkish defense industry lost after Turkey was removed from the program, the establishment of regional engine depot maintenance capability for domestic and allied use, and provide experience relevant to further development of the Turkish National Combat Aircraft (MMU).

Given Turkey’s formidable air force; its strategic location in a region with key transportation, energy, and hydrocarbon resources; and improving relations with Israel, the United States can again view it as a reliable and strong strategic ally. With the right mindset, Turkish and US state authorities can still turn back time.

The way ahead

The resolution of issues related to the S-400, PYD, and YPG is key to mending relations between Turkey and the United States. Ideally, this must be followed by the approval of the sale of F-16Vs, the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, and a return to the F-35 program.

Addressing Turkey’s security concerns is a prerequisite for successful and sustainable cooperation between strategic partners in the Middle East. This would allow for stability to be achieved in Syria, curtail the activities of foreign actors operating in the region, and encourage Syrian refugees currently residing in Turkey to return to Syria. Combined, these developments would drastically reduce the threats to Turkey’s security. In addition, it would have positive implications for peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean region, and it may also allow for the safe transport of natural gas extracted in the region to Europe via Turkey.

The United States, which has always prioritized Israel’s security in its Middle East policy, should also consider Turkey’s positive contributions to regional stability in the process of normalizing relations.

A partnership with Turkey is crucial for balancing China’s increasing economic and military strength in the Asia-Pacific region, especially as Russia’s position in the world has diminished as a consequence of its ongoing war in Ukraine. Turkey is located at a critical crossroads of the Middle East and the Caucasus. In the long run, Turkey’s strategic ties to Central Asia will also be an important asset for NATO. Hence, the United States must accept the importance of Turkey to NATO’s policy in these regions as an undeniable reality.

The Turkish-US relationship has had its bad days in the past. However, consultations resulted in the recognition of the significance of this strategic partnership, leading to a resumption of political and military relations. Now, similarly, I am hopeful that the US approach toward the support it provides to the PYD and YPG can be resolved in good faith alongside the S-400 issue.

Despite some members of Congress attempting to impose restrictions on Turkey similar to the 1975 arms embargo, I believe that the Biden administration will soon approve the supply of F-16V aircraft and the modernization package. This could potentially create a favorable atmosphere for Turkey’s return to the F-35 program as well, thereby removing obstacles to the development of bilateral political relations and a strengthened Turkish-US strategic partnership.

Turkish Air Force Lt. Gen. (ret.) Nihat Kökmen served as Turkey’s military representative to NATO from 2017 to 2019. Between 2001 and 2004, he served as the air plans officer at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. He currently serves as Executive and Supervisory Board member at the Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM).

Online Event Wed, June 21, 2023 • 11:30 am ET

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Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Andriy Yermak on how Ukraine’s friends should step up their support next

Atlantic Council — Wed, 21 Jun 2023 21:18:58 +0000

Watch the event

Securing Ukraine’s future in NATO with Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Andriy Yermak

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – A conversation on Western efforts to establish security guarantees for Ukraine and strategies to prepare for a productive NATO Summit in July.

NATO Security & Defense Security Partnerships Ukraine

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speakers

Anders Fogh Rasmussen
Former Secratary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Former Prime Minister of Denmark

Andriy Yermak

Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine

Moderator

John E. Herbst
Senior Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council

JOHN HERBST: We have a Front Page event for you today, a very special event. We have two very distinguished speakers. We have Mr. Andriy Yermak, who is the head of the president’s office in Kyiv in Ukraine. We have Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, a former Danish prime minister and former secretary general of NATO. And they’re going to talk today about the upcoming NATO summit, the question of the NATO-Ukraine relationship, and also—critical to the security guarantees for Ukraine—how do you ensure Ukraine’s stable, secure future? They were both the authors of the Kyiv Compact, which addressed the issue of security guarantees for Ukraine. And with that, we’ll turn it over to Mr. Yermak for some introductory remarks and then to Mr. Rasmussen. So, please.

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Thank you very much, Ambassador Herbst, and I would also like to thank the Atlantic Council for organizing this event. It’s indeed very timely. Next month, NATO leaders meeting in Vilnius have the opportunity to make history. Let me be completely clear right from the outset. I am personally in favor of extending an invitation to Ukraine to join NATO. It would be the first time that we invite into NATO a country that is at war. And that requires careful consideration. Not least, resolving practicalities regarding Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, and which areas and eventualities it would cover in the current conflict. I have reached this conclusion for three reasons.

First, in 2008, we decided that Ukraine will become a member of NATO, but we did not provide a roadmap. Now Ukraine has been in the waiting room for fifteen years. It is not a safe place. The time has come to move Ukraine into a safe place, as we are doing with Finland and Sweden.

Second, it is often argued that the prospect of NATO enlargement incited Putin. The truth is the opposite: It was the failure to extend security guarantees to Ukraine that incited Putin. Gray zones are danger zones. Neutrality provides no security. Finland and Sweden realized that.

Third, often I hear the argument that we cannot give Ukraine neither security guarantee nor membership of NATO while there is a war going on. That is an extremely dangerous argument. If you make security guarantees and NATO membership dependent on cessation of hostilities, you are giving Putin an incentive to continue the war. By extending an invitation now, we tell Putin Ukraine will become a member of NATO. It will not happen overnight, but you cannot stop this process. Our door is open for Ukraine and you are not the doorman.

Now, if allies cannot find consensus on an invitation to Ukraine in Vilnius, the second-best option would be to outline the path toward NATO membership in three steps.

First, to remove the need for a Membership Action Plan, as was the case with Finland and Sweden. The fact is the Ukrainian army is probably the most combat-ready army in Europe.

Second could be a pledge to review the question of NATO enlargement at the NATO summit in Washington, DC, next year.

And then, third, we could establish a NATO-Ukraine Council with a mandate—with a mandate to identify the conditions that must be met in order to join NATO. The deadline for the report should be the NATO summit next year.

Regardless, Ukraine will need security guarantees until it is a full member of NATO. We need strong methods to deter any further Russian aggression. And that’s the purpose of the Kyiv Security Compact that I coauthored with President Zelenskyy’s chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, who I’m very pleased joined us today.

The compact is based on four parts. First, deliver weapons on such a scale that Ukraine can repel or deter any further Russian aggression. Second, enhance intelligence sharing. Third, training of Ukrainian forces under EU and NATO flags. And fourth, support to build Ukraine’s defense industry so that Ukraine can produce weapons and ammunition itself. These security guarantees, similar to those that Israel received from the United States, will not replace Ukrainian membership of NATO, but they will build the bridge and allow Ukraine to defend itself until it is covered by NATO’s Article 5.

The summit in Vilnius is the most important NATO summit in a generation and let us not repeat the mistake of the Bucharest summit in 2008. Any pledge to Ukraine should be followed by a clear path forward. And NATO leaders must be prepared to be bold; otherwise, we risk constant war and instability on the European continent. Thank you.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you.

Mr. Yermak, over to you.

ANDRIY YERMAK: Yes. Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador Herbst.

Good day for everybody. I’m glad to welcome all of you here in the Atlantic Council.

There are about four hundred ways to prove fundamental Pythagorean theorem in mathematics, four hundred ways to prove the obvious. Sometimes it seems to me that during this war year we have provided not less explanation as to why Ukraine should get all the assistance it needs—why it requires reliable security guarantees, and the clear and understood prospect of the join NATO. In other words, throughout this year we, too, have to prove the obvious over and over again.

But the truth is simple: The Russian dictator’s desire to restore the empire is an existential threat to the Ukrainian state and nation. But it also poses a spectrum of the threats from the military to environmental to the Western civilization and humanity and the world. Therefore, Ukraine must win. It must integrate into Euro-Atlantic community. It must get reliable security guarantees for the transitional period. Not losing, it’s not [an] option for us. Simply restoring the status quo, it’s not [an] option. Any uncertainty involved outcome of this war, any ambiguity in NATO’s response to our inspiration will be equal to Russian victory. It will reinforce the Kremlin’s narratives of Russia fighting against an Alliance expansion in Ukraine and winning.

However, we cannot be—by war and sanctions, Russia will increasingly depend on China. Thus, by defending Ukraine, the West itself will have all the strategic advantages to Russia and geographical advantages to China in Europe.

The Ukrainian people have proven they will not give up their rights to stay free. They have paid with their blood, sweat, and tears for their place in the ranks of the world democratic community… To deny them now is to betray everything Ukraine has paid for the—with tens of thousands of lives and destructions unseen in Europe since World War II. It will be a defeat for democratic community far greater than Afghanistan. It will be a triumph for dictatorship. This must be prevented, not only for the sake of Ukraine but for the sake of all democracies on the planet.

Words about Russia having no way to power in the Alliance must finally be supported by actions. The fifteen-year schedule ban of Ukraine must come to end. Otherwise, Putin will get a huge bonus for his next presidential term, which is next year they have the elections… It will, obviously, strengthen support for his regime. It will increase the illusion of the legitimacy for the invasion among the Russian public—but also among the Global South countries, for, as we know, elections will be—inevitably be furnished in the occupied territories. Therefore, preparatory actions is needed. We must connect the dots once and for all. No arguments against Ukraine’s NATO membership go beyond… fear.

Throughout this war year, Ukraine has repeatedly been providing that the Russian threats are more a bluff than menace. The current wave of the alliance expansions has also proven this. Ultimately, it was the uncertainty in the Budapest and… in Bucharest that made the attack on Ukraine possible. Uncertainty… precisely the gray zone where Russia has the advantages, and we have got to deprive it of these advantages.

The state of war cannot be an obstacle to inviting Ukraine into Alliance because in that case Russia will do everything to indefinitely prolong this state. Our Alliance and partners prepared support Ukraine fighting for independence individually. Do we have enough resources to provide such support? I am afraid these are rhetorical questions.

Therefore, the solution is evident: The prospect of the membership when circumstances allow along with the reliable security guarantees for the transitional period. They will be not replace Ukraine’s participation in the Alliance, but we will be provided sufficient opportunity for defense until the possibility of actual NATO membership arise.

The International Working Group Anders Fogh Rasmussen and I co-chair has developed and presented our view of the guarantees in the Kyiv Security Compact documents. These documents has great potential for modifications to maintain a balance of the interest between Ukraine and the guarantor states for our common good.

We must win together, and together we must lay the base for reliable and secure peace in the future. It’s not the theorem. This is actual. And as such, it requires not proof. Thank you very much for your attention.

JOHN HERBST: OK. Thank you, Mr. Yermak.

All right. I have a few questions and then we will turn to audience questions.

So, Mr. Rasmussen, you made clear what you would like to see in Vilnius. You are, obviously, very well connected. What do you expect to happen there?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Well, I made clear that I would favor to extend an invitation to Ukraine already in Vilnius. My impression is there will be no consensus on that at this stage and that’s why I tried to outline the second best option and actually I think that could be possible to reach a compromise to remove MAP; to review the whole question again in Washington next year; and to establish, for instance, a NATO-Ukraine council with a clear mandate to identify the conditions that must be met.

That gives Ukraine a pledge but also a clear roadmap, and allies have still the control of the process. So, in my opinion, that should be achievable. So but, overall, I hope that Vilnius will demonstrate unity, and the worst thing would be a split and that would only serve the purpose of Putin.

JOHN HERBST: All right. Just one quick follow-up here, though.

You laid out a variety of things that I think would be a reasonable outcome, a good outcome, for Vilnius short of actual Ukrainian membership. We’ve seen—it looked like the United States was moving partly in that direction when they seemed that they were dropping MAP as required—the Membership Action Plan. But then President Biden said something over the weekend which wasn’t so clear about that. So do you think that MAP is still something that needs to be argued away or is this something which has been decided?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Yeah, I took notes of the same as you did. I would interpret the statement of President Biden as a negotiating position. I think everybody is now positioning themselves in the run-up to the Vilnius Summit.

Still, I think it would be a natural step forward to go beyond the 2008 language. Back in 2008 we decided that Ukraine will become a member of NATO and then we added next step in that process would be a Membership Action Plan, a so-called MAP.

Now, I mean, we—it’s easy to remove that precondition partly because we didn’t require a MAP for neither Finland nor Sweden before we extended an invitation to them and actually Ukraine already fulfills all criteria within a Membership Action Plan. They have demonstrated such efficiency on the battlefield that they don’t need a Membership Action Plan.

So I think it’s essential that Vilnius goes beyond the language of 2008.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you.

Mr. Yermak, as you know, I was in Kyiv. I spent ten days there last month, and the—it was clear from talking to many Ukrainians that there are high expectations for Vilnius. What are the Ukrainian people expecting in Vilnius and what is the president of Ukraine expecting in Vilnius, and you yourself?

ANDRIY YERMAK: I try to be—will answer very specifically. We really—the Ukrainians, because now—and, John, I’m sure that you can feel your—you know our country very, very good and you feel how united Ukrainians, how strong Ukrainians, and the—our position, the position of the president, the position of the team, it’s absolutely same that the positions of the—all Ukrainians, and the position is following.

We expect that Ukraine will be invited to NATO with open date but with concrete signal. And I agree with Anders that we need and everybody in the world need to receive strong signal the way to membership of Ukraine in NATO nobody can change; it’s decided and it’s happened.

And of course, in this way we want to receive and our expectation to receive the concrete security guarantees. We a lot of times talk about it. I mentioned in my speech about the Kyiv Security Compact. We can, on the base of these documents, continue to work with the partners.

This is two most important expectation of Ukraine, Ukrainians, president of Ukraine, and all our team.

JOHN HERBST: OK. Thank you. Let’s—well, let’s pursue this a bit more.

Mr. Rasmussen laid out four points from the Kyiv Security Compact regarding security guarantees and that started with substantial weapon supplies to make sure that Ukraine could defend itself.

I’ve been advocating, Ukraine has been requesting, various advanced weapons right now to conduct its counteroffensive and it’s gotten some—it’s gotten some of those weapons. It’s not gotten others.

Given the caution we see in the weapon supplies coming from the West to Ukraine just to fight the war, do you think they’d be willing to consider substantial weapon supplies now not just to fight the war but to insure you going forward? In other words, might that not be something you can’t quite count on at this point?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Me or—

JOHN HERBST: We’ll start with you, Mr. Secretary.

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Well, first of all, I appreciate, of course, all the deliveries of weapons we have seen so far. However, so far we have provided weapons for Ukraine just to survive. Now time has come to provide weapons for Ukraine to win. And that should be the overall goal. We should define the overall goal very clearly. We want a victory, and everything we do is with the goal to ensure a Ukrainian victory. And victory ultimately, of course, is to kick out all Russian troops from Ukrainian soil.

Next, you cannot win a war by an incremental, step-by-step approach. You have to surprise and overwhelm your adversary. We—so that’s why we need to use the big hammer to put a quick end to this conflict. So I’m in favor of lifting all self-imposed restrictions on weapon deliveries. We should deliver everything the Ukrainians need, not only heavy battle tanks, longer-range missiles, but eventually also fighter jets. We have seen how the Ukrainians lack air superiority during the first phases of their counteroffensive. So we should deliver fighter jets as soon as possible.

JOHN HERBST: Mr. Yermak, do you have anything you’d like to add to this?

ANDRIY YERMAK: I’m agreed with Anders. And, of course, you know that we are sure about our victory. But, of course, it depends of how in time we will receive everything which we need. We need very important things. We need strong character of our people, of our heroes. They are very motivated. And we receive enough people to be successful in the battlefield. And you can know that we have some success, and I hope we will see it more in the nearest future.

And of course, all this issue and all this kind of weapons which mentioned Anders, it’s, of course, very important. I just can add that we still have one option which still not open for us. It’s long-range missiles. But I hope and believe that it’s a question of the—of the very, very near future. Another—you know that this opportunity, it’s open. And we now closely working with the partners about the time and—for our jets and before it about tanks.

But the question is time. You know, every day it cost Ukraine the lives of our heroes, the lives of our civilians. You know that the Russian not stop this terroristic attack to our city. I’d like just to say just in the day when the delegation of the African countries was here, and they definitely know that next day they go to the—to the St. Petersburg, and they know exactly—they in Kyiv—they sended the twelve ballistic rockets to the Kyiv. Thanks God and thanks our heroes and thanks to United States for Patriot, we destroy all of them.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you.

Mr. Secretary General, you mentioned earlier that it’s very important for there to be unity in Vilnius. And I think everyone understands that. Sometimes that understanding is used to argue for a more cautious policy, because some members of the Alliance don’t want to be as strong in confronting Kremlin aggression as others. But now you have an interesting situation where a group of members of NATO, particularly in the east, want a stronger policy. So you have to worry about how you get to unity.

Now, I mention that as an introduction to this question-slash—well, this question. If NATO in Vilnius were willing to make commitments on weapons that we have not seen yet—of course, the US ATACMS, but of course, clear signal with clear delivery dates for F-16s and other fighter jets—while being more cautious on some of the other elements that we’ve discussed already, might that be a compromise which in fact could still—would help Ukraine have a more successful counteroffensive and pave the way for other direct NATO-Ukraine missions in the future? Would this be a suitable compromise that could work for everyone’s benefit?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: First of all, let me stress, it is not NATO as such that delivers weapons. NATO is not, as you know, a party to the conflict. But NATO allies—you’re right—NATO allies deliver the weapons. And actually, they are right to do so. They are parties to the conflict, and they have every reason and right to do so because, according to Article 51 in the UN Charter, Ukraine obviously has every right to defend itself against Russian aggression. But furthermore, Ukraine has the inherent right to ask its allies to help it to counter this Russian aggression. So when the US and the European allies deliver weapons to Ukraine, it’s on firm legal ground.

So I’ve never, ever understood this ridiculous discussion where the Russians time and again are complaining about NATO allies being engaged in this conflict. We are. Obviously, we are. And of course we are. Because we have every right to help Ukraine. Now, on weapon deliveries actually let me be very clear. I don’t understand why we have any restrictions on weapon deliveries. To make sure that Ukraine is winning this war, we need to deliver everything the Ukrainian people need. The Ukrainians have the will to fight. We have one thing to do, to give them the means to fight. And this is actually a winning formula.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you.

Mr. Yermak, you spoke about Ukrainian heroes. You’ve talked about the morale. Some people say that if there is a—

ANDRIY YERMAK: Sorry.

JOHN HERBST: I’m sorry?

ANDRIY YERMAK: John, we lost you.

JOHN HERBST: OK, I’ll repeat. You spoke about the Ukrainian heroes fighting off the Russians against great odds, in terms of numbers. And, for that matter, amount of weapons. You’ve spoken about the strong morale of the Ukrainian people. Some observers have expressed concern that if in Vilnius NATO does not offer something substantial in support of Ukraine, morale might be impacted. So here’s my question: If in fact—taking into account what Mr. Rasmussen just said—if the United States, Germany, the UK were to announce decisions on, you know, more robust weapon supplies in Vilnius, even if progress towards Ukraine’s eventual membership in NATO was not so much, would that be an outcome that can suit Ukraine? In other words, might that prevent any fall in morale because people would think, oh, news of weapons systems?

ANDRIY YERMAK: Yes. I think that of course the expectation of the Ukrainian society, the expectation of Ukrainian soldiers, it’s very high because we have historical unity around Ukraine. We have the historical unity with all our partners. And of course, no strong decisions in the—in the Vilnius, of course, it will be—that will be very, very strong demotivation of the people. And I absolutely agree with Mr. Rasmussen that he said—his phrase that it’s impossible to give Putin to be like not just right, like feel like a doorman in the—in the door of the NATO. It will be after the catastrophe in Kakhovka, after all these terrible things which continue to happen every day in Ukraine, it will be very bad signal.

And very—and, of course, the Russian, the Russian machine, it will be used against Ukraine. And of course, we very respect the opinion of our partners. But we also believe that Ukraine has already passed all exams and passing them every day in battlefield. I mean, exams to be—exams to be a real—to be a real member of the NATO. And I can say very openly that now the level of the professionalism, the level of the average soldier, we showed for all the world. I think we—I will be very surprised that still existing somebody in the planet who not be sure that Ukrainian army, Ukrainian people, one of the most strongest in the world.

And be very honest, let’s back to the first day of invasion. Many people in the world give to us three days, one week, one month. But look at it, one year and we have—we not just defend, we already show how we’re able to liberate our lands, how we can be real guarantors in the future of the security of our neighbors. I think it’s necessary to not forget about them because, you know, how in our childhood many people—you can listen many people, but you trust when you really see how your friends can fight it, and how your friends can be fighting himself and you. And Ukraine show this.

And I think now it depends for the final political points. It’s necessary to do. It’s necessary not give any more chance in the world to afraid any dictators, to afraid any countries who is breaking international law, who is not respect independence, who is not respect freedom, who is not respect territorial integrity and sovereignty of any countries. It’s great historical chances. We, Ukrainians, back the faith that it’s possible in our world—be free, be independent, be strong, and be secure.

JOHN HERBST: That’s very clear. We’ll turn now to audience questions. We’ve got a bunch. The first one I have here is from Jonathan Landay of Reuters.

He notes that—this is to you, Minister Yermak—he notes that Ukraine has agreed with NATO that it cannot join the alliance while the war continues. But you’ve spoken about, and other NATO members have spoken about, the need for security guarantees. But his question is this. He says: The Biden administration speaks only of security commitments to be considered from Vilnius. He asks, how has the Biden administration explained to you, to Ukraine, what these security commitments might look like and how they would bolster Ukraine’s security? Is this a question you feel comfortable answering?

ANDRIY YERMAK: Thank you. First of all, I’d like to say that we are very appreciative and always not tired to repeat the words of thanks personally President Biden, his administration, both parties, Congress, and Americans. It’s mean that for us very important that we in the every day’s dialogue, and now we continue consultation of the workings of these guarantees. I can say that administration absolutely understands our positions, our idea. And I didn’t listen any refuse or any not agreements that Ukraine need to have concrete security guarantees. Yes, we discussed wordings. Yes, we have that experience, and we remember Budapest. And of course, we have today war in our lands.

But I think we found the solutions. I hope in this. I very appreciate that we have very friends, very partners, conversations with other areas and, first of all, with United States. This job, it continues. It’s not easy, honestly. But I hope that this consultation will be continue all these days which we have before Vilnius. I optimist by my life. I do all my best from myself. I know the all best doing from the allied team. And I hope we found the forums which give to Ukraine can create a very serious working what is important, working security guarantees.

Look, I can say that when we are start with Mr. Rasmussen, our group understand, agree with me. We have mostly skeptics. Now I can say our documents in the table of all leaders—practically all leaders in the world. And now nobody discuss that this is very serious, very fundamental, a very strong document. We continue to work.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you. Mr. Rasmussen, we have a request from—a question from Volodymyr Svyryda. He asks: What is the likelihood of Russia using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, or for that matter in Poland?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Yeah. I am very often—I’m very often asked that question. And my answer is also very clear. I don’t think there is any risk of Putin using nuclear weapons in neither Ukraine, nor Poland, nor any other country. Why? Because the Russian military knows that it would face no strategic advantage in using nuclear weapons. It’s been clearly communicated to the Russian military that the response from the United States and its allies would have a devastating effect on the Russian military.

Further to that, we know that the rest of the world would probably turn its back to Russia if they were to use nuclear weapons. So, in conclusion, the Russian military would refuse to abide by orders from Putin, and their own alternative would be to remove Putin and install a new leader. So and any attempt to try to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine would be the end of the Putin era and the Putin regime. And for that reason, I’m not concerned about risk of Putin using nuclear weapons.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you. That was clear.

I have a question from Nino Gelashvili, who’s of the RFE/RL Georgian Service, and—well, actually, this is also for you, Mr. Rasmussen, but I’ll ask—well, then see if Mr. Yermak wants to add as well: Why are NATO members hesitant on moving towards Ukraine’s NATO membership? Are they afraid of being involved in a war with Russia? Is there something else, maybe the issue of nuclear escalation?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Yeah. Sometimes I’m asking exactly the same question because I think we should learn lessons from the past, and the ultimate security guarantee for Ukraine would be membership of NATO, let’s face it. Until Ukraine can join NATO Ukraine will need security guarantees and that’s why there’s a clear link between security guarantees and a future membership of NATO.

There may be allies who are concerned about the fact that a country that is currently at war would have difficulties in defining the coverage of Article 5. But I think where there is a will there is also a way forward.

We have precedents for solving that kind of problems in the past. Germany joined NATO back in 1955, the whole of Germany, actually, but as we all know at that time Germany was divided in a West Germany and an East Germany.

So when Germany—when western Germany joined NATO it was clearly stated that Article 5 covered only the territory controlled by the western German government in Bonn. We could use exactly the same formula when it comes to Ukraine. We could say, OK, Article 5 covers the territory controlled by the government in Kyiv but still we would have some outstanding questions, including in Donbas and Crimea we still have a war going on—maybe we still have a war going on and you have a borderline that move forth and back and you have continual clashes between the Ukrainian forces and Russian forces. And then, of course, the question is if Russia attacks Ukraine in Donbas would that invoke Article 5 or not? How should we respond in that case?

These are not trivial questions. They are crucial questions to guard the credibility of Article 5 and security guarantees in Article 5. So we have to work to sort out all those practicalities in confidential negotiations with Ukraine. That’s not for public use. But we have to spend some time in sorting out those questions and that’s why I think we should extend an invitation to Ukraine sooner rather than later and then spend some time sorting out those practical issues in confidential negotiations with Ukraine before you can actually access NATO.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you.

OK. We have a question from Roman Zakaluzny from Calgary, Canada, and it’s for Mr. Yermak: Can we say today that a Ukrainian victory in this war is not—not—a precondition for Ukrainian membership in NATO?

ANDRIY YERMAK: Yes. Yes, absolutely. I’m absolutely can confirm this phrase, this principle. I think vice versa. The membership of the—of the NATO, and just we are talking about invitation, will be—work as help and supporting element of the more sooner victory of Ukraine. I am sure about it.

I think that I can add one very important thing. We’re now in the stage when the authority and the power of the NATO very, very high. And today, NATO need one very important element after Sweden and Finland, Ukraine. It will be elements which fits everybody and now understand that NATO is the most strongest alliance in the world. And everybody understand only NATO can give the 100 percent guarantees of the security, because you can see in reality any countries of NATO not involved in the war, and the people—any potential aggressors understood it. I just can confirm this phrase.

JOHN HERBST: OK. Thank you.

We have a question which almost answers itself, but I’ll pose it anyway. It’s from Dr. Wayne Schroeder at the US Naval War College. He asks: Should the US provide long-range strike capabilities such as ATACMS on an urgent basis? And what is the likelihood that Ukraine will receive ATACMS, and when? So, Mr. Yermak, for you.

ANDRIY YERMAK: Yes, of course. Thank you for these questions.

Yes, of course we need it so much as soon as possible. We’re waiting for decisions. And my attitude that we are very near of these decisions, and I hope that it happens very soon. And I can say that as soon as possible it’s happened, it give to us possibility, first of all, to survive lives of our people. With Mr. President Zelenskyy it’s a lot of times and the represent of our team said one example is Kherson, which we occupied, but we have not how to protect our people because the enemy’s attack from another side of the river. And you can see terrible photos and videos how their rockets destroyed supermarkets, the civilian infrastructure. Of course, we will be more strong with the ATACMS.

Waiting. Waiting. And I can say, you know, maybe just for the positive things when we are talking about this very, very big tragedy for my country, I don’t know the person in Ukraine who is exactly know all these words: HIMARS, ATACMS, Leopards, and many others. I think because this is symbolic for our people. It’s—Patriot, of course. It’s symbolic of life. It’s symbolic of surviving. And what is very important, that you can see that you—I mean Americans—when you deliver these weapons, how it’s really work and how it’s strengthening our able—how we, with these weapons, more able to defend our country. I think it’s we—you can see the real evidence how these weapons really survive people, really survive children, really survive old people, women.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you.

We have a very large question from Albert Lee. It’s for you, Mr. Rasmussen: What can be done to further break down the mental, bureaucratic, and institutional obstacles blocking not just the supply of advanced weapons systems, but also future security guarantees and NATO membership for Ukraine?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Yeah.

JOHN HERBST: It’s a big one.

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: That’s a big question.

But first of all, I think it will take determined political leadership, because I fully agree we really have to overcome all those obstacles. As I said before, we cannot—we cannot conduct warfare in this bureaucratic way of an incremental, step-by-step approach because we are concerned about provoking Putin. Let’s face it, Putin has exploited our long decision-making processes to fortify Russian defenses in Donbas and Crimea, so it’s being even more complicated for Ukraine to conduct its counteroffensive because of our hesitation. So we really have to step up to the plate.

And that’s why I think it’s quite simple: We should deliver everything the Ukrainians need without any restrictions. And we shouldn’t be concerned about Putin’s reaction because he has been the one who has escalated the war already, and we are always two or three steps behind him. So I fully agree, and I think first and foremost it will take determined political leadership.

And let me stress if we are to ensure long-term peace and stability on the European continent, we need a strong and stable Eastern European ally like Ukraine to serve as a bulwark against a still-aggressive Russia. Because when this war is over you will still have an aggressive Russia, so we have to protect not only Ukraine but the whole of Europe against that threat. And to that end, we need Ukraine as a NATO ally.

JOHN HERBST: I can’t help but step out of my role to say that it would be wonderful if the problem was described the way you’ve described it by President Biden and other Western leaders, making it clear that this is a war of Putin not just on Ukraine but also, ultimately, on us.

OK. Mr. Yermak, question from Trudy Rubin from the Philadelphia Enquirer: Is retaking Crimea or cutting it off, making it impossible for Russia to hold it, a necessary goal for Ukraine’s counteroffensive? And are some NATO countries, including the US, opposed to this?

ANDRIY YERMAK: We are very open for our goals. And we said that our victory, it’s to back all our territory over the international-recognized border. And we’re very clear of this. And of course, Donbas, it’s Ukraine; and Crimea, it’s Ukraine.

I can say about—if the question is about the position of our partners, I know that the partners very respect this our positions. And I—me personally—never listen that somebody just try to talk with us about any compromise of this.

And I can say that, for example, today I have the meetings with the G7 ambassadors here in Kyiv and we discussed the Ukrainian peaceful plan. And what is—and our position is very clear and very principled—that we are ready to listen and to talk and to take some idea with all countries in the world who respect our territorial integrity, our sovereignty, our independence.

It’s my answer.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you.

OK. We have one minute and we have one more question. This one’s for Mr. Rasmussen, also from Trudy Rubin: What do you think would be Putin’s reaction if Ukraine were, in fact, to take back Crimea?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Yeah. Putin attaches strong importance to keeping Crimea, but as Andriy Yermak just stated Crimea is, according to international law, a part of Ukraine. So I wouldn’t be concerned about how Putin would react. He would, of course, react militarily in a very strong way. But why should we care about that? I mean, this is Ukrainian territory.

And actually, back in 1994, when Ukraine gave up her nuclear weapons and handed them over to Russia, of all countries, and Ukraine signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in exchange Ukraine received so-called security guarantees from Russia in which Russia pledged not to attack Ukraine. They violated that. And Russia also confirmed that they would respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine within these internationally-recognized borders, including Crimea. So Crimea is Ukrainian territory.

And if we accept that Putin can keep Crimea, it sends an extremely dangerous signal to the whole world because Xi Jinping would argue and he would conclude if Putin can take Crimea, I can take Taiwan. And I also say this as a message to the American public, where I have met the argument we should reduce—we Americans should reduce our support for Ukraine because we need the resources to protect Taiwan. The fact is those two conflicts are interrelated. A clear defeat—a clear Russian defeat in Ukraine will also tell Xi Jinping not to attack Taiwan.

So the two conflicts are interrelated. Crimea is Ukrainian territory. So I don’t care about how Putin would react. For me, a Ukrainian victory includes taking back Crimea.

JOHN HERBST: Well, I would agree with that.

And I would thank both of you for a wonderful and extensive conversation. I hope—in fact, I’m confident—that you’ve contributed to moving the debate in the right direction, and now we wait and see what happens.

So thank everyone for tuning in. We will be doing more stuff on Russia’s war on Ukraine and how the United States and the West should respond, and perhaps more stuff on NATO-Ukraine in the year to come.

Do pobachenn’a.

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Thank you.

Watch the event

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The way for the US to ensure Gulf security is through partnership, not policing

David Mack — Tue, 20 Jun 2023 17:37:59 +0000

Earlier this month, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken traveled to Riyadh to meet with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) foreign ministers and the GCC secretariat. There, he mentioned how deeply the United States is invested in partnering with Gulf countries to build a brighter future for the region. In pursuit of that future, the United States should assist GCC countries with Gulf security as true partners—not as a policeman in the neighborhood.

The concept of Gulf security is not new. It was always top of mind for those who inhabited its shores. Historians have written of Russian Tsars’ desires to push south to the Gulf. This desire can be seen in the language of the purported will of Peter the Great from 1725. He advised his descendants to “approach as near as possible to Constantinople and India. Whoever governs there will be the true sovereign of the world. Consequently, excite continual wars, not only in Turkey but in Persia… Penetrate as far as the Gulf, advance as far as India.” The Carter Doctrine, outlined in US President Jimmy Carter’s State of the Union Address in January 1980, committed the United States to use military force, if necessary, to defend its national interests in the Gulf—the doctrine was a direct response to the Soviet Union’s entry into Afghanistan the year prior.

Generations of US strategic thinkers have spoken of US opposition to threats lodged by any country aiming to control the waters or air space of the Gulf and the adjacent Arabian Sea. Those thinkers focused on what would impede the peaceful relations that the United States and its allies have enjoyed with Gulf countries—countries that have energy resources that make them important for the global economy.

In over forty years, many realities have changed. US imports of Gulf energy supplies declined. By contrast, US exports to the region have expanded many times over. The parties and conditions that would likely pose a threat to US trade and other relationships with the Gulf are now largely located within the region. In the 1980s and early 1990s, it was the Iraq-Iran War and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Recently, it has been nonstate terrorist groups and Iran.

In addition, the countries with which the United States has friendly relations don’t depend on the United States to do the job of Gulf security for them. These countries do want Washington to be a reliable partner in support of their individual and collective defense efforts. This is also the goal of the United States. Through diplomacy and through working with the US private sector, Gulf countries’ militaries have been connected to military contacts with US companies and joint exercises conducted by the US Central Command. That fits what the Arab countries in the region need, and it fits what the US political system can accept.

This takes me back to the Iranian attacks on tankers and other commercial vessels in the final years of the Iran-Iraq War. I was the US ambassador to the United Arab Emirates at the time. Together with other US envoys to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, I was called back to Washington in early 1987 for consultations at the US State Department.

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The Kuwaiti government had formally requested that the United States put its flags on Kuwaiti oil tankers in order to gain the protection of US naval warships. The Kuwaitis promised to reimburse the United States handsomely for the flagging operation and to steadfastly maintain it was merely a commercial arrangement. Kuwait wished to shun any overt military alliance with the United States; for example, it did not even welcome US Navy ship visits. Indeed, the United States only had a small contingent of warships in the Gulf at the time, homeported in Manama, Bahrain. The answer from Washington was negative. The Kuwaitis then redirected their request to the Soviet Union.

When the group of US envoys and I gathered in the State Department, it was clear that the White House and top US politicians were still disinclined to make a major commitment to protect neutral-flag shipping in the Gulf, despite the unanimity among those of us coming from our posts in the region—we were in favor of some kind of positive response. After a half day of talks, we were told that then US President Ronald Reagan did not want to allow an opportunity for the Soviet Union to bring its military force into the Gulf. So, for that reason (however flawed it may be), Operation Earnest Will was born.

The United States committed to sending a military presence sufficient to protect neutral-flag commercial shipping without spending time quibbling over whether the GCC countries were actually neutral in the Iran-Iraq War. When I returned to Abu Dhabi, I received a warm welcome from Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, who was then the president of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and soon after from the rulers of the UAE’s other six emirates and from Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the minister of defense. At the time, the UAE was a confederation that granted only limited federal powers and separated military commands across Dubai and several other northern emirates. Even without actual authority outside Abu Dhabi, a young rising star in the Abu Dhabi military command, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed, along with Dubai’s Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, eventually became key contacts for me as the United States ramped up its military presence in the Gulf.

When I had arrived at my post in September 1986, the United States was limited to a mere four visits per year by its Navy warships and had very limited military relationships with the UAE emirates. By the time I left in October 1989, the United States had a large number of Navy ship visits, refueling and even making critical ship repairs at the large (and, at the time, new) port of Jebel Ali, as well as at established ports from Abu Dhabi to the city of Fujairah. The United States was also on its way to becoming a major supplier of military aircraft to the UAE. The rulers of the seven emirates were seeking joint military exercises as well as ship visits. Moreover, the leaders of these individual emirates had responded to the crisis of the tanker wars and various other demands by strengthening federal powers.

Because the United States responded to the GCC countries during their time of need (the so-called Tanker War), a strategic partnership formed—one that became the foundation for cooperation to reverse the Iraqi military occupation of Kuwait in 1990. The success of Operation Desert Storm gave the United States political credibility to bring GCC countries and other Arab countries to the Madrid Conference, a peace conference geared toward reviving the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, at the end of 1991. Those talks between Israel and the United States built upon peace between Egypt and Israel negotiated with the help of the United States at Camp David in September 1978 and the peace treaty between those two former military adversaries in March 1979. Camp David, the Madrid Conference, and Israel’s growing relationships with countries ranging from the UAE in the east and Morocco in the west laid the foundation for normalization. In a shrewd move, the Trump administration labeled this growing interaction as the “Abraham Accords.” The Biden administration has continued to play a role as a convenor and mediator.

As the Biden administration continues to play this role, it and Congress will find that the Arab countries of the GCC want to do their part when it comes to Gulf security. They are not expecting the United States to be the policeman of their neighborhood. Along with other key Arab and global leaders, they will welcome the United States as a partner in facing shared strategic interests.

Defense coalitions have historically been tricky, requiring skill and mid-course corrections. As the United States continues to work with the Gulf on security, expect blips, such as the report of a UAE withdrawal from the Combined Maritime Forces, a US-led maritime coalition. But if the United States shows that it is ready to work together with Gulf countries, Washington can get this partnership back on course. Read more about improving Gulf security frameworks in our latest report here.

David Mack is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, a former deputy assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, and a former US ambassador to the United Arab Emirates.

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The hits and misses in Germany’s new national security strategy

Atlantic Council experts — Wed, 14 Jun 2023 18:53:50 +0000

It sounds momentous in German, and it is. On Wednesday, Germany released its first comprehensive Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie, or national security strategy. Chancellor Olaf Scholz called the document a “major change” that seeks to integrate military planning with security issues ranging from climate change to alliances. It also carries forward the chancellor’s announcement of a Zeitenwende, or historical turning point, following Russia’s continent-unsettling invasion of Ukraine and Germany’s years of overdependence on Moscow for energy.

Below, Atlantic Council experts answer the most urgent questions about Germany’s new strategy and the path forward for this major European power.

1. How has Russia’s war in Ukraine changed Germany’s view of its security environment?

Germany’s new national security strategy calls out Russia as “the biggest threat to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.” For now, that means Germany isn’t at risk of going back to the way things were regarding its relationship with Russia. That is good news.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Germany’s first-ever national security strategy is one step in Germany security-proofing its politics and policies in the face of Russia’s war in Ukraine and the seismic changes in European security the war has brought. The disagreements, delays, and drawn-out process in finalizing the strategy show how challenging both the “mental” Zeitenwende required of Berlin decision makers and its practical implementation are. For far too long, strategic and security criteria seemed to play too little a role in German decision making. The national security strategy means progress on that front. Germany’s allies should consider the old adage “Der Weg ist das Ziel”—meaning “the journey is the reward,” or “the way is the goal.” Sure, the pace is too slow, and the end product is missing progress on key institutional elements like a national security council. But having undergone this process and attempted more of a whole-of-government and -society approach, Germany and its political decision makers have inched the ball forward on what is needed for the mental Zeitenwende and a more robust strategic culture in Berlin.

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Europe Center.

Germany takes a comprehensive societal view on its security environment, focusing not only on the immediate challenge that Russia poses, but also on hybrid threats arising from climate change, pandemics, world hunger, and poverty, as well as disinformation and cyberattacks.

—Roderick Kefferpütz is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and director of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union office in Brussels.

2. What does the focus on wehrhaft reveal about strengthening Germany’s armed forces?

The focus on wehrhaft—both the ability and, importantly, the willingness to defend oneself—goes beyond the necessary but in-and-of-itself insufficient modernization of the German armed forces. It means Germany has to build the strategic culture across government and society to consider geopolitical and security matters more prominently in comprehensive ways. Linked to that is the guiding principle of a “policy of integrated security” that runs through the strategy. Here implementation will be a steep hill to climb because of a variety of factors: from Germany’s federalist structures in law enforcement, intelligence, cybersecurity, and disaster management to variations on security concepts among the three-way governing coalition and growing budgetary constraints.

—Jörn Fleck

Germany is realizing that burgeoning trade ties and diplomacy alone don’t provide security. Peace comes through strength, and Germany’s first national security strategy rightfully emphasizes the importance of credible deterrence and lists the goal to make the Bundeswehr one of the most effective conventional armed forces in Europe.

—Roderick Kefferpütz

Germany’s national security strategy states that “the Federal Government will make the Bundeswehr one of the most effective conventional armed forces in Europe in the coming years, one that is able to respond and act rapidly at all times.” Given the current state of the Bundeswehr, it has a long way to go. The strategy also states that Germany will reach its 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) defense spending target, something it has said for years but hasn’t been able to reach yet. The strategy offers no clear sense of how this might be different going forward. It states that Germany will get there gradually over a “multi-year period” and “initially in part via the newly created special fund for the Bundeswehr.”

Unfortunately, in that same vein, one other glaring sentence stood out to me: “Given the considerable demands on our public finances at present, we will strive to implement this Strategy at no additional cost to the overall federal budget.” This doesn’t seem to make sense.

—Rachel Rizzo

3. How does Germany see its role in NATO and Europe going forward?

The strategy clearly underlines how essential European security, stability, and peace—as well as the role of the United States in Europe—are for Germany. A commitment to NATO’s 2 percent goal on defense spending—even if qualified as a multi-year average—is a good signal. So are commitments to enhanced forward presence in NATO and support for European security and defense policies and initiatives. But allies will find few tangible commitments to a greater German role and responsibility in hard security.

—Jörn Fleck

Collective defense is held high with NATO’s Article 5 mentioned alongside the European Union’s mutual assistance clause Article 42 as well as Article 4 of the Aachen Treaty with France. However, with regards to meeting NATO’s 2 percent of GDP goal, Germany has added the caveat of meeting this target “as an average over a multi-year period.” This underlines the difficulty the German government has in reaching this goal, particularly in these times of budgetary constraints.

—Roderick Kefferpütz

4. What does the strategy say about how Germany views China?

With a separate China strategy in the works, Germany’s new national security strategy says few things beyond the holy trinity of China as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival. It does acknowledge a rise in rivalry and competition, probably a careful compromise between the chancellor’s realist approach and the Greens’ more hawkish stance on China. But as so often with European initiatives, not everything about China bears a China label or framing. Trust that the strategy’s extensive discussions of supply-chain security, innovation and technology, and access to natural resources were driven with de-risking from Beijing in mind.

—Jörn Fleck

China is a conflictual issue within the governing coalition, and a first China strategy is expected to be released in the coming months. While Germany abides by the catch-all phrase that China is a partner, competitor, and systemic rival, it does acknowledge that the latter two elements have gained more traction in light of Chinese efforts to change the world order. However, the Indo-Pacific at large and likeminded partners such as India, Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan do not receive any attention in the national security strategy.

—Roderick Kefferpütz

Germany’s national security strategy offers the familiar framework of partner, rival, and systemic competitor for its relationship with China. However, what’s one word that doesn’t appear once in the strategy? Taiwan.

—Rachel Rizzo

5. What is missing in the strategy?

This strategy is comprehensive when it comes to nontraditional hard security threats, but it fails to address hard power questions in new arenas of competition. There is very little attention given to how geopolitical frontier areas, such as the Arctic, Antarctic, deep sea, and space might affect the security environment and international order.

—Roderick Kefferpütz

Not surprising for those who had followed the process but still a huge missed opportunity is the lack of institutional and process changes that would help the implementation of the Zeitenwende. Here, clearly the creation of a National Security Council–like format stands out. Most long-term observers of Germany will agree this is urgently needed to effectively coordinate an inter-agency process across the federal government and with state authorities and international partners, but also to drive strategic culture more in the medium term. Also missing are a clear follow-up process for implementation—always the biggest challenge with these strategies and who owns them—and installation of a regular review that forces future governments to keep up this process in regular intervals.

—Jörn Fleck

The post The hits and misses in Germany’s new national security strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Michèle Flournoy and Wendy Anderson promote rapid software acquisition in Breaking Defense

Atlantic Council — Tue, 13 Jun 2023 12:59:00 +0000

On June, two members of the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, former US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy and Palantir Senior Vice President Wendy Anderson, co-wrote an article in Breaking Defense discussing adopting and leveraging innovative software across the Department of Defense. In their op-ed, Flournoy and Anderson highlighted one of the recommendations from the Commission’s interim report for Congress to authorize funding for scaling operationally relevant and mature commercial technology demonstrated in major exercises, such as Rim of the Pacific.

The post Michèle Flournoy and Wendy Anderson promote rapid software acquisition in Breaking Defense appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Should NATO extend Stoltenberg’s term as leader?

Charles Barry — Mon, 12 Jun 2023 17:25:36 +0000

As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg meets with US President Joe Biden at the White House on Tuesday, there is a lot for them to discuss. Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive has just begun, and key decisions will face allies at the NATO Summit in Vilnius less than a month away. One of those decisions may be confirming the “who”—and also the “when”—of changing NATO’s top leader in the midst of an ongoing war.

Stoltenberg has announced he will conclude his secretary general tenure as planned at the end of September. He has served since October 2014*, just a few months after Russia invaded Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region and Crimea. Since then, Stoltenberg has shown himself to be NATO’s most impactful wartime secretary general. It would surprise no one should historians ultimately deem him the strongest, most capable secretary general in Alliance history. He has kept NATO out of direct combat with Russia while boldly marshaling allied support for Ukraine with mountains of nonlethal matériel and the promise of political backing for “as long as it takes.” (NATO members themselves provide Ukraine lethal warfighting matériel outside of NATO structures, as the core of the fifty-nation Ukraine Defense Contact Group.)

Should NATO members accept Stoltenberg’s decision to step down? Or should he be pressed to stay on as NATO navigates the fierce fighting and political choices ahead; until the path of the war in Ukraine is better known, perhaps in early 2024? Alliance members may decide as soon as their July 11-12 NATO Summit in Vilnius.

Issue Brief

Apr 11, 2023

Defining success for NATO’s Vilnius summit: A primer

By Charles Barry and Christopher Skaluba

A successful NATO summit in July requires significant progress on a host of NATO’s political and military priorities, especially those enumerated at Madrid.

Europe & Eurasia National Security

There is a good case for Stoltenberg staying longer. He has been remarkably successful at countering Russian propaganda and nuclear threats and in parrying the internal disruptions of highly contentious members, including by former US President Donald Trump and current Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. He has also skillfully guided Alliance responses to China’s growing presence and influence in Europe. Above all, Stoltenberg has been the stalwart pillar of Alliance cohesion. As the war in Ukraine intensifies this summer and into the fall, and especially should Russia up the ante on nuclear threats, NATO would do well to have Stoltenberg’s seasoned leadership.

Allies might feel an urgency to select Stoltenberg’s replacement at the upcoming Vilnius summit, but they are not required to at that time. That decision could be made later in 2023 or early 2024, still in time for a new secretary general to be installed at the seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington DC. If Stoltenberg does indeed step down this September, he will have already completed nearly ten years of service, making him the second-longest serving NATO secretary general after Joseph Luns, who served from 1971 to 1984. Stoltenberg has given NATO a full measure of service. Yet changing captains in the heat of battle should give some NATO capitals pause.

Key calculations in choosing Stoltenberg’s eventual successor

Whether in September or later, when Stoltenberg does depart and a new secretary general is needed, whom should the allies select?

Some members chafe at the fact that twenty years after new members from Eastern Europe joined the Alliance, no candidate from those seven countries has been selected as secretary general. Other members, including the United States, have shown notable interest in seeing women chosen for high leadership positions. Women leaders have been elected as heads of state for many NATO members, as well as for international organizations such as the European Commission (Ursula Von der Leyen), the International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank (Christine Lagarde), the World Trade Organization (Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala), and the United Nations General Assembly (Maria Fernanda Espinosa Garcés).

To be sure, NATO is past due to join the growing club of glass ceiling breakers. That achievement must be weighed in the context of giving both any prospective candidate and the Alliance the best conditions for success. The conditions facing the next secretary general could not be more challenging. There will be no quiet time for a transition before assertive transatlantic leadership and momentous decisions will be required.

Most immediately, it is critical that NATO solidarity and momentum not slacken in backing Ukraine’s military success over Russia. By the end of this year, the war in Ukraine will likely have moved into a new stage, either—and hopefully—toward a full Ukrainian victory or into a steady stalemate. Until then, and as Vilnius approaches, the war and other major issues—Sweden’s NATO membership, defense spending levels, confronting China’s challenges—will demand unrelenting leadership and diplomacy. The months ahead are not optimum for farewelling NATO’s most capable leader—or for welcoming a new one. Proceed with caution!

Correction: An earlier version of this piece incorrectly stated Stoltenberg began his role as secretary general in March 2014. He was appointed as secretary general designate in March 2014, but formally began the role in October 2014.

Charles Barry is a visiting research fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Since 1990, he has assisted senior US and NATO officials in developing three NATO Strategic Concepts and preparing for fourteen NATO summits. These views are his own and do not reflect those of the US Department of Defense or the National Defense University.

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Russia’s failing Ukraine invasion is exposing Putin’s many weaknesses

Anders Åslund — Mon, 12 Jun 2023 00:29:11 +0000

Vladimir Putin’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine is exposing all of his personal weaknesses as a ruler. It is also casting an unforgiving light on the extensive damage he has done to Russia.

In the early 1990s, I encountered Putin several times at international meetings in St. Petersburg, but I never really met him. I talked to the city’s friendly mayor, Anatoly Sobchak, and his first deputy Alexei Kudrin, but Putin, whose background in the KGB was well known, hid on the sidelines and did not really talk to anybody. He was perceived as a secretive nuisance.

Based on this early impression of Putin, I have always been surprised by his remarkable rise to the pinnacle of Russian politics. My view is that he was simply lucky and owed his many promotions to a handful of people close to Russia’s first post-Soviet president, Boris Yeltsin. Putin’s main benefactors were Yeltsin’s daughter Tatyana and last two chiefs of staff, Valentin Yumashev and Alexander Voloshin, along with oligarchs Boris Berezovsky and Roman Abramovich, who trusted his loyalty while Yeltsin was too sick to rule in 1998-99.

Putin arrived at a table of increasing abundance laid by Yeltsin and his reformers; he was further helped by an extended period of rising global oil prices. He has had a surprisingly long run, but nobody can expect to be lucky forever. For more than two decades, Putin thrived on personal loyalty and relied on his slow, deliberate approach to decision-making. However, as the invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel, his many flaws and weaknesses are now coming to the fore.

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Despite being in power for more than two decades, Putin has never broadened his expert base. Instead, he has stuck to his former KGB colleagues and old St. Petersburg technocrats along with a small number of economists and lawyers. How can anybody seriously listen to Nikolai Patrushev or Yuri and Mikhail Kovalchuk? They are considered among Putin’s closest advisers but they are full of old-style Soviet conspiracy theories.

Putin himself has consistently refused to rely on any sources of information other than his own intelligence agencies. In his big media events, he has repeatedly shown that he believes in all manner of conspiracy theories. In other words, he has consciously chosen to remain poorly informed.

He has never been a fast decision maker or crisis manager and has always taken his time. For much of his reign this has not been a major issue, but that is no longer true in the current wartime environment. Putin’s obvious lack of skill as a crisis manager is presumably one of the reasons why so many important decisions related to the war in Ukraine are late and inconsistent.

Putin is also a micromanager who is reluctant to delegate and prone to over-centralizing. He has persistently gone far too deep into details. Much of the failure of the war in Ukraine seems to have been caused by Putin insisting on deciding too much himself, just like Hitler during World War II. Military decisions require detailed knowledge which Putin simply does not possess. He is also physically far from the battlefield due to his lack of personal courage.

Eurasia Center events

Gen James E. Cartwright, USMC (ret.)

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Since 2000, Putin has systematically destroyed Russia’s state institutions and imposed extreme repression. One consequence is that his regime has very little capacity to generate, receive, or utilize negative feedback. Everybody around him has learned that he only wants to hear good news. As a result, neither he nor his administration learn much from their mistakes.

Many biographers of Putin have been reluctant to discuss allegations that he has been deeply involved in organized crime and kleptocracy for much of his political career. Nevertheless, awareness of this kleptocracy is vital for anyone seeking to understand today’s Russia. Far-reaching criminal influence has made the Russian state rot from within. It can neither manage processes nor produce things effectively.

A peculiarity of the Putin regime is that the ruler actually offers two-way loyalty, unlike Stalin. Putin recognizes only one crime, disloyalty. If one of his underlings happens to steal a billion or two, it is not typically seen as a problem. Nor does Putin fire anybody because of incompetence. Instead, incompetent senior officials are forgiven for their frequent blunders as long as they remain personally loyal to Putin.

The invasion of Ukraine has exposed widespread corruption and incompetence throughout the Russian military and defense sector, but Putin’s old friends and allies remain in their posts. Rather than dismissing the many incompetent Russian generals, Putin prefers to circulate them. The most outstanding failures, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, have not lost their jobs despite their obvious and costly mistakes.

With the invasion of Ukraine now in its sixteenth month, Putin’s limitations as a leader have left Russia heading for an historic defeat. During the early years of his reign, he benefited from the hard work done before him by 1990s reformers and enjoyed favorable international conditions, but his many sins and shortcomings are now clearly catching up with him.

Anders Åslund is a senior fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum and author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

In these times, business as usual at the department is not acceptable.

— Lloyd J. Austin, Secretary of Defense

Traditional joint force deterrence is no longer sufficient: a near-singular focus on armed conflict and platform-based capability development fails to deter strategic adversaries like China and Russia from their pursuit of strategic objectives while simultaneously increasing the risk of war. Simply owning the most advanced weaponry, while ceding ground in the competitive space left of conflict, is not enough to meet US deterrence needs, nor is it sufficient to ensure the joint force prevails in conflict. Expanding the joint force’s construct for targeting and effects generation will enable the Department of Defense (DOD) to more effectively deter future conflict while simultaneously shaping the environment to the joint force’s advantage in conflict should deterrence fail.

Why the twenty-first century security environment merits an updated approach

Today’s security threats span the competition continuum, cut across theaters and domains, and are intensified through the application of emerging technologies. The joint force faces challenges spanning the full competition continuum from high-end conflict to gray zone competition, including cyber threats and economic coercion, to cooperation. Technological advancements have changed the character of threats, the types of activities that the DOD can conduct, the speed at which it can act, and expanded its notion of physical and non-physical tools and effects. Specifically, the evolution of the cyber domain has enabled the joint force to gain access to non-physical spaces and generate options to achieve effects in a matter of milliseconds. The realities of twenty-first century competition drive the need to confront adversaries across a global contact layer to counter malign activities and proactively advance US strategic objectives. In other words, actions in one theater or domain can generate options and lead to outcomes in distant corners of the globe.

Moreover, the joint force faces a far more sophisticated adversary in China—qualitatively and quantitatively—than it did in countering violent extremist organizations over the past two decades. Strategic competition requires a significant mindset shift to effectively harness the effects of multiple instruments of power in a global, multi-domain, and coherent manner. DOD doctrine acknowledges this, but the department and joint force have yet to fully operationalize it.

While many activities executed along the competition continuum can enable success in conflict, specific operations, activities, and investments are necessary to ensure joint force superiority in direct combat, especially considering the criticality of combined arms warfare with allies and partners, as well as the seamless integration of multi-domain fires and effects. joint force activities must continually pursue positional advantage across the competition continuum to achieve the necessary balance between deterrence and conflict preparation. Yet, currently, the level of attention to and investment in preparation for armed conflict inhibits the joint force from leveraging the vast data, tools, and authorities at its disposal to prevent such conflict from occurring in the first place.

How joint force operations can meet an evolving threat landscape

The joint force must update its approach to targeting and effects generation to respond to the range of security challenges at hand, else it risks losing without going to war. Success across the full competition continuum will be enabled by the joint force’s ability to effectively harness data and a wide spectrum of tools and authorities with speed, precision, and lethality. This necessitates a deeper and more informed understanding of adversary capabilities, the operating environment, the interconnected nature of the physical and virtual domains, and the range of data sources available to operators. By “expanding its competitive mindset and competitive approach”¹ —to include and integrate tools, information, and actions that span the competition continuum—the joint force can exploit this understanding to apply the right effects to the right problems at the right times, advancing strategic objectives and maintaining informational, decisional, and combat dominance. An expanded competitive mindset will allow the joint force to view competition not as an inevitable march toward future conflict, but rather as a persistent effort to gain and maintain positional advantage across all domains.

The joint force is designed to excel at crisis response; it must make a deliberate mindset shift to plan prior to impending crisis (and prevent such scenarios from occurring in the first place). However, while the urgency of evolving the joint force’s targeting framework is evident across doctrine and policy,² the joint force has not yet taken to scale an assertive approach to dominating across the competitive space. Doctrine included in the DOD’s 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Joint Concept for Competing, for instance, make clear that the department and joint force are thinking about strategic competition more broadly, yet operationally—through authorities, combatant commands, and collaboration with different agencies and allies—DOD and the joint force have yet to fully realize integrated deterrence.

Explainer: Targeting and effects generation

Targeting: Traditional joint or dynamic targeting is “the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them.” In this paper, targeting is an enabler of options, characterized as a continuous activity that furthers the pursuit of objectives by addressing critical intelligence and operational requirements and shaping the environment through a multitude of proactive means. Targeting includes everything from illuminating human networks and key actors, to finding and fixing mobile capabilities, to identifying cyber access vectors and vulnerabilities.

Effects: While conventionally viewed as the “finish” of the targeting cycle—the kinetic fire or kill—effects generation here refers to the employment of instruments of national power (individually or in concert) to achieve a desired outcome. This ranges from traditional kinetic military fires to information operations, cyber tools, and electronic warfare, to targeted economic sanctions and law enforcement actions, to diplomatic démarche or other means of localized leverage.

What this report sets out to achieve

Operationally, the joint force has not adapted to an era of strategic competition, which requires targeting across theaters and domains, the entire competition continuum, and leveraging the range of data sources at its disposal. Doing so requires the joint force to stitch together the data, tools, and authorities needed to achieve global objectives—rather than viewing missions as constrained to a singular region or ends, as has been the status quo.

This report outlines a framework to leverage existing targeting models to more assertively and deliberately compete by: 1) incorporating an expanded use of military and interagency capabilities; 2) leveraging expansive public and private data and harnessing it for effect through emerging technologies; and 3) smartly balancing priorities and weight of effort related to competition and conflict preparation. The authors offer key action areas for implementation at scale.

Expanding the joint force’s competitive mindset

To achieve unity of effort, the joint force must seek opportunities to integrate its operations and activities in time, space, and purpose with the activities of interorganizational partners, proxies, and surrogates.

— Joint Concept for Competing³

While the Pentagon recognizes it must adopt a new mindset to prevail across the competition continuum, it continues to approach targeting and fires through a lens of armed conflict. Traditional approaches to targeting and fires still prevail across the joint force despite the recognition of a need to expand them. Traditionally, the joint force aligns “sensors to shooters” (i.e., targeting) to inflict damage on enemy personnel, materiel, or infrastructure (i.e., fires or effects generation). This sentiment is expressed through variations of the targeting cycle, whether it be the dynamic targeting kill chain (Find, Fix, Target, Track, Engage, Assess) or the Special Operations Forces-preferred cycle (Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate). These processes lend well to a temporal and kinetic approach to targeting and fires—exemplified by strikes on violent extremist organization (VEO) leadership networks or disabling mobile surface-to-air threats as part of a layered suppression of enemy air defenses effort—yet they are insufficient for generating the nonlethal and continuous effects necessary in today’s expansive security environment. This traditional approach to targeting and fires is incongruent with current DOD realities, given “most joint force activities occur in the context of cooperation and competition below armed conflict.”⁴

US Army Cyber Command hosts a town hall. Credit: US Army photo/ Candy Knight

As the DOD recognizes through its integrated deterrence concept, the joint force’s tool kit expands beyond the military arsenal, and solely relying on traditional approaches for targeting and effects is limiting. As articulated in the NDS, integrated deterrence campaigning calls for the joint force—in alignment with and often in a supporting role to other instruments of power found across the interagency—to execute “logically linked” activities to advance “strategy-aligned priorities over time” in order to counter or complicate competitors’ coercion across the globe.⁵ Linking activities across global campaigns require a high level of understanding of competitors’ intent and capabilities and their underlying geopolitical realities, enabled by prolonged access across multiple domains, which creates options to leverage multiple effects in achieving desired ends. For example, developing an understanding of how China’s coercive economic activities in Africa and Latin America support its broader global ambitions can inform the breadth (and complexity) of US response options. While the joint force typically excels at responding to crises, single-purpose platforms and the constant rotation of forces often prohibit the long-duration stare that integrated deterrence requires for proactive campaigning left of crisis.

Operationalizing integrated deterrence: A new model for targeting and effects

To achieve integrated deterrence, this paper outlines a model for operationalizing it. The joint force must meld the existing framework for joint targeting with a model that places a premium on gaining placement and access in a domain or region, enabling a focused understanding of an entity of interest, to facilitate a range of options for the joint force to execute in concert with other instruments of power, whether in a supported or supporting role. Each layer includes the concepts of persistence, local distinction, and global relevance, and can be in a near-constant state of change based on the sensing environment. For example, security cooperation with a partner in Southeast Asia requires access, understanding, and options that are: 1) persistent, to ensure ongoing understanding and to achieve effects over the long term; 2) locally distinct based on regional and local considerations; and 3) globally relevant, acknowledging that awareness and action related to one country affects global dynamics and goals. This layered model is represented in Figures 1 and 2 and further described below.

Integrated Deterrence Targeting. The figures above convey the elements of the joint targeting cycle and the dynamic targeting process (figure 1), with a philosophical and nonlinear pyramid approach to developing options for complex problems (figure 2). These two frameworks must be fused together to operationalize integrated deterrence. The joint force’s traditional targeting cycle must be informed by a foundation of situational awareness. Data, tools, and authorities are all necessary mechanisms to establish situational awareness.

Placement and access

virtual and/or physical proximity to an entity of interest

Focused understanding

situational awareness and perception of an entity (actor and/or location) and how it fits into broader geostrategic missions

Options

potential pathways forward to respond to a complex problem set and achieve outcomes, informed by focused understanding and placement and access

Explaining the model of a modified targeting and effects process

Adopting this layered model is critical for two reasons. First, the complex, global, and multi-domain problem sets the DOD faces today necessitate options that are similarly sophisticated in nature and cut across the competition continuum. By prioritizing a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of problem sets, the joint force is presented with a wider array of options to address key challenges. Such focused understanding is possible when the near-infinite amount of data available across the public and private sectors is transformed into usable information and, ultimately, intelligence.

Second, a new competitive mindset requires broadening the joint force’s tool kit beyond traditional military effects. The joint force has the authority to, and does, execute non-kinetic targeting, albeit insufficiently, yet it prioritizes kinetic fires as part of the traditional targeting cycle. Fusing kinetic and non-kinetic fires is critical not only from a deterrence perspective but also, more significantly, to enable victory in armed conflict. Yet, alone, the military instrument of power is insufficient for the problem sets germane to integrated deterrence. While the joint force has significantly advanced its organic non-kinetic capabilities, it primarily leverages kinetic effects, which neglects other instruments of power, disincentivizes creative thinking, and leads to poor integration with interagency partners.⁶ A high degree of awareness of the capabilities and authorities that other instruments of power bring to the table is critical such that they can be synchronized with, or amplified by, joint force activities at all echelons.

The process of generating placement and access, focused understanding, and options is not linear, and each stage can and should inform the others over time. Specific placement and access may be generated to understand a particular problem in a sophisticated manner such that novel options can be developed. Similarly, focused understanding may drive the need for additional or alternative access to close critical intelligence gaps and inform options. Likewise, commanders may demand options to address a particular problem, which in turn will inform the planning process to generate the necessary access and understanding. Below is an overview of the three foundational elements of the pyramid.

I. Placement and access

To develop the focused understanding required for integrated deterrence, the joint force cannot stare at problems from afar. Placement and access are foundational to developing an enhanced understanding of the problem sets facing the United States. Placement and access, however, does not necessarily mean physical proximity of the military to a particular interest area—it also encompasses virtual presence and can be developed by the joint force, interagency partners, and allied counterparts. It also implies some degree of usability, sustainability, and repeatability; simply visiting a location or gaining virtual access to a network does not equate to true placement and access. Rather, that access must be repeatable if it is temporal in nature, sustainable over operationally relevant time periods, and usable for alternate purposes such as data collection, security cooperation, or reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. Placement and access can be enhanced by leveraging data from a multitude of sources to enable the joint force insight into digital networks of value to access, or the nature of key partnerships required for physical access. Additionally, enhancing existing authorities and making them more flexible would allow units pursuing a mission set in one area to adapt and undertake additional mission sets that may be valuable for a broader or global mission set.

Evolving the joint force approach to placement and access will open a range of opportunities given the interconnected nature of global problem sets. For example, France’s historical security cooperation and counterterrorism activities in the Sahel region of West Africa, during the 2010s, could have also served as an access vector to increasing understanding of the growing threat of Russian private military corporations (PMC) like Wagner Group in the region. This physical proximity can enable a deeper understanding of Wagner’s activities in the region, potentially driving requirements for further physical or virtual access or informing options in line with global campaign plans to counter Russian malign influence. Critically, the joint force must explore means to creatively exploit access when mission convergences exist—units or platforms deployed for one purpose, such as countering VEO, may enable access vectors to support another mission, such as strategic competition, and vice versa. While clarity of primary and secondary objectives of missions would need to remain, the makeup of units and task forces, and the requisite authorities given to them, should be meaningfully considered to capitalize on mission convergences. Not only does this approach create efficiencies with respect to endeavors like security cooperation, but it also offers the opportunity to obfuscate strategic intentions.

II. Focused understanding

Focused understanding of an actor, environment, or relationship is required to solve complex problems, not only due to the sophisticated capabilities of strategic adversaries but also because integrated deterrence campaigns are global in nature. Transregional, multi-domain problems cannot be thoroughly addressed in compartmentalized and only localized ways. Rather, the joint force must stitch together regional understandings based on local access and conditions with broader knowledge informed by other global touch points. The roles of partners, both interagency and international, are critical in developing focused understanding. Not only do they enable multi-domain access, but they also provide unique perspectives. The vast amounts of commercial and government data can and should be harnessed and fused to improve focused understanding of actors and problem sets. While data from traditional sources is immensely valuable, open-source information—organized into actionable information—can drastically improve understanding of patterns and behavior. For example, social media data may help inform US forces of the presence of an adversarial force’s covert presence in a country that may be hard to identify or find evidence for using other means. Ultimately, the fusing of different data sources more consistently can help understanding across the competition continuum.

Building on the previous example, to address Wagner Group’s activities in the Sahel, the joint force should first understand how those activities tie into Russia’s global campaign to secure influence and create instability through expeditionary PMC activities. A holistic understanding of Wagner’s activities across the Sahel, Central Africa, Latin America, Syria, and Eastern Europe presents a more informed picture of the totality of the problem, as well as the associated pressure points, vulnerabilities, and opportunities. Moreover, the local US country team, elements of the intelligence community, French forces, and host-nation partners will all view the Wagner problem in different lights, which can enhance the joint force’s perspective and is necessary in developing viable options leveraging all instruments of power.

This combination of regional and global understanding, enabled by joint force and partner access and capabilities, ultimately informs a far greater range of options than is achieved strictly through a regional military lens, which has been the status quo. Critically, focused understanding better informs risk assessments at echelon, abating risk aversion frequently seen at higher levels of command authority that are farthest removed from the tactical edge.

III. Options

Senior leaders and commanders typically request a range of options to address problems, both to allow flexibility and enable sound decision-making in light of strategic priorities and risks. The Joint Concept for Competing calls for the joint force to:

Identify approaches that enable it to apply its military capabilities proactively, and differently in some cases, to gain influence, advantage, and leverage over adversaries to establish the necessary conditions to achieve strategic outcomes.

— Joint Concept for Competing⁷

While doctrinally this is clear, today’s traditional approach to targeting and competition limits the most effective suite of options from being generated. More-nuanced options may place the joint force in a supporting role to other departments and agencies: for example, conducting traditional manhunting activities (via military authorities) to enable a diplomatic action such as a démarche (via Department of State authorities). The level of sophistication required to achieve what the Joint Concept calls for, especially across activities below armed conflict, makes both risk and efficacy assessments challenging. It is far more difficult to quantify the effectiveness of a campaign to counter Chinese regional influence—for example, assessing long-duration efforts to obstruct effort by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to secure access, basing, and overflight—than it was to measure the success of kinetic drone strikes during the Global War on Terrorism. This challenge is met not only by prioritizing focused understanding but also by parlaying that understanding into a range of options that may be locally distinct but support global campaign plan objectives.

Ultimately, options for senior decision-makers are developed to achieve outcomes that are in service of more-aspirational objectives. Again, examining Wagner activity, a desired outcome of an operation could be to deny Wagner’s ability to securely communicate between several outstations across the Sahel. The aspirational objective is to critically degrade Wagner’s ability to conduct and sustain expeditionary activities globally.

Targeting throughout the competition continuum

This model for the generation of options for complex problems must be melded with an adaptation in the application of traditional joint force targeting processes. Joint targeting is not solely reliant on joint force tools, capabilities, and authorities; it can and should incorporate other instruments of power—by collaborating across departments and agencies—to bolster data and inform understanding, as well as “identify, develop, and affect targets to meet commander objectives.”⁸

Take, for example, a PRC network in Latin America that facilitates command and control of dual-use infrastructure. Here, data could be harnessed from the intelligence (e.g., National Security Agency) and diplomatic (e.g., Department of State Regional Security Office) instruments of power to identify a particular local criminal network that facilitates relevant PRC contracting activities. Host-nation law enforcement can then apply pressure on the criminal network to share information about the PRC actors with whom it engages routinely. Over time, this information can help generate several options to gain access to the objective network through Special Operations Forces-enabled cyber activities. Throughout, the military (e.g., Military Information Support Operations) and diplomatic (e.g., Department of State Global Engagement Center) instruments of power can expose malign PRC practices through information operations to positively shape narratives in line with strategic objectives. The joint targeting cycle could be leveraged multiple times for:

Employing traditional manhunting techniques to find and fix specific local criminal actors of interest, develop their pattern of life, then using non-kinetic fires to register their phones with specific networks that enable intelligence access to key digital data.
Leveraging data obtained through financial (e.g., Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control) instruments of power to target specific institutions that enable transactions between local criminal networks and the PRC. This data can be correlated with intelligence derived from the activities above, as well as populated to other portions of the joint force focused on countering PRC dual-use activities to further global understanding of their tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Conducting intelligence preparation of the cyber environment to find and fix key nodes that are vulnerable to offensive cyber fires (e.g., US Cyber Command), as well as to bolster and amplify information operations that counter local PRC propaganda strategies.

The myriad of joint targeting activities outlined above not only enable specific tactical actions but also inform or further placement and access that continuously matures the collective understanding of the operating environment. Given the nature of strategic competitors, much of this understanding can be exported to other locations to bolster awareness and enable the linking of activities in a logical way as outlined in the NDS. At the center of this process is data, and as stated by former Deputy Secretary of Defense David L. Norquist, “our ability to fight and win wars requires that we become world leaders in operationalizing and protecting our data resources at speed and scale.”⁹

Harnessing data to improve the targeting and effects process

Data is a strategic asset that must be operationalized in order to provide a lethal and effective joint force.

— DOD Data Strategy¹⁰

The joint force’s ability to leverage data at speed and scale, predicated on its adoption of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), enables this framework for targeting and effects generation. Data informs the nature of required access, feeds the focused understanding process, and enables the development of well-informed options that artfully balance desired outcomes with strategic risk. However, raw and unstructured data in isolation does not create a decisive advantage. Rather, it must be harnessed for effect, transforming data into both information and intelligence that is usable and accessible at the speed of relevance.

The US Space Command Joint Operations Center is responsible for integrating data and status from multiple operations centers, the services, and agencies to provide the commander with critical Command and Control capabilities. The capabilities are being increasingly leveraged by other services in support of joint global operations. Credit: US Space Command

While the importance of data is nothing new, the joint force must grapple with the explosion of available data spanning all domains, sectors, and sources. Technologies such as AI and machine learning (ML) present meaningful ways to navigate this near-infinite amount of data. The 2020 DOD Data Strategy envisions the department as a “data-centric organization that uses data at speed and scale for operational advantage and increased efficiency,” with particular focus on enabling all-domain operations, more rapid and informed decision-making, and organizational business analytics.¹¹ Moreover, AI makes determinations and finds data connections in ways humans alone cannot, encapsulating everything from making obvious connections more rapidly (e.g., using satellite data to geolocate battlefield equipment) to identifying valuable datasets overlooked by humans (e.g., how commercial shipping telemetry data can enable deeper understanding of the PRC’s fifth-generation [5G] infrastructure development in Africa).

Data

Data is obtained by a variety of automated or manual and physical or virtual means. Any entity that can obtain data is considered a sensor. Data becomes information once put into context prescribed with meaning by the observer. Often, the meaning prescribed by the observer can be adapted as understanding of the environment grows, making particular datasets more or less useful. The process by which information is transformed into intelligence is complex and combines both art and science as described in JP 2-0 Joint Intelligence:

Intelligence fuses and evaluates information from multiple sources to provide the most accurate assessment possible of the current state of the operating environment.
From current assessments, intelligence draws predictive estimates of the full range of potential alternative future states of the operating environment.
To inform decisions, intelligence illuminates how the operating environment may react to different friendly options under consideration.¹²

The flow from data to intelligence—known as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) cycle—is illustrated in Figure 3, overlaid with the targeting framework from Figure 2.

The automation of PED enhances and accelerates the path from raw data to actionable intelligence, or from “sensor to shooter.”

The nature of today’s security environment necessitates the execution of PED at greater speed and scale than is achievable by humans alone. Particularly, the operating environment below armed conflict—which encompasses most joint force activities—places a premium on scale. To effectively compete globally and deter China and Russia, large quantities of data must be triaged and transformed into intelligence to inform transregional and multi-domain activities that are logically linked. In contrast, armed conflict—the highest-risk joint force activity—places a premium on speed. Rapidly processing and disseminating targeting data, effectively integrating kinetic and non-kinetic fires against mobile targets, and incorporating virtual capabilities that can affect adversary nodes within milliseconds would be impossible without AI/ML and human-machine teaming. The Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concept describes the importance of this flow from data to intelligence based on the requirement for “joint force commanders to ‘sense,’ ‘make sense,’ and ‘act’ in the operational environment.”¹³ While this paper is not focused on the JADC2 and Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO) concepts, the employment of this paper’s updated targeting and effects process would support the more rapid implementation of JADO/JADC2 across the joint force.

Sense

The joint force must consider nearly all entities to be sensors, ranging from sensitive intelligence collection activities to open-source commercial datasets. Adopting a more competitive mindset requires the joint force to democratize data, allowing for a wide array of data-gathering streams to interact with AI algorithms trained to produce usable information. Much attention is placed on gathering data from the tactical edge, yet the edge can take many forms across physical and virtual spaces, regions, and domains. Critically, leveraging nonmilitary instruments of power, as well as allied and partner sensors, can both increase and diversify the data gathered. The role of commercial data is invaluable, with the private sector often having access to people, places, and things that are difficult, if not impossible, for overt government entities to replicate. However, while nontraditional data sources are crucial to building global situational awareness, the DOD does not currently have the communications infrastructure to integrate data from these various inputs at speed and scale—this change must be accelerated.

Make sense

Making sense of the operating environment correlates to the process depicted in Figure 2. The importance of AI/ML becomes paramount here, such that the joint force can achieve automation of prediction at speed and scale, while reserving judgment for human decision-makers on or in the loop. Ultimately, larger and more diverse datasets correlate to more sophisticated training of AI/ML algorithms, increasing the precision of predictive modeling to inform human decision-making. Analysis of the nature of adversary activities—and the subsequent options to address them—may look quite different when viewed through a whole-of-government versus strictly military lens. Furthermore, allies’ and partners’ perspectives on problem sets, especially those close to home, offer invaluable information to complement the joint force’s understanding of the operating environment.

Act

Taking action is a data-driven endeavor—not only in regard to the appropriate action but also the expected adversary reaction and the associated risks. Data-informed decision-making, given its bias toward empiricism, helps challenge assumptions, drive rigorous planning, and enable more-decentralized and potentially faster decision-making. Indeed, the focus of this framework is to utilize access-enabled understanding, coupled with sophisticated data-harnessing techniques, to ultimately provide commanders with a range of well-informed, data-driven options to act. It should be emphasized that to act does not signify finality of the process. As stated in the Joint Concept for Competing, “strategic competition is an enduring condition to be managed, not a problem to be solved.”US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, 7. In fact, the “act” could be a decision to develop further placement and access to address critical intelligence gaps, or to submit requirements to inform further capability development for an unaddressed operational need.

The process of sensing, making sense, and acting is continuous. The speed by which this process plays out is variable based on the nature of the domain, location along the continuum, commander’s intent, and both local and global risk considerations. Deliberate planning and preparation of the operating environment, to include the establishment of relationships and infrastructure, deployment of sensors, and data architecture, and other such activities are necessary to enable this process to occur with speed downstream. In particular, active conflict places a premium on achieving maximum speed for this process, which simultaneously necessitates extensive preparation and autonomy.

Using the competition space to prepare for high-end armed conflict

Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win.

— Sun Tzu, The Art of War¹⁴

Conflict preparation is the persistent, locally distinct, and global sensing of the target ecosystem. It is a dynamic process that constantly generates and updates the integrated targeting planning and execution decisions. Prevailing in armed conflict is the ultimate basis for the existence of the joint force, and places a significant premium on preparation to maintain a position of advantage, inform capability development, and hold adversaries at risk. Armed conflict exists on the far-right side of the competition continuum and represents the most consequential activity the joint force must prepare for and, when called upon, execute. While often referred to in sterilized terminology, a clear description of armed conflict—the application of violence to destroy an enemy’s will and means to resist—serves to highlight the care and attention that preparation for conflict requires. While any type of conflict requires serious attention, high-end armed conflict against a peer adversary represents the most potentially dangerous scenario for which the joint force must prepare. While the objective of integrated deterrence is to deter conflict from occurring in the first place, it is equally about shaping the environment to ensure joint force dominance should deterrence fail. As outlined in Joint Publication 3-0, “while commanders conduct activities of cooperation and adversarial competition, they are still preparing for armed conflict.”¹⁵

Trilateral exercises between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, Australian Defense Force, and US Navy support shared goals of peace and stability while enhancing regional security. Credit: US Navy/ Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Codie L. Soule

Conflict preparation is a balancing act. The joint force must weigh concerns of strategic risk and escalation management: “Tilting the competitive balance too far in one’s own favor will affect an adversary’s decision-making and behavior, but the effect may be vertical or horizontal escalation, not compliance.”¹⁶ Smartly preparing for conflict to create and maintain advantage over an adversary can be a campaign in its own right and must involve shaping activities as well as capability development. These activities will often nest within an overarching integrated deterrence campaign, but at times these endeavors may diverge, at which point the balance of priority and weight of effort must be considered. For example, winning a conflict to defend the Panama Canal would be a clear priority of the United States. However, preparation for such a conflict is not assigned the same weight of effort as, for example, the defense of Taiwan, which is being treated as a high-likelihood event by the Pentagon today.

The United States will not achieve a decisive warfighting advantage against a near-peer competitor through sheer mass or weapon systems alone—rather, the victor will be the military that stacks the deck in its advantage before conflict erupts. Russia’s current war in Ukraine highlights the severity of high-end armed conflict involving near-peer competitors. While great wartime effort is aimed at bolstering sustainment through industrial base and supply chain modernization, operational activities will eventually be curtailed to whatever pace can be sustained through resupply. The joint force’s future advantage will hinge on its ability to: 1) advantageously shape the environment and 2) field capabilities with greater speed, precision, and lethality than its adversary.

Shaping the environment

Shaping the environment is crucial to securing a position of advantage across multiple domains left of conflict. In the context of targeting and effects generation, activities to shape the environment must center around closing critical operational and intelligence gaps associated with a prioritized target list tied to operational plans. These activities are intended to enhance precision and lethality of engagement and shorten the kill chain once armed conflict begins. In line with the framework espoused in this report, focused understanding of the enemy’s order of battle, critical infrastructure, battle management tactics, techniques and procedures, and standard operating procedures is key to establishing and maintaining a prioritized target list. In this way, portions of the joint targeting cycle are accomplished prior to conflict, informing weaponeering recommendations across kinetic and non-kinetic effects, as well as the requirements necessary to develop new capabilities to counter enemy systems for which the joint force does not yet possess a solution.

Moreover, shaping activities can be geared toward increasing resiliency in the joint targeting process. Much attention is given to the challenges of contested, degraded, and operationally limited (CDO) environments and how they complicate traditional means by which the joint force projects combat power. Peer adversaries can contest environments in a multitude of ways such as anti-access/area denial capabilities, electromagnetic interference, countering space situational awareness, and defensive cyber operations. Shaping activities must prioritize alternate means of accomplishing warfighting functions given the potential for primary means to become denied or degraded. Ironically, the CDO nature of Russia’s war in Ukraine has led to a much more conventional and analogue fight than anticipated. This highlights the importance of bolstering resiliency through shaping operations, as peer adversary denial capabilities may effectively cancel out one another’s high-end platforms.

Shaping across the physical and virtual domains

As is the case throughout the competition continuum, the contact layer for armed conflict is both physical and virtual. Traditional physical targets include surface-to-air missile systems, radars, maritime vessels, and command posts, and they exist in quantities of hundreds or thousands; virtual targets include network nodes tied to communication systems, power infrastructure, situational awareness, and early warning, and they are quantified in the millions. When expanding the battlefield to the virtual domain, synchronization of kinetic and non-kinetic effects can lead to significant advantages across the joint warfighting functions¹⁷ and with regard to the principle of mass.

Gaining a competitive advantage traditionally depends on availability and posture: the forces available, and on what timeline, are determined by their current posture. In the physical world, this construct presents challenging time-distance problems when considering global conflicts, raising questions for both escalation management as well as force preservation. The virtual world can alter this paradigm by enabling virtual mass, leveraging cyber operations to hold adversary networks and capabilities at risk at unprecedented speed and scale. Even modest impact on adversary capabilities executed on this scale of mass and speed can complicate the enemy’s risk calculus and mitigate some risk associated with physical force flow into theater. Given the challenges of logistics and sustainment, efficiencies gained through the employment of virtual capabilities provide a significant advantage during a protracted conflict. Saying this, virtual capabilities are not a silver bullet and effects delivered through cyberspace are insufficient in isolation during armed conflict, and often require large up-front investment in time and resources.

The evolution of virtual targeting and effects, to include the integration with physical targeting and fires, drives a greater premium on shaping the environment prior to conflict. To hold millions of virtual targets at risk instantaneously necessitates significant preparation of the environment. Indeed, a multiyear campaign built around access and understanding—by, with, and through regional allies and partners—may be necessary to simply gain access to the right adversary networks. Development and installation of cyber capabilities would be executed in parallel, with the associated development and intelligence gaps feeding back into the overall campaign approach. Shaping campaigns can provide the decisive advantage once armed conflict begins, all while informing the joint force of its own potential vulnerabilities and thus allowing for continued defensive hardening in stride.

Capability development

While fielding innovative and advanced technologies is critical to maintaining a decisive battlefield advantage, technology (whether platform or software-based) does not on its own equate to capability.¹⁸ Rather, it is the combination of technology, tactics, and training that creates a true capability—for instance, the United States sells fifth-generation fighter jets to other nations, but those nations do not instantly gain the capability to execute low-observable deep strike operations. Technology development must be informed by an understanding of the operating environment, the capabilities of adversaries, and the nature by which the joint force executes operations. To that end, furthering capability development is an objective for the campaigning framework outlined in this paper.

Training AI/ML algorithms often emulates or requires real-world data, further underscoring the need for capability development to harness data for effect. While great strides have been made in emulation for training, the real world offers the most significant data, which is accessible through robust campaigning activities across the joint force in concert with interagency and international partners. The integration of emerging weapon system technology such as hypersonics, lasers, and space-based fires is equally critical. Capabilities such as JADC2 seek to establish the necessary datacentric architecture for seamless integration of information and effects, which span employment times from milliseconds to hours. However, without AI/ML-driven predictive capabilities in the loop, joint force commanders will be challenged to make appropriate targeting and weaponeering decisions amid a large-scale conflict, creating significant risk with respect to sustainment, logistics, and force protection. Without a similar distribution of situational awareness, authority, and capability to the tactical edge, the joint force will not be able to field a credible combat force in a CDO environment where being disconnected from higher headquarters is the norm.

Lastly, while security cooperation is a foundational activity underlying integrated deterrence, the execution of high-end combined arms warfare with allies and partners requires a great deal of specific investment. This includes years of combined training, exercises, and rehearsals to create a dependable capability, especially when factoring in the complexity of integrating emerging technology. Incorporating allies and partners into the joint force-led scheme of maneuver will be critical to maintaining an advantage in targeting and effects generation. However, information-sharing hurdles, disparate rules of engagement, authorities, and cultural considerations must be ironed out in advance of conflict such that the full force of allied firepower can be realized. Ensuring that key allies are fielding capabilities that are JADC2 compatible will be critical to achieving the shared situational awareness required for a common operating picture. Making strides of this nature and fielding a combat-credible combined force will not be accomplished through sporadic exercises, key leader engagements, or exchanges; the joint force must train with allies and partners in the same manner with which it trains internally.

In sum, high-end conflict with a peer adversary presents the most difficult and high-risk challenge, and it requires specific attention given the gravity of its nature. When adequately prioritized, preparation for armed conflict prescribes a unique set of requirements for the joint force and its partners to execute during cooperation and competition and across multiple domains and instruments of power, which at times may overlap or diverge from deterrence. Shaping activities of this nature fall expressly within the proposed proactive targeting and effects framework given that, in the event of war, “these capabilities will shape the environment to ensure combat dominance and our ability to end any conflict on our terms.”¹⁹

The way forward

If we don’t change – if we fail to adapt – we risk losing the certainty with which we have defended our national interests for decades. We risk losing a high-end fight.

— Gen Charles Q. Brown, Jr., US Air Force Chief of Staff²⁰

Implementing change is no easy task, especially when considering the massive scale of the joint force. Nonetheless, a tidal wave of contemporary strategies, guidance and policy documents, and service visions all speak to the urgent need for change. Culture—coupled with procedural and technological changes—will be key to enabling sustainable adoption of a new approach.

Culture: Adapting the joint force’s mindset to global problems across the competition continuum

First, to deter armed conflict the joint force must adopt and operationalize the competitive mindset shift outlined in recent strategic doctrine. While armed conflict is never desirable, regardless of scale, high-end warfare between nuclear-armed peer competitors is of such gravity that deterring it from ever occurring is crucial. General Mark A. Milley’s assertion that “traditional joint force deterrence” is “less effective,” alludes to the notion that owning the most sophisticated or greatest quantity of weaponry is inadequate on its own as a deterrent.²¹ Moreover, while an adversary’s belief in the joint force’s will to act is critical to deterrence, it cannot solely revolve around direct military force given escalation concerns. Rather, adopting a more proactive and creative approach to strategic competition can simultaneously deter malign behavior while complicating, confusing, and frustrating adversary decision-making. The spectrum of views on Russia’s war in Ukraine are informative in this regard: Some highlight US and NATO success in arming Ukraine in its valiant campaign to oppose Russia’s invasion, whereas others view the ongoing war as “a direct result of the West’s lack of resolve and failure to credibly deter Russia” from waging war on the European continent more broadly, regardless of NATO borders.²² This latter sentiment pushes the force to adopt cultural change in order to deter future conflicts. Of course, the United States cannot deter all conflicts from occurring. However, well-informed global campaign plans can and should inform the prioritization of operational activities tied to certain potential conflicts the joint force deliberately seeks to deter.

Incorporating all instruments of power

The joint force need not abandon its traditional strengths; rather, it ought to smartly evolve its approaches to incorporate all instruments of power to expand access, fuel understanding, and generate a range of options regardless of location within the competition continuum. Increased training and education on the nature of authorities and tools that the various instruments of power can bring to the fight is critical for joint leaders. In this way, entities like the State Department or Intelligence Community do not simply represent “concurrence” boxes that must be checked to get military operations approved. Rather, they can be incorporated as partners that offer unique access vectors, diverse understanding, and a variety of tools to support or be supported by military actions, whether at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels. As described in this framework, adopting this change bolsters the joint force’s capability to target within any domain, and similarly expands the nature of effects, fires, and actions available to achieve desired outcomes.

Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) exemplify this approach and could be scaled to enable joint targeting and effects generation. Scaling a similar approach to that of the JIATF, however, requires cultural adaptation. JIATFs are tailor-built to address singular problems and combine multiple instruments of power—and their accompanying authorities and capabilities—under a single chain of command to create unity of effort. However, unity of effort does not necessitate unity of command: The joint force can lead the integrated deterrence effort without being in charge, and it often does play a supporting role to its interagency counterparts. This requires senior leaders to establish a culture that moves beyond “coordination” and “deconfliction” and toward “collaboration.” Increased organizational trust, built upon real-world operational experiences, will increase trust both across departments and in the disparate datasets produced across the instruments of power, ultimately amplifying the predictive capabilities of the AI architecture this framework is reliant upon. Moving toward collaboration is similarly critical as it pertains to enhancing the aggregate power among allies and partners.

Embracing the global nature of problem sets

The joint force must also embrace the concept of a global, multi-domain contact layer. When viewing the world solely through the lens of armed conflict, the joint force focuses narrowly on Russia in Europe and the PRC in the Indo-Pacific. Targeting and effects generation in Latin America, Africa, or the Arctic are then insufficiently regarded as supporting, complementary, or niche efforts rather than as potential key components of integrated deterrence. Many operational efforts—such as security force assistance, building a partner’s combat capability, gaining access, and illuminating vulnerabilities of an adversary’s capabilities—require significant time and resource investments. Senior leaders must understand why, for example, a multiyear effort to gain placement and access in Equatorial Guinea fits within the global campaign to counter PRC malign influence; otherwise they will be less likely to resource it (in this case, Equatorial Guinea is a candidate for the establishment of what would be the PRC’s first Atlantic naval base).²³ As such, combatant commanders who lead global campaign plans, such as the global campaign plan for China, should prioritize regularly communicating their priorities to other combatant commands when activities take place in another geographic area of command. This is especially important when activity falls under the authority of a different combatant command.

Generating senior leader understanding is a by-product of cultivating a joint force that thinks with a competitive mindset. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph F. Dunford recognized, the United States “think[s] of being at peace or war…our adversaries don’t think that way.”²⁴ Altering the “peace or war” mentality to a deeper understanding of activities across the competition continuum—and adopting a strategy of proactive targeting harnessing all instruments of power—is necessary to simultaneously deter aggression and effectively prepare for conflict. Combatant command force structure changes; intergovernmental professional training, education, and exercises; and in-garrison and deployed intergovernmental cross-pollination are beyond the scope of this paper but are among concepts worth exploring to enable cultural changes at scale.

Technology and data: Building a resilient and holistic data architecture

The DOD must build a robust and extensive data architecture, fusing private sector data with government data, and build frameworks and standards to harness it into actionable information. Data fuels everything from access and understanding, to options, targeting, and analysis, to predictions and recommendations. For data to be usable, however, it must first be accessible. Accessibility must occur at echelon given the nature of CDO environments and the expectation that severed links between the tactical edge and higher headquarters elements will be the norm, not the exception.

The joint force needs a data architecture in line with, and as a central component of, the JADC2 concept that aggregates data from all sensors across all domains to enable a proactive framework for targeting and effect. The architecture must encompass the tactical edge, fusing commercial and government-procured data across a spectrum of classification levels. In line with the DoD Data Strategy, such an architecture must make data visible, accessible, understandable, linked, trustworthy, interoperable, and secure.²⁵ The DOD must involve the private sector in the process of building this architecture and consider how interoperability standards and technologies can be integrated and kept up to date. Not only will this help the joint force accelerate the PED cycle and act on intelligence, but it will also allow the joint force to operate across the scale of attribution to mitigate the operational and counterintelligence risks inherent to strategic competition.

Airmen from the 7th Reconnaissance Squadron communications flight conduct a satellite communications training course. Credit: US Air Force/ Senior Airman Ashley Richards

Moreover, the joint force must explore how classified intelligence can safely be used to facilitate AI/ML algorithmic training. Otherwise, it may inadvertently incur risk to sources, methods, or exquisite platforms. Alternatively, with the appropriate mechanisms, AI/ML algorithms can be trained to reach similar conclusions as classified analysis using only open-source data. This will greatly enhance the joint force’s ability to export capabilities to allies and partners without concern for security-sharing agreements or classification obstacles.

Authorities, rules of engagement, and risk: Updating DOD guidelines and standards

DOD guidelines and standards must be updated to harness all tools of national power and to enable combatant commands to prioritize global issues alongside their regional areas of responsibility. For distribution of data to achieve the desired effect, the joint force must explore changes in the distribution of authorities, rules of engagement, and the nature of assessing risk. While a lack of authorities is frequently cited as a barrier to accomplishing operational activities, it is often the cumbersome means by which to access existing authorities that stands in the way. If a joint force commander (JFC) can exercise kinetic strike authority at their level but require permission from several echelons higher to execute information operations, the JFC will increasingly rely on kinetic effects. Authorities often lack clear processes by which subordinate commanders can quickly access them. Similarly, when authorities are reserved at the highest echelons, the approval authority is farthest removed from the problem, lacks adequate understanding, and often leads to excessive risk aversion. This plays out with the array of authorities germane to the joint force and will only become more complex and burdensome when expanding the aperture to include other instruments of power. At a minimum, when the National Command Authority delegates authorities to combatant commanders, there ought to be a standardized and coherent process by which subordinate echelons of command can access them efficiently. Additionally, an effective JADO/JADC2 operating environment that collects, disseminates, and harnesses data requires more effective coordination across the US services and manufacturers. The development of standards must be pursued to advance capabilities that are interoperable across the joint force and with US allies. Doing so will help improve the speed and precision of the targeting cycle.

Second, streamlining the approach to accessing authorities goes hand in hand with updating the joint force’s rules of engagement. These concepts help mitigate the concerns around disparate joint force elements operating with degraded or nonexistent contact with higher headquarters elements. Rules of engagement allow for commanders to lead through intent instead of specific guidance, facilitating more rapid and creative localized targeting and effects generation. Distribution of authorities and associated rules of engagement could transform a unit’s guidance from “employ electronic warfare (EW) effects against Russian ORLAN-10s” to “disrupt Russian ISR below 5,000 feet AGL.” The former is prescriptive and limiting; the latter is intent based, provides greater flexibility, and informs the necessary capabilities for the tactical edge to operate autonomously for longer periods of time.

Finally, the department must rethink the way it assesses risk in light of integrated deterrence and a global contact layer. Making informed decisions on risk management is a key underpinning of this framework. Yet, risk assessments are traditionally conducted in a temporal manner: the risk associated with a particular activity, in a particular location, with a particular target. Risks associated with strategic competition are not, however, suited to traditional ways of thinking. Competing with adversaries across a global contact layer requires considering how local risk ties into strategic risk, whether that be transregional or trans-domain. This is further complicated by the imperative to effectively prepare the joint force for combat. If, for example, a particular PRC capability presented a significant problem for the joint force’s ability to execute a contingency response plan, significant investment may be required to mitigate the threat. This may lead to a scenario in which the joint force assumes greater risk elsewhere in the globe to gain access to locations where the PRC has proliferated similar capabilities to increase understanding and develop options for use during crisis. A similar situation could arise where the joint force makes the decision to reveal a capability it would otherwise hold in reserve to complicate an adversary’s decision-making and risk calculus, thus enhancing deterrence. Maturing the joint force’s ability to assess risk in this manner must begin with data-informed understanding, shared consciousness, and unity of effort across all instruments of power.

Conclusion

Cultivating a joint force that enables and supports a whole-of-government approach to integrated deterrence is a daunting yet achievable vision, requiring transformational leadership to achieve. “Humans are more important than hardware,” and how leaders harness the joint force’s enduring strategic advantage of human capital will dictate whether success is achieved.²⁶ This paper has outlined a vision to update the way the joint force conducts targeting and effects generation for an era of strategic competition. Evolving the joint force’s model for targeting and effects will require adopting a mindset shift that sees competition as key to setting the conditions for, and ideally avoiding, armed conflict. To truly operationalize integrated deterrence, the joint force must embrace targeting and effects across the competition continuum, leveraging the range of tools at its disposal across its domestic and international counterparts, and avoiding a solely military or kinetic lens. Moreover, through the power of AI, the DOD can harness data for effect and fuel the proactive, continuous, and global campaigning required for integrated deterrence.

About the authors

Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Department of Defense

Fellow

Justin M. Conelli

Senior US Air Force Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan National Security

Staff

Clementine G. Starling

Director, Forward Defense

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Staff

Julia Siegel

Associate Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, Intellectual Property—Patents, Patent Related Matters, Trademarks and Copyrights, 1 September 1998, this research paper is not copyrighted but is the property of the United States government.

Public Event Mon, May 22, 2023 • 10:30 am ET

1 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, February 2023, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23698400/20230213-joint-concept-for-competing-signed.pdf.

2 DOD guidance and Joint Doctrine, such as the integrated deterrence concept nested within the National Defense Strategy and the Joint Concept for Competing, recognize that security challenges facing the United States span the competition continuum. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, February 10, 2023, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23698400/20230213-joint-concept-for-competing-signed.pdf, and US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 2022, 8-11, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.

3 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, v.

4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfighting, Joint Publication 1 (JP 1), July 2019, II-13.

5 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 1.

6 Cesar Augusto Rodriguez, Timothy Charles Walton, and Hyong Chu, Putting the “FIL” into “DIME”: Growing Joint Understanding of the Instruments of Power, Joint Force Quarterly, April 2020, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1099537.pdf.

7 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, v.

8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Targeting, Joint Publication 3-60 (JP 3-60), September 2019, II-8 – 11-9.

9 Department of Defense, DOD Data Strategy, September 2020, i, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/08/2002514180/-1/-1/0/DOD-DATA-STRATEGY.PDF.

10 US Department of Defense, DoD Data Strategy, i.

11 US Department of Defense, DoD Data Strategy, 2.

12 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence, Joint Publication 2-0 (JP 2-0), May 2022, I-2.

13 US Department of Defense, Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) Strategy, March 2022, 4, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/17/2002958406/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-THE-JOINT-ALL-DOMAIN-COMMAND-AND-CONTROL-STRATEGY.PDF.

14 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 401.

15 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Campaigns and Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (JP 3-0), June 2022, xxx.

16 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, 22.

17 The joint warfighting functions include command and control, information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment.

18 Tate Nurkin, The Five Revolutions: Examining Defense Innovation in the Indo-Pacific Region, Atlantic Council, November 20, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Five-Revolutions-Report.pdf.

19 Department of Defense, Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy, October 2020, 1, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/02/2002510472/-1/-1/0/Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.PDF.

20 Charles Q. Brown, Accelerate Change or Lose, US Air Force, August 2020, https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/csaf/CSAF_22/CSAF_22_Strategic_Approach_Accelerate_Change_or_Lose_31_Aug_2020.pdf.

21 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing.

22 Liam Collins and Frank Sobchak, “U.S. Deterrence Failed in Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, February 20, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/20/ukraine-deterrence-failed-putin-invasion/.

23 David Vergun, “General Says China Is Seeking a Naval Base in West Africa,” US Department of Defense, March 17, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2969935/general-says-china-is-seeking-a-naval-base-in-west-africa/

24 Dunford: Challenges Require More Than ‘Buying New Hardware,’ Association of the United Stated Army, October 10, 2016, https://www.ausa.org/news/dunford-challenges-require-new-hardware.

25 US Department of Defense, DOD Data Strategy.

26 US Special Operations Command, “SOF Truths,” https://www.socom.mil/about/sof-truths.

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Restocking US and allies’ arsenals starts with getting industry involved at the NATO summit

Giedrimas Jeglinskas and Viltaute Zarembaite — Thu, 08 Jun 2023 13:45:11 +0000

Defense industry chief executive officers and the leaders of NATO members and partner countries need to have an urgent discussion about insufficient stockpiles of ammunition and equipment. The NATO Leaders’ Summit July 11-12 in Vilnius, Lithuania, is a perfect opportunity to bring them together.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg summed up the problem last week. “So far allies have depleted stocks to be able to support Ukraine—that’s not a sustainable path so we need to ramp up production to fill these new and more ambitious targets,” he explained. The will to support Ukraine for “as long as it takes” is there, but the capacity to deliver support while also defending NATO members is also needed.

According to the Kiel Institute, Ukraine has received more than seventy billion dollars in military aid since Russia’s full-scale invasion started on February 24, 2022. While this figure is large and the aid has contributed to Ukraine’s ability to resist and later repel the Russian invasion, Ukrainian forces need more ammunition and equipment to finish the job. However, the countries supporting Ukraine are struggling to produce enough vital defense materiel. Ukraine is burning through ammunition a lot faster than NATO countries currently manufacture it.

Massive industrial bottlenecks in manufacturing of artillery shells and related equipment, if unresolved, threaten to undermine efforts to help the Ukrainians push out the invaders. Stoltenberg has dubbed it a “race of logistics,” and more than Ukraine’s future is at stake. The readiness of US and allied militaries is put at risk by ineffectively designed supply chains, cumbersome process-focused procurement, and political wrangling. This incapacity to replenish allies’ ammunition stocks and equipment undermines the deterrence posture of NATO as a whole.

Similarly, the US defense industry has been slow to deliver enough munitions to Taiwan as it faces increased saber-rattling from the People’s Republic of China. A recent report by Seth G. Jones at the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that, in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the United States would deplete certain long-range munitions in less than a week. As allies such as Australia and Japan start to ramp up defense spending, the US defense industry will need to deliver more weapons to meet the increasing demand.

In Europe, the defense industry revival is not fairing any better. In May, after weeks of negotiations, the European Union (EU) announced a one-billion-euro initiative to procure ammunition for Ukraine “via the European Union industry and Norway.” This initiative, however, has faced multiple stumbling blocks and delays as certain countries have prioritized defending the interests of national industries and using protectionist measures to purchase ammunition only from European companies. EU leaders appear to have decided to move forward, but it is clear that both the structure of the initiative and its lack of scale will not solve the long-term underinvestment issues in Europe. This is despite the level of ambition outlined in the EU’s Strategic Compass for Security and Defense last year and important progress made on the issue since.

What can be done?

Looking to history, the urgency and unity shown as allied—primarily US—industry mass produced equipment for World War II is nowhere to be found in today’s production process. The Atlantic Council’s Thomas S. Warrick recently advocated for “the Department of Defense to shift procurement to a wartime footing.” However, even short of this proposal, the United States and its allies and partners can nonetheless launch a coordinated effort to overcome industrial and bureaucratic constraints. It also must include both the governments and heads of industry responsible for stocking any future arsenal of democracy.

Representatives from the defense industry have already been invited by NATO to participate in a meeting of defense ministers in Brussels later this month. However, more is needed. The Vilnius summit in July is an important opportunity to further advance engagement with the defense industry, which NATO can do by holding an official side event for government officials to meet with the chief executive officers of the defense industry. Here they could all get on the same page about the true urgency of inadequate defense value chains. Defense contractors would benefit from direct awareness-raising conversations at the highest political level. In exchange, policymakers would benefit from hearing directly from defense contractors about what policies are necessary to streamline their production processes.

This would be taking a page out of Japan’s playbook. On the eve of last month’s Group of Seven (G7) Hiroshima summit, seven of the world’s largest semiconductor makers met with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in Tokyo to discuss plans to significantly increase Japan’s chipmaking capabilities. The unprecedented meeting demonstrated a concerted effort between the private and public sectors to reshape global commercial supply chains as tensions with China continue to grow.

Productive collaboration with the defense industry is essential not only for replenishing stockpiles and maintaining a steady supply of armaments, but also for addressing a wider range of future concerns, spanning from information sharing to cybersecurity and resilience. Developing a strong partnership with the defense industry will be vital for advancing in these areas. So, where might this collaboration start?

First, NATO’s Vilnius summit will be the second time in a row when Asia-Pacific partners are participating, offering opportunities to look into diversifying supply chains across Europe and North America and into the Indo-Pacific.

Second, allies need to rethink process-centered procurement, which avoids rather than manages risk and consumes massive financial and time resources rather than promptly delivering what is necessary. Anyone who has ever dealt with the notorious procurement schemes will agree that change is impossible without forceful political will. In Vilnius, heads of the defense industry and NATO member states could commit to pursue new and specific orders and deliverables, the fulfillment of which could help reorganize or override currently inefficient procurement processes.

Third, to truly empower NATO’s innovation efforts, such as the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic and the NATO Innovation Fund, industry leaders must commit to advancing these nascent initiatives. As disruptive technologies mature and become essential for future defense capabilities, a closer collaboration between the private sector and governments is needed to bridge the investment gaps and avoid the “valleys of death,” in which small but high-potential companies are left in limbo between initial development and production. In order to maintain technological edge and bring more companies and innovation into the defense space, NATO needs to boost investment in cutting-edge technologies and make its innovation cycle more efficient and robust.

The task of rebuilding the arsenal of democracy is a complex multi-stakeholder endeavor. What is required is a robust no-nonsense collaboration between an industry that can deliver and governments that can lead with political decisions to enable relevant industrial policies. Vilnius is a great place to start.

Giedrimas Jeglinskas is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He was previously assistant secretary general for executive management at NATO and deputy minister of defense of the Republic of Lithuania.

Viltaute Zarembaite is a visiting fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is also a career diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania. These views are her own and do not reflect those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania.

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How the United States and Poland can use this moment to reshape transatlantic security

Daniel Fried — Thu, 01 Jun 2023 21:18:31 +0000

As Russia’s war against Ukraine rages on, US-Polish relations have returned to prime strategic importance on the global stage. But for the two transatlantic allies, it is no time for celebration or to look back to past achievements; the United States and Poland must focus on the urgent problems of now.

That was the takeaway for a group of leaders from the Atlantic Council who consulted with Poles, on the frontier of war, in a series of events on May 22-25 called “Warsaw Week”— timed to the first anniversary of the reestablishment of the Atlantic Council’s Warsaw Office.

The strategic importance of US-Polish relations today recalls its importance at the end of the Cold War. In 1989, the United States backed the Solidarity movement in overthrowing communism in favor of democracy, the first Soviet-controlled country to do so. The George H. W. Bush administration provided critical economic support that helped Poland’s early democratic governments transform the Polish economy, ushering in a generation of growing prosperity. In the early 1990s, Poles pushed the United States to open NATO’s door, seeking to erase the legacy of the Iron Curtain. The Clinton administration listened and led. With Poland and its neighbors having attained NATO membership, and later having secured European Union (EU) membership, the goal of a united, free Europe seemed at hand—and governments on both sides of the Atlantic were willing and even eager to work with what seemed a new, less-imperial Russia.

But Russian leader Vladimir Putin had other ideas. Embittered by the fall of Soviet power, he has sought by pressure and war to restore the Russian Empire, an empire that included Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic countries, Poland, Finland, Moldova, and the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. He has deployed energy pressure, nuclear threats, disinformation, and other tools in the hopes of intimidating key Western powers to turn away from Ukraine and recognize Moscow’s domination of it.

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2023 Warsaw Week

This series of events hosted by the Europe Center’s Warsaw Office celebrates the US-Polish partnership and the countries’ leadership in the transatlantic community.

Poland

Thus, history has brought the United States and Poland together again, with an opportunity to shape transatlantic security. Here’s where they should start, as outlined at Warsaw Week’s public convenings and private meetings, including one between Polish President Andrzej Duda and the Atlantic Council’s delegation:

Poland and the United States must keep Ukraine front and center. They succeeded at Warsaw Week, where the representatives from Poland across the political spectrum and the Atlantic Council were united in agreement that there should be no premature ceasefire that gives Russia de facto possession of Ukrainian land and people. Poles urged the United States to continue and intensify its provision of weapons to Ukraine (and the Americans at Warsaw Week agreed). Poles and Americans alike tried to look ahead to Ukraine’s reconstruction and, hopefully, to its post-war transformation and integration with European and transatlantic institutions; they also discussed the future of European energy security and ways to accelerate the Three Seas Initiative to support infrastructure development in Europe’s eastern tier countries.

Poles and Americans also explored ways to secure Ukraine after this phase of the war ends, including what the NATO Summit in Vilnius this summer (and the NATO Washington Summit in 2024) can do to prevent Ukraine from ending up in a gray zone of insecurity, knowing that gray zones can look to the Kremlin like green lights. After Warsaw Week, both Poland and the United States will need to move forward on these various efforts to support Ukraine.

The United States and Poland, with their allies and partners, will need to keep the transatlantic alliance united through what may be tough challenges ahead. Poland’s dark assessments of Putin’s Russia proved prescient. Some Western European governments, especially Germany, are now grappling with the consequences of Putin’s use of military and energy aggression and have adopted less hopeful (and more realistic) assessments of their relations with Russia. The transatlantic alliance is closer to full agreement on how to contend with Putin’s Russia than it has ever been. With the battle for Ukraine hanging in the balance, operationalizing this convergence of views is critical.

Poland and the United States will also need to champion the democratic values that are at the heart of their national traditions—and that form the foundation of their relations. At Warsaw Week, politics (hot and divisive in both countries) came up many times. There were questions about whether US neo-isolationist forces will weaken US support for Ukraine and even for NATO’s defense of its own members against potential Russian aggression. There were also questions about Polish domestic politics, and more specifically about whether those politics would complicate work with Germany and even Ukraine, to the detriment of strategic goals and the benefit of Putin.

In both Poland and the United States, authoritarian temptation—a crouching demon—exists. Elections, approaching in both countries, can bring out anti-democratic temptations, such as repeats of the 2021 attempt in the United States to subvert the electoral process or exploitation of the recently enacted Polish law on Russian influence to go after the political opposition. As always in such moments, the United States and Poland must take inspiration from their best traditions, their better angels.

Warsaw Week was no ordinary week of talks and events. It was productive and forward-looking, filled with a sense of potential success for Ukraine and the free world. But it was also intense and serious, both fitting the times. Poles and Americans alike will have to follow through on the ways ahead that they charted at Warsaw Week.

Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former US ambassador to Poland.

Watch a playlist of the week’s events

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Autonomy and asymmetry: The future of Norway’s defense 2022-2042

August Cole — Thu, 01 Jun 2023 14:20:16 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

Issue brief release

If Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 spurred a reassessment of European security, it also served as a poignant reminder to Norway of how quickly armed conflict can require, if not force, transformation of military technologies and norms to better prepare for future wars. In a matter of months, NATO members, including Norway, coalesced to respond with direct lethal military aid to Ukraine.¹ Soon after, Finland and Sweden joined NATO, creating a Scandinavian bloc for the first time since the alliance was founded in 1949. Russia’s brinksmanship over European energy also raised the strategic value of—and risk to—Norway’s oil and gas sector.

Against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict, it is time to revisit assumptions in Norway about how armed conflict will evolve from today through 2042 and what that means for Norway’s defense technology priorities in relation to threats from Russia and beyond. The lessons of how Ukraine and Russia employ emergent technologies in a war that seems to have one boot in the past and one in the future should prompt deep introspection about Norway’s military operations.

Some of the key technological concepts raised in this examination will be familiar, but what differs is how they can be employed in disruptive ways. For example, military officers should consider whether to defend Norwegian territory with mechanized forces in depth at the border or whether to draw in an adversary’s land and naval forces to better destroy them on familiar ground with armed autonomous drones. Other issues are new, such as defining the responsible use of autonomously armed drones inside Norway’s northern territory during a wartime scenario with Russia or China. Many of these technological advances have roots in civilian innovations, such as artificial intelligence (AI) software and commercial drones. All of them require facing the uncomfortable aspects of disruption that require reappraisal of whether the way things were done in the past will be sufficient to confront the present and future world as it is, not as we wish. While Norway is a core member of NATO and will soon remake longstanding defense partnerships with Sweden and Finland, it should not shy away from its own technology-forward approach to national security.

Norway’s challenge—and opportunity

The challenge

Norway’s armed forces are historically small in number, yet this highly professional force has transformed in recent years to perform myriad twenty-first-century missions that are unique to the nation. As a NATO member, it must defend Europe’s longest coastline, patrol the skies over the stormy and strategically vital North Atlantic, and maintain a small but economically and culturally vital border with Russia. It must also jointly protect Arctic interests such as Svalbard and natural ocean resources, in addition to assuring cyber and electronic infrastructure. It also has a fresh mandate to reimagine defense cooperation with new Scandinavian NATO allies Sweden and Finland.

A B-52H Stratofortress assigned to the 23rd Expeditionary Bomb Squadron flies over Norway during a Bomber Task Force mission March 16, 2023. Credit: US Air Force/ Senior Airman Zachary Wright

The challenge for Norway today involves countering growing numbers of potential asymmetric threats in each of these areas posed by the new technologies changing warfare, while traditional military threats requiring highly capable conventional forces have not gone away. Furthermore, Russia’s military failures in Ukraine are no guarantee that future operations will not succeed or at least be catastrophically harmful to Norway. Russia will certainly reform its military after the war in Ukraine. Moscow will likely address many of the operational shortcomings exposed by the conflict and may even accelerate their technological transformation.

It is tempting to assess Norway’s current and future military by its budget or the number of active-duty troops or squadrons of fighter jets. After all, the force is half the size it was at the end of the Cold War.² Yet spending has more than doubled since then to reach historical highs as the force has incorporated more technology.³ It is unlikely that Norway’s military will grow in end strength to past peaks, which therefore requires a fresh way of thinking about military strength and the role that technology can play in it. Moreover, Norway’s growing population of ageing citizens may pose challenges to filling the ranks of the armed forces.⁴

The opportunity

Recent advancements in robotics, software, satellites, and autonomy place a new onus on Norway’s leaders to carefully consider the technological possibilities in areas such as robotic systems capable of supplanting human forces, powerful individual weapons to target aircraft and armored vehicles, and lower-cost commercial geospatial data. Technological asymmetries can be turned into advantages with the right policies and investment. As such, this review offers an opportunity to consider how the above challenges can be addressed with investment in new technological capabilities that link to current and near-future warfare trends. It reflects observations from the conflict in Ukraine, such as:

Commercial space is vital for situational awareness and communications.
Defending civilians requires hard power because laws and norms are insufficient.
Mobile phones and AI create new battlefield transparency and cognitive effects.
Civilian expertise in AI, drones, and software is central to tactical operations.

Norway must also contend with more than the threat of Russia. As NATO recently asserted at its Madrid Summit in 2022: “We face systemic competition from those, including the People’s Republic of China, who challenge our interests, security, and values and seek to undermine the rules-based international order.”⁵ Irrespective of recent public tension between Beijing and Moscow, China’s military interoperability with Russia continues to expand, particularly in the Arctic.⁶ China’s growing defense-industrial capabilities, particularly in autonomy, hypersonic missiles, offensive space capabilities, and advanced shipbuilding portend Russia-like consideration of Beijing’s strategic interests and how military presence, if not force, may be used.

Norway’s military posture today also embodies a useful tension between high-tech platforms and traditional defense. Fifth-generation F-35 fighters patrol Arctic skies flying tens of thousands of feet over small-unit, long-range reconnaissance foot patrols along the Russian-Norway border. This is a useful paradigm for understanding how emergent technologies can contribute to Norway’s security, but not at the expense of common sense or overreliance on vulnerable systems.

The following concepts reflect this realistic understanding of what is not only technologically possible, but politically or culturally feasible. At the same time, it should be clear that some of the ideas offer a path that will lead to clear departures from traditional ways of thinking about the Norwegian military and how it employs technology. It would be easy to discount the concepts discussed as too radical. Even with that categorical reaction, it is worth considering the rationale behind them because they address underlying truths that future conflict will be waged at machine speed, with increasing autonomy, and involve greater peril to civilian populations from cognitive and kinetic effects.

Norway’s solutions

Thinking clearly about the future of warfare and technology’s role in it requires imagination. Yet such thinking must also remain anchored to a central line of questioning. In this case, the crucial questions focus on threats, priorities, and operations:

What technology areas will create new or amplify existing threats to such an extent that they will affect the defense sector in the next ten to twenty years?
What technology areas should the defense sector emphasize in order to avoid weakened defence capabilities in relation to Russia in the next ten to twenty years?
What types of technology should the defense sector use to maximize interoperability with allies and partners for the next ten to twenty years?

U.S. Marines work together with the Norwegian Army to conduct offensive and defensive operations at the battalion and brigade-level during Exercise Reindeer II in Blåtind, Norway. Credit: US Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Timothy J. Lutz

These questions lead to the conclusion that, to prevail in a high- or mixed-intensity war with Russia over the next two decades, Norway should invest in next-generation situational awareness and targeting, as well as seek-and-destroy weapons systems capable of semi- or fully autonomous target selection.

The Norwegian flag waves in the wind in Trondheim, Norway, June 20, 2022. Credit: U.S. Marine Corps/ Cpl. Brendan Mullin

As an example, traditional mechanized armored forces are still vital to domestic and foreign military operations. Yet the introduction of Sweden and Finland as NATO members allows for a reconsideration of how Norway should defend Finnmark at a time when heavy armored vehicles are increasingly vulnerable to both long- and close-range weapons systems. Instead, small, fast-moving, lightly armored units equipped with short- and medium-range strike weapons like rocket artillery, as well as organic anti-air and anti-drone defense systems, can have the same or greater destructive capability at greater range, but with less exposure to Russian artillery or long-range missiles fired from within Russian territory than traditional units. In the air, fifth-generation fighters like the F-35 will jointly defend Scandinavian airspace with the aid of autonomous unmanned fighter and ground attack aircraft, while providing crucial data and sensing capabilities to ground and maritime forces. Norway’s naval forces will necessarily operate with squadrons of distributed manned and unmanned squadrons for surface and undersea missions given the growing lethality of Russian and Chinese anti-ship missiles.⁷ As part of a renewed Scandinavian defense, Norway could become a regional or European leader in such autonomous and human-machine teamed systems by partnering with US and other allied software, sensors, and robotics programs. This would represent a new specialization for the Forsvaret of the late 2020s and 2030s and complement Swedish and Finnish capabilities.

Threats 2022-2042: What technology areas will create new or amplify existing threats to such an extent that they will affect the defense sector in the next ten to twenty years?

There is a long list of military-oriented or specific defense technologies that will have a significant impact on the threat environment Norway faces. Some, such as synthetic biology or quantum computing, have the potential to be truly game-changing in the near future. Yet the following three military technology threats that fuse next-generation software, AI, and breakthrough hardware are already extremely consequential, whether Russia or another nation employs them:

Space-based surveillance, communications, and offensive systems;
Inexpensive autonomous armed drones and unmanned ground systems; and
Smartphones and AI-personalized cognitive and kinetic warfare.

Space data

This is a new era for commercial space-based data from small satellites that has major implications for future warfare. Precise and accurate information about imagery on Earth is now accessible and relatively affordable due to a new generation of inexpensive and ultimately disposable satellites. At the same time, advances in AI make processing this new wave of data much faster and more reliable. Recently, space-based surveillance has proven extremely effective for the Ukrainian military for establishing situational awareness and targeting their operations against Russian forces. Norway’s sensitive maritime oil and gas resources and infrastructure are likely one such target of persistent space-based surveillance. This space-based approach is also part of a solution to protecting those same commercial assets. The emerging market for data from space will make hiding—and defending—much more difficult in the 2020s and 2030s, as will small satellite constellations owned by nation states.⁸ As precision weapons like rocket artillery and armed drones proliferate, the ability to locate targets from space will become increasingly important, particularly in contested airspace.

With communications, the Starlink space-based internet connectivity platform shows the military effectiveness of small satellite alternatives to terrestrial networks during wartime.⁹ For Norway, this is both risk and opportunity. Defensive fortifications or movement of material, for example, will be detected immediately. At the same time, purchased satellite data offers near real-time access to information on Russian preparations and movement.

Robotic autonomy

The past three years revealed a growing profile for drones in warfare, from the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict¹⁰ to Ukraine’s present battlefields, even with the rudimentary level of control and semi-autonomy that exists today. Small and inexpensive drones can now be equipped with AI-powered target-recognition systems, as well. As drones move from surveillance roles to regularly attacking targets, this will only grow and evolve tactics. Russia’s experience in Ukraine with drones shows a willingness to regularly employ them in warfare, and its import of foreign-made drones such as Iran’s indicates Moscow will continue employing armed drones.¹¹ Many nations are proliferating drone systems, including China as a leading exporter. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s crowd-sourced and civilian-driven drone innovation shows a new leading technological edge, while its military flies Turkey’s TB2 drone that can operate largely autonomously.

Members of the Office of Naval Research, based out of Washington, D.C., launch the REMUS 600 autonomous underwater vehicle for mine search and identification operations off the coast of Bornholm Island in support of exercise Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) 2018, June 7. Credit: U.S Navy/ Chief Mass Communication Specialist America A. Henry

A mix of heterogenous robotic capabilities will be a staple of future conflicts. Armed ground systems are poised to emerge onto battlefields, as well, in a replication of the aerial drone evolution. The recent Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipeline explosions point to the sort of high-consequence strategic economic attack that an undersea robotic system might carry out in the future with greater autonomy and therefore stealth.¹² The significant shift ahead will involve systems operating without that control stations and high-bandwidth communications that are necessary today. To that end, NATO is reportedly preparing a strategy for the responsible use of autonomy, in another recognition of evolving robotic systems. Even if NATO members adhere to such guidelines, it is unclear whether states such as Russia or China will do so even as they develop and employ autonomous weapons systems.¹³

Smartphones and AI

Smartphones are ubiquitous on twenty-first-century battlefields, but their use has evolved during the past few years, leading to new tactical and strategic implications. There is a developing fusion of AI-powered image processing, scaling information, and cognitive campaigns using social media, and ever-more refined kinetic and electronic targeting capabilities honing in on mobile devices. Just as space-based surveillance creates new levels of operational transparency, the proliferation of high-quality smartphone cameras linked to cloud computing means that as soon as information is identified with a handheld device it can be shared across civilian or military networks, not just social media. In a recent example, Ukraine’s software developers have created apps that can alert citizens in real-time to air raids, while the government’s eVorog chat program enables registered users to rapidly report Russian equipment or personnel, data which is screened by AI.¹⁴

Just as smartphones are sensors, they are vectors of information—and disinformation. The contest to capture an individual’s attention and influence their emotional state or real-world actions is in effect an evolution toward cognitive warfare, which could see the precision targeting of individuals at scale using new AI systems.¹⁵ Among those systems are text-generating tools called large language models, which have the ability to churn out an unending stream of realistic, human-like writing on social media and elsewhere. The open-source LLM Bloom features forty-six languages and thirteen programming languages.¹⁶ Image generation and manipulation tools using AI are also proliferating as easy-to-use programs, with social media consumer apps offering a preview.¹⁷ In Ukraine, deep fakes quickly emerged in the conflict with a spoofed video of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky ordering Ukrainian forces to stand down.¹⁸ Both of these software capabilities will increasingly be managed by AI programs themselves, a form of autonomy that is going to influence everything from propaganda to civil discourse during conflict.

Priorities and interoperability 2022-2042: What technology areas should the defense sector emphasize in order to avoid weakened defense capabilities in relation to Russia over the next ten to twenty years and how might they reinforce interoperability with allies and partners?

The other side of risk from technologies changing warfare is opportunity. The same inventions and innovation that exacerbate current and future threats to Norway also indicate where to focus research and investment. This requires consideration of Russian military capability and investment plans, as well as a realistic assessment of their effective execution over the next two decades. Caution is needed, however, in assuming the failures of Russian forces in Ukraine¹⁹ will contribute to the failings of late 2020s and 2030s Russian military forces. While military reform of the past five years in Russia has proven to be hollow, it is also possible that the same mistakes will not be made again. Either way, there are enduring aspects to the threat Russia poses to Norwegian territory and Norwegian forces operating abroad in support of NATO: threatening Arctic and North Sea lines of communication (including Svalbard), air-defense denial zones over Scandinavia, seizing and holding territory in Finnmark through massed armor, medium- and long-range precision and area weapons fired from inside Russia, as well as cyberattacks and “gray zone” operations.

Each of the following priorities addresses these threats:

Autonomous aerial, maritime, and ground systems for rural or open territory (surveillance, logistics, attack);
Small unit anti-armor, anti-ship, and anti-air: Javelin in every closet; and
Commercial space access and support

Autonomy 3.0

In the era of software-driven warfare, the ability to mass large numbers of forces still rings true—even if it strikes a different note. Advances in robotics and AI-powered autonomous systems will enable nations to mass forces differently than in the past, and in ways that are difficult for conventional defenses to counter. It also opens new avenues for defense. Today’s swarm-capable munitions like the Naval Strike Missile already show the potential of such systems and preview how they might develop.
Consider that Norwegian military forces must cover over 385,000 square kilometers of territory and more than 25,000 kilometers of coastline. Using unmanned and largely autonomous systems to patrol Norwegian territory would allow for the judicious use of manned platforms such as F-35 fighters or Norway’s six Skjold-class missile ships. Many strategic areas in Arctic Scandinavia, such as Cap of the North where Finland, Norway, and Sweden share interests and territory, are sparsely populated yet constitute significant land and maritime portions of each country. With traditional mechanized forces, such an area is difficult to patrol, let alone defend. Using more numerous autonomous air, ground, and sea systems for joint or unilateral patrolling, logistics support, and deterrence would allow for extending that presence beyond what has been traditionally possible.

Take the example of Norwegian military patrols on oil and gas infrastructure in the wake of the Nord Stream pipeline attacks: this presents a resource challenge to the Forsvaret if this mission becomes an enduring one.²⁰ Such persistent surveillance and interdiction missions are well suited to autonomous maritime and air systems whose data is collected and sorted by AI onboard or on the ground. Yet current unmanned aerial systems (UAS) spending in the air domain, for example, is less than 1 percent of 2021-2028 Norwegian Defense Ministry forecasts, and land domain spending for UAS is under 5 percent.²¹

Similar explorations of operational trade-offs are underway with the US Marine Corps Force Design 2030 reforms.²² By giving up main battle tanks and some fighter aircraft, the Marine Corps seeks to reinvest those resources in smaller units of infantry supported by robotic and autonomous systems whose military capabilities are on par with the conventional weapons they replace. Moreover, it will allow Marines to operate near China, often without direct support from conventional US military resources, and deploy a new generation of unmanned platforms, such as the NMESIS robotic wheeled vehicle armed with Naval Strike Missiles or the Metal Shark autonomous ship armed with loitering munitions.²³

Norwegian Leopard tank crews from the Telemark Battalion prepare for a live-fire exercise in Rena, Norway. Credit: US Marines

One of the abiding defensive challenges is how to protect Finnmark and southern Norway from a Russian incursion in the north. In the case of such a scenario, a Brigade North defensive line in or south of Finnmark could be reinforced and patrolled with autonomous ground and air vehicles, which could be armed and tasked with deterring or interdicting Russian forces. Similarly, an ongoing challenge of regional resupply to Finnmark during wartime could be addressed with the new generation of autonomous cargo aircraft.²⁴ Similar tactics could be used with unmanned maritime surface and undersea systems along Norway’s extensive coastline for patrol and supply. Because such autonomous robotic platforms’ software can train in AI-powered synthetic environments, they can be readied for wartime use without requiring as much real-world training.²⁵ They also allow for reconsidering the composition of land units, such as the Norwegian Army’s Brigade North. Acknowledging the break with traditional conceptions of military force and the attendant operational ethics issues of weaponized autonomy, a shift by the Norwegian military to employ autonomous robotic systems compensating for its end strength would allow for a novel way to counter massed (or dispersed) Russian ground forces with less risk and greater precision.

However, robotic systems have their own logistical challenges and operational limits. Yet there is existing software and robotics expertise in Norwegian society, which could be developed as a national resource of expertise in developing robotics for austere environments. The likely growing use of autonomous weapons systems by Russia and China necessitates ensuring those nations will not take a lead that will be difficult to close operationally—or ethically.

Small unit combat capability

The iconic imagery of “St. Javelin” as a pop-culture meme in Ukraine underscores how significant soldier-portable anti-armor systems like the FGM-148 Javelin are in an era of persistent surveillance and targeting.²⁶ Indeed, the United States and NATO members supplied Ukraine some 17,000 Javelins in less than a week in March.²⁷ What advantage Russia had with its armored forces was radically reduced by the proliferation of these portable anti-armor weapons. Other models have been rushed to Ukraine, as well. Of course, most of these weapons were shipped hurriedly after Russia invaded Ukraine. Whether they would have had a deterrent effect on Moscow were they already in place is debatable. Yet it is undeniable that they would be able to thwart the free movement of spearhead armor units and harass supply columns. The same could be achieved in Norway, particularly in Finnmark, by acquiring highly portable and concealable anti-tank missiles like the Javelin so that Norwegian Army and Home Guard forces have access not to hundreds, but thousands of missiles and launchers.

The Norwegian military’s approach to territorial defense, beyond deploying in support of NATO in the Baltics, would be aligned with technology trendlines converging on small units that can find their own targets with their own drones and access to satellite imagery, then attack them with their own anti-armor or weapons systems before dispersing. These are not partisan tactics from the 1980s, but a networked approach to small-unit warfare that exploits an invading adversary’s need to consolidate force around seized terrain. Portable anti-air, anti-ship, and anti-drone systems could also be dispersed along similar lines to deny airspace access from lower-altitude threats from attack drones and helicopters, as well as close-air support jets. As a model, reforms by the US Marine Corps to increase the combat power of small units portends this nearly inevitable reform of combined arms forces in high-threat contested environments.²⁸

Geospatial data and communications

Geospatial data from civilian satellites for military operations are becoming increasingly affordable—and effective. From exposing Chinese government transformation of South China Sea reefs²⁹ into military facilities to documenting pre-invasion Russian troop movements and wartime human rights violations in Ukraine,³⁰ there is a revolution underway with commercial space satellites. Norway is already active in the military space domain, including Norwegian satellites carrying Arctic communications payloads for the US Space Force.³¹ The Svalbard Archipelago, one of the world’s most important collections of satellite ground stations, naturally positions Norway as a space-oriented nation.³² This new generation of satellites and data represents a new opportunity for this status to evolve with the technology.

While conventional military- or intelligence-grade satellites can cost hundreds of millions of kroner, it is no longer necessary to outright acquire them. Defense spending plans for military space—at less than 1 percent of 2021-2028 spending in the space domain³³ —are relatively small and may be insufficient given the high-bandwidth requirements of military systems of the late 2020s and 2030s. Commercial imagery or communications bandwidth is available with “space as a service,” as are other orbital services related to specific terrestrial sensing tasks. This is already an area of interest and investment for many NATO member militaries, including the United States.³⁴ As the economic value of space activity grows, so does its strategic value. Yet much of that value will come from geospatial data or bandwidth from commercial assets, such as Starlink has shown in Ukraine. To that end, Svalbard’s military importance is only going to grow. The severing of an undersea fibre-optic cable from Svalbard to mainland Norway in January 2022 indicates the potential strategic vulnerability there and its potential as a target from Russian forces or interests.³⁵

Conclusion

These are vital questions considering how new technologies like lower cost geospatial data, AI-powered information campaigns, increasingly powerful individual anti-armor and anti-air weapons, and autonomous vehicles and aircraft could be used to reimagine the defense of Norway, as well as support Forsvaret operations abroad. Russia may be the near-term focus, but these explorations are also applicable to other strategically important areas, such as the growing importance of Arctic trade routes to nations like China. Allies and partners are essential, not just operationally in the defense of Norway but in how the nation prepares for the unthinkable. There are also lessons to be drawn elsewhere regarding technology and transformation, such as the Force Design 2030 reform of the United States Marine Corps, and emerging concepts around the civilian-military composition of combat units using new capabilities like drones. The war in Ukraine offers myriad hard-won lessons, too, but it is important to remember that Russia in 2022 will be different than the Russia of 2032 or 2042. For all the focus on technology and the questions about the future of Norway’s defense, it is impossible to understand, and prepare for, the kinds of technologies that will shape future conflicts without remaining focused on the human experience of twenty-first century warfare.

This essay was originally written for the Norwegian Defense Commission, which is reviewing Norway’s security and defense policies of the next ten to twenty years.

About the author

Fellow

August Cole

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

1 “Will donate Hellfire missiles and night vision equipment to Ukraine,” Norway Ministry of Defence, August 9, 2022, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/donerer-hellfire-missiler-og-nattoptikk-til-ukraina/id2926713/.

2 “Armed forces personnel, total – Norway,” World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1?locations=NO.

3 “Armed forces personnel, total – Norway,” World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1?locations=NO.

4 “A historic shift: More elderly than children and teenagers,” Statistisk Sentralbyra, June 3, 2020, https://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/a-historic-shift-more-elderly-than-children-and-teenagers.

5 “Madrid Summit Declaration,” NATO, June 29, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_196951.htm.

6 “NATO head warns about Russian, Chinese interest in Arctic,” Voice of America, August 26, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/nato-head-warns-about-russian-chinese-interest-in-arctic/6718667.html.

7 Timothy Wright, “Russia’s ‘new’ anti-ship missile,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, July 18, 2022, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2022/07/russias-new-anti-ship-missile.

8 Nicholas Eftimiades, Small satellites: The implications for national security, Atlantic Council, May 5, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/small-satellites-the-implications-for-national-security/.

9 Christopher Woody, “The US Air Force is signing up for Starlink after watching it help Ukraine stay online amid Russia’s ongoing attacks,” Business Insider, August 8, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-air-force-contracts-with-starlink-as-it-helps-ukraine-2022-8.

10 Craig A. Reed and James P. Rife, “New wrinkles to drone warfare,” US Naval Institute, January 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/january/new-wrinkles-drone-warfare.

11 Yaroslav Trofimov and Dion Nissenbaum, “Russia’s use of Iranian Kamikaze drones creates new dangers for Ukrainian troops,” Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-use-of-iranian-kamikaze-drones-creates-new-dangers-for-ukrainian-troops-11663415140 ; Samuel Bendett and Jeffrey Edmonds, “Russian military autonomy in Ukraine four months in,” Center for Naval Analyses, July 2022, https://www.cna.org/reports/2022/07/russian-military-autonomy-in-ukraine-four-months-in.

12 Arne Delfs, Elena Mazneva, and Anna Shiryaevskaya, “Germany suspects sabotage hit Russia’s Nord Stream pipelines,” Bloomberg, September 27, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-27/nord-stream-probing-pressure-drop-at-second-russian-gas-link.

13 Steven Zeitchik, “The future of warfare could be a lot more grisly than Ukraine,” Washington Post, March 12, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/11/autonomous-weapons-geneva-un/.

14 Drew Harwell, “Instead of consumer software, Ukraine’s tech workers build apps of war,” Washington Post, March 24, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/24/ukraine-war-apps-russian-invasion/ ; Ylli Bajraktari, “The first networked war: Eric Schmidt’s Ukraine trip report,” Special Competitive Studies Project, September 13, 2022, https://scsp222.substack.com/p/the-first-networked-war-eric-schmidts.

15 August Cole and Herve Le Guyader, Cognitive: A 6th domain of operations?, NATO, April 2021, https://www.innovationhub-act.org/content/cognitive-warfare.

16 Bloom, https://huggingface.co/bigscience/bloom.

17 Hitoshi Nasu, “Deepfake technology in the age of information warfare,” Lieber Institute, March 1, 2022, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/deepfake-technology-age-information-warfare/.

18 Bobby Allyn, “Deepfake video of Zelenskyy could be ‘tip of the iceberg’ in info war, experts warn,” NPR, March 16, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/03/16/1087062648/deepfake-video-zelenskyy-experts-war-manipulation-ukraine-russia.

19 Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, “Not built for purpose: The Russian military’s ill-fated force design,” War on the Rocks, June 2, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/.

20 Nora Buli, “Norway to deploy military to protect its oil and gas installations,” Reuters, September 28, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/norway-beefs-up-security-across-oil-gas-sector-2022-09-28/.

21 Future acquisitions for Norwegian defence sector 2021-2028, Forsvars Department, April 2021, https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/09d83a5cbefd4fb68064e6ca871acccb/faf-2021-2028-engelsk-versjon-__.pdf.

22 Andrew Feickert, “New U.S. Marine Corps force design initiative: Force Design 2030,” Congressional Research Service, March 7, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11281.

23 Peter Ong, “Latest details on the USMC’s NMESIS and long range USV,” Naval News, June 22, 2022, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/06/latest-details-on-the-usmcs-nmesis-and-long-range-usv/.

24 Kelsey D. Atherton, “What DARPA wants in a new recon and delivery drone,” Popular Science, September 14, 2022, https://www.popsci.com/technology/darpa-ancillary-drone-project-goals/.

25 Gerard Andrews, “NVIDIA Omniverse Replicator generates synthetic training data for robots,” NVIDIA Developer, November 9, 2021, https://developer.nvidia.com/blog/generating-synthetic-datasets-isaac-sim-data-replicator/.

26 Leila Barghouty, “How the St. Javelin mem raised a million dollars for Ukraine,” Washington Post, September 18, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/18/ukraine-war-meme-fundraising/.

27 David Sanger, Eric Schmitt, Helene Cooper, Julian Barnes, and Kenneth Vogel, “Amid Ukraine: 17,000 anti-tank weapons in 6 days and a clandestine cybercorps,” New York Times, March 6, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/06/us/politics/us-ukraine-weapons.html.

28 Megan Eckstein, “Marines Force Design 2030 update refocuses on reconnaissance,” Defense News, May 9, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/05/09/marines-force-design-2030-update-refocuses-on-reconnaissance/.

29 “China island tracker,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/.

30 Sandra Erwin, “Commercial spy satellites put Russia’s Ukraine invasion in the public eye,” Space News, February 27, 2022, https://spacenews.com/satellite-imaging-companies-increase-profile-as-they-track-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/.

31 Josh Luckenbaugh, “JUST IN: Space Force partners with Norway to launch Arctic comms satellites,” National Defense, August 31, 2022, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/8/31/space-force-partners-with-norway-to-launch-arctic-comms-satellites

32 Johannes Dobson, “Arctic space,” Konsberg Magazine, February 2018, https://www.kongsberg.com/kmagazine/2018/2/arctic-space/.

33 Future acquisitions for Norwegian defence sector 2021-2028, Forsvars Department.

34 Emmi Yonekura, Brian Dolan, Moon Kim, Krista Romita Grocholski, Raza Khan, Yool Kim, Commercial Space Capabilities and Market Overview, RAND Corporation, 2022, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA500/RRA578-2/RAND_RRA578-2.pdf.

35 Dan Henrik Klausen and Knut Anders Finnset, «Brudd på sjøkabel på Svalbard – heller mot at mennesker står bak,» Troms og Finnmark, February 11, 2022, https://www.nrk.no/tromsogfinnmark/politiet-tror-det-er-en-menneskelig-arsak-bak-bruddet-pa-sjokabel-pa-svalbard-1.15850988#:~:text=Brudd%20på%20sjøkabel%20på%20Svalbard,Her%20kommer%20sjøkabelen%20i%20land.

The post Autonomy and asymmetry: The future of Norway’s defense 2022-2042 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Agachi interviewed by TVR Info on Western unity and resolve before NATO Summit (in Romanian)

aagachi — Sat, 27 May 2023 18:55:00 +0000

Original INTERVIEW

Staff

Anca Agachi

Associate Director

Africa Conflict

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

The post Agachi interviewed by TVR Info on Western unity and resolve before NATO Summit (in Romanian) appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Belgorod raid sparks border alarm for Russia ahead of Ukrainian offensive

Peter Dickinson — Wed, 24 May 2023 00:48:53 +0000

Ukrainians woke up on Monday morning to the unexpected news of an unfolding military operation across the border in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast. The incursion was reportedly the work of two Ukraine-based Russian opposition militias, the Free Russia Legion and the Russian Volunteer Corps, who claimed the attack marked the start of a campaign to “liberate Russia.”

Further details remain confused, with conflicting information still circulating on Tuesday evening regarding the fate of the Russian militias. However, the mere fact of the incursion is itself noteworthy and may be part of Ukrainian shaping operations ahead of a widely anticipated counteroffensive. By exposing the weakness of Russia’s largely undefended borders, Ukraine could succeed in forcing Putin to reluctantly pull troops out of Ukraine in order to defend his own country.

At the official level, Ukraine has denied any involvement in the Belgorod border raid. However, while Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak declared that Ukraine “has nothing to do with it,” he could not resist mocking the Kremlin. “As you know, tanks are sold at any Russian military store, and underground guerrilla groups are composed of Russian citizens,” he tweeted in an obvious reference to the transparent lies employed by Vladimir Putin during the 2014 Russian military seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. These tongue-in-cheek comments were widely interpreted as confirmation that Ukraine was now using Russia’s own hybrid war playbook against the Putin regime.

Podolyak was not the only Ukrainian to revel in what many saw as Russia receiving a long overdue taste of its own medicine. As news of the Belgorod incursion spread, Ukrainian social media was flooded with memes proclaiming the establishment of the “Belgorod People’s Republic,” playing on earlier Kremlin disinformation about a “Ukrainian civil war,” and favorably comparing the speed of the Belgorod advance with the Russian army’s own glacial progress in eastern Ukraine.

Predictably, few in Russia saw the funny side. Instead, reactions ranged from anger and indignation on Kremlin TV to alarm over the apparent ease with which the Ukrainian-backed Russian militias were able to penetrate the border and enter the Russian federation. The outspoken leader of Russia’s mercenary Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, used the incident to launch another of his regular attacks on the Russian military establishment. “As far as I know, the military is not bothering with the strengthening of our borders,” he commented.

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While the Belgorod incursion has undoubtedly lifted Ukrainian spirits and plunged Russia into a minor panic, this was not just an example of Ukraine’s world-class trolling skills. The attack has very real implications for Russian national security and is a huge personal embarrassment for Vladimir Putin, who prides himself on his strongman image. After all, what kind of strongman ruler cannot even secure the borders of his own realm?

It is too early to predict the exact nature of the Russian response to events in Belgorod Oblast, but it seems inevitable that any reaction must necessarily include a strengthening of the entire Russia-Ukraine border. To achieve this, Moscow must find the additional soldiers and weapons systems to reinforce a frontier stretching for approximately one thousand kilometers beyond the front lines of the current military conflict.

At a time when the vast majority of the Russian military’s available forces have already been deployed in Ukraine, this will be no easy task. Indeed, British Defense Minister Ben Wallace claimed in February that 97% of the Russian army is already in Ukraine. Any efforts to bolster defenses along the Russian border with Ukraine will likely mean reducing this presence.

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Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Russia’s military equipment shortages were recently laid bare by the country’s exceptionally modest Victory Day celebrations, with traditional parades canceled in a string of cities and a solitary tank taking part in the flagship event on Moscow’s Red Square. The manpower situation in the Russian army is unlikely to be much better. Russian losses during the first six months of the Ukraine invasion were so severe that Putin was forced to launch the country’s first mobilization since World War II in September 2022. However, many of the 300,000 extra troops mobilized late last year have already become casualties, with US officials estimating Russian losses since December at 100,000.

This poorly prepared, badly mauled, and increasingly demoralized Russian invasion force is currently bracing to face a major Ukrainian counteroffensive that has been under preparation for the past half year. Tens of thousands of fresh Ukrainian soldiers have undergone training in NATO countries, while Ukraine has received a wide array of new equipment including modern battle tanks, armored vehicles, and long-range cruise missiles. The last thing Russian commanders would want to do at this critical point in the invasion is withdraw soldiers from the front lines, but that is exactly what may now happen.

As Ukraine continues to set the stage for the coming offensive, shaping operations could include further border incursions designed to embarrass the Kremlin and force Russia to thin the ranks of its invasion army. Any attempts to penetrate deep inside Russia or establish bridgeheads on Russian territory would probably be frowned upon by Ukraine’s Western partners, but there is unlikely to be much opposition to additional destabilizing border raids.

This week’s Belgorod incident remains shrouded in mystery but it may come to be seen as a symbolically significant moment in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. For the past fifteen months, Russia has attacked Ukraine with impunity while assuming Ukraine would never dare to strike back inside Russia. That complacency has now been very publicly shattered, creating a serious security headache for the Kremlin. Leaving Russia’s borders largely undefended is no longer an option, but reinforcing them will inevitably weaken Putin’s army in Ukraine. Ukraine’s commanders may have just outsmarted their Russian counterparts yet again.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

As President Biden prepares to announce his choice for the next chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Major General Arnold Punaro, USMC (ret.) gives an inside look on what factors make for a successful chairman and the “unfinished business” of the reforms that led to the creation of the CJCS office. How has the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) sought to streamline the civilian-military chain of command and improve military advice and operations? To what extent has the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) been integrated into top-level management areas since the implementation of the GNA? And how have the shortcomings of civilian integration and the resulting structure affected the US military’s readiness, logistics planning, force capabilities, and resource allocation?

This issue brief considers these questions and more, ultimately suggesting that there is room for improvement to the existing GNA structure worth serious consideration in the coming years.

Evolution and shortcoming

The roles of the CJCS and Vice Chairman (VCJCS) have evolved in the last decade to require distinct yet complementary skillsets, encompassing greater operational, administrative, and budgetary challenges. As such, the author proposes the skillsets for the CJCS and VCJCS now include experience in institutional and managerial aspects of the defense establishment as well. Furthermore, a suitable CJCS should have a background in both strategic and operational issues, while the Vice Chairman (VCJCS) should have experience in technical and programmatic areas like procurement. Ultimately, the CJCS along with the VCJCS should fill the experience gap for presidents with limited military knowledge and provide the president with insight into the world of military operations, society, and culture. These are distinct skillsets, and while it may be overly simplistic to view these two roles as being those of “the operator” (the CJCS), and “the manager” (the VCJCS), using this general paradigm as a reference while selecting new occupants for these key positions is worth considering.

Key recommendations

Although assessments of the GNA are overwhelmingly positive in recent years, not every objective has been achieved and as a result key efforts on the management side have been disappointments. Therefore, the author concludes that improvements to the GNA structure include involving all members of the JCS in operational planning, delegating resource-allocation authority to the CJCS and VCJCS, reemphasizing the chain of command, reducing duplication between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff, improving the president’s relationship with the military, and reducing headquarters staff duplication. Service chiefs should have an increased role in linking and streamlining requirements, acquisition, and budgets.

About the author

Advisory Council member

Arnold Punaro

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

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Starling joins Irregular Warfare Initiative podcast to discuss gray zone conflict

Atlantic Council — Fri, 19 May 2023 16:29:24 +0000

Director, Forward Defense

On May 19, Forward Defense director Clementine G. Starling was featured on an episode of the Irregular Warfare Initiative’s podcast to discuss gray zone conflict. She was joined by David Van, who is a member of the Australian Senate for Victoria.

Starling discussed Forward Defense’s report “Seizing the advantage: A vision for the next US national defense strategy” which laid out an approach for the US address challenges across the competition continuum. She also described how policymakers think about the gray zone as a space between cooperation and armed conflict.

[There is] a spectrum of activities and intent. On the far left there is cooperation, on the far right is armed conflict and warfare and then in the middle is the gray zone…adversarial competition below the level of armed conflict.

Clementine Starling

Staff

Clementine G. Starling

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Public Event Fri, May 5, 2023 • 8:30 am ET

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How NATO can take a 360-degree approach to the Vilnius summit

Joslyn Brodfuehrer, Zelma Sergejeva — Wed, 17 May 2023 20:46:03 +0000

This article is part of the Transatlantic Security Initiative’s Stronger with Allies series, which charts the course forward for the Alliance in conjunction with the 2023 NATO Summit.

Last year, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine launched a brutal war in the heart of Europe. Russia’s unrelenting aggression has been repelled by brave Ukrainians—with assistance from friends on both sides of the Atlantic. The war united the transatlantic community, with NATO providing unprecedented support for Ukrainians fighting for both their own freedom and values and those of the broader Euro-Atlantic region.

As allies and partners head into the Vilnius summit in July for the Alliance’s annual meeting of all heads of state and government, NATO must deliver on its commitment to enhance collective transatlantic security. Meeting the challenge will require NATO to turn ideas (drummed up at the Madrid summit last year) into concrete action. Success, as argued in a recent Transatlantic Security Initiative issue brief, will depend upon NATO’s ability to make tangible progress on its enumerated political and military priorities.

Ideas to implementation: Priorities for NATO’s Vilnius Summit

After more than a year of Russia’s brutal, illegal, and unprovoked war in Ukraine, the transatlantic community remains at a critical juncture. The upcoming Vilnius summit is an opportunity for the Alliance to turn ideas into action.

Defense Policy Eastern Europe Europe & Eurasia NATO

Responding to Russia, supporting Ukraine, and securing the region

NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept—a new strategy adopted at last year’s Madrid summit—named the Russian Federation as the “most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security.” Russia will remain at the top of NATO’s agenda in Vilnius, according to senior US and allied officials and experts at a recent Atlantic Council event—held in partnership with the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Lithuania—that mapped out priorities for the summit. The officials and experts at the event explained that it will be even higher a priority for the Alliance to make commitments that enable Ukraine’s victory as the current war continues and possibly becomes a protracted conflict.

Since the start of the war, NATO members have provided Ukraine with multipronged support ranging from humanitarian assistance to military aid. Solidarity and support from the West, according to Ukrainian Minister of Defense Oleksii Reznikov, is helping Ukraine face down Russia’s imperialist incursions and “[destroy] the military power targeting European values and freedoms.”

US Senator Jeanne Shaheen underscored the durability of allies’ support, explaining that “there is strong, continued, bipartisan support [for] the Ukrainians, appreciation for their courage [and] for how hard they are fighting, and a real commitment to continue to support this effort.” More can be done, however, to enable Ukraine’s victory and secure Euro-Atlantic stability. During the event, former US Permanent Representative to NATO Kay Bailey Hutchison emphasized that while the US Department of Defense’s new security assistance package and provision of high mobility artillery rocket systems are steps in the right direction, the United States and other NATO allies must expand coordinated military assistance and pivot towards “doing more and doing it faster” to help Ukraine ramp up activities for the coming counteroffensive. Reznikov added that “NATO should commit to meet Ukraine’s urgent military needs for military defense equipment, focusing on air defense systems, long-range artillery, and necessary ammo, tanks, and combat aircraft.” Expanded support, panelists added, will greatly enhance Ukraine’s ability to strike behind enemy lines and neutralize the bases that are launching attacks, killing Ukrainians, and destroying critical infrastructure in the next stage of the war.

NATO must also figure out how it will signal that Ukraine will be protected from future Russian assaults. For Reznikov, the answer is clear: The Vilnius summit must deliver a concrete path for Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance. But that is not all. Security guarantees and necessary military defense equipment are Ukraine’s top requests from NATO, and Reznikov is hoping NATO leaders will address these needs at the summit. In the long term, Western military presence within Ukraine will be the strongest deterrent against a future Russian attack, argued panelist Michael O’Hanlon, the Brookings Institution’s foreign policy director.

Securing the Euro-Atlantic area will require the Alliance to fortify its force posture on its eastern flank, according to Samuel J. Brannen, US deputy assistant secretary of defense for plans and posture. Although the United States has already begun to make force posture adjustments on NATO’s east, with the addition of a brigade combat team, rotational forces in the Baltic states, and prepositioned stocks, Brannen said that “having ready forces and having the plans to go with them” will have to remain at the top of NATO’s agenda in Vilnius. The increased readiness and capabilities that come with rotational forces can help NATO move towards deterrence by denial—reducing the likelihood of a future Russian attack and positioning the Alliance to prevail in the event one occurs.

On July 11-12, the Atlantic Council will host the NATO Public Forum, gathering experts and decision makers from the globe on the sidelines of the NATO Summit in Vilnius. Subscribe below to get updates about the forum.

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Assessing challenges on the horizon

An array of challenges—ranging from the rise of China to emerging disruptive technologies—will also feature on the agenda at the Vilnius summit.

Countering an assertive China amidst other evolving short- and long-term threats will require the Alliance to operationalize its 360-degree scope and, as Hutchison added, increase cooperation with NATO’s partners in the Pacific. That is because, as Sarah Kirchberger—head of the Center for Asia-Pacific Strategy and Security at Kiel University’s Institute for Security Policy and Atlantic Council nonresident senior fellow—put it, “anything can be a battlefield” in the eyes of China. Beijing has entrenched itself in Western economies, has forged a strategic partnership with Russia in its bid to undermine the rules-based international order, and (like Russia) employs hybrid tactics like information operations in an attempt to divide the Western alliance. Despite converging concern about the China challenge across the transatlantic, NATO will need to translate policy articulated in the 2022 Strategic Concept into action in Vilnius, a recent Transatlantic Security Initiative report argues.

What makes navigating the geopolitical environment difficult, according to Philippe Lavigne—a general and NATO’s supreme allied commander, transformation—is that today’s challenges are “more, faster, and everywhere.” He continued to explain that emerging and disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, and quantum technologies are changing how NATO operates and how wars are fought. There is more data, decision-making is faster, and conflict can happen in almost every domain. NATO’s digital transformation—through the integration of emerging technologies, interoperability of forces, and multi-domain operations—must ready the Alliance to tackle more challenges, do it rapidly, and operate everywhere. Lavigne said he is expecting a decision on the Digital Transformation Implementation Strategic Plan, an initiative he advises on and oversees at NATO, to maintain and sharpen the Alliance’s technological edge at the Vilnius summit.

As authoritarian leaders continue to take advantage of emerging technologies, experts argued that democracies can win the digital race—if they play to their strengths. Openness is NATO’s advantage, Kirchberger explained, so the Alliance must not “underestimate how innovative [its] ecosystem is.” To strengthen defense innovation, panelists pointed out, it will be important to both invest in emerging technologies and address urgent capability and critical-infrastructure gaps, which would require Allies to replenish weapons stocks and agree to spend more than two percent of their respective gross domestic products on defense (further military priorities for the summit are outlined in this recent Transatlantic Security Initiative issue brief).

Addressing the role of the private sector, Giedrimas Jeglinskas, former NATO assistant secretary general for executive management, said that the Alliance can leverage private capital to drive innovation, and Lavigne added that NATO should adopt best practices from the private sector. Jeglinskas proposed a practical solution for the Alliance at the summit, calling for NATO leaders to meet with top defense industry leaders in Vilnius to share those best practices. Lithuanian Minister of National Defense Arvydas Anušauskas stressed that the war “requires” NATO “to boost [its] defense industry as quickly as possible” and suggested that multinational contracts are signal to the defense industry.

Online Event Tue, May 9, 2023 • 9:30 am ET

Gearing up for Vilnius

NATO allies and partners, according to Anušauskas, must “move full steam ahead” to “make [the] Vilnius summit [a] strategic win.” Experts and officials convening at the Atlantic Council conveyed that implementing NATO’s vision for Euro-Atlantic security will be of paramount importance. Allies must arrive ready to enable Ukraine’s victory, strengthen NATO’s forward presence, and tackle an increasingly contested security environment of evolving challenges—NATO’s adversaries, panelists emphasized, will be watching the summit’s outcomes closely.

Joslyn Brodfuehrer is an assistant director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Zelma Sergejeva is a visiting fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Money talks: Here’s what the president’s budget says about the US military edge

Clementine G. Starling, Marek Jestrab, Julia Siegel — Tue, 16 May 2023 17:23:57 +0000

President Joe Biden’s National Security Strategy says that the United States has entered a “decisive decade” when it comes to competition with China. But the first comprehensive look at how the administration hopes to implement that strategy—Biden’s $886-billion request for defense-related activities in his fiscal year (FY) 2024 budget—may be insufficient to meet the moment.

The budget does hit the mark in some ways. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin called it “the most strategy-driven [budget] request” ever produced for defense. The proposal prioritizes investments needed to implement the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and necessarily accepts risk in other areas. And the request focuses on improving readiness, boosting procurement of the most-valued munitions, and modernizing—making clear that the United States is highly concerned with preventing war with China in the near term and deterring conflict more generally in the long term.

However, the 3 percent funding increase from FY23 to FY24 may be entirely offset by inflation or even signify a decline in buying power. That means painful trade-offs for the Department of Defense’s (DOD) force structure in personnel and platforms.

The strengths: Implementing the NDS

First, the budget reinforces the view that China is the pacing challenge for the United States. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative, a set of defense investments established by Congress in 2021 in response to China’s growing military power, received its largest investment. Moreover, research-and-development and procurement requests were the largest in DOD history.

The budget places an emphasis on modernization programs that were long deferred, including those for hypersonic weapons, space, cyber, contested logistics, and platforms built for contested environments—all of which will be valuable in deterring China. Modernizing the entire kill chain is also a focus of this budget, in its requests for investments in elements of the DOD’s Joint All-Domain Command and Control strategy, enhanced sensors, and electronic-warfare capabilities. In response to the rapid build-up of China’s nuclear forces, this budget continues to fully fund the revitalization of all legs of the nuclear triad along with nuclear command, control, and communication systems.

The budget has a focus on ensuring that the United States’ advantages endure, as demonstrated through the president’s requested funding for critical emerging technologies, supply-chain resiliency, and the defense workforce. An advantage in technology—especially in artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, directed energy, biotechnologies, and microelectronics—is necessary to keep up with the changing nature of warfare in the coming decade. Shoring up supply chains, specifically ones that are needed to produce defense systems such as metal-fabrication and battery supply chains, is necessary for national security. The budget request, by investing in the research and development of tech across the defense-industrial base, forms the foundation for a self-sustaining defense economy. And, as the all-volunteer force clocks its fiftieth year, the budget shows that the military is, at its core, a people business: The president recommends the largest pay raise for defense personnel in decades (5.2 percent) and notes that military families are key to readiness.

This budget signals an uptick in demand to the defense-industrial base, particularly through increased investment in the most-valued munitions and the execution of a multiyear procurement authority. A stable topline across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)—part of the budget request that reflects detailed budget projections over the next five years—provides predictability for industry. Last year, the FYDP provided less predictability because it did not pace inflation each year between 2024 and 2027. Even though its overall increase from FY23 may be offset by inflation, the FY24 request is stable, pacing inflation each year between 2025 and 2028. Last year’s budget also confused industry by not making clear which production lines should be maintained or expanded—but the FY24 budget request makes it clear. The FY24 budget also provides industry-stable procurement counts for the highest-valued aircraft and maritime platforms needed to deter China.

The challenges: Every budget requires trade-offs

How the president chooses to invest in the country’s defense reveals the strategic assumptions he and his leadership team are making about the future fight—and in what areas they are willing to accept risk. The FY24 budget assumes risk in capacity, specifically for the Air Force’s and Navy’s force structures.

The Pentagon is shifting its focus from land wars in the Middle East to deterring high-end conflict with China, and the budget reflects this. The Army and Marine Corps continue to execute previous plans, reinvesting savings from reductions in the number of troops to fund modernization efforts needed for the Indo-Pacific. These modernization efforts include investments in long-range fires, sensing, and air defense. Meanwhile, the Air Force continues trading aircraft capacity for capability—retiring aircraft faster than they can be replaced by deliveries of next-generation or more modern aircraft—resulting in a decrease of total aircraft inventory by 190 in FY24. While modernization (and, accordingly, the trading of legacy systems for advanced capabilities) is necessary for deterring future wars, such decisions inherently assume some level of risk. For example, the Navy’s reduction in battle-force-ship numbers, included in the FY24 request, has implications for the United States’ maritime competitive edge. The decision to truncate production of the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock impacts all combatant commanders, as these ships are foundational for the United States’ response to contingencies or crises around the globe. Moreover, in the event of a naval blockade of Taiwan, the United States would possibly lack the number of platforms it needs to deploy its response. The People’s Liberation Army Navy is numerically the largest in the world in terms of battle force ships (approximately 340) and is projected to grow to four hundred ships by 2025. In contrast, Biden’s budget request shows a flatlining US naval inventory.

This budget follows guidance from the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review to cancel the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) program, even though the program earned bipartisan support as part of the FY23 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the DOD Appropriations Act. In a tripolar-nuclear-threat environment, the SLCM-N program is a valued capability that is survivable, is prompt, and helps expand the United States’ nuclear deterrence. Expect Congress to push back once again on this misguided request.

What’s next?

As Congress continues hearings on the FY24 NDAA and DOD appropriations bill in the coming months, lawmakers will need to monitor inflation projections and adjudicate whether defense spending should increase above the rate of inflation. They will also need to arbitrate the DOD’s long-term force-structure plans and determine whether deterrence is enhanced by continuing the SLCM-N program. Most importantly, Congress should work to ensure that appropriations are on time so that the DOD is not disadvantaged by the constraints and inefficiencies of beginning nearly every fiscal year under the burden of a continuing resolution.

As Forward Defense’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption recommends, Congress should provide increased spending flexibility by spelling out fewer line items, so that the DOD can easily add novel technologies to the force without requiring a new program. The budget process must remain agile, especially given that the services formulate their requests two years before funding is received and their capability needs will evolve within that time.

If the United States is committed to setting up the DOD for an era of strategic competition, it must commit to increasing the defense budget above the rate of inflation to provide the capacity required while not sacrificing readiness and modernization. Otherwise, the US military risks eroding its military edge in the face of a modernized and capable China.

Clementine G. Starling is the director of the Forward Defense program at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Lieutenant Commander Marek Jestrab is the 2022-2023 senior US Navy fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. These views do not represent the US Navy or the Department of Defense.

Julia Siegel is an assistant director with Forward Defense.

This article is part of the 21st Century Security Project by the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice with financial support from Lockheed Martin.

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Ukraine’s friends must show ‘we’ve got the grit’ in supporting its fight, says UK foreign secretary

Katherine Walla — Wed, 10 May 2023 17:42:12 +0000

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A conversation with UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly joined the Atlantic Council for a discussion on the United Kingdom’s role in an increasingly adversarial world.

Defense Policy Economy & Business Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

The world is watching closely to see if the United States, United Kingdom, and other allies will lose their stamina in the coming months to support Ukraine, warned UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly.

“If we signal to the world that we have only got about eighteen months’ worth of staying power, then we create a more dangerous environment for the future,” he said. “That’s why this is so very important.”

Cleverly spoke at an Atlantic Council Front Page event hosted by the Europe Center on Tuesday. He explained that failure in Ukraine would bring back a world order in which big and powerful countries prey on weak ones. “So we’d better spend the time and money defending those institutions now, or the costs—both in terms of financial costs and human costs—will be much, much, much higher in the future,” he said.

Cleverly said that instead of providing jets, the United Kingdom has been focusing on training the next generation of fighter pilots and working with the Ukrainian army. Ahead of an expected Ukrainian counteroffensive, “we have to keep looking at opportunities to enhance and speed up the support we give to Ukraine,” he said.

In response to critics who argue the West should limit its support to Ukraine at the risk of leaving its “military cupboards bare,” Cleverly replied that “if we’re saving stuff up for a rainy day, this is the rainy day.” With the invasion posing such a threat to the international security architecture, “we need to respond robustly.”

Below are more highlights from the event, moderated by Atlantic Council President and Chief Executive Officer Frederick Kempe, which covered the United Kingdom’s refreshed foreign-policy strategy.

A change of pace

In the UK Integrated Review Refresh foreign-policy plan, released in March this year, “the thing that has changed is more… pace rather than direction,” Cleverly explained.
He said that his office still stands by the assumptions, reflections, and observations made in the 2021 Integrated Review, which said that the United Kingdom would have to think carefully about its posture toward China, that Russia was a risk, and that allies and partners would be vitally important to the national interest.
But that strategy needed a touch-up, Cleverly argued, after a whirlwind year-and-a-half: Beijing became closer with Moscow, Russia invaded Ukraine, and the Kremlin weaponized energy and food supplies. In addition, the “geopolitical center of gravity” began to shift more quickly toward the Indo-Pacific and Global South, Cleverly explained. “We are not either alarmed by or shocked by that gentle shift… but we do have to respond to it,” he said.

The China challenge

There are critics who say that the West should redirect its focus from Ukraine to China; but “we can’t just pretend Ukraine isn’t happening,” Cleverly said, adding that the world is closely watching how the West responds to Russia’s full-scale invasion. “[Beijing] will make decisions based on what they observe us doing.”
On the possibility of China playing a peacemaking role in the war, Cleverly said he’d “welcome” an intervention that brings “a just and sustainable conclusion,” no matter where it comes from. However, “it needs to be more than just headline-grabbing stuff,” he added. “It needs to be genuine.”
At the same time, China is “big,” “influential,” and “powerful,” Cleverly noted, which means that London will need to “engage” with Beijing.
But the United Kingdom cannot ignore the fact that “China does many things that we fundamentally disagree on,” Cleverly said, pointing to its abuses against Uyghurs, its assertiveness in the South China Sea, and its failures to protect intellectual property. When such issues come up, “we raise [them] directly,” he said, in addition to taking self-protective measures and strengthening long-term alliances in the region.

“In cooperation, collaboration, and concert”

The foreign secretary noted that the United Kingdom will need to strengthen its “pre-existing relationships” with its partners and allies—including the United States and Commonwealth countries—to make sure that they’re “meaningful and mutually beneficial” for their national security and “not just some romantic narrative.”
Cleverly said that rebuilding Ukraine will take public and private money (in addition to Russia paying for the damage it caused). The West needs to “make the case that [investments] will be safe and secure” and that Ukraine won’t be invaded again, Cleverly explained. “The exact mechanism for doing so… certainly is open to discussion,” he added, saying that he is “definitely not closing the door to NATO membership” for Ukraine.
The United Kingdom, Cleverly said, will need to work closely with allies and partners on all areas of defense “simultaneously.” Whereas past conflict was primarily kinetic, he explained, future challenges are more likely to be in domains such as cyberspace and the economy: “Isolation in any of those fields would be counterproductive.”
In March, Chancellor of the Exchequer Jeremy Hunt said the United Kingdom wouldn’t engage in a global clean-energy subsidy race following the passage of the US Inflation Reduction Act. Cleverly said that he understands why the United States would want to “protect its people” in “an increasingly unpredictable and competitive world,” but he also encouraged the United States to “do that in cooperation, collaboration, and concert with [its] like-minded friends around the world.”
Cleverly said that King Charles III, whose coronation took place this past weekend, also plays a part in shaping the United Kingdom’s global role and its relationship with allies. His majesty’s focus on the environment, diversity, and alleviating poverty are “issues which will define the modern era and the future,” Cleverly explained, adding that this focus makes the monarchy “very relevant” today.

Katherine Walla is the associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

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James Cleverly on the UK’s support for Ukraine and foreign policy ‘refresh’

Atlantic Council — Tue, 09 May 2023 16:16:10 +0000

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Online Event Tue, May 9, 2023 • 9:30 am ET

A conversation with UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly joined the Atlantic Council for a discussion on the United Kingdom’s role in an increasingly adversarial world.

Defense Policy Economy & Business Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speaker

James Cleverly MP
Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Affairs

Moderator

Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council

FREDERICK KEMPE: Good morning. I’m Fred Kempe. I’m president and CEO of the Atlantic Council.

Thank you for joining us for this edition of Atlantic Council Front Page, our premier platform for global leaders. And greetings to those in the audience, members of a dozen embassies, international media, many members of the Atlantic Council board, and, of course, to our viewers around the world. Good morning from here, good afternoon and evening to wherever you are.

It’s my pleasure today to welcome you to Atlantic Council Front Page event with James Cleverly, the United Kingdom’s secretary of state for foreign, commonwealth, and development affairs—or, in layman’s terms, Britain’s foreign secretary. Foreign Secretary Cleverly, it’s wonderful to have you with us.

You were in Washington in January, but that seems a long time ago now, considering the speed of developments. Russia’s war in Ukraine continues. We await the Ukrainian spring offensive and whatever should follow as well from Russia. We saw evidence of Chinese-Russian common cause in the meeting of President Xi and President Putin in Moscow not so long ago. They toasted each other. They showcased their no-limits partnership. But also talked about how they intended to reshape the global order together and in their vein.

A number of European leaders have visited Beijing recently. And you, yourself, provided the view from London with your recent speech at Mansion House. Any of you who really want to understand the UK’s approach to global affairs, I think the Mansion House speech is absolutely brilliant and well worth looking at. On this side of the Atlantic, recent landmark speeches by US officials like Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, have outlined the Biden administration’s approach to China, and then closer to home, Mr. Foreign Secretary, the UK and the EU seem to have turned a page with the Windsor Framework, which, as your prime minister put it, represents a decisive breakthrough between London and Brussels and you, of course, played a significant role there.

You also had the visit of President Biden to Northern Ireland to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Good Friday Accords. Last, but certainly not least, we saw the coronation of King Charles over the weekend. Even at 5:00 a.m. on this side of the pond, millions of Americans got up in the morning to watch that spectacle. I think we consider them our royalty as well.

This is all since January. Your government in March released a refresh of the Integrated Review, Britain’s strategy document published first from 2021, which outlined a holistic vision for the UK’s strategy in the world. And to steal a phrase from the refresh, quote, “The transition into a multipolar, fragmented, and contested world has happened more quickly and definitively than anticipated.” That may score under the term British understatement.

So we’re here today to shed a light on all this. We have forty-five minutes with you and there’s a lot to get in, Mr. Foreign Secretary. Those who want to follow the discussion can use the hashtag #ACFrontPage on Twitter. Send your questions in there. For those here in the audience I’ll take questions from you later in the discussion.

So, Mr. Foreign Secretary, let me start with a question about the refreshed Integrated Review. You told—and that’s—because it’s a big broad context it allows you to set the stage—you told the House of Commons with the original review, quote, “Our overall analysis was right and our strategic ambition on track.”

What’s changed, and can you walk us through the priorities that you’ve set for the UK’s role in the world?

JAMES CLEVERLY: Well, look, Fred, thank you, and, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for joining me this morning or this lunchtime or this evening, for those who are watching at various other places around the world, and thank you for that reminder of how much has happened, and I think when it comes to the Integrated Review refresh the thing that has changed is more about pace rather than direction.

So the original Integrated Review, which I worked on as a more junior minister within the foreign office—Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office—set certain assumptions, certain reflections, certain observations, and we stand by those, one of which was that the geopolitical center of gravity was shifting eastwards and shifting southwards, that the areas in the world where huge economic growth and also influence were happening was in the Asia Pacific region.

Now, the UK itself is a, you know, little rock parked off the coast of Europe but we have always had or certainly over the last, you know, few centuries at least very much a global perspective and so we are not either alarmed by or shocked by that gentle shift of [the] geopolitical center of gravity but we do have to respond to it.

In the Integrate—the original Integrated Review we said we would have to think carefully about our posture towards China as China desires to be more active, more influential, some would say, perhaps, more coercive on the world stage.

We highlighted the fact that Russia remained at that point a risk and we made the point that our Euro-Atlantic longstanding friends and partners would be just as important to the UK’s self-interest and national interest in the future as they have done in the past. And, obviously, the relationship between the UK and the US is famous. It’s strong. It’s close. That has been the case for well over a century and we recognize that in the original Integrated Review.

So fast forward a couple of years and we have seen a closer relationship between Beijing and Moscow. We have seen Vladimir Putin initiate an unprovoked and brutal invasion of Ukraine. We have seen energy supplies being weaponized across the—not just the European continent, but more widely. We’ve seen food supplies into developing countries consciously disrupted by Russia as a point of leverage. We have seen longstanding relationships, relationships that Vladimir Putin inherited from the old USSR at various places around the world, being utilized as points of leverage.

All these things we envisaged in the integrated review, but the pace—the pace is fast, and it’s accelerating, which has meant that we are—we’re conscious that we need to strengthen our preexisting relationships, like the one between the UK and the US, and make sure that they’re not just some romantic narrative but are really meaningful and mutually beneficial. It means that from the UK’s point of view, our longstanding relationships through the commonwealth, for example, with India, with Singapore, with Australia, with New Zealand, are, again, made into something really meaningful and really useful.

And finally, I would make the point that we need to recognize that all the areas of risk and all the areas of defense have to be worked on simultaneously. So traditional physical defense through NATO, for example, is something where we have a longstanding relationship with our transatlantic and European friends and partners. And we’ve been reminded of the importance of NATO in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In cyberspace, and strategic communications, in global messaging of our values and the things that matter to us, we recognize that we have to fight on that front as well to explain why democracy matters, to explain why freedom and choice are very, very important.

But finally, something which has really come into sharp focus, is the need to work closely in the economic sphere. We need to defend ourselves economically as well. And we don’t have the choice to pick one or other of those. We have to do them all. We have to do them now. And we have to do them in close cooperation. And isolationism in any of those fields would be counterproductive. And I’m very much here to make the case that, you know, we’ve—you know, militarily, in terms of projecting our values, in terms of protecting our economic base and the people that work in our economies, the UK and the US have always been very, very close partners. I want to make sure that on this trip and on future trips we reinforce those three areas, because I think that gives us both, and our friends and allies around the world, the best chance of weathering what are increasingly stormy times ahead.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So, Mr. Foreign Secretary, thank you for that opening. All areas have to be worked on simultaneously. The economic sphere, critical. You can’t just do one or the other. At the same time, resources aren’t unlimited. And so how will you measure the success of the integrated review a year from now, five years from now, number one? And then, number two, in the setting of priorities, what are the one, two, or three—particularly as we’re talking about the US-UK relationship?

JAMES CLEVERLY: Yeah, this is a brilliant question, and goes to the heart of what I think is a real quandary in terms of international relations. Because you’re saying what are kind of the one, two, three deliverables. And we live in democracies. And we are accountable to our people. I think that is one of our great strengths, one of the things that both our nations are very proud of. And it means that we need to demonstrate to voters what they’ve got from their government. And we have to be able to demonstrate things in those one, two, three cycles. And I think some of those questions are obvious.

We want to see, you know, gas prices and food prices come down. We want to see economic growth. We want to see peace in Ukraine. We want to be able to deliver a bit more stability to those hardworking people here in US, and in the UK, and more broadly. That’s the kind of thing we need to deliver in the short term. But we also need to recognize that some of the things we’re discussing in the integrated review are multidecade challenges. I talk about, you know, Russia’s influence operations in many parts of the world. Talk to African leaders, for example.

And many African leaders, many African countries, have had relationships with Russia that are many, many decades long. And I and Secretary of State Blinken and others talk to those leaders, saying: Look, you know, Russia has brutalized its neighbor. It’s breached the UN Charter. It is undermining the foundations of peace in the twentieth century, and you have to be critical—actively critical.

But I also recognize that we are having those conversations against the backdrop of multi-decade-long relationships between those countries and Russia, and you can’t magic those relationships away overnight.

In my Mansion House speech, I made the point that China is a country which can credibly trace its history back at least a couple of thousand years, and its language a couple of thousand years longer than that. Chinese written characters existed before the pyramids. And if we’re thinking one-, two-, three-year cycles in our interaction with countries that are thinking at least in decades, often in centuries, and sometimes in millennia, then there is a—there is a real differential of pace.

So we have to have deliverables for our people in the here and now because that’s what democracy demands—and rightly so—but we also need to think long term, and we need to think what’s going to happen in ten, twenty, thirty, fifty years’ time whilst also dealing with the here and now. And again, we can’t choose to do one or the other; we have to do both. And that longer term activity is sometimes a lot harder to justify, a lot harder to explain because often it’s like water on stone; you can’t see the individual change in the short term, you have to look at the big arc. And that’s why I think referring to the long historic arc of our bilateral relationship matters because, if I’m justifying why the US should spend time talking to the UK and why I’m spending time talking to the US, it has to be set against that backdrop of a multi-decade relationship which has been mutually beneficial pretty much the whole time.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you, Mr. Foreign Secretary. So let me focus on the here and now, which you referred to, and the here and now is Ukraine.

JAMES CLEVERLY: Yeah.

FREDERICK KEMPE: And the UK has been—to the UK’s credit—way out in front on this, right from the beginning and before the actual invasion. What’s at stake? What strategic objectives does the British government have that inform your decision-making toward Ukraine so forcefully?

JAMES CLEVERLY: Well, I think that Ukraine is emblematic of some really big issues. Ukraine is about more than Ukraine. It is about defending the UN Charter. And we should remind ourselves what happened—something unique in human history—at the end of the Second World Ward. Throughout most of human history, the rules have been really simple. If you are smaller and weaker, you are preyed upon by the bigger and more powerful, and that has basically been the arc of human history, so it was a massive incentive to be big, and to be powerful, and to be aggressive, and that led to cycles of conflict where the powerful preyed on the less powerful.

At the end of the Second World War, something genuinely unique happened. The winners—the winners—decided to break that cycle. So the winners from the Second World War, who were the most powerful, decided to put institutions in place that prevented that aggressive cycle. It’s why we signed up to the UN Charter. That’s why we said, you can’t just invade your neighbor with impunity, no matter how big and powerful you are. And in relative terms, compared with the long arc of human history, that has been really successful.

That compact was breached in February of last year with that Russian invasion—

FREDERICK KEMPE: Two thousand twenty-two.

JAMES CLEVERLY:—2022, yeah. One of the initial signatories attacked its neighbor, and if we don’t defend the principles, then we revert back to the status quo ante where the big and powerful prey on the weak, and that is in no one’s interest. It makes the world a more dangerous, a more expensive place. So we’d better spend the time and money defending those institutions and those principles now or the costs, both in terms of financial costs and human costs, will be much, much, much higher in the future.

So that’s what’s at stake. That’s why the UK and—I think admirably so also—the US, I think, take this issue so seriously because how we respond to Russia’s attempted full-scale invasion of Ukraine will be viewed, and it will be viewed by observers all over the world, both state and non-state actors. And they will check to see how it resolved. They will want to see whether the US, and the UK, and the other members of the United Nations supporting Ukraine have got the staying power, whether we’ve got the grit, whether we’ve got the determination, or whether we’re going to lose interest or lose stamina kind of eighteen, twenty-four months into this endeavor.

And my argument is that if we signal to the world that we have only got about eighteen months’ worth of staying power, then we create a more dangerous environment for the future. That’s why this is so very important.

So, there’s a strong, pragmatic argument, as well as the obvious moral argument. We have, throughout our nations’ histories, respective histories, we have stood shoulder to shoulder with the people defending the things that we believe in. And no country is perfect, and no country ever will be. But, actually, the Ukrainians have been admirable in the defense not just of themselves, but of the principles that have kept the world relatively safe over the last seventy years. And they deserve our—they deserve our support.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So, thank you for that powerful context. There is so much more at stake in Ukraine than Ukraine, and you outlined that brilliantly.

With that as context, is our response thus far commensurate? When you visited Washington in January, the UK pledged to supply Ukraine with main battle tanks. The conversation now has turned to the provision of jets. The Economist and others have endorsed the provision of F-16s, longer-range missiles to hit the targets they are being shot from.

Where does the British government stand on the provision of jets and long-range missiles? But beyond that, is what we’re doing sufficient for the stakes?

JAMES CLEVERLY: Well, one of the—so, one of the strong arguments is that Ukraine, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, is not the only challenge we face, and that is absolutely true. The world has never been particularly predictable. I think it’s less predictable now than it has been for a long time. And there is a strong argument that we shouldn’t leave our respective military cupboards bare.

My answer is that, you know, if we’re saving stuff up for a rainy day, this is the rainy day. And when a permanent member of the UN Security Council invades its neighbor, that is an issue so fundamental to our international security architecture that we need to respond, and we need to respond robustly.

I’m going to steal a quote from a good friend of mine, another British minister, Tom Tugendhat, who was the chair of our foreign affairs select committee. And he said that, you know, the worst fight is a fair fight, is an even fight, because it drags on and there’s, you know, increased amount of damage, increased amounts of death. And what we need to do is we need to bring this conflict to a conclusion, and we need to bring it to a conclusion quickly.

That’s why the UK decided at the beginning of this year to significantly increase our response, and we have said we will constantly keep under review what Ukraine needs to be successful in its self-defense. And that means that we will—you know, we will look at how they defend themselves, how they push back against the aggression, how they retake land.

And we need to help them to win quickly because they have to win, otherwise all the things that I discussed are at stake [or] have a big question mark over them. So our view is that Ukraine has to be successful, has to be victorious. And the most humane way of doing that is for them to be victorious quickly, and the best way of doing that is to give them the tools that they need to get the job done, and give them those tools in the here and now. That’s why the UK has been very, very vocal in—or, sorry, very active in our support, and very vocal in saying that that support needs to come from allies as quickly as possible. Because as I say, we want this to end, we want this to end soon, and we want this to end with Russia withdrawing its troops, and Ukraine getting its country back.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So, if one agreed with absolutely every word you just said, have we provided enough for that outcome? What does a successful counter-offensive look like? And have we provided enough—again, to the F-16s and long-range fires—to—the things that the Ukrainians are still asking for?

JAMES CLEVERLY: Well, look, we can’t possibly know until we kind of look back at events afterwards. So, you know, I want to put on record the admiration that I hold for the US in terms of the scale of the support that it’s given to Ukraine. You were very kind to say the UK has been very active, and we have. But of course, in absolute terms, the UK—sorry, the US has been the most generous supporter, and by—you know, by extension, therefore, one of the most influential defenders of the principles that are at stake. And I thank you for doing that.

We have to keep—we have to keep looking at opportunities to enhance and speed up the support we give to Ukraine. I’m not going to speculate about exactly what that nature would be, particularly ahead of what is likely to be a counteroffensive this spring. The one thing I would say, of course, is that, you know, this isn’t a film. You know, in films, it’s really, really easy. You know, you’ve got three acts. You’ve got, you know, the initial invasion, and the plucky defense of Kyiv by the Ukrainians. You then have the second act where the international community kind of rallies ’round and supports the Ukrainians. And then in the third act, there’s a counteroffensive and everything is easy, and the credits roll, and it’s a lovely ending.

Of course, the real world doesn’t work like that. The Ukrainians have outperformed [expectations] throughout this conflict. And they have been preparing themselves, they have been training their troops, they have been learning through this conflict. And they have demonstrated themselves to be very, very effective defenders of their country. But we need to recognize that there might not be a simple, quick, decisive breakthrough. And the point that we’ve made in the UK is that we have to—we have to stick with them.

Now, I hope and expect they’ll do very, very well, because whenever I’ve seen the Ukrainians, as I say, they’ve outperformed expectations. But, you know, we have to be realistic. This is the real world. This is not a Hollywood movie. Things are complicated. Things are messy. Things are difficult. Things will get scary. We will expect to hear escalatory words coming out of Vladimir Putin’s lips. We need to be ready for that. We need to have the resolve to continue to do the right thing, notwithstanding those comments because, as I say, if we don’t what’s at stake is of immeasurable importance, and will prove, as I say, to be so much more expensive both in terms of lives and in terms of money if we don’t reestablish the importance of those principles in the here and now.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you, Mr. Foreign Secretary.

So let’s spin forward to July and the Vilnius summit, the NATO summit. And then that will be followed next year in Washington, the seventy-fifth anniversary of NATO here. Some would argue that it was the perspective of NATO membership for Ukraine that was provocative. I think those members of NATO that neighbor Ukraine, the Baltics, et cetera, would say, you know, look at us. We’re safe. We’re secure. Ukraine is not. Maybe NATO—Ukraine and NATO would have been a better solution earlier. We’re not there.

But decisions need to be made in NATO, in Vilnius. What are the UK and NATO allies thinking about regarding guarantees of Ukrainian sovereignty and territory? Is there a path you could envision in Vilnius? And will NATO membership for Ukraine be discussed there and go beyond what was decided in 2008 in Bucharest?

JAMES CLEVERLY: Well, I think it’s really, really important that we remind the world of our Bucharest commitments. It strikes me that there are a number of things which will be important over the coming years. Ultimately, we want to see Ukraine’s territorial integrity restored and its sovereignty restored. And of course, we want to see that country rebuilt. And there will be a degree of public money that is involved in the rebuilding of Ukraine. But ultimately, I think the heavy lifting financially should be done by the private sector. And there will be opportunities for that. Of course, you know, Russia will need to play its part in paying for the damage that it has caused.

But ultimately, if we are going to make the case that Ukraine is worth investing in in the future, we also need to make the case that that investment will be safe and secure. Now, some of that will be through insurance instruments, for example, but some of it will be about making the case that Ukraine is not going to be subjected to another invasion. The exact mechanism for doing so, I think, certainly is open to discussion. There has been a commitment to Ukraine’s NATO membership and NATO’s open-door policy. The actual timing of that I know will be up for debate and discussion. But ultimately, we need Ukraine and potential investors in the rest of the world to understand that we value Ukraine’s safety and territorial integrity very, very highly.

But I wouldn’t be fixated on exactly which mechanism is best to do that. As I say, definitely not closing the door to NATO membership. That will be completely wrong and that’s not where the UK is at all and definitely looking at how we ensure that once Ukraine has got its country back that it’s never subjected to this brutality again. And that’s not just in the interest of Ukraine. That’s in the interests of all of us.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that.

China—I won’t ask you to repeat the Mansion House speech, which was really deep and really thoughtful on all things China. I think it’s more the question of whether you see a risk of disunity on China policy.

Two things, really. You saw the comments of President Macron when he left China. It’s clear that there are differences within Europe. It’s clear there’s some differences across the Atlantic. Even here in the United States, we have an argument that maybe because China is so important we shouldn’t be doing so much regarding Ukraine. Where do you stand on that in general? And then, also, how do we manage the real danger of disunity going forward on China?

JAMES CLEVERLY: So I think we should recognize that if there ever was the idea of kind of over there and over here those days are long gone and the traditional Euro-Atlantic security architecture and the Pacific security architecture or the focus you can’t disentangle those. They are completely interwoven.

And so I—there is, I know, talk here and in the UK and other parts of the world that somehow, you know, Ukraine is a distraction and our main focus should be on China and what China’s aspirations are and what China’s activities are, and the point I was making in the Mansion House speech, the point we’re making in the Integrated Review refresh, is that, of course, we are right to focus on what China aspires to do, what China is currently doing, its actions, whether it be through Belt and Road, whether it be through its military buildup, whether it be how it looks across the Taiwan Strait, and we are absolutely right to focus on those.

But we can’t just pretend Ukraine isn’t happening and we do need to do both. And as I say, the world is watching and Beijing is watching. They will—you know, Beijing will make—the leadership in Beijing, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, will make decisions based on what they observe us doing, how much resolve we have, how much commitment we have, how good we are when we make promises, how good we are at delivering on the promises that we made, and, of course, that will influence their thinking and we need to make sure we think about the message we’re sending there.

In terms of—

FREDERICK KEMPE: That’s the message of Ukraine is crucial in our relations with China?

JAMES CLEVERLY: Absolutely. These are not different files. Everything is connected. Everything is being observed.

When it comes to the Mansion House speech the point that I was making is, you know, China is big. It’s influential. It is powerful. It was the largest economy in the world for twenty of the last twenty-two centuries and China aspires once again to being a dominant global power.

So we can’t pretend that is not the case. We do absolutely have to engage with China. We also need to be realistic that China does many things with—that we fundamentally disagree on: its activities in Xinjiang against the Uighur Muslim minority, its failure to uphold the commitments it made to us with regard to Hong Kong, its increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea, its—the tone it’s taking across the Taiwan Strait.

There are many things where we are uncomfortable and we raise these issues directly as I did very recently when I had a meeting with senior Chinese government officials and we will continue to do.

We need to make sure that we protect ourselves, our intellectual property, our key infrastructure just as the US is seeking to do and we also need to make sure we are strengthening our long-term friendships and alliances in the region and those are the three pillars that I outlined in the Mansion House speech and, again, you need to do all these things.

You need to engage robustly, you need to defend at home, and you need to build alliances overseas and that will be the long-term posture from the UK’s point of view. And as I said at the beginning of this, as with all these things, they are so much more effective if we do them in close coordination and cooperation with our longstanding friends in the world.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that.

So let me ask one more question on something you raised in the beginning, which is the economic sphere, and then I’d like to take one or two questions or whatever we can get to from the audience.

JAMES CLEVERLY: Sure.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So we at the Atlantic Council talk a lot about the non-kinetic competition and, particularly in our era of global competition, are we doing enough as a group in the economic sphere? I think the answer is no. But then the harder question is: What do you do about it?

With your prime minister coming here, I know you’ve spoken a lot about that. You know, Chancellor Jeremy Hunt rejected the idea of going toe-to-toe with the US, I think that’s playing partly off the Inflation Reduction Act. What’s the UK’s strategy in the economic sphere, tying together with everything else that you’ve said?

JAMES CLEVERLY: Well, look, the UK’s foreign policy has always been defined by our geography. We’re an island nation. We’re a relatively small island nation. We’ve been technological innovators from the, you know, Stephenson’s Rocket—from the steam engine to the—Tim Berners-Lee and the World Wide Web. We very much pride ourselves [on] being big enough to be a significant global player, but small enough to be agile and innovative. But we’ve always had a global network, now through not just the Commonwealth but many of our—many of our friends internationally, and that’s always going to be an important part of what we do.

So we think globally. We always have done. We always will do. And we recognize that partnering with countries that have similar values, similar aspirations, similar expectations, wherever they are in the world, matters to us. And the point that we would make is that the US—you know, you mentioned the Inflation Reduction Act. So completely understand in [an] increasingly unpredictable and competitive world why the United States would want to make sure that it protects its people—rightly so. Absolutely the case. All I would say is make sure you do that in, you know, cooperation, collaboration, and concert with your like-minded friends around the world, whether it be the Europeans, the UK, the Japanese, South Koreans, and many others.

We need to make sure that we are thinking longer term and we’re thinking about the economic relationships that we want, not just this year and next year but in the next decade and the next couple of decades; and that we are stronger together just as—just as, you know, that proved to be the case in decades gone past where the conflict was kinetic, where the security was about physical security. I think the future challenges are more likely to be in the digital sphere—cyber—and in the economic sphere. So we need to make sure—and the US needs to make sure—that its self-defense in the cyber and economic realms is as networked and internationally-coordinated as it has historically been in the realm of physical defense.

FREDERICK KEMPE: And this will be a growing area of emphasis for you, common cause in these areas?

JAMES CLEVERLY: Yeah, absolutely. You know, the world is a very, very deeply integrated place. It is—if it were ever possible to defend yourself physically—and the UK has had to do that, and our status as an island has helped. You know, we haven’t had a successful physical invasion since 1066, when, of course, the coronation that we—you know, the roots of that coronation were William the Conqueror cementing his authority as the new monarch of then-England, you know, nearly a thousand years ago—sorry, over—yeah, nearly a thousand years ago. And so, you know, that golden thread historically in the UK, and we’ve been able to defend ourselves physically because we are an island nation.

But the simple fact is that, you know, island status or even a large landmass like the US does not protect you in cyberspace. You need friends and you need partners, and you need to be close to them. It does not protect you when it comes to critical mineral supply chains. You need friends, you need partners, and you need to stay close to them as well. So physically, digitally, economically making sure that we put our arms around each other. I’m a rugby player. That’s like American football, but better. And—

FREDERICK KEMPE: Without the pads.

JAMES CLEVERLY: Yeah. And just—I’ve ruined the transatlantic relationship now. And I played in the scrum. And you’ve got to interlock. You put your arms around each other. You bind in tight. That is how you confront the challenges of the future. And I say, it needs to be in all three of these spheres because, as we’re seeing, the proof point is Ukraine. That conflict is being waged physically, digitally, and economically. And you either protect yourself with partners in all three of those areas, or you’re going to be exposed—even a country undoubtably as big, and powerful, and influential as the United States.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So, speaking of the scrum, we’re going to turn to questions. And out of respect for our allies across the pond, I’d like to turn to Alistair Dawber from The Times. Are you here? And this is not The New York Times. This is the Times of London. And then we’ll turn to The Financial Times after this.

Q: Thank you.

The issue of fighter jets came up, for Ukraine. And obviously President Zelensky’s been very clear he wants them. He thinks they’ll make a difference. He wants them immediately. Poland has also said it’s necessary. Is the British position that at the moment fighter jets are not necessary for the war in Ukraine—for Ukraine’s war effort?

JAMES CLEVERLY: So we do recognize that air defense and the ability for the Ukrainians to interdict and defend themselves from air attack is important. We don’t have F-16th in our fleet. That is not an equipment type that we can donate. We were able to donate tanks beginning of the year. We donated armored vehicles, very significant amounts of ammunition. What we’ve also been doing is training the next generation of fighter pilots, the next generation of amphibious warfare troops, as well as working very closely with our international partners, the Ukrainian Army.

So we know that we need to keep evolving our support. Those NLAW missile systems, Javelins and NLAWs that were so instrumental in the defense of Kyiv, that was absolutely the right thing at that point. Air defense missile systems became increasingly important over time, and the next stage we’ll see another evolution of the support. We provide that support in close cooperation and coordination with our international allies, and we will constantly keep it under review. And I know that’s such a politicians answer, but the bottom line is we have got to evolve and adapt our support just as the Ukrainians evolve and adapt their tactics to defend themselves against Russia’s invasion.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that question. Felicia Schwartz. Please, of Financial Times.

Q: Thanks so much.

Secretary Blinken last week signaled he was more open for the Chinese to play a role in the diplomatic process. What is your view? And do you think that China could eventually bring Russia to the table? And then, secondly, you just warned about the perils of signaling that the West is not in this for the long haul, but do you think the US can sustain its current support with the election coming up next year?

JAMES CLEVERLY: So I would welcome the intervention that brought this war to a just and sustainable conclusion, from wherever it came. And I don’t think we should dog in the manger about this. We know that Xi enjoys a significant degree of influence with Vladimir Putin. If he can use that influence to deliver on what he has publicly stated he feels strongly about, which is sovereignty, territorial integrity, the nonuse of nuclear weapons, the nonthreat use of nuclear weapons, then why would we be critical of that intervention? If it is meaningful and if he actually delivers upon it—two big “ifs.” But if, through his intervention, he can help restore the sovereignty of Ukraine and get Russian troops out of that country, then I’m not going to be critical of that. But it needs to be more than just headline-grabbing stuff. It needs to be genuine intervention.

And the second part, just to say, you know, we live in democracies. It’s our greatest strength. And we have democratic cycles. And the great thing about democracies is it forces a discipline on national leaders. We have to explain and justify why we take the actions that we do. We cannot spend—we cannot just spend money as if it’s our own. We recognize that that money comes from the people that vote for us and put us in place. And we have to be able to justify why that expenditure matters, why it’s in their interest, particularly at times when gas prices are going up, particularly at times when food prices are going up, particularly at times when food prices are going up, particularly at times when people are worried about their personal financial circumstances.

And we need to make the case. You know, we can’t be lazy, and we can’t be complacent. And I know that the UK administration is none of those things. I also know the US administration is none of those things. But we’ve got to make the case. And we’ve got to make the case robustly. And we’ve got to explain why it’s in the interest of those middle-class Americans who are worried about their tax bills, who are worried about their food bills; that spending money on this thing now will mean that we don’t have to spend more money on the next thing coming along and it is in their interest that we do these things.

It’s not just about the Ukrainians. It is about the Ukrainians, of course it is. But it is—you know, when I went to, you know, Jefferson City, or I went to the Midwest, you know, it matters to those people there. And we need to make that case. And it’s not going to be easy, but that’s our job and I think we should rise to it.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So we have to close, but I’d be remiss not to ask a question about the king.

JAMES CLEVERLY: Go on.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So Britain, the Commonwealth, have a new king. Does the monarch still play a role in Britain in the world? And if so, what is it?

JAMES CLEVERLY: So, short answer, yes. And like so many things in British society, you know, if you started with a blank sheet of paper, this is probably not necessarily the [structure] that you would create. But nevertheless, somehow strangely it manages to work. Of course, His Majesty King Charles III is the king of the United Kingdom. He’s also the king of fourteen other countries around the world. He is the head of the Commonwealth [with] member states of the Commonwealth in all time zones around the globe.

He is passionate about protecting the natural environment, has been for many, many decades, long before it was the cool thing to talk about. He is passionate about the diversity, not just in the UK but around the globe, and protecting that diversity. He is passionate about making sure the international system benefits not just the rich, and the wealthy, and the powerful, but the poorest and the most underprivileged around the world.

So even if—even if we didn’t have this amazing—I had the privilege of being in Westminster Abbey during the coronation. It was deeply, deeply moving. With all the pomp and circumstances, it was ultimately a really deeply moving thing. I found myself, you know, on the verge of tears on a number of occasions. And there was a camera pointed right at me, I didn’t think blubbing was a particularly good look. But all those things that he has advocated for and will continue to be passionate about, they really matter.

And so, yes, it was in a one-thousand-year-old church. And, yes, the ceremony dates back to the time of William the Conqueror. And, yes, it was dripping with gems and ermine. But also, it was remarkably relevant to the modern world in a way that I didn’t expect or predict. And I think that’s why the monarchy is still relevant. And I think that was proven by the fact that so many senior people, including the—including the first lady—came to join us, at what was ultimately a kind of—I suppose, at one level, an intimate family affair. But by the same token, was an event of global significance.

And the fact it can be both simultaneously, the fact that so many people from around the world came to join us in our moment of celebration, the fact that at the heart of what the king is passionate about are so many issues which will define the modern era and the future. All these things make him very, very relevant. And it was a privilege to be there, and privilege to welcome so many of our friends from around the world.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that. It was a gorgeous moment. And many of us watching on our televisions also got a little bit wet-eyed. A former head of state, head of government in the United States told me—I shouldn’t mention the name—that this person was envious, because it’s so hard wearing both hats, head of state and head of government. And so I think this is one of the reasons why we watch the UK, and watch these, and almost feel vicarious emotion about it.

Mr. Foreign Secretary, this just was a terrific conversation. Come back often. We’d love to hear more and more from you. And welcome to the United States on this trip. Thank you.

JAMES CLEVERLY: Thank you very much.

Watch the event

The post James Cleverly on the UK’s support for Ukraine and foreign policy ‘refresh’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Sec. Mark Esper and Sec. Deborah Lee James promote DoD budget flexibility and program management reform in Defense One

Atlantic Council — Mon, 08 May 2023 19:51:38 +0000

On May 8, Sec. Mark Esper and Sec. Deborah Lee James, Co-Chairs of the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, co-wrote an article in Defense One discussing two key recommendations from the Commission’s recently released interim report. First, DoD needs more flexibility to reprogram funds within fiscal years without congressional approval. Second, DoD program managers should have fewer but larger portfolios so they can shift resources and technologies, threats, and priorities evolve.

The post Sec. Mark Esper and Sec. Deborah Lee James promote DoD budget flexibility and program management reform in Defense One appeared first on Atlantic Council.

US strategy and force posture for an era of nuclear tripolarity

Keir Lieber, Daryl G. Press — Mon, 01 May 2023 19:47:25 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

Issue brief release

The term “nuclear tripolarity” describes a world in which China has joined the United States and Russia as a leading nuclear power. As China modernizes its existing nuclear forces and deploys new weapons, it is on track to roughly double its deployed nuclear arsenal in the next few years—from approximately 350 to 700 deliverable warheads. The US Department of Defense projects that China will go further, expanding its arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035.¹ At those force levels, China’s arsenal would be comparable to US and Russian deployed nuclear forces, currently capped at 1,550 by the New START Treaty.²

What are the consequences of emerging tripolarity for US nuclear strategy and force posture? If the United States retains its current approach to nuclear force planning, the growth of China’s arsenal (and the ongoing modernization of Russia’s nuclear weapons) will likely compel the United States to significantly increase its own arsenal. The easiest way to do so would be to upload one to two thousand additional warheads from US reserves onto existing delivery systems when the New START treaty expires in 2026. Unfortunately, a major increase in US forces would likely mark just another step in an intensifying arms competition among the three leading nuclear powers, since China and Russia would then feel pressure to respond.

Alternatively, if US leaders meet the challenge of emerging tripolarity by reevaluating core nuclear missions, assumptions, and planning principles, then the costs and risks of a new nuclear arms competition might be avoided. Specifically, the United States should reconsider its current prohibition on deliberately targeting enemy civilians with nuclear weapons—a policy that prohibits counter-city targeting even in retaliation for a major Chinese or Russian nuclear attack on the US homeland.³ The prohibition on deterrence through “countervalue” targeting—the common term for targeting civilian populations and infrastructure—is a hidden driver of US nuclear force requirements. It necessitates a large US arsenal that can absorb an enemy strike and subsequently destroy hundreds of hardened enemy military sites.⁴ In an era of rapid adversary nuclear enhancements, this “counterforce-only” approach to nuclear planning is a recipe for large nuclear requirements and a likely three-party arms race.⁵

Those who would abhor a return to countervalue nuclear targeting should consider that the current counterforce-only doctrine is a costly fiction. It is a fiction because the type of massive retaliatory strike the United States would launch if China or Russia attacked the US homeland would hit cities and kill millions of adversary civilians, even if formally aimed at military targets. The pure counterforce approach to targeting does not actually spare enemy civilians or cities, but it does expand US nuclear requirements. A more tailored approach to nuclear deterrence—one that threatens military targets in some scenarios, and cities in the most extreme circumstances—might not increase the risk to enemy civilians at all. It may pose a stronger deterrent than a counterforce-only approach, and it may offer the best means for avoiding a costly arms race in a tripolar world.

Russia’s Kh-47M2 Kinzhal is a dual-capable hypersonic weapon shown here on a MiG-31 interceptor. It is featured here in the 2018 Moscow Victory Day Parade. Image courtesy Russian Presidential Press and Information Office. http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57436.

To be clear, this report advocates for neither a “minimum deterrence” doctrine (which requires only the capabilities necessary for retaliation against cities), nor the current counterforce-only approach. Instead, the United States should tailor its deterrent threats to the circumstances. The best way to deter nuclear attacks by regional adversaries is probably the threat of retaliatory disarming strikes—meaning counterforce strikes designed to disable the enemy’s remaining nuclear forces.⁶ However, the best, simplest, and least destabilizing way to deter massive counter-city strikes on the US homeland by a leading nuclear power is to threaten retaliation in kind.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: First, it briefly describes the meaning and importance of emerging nuclear tripolarity. Second, it examines the foundations of US nuclear force requirements, including the core missions assigned to nuclear weapons and the principles used to guide force planning. Third, it explains why emerging tripolarity will require significant increases in US nuclear forces as long as core missions and planning principles remain in place. Fourth, it explains why the United States should consider an alternative, hybrid approach to nuclear policy—one that avoids the pitfalls of the current counterforce-only doctrine. Finally, it raises and refutes potential counterarguments.

The era of nuclear tripolarity

The first decades of the nuclear age were defined by the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and the emergence of nuclear bipolarity. The United States developed nuclear weapons in 1945, and the Soviets joined the nuclear club just four years later in 1949. It took more than a decade (until the early 1960s) for the Soviet Union to deploy a truly survivable retaliatory capability against the United States. However, the basic structure of the nuclear order—two superpowers, each with much greater nuclear capabilities than anyone else—survived the end of the Cold War and endures today.⁷

China developed nuclear weapons in 1964 but maintained a relatively small arsenal, in the low hundreds of warheads, until recently. Today, according to US government assessments, China is “accelerating the large-scale expansion of its nuclear forces” by modernizing its existing forces and developing new capabilities, particularly silo-based, road-mobile, and sea-launched ballistic missiles. The Pentagon’s 2021 report to Congress projected that by the end of the decade China could have as many intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as the United States and Russia. Predictions about the exact size and composition of China’s future nuclear arsenal of course remain uncertain, but what is clear is that China will soon be armed with hundreds of additional nuclear weapons that can be targeted at the United States.

The emergence of nuclear tripolarity is a fact, but its impact on US nuclear policy and force requirements is less clear. While some analysts conclude that deterrence will become somewhat more complicated in a tripolar world, others see a far greater risk that nuclear weapons will be used in a crisis or war as China upends the apparent stability of a bipolar nuclear world.⁸ In fact, some leading analysts urge the United States to exit the New START Treaty and deploy as many as 3,500 nuclear weapons to maintain a credible deterrent.⁹

It is important to note that the consequences of nuclear tripolarity cannot be adequately understood in isolation from other key changes in the global nuclear environment. One area in particular—rapid technological changes that are rendering nuclear forces increasingly vulnerable—will amplify the strategic impact of tripolarity. Specifically, the “new era of counterforce,” based on revolutionary improvements in the accuracy of nuclear and conventional weapons and the ability to track nuclear forces via remote sensing, will exacerbate competition among the major nuclear powers as these countries face growing threats to maintaining secure retaliatory arsenals.¹⁰ Although this paper primarily discusses the impact of emerging tripolarity, the interaction effects with technological change deserve further analysis. In order to understand how the changing strategic landscape will shape US nuclear force requirements, one must examine the core missions that those forces are meant to carry out.

The foundations of US nuclear requirements: missions and guidelines

The United States requires its nuclear forces to execute three central missions: (1) deter nuclear attacks against the United States and its allies; (2) assure US allies that their nuclear deterrence needs will be met; and (3) mitigate the consequences if nuclear deterrence fails.¹¹

The first mission, the core of US nuclear policy, is broader than it appears because it requires deterring attacks from a diverse set of adversaries in a wide range of circumstances. The US arsenal must reliably deter powerful rivals that themselves are armed with large and diverse nuclear forces, as well as regional adversaries that field small and potentially vulnerable nuclear arsenals. US strategists must also posture US nuclear forces to deter a wide range of nuclear attacks, from large-scale strikes on the US homeland, such as an attack on US cities or a disarming strike aimed at the US nuclear arsenal, to smaller nuclear attacks, including battlefield strikes or instances of coercive nuclear escalation.

An unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile was launched at 4:36 a.m. PST during an operational test Dec. 17, 2013, from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif. https://www.flickr.com/photos/usairforce/11469547345/in/photolist-itwqQi-cid6Z7-L6rgw3-2g8E4EW-iEuYgn-8DzH6e.

Recognizing the breadth of the core mission to deter nuclear attack is important because the targets the United States threatens to retaliate against in each case, and the forces available to execute those retaliatory strikes, would vary across those circumstances. Retaliation against a battlefield nuclear attack by a weak, poorly armed enemy might entail low-yield, highly accurate nuclear forces—either to punish or disarm the enemy. By contrast, retaliation after a strategic attack on the US homeland by a major nuclear rival might involve dozens of high-yield weapons drawn from whatever US forces survived the initial enemy strike. The key point is that an arsenal designed to deter nuclear attacks across a wide range of circumstances will require a range of capabilities.

The second mission for US nuclear forces—assurance—is principally an effort to convince allies that the US nuclear umbrella will succeed at the core deterrence mission. If allies lose faith that US deterrent efforts will succeed, they may pursue nuclear capabilities of their own or change their geopolitical alignment to reduce their exposure to nuclear attack. Viewed in this way, the assurance mission is important, but it does not create force structure requirements beyond the core deterrence mission. In some cases, allies may disagree with US planners about the nuclear capabilities (or posture or declaratory policy) that are needed to reliably deter nuclear attack. However, as long as the US nuclear force structure is well suited for the deterrence mission, assurance principally involves reaching agreement with US partners that US force structure, posture, and declaratory policies will in fact deter adversaries.¹²

Similarly, the requirements for the third mission—mitigating the consequences if deterrence fails—are roughly the same as the requirements for the first mission. For example, if North Korea uses nuclear weapons during a war on the Korean Peninsula, the United States may decide to “mitigate” the impact by conducting conventional and low-yield nuclear disarming strikes against Pyongyang’s remaining arsenal. The most relevant US nuclear capabilities for such strikes—such as B-61 bombs, low-yield warheads on Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and air-launched cruise missiles—are also, by definition, the weapons on which the United States implicitly relies to deter North Korean attacks in the first place. The most demanding counterforce mission (in terms of force structure) is likely the requirement to conduct effective counterforce strikes after absorbing a major Russian nuclear attack. Some important scenarios may create niche requirements for the third mission (i.e., “mitigate consequences”), but because of the way the United States limits its target selection (“counterforce-only”), the deterrence mission and the mitigation mission largely call on the same forces.

To some extent, US force requirements follow logically from the three missions described above—and principally from mission one. In reality, however, the missions merely shape the force. The actual requirements (that is, the precise numbers of weapons and their operational requirements) depend substantially on three additional planning principles.

First, the survivability of US nuclear forces is not permitted to depend upon an elevated nuclear alert status nor quick employment decisions by US leaders. The US arsenal is deliberately designed to be survivable even at peacetime alert levels. Although the United States maintains a “launch on warning” capability, its retaliatory ability does not depend on the quick launch of forces. Instead, the US arsenal is designed to “ride out” an enemy’s counterforce strike and subsequently inflict devastating retaliation. This is an aspect of US posture intended to reinforce deterrence and reduce the risk of nuclear accidents from false alarms. Not surprisingly, an approach to deterrence that rejects high alert levels or quick employment decisions is costly, requiring redundant capabilities and robust command and control arrangements to ensure that some retaliatory forces will always survive and remain usable after any plausible attack.

The second key planning principal that drives US nuclear force structure is the rejection of a “single-leg survivability” approach to deterrence. Although some commentators refer to the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force as the inherently survivable leg of the US nuclear triad, US planners have intentionally designed survivability into each element of the arsenal. For example, individual US ICBMs are vulnerable to Russian missile attacks, but the missiles are deployed in large enough numbers to make them survivable as a force. Even a major strike on US ICBM fields using current Russian weapons would leave many missiles intact and ready to retaliate. Previously, the US strategic bomber force was deployed in a dispersed manner, with enough aircraft on alert to ensure retaliation. Today’s force is concentrated at a small number of bases, although at times of heightened tension the aircraft can be alerted and dispersed. In short, the US nuclear triad is not merely designed to create flexible employment options—each leg enhances the survivability of the overall force.

Of the three core US nuclear planning principles, the third has the greatest impact on US nuclear force structure. As mentioned at the outset, the United States aims nuclear weapons solely at enemy military targets, not at their cities.¹³ In other words, the United States threatens to respond to any nuclear attack—even an unrestrained strike on US cities—by retaliating against enemy military forces.

At first glance, this US policy appears to create a dangerous asymmetry. Telling enemies that a devastating strike on US cities will trigger retaliation against adversary military targets seems like an underwhelming threat, thereby weakening deterrence. Although there may be some validity to that concern, the United States’ counterforce retaliatory doctrine is not as restrained as it sounds. Many adversary military targets are located inside urban areas. Furthermore, many enemy military targets would require nuclear ground bursts to destroy them. Ground bursts (as opposed to airbursts) would necessarily create large fallout plumes that would contaminate wide swaths of territory. In short, current US targeting doctrine does not directly threaten cities, but it does not protect enemy civilians either. The “counterforce-only” approach to US nuclear deterrence would do little—or perhaps nothing —to reduce civilian fatalities if there were a major nuclear war.

Although the counterforce-only approach to retaliation may not spare enemy populations, it does significantly increase US nuclear requirements. For example, if the US retaliatory posture were based on the threat to retaliate with one hundred high-yield warheads against enemy cities, a total force of one thousand US weapons might be sufficient to guarantee that at least one hundred would survive. However, a nuclear doctrine based on the threat to retaliate against hundreds of military targets, many of which are hardened and thus require multiple strikes, means that large numbers of US forces must survive an enemy attack. A peacetime US arsenal must be even bigger.

A U.S. Air Force B-52H Stratofortress assigned to Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana., lands at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, in support of a Bomber Task Force deployment, Feb. 8, 2021.
https://www.dvidshub.net/image/6527213/b-52-landing.

To be clear, there are reasonable arguments in favor of each of these guiding principles. However, for reasons described in the next section, if US planners continue to base US force structure requirements against the ability to execute the current missions—and do so according to current planning principles—the emergence of nuclear tripolarity will cause US nuclear requirements to grow significantly.

Force structure in the era of tripolarity

If the United States retains its current nuclear missions and planning principles, the pressures of tripolarity—exacerbated by the impact of rapidly changing technology on arsenal vulnerability—will require significant increases to US nuclear force structure.

Tripolarity—exemplified by the additional 350 Chinese ICBMs—raises new challenges for US nuclear planners. First, there is the possibility, however remote, that Russia and China might someday coordinate a joint nuclear disarming strike against US nuclear forces.¹⁴ Given the extraordinary risk involved in a nuclear disarming strike, and the extreme sensitivity of information that would need to be shared among the co-conspirators, the likelihood of a coordinated attack appears very low. That said, nuclear weapons deter best when countries are fully confident that their arsenals are survivable. Therefore, the possibility of an overwhelming joint attack does slightly increase the challenge for the US nuclear arsenal.

The second effect of nuclear tripolarity works through a subtler logic and presents a greater challenge for US nuclear planners—a problem often referred to as the “third man in.” Currently, the core US nuclear mission (“deter nuclear attack”) requires, among other things, the ability of US forces to survive any Russian nuclear disarming strike and subsequently inflict unacceptable damage on Russia’s military forces. In a tripolar era, however, the US ability to retaliate after a Russian attack would be limited by fears that China might subsequently strike the United States (i.e., after US forces had first been degraded by Russia and then expended in the US retaliatory strike). The third man in problem is not merely that a retaliatory strike on Russia would leave the United States vulnerable to China. Rather, the knowledge that the United States would be constrained in its retaliation might embolden Russia and China in the first place. In short, if the United States is vulnerable to the sequential strikes by Russia and China envisioned in a third man in scenario, it might be vulnerable to many types of nuclear coercion.

The third effect of tripolarity exacerbates the third man in problem. Nuclear forces take years to build, and they are designed to last for decades. As a result, force structure should be resilient against plausible political changes in international politics. In the coming decades, however, the geopolitical landscape may evolve in radically different directions. China and Russia might become close allies. Alternatively, China may reverse its recent authoritarian turn, liberalize, and move toward the West. Pessimists in Beijing may even worry about a third possibility: regime change in Moscow, opening the door to a US-Russian rapprochement. However, if each tripolar power feels compelled to build an arsenal able to survive an adversary’s attack, retaliate, and still be able to deter the third nuclear great power, the world will be primed for costly and destabilizing arms racing.

The pernicious effects of nuclear tripolarity are exacerbated by the other aspects of the deterrence landscape, described above. The revolutions in accuracy and remote sensing mean that all nuclear forces are becoming more vulnerable, magnifying the third man in problem.¹⁵ US planners remain understandably reluctant to base their nuclear deterrence strategy on single-leg survivability. They understand that submarines can sometimes be tracked—in fact, Soviet submarines were vulnerable during significant periods of the Cold War. In an era of unprecedented technological change, no delivery system—even whisper-quiet US nuclear submarines—will necessarily be survivable in the future.

The Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine USS Henry M. Jackson (SSBN 730) gets in position to receive a payload of supplies from an MV-22B Osprey in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands. (US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Devin M. Langer).

Possibly the biggest factor that exacerbates the problems of nuclear tripolarity is the US counterforce-only approach to deterrence. Maintaining a force that can survive a Russian attack and retaliate effectively against Moscow’s military forces—and then survive a Chinese attack and retaliate effectively against Beijing’s military—is a demanding mission. Furthermore, building the capabilities to carry out those counterforce strikes in such demanding circumstances (i.e., after absorbing massive disarming attacks) will necessitate a force that is so capable that it will undermine the peacetime survivability of Russia’s and China’s arsenals.

The implications of tripolarity on deterrence may seem esoteric to those outside the nuclear community, but they are well understood by US planners. Consequently, calls for increasing US nuclear forces are growing common. The easiest way to enhance US nuclear capabilities in the short term is to upload existing delivery systems with available warheads. The current Minuteman III ICBM force (four hundred missiles, with one warhead each) can accommodate an additional four hundred warheads, which would not enhance the survivability of the missiles but would increase the capability of any ICBMs that survived an enemy disarming strike.¹⁶ Similarly, the United States could increase the number of warheads on each Trident II missile, adding between five hundred and one thousand warheads across the eight to ten submarines typically at sea.¹⁷

Estimating the number of uploaded warheads required to absorb a Russian nuclear attack and retaliate, and then absorb a Chinese attack and retaliate, would require a complete force exchange analysis, which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, analysts who advocate for more US nuclear forces have a point: if the United States intends to retain its current nuclear missions and achieve them using traditional planning principles, the addition of one thousand Chinese warheads, potentially loaded on 350 modern ICBMs, would require a significant increase in US forces. At the same time, critics of a US nuclear buildup have a point too: given the substantial counterforce capabilities of the additional US weapons (and the geopolitical uncertainties inherent in tripolarity), it is likely that these US enhancements would trigger responses from Russia and China.

Is there an alternative approach to nuclear planning that would achieve core missions (deter, assure, and mitigate), continue to reject hair-trigger alert postures, and steer clear of the uncertainties of single-leg survivability?

A hybrid strategy for the era of nuclear tripolarity

The United States should consider an alternative approach to nuclear policy that avoids the pitfalls of the current counterforce-only strategy and the weaknesses of a pure minimum deterrence countervalue doctrine. This paper proposes an alternative hybrid approach, which retains and continues to gradually enhance existing counterforce capabilities to fulfill their current roles in US plans. The hybrid policy, however, would change its approach to deterring large-scale nuclear attacks on the US homeland by threatening punitive retaliatory strikes against enemy cities in those extreme circumstances.

The weaknesses of the current counterforce-only approach are described above. It requires a large and expanding force, thereby undermining future efforts to limit or reduce nuclear stockpiles; it may trigger a spiraling arms race among the United States, Russia, and China; and it may ironically provide a weaker deterrent.¹⁸ At the same time, the opposite approach—a pure countervalue strategy—has even greater limitations. Most importantly, a countervalue-only approach would limit US leaders to poor retaliatory options after a limited enemy nuclear attack—especially one that spared US and allied cities. US credibility—in the eyes of both allies and adversaries—would suffer as a result, with adverse consequences for proliferation and deterrence.

A hybrid strategy would avoid the negative consequences of both alternatives—leaving the United States with its current counterforce capabilities to provide credible retaliatory options across a wide range of circumstances (e.g., an adversary’s limited nuclear attack), all the while avoiding the need to build additional counterforce capabilities each time China or Russia enhances its nuclear arsenal.

Table 1 summarizes the current and hybrid approaches to nuclear deterrence. Regardless of which approach the United States chooses, the mission of deterring a nuclear attack can be accomplished in two ways: by threatening a retaliatory damage-limiting strike against the enemy’s nuclear forces, or by threatening a punitive retaliatory response designed to inflict pain. Where the strategies differ is in how each would execute a punitive response.

The current policy seeks to deter nuclear attacks by providing US leaders with two options for retaliation: First, the policy allows for counterforce strikes to degrade (or disarm entirely) an enemy’s forces after the enemy has used nuclear weapons against the United States or its allies. Second, if meaningful damage limitation is impossible, the United States can conduct retaliatory counterforce strikes to punish an enemy. The overarching goal is deterrence: the threat of disarming attacks, or punitive strikes against military targets, is intended to dissuade a potential adversary from conducting nuclear attacks in the first place.

The hybrid strategy would retain counterforce capabilities for damage limitation, but in case of direct attacks against US or allied urban areas, it would rely on countervalue threats for the purpose of punishment. In other words, against adversaries with potentially vulnerable arsenals (e.g., North Korea today; possibly Iran in the future), US nuclear deterrence would rest on the threat of retaliatory damage-limiting strikes—meaning counterforce attacks designed to disarm the adversary, if possible. (In this respect it would be identical to the current approach.) Against adversaries with forces too large for effective damage limitation, however, the hybrid strategy would base retaliatory plans—to deter the most extreme attacks—on threats of punitive countervalue retaliation.

Table 1: Comparing the current and alternative approaches to targeting

The hybrid strategy could be implemented at current and planned force levels. The hybrid approach requires the same damage-limitation capabilities as the counterforce-only strategy. In both cases, the United States requires nuclear and non-nuclear means for degrading (or disarming) the arsenals of small nuclear powers. Weapons like the B-61, low-yield Trident, the planned “long range standoff” (LRSO) cruise missile, and possibly the proposed nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) could play a role in this mission. Also, in both cases, the United States would retain (and enhance) the counterforce weapons that provide substantial damage limitation capabilities against larger nuclear adversaries. The higher-yield Trident, Minuteman III, and stealthy long-range bombers armed with LRSO missiles are well-suited to that role. Those counterforce capabilities, which have been force-sized against the Russian target set, would be more than adequate against China’s smaller force.¹⁹

Simply put, the switch from a counterforce-only approach to the hybrid strategy offered here affects US force requirements merely by changing the means by which the United States would inflict punishment after a catastrophic attack on the US homeland. Following the current strategy will drive the United States to acquire more warheads to target China’s new ICBMs and other new nuclear targets with whatever US force survived a Chinese first strike. Worse yet, the current strategy would require US planners to cover Russian military targets with the weapons that survived a Russian disarming strike, and still have enough forces remaining to survive a third man in attack from China before retaliating against Chinese military targets. The hybrid strategy, by contrast, rejects this excessively demanding approach to deterrence. It would simply warn Russia that a crippling nuclear attack on the US homeland will be met with a hundred (or so) weapons that will inflict massive punishment on Russian society. If China, for some inconceivable reason, wished to be the third man in for this catastrophe, the US arsenal will have a hundred or more warheads left to inflict massive harm on China’s society too.

To reiterate, the purpose of these threats is to deter the attacks in the first place. However, the goal of deterrence is easier to reach—and can be done with fewer forces—if the planning guidance abandons the counterforce-only approach.

Counterarguments

Critics of a hybrid deterrent approach might argue that the current US strategy already targets adversary civilians indirectly, and therefore solves the problem this paper identifies, in a politically acceptable fashion. Specifically, critics of a hybrid strategy argue that adversary “military” sites selected for nuclear retaliation include many targets located inside enemy cities. Thus, any adversary would suffer vast civilian casualties from US retaliation whether or not the US strike were technically limited to counterforce targets. Moreover, this critique explains why, allegedly, the United States will not need to arms race under tripolarity, since the deployment of additional Chinese weapons will not affect US requirements for punitive counterforce attacks. Given that the effect of these retaliatory counterforce strikes is intended to be punitive, the United States can plan to destroy the same number of (urban) military targets in Russia or China, regardless of how many new ICBMs or other weapons China deploys.

The problem with this critique (and the current counterforce-only strategy) is that it is an unstable solution built on sleight-of-hand: targeting cities, without targeting cities. As a result, the strategy is vulnerable to powerful critiques from both doves and hawks. The doves will assail the current strategy because the military targets inside cities do not meet the high legal bar for “proportionality,” because millions of civilians would inevitably die. These attacks on the current strategy are underway, evidenced by efforts to define the practice of nuclear deterrence (and nuclear weapons themselves) as illegal under international law.²⁰ Hawks will attack the contradictions in the current policy from the other side. US policy aims to deter nuclear attack by threatening to retaliate against enemy military targets, but with China’s buildup the United States does not have enough weapons to cover those targets. Therefore, the United States needs more. These attacks are also underway as seen in calls to upload US missiles and submarines in response to China’s new ICBMs.

An unarmed Trident II (D5LE) missile launches from Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS Maine (SSBN 741) off the coast of San Diego, California, Feb. 12, 2020. (US Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Thomas Gooley).

The better option is the hybrid approach: (1) maintain enough counterforce capability to provide the disarming and damage limiting options that US foreign policy commitments require, and (2) retain enough survivability to inflict devastating countervalue strikes—against one or two major adversaries—to deter the most extreme attacks on the US homeland. The legal battles to defend the practice of deterrence will ensue, just as they would with the current strategy. However, the hybrid approach is much less likely to trigger a costly and dangerous tripolar arms race.

A second criticism is that US allies and the international community would be appalled if the United States adopted a hybrid deterrence policy which explicitly incorporated countervalue targeting. Critics might contend that allied objections would weaken US alliances and undermine US standing as a leader in the rules-based order. However, for decades US policy rejected the claim that the humanitarian legal principles of distinction and proportionality applied to plans for nuclear deterrence. A major policy shift mandating that US nuclear doctrine adhere to those principles occurred only recently—during the administration of former US President Barack Obama in 2013.²¹ The United States was able to stake a claim to global leadership and promote the rules-based-order prior to 2013, and it could continue to do so today regardless of the details of its nuclear deterrence strategy. Debates over deterrence and law are political as much as they are legal, and key US allies depend on the US nuclear umbrella. They will accept the hybrid approach if they understand it is the best way to provide a credible deterrent while minimizing the risk of a nuclear arms race.

Conclusion

The strategic dynamics of a tripolar nuclear world are worrisome. If China’s nuclear expansion and modernization continue as expected, the US nuclear arsenal will also need to grow to satisfy current mission requirements. This in turn will lead China and Russia to worry about the vulnerability of their own arsenals, likely triggering additional arms buildups. Understood in this light, the United States must find a balance that addresses real challenges to critical nuclear deterrence missions yet avoids (if possible) actions that will trigger a costly and counterproductive arms race.

One promising path forward is to revisit and adapt fundamental nuclear planning principles—to address the constraints of a new era. Specifically, the United States should formulate a hybrid deterrent approach, which retains counterforce capabilities for some circumstances (e.g., deterring nuclear escalation during regional wars) while accepting that a counterforce-only doctrine is not well suited to deter major nuclear attacks on the US homeland. Adopting a hybrid approach would more effectively deter nuclear attacks on the US homeland or that of its allies, while also allowing the United States to avoid a new nuclear arms race.

If the United States were to move in the direction this paper suggests, it would raise important questions about how to square US nuclear policy with international law.²² Changing US doctrine to permit countervalue targeting for the most extreme contingencies might be justified by legal exemptions given for national “supreme emergency” or interpretations that allow for “belligerent reprisal.” Alternatively, a legal justification might be built on the distinction between what is necessary for planning (for the purpose of deterrence) versus actual execution (in case of nuclear war).²³ As others have noted, international humanitarian law was intended to moderate the conduct of war—not undermine policies designed to prevent war.²⁴ Ultimately, international humanitarian law, and the boundaries of its jurisdiction when those laws conflict with necessary action in the face of existential threats, has always been subject to interpretation and reinterpretation. Regardless, the first step involves the renewed analysis of fundamental strategic questions. The answers point to the need to change US policy to bolster deterrence and prevent a dangerous arms race.

Issue brief authors

Fellow

Keir Lieber

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

Fellow

Daryl G. Press

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Arms Control Defense Policy

Acknowledgement

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s work on nuclear and strategic force has been made possible by support from our partners, including Los Alamos National Laboratory, Northrop Grumman Corporation, Norwegian Ministry of Defense, the United States Department of Defense, the United States Department of Energy, as well as general support to the Scowcroft Center. The partners are not responsible for the content of this report, and the Scowcroft Center maintains a strict intellectual independence policy.

1 US Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2022, Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 98.

2 The New START treaty limits deployed strategic warheads at 1,550, but it counts each strategic bomber as a single “warhead.” Because bomber aircraft can carry multiple weapons, US and Russian nuclear forces can be slightly above 1,550 and still be compliant with the treaty. The treaty also does not address nuclear forces with a range below 5,000 kilometers. While Russia announced in February 2023 that it would suspend participation in New START inspections, both parties continue to appear to be in compliance with the treaty’s central limitations on deployed accountable strategic forces.

3 For debates on the legal status and policy wisdom of the current US prohibition on intentionally targeting civilians in nuclear reprisal, see Scott S. Sagan and Allen S. Weiner, “The Rule of Law and the Role of Strategy in U.S. Nuclear Doctrine,” International Security, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Spring 2021), pp. 126-166; Christopher A. Ford, et al., “Correspondence: Are Belligerent Reprisals Against Civilians Legal,” International Security, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Fall 2021), pp. 166-172; and Steve Fetter and Charles Glaser, “Legal, but Lethal: The Law of Armed Conflict and U.S. Nuclear Strategy,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Spring 2022), pp. 25-37.

4 These enemy military sites include but are not limited to nuclear targets.

5 Consistent with the nuclear literature, we divide nuclear targets into two broad categories: counterforce targets, which are military sites, and countervalue targets, which are civilian sites. Note that counterforce targeting (e.g., aiming at military sites) is often conflated with attacks intended to disarm (fully or partially) an enemy. In reality, one might strike counterforce targets for a wide range of reasons: to punish, to coerce, to disarm, and more. The distinction between target types and operational goals lies at the heart of the argument that follows.

6 See Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “Coercive Nuclear Campaigns in the 21st Century: Understanding Adversary Incentives and Options for Nuclear Escalation,” March 2013, Report Number 2013-001, Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC), pp. 46-48.

7 On the Soviet Union’s struggle to create a survivable retaliatory capability, and US efforts to delay that day from arriving, see Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020), pp. 41-51.

8 Then-USSTRATCOM Commander Admiral Richard Charles Richard stated, “We can start by rewriting deterrence theory… We have never faced two peer nuclear capable opponents at the same time who have to be deterred differently.” Theresa Hitchens, Breaking Defense, August 11, 2022. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., referring to “the general stability of [a] bipolar system,” writes, “China’s attainment of great-nuclear-power status will dramatically upset this delicate equilibrium.” Andrew F. Krepinevich, “The New Nuclear Age: How China’s Growing Nuclear Arsenal Threatens Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2022.

9 Frank C. Miller, “Outdated Nuclear Treaties Heighten the Risk of Nuclear War,” Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2022.

10 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence,” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Spring 2017), pp. 9-49.

11 US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, October 27, 2022, pp. 7-8.

12 Some analysts may claim that the second mission does occasionally require additional forces—i.e., beyond those needed for mission one—by pointing to instances in which US allies lobbied the United States to retain particular weapon systems in the arsenal. Japan, reportedly, advocated for the nuclear Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM-N) despite US assessments that it was unnecessary for deterrence. But these cases are better understood as disagreements among allies about what forces are required for mission one (i.e., deterrence), rather than about extra forces required for mission two. The debate between US and Japanese officials reportedly centered on whether US ICBMs and SLBMs would be credible against limited attacks on Japan, given the large yield of those weapons, and hence whether the ballistic missiles would reliably deter attacks on Japan—i.e., a debate over the requirements of deterrence.

13 Current US doctrine prohibits the deliberate targeting of civilians with nuclear weapons, so all US plans for nuclear employment exclusively target military objectives. According to the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States “will not intentionally target civilian populations or objects” with nuclear weapons. Official guidance also holds that all nuclear employment plans must “seek to minimize collateral damage” to civilians, even in retaliation for a nuclear strike against US or allied civilians. In short, US nuclear doctrine, strategy, legal commitments, and policy appear to prohibit deliberate countervalue targeting, meaning that all US nuclear options are fundamentally counterforce in nature.

14 This seems extremely unlikely to the authors, but it cannot be completely dismissed, as countries have in the past conspired to launch aggressive wars together.

15 On the revolutions in accuracy and sensing, see Lieber and Press, “The New Era of Counterforce.” These technological trends exacerbate the third man in problem because, in an era of high-accuracy and unprecedented sensing capabilities, an initial disarming strike will be expected to destroy a large fraction of a country’s retaliatory forces. Additionally, the dangers posed by the “third man’s” arsenal—which will be highly accurate itself and cued by advanced sensors—will constrain the victim’s retaliatory options more than if the “third man” had a blunt, unsophisticated arsenal.

16 Of the four hundred US Minuteman ICBMs currently deployed, two hundred are armed with Mk12A reentry vehicles; those missiles can each carry two additional warheads. The United States has fifty unused Minuteman silos which could be reloaded, but doing so would draw missiles away from the pool designated for testing, which would harm force readiness.

17 As the United States transitions from Ohio- to Columbia-class SSBNs, both the number of deployed submarines and the number of missiles per boat will drop.

18 For these and additional arguments, see Fetter and Glaser, “Legal, but Lethal,” pp. 31-35.

19 Unless the United States requires the ability to conduct substantial damage-limitation strikes against both China and Russia simultaneously, the increase in China’s ICBMs does not require additional counterforce capabilities for the United States.

20 See the analysis in Sagan and Weiner, “Rule of Law.”

21 Sagan and Wiener, “Rule of Law,” pp. 127-128.

22 Alternatively, the importance of adopting a nuclear policy that most effectively bolsters deterrence (i.e., the prevention of nuclear war) and avoids the dangers of a “no cities” approach may simply require the United States to no longer abide by current interpretations of international law in this area. As Fetter and Glaser write in reference to the Law of Armed Conflict, “[we] do not believe that the value of complying with the LOAC for its own sake warrants adopting a strategically inferior strategy.” Fetter and Glaser, “Legal, but Lethal,” p. 28.

23 Note that NATO’s nuclear sharing policy involves planning (for the purpose of deterrence) to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear members of the Nonproliferation Treaty—an action that would be illegal if executed. Similarly, a hybrid deterrence strategy would involve planning for actions that would only be executed if such extreme events had occurred (major nuclear strikes on the US homeland) as to nullify the context of existing international law.

24 Fetter and Glaser, “Legal, but Lethal,” pp., 27-28.

The post US strategy and force posture for an era of nuclear tripolarity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What Russian mercenaries tell us about Russia

Alia Brahimi — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 14:17:06 +0000

In Season 1, Episode 2 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi speaks with the Russian defence analyst Pavel Luzin about what the proliferation of Russian mercenaries abroad tells us about Russia at home. They explore the domestic forces that gave rise to the Kremlin’s co-optation of Russian mercenaries, how they are funded by the Russian federal budget, and the effects mercenaries are already having on Russian society. They also discuss how Russia’s strategy of playing the troublemaker in Libya won it a seat at the table in determining Libya’s future.

“Hundreds of thousands of veterans will come back sooner or later to Russia and it will be a political economy and social disaster. It will be [a] high level of violence”

Pavel Luzin, Russian defence analyst

Find the Guns For Hire podcast on the app of your choice

About the podcast

The Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalisation of contract warfare tells us about the world as we currently find it, but also about the future of the international system and about what war could look like in the coming decades.

Middle East Programs

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

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The post What Russian mercenaries tell us about Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes

Tiffany Vora — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 13:00:49 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

ISSUE BRIEF

The “United States Space Priorities Framework,” released in December 2021, confirmed the White House’s commitment to American leadership in space.¹ Space activities deliver immense benefits to humankind. For example, satellite imaging alone is crucial for improvements in daily life such as weather monitoring as well as for grand challenges like the fight against climate change. Such breakthrough discoveries in space pave the way for innovation and new economies on Earth. Exploration is at the cutting edge of this process: it expands humankind’s knowledge of the universe, transforming the unknown into the supremely challenging, expensive, risky, and promising. US allies and partners accelerate this transformation via scientific and technical achievements as well as processes, relationships, and a shared vision for space exploration. By integrating these allied capabilities, the United States and its allies and partners set the stage for safe and prosperous space geopolitics and economy in the decades to come.

However, harnessing the capabilities of US allies and partners for space exploration is complex, requiring the balance of relatively short-term progress with far-horizon strategy. Space exploration has changed since the US-Soviet space race of the 1960s. In today’s rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical environment, it is unclear whether the processes, relationships, and vision that previously enabled allied cooperation in space, epitomized by the International Space Station (ISS), will keep pace. Here, China is viewed as the preeminent competitor for exploration goals and capabilities—as well as the major competitor for long-term leadership in space.² This development drives fears of space militarization and weaponization, prompting protectionist legislation, investment screening, and industrial policies that can disrupt collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners.³ Further complication stems from the rise of commercial space, with opportunities and challenges due to the decentralization, democratization, and demonetization of technologies for robotic and crewed space exploration.

China is viewed as the preeminent competitor in space. Pictured here, the Shenzhou-14 has been used extensively by both the PLA and Chinese commercial sector. May 29, 2022. Source: China News Service

This paper serves as a primer for current US space exploration goals and capabilities that will be critical to achieving them. It highlights arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned to jointly accelerate space exploration while also benefitting life on Earth. This paper concludes with recommended actions—gleaned from interviews with international experts in space exploration—for the US government as well as allied and partner governments to increase the number and impact of global stakeholders in space exploration, to remove friction in collaboration, and to guide the future of space toward democratic values.

Current space exploration efforts

Over the next few decades, US and allied space exploration will integrate uncrewed (robotic) and crewed missions to achieve scientific discovery, technological advancement, economic benefits, national prestige, and planetary defense.

Concept art for NASA’s Gateway Program, includes elements from international partners and government partners. Credit : NASA

Uncrewed space exploration missions generally focus on expanding fundamental scientific knowledge and laying the foundation for future activities such as resource extraction. Collaborators include the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the European Space Agency (ESA) and member space agencies, and the space agencies of India, Japan, South Korea, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), with public-private partnerships delivering additional capabilities.⁴ Several missions to Mars will study the planet’s geology, atmosphere, and possible past or current life, with sample-return missions currently scheduled by NASA and the ESA for the early 2030s.⁵ The search for conditions suitable to life will be extended to other locations in the solar system, such as the moons of Jupiter and Saturn. Robotic missions will continue to increase understanding of the Sun, Mercury, Venus, the Moon, asteroids, Jupiter and its moons, and deep space. Observational studies of planets outside our solar system, black holes, comets, stars, and galaxies will be enabled by space telescopes and other imaging modalities. Uncrewed exploration goals are also being pursued by the China National Space Administration, with particular attention to its planned International Lunar Research Station.⁶ Note that important technological gaps in robotic space exploration—such as dust mitigation⁷ and space situational awareness⁸ —are being tackled by critical research and development by US partners and allies.

Crewed space exploration objectives for the United States and its allies and partners are encapsulated by the Moon to Mars roadmap,⁹ an integrated strategy that, over the next several decades, will synergize exploration goals in low-Earth orbit (LEO), cislunar space, and Mars. Within this roadmap, for which all timelines may shift, the Artemis program will return humans (including the first woman and person of color) to the Moon no earlier than 2025, with the long-term goal of establishing a sustainable human presence on the lunar surface.¹⁰ The Artemis program will use the heavy-lifter Space Launch System (SLS) and the Orion spacecraft to send astronauts and payloads to a space station in lunar orbit called the Gateway. From there, the Human Landing System will transport them to and from the Artemis Base Camp on the lunar surface (note that mission details are still being refined). The program involves crucial contributions from allied governments and industries. Hardware, software, and lessons learned from the Artemis program and other activities in LEO and on the ISS will lay the foundation for Mars:¹¹ human exploration (generally projected for the 2030s), scientific investigation, and eventual permanent settlement.¹² In particular, the Gateway serves important roles in infrastructure development (e.g., supply chains) and better understanding of the effects of extended deep-space missions on the human body—both crucial aspects of crewed space exploration.

NASA’s Artemis I rocket carrying the Orion research spacecraft, Wednesday from Launch Complex 39B at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Florida, Nov. 16, 2022. Source : Andrew Parlette

International partners are critical for the success of the Artemis program. They are providing expertise, technology, and funding across the spectrum from basic science and engineering to specific software and hardware mission deliverables. A few examples highlight the benefits of leveraging the capabilities of US allies and partners.¹³ The ESA is contributing to the construction and operation of the Gateway and the Orion service module. Canada is delivering several critical components of the Gateway,¹⁴ while Japan and the ESA are building important components of habitation modules. Navigation, tracking, and communication capabilities are key contributions from Australia; an ESA program will also provide lunar telecommunications and navigation.¹⁵ Other important hardware, subsystems, and expertise will be supplied by space agencies such as those of Italy¹⁶ and the United Kingdom. Moreover, allied companies are partners in the design, development, and deployment of capabilities underlying the Artemis program.

Today, US and allied cooperation in space rests on the Artemis Accords,¹⁷ a set of principles, guidelines, and best practices for peaceful civilian space exploration building on the Outer Space Treaty of 1967¹⁸ and subsequent policies. Key principles include peaceful operations, transparency, interoperability, and commitments to deconfliction and the collaborative management of orbital debris and space resources. The original group of eight signatories in 2020 has since expanded to twenty-three as of March 2023, with representation across the globe from the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific, and Africa.

Signatory nations host mature or developing industries directly or indirectly pertinent to space exploration (see Table 1), signaling strong potential for bilateral and multilateral collaboration. Notably, neither Russia nor China—the two largest competitors to allied space exploration—have signed, nor appear likely to sign, the Artemis Accords. Thus, it is imperative for the United States to follow through on its commitments to its allies and partners, demonstrating that it remains the partner of choice for open and transparent space exploration and scientific inquiry.

To project leadership in space exploration, the United States and its allies and partners ought to be first in returning humans to the Moon and landing astronauts on Mars. Most experts interviewed for this paper agreed that—with China and Russia also racing to these benchmarks—achieving these “firsts” is important for prestige, diplomacy, and establishing a strong foundation for a rules-based order in outer space, similar to that seen across traditional domains, with the goal of promoting long-term freedom and prosperity. Failure to achieve these “firsts” could arise due to Chinese achievements, insufficient allied funding and political will, geopolitical events, a catastrophic mission failure, or from the United States underutilizing the capabilities of its allies and partners, both in the public and private sectors. The latter becomes more likely due to protectionist policies, including caps on foreign contributions, and political interference in competition. Overall, early stakeholders in this new phase of space exploration will set the culture, norms, and standards that will underpin space activities for years to come—a major reason to strengthen the systems and processes that enable US-led collaboration with allies and partners.

Technological opportunities and challenges

There are numerous opportunities to facilitate, enrich, and expand collaboration in space exploration between the United States and its partners and allies. At the same time, important challenges hold back current efforts to harness allied capabilities, pointing to opportunities to improve collaboration in the coming years.

Allied opportunities in space exploration

Continuing to advance space exploration by both machines and humans requires costly, sophisticated, interdisciplinary technology development across sectors; this can only be done through the aggregate efforts of the United States and its allies and partners from start to finish.¹⁹ Such international cooperation, and cooperation between the public and private sectors, will not only overcome the major technical, logistical, and scientific challenges of space exploration, but also complement Earth-focused innovation initiatives in critical technologies (see Table 1).²⁰ For example, formal and informal strategies to leverage biotechnological advances for the expansion of bioeconomies²¹ have been formulated for the United States,²² Germany,²³ United Kingdom,²⁴ European Union,²⁵ India,²⁶ and others—including China.²⁷ Together, allied and partner space agencies play crucial roles as early funders of the science, engineering, and business development of space and space-adjacent products and services that will both benefit from and drive space exploration in the coming decades; they also serve as early (and often sole) clients for these products and services.

Autonomous robotic system²⁸ are an illustrative example of how collaboration around a major technology objective for space exploration can overcome a series of challenges and deliver benefits across both Earth and space. Such systems rely on sophisticated integration of sensors, robotics, microelectronics, imaging, and computation. Depending on the target application, they must withstand extremes in temperature, radiation, gravity, pressure, resource constraints, and other parameters. Autonomous operation is imperative because of the vast distances that signals must travel (the one-way time delay for operating a robot on the asteroid closest to Earth that may be suitable for mining, 16 Psyche, is at least ten minutes).²⁹ Trusted (cybersecure) autonomous robotic systems will be critical for resource extraction, safety, human health, and sustainability in space environments; related technology development is benefiting Earth-based applications such as mining, surgery, supply chains, and transportation. The European Space Resources Innovation Center—a partnership of the Luxembourg Space Agency, the Luxembourg Institute of Science and Technology, and the ESA—is running an incubation program for early projects around utilizing space resources,³⁰ a salient example of how public and private entities can cooperate to drive capabilities for exploration and commercialization. All experts interviewed for this paper agreed that the quicker pace, receptiveness to risk, and sensitivity to costs and markets of commercial endeavors can benefit public-private partnerships for space exploration.

Challenges to allied space exploration

Despite the affordances of international cooperation, systems and processes can make it difficult to harness allied capabilities. Protectionist activity by the United States and its allies and partners can arise when a single government has made large investments in research and development, hindering the transfer of technologies, personnel, information (including unclassified information), and data across borders. Many of the technologies shown in Table 1 appear on lists of critical, emerging, and breakthrough technologies from the United States,³¹ European Union,³² and other public and private organizations. This complicates collaboration, as many of these technologies are dual use and under intense Chinese scrutiny/competition, and are thus subject to export regulations—in some cases, even to US allies.

A lightweight simulator version of NASA’s Resource Prospector undergoes a mobility test in a regolith bin at the agency’s Kennedy Space center in Florida. The Resource Prospector mission aims to be the first mining expedition on another world. Source: NASA/Kim Shiflett

Notably, space exploration and the technology segments in Table 1 support concentrated, high-paying jobs with strong economic impact,³³ and are therefore subject to political protection from competition, from allies, and/or between the public and private sectors. For example, the US Congress’s NASA Authorization Act of 2010 called for the reuse in the SLS of components of the Space Shuttle, with reliance on legacy suppliers, infrastructure, and personnel.³⁴ The resulting SLS is not reusable, and a single launch may cost upward of $1 billion.³⁵ In contrast, SpaceX (one of several companies developing rockets) claims that its Starship is fully reusable, has a larger payload, has much lower development costs (which have been partially funded by NASA), and—controversially—may have operational costs of less than $10 million per launch within the next few years.³⁶ Several experts interviewed for this paper suggested that a healthy sense of competition between the public and private sectors could encourage government space agencies to support ambitious timelines and budgets while upholding their commitment to safety.

Harnessing allied space capabilities will be key for constraining duplication of efforts and optimizing value creation, resource sharing, technology transfer, and costs. Over time, the hardware, software, and data from exploration missions will support off-Earth communities of increasing size, complexity, and duration in LEO, cislunar space, the Moon, Mars, asteroids, and beyond—underscoring the importance of harnessing allied capabilities in these technology areas for space exploration today.

Table 1: Allied and partner offerings in key space exploration technologies

This table includes select nations with a strong history of space- and/or Earth-related success within a specific technological segment (examples labeled “Now”) and/or have burgeoning commercial sectors worth examining (examples labeled “Next”). Note: This table is not exhaustive.

Recommendations and conclusions

Harnessing allied capabilities is crucial for future space exploration, with major potential benefits to life on Earth as well. The US government, working alongside allied and partner governments, should therefore consider the following next steps:

Recommendation #1: US government actors—including Congress, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, the State Department including its Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, and the Defense Technology Security Administration in the Office of the Secretary of Defense—should reexamine and reform Export Administration Regulations. Priority should be given to potential reforms that strengthen the United States’ position as an orchestrator of complex international collaborations and supply chains, in contrast to a paradigm of the United States as a globally dominant, unilateral player. Support from executive- and ministerial-level offices is essential.

Effects include:

Promote removal of friction in international collaborations and public-private partnerships.
Enable reciprocity in cooperation (including data transfer and potential to bid).
Balance safety with risk.
Render attractive the inclusion of US companies and government bodies in allied workflows, supply chains, and markets, particularly for businesses in emerging technologies.
Support short-term economic and security goals as well as long-term diplomatic efforts, particularly with close allies and partners.

Recommendation #2: NASA and the National Space Council should collaborate with allied space agencies, both national and international, to identify opportunities to engage in space exploration at whatever level of contribution is individually appropriate, given the state of maturity of allied sectors (see Table 1) and geopolitics. For example, allies could contribute commodities or launch locations rather than mature costly software or hardware. Attention should be paid to maturing industries to identify opportunities for early relationships and processes that will accelerate space exploration.

Effects include:

Decentralization to improve the resilience of space exploration to disruptions in funding, supply chains, politics, and unexpected but highly impactful events.
Diplomacy and inspiration of young workers.
Expansion of the community of active stakeholders in space exploration aligned with democratic values, with the United States serving as the trusted partner.

Recommendation #3: The Office of Science and Technology Policy, Office of the Secretary of Commerce, Department of Defense, and other US interagency actors should identify and support synergies between technology development for space exploration and for Earth-focused innovation in critical technologies. New multistakeholder (cross-border) grants, fellowships, seed funding, and prizes should be modeled on current international efforts like XPRIZE and the Deep Space Food Challenge. Programs such as the NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts and the ESA Open Space Innovation Platform, which incubate early-stage innovations in space exploration, should be expanded to noncitizens.

Effects include:

Risk-mitigated financial support of early and maturing technologies for space exploration.
Exchange of human capital across public/private, international, Earth/space, and industry boundaries.

Recommendation #4: Through organizations like the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, international stakeholders in space exploration—including space agencies, companies, philanthropic groups, and nongovernmental organizations—should formulate an actionable, unified multilateral space strategy that goes beyond the Artemis Accords. For example, while the Artemis Accords recognize “the global benefits of space exploration and commerce,” they do not explicitly address commercial activity, and commercial enterprises are not signatories. Action is urgently needed, as it is conceivable that extraction and exploitation of lunar resources could begin in the very short term—in the mid 2020s. An expanded space strategy must include the commercial sector.

Effects include:

Identification of pathways to create/strengthen linkages among stakeholders and eliminate choke points that render exploration vulnerable to disruption and negative outcomes.
Establishment of rule of law and crisis-mitigation strategies spanning early crewed and uncrewed exploration missions through permanent human habitation off Earth, including commercial activity.

In conclusion, just as no one could have foreseen the precise progression from the Wright brothers’ first flight to today’s rapidly exploding telecommunications and space industrial ecosystems, one cannot expect to accurately predict the progression—or the ramifications—of today’s space exploration to tomorrow’s future. Nonetheless, international collaboration is certainly key to success. Now is the time to enhance the processes, relationships, and shared vision for space exploration, thereby expanding humankind’s knowledge of the universe, improving life on Earth, and setting the stage for a reliable, routine, and prosperous space economy for all.

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1 “United States Space Priorities Framework,” White House, December 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/united-states-space-priorities-framework-_-december-1-2021.pdf.

2 “China’s Space Program: A 2021 Perspective,” State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, January 28, 2022, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2022-01/28/content_78016843.htm.

3 “Rethinking Export Controls: Unintended Consequences and the New Technological Landscape,” Commentary series on expert controls, Center for a New American Security, accessed March 23, 2023, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/rethinking-export-controls-unintended-consequences-and-the-new-technological-landscape.

4 “Our Missions,” European Space Agency, accessed February 14, 2023, https://www.esa.int/ESA/Our_Missions; and Gary Daines, “Solar System Missions,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, March 11, 2015, http://www.nasa.gov/content/solar-missions-list.

5 Timothy Haltigin et al., “Rationale and Proposed Design for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) Science Program,” Astrobiology 22, no. S1, June 2022, https://doi.org/10.1089/ast.2021.0122.

6 Andrew Jones, “China Outlines Pathway for Lunar and Deep Space Exploration,” SpaceNews, November 28, 2022, https://spacenews.com/china-outlines-pathway-for-lunar-and-deep-space-exploration/.

7 Scott Vangen et al., “International Space Exploration Coordination Group Assessment of Technology Gaps for Dust Mitigation for the Global Exploration Roadmap,” in AIAA SPACE 2016 (American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics), accessed March 23, 2023, https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2016-5423.

8 Daniel L. Oltrogge and Salvatore Alfano, “The Technical Challenges of Better Space Situational Awareness and Space Traffic Management,” Journal of Space Safety Engineering 6, no. 2 (June 1, 2019): 72–79, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsse.2019.05.004.

9 “Moon to Mars Objectives: Executive Summary,” NASA, September 2022, https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/m2m-objectives-exec-summary.pdf.

10 S. Creech, J. Guidi, and D. Elburn, “Artemis: An Overview of NASA’s Activities to Return Humans to the Moon,” 2022 IEEE Aerospace Conference (AERO), Big Sky, Montana, 2022, 1–7, https://doi.org/10.1109/AERO53065.2022.9843277.

11 Steve Mackwell, Lisa May, and Rick Zucker, “The Ninth Community Workshop for Achievability and Sustainability of Human Exploration of Mars (AM IX),” hosted by Explore Mars at The George Washington University, June 2022, https://www.exploremars.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/AM-9_Upload_v-1.pdf.

12 P. Kessler et al., “Artemis Deep Space Habitation: Enabling a Sustained Human Presence on the Moon and Beyond,” 2022 IEEE Aerospace Conference, 1–12, https://doi.org/10.1109/AERO53065.2022.9843393.

13 Here, country/agency designations simplify complex agreements between public and private entities, sometimes across borders, showcasing the need for processes and relations that enable allied cooperation.

14 Canadian Space Agency, “Canada’s Role in Moon Exploration,” Canadian Space Agency, February 28, 2019, https://www.asc-csa.gc.ca/eng/astronomy/moon-exploration/canada-role.asp.

15 “Moonlight,” ESA, accessed March 9, 2023, https://www.esa.int/Applications/Telecommunications_Integrated_Applications/Moonlight.

16 Fulvia Croci, “Artemis Mission: Signed Agreement Between ASI and NASA,” ASI (blog), Italian Space Agency, June 16, 2022, https://www.asi.it/en/2022/06/artemis-mission-signed-agreement-between-asi-and-nasa/.

17 “The Artemis Accords: Principles for Cooperation in the Civil Exploration and Use of the Moon, Mars, Comets, and Asteroids,” NASA, October 13, 2020, https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/img/Artemis-Accords-signed-13Oct2020.pdf.

18 “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” United Nations, 1967, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20610/volume-610-I-8843-English.pdf.

19 See “State Exploration and Innovation,” UN Office of Outer Space Affairs, annual reports on national space activities and innovation accessed March 9, 2023, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/topics/space-exploration-and-innovation.html.

20 “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” United Nations, 2015, https://sdgs.un.org/sites/default/files/publications/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf; and “Exploring Space Technologies for Sustainable Development,” UN Conference on Trade and Development, 2021, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/dtlstict2021d1_en.pdf.

21 “Report to the President: Biomanufacturing to Advance the Bioeconomy,” US President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, December 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/PCAST_Biomanufacturing-Report_Dec2022.pdf.

22 White House, “Executive Order on Advancing Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Innovation for a Sustainable, Safe, and Secure American Bioeconomy,” White House Briefing Room, September 12, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/09/12/executive-order-on-advancing-biotechnology-and-biomanufacturing-innovation-for-a-sustainable-safe-and-secure-american-bioeconomy/; and White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, “Bold Goals for U.S. Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing: Harnessing Research and Development to Further Societal Goals,” March 2023.

23 “National Bioeconomy Strategy,” German Federal Government, July 2020, https://www.bmel.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Publications/national-bioeconomy-strategy.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2.

24 “UK Innovation Strategy: Leading the Future by Creating It,” UK Department of Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy, July 22, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-innovation-strategy-leading-the-future-by-creating-it/uk-innovation-strategy-leading-the-future-by-creating-it-accessible-webpage.

25 Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (European Commission), European Bioeconomy Policy: Stocktaking and Future Developments: Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022), https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2777/997651.

26 Narayanan Suresh and Srinivas Rao Chandan, “India Bioeconomy Report 2022,” prepared for Biotechnology Industry Research Assistance Council by Association of Biotechnology Led Enterprises, June 2022, https://birac.nic.in/webcontent/1658318307_India_Bioeconomy_Report_2022.pdf.

27 Xu Zhang et al., “The Roadmap of Bioeconomy in China,” Engineering Biology 6, no. 4 (2022): 71–81, https://doi.org/10.1049/enb2.12026.

28 Issa A. D. Nesnas, Lorraine M. Fesq, and Richard A. Volpe, “Autonomy for Space Robots: Past, Present, and Future,” Current Robotics Reports 2, no. 3 (September 1, 2021): 251–63, https://doi.org/10.1007/s43154-021-00057-2.

29 Smiriti Srivastava et al., “Analysis of Technology, Economic, and Legislation Readiness Levels of Asteroid Mining Industry: A Base for the Future Space Resource Utilization Missions,” New Space 11, no. 1 (2022): 21–31, https://doi.org/10.1089/space.2021.0025.

30 “ESRIC: Start-up Support Programme,” ESRIC: European Space Resources Innovation Centre, accessed March 9, 2023, https://www.esric.lu/about-ssp.

31 “Critical and Emerging Technologies List Update,” Fast Track Action Subcommittee on Critical and Emerging Technologies of the National Science and Technology Council, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/02-2022-Critical-and-Emerging-Technologies-List-Update.pdf.

32 European Innovation Council, “Identification of Emerging Technologies and Breakthrough Innovations,” January 2022, https://eic.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-02/EIC-Emerging-Tech-and-Breakthrough-Innov-report-2022-1502-final.pdf.

33 Yittayih Zelalem, Joshua Drucker, and Zafer Sonmez, “NASA Economic Impact Report 2021,” Nathalie P. Voorhees Center for Neighborhood and Community Improvement, University of Illinois at Chicago, October 2022, https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/nasa_fy21_economic_impact_report_full.pdf.

34 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C. 18301 (2010).

35 “The Cost of SLS and Orion,” Planetary Society, accessed March 9, 2023, https://www.planetary.org/space-policy/cost-of-sls-and-orion.

36 Kate Duffy, “Elon Musk Says He’s ‘Highly Confident’ That SpaceX’s Starship Rocket Launches Will Cost Less than $10 Million within 2-3 Years,” Business Insider, February 11, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-spacex-starship-rocket-update-flight-cost-million-2022-2.

The post Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

Nicholas Eftimiades — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 13:00:31 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

ISSUE BRIEF

Introduction

Over the last two decades, the world entered a new paradigm in the use of space, namely the introduction of highly capable small satellites, just tens or hundreds of kilograms in size. This paradigm has forever changed how countries will employ space capabilities to achieve economic, scientific, and national security interests. As is so often the case, the telltale signs of this global paradigm shift were obvious to more than just a few individuals or industries. Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate began exploring the use of small satellites in the 1990s. The Air Force also established the Operationally Responsive Space program in 2007, which explored the potential use of small satellites. However, both research efforts had no impact on the US Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) satellite acquisition programs. The advancement of small satellites was largely driven by universities and small commercial start-up companies.¹

The introduction of commercial and government small satellites has democratized space for states and even individuals. Space remote sensing and communications satellites, once the exclusive domain of the United States and Soviet Union, can now provide space-based services to anyone with a credit card. Eighty-eight countries currently operate satellites, and the next decade will likely see the launch of tens of thousands of new satellites.² Commercial and government small satellites have changed outer space into a more contested, congested, and competitive environment.

The United States has shared space data with its allies since the dawn of the space age.³ Yet it also has a history of operating independently in space. Other domains of warfare and defense policy are more closely integrated between the United States and its allies and partners. The United States has military alliances with dozens of countries and strategic partnerships with many more.⁴ In recent years, there have been calls to coordinate with, or even integrate allied space capabilities into US national security space strategy and plans. In this regard, the US government has made significant advances. However, much work needs to be done. There is pressure on the United States to act quickly to increase national security space cooperation and integration, driven by rapidly increasing global capabilities and expanding threats from hostile nations and orbital debris.

This paper examines the potential strategic benefits to US national security of harnessing allied space capabilities and the current efforts to do so, as well as barriers to achieving success. The paper identifies pathways forward for cooperating with allies and strategic partners on their emerging space capabilities and the potential of integrating US and allied capabilities.

The security environment in space

The changing security environment in space is driving the United States and allies’ collective desire to cooperate in the national security space. Several recent statements and actions demonstrate potential adversaries’ plans and intentions to dominate the space domain. China and Russia have demonstrated offensive and defensive counterspace capabilities. In 2021, the two countries announced plans to build a joint International Lunar Research Station on the moon, although the path forward on this effort may have been impacted by the Russian invasion of the Ukraine.⁵ The US Space Force notes this action would give those nations control of cislunar space, an area of balanced gravity between the Earth and moon. The movement of potential adversaries to cislunar space changes the strategic environment by forcing the United States to maintain surveillance of that region of space. In addition, Russia and China have threatened to destroy entire US orbital regimes.⁶ China has also expressed its intention to be the world’s leading space power by 2045.⁷ In 2022, Chinese researcher Ren Yuanzhen of the Beijing Institute of Tracking and Telecommunications led a People’s Liberation Army study to counter SpaceX’s Starlink small satellite constellation. Ren boasted they had developed a solution to destroy thousands of satellites in the constellation.⁸

Russian MiG-31 ‘Foxhound’ supersonic interceptor jet carrying an anti-satellite weapon during the 2018 Victory Day Parade. Source: kremlin.ru

Benefits of collaborating in space

Collaborating may be defined as coordinating development programs and operational efforts of current or projected allied and partner space and related capabilities.⁹ US interests would be to ensure these programs and operational efforts support US national security space strategy and planning objectives. Allied nations’ interests are in leveraging extensive US space capabilities and establishing collective security. The United States, allies, and partners have a shared interest in establishing behavioral norms in space. Collaboration between allies in space capabilities would have numerous benefits, including the following.

Altering the calculus for offensive actions. A hostile nation or nonstate actor risks a stronger response from multiple nations when attacking a coalition (versus a single nation). If the United States and allies had interoperable or integrated space capabilities, then an attack on any single country’s space systems would no longer be solely against the United States and would have impact on the collaborating or integrated systems of allies and partners. Changing the calculus for offensive actions could lead to increased deterrence against foreign aggression: “Partner capabilities increase both resilience and the perceived cost to an adversary, when an attack on one partner is seen as an attack on all,” according to the US Air Force.¹⁰

Accessing geostrategic locations. Access to global geographic locations also provides access for ground-based space situational awareness (SSA); telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C); and increasing launch resilience. Ground-based SSA requires globally distributed telescopes and radar systems. Allied collection systems operating in Japan, Australia, and territories of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and others ensure all partners have access to global SSA data. Given that the United States has only two major space launch facilities, natural or manmade disasters could significantly erode the US ability to provide responsive space launch. Use of allied launch facilities could lessen US reliance on limited launch sites and thus mitigate that risk.

Burden-sharing in space. Allied investments in less costly smaller satellites, along with other space technologies, would increase their security and potentially reduce the financial burden on the United States to maintain space security. There have been positive developments in this realm, including Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy, which identified several new space systems the country intends to procure.¹¹ Given Russia’s military aggression and the success of Space-X’s Starlink satellites in supporting Ukraine, the European Union (EU) recently adopted the proposal to develop the Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnection, and Security by Satellites (IRISS) constellation to provide broadband connectivity via up to 170 satellites.¹² The system, with an expected deployment date in 2025, expects to employ quantum cryptography and be available to governments, institutions, and businesses (in 2027). Canada’s Department of National Defense is developing the Redwing optical microsat to provide space domain awareness (SDA).¹³

Establishing global norms and standards. The space domain lacks adequate rules of the road to regulate the behavior of spacefaring nations. As the United States and its allies and partners coordinate and perhaps integrate national security space systems, they also are in the position to shape norms and increase pressure on potential adversaries to accept global standards for acceptable space behavior.

Crisis management in space. Several allies have expressed the need to ensure their strategic autonomy—that is, not being wholly dependent on the United States and therefore free to act in their own interests. The EU’s IRISS “system aims to enhance European strategic autonomy, digital sovereignty, and competitiveness.”¹⁴ Still, institutions such as NATO and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue offer an avenue to explore collective options for crisis management in space by establishing agreed-upon terminology, codes of conduct, and response policies and procedures for emergencies or crises in the space domain.

Resiliency in the face of conflict. While seemingly unlikely, a conflict in the space domain would result in attrition of space-based services. Yet, unlike in other domains, a stockpile of space systems does not exist. The emerging commercial small satellite market now provides an opportunity for resiliency in space systems. Interoperable or integrated use of allied and US government and commercial space capabilities would provide improved resiliency in response to accident or attack.¹⁵

China and Russia have proposed constructing a Sino-Russo International Lunar Research Sation, a joint modular project proposed to strengthen international security cooperation and the monetization of space for both nations. Source: Mil.ru

Bolstering industrial partnerships and reducing supply chain vulnerabilities. If cybersecurity standards are put in place, integrating allied manufacturing capabilities could diversify the US supply chain and reduce existing vulnerabilities. As a first step, the space-industrial supply chain must transition away from China and toward US allies and partners, who would then be able to enhance their production capabilities by contributing to interoperable or integrated space and associated systems. However, despite a long record of international procurement collaboration between the United States and its allies and partners, the outcomes of past programs have often been mixed.¹⁶

Existing efforts toward allied integration

Collaboration does not merely mean standardization and interoperability. Rather, the effort to create an overall US and allied space vision is a necessary first step in integrating allied space capabilities in order to obtain interoperability. Through various partnerships and efforts, the US Space Force has led efforts with six allies and partners to create a unified vision for national security space cooperation.

Combined space operations vision 2031

In 2022, the United States, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom signed the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) Vision 2031, which aims to “generate and improve cooperation, coordination, and interoperability opportunities to sustain freedom of action in space, optimize resources, enhance mission assurance and resilience, and prevent conflict.” This shared vision establishes a framework to guide individual and collective efforts.¹⁷

CSpO participants’ shared-objectives effort is a framework to guide individual national and collective efforts:

Develop and operate resilient, interoperable architectures to enable space mission assurance and unity of effort.
Enhance command, control, and communications capabilities and other operational linkages among CSpO participants.
Foster responsible military behaviors, discourage irresponsible behavior, and avoid escalation.
Collaborate on strategic communications efforts.
Share intelligence and information.
Professionalize space cadres and training.¹⁸

Training to fight together

Since 2018, the United States has been integrating allies and partners into space warfighting plans, most notably through Operation Olympic Defender, a US effort to synchronize with spacefaring nations to deter hostile acts in space. The annual Schriever Wargame—designed to explore critical space issues and advance space support across domains—also allows select allies and partners to coordinate defense-related space activities with the United States. In August 2022, US Space Command conducted its Global Sentinel exercise, which serves as US Space Command’s premier security cooperation effort, with twenty-five participating countries. Over a one-week period, this series simulated scenarios focused on enhancing international partnerships, understanding procedures and capabilities, and integrating global SSA. These scenarios further allow participants to understand allies’ and partners’ capabilities and operating procedures, serving as a foundation for future collaboration.¹⁹

Multinational and joint military space operators stand for a photo in the Combined Space Operations Center after the safe return of NASA’s Commercial Crew Program Demonstration Mission 2. Source: US Air Force

To date, the joint training efforts between the United States and its allies have been limited to tabletop exercises, thereby restricting participants’ experience in real-world applications of offensive and defensive counterspace measures. Tabletop exercises do not test capabilities or demonstrate how well an ally or partner might perform in crises or conflict scenarios. Space capabilities are integrated into major military exercises conducted with allies but do not address offensive or defensive counterspace measures.²⁰

Challenges and barriers to integration

While the United States recognizes the value of working with allies and partners in the space domain, myriad hurdles stand in the way to fully realize the competitive advantage space alliances and partnerships offer.

In total, US allies could bring a significant fraction of US capabilities. A systemic problem is how to leverage those capabilities in a coherent way. Limited coordination limits the values of those allied capabilities. Those capabilities are only additive to United States if there is good integration and understanding on how they will have a contributing effect.²¹

Lack of strategy to execute the vision for space. While a shared vision exists among the defense establishments of select allies and partners, there is little in the way of strategy or planning to fully realize that vision. Perhaps the greatest problem with the US approach to working with its allies and partners in space is that there is no coherent strategy for integrating allied space capabilities. Several subject matter experts interviewed for this study noted US public statements around the value of and desire to integrate allies, yet no interviewee was able to identify an existing strategy or plan to do so at any level of US government.

Bureaucratic impediments. Collaborating with allies is far easier than integrating multinational space capabilities. Allied integration must be done through a national-level strategy, integrating what, to date, are largely disconnected efforts between the National Space Council, National Security Council, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, US Space Command, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Department of State. While each organization is credited with making strides in integrating allies (with varying degrees of success), the efforts are disjointed and lack connectivity and unified goals and strategy.²²

Mind the gap. Allies and partners are attempting to understand existing gaps in the US national security space architecture and the capabilities they could provide to fill those gaps. Ironically, the CSpO Vision 2031 states that allies will collaborate “through identification of gaps and collaborative opportunities.” With the onus almost exclusively placed on the ally or partner, interviewees noted nations’ repeated requests to the United States to identify capability gaps in its projected architectures. The lack of information is due to the sensitivity of US defense gaps, with classified information making it more feasible for allies and partners to provide add-on capabilities rather than fully integrating assets.

Some level of gap analysis should be done by the United States to identify the niche areas that allies and partners could fill in the national security space architecture. That analysis should cover a period of at least five to ten years, thereby allowing allies to budget, develop, and deploy capabilities. Identifying capability gaps as requested by allies would ensure a future interoperable or integrated architecture. Primary focus areas should include space situational awareness, on-orbit servicing, communications, positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT), and cybersecurity. Each of these areas are baseline capabilities that should be interoperable or integrated between the United States and its allies and partners.²³

Classification issues. There exists a widespread belief that the United States’ overclassification of intelligence is hindering US and allied space security. This issue has been publicly acknowledged by several senior US military leaders. Misclassification might be a better word to describe the problem. In addition, the US system for sharing intelligence is cumbersome, requiring an exception to the normal production processes to share intelligence with allies. Experts (including myself) note cases where sharing space-related intelligence with allies was difficult due solely to organizational culture, established processes, poorly administered policies, and other bureaucratic impediments.²⁴

The H-IIA rocket lifts off from the Tanegashima Space Center in Japan. The H-IIA has been supporting satellite launch missions as a major large-scale launch vehicle with high reliability. Source: NASA

Many of these classification-related problems have existed for decades—and the United States should not wait to figure out how to share information until its hand is forced by a crisis or war. There is an inability to share information, particularly information that can be integrated into a kill chain for weapon systems. The United States has integrated information-sharing systems in other warfighting environments, but as of yet, not in space. This lack of imagination even spreads down to the US combatant commands (COCOMs): allied integration would be enhanced if US COCOMs had joined with allied space personnel providing integrated PNT and communications.²⁵ Moreover, the US Space Force could deploy space attachés to select embassies, perhaps under the Office of Defense Cooperation, to further embed space security interests across the globe. ²⁶

Communications and data integration. After spending hundreds of millions of dollars to build the Joint Mission System to track satellites and space debris, the US Department of Defense still has no automated means to seamlessly integrate SSA data provided by allies into the US space surveillance system. One particularly high-level interview with a close ally called out the biggest issue as being communications, noting that it is impossible to discuss interoperable deterrence until this issue is addressed.²⁷

Fifteen NATO members recently signed a memorandum of understanding to launch a Space Center of Excellence in Toulouse, France. This body could provide a mechanism for data integration and operational coordination. The Toulouse center is in addition to the already operating NATO Space Centre at Allied Air Command in Ramstein, Germany, which serves as a single point for the requests and production of NATO space products.²⁸ As of February 2023, the US and Canadian governments are not founding members of the Toulouse Space Center effort.

Case study: US-Japanese space integration

While allied integration has seen success across other warfighting domains, the same cannot be said for the space domain.²⁹ Space collaboration with Japan is illustrative of the challenges in integrating efforts.

Overclassification of information related to US programs and operation capabilities makes allied integration even more difficult. For example, France and Japan have publicly stated their intentions to build geo satellites for space domain awareness. Currently, a strategy to coordinate those systems with the operating US geosynchronous space situational awareness program (GSSAP) does not exist, demonstrating a lack of plans for data sharing, burden sharing, or coordination of mission operations.³⁰ However, Japan and the United States have agreed that space domain awareness data will be shared between the Japan Air-Self Defense Force and US Space Command starting in federal year 2023.

In 2022, the government of Japan approached the United States about its interest in playing a role in the Space Development Agency’s “Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture,”³¹ as Japan intends to launch a similar constellation of satellites for missile defense purposes. However, the United States has been unresponsive to Japan on how it could achieve integration. This is partly because the United States maintains concerns about Japan’s level of information security, despite Japan’s commitment to “strengthen and reinforce information security practices and infrastructure.”³² Yet, Japan has the world’s third largest defense budget and is a spacefaring nation with launch infrastructure, years of experience, and advanced satellite manufacturing capabilities. In addition, Japan faces increasing threats from China and North Korea, providing incentive to expand its security relationship with the United States.³³ In 2010, the United States came to agreement with Japan to integrate SSA sensors into the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) PNT system.³⁴ However, to date, there is no plan on how to integrate the data.³⁵

Overclassification of US intelligence is hindering cooperation with allies and partners. Two controllers work in the Global Strategic Warning and Space Surveillance System Center. Source: US Air Force

Policy recommendations

There are several key actions the United States can take to integrate allies and partners into national security space efforts.

Recommendation #1: The US Space Force should conduct a gap analysis to guide allied investments into space capabilities, prioritizing capabilities such as SSA, on-orbit servicing, communications, PNT, and cybersecurity. This gap analysis should identify in which areas the United States wants to collaborate with allies, identify opportunities for interoperability, and which areas are open to integration of capabilities.

Recommendation #2: It would benefit the US Space Force to have an outside entity analyze its internal policies, procedures, bureaucratic obstacles, and human capital levels to determine why the effort to integrate allies has been so minimally effective.

Recommendation #3: The US National Space Council should lead an interagency working group to develop a US government integrated strategy that establishes goals for and metrics to assess US and allied space capabilities and integration efforts.

Recommendation #4: The US Department of Defense and Office of the Director of National Intelligence should form a working group to establish best practices for sharing classified information with allies.

Recommendation #5: US Space Command should develop real-world exercises with allies and partners to test SDA, electronic warfare, and space control capabilities—all of which will be critical to deterring and, if necessary, responding to future space conflicts.

Recommendation #6: The US Departments of Defense and State should work toward consistency of approach in terms of governance of space activities, including through establishment of multilateral engagement and national regulations to allow flexibility and transportability of launch access at short notice.

Recommendation #7: The National Security Council should lead an interagency effort to establish consistency of national regulations between allies and partners (comparable laws and/or standards) so that systems and operations are transferable and receive mutual recognition and acceptance.

Conclusion

The United States and its allies and partners are moving toward sharing SSA data, understanding each other’s policies and procedures, and collaborating on space operations. Still, much work needs to be done to expand collaboration and achieve interoperability (if desired) between rising space powers. Without a strong indication from the US government of what exactly it wants from its allies and partners—as well as what it is prepared to give in return—the United States will not be able to effectively harness the competitive advantages offered by allied space capabilities. It is incumbent on the United States and its allies to immediately embark on a way forward to jointly ensure a safe and secure environment in space. Failure to change current practices and act in a timely fashion will lead to increased space threats and diminished national and economic security.

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Nicholas Eftimiades

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Harnessing allied space capabilities

A panel of experts explores how the United States can work with its allies and partners to achieve common security, commercial, and exploration objectives in outer space.

Europe & Eurasia National Security Security Partnerships Space

1 The pioneer in small-satellite design and production at this time was Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. (SSTL) of Surrey University, United Kingdom.

2 Nicholas Eftimiades, “Small Satellites: The Implications for National Security,” Atlantic Council, May 5, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/small-satellites-the-implications-for-national-security/.

3 Examples include remote sensing and the global positioning system (GPS).

4 Claudette Roulo, “Alliances vs. Partnerships,” US Department of Defense, March 22, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/story/Article/1684641/alliances-vs-partnerships/.

5 “International Lunar Research Station Guide for Partnership”, Vol. 1.0, June 2021, http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6812150/content.html ; Andrew Jones, “China Seeks New Partners for Lunar and Deep Space Exploration,” Space News, September 8, 2022, https://spacenews.com/china-seeks-new-partners-for-lunar-and-deep-space-exploration/; and “International Lunar Research Station Guide for Partnership,” China National Space Administration, Vol. 1.0, June 2021, http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6812150/content.html.

6 Matthew Mowthorpe, “Space Resilience and the Importance of Multiple Orbits, The Space Review, January 3, 2023, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4504/1.

7 Ma Chi, “China Aims to Be World-leading Space Power by 2045,” China Daily (state-owned daily), November 17, 2017, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-11/17/content_34653486.htm.

8 Stephen Chen, “China Military Must Be Able to Destroy Elon Musk’s Starlink Satellites if hey Threaten National Security: Scientists,” South China Morning Post, May 25, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3178939/china-military-needs-defence-against-potential-starlink-threat.

9 Note that related capabilities could include software, sensors, SSA systems, ground stations, etc.

10 Curtis E. Lemay Center for Counterspace Operations, “Counterspace Operations,” US Air Force, Last Updated, January 25, 2021 https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-14/3-14-D05-SPACE-Counterspace-Ops.pdf.

11 National Security Strategy of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Provisional Translation, December 2022, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf.

12 Andrew Jones, “European Union to Build Its Own Satellite-internet Constellation,” Space.com, Future Publishing, March 1, 2023, https://www.space.com/european-union-satellite-internet-constellation-iriss.

13 David Pugliese, “Canadian Military Orders Space Surveillance Micro Satellite,” Space News, March 10, 2023.

14 “Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnection and Security by Satellites (IRISS) Constellation,” European Parliament (video), in Jones, “European Union to Build Its Own Satellite-internet Constellation,” Space.com, segment between 47 seconds and 55 seconds, https://cdn.jwplayer.com/previews/hMtl8Ak7.

15 B. Bragg, ed., “Allied/Commercial Capabilities to Enhance Resilience,” NSI Inc., December 2017, https://nsiteam.com/leveraging-allied-and-commercial-capabilities-to-enhance-resilience/.

16 A successful example of coordinated global defense production includes the F-35, which is produced by over 1,900 companies based in the United States and ten additional nations. See “A Trusted Partner to Europe: F-35 Global Partnership,” Lockheed Martin (video), https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/who-we-are/international/european-impact.html.

17 Theresa Hitchens, “US, Close Allies Sign ‘Call to Action’ in Space Defense,” Breaking Defense, February 22, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/02/us-close-allies-sign-call-to-action-in-space-defense/.

18 US Department of Defense, “Combined Space Operations Vision 2031,” February 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/22/2002942522/-1/-1/0/CSPO-VISION-2031.PDF.

19 “25 Nations Participate in Global Sentinel 22,” US Space Command, August 3, 2022, https://www.spacecom.mil/Newsroom/News/Article-Display/Article/3115832/25-nations-participate-in-global-sentinel-22.

20 For example, such military exercises include Balikatan, Cobra Gold, Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), Northern Edge, Saber Strike, and Talisman Sabre.

21 Off-the-record online interview by the author with a close US ally, November 30, 2022.

22 Interviewees noted difficulties in the US internal coordination efforts between the US Space Force’s conduct of international relations, US Department of Defense acquisition, and national and defense policy formulation.

23 Note that on-orbit servicing is not a baseline capability, but should eventually become one.

24 The author travelled with then-Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, who was pursuing establishment of an intelligence exchange with a foreign country; the effort had limited success because the ODNI was unable to get analysts to release data. Notably, intelligence community information systems use “No Foreign Dissemination” as a default setting in the production of intelligence products; foreign disclosure of intelligence requires additional effort. It also should be noted that interviews conducted for this study with US and allied officials did not uncover any instances where space or related systems (or a national interest) were damaged due to overclassification of space intelligence.

25 This is the case at US INDOPACOM. See “Space Force Presents Forces to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command,” Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, US Air Force (website), November 23, 2022, https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article/3227481/space-force-presents-forces-to-us-indo-pacific-command/.

26 Space Force already deploys a few liaison officers globally.

27 Off-the-record online interview by the author with a close US ally, December 5, 2022.

28 NATO, “NATO’s Approach to Space,” last updated February 16, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_175419.htm.

29 An example of integrated international military operations would be the NATO International Security Armed Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan. At its height, ISAF was more than 130,000 strong, with troops from fifty-one NATO and partner nations.

30 GSAP is a US geosynchronous space surveillance system, which operates like a space-based SSA system.

31 “The Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture” is a layered network of military satellites and supporting elements; the architecture was formerly known as the “National Defense Space Architecture.”

32 “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (‘2+2’),” Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100284739.pdf.

33 John Hill (deputy assistant secretary for space and missile defense, US Department of Defense), telephone interview with the author, January 2023.

34 QZSS operates at the same frequency and same timing as GPS. This service can be used in an integrated way with GPS for highly precise positioning. The additional US sensor is unknown.

35 Paul McLeary and Theresa Hitchens, “US, Japan to Ink Hosted Payload Pact to Monitor Sats,” Breaking Defense, August 5, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/08/us-japan-to-ink-hosted-payload-pact-to-monitor-sats/.

The post Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The NewSpace market: Capital, control, and commercialization

Robert Murray — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 13:00:07 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

ISSUE BRIEF

Commercial opportunities in space-based technologies are expanding rapidly. From satellite communications and Earth observation to space tourism and asteroid mining, the potential for businesses to capitalize on these emerging technologies is vast and known as “NewSpace.”¹

The NewSpace model is important for governments to understand because the dual-use nature of space, specifically its growing commercialization, will influence the types of space-based technologies that nations may leverage, and consequently, impact their national security paradigms. By capitalizing on the private sector’s agility and combining it with the essential research efforts and customer role played by the public sector, the NewSpace industry can play a critical function in addressing current and future national security challenges through public-private codevelopment.

As the NewSpace industry expands, the role of government is evolving from being the primary developer and operator of space assets to facilitating their commercialization, while still prioritizing key advancements. US and allied governments can capitalize on this competitive landscape by strategically investing in areas that align with their national security objectives. However, it is crucial for them to first understand and adapt to their changing roles within this dynamic environment.

Indeed, the benefits of the burgeoning NewSpace industry extend beyond the United States. International collaboration and competition in this area can lead to faster technological advancements and economic gains. The global NewSpace landscape is driving down costs, increasing access to space, and fostering innovation that can improve not only economic well-being, but also impact national security models.

To that end, this memo will examine the broad state of the space market, discuss the industry drivers, and propose recommendations for US and allied policymakers as they consider future government investments in those enabling space-based activities that support wider national security ambitions.

The commercial context

In recent years, the space industry has undergone significant commercialization (NewSpace) in which governments have partnered with private companies and invested more into the commercial space sector. NewSpace companies often carry many of the following characteristics.²

Figure 1: Characteristics of NewSpace Companies

NewSpace contrasts with the historical approach to space-based technologies, which typically involved a focus on standardization to ensure the reliability and quality of space components. This standardization was (and still is) essential for the safety of manned space flight, the longevity of systems, and the overall success of missions. Despite the increased collaboration between the public and private sectors, the failed January 2023 Virgin Galactic launch in the United Kingdom, the failed March 2023 Mitsubishi H3 launch in Japan, and the failed June 2022 Astra launch in the United States serve as clear reminders of the challenges associated with NewSpace technology.³

Today, when considering who is spending what on space-based technology research, US and allied governments can be viewed more as customers than as creators. This is in stark contrast to former US President John F. Kennedy’s famous 1962 speech launching the Apollo program, which put NASA at the forefront of driving the necessary technology and engineering needs.⁴ Indeed, the capital flows of research and development (R&D) from the US government relative to the private sector have shifted significantly since the era of Sputnik (1957), a pattern that also is evident across many allied nations (see Figure 2).⁵

Figure 2: Ratio of US R&D to gross domestic product, by source of funds for R&D (1953-2021)

For US space technology, this financial shift from public sector to private sector is arguably no surprise given the findings of a 2004 presidential commission on US space exploration, which recommended that:

NASA recognize and implement a far larger presence of private industry in space operations with the specific goal of allowing private industry to assume the primary role of providing services to NASA. NASA’s role must be limited to only those areas where there is irrefutable demonstration that government can perform the proposed activity.⁶

As a result of the commission’s findings, Congress created the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services Program, which sought to create new incentives to support the privatization of both upstream and downstream space activities.⁷ In short, the aim of this legislation was to create market forces that would enhance innovation while driving down costs through competition.

To do this, a new approach was developed to shape the relationship between NASA and its private contractors. Instead of being a supervisor, NASA became a partner and customer of these companies. This shift was reflected in the change of contract type, replacing cost-plus procurement with fixed-price payments for generic capabilities such as cargo delivery, disposal, or return, and crew transportation to low-Earth orbit (LEO).⁸ As a result, the risk was transferred from NASA to private firms, leading to less intensive government monitoring of cost-plus contracts and more encouragement of innovation.

Ripple effects

In recent years, the European Space Agency (ESA) has also prioritized commercialization activities. This, too, was an outcome of political and economic pressure to rethink European space policy to provide products and services for consumers, with a specific focus on downstream space activities. This policy shift toward greater commercialization was driven, in part, by those structural changes (i.e., competition) emerging from the United States (NASA).⁹

Likewise, in India—following a 2020 change in Indian space policy—private firms are no longer only suppliers to the government, but the government is now supporting and investing in them, similar to the NASA model.¹⁰ These and other shifts in public policy have shaped much of the market we have today.¹¹

However, this market arguably represents a challenge to government control over NewSpace firms and their technologies. NewSpace companies operate with more agility and flexibility than traditional government-led programs.¹² This rapid pace of innovation and commercial competition can make it difficult for governments to keep up with regulatory frameworks and oversight. Additionally, the increasing role of the private sector in space activities is arguably leading to a diffusion of state control, making it more challenging for governments to ensure the responsible use of space and manage potential security risks associated with dual-use technologies. Therefore, governments should look to partner, co-develop, and invest in NewSpace firms as alternative ways to influence the sector. Such an approach carries impacts not only on public-sector capital flows but also on national security paradigms.

This image from April 24, 2021, shows the SpaceX Crew Dragon Endeavour as it approached the International Space Station less than one day after launching from Kennedy Space Center in Florida. Source: NASA

The global space market

The space industry is a rapidly growing market that can bring about both commercial and national security benefits: the total sector was valued at $464 billion in 2022 and is expected to reach around $1.1 trillion by 2040, with a projected compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of around 7 percent.¹³ Of today’s total market, the commercial sector accounts for around 75 percent.¹⁴ To put this in perspective, the 2021 global aerospace industry saw the top ten earning companies generate a combined revenue of $417.15 billion.¹⁵ Breaking this down further, the United States is currently the largest market for both public and private space activity, holding a 32 percent market share, while Europe and the United Kingdom hold a combined 23 percent.¹⁶

However, Asia has experienced the most significant growth in this market over the last five years and now holds 25 percent of the market share.¹⁷ In terms of satellite launches, China has been the most active country in the region, with a total of sixty-four launches in 2022, placing it behind only the United States, which launched 87 times that year.¹⁸ Trailing China is India, which deployed over fifty satellites across four separate launches in 2022.¹⁹

In China and India alike, commercial firms are supported by both government R&D and public programs designed for national needs (including requisite contracts), as well as mature commercial markets that demand advanced satellite systems. What this translates to is an upstream market that relies on government funding to thrive, while the downstream market is more evenly distributed and does not require significant upfront investment or government contracts to sustain itself. This downstream market is currently driven by NewSpace demand for connectivity and location-based services, and its growth is influenced by demographic and regional economic trends, as well as government efforts to close the digital divide as governments finance satellite connectivity.²⁰

Challenges to and opportunities for NewSpace industry growth

The key challenges to NewSpace industry growth are the regulatory landscape and access to financing. This is evidenced by the European NewSpace ecosystem where, at a structural level, regulatory frameworks do not facilitate the scaling of the financial resources (public and/or private) necessary to match the political and commercial intent (demand) espoused by European political and business leaders. This mismatch between demand and financial firepower results in slower development and uptake of NewSpace opportunities despite significant engineering and entrepreneurial talent residing within Europe.²¹ Figure 3 shows the breakdown of global government investment in space technologies between 2020 and 2022 in real terms, and figure 4 shows how such expenditure relates to GDP, while figure 5 shows the global private sector space investment breakdown, which highlights a significant role for venture capital (VC) firms.²²

Noting that the United States accounts for almost half of the world’s available VC funds, while Europe only accounts for around 13 percent, it is evident that the sheer scale of investment from the United States enables NewSpace to flourish within the US market, while many allies and partners struggle to access private funding.²³ For Europe to embrace the NewSpace model, conditions must foster timely connections between both public and private finance and NewSpace opportunities.²⁴ That said, given the deep technology nature of NewSpace, and the long time horizons for venture capitalists to see a return, financing this sector writ large remains a challenge.

Figure 3: Government expenditure on space programs in 2020 and 2022, by major country (in billions of dollars)

Figure 4: Government space budget allocations for selected countries and economies (measured as a share of GDP in 2020)

Figure 5: Value of investments in space ventures worldwide from 2000 to 2021, by type (in billion U.S. dollars)

In addition to attracting financing, the business models of NewSpace companies rely on foundational technologies—often resourced by governments—to be in place. Such technologies include: access to low-cost launch capabilities; conditions for in-space manufacturing and resource extraction for space-based production; foundational research to support space-based energy collection, combined with reliable radiation shielding; and debris mitigation efforts in an increasingly busy orbital environment. This indicates that there is a persistent role for governments to actively invest in deep technologies to help foster the commercial markets that NewSpace can bring about. Only governments have the financial risk tolerance (a tolerance that takes one beyond risk and into uncertainty) to undertake such endeavors.

While each of these foundational technologies has limited profitability, together they form a self-sustaining system with enormous potential for profit when subsequently exploited through relatively cheap NewSpace technologies. Indeed, the economics of human space activities often mean that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. To that end, one might envisage how a potential self-reinforcing development cycle would support the space economy, with cheaper and more frequent rocket launches enabling short-term tourism and industrial and scientific experimentation, leading to demand for commercial space habitats, which would then create demand for resources in space. However, it is doubtful that this path will be easily achieved without government support.²⁵

In addition to traditional space-based areas of monitoring, observation, and communications, the sectors listed below offer further commercial opportunities NewSpace is likely to exploit.²⁶

Figure 6: Commercial opportunities for NewSpace companies

Allied advancements in NewSpace

While the above table represents a broad perspective, many US allies and partners are already at the leading edge of aggregating NewSpace technologies to take advantage of growing markets.

In Denmark, the government and private commercial actors are working on project BIFROST, with plans to launch in early 2024. BIFROST is a satellite-based system for advanced on-orbit image and signal analysis that aims to demonstrate artificial intelligence-based surveillance from space. The satellite will have versatile payloads on board to provide information on applied AI in space for Earth-observation missions—detecting ships, oil spills, and more. The main purpose of the mission is to establish: “a platform in space for gaining further experience in AI-based surveillance and sensor fusion using multiple on-board sensors. The satellite will also test means of communication between different satellites to achieve real-time access to intelligence data and demonstrate the feasibility of tactical Earth observation.”²⁷ Additionally, the mission will evaluate the capability of changing AI models during its lifespan to improve the surveillance system.²⁸

In Sweden and Germany, OHB (a German-based European technology company) is working with Swiss start-up ClearSpace SA for its space debris removal mission, ClearSpace-1. OHB will provide the propulsion subsystem and be responsible for the complete satellite assembly, integration, and testing. The mission is aimed at demonstrating the ability to remove space debris and establishing a new market for future in-orbit servicing. The mission will target a small satellite-sized object in space and be launched in 2025. Carrying a capture system payload—“Space Robot,” developed by the ESA and European industry—it will use AI to autonomously assess the target and match its motion, with capture taking place through robotic arms under ESA supervision. After capture, the combined object will be safely deorbited, reentering the atmosphere at the optimum angle to burn up.²⁹

In Belgium, entities such as Interuniversity Microelectronics Centre, aka imec, are at the leading edge of developing nanotechnology that is being commercialized for space. Imec’s Lens Free Imaging system is a new type of microscopic system that is not dependent on traditional optical technologies and fragile mechanical parts. Instead, it operates through the principle of digital holography, which allows images to be reconstructed afterward in software at any focal depth. This eliminates the need for mechanical focusing and the stage drift that occurs during time-lapse image acquisition, making it a more robust and compact system suitable for use in space.³⁰ Imec is also perfecting manufacturing in space leveraging microgravity, which minimizes “gravitational forces and enables the production of goods that either could not be produced on Earth or that can be made with superior quality. This is particularly relevant for applications such as drug compound production; target receptor discovery; the growth of larger, higher-quality crystals in solution; and the fabrication of silicon wafers or retinal implants using a layer-by-layer deposition processes,”³¹ all of which are enhanced in microgravity.

The SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket carrying the Dragon capsule lifts off from Launch Complex 39A at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Florida on July 14, 2022. Source: SpaceX

In the United Kingdom, collaboration between the agricultural and space sectors seeks to enhance societal resilience through more efficient and self-sustaining crop production. Research entities such as the Lincoln Institute for Agri-Food Technology is commercializing technologies on LEO satellites to improve the spatial positioning of robots in agriculture to enhance their precision weeding, nutrient deployment, and high-resolution soil sampling capabilities.³² Furthermore, UK start-ups such as Horizon Technologies have developed novel ways of creating signals intelligence focusing on specific parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, allowing the company to leverage meta data for both commercial and government clients. An important component to Horizon’s success is the reduction in productions costs combined with accessibility to space launches.

Across Europe, the ESA is conducting R&D to harness the sun’s solar power in space and distribute that energy to Earth. Under Project Solaris, space-based solar power is harvested sunlight from solar-power satellites in geostationary orbit, which is then converted into microwaves, and beamed down to Earth to generate electricity. For this to be successful, the satellites would need to be large (around several kilometers), and Earth-surface rectennas³³ would also need to be on a similar scale. Achieving such a feat would enhance Earth’s energy resilience, but would first require advancements in in-space manufacturing, photovoltaics, electronics, and beam forming.³⁴

The United States also partners with allied firms on foundational research to support upstream and downstream NewSpace technologies. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Space-Based Adaptive Communications Node (BACN) is a laser-enabled military internet that will orbit Earth. The Space-BACN will create a network that piggybacks on multiple private and public satellites that would have been launched regardless, using laser transceivers that are able to communicate with counterparts within 5,000 km. The satellite network will be able to offer high data rates and automatic rerouting of a message if a node is disabled, and it will be almost impossible to intercept transmissions. DARPA is working with Mynaric, a German firm, which designs heads for Space-BACN, and MBryonics, an Irish contractor, which uses electronic signals to alter light’s phase, with the aim of having a working prototype in space in 2025.³⁵

While US allies and partners offer a plethora of specific space-based commercial opportunities, the criteria for successful development remains constant: the combination of multiple technologies, reduction in production and maintenance costs, and safe access to operate in space. With that in mind, the US government can play two roles to help further expand this market:

Act as a reliable, adroit customer who can issue contracts quickly (noting that many NewSpace firms do not carry large amounts of working capital and therefore cannot wait months for contractual confirmation).
Continue to invest in deep technologies and develop those foundational upstream building blocks that NewSpace will seek to leverage.

Notably, however, some US executives are deliberately registering firms in allied jurisdictions and conducting all research and patenting there, too, to avoid the bureaucratic challenges of dealing with US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and, specifically, the tight controls associated with exporting NewSpace dual-use products for commercial use. This suggests two things: The first is that, while allies may lack financial firepower, they have jurisdictional strengths that can attract NewSpace firms to their shores; and the second is that US ITAR controls impacting dual-use technologies need to be updated to enable NewSpace firms to thrive. If such companies are blocked from selling to allied and partner markets, then the very model of dual-use becomes diminished and governments will be unable to benefit from the competition and iterative technology development that spill over from such commercial settings into the public sector. As Figure 2 shows, the US government does not currently invest enough in technologies relative to the private sector to enable such a stringent export controls program in the context of NewSpace. The two policies are incongruous: limited government R&D spending and excessive export controls.

Recommendations for US and allied policymakers

Taking all the above into account, US and allied policymakers should focus on enhancing regulations and financial resources. Governments need to continue to create the conditions for the NewSpace market to prosper by playing the roles of a nimble customer and deep technology investor, enabling NewSpace companies to quickly access government contracts, while also helping mature next-generation space-based technologies. This helps such companies grow, become competitive, and enhance the sector. Specifically, US and allied governments should consider the following.

Recommendation #1: US and allied governments must continue to provide a stable and progressive regulatory environment for the NewSpace industry. This includes providing a clear and predictable legal framework for commercial space activities, as well as ensuring that regulations are flexible and adaptable to the rapidly changing technology and business models of the industry. ITAR is one area that needs urgent reform, given the dual-use nature of many new space technologies. This problem is exemplified by US talent establishing next-generation space companies in Europe to avoid overly controlling and outdated ITAR constraints, according to interviews with industry participants.³⁶ Given the cross-cutting nature of ITAR, the US National Security Council should examine ITAR rules and their utility for dual-use technologies impacting NewSpace, assessing such rules from a holistic perspective covering defense, trade, and economics.

Recommendation #2: US and allied governments should maximize coinvestment with industry in R&D to support the codevelopment of new technologies and capabilities for both the public and private sectors. This includes funding for research into new propulsion systems, as well as materials and nanotechnologies that will enable more cost-effective and reliable access to space. To support such funding—and noting the challenge of private investment finding its way to allied entrepreneurs and engineers—the US government should consider establishing with allies and partners a new multilateral lending institution (MLI) focused on space technology to provide funding and other forms of support to companies in the commercial space industry. The MLI or “space bank” could provide loans, grants, loan guarantees, insurance, and other forms of financial assistance to companies engaged in commercial space activities, helping to mitigate the high costs and risks associated with space ventures. This could be modeled after any of the MLIs of which the United States is already a member.³⁷

Recommendation #3: Furthermore, the US government could provide tax credits and grants to NewSpace firms (US and allied) based on certain provisions that support wider government objectives—such as manufacturing locations, supply network participants, and expected labor market impacts.

Any such credits and grants should be complemented by leveraging a suitable financial vehicle to conduct direct investment to take equity in NewSpace firms both at home and abroad. Crucially, this should be conducted without the government owning any of the intellectual property, as this impacts export opportunities and thus undermines the dual-use model. Such an effort would go some way in minimizing the socialization of risk and the privatization of rewards, and could be a role for either In-Q-Tel and/or the Department of Defense’s new Office of Strategic Capital.³⁸

Recommendation #4: To further support such an approach, the US government might create a national space co-R&D center of excellence for government and industry to work hand in glove to drive the codevelopment of breakthrough technologies, taking inspiration from a conceptually similar UK model of designing government contracts to address specific problems and awarding them to capable small companies.³⁹

An increasing number of nations are launching an increasing number of space missions. United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket carries Cygnus cargo vessel OA-6 for commercial resupply services supporting the International Space Station. Credit: United States Air Force Flickr

Conclusion

NewSpace is making significant strides in developing cost-effective and innovative technologies for both public- and private-sector customers. This is important because it drives economic growth and can enhance national security through the delivery of new, cost-effective, and resilient technologies. Indeed, the NewSpace market is unquestionably growing, and governments, including the United States and its allies, have a critical role to play in shaping this market by acting as both customers and codevelopers with NewSpace firms. Such an approach allows governments to exert a degree of influence in the sector without constraining its creativity. However, this way of working may carry wider implications for national security paradigms in terms of dual-use technologies and public/private partnerships.

While use cases for NewSpace are almost limitless, multiple US allies and partners are already forging niche NewSpace areas of excellence that can bring about a degree of comparative advantage. To make best use of such opportunities, the United States should:

Keep its market as open as possible to encourage competition and thus drive innovation.
Provide specific programs and locations for codevelopment between allied academia, government, and industry without taking any intellectual property.
Act as a nimble customer.
Ensure there is a pragmatic balance between regulations that protect US space interests (i.e., ITAR) and those that unleash innovative dual-use endeavors.
Create new financial instruments with allies through an MLI bank to support the financial investment needed to help the private sector commercialize the next generation of breakthrough space-based technologies.

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About the author

Robert Murray
Senior Lecturer and Director, Master of Science in Global Innovation and Leadership Program, Johns Hopkins University

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Harnessing allied space capabilities

A panel of experts explores how the United States can work with its allies and partners to achieve common security, commercial, and exploration objectives in outer space.

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1 Ken Davidian, “Definition of NewSpace,” New Space: The Journal of Space Entrepreneurship and Innovation 8, no. 2 (2020), https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/space.2020.29027.kda.

2 Roger Handberg, “Building the New Economy: ‘NewSpace’ and State Spaceports,” Technology in Society 39 (2014): 117–128, https://www-sciencedirect-com.iclibezp1.cc.ic.ac.uk/science/article/pii/S0160791X14000505.

3 Peggy Hollinger, “Virgin Orbit Pledges to Return for New UK Satellite Launch,” Financial Times, January 12, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/250b6742-a0a6-4a96-bca6-d7a61883a975; Tariq Malik, “Astra Rocket Suffers Major Failure during Launch, 2 NASA Satellites Lost,” Space.com, June 12, 2022, https://www.space.com/astra-rocket-launch-failure-nasa-hurricane-satellites-lost; “Mitsubishi/Rockets: Launch Failure Points to Drain on Resources,” Financial Times, March 7, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/30386ff6-eaea-442d-b285-82c19dbb1b19.

4 President John F. Kennedy, “Address at Rice University on the Nation’s Space Effort,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, September 12, 1962, https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/historic-speeches/address-at-rice-university-on-the-nations-space-effort.

5 Gary Anderson, John Jankowski, and Mark Boroush, “U.S. R&D Increased by $51 Billion in 2020 to $717 Billion; Estimate for 2021 Indicates Further Increase to $792 billion,” National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, January 4, 2023, https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf23320 and https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/eda—defence-data-2021—web—final.pdf

6 A Journey to Inspire, Innovate, and Discover, Report of the President’s Commission on the Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy, June 2004, https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/60736main_M2M_report_small.pdf.

7 The upstream market can be thought of as: satellite manufacturing; launch capabilities; and ground control stations. The downstream market can be thought of as: space-based operations and services provided, such as satellites and sensors.

8 Matthew Weinzierl, “Space, the Final Economic Frontier,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 32, no. 2 (Spring 2018): 173–192, https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.32.2.173.

9 Douglas K. R. Robinson and Mariana Mazzucato, “The Evolution of Mission-oriented Policies: Exploring Changing Market Creating Policies in the US and European Space Sector,” Research Policy 48, no. 4 (2019): 936-948, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2018.10.005.

10 “Indian Startups Join the Space Race,” Economist, November 24 2022, https://www.economist.com/business/2022/11/24/indian-startups-join-the-space-race.

11 Robinson and Mazzucato, “The Evolution of Mission-oriented Policies.”

12 Amritha Jayanti, “Starlink and the Russia-Ukraine War: A Case of Commercial Technology and Public Purpose,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, March 9, 2023, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/starlink-and-russia-ukraine-war-case-commercial-technology-and-public-purpose.

13 “Space Foundation Releases the Space Report 2022 Q2 Showing Growth of Global Space Economy,” Space Foundation News, July 27, 2022, https://www.spacefoundation.org/2022/07/27/the-space-report-2022-q2/; and “Space: Investing in the Final Frontier,” Morgan Stanley, July 24, 2020, https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/investing-in-space.

14 “Space Economy Report 2022,” Ninth Edition, Euroconsult, January 2023, https://digital-platform.euroconsult-ec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Space-Economy-2022_extract.pdf?t=63b47c80afdfe.

15 Erick Burgueño Salas, “Leading Aerospace and Defense Manufacturers Worldwide in 2021, Based on Revenue,” Statista, November 27, 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/257381/global-leading-aerospace-and-defense-manufacturers/.

16 “Space Economy Report 2022,” Ninth Edition, Euroconsult, January 2023, https://digital-platform.euroconsult-ec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Space-Economy-2022_extract.pdf?t=63b47c80afdfe.

17 “Space Economy Report 2022.”

18 Andrew Jones, “China Wants to Launch Over 200 Spacecraft in 2023,” Space.com, January 27, 2023, https://www.space.com/china-launch-200-spacecraft-2023.

19 2022: A Year of Many Firsts for Indian Space Sector,” World Is One News (WION), updated December 30, 2022, https://www.wionews.com/science/2022-a-year-of-many-firsts-for-indian-space-sector-heres-a-recap-548099; and “List of Satish Dhawan Space Centre Launches,” Wikipedia, accessed April 12, 2023, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Satish_Dhawan_Space_Centre_launches.

20 “Space Economy Report 2022.”

21 OECD Space Forum, Measuring the Economic Impact of the Space Sector, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, October 7, 2020, https://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/space-forum/measuring-economic-impact-space-sector.pdf.

22 “Space Industry Worldwide,” Statista, 2020, https://www.statista.com/study/59030/space-exploration/; and OECD Handbook on Measuring the Space Economy, Second Edition, OECD, July 12, 2022, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/8bfef437-en.pdf?expires=1678223695&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=34A62A18C888485A89F58BE6E5841B30.

23 “Value of Venture Capital Financing Worldwide in 2020 by Region,” Statista, April 13, 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1095957/global-venture-capita-funding-value-by-region/.

24 Matteo Tugnoli, Martin Sarret, and Marco Aliberti, European Access to Space: Business and Policy Perspectives on Micro Launchers (New York: Springer Cham, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78960-6.

25 Weinzierl, “Space, the Final Economic Frontier.”

26 James Black, Linda Slapakova, and Kevin Martin, Future Uses of Space Out to 2050, RAND Corporation, March 2, 2022, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA609-1.html.

27 “BIFROST: Danish Project with International Collaboration to Explore AI-based Surveillance Applications from Space,” Gatehouse Satcom (website), August 22, 2022, https://gatehousesatcom.com/bifrost-danish-project-with-international-collaboration-to-explore-ai-based-surveillance-applications-from-space/.

28 “Terma Delivers AI Model for Danish Surveillance Satellite Project,” Defence Industry Europe, January 28, 2023, https://defence-industry.eu/terma-delivers-ai-model-for-danish-surveillance-satellite-project/.

29 “OHB Sweden Contributes to ClearSpace-1 Mission,” December 8, 2020, OHB, https://www.ohb.de/en/news/2020/ohb-sweden-contributes-to-clearspace-1-mission.

30 “Imec Technology Taking Off to Space,” Imec (website), January 25, 2021, https://www.imec-int.com/en/articles/imec-technology-taking-space.

31 “Imec Technology Taking Off.”

32 “Lincoln Institute for Agri-Food Technology,” homepage accessed February 2023, https://www.lincoln.ac.uk/liat/.

33 A rectenna (rectifying antenna) is a special type of receiving antenna that is used for converting electromagnetic energy into direct current (DC) electricity.

34 “Wireless Power from Space,” European Space Agency, September 11, 2022, https://www.esa.int/ESA_Multimedia/Images/2022/11/Wireless_power_from_space.

35 “DARPA, Lasers and an Internet in Orbit,” Economist, February 8, 2023, https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2023/02/08/darpa-lasers-and-an-internet-in-orbit.

36 Author’s video interview with multiple American NewSpace executives, December 2022.

37 Rebecca Nelson, Multilateral Development Banks: U.S. Contributions FY2000-FY2020, Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2020, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RS20792.pdf.

38 In-Q-Tel is an independent, nonprofit strategic investor for the US intelligence community, created in 1999, https://www.iqt.org; The US Secretary of Defense created the Office of Strategic Capital (announced December 2022), https://www.cto.mil/osc/.

39 “Niteworks,” UK Ministry of Defence, March 28, 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/niteworks; and “UK MOD Front Line Commands Set to Benefit from New Decision Support Capability That Replaces Former Niteworks Service,” Qinetiq, June 4, 2021, https://www.qinetiq.com/en/news/futures-lab.

The post The NewSpace market: Capital, control, and commercialization appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Harnessing allied space capabilities

Robert Murray, Tiffany Vora, and Nicholas Eftimiades — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 13:00:00 +0000

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The United States’ vast network of alliances and partnerships offers a competitive advantage—this is especially evident in outer space. Often characterized as a global commons, space holds value for all humankind across commercial, exploration, and security vectors. As technological advancements trigger a proliferation in spacefaring nations, the United States and its allies and partners are confronted with new challenges to and opportunities for collective action.

This series examines how US space strategy can recognize the comparative advantages of allies and partners in space and best harness allied capabilities:

Robert Murray examines the state of the commercial space market and key drivers, considering how government investments in enabling activities can support broader national imperatives.

Tiffany Vora analyzes current US space exploration goals and the capabilities that will be critical to achieving them, highlighting arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned for integration.

Nicholas Eftimiades assesses the potential benefits to US national security offered by allied integration, identifying pathways for cooperating with allies and partners on their space capabilities.

The way forward for US and allied coordination in space

Several common themes emerge across this series. First, outer space is characterized by a transforming landscape and market. Commercial tech advancements—including the introduction of small satellites, advancements in Earth observation and asteroid mining, and the rise of space tourism—drive the development of what Murray terms the “NewSpace” market. The way in which the United States and its allies do business in space is changing, with the private sector leading in capability development and the government becoming the consumer. The burgeoning space sector, totaling $464 billion in 2022, is attracting allies and adversaries alike to invest in and expand their space operations. Strategic competitors recognize they can now target US and allied commercial and national security imperatives from space.

Second, this increasingly competitive environment further accentuates the value of alliances and partnerships in space. As Vora highlights, US and allied cooperation in space today rests on the Artemis Accords, which advances shared principles for space activity, and is a key mechanism for the international transfer of expertise, technology, and funding. The US Department of Defense also houses the Combined Space Operations Vision 2031, which offers a framework to guide collective efforts with several allies, and a host of collaborative exercises and wargames. Eftimiades describes the cross-cutting benefits of this collaboration: it alters the decision calculus for hostile actors, threatening a response from a coalition of nations; offers the ability to share capabilities, responsibilities, and geostrategic locations; and creates consensus in setting the norms for responsible space behavior. Current collective efforts in the space domain are limited, albeit expanding, considering the benefit allies and partners bring to the table.

Third, in order to promote stronger collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners, it is necessary to address and overcome the barriers that stand in the way. Vora identifies protectionist policies and regulations that act as hurdles to the transfer of key technologies and information. Murray explains that lengthy government contract timelines, coupled with insufficient investment in technologies critical to NewSpace, hinder US and allied commercial advancement. Eftimiades argues that the United States has yet to articulate a strategy for space coordination, highlighting a lack in transparency with allies and partners on capability and data gaps.

The authors put forth ideas to pave the way forward for US and allied space development. Recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners include conducting gap analysis on where allied investments can complement existing US capabilities, establishing a “space bank” to support NewSpace actors, and formulating a US and allied strategy for space development, building upon the Artemis Accords. To maintain its competitive advantage in space, the United States cannot go at it alone.

Read the full papers:

The NewSpace market: Capital, control, and commercialization

By Robert Murray

Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes

By Tiffany Vora

Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

By Nicholas Eftimiades

Acknowledgements

To produce this report, the authors conducted a number of interviews and consultations. Listed below are some of the individuals consulted and whose insights informed this report. The analysis and recommendations presented in this report are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the individuals consulted. Moreover, the named individuals participated in a personal, not institutional, capacity.

Allen Antrobus, strategy director, air and space, Serco
John Beckner, chief executive officer, Horizon Technologies
Dr. Mariel Borowitz, associate professor, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology
Steven J. Butow, director, space portfolio, Defense Innovation Unit
Chris Carberry, chief executive officer and co-founder, Explore Mars
Darren Chua, EY space tech consulting partner and Oceania innovation leader, Ernst & Young Australia
Kenneth Fischer, director for business development North America, Thales Alenia Space
David Fogel, nonresident senior fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Dr. Yasuhito Fukushima, senior research fellow, National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan
Peter Garretson, senior fellow in defense studies, American Foreign Policy Council
Sqn Ldr Neal Henley, chief of staff, Joint Force Space Component, UK Space Command
John Hill, deputy assistant secretary of defense for space and missile defense, US Department of Defense
Komei Isozaki, Japan Chair fellow, Hudson Institute
Mat Kaplan, senior communications adviser, The Planetary Society
Cody Knipfer, director of government engagement, GXO, Inc.
Dr. Jerry Krasner, independent consultant, US Department of Defense
Massimiliano La Rosa, director, marketing, sales, and business, Thales Alenia Space
Ron Lopez, president and managing director, Astroscale U.S. Inc.
Douglas Loverro, president, Loverro Consulting, LLC; former deputy assistant secretary of defense for space policy, US Department of Defense
Russ Matijevich, chief innovation officer, Airbus U.S. Space & Defense, Inc.
Jacob Markish, vice president, strategy and corporate development, Thales North America
Brig Gen Bruce McClintock, USAF (ret.), lead, RAND Space Enterprise Initiative, RAND Corporation
Col Christopher Mulder, USAF, active-duty officer, US Air Force; 2020-2021 senior US Air Force fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Dr. Eliahu Niewood, vice president, Air and Space Forces Center, MITRE Corporation
Dr. Jana Robinson, managing director, Prague Security Studies Institute
Audrey Schaffer, director for space policy, National Security Council
Paul Szymanski, director, Space Strategies Center
Dr. Christian Willmes, doctor of philosophy, University of Oxford

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There can be no lasting peace with Russia until Ukraine liberates Crimea

Mariia Zolkina — Thu, 20 Apr 2023 18:55:01 +0000

As the world waits for Ukraine’s widely anticipated spring offensive, debate continues to rage over whether Ukrainian military objectives should include the de-occupation of Crimea. Some skeptics question if Ukraine has the military capabilities to successfully liberate the Russian-occupied peninsula; others claim Crimea’s personal importance to Putin make it a red line for the Russian dictator that could spark a nuclear escalation. These concerns are understandable but shortsighted. Crucially, they fail to recognize Crimea’s status as the decisive battlefield in the current war. Put simply, there can be no lasting peace with Russia until Ukraine liberates Crimea.

Today’s debate over Crimea reflects the success of Russian efforts since 2014 to convince the international community that the occupied Ukrainian peninsula is a “special case” and not directly related to Russian aggression on the Ukrainian mainland. Indeed, prior to last year’s full-scale invasion, long-running international efforts to resolve the war in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region had excluded any discussion of Crimea, fueling perceptions that the ongoing occupation of the peninsula was a separate issue entirely.

In the years following the military occupation of Crimea, Putin regime officials frequently declared the issue to be closed. Meanwhile, Kremlin propagandists insisted that the occupied Ukrainian province was now an indivisible part of the Russian Federation. These efforts proved effective. Even after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, many international observers have persisted in affording Crimea a different status to other occupied parts of the country.

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Those who view Crimea as a red line for Vladimir Putin often stress the symbolic importance of the peninsula. They note that the seizure of Crimea ranks as by far the most significant achievement of Putin’s entire reign and therefore plays a key role in his claim to a place among Russia’s greatest rulers. Many also believe continued Russian control over the peninsula is necessary in order to soften the blow of looming military defeat on mainland Ukraine. As long as Putin has Crimea, they argue, he can still convince domestic audiences in Russia that the core objectives of his invasion have been reached.

The other most frequent argument against the de-occupation of Crimea is fear of provoking a Russian nuclear response. Since launching the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin has frequently engaged in nuclear saber-rattling. This has included specific threats to use nuclear weapons in defense of Russian territory, with Putin stating in September 2022, “I’m not bluffing.”

While the impact of this saber-rattling appears to be diminishing, Putin knows Western leaders cannot completely ignore his nuclear blackmail, particularly as Russia has repeatedly emphasized that it views Crimea as Russian sovereign territory. If the possibility of a Ukrainian military campaign to liberate Crimea becomes more realistic in the coming months, the Kremlin is likely to dramatically increase its nuclear rhetoric.

At present, there appears to be a lack of consensus among Ukraine’s Western partners over how best to react to Russia’s nuclear intimidation tactics. While senior figures from NATO, the US, and the EU have all publicly warned Moscow of grave consequences, separate statements from various European capitals indicate some Western governments are eager to avoid a further escalation in nuclear tensions at almost any price. This is a fundamental miscalculation that risks legitimizing nuclear blackmail as a foreign policy tool. If Russian nuclear threats succeed in preventing the liberation of Crimea, the Kremlin will inevitably employ the same approach to consolidate control over other regions of Ukraine currently under Russian occupation. A dangerous precedent will have been established with disastrous consequences for the future of international security.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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Ukraine’s political and military leaders have been extremely clear that without the liberation of Crimea, no sustainable peace with Russia is possible. They argue that as long as Crimea is under Russian occupation, it will serve as a base for future military operations and pose a threat to the whole of southern Ukraine. Even if Ukraine succeeds in de-occupying all of the regions currently under Russian control in the south and east of the country, Russian-occupied Crimea would continue to represent a dagger pointed at the heart of Ukrainian statehood.

Furthermore, free navigation of the Black Sea cannot be restored while Crimea is under Russian occupation. Using Crimea as its base, the Russian Navy has imposed a Black Sea blockade that has had a devastating impact on the Ukrainian economy. This blockade prevents the resumption of vital merchant shipping from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, while also undermining the security of other Black Sea countries. Moscow’s current efforts to manipulate the terms and conditions of the UN-brokered grain agreement illustrate the futility of negotiating any compromise deals with Russia while the Kremlin retains the ability to impose its will by force. As long as Russia occupies Crimea, Black Sea shipping will be severely restricted and Ukraine will remain trapped in economic crisis.

It is worth noting that the de-occupation of Crimea could take a number of different forms and may involve a combination of military and diplomatic tools. One of the possible alternatives to a large-scale Ukrainian land operation would be the methodical destruction of Russian logistical chains and military infrastructure in Crimea along with precision strikes on military storage facilities and bases across the peninsula. This could render the continued occupation of Crimea unfeasible and force Russia to retreat. Similar tactics have already succeeded in forcing Russia to withdraw from Kherson and the right bank of the Dnipro River, despite Putin’s loud declarations that Russia had come to the region “forever.”

If Ukraine’s international partners are serious about securing a lasting peace, they should first acknowledge the central importance of de-occupying Crimea and provide Ukraine with the tools to do so. This is the only way to decisively defeat Russia and end the war. It is also the best way to prevent further reckless nuclear blackmail.

Kyiv is determined to complete the de-occupation of the whole country including Crimea, and Ukrainian military planners are convinced this is a realistic objective. However, a bloody land campaign to liberate the peninsula could still be avoided if Ukraine’s spring offensive achieves its immediate goals on the mainland, and if the Ukrainian military receives long-range missile capabilities from its international partners that would enable them to strike targets throughout occupied Crimea. This would leave a weakened Russia with little choice but to begin serious negotiations. At present, that is not the case. Until Russia recognizes the need to withdraw from Crimea and the rest of Ukraine, peace will remain elusive.

Mariia Zolkina is a research fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science and head of regional security and conflict studies at the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in Kyiv.

Read the Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption’s interim report.

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Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption interim report

Eric Lofgren*, Whitney M. McNamara, and Peter Modigliani — Wed, 12 Apr 2023 14:49:18 +0000

Co-chairs: The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD,
& The Hon. Deborah Lee James

Commission director: Stephen Rodriguez

Program director: Clementine G. Starling

Commission staff: Mark J. Massa, Delharty M. Manson II, and Jacob Mezey

Download PDF

Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption: Interim Report Launch

Former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and former Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James discuss a new report on the challenges the United States faces in maintaining its technological and military advantage over its adversaries and what adaptations Congress, the Pentagon, and the defense sector should make to increase the pace of innovation adoption.

Defense Industry Defense Policy Defense Technologies National Security

Commissioners

The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD, Board Director, Atlantic Council; 27th Secretary of Defense; Co-Chair, Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption
The Hon. Deborah Lee James, Board Director, Atlantic Council; 23rd Secretary of the Air Force; Co-Chair, Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption
Ambassador Barbara Barrett, Board Director, Atlantic Council; 25th Secretary of the Air Force
General James E. Cartwright, USMC (ret.), Board Director, Atlantic Council; 8th Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Frank A. Finelli, Managing Director, The Carlyle Group
The Hon. Michèle Flournoy, Co-founder and Managing Partner, WestExec Advisors; Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, US Department of Defense
Scott Frederick, Managing Partner, Sands Capital
The Hon. James “Hondo” Geurts, Distinguished Fellow, Business Executives for National Security; Former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, US Department of Defense
Peter Levine, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Defense Analyses; Former Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, US Department of Defense
The Hon. Ellen M. Lord, Former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, US Department of Defense
Major General Arnold L. Punaro, USMC (ret.), CEO, The Punaro Group; Member, Advisory Council, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Nick Sinai, Senior Advisor, Insight Partners; Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs and Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School
Josh Wolfe, Co-founder and Managing Partner, Lux Capital
The Hon. Robert O. Work, Senior Counselor for Defense and Distinguished Senior Fellow for Defense and National Security, Center for a New American Security; 32nd US Deputy Secretary of Defense

Industry commissioners

Steven Escaravage, Executive Vice President and AI Lead, Booz Allen Hamilton
Wendy R. Anderson, Senior Vice President, Palantir Technologies
Prashant Bhuyan, Founder and CEO, Accrete AI
Mark Brunner, President, Primer Federal, Primer AI
Colin Carroll, Director of Government Relations, Applied Intuition
Adam Hammer, Counselor, Schmidt Futures
Chris Lynch, CEO, Rebellion Defense
Mara Motherway, Senior Vice President, Peraton
Michael Niggel, CEO, ACT1 Federal
Doug Philippone, Co-founder, Snowpoint Ventures

Foreword
Overview

Recommendations:

Introduce a new capability portfolio model
Consolidate program elements
Reset reprogramming authorities
Modernize DoD to align with the 21st century industrial base
Strengthen alignment of capital markets to defense outcomes
Incentivize tech companies to do business with DoD
Modernize budget documents
Establish bridge fund for successfully demonstrated technologies
Scale the Space Development Agency model
Modernize DoD’s requirements system

Conclusions and next steps
Biographies
Acknowledgements
List of acronyms

Foreword

The US Department of Defense (DoD) needs to accelerate the adoption of cutting-edge technology from the leading edge of the commercial and defense sectors. Doing so will enable the Pentagon to deliver high-impact operational solutions to the Warfighter in a much timelier manner. That is why we are co-chairing the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, which has released this interim report.

In our time serving in the Defense Department, we have found that the United States does not have an innovation problem, but rather an innovation adoption problem. That is to say, our Nation leads in many emerging technologies relevant to defense and security—from artificial intelligence and directed energy to quantum information technology and beyond. But the DoD struggles to identify, adopt, integrate, and field these technologies into military applications.

The persistence of this challenge is not for lack of trying. The Air Force’s Rapid Capabilities Office has cut through bureaucratic constraints to accelerate even the most complicated major acquisitions. The Defense Innovation Unit stands out for expanding the range of firms involved in innovation for national security purposes. Army Futures Command has accelerated modernization in ground forces through its cross-functional team model. The new Office of Strategic Capital has a promising new approach to engaging capital markets in support of national security goals.

But the growing national security challenges facing our country and the threat they pose to the rules-based international order require actionable reform across the DoD. We and a group of distinguished Commissioners, with decades of service between us in government, the private sector, and capital markets, believe that time is running out to do so. The United States faces simultaneous competition with two nuclear-armed, autocratic great-power rivals. Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and China’s revanchism not only spur urgent geopolitical considerations, but also cast into sharp relief the US industrial base’s ability to produce and field innovative technologies at scale.

To address the DoD’s innovation adoption challenge in light of the urgency of the geopolitical environment we face, this interim report advances ten policy recommendations for Congress and the Pentagon, focusing on the three key areas of reforming acquisition; overcoming barriers to innovation; and revising specific Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution structures.

To that end, the DoD should adapt the way it conducts its acquisition programs to provide additional flexibility in the year of execution, and Congress can authorize that flexibility. We recommend that five DoD program executive offices be empowered to operate in a portfolio model so that they can more easily shift funding among possible products that meet their mission needs. Congress should appropriate money to DoD with fewer but larger discrete budget line items and reset reprogramming authorities so that acquisition professionals have greater flexibility.

To better leverage innovation in the commercial sector, Congress should restore at least the traditional ratio of procurement funding to other defense spending, and the DoD should more intentionally engage a much broader innovation base. Allocating a higher percentage of the DoD’s budget to procurement will clearly signal a larger market to nontraditional defense firms.

Additionally, the deputy secretary of defense, with the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) as a direct report, should take a leadership role in aligning and harnessing stakeholders within the Pentagon and the existing defense industrial base for the twenty-first century. The DIU should be resourced and empowered to broaden the defense ecosystem by robustly engaging start-ups, nontraditional vendors, and capital market players.

The DoD must develop approaches to more rapidly validate its needs for commercial capabilities, rather than waiting years after identifying a key capability to write a requirement and submit a budget request. The DoD should both reform the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to operate more swiftly and develop a military need validation system outside of JCIDS for mature commercial capabilities. Congress and the DoD should expand both eligibility for, and the award size of, Small Business Innovation Research grants. To provide additional mechanisms for rapidly matching key capabilities with funding, they should also provide funds to procure capabilities successfully demonstrated in exercises.

As the 2022 National Security Strategy states, we are living through a “decisive decade,” a sentiment shared by the previous administration as well. Congress and the DoD must seize this opportunity to enact near-term changes that will help get our service members the capabilities they need to defend our country and its interests.

The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD

27th US Secretary of Defense

The Hon. Deborah Lee James

23rd US Secretary of the Air Force

* Eric Lofgren served as a project author until February 2023, when he transitioned to a position in government service. All of his contributions were made before his transition to that role.

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Overview

Mission statement

Accelerate the DoD’s ability to adopt cutting-edge technology from commercial and defense sectors and deliver high-impact operational solutions to the Warfighters.

Enterprise challenges

The DoD faces the following enterprise challenges in adopting defense innovations:

1. Outdated R&D model

The DoD’s requirements and acquisition processes were designed for a time when the DoD was the largest funder of global research and development (R&D). By 2020, however, the federal government’s share of national R&D had fallen below 20 percent, and yet its processes have not adapted to this new leader-to-follower reality. Today, while the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), national and service laboratories, and universities continue to innovate, many of the most critical technologies are driven by the commercial sector. The DoD struggles to adopt commercial technology at a relevant speed. Innovations from noncommercial R&D organizations are infrequently tied to a commercialization and adoption pipeline. Traditional prime contractors orient their independent R&D (IRAD) toward near-term defense requirements that are prescriptive relative to solutions rather than broadly defining warfighter gaps that allow applications of advanced technologies. As a result, the DoD is unable to effectively apply leading technologies to its weapon systems.

2. Long timelines and inflexible execution

Too often, the DoD delivers systems to meet requirements defined more than a decade earlier. It is difficult to insert new technology to effectively respond to dynamic adversary threats, technological opportunities, advances in warfighting concepts, or macroeconomic and supply-chain disruptions, especially within fiscal years. Hardware-centric models ineffectively integrate rapid software updates.

3. Fewer companies providing defense solutions

The DoD’s industrial base has shrunk by 40 percent over the past decade, due to both consolidation and exit. This decline stems from multiple causes, including a pivot to fewer more-complex major systems, long timelines, complex regulations, and the high compliance cost of doing business with the DoD. Many start-up, commercial, and international businesses are unable or unwilling to enter the DoD ecosystem. As a result, reduced competitive pressure has increased costs and decreased adoption of innovation.

4. Valleys of death

The DoD spends billions annually on research and prototypes, yet only a small percentage transitions to production contracts with revenue to sustain operations and scale output. Consequently, one must question why the DoD continues to fund so many defense research organizations when most technology innovation comes from the commercial sector. Long timelines for contracts and funding, program constraints, and a disconnected ecosystem are among the transition challenges for companies that have developed viable products or services.

5. Hamstrung workforce

The DoD acquisition workforce is subject to a bureaucratic culture of excessive compliance and oversight, a challenging environment for innovation. Creative problem-solving and measured risk-taking are not often rewarded, and too few individuals with an industry background agree to take senior leadership roles at the DoD.

6. Program-centric acquisition

Defining requirements, securing budgets, and acquiring capabilities are done for hundreds of individual programs. The DoD invests a significant percentage of its funds in complex major systems for which prime contractors offer closed, propriety solutions. This impedes interoperability and responsiveness to changes in operations, threats, and technologies. Open-system architectures with well-defined interface control documents are rarely adopted, which constrains the ability to insert innovative technology.

7. Cumbersome reporting from DoD to Congress

Budget justification documents run dozens of volumes and tens of thousands of pages. Document format, detail, and supporting information is inconsistent among military services and agencies. This impedes Congress’s ability to understand program objectives in a timely manner. In turn, Congress does not trust that delegated decisions will consistently result in more rapid technology adoption.

8. Limited understanding of emerging technology

The DoD struggles to effectively leverage critical emerging technologies (like biotechnology and quantum information technology) due to a lack of understanding of their state-of-the-art applications among those who generate requirements and draft requests for proposals. As these technologies mature, the DoD is challenged to have meaningful conversations about how to adopt, leverage, and defend against these technologies.

Top recommendations

To address these challenges, the Commission recommends that DoD leaders, congressional defense committees, and other executive branch agencies take the following ten high-priority actions to accelerate DoD innovation adoption:

Introduce a new capability portfolio model
Consolidate program elements
Reset reprogramming authorities
Modernize the DoD to align with the twenty-first century industrial base
Strengthen alignment of capital markets to defense outcomes
Incentivize tech companies to do business with the DoD
Modernize budget documents
Establish bridge fund for successfully demonstrated technologies
Scale the Space Development Agency model
Modernize the DoD’s requirements system

Recommendation 1: The DoD and Congress empower and resource five Program Executive Officers (PEOs) to operate via a new capability portfolio model in 2024.

Addresses challenges 2, 4, and 6.

Congress authorizes in the FY24 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and/or the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) implements via a memo empowering five PEO portfolios to operate via a new capability portfolio model. Component acquisition executives from the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Special Operations Command, and a defense agency will each select a PEO portfolio.
Service requirements organizations capture portfolio requirements in a concise, high-level document that provides overarching, joint, enduring capability needs and key mission impact measures that focus on warfighter-informed needs and mission outcomes. The Joint Staff validates the portfolio requirements within thirty days. The portfolio requirements document enables leaner program requirements and shapes future research and prototypes.
Selected PEOs negotiate with congressional defense appropriations staff the consolidation of at least 20 percent of the smallest budget line items within their portfolios. This enables reprogramming flexibility to meet evolving, warfighter-informed requirements. These merged budget accounts must provide Congress with sufficient visibility of major elements within each.
Selected PEOs develop a set of portfolio strategies, processes, road maps, contracts, infrastructure, and architectures to enable programs to leverage for greater speed and success. Portfolio contracting strategies will look beyond individual contracts or programs to promote a robust industrial base by enabling continuous competition, iterative development, supply chain risk mitigation, greater participation of nontraditional companies, commercial service acquisition, and economies of scale.
Selected PEOs may lay out plans to decompose large programs into modular acquisitions; leverage common platforms, components, and services; and maximize use of commercial solutions and DoD research. Portfolios will scale and align prototyping, experimentation, and testing infrastructure. They will invest in a common suite of engineering tools, platforms, and strategies to enable interoperability, cybersecurity, and resiliency.
PEOs require portfolio leaders to actively engage the DoD’s R&D community, industry, and academia to communicate joint-warfighter portfolio needs and business opportunities, scout technologies, engage companies, and drive novel solutions to address portfolio needs.
Congress appropriates at least $20 million to each portfolio per year for three years to enable PEOs to implement the new model with appropriate staff, analytic tools, and strategies. The five PEOs work out the details for others to adopt. In time, the department will realize savings and return on investment through greater program efficiencies and mission impact.
PEOs provide the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Congress a short annual report to share insight into the new portfolio model progress, including issues, successes, and inputs to scale adoption.

Success measure: By the end of 2023, five PEO portfolios are identified to operate via the new portfolio model. By the end of 2024, these portfolios begin operating with clear direction, leadership support, and initial implementation plans.

Notional example: A command-and-control PEO shapes a portfolio strategy that invests in a software factory and enterprise services as a common infrastructure, with smaller programs tapping a diverse vendor base to regularly and iteratively deliver a suite of applications that work together seamlessly.

Recommendation 2: Acquisition executives propose consolidated program elements to congressional staff and negotiate what can be included in the FY 2024 Appropriations Act joint explanatory statement.

Addresses challenges 2, 6, and 7.

The deputy secretary of defense (DepSecDef) directs acquisition executives to propose a list of program elements (PEs) and budget line items (BLIs) to consolidate. This will simplify budget submissions and enable greater flexibility within the year of execution to respond to rapid changes in warfighter needs and technology advancement within capability or mission portfolios.
- Determine criteria for consolidation, such as BLIs and PEs under $20 million, software-defined technologies, and supply chain-affected efforts.
- Determine constructs for consolidation, such as capability areas, mission areas, and organizational alignment.
Reduce BLI and PE count from more than 1,700 today in the investment accounts by at least 200 BLI and PEs each year, starting with the FY 2024 markup, for three years to enable cost-schedule-performance trade-offs, including the prototyping and fielding of novel systems that meet defined capability or mission areas.
Allow PEOs, warfighters, and other DoD stakeholders to provide input to acquisition executives. Senior leadership in the resourcing process should propose the items to be consolidated and negotiate with congressional staff in advance of FY 2024 appropriations.
Identify line items that enable opportunistic efforts to insert technologies into existing weapons programs without requiring a new start. Identify best practices for broadly justifying activities within a capability set.

Success measure: The number of BLIs in the investment accounts is reduced by at least 200 in time for the passage of regular appropriations in FY 2024.

Notional example: A PEO identifies a novel technology from DARPA or industry to integrate into one of its programs to improve performance and accelerate capability delivery. With investment funds spread across fewer budget accounts, the PEO is able to reprogram funds from a lower-priority development within the year of execution.

Recommendation 3: Congressional appropriations committees reset reprogramming authorities to historical norms in their FY 2024 joint explanatory statements.

Addresses challenges 2 and 7.

Appropriations committees write into FY 2024 joint explanatory statements the following changes:
- Current reprogramming thresholds will be maintained, but above-threshold actions will revert from congressional prior approval to the historical norm of congressional notification with a thirty-day window for briefing or rejection. This streamlines the process and enables greater reprogramming while still providing Congress “veto authority” to block reprogramming actions they oppose. Prior approval will remain in place for items omitted, deleted, or specifically reduced; general transfer authorities; or above threshold new starts.
An alternative approach: Raise reprogramming thresholds from the lesser of $10 million or 20 percent to at least $40 million for Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and $100 million for procurement appropriation titles. Historical norms for reprogramming thresholds were $15 million for RDT&E and $40 million for procurement yet were progressively lowered to this historically low threshold. This change would revert thresholds to account for decades of inflation.
- Letter notifications for new starts will be “for the fiscal year,” not “for the entire effort.” This enables programs greater flexibility to start small programs while Congress retains the right to veto any new starts it opposes.

Success measure: Recommended language is included in the FY 2024 Appropriations Act joint explanatory statement by the time regular appropriations are passed.

Notional example: An acquisition program is “early to need” for procurement funds due to delays in finalizing development. Another program desperately seeks additional funds to accelerate and scale production of its weapon system. Service leadership decides to reprogram $50M in procurement funds between the programs to optimize investments.

Recommendation 4: Congress directs the DoD to elevate the DIU to a direct report to DepSecDef and resource it effectively to align and harness the nontraditional defense industrial base for the twenty-first century no later than six months of the enactment of this act.

Addresses challenges 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8.

Re-align DIU as a direct report to DepSecDef with the necessary staffing and resources to engage start-ups, nontraditional vendors, and capital market players in aligning capability requirements to harness solutions from the twenty-first-century industrial base per the 2022 National Defense Strategy.
- DIU’s expanded role should complement existing efforts in USD(R&E) and USD(A&S) in terms of traditional industrial policy and technology scouting, respectively, by better connecting the nontraditional industry and its resources, intelligence, and technologies to the needs of the warfighter.
  - DIU, USD(R&E), USD(A&S), and service partners should regularly integrate their efforts, in communicating to the industrial base the department’s needs, planned investments, and business opportunities. In addition, they should share among themselves what is being discovered in industry that aligns with the department’s missions.
  - In its expanded role, DIU should be resourced to regularly engage with acquisition organizations (PEOs, program offices), science and technology (S&T) organizations (labs, DARPA), and combatant commands to share the insights it gets from nontraditional industry players throughout the DoD. Additionally, DIU will communicate back to industry where it can align its technologies to the needs of the warfighter as communicated by acquisition organizations and combatant commands.
  - Prioritization for expanded staffing for DIU should be for new billets from the services over funding for contractors. The billets would be priority assignments, selected from relevant PEOs and service acquisition executives (SAEs).
  - DIU should track the intelligence, insights, and inputs it receives from industry trade associations, venture capitalists (VCs), private equity firms, primes, nontraditional defense companies (NDCs), Other Transaction (OT) Consortia, and innovation hubs. This information should be interoperable with USD(R&E)’s existing repository of research and intelligence for the department’s needs.
- DIU, USD(A&S), and SAEs charter a team, including joint warfighter perspectives, to streamline processes, reviews, and documents for acquiring commercial solutions. The team will reinforce “buy before build” commercial practices in the early phases of programs by baking it into acquisition strategy templates and program reviews. It will also collaborate with defense industry, capital markets, and Congress to develop a broader set of rapid funding tools and approaches to demand signals consistent with the speed of commercial innovation cycles. It will publish an initial commercial pathway or guide by December 2023, with a comprehensive version in 2024.
  - Joint Staff and service requirements organizations develop a rapid “military need validation” process, involving feedback from the warfighter, for commercial solutions in lieu of traditional Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) requirements documents. This new process will enable hundreds or even thousands of commercial solutions to be validated by empowered, distributed officials, and not subject to the JCIDS process managed by the Joint Staff and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).
  - The Defense Acquisition University and related organizations should modernize guidance and training for commercial acquisition, to include:
    - Collaborating with industry, traditional and otherwise, in the early phases of an acquisition program to inform concepts, alternatives, and designs. The focus should be on feeding into mission objectives, not market research for system specifications.
      - Contracting strategies focused on commercial solutions (e.g., Commercial Solutions Openings, Other Transactions, Federal Acquisition Regulation Parts 12 and 13).
      - Testing, experimentation, exercises, rapid deliveries, and iteration.
      - Scaling programs like DIU’s Immersive Commercial Acquisition Program.

Success measures: Higher number of DIU projects that transition to a program of record; increased number of vendors entering the federal market and competing for contracts; better alignment of capital market investment and lending to DoD missions; alignment of DoD R&D and prime IRAD funds to help a wider number of entrants across the Valley of Death; increased transparency with the industrial base on DoD’s priorities; a commercial pathway, guidance, and training enabling workforce to rapidly and successfully acquire commercial solutions; increased transparency and collaboration within the department on tech-related initiatives and intelligence; resources saved and efficiencies gained from central repository information from traditional and nontraditional industrial base like market intelligence, technology landscape analysis and due diligence on vendors.

Notional example: Expanded engagement with nontraditional industrial base helps DIU identify the commercial sector’s leader in autonomous software for ground vehicles and through the streamlined, well-defined process for rapid acquisition, the Army begins adopting it across its fleet of logistics vehicles on CONUS bases.

In their quarterly engagement, the US Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) talks to DIU about its desire to procure better mission planning tools at the edge. DIU identifies and provides three viable commercial options for demonstrations. Before presenting them to MCWL, DIU leverages VC firm relationships to get existing due diligence on the potential vendors and discovers one of them draws components of its chips from China. DIU finds an alternative.

In its engagements with capital market players, DIU discovers there are several critical bottlenecks in the quantum computing supply chain due to either a severe lack of redundancy or routing through adversary nations. DIU flags this to R&E, the Office of Strategic Capital, and A&S Industrial Policy to determine how to address this. As part of this, DIU and OSC engage with capital market players to inform them this is now a department priority, helping to direct capital market funding toward these enabling technologies critical to the US broader tech competition vis-à-vis China.

Recommendation 5: Strengthen existing capital market programs and create new pathways for mission-critical technologies.

Addresses challenges 1, 3, 4, and 8.

US capital markets represent a critical yet underutilized strategic advantage for the DoD. To better leverage vast capital market resources for defense innovation and mission outcomes, the DoD should broaden programs through which capital market-backed companies can participate and create new pathways for DoD program offices to leverage capital market funding for mission-critical technologies.

Congress directs in legislation the Small Business Agency (SBA), in coordination with the General Services Administration (GSA), to enhance the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) grants program no later than six months after enactment.

To better scale SBIRs, the SBA should:

Generate direct to Phase III SBIR grants in which early successful performers in Phase I can be fast-tracked to more-flexible contract vehicles, for which performers have exemptions from SBA size standards for procurement; no limits on dollar size of procurement; the right to receive sole-source funding agreements; and the ability to pursue flexible ways to add value to an end user, whether that be research, R&D, services, products, production, or any combination thereof.
Direct the SBIR offices of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps to pilot a Strategic Funding Increase (STRATFI) program to help bridge the Valley of Death between Phase II and Phase III SBIR grants, no later than twelve months after designated. Service pilots would replicate the STRATFI program in that SBIR funding ($15 million) would receive matched funding from customers ($15 million) and private funding (up to $30 million).

To increase competition and widen the aperture of firms competing for SBIR grants, the SBA should:

Remove the barrier preventing companies with more than 50 percent backing by VCs or other capital market players to compete for SBIR grants. Small businesses often rely on VC funding to cover the costs of operating as they work to commercialize their products and generate sufficient revenue to sustain their business. This is particularly true in the case of software development, where highly skilled software engineers are the single most expensive operating cost. Placing strict limitations on the ability of these small businesses to compete for SBIR grants is contrary to the SBIR program goal of supporting scientific excellence and technological innovation.
Remove the barrier preventing companies that meet the requirements of being a small business, but are publicly traded, to compete for SBIR grants. Small, high-tech R&D firms go public to continue their ability to raise funds for their capital-intensive technologies. By disallowing them from competing for SBIR grants, the DoD is limiting technology competition among some of the most technology-proficient corners of the industrial base.

To drive deep tech adoption, OSC should develop tools for leveraging external capital market funding for pilot projects to service R&D organizations in FY 2024, with a formalization plan in conjunction with the president’s FY 2025 budget request.

OSC to be given expanded authorities to access capital markets to develop revenue, investment, and credit approaches for defense programs contracting with small-, mid-, and large-cap companies. As an initial step, direct $15 million of external capital market funding to the R&D organization of each military branch to pilot projects that identify two
novel use cases in one or more of R&E’s deep-tech priority areas of quantum technology, biotechnology, or advanced materials that could be leveraged to achieve service-specific missions. The period of performance would be eighteen months. Service end users would provide matched funding of up to 25 percent of total outside funding to pilot these projects.
This would assist in directing capital market funding to the DoD’s mission, providing additional R&D funding and incentives for deep-tech companies to commercialize their technologies, and creating optimization loops that connect technology to warfighter use cases that can help turn basic research into relevant products and services. Lastly, exposure to deep-tech applications would allow service end users to better understand emerging technologies’ applications to future defense requirements. This will help accelerate the well-aligned adoption of these capabilities to meet services’ unique missions at the speed of relevance.
R&D leads will report to DIU’s director and USD(R&E) no more than 180 days past the period of performance on the pilot’s utility, lessons learned, and challenges DoD would face if technology were to be adopted at scale.

Success measures: Meaningful increase in capital market funding for defense-related companies; increased number of companies crossing Valley of Death and program offices integrating commercially developed technology to speed innovation milestones; increased number of production contracts from nontraditional vendors, with more vendors competing for each contract; increased touchpoints between cutting-edge tech and the warfighter/end users; and the identification of specific tech adoption challenges that can be addressed ahead of requirements process for more-seamless tech adoption and integration.

Notional examples: 1) A majority VC-backed company demonstrates a novel capability that provides an advantage over a near-peer adversary and is fast-tracked to SBIR Phase III, through which the firm begins production at scale and crosses the Valley of Death. 2) A publicly traded deep-tech company that qualifies as a small business, now allowed to compete for SBIR grants, begins to develop the foundation of a quantum network for the US military. 3) The army discovers through a biotech pilot project that an advanced material it hoped to put into a program of record does not provide meaningful benefit for the cost and pursues another alternative. 4) The navy uses its OSC pilot to buy hours of time on a quantum computer provided over the cloud, through which the navy discovers the quantum computer’s utility in improving logistics and maintenance. However, the navy does not know how to manage the data being generated and needs an extra data scientist to oversee the process. The navy begins to generate a data governance process, forms a new billet to manage it, and begins determining the best acquisition pathway in anticipation of purchasing quantum computing as a service.

Recommendation 6: Congress, OSD, and SAEs increase incentives and reduce barriers for leading technology companies to do business with the DoD by September 2024.

Addresses challenges 1 and 3.

Increase incentives

Production Contracts. The DoD and Congress in future defense budgets rebalance the ratio of RDT&E and Procurement funding to historical norms over the past thirty years. From 1990 to 2019, the ratio was 39 percent to 61 percent, respectively. This would provide more than $20 billion in additional procurement funds to acquire production quantities faster, leverage commercial R&D, and fuel a broader market for leading technology firms. Increasing production and lowering barriers to entry will attract venture capital firms and bring private research and development funding to the defense market. As most of USD(R&E)’s fourteen critical technologies are commercially driven, this rebalance would enable faster fielding of warfighter priorities.
Set Precedent. USD(A&S) and SAEs report the number of large contracts (i.e., more than $50 million) awarded to start-ups and NDCs annually to measure and convey the trends of the DoD investing in these companies beyond small SBIR awards.
Innovation Funds. USD(R&E) and services include start-ups and NDCs as part of selection criteria for congressionally directed innovation funds.
Show Support. USD(A&S) and SAEs scale the direction, goals, and guidance for working with small and disadvantaged businesses to include technology start-ups and NDCs. Include NDCs as part of the small-business integration working group being established for FY23 NDAA Section 874.
Broaden Access to Capital Markets. Congress and USD(A&S) modernize the use of Defense Production Act Title III and credit loan authorities available to other agencies and departments to dynamically access capital, embrace commercial terms, and strengthen the domestic industrial base capabilities, based on lessons learned from COVID and the war in Ukraine. This use could include purchase commitments and loan guarantees, similar to how the Export-Import Bank works with US companies overseas, to increase incentives and reduce risk for companies seeking to scale production of critical technologies.

Decrease barriers

Congress should raise the cost accounting standards (CAS) threshold to at least $100 million; revise the commercial item exemption in 48 CFR 9903.201-1(b)(6); and make related CAS reforms as recommended by the Section 809 Panel to reduce compliance costs, which are the biggest barrier to entry in defense.
DoD, GSA, and Office of Management and Budget invest in modernizing SAM.gov and related DoD websites that publish contract opportunities to improve user design, alerts, DoD-industry collaboration, processes, and status. Many find SAM.gov onerous to use.

Fully resource and drive the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency to streamline processes, increase staffing, and pursue novel approaches to reduce the large backlog of individual and facility security clearances that impose long delays on contractors to begin work or scale.
USD(A&S) and SAEs assign visible leaders for SBIR, OT (including OT Consortia), Middle Tier of Acquisitions, and Commercial Solutions Openings to champion adoption; set vision; simplify processes; curate leading strategies; and improve guidance, training, structures, and direction to continuously improve adoption. Update policies and guidelines to ensure efforts conducted under OTs count for past performance and small disadvantaged business goals to incentivize industry and government use.
USD(A&S), USD(R&E), and services establish a team to map and improve processes to scale successful research and prototypes into new or existing acquisition programs. This includes requirements, acquisition, budget, contracting, engineering, and testing, among others.

USD(A&S) and SAEs establish a working group, to include primes and NDCs, to explore how to incentivize primes to better leverage technology start-up companies. The objective is to fuel disruptive defense innovation from novel tech companies and leverage the primes to scale integration and production of weapon systems to create an enduring battlefield advantage.

Success measure: USD(A&S) reports an increase in the number of new companies in the industrial base by 5 percent, offsetting the recent trend of 5 percent decrease annually. At least ten NDCs are awarded contracts of more than $50 million that address validated defense requirements. Defense primes significantly increase partnerships, subcontracts, and acquisitions of start-ups and NDCs to integrate their technologies into weapon systems.

Notional example: A leading technology company with viable solutions for defense that historically avoided defense contracts is now receptive (with board support) to pursue contracts given the higher CAS thresholds, reduced unique compliance requirements, and improved clearance processes.

Recommendation 7: USD comptroller proposes streamlined budget justification and chief digital and artificial intelligence officer (CDAO) modernizes supporting details in congressionally accessible information system for the president’s FY 2026 budget request.

Addresses challenge 7.

USD comptroller proposes a format for streamlining budget justification documents in the investment accounts, focusing on cogent six-page program overviews at the BLI/PE level (R-1 and P-1) with hyperlinks to supporting details.
- Seek implementation for the president’s FY 2026 budget request.
CDAO leads the effort to create a query tool and dashboard tied to Advana’s backend data that delivers insight down to the existing level of justification material, allowing for more frequent updates.
- This tool should be capable of replicating Financial Management Regulation Volume 2B, Chapters 4 and 5 presentations.
- Prototype early access to congressional staff with the president’s FY 2025 budget request, in addition to the traditional format.
- This tool should seek to incorporate budget execution data such as quarterly DD1416s and contract obligations as data integration improves.

Success measure: Congressional staff use the new information system for their budgetary and program analysis; staff desires expansion into other accounts, including Operations and Maintenance and Military Personnel.

Notional example: Congressional staff can find up-to-date information on DoD program activities without having DoD officials provide the information directly to a committee.

Recommendation 8: Tying experimentation to acquisition outcomes: Scaling and accelerating successful demonstrations

Addresses challenges 1, 4, and 8.

The DoD and industry invest significant time, funding, and resources to conduct operational exercises that experiment and demonstrate emerging capabilities and technologies in an operationally relevant environment. Even after a major exercise in which senior commanders agree on the success of demonstrated capabilities and demand to acquire these at scale, there is often a two- to four-year lag time for DoD to formally define requirements, secure funding, and shape acquisition and contract strategies. For example, even successful capabilities selected by USD(R&E)’s Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve (RDER) still must go through the Program Objective Memorandum and Deputy Secretary’s Management Action Group processes to begin scaling.

Congress to pilot providing $250 million to scale operationally relevant technologies demonstrated at operational exercises that address the preeminent challenge of deterring the People’s Republic of China, such as RDER. The funds will facilitate the acceleration and scaling of novel capabilities into the hands of the warfighter at the speed of relevance, help vendors cross the Valley of Death, and incentivize new nontraditional companies to work with the DoD. This will significantly shorten the traditionally long lag times for successful vendors to receive funding while the DoD finalizes requirements, funding, and contracts. The associated funds would be particularly useful for the technology needed to integrate military forces that will revolve around digital tools and other foundational “middleware” technologies that sometimes fall in the seams of traditional major hardware-centric acquisition.

The fund should:

Be allocated in FY 2024 spending bill to specific programs or initiatives no later than 180 days from completion of the exercise on discovered solutions.
Be limited to five or fewer high-potential capabilities to ensure they are properly resourced to meaningfully scale.
Be directly allocated to an acquisition organization, such as a program executive office, to rapidly acquire capabilities that have demonstrated success in order to address priority operational risks or opportunities.
Use Defense Production Act Title III or adapt authorities available to other agencies and departments to provide credit guarantees or other funding approaches in support of technology and capability providers.

Success measures: Increased number of technologies and capabilities demonstrated successfully that are transitioned at scale to the warfighter; increased number of vendors incentivized to demonstrate at exercises.

Notional example: A company demonstrates a swarm of small undersea intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance drones at the Rim of the Pacific 2024 exercise. The firm is awarded a low-rate initial production contract within sixty days and deploys its capability with the navy in 2025.

Recommendation 9: USD(A&S) and acquisition executives propose realigning existing organizations to adopt the Space Development Agency (SDA) model, and Congress grants additional enabling authorities to those organizations in FY25 NDAA.

Addresses challenges 2 and 4.

USD(A&S) and SAEs charter a small team to build out a model, structure, key elements, and a framework replicating the SDA and lessons learned from rapid acquisition.
- SDA provides an early model for preemptive disruption within the Space Force. The disruptive units should focus on current technologies from the labs and industry that can be quickly fielded and scaled within existing rapid acquisition authorities. Mature defense and commercial capabilities, along with broader portfolio requirements, can shape a streamlined process. This model builds upon successful organizations like the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, Big Safari, and Special Operations Command’s acquisition and SOFWERX organizations.
Service leadership identifies priority capability areas that are ripe for disruption—ones where the current operational model is outmoded for the digital age and/or where novel technologies offer radically different operational capabilities at greater speed and scale to achieve mission priorities.
Each identified service and defense agency employs an SDA model to a priority capability area and repurposes organizations, funding, and resources to implement.
- Identify the right charismatic leader who embodies these characteristics: high technical acumen, proven product manager, well-defined vision, extensive personal network in warfighting and industry communities, commitment to a five-year tenure, and an intangible “wild card” quality. Provide statutory protections to extend top cover beyond the length of time of political appointees for the new organizations to disrupt entrenched mindsets on major systems, operations, and force structures employed for decades.
DoD leaders continually discuss and iterate on the new model with key stakeholder organizations across the DoD and congressional defense committees.

Success measure: Congressional buy-in, with a small set of targeted projects identified for each organization and underway in FY 2024 to prepare for rapid scaling in FY 2025 with capabilities initially fielded by FY 2027.

Notional example: Navy leadership, in its commitment to autonomous systems, bundles PEO Unmanned and Small Combatants, Task Force 59, Unmanned Task Force, and the director of unmanned systems into a new naval autonomy organization with authorities and flexibilities similar to SDA and related rapid-innovation organizations.

Recommendation 10: Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) and services establish a team to collaboratively modernize JCIDS and service requirements processes by September 2024.

Addresses challenges 2, 4, and.

The DoD’s JCIDS is a complex, disjointed bureaucracy across Joint Staff and the services. The DoD requires a streamlined, tailored requirements framework and processes that iterate operational needs and threats with technology solutions, while also aligning requirements, acquisition, and budget systems.

VCJCS and services charter a team or multiple teams to modernize DoD’s requirements enterprise to include:

Design a requirements framework that better incorporates bottom-up capability requirements from the warfighter and addresses joint strategic capability concerns. It must align service/agency and JROC core processes while allowing some tailoring and flexibility.
Enable a requirements system that breaks from the mindset of locking down all requirements up front to a dynamic model that enables software-intensive commercial solutions and emerging technologies that meet changing or evolving warfighting needs to iteratively shape capability developments.
Overhaul, streamline, and tailor requirements documents based on capability size, urgency, product vs. service, and hardware vs. software. Develop new process to rapidly validate the military utility of a commercial solution instead of the traditional JCIDS.
Aggressively streamline capability requirement development, coordination, and approval timelines from operational commands, through component commands, and Joint Staff. Impose tripwires for exceeding six months for software and twelve months for hardware to get senior leader involvement.
Develop enduring overarching requirements for capability portfolios. Include a set of mission impact measures to focus investments and acquisitions to continuously improve.
Retire the outmoded DoD Architecture Framework and focus on application programming interfaces per DepSecDef’s data decree, architectures, and standards to enable interoperability. Strike the right balance between enterprise, service, and portfolio orchestration with flexibility for program and industry solutions.
Modernize the analysis of alternatives processes to enable a more streamlined and iterative approach that values prototypes, experiments, minimum viable products, and commercial solutions with warfighter and other user feedback over lengthy headquarters staff analysis.
Better integrate threat and technology assessments early and throughout the process.
The team must include external change management experts and collaborate with industry (traditional and nontraditional) and the DoD S&T community to get their input and feedback on providing options to inform DoD requirements.
Develop a career path, structure, and improved training for DoD requirements managers.
Publish new policies, guidance, and templates in dynamic online formats instead of five-hundred-page PDFs.
Congress directs the Government Accountability Office to assess the DoD’s requirements management processes, policies, and practices to include timelines; alignment to the DoD
budget and acquisition processes, mission outcomes, portfolio management; and harnessing commercial technologies.
The Senate Armed Services Committee and/or House Armed Services Committee hold hearings with the VCJCS and the service chiefs on modernizing DoD requirements processes to enable greater speed, agility, and innovation.

Success measure: Joint Staff and service stakeholder organizations collaboratively develop a modern approach to managing defense requirements. The new requirements system integrates the key elements outlined above by September 2024.

Notional example: The Air Force establishes an uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) portfolio requirements document that aggressively streamlines all future UAS requirements, bakes in interoperability standards, and enables many novel commercial solutions.

Conclusions and next steps

This interim report is focused on providing elected officials and senior DoD leaders with actionable recommendations that can be enacted promptly. The Commission discussed and acknowledged broader, strategic matters that will take time to flesh out and implement. These include establishing a more fulsome capital market engagement strategy, harnessing a modern workforce, and exploring digital transformations of enterprise systems to enable broader reforms and opportunities. The Commission’s final report, which is planned for September 2023, will expand upon these ten recommendations to include a broader set of reforms to strengthen defense innovation adoption. It will include case studies that highlight successes in adopting dual-use technologies within short time frames. After all, living through the “decisive decade” means that Americans deserve decisive capabilities to provide for the common defense, in this decade.

Biographies

The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD

Board Director and Co-Chair of the Commission, Atlantic Council; 27th US Secretary of Defense

The Honorable Mark T. Esper is a partner and board member of the venture capital firm Red Cell Partners and a board director at the Atlantic Council. He was sworn in as the 27th Secretary of Defense on July 23, 2019, and served in that capacity until November 9, 2020. He previously served as acting secretary of defense from June 24, 2019, to July 15, 2019. Esper was confirmed as the 23rd secretary of the US Army in November 2017.

In the private sector, Esper was vice president for government relations at the Raytheon Company.

He earlier served concurrently as executive vice president of the US Chamber of Commerce’s Global Intellectual Property Center and as vice president for European and Eurasian affairs from 2008 to 2010. From 2006 to 2007, He was chief operating officer and executive vice president of defense and international affairs at the Aerospace Industries Association.

In addition to his work in the private sector, Esper served in a range of positions on Capitol Hill and in the Defense Department. He served as legislative director and senior policy advisor to former Senator Chuck Hagel. He was a senior professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations and Senate Governmental Affairs committees, policy director for the House Armed Services Committee, and national security advisor for former Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist. During the President George W. Bush administration, he served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for negotiations policy at the Pentagon. He was national policy director to the late Senator Fred Thompson for his 2008 presidential campaign and was a Senate-appointed commissioner on the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 

Esper began his career in the US Army. He is a 1986 graduate of the United States Military Academy and received his commission in the infantry. Upon completion of Ranger and Pathfinder training, he served in the 101st Airborne Division and participated in the 1990-91 Gulf War with the “Screaming Eagles.” He later commanded a rifle company in the 3-325 Airborne Battalion Combat Team in Vicenza, Italy. He retired from the army in 2007 after spending ten years on active duty and eleven years in the National Guard and Army Reserve. After leaving active duty, he served as chief of staff at the Heritage Foundation think tank.

He is a recipient of the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service. Among his many military awards and decorations are the Legion of Merit, a Bronze Star Medal, the Kuwait Liberation Medal, Kuwait Liberation Medal-Saudi Arabia, and the Combat Infantryman Badge. Esper holds a PhD from the George Washington University.

The Hon. Deborah Lee James

Board Director and Co-Chair of the Commission, Atlantic Council; 23rd US Secretary of the Air Force

The Honorable Deborah Lee James is chair of the Defense Business Board and board director at the Atlantic Council. Previously, she served as the twenty-third secretary of the US Air Force and was responsible for the affairs of the Department of the Air Force, including the organizing, training, equipping, and providing for the welfare of its nearly 660,000 active-duty, National Guard, Reserve, and civilian airmen and their families. She also oversaw the Air Force’s annual budget of more than $139 billion. James has thirty years of senior homeland and national security experience in the federal government and the private sector.

Prior to her Air Force position, James served as president of Science Applications International Corporation’s (SAIC’s) technical and engineering sector, where she was responsible for 8,700 employees and more than $2 billion in revenue.

For twelve years, James held a variety of positions with SAIC, including senior vice president and director of homeland security. From 2000 to 2001, she was executive vice president and chief operating officer at Business Executives for National Security, and from 1998 to 2000 she was vice president of international operations and marketing at United Technologies. During the Bill Clinton administration, from 1993 to 1998, James served in the Pentagon as assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs. In that position, she was senior advisor to the secretary of defense on all matters pertaining to the 1.8 million National Guard and Reserve personnel worldwide. In addition to working extensively with Congress, state governors, the business community, military associations, and international officials on National Guard and Reserve component issues, James oversaw a $10 billion budget and supervised a one-hundred-plus-person staff. Prior to her Senate confirmation in 1993, she served as an assistant to the assistant secretary of defense for legislative affairs.

From 1983 to 1993, James worked as a professional staff member on the House Armed Services Committee, where she served as a senior advisor to the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee, the NATO Burden Sharing Panel, and the chairman’s Member Services team.

James earned a BA in comparative area studies from Duke University and an MA in international affairs from Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs.

Eric Lofgren

Professional Staff Member, Seapower and Acquisition Lead, US Senate Committee on Armed Services; Author, Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, Atlantic Council

Eric Lofgren is a professional staff member and the seapower and acquisition lead for the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services. His work on this Commission was completed while he was a research fellow at the Center for Government Contracting in the George Mason University (GMU) School of Business, where he performed research, wrote, and led initiatives on business, policy, regulatory, and other issues in government contracting.

He manages the daily blog Acquisition Talk and produces the Acquisition Talk podcast, on which he interviews leading experts in the field. Lofgren was an emergent ventures fellow at GMU’s Mercatus Center. Prior to joining GMU, he was a senior analyst at Technomics Inc., supporting the Defense Department’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office. He has also supported government analyses for the Government Accountability Office, Naval Sea Systems Command, Canada Public Works, and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Cost and Economics.

Whitney M. McNamara

Vice President, Beacon Global Strategies; Author, Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, Atlantic Council

Whitney McNamara is a vice president at Beacon Global Strategies. Prior to that, McNamara worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, where she served as the S&T portfolio lead at the Defense Innovation Board, whose mission is to provide the secretary of defense, deputy secretary of defense, and other senior leaders with recommendations on emerging technologies and innovative approaches that DoD should adopt to ensure US technological and military dominance.

Before that, McNamara was an emerging technologies policy subject matter expert supporting the Department of Defense’s Chief Information Officer (CIO). Prior to that, she was a senior analyst at national security think tank the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, focusing on emerging technologies, future operating concepts, and informationized warfare in the context of long-term technological and military competition with great powers.

Peter Modigliani

Defense Acquisition Lead,MITRE Corporation; Author, Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, Atlantic Council

Peter Modigliani is a defense acquisition leader within the MITRE Corporation enabling the DoD and intelligence community to deliver innovative solutions with greater speed and agility. He works with acquisition and CIO executives, program managers, the Section 809 Panel, congressional staffs, industry, and academia to shape acquisition reforms, strategic initiatives, and major program strategies.

Modigliani champions digitally transforming the acquisition enterprise to modernize and accelerate operations. He launched MITRE’s digital acquisition platform, AiDA. Prior to MITRE, Modigliani was an Air Force program manager for C4ISR programs and an assistant vice president with Alion Science and Technology, supporting the Air Force Acquisition Executive’s Information Dominance division.

Stephen Rodriguez

Senior Advisor and Study Director of the Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Stephen Rodriguez is a senior advisor with the Forward Defense program at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and founding partner of One Defense, a next-generation strategic advisory firm that leverages machine learning to identify advanced software and hardware commercial capabilities and accelerate their transition into the defense industrial base. He is also a venture partner at Refinery Ventures, an early-scale fund investing in dual-use technologies across the country. Rodriguez began his career at Booz Allen Hamilton supporting its national security practice.

In his capacity as an expert on game-theoretic applications, he supported the US intelligence community, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security as a lead architect for wargames. He subsequently was a vice president at Sentia Group, an artificial intelligence company, and served as chief marketing officer for NCL Holdings, an international defense corporation. Rodriguez serves as a board director or board advisor of ten venture-backed companies—Duco, Edgybees, Hatch Apps, HighSide, Omelas, Uniken, Ursa Major Technologies, Vantage Robotics, War on the Rocks, and Zignal Labs—as well as the nonprofit organizations Public Spend Forum and Training Leaders International. He is also senior innovation advisor at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Clementine G. Starling

Director, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Clementine G. Starling is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program and a resident fellow within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In her role, she shapes the Center’s US defense research agenda, leads Forward Defense’s team of nine staff and forty fellows, and produces thought leadership on US security strategies and the evolving character of warfare. Her research focuses on long-term US thinking on issues like China’s and Russia’s defense strategies, space security, defense industry, and emerging technology. Prior to launching Forward Defense, Starling served as deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security team, specializing in European security policy and NATO.

From 2016, she supported NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division at two NATO summits (Brussels and London) and organized and managed three senior Atlantic Council task forces on US force posture in Europe, military mobility, and US defense innovation adoption. During her time at the Atlantic Council, Starling has written numerous reports and commentary on US space strategy, deterrence, operational concepts, coalition warfare, and US-Europe relations. She regularly serves as a panelist and moderator at public conferences. Among the outlets that have featured her analysis and commentary are Defense One, Defense News, RealClearDefense, the National Interest, SpaceNews, NATO’s Joint Air and Space Power Conference, the BBC, National Public Radio, ABC News, and Government Matters, among others. Starling was named the 2022 Herbert Roback scholar by the US National Academy of Public Administration. She also served as the 2020 Security and Defense fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy. Originally from the United Kingdom, Starling previously worked in the UK Parliament focusing on technology, defense, Middle East security, and Ukraine. She also supported the Britain Stronger in Europe campaign, championing for the United Kingdom to remain within the European Union. She graduated with honors from the London School of Economics with a BS in international relations and history and is an MA candidate in security studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

Mark J. Massa is an associate director in the Forward Defense program. His work focuses on nuclear deterrence strategy and policy. He holds an MA in security studies and a BSFS in science, technology, and international affairs from Georgetown University.

Delharty M. Manson II is a program assistant in the Forward Defense program. His work focuses on defense innovation and operational concepts. He holds a BA in public policy from the College of William & Mary.

Jacob Mezey is a program assistant in the Forward Defense program. His work focuses on nuclear security, space security, and defense innovation. He holds a BA in history from Yale University.

Acknowledgments

This interim report was written and prepared with the support and input of its authors, Commissioners on the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, and the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

This effort was conducted under the supervision of Commission Director Stephen Rodriguez, Forward Defense Director Clementine Starling, and Forward Defense Associate Director Mark J. Massa. Thank you to Julia Siegel and Christian Trotti for earlier contributions. Special thanks to Atlantic Council CEO Fred Kempe and Barry Pavel for their support of this effort.

This effort has been made possible through the generous support of Booz Allen Hamilton as the Foundational Sponsor as well as sponsorship from Accrete AI, ACT1 Federal, Applied Intuition, Palantir, Peraton, Primer AI, Rebellion Defense, Schmidt Futures, and Snowpoint Ventures.

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List of acronyms

ATR: Above threshold reprogramming
BLI: Budget line item
CAS: Cost Accounting Standards
CDAO: Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer
DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DepSecDef: Deputy Secretary of Defense
DIU: Defense Innovation Unit
DoD: US Department of Defense
FFRDC: Federally Funded Research and Development Center
GSA: General Services Administration
IRAD: Independent research & development
JCIDS: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
JROC: Joint Requirements Oversight Council
MCWL: US Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
NDAA: National Defense Authorization Act
NDC: Nontraditional defense companies
OSC: Office of Strategic Capital
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense

OT: Other transaction
PE: Program elements
PEO: Program executive officer / office
RDER: Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve
RDT&E: Research, development, testing, and evaluation
S&T: Science and technology
SAE: Service acquisition executive
SBA: Small Business Agency
SBIR: Small Business Innovation Research program
SDA: Space Development Agency
SOCOM: US Special Operations Command
STRATFI: Strategic Funding Increase
UAS: Uncrewed aerial system
USD(A&S): Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
USD(R&E): Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
USD: Under Secretary of Defense
VC: Venture capital / venture capitalist
VCJCS: Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Human wave tactics are demoralizing the Russian army in Ukraine

Olivia Yanchik — Sat, 08 Apr 2023 20:41:38 +0000

It is no secret that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has not gone according to plan. Nevertheless, with the conflict now in its second year, Vladimir Putin still hopes to break Ukrainian resistance in a long war of attrition.

This may be easier said than done. While Russia enjoys significant demographic, industrial, and economic advantages over Ukraine, questions remain over the ability of the once-vaunted Russian military to achieve the Kremlin’s goals. Crucially, an apparent reliance on human wave tactics during Russia’s recent winter offensive has led to catastrophic losses which threaten to undermine morale within the ranks of Putin’s invading army.

There is currently no confirmed data regarding losses on either side of the Russo-Ukrainian War. At the same time, most independent sources agree that fighting in recent months has resulted in some of the worst carnage of the entire war. In mid-February, Britain’s Ministry of Defence reported that during the previous two weeks, Russia had likely suffered its highest rate of casualties since the initial stages of the invasion almost one year earlier.

Russia’s heaviest losses in recent months are believed to have occurred in battles for control over strategic towns in eastern Ukraine such as Bakhmut and Vuhledar, with Ukraine claiming to have killed or wounded tens of thousands of Russian soldiers. While unconfirmed, these figures are supported by extensive battlefield footage, much of which appears to show Russian troops engaged in reckless frontal assaults on entrenched defensive positions.

The human wave tactics on display in eastern Ukraine reflect Russia’s narrowing military options following a year of embarrassing battlefield setbacks. The Russian military entered the current war with a reputation as the world’s number two army, but has performed remarkably poorly in Ukraine. With many of his most experienced units and elite regiments decimated, Putin now hopes to grind down Ukraine’s resources and outlast the country’s Western backers by relying on superior numbers. In the final months of 2022, he bolstered his invasion force with an additional 300,000 troops via Russia’s first mobilization since World War II.

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Human wave tactics are not new and typically involve soldiers conducting direct attacks in large numbers with the objective of overwhelming an opposing force. Such troops are often regarded as “single-use soldiers,” with each wave suffering heavy casualties as it attempts to move the front lines further forward. This is not the first time Russian troops have been called upon to conduct such attacks. During WWII, Soviet commanders often ordered Red Army soldiers into frontal assaults that resulted in exceptionally high death tolls.

In the present war against Ukraine, the Kremlin may see human wave tactics as an effective way of overcoming determined Ukrainian resistance. It allows Russia to wear down Ukraine’s numerically fewer but battle-hardened troops, and can be implemented using a combination of easily replaced forces including recently mobilized soldiers and former convicts serving in the Wagner private military company.

This approach allows Russia’s more experienced soldiers to be held in reserve and used to exploit emerging weak points in the Ukrainian defenses. So-called “blocking units” are also reportedly being deployed behind the front lines to ensure Russian troops do not try to flee. According to numerous battlefield accounts, any Russian soldier who attempts to retreat from a human wave attack faces the prospect of being shot by their own side.

Although grisly, Russia’s human wave tactics are producing results. However, any advances during the past three months in Bakhmut and at other points along the 600-mile front line have been modest in scale and have come at a high cost. In an interview with Current Time on the front lines of Bakhmut, one Ukrainian soldier described the horrors of Russia’s frontal assaults. “The Russian soldiers face certain death in these attacks, but they are not retreating,” he commented. “You can shoot his head off, but his comrade will keep coming. Their own commanders will kill them if they don’t attack.”

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The brutality of Russia’s human wave attacks is leading to growing signs of demoralization among front line troops. Since the beginning of 2023, dozens of video appeals have been posted to social media featuring Russian soldiers in Ukraine complaining to Putin or other state officials about human wave tactics and high death tolls. Russian media outlet Verstka reported that since early February, Russian soldiers from at least 16 different regions of the country have recorded video messages in which they criticize their military commanders for using them as cannon fodder.

Footage has also emerged of Russian soldiers refusing to follow orders after suffering heavy losses during the recent winter offensive in eastern Ukraine. While details remain unconfirmed, most of these incidents appear to have involved recently mobilized Russian troops who found themselves rushed into battle, often after having received minimal training.

In a further worrying sign for the Kremlin, Ukrainian officials have reported a record number of calls in March 2023 to the country’s “I Want to Live” initiative, which helps Russian troops surrender to the Ukrainian military. All this points to the conclusion that human wave attacks could be compounding Russian morale issues and further accelerating the buckling of front line offensives.

At this stage, there appears to be little prospect of a sudden collapse throughout the Russian military comparable to the disintegration of Afghanistan’s security forces during the 2021 US withdrawal. While the demoralization issues facing the Russian army appear significant, recent steps to introduce draconian penalties for Russian soldiers found guilty of disobedience, desertion, or surrender represent a powerful deterrent. The continued domestic strength of the Putin regime and its control over the information space also serve to hold Russia’s army together in Ukraine.

The Kremlin may now have recognized that it must address widespread anger and alarm over the military’s use of human waves. In early April, Russian General Rustam Muradov was reportedly dismissed from his post as commander of the Eastern Group of Forces in Ukraine following his disastrous handling of the recent failed assault on Vuhledar, which resulted in “exceptionally heavy casualties.” Muradov had been widely criticized by his own troops along with many members of Russia’s vocal pro-war blogger community, making him an unofficial symbol of the army’s human wave tactics.

If confirmed, Muradov’s departure may indicate a coming change in tactics. This would arguably be long overdue. If Russia is hoping to outlast Ukraine in a war of attrition, Putin’s generals will need to move beyond a reliance on costly human waves and demoralizing frontal assaults.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

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Game-changers: Implications of the Russo-Ukraine war for the future of ground warfare

T.X. Hammes — Mon, 03 Apr 2023 16:30:00 +0000

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What does the record of combat in the year since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine herald about the future character of ground war? Defense analysts are split on whether the conflict manifests transformative change or merely reinforces the verities of ground combat. On the one hand, the bulk of each side’s formations are armed with decades-old equipment and trained in Soviet-era tactics. However, both forces are adapting, and the Ukrainian military is demonstrating an impressive propensity to improvise and innovate. In particular, Russia was not prepared for Ukraine’s convergence of new capabilities in command and control, persistent surveillance, and massed, precision fires which are changing the game of ground warfare.

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Game-changers or little-changed? Implications of ground combat in Ukraine

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Verities of ground combat

The Russo-Ukraine war has reinforced important continuities in military operations. These include the importance of preparation, logistics, and industrial capacity which are the core components needed to sustain a capable force. The war has also driven home the importance of both massed and precision fires. Cannon artillery has played a central role in the war, firing about two million rounds to date. Ukrainian forces have also adeptly employed long-range High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) to dramatically damage Russian ammunition resupply. Artillery fires have been, and will continue to be, crucial for supporting maneuver, degrading adversary communications and logistical capabilities, and destroying or suppressing adversary artillery. Consequently, the industrial capacity to produce the necessary ammunition, maintenance equipment, and systems to replace losses, will remain a defining feature of military preparedness.

Game-changers

The Ukrainian military has combined existing and new technologies to develop three capabilities that are dramatically altering the dynamics on the battlefield. First, Ukraine has developed truly connected, high-speed command and control. Second, Ukraine has access to near-persistent surveillance of the battlespace. Third, Ukraine’s skilled use of precision artillery, drones, and loitering munitions demonstrated how their smaller, lighter forces could defeat Russia’s offensive.

Recommendations

Recognize that these game-changing capabilities are giving new and powerful advantages to defenders in ground combat.
Structure and organize forces to operate in an environment of ubiquitous surveillance.
Prepare for ground combat in which large numbers of “semiautonomous” loitering munitions dominate the battlefield.
Recognize ground-based missiles and drones as key instruments of air power.
Engage the commercial sector as a key source of technology and innovation.

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About the author

T.X. Hammes

Distinguished Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Dr. Thomas X. Hammes joined Institute for National Strategic Studies in June 2009. His areas of expertise include future conflict, the changing character of war, military strategy, operational concepts, and insurgency. Dr. Hammes earned a Bachelor of Science from the Naval Academy in 1975 and holds a Masters of Historical Research and a Doctorate in Modern History from Oxford University. He is a Distinguished Graduate from the Canadian National Defence College. He has published three books: Deglobalization and International Security; The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century; and The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, the Corps’ Ethos, and the Korean War. He has also published over 160 articles. His publications have been used widely in staff and defense college curricula in the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and Singapore. Dr. Hammes has lectured extensively at leading academic and military institutions in the United States and abroad. Prior to his retirement from active duty, Dr. Hammes served 30 years in the Marine Corps to include command of an intelligence battalion, an infantry battalion and the Chemical Biological Response Force. He participated in military operations in Somalia and Iraq and trained insurgents in various locations.

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Soofer writes on the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review

Atlantic Council — Fri, 31 Mar 2023 14:35:10 +0000

Forward Defense Senior Fellow Dr. Robert Soofer recently contributed an essay titled “Explaining the 2022 Nuclear Posture and Why it Matters” in the National Institute for Public Policy‘s recently released Occasional Paper on the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).

In his essay Soofer argues that the 2022 NPR accurately assesses the threat posed by the rise of two nuclear peer competitors, Russia and China, but the document fails to articulate a clear strategy to mitigate that threat.

Having co-led the 2018 NPR, I can attest to the time, resources, and senior leader attention needed to conduct such reviews so it is plausible that the reason the NPR contains no specific strategy or force structure recommendations is because they simply ran out of time

Robert Soofer

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Robert Soofer

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Defeating the Wagner Group

Alia Brahimi — Thu, 23 Mar 2023 14:39:42 +0000

In Season 1, Episode 1 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi speaks with the author and former mercenary Dr. Sean McFate about his three-pronged strategy for defeating the Wagner Group. They also discuss internal dynamics within the Kremlin-linked private military company, the dangerously outsized influence of its leader in the war in Ukraine, and Sean’s argument that there’s nothing more unconventional today than a conventional war– and that this is borne out by the way that Russia is fighting in Ukraine.

“There’s this natural schism, between for-profit and not-for-profit warriors. Let’s just widen that schism in the Russian instance.”

Sean McFate, author and former mercenary

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What NATO can do now to apply lessons from Russia’s war in Ukraine

John R. Deni — Mon, 20 Mar 2023 10:00:00 +0000

Although Russia’s war against Ukraine shows no signs of ending soon, there are lessons about modern warfare generally and about the Russian way of war specifically that the West should apply now. Understanding and learning from the first large-scale armed conflict in Europe since World War II is critical at the moment, just as NATO embarks on its quadrennial defense planning effort, the Alliance finalizes regional operational plans, and leading allies devote increasing sums to national defense.

Every four years, the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) begins anew, as allies strive to harmonize defense plans and ensure the timely identification, development, and delivery of interoperable forces to undertake NATO’s missions. Alliance defense ministers kicked off the latest iteration of the NDPP in February at a ministerial meeting in Brussels, when they approved political guidance for the upcoming four-year cycle. At the same time, the Alliance continues to finalize “strategic, domain-specific, and regional defense plans,” which have been under development for over a year. These plans outline how NATO will conduct operations in support of collective defense and are expected to be completed this summer. Meanwhile, Germany’s new defense minister is trying to spend the one hundred billion euros in additional funds announced in early 2022 and push for still more. French President Emmanuel Macron has announced a major increase in defense spending over the 2024-2030 budget cycle. And the United Kingdom just announced a defense spending increase of six billion pounds over the next two years. The time is ripe to examine what lessons can be drawn from the war in Ukraine and distill from those lessons the practical implications for Western military forces.

Four lessons to learn

Four key strategic and operational takeaways stand out. First, to borrow some of the words if not the exact formulation of a past Kremlin leader regarding numerical advantage, quantity lacks quality if it’s all alone. Put another way, mass without adequate training, equipment, and leadership results in exceptionally high casualties and operational failure. Moscow’s inability to capitalize on what practically all observers assessed as a quantitative overmatch of Ukrainian forces clearly caused major battlefield setbacks and has arguably prevented it from claiming victory in the war more broadly.

Second, precision can overcome mass. This lesson is the flip side of the one above. Ukraine’s reliance on more advanced, precision-guided munitions from the West helps to explain in large part why Russia’s overwhelming quantitative advantage at the war’s outset really was not that overwhelming. However, it is important to note two key caveats to this lesson—it is only true to a point when it comes to air defense, as Ukraine’s mauled critical infrastructure can attest, and it requires giving up some terrain to allow precision-guided weapons time to make an impact on an unfolding offensive.

Third, whatever stockpiles you think you need for an intense conventional fight against a near-peer, triple them. The European Union’s foreign policy chief revealed as early as September of last year that European weapon stocks were severely depleted, and things have only gotten worse since then. Meanwhile, Russia is reportedly drawing on decades-old ammunition stocks, relying on North Korean weaponry, and making devastating use of Iranian drones. The rate of equipment and ammunition usage by both sides reflects novel aspects of modern warfare—unmanned drones replacing scout troops, for instance—as well as more enduring characteristics, such as the importance of artillery and secure communications. When new characteristics are layered on older ones, as seen in Ukraine, the results will challenge even the most parsimonious quartermaster.

Fourth, having good friends matters. Certainly, Kyiv’s ability to stave off catastrophic defeat to date has primarily been due to Ukrainian will at both the popular and elite levels. But its second-most important center of gravity has been the equipment and assistance provided by the United States and the rest of NATO. Although the variety of equipment creates logistical challenges, Ukrainian forces have proven remarkably adept at maintaining and repairing all that has been provided so far, again in part due to assistance from the West. This same lesson applies within the Western alliance—the ability to share risk among allies interested in supporting Ukraine has been critical, allowing allies to move forward in unison on controversial decisions such as providing tanks.

Five ways to apply them

How do these four key strategic and operational lessons translate into action items for NATO defense planning, allied regional plans, and the defense priorities of leading member states? Several implications stand out. First, the Alliance should be content with maintaining a force posture of roughly one-to-three vis-à-vis corresponding regional Russian forces across most of the eastern flank. This generally accepted force-ratio principle holds that an attacker needs at least a three-to-one advantage to succeed over a defender. The exception, though, is the Baltic region, where the allies clearly lack any strategic depth, prospective Swedish and Finnish membership in NATO notwithstanding. Here, the allies cannot trade territory for the time necessary for precision munitions to blunt a Russian advance or for US reinforcements to arrive on the continent—and thus they will need to come closer to matching Russian forces.

Second, the larger European allies should be assigned allied defense planning targets that include building larger military force packages. To fill out the additional force structure required in the Baltic region especially, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom need to be capable of acting as first responders while US troops and materiel flow across the Atlantic. The lack of allied capacity explains much of why NATO has not already expanded its forces in the Baltic states from 1,200-person battlegroups into 4,000-person brigades. More broadly, each of these leading European allies ought to be capable of deploying and sustaining over time and distance a full corps of roughly 40,000. Admittedly, this is a very tall order given the state of allied militaries today and could take many years to achieve. At a minimum, it will require additional funding for military personnel and infrastructure—to attract enlistees with sufficient pay and benefits and to retain them with adequate standards of living and facilities.

Third, allies should ensure their political guidance emphasizes the need for NATO to engage in the kind of hybrid warfare activities that Russia has been unleashing for several years against North America and Europe. As a defensive alliance of sovereign countries, NATO has historically been far more comfortable assuming a reactive stance, but this is outmoded in a hybrid context typically playing out below the threshold of armed conflict—it leaves allies vulnerable to an aggressor’s decisive opening move. Examples of how the Alliance could make this shift in practice might include cyber or covert operations directed against Russia’s foreign-based supply chain. For instance, corrupting the software code used to produce Iranian drones could have positive impact today on the war in Ukraine and tomorrow in diminishing Russian military power over time.

Fourth, NATO should ensure it has expanded prepositioned equipment stocks both along its eastern flank but also elsewhere in Europe. These sites, perhaps in Poland and Germany as well as Sweden and Finland after they join the Alliance, ought to be sufficiently hardened against anticipated Russian missiles. Moreover, the sites should be maintained with up-to-date, interoperable equipment and ammunition, which would help European armaments manufacturers to keep production lines warm.

Finally, as the Alliance and its leading member states look to their future capabilities, they should prioritize both interoperable off-the-shelf acquisition in the short run and interoperable multilateral procurement in the long run. In other words, buy what is available from existing trusted manufacturers to meet today’s needs while aiming for grander collaborative projects in the future. The recent German decision to acquire sufficient US-made F-35 fighter jets to maintain Berlin’s role in the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence mission while preserving Germany’s commitment to the longer-term Franco-Spanish-German Future Combat Air System is a model that others might consider following.

John R. Deni is a research professor at the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He’s the author of NATO and Article 5. The views expressed are his own.

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Binnendijk in Global Politics and Strategy: Towards Nuclear Stewardship with China

Hans Binnendijk — Sun, 19 Mar 2023 14:41:56 +0000

Original Source

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Distinguished Fellow

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

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In brief: C4ISR – A five-step guide to maintaining NATO’s comparative military edge over the coming decade

Transatlantic Security Initiative — Thu, 16 Mar 2023 14:11:14 +0000

Top lines

C4ISR, which stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, is the nervous system of the military.
NATO’s current C4ISR systems and thinking do not meet all of the Alliance’s needs. The relevance of such systems in the future will only grow. Mounting threats and challenges to NATO will raise requirements for better awareness, decision making, and rapid response.
NATO should seize the momentum and unity that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has generated, and use it to update its C4ISR.

WORTH A THOUSAND WORDS

C4ISR is the backbone on which NATO awareness, decisions, and action rely, yet the complexity of the system makes its modernization both difficult and essential.

Credit: NATO

THE DIAGNOSIS

Amid historical neglect and focus on crisis response, C4ISR capabilities for collective defense lag behind the level of ambition necessary for the currently volatile geopolitical environment.

With Russia’s war in Ukraine drastically changing the context of European security and defense, the speed of understanding, decision-making, and action among allies are more important than ever. NATO’s strength lies in its ability to collectively decide and act, organize, and integrate. However, the C4ISR capabilities that allow the allies to do that—and much more—remain under resourced and much less effective than required. While much has been done to improve NATO C4ISR over the past decade, much work remains.

NATO has a unique opportunity to leverage the current sense of unity, urgency and shared vision among allies to build the C4ISR architecture the Alliance needs for the future. The time to act is now, when the war in Ukraine is providing a treasure trove of lessons for the Alliance, ranging from the requirements to be ready from day one for any NATO mission (also called day zero readiness) to the important role the private industry plays in the security and resilience of any modern nation state. Early progress can also prepare the Alliance for emerging threats and challenges, such as China’s rise and climate change. The political decisions and level of ambition set by the June 2022 Madrid Summit Declaration and NATO 2022 Strategic Concept—the most important of which include those related to strengthening NATO deterrence and defense and increasing focus on innovation and emerging and disruptive technologies—will be guiding and shaping the requirements and development of the NATO C4ISR architecture of the future.

THE PRESCRIPTION

How to seize the moment

There are five critical steps transatlantic decision-makers can take to modernize NATO C4ISR and help the Alliance maintain its military edge against potential adversaries in an increasingly contested geopolitical environment. Improving NATO’s C4ISR capabilities will give NATO a relevant and credible nervous system equal to the challenges ahead.

Share more data and intelligence.

Shared data, information and intelligence are fuel for C4ISR. The uncomfortable truth is that data and intelligence sharing is not at the level it can or needs to be. This also means that the opportunity cost of not sharing sometimes can be enormous. With the right political will and tailored security measures, the vast amounts of data and intelligence collected by NATO and its member states could be better exploited for the benefit of collective security and defense.
Transform digitally.

Digital transformation, intended to address digitalization, connectivity, data frameworks and data management, is a nascent effort that is fundamental for strengthening security and defense and improving resilience. The digital revolution is intertwined with C4ISR architecture, because a more technologically advanced C4ISR edge can help the Alliance achieve significant increases in speed, security, and effectiveness in command and control, communications, data and intelligence analysis, decision-making, operations, and interoperability. Proceeding along this journey is particularly important as the Alliance is trying to shift to a new concept of operations, effective multi-domain operations, which entails the integration of kinetic and non-kinetic efforts, across all warfighting domains, at speed and scale.
Implement new concepts, policies, and plans to clarify C4ISR requirements.

To outthink and outpace potential adversaries, NATO must act now to develop the future C4ISR architecture it needs. Several efforts underway, such as the new NATO Force Model, Alliance Multi Domain Operations Concept, Allied Command Operations Command and Control (C2) assessment, and NATO’s Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) Vision 2030+, will directly influence future NATO C4ISR requirements. NATO must provide a definition for C4ISR in an allied context, build a shared understanding among allies around that definition, and ensure coherence in planning, capability and concept development.
Modernize, augment, and acquire capabilities to meet new C4ISR requirements.

There are a few practical steps NATO should take to maintain its technological and military edge in the future. This includes transforming existing C4ISR force structure, improving NATO’s ability to receive national and commercial space-based information, reducing gaps in integrated air and missile defense (IAMD), developing greater electronic warfare capabilities, and investing in and promoting innovation and adoption of emergent and disruptive technologies such as Artificial Intelligence, autonomy, space-based capabilities, and quantum computing.
Continue to invest in C4ISR interoperability, readiness, resilience, innovation, and adaptation.

NATO’s strength lies in its ability to collectively decide and act, organize, and integrate. NATO C4ISR forces and capabilities provide the interoperable structure and digital backbone into which member states plug for collective awareness, decision-making, and action. Investing in C4ISR readiness, resilience, and capabilities is a direct contribution to greater potential of the Alliance itself.

BOTTOM LINES

NATO needs a modern and well-defined C4ISR architecture to keep pace with the rapidly changing operational environment and achieve its mission of securing and defending its thirty allies and their interests. Ultimately, the question is not whether NATO will need to evolve and develop its C4ISR capabilities, but whether it can do so in time to meet the ever-growing threats to the Alliance. In its current state, NATO C4ISR will be severely challenged to guarantee the security and defense of the Alliance against the threats it expects to face over the coming decade.

Although C4ISR underpins the success of every NATO operation, its criticality remains underappreciated. However, transatlantic decision-makers right now have the perfect opportunity to implement the recommendations above and set forth the path for the necessary modernization of NATO’s C4ISR architecture. NATO stands stronger and more united than ever. Allied defense investments are rising. Additionally, the foundations of a future C4ISR architecture and its components are progressing in various stages of development and planning. NATO must prioritize C4ISR in light of these positive developments, helping it leapfrog from an underappreciated piece of the puzzle to a key enabler for the Alliance’s defense and deterrence.

Like what you read? Dive deep into our full report.

Report

Mar 16, 2023

The future of NATO C4ISR: Assessment and recommendations after Madrid

By Gordon B. “Skip” Davis Jr.

Current C4ISR capabilities, concepts, policies, and processes do not meet all of the Alliance’s needs. While much has been done to improve NATO C4ISR over the past decade, much work remains.

China Conflict

Related program

Foreword
Premise
Introduction
Threats and challenges shaping NATO C4ISR
Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war for NATO C4ISR and future needs
Multi-domain operations
Day zero readiness
NATO Intelligence Enterprise (NIE)
Persistence and survivability
Multidisciplinary intelligence and fusion
Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (TCPED)
Cyber
The role of private industry
Digitalization, connectivity, and Big Data
Decisions taken at the Madrid Summit and work underway affecting NATO C4ISR
Multi-domain warfighting
Digital Transformation
Strengthened deterrence and defense posture
Robust, resilient, and integrated command structure and enhanced C2 arrangements
Global awareness
Innovation and EDTs
Defense investment
Recommendations: Share, transform, implement, modernize and invest
1. Share more data and intelligence
2. Transform digitally
3. Implement new concepts, policies, and plans to clarify requirements for NATO C4ISR
4. Modernize, augment, and acquire capabilities to meet new C4ISR requirements
5. Continue to invest in NATO C4ISR interoperability, readiness, resilience, innovation, and adaptation
Conclusion
Glossary
About the author

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The post In brief: C4ISR – A five-step guide to maintaining NATO’s comparative military edge over the coming decade appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The future of NATO C4ISR: Assessment and recommendations after Madrid

Gordon B. “Skip” Davis Jr. — Thu, 16 Mar 2023 13:36:35 +0000

Foreword

Even as Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war in Ukraine rages, the transatlantic community is seeking to integrate lessons from the battlefield to adapt its defense planning for a rapidly changing world. Already, one lesson is clear: In a contested Europe, allies need to have better awareness of the operating environment. The speed and quality of decision-making and execution must improve. Effective and ethical NATO decision-making must be translated into operational effects. NATO must prioritize the modernization and integration of its command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture to keep pace with the rapidly changing operational environment.

While a complex concept, C4ISR is most easily understood as the “nervous system” of the military. It is essential to everyday operations, automatic responses, and the complicated processes inherent to large enterprises. Rapid and fundamental changes in our security environment—including the return of large-scale war in Europe, China’s growing global ambitions, climate change, and the transformative potential of emerging technologies—require an immediate and critical examination of NATO’s C4ISR architecture. Modernizing C4ISR is necessary to maintain a competitive advantage against state-based adversaries, other systemic challenges, and threats yet to materialize—all of which could overturn the rules-based international order NATO is dedicated to preserving.

The platform offered by NATO’s new Strategic Concept for strengthening defense and deterrence while leveraging emerging and disruptive technologies provides a unique window of opportunity for transatlantic decision-makers. It is NATO’s C4ISR capabilities that will enable a relevant and credible NATO “nervous system” equal to the challenges ahead.

To that end, this study by the Atlantic Council—the culmination of a year of research and interviews by NATO’s former deputy assistant secretary general for defense investment—offers a detailed roadmap to achieve this goal. This comprehensive report offers an expert treatment on the topic of C4ISR modernization to help transatlantic decision-makers, operational forces, the expert and policy community, and military technology watchers alike better understand the challenges and opportunities inherent to NATO’s C4ISR architecture. Importantly, it imagines the possibilities for C4ISR modernization through a series of thoughtfully considered recommendations.

Ultimately, the question is not whether NATO will need to evolve and develop its C4ISR capabilities, but whether it can do so in time to meet the gathering threats to the Alliance. I believe this extensive study skillfully sets forth the path for the necessary modernization of NATO’s C4ISR architecture.

Gen. James E. Cartwright, USMC (Ret.)
Board Director
Atlantic Council
Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Premise

NATO needs to urgently respond to changing requirements, leverage the potential of technology and innovation, and address critical issues to provide the command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture that Alliance leaders and forces need to maintain their comparative military advantage over the coming decade.

Current C4ISR capabilities, concepts, policies, and processes do not meet all of the Alliance’s needs. While much has been done to improve NATO C4ISR over the past decade, much work remains. Russia’s war in Ukraine and other threats and challenges, including from China and climate change, have added a sense of urgency to this task. Russian aggression, in particular, has tested some aspects of NATO C4ISR and provided initial lessons learned in terms of its strengths, vulnerabilities, and shortfalls.

NATO has a unique window of opportunity to leverage the current sense of urgency, newfound cohesion among allies, and an agreed vision to build the C4ISR architecture it needs for the future.

NATO needs to first provide a clarifying definition of C4ISR architecture, which does not currently exist. A defined C4ISR architecture would harmonize defense planning efforts across multiple domains, enable aggregation and assessment of related capability targets, and ensure greater coherence in concept and capability development.

The trajectory of NATO C4ISR is impacted by political ambitions. These include Digital Transformation, increasing resilience, understanding the security implications of climate change, reducing defense impacts on climate change (e.g., reducing the use of fossil fuels, energy consumption, carbon emissions, toxic waste, and contaminants), and raising the level of NATO common funding.

Political decisions and ambitions announced in the June 2022 Madrid Summit Declaration and NATO 2022 Strategic Concept—the most important of which include those related to strengthening deterrence and defense and increasing focus on innovation and emerging and disruptive technologies—will shape the NATO C4ISR architecture of the future.

Read our in-brief summary of the report

Executive Summary

Mar 16, 2023

In brief: C4ISR – A five-step guide to maintaining NATO’s comparative military edge over the coming decade

By Transatlantic Security Initiative

The Atlantic Council presents a five step guide to maintaining NATO’s comparative military edge over the coming decade.

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

Introduction

The context of European security and defense has drastically changed since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The war has upended conventional wisdom on Russia’s willingness to use violence, exposed the destructiveness of modern weapons and barbarity of an undisciplined force, and revealed Russian hubris and the limits of Russian power.

On the flip side, the war has strengthened the bond between NATO and the European Union (EU). NATO and EU leaders have taken an unprecedented level of coordinated decisions and actions to impose costs on Russia, defend Europe from further aggression, and support Ukraine in its battle for survival and independence. Alliance and EU leaders have also begun to seriously address other challenges affecting security, such as energy, climate change, and China.

Russia’s war has highlighted the power of united action while exposing the limits of Alliance adaptation to date and identifying vulnerabilities and shortfalls that allies and EU member states must address to ensure their security and defense.

More than ever, the speed of understanding, decision-making, and action are important in modern warfare. Russia has demonstrated on multiple occasions over the past fifteen years that it is capable of rapid decision-making, assembly, and maneuver that has arguably challenged NATO’s ability to respond at the speed of relevance. Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014, annual strategic exercises, and frequent combat readiness tests are all examples.

NATO has improved intelligence sharing and its defense posture since 2014, the year Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine and began its support to separatists in the Donbas. These improvements have enabled a cohesive and coherent NATO response to the Russian military buildup in 2021 and subsequent invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Whether NATO can effectively identify, prepare for, and defend against Russian aggression toward an ally anywhere in Europe without significant additional posture adjustments is in question.¹

NATO command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) structures, capabilities, and processes enable effective political and military awareness, decision-making, and action.² These capabilities encompass an array of land, air, maritime, cyber, and space systems, platforms, and applications that can be owned and operated by all thirty allies (which may soon be thirty-two with Finland and Sweden joining the Alliance),³ by a group of allies (e.g., multinational formations), or by single nations contributing to NATO missions, operations, and activities.

The time to act is now. NATO allies currently enjoy unprecedented cohesion, share an agreed and clear vision for the future, and are motivated by a common sense of urgency, all imbued by the ongoing Russian war on Ukraine.

Despite a growth in collective and national capabilities over the past ten years, NATO C4ISR capabilities remain under resourced, vulnerable, and much less effective than required. Supporting concepts, policies, and procedures related to NATO C4ISR need urgent revision. Many are under development. NATO is engaging industry and the broader private sector, but the latter’s role is not yet fully leveraged. In its current state, NATO C4ISR will be severely challenged to guarantee the security and defense of the Alliance against the threats and challenges it expects to face over the coming decade.⁴

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg displays the Strategic Concept booklet during his news conference at a NATO summit in Madrid, Spain June 29, 2022. REUTERS/Susana Vera

The time to act is now. NATO allies currently enjoy unprecedented cohesion, share an agreed and clear vision for the future, and are motivated by a common sense of urgency, all imbued by the ongoing Russian war on Ukraine. Defense investment is rising and the foundations of a future C4ISR architecture and its components are in various stages of development or planning.

NATO and national capabilities must be interoperable and more integrated within and across domains to deliver multidomain effects. The Alliance needs a modern and well-defined C4ISR architecture to achieve its ambition of securing and defending the Alliance and its interests. NATO must improve and further enable its C4ISR with common structure, policies, concepts, frameworks, standards, procedures, and connectivity. NATO must also modernize and integrate current capabilities and acquire new capabilities. Allies need to further increase sharing of data and intelligence, interoperability, and national contributions (forces, platforms, systems, people, and resources) to strengthen NATO C4ISR.

NATO C4ISR policy recommendations

To maintain a comparative advantage against potential adversaries and challengers, NATO allies must 1) share more data and intelligence; 2) transform digitally; 3) implement new concepts, policies, and plans to clarify C4ISR requirements; 4) modernize, augment, and acquire capabilities to meet new C4ISR requirements; and 5) continue to invest in C4ISR interoperability, readiness, resilience, innovation, and adaptation.

Threats and challenges shaping NATO C4ISR

Russia’s war against Ukraine is a major inflection point for NATO, which is in the midst of a long-term effort to improve its deterrence and defense. NATO’s response to Russian aggression has been to assure and defend allies, deter Russia, and support Ukraine. This response has included a surge in the employment of NATO-owned C4ISR forces such as the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Force (NAGSF);⁵ still at Initial Operational Capability and the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&CF).⁶ National joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (JISR) assets have contributed to Alliance shared awareness. NATO cooperation with the EU has led to a united front in communications and complementary actions by EU and non-EU allies on sanctions against Russia, energy security, and support to Ukraine.

Russia “poses the most significant and direct threat” to NATO,⁷ but there are other threats and challenges that the Alliance must also face or prepare for. Other threats identified by NATO include terrorism in all its forms, missiles from Iran, and cyber and hybrid attacks. All of these threats require constant vigilance, early warning, intelligence, rapid response, and defense and security capabilities enabled by NATO C4ISR.

Among the challenges identified by NATO, China and climate change are the most significant, along with regional instability and strategic shocks. China’s policies and its rising economic, financial, diplomatic, informational, and military power pose a multitude of challenges to NATO’s security, interests, and values. NATO C4ISR must enable shared awareness of China’s policies, actions, and growing military and civilian capabilities. NATO C4ISR must be resilient and respond to Chinese cyber and hybrid activities and favorably compete with Chinese technological advancements and norm-setting efforts.

With respect to climate, NATO C4ISR must contribute to awareness and understanding of the security implications of climate change and contribute to the reduction and mitigation of adverse impacts on climate. Similarly, NATO C4ISR must be able to contribute to anticipation and response related to regional instability and strategic shocks. The addition of crisis prevention to the previous core task of crisis management in the 2022 Strategic Concept highlights a NATO ambition to ensure sufficient awareness (only provided by an effective C4ISR architecture) to understand potential challenges in time to proactively shape, attenuate, or mitigate them.

Preparing for and facing the other threats and challenges listed above implies an ability to cooperate with a broad range of partner organizations and nations, including sharing information and intelligence, and an adequate level of interoperability for coordinated responses. Interaction and combined action with partners will both contribute to and set demands on NATO C4ISR.

Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war for NATO C4ISR and future needs

The ongoing Russian war in Ukraine is providing a treasure trove of lessons for NATO. NATO is still gathering, processing, and internalizing these lessons, but many are already evident. Some are already captured in reports and articles from journalists, academia, industry, and civilian and military leaders. After reviewing open sources and interviewing several NATO civilian and military leaders, I have assembled the following lessons as most relevant to the future development of NATO C4ISR.

Multi-domain operations

NATO C4ISR must be able to support multi-domain operations (MDO) and deliver multi-domain effects. Much work in connectivity, integration, and interoperability is needed.

The Russian war on Ukraine is the first of its scale in Europe in the twenty-first century. No other recent conflict in Europe—Russia’s war on Georgia in 2008 or Ukraine from 2014 to February 24, 2022—has involved a similar number of military forces or employed such destructive power. Russia and Ukraine have employed or leveraged capabilities in all five domains—air, land, maritime, cyberspace, and space. Russia has struggled with coordinating joint action, let alone achieving multi-domain effects. “Russia has definitely showed us how not to fight,” said Rear Adm. Nicholas Wheeler, director of NATO Headquarters C3 Staff (NHQC3S).⁸ Ukraine appears to have had more success leveraging multi-domain capabilities. Ukrainian forces have effectively targeted and engaged Russian land and maritime forces using limited multi-source intelligence, aerial drones, maneuver and fires units, and commercial space-based open-source intelligence (OSINT) services from a variety of private companies.

The Russian war in Ukraine is a likely catalyst for NATO leaders to hasten the development of an Alliance MDO Concept. Additionally, NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept highlights the importance of multi-domain forces and warfighting⁹ NATO has added cyber and space as operational domains over the past decade and has been working on an MDO concept for some time.¹⁰ Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and Allied Command Operations (ACO) delivered an Initial Alliance Concept for MDO in July 2022.¹¹ NATO’s “working definition” of MDO is “the orchestration of military activities, across all domains and environments, synchronized with non-military activities, to enable the Alliance to deliver converging effects at the speed of relevance.”¹²

According to Headquarters (HQ) Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) for Capability Development Lt. Gen. David Julazadeh, NATO leaders have directed the Strategic Commands to accelerate delivery and implementation of an Alliance MDO Concept.¹³

Day zero readiness

The scale of Russia’s military buildup and geographically broad and rapid employment of force against Ukraine have caused NATO civilian and military leaders to question whether the Alliance’s current plans and defense posture would have deterred or rapidly repelled a similar Russian assault against an ally, particularly a small nation.¹⁴ Could NATO respond with the speed, scale, and coherence needed to prevent initial success?

Day zero readiness

An informal NATO term referring to being mission-ready on the first day of a NATO mission (e.g. a network, a force, a headquarters).

Two ongoing efforts will help. First, a new Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR’s) Area of Responsibility (AOR)-Wide Strategic Plan (SASP) was approved earlier in 2022, but the underlying regional and subordinate strategic plans have yet to be completed and stitched together. Second, a new NATO Force Model approved at the Madrid Summit in June 2022 will address much of the speed, scale, and coherence lacking in current policies and posture by assigning a much larger number of forces (up to four hundred thousand) to regional plans.

Other efforts are in the works. The adapted command and control (C2) structure is not yet fit for purpose and ACO has been directed to conduct a comprehensive C2 assessment. NATO’s Air Command and Control System (ACCS) is woefully behind the times, and a transition plan to a future Air C2 system is in development. According to NATO Assistant Secretary General (ASG) for Operations Tom Goffus: “The NATO Crisis Response System [NCRS] was designed for out of area operations where NATO drives the timeline and has the luxury of time. Now we don’t have that time advantage.”¹⁵ The NCRS needs significant revision to enable day zero readiness for collective defense. Goffus is determined to drive such a revision.

The family of plans under development, the new NATO Force Model, and revised C2 structure and NCRS will influence future requirements for NATO C4ISR. NATO must review and update C4ISR requirements for standing defense and baseline activities, as well as exercise and enable rapid activation and deployment related to a short to no-notice collective defense scenario.

NATO Intelligence Enterprise (NIE)

The NATO Intelligence Enterprise (NIE) surged, adapted, and delivered the intelligence political and senior military leaders needed to respond to the Russian war in Ukraine.¹⁶ This is good news. The decisions post-2014 to establish the NATO HQ Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JISD), increase JISR capabilities, and improve NATO’s indicators and warnings (I&W) system have all been validated. The capabilities and processes were not always ideal, but holistically the NIE enabled cohesion, collective decision-making, an effective military response, and effective communications for aggression against a partner nation. The bad news is these outcomes are related to, but not sufficient for, defense against a peer adversary.

NIE’s ability to function and deliver in a collective defense, multi-domain, and high-intensity combat situation requires further improvements in the C4ISR architecture.

NATO-owned C4ISR capabilities like the Alliance Ground Surveillance¹⁷ (AGS) and Airborne Early Warning and Control System¹⁸ (AWACS) have proven their value in the current conflict in Ukraine, yet operations have exposed limitations in readiness, types of sensors, quantity of platforms, and connectivity.¹⁹ NATO ASG for Intelligence and Security David Cattler highlighted the positive: “NATO and nations contributed with data, platforms, and intelligence. The US shared and declassified intelligence in an unprecedented way and even small nations responded and contributed to specific requirements. Strategic and operational intelligence provided to allies was well coordinated between JISD and ACO.”²⁰ That said, personalities drove much of the success in overcoming standing C4ISR issues in terms of sharing, declassification, coordination procedures between NATO HQ and ACO, and related budgetary issues.²¹

NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) RQ-4D ”Phoenix” remotely piloted aircraft. Photo by NATO.

Persistence and survivability

One clear lesson from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, said former ACO DCOS Strategic Employment Maj. Gen. Philip Stewart, “is the need for persistent surveillance.”²² Persistent surveillance is fundamental for effective NATO deterrence and defense and crisis prevention and management because it provides military and political leaders the near-real-time awareness of threat I&W that enable timely decision-making and action. The ability to see and communicate the Russian buildup, invasion, and military action at the operational and tactical levels enabled shared awareness, decision-making, and response. The allies had the luxury of time in the case of Ukraine.

To ensure an effective response against a highly capable peer adversary, NATO needs persistent surveillance, which requires new structures, policies, processes, and capabilities. Persistent surveillance will likely demand a combination of assets from multiple domains. According to NATO ASG for Defense Investment (DI) Camille Grand, “The ability to use and fuse different tools will be critical to achieve persistent surveillance.”²³ Both Russian and Ukrainian combatants have employed a vast array of drones, from high and medium-altitude long-endurance platforms to small and very small systems, with an array of capabilities for a variety of missions (including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or ISR, and target acquisition). Increases in dedicated NATO and national capabilities from space, high, medium, and low altitude are needed to respond to strategic and operational intelligence requirements in a collective defense scenario.

One clear lesson from the Russian invasion of Ukraine is the need for persistent surveillance.
Former ACO DCOS Strategic Employment Maj. Gen. Philip Stewart

“The Alliance needs robust, in-depth, and survivable JISR platforms in the future,” Cattler said.²⁴ Survivability of NATO C4ISR in modern warfare against a peer adversary is a critical requirement. NATO-owned AGS RQ-4s and AWACS E3As have limited survivability in a contested environment. NATO and national tactical communications are vulnerable to adversary electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. Future solutions may come from a combination of greater sensor range, stealth characteristics, electronic countermeasures, other performance characteristics, or next generation communications systems. Survivability of non-deployable and deployable NATO C2 is another aspect highlighted by the destructive effect of missiles employed in the Russia-Ukraine war. Passive measures like dispersion, displacement, alternate locations, concealment, and degraded operational procedures are all being reviewed or planned. Active measures like air and missile defense planning and deployment to protect NATO C2, not so much. That said, NATO has increased its air and missile defense posture along its eastern flank in the form of short deployments of air and land assets under NATO’s Air Shielding mission.²⁵

Space-based intelligence (as well as other space-based services like communications, early warning, tracking, and guidance) offers a partial answer to the need for both persistent surveillance and survivability, as space-based capabilities are expected to expand rapidly in the coming years.²⁶ National, military, and commercial space-based intelligence (imagery, communications, and electronic signatures) has the potential to contribute greatly to persistent surveillance. NATO will be more and more interested in protection, durability, and survivability of space-based assets, which must be addressed by nations and industry. Redundancy in space-based sensors and assets and the decreasing cost of replacement and remote maintenance may offset some of the need for survivability.

Multidisciplinary intelligence and fusion

Imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT),²⁷ and OSINT played a key role in unmasking Russian intent and disinformation from the national to tactical level, as well as in targeting. Allies, NATO, Ukraine, and Russia have all exploited space-based data and information (imagery, signals, signatures) for intelligence analysis and production. Ukraine has combined commercially available space-based data and crowdsourced information (technically both part of OSINT) to effectively identify and engage key Russian targets (e.g., leadership, C2 and logistic nodes, and major platforms), refute Russian official narratives, and identify war crimes and war criminals.

There is a need for improvements in NATO’s multidisciplinary intelligence capabilities and ability to collect, fuse, and process such intelligence. The Alliance has powerful all-weather sensors in its NATO-owned AGS (Synthetic Aperture Radar, Ground Movement Target Indicator), but no electrical-optical (EO), infrared (IR), full-motion video (FMV), or SIGINT capabilities.²⁸ The latter capabilities are key for collective defense and a broad range of other crisis and security operations. NATO SIGINT (provided through national contributions) has contributed to strategic shared awareness and decision-making but is still too compartmentalized and often overclassified to be fused and used meaningfully at the operational and tactical levels. NATO has no NATO-owned SIGINT sensors or platforms, and its EW capabilities are a long-standing shortfall at the tactical level.

Two initiatives underway can partially address NATO’s need for SIGINT and OSINT. First, the Alliance Persistent Space Surveillance²⁹ (APSS) initiative set up in April 2022 and formally launched in February 2023 is a key step toward enabling NATO’s collection of national contributions and commercial contracting of space-based data, products, and services.³⁰ Second, the NATO Public Diplomacy Division’s (PDD) Information Environment Assessment (IEA) project (supported by JISD and ACT) is prototyping an artificial intelligence (AI) tool to help NATO professionals sort and analyze vast amounts of print, media, and online information.³¹ The APSS and IEA initiatives deserve expansion and acceleration in delivery to meet NATO’s current and future C4ISR needs.

Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (TCPED)

TCPED is the information management process that NATO and other military or government organizations use to synchronize intelligence and operational efforts to acquire and deliver intelligence in response to specific requirements.³² An effective and responsive TCPED process is fundamental to NATO’s ability to deliver timely and relevant intelligence in response to strategic political and operational military demands. The NIE’s response to the Russia-Ukraine crisis as well as observations of the combatants in the war have highlighted the need for vastly improved capacity for TCPED.

NATO’s TCPED process is operating at a level below its potential and short of strategic and operational need. Speed and efficiency of the TCPED process are already challenged by current levels of structure, data, assets, and analysts. According to NAEW&C Force Commander Maj. Gen. Tom Kunkel, “NATO leaves so much data on the cutting floor.”³³ Matters would only be worse if NATO were fully engaged in a modern conflict attempting to execute MDO.

AI and machine learning (ML) tools, along with improved data management and connectivity, could offer relatively cheap solutions (as opposed to major equipment programs) to vastly improve the speed, efficiency, and effectiveness of the NATO TCPED process (from the strategic to tactical levels).

You can’t cyber your way across a river.
Gen. Patrick Sanders, Chief of Britain’s General Staff

Cyber

The role of cyber in the Russia-Ukraine war has been surprising. Pre-invasion, leaders and analysts generally expected the Ukrainian government and military to succumb to the crippling effects of Russia’s “overwhelming” cyber capabilities. That has not happened.

According to Cattler, open sources reveal that Russia deployed destructive cyber malware against Ukrainian government and military C2, rendered systems inoperable, and sabotaged an Internet provider that both Ukrainian police and military depend on. All of this was evidence of “good cyber reconnaissance ahead of time by Russia,” he said.³⁴ However, he added, Russian cyber operations were “not coordinated with conventional ops” nor exploited.³⁵ The reasons are likely a mix of restraint on the part of Russia; a limited ability of Russia to coordinate cyber and other domain effects; the competence of Ukrainian military, government, and private citizens in restoring and protecting systems and services; and significant assistance to Ukraine from powerful private companies like SpaceX and Microsoft (see more on this later).

Locked Shields, cyber defence exercise organized by NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn, Estonia April 10, 2019. REUTERS/Ints Kalnins

There are also limits to cyber effects. Chief of Britain’s General Staff, Gen. Patrick Sanders, said: “You can’t cyber your way across a river.”³⁶ But you might be able to stop a river crossing (see more on this later). While cyber-related lessons from Russia’s war on Ukraine have yet to be comprehensively gathered, Cattler said: “Allies have recognized that cyberspace is contested at all times and cyber defense underpins the broader deterrence and defense posture.”³⁷ Cyberspace is an enabler of C4ISR and an operational domain for cyber operations, activities, and effects related to C4ISR. Cyber represents great potential and opportunities as well as risk and vulnerabilities. NATO must build cyber resilience in its C4ISR architecture and capabilities, leverage private sector expertise and services, and incorporate voluntary national contributions of cyber ISR.

The role of private industry

Private industry has played an outsized role in enabling the Ukrainian response to the Russian aggression, and providing security, resilience, communications, and intelligence to Ukraine and allies alike—all key elements and enablers of C4ISR. SpaceX’s decision to provide thousands of Starlink terminals to enable satellite communications and Internet services for Ukrainian private and public users has been a game changer.³⁸ Microsoft’s support to Ukraine and other countries under Russian cyberattack has enabled understanding of the threat, capabilities to secure data and networks and enable resilience, and provided a comprehensive strategy for response.³⁹ According to NATO ASG for Emerging Security Challenges David van Weel, Microsoft’s talent, expertise, and tools are critical for NATO cyber defense and data management.⁴⁰

Private companies like Maxar, BlackSky, and Planet (imagery) and HawkEye 360 (signals) are providing AI-enabled space-based services to Ukraine and NATO allies.⁴¹ Commercial data, information, and services provided to Ukraine and the allies have been used to confirm Russian military locations and actions (including atrocities and war crimes) and refute disinformation. According to Van Weel, one commercial AI tool is being prototyped by the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center⁴² (NIFC) to save hours of costly analyst time spent counting aircraft from massive amounts of collected imagery. This tool has enabled near-real-time analysis of Russian air assets and battle damage as well as cueing of changes to existing status.⁴³

NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) General Manager Ludwig Decamps offered that “perhaps we need to add industry as another domain of operations.”⁴⁴ Noting that NATO already depends on industry for critical services and innovative responses to military need, Decamps added: “How do we include in our planning to account for industry’s expertise, inherent responsibilities, and potential contributions?”⁴⁵ NATO engagement with industry includes a robust relationship through the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG),⁴⁶ which includes national industry delegations from all allies, and recently launched NATO initiatives like Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA)⁴⁷ and the NATO Innovation Fund.⁴⁸

There have been several NATO initiatives and policy efforts over the past five years to increase engagement with parts of the private sector that produce some of the most advanced and innovative technologies. Developed for commercial use, these technologies could also respond to defense requirements.

Until recently, many start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) rarely engaged with NATO for a variety of reasons, including lack of visibility of NATO needs, lack of experience in NATO procurement processes, concerns over the capital investment needed to compete, and a general view that NATO focused on large, complex systems that were the bailiwick of major primes or consortiums of traditional defense industry.⁴⁹

Local residents use a Starlink terminal, amid Russia’s attack on Ukraine, in Chasiv Yar, Donetsk region, Ukraine January 31, 2023. REUTERS/Oleksandr Ratushniak

NATO-Industry Forums (NIFs),⁵⁰ multinational cooperation in capability development,⁵¹ internal NATO HQ trials,⁵² ACT innovation initiatives,⁵³ NCIA industry key events,⁵⁴ and NATO policy efforts to address emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs)⁵⁵ are all examples of NATO engaging nontraditional industry partners to leverage their creative and innovation potential. Among this broad list of efforts, multinational cooperation in capability development has provided the most concrete, albeit still limited, results. DIANA, specifically, will focus on engaging and leveraging start-ups and SMEs, which until recently (prior to 2019) had been under-represented or less represented in NATO engagements with industry.⁵⁶

The importance of these initiatives in engaging the private sector and leveraging its technology, innovation, and expertise, including that of promising start-ups and SMEs, to develop creative solutions to NATO military problems at pace has only grown due to the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Digitalization, connectivity, and Big Data

Interrelated to many of the previous lessons identified are the importance of digitalization of information (including signals, print, and electronic media), connectivity (efficient, secure, robust, and resilient networks), common data frameworks (standard protocols and interfaces), and data management tools to enable data sharing and Big Data exploitation. More comprehensive intelligence analysis (as well as research in general) has long been hampered by several limitations: the number of documents or signals available in digital form, disconnected private and public data silos containing exploitable information, the lack of common protocols and interfaces to access and share data, and the lack of data management tools in general. While data management and cloud services have become the norm in the private sector, the public defense sector has been wary and slow to adopt. But necessity is the mother of invention and Ukraine is a particularly relevant proving ground.

A prominent example of digitally enabled C4ISR that has been used to rapidly target and destroy Russian forces is the Ukrainian-developed and British-enabled GIS Arta application.⁵⁷ Described as “Uber-style technology” providing situational awareness and rapid targeting, the system is fed by “real-time battlefield data from reconnaissance drones, rangefinders, smartphones, GPS [global positioning system] and NATO-donated radars.”⁵⁸ The system then identifies targets and “rapidly selects artillery, mortar, missile or combat drone units that are within range.”⁵⁹ Rapid calculation of firing options and alerting of firing units has cut the (Ukrainian) military’s targeting time from twenty minutes to one.⁶⁰

A prominent example of digitally enabled C4ISR that has been used to rapidly target and destroy Russian forces is the Ukrainian-developed and British-enabled GIS Arta application.

Microsoft’s ability to connect, secure, and exploit data globally is another example of effective Big Data management and exploitation. While digitalization is proceeding, NATO connectivity currently falls short of requirements to effectively link NATO HQ, commands, forces, other bodies, and nations in peacetime, let alone crisis or conflict. A common data framework is not yet operational, data management tools are rudimentary, and data sharing is far below potential. Former NATO Director General of the International Military Staff (DGIMS) Lt. Gen. Hans-Werner Wiermann advocated for a NATO digital backbone to enable connectivity and a military Internet of Things (IoT) to connect C2, systems, sensors, and shooters. The envisioned military IoT would support applications for all manner of military assessment, planning, coordination, and execution functions.⁶¹

As a result of impetus from the Russia-Ukraine war, other NATO efforts, and productive collaboration across NATO HQ and Strategic Commands, Wiermann’s ambition expanded to a more comprehensive Digital Transformation (DT) concept.⁶² This DT concept would address digitalization, connectivity, data frameworks, and management tools across the NATO Enterprise. According to Julazadeh, “The nascent NATO DT effort is similar to the US Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) effort, but a bit broader as it encompasses transforming people, processes, and technology. DT is recognized as a sine qua non component of NATO MDO.”⁶³ NATO DT will also enable the design of a future NATO C4ISR architecture.

This is not a complete list of lessons relating to C4ISR to be gained from the Russia-Ukraine war, but it provides a good starting point for identifying recommendations for the improvement and further development of NATO C4ISR. Other lessons related to NATO C4ISR, such as the variety of missions autonomous systems can perform, the importance of counter-unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) capabilities in protecting C4ISR, the importance of EW capabilities, and how to replicate aspects of Ukraine’s whole-of-society response to Russian aggression in a whole-of-enterprise NATO effort to adapt, modernize, and transform, will be included in this report’s final set of recommendations.

Russia-Ukraine war lessons for NATO C4ISR

• Multi-domain operations • Day zero readiness • NIE surged, adapted, and delivered • Persistence and survivability • Multidisciplinary intelligence and fusion • Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination • Cyber • Role of private industry • Digitalization, connectivity, and Big Data

In summary, NATO and the allies have gained valuable lessons related to C4ISR from the Alliance’s response to Russian aggression and from the employment of C4ISR capabilities by both Russia and Ukraine.

Decisions taken at the Madrid Summit and work underway affecting NATO C4ISR

Russian aggression and other threats and challenges, including from China and climate change, resulted in a historic NATO summit in Madrid in June 2022. A new NATO 2022 Strategic Concept was approved clearly delineating the threats and challenges facing the Alliance, revising NATO’s three core tasks (deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security), and laying out key lines of effort for adapting the Alliance politically and militarily for 2030 and beyond.⁶⁴ Political decisions and ambitions announced in the Summit Declaration and in the Strategic Concept, the most important of which include those related to achieving a strengthened deterrence and defense and an increased focus on innovation and EDTs, will shape the requirements and development of NATO’s C4ISR architecture.

Other political ambitions impacting the trajectory of NATO C4ISR include DT, increased resilience, understanding the security implications of climate change, reducing defense impacts on climate change (e.g., reducing the use of fossil fuels, energy consumption, carbon emissions, toxic waste and contaminants), and increasing the level of NATO common funding.

The following analysis summarizes decisions taken at the Madrid Summit, the expected follow-through on these decisions, and other ongoing adaptation efforts previously decided and impacting NATO C4ISR.

NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept broadly sets the context for C4ISR architecture and requirements in its description of threats and challenges expected over the coming decade, and the political guidance under NATO’s three revised core tasks.⁶⁵ The concept refers to decisions taken at and prior to the Madrid Summit and has critical implications for the enablement, development, and employment of NATO C4ISR..

Multi-domain warfighting

NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept sets an ambition for multi-domain warfighting and multi-domain forces.⁶⁶ NATO has taken an initial step toward this end by adopting a working definition for MDO (as previously noted).⁶⁷ To achieve NATO’s level of ambition with respect to multi-domain warfighting several more steps are required, such as an approved Alliance MDO Concept, revised Allied Joint Doctrine, improved awareness of threats and opportunities in all domains, upgrades and improvements in capabilities, and secure use of and access to cyberspace and space capabilities. Multi-domain warfighting also requires trained and educated leaders and professionals, trained and exercised forces in MDO, a data-centric approach, and, above all, a cultural shift and new mindset.⁶⁸

The level of effort will be demanding, but the expected outcome is worth the effort: greater shared understanding, collaboration, and synchronization of capabilities and activities across domains to achieve multi-domain effects. MDO concept development and implementation will be enabled by ACT’s Warfare Development Agenda, DT, and NATO initiatives related to innovation and EDTs. According to Julazadeh, HQ SACT DCOS for Capability Development, NATO leaders are pressing for accelerated delivery of an Alliance MDO Concept by 2023.⁶⁹ Given the breadth and complexity of MDO and the need for supporting studies this is a stretch goal for NATO’s Strategic Commands, but its approval and implementation will be revolutionary for the Alliance. Future C4ISR architecture and capabilities will have to be designed, optimized, integrated, and interoperable to support multi-domain warfighting and full-spectrum operations at the speed of relevance.

Digital Transformation

As mentioned earlier, DT is intended to address digitalization, connectivity, data frameworks, and data management tools across the NATO Enterprise. DT is intended to enable significant increases in speed, security, and effectiveness in C2, communications, data analysis, intelligence analysis and dissemination, decision-making, operations, and interoperability. Proceeding along this journey will make NATO more agile, resilient, and capable of seizing and maintaining the initiative in peacetime and conflict.

Much of the vision under development is not new and many strands have been under development for some time. Former NCIA General Manager Kevin Scheid was a strong advocate of digitally transforming NATO and had initiated an effort known as “NCIA’s digital endeavor” to modernize and improve the security of NATO’s communications and information infrastructure and services.⁷⁰ Wiermann, the former NATO DGIMS, advocated for development of a NATO digital backbone, which in his view would constitute the new NATO added value to nations in the information age.⁷¹

The current effort includes both initiatives and is broader and more ambitious. The effort will address the entire NATO Enterprise and include political approval by nations of a vision in fall 2022 and an implementation plan (ideally with resource assessment) by 2023.⁷² According to NHQC3S Deputy Director Marco Criscuolo, a three-step concurrent process (modernization, optimization, and transformation) is necessary to address the complexity and uncertainty of a DT journey.⁷³

NATO Digital Transformation Steps

1. Modernization 2. Optimization 3. Transformation

In brief, in step one—modernization—the current main effort includes continuing modernizing existing capabilities and resourcing ongoing programs and projects such as Information Technology Modernization and related network, data, and cybersecurity initiatives. Step two—optimization—includes reviewing and cohering the numerous and currently disconnected capability programs to build synergies, gain efficiencies, and develop better processes, including adopting current off-the-shelf capabilities. Step three—transformation—begins as NATO gains an understanding of the potential of related technologies and tools, starts to adopt them, then revises structures, processes, and capabilities, and builds in resilience (in cyber, space, and physical infrastructure).⁷⁴

DT will enable connectivity between data pools and access to and exploitation of data across the NATO Enterprise. NATO Enterprise coherence will be driven by top-down guidance and internalized principles (a whole-of-enterprise approach). DT will rely on a new organizational culture and mindset that is digitally savvy and data centric. It will also rely on greater engagement with industry to leverage its expertise and services, and greater integration and interoperability, the latter supported by the active setting and shaping of standards. DT will also rely on an agility in capability development and resource management (budgetary and human capital) and a modern approach to obsolescence management that do not currently exist.

DT will influence and enable the design of future C4ISR architecture and capabilities and improve the integration, connectivity, ability to manage and exploit Big Data, and the quality and speed of C4ISR processes.

Strengthened deterrence and defense posture

The Alliance’s decision to “strengthen our deterrence and defense posture to deny any potential adversary any possible opportunities for aggression”⁷⁵ is a major change in strategy and has multiple implications for future NATO C4ISR. In particular, the enhanced NATO posture will increase requirements for persistent surveillance and improved awareness of potential threats, a rapid and more effective intelligence process, a revised and robust C2 structure, and resilient and secure networks.

A strengthened posture will be enabled by a new NATO Force Model,⁷⁶ which will identify and assign around three hundred thousand allied forces at high readiness (ready to move in less than thirty days) to a family of NATO strategic and regional defense plans for the first time since the Cold War.

C4ISR assets from NATO and national services will be an integral part of the NATO Force Model and support the requirements in the SASP and family of regional and subordinate strategic plans. C4ISR architecture and capabilities must also support a strengthened integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) through improved ISR for shared awareness, early warning, and tracking, and improved air and surface-based C2 systems. Persistent surveillance is needed to support the Alliance’s I&W requirements. There will certainly be shortfalls in available assets and interoperability.

Strengthened IAMD is an important and new commitment associated with the 2022 Strategic Concept; it is a must to respond to the broad range of Russian air and missile capabilities, which can threaten allied populations, forces, and infrastructure from any direction given their ranges and mobility. Strengthened IAMD should include greater day zero connectivity and integration of existing IAMD-related C2 nodes, sensors, and effectors; new and improved IAMD capabilities; and an improved Air C2 system. The Air C2 system is already the focus of a transition effort by allies in conjunction with NCIA and ACO that seeks to address numerous shortfalls in the existing system while concurrently planning for the upgrades and development of an Air C2 system that can meet future needs. This transition effort should be accelerated. In particular, a strengthened IAMD should prioritize the ability to detect and defeat the broad range of tactical ballistic and cruise missiles in the current and future Russian inventory. This includes closing the low-altitude surveillance gap to detect and track cruise missiles across SACEUR’s AOR.

Ongoing planning, force generation, and future exercises will identify C4ISR shortfalls and refine future C4ISR requirements to meet the demands of an improved NATO posture, including persistent surveillance and strengthened IAMD.

New NATO Force Model

Robust, resilient, and integrated command structure and enhanced C2 arrangements

NATO leaders recognize that the strengthened deterrence and defense posture they envision must be enabled by an improved Alliance C2 structure, parts of which do not yet exist. ACO’s C2 structure currently includes one strategic headquarters (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; SHAPE), three joint force commands (JFCs) (Brunssum, Naples, and Norfolk), three service component commands (Air, Maritime, and Land Commands), a theater logistics command (Joint Support and Enabling Command), and several operational commands (e.g., Striking Forces NATO, the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force, and NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Force).

The existing structure was designed for maximum flexibility and options to respond to multiple crises of different scale and operational requirements, primarily outside SACEUR’s AOR. It was not optimized for collective defense. The JFCs do not have regional geographic boundaries or AORs. Maritime and Land Commands are neither manned nor trained for C2 of large-scale or AOR-wide operations. Staffs at strategic and operational levels lack critical expertise in key warfighting competencies (e.g., targeting, cyber defense and response, and space support).

Current ACO C2 structure and supporting command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems (i.e., the current Air Command Control System, Federated Mission Network, Land tactical C2) are not yet fit for modern multi-domain warfare against a peer adversary. Viable Joint, Land, and Maritime C2 structures for an AOR-wide defense accommodating two new allies in the north (Finland and Sweden) will be priorities to establish. According to International Military Staff (IMS) Director of Plans and Capabilities Maj. Gen. Karl Ford, “SHAPE is working on a C2 assessment which will identify the drivers of change, review current capabilities and shortfalls, and propose design principles for future NATO C2.”⁷⁷

The assessment will look at C2 in three time horizons in order to capture short, medium, and long-term NATO adaptation needs. First, NATO C2 here and now and how to achieve the Concept for the Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) with the current NATO Command Structure and thirty allies. This stage aims to respond to current NATO needs, within the current membership format. Second, decision-makers are exploring NATO C2 needs for a potential thirty-two-nation Alliance, which would operate based on an MDO Concept and with a DT plan in place. This stage represents a much-expanded level of ambition, with NATO C2 over a contiguous northern region able to coordinate and execute cross-domain effects increasingly enabled by DT. Finally, the third stage will include SACT’s vision of NATO C2 out to 2040 carrying out MDO and tailored to future challenges and threats that are expected to be increasingly persistent, boundless, and simultaneous from multiple state and non-state actors as well as from changes in the physical and social environment.⁷⁸ The third time horizon will be informed and enabled by the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC) and Warfare Development Agenda to get there.⁷⁹

The NATO Force Structure must also be reviewed. This includes assessing requirements, overlaps, and gaps, in some cases rationalized (numbers of tactical headquarters), in some cases reinforced (creating sufficient manpower and expertise for MDO and peer combat), aligned with plans, and integrated with the NATO Command Structure (i.e., ACO and JFCs). The 2022 Strategic Concept’s increased emphasis on resilience will require increased understanding and intelligence sharing of cyber and other related threats to civilian infrastructure. It will also require sustained investment to meet resilience targets (notably to improve cybersecurity and defense for NATO networks, national communications, transportation, health systems, and financial networks).

DT and increased cyber resilience will need to account for an enhanced NATO Command Structure integrated with a rationalized NATO Force Structure and connected to national forces associated with the new NATO Force Model and NATO plans.

Global awareness

Enhanced shared, situational, and global awareness are all referenced in the 2022 Strategic Concept.⁸⁰ The first, enhanced shared awareness, implies improved collective awareness enabled by better intelligence sharing and more effective NATO C4ISR to enable timely and relevant intelligence for political and military leaders. The second, situational awareness, likewise implies timely and relevant intelligence and the addition of persistent surveillance of threat indicators that can rapidly evolve and thus require rapid response. The third, global awareness, refers to the need to monitor and analyze data and intelligence related to global factors such as climate change, pandemics, and strategic shocks emanating from abroad that could affect the Alliance. Global awareness also applies to China and Russia and their related activities and influence across the globe that impact Alliance security, interests, and values.

NATO’s revised core tasks include deterrence by denial and crisis prevention. China and climate change are now characterized as long-term challenges. The revised tasks and long-term challenges will lead to new or revised strategic and operational intelligence requirements. Revised intelligence requirements will justify and generate a need for persistent, multidisciplinary, data-enabled, multi-domain NATO JISR and higher-quality and faster analysis to enable shared awareness, decision-making, and action at the speed of relevance (speed is more of a requirement for crisis and conflict than for long-term challenges).

Intelligence to enable awareness for crisis prevention and addressing long-term challenges will need to integrate inputs from a variety of national, regional, and organizational partners, and commercial providers (e.g., space industry, media, and data; computing; and network service and security providers). For example, broader NATO understanding of China would be enabled by financial, commercial, and science and technology data and analysis and greater information sharing with Indo-Pacific partners. NATO climate policy will require better analytics to understand and respond to the security implications of climate change and require greater NATO and national efforts to incorporate aspects of climate change mitigation in defense infrastructure and capability development (e.g., greater energy efficiency and use of sustainable energy sources, better monitoring of defense impacts on climate, reduced waste production, reduced carbon emissions, etc.).⁸¹

The approval of JISR Vision 2030+ by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in Spring 2022 will enable enhanced awareness, multi-domain warfighting, and other aspects of the 2022 Strategic Concept. Giorgio Cioni, director of Armament and Aerospace Capabilities in NATO’s Defense Investment Division, said the new JISR vision “includes a series of strategic outcomes, the overall purpose of which are to render JISR architecture more robust.”⁸²

Cioni said the strategic outcomes include: “1) increased investment in collection capabilities, looking beyond existing NATO-owned platforms and payloads (AGS and AWACS), achieving persistent surveillance through a combination of capabilities and services; 2) expanding the APSS initiative to collect and acquire space-based data, products, and services to improve NATO indicators & warnings and strategic anticipation; 3) improving PED [Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination] with capabilities and tools to ensure timely and efficient analysis; 4) achieving coherence and integration of different programs contributing to the NATO C4ISR network of sensors, C2 nodes and systems, and effectors; 5) review of the JISR TCPED process to ensure it can cope with more data and capabilities (sensors, platforms, AI and ML tools) and support decentralized MDO operations; 6) enhance the human element of ISR, ensuring training and education of leaders, operators, intelligence professionals involved in ISR or end users of its output.”⁸³

NATO’s level of ambition for global awareness will lead to much greater demands to provide persistent, multidisciplinary, data-enabled, and multi-domain NATO JISR. It will also instigate higher-quality and faster analysis which the new JISR Vision 2030+ and the existing JISR Capability Development Strategy should help NATO and its member states deliver.

NATO’s Nine Priority Technology Areas

Innovation and EDTs

NATO is currently focused on protecting and fostering adoption of EDTs in “nine priority technology areas:” AI, data, autonomy, quantum-enabled technologies, biotechnology, hypersonic technologies, space, novel materials and manufacturing, and energy and propulsion.⁸⁴ The 2022 Strategic Concept states NATO’s aims for innovation and EDTs.⁸⁵

NATO has always focused on innovation as a critical element of maintaining its technological edge. However, since 2018 it has redoubled internal efforts to develop policy and external work to engage industry and the private sector to capture the potential of innovative technologies, concepts, applications, and processes.

Advanced, rapidly developing technologies have captured the attention of NATO leaders and led to a series of policies and plans related to EDTs. At the 2021 Brussels Summit, for example, NATO leaders agreed to stand up DIANA and a NATO Innovation Fund.⁸⁶

According to Van Weel, NATO ASG for Emerging Security Challenges, the Alliance is learning how to promote innovation tailored to its needs. “We can create [a location and context to meet and discuss a particular topic], communicate what we want to achieve, and leverage civilian and commercial expertise,” he said.⁸⁷ Van Weel also explained that for DIANA, “nations will collectively agree on strategic guidance developed from end users.” The strategic guidance will include a set of prioritized defense needs developed by NATO Military Authorities (who set NATO defense requirements) and informed by the armaments community (consisting of the Conference of National Armaments Directors, or CNAD, and its subordinate structure, which are responsible for supporting capability delivery of NATO defense needs)⁸⁸ and the Science & Technology Organization (STO), which focuses on horizon scanning of technology developments and enabling collaboration in research and development (R&D).

This strategic guidance for DIANA will subsequently be transformed by the DIANA executive into challenge programs for the private sector. These challenge programs will articulate prioritized defense problems that will be shared with industry to seek potential solutions, much like how national security challenges are used by the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to guide US government investment in private sector technology. NATO engagements to date have demonstrated that two-way communications with high-tech enterprises are more than just an opportunity for NATO to communicate needs.⁸⁹ This dialogue also exposes business opportunities that commercial enterprise may not know exist. “Many private sector companies don’t know they can help in the defense and security field,” said Van Weel.⁹⁰

DIANA and the NATO Innovation Fund are being designed specifically to enable delivery of solutions versus simply to promote R&D. “DIANA will not just provide access to dual-use commercial solutions, but it will help mature them,” said Van Weel. “Start-ups need founders, venture capital, business coaching, networking, and solution iteration between end users and industry. DIANA will make sure there is a connection with defense primes. The end of program is to showcase to all allies what solutions have been identified to respond to the agreed problems. Go to the Conference of National Armaments Directors, etc. And the NATO Innovation Fund can come in and put equity into a start-up company to help it scale up.”⁹¹

NATO efforts to promote innovation and investment in EDTs will also help allies retain interoperability.⁹² Interoperability by design is to be baked into capability development supported by DIANA and the NATO Innovation Fund. National efforts in R&D are less likely to be so inspired. Market competition and differing levels of available funding and technology across the Alliance will continue to create gaps in compatibility and interoperability. Without increased commitment by allies to ensure NATO interoperability as a requirement in the development of advanced technology, gaps will persist or increase.

Most of the nine priority technology areas that NATO EDT efforts are focused on will enable improvements in NATO C4ISR and consequently improve the speed and effectiveness of NATO intelligence, decision-making, and operational processes. Here are key points for four priority technology areas most relevant to NATO C4ISR:

Expansion of AI and ML use cases and rapid adoption and scaling up of promising solutions will be critical for achieving NATO’s ambition for C4ISR.

AI, ML, and Big Data services and tools have already been identified for their potential to enable future NATO C4ISR.¹ A few AI and ML use cases as described earlier are already underway (e.g., IEA’s tool and NIFC’s aircraft counting tool). These use cases are trials or proofs of principle to demonstrate that technology can improve speed and quality of output and provide new capabilities that respond to unmet needs.

Autonomy promises cost-effective solutions across multiple domains which can increase endurance, reach, survivability, and performance of C4ISR in contested environments while reducing risk to operators.

Autonomy is a field of rapid development for NATO and involves land, maritime, and aerial systems.² It is significantly enabled by AI, ML, and Big Data services and tools. The NAGSF and future Alliance Future Surveillance and Control (AFSC) ³ are likely to be a subset of future aerial autonomous capabilities available to the Alliance. Land and maritime unmanned systems also promise great potential in delivering C4ISR capabilities. The NATO Maritime Unmanned Systems Initiative is a multinational effort and a splendid example of what collaboration between public and private sector approaches can achieve in terms of vision, capability development, and experimentation.⁴ NATO’s Project X (testing use cases for unmanned aircraft systems, or UAS, enabled by AI) is another excellent example of private-public collaboration and innovation.⁵ Finally, countering adversary UAS capabilities is crucial for battlefield success as has been demonstrated in conflicts from the Middle East to Ukraine. C-UAS capabilities are a growing field of NATO collaboration with the private sector. NATO is testing C-UAS interoperability standards with both military and commercial capabilities. ⁶

Quantum technology in computers, communications, and sensors promises revolutionary changes for NATO C4ISR. ⁷

Quantum computers will provide vastly improved processing speeds and capacity to enable data processing and exploitation to include decryption of current methods of secure communications. Quantum communications will enable improved security and unbreakable encryption. Quantum sensors will provide multispectral abilities to locate and identify objects previously undiscoverable due to cover and concealment, including objects in buildings or underground and submarines under water. Of these three applications of quantum technology, NATO has already begun R&D projects and tests related to quantum communications. ⁸

Exponential increases in space-based capabilities over the coming decade will impact C4ISR requirements and resilience and enable C4ISR architecture and capabilities.

Space-related technology is included in EDTs, but managed under a distinct NATO Space Policy, which recognizes the role of national contributions from space-faring nations, but also unique NATO space support requirements (i.e., communications, intelligence, early warning, targeting, positioning, navigation, and timing). ⁹ NATO has had its own satellite communications capability for years, but in 2020 a group of allies contracted NCIA to expand its transmission capacity and improve the capabilities of NATO ground stations. ¹⁰ More recently, NATO has established a Space Center at ACO’s Air Command (AIRCOM) in Germany, ¹¹ a Space Situational Awareness Capability at NATO HQ, ¹² and a Space Center of Excellence in France.¹³

Defense investment

NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept mentions the importance of fulfilling the 2014 Defense Investment Pledge,⁹³ which was created to ensure adequate investment in defense in support of an ambitious NATO Readiness Action Plan⁹⁴ agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit.⁹⁵ The NATO Readiness Action Plan and increased defense investment were meant to adapt NATO politically and militarily in response to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea earlier that year and its ongoing aggression against Ukraine. The pledge commits NATO allies to spend 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defense by 2024 and to ensure 20 percent of defense spending is allocated for “major new equipment, including research and development.”⁹⁶

In the 2022 Strategic Concept, allies further commit “to provide the full range of required capabilities,” “ensure that increased national defence expenditures and NATO common funding will be commensurate with the challenges of a more contested security order,” and “increase our investments in emerging and disruptive technologies to retain our interoperability and military edge.”⁹⁷ These new commitments are the sine qua non foundation for strengthening deterrence and defense and achieving the level of ambition NATO has set for adapting its political and military instruments of power to meet the threats and challenges of the coming decade.

NATO C4ISR structure and NATO-owned capabilities (e.g., AGS, AWACS, AFSC, JISR, Air C2 System, and Federated Mission Network) figure prominently in NATO’s current defense investment programs and projects. Capability targets for national C4ISR are likely to increase in NATO’s next defense planning cycle because of the new strategic environment and a new level of ambition to prepare for “high-intensity, multi-domain warfighting against nuclear-armed peer-competitors.”⁹⁸ Both NATO-owned and national capabilities will consequentially be the object of future increases in defense spending.

In addition to supporting the costs of NATO’s common military and civilian structure (i.e., manpower, operations, and sustainment), NATO common funding also supports collective defense investment in C4ISR capability development, which is of great political interest and subject to significant collective oversight and governance. Attempts to streamline and accelerate common-funded capability development and oversight have produced limited positive results to date. Low risk tolerance for early or any failure, detailed reporting requirements, and limited options for accelerated procurement are some of the main issues.⁹⁹ Upgrades of information technology (IT), which rapidly become obsolete, are taken as distinct collective decisions instead of being embedded in upfront requirements. Upgrades and modernization of major capabilities like NATO-owned AGS have been similarly delayed. Hence the need to review how NATO manages obsolescence in the modern age. The private sector provides ample examples of faster capability development and the NIAG has provided tailored advice on how to improve agility in acquisition.¹⁰⁰ Allies have not achieved the acceleration and expansion of common-funded capability development they desire, which has frustrated NATO military, civilian staff, and agencies involved. Further change is needed.

The biggest challenges will be in achieving the cultural shift and sustained sense of purpose needed to enable a whole-of-enterprise approach in the face of inevitable resistance to change and competing domestic and global challenges.

The NWCC, approved in 2021, managed by ACT, and supervised by the Allied Chiefs of Defense, should be a major driver of military innovation and investment over the coming decade, specifically concept and capability development.¹⁰¹ While details in open sources are scarce, the NWCC will be managed through a Warfare Development Agenda that includes imperatives (e.g., cognitive superiority, multi-domain command, integrated multi-domain defense) and principles (e.g., right people, data centric technology, day zero integration, persistent disruptive preparation) which are meant to influence national and NATO C4ISR development and delivery decisions.¹⁰² The ability to synchronize ACT’s Warfare Development Agenda across NATO and nations and with existing NATO defense planning and capability development processes will be a daunting task. ACT has a direct role in common-funded capability development but has not yet leveraged its authorities and abilities to support national and multinational capability development.

NATO ambition is high for its innovation and EDT adoption efforts, both of which are meant to direct investment into capability development that enables NATO’s military edge. Initial efforts like DIANA, the NATO Innovation Fund, use cases for AI, and ongoing work to develop strategies for individual EDTs are all promising. Engagement with industry and the broader private sector is strong and growing. Similar to DT efforts, success in NATO innovation efforts will rely on an agility in investing in capability development and resource management (budgetary and human capital) that does not exist within NATO’s current structure and processes. DIANA and the NATO Innovation Fund will offer alternative development and resourcing options to include bilateral, multilateral, and multinational programs. Scaling up solutions to provide NATO-wide enterprise capabilities would require common funding and be subject to NATO governance that has been historically resistant to higher risk and decentralized control. To achieve NATO’s level of ambition, the Alliance will need to embrace a whole-of-enterprise effort, ensure sustained commitment and investment, and change the way it currently does business with regard to common-funded capabilities.

Decisions taken at the Madrid Summit and work underway affecting NATO C4ISR

• Multi-domain warfighting • Digital Transformation • Strengthened deterrence and defense posture • Robust, resilient, and integrated command structure and enhanced C2 arrangements • Global awareness • Innovation and EDTs • Defense investment

Deductions from the Madrid Summit and other recent developments include the following. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept and recent policy decisions, including the political commitment to increase defense investment, have set the context for future NATO C4ISR. The foundation for future NATO C4ISR is being built through existing programs and initiatives, supporting concepts, assessments, and plans under development. The devil will be in the implementation of decisions taken and others still to be taken. The biggest challenges will be in achieving the cultural shift and sustained sense of purpose needed to enable a whole-of-enterprise approach in the face of inevitable resistance to change and competing domestic and global challenges.

The importance of investing in NATO C4ISR innovation. Photo by NCI Agency

Efforts are already underway to improve NATO C4ISR and more will follow as decisions taken at the Madrid Summit are implemented. Lessons and security implications from the Russia-Ukraine war for NATO C4ISR will and must be a priority for directing efforts and investment in C4ISR improvements, modernization, and future capability development. Due to its importance to effective Alliance security and defense, NATO C4ISR deserves special focus and effort to improve its multiple components (i.e., organizations, capabilities, networks, concepts, policies, processes, and people). NATO must change in several areas to maintain its technological and military edge and increase the likelihood of achieving the security and defense it deserves. The following recommendations build on positive momentum, leverage new concepts and initiatives, and offer suggestions for improvement, including adopting new efforts and approaches.

NATO C4ISR Policy Recommendations

To maintain a comparative advantage against potential adversaries and challengers, NATO and allies must 1) share more data and intelligence; 2) transform digitally; 3) implement new concepts, policies, and plans to clarify C4ISR requirements; 4) modernize, augment, and acquire capabilities to meet new C4ISR requirements; and 5) continue to invest in NATO C4ISR interoperability, readiness, resilience, innovation, and adaptation.

Sharing data and intelligence is first and foremost a matter of political will, as NATO relies on voluntary information sharing by its allies. Sharing requires trust in NATO, specifically that the Alliance can protect information shared. Sharing will always be a delicate subject, as not all nations trust NATO or one another to protect their shared data and intelligence in the face of aggressive espionage, cyber incidents, mishandling, and leaks. NATO and its member states collect vast amounts of data and intelligence that are not exploited for the benefit of collective security and defense or other Alliance aims.
Trust is enabled by modern and secure networks, a common data framework and standards respected by all, and an efficient and effective NIE, all of which act as guarantees that the information can be protected and effectively exploited by the Alliance. Much of this is in place, but two key elements require attention: political will (greater emphasis) and security (continued emphasis).

The NAC must commit politically to addressing obstacles and shortfalls in sharing. Shared data or shared intelligence do not appear in the 2022 Strategic Concept or Madrid Summit Declaration. Their absence may reflect a view of adequacy in current levels of sharing or discomfort in addressing the many national policy and technical issues that affect trust in NATO’s ability to protect data and intelligence.¹⁰³ Technical issues also inhibit interoperability, which must be addressed through greater emphasis on common standards (see sections 4 and 5 below). Shared data, information, and intelligence are fuel for C4ISR. Sharing is not at the level it can and needs to be to ensure NATO maintains its comparative military advantage.¹⁰⁴

Security, including cybersecurity, remains an issue. But cybersecurity, document security, and communications security are improving with policy emphasis, cyber adaptation efforts, improved security measures, and with improved supporting tools being put in place or planned for the future.

Officers analyze data coming in from the field at the trial control room during Unified Vision, NATO’s main event for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Photo by NATO.

A golden opportunity lies in the ability of NATO and its member states to tap into the potential of shared data and intelligence to exponentially improve the quality and speed of shared awareness, decision-making, and action. The opportunity cost of not sharing is enormous. For example, restricted sharing of intelligence on Russian violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty complicated NATO consensus from 2014 to 2018 on US findings that the Russian 9M729 (or SSC-8) missile constituted a violation of the treaty.¹⁰⁵ Earlier sharing of sensitive intelligence could have significantly accelerated common positions on Russian nuclear-capable missiles, leading to earlier decisions on mitigation and pressure on Russia to comply. By contrast, the early decision by the United States and other NATO allies to share sensitive intelligence on Russian intentions vis-à-vis Ukraine in early 2022 led to greater and timely shared awareness, clarity in communications, and timely consensus on decisions taken to assure and defend allies and deter Russia.¹⁰⁶ Here are basic, but critical, recommendations for NATO:

Implement the NATO Data Exploitation Framework Policy (DEFP) agreed by Alliance defense ministers in October 2021. While details on the DEFP are not widely known, it is fundamental to establishing a common data framework across the NATO Enterprise to enable Big Data sharing, exchange, and exploitation. NATO Military Authorities (NMAs) have begun the implementation process, but it will require a whole-of-enterprise approach, with commitment from the nations, NATO HQ, and common funding. NCIA expertise and support will be critical. NATO should leverage the NIAG and look to industry for expertise and enabling services, such as cloud computing and Big Data management.
Task the NIE in conjunction with NMAs to assess and recommend critical improvements needed to enhance intelligence-sharing procedures and tools, specifically:
- Mutually supporting strategic and operational intelligence management procedures for warfighting and crises,
- Intelligence functional services fit for MDO, and
- AI tools to assist in real-time exploitation of shared intelligence (including sorting, cueing, and other automated functions).
Set realistic and measurable objectives to share more data with metadata, information, and intelligence, both military and commercial, related to threats and challenges.

2. Transform digitally

DT is a nascent effort that is fundamental for strengthening security and defense and improving resilience. DT is a key enabler of MDO. In turn, effective MDO depend on multi-domain C4ISR. Multi-domain C4ISR is critical for delivering multi-domain effects through multi-domain awareness, decision-making, and action. Enabling multi-domain C4ISR should, therefore, be a particular focus of DT.

A DT vision was developed in fall 2022 and an implementation plan is expected in 2023.¹⁰⁷ The 2021 DEFP is a fundamental first step in the process. The DT vision and implementation plan constitute policy that will have to be followed by investment in infrastructure, capabilities, people, supporting policies, and governance processes. Standards in data exchange and connectivity will be particularly important for networks, weapons systems, platforms, equipment, and software. The US Department of Defense’s C4ISR/Electronic Warfare Modular Open Suite of Standards (CMOSS) provides a national example of an open standard approach that could be used to develop a similar NATO open standard approach allowing various national and commercial entities to design and develop interoperable capabilities.¹⁰⁸

NATO DT must be comprehensive in its objectives and enterprise wide in its application to achieve what NATO needs for shared awareness, decision-making, and action at the speed of relevance for multi-domain warfighting as well as for effective crisis prevention and management.¹⁰⁹ NATO is politically committed to transform digitally, and policy development is in progress. As the NATO consultation, command, and control (C3) staff and board are central to DT policy development, implementation of DT into current and future C3 capability efforts is almost a given. A similar sense of urgency and focus will be needed across the NATO Enterprise. Given current positive momentum, NATO should:

Ensure funding matches political ambition for and military (and Enterprise) requirements inherent to DT.
Ensure requirements for enabling multi-domain C4ISR are captured, resourced, and addressed as a priority.
Seek and leverage private sector expertise and capabilities. Large and small industries offer expertise and capabilities (services) related to DT.
Look long to enable transition to technologies and applications in NATO’s near-term horizon (i.e., the next six years), such as 6G networks and space-based capabilities and services.
Ensure a whole-of-enterprise approach to link DT policy development and implementation, including:
- Active collaboration between relevant NATO governance bodies (e.g., those covering C3, cyber defense, security, armaments, standards, budgeting and resourcing, IAMD policy, defense planning) and the Military Committee, and
- Collaboration within and among key staff management bodies (e.g., those responsible for communications, information and data management, cybersecurity, JISR, and innovation), including Strategic Commands, agencies, and perhaps Centers of Excellence where relevant.
Ensure the political focus and funding support to the NATO C3 community to achieve and accelerate the delivery of critical C3 capabilities such as Federated Mission Network and Information Technology Modernization, and a standing operational net for current operations and activities (day zero readiness).
Ensure implementation of DT is integrated into related ongoing lines of effort beyond C3, i.e., cyber defense adaptation, standards development, common-funded capability development, multinational capability development cooperation, and complex armaments programs (e.g., Air C2, AWACS, and AFSC).
Adapt existing service contracts and capability development plans, programs, and projects to include DT implementation guidance and standards.
Develop and implement a human capital development and management policy focused on hiring the right talent, and training and educating NATO civilian and military workforce and leaders to enable DT. Seek and leverage private sector expertise.

3. Implement new concepts, policies, and plans to clarify requirements for NATO C4ISR

NMAs determine C4ISR requirements through the NATO defense planning process (NDPP), and the NAC and allies decide how to meet those requirements through collective, multinational, and national capabilities. NATO’s C3 community plays a key role in determining the technical aspects of interoperable and secure C2, communications, and computers for NATO’s military and broader NATO Enterprise. With this as context, several efforts underway over the next year or the longer term will directly influence future NATO C4ISR requirements. The Alliance should leverage these efforts to clarify requirements and ensure coherence in the next NDPP cycle and future capability development and delivery to develop the future C4ISR architecture NATO needs.

First, the new NATO Force Model and alignment of forces with NATO’s new family of plans (SASP and regional and subordinate strategic plans) will identify C4ISR force and capability requirements. This effort is underway and will likely conclude at the June 2023 defense ministers’ meeting.¹¹⁰ These requirements could include new or revised NATO C4ISR structure. If force generation shortfalls reflect shortfalls in national inventories, then C4ISR capability requirements should increase.

Second, an Alliance MDO Concept will help define what NATO C4ISR must deliver to outthink and outpace potential adversaries and how NATO C4ISR will contribute to achieving multi-domain effects. The final Alliance MDO Concept is under development by the Strategic Commands and allies expect it to be delivered in 2023. Likewise, a DT implementation plan is expected in the first half of 2023.¹¹¹ DT is a fundamental condition for MDO and will set standards for digitalization, connectivity, and data exchange and exploitation that will affect current and future NATO C4ISR.

Third, NATO leaders have tasked ACO to produce a C2 Assessment to enable allied ministers to consider new requirements from NMAs and defense policy proposals (from relevant committees) by Spring 2023.¹¹² Adjustments to the NATO Command Structure over several time horizons will impact C4ISR requirements, specifically to enable effective AOR-wide C2 and multi-domain warfighting. The NATO Force Structure, which is composed of allied national and multinational forces and HQs, should also be part of proposals for change to execute SASP and support the new NATO Force Model. Additional or new C4ISR structure should be considered as well. The timing of the ministers’ decision in 2023 is fortuitous and will allow endorsed C4ISR-related requirements to be captured in the next NDPP cycle, specifically in the Minimum Capability Requirements (MCR) that NMAs will produce for NAC approval in 2024.

NATO’s Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR) Concept. Source: NATO

Fourth, over a longer term, the JISR component of NATO C4ISR is driven by several agreed documents and programs. Strategic outcomes of NATO’s JISR Vision 2030+, discussed earlier along with the JISR Capability Development Strategy, and JISR community stakeholder decisions will drive enhancements in JISR capabilities, including existing JISR programs and initiatives (e.g., AGS, APSS). JISR Vision 2030+ strategic outcomes will address NATO TCPED (structure, tools, and processes), human capital supporting JISR architecture, and overall coherence in JISR architecture.¹¹³

There is another effort not yet on NATO’s task list that merits attention. A clarifying definition for NATO C4ISR does not exist (as a whole versus in its subcomponents of C2, C3, or C4, and JISR). NATO Architecture Framework Version 4 provides guidance for developing, designing, and managing enterprise architectures.¹¹⁴ According to Paul Savereux, director of Defense Planning in NATO’s Defense Policy and Planning Division, NATO C4ISR capabilities are addressed in multiple planning domains of the NDPP but are neither aggregated nor treated as part of a single function.¹¹⁵

Achieving the full potential of NATO C4ISR and ensuring it is fit for multi-domain warfighting requires coherence in defense planning, capability, and concept development supported by a recognized and defined NATO C4ISR architecture. A defined C4ISR architecture would harmonize defense planning efforts across multiple domains, enable aggregation and assessment of related capability targets, and ensure greater coherence in concept and capability development. A common definition would assist in the development of common standards for the various components that comprise or enable C4ISR (including interfaces and data-sharing protocols).¹¹⁶ A common definition would also enable engagement with the private sector. Here are some recommendations for NATO to capitalize on current efforts and improve their collective outcomes relative to C4ISR. NATO should:

Define NATO C4ISR architecture to provide a shared understanding of what makes up NATO C4ISR in terms of capabilities (forces, systems, platforms, networks, applications) and enabling policies, concepts, standards, and processes.
- Author’s proposed definition: NATO C4ISR architecture is the whole of structures, organizations, systems, platforms, networks, applications, policies, concepts, and processes connecting decision-makers, operators, intelligence professionals, and capabilities in support of NATO shared awareness, decision-making, and execution in a multi-domain environment.
Include goals or objectives and operating principles for each of the key NATO-owned components of NATO C4ISR architecture that leverages existing elements and addresses gaps. This would allow for a methodical approach to determining effectiveness and progress over time of both components of NATO C4ISR and C4ISR architecture as a whole.
Ensure C4ISR requirements are rigorously collected from efforts to strengthen deterrence and defense through the NATO Force Model aligned with the SASP and family of plans, to conduct MDO, to digitally transform NATO, and to enhance C2.
Improvement of the TCPED process (a strategic outcome of JISR Vision 2030+) should be an early focus of DT and EDT efforts (e.g., related to AI, data, autonomy, and space) to enable speed and multidisciplinary intelligence fusion, and improvements in processing capacity and quality demanded for multi-domain warfighting.
Leverage existing NATO C4ISR forces and build upon their potential. Consider adjustments to NATO C4ISR forces (NAEW&CF and NAGSF) to enhance their effectiveness and contributions in support of the SASP and force generation related to the NATO Force Model.
- The NAEW&CF has two subordinate component commands, one of which (the British national component) is currently phasing out its E3Ds for higher performance E7s. The NAEW&CF could potentially command other nationally contributed C4ISR platforms or new NATO C4ISR forces. Similarly, the NAGSF has the potential to command additional JISR assets and platforms.
- NATO should review NAEW&CF and NAGSF manpower and operational requirements, and funding levels for operations and sustainment to support a higher level of baseline activities and missions in view of the new political ambition for strengthened deterrence and defense.
- NATO should ensure C4ISR coherence throughout the defense planning process.
- C4ISR elements contained in Political Guidance 2023 should be mapped and consolidated for future reference, e.g., through the delivery of MCR in 2024.
- C4ISR-related MCR should be the subject of multi-domain wargaming based on the SASP, the NATO Force Model, ACO C2 adjustments, and known NATO capability program milestones.
- NATO should ensure a method to aggregate and track C4ISR-related capability targets apportioned in 2025.
- Revised procedures for capturing C4ISR requirements will also enable biennial assessments of progress in achieving C4ISR-related targets.

4. Modernize, augment, and acquire capabilities to meet new C4ISR requirements

This category of recommendations is the most extensive and associated with practical delivery of what the Alliance needs to maintain its technological edge and comparative military advantage over the coming decade. The following recommendations are grouped by central themes.

(A) The first step must be ensuring coherence in concept and capability development. Such coherence does not yet exist. A recognized definition for NATO C4ISR architecture will help, but other steps must be taken to ensure 1) a whole-of-enterprise approach, 2) synergy between political and military efforts, and 3) greater agility and effectiveness in concept and capability development.

NATO must take a holistic approach to C4ISR concept and capability development. Cross-committee efforts related to C4ISR policy and capability development need a forcing function, including top-down guidance with clear responsibilities for lead, but also NATO Enterprise contribution to ensure coherence and synergy. NATO committee and military efforts supporting concept and capability development must be better connected and integrated.
Implementation of ACT’s Warfare Development Agenda should incorporate a coherent approach to C4ISR concept and capability development, enabled by a defined NATO C4ISR architecture.
The approach intended for DT (modernize, optimize, transform concurrently) is practical and inherently agile and offers an example of how C4ISR capabilities can be planned and developed in concurrent phases.

(B) According to NATO Deputy ASG for Defense Investment Robert Weaver, on October 2021 the CNAD agreed a NATO armaments policy on Achieving and Accelerating Capability Development and Delivery (A2CD2).¹¹⁷ Speed, agility, and effectiveness are at the heart of this policy, which aims to identify opportunities for accelerated delivery, pursue approaches with highest potential payoffs, and deliver results. Greater collaboration between the CNAD, Science & Technology Board, and Strategic Commands is the primary enabler of the policy’s aims. The policy includes ideas for increased multinational cooperation, leveraging testing and experimentation within NATO exercises to enable warfighter interaction with the private sector, wargaming and tabletop exercising of capability solutions, and improved collaboration in concept development.¹¹⁸

A soldier sits inside a Boeing AWACS reconnaissance plane. Photo by Johanna Geron via REUTERS.

ACT and ACO need to change how they currently support capability development to enable A2CD2 policy implementation. ACT currently focuses primarily on common-funded capability development and experimentation and lower technology readiness levels, which limits support to other approaches to capability development (i.e., national and multinational). ACO owns control, design, and funding of training and exercises, which offer the venue and opportunity for critical testing and experimentation of maturing technologies. However, ACO has ceded responsibility for operational testing and experimentation to ACT along with capability integration.

NATO leaders should encourage NMAs to take a broader role in supporting national and multinational capability development through operational experimentation efforts. NATO should ensure both authority and funding to do so.
NATO leaders should align appropriate responsibilities and focus within the Strategic Commands concerning operational testing and experimentation. Testing and experimentation opportunities are critical for enabling warfighter interaction with industry. They lead to industry refinements necessary for effective capability delivery. They also lead to warfighter awareness of new technology and applications and follow-on action to develop the concepts, plans, and procedures for effective integration. ACO Maritime Command’s collaboration with ACT, nations, and private industry in preparation for exercise Dynamic Messenger in September 2022 is a good example of operational testing and experimentation that deserves replication and institutionalization.¹¹⁹
NATO leaders should expand and ensure dedicated funding for biannual Unified Vision trials (long-standing ACO interoperability tests and experimentation supported by ACT, nations, and the JISR community) to include testing and experimentation of mature promising C4ISR capabilities and enablers.

(C) Modernize, augment, and build on existing C4ISR force structure. NATO’s AFSC program’s innovative approach of partnering closely with industry to replace AWACS by 2035 with C4ISR capabilities that are fit for the future offers an excellent example of innovation in action.

At the Madrid Summit, NATO leaders expressed their commitment to support the AFSC program into design and delivery and procure an advanced C4ISR platform in time for crew training to replace NATO E3As as they start to phase out in the early 2030s. “The fast-track approach will deliver an initial element of the AFSC capability in coherence with the agreed AFSC concept and with the subsequent stages of delivery of the selected technical solution,” said Cioni, director of Armament and Aerospace Capabilities in NATO’s Defense Investment Division.¹²⁰ The selected technical solution is yet to be determined and may consist of crewed and/or unmanned systems or a network of systems. Follow-through with political commitment and funding over the life of the AFSC program will be critical.

NAEW&CF and NAGSF have the potential to deliver more and to satisfy new requirements related to strengthened deterrence and defense. With respect to the NAGSF, NATO needs more platforms and sensor capabilities (such as IMINT/FMV/EO/IR and SIGINT) to enable effective support to its core tasks.

NATO should integrate national contributions on a permanent or rotational basis into the NAEW&CF and NAGSF based on NATO Force Model force generation to meet C4ISR requirements within NATO plans.
NATO should authorize and provide the funds for NAEW&CF and NAGSF commanders to leverage AI, ML, and Big Data management and exploitation tools. Such adoption must be in line with DT principles but will exploit the vast opportunities for improving image or signals recognition and classification, database management, maintenance, and planning for NAEW&CF and NAGSF. Such tools could also enable a sense and avoid capability for AGS.
NATO should upgrade, augment, resource, and fully exploit the NAGSF. The NAGSF has been effective and responsive but is still at Initial Operational Capability. NATO and nations should:
- Fund and accelerate infrastructure. Provide the required manpower to achieve Full Operational Capability.
- Fully leverage the analyst and operator training provided by the NAGSF.
- Fully leverage the NAGSF’s PED potential through full manning and rotation of national analysts as members or augmentees. Experience in the NAGSF provides an opportunity for national analysts to gain expertise for national employment and contribute to NATO intelligence requirements.¹²¹
- Fund the validated critical modernizations and upgrades required for current operations (especially Link 16, a standardized communications system used by the US military and its NATO allies, and secure communications accreditation).
- Plan now and fund the acquisition of sensors (IMINT and SIGINT) to upgrade AGS platforms and fill gaps in collection capability.
- Plan early to replace AGS RQ-4s at the end of their operational life span.
Fully fund AFSC development, including the fast-track approach, to ensure seamless delivery of the advanced C4ISR capabilities NATO needs for multi-domain warfighting beyond 2030.

(D) APSS needs political commitment and funding and deserves expansion. NATO-owned JISR platforms provide IMINT and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT).¹²² NATO exploits significant amounts of OSINT to include commercial satellite imagery. The APSS initiative will significantly enhance the ability to receive national and commercial space-based information (imagery, signals, electronic signatures). NATO relies on nations for a greater breadth of IMINT as well as SIGINT, human intelligence (HUMINT), and cyber intelligence (multi-source). Multi-discipline intelligence fusion is critical for confidence in the analysis that enables shared awareness, consensus decision-making, and action. Additional IMINT and SIGINT capabilities (NATO-owned or contributed by nations) are needed now and offer promising prospects for improving NATO C4ISR. NATO should:

Expand its APSS initiative to include all allies. In support of APSS, NATO should:
- Encourage national contributions and funding to meet strategic and operational intelligence requirements.
- Limit bureaucracy by keeping governance simple and lean, ideally supported by existing committee structure.
- Enable the NIE to fully exploit the multiple intelligence disciplines that space-based assets offer.
- Consider including national and commercial high-altitude platforms (balloons, airships, aircraft that operate in the stratosphere) that can contribute to persistent surveillance.
- Ensure space data collection, exchange, and exploitation requirements are part of DT.
- Ensure the space expertise required to exploit space-based C4ISR capabilities is established within the Strategic Commands (ACO and ACT).
Integrate IMINT and SIGINT capabilities into NATO C4ISR (multiple options—additional sensor payloads for existing platforms, national contributions augmenting existing forces, and new platforms with IMINT and SIGINT sensor payloads).
Develop and implement policy to normalize and integrate SIGINT (military and commercial) for operational and tactical use across NATO Command and Force Structures.

(E) Integration of NATO air and missile defense requires additional efforts to close gaps in sensors, Air C2, Ground C2, and Tactical Data Links (TDLs) between sensors, weapons, and C2 platforms. NATO IAMD requires a special focus due to its critical role in protection of NATO C2, forces, and populations. NATO IAMD relies on C4ISR capabilities to ensure operational sensing, decision-making, and action. The ground-based air defense (GBAD) C2 multinational cooperation project supported by the CNAD promises focused solutions to integrating disparate allied GBAD C2 systems at the brigade and battalion level.¹²³

A similar effort is needed to integrate Surface-Based Air and Missile Defense (SBAMD includes land and maritime systems) for area defense of NATO critical assets. NATO TDL standards are particularly important for NATO IAMD, yet not completely implemented by nations.¹²⁴ Select air and missile defense platforms (i.e., fifth-generation aircraft) are becoming more advanced and capable of serving simultaneously as sensors, C2 nodes, and effectors. Yet these advanced platforms cannot seamlessly share tactical data. NATO and national investment in TDL software and hardware is critical. Additional R&D is required for data sharing between fifth-generation aircraft. NATO should:

Connect existing ground radars and field additional surface or space-based sensors required across the Alliance to close the radar sensor gap for low-flying threats (below 5,000 feet).
Develop a NATO program for the network of sensors and C2 nodes needed to ensure shared early warning, tracking, and engagement of hypersonic threats.
Accelerate transition to a future Air C2 system fit for multi-domain warfighting and future threat and friendly capabilities.
Focus innovation and capability development efforts on integrating sensors, C2, and effectors at the higher tactical (above brigade) level and AOR wide.
- NATO needs political commitment and national action to ensure its TDL standards are implemented in national and NATO platforms.
- Nations must follow through with integration of Link 16 capability in appropriate land, maritime, and aerial platforms.
- NATO needs to prioritize Link 16 capability for the NAGSF in its modernization and upgrade efforts.
- Nations must follow through with integration of Link 22 in maritime systems to replace Link 11, ensure Link 16 compatibility, and improve overall interoperability.
- The United States needs to accelerate development of an interoperable TDL network between its fifth-generation aircraft and compatible with NATO TDLs.¹²⁵

(F) EW capabilities are central to modern warfare and a principal focus of peer adversaries due to their potential for asymmetric response to Alliance comparative advantages (i.e., high-performance C4ISR platforms, precision-guided missiles). EW capabilities support intelligence collection and targeting, disrupt or destroy C4ISR, and require specialized C2 for effective employment. EW offensive capabilities can be relatively low-cost and range from radars to jammers to direct energy weapons to missiles guided by electromagnetic (EM) seekers.

Protection from adversary offensive EW capabilities is critical for NATO C4ISR. NATO operational and tactical communication networks must be secure, survivable, and resilient in a contested environment. Low probability of intercept, low probability of detection, directional communications, and autonomous functions can support improved security, survivability, and resilience.¹²⁶ Self-organizing networks should be the aim with autonomous functions supported by AI and next generation network capabilities (i.e., 5G, 6G) and may require new waveforms enabled by new radio and antenna systems.¹²⁷

The NATO EW community is active in promoting policy, doctrine, and capability development, but has not gained the political attention and commitment needed to ensure development of NATO EW capabilities to the level needed for modern warfare.¹²⁸ NATO’s Joint Airpower Competence Center (JAPCC) has developed several recommendations for NATO action related to EW that could enhance NATO C4ISR effectiveness.¹²⁹ Building on JAPCC’s recommendations NATO should:

Establish a Strategic EW Operations Center to enable NATO C2 of and employment guidance for nationally contributed EW capabilities and assets and assist in doctrine and concept development and training.
Ensure modern warfare EW capability needs are prioritized in NATO defense planning. Specifically include a focused section in Political Guidance 2023 and ensure the development of appropriate MCR in 2024 (leveraging modern warfare lessons and ambitious wargaming).
Promote national and multinational capability development and delivery of prioritized EW capabilities that improve security, survivability, and resilience of C4ISR, including through NATO innovation initiatives.
Integrate EM operations in the Alliance MDO Concept and clarify policy and doctrine on how the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) fits into existing operational domains. (For example, should the EMS be merged into a single cyberspace-EMS domain?)
Develop a culture of EM signature awareness among all forces (especially land forces) and integrate EM signature monitoring, control, and mitigation into all (including C4ISR) new systems and capabilities.

(G) NATO recognizes the importance of investing in and promoting innovation and adoption of EDTs to retain its “technological and military edge.”¹³⁰ The DIANA and NATO Innovation Fund initiatives as explained earlier provide great promise in developing the “innovation ecosystem” and collaboration with private sector that is needed to identify, promote, and deliver solutions to NATO’s operational and business challenges.¹³¹ DIANA will focus on leveraging innovation and creative solutions from start-ups and SMEs, but will include the NIAG throughout its processes to ensure wider industry awareness and preparation of defense and aerospace primes for scaling up promising solutions when necessary.

Complementary efforts are needed in three areas to leverage the potential that innovation and EDTs offer. First, clarification of the role of NATO’s military in innovation could empower NMAs to focus on improving the quality and substance of their collective contributions, including NATO Enterprise-wide collaboration. Second, greater agility in common-funded capability development and resourcing is needed to modernize how NATO acquires C4ISR capabilities and services. Third, NCIA as a customer-funded agency should be leveraged by allies to provide greater support to national and multinational capabilities and services related to C4ISR.¹³² NATO should:

Formalize and improve contributions from NATO’s military to innovation.¹³³ Elements of which follow:
- NWCC includes future capability considerations that should be refined over time through dialogue with the Armaments Community and STO.
- The Warfare Development Agenda is meant to drive concept development and influence capability development but must be aligned with the NDPP.
- Military requirements can be better informed by engagement with industry, the Armaments Community, and the Science & Technology Board.
- Promotion of innovation challenges to military problem sets should be developed through greater involvement with the NATO Enterprise.
- Military advice and input into the strategic guidance for DIANA are critical for leveraging DIANA’s potential to address military problems and challenges.
- Support for testing and experimentation (including warfighter-industry interaction) of maturing technology and applications in NATO training and exercises needs greater focus.
- Concept development is not yet at pace to leverage maturing technology and applications to enable integration and effective employment.
Adopt agile capability development and resourcing principles for common-funded C4ISR capabilities and services.
- Revise how IT components of capabilities are addressed in requirements and acquisition to account ahead of time for cybersecurity, obsolescence replacement, upgrades, and modernization.
- Reduce complexity in requirements drafting and committee oversight but enforce schedules.
- Adopt modular approaches to design to enable interchangeability and interoperability among capabilities.
- Adopt advanced technology that is mature, available, and corresponds to need rapidly.
- Allow for an approach that includes early prototype testing and experimentation, small-scale purchases, building on success, and scaling up.
- Allow for the appropriate risk tolerance for failure and revision.
- Fully leverage NCIA’s potential support to national and multinational capability development and services related to C4ISR. Recent contracts for satellite communications, Strategic Space Situational Awareness System, and APSS are great examples of NCIA’s ability to leverage funding from single allies and groups of allies to provide capabilities and services that benefit the entire Alliance.

NATO Command Structure. Source: NATO

5. Continue to invest in NATO C4ISR interoperability, readiness, resilience, innovation, and adaptation

NATO’s value added to allies are its abilities to collectively decide and act, organize, and integrate. NATO provides the structural and digital backbone for nations to plug into, and develops common doctrine, concepts, procedures, and capabilities to enable interoperability and effective collective action. NATO nations have already increased defense spending by the equivalent of $350 billion since making their Defense Investment Pledge in 2014.¹³⁴ More billions of dollars are planned to be spent by 2024 and beyond as additional allies meet or exceed their defense spending goal of 2 percent of their GDP. As of June 30, 2022, eight allies exceed the 2 percent goal.¹³⁵ A total of nineteen allies have plans to do so by 2024 and five more plan to meet the goal shortly after 2024.¹³⁶

NATO-owned C4ISR forces (e.g., NAEW&CF and NAGSF) and capabilities ensure a guaranteed minimum level of shared data and intelligence that is rapidly employable to enable political and military shared awareness. NATO-owned assets have proven their value time and again in crisis and partially compensate for the lack of standing national C4ISR contributions. The C4 elements of NATO-owned C4ISR assets provide secure and interoperable C2 and secure computer and communications networks for political consultation and NATO military operations and activities (strategic to tactical).

NATO-owned C4ISR forces and capabilities are NATO’s added value to the Alliance, providing the interoperable structure and digital backbone into which national contributions plug for collective awareness, decision-making, and action. Investment in NATO-owned C4ISR forces and capabilities can only enhance the Alliance’s capability to observe, orient, decide, and act.

NATO C4ISR will reap the benefits of known and expected increases in defense spending. While the bulk of allied defense spending will go to national defense requirements, spending on increased readiness of national C4ISR forces (personnel, training, equipment, sustainment, and infrastructure), enhanced resilience (especially communications networks and transportation), and delivery of capabilities corresponding to allied C4ISR capability targets will all contribute to the potential of NATO C4ISR.

As this report has highlighted, there are several areas where national defense spending and common funding are needed to ensure NATO C4ISR is fit for modern warfare and the threats and challenges identified in NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept. The following recommendations are an elaboration of key investment recommendations previously mentioned. Allies should:

Invest in NATO interoperability and integration.
- Accelerate development of C4ISR-related equipment and connectivity standards to ensure nations’ disparate C4ISR systems and platforms (all types—C2, communications, computers, and ISR) can talk to each other and share real-time data and intelligence. This effort must address interoperability between national and proprietary cryptographic equipment and software.
- Ensure adequate NATO staff support to nations in standards development.
- Implement a NATO assessment mechanism to confirm the adoption of NATO standards by national and NATO C4ISR forces.
- Review and act on the implications of NATO military assessments of C4ISR interoperability.
- Leverage and support the potential of NATO’s JISR interoperability trials (United Vision) to test, experiment, and validate C4ISR systems.
- Adopt dual-use standards whenever possible to accelerate delivery of interoperable C4ISR capabilities or enablers.
Invest in NATO C4ISR force readiness and resilience. Review manpower and resilience (cybersecurity, communications, and infrastructure) requirements of the NAEW&CF and NAGSF for MDO.
- Invest in NATO C4ISR innovation and adaptation commensurate with NATO C4ISR’s prominent role in shared awareness, decision-making, and action.
- Include C4ISR challenges in the strategic guidance developed by nations for DIANA and the NATO Innovation Fund.
- Invest in human capital development and management of leaders, operators, and intelligence professionals involved in or supporting NATO C4ISR.
Invest in NATO C4ISR adaptation (and modernization) to meet the needs of the Alliance now and out to 2030 and beyond.
- Ensure funding for DT requirements that will enable and enhance NATO C4ISR.
- Plan for and invest in the modernization and future replacement of NAGSF platforms and systems.
- Ensure funding of NATO commitments to AFSC and a fast-track approach for an advanced platform replacement for AWACS aircraft.

Conclusion

NATO C4ISR capabilities have improved over the past decade but are not projected to meet future Alliance needs. Vulnerabilities and shortfalls persist, which are aggravated by a demanding security environment and an elevated level of NATO ambition agreed at the Madrid Summit. In particular, Russian aggression and other threats and challenges, including from terrorism, China, and climate change, raise requirements for speed and quality in NATO shared awareness, decision-making, and action. The latter are all enabled by NATO C4ISR.

The NATO 2022 Strategic Concept and recent policy decisions will set the context for future NATO C4ISR requirements. Future NATO defense planning and capability development of NATO C4ISR must respond to changing requirements and address critical issues. NATO has a unique window of opportunity over the next few years to leverage a newfound sense of cohesion and urgency among allies along with an agreed vision. Implementing recent NATO decisions, leveraging increases in defense investment, and exploiting proven or promising technologies present multiple opportunities to develop and deliver the C4ISR capabilities NATO forces need.

Five key efforts will maximize NATO’s ability to maintain its comparative military advantage over the coming decade: improving data and intelligence sharing, transforming digitally, clarifying C4ISR architecture and requirements, modernizing or acquiring C4ISR capabilities and enablers, and continuing to invest in the ingredients of NATO’s success for the past seven decades (i.e., interoperability, readiness, resilience, innovation, and adaptation).

Glossary

A2CD2

ACCS

ACO

ACT

AFSC

AGS

AIRCOM

AOR

APSS

ASG

AWACS

C4ISR

CMOSS

CNAD

COMINT

C-UAS

DCOS

DDA

DEFP

DGIMS

DIANA

EDTs

ELINT

EMS

FMV

GBAD

GDP

GPS

HUMINT

I&W

IAMD

IEA

IMINT

IMS

INF Treaty

IoT

ISR

JADC2

JAPCC

JFC

JIS

JISD

JISR

MASINT

MCR

MDO

NAC

NAEW&CF

NAGSF

NATO

NCIA

NCRS

NDPP

NHQC3S

NIAG

NIE

NIF

NIFC

NMAs

NSPA

NWCC

OSINT

PDD

PED

R&D

SACEUR

SACT

SASP

SBAMD

SHAPE

SIGINT

SMEs

STO

TCPED

TDL

UAS

Achieving and Accelerating Capability Development and Delivery

Air Command and Control System

Allied Command Operations

Allied Command Transformation

Alliance Future Surveillance and Control

Alliance Ground Surveillance

artificial intelligence

Air Command

Area of Responsibility

Alliance Persistent Space Surveillance

assistant secretary general

airborne early warning and control system

command and control

consultation, command, and control

command, control, communications, and computers

command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

C4ISR/Electronic Warfare Modular Open Suite of Standards

Conference of National Armaments Directors

communications intelligence

counter-unmanned aircraft system

Deputy Chief of Staff

Defense and Deterrence of the Euro-Atlantic Area

Data Exploitation Framework Policy

Director General of the International Military Staff

Defense Investment

Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic

Digital Transformation

emerging and disruptive technologies

electronic intelligence

electromagnetic

electromagnetic spectrum

electrical-optical

European Union

electronic warfare

full-motion video

ground-based air defense

gross domestic product

global positioning system

headquarters

human intelligence

indicators and warnings

integrated air and missile defense

Information Environment Assessment

imagery intelligence

International Military Staff

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

Internet of Things

infrared

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

information technology

Joint All Domain Command and Control

Joint Airpower Competence Center

joint force command

Joint Intelligence and Security

Joint Intelligence and Security Division

joint intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

measurement and signature intelligence

Minimum Capability Requirements

multi-domain operations

machine learning

North Atlantic Council

NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force

NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Force

North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Reconnaissance

NATO Communications and Information Agency

NATO Crisis Response System

NATO defense planning process

NATO Headquarters C3 Staff

NATO Industrial Advisory Group

NATO Intelligence Enterprise

NATO-Industry Forum

NATO Intelligence Fusion Center

NATO Military Authorities

NATO Support and Procurement Agency

NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept

open-source intelligence

Public Diplomacy Division

Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination

Research and development

Supreme Allied Commander Europe

Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility-Wide Strategic Plan

Surface-Based Air and Missile Defense

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

signals intelligence

small and medium-sized enterprises

Science & Technology Organization

Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination

Tactical Data Link

unmanned aircraft system

About the author

Gordon B. “Skip” Davis Jr. is currently a Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis. He recently served as NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment.

Prior to NATO, Skip served 37 years in the U.S. Army retiring as a Major General. Skip’s last military positions were as Director of Operations, U.S. European Command, Commander of Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, and Director of Operations and Intelligence for Allied Command Operations. Skip’s professional life included operational and institutional assignments interspersed with study and practice of international affairs and defense issues, primarily in Europe. Skip participated in operations with U.S., NATO, and UN forces in Europe, Africa, Middle East, and Central Asia. Skip brings practical experience and conceptual understanding of contemporary and emerging defense issues as well as executive-level experience in operations, intelligence, leader development, capability development, and policy development. Skip holds an undergraduate degree in nuclear physics and graduate degrees in international business, defense and military history, and strategic studies.

Mr. Davis and his wife Rita have two daughters, Stefania and Victoria, both of whom completed their undergraduate degrees in Italy. Stefania is a Captain in the U.S. Military Intelligence Corps serving at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Victoria is a graduate student completing a MBA in Performing Arts in Paris.

Issue Brief Jun 13, 2022

NATO priorities: Initial lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war

By Franklin D. Kramer, Barry Pavel

At the June 2022 NATO summit it will be important to implement four key operational priorities, each derived from initial lessons underscored by the Russia-Ukraine war, to maintain the Alliance’s long-term capacity for defense and deterrence.

Europe & Eurasia National Security

NATO 20/2020 Oct 14, 2020

Digitalize the enterprise

By Jeffrey Reynolds, Jeffrey Lightfoot

If NATO is to unlock new frontiers of innovation and harness emerging technology, digitalizing how it does business is the key.

Defense Technologies Digital Policy

Issue Brief Mar 9, 2022

Defending every inch of NATO territory: Force posture options for strengthening deterrence in Europe

By The Scowcroft Center Task Force on Deterrence and Force Posture

Deterrence in Europe can be enhanced through a range of US and NATO force posture enhancements.

Conflict Defense Policy

1 Scowcroft Center Task Force for Deterrence and Force Posture, Defending Every Inch of NATO Territory: Force Posture Options for Strengthening Deterrence in Europe, Atlantic Council, March 9, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/us-and-nato-force-posture-options/.

2 For this report, information technology (IT), including services, are included in the categories of “communications” and “computers.” While some countries include cyber as a related capability category (i.e., C5ISR), NATO treats cyber as an operational domain (cyberspace) and an enabling capability for C4ISR.

3 NATO, “NATO Allies Sign Protocols for Accession of Finland and Sweden,” last updated July 5, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_197763.htm.

4 NATO, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, June 29, 2022, 3-6, https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/#StrategicConcept.

5 NATO Air Command, “NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Force takes over critical infrastructure,” November 28, 2022, https://ac.nato.int/archive/2022/NAGSF_new_infra.

6 NATO Air Command, “NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control,” accessed February 16, 2023, https://ac.nato.int/missions/indications-and-warnings/AWACS.

7 NATO 2022 Strategic, “Strategic Environment,” 4.

8 Rear Adm. Nicholas Wheeler, interview by author, August 16, 2022.

9 NATO 2022 Strategic, 6.

10 Allied Command Transformation (ACT) began talks in June 2021. See Lieutenant Colonel Jose Diaz de Leon, “Understanding Multi-Domain Operations in NATO,” Three Swords Magazine 37 (2021), 92, https://www.jwc.nato.int/application/files/1516/3281/0425/issue37_21.pdf. During the author’s assignment to Allied Command Operations (ACO), from 2013 to 2015, staff officers in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Plans Directorate developed a draft definition and concept for MDO that was shared with senior SHAPE staff.

11 Allied Command Transformation (ACT), “Multi-Domain Operations: Enabling NATO to Out-Pace and Out-Think Its Adversaries,” July 29, 2022, https://www.act.nato.int/articles/multi-domain-operations-out-pacing-and-out-thinking-nato-adversaries.

12 Ibid.

13 Lt. Gen. David Julazadeh, interview by author, August 2, 2022.

14 The author defines defense posture as the whole of command and control (C2) structures, baseline activities for deterrence and defense, force readiness, responsiveness, reinforcement plans, and capabilities.

15 Tom Goffus, interview by author, July 15, 2022.

16 David Cattler, interview by author, July 13, 2022, and Maj. Gen. Philip Stewart, interview by author, July 11, 2022.

17 NATO, “Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS),” last updated July 20, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48892.htm.

18 Airforce Technology, “E-3 AWACS (Sentry) Airborne Early Warning and Control System,” June 25, 2020, https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/e3awacs/.

19 Stewart, interview and Brig. Gen. Houston Cantwell, interview by author, July 8, 2022.

20 Cattler, interview.

21 Ibid. and Stewart, interview.

22 Ibid. and Stewart, interview.

23 Camille Grand, interview by author, August 1, 2022.

24 Cattler, interview.

25 “Video: 5 Things You Should Know about NATO’s Air Shielding Mission,” SHAPE, August 19, 2022, https://shape.nato.int/news-archive/2022/video-5-things-you-should-know-about-natos-air-shielding-mission.

26 Mattia Olivari, “The Space Sector: Current Trends and Future Evolutions,” ISPI, December 11, 2021, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/space-sector-current-trends-and-future-evolutions-28602.

27 Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is composed of communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT).

28 NATO’s E-3A AWACS has a look down surveillance radar that collects measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), but not COMINT. See Airforce Technology, “E-3 AWACS (Sentry) Airborne Warning and Control System,” June 25, 2020, https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/e3awacs/.

29 NATO, “Alliance Persistent Surveillance from Space (APSS),” updated February 2023, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2023/2/pdf/230215-factsheet-apss.pdf.

30 NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) General Manager Ludwig Decamps, interview by author, July 21, 2022, and Director of Armament and Aerospace Capabilities in NATO’s Defense Investment Division Giorgio Cioni, interview by author, August 2, 2022.

31 Author’s personal knowledge from assignment at NATO Headquarters as deputy assistant secretary general (ASG) Defense Investment (DI).

32 NATO uses TCPED in internal documents and communications to refer to the key steps of its intelligence process. The five steps of NATO TCPED are equivalent to what the US Department of Defense describes as the six steps of the “intelligence process”: “planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback.” See Department of the Army et al., Joint Publication 2-01. Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, January 5, 2012, GL-10, https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp2_01.pdf.

33 Maj. Gen. Tom Kunkel, interview by author, August 4, 2022.

34 INSA (Intelligence & National Security Alliance), “Coffee and Conversation with David Cattler,” July 25, 2022, YouTube video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b5mJUtnNI88.

35 Ibid.

36 Daniel Michaels, “Lessons of Russia’s War in Ukraine: You Can’t Hide and Weapons Stockpiles Are Essential,” Wall Street Journal, July 4, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/lessons-of-russias-war-in-ukraine-you-cant-hide-and-weapons-stockpiles-are-essential-11656927182.

37 INSA, “Coffee and Conversation.”

38 Michael Sheetz, “Elon Musk’s SpaceX Sent Thousands of Starlink Satellite Internet Dishes to Ukraine, Company’s President Says,” CNBC, March 22, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/22/elon-musk-spacex-thousands-of-starlink-satellite-dishes-sent-to-ukraine.html.

39 Microsoft, Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War, June 22, 2022, 4, https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RE50KOK.

40 David van Weel, interview by author, August 18, 2022.

41 Tara Copp, “Satellite Firms Are Helping Debunk Russian Claims, Intel Chief Says,” Defense One, April 5, 2022, https://www.defenseone.com/business/2022/04/satellite-firms-helped-debunk-russian-claims-intel-chief-says/364060/.

42 NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre, “NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre,” accessed February 16, 2023, https://web.ifc.bices.org/.

43 Van Weel, interview.

44 Decamps, interview.

45 Ibid.

46 NATO, “NATO Communications and Information Agency,” https://www.ncia.nato.int/.

47 NATO, “NATO approves 2023 strategic direction for new innovation accelerator,” last updated December 21, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_210393.htm.

48 NATO, Brussels Summit Communiqué, press release, last updated July 1, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm; NATO, “NATO Launches Innovation Fund,” last updated June 30, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_197494.htm.

49 Author’s notes from NATO-Industry Forums (NIFs) 2018 and 2019 and post-NIF reports co-published by SACT and ASG DI internally after the event and edited by the author.

50 NIFs 2018, 2019, and 2021 specifically focused on innovation, emerging technologies, and inviting start-ups and SMEs. See references to NIFs 2019 and 2021 in NATO, “NATO-Industry Forum,” accessed October 3, 2022, https://www.act.nato.int/industryforum.

51 NATO, “Multinational Capability Cooperation,” last updated November 18, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_163289.htm.

52 While assigned to NATO HQ, the author sponsored, enabled, or was aware of several trials leveraging advanced technology in AI and data services to demonstrate private sector capabilities to assist in security or defense-related requirements such as: tracking COVID-19-related factors impacting allies, foreign investment in allied defense industry and critical infrastructure, and tracking and analyzing open-source information related to threats.

53 ACT, “Innovation Hub,” accessed October 2, 2022, https://www.innovationhub-act.org.

54 NATO Communications and Information Agency, “Our Key Events,” accessed October 2, 2002, https://www.ncia.nato.int/business/partnerships/key-events.html.

55 NATO, “NATO Sharpens Technological Edge with Innovation Initiatives,” last updated April 7, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_194587.htm.

56 Ibid.

57 Charlie Parker, “Uber-Style Technology Helped Ukraine to Destroy Russian Battalion,” Times, May 14, 2022, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/uk-assisted-uber-style-technology-helped-ukraine-to-destroy-russian-battalion-5pxnh6m9p.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 Lt. Gen. Hans-Werner Wiermann, interview by author, July 21, 2022.

62 Grand, interview.

63 John R. Hoehn, “Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2),” Congressional Research Service, updated January 21, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11493.pdf; Julazadeh, interview.

64 Atlantic Council Experts, “Our Experts Decipher NATO’s New Strategic Concept,” New Atlanticist, Atlantic Council, June 30, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/our-experts-decipher-natos-new-strategic-concept/.

65 NATO 2022 Strategic, 1.

66 NATO 2022 Strategic, 6.

67 “Multi-Domain Operations: Enabling NATO.”

68 Based on the author’s analysis of an unclassified document, not publicly released. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) – HQ SACT, “Bi-Strategic Command, Initial Alliance Concept for Multi-Domain Operations,” July 5, 2022.

69 Julazadeh, interview.

70 NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), “Digitally Transforming NATO: Our Work Explained,” March 19, 2019, https://www.ncia.nato.int/about-us/newsroom/digitally-transforming-nato-our-work-explained-.html.

71 Wiermann, interview.

72 Wheeler, interview.

73 Marco Criscuolo, interview by author, August 18, 2022.

74 Wiermann, interview; Criscuolo interview; and Grand, interview.

75 NATO 2022 Strategic, 6.

76 NATO, “New NATO Force Model,” June 29, 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220629-infographic-new-nato-force-model.pdf.

77 Maj. Gen. Karl Ford, interview by author, July 27, 2022.

78 Author’s notes from unclassified ACT brief “2021 NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept” to the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) in Partner Format, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, January 29, 2021.

79 NATO, “The Alliance’s Warfare Development Agenda: Achieving a 20-year Transformation,” March 29, 2022, https://www.act.nato.int/articles/wda-achieving-20-year-transformation; Ford, interview.

80 NATO 2022 Strategic, 5–7.

81 NATO, “Environment, Climate Change and Security,” last updated July 26, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_91048.htm.

82 Cioni, interview.

83 Ibid.

84 NATO, “NATO Sharpens.”

85 NATO 2022 Strategic, 7.

86 Brussels Summit Communiqué.

87 Van Weel, interview.

88 The CNAD and its seven Main Groups and over one hundred and fifty subordinate groups constitute NATO’s largest standing committee structure and one of its longest standing. The CNAD is supported by NATO’s DI Directorate. Collectively, the CNAD and DI Directorate are referred to as the NATO armaments community. See NATO, “Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD),” last updated January 17, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49160.htm.

89 NATO, “NATO Steps Up Engagement with Private Sector on Emerging Technologies,” last updated September 15, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_207258.htm.

90 Van Weel, interview.

91 Ibid.

92 NATO 2022 Strategic, 7, par. 24.

93 NATO, “Funding NATO,” last updated January 12, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm.

94 NATO, “Readiness Action Plan,” last updated September 1, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_119353.htm; NATO, “NATO Wales Summit Guide,” Newport, September 4-5, 2014, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20141008_140108-summitguidewales2014-eng.pdf.

95 NATO, “NATO Wales Summit 2014,” last updated September 5, 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/events_112136.htm.

96 NATO, “Deterrence and Defence,” last updated September 12, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_133127.htm. See section on “Investing in defence.”

97 NATO 2022 Strategic.

98 NATO 2022 Strategic, 6, par. 22.

99 Comments on NATO’s common-funded capability development governance model and progress are based on the author’s personal experience in NATO from 2018 to 2021. In 2018, a new governance model for common-funded capability development was adopted which was intended to empower NATO’s strategic commands and agencies to drive capability development, introduce acceptable risk tolerance measures, streamline governance processes, and satisfy allies’ appetite for control and cost-efficiency. Expected outcomes have been underwhelming. Learning has been steep, adaptation difficult, and control difficult for nations to release. The new governance model also controls common funding for IT and services (including cybersecurity), which require upgrades and modernization at speeds beyond which NATO processes can keep up.

100 NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG), “Industry Initiative for Agile Acquisition (I2A2),” February 15, 2021.

101 Rear Admiral John W. Tammen, “NATO’s Warfighting Capstone Concept: Anticipating the Changing Character of War,” NATO Review, July 9, 2021, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/07/09/natos-warfighting-capstone-concept-anticipating-the-changing-character-of-war/index.html.

102 Ibid.

103 NATO’s first ASG for Joint Intelligence and Security (JIS), Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven, noted the “ingrained tradition” of national civilian intelligence agencies to restrict intelligence sharing in a 2019 article at the end of his tenure. See Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven, “A New Era for NATO Intelligence,” NATO Review, October 29, 2019, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/10/29/a-new-era-for-nato-intelligence/index.html.

104 This is an uncomfortable truth acknowledged by current and past senior ACO intelligence officials (of which the author is one) and NATO’s first two ASGs for JIS: David Cattler and Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven. Maj. Gen. Matt Van Wagenen, interview by author, September 11, 2022; Stewart, interview; Cattler, interview; and Von Loringhoven, “A New Era.”

105 Despite numerous NATO consultations between 2014 and 2018 on the 9M729 or SSC-8 Russian missile (including when the author was an ACO presenter in 2014 and a NATO official in 2018), it was not until December 2018 that allies decided to unanimously endorse the US finding and presume the lack of an adequate Russian response as evidence of an Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty violation. Several allies prior to late 2018 were not ready to take US declarations at face value without the primary source intelligence behind the US position. While the INF Treaty was between the United States and the Soviet Union, European allies were directly implicated because the treaty-limited ranges provided security from attack of prohibited weapon systems. See NATO, “NATO and the INF Treaty,” last updated August 2, 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_166100.htm.

106 Stewart, interview; Cattler, interview; and Cioni, interview.

107 Wheeler, interview and Criscuolo, interview.

108 Sally Cole, “CMOSS: Building-Block Architecture Bring Speed, Cost Benefits,” Military Embedded Systems, November 29, 2021, https://militaryembedded.com/comms/communications/cmoss-building-block-architecture-brings-speed-cost-benefits.

109 The following Atlantic Council report explains the importance of enterprise-wide digitalization to improve shared awareness, decision-making, and action. Jeffrey Reynolds and Jeffrey Lightfoot, Digitalize the Enterprise, Atlantic Council, October 20, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/nato20-2020/digitalize-the-enterprise/.

110 Ford, interview.

111 Criscuolo, interview.

112 Ford, interview.

113 Per AJP-2.7, JISR architecture consists of the organizations, processes, and systems connecting collectors, databases, applications, producers, and consumers of intelligence and operational data in a joint environment. See NATO Standardization Office, NATO Standard, AJP 2.7, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Edition A, Version 1, July 11, 2016, 1–3,https://jadl.act.nato.int/ILIAS/data/testclient/lm_data/lm_152845/Linear/JISR04222102/sharedFiles/AJP27.pdf.

114 Architecture Capability Team, Consultation, Command & Control Board, NATO Architecture Framework, Version 4, NATO, January 2018, Document Version 2020.09, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/1/pdf/NAFv4_2020.09.pdf.

115 Paul Savereux, interview by author, July 29, 2022, and NATO, “NATO Defence Planning Process,” last updated March 31, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49202.htm.

116 Fabrice Fontanier, chair of NIAG C4ISR Community of Interest, notes to author, September 17, 2022.

117 Robert Weaver, interview by author, March 11, 2022.

118 Ibid.

119 NATO, “NATO Exercises with New Maritime Unmanned Systems,” last updated September 15, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_207293.htm.

120 Ibid.

121 Stewart, interview and Cantwell, interview.

122 NATO’s AGS RQ-4Ds are equipped with MP-RTIP ground surveillance radar that provides ground moving target indicator and synthetic aperture radar imagery. See Wikipedia, “Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program,” accessed July 29, 2022, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multi-Platform_Radar_Technology_Insertion_Program#Overview. NATO’s AWACS E-3s have look-down radar that essentially collects MASINT. See “E-3 AWACS.”

123 NATO, “Command and Control Capability for Surface Based Air and Missile Defence for the Battalion and Brigade Level (GBAD C2 Layer),” Factsheet, February 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/10/pdf/2110-factsheet-gbad-c2-layer.pdf.

124 Military Wiki, “Tactical Data Link,” accessed September 1, 2022 https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Tactical_Data_Link#TDL_standards_in_NATO.

125 Harry Lye, “Fifth-Generation Aircraft Share Bi-Directional Data in Military IoT First,“ Airforce Technology, December 15, 2020, https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/fifth-generation-aircraft-share-bi-directional-data-in-military-iot-first/.

126 Fontanier, notes to author.

127 Ibid.

128 Commander Malte von Spreckelsen, “Electronic Warfare – The Forgotten Discipline,” Journal of the JAPCC 27 (2018), 41–45, https://www.japcc.org/articles/electronic-warfare-the-forgotten-discipline/.

129 De Angelis et al., NATO ISTAR, 52; Von Spreckelsen, “Electronic Warfare”; and Major Erik Bamford and Commander Malte von Spreckelsen, “Future Command and Control of Electronic Warfare,” Journal of the JAPCC 28 (2019), 60–66, https://www.japcc.org/articles/future-command-and-control-of-electronic-warfare/

130 NATO 2022 Strategic, 7.

131 Van Weel, interview.

132 NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) is already involved in major C4ISR programs like AFSC, AWACS, and AGS. NCIA focuses almost overwhelmingly on common-funded capabilities and services but could provide support to multinational and national capability development given its charter and expertise.

133 Based on ideas discussed between the author and Lt. Gen. Hans-Werner Wiermann in February 2021.

134 NATO, “Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and US President Joe Biden at the start of the 2022 NATO Summit,” last updated June 29, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_197374.htm.

135 Katharina Buchholz, “Where NATO Defense Expenditure Stands in 2022 [Infographic],” Forbes, June 30, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/katharinabuchholz/2022/06/30/where-nato-defense-expenditure-stands-in-2022-infographic.

136 Patrick Goodenough, “Only 9 Out of 30 Allies Are Meeting NATO’s Defense Spending Goal,” CNSNews, June 30, 2022, https://www.cnsnews.com/article/international/patrick-goodenough/only-9-out-30-allies-are-meeting-natos-defense-spending.

The post The future of NATO C4ISR: Assessment and recommendations after Madrid appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Improving Gulf security: A framework to enhance air, missile, and maritime defenses

The Gulf Security Task Force — Tue, 14 Mar 2023 20:00:00 +0000

This report is the final product of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative‘s Gulf Security Task Force, a team of experts whose US government experience includes senior roles at the Department of Defense, Department of State, White House, and Intelligence Community. The Task Force joined together to shape this new strategy, with an eye on sustainable success in protecting both US and allies in the Gulf. The views expressed in the report are those of the authors and not their respective institutions.

Looking at decades of US support and operations in the Gulf and recognizing a continued, arguably growing, air and maritime threat from Iran, the Atlantic Council Gulf Security Task Force developed a framework on how to best protect US and allies’ interests in this sensitive, always relevant region. The report provides US decision-makers with an updated, fact-based strategy for protecting its interests in the air and maritime domain from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea, while ensuring Gulf partners’ ability to assume this responsibility, with the assistance and leadership of the United States.

In this capstone report, “Improving Gulf Security: A Framework to Enhance Air, Missile, and Maritime Defenses“, the Gulf Security Task Force brings together their cross-section of expertise to address the nature of the threats and provide practical policy solutions for the development of an integrated air, missile, and maritime defense in the Gulf, that provides long-term, reliable protection for the US and our partners’ security in the region.

Competing Security Interests in the Arab Gulf

Authors

Michael S. Bell

Former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Middle East Affairs, National Security Council

Dr. Mike Bell is the Executive Director of the Jenny Craig Institute for the Study of War and Democracy. Commissioned in Armor following graduation from the US Military Academy at West Point, he is a combat veteran, historian, and strategist who has served at every level from platoon through theater army, as well as with US Central Command, the Joint Staff, the West Point faculty, and the National Defense University. As a civilian faculty member at the National Defense University, he also served details to the Office of the Secretary of State and as a National Security Council Senior Director and Special Assistant to the President of the United States. His monograph on the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was published by the Strategic Studies Institute.

Clarke Cooper

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, Middle East Programs, Atlantic Council
Former Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs

R. Clarke Cooper recently served as the assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State from 2019 to 2021. During his tenure, Cooper implemented reforms to streamline arms export licensing and improve government support to the US defense industry. By enabling security partnerships and through advocacy for burden sharing to counter shared threats, Cooper continued his advocacy for performance measures across United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions, women in active peacekeeping roles, and accountability measures for troop and police contributing countries. In 2021, Cooper was awarded the Superior Honor Award for interagency coordination and implementation of the security cooperation elements of the Abraham Accords.

Kirsten Fontenrose

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, Middle East Programs, Atlantic Council
Former Senior Director for the Gulf, National Security Council

Kirsten spent 2018 as Senior Director for the Gulf at the National Security Council, leading the development of U.S. policy toward nations of the GCC, Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan. Prior to this service at the White House, Kirsten spent a year in the private sector consulting on specialized projects in the national security space. Her interagency experience includes five years at the Department of State leading the Middle East and Africa team in the interagency Global Engagement Center. Prior to this, Kirsten worked with a field team studying foreign populations for the US Department of Defense Theater Special Operations Commands.

Greta Holtz

Chancellor, College of International Security Affairs National Defense University
Former US Charge d’Affaires in Qatar and former US Ambassador in Oman

Ambassador (Ret.) Greta C. Holtz enjoyed 35 years as a career diplomat with extensive experience in the Middle East region. She retired in April 2021 with the personal rank of Minister Counsellor. Ambassador Holtz served as Senior United States Coordinator for Operation Allies Refuge in Qatar from August – October 2021 and as Chargé d’affaires in Qatar from June 2020 until April 2021. She was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the State Department’s Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, and she was the Senior Foreign Policy Advisor (POLAD) to the Commanding General of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) from 2017-2019. She served as the United States Ambassador to the Sultanate of Oman from 2012 to 2015 and was the Vice-Chancellor at National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs from 2016 to 2017. Ambassador Holtz was Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and she ran the United States Provincial Reconstruction teams in Iraq from 2009-2010.

Richard LeBaron

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East programs, Atlantic Council Former US Ambassador to Kuwait

Ambassador (Ret.) Richard LeBaron is a career diplomat with over thirty years of experience abroad and in Washington. His most recent overseas posting was as deputy chief of mission at the US embassy in London from August 2007 to August 2010. Amb. LeBaron served as chargé d’affaires in London from February to August 2009. Previous to his assignment to London, Amb. LeBaron served as the US ambassador to Kuwait (2004 to 2007). From September 2001 to July 2004, Amb. LeBaron served as deputy chief of mission at the Embassy of the United States in Tel Aviv, Israel.

Fozzie Miller

Former Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East programs, Atlantic Council Former Commander, US Naval Forces Central Command/Combined Maritime Forces/US Fifth Fleet

In 2015, Vice Admiral (Ret.) John W. “Fozzie” Miller retired from the US Navy after serving as the Commander, US Naval Forces Central Command; Commander, Combined Maritime Forces; and Commander, US Fifth Fleet. Miller spent a considerable amount of his naval career focusing on the Middle East—beyond his role as Commander of the US Fifth Fleet, he also served as Deputy Commander to US Naval Forces Central Command/United States Fifth Fleet; Deputy Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J5); and Chief of Staff of US Central Command. In 2015, Miller received the Navy Distinguished Service Medal.

Daniel Vardiman

Senior US Navy Fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security (2021-2022), Atlantic Council *

Commander Daniel Vardiman was the intelligence lead for Expeditionary Strike Group Two from August 2019 through July 2021. In this role, he also served as the acting information warfare commander; supported staff certification, contingency operations, and integration with the Marines; participated in exercises in Europe and off the East Coast of the United States; and assisted with defense support to civil authorities. For his lieutenant commander milestone tour, he was the intelligence lead for Amphibious Squadron Six from June 2014 through June 2016, and on the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group and Wasp Amphibious Ready Group deploying to the US Fifth and Sixth Fleet areas of responsibility.

* The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not reflect those of the U.S. Navy or Department of Defense.

Brett McGurk sets out the ‘Biden doctrine’ for the Middle East

White House Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa, Brett McGurk, delivered remarks in support of “enabling an integrated air and maritime defense architecture in the region, something long talked about, which is now happening through innovative partnerships and new technologies,” at the Atlantic Council’s inaugural Rafik Hariri Awards, celebrating the tenth anniversary of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, in Washington on February 14, 2023.

full remarks

Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

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No ‘free-riding’ here: European defense spending defies US critics

Jason Davidson — Mon, 13 Mar 2023 13:55:09 +0000

Barack Obama and Donald Trump agreed on very little. Yet both former US presidents critiqued NATO allies for “free riding” off of US military power. Obama said that “free riders aggravate me” and pressured the British (seen by many as the United States’ closest ally) to spend more on defense. Trump reportedly threatened that the United States would “do its own thing” if NATO allies did not spend at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. The free-riding critique extends far beyond Obama and Trump. The 2014 Wales summit agreement that NATO members “aim to move towards” spending 2 percent of GDP on defense within a decade has since been used by US policymakers and commentators to push for NATO allies to meet the 2 percent threshold. Has all of this criticism led to meaningful policy change? Or has it mostly created division within the Alliance?

At first glance, events since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine have seemed to validate the free-riding critique: The United States has clarified its commitment to defend NATO members, and its defense spending dwarfs the rest of the Alliance. Yet recently released evidence suggests that most of NATO’s members have increased their defense spending in the past year or plan to do so in the near term. The evidence shows that the United States’ European allies make defense spending decisions based on the threats they perceive, and US actions and criticisms are not as important as Americans would like to think.

The problem with the free-riding critique

Free riding provides a compelling explanation of collective action problems. The insight is that individual actors who can consume a public good without providing for it will do so—they will take a “free ride” off of others’ contributions. When one actor makes a particularly large contribution to the public good, potential free riders choose to rationally abstain from contributing, knowing that the good will be provided. Obama, Trump, and others who accuse NATO allies of free riding argue that the allies choose to spend less on defense than they otherwise would because of the massive US military budget and the US commitment to defend Europe against attack. In this view, US taxpayers are gullible suckers, providing security to Europeans who, in turn, spend lavishly on social welfare and infrastructure instead of ensuring their own defense.

Scholars and experts have long noted problems in applying free-riding theory to alliances such as NATO, however. First, the total amount that all NATO members spend on defense is hardly a public good. Given that each NATO member can decide to contribute to or withhold its military from NATO operations (see the “as it deems necessary” clause of Article 5), the best one can say is that NATO member defense spending contributes to the potential for a better allied defense. Second, some NATO members spend far more on their defense as a percentage of their GDP than others, and the straightforward free-riding critique cannot explain that variance even when taking into account variance in the ally’s size. Finally, collective action logic only applies if all actors agree on the nature of both the problem and the solution. If a NATO member does not see Russia as a threat to its territorial integrity, for example, it is not free riding off of US defense spending by spending 1 percent of its GDP on defense; it is providing a spending level appropriate to its perceived threat environment.

Why 2022 should have been the free-riding perfect storm

The world of 2022 seemed to provide the perfect environment for European free riding according to the logic the critics have outlined. In 2021 the United States spent $766 billion on defense, which was over twice what the rest of NATO members spent on their defense combined. Moreover, US President Joe Biden, who took office in January 2021, consistently and clearly pledged to come to the defense of NATO allies if they were attacked. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Biden administration reiterated the US commitment to defend NATO allies. The United States also sent twenty thousand additional troops to the Alliance’s eastern flank to assure the Europeans and deter the Russians, bringing the US total on the continent to one hundred thousand. If there was ever a moment for Europeans to take a free ride off of US largesse, this was it.

Economic trends and fiscal pressures provided European governments with a good reason to spend less on defense—and, conceivably, a good story to Washington as to why they were not spending more. After contracting by 6.2 percent in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the eurozone’s GDP grew by 5.2 percent in 2021, but slumped to 3.1 percent growth in 2022 due in large part to the war in Ukraine and post-pandemic inflationary pressures. Higher interest rates to combat inflation make government borrowing more difficult, which is especially problematic given the high debt-to-GDP ratio in most European countries.

The truth about European defense spending

European NATO members’ defense spending in 2022, as collected in the recently released volume The Military Balance: 2023, provides three pieces of evidence that defy the free-riding critique.

Sixteen NATO members (over half the Alliance) increased their defense spending in 2022 relative to 2021 in current US dollars. This was after significant increases in European defense spending in 2021. Europe was an exception to the global norm here, as global military spending declined by roughly 2 percent in 2021 and 2022, according to The Military Balance.
In 2022, twelve NATO members increased their defense spending as a percentage of GDP. For example, Lithuania increased its defense spending from $1.3 billion to $1.5 billion (in current US dollars) and as a percentage of GDP from 2.07 percent to 2.34 percent. Given the aforementioned economic headwinds and other budgetary demands (such as pandemic expenditures and economic stimulus), increasing defense spending as a percentage of GDP was extremely challenging in fiscal and political terms. For example, the United States increased defense spending from $759 billion in 2021 to $766 billion in 2022, but defense spending as a percentage of GDP declined from 3.3 percent in 2021 to 3.06 percent in 2022.
An additional seven NATO governments have pledged to raise defense spending as a percentage of GDP in the near term: the Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Poland, and Romania. For example, in March 2022, Latvia’s cabinet approved an increase in defense spending from 2.2 percent to 2.5 percent of GDP by 2025.

What should one take away from these defense spending figures? While the United States’ massive military budget and reinvigorated commitment to defend Europe provided incentives to free ride in 2022, many of the United States’ European allies responded to the increased threat from Russia by increasing their defense spending immediately or announcing that they would do so in the coming years.

Moving past the critique

Many US policymakers and commentators argue that NATO allies free ride off of US defense spending and Washington’s commitment to defend Europe. But the evidence from the past year suggests that when NATO allies perceive extreme threats, they spend more on defense. Of course, perceptions of threats evolve over time, and as we look toward the future, we should recognize that perceptions do not always translate into immediate spending outcomes.

Two lessons emerge from this analysis. First, US policymakers would do well to stop publicly berating NATO allies for their defense spending decisions. While some private pressure may be useful (especially on the kinds of capabilities allies are spending on), public criticism is likely to divide the Alliance and is unlikely to achieve the intended outcome. Second, the United States should be less fixated on whether its behavior is encouraging free riding. European allies’ actions offer a substantial counterpoint to the free-riding critique. Washington should take notice.

Jason W. Davidson is a professor of political science at the University of Mary Washington and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Former secretaries Mark Esper and Deborah Lee James publish op-ed in The Hill

Atlantic Council — Thu, 09 Mar 2023 18:00:00 +0000

On March 9, Mark T. Esper and Deborah Lee James, Atlantic Council Board Directors and Co-Chairs of the Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, published an op-ed in The Hill. They lay out ways that the Department of Defense can accelerate its ability to harness commercial technology in order to stay ahead of US adversaries. Access the article here or at the button above.

Quickly adopting cutting-edge technology, which is mostly found in the commercial sector, is the key to guaranteeing U.S. military dominance critical to deterring war and winning one if all else fails.

Mark Esper and Deborah Lee James. Originally published in The Hill.

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Soofer in the Wall Street Journal on new Russian missiles

Atlantic Council — Fri, 24 Feb 2023 01:35:00 +0000

On February 23, Forward Defense Senior Fellow Dr. Robert Soofer was quoted in a Wall Street Journal article on Putin’s recent announcement to deploy new Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missiles, equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles, as part of wider campaign to strengthen Russia’s nuclear triad.

The Sarmat reflects the modernization of the Russian nuclear force, but it does not alter the strategic nuclear balance.

Robert Soofer

Fellow

Robert Soofer

Senior Fellow

Forward Defense

Arms Control Defense Policy

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Zeiten-when? Scholz needs to stop standing in the way of Germany’s foreign-policy turning point.

Noah DeMichele — Thu, 23 Feb 2023 21:38:51 +0000

Germany’s relationship with its own security looks fundamentally different one year after the war in Ukraine prompted Chancellor Olaf Scholz to announce a Zeitenwende, or turning point, before the Bundestag. The idea represented an about-face that promised greater investment in the German armed forces and a rethink of Berlin’s relationship with Moscow—raising hopes on both sides of the Atlantic. But as the meaning of Zeitenwende has grown to represent broader transformations to Berlin’s security, defense, and economic policies, the chancellor has routinely missed the mark and gotten in the way of his own big idea.

The Zeitenwende is the chancellor’s brainchild, yet he has been its major roadblock. Since announcing the speech, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) leader has habitually hesitated when faced with key decisions, best encapsulated by the Leopard 2 battle tank saga. Despite the international pressure, which eventually reached a fever pitch, for Germany to send its Leopards and approve European shipments to Ukraine, Scholz abdicated, only making Leopards contingent on US deliveries of less logistically viable Abrams tanks. Looking ahead, the early debate about fighter jets for Ukraine is following the same pattern. Scholz already appears to have labeled planes for Ukraine a red line.

The repeated public diplomacy disasters do Scholz and Germany a disservice. Navel-gazing in Berlin diverts attention away from the fact that Germany is, among European Union member countries, the largest supporter of Ukraine—supplying heavy machinery, Patriot missiles, and more. Despite that, international focus has landed on Germany’s delay in approving or providing critical materiel. During instances in which Germany is given the opportunity to advance the Zeitenwende agenda by displaying leadership from Berlin, Scholz squanders the moment acting only after maximum pressure is applied by governments in Washington, Tallinn, and everywhere in between. A true Zeitenwende will require Germany to lead from the front, not defer to a US decision for fear of Germany “going it alone.” The Leopards debate showcases this: Inaction on the highly desired Leopard tanks was Germany going it alone.

Nobody expects the sea change in German foreign-policy thinking that is Zeitenwende to happen overnight. Even so, Berlin should seize the opportunities it has to move the strategy forward and prove Germany’s willingness to be the leader in Europe.

Others in Berlin recognize this opportunity. Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, the Green Party’s first candidate for chancellor with a significant shot, has been the most outspoken voice in favor of transforming German security and projecting strength vis-à-vis Russia and China, as exemplified by her August speech to the New School in New York in which she called on Germany to “seize this transatlantic moment.” Elsewhere, SPD Chair Lars Klingbeil, in a new foreign-policy strategy paper for the party, recently advocated for Germany to take a strong leadership role in the world. German Economy Minister Robert Habeck, of the Green Party, has previously urged against “stupid trade” with China—showing a shift in German foreign-policy thinking away from the belief that economic ties with autocracies is the best way to bring about change.

This next generation of German policymakers is prepared to reinvigorate German foreign policy—that is a good sign for Zeitenwende hopefuls. In the meantime, Scholz needs to stop inhibiting the foreign-policy transformation. The first opportunity for the chancellor to recoup lost trust is ensuring the successful, swift delivery of the now-promised Leopards to Ukraine. The implementation cannot resemble the decision process. Yet Germany’s new defense minister, Boris Pistorius, was noncommittal on a delivery date for the Leopards in a February 16 interview with the Washington Post.

Scholz must also apply today’s lessons to challenges beyond Ukraine. Looking to Germany’s neighborhood, Scholz has emphasized the need for a strong and capable Europe that is not reliant solely on the United States for security. Yet, following the chancellor’s “you first, Washington” approach to sending tanks to Ukraine, countries such as Poland and the Baltic states will need reassurances that he is serious about reducing Europe’s reliance on the United States. In an effort to recover confidence in Germany’s European leadership abilities, Scholz should look for avenues for easy cooperation with his European neighbors. One easy win for Scholz and Pistorius could be coordinating with allies to refill tank stockpiles.

The Zeitenwende needs to look beyond Europe as well. The chancellor’s latest writing on the Zeitenwende pays little attention to China, while the development of Germany’s much anticipated national security strategy has reportedly been paused by the chancellery for being too sharp on Beijing after the strategy left Baerbock’s foreign ministry. To avoid falling into a renewed economic-dependence trap with China, Scholz should follow Baerbock’s lead in treating Beijing as a competitor, consistent with the renewed emphasis on German and European security prescribed by the Zeitenwende. You can bet this will be a topic of discussion when Scholz meets with US President Joe Biden at the White House on March 3.

The Zeitenwende is a process that will take time and require patience from Berlin’s allies. Yet, it is also one that requires clarity from Germany’s highest levels. At February’s Munich Security Conference, the chancellor remarked that Germany will assume the responsibility required of it in times like these. In the interest of turning words into action, a break from the ever-repeating cycle of hesitancy and seesawing would be a welcome development from the chancellery and will help ensure the Zeitenwende becomes reality.

Noah DeMichele was a fall 2022 young global professional with the Europe Center and is currently working on transatlantic relations at Bertelsmann Foundation North America.

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Shahid in foreign policy and security conference

Atlantic Council — Wed, 22 Feb 2023 18:37:00 +0000

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Russia policy after the war: A new strategy of containment

Alexander Vershbow — Wed, 22 Feb 2023 17:10:01 +0000

As Vladimir Putin’s world-altering war against Ukraine enters its second year, any hope of reviving the post-Cold War European security order depends on defeating Russia in Ukraine. But that will only be the first step in what will be a long struggle—one that calls for an updated strategy of containment.

We, the transatlantic community together with other like-minded democracies, face a long-term strategic confrontation with Russia—a hostile adversarial relationship that will have few guardrails, and where even the modest ambition of peaceful coexistence may be out of reach for a long time to come.

The nature of the Putin regime, its disregard for international law, its brutal suppression of all dissent, its whitewashing of Russian history, plus Putin’s obsession with subjugating his neighbors and reconstituting the Russian empire—all these factors make peaceful coexistence difficult, if not impossible, to conceive in the near and medium term.

Even if developments on the battlefield force Russia to end the war on terms relatively favorable to Kyiv, Putin will not readily abandon his broader revisionist aims. For Putin’s Russia, Ukraine is Ground Zero in its existential war against the West. A winding down of the military conflict is not likely to lead to a reduction in Russia’s efforts to control Ukraine by other means or to dominate its other neighbors, including the Baltic states and other NATO and European Union (EU) members.

Indeed, in non-military domains the conflict is likely to intensify while Russia seeks to rebuild and reconstitute its decimated conventional forces. Information warfare, covert action, sabotage, energy blackmail, counter-sanctions, support for pro-Russian separatists, and other hybrid attacks will all remain active parts of the Russian toolkit against its neighbors and the West. For NATO and the European Union, resilience against hybrid threats will be as important as bolstering defense and deterrence, and the effort to build such resilience should receive significantly more financial support at the national level and in Brussels.

Don’t let Putin seize victory from the jaws of defeat in Ukraine

While Russia grossly underestimated Western unity and resolve, Putin may still hope that allied publics and parliaments will grow tired of supporting Ukraine and bearing the burden of sanctions, just as he hopes to break the will of the Ukrainian people by bombing the country’s civilian infrastructure. As the war grinds on into the spring and summer of 2023, it could devolve into a stalemate. In that case, Russia may count on some allies to revive proposals for early negotiations to freeze the conflict with a ceasefire in place, the first step toward a broader “reset” in relations at Ukraine’s expense.

Russia needs to understand that there can be no normalization of relations until it once again upholds—in deed as well as in word—the fundamental principles laid down in the Helsinki Final Act, Paris Charter, and NATO–Russia Founding Act.

Allied leaders will need to explain to their citizens what is at stake, why a ceasefire in current conditions would only help Putin seize victory from the jaws of defeat, and why it is vital to maintain sanctions and supply advanced weapons to the Ukrainians for as long as it takes to defeat Russia and expel Russian forces from Ukrainian lands. US President Joe Biden hit the right notes in his remarks in Kyiv and Warsaw this week.

Russia needs to understand that there can be no normalization of relations until it once again upholds—in deed as well as in word—the fundamental principles laid down in the Helsinki Final Act, Paris Charter, and NATO–Russia Founding Act. If the United States were to settle for anything less, it would only embolden the Russians to use force to change borders again after they have had time to regroup and rearm. Chinese leader Xi Jinping and other autocrats will happily follow Russia’s example if Putin gets off with little more than a slap on the wrist.

Pursue containment to stop Russian expansionism

To prevent further damage to the rules-based international order, the United States and its allies will need a comprehensive strategy of containment that aims to deter Russia militarily, raises the cost to Russia for its destabilizing behavior, and increasingly decouples Russia from the international community, politically and economically, until Moscow has earned the right to be considered a partner once more.

Containment today is similar to the containment policy enunciated by George Kennan and adopted in the early years of the Cold War. The idea is to stop Russian expansionism, exert forceful counter-pressure on Russian efforts to extend its influence, weaken the Russian regime economically, and conduct an aggressive information campaign to undermine domestic support—the ultimate goal being to encourage the emergence of forces that could liberalize the regime and end the geopolitical competition, as occurred in ending the first Cold War in the 1980s and 1990s.

Containment today benefits from the fact that the Russians are much weaker militarily after the Ukraine war and more isolated politically, although today’s Russia benefits from its close alignment with China and the fact that many nations beyond the democratic West are sitting on the fence.

Containment today also means taking a patient, long-term approach to the promotion of internal change in Russia. While it may be a generation before such change happens, we should be prepared to act quickly when the Russian people themselves demand leaders who are ready to return to the path of cooperation and integration that Putin has abandoned.

While it may be a generation before such change happens, we should be prepared to act quickly when the Russian people themselves demand leaders who are ready to return to the path of cooperation and integration that Putin has abandoned.

Military strength and Alliance cohesion are the foundation of an effective containment policy. We need a NATO- and EU-coordinated strategy to push back against all forms of Russian expansionism, in Ukraine and beyond, and to strengthen our resilience against conventional and hybrid warfare.

In the short term, we need to commit unambiguously to the goal of Ukrainian victory. We should help Ukraine capitalize on its successful counter-offensives by boosting and accelerating the supply of heavy weapons, long-range strike systems, and air and missile defense that can inflict further defeats on Russia in the weeks and months ahead, while increasing economic and humanitarian assistance at the same time.

For Ukraine to prevail, we need to speed up the weapons delivery process and restart production of the most urgently needed systems such as High Mobility Rocket Artillery Systems (HIMARS) and advanced drones, both to secure new gains for the Ukrainians and to replenish depleted allied stocks.

We need to calibrate what weapons we provide to avoid escalation, but we should not let ourselves be intimidated or self-deterred by Russian saber-rattling. Putin is more interested than we are in avoiding a direct clash with NATO, conventional or nuclear, and he understands that any use of nuclear weapons, even a “demonstration” strike, would open Pandora’s box and fundamentally change the nature of the war.

Right now, it is the Russians who are doing the escalating, with their barbaric missile and drone attacks on civilian infrastructure and terrorization of the Ukrainian people.

In my view, it is time to reconsider our self-imposed range limits and provide systems that enable Ukraine to deny the Russians a sanctuary for launching their infrastructure attacks. If the Russians can strike with impunity from Crimea or across the Russian border, they will continue to escalate, at horrific human cost. Enabling Kyiv to target those systems is not escalation, but legitimate self-defense.

Press pause on the NATO–Russia Founding Act

Beyond helping Ukraine prevail, NATO’s number one defense priority is to implement the forward-looking decisions at the 2022 Madrid summit on deterring and defending against threats to allied territory. The Russians have suffered enormous losses of military equipment and manpower. But like the Terminator, they will be back.

As agreed at Madrid, NATO needs to move expeditiously from forward presence to forward defense, with larger forces along the eastern flank able to repel any attempted land grab and not simply serving as tripwires. In particular, NATO needs to fully implement the decision to expand from battalion-sized battle groups to brigade-sized forces in the east as part of the shift to deterrence by denial.

Establishing the new force model could be easier if allies declared that they are no longer bound by the constraints in the NATO–Russia Founding Act on permanent stationing of substantial combat forces, given Russia’s flagrant violations of that document. This would allow a mix of permanent and rotational deployments, which would be more effective than rotational forces alone.

Ending NATO’s self-imposed constraint on deploying nuclear weapons on the territory of NATO’s post-Cold War members could bolster deterrence and allied cohesion by spreading responsibilities and risks among a larger number of allies.

The NATO–Russia Founding Act could be suspended rather than terminated. But it makes no sense to pretend that the security environment after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is anywhere comparable to the more benign security environment in 1997 when the act was signed.

In the face of Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling since the invasion of Ukraine, allies also need to undertake a more serious review of NATO’s nuclear posture and policy than that reflected in the Biden administration’s recent Nuclear Policy Review.

In addition to threatening “catastrophic consequences” for any Russian use of nuclear weapons, we must be sure we have a wide enough set of non-strategic capabilities to defeat the Russian “escalate to deescalate” strategy under any scenario. In this regard, developing a new nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile would be a valuable addition to the US force mix.

This may be another area where we should review commitments under the NATO–Russia Founding Act and consider bringing more allies into the Alliance’s nuclear-sharing arrangements. Ending NATO’s self-imposed constraint on deploying nuclear weapons on the territory of NATO’s post-Cold War members could bolster deterrence and allied cohesion by spreading responsibilities and risks among a larger number of allies.

Just raising the possibility could be effective as leverage to persuade the Russians to accept verifiable constraints on their non-strategic nuclear weapons. For the United States and NATO, limiting Russian non-strategic systems is a sine qua non for any successor to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, known as New START. Putin put that treaty’s future in doubt with his recent announcement that Russia is suspending implementation.

Aim for Europe to evenly shoulder collective defense by 2030

In implementing the Madrid summit’s decisions, NATO needs to move toward a more balanced sharing of responsibility across the Atlantic. Even before the 2022 US midterm elections, concerns were growing among congressional Republicans about burden-sharing and allied free-riding, and this could become an even bigger concern in the 2024 US presidential election.

European allies could head off a future transatlantic rift by committing now to produce and deploy, by the end of this decade, at least 50 percent of the capabilities that NATO requires for collective defense. This would also be a prudent hedge in case the United States should need to divert some of its NATO reinforcements to the Indo-Pacific theater to deal with a simultaneous China crisis.

Ensuring that European countries provide half of the capabilities and enablers for collective defense will also make it possible for Europe to become the first responder for managing crises along NATO’s periphery. That would be a tangible demonstration of greater strategic responsibility for Europe in its own neighborhood.

As NATO strengthens its own deterrence posture, the Alliance should take on a formal, long-term role in helping all of Russia’s vulnerable neighbors strengthen their own deterrence capabilities and their resilience against cyber and other hybrid threats. This could be called the “Secure Neighborhood Initiative.”

Unfortunately, it is clear that for the foreseeable future allies will remain reluctant to give NATO membership and an Article 5 security guarantee to Ukraine, Georgia, or any other former Soviet state, no matter how deserving and qualified they may be. While NATO membership should be the long-term goal, the next-best thing allies can do now is to ensure that these vulnerable partners acquire the capabilities, training, and intelligence needed to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russian aggression. A commitment to that effect could form the core of security guarantees for Ukraine under a potential peace agreement to end the war.

Ensure containment goes beyond defense

An effective containment strategy should also seek to maximize Russia’s economic and political isolation. Economic decoupling should be achieved through a long-term policy of sanctions on the Russian economy and following through on moves to end the West’s dependence on Russian energy and raw materials.

In terms of political isolation, we need to treat Russia as a pariah or rogue state and avoid any premature return to business as usual. We should not rule out future discussions on arms control and strategic stability, while recognizing the difficulty of negotiating new agreements with a Russia that has violated every existing agreement and has behaved recklessly in occupying the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in southern Ukraine.

While isolating Russia politically, we should look for ways to engage with Russian civil society and the growing number of political oppositionists operating from exile in neighboring countries. This should include efforts to connect to the next generation of potential leaders, making clear that our issues with Russia are with the policies of the regime, not the Russian people.

The death of Mikhail Gorbachev last year is a reminder that it was internal change that ended the first Cold War forty years after it began. It may take decades to happen this time around, but we should be ready to engage with a better Russia when it appears.

Alexander Vershbow is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He is a former US ambassador to NATO, Russia, and South Korea; US assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs; and NATO deputy secretary general. This article is adapted from a speech Vershbow delivered to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in December.

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Putin could still win unless the West speeds up efforts to arm Ukraine

Dennis Soltys — Tue, 21 Feb 2023 21:24:24 +0000

As the Russian invasion of Ukraine enters its second year, Western support for the Ukrainian war effort is growing. The first two months of 2023 have seen a series of landmark decisions to provide Ukraine with weapons that Western leaders had previously been reluctant to deliver, with the list including armored vehicles, modern tanks, and long-range missiles.

At the same time, the whole process continues to lack a sense of urgency. Instead, excessive caution on the part of Kyiv’s Western partners prevents Ukraine from receiving the quantities of weapons its requires, while also fueling delays that risk handing the battlefield initiative back to Russia.

EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell highlighted the issue during the Munich Security Conference on February 19. “We are in urgent war mode,” he said. “This shortage of ammunition has to be solved quickly.” If European countries did not step up ammunition supplies “in a matter of weeks” the war would be over, he warned.

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Recent steps to increase arms deliveries to Ukraine are encouraging and indicate that the West is gradually losing its fear over the possible consequences of a decisive Russian military defeat. Over the past year, Moscow has sought to the intimidate Western leaders with everything from nuclear blackmail to gas shutoffs, but these scare tactics appear to be increasingly ineffective.

Putin is now betting on the overwhelming numbers provided by Russia’s first mobilization since World War II, and is in the process of deploying an estimated 300,000 fresh soldiers to bolster his depleted forces in Ukraine. However, these poorly trained replacements can hardly be compared to the tens of thousands of professional Russian soldiers killed or wounded during the first year of the invasion. Indeed, Russian losses over the past twelve months have been so severe that many analysts believe Moscow must now build what essentially amounts to a new army from the ground up.

As a fresh Russian offensive gets underway in eastern Ukraine, there is little to suggest that Putin is on the verge of achieving the military breakthrough he craves. On the contrary, initial reports indicate primitive tactics and catastrophic losses, with NATO intelligence estimating that Russia is losing around 2000 soldiers for every 100 yards of Ukrainian land gained.

With Putin’s invasion force looking anything but formidable, Kyiv’s Western partners may now sense an opportunity to arm Ukraine for a major spring offensive. Most observers expect Ukrainian activity to focus on the southern front, where the Russian army is believed to be particularly vulnerable. By striking south toward the Azov Sea in the coming months, Ukraine could split Russia’s invasion force in two and cut the land bridge to Crimea.

This is an appealing prospect to Western leaders such as French President Emmanuel Macron, who have often framed their support for Ukraine in terms of achieving battlefield victories that would enable Kyiv to negotiate a peace settlement from a position of strength. A decisive offensive against Russian forces in southern Ukraine would expose the costly failure of Putin’s invasion and inevitably lead to a decline in his political authority.

An alternative explanation for the West’s recent readiness to increase arms deliveries to Ukraine may be found in mounting fears that Russia’s mobilization will ultimately prove successful. Western leaders could be genuinely concerned that Moscow can regain the military initiative and make significant further territorial gains, or at least achieve a stalemate that secures the considerable areas currently under Russian occupation.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Whatever their individual motivations, Ukraine’s partners must both expand and speed up arms deliveries if they wish to achieve their stated aim of preventing a Russian victory in Ukraine. During the first year of the war, it was striking to note that the most active European members of the coalition arming Ukraine were former Eastern Bloc countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic states, Romania, and Bulgaria. While these countries are all potentially next in line if Russia is not stopped in Ukraine, they have nevertheless been most willing to draw down their own weapons stocks. Clearly, they recognize that weapons sent to Ukraine are of more use than those sitting in warehouses.

The nations of Old Europe have been significantly less decisive and still often appear unable to grasp the gravity of the military and political situation. Rather than doing everything to secure Ukrainian victory, they sometimes seem preoccupied with the notion of avoiding “escalation.” Such thinking is delusional. In reality, there is no way Ukrainians can liberate their country entirely from Russian occupation without crossing the Kremlin’s “red lines.”

Unless Russia is militarily defeated, no sustainable diplomatic solution will be possible. If Ukraine is pressured into accepting a disadvantageous settlement before Russia is beaten, this would reward Putin and set the stage for the next war. Europe would be plunged into an era of instability. If they wish to avoid this disastrous outcome, Western policymakers must accept that the only path to peace is via a decisive Ukrainian victory.

Recent developments suggest an international consensus is indeed forming over the need for a long-term commitment to Ukrainian victory. However, decisions to deliver new categories of weapons to Ukraine are still subject to unacceptable delays that cost lives. Likewise, Ukraine’s partners have yet to begin producing weapons and ammunition on a wartime footing. This has to change if the West is serious about stopping Putin.

Western arms deliveries played a key role in enabling Ukraine to survive the initial onslaught of Putin’s blitzkrieg. Military aid has since helped Ukraine liberate around half of the territory occupied by Russia during the early months of the invasion. In order to finish the job in 2023, Old Europe must follow the example of the former Eastern Bloc countries and open up its warehouses without further delay. Continued hesitation and indecisiveness could have dire consequences for European security, allowing Putin to rescue his faltering invasion and snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.

Dennis Soltys is a retired Canadian professor of comparative politics living in Almaty.

Russian success in Ukraine would almost certainly lead to further aggression in the Black Sea, in Moldova, and most alarmingly, in the Baltic states as the Kremlin seeks to reintegrate former imperial territories. In numerous instances since 2008, Russia has used force to alter borders, committing egregious human rights violations and war crimes along the way. By deliberately targeting Ukrainian cities and the civilian population while conducting large-scale forced deportations, Russia has placed itself far outside international law and norms. It is a pariah state that must be confronted.

Nor is characterizing America’s NATO allies as “free riders” fair or balanced. In 2022, NATO allies (excluding the US) spent in excess of $325 billion on defense. This represented more than five times Russian defense spending and was the eighth consecutive year of defense spending increases. Contrary to popular belief, the US pays only 16.33% of NATO’s common operating budget, the same rate as Germany. While it is true that US defense spending is about twice that of Europe, most of that expenditure is not focused in Europe, where the US military footprint is quite small.

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Years of harsh criticism of our NATO allies contributes to an unfortunate perception that is harmful to transatlantic security and to alliance cohesion. The true picture is quite different. NATO member states contributed billions in funding and substantial troop contingents to Afghanistan and to the counter-ISIS campaign over two decades, suffering more than a thousand fatalities. The US enjoys forward basing and overflight rights as well as valuable intelligence-sharing that yield national security advantages reaching far beyond Europe.

Nor does the US military presence in Europe prevent the ability to deter or defend against Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region. Only five of America’s 31 active combat brigades are currently on the ground in Europe, leaving the remainder for contingencies in Asia along with 27 National Guard brigades and the entire US Marine Corps. No bomber squadrons and only seven of the US Air Force’s 56 fighter squadrons are based in Europe, while no US Navy or USMC fighter squadrons are based there.

The ”China First” community also makes its case by overstating Chinese capabilities and understating America’s. The naval balance of forces is a case in point. US admirals in testimony before Congress often cite China’s lead in the number of surface warships without noting that most are smaller patrol combatants poorly suited for “blue water” operations. In total tonnage, numbers of missile launchers, fleet carriers, nuclear attack submarines, and many other categories, the US Navy is far superior, even without including powerful navies like the Japanese, Indian, or Australian.

The same is true in the air. China’s air force is far smaller, older, and weaker than the US Air Force, with few fifth generation aircraft in contrast to America’s more than 500. The US lead in strategic airlift, tankers, and large unmanned aircraft is even more pronounced. Add in US naval and Marine aviation along with the air forces of regional allies, and the US advantage becomes overwhelming.

Should China seek to expand its territory through force, it is surrounded by militarily significant states including India, South Korea, Vietnam, Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and others who together represent a formidable potential coalition. For its part, China has virtually no allies. It lacks the strategic air, sealift, and theater logistics to project its military forces very far from its borders.

Largely dependent on imported energy and food supplies, China is extremely vulnerable to blockade in time of war. In short, the Chinese military threat is often exaggerated, while US military strength is undervalued. As the world’s greatest military power, with NATO partners and allies that together constitute almost 70% of the world’s GDP and military strength, the United States is well able to cope with both China and Russia.

Eurasia Center events

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Nor is China America’s most important economic concern. In economic terms, the US-Europe relationship is crucial to American prosperity. US goods and services trade with the EU totaled an estimated $1.2 trillion in 2021, compared to $657 billion with China. While Canada and Mexico are America’s largest individual trading partners, the US-EU trade and investment relationship is the largest in the world.

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in Sound ON Podcast, discusses Increasing Risks of China-US War appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Eftimiades in TIME

Atlantic Council — Thu, 16 Feb 2023 20:03:34 +0000

On February 16, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Nicholas Eftimiades published an article in TIME magazine to discuss the reasons China may have deployed a spy balloon over the United States and the implications for the relationship between the two countries. Eftimiades suggested that the balloon may have been designed to intercept high frequency radio communications or satellite downlink data.

Beijing badly miscalculated by violating US airspace, particularly on the eve of Secretary of State Blinken’s visit.

Nicholas Eftimiades

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

The view from London: Doug Klain

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The view from European capitals on Zelenskyy’s trip across the continent

Atlantic Council experts — Thu, 09 Feb 2023 23:04:21 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy zipped from London to Paris to Brussels this week in his second trip abroad since Russia’s full-scale invasion of his country nearly a year ago. His message to leaders and lawmakers was that their military aid so far to his country has been substantial, but is not enough to repel Russia’s brutal invasion. More is needed, Zelenskyy urged.

What came of his meetings with UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak in London, and with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Paris? Will European lawmakers now support hastening Ukraine’s entry into the EU? Will Western tanks beget fighter jets? Below, our experts on the inner workings of European politics break down the meaning of Zelenskyy’s trip and what to expect next from each capital.

Click to jump to an expert reaction

The view from Paris: Marie Jourdain

The view from Brussels: Dave Keating

The view from Berlin: Jörn Fleck

The view from Kyiv: Peter Dickinson

The view from London

Itinerary: arrival at London Stansted airport on Wednesday, speech at Westminster Hall, meetings with King Charles III and Sunak, visit with Ukrainian forces training with the British military in Dorset

Zelenskyy’s surprise visit to London underscored that Britain stands out as one of the few Western European powers able to marshal both the resources and political will to substantially aid Ukraine in pursuit of outright victory over Russia—something Sunak aptly identifies as an explicit shared goal of his government.

Sunak’s statement that “nothing is off the table” shows that the United Kingdom is not letting up after announcing it will send Challenger tanks to Ukraine—now set to deploy on the battlefield in March. Along with sanctions and an “immediate surge” of equipment that will surely aid a coming Ukrainian offensive, what really stands out is the United Kingdom’s plan to train twenty thousand Ukrainian soldiers and marines. This kind of NATO-style training is one of the keys to Ukraine’s success in consistently outmaneuvering a numerically superior but professionally inferior Russian army.

British politicians may well be trying to outdo each other in just how much they can support Ukraine. Within hours of Zelenskyy’s visit concluding, former Prime Minister Boris Johnson called for the transfer of Typhoon fighter jets for Ukraine to make use of the newly announced training for Ukrainian pilots on NATO fighters. (The suggestion was quickly identified by some experts as less likely to help, since Typhoons are ill-equipped for fighting conditions in Ukraine.) Still, Britain’s military, financial, and rhetorical support is meeting the moment as Ukrainians prepare for what may be a decisive next few months, facing down a likely Russian offensive while preparing their own.

—Doug Klain, a London-based nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Find him on Twitter @DougKlain

The view from Paris

Itinerary: arrival at Paris Orly airport on Wednesday night, dinner meeting at the Elysee Palace with Macron and Scholz, flight Thursday morning with Macron to Brussels

Zelenskyy could not skip Paris in his European tour, and his message Wednesday was clear: Ukraine has weaponry needs, and France has capabilities.

In recent weeks, French strategic communication has evolved regarding the delivery of military equipment to Ukraine. Paris is now more assertive, even as the drivers of the decision about military aid have not changed. The aim is still to avoid escalation, match the Ukrainian operational needs, and preserve French national capacities. But France’s recent decision to send AMX 10-RC armored vehicles is not only significant for what it might change on the battlefield, but also because they were presented in official statements as “tanks,” in part to encourage other allies to move forward with their own tank deliveries to Ukraine. This move reveals that France does not now view these deliveries as unacceptably escalatory and suggests that France is considering Ukrainian requests to send additional weapons that were excluded before. However, it does not mean Paris will actually send its Leclerc tanks, which are very limited in number, unlike the German-designed tanks. Nor does it mean France is any closer to sending Rafale or Mirage jets, even as Zelenskyy’s visit aimed to push French leaders in that direction, as did the visit ten days earlier by Ruslan Stefanchuk, speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, who addressed the French National Assembly with a similar message. On jets, Paris’s hesitation is similar to the Biden administration’s thinking: questions about constraints on training, maintenance of the jets, and how they will be used.

Zelenskyy’s quick visit is a reminder that, for Paris, what is at play is not only the necessity for Ukraine to prevail and European stability to be restored, but also the credibility of France as a reliable European military partner able to lead. For Ukraine, it is key to have the continuous support of France when it comes not only to the war but for its future in Europe.

—Marie Jourdain, visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a former staffer for the French Ministry of Defense’s Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy

The view from Brussels

Itinerary: arrival Thursday morning at Melsbroek military airport, where met by Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo, President of the European Council Charles Michel, and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen; address to European Parliament; meeting with twenty-seven European Union (EU) heads of state

While Zelenskyy was mainly focused on weapons delivery during his visits to London and Paris, in Brussels his main message was one of European unity. Ukraine’s place is in the EU, he said, and “a free Europe cannot be imagined without a free Ukraine.” During a joint press conference, Zelenskyy told Michel that he wants to see accession talks with Ukraine begin this year. That requires unanimity among all twenty-seven member states, Michel reminded him. The reality is that EU accession is a long process and, as von der Leyen said Thursday, it has to be “a merit-based process.” There can be no fast track for Ukraine simply out of sympathy. Otherwise, the message sent to the Western Balkans is, “You can only join the European Union if you’re at war.”

The difference between this visit and Zelenskyy’s visits to London and Washington was perhaps best represented by his choice of language. When speaking to the US Congress and British Parliament, Zelensky spoke in English. In all his appearances in Brussels, he spoke only Ukrainian—even though English would have been the natural choice as it is the main working language of the EU. He explained why at his press conference. “The Ukrainian language is part of the European discussion.” Hearing Ukrainian “will be common practice when Ukraine will be part of the European Union.” In the United States and United Kingdom, he was a guest and spoke his hosts’ language. In the EU, he wants to be home.

—Dave Keating, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and the Brussels correspondent for France 24

The view from Berlin

Itinerary: no stop scheduled

The absence of Berlin among Zelenskyy’s European tour isn’t exactly a snub, as some might have it. Scholz joined Macron and Zelenskyy in Paris, and the last-minute addition of the French capital was likely a concerted effort by Zelenskyy to lock Macron into more meaningful military support than France has thus far provided. For its part, Germany is still the leading EU member state in terms of gross military and financial aid to Ukraine, despite its dithering and delaying on tanks. And following Scholz’s decision to provide Leopard 2 tanks and to let other allies do the same, Ukrainian-German relations seem to be on the up again. A constructive visit by the new German defense minister, Boris Pistorius, to Kyiv a few days ago seems to have underscored this.

The choice to go to Paris, not Berlin, then likely has more to do with what the Ukrainian president hopes to get from France than what he is not getting from Germany. Macron has thus far escaped the fever-pitch of criticism Scholz has faced for his handling of assistance to Ukraine, and Zelenskyy’s visit was paired with an interview in a French daily in which he expressed his confidence that Macron had fully come around to the threat from Putin and Russia—having shown impatience with the French leader in the past for his diplomatic outreach to Putin. Combined with Zelenskyy’s time constraints and the potential for more French support, a preference for Paris over Belin makes strategic sense.

—Jörn Fleck, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

The view from Kyiv

Itinerary: return to Ukraine TBA

Zelenskyy’s whirlwind European tour has not produced any immediate breakthroughs in terms of military aid, but Kyiv audiences have been encouraged by positive signals in London, Paris, and Brussels that indicate Ukraine will eventually receive the tools it needs to defeat Russia. There remains considerable frustration in Ukraine over the slow pace of the decision-making process, but the statements that have accompanied Zelenskyy’s visit underline the recent shift toward abandoning earlier red lines and supplying new categories of weapons and equipment. While many Ukrainians have been highly critical of the overcautious approach adopted by many Western leaders, the key message now seems to be that “nothing is off the table” when it comes to arming Ukraine.

Zelenskyy’s triumphant trip has also underlined the continued strength of international support for Ukraine. This is important at a time when Ukrainians are acutely aware of Russian efforts to weaken Western resolve. Russian President Vladimir Putin hopes the West will eventually lose interest in Ukraine and is counting on war-weary Western leaders to pressure Kyiv into accepting a compromise peace that would allow Russia to retain its Ukrainian territorial gains. In this context, the rapturous applause that followed Zelenskyy from Westminster Hall to the European Parliament was particularly welcome. Many Ukrainians noted gleefully that these scenes must have made for particularly grim viewing in the Putin bunker.

—Peter Dickinson, editor of UkraineAlert

The post The view from European capitals on Zelenskyy’s trip across the continent appeared first on Atlantic Council.

#AtlanticDebrief – How has France’s role on Ukraine evolved? | A Debrief with Tara Varma and Marie Jourdain

nlawler — Thu, 09 Feb 2023 17:10:17 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

How does France view its own role in Europe on Ukraine? Has President Macron’s position as an alleged “mediator” with Russia changed since the beginning of the invasion? What is public opinion in France on the government’s response to Russia’s war? And how is France responding to talk of a pending geopolitical shift to Europe’s East?

As we approach the anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Rachel Rizzo sits down with Brookings Visiting Fellow Tara Varma and Atlantic Council Visiting Fellow Marie Jourdain to discuss the current policy debates in France on Ukraine and the future of European strategic autonomy.

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

Explore the #AtlanticDEBRIEF series

SUBSCRIBE TO #Atlanticdebrief

listen to #AtlanticDEBRIEF as a podcast

MEET THE #ATLANTICDEBRIEF HOST

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Rachel Rizzo

Europe Center

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Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

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The post #AtlanticDebrief – How has France’s role on Ukraine evolved? | A Debrief with Tara Varma and Marie Jourdain appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Deni in Defense One on Germany’s indecisiveness sending tanks to Ukraine

ktalley — Tue, 07 Feb 2023 22:16:21 +0000

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John R. Deni

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

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Binnedijk in Defense News on the implications of China’s spy balloons on nuclear tensions

ktalley — Tue, 07 Feb 2023 21:53:49 +0000

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

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Hans Binnendijk

Distinguished Fellow

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

Explore the #AtlanticDEBRIEF series

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#AtlanticDebrief – Where does Germany stand on military support for Ukraine? | A Debrief with Bojan Pancevski

nlawler — Tue, 07 Feb 2023 16:20:17 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

Where does Germany stand as both a geopolitical and military actor in Europe? How instrumental was Germany’s role in the tank debate to convince the United States to send its Abrams? Are Germany’s efforts on military support for Ukraine minimized by the government’s poor communication strategy? What does the German public think about Germany’s new role as a more forward leaning actor?

As the anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine nears, Rachel Rizzo sits down with Wall Street Journal’s Germany Correspondent Bojan Pancevski to assess Germany’s record on military support for Ukraine and leadership in Europe.

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

SUBSCRIBE TO #Atlanticdebrief

listen to #AtlanticDEBRIEF as a podcast

MEET THE #ATLANTICDEBRIEF HOST

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Rachel Rizzo

Europe Center

Economy & Business English

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Lessons from history

Clearly, many classified studies and war games have been conducted into the prospect of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invading Taiwan. None has been made public even in the most general terms, including in the impressive Department of Defense report, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2022” delivered to Congress last fall.

War games are helpful in answering this question. But history may provide more valid answers. Three World War II campaigns are relevant: operations Overlord, Causeway, and Jubilee. Overlord was the landing at Normandy on June 6, 1944. About 180,000 British, Canadian, French, and American soldiers disembarked from some five thousand ships and small craft on the first day. Operation Causeway planned for four hundred thousand marines and soldiers and six thousand ships and small craft to invade Taiwan; it never happened, deferred by the invasion of the Philippines.

Operation Jubilee was the disastrous raid on Dieppe against the Nazis in August 1942. Approximately 10,500 allied troops, mostly Canadian, were carried in about 240 ships and small craft landing on the northern coast of France. The assault was immediately repulsed by the Germans with substantial British losses.

The last major amphibious operation under fire was Inchon during the Korean War in late 1950. During the 1991 Iraq War, the US Marines lobbied for an amphibious assault from inside the Gulf. That was denied as too dangerous. The Marines instead were used as a decoy force. With today’s precision weapons and ubiquitous surveillance, any amphibious operations would be even more difficult and costly.

By the numbers

While the exact size and capability of the PLA for conducting large-scale amphibious operations is uncertain, in general terms, China’s navy has about thirty thousand marines and a combined seventy large amphibious ships. China has two and is building a third helicopter assault ship that reportedly can carry about nine hundred marines. Taken together, these ships could carry perhaps fifteen to twenty thousand marines, and possibly as many as thirty thousand.

The PLA also has six army amphibious combined arms brigades with a total of twenty-four-to-thirty thousand troops and up to fifteen Special Operations (SOF) brigades. However, as with airborne troops, deploying SOF across the Taiwan straits in helicopters raises logistics problems that restrict their use over such a distance and in uncertain weather conditions.

It can be argued that China’s large shipbuilding industry could turn out the thousands of smaller landing craft essential for an amphibious assault. However, those shipyards build big ships, and making any transitions would be time-consuming, expensive, and difficult to conceal.

From a Chinese perspective, an invasion would be a worst-case option. Greater pressure can be applied by threatening or imposing a blockade against Taiwan, cutting off access by sea and air, and by economic sanctions. Grabbing small offshore islands belonging to Taiwan as leverage is well within PLA capabilities. Leninist doctrine has long called for regime change from within, as China could step up its attempts to use internal Taiwanese politics to effect a change.

And China could destroy or threaten to destroy Taiwan’s infrastructure under a rain of missiles after attempting a Dieppe-like assault to gain a foothold. But a traditional amphibious assault is more problematic.

Taiwan’s geography is unsuitable for those as well as amphibious operations, as it lacks the beaches of Normandy or Luzon. There are only a handful of landing sites on the west coast. Mountainous areas run the length of the 250-mile-long island, some topping ten thousand feet above sea level. While Taiwan does not train for guerrilla war, this difficult terrain would be very suitable for it. And Taiwan lacks the physical infrastructure to accommodate hundreds of thousands of invaders and support their logistical needs, the bulk having to come from the mainland.

Hence, to mount an opposed PLA amphibious assault to size and occupy Taiwan, China lacks, probably indefinitely, the military capability (power) and capacity (numbers).

Time for a strategy shift

A two year effort from 2017-2019 at the Naval War College called “Breaking the Mold” examined alternative means to implement the NDS. For the Indo-Pacific theater, a Mobile Maritime and Porcupine Defense for Taiwan was proposed in close concert with allies. That Japan is increasing defense spending is one indication of greater allied concern, as is the AUKUS program to provide nuclear submarines to Australia.

This Mobile Maritime strategy would confine the PLA to the first island chain running from Japan through Taiwan to Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. As in World War II in the Pacific against Japan, China would be blockaded and denied access to overseas access and resupply. It would be cut off from its Belt and Road outposts. And by Taiwan adopting a Porcupine Defense to make a PLA invasion too costly to consider, the United States would not have to spend as many resources in deterring and preparing for that contingency.

If an opposed-entry invasion of Taiwan is beyond China’s capacity, and it could be prevented by a Porcupine Defense of the island, what would be the consequences for US strategy? If Taiwan is not the immediate or even long-term danger spot the US believes it is, then is it time to ask if US strategy towards China has become overly militarized.

De-militarizing the China strategy

Tensions between China and the United States, if anything, are worsening. The specter of a world war has been raised with Taiwan as the cause célèbre. Rather than examining means to improve relations or to lower tensions, this focus on a Taiwan scenario has taken on greater importance and probability of occurrence. In this situation, the response has been for the United States to increase its emphasis on defense as the de facto policy and strategy. While this is understandable, it clearly has overly militarized US strategy at the expense of other options.

During the Cold War, the United States fought a war against China in Korea and believed that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was the surrogate enemy in Vietnam. The Nixon administration reversed this thinking with its “triangular politics” to offset the Soviet Union, culminating with then President Richard Nixon’s famous visit to China in 1972.

The United States needs to undertake a major review of its China policy to determine if it has become overly militarized and, if so, what are the alternatives. Further, are there positive steps that can be taken vis-a-vis China in the best interests of all concerned?

Too often in the past, instead of being the last option, military force, threatened or used, has become the default US position. The United States is at risk of repeating that error. It may well be that the PRC is indeed the greatest threat to the United States and its allies. However, a race to that judgment is ill-advised. Perhaps the Congressional-Executive Commission on China can fill the gap in shaping a strategy.

If it does, the commission needs to answer the question of whether the United States has overly militarized its response to China. If the answer is yes, the next question is to what degree should Russia be the centerpiece for US military thinking and strategy.

Harlan Ullman is an Atlantic Council senior advisor and UPI’s Arnaud deBorchgrave distinguished columnist. His latest book is The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD—How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large. He can be found on Twitter @harlankullman.

The post Is the US over-militarizing its China strategy? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Sweden has a chance to transform European security—even before it officially joins NATO

Franklin D. Kramer — Mon, 30 Jan 2023 17:29:28 +0000

Sweden’s decision to undertake NATO membership reflects a monumental change in the European security environment. But while twenty-eight NATO countries have voted to approve Sweden’s accession to the Alliance, the Nordic country’s bid may be in jeopardy. Last week, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told Sweden not to expect “benevolence” for its bid following protests near the Turkish embassy in Stockholm, then on Sunday floated the idea of approving Finland’s NATO membership but not Sweden’s. Whether or not a definitive decision, the Turkish president’s statements highlight how much Sweden’s membership is dependent on Turkey—and Turkey’s decision will likely not be concluded until after the country’s elections in May.

Nonetheless, in the interim, Sweden can significantly add to European security during its presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU)—a role it assumed in January and will hold through June—by ensuring that the EU plays a role, as outlined in the recent Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation, that complements and reinforces NATO’s actions. Sweden can wield the agenda-setting powers of its presidency to push debate forward on a fully resourced EU security and defense budget directed toward three crucial aims: mobility, sustainment, and critical infrastructure protection. Each of these aims is a prerequisite to defending Europe—but none of them has been adequately achieved yet.

The EU has long asserted the importance of European defense. As EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell has described, the EU’s history has been “full of plans and initiatives to strengthen the EU’s security and defence policy.” But, he added, “most have come and gone.” Rather, as a comprehensive study by the EU itself concluded, “years of defence underspending… has led to an accumulation of gaps and shortfalls” in the group’s collective military capabilities.

However, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year, European nations have begun taking steps to improve their defense capabilities. The EU itself has provided useful support through its peace facility fund that has backfilled national weapons deliveries to Ukraine, and the EU is in the process of legislating a five-hundred-million-euro fund to support common procurement. But responding to the threat that Russia presents requires much more significant action. Sweden should use its presidency to focus on substantially improving Europe’s capabilities through the establishment of an EU security and defense budget directed toward three key elements of collective defense.

1. Mobility

NATO’s defense against a Russian attack will require moving a large number of NATO forces. According to the NATO Force Model, the Alliance will provide “well over” one hundred thousand forces in under ten days and around two hundred thousand forces between ten to thirty days. Those are very substantial requirements, and NATO needs to ensure that it has the mobility capability to deliver forces in the requisite time frame. With the Alliance’s current capabilities, NATO likely cannot meet those demands.

The deficiencies can be inferred from the EU’s recent “Action plan on military mobility 2.0.” The new plan does recognize that with Russia’s war in Ukraine, the EU has “learned how important it is to move military aid as quickly and smoothly as possible.” But what the plan does not do is describe how well over one hundred thousand forces could be moved in under ten days, nor how around two hundred thousand forces could be moved in ten to thirty days—though this is what the new NATO Force Model requires.

Sweden should ensure that the EU’s implementation of the new military mobility action plan is, in the words of Borrell, “result-oriented and avoid[s] our usual European tendency to go for conceptual or institutional discussions.” Achieving the necessary results will, first and foremost, require sufficient funding.

In the context of the original mobility plan, the European Commission proposed a budget of approximately 6.5 billion euros. However, that proposal was reduced to 1.69 billion euros in the enacted budget, far from what would have been necessary prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and even less so now. The new action plan does not remedy this deficiency, stating only that the Commission will “consider” strengthening the military mobility budget “within the overall review of priorities in the mid-term review of the Multiannual Financial Framework.” Yet given the changes in the security environment, even the 6.5 billion number would be inadequate. Sweden should utilize its presidency to build a consensus that the budget will be revised substantially upward to support what will be necessary to meet the requirements of the NATO Force Model.

2. Sustainment

Here too, adequate resources will be critical. The Russian war in Ukraine has underscored that a European defense against a Russian attack could result in an extended conventional conflict. But for European forces to be able to effectively engage in such a conflict, the EU will need to close what it called one of the “most urgent capability gaps”—inadequate stockpiles of military equipment. While resupplying those stockpiles, the EU should ensure that they include anti-armor capabilities and man-portable and medium-range air defenses, unmanned aerial vehicles for both sensing and attack, long-range fires, and precision-guided munitions.

Nations are increasing their own spending, but the EU has the fiscal capability to provide complementary resources—though the currently planned five-hundred-million-euro fund for common procurement is far from sufficient. Sweden should advocate to include a sustainment initiative in the EU security and defense budget that will provide complementary resources to nations so that they have the conventional capabilities required for an extended conflict.

3. Resilience of critical infrastructure

The EU recently issued important directives requiring that nations enhance the resilience of their critical infrastructure—one set of directives focused on cybersecurity and the other on physical threats. But implementing the directives will require significant fiscal expenditures. For example, the cybersecurity directive tells nations to adopt “cyber hygiene practices” such as “zero-trust principles, software updates, device configuration, network segmentation, identity and access management.” Similarly, the directive tasks national computer security incident response teams with “incident handling”—not an insignificant job during conventional conflict, as shown by the efforts needed to respond to Russian cyber attacks on Ukraine. Accordingly, to achieve the required levels of cybersecurity, Sweden should advocate for a budget that provides complementary fiscal support for following the new directives, rather than leaving those responsibilities solely to nations.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has required Europe to change the way it approaches security and defense, amounting to what German Chancellor Olaf Scholz calls a Zeitenwende—a turning point. That Zeitenwende applies just as much to the EU as it does to Germany. Contending with the new demands of Europe’s security architecture will require establishing an EU security and defense budget that supports mobility, sustainment, and resilience. Sweden’s presidency can help the EU achieve that goal.

Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished fellow and a board member of the Atlantic Council. He is a former US assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

The post Sweden has a chance to transform European security—even before it officially joins NATO appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 27 Jan 2023 13:00:00 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Russia attempts to storm Bakhmut after Ukrainian retreat from Soledar

As Ukrainian forces retreated from Soledar following two intensive weeks of battle, shelling across the Bakhmut-Donetsk axis intensified and hit several civilian residential areas across the region. On January 20, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that Russia had also gained control over Klishchiivka. Videos posted on Twitter and Telegram appeared to document Russian use of thermobaric warheads in Novoselivski. In Luhansk oblast, heavy shelling inflicted damage to residential buildings in Kreminna.

The DFRLab geolocated a civilian residential apartment building in the Russian-occupied city of Avdiivka that was struck on January 24. Footage of the heavily damaged apartment allowed us to confirm its location on Hrushevsky Street in the western part of Avdiivka.

This is Mykhailo Hrushevsky Street, South West end of Avdiivka @GeoConfirmed

Location of the shelledbuilding : 48.13674751929483, 37.74275575321526
Beginning of the video : 48.135589, 37.745175
The last photo on the bottom right comes from @wikimapia
https://t.co/a3shsRtnpj https://t.co/PQt4TnCjdg pic.twitter.com/Ov9nXHKAwG
— Valentin Châtelet (@gyron_bydton) January 25, 2023

Russia’s buildup of forces continues just outside of Ukraine’s eastern and southern borders. Geolocated footage shows an increase in Russian military vehicles stationed in Alexeyvka, Belgorod oblast. This equipment is staged to support the Russian army in its offensive against Bakhmut.

A follow-up on Alexeyevka.

Russia is still using the city's infrastructure extensively to bring in ammunition and equipment. I also suspect that equipment is being repaired in some of the warehouses. This major logistics center is used for Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast. https://t.co/GRTEPXQA33 pic.twitter.com/87nHZZbrOw
— Sarah Hansen (@SarahHa42) January 24, 2023

Several military air bases were identified on social media as harboring Russian military transport aircrafts. The DFRLab identified a dozen military transport aircrafts – likely Ilyushins and Tupolevs, as well as smaller aircrafts and helicopters – at Russia’s Tsentralny military air base in Rostov-on-Don on January 25.

Satellite image captures military transport aircraft at Russia’s Tsentralny military air base. (Source: Planet.com/DFRLab)

Additional evidence of the current buildup was corroborated by open-source researcher Brady Africk, with satellite imagery indicating eleven Russian transportation military aircrafts at Taganrog air base.

Activity has increased at Russia's Taganrog-Central air base over the past month. This base is one of several used by Russian aircraft operating over Ukraine.

Satellite imagery from today shows several transport planes as well as new paths created for vehicles and equipment. pic.twitter.com/lmwkRFXSNn
— Brady Africk (@bradyafr) January 18, 2023

The Taganrog air base is the Russian air force coordination center nearest to the Ukrainian border. It is also regarded as the likeliest location for the delivery of the Iranian Shahed drones that were responsible for a massive attack on January 26 in the Sea of Azov.

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Renewed Russian shelling along the southern frontline as Ukrainians attempt to push back

Additional fighting concentrated last week across the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions of southern Ukraine. As Ukraine prepares for a spring offensive to regain control over the lower bank of the Dnipro River, the Russian DPR brigade and the Russian army tried to contain Ukraine’s progression near Stepove, south of the Ukrainian-controlled city of Orikhiv.

Although initial analysis documented Russian forces erecting fortifications from the city of Tokmak, south of Zaporizhzhia, up to Polohy, Russian shelling on Polohy suggested its armed forces were unable to secure their positions. On January 24, the city of Kherson suffered another round of Russian attacks comprised of artillery and air strikes. A geolocated photograph posted on Twitter indicated that Russian soldiers managed to raise their flag on the river island of Velykyy Potomkin, suggesting the front on the lower and upper banks of the river remains unstable.

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

Pro-Kremlin sources amplify forged diplomatic letters targeting Ukrainian refugees

Several pro-Kremlin telegram channels and media falsely reported that European countries, in response to the request of the Ukrainian government, would deport Ukrainian refugees to serve in the military. To prove the point, channels provided forged letters allegedly written by Ukraine’s ambassadors to Latvia and Lithuania. The channels also fabricated Facebook responses from the mayors of Liepāja and Vilnius that appeared to offer support for the letters. The DFRLab previously investigated a similar campaign aimed at Poland with the same claim of sending male refugees back to Ukraine.

The forged letters and Facebook posts contained several red flags. The letters featured incorrect email domains for the embassies, using mfa-ua.info instead of mfa.gov.ua. A Facebook post attributed to Vilnius Mayor Remigijus Šimašius used the wrong profile picture and omitted his verified badge. One Telegram channel added a ‘this content isn’t available’ screenshot to imply one of the Facebook pages had been deleted.

Additionally, the forged letter allegedly written by Ukraine’s ambassador to Latvia included an email address with the fake domain name mfa-ua.info and requested that Latvian officials send information about Ukrainian refugees, including their personal details. This may have been an attempt by the forgers to collect refugee data from the Latvian government. The scale of the forgery campaign remains unknown. Two of the Telegram channels – Rezident and MediaKiller – deleted their posts soon after publishing them.

Left: A forged letter allegedly amplified by the mayor of Vilnius, whose account profile image, highlighted in blue, does not match his actual Facebook profile (top right). Bottom right: Facebook account of the mayor of Liepāja debunks the letter and post published under his name. The wrong email domain is highlighted in red boxes, while an image artifact is highlighted in a green box. (Sources: Telegram/archive, left; Facebook, top right; Facebook, bottom right)

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Ukraine to receive advanced Leopard tanks as Germany takes U-turn

On January 25, Germany confirmed it will make fourteen Leopard 2A6 tanks available for Ukraine’s war effort and give partner countries permission to re-export further battle tanks to Kyiv. The German decision, which will also allow Poland and other countries to export their German-made Leopards, comes after NATO talks in Berlin.

Norway announced that will give Ukraine eight Leopard 2A5 tanks. In addition, the Netherlands is currently leasing tanks from Germany, but the Dutch government is likely to buy eighteen of them and give them to Ukraine as aid.

Sweden’s defense minister said that he had not ruled out supplying Stridsvagn 122 tanks, a licensed version of the German Leopard 2A5, to Ukraine at some point in the future. The advanced tank features enhanced protection against anti-tank systems, improved protection system against chemical, biological and radioactive weapons, and the ability to pinpoint several targets at once.

According to a New York Times report, the United States will increase 155-millimeter shell production, needed by Ukraine’s army, to 90,000 shells per month, a sixfold increase from the previous year’s level. This is the highest level of US production since the Korean War. The US military is also expected to increase production of Stinger missiles to sixty per month by 2025, a 50% increase over current levels. Additionally, the US will likely send between thirty and fifty M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine, sources told Politico on January 24. Later, new information suggested that the US planned to transfer M1 Abrams tanks of the A2 modification to Ukraine, and not the older A1, as was previously assumed. The A2 has much more advanced aiming optics, thermal imagers, and combat control systems.

Turkish company Baykar donated two Bayraktar TB2 attack drones to Ukraine. According to reports, Baykar completed the design of a Ukrainian plant to produce its own drones. The plant is expected to be built in the next two years and will employ more than 300 Ukrainian specialists.

The Security Policy Committee of the Swiss Parliament voted on an initiative under which the country will allow the re-export of its weapons from third countries to Ukraine. The committee noted that despite Switzerland’s neutrality, re-exports should be allowed in cases where international law is violated, as the Russian Federation did when it attacked Ukraine.

Lastly, Slovakia is ready to discuss the transfer of its MiG-29 fighters to Ukraine, as well as thirty T-72 tanks, said Defense Minister Jaroslav Naď during an online briefing at the Ukraine Media Center-Odesa on January 26. Belgium also will provide Ukraine with missiles for NASAMS air defense systems, as well as small arms and ammunition as assistance.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

The post Russian War Report: Pro-Kremlin sources amplify forged diplomatic letters targeting Ukrainian refugees appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Skaluba in The Sydney Morning Herald on what western tanks mean for Ukraine

ktalley — Thu, 26 Jan 2023 21:46:10 +0000

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Staff

Christopher Skaluba

Director

NATO Security & Defense

The post Skaluba in The Sydney Morning Herald on what western tanks mean for Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Townsend in Foreign Policy on the logistical challenges of delivering tanks to Ukraine

ktalley — Thu, 26 Jan 2023 14:50:34 +0000

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Fellow

James J. Townsend Jr.

Senior Advisor

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

The post Townsend in Foreign Policy on the logistical challenges of delivering tanks to Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Skaluba in Bloomberg on modern tank deliveries to Ukraine

ktalley — Thu, 26 Jan 2023 14:39:54 +0000

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Staff

Christopher Skaluba

Director

NATO Security & Defense

The post Skaluba in Bloomberg on modern tank deliveries to Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Tanks are vital but Ukraine will need much more to defeat Putin’s Russia

Jeffrey Cimmino, Shelby Magid — Wed, 25 Jan 2023 21:16:04 +0000

For nearly a year, Ukrainian forces have shown their ability to heroically defend their land and their people against Russia’s invading army. However, despite some genuine triumphs on the battlefield, Ukrainian soldiers and civilians continue to die. Meanwhile, Russian forces are seeking to consolidate their gains and a major new Russian offensive may be looming in the near future.

In this context, after tense and drawn-out wrangling among Western allies and partners, Germany has finally agreed to send (and allow others to send) Leopard 2 main battle tanks to Ukraine, while the United States will provide 31 M1 Abrams tanks. Ukrainians and their supporters have welcomed these long-awaited decisions. Leopard print is now all the rage in Ukraine.

Such decisions are worth celebrating as they were hard fought and will make a difference in saving Ukrainian lives. But while the landmark step of sending tanks demonstrates further Western resolve in support of Kyiv, Ukraine’s partners cannot afford to take a victory lap. Instead, they must remain firmly focused on the work ahead. Tanks are a vital element in Ukraine’s fight, but timing is everything and more is still needed to win the war. Ukraine’s allies and partners must continue to prepare for the long haul in order to defeat Russia.

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In the short term, Ukraine’s Western partners need to ensure the country has what it needs to defend against Russian attacks and launch additional counteroffensives to push back Russian forces. In addition to main battle tanks, the announcement earlier this month by France, Germany, and the United States that they would provide newer infantry fighting vehicles, as well as other countries stepping up to provide critical equipment including Czechia, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden, were important steps toward ensuring Ukraine will be able to pack a substantial punch. Meanwhile, Patriot missile systems will further augment Ukraine’s air defense against Russian missile attacks that have terrorized civilians.

While this support is meaningful, there is no time for complacency. Speed in both decision-making and delivery must now be prioritized. As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said to the latest Ramstein Format meeting on January 20, “time remains a Russian weapon. We have to speed up.”

New weapons systems will require training and logistical support networks to handle everything from maintenance to refueling. Moreover, Russian forces continue to launch attacks, while their terror tactics remain a major threat to the civilian population and infrastructure. Crucially, Putin’s troops are also digging in and fortifying their positions in an effort to better defend and consolidate their gains.

Ukraine’s Western partners should not stop with tanks and armored fighting vehicles. While tanks have long been a Ukrainian priority, a range of other important items featured on Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov’s wish list before the latest Ramstein meeting, including more air defense systems and systematic ammunition supplies. And just as HIMARS devastated Russian supply depots, transportation nodes, and command centers during summer 2022, setting the stage for Ukraine’s autumn counteroffensives, the United States should now give Ukraine longer range systems and UAVs, including ground-launched small diameter bombs and ATACMS, to better enable Ukraine to lay the groundwork for future counteroffensives.

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