Defense Industry - Atlantic Council

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On July 14, Scowcroft Vice President and Director Matthew Kroenig was featured in Marketplace discussing the House of Representatives’ recent authorization of an $886 billion defense bill. Kroenig argues that, atypical of most defense bills, the 2023 bill includes various amendments and provisions pertaining to social issues that are completely unrelated to defense or security.

This year is a little bit unusual… there is more debating over these controversial social issues and whether Congress will allocate funding to the Pentagon for things like diversity and diversity training, travel for abortion, and things like that.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

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With re-election behind him, Erdogan is turning toward the West

Grady Wilson — Fri, 14 Jul 2023 22:13:53 +0000

In a reprise of the accession drama at last year’s NATO Summit, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan flashed Turkey’s long-awaited green light for Sweden’s NATO membership on the eve of this year’s summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. But that green light signals much more than “go” for Stockholm: It also signals that Turkey has taken the opportunity to greater align itself with the West in the months since Erdoğan secured re-election.

Sweden’s journey to accession seems to be playing out along Turkey’s preferred timeline, coming one month after Sweden’s tougher anti-terror laws came into force and having been affirmed at the Alliance’s marquee gathering for maximum effect. Recent developments—including fresh pro-Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) demonstrations and a Quran burning in Sweden—threatened to derail the process, but Turkey should be credited for not giving in to these provocations.

The agreement is the latest and greatest signal that Turkey has decided to align more with the West. Other notable signals came in the form of Turkey’s hosting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (during which Ankara reiterated its longstanding support for Ukraine’s NATO membership and angered Moscow by releasing Azov battalion commanders) and the reiteration of the value it places on European Union membership. All these signals happened in a span of three days. The developments stand in stark contrast to speculation—that has arisen since before Turkey first raised an issue with Sweden’s accession—that Turkey, under Erdoğan, is pivoting toward Russia and the East.

Two months ago, when in the heat of a tough re-election campaign, Erdoğan accused Western countries (including the United States) of colluding with the opposition to remove him from power. At that point, the trajectory of Turkey’s relations with transatlantic allies appeared much less clear. Once Erdoğan won the presidential elections and the parliament became distinctly more nationalist, there were fears an emboldened Turkey would move toward the East. The first hint that this would not be the case, and that the president’s pragmatism would once again emerge, appeared in the selection of the post-election cabinet, which broadly elevated several pro-Western voices—including widely respected Mehmet Şimşek, who was brought back as minister of treasury and finance—and sidelined the most outspoken transatlantic skeptics.

Analysts close to the Turkish government were quick to assert that Turkey’s moves constitute not so much a pivot to the West but a push to balance relations and mend troubled relationships in line with a course Turkey has been pursuing for many years. On the other hand, there is speculation that part of the impetus lies in the perception of a weakened Russia following the Wagner Group mutiny in June and its aftermath. What is clear is that a weaker Russian President Vladimir Putin renders Moscow a less reliable partner for Turkey. Particularly since the 2016 coup attempt against Erdoğan’s government, Turkey-Russia relations have been driven from the top down by leader-to-leader chemistry. While Turkey and Russia’s deep economic relations are unlikely to be interrupted or curtailed, the idea or illusion of Russia as a balance or alternative to the West in any kind of strategic sense will begin to fray.

This move from Erdoğan is a major win for Sweden, Turkey, and the whole Alliance. It’s also a big win for the Biden administration and for NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who both worked very hard behind the scenes to make the agreement possible.

The breakthrough followed soon after a phone call between the US and Turkish presidents and after a flurry of contact between US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and their counterparts. A major, yet unofficial, sweetener to the agreement appears to be the United States’ assurance, issued one day after Erdoğan’s agreement, that it will sell F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, which Turkey first requested in October 2021 (after its ejection from the F-35 program) but has been thus far blocked by Congress.

In a pre-NATO Summit interview over the weekend, Biden alluded to boosting support for both Greece and Turkey’s defense capabilities simultaneously as a way to push the F-16 deal through Congress. That hearkens back to how the United States has historically balanced its two key allies in Southeastern Europe through aid dating back to the Truman Doctrine, which laid the groundwork for the eventual inclusion of both in NATO. It also underlines the importance of Turkey’s warming of ties with Greece in the wake of the devastating earthquake this February. These factors may play a role in overcoming the concerns of key members of the US Congress, including Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez (D-NJ), who confirmed that he is in talks with the Biden administration on the F-16 sale.

Finalizing Sweden’s NATO accession—which still needs to be ratified by Turkey’s parliament (as well as Hungary’s)—and completing the F-16 deal would be big steps toward rebuilding trust between Turkey and its transatlantic partners. In a speech on July 12, Erdogan announced that Turkey’s parliament will take up ratification after the long recess in October, in line with the parliamentary calendar.

One grievance from Turkey regarding its troubled transatlantic relationship is the perception that its Western allies have never fully appreciated Turkey’s security concerns. Despite officially designating the PKK—Turkey’s number one security threat—as a terrorist organization, the United States and Europe have not shown Turkey the deference that it feels due on this issue. This is in part due to the United States’ cooperation with the PKK’s Syrian affiliate to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. Turkey’s temporary block on Sweden afforded Turkey the opportunity, in high-stakes fashion, to remind the Alliance that its concerns need to be taken more seriously moving forward.

One way to read Turkey’s post-election foreign-policy posture is a willingness to improve its relations with the West. Over the past three years, Turkey has aggressively pursued and concluded rapprochements with many countries in its neighborhood including Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. While Turkey’s relations with its NATO allies never deteriorated as much as they did with the aforementioned countries, there is without question room to improve. Turkey, Sweden, the United States, and NATO have all committed to win-win moves that would contribute to a more positive and productive atmosphere. Now, they all need to follow through.

Grady Wilson is associate director at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. Follow him on Twitter @GradysWilson.

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A looming US-Turkey F-16 deal is about much more than Sweden’s NATO bid

Rich Outzen, Pınar Dost — Sat, 08 Jul 2023 19:47:16 +0000

The NATO Summit in Vilnius starting on July 11 will mark milestones in several strategic processes of vital importance to the Alliance. These include assessing progress on the Strategic Concept adopted in Madrid last year, recognizing Finland’s successful accession, debating the path forward on Ukraine’s application, and consideration of the end game towards Swedish membership. A long-awaited deal for the United States to sell F-16 fighter jets to Turkey is also on the table in Vilnius, but it’s about much more than unlocking Sweden’s accession: It is a puzzle piece in a broader strategic calculation about Ankara’s role in NATO’s Southeast.

At the 2022 summit, Finland and Sweden signed a trilateral Memorandum of Understanding outlining a path for accession through progress on Turkey’s security concerns. After Finland officially became a member country on April 4, 2023, the United States and other NATO member countries started to exert pressure on Turkey to accelerate approval for Sweden prior to the Vilnius summit. Sweden, with two hundred years of military non-alignment, and Finland, neutral throughout the Cold War, applied for membership only after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February last year. Enhancing Ukraine’s security is high on the agenda at the NATO Summit, necessitating attention to direct support for Ukraine’s defense, Alliance enlargement, and effective cooperation in the Black Sea region.

For Ankara the primary consideration in approving Sweden is tougher enforcement of counter-terror laws against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), an internationally recognized terrorist group, and its offshoots. Washington has dangled possible approval of Turkey’s proposed purchase of F-16 fighter jets and upgrade kits in attempts to influence Ankara’s calculation. Ankara, which is a long-time F-16 producer and user, desires reasonable compensation for its earlier expulsion from the F-35 program, after it went ahead with the purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile defense system which also led to the imposition of US sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Both the United States and Turkey see Turkish air power as a NATO anchor in the Black Sea region.

Securing the Black Sea

Alongside Romania and Bulgaria, Turkey is the largest of three NATO member countries in the Black Sea region and controls access to it under the Montreux Convention. With the Alliance’s second largest military and unique geographic positioning, Turkey has been a crucial player in the Russia-Ukraine war both diplomatically and militarily. Turkey has managed to maintain trade and diplomatic ties with Russia while providing vigorous support to Ukraine’s defense, and it has built a record of frustrating Russian military ventures in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Securing NATO’s interests in the Black Sea depends on a strong Turkey. Ukraine understands this, leading its officials to consider Turkey as one of the few potential security guarantor countries.

Turkey has provided support to NATO maritime operations in the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions, and most recently agreed to sell Bayraktar drones to Romania. Yet Turkey’s ability to deter Russia depends in part on the health of its F-16 fleet—the third largest in the world but feeling its age. Ankara’s request for forty new F-16s and upgrade packages for its seventy-nine existing fighters to sustain its air capabilities has made little headway over the past two years, and members of the US Congress have added Swedish accession as a new condition to the frozen sale. At the same time, many members of Congress have indicated that Turkey agreeing to Sweden’s accession will not be enough for them to approve Ankara’s F-16 request.

Ironically, Turkey is not an ordinary F-16 buyer. It has been an important F-16 manufacturer through Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ) established in 1984, according to the company, as a “Turkish-U.S. joint investment company to carry out the manufacture of F-16 aircraft, integration of on-board systems and flight tests” following the initial Turkish decision to acquire F-16s. Working with US defense giants such as General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, and General Electric, TUSAŞ manufactured and tested almost all of the Turkish F-16 fleet—nearly three hundred aircraft in various configurations.

Additionally, TUSAŞ produced forty-six F-16s for the Egyptian Air Force between 1993 and 1995, and helped modernize the F-16 fleet of the Royal Jordanian Air Force. In short, Turkey has been a critical partner in the F-16 program for decades—and a further sale remains in the mutual interest of Ankara, Washington, and NATO.

A de facto arms embargo?

In February 2023, the US Senate NATO Observer Group co-chairs, Senators Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Thom Tillis (R-NC), presented a bipartisan letter to President Joe Biden requesting that “F-16 fighter jet sales to Türkiye should not begin until the NATO protocols [for Finland and Sweden] are ratified.” This followed, according to a report in Defense News, multiple congressional holds of US arms sales to Turkey starting in 2018 or earlier.

Turkey has not added any new F-16s to its inventory since 2012 as the country was expecting to receive more than one hundred F-35 jets, for which it has already paid $1.4 billion. After Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program in March 2020, Ankara requested F-16s in exchange for the amount it had already paid.

The Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries also remains sanctioned by the United States under CAATSA. There has been a sustained campaign by congressional opponents of Turkey to deny major new arms sales to Ankara, spearheaded by the Hellenic and Armenian caucuses. Ironically, 1970s-era congressional sanctions against arms sales to Turkey catalyzed the drive for defense industrial autonomy that drove Turkey’s rise as a defense exporter. The ongoing replay of similar resistance from the US Congress is only reinforcing Turkey’s view that the United States is not a reliable arms provider in the long run. The resulting drive for self-sufficiency has increased the domestic share of Turkish defense production from roughly 20 percent to 80 percent and established the Turkish arms industry as a major international player.

Defense industrial decoupling

Consequently, Turkey has dropped from the seventh-largest US arms importer between 2013-17 to the twenty-seventh largest between 2018-2022. Meanwhile, Turkey’s defense exports skyrocketed by 69 percent during the same period, making the country the twelfth largest exporter of arms globally. In 2022, it set a new arms export record of $4.3 billion—an increase of nearly 37 percent from the previous year.

In order to produce a national fighter aircraft that can replace the aging F-16, the Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries signed a contract with TUSAŞ in 2016 to develop the fifth-generation National Combat Aircraft. The first successful taxi test of the prototype was completed in March this year, and it is expected that the first Kaan (previously known as the TF-X) will join the Turkish air force by 2030.

In the medium to long term, defense industrial decoupling of Turkey from the United States would seem to suit both sides. Ankara will be free from the strings that come with US systems, and Congress will be able to satisfy select constituencies that it is not complicit in Turkish military actions. Bilateral relations can move on to happier and less complicated storylines—like the drive towards one hundred billion dollars in bilateral trade. Turkey will continue to partner with countries with a more streamlined defense cooperation model, such as the United Kingdom and Ukraine.

In the short term, a deal on F-16s could restore a modicum of mutual trust, meet the needs of the Alliance, and close the chapter of US-Turkish defense cooperation on a positive note. For those reasons, far more than to spur Swedish accession, US and Turkish leaders continue to push for progress.

Approval of Swedish accession before the Vilnius Summit is unlikely not because of F-16 haggling, but due to the early stage of implementation of Sweden’s new counter-terror laws. The arrest and conviction of a PKK financier in Stockholm in early July, a first of its kind under Sweden’s newly strengthened anti-terror laws, could mark a new phase of progress. It is unlikely that enough can be done in a few days to conclude the process. More likely, and encouraging nonetheless, would be positive signals out of the summit that real progress is being made: in counter-terror implementation, in F-16 talks, and in eventual Swedish accession. Vilnius probably will not mark the completion of these processes, but it could mark the start of a decisive and positive stage toward their conclusion.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on Twitter @RichOutzen.

Pınar Dost is a historian of international relations with a PhD dissertation on the history of US-Turkey relations (Sciences Po Paris). Follow her on Twitter @pdosting.

The post A looming US-Turkey F-16 deal is about much more than Sweden’s NATO bid appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Oleksii Reznikov: Ukraine’s defense doctrine will define country’s future

Oleksii Reznikov — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 18:49:23 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has recently initiated a national debate over the creation of a Ukrainian Doctrine that will shape the future development of the country. I am confident that defense policy will be at the heart of this national dialogue and see a number of key points that are worth underlining.

The first point to note is the global nature of Ukrainian security. For decades to come, the entire world will live by the rules established by the outcome of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin has demonstrated its readiness to weaponize everything from energy resources and food supplies to cyberspace and social media. Moscow has engaged in nuclear blackmail, interfered with maritime freedoms, and called into question the very idea of territorial integrity. These challenges are not local or even regional in scope; they are global threats that resonate equally around the world.

How we respond to these issues in Ukraine will define the international security climate. Any attempts to address the Russian invasion on a purely local level by freezing the conflict or forcing Ukraine into territorial concessions will result in failure and will only fuel further international instability. Instead, we must acknowledge that the threats posed by Russia are global in character and demand a global response.

The second key point is the need to define Ukraine’s position in regional and global security systems. In simple terms, the desired trajectory should include security guarantees followed by full NATO accession, with internal transformations taking place in parallel that implement the best lessons from Ukraine’s wartime experience and enable the country to acquire the necessary domestic defense capabilities. These processes can and must be advanced during the current active phase of the war.

The third key point is the need to develop a defense doctrine that meets the security expectations of both Ukraine and the country’s partners. It is now clear that Ukraine is capable of serving as a shield on Europe’s eastern frontier. Indeed, Ukraine is currently carrying out NATO’s core mission of defending Europe against Russian military aggression. At the same time, over the past eighteen months Ukraine has received direct and indirect military aid worth more than the country’s entire defense budget since the restoration of Ukrainian independence in 1991. Without continued external assistance, Ukraine will not be able to carry out rapid rearmament or acquire the kind of defense capabilities it needs. The best solution would be to move toward greater reliance on internal resources while maintaining strong levels of international support.

Clearly, Ukraine’s partners will be reluctant to invest in a security model that differs significantly from established NATO standards, or one that conflicts with their own military, industrial, or economic interests. Finding the right balance between strengthening Ukraine’s domestic defense sector capabilities and optimizing international cooperation will be crucial.

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Efforts to develop a practical vision for Ukraine’s army of the future have been underway since June 2022, when I ordered a capacity review. These findings, coupled with Ukraine’s unique wartime experience, form the basis of a concept paper on the transformation of Ukraine’s defense sector submitted to Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal at the beginning of June 2023. The next stage will involve consultations to coordinate interagency efforts required to create the right legislative framework and ensure effective cooperation between different government bodies. This synergy will be the key to success.

Russia’s invasion has underlined that defense is an investment not an expense. For instance, strengthening Ukraine’s naval capabilities will help guarantee maritime security in the Black Sea and Azov Sea, which secures vital income from trade. Likewise, failure to provide adequate security measures will leave Ukraine unable to rebuild and trapped in costly wartime insecurity. All of Ukraine’s security policy decisions must reflect these fundamental truths.

Complex defense capabilities revolve around three main factors: people, weapons, and financial resources. Each has their own planning specifics. Successful weapons and financing policies take years to plan; when it comes to human resources, it often takes a generation or longer to get it right.

Ukraine is now looking to coordinate the country’s defense sector transformation under conditions of extreme uncertainty. We know the current war will end in Ukrainian victory, but we do not know when this will be. This makes it difficult to begin the process of optimizing the range of weapons in use by the Ukrainian armed forces. After all, in order to defeat Russia, Ukraine needs to receive as many weapons as it can, and needs to get them as quickly as possible.

We also don’t know exactly when Ukraine’s partners will make the final decision to fully integrate the country into the Euro-Atlantic security community. This is fundamental. It is one thing to reform the Ukrainian military as part of a collective defense strategy in cooperation with partners; it is quite another to build defense capabilities in relative isolation with some external support.

One of my main requests to our partners is therefore to make a decision on Ukraine’s NATO accession as soon as possible. This will make it far easier for all parties to conduct long-term defense planning. If a decision is not forthcoming, Ukraine’s partners will be obliged to include the country’s security needs in their own planning on a bilateral and multilateral basis.

A further priority for Ukraine’s defense doctrine is the de-Sovietization of defense policy and planning. This needs to be addressed in a practical manner that goes beyond mere slogans. Eighteen months ago, many military analysts believed a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine would mean a fight between a large Soviet army against a small Soviet army. In reality, it soon became clear that the Ukrainian army had undergone significant change. However, the same cannot be said for the broader state systems underpinning Ukrainian defense policy. A wide range of political, social, and economic changes are still needed.

For example, the system of registration for military service is still linked in the Soviet fashion with place of work or study. This means that entrepreneurs along with the self-employed and unemployed are often outside the system. Far-reaching changes are needed in order to establish and maintain the right kind of reserve and effectively mobilize the country’s human, material, and financial resources. Efforts to overcome quality problems with quantity must be set aside. In conditions of resource scarcity, such an approach is suicidal.

The human dimension of future Ukrainian defense is a professional army. This must be based on the transparent logic of a military career and an extensive social protection package, relying on well-trained reserves formed of all men liable for military service and of women on a voluntary basis (with the exception of those categories of women who are liable for military service).

The registration of people liable for military service should be fully digitized. This process is underway. We also need to implement separate training policies for different groups in order to create a genuine rather than nominal reserve. This should look to maximize citizen engagement by improving the motivation system.

Statements about there being seven million Ukrainians liable for military service are meaningless if the country is not capable of structuring the reserve in ways that make efficient use of these people. Similarly, declarations that anyone subject to military service must complete their compulsory period in uniform do little to help the state capitalize on existing resources. Instead, basic training should be supplemented by the development of specific groups within the country’s military reserve forces. This should include a combat reserve consisting of those with combat experience; a territorial reserve for territorial defense units; an operational reserve of military veterans without combat experience; a mobilization reserve of those who previously passed through basic training; and a general reserve register featuring individuals with no prior military training.

The development of an efficient reserve is only possible in conjuction with an effective Heroes Policy, which has been identified as a priority by President Zelenskyy. This is a good example of the need for interagency synergies and is also an area where a sense of justice must serve as a cornerstone. Meanwhile, the task of managing military registration should be taken away from the General Staff and the Land Forces Command. Instead, it is necessary to establish a separate and tailored agency within the Ministry of Defense.

Similar efforts are required for the civil reserve. Over the past eighteen months of Russia’s full-scale invasion, it has become clear that a significant portion of the almost one million Ukrainian men and women in uniform perform purely civilian functions. It makes no sense to bunch all of these people together with the military until the end of hostilities. Instead, a more nuanced approach is required. When society sees that the state seeks to engage people in defense tasks as rationally and reasonably as possible, we will witness a decline in negative phenomena associated with military service. After all, many of those who seek to avoid military service do so in order to escape perceived uncertainty, injustice, and abuses.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

A new mobilization and reserve policy will require a new regulatory framework. This will involve comprehensive legislative changes. The entire mobilization system for central and local authorities, enterprises, and institutions should undergo revision, with mobilization tasks in their current form abolished. In its place, the emphasis should be on practical needs and common sense. Training for reservists should be synchronized with real life requirements and skills, with citizens aware of opportunities at the level of school leaver, university undergraduate, employee, or entrepreneur.

Professional military education and career management must be developed according to NATO principles and standards to ensure interoperability. At the same time, all training and education should be adjusted to reflect Ukraine’s unrivalled combat experience. This is the country’s unique advantage and should shape Ukraine’s defense doctrine as much as possible.

Work is already underway on the transformation of Ukraine’s military education system, with a concept approved by the government in December 2022. Over the coming decade, Ukraine’s military education will be fully integrated into the broader European military education environment in terms of both form and content. A separate element here is military-patriotic education. At the moment, this is governed by two laws and a presidential decree which contain a number of apparent conflicts and contradictions. We must achieve a clearer division of tasks and harmonization.

Ukraine’s entire defense doctrine should be underpinned by solid economic foundations. At present, the Ukrainian defense industry is not capable of meeting the demands of the military, but the sector has huge potential. Indeed, if managed correctly, a highly profitable Ukrainian defense industry could realistically become a major engine driving the country toward the goal of a one trillion dollar GDP.

I have repeatedly stated my position that self-sufficiency in the defense sector is a core component of genuine national sovereignty. Moving forward, Ukraine should be aiming to produce as much as possible itself. Once again, Ukraine’s unique combat experience creates exciting opportunities in this area. In order to make the most of the country’s experience and its industrial capabilities, a new defense industry development strategy is required. This should take international defense sector trends into account while also focusing on other economic factors and Ukraine’s specific strengths.

The time has come to turn away from the old Soviet model governed by unprofitability and resource consumption. Instead, Ukraine must strive to become a global defense sector leader and an attractive international partner. This will require a unified center capable of establishing and implementing policy, with exceedingly flexible R&D assets responding rapidly to the latest requirements. Procurement should be synchronized with budget planning, while efforts must be made to move away from lingering problems relating to blurred responsibilities. Efforts in this direction are already underway and must continue.

The overall objective of Ukraine’s defense doctrine is to defend the state against any possible threat. This requires new approaches to everything from managing mobilization and maintaining an effective reserve, to reforming the defense industry and boosting domestic production at every level. The country’s needs will inevitably evolve over time. Five years after victory in the current war, will Ukraine need a mobilization reserve of 500,000 or two million? This is why scalability is so critical.

In the defense sector, Ukraine has huge untapped potential and much to offer the international community. In the drone sector alone, Ukraine is at the cutting edge of current innovations and is well-placed to remain a key source of solutions for European and other markets. This military tech prowess will help open doors to new cooperation that are currently closed. Ukraine can build on its experience and expertize to become a major player in the global defense industry, but this requires solid foundations and a strong domestic sector.

Every day, our defenders are bringing victory closer. This progress is taking place in a rapidly changing world, and is contributing to these changes. Ukraine must be ready to capitalize on the opportunities this creates in ways that guarantee the safety of all Ukrainians while enabling the country to prosper.

Oleksii Reznikov is Ukraine’s Minister of Defense.

In Season 1, Episode 5 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by two guests. She speaks with Cameron Hudson, the former US government expert on Sudan, about the mercenary pedigree of one of the two main belligerent parties, the Rapid Support Forces, and the determinative impact this has had on the current conflict in Sudan. By fighting as mercenaries in Libya, and especially Yemen, the RSF secured a cash windfall that let it recruit in numbers to rival the size of the national army, it forged regional relationships that are now central to its resupply, and it has committed crimes and abuses in the conduct of the war which represent a detached mercenary mindset.

Alia also chats with Professor Munzoul Assal of the University of Khartoum about the danger of two parallel governments emerging in Sudan along the lines of the bifurcation in Libya; the presence of RSF fighters at the Sudanese border with the Central African Republic where the Wagner Group is deeply entrenched; and the clear and alarming possibilities of a regional conflagration.

“The origin story of the wealth is really sending the RSF out into the region as a mercenary force… Hemedti has now been able to return back to his fighting roots but doing it with a war chest that has allowed him to recruit and to resupply in such a way that he is now a rival to the authority of the country.”

Cameron Hudson, Former US government expert on Sudan

Find the Guns For Hire podcast on the app of your choice

About the podcast

The Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalisation of contract warfare tells us about the world as we currently find it, but also about the future of the international system and about what war could look like in the coming decades.

Middle East Programs

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

The post Mercenary bloodline: The war in Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Building a navy fighting machine

Bruce Stubbs — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 13:00:00 +0000

Key terminology
The navy’s approach to strategy development and force planning
The sources of the problem
Problem definition
Key issues shaping problem solution
Recommendations
First recommendation: Establish a new assistant secretary of the navy
Second recommendation: stand-up the navy strategy cell
Third recommendation: Stand-up the force planning directorate
Resourcing the recommendations
Conclusion
About the author

Key terminology

This paper uses five key terms. The first two, force design and force development, are precise US Navy terms that are not interchangeable.

Force design is the innovation and the determination of future Navy ships, aircraft, and weapon systems, along with a warfighting concept for a twenty-year and beyond timeframe. Force development is the adaptation and modernization of Navy in-service ships, aircraft, and weapon systems, along with a warfighting concept within a two-to-seven-year timeframe. The difference between these two official Navy terms may seem arcane: force design is all about the future force, and force development is all about the current force. However, both address Navy requirements based on an appraisal of US security needs, and then choose naval capabilities (along with a warfighting concept) to meet those requirements within fiscal limitations.

The following terms are also important for the reader’s comprehension.

Force planning is the more commonly understood term—used in place of force design and force development—and is used across Congress, defense media, academia, and industry. While force planning is not an official Navy term, the term is used in this paper to encompass both force development and force design.
Force structure is used by the Congress to mean the number and types of combat units the Navy can generate and sustain, as well as to represent the Navy’s combat capability.
Budget is an informal and shortened expression to encapsulate all Navy activities in the Defense Department’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system, especially the programming activity.

The navy’s approach to strategy development and force planning

The US Navy’s approach to strategy development and force planning in 2023 is not working. Strategy development is on life support and force planning uses an incremental approach of buying marginally better and more expensive versions of the same platforms the Navy has relied upon for decades. In effect, it is producing the Navy’s force structure one ship class at a time, without reference to an overall Navy strategy and force plan to field an integrated, aligned, and synchronized “Navy fighting machine.”¹ Moreover, this approach is delivering an unaffordable fleet over too long a procurement time. Proposals for developing new capabilities are viewed as threats to in-service platforms and programs, thereby blocking innovation.

Navy F/A-18E Super Hornets prepare to launch from the USS Harry S. Truman in support of Exercise Trident Juncture 18. Credit: US Navy, Navy Petty Officer 3rd Class Adelola Tinubu.

Congress, defense media, defense analysts, the Defense Department, and independent US government agencies have all found fault with the US Navy’s strategy development and force planning. Most notably, Congress has expressed its dissatisfaction.

In December 2017, Congress mandated a Navy with 355 crewed ships, a goal based on the Navy’s 2016 Force Structure Assessment (FSA) and, in February 2020, Representative Joe Courtney (D-CT) complained to then Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper about, “the lack of a shipbuilding plan and the [Donald] Trump administration not delivering a strategy to build a 355-ship Navy.”² In December 2021, Congress mandated the Navy to submit the Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report on its force structure plans for the near, middle, and far terms to meet the combatant commanders’ requirements using Defense Department-approved scenarios.³ However, Congress reacted with little enthusiasm for the Navy’s thirty-year shipbuilding plan for fiscal year 2023 (FY2023), despite its being the first such report from the Navy to Congress in more than three years, and was similarly unimpressed by the following year’s iteration. This has led Congress to mandate the establishment of an independent National Commission on the Future of the Navy in December 2022 to determine the size and force mix of the fleet by mid-2025.⁴

This litany of events—particularly the unprecedented direction for the Navy to submit the Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report, the establishment of an independent National Commission on the Future of the Navy, and the assignment to the commandant of the Marine Corps of sole responsibility to develop amphibious warfare ships requirements—indicates Congress’ displeasure with Navy force planning. Moreover, the inability of the Department of Defense (DoD) and Navy leaders to consistently state how many ships the Navy needs to meet its requirements may be a driving factor in Congress’ decision to legislate these unprecedented mandates. During the first seven months of 2022, DoD leaders suggested five different targets for the objective size of the Navy—316, 327, 367, 373, and five hundred.⁵ In addition, the use of three options in both the FY2023 and FY2024 thirty-year shipbuilding plan—rather than a single projection—handicaps congressional understanding of the Joe Biden administration’s goals concerning the future size and composition of the Navy, and assessing the Navy’s proposed FY2024 shipbuilding budget, five-year shipbuilding plan, and thirty-year shipbuilding plan. Moreover, to follow its mantra of providing best military advice to civilian leadership, the Navy must have a preferred option for what it needs to get the job done, and, most importantly, must assess the risk to the United States if it does not get the resources it needs (see Table 2).

As Dr. Scott Mobley pointed out in his November 2022 Proceedings essay, the Navy largely focuses on programming and budget to develop the means for strategy while “devaluing the strategic underpinnings for rationalizing and justifying those means.”⁶

Navy force planning uses a piecemeal approach—“buying at the margin [fewer, but] better [and more expensive] versions of the same [type] of platforms [the Navy] has relied upon for decades”—that is delivering an unaffordable fleet over too long a procurement time.⁷ Navy force planning almost always occurs in a resource-constrained environment imposing a zero-sum approach, in which proposals for new capabilities are frequently viewed as threats to in-service platforms, thereby blocking innovation. At the end of the day, the Navy’s new platforms, weapons, and systems are quite similar to what is already in the fleet.

The preponderance of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) platform and capability staffs each focus on a single platform or capability. No one looks at all the platforms and capabilities as an integrated, collective whole. No single staff entity ensures all these individual platform and capability staffs are integrated by a well-articulated, comprehensive strategy and warfighting concept to achieve the required strategy-force match.

The Navy cannot create a lasting OPNAV organizational structure to ensure its strategy drives its force planning and its budget in that order. OPNAV cannot conduct its business “with strategic intent” at all times in its key processes. Because it operates within the Defense Department’s mandated five-year Future Years Defense Program and is focused on the budget, OPNAV tends to concentrate on numerous process-centric products, which, coupled with cascading short-term urgent projects, frequently sees its strategic guidance displaced, or even lost, in the sausage making.

The continuing need to reconcile the interface between the Navy’s strategy with its mid-range to long-range forecasts, and between the Navy’s budget and its short-term timelines and all-consuming fiscal pressures, has eluded OPNAV. Numerous OPNAV reorganizations since the early 1980s underscore this observation. As a 2010 Center for Naval Analyses study highlighted: “successive CNOs have sought to make [OPNAV] responsive to their needs—chief among which is usually construction of a balanced and integrated program and budget.”⁸ They failed and, as a result, the Navy continues to address its force requirements incrementally, which frustrates innovation, alarms Congress, and delivers fewer, more expensive, and almost always bigger platforms. The various uncrewed surface vessels and aircraft may break the bigger-is-better paradigm, yet they are arriving too slowly.

The sources of the problem

The causes of the Navy’s problem with its approach to strategy development and force planning are numerous and diverse.

Divergent CNO proclivities prevent strategic consistency

Effective force planning suffers from insufficient strategic consistency between chiefs of naval operations (CNOs). The historical record suggests these service chiefs seem to believe they must differentiate themselves from their predecessors, with their own distinct, separate strategy—or what is typically a strategic, aspirational plan rather than a strategy with ends, ways, and means. As Dr. Peter Haynes explained in his book, Toward a New Maritime Strategy:

In the political climate of Washington, a place that demands constant change and where only new ideas can be ensured a hearing, strategic statements have a shelf life. Navy leaders have to replace or update their ideas or risk being seen as too slow in responding to changes in the domestic political or international security environments.⁹

Assuredly, senior Navy leaders would agree that, regardless of who is the CNO, the Navy has enduring institutional objectives and the benefits of consistency would be enormous for strategy development and force planning. There would be: assured continuity of strategic direction over the fielding of major platforms and weapons systems; no requirement for an incoming CNO to craft a “new” Navy strategic direction from whole cloth; unity of effort on the Navy’s way ahead based on organizational agreement hammered out at four-star updates; a consistent Navy message for strategic communications; and reduction in false starts and nonproductive efforts (see Table 1).

The service needs each CNO to build upon what has gone on before so that the Navy can benefit from continuous unity of effort over time. The service also needs a consistent planning process, and not a completely new version to accompany the incoming CNO’s new strategy. The challenge is to sustain consensus in a planning and acquisition process that runs a decade or more, and is instigated by a CNO who typically serves a four-year tenure.

OPNAV’s budget process dominates strategy and force planning

OPNAV remains focused on the budget as its overarching and defining process, believing strategy can be generated during the budget process. This narrow focus constrains the development of long-range strategies and plans to address transcendent challenges and opportunities. There is an irreconcilable difference between the needs of the budget process and the strategy-development process.

In a 2021 interview, a former deputy director of the Integration of Capabilities and Resources Directorate (OPNAV N8), Irv Blickstein, provided an explanation of why the budget process dominates. First, it is impossible to follow literally the linear prescript of strategy, requirements, and budget. If a strategy is unaffordable, then capability trade-offs must be made. The budgeteers knew that just opining about strategy would not carry the day for funding. Instead, the Navy needed analysis to show the effectiveness of its programs and the validity of its arguments. As deputy programmer in OPNAV in the early 1980s, Blickstein noted:

I had no relationship with anybody in OP-06 [Plans, Policies and Operations Directorate]. And you’d think, well you’re building a [budget] and they’re in charge of the Maritime Strategy, shouldn’t you guys be talking all the time? The answer is yes, but did the Maritime Strategy have an impact on our programming work? It really didn’t…Historically, there was no relationship between strategists and programmers, but I think it would be a good thing to have.¹⁰

In June 2015, the Naval Postgraduate School published a report on strategy’s role to drive the Navy’s budget process. The report’s principal findings stated that the “Navy has failed to ensure that strategy and policy priorities drive [budget] development and execution.” Specifically, within OPNAV, the budget process “eclipses strategy” and “is substituted for, and is often equated to, strategy.”¹¹ The report noted that the Integration of Capabilities and Resources Directorate, a directorate that acts essentially as OPNAV’s Chief Financial Officer, “wields most of the intra-bureaucratic authority and power when it comes to the making and implementation of strategy” and that the Operations, Plans, and Strategy Directorate (OPNAV N3/N5), with its strategy staff, does not “play meaningful role in strategy development and execution.” During his tenure as CNO (2015–2019), Admiral John Richardson attempted to change this attitude. His efforts did not succeed.

Currently, there are significant alignment issues among the budget process, strategy development, and long-range planning processes. The budget process focuses on a five-year period and emphasizes the application of quantitative analysis, which is effective for near-term resource decisions. However, with no clear-cut beginning or end to its annual cycle, the budget process dominates all OPNAV planning activities and “tends simply to encourage the continuation of programs already under way” and discourage “the development of fresh new alternatives.”¹² The Navy needs to avoid defaulting to budget execution to develop its strategy. All strategies are shaped and informed by available resources, but the budget should serve the strategy—not the other way around.

Currently,the responsibility to manage the Navy’s force-planning ecosystem is dispersed throughout OPNAV. The Warfighting Development Directorate (OPNAV N7) addresses force design. The Integration of Capabilities and Resources Directorate (OPNAV N8) addresses the quantitative means to support force design and development, and the Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities Directorate (OPNAV N9) addresses force development and force design. The CNO’s Commanders Action Group provides the terms of reference—strategic guidance—for force design and force development. The Naval Warfare Development Center produces warfighting concepts, such as the current Distributed Maritime Operations (See Figure 1).

Each of these responsibilities must occur, but they are uncoordinated. No directorate integrates these force-planning efforts along with the ongoing production of new ships, aircraft, and weapons to produce a unified Navy fighting machine. As a result, decisions about production of new forces and modernization of in-service forces directly shape decisions about determining future platforms and capabilities, and vice versa. This interrelationship among force development, force design, and the production of new platforms and capabilities demands alignment, integration, and synchronization into a comprehensive process—not as individual platforms and capabilities—along with a shared understanding of the future security environment and a common warfighting concept to deter and defeat future adversaries in specific time periods.

Furthermore, this dispersion of force-planning responsibility has harmful consequences. In February 2022, OPNAV sponsored a workshop, titled the Force Design Sprint, to assess the Navy’s force-design posture. At the conclusion, a senior N7 leader informed the author that the workshop determined, “everyone in OPNAV was in charge [of force design], but no one was in charge.” It was an astonishing discovery for a military service to declare no one in OPNAV actually held responsibility for force design, with its focus on future ships, aircraft, and weapon systems, along with warfighting concepts for the twenty-plus-year time horizon.

Insufficient strategic guidance misdirects force planning

The Navy lacks sufficient and coherent guidance to ensure strategy shapes its budget and warfighting concepts. It has no classified strategy to facilitate an unambiguous expression of its ends, ways, and means. It has no codified assessment of both the current and future security environments to provide baseline understandings of them and set conditions for effective concept-driven, threat-informed capability development. Another missing document is a warfighting concept for the 2040s timeframe. The result is that, in 2023, specialized N9 staffs are planning the next-generation platforms without the benefit of a common set of capstone strategic guidance. (See Figure 1a)

Navy platform communities distort force planning

Internecine warfare by the Navy’s three platform communities (its surface, aviation, and submarine communities) severely unbalances the Navy as a whole. Expected in theory to rise above their individual platform advocacy and warfare concerns, the communities are all too susceptible to pressures and rivalries from the others. Each warfare community produces an unclassified strategic guidance document with little regard for how the other communities interact and cooperate to generate a unified Navy fighting machine.

Problem definition

In response to this criticism, CNO Admiral Michael Gilday reassigned force-design responsibilities to N7 and focused its efforts on 2045, as outlined in the CNO’s 2022 Navigation Plan.¹³ However, the Navy has largely already decided upon a 2045 force design and, moreover, the Navy is full speed ahead on its implementation. The year 2045 is only about twenty years away, well within the service life for the ongoing production of new ships, aircraft, and weapon systems. CNO Gilday has approved the Navy’s future direction for its next generation of platforms and capabilities, which N9 has developed with the priority order of acquisition as the next-generation aircraft first, the next-generation destroyer second, and the next-generation attack submarine third.¹⁴ This prioritization seems to cement the aircraft carriers as the Navy’s warfighting center of gravity, rather than precision weapons launched from a variety of air, surface, and subsurface platforms.

The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson prepares for flight operations in the Arabian Gulf. Credit: US Navy/ Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Alex King.

The long-term problem confronting Navy strategy development and force planning is larger than reassigning force-design responsibility to N7. The Navy needs to address the problem of how it conducts and organizes for strategy development and force planning in toto, not as disparate processes. Based on this paper’s assessment of the Navy’s strategy development and force planning posture, the Navy faces a three-part problem.¹⁵

Part one: How does the Navy produce “a force structure, now and in the future, of the right size and the right composition (force mix) to achieve the nation’s security goals, in light of the security environment and resource constraints” and avoid a strategy-force mismatch?¹⁶
Part two: How does the Navy ensure its strategy—based upon codified current and future assessments of the security environments, along with associated warfighting concepts—drives force-planning decisions in its budget process, and not have those decisions made by default?
Part three: How does the Navy ensure its force-planning activities include revision of existing warfighting concepts and development of new ones that fully integrate all platforms to produce a single, lethal Navy fighting machine?

Key issues shaping problem solution

Several key issues significantly influence the formulation of recommendations to improve Navy strategy development and force planning.

Organizing OPNAV for effective strategy development

Given the enduring nature of developing, maintaining, updating, and iterating capstone strategic guidance, a dedicated strategy staff (to include responsibility for long-range planning) must have continuity and longevity. Because this guidance is so central to the Navy’s future, their production cannot be an on-again-off-again process. The key is for the CNO to select its director and have confidence in its staff. Once a strategy staff is up and running, the Navy needs to keep it in place. If the CNO is unhappy with its product, he or she should certainly bring in their own selectee to run the show, but the organization itself needs to retain its role, rather than being shoved aside and replaced with a new, favorite staff group.

Avoiding a federated organization to conduct force planning

OPNAV is using a federated organizational construct, which is problematic for conducting force planning. This construct attempts to achieve simultaneously decentralization of responsibilities and unity of effort. It supposedly unites, under a central entity, diverse responsibilities along with distinctive, associated processes, but with the responsibilities still controlled by different and independent entities. It is aspirational and relies on goodwill to meet mission in lieu of a hierarchical structure with authorities to make hard decisions and not focus on achieving consensus. Given the importance of successful force planning to the Navy, the organizing model to follow is a dedicated entity reporting directly to the CNO, such as the Navy Strategic Systems Programs and Naval Nuclear Propulsion, which, respectively, have cradle-to-grave responsibility for sea-launched nuclear-deterrent capabilities and for the Navy’s nuclear propulsion. The Navy needs to borrow a page from these two organizational successes and establish a dedicated, single entity responsible for all matters pertaining to force planning. The CNO’s force-planning responsibilities are so vast in scope, so complex, and so critical, that the Navy cannot disaggregate them across the OPNAV staff or employ a federated construct. It needs to establish a dedicated entity reporting directly to the CNO.

Providing CNO’s direct oversight of force planning and strategy

Only the CNO and the vice chief of naval operations (VCNO), with the authority vested in their offices, can ensure OPNAV maintains a strategic focus. They alone can focus the staff to keep the Navy’s strategic direction front and center, to drive force planning and the budget. The vice admirals who are the deputy chiefs of naval operations leading the seven major functional directorates cannot do it individually; they are challenged enough to meet the urgent demands of the budget process and the press of their daily business.

Understanding defense-analysis limitations to support force planning

Quantifiable defense analysis makes a strong contribution to force planning, especially in the near and middle terms, by understanding trade-offs among platforms and weapons systems. Defense analysis—operations research, campaign analysis, and systems analysis—has restricted relevancy to force planning with its long-range focus of twenty or more years into the future. Defense-analysis methods require certainty of data before they can productively yield reliable certainty in answers. The Navy’s current force-structure assessment methodology, which uses these quantifiable defense analysis tools, will be hard pressed to generate useful data about the long term. Its processes require data for modeling that are simply unavailable twenty years from now—hence, the need for a strong component of risk analysis, wargames, red teams, and alternative-futures work.

Incorporating net assessment capability to support force planning

Force planning requires long-range comparative assessment of trends, key competitions, risks, opportunities, and future prospects of Navy capability. Net assessment provides this comparison of red-blue interaction, using qualitative and quantitative factors across alternative future scenarios. The Navy cannot predict the future with certainty. However, net assessments generate a spectrum of needed capabilities for the Navy to draw upon. The Navy needs this capability because its reliance on campaign analysis, systems analysis, and operations research is grossly unbalanced. The Navy needs to conduct force planning based upon an assessment of the future security environment, and then use tools such as strategic wargames, emulations, expert-panel reports, and net assessment to build a strategy and a warfighting concept, and derive required capabilities. Once that is done, the quantifiable tools can refine the types and number of capabilities.

Clarifying N7 and N9’s force-planning roles

Force planning encompasses force design (i.e., the future fleet) and force development (i.e., the current fleet). CNO Gilday reassigned force-design responsibility from N9 to N7 in July 2022. In reality, N9 will likely continue to conduct force-design responsibility as it determinines the next generation of platforms for operational employment in the 2040s. Given all the approved and funded N9 force-design activity to plan the 2040s Navy, N7’s force planning responsibilities are far from clear.

Incorporating the secretary of the Navy into force planning

Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro has signaled caution and unease with Navy force planning, and wants a realistic approach to understand the total cost and impact of the next-generation destroyer, attack submarine, and crewed/uncrewed aircraft. He wants to test new technologies for these platforms before any production. Given the Navy’s uneven track record in planning and delivering surface ships, along with the issue of affordability to fund an immense recapitalization, his caution is warranted.

Evaluating new technologies and concepts for force planning

The Navy is replacing in-service platforms with newer, follow-on versions, with the exception of uncrewed platforms. This is significant because strong platform attachment may be preventing the Navy from embracing new technologies and warfighting concepts. More importantly, such a possible attitude may prevent the Navy from understanding the changing character of war at sea. For example, because of the convergence of technologies, by 2045 the air and surface domains might become so significantly transparent that, in the competition between the “finder” and the “hider,” the finder might well dominate. If this is correct, surface ships and even aircraft will be increasingly vulnerable to continuous enemy tracking, targeting, and long-range attacks, thereby ending their role—or, at a minimum, severely limiting it—as the principal means of conventional naval power projection. Such an outcome has enormous consequences for the design of a 2045 Navy fleet.

A fast-response cutter sails near a US sail drone explorer in the Gulf of Aqaba during the International Maritime Exercise/Cutlass Express (IMX) 2022. Credit: US Army/ Cpl. DeAndre Dawkins

Communicating Navy force-structure requirements

Given the December 2022 establishment of the National Commission on the Future of the Navy and the new reporting requirement for a Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report in December 2021, the Navy’s strategic-communications capability appears to have had little effect in countering the criticism of its force-planning efforts. The Navy’s strategic communications require an adjustment.

Recommendations

The overarching intent of these recommendations is to link OPNAV’s strategy, analysis, and budget processes. This is a challenge, as the work among the budgeteers, analysts, planners, and strategists is so different. Producing a budget is incremental work that “involves a great deal of analysis and negotiation, over and over again, year after year” and requires “orthodox bureaucratic labor.” Conversely, producing a strategy or a warfighting concept demands “unorthodox leaps of thought—of drawing exceptional inferences from exercises, war games, technology, intelligence, and events.”¹⁷

Historically, with a few notable exceptions, effectively linking these two groups has eluded OPNAV. Consequently, the recommendations address eliminating this gap by consolidating force-planning functions under the direct and strategic oversight of the CNO and VCNO to ensure the linkage between these two groups is maintained. In effect, force planning becomes OPNAV’s center of gravity, with the production of the budget in support.

The logic behind these recommendations is straightforward. The recommendations are governed by an overarching objective to ensure that the Navy’s strategy and policy priorities drive its force planning and budget, not the other way around. The Navy needs to build its forces and capabilities to implement the CNO’s recommended strategy. Force planning begins with that strategy, but the force-planning staff does not create that strategy; the origins of that strategy reside in the CNO’s personal domain, drawing upon higher-level guidance such as the National Defense Strategy. Using the CNO’s strategy, the force-planning staff determines the naval tasks required, and the problems and impediments—such as geography and the adversary’s capabilities—in the current and future security environment that must be surmounted. This activity, in turn, drives the development of warfighting concepts, which leads to the discovery of required naval forces and capabilities and their associated attributes (i.e., operational requirements). Finally, force planning calculates the number and mix of forces and capabilities required to achieve the strategy.¹⁸ The following recommendations make this logic a reality.

The eleven primary documents written by the proposed Navy Strategy Cell and the Force Planning Directorate would not be carved in stone and immutable like the Ten Commandants. In the final analysis, they would be the CNO’s documents. Vitally, they would be developed through the active participation of the Navy’s four-star leadership to identify the biggest challenges to the service’s continued relevancy and contribution to national security, and to devise a coherent approach to overcoming them, which the Navy senior leaders would hammer out and support. The purpose of this effort is to define how the Navy will move forward over successive five-year increments of the budget-planning process, with its senior leaders sharing and agreeing to a common approach. It is all about institutionalizing a force-planning process that can endure over decades from first inception to acquisition to initial operational employment, all managed by relatively short-tenured senior leaders.

Obviously, as the threat, budget, technology, and higher-level policy change, the CNO would update these documents on an annual basis, such as the process the Navy employed in the 1930s with at least nineteen major iterations to its War Plan Orange, and in the 1980s with several successive versions of the Maritime Strategy. Full participation of serving four-star and selected three-star admirals in this process will be vital, because, without question, one of these flag officers will become the next or subsequent CNO. If this participation does not occur, the probability for false starts and radical course changes will greatly increase as CNOs change.

First recommendation: Establish a new Assistant Secretary of the Navy

The secretary of the Navy should establish an assistant secretary of the Navy for strategy, concepts, and capabilities (ASN/SC&C) to assist the uniformed Navy (See Figure 2). The standing up of this position would deliver that assistance without needing another management layer. Instead, it offers enormous, impactful benefits by providing the secretary of the Navy the means to ensure:

Alignment of both Navy and Marine Corps resources, activities, and capabilities with the strategic military objectives and force planning goals of the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy;
Synchronization of Navy and Marine Corps force planning by integrating their efforts at the service-chief level, as well as at developmental level between the Navy’s Naval Warfighting Development Center and the Marine Corps’ Warfighting Laboratory;¹⁹
The establishment of a strategy-focused counterpart to the assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development, and acquisition (ASN/RDA), and a vital interface with the assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans and capabilities (ASD/SPC);²⁰
The development of a single Navy Department strategy, vis à vis the three separate strategies of the department, Navy, and Marine Corps;
Reform of Navy force-planning activities, reinvigoration of Navy strategic expertise, and the promotion of a strategy-centric culture in both the secretariat and OPNAV; and²¹
A resolution of protracted issues and problems bedeviling Navy strategy development and force planning.

The final benefit has immense implications, and requires elaboration. The number of issues and problems confronting Navy strategy development and force planning seem almost enduring, foster significant congressional concern, and underscore the compelling need for great secretariat and OPNAV integration. On its own, the Navy has been unable to solve, correct, or mitigate these issues and challenges. Examples of such issues and problems that substantiate the services of a new assistant secretary are as follows.

Increasing affordability of platform

In June 2021, then acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Harker signed a memo addressing Navy funding priorities in its fiscal year 2023 planning cycle to match fiscal guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Navy cannot afford to simultaneously develop the next generation of air, surface, and subsurface platforms and must prioritize these [three] programs, balancing the cost of developing next-generation capabilities against maintaining current capabilities. As part of the budget [program objective memorandum 2023], the Navy should prioritize one of [these three] capabilities and rephase the other two after an assessment of operational, financial, and technical risk.²²

However, it was not until January 2023 that the Navy explicitly admitted that it could not afford all three major acquisition programs simultaneously, when the Navy announced that the order of acquisition as first is Next Generations Air Dominance (NGADS), then Next-Generation Guided-Missile Destroyer program (DDG(X)), and finally the Next-Generation Attack Submarine program (SSN(X)).²³

PACIFIC OCEAN (Jan. 4, 2011) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Stockdale (DDG 106) pulls alongside the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) during a refueling at sea. Platforms like the Arleigh Burke can provide provided much of the same support offered by carriers in mixed battlegroups and run far cheaper in comparrison. Credit: US Navy/ Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Travis K. Mendoza.

Navy platforms keep getting bigger and more expensive

Strong platform attachment may be preventing the Navy from embracing new technologies and concepts, and consequently replacing in-service platforms with newer, follow-on versions. Navy force planning uses an incremental approach—“buying at the margin [fewer, but] better [and more expensive] versions of the same [type] of platforms [the Navy] has relied upon for decades”—that is delivering an unaffordable fleet over too long a procurement time.²⁴

The San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Anchorage (LPD 23), the littoral combat ship USS Coronado (LCS 4), the joint high-speed vessel USNS Millinocket (JHSV 3) and the Military Sealift Command mobile landing platform USNS Montford Point (MLP 1) transit in formation off the coast of Southern California as part of Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise 2014. Some of these platforms are showing their costly age in in the 2020s. Credit: US Navy/ Chief Mass Communication Specialist Mark C. Schultz.

Proposals for new capabilities can be viewed as threats to in-service platforms, thereby blocking innovation. Quite often, the Navy’s new platforms, weapons, and systems are quite familiar to what is already in the fleet. The DDG(X) is the large surface-combatant replacement for the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers, currently still being procured by the Navy. A November 2022 Congressional Budget Office report on the Navy’s FY-2023 thirty-year shipbuilding plan states, “the Navy has indicated that the initial [DDG(X)] design prescribes a displacement of 13,500 tons,” about 39 percent greater than the 9,700-ton Flight III DDG-51 design.²⁵ There are media reports that actual displacement may be closer to fifteen thousand tons, which would make them comparable to a World War II heavy cruiser.

Technological developments are changing the character of warfare.

The principal means of conventional naval power projection are transforming, and this has enormous consequences for the design of a 2045 Navy fleet. According to US strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., a disruptive shift is occurring from “precision-warfare regimes” to an emerging one based on “a new military revolution” incorporating “artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing, synthetic biology, and quantum computing, as well as military-driven technologies, including directed energy and hypersonic weapons.”²⁶ Krepinevich cautions that, too often, the US military gets the cart before the horse by fielding capabilities based on new technologies and not addressing “how these new capabilities would maintain their effectiveness” as a technological revolution matured, as was the case with the Navy’s next-generation cruiser.²⁷ Unfortunately, as of May 2023, such strategic-planning documents do not exist for the US Navy.

Ineffective strategic communications

The Navy’s poor strategic-communications practices are exemplified by its annual, unclassified thirty-year shipbuilding plan.²⁸ The plan fulfilled its purpose, but it was devoid of even a summary of a rigorous, unclassified, analytical rationale to make the case for a larger, more lethal Navy. With that, political leadership could understand the Navy’s defense role and support its claims upon the nation’s resources. It was a missed opportunity to strategically communicate the Navy’s case for resources to one of the Navy’s most important audiences.²⁹ The Navy does not know how to communicate its force requirements consistently. The best construct for Navy strategic communications is to use platforms. Right now, the Navy is using platform attributes—such as “Ensure Delivery,” which conjures images of Domino’s Pizza or Amazon delivery services—to communicate its requirements to Congress and the American people. Aircraft and ship types are not abstract; they are real things that people can easily visualize when they hear their names—submarine, destroyer, aircraft carrier, and jet fighter, among others.

An a-strategic Navy culture

Strategy is not an institutional Navy value; the service values operational and technocratic expertise above all. Indeed, one telling example illustrates this attitude. Unlike the five other armed services, the Navy does not formally board its selectees to attend the war colleges as students; in effect, the Navy assigns whoever is available. The Navy largely focuses on programming and budget to develop the means for strategy, while “devaluing the strategic underpinnings for rationalizing and justifying those means.³⁰ Regrettably, the Navy has become, “a technocracy—a technologically centered bureaucracy,” with the CNO and OPNAV staff acting as the “Navy’s lead programmers and budgeters, incentivizing a career system that rewarded officers who acquired the technical skills needed for these roles,” but not incentivizing a career path for strategists.³¹

A prescient 1984 US Naval Institute Proceedings essay encapsulated the Navy’s astrategic culture: “The finest personal accolade an officer can receive is, ‘He’s a great operator.’”³² However, the essay identified a major shortcoming these “great operators” have: they experience, “great difficulty comprehending or even identifying—long-term problems” and are, “convinced that only short-term problems are real, and that continued solutions to each in turn will eliminate or indefinitely postpone the distant ones.”³³ As a consequence of this attitude, the Navy cannot determine a lasting OPNAV organizational structure to ensure its strategy drives its force planning and its budget, in that order. On its own, the Navy cannot sustain its strategy enterprise over the long haul. Underscoring this assessment is the current lack of capstone strategic and force-planning guidance. The Navy does not have:

A classified version of a combined “2020 Advantage at Sea” and “2022 Navigation Plan” to facilitate a clear and unambiguous expression of Navy ends, ways, and means along with such topics as strategic assumptions, risk, capacity, concepts, and threats;
A classified assessment of the current and future security environments to provide baseline understandings of operating environments, setting conditions for effective concept-driven, threat-informed capability development;
A classified warfighting concept for the 2040s timeframe;
A classified red-blue net assessment at the strategic level;
A classified description of a red-blue war; and
A classified Navy long-range plan.

Competition among the Navy platform communities

The internecine warfare between the Navy’s three platform communities (the surface, aviation, and submarine communities) can severely unbalance the Navy as a whole. For example, the aviation tribe focuses on strike from the air; the submarine tribe on strike from the subsurface; the surface tribe on strike from the surface; and the amphibious tribe on strike across the beach. All the while, it is unclear if anyone is asking two fundamental questions: “What are we trying to do? And how can we accomplish this in a far more effective way than we can at present?”³⁴ Invariably, there is a competition among tribes for manpower and funding, resulting in disagreements over strategy and the allocation of resources. Reaching consensus among them has always been difficult, and remains a fundamental service chief responsibility.

As defense secretary, Mark T. Esper rejected the Navy’s force plans.

They seemed to be a product of internal Navy logrolling among the various tribes— surface, subsurface, aviation, etc.—to keep their share of the Navy budget largely unchanged. Insiders were confirming this to me.
— Mark T. Esper³⁵

Esper wanted more attack submarines and a mix of light aircraft carriers (large-deck amphibious ships with F-35B aircraft) for more operational choices and affordability.³⁶ He did not want a plan bounded by past warfighting constructs and irrelevant to a future fight with China.³⁷ Because the naval-warfare tribes could not give him what he wanted, he directed Deputy Secretary of Defense David Norquist in the spring of 2020 to lead a new force-structure assessment study to maintain naval dominance.

A U.S. Navy MH-60 Sea Hawk prepares to land aboard the Wasp-Class Amphibious Assault Ship USS Bataan (LHD 5) during a strait transit exercise part of Amphibious Squadron/MEU Integration Training (PMINT), Jan. 28, 2023. Credit: US Marine Corps/ Cpl. Michele Clarke.

Each warfare community produces an unclassified strategic guidance document—the aviation community has Navy Aviation Vision 2030–2035, the submarine community Commander’s Intent 4.0, and the surface community has Surface Warfare: The Competitive Edge. Each document, for the most part, encompasses community strategy, planning, policy, and vision topics about operations, capabilities, and personnel. There is little in each document about how that community interacts and cooperates with the other two to generate a unified Navy fighting machine. The lack of stated cooperation among the aviation, surface, and submarine-warfare communities in these documents is palpable. The three communities act like a true team of rivals whose intra-service actions have contributed substantively to the establishment of the National Commission on the Future of the Navy.

To resolve these and other such issues and problems challenges, the secretary of the Navy’s role in strategy development and force planning needs to be strengthened by the services of this new assistant secretary.

Second recommendation: Stand up the Navy strategy cell

The CNO should repurpose his Commander’s Action Group as the Navy Strategy Cell to produce the Navy’s capstone strategic guidance and to monitor its implementation by this one, central, and empowered staff entity reporting directly to the CNO (See Figure 2).

All CNOs understand that their most important responsibility as a service chief is to identify the biggest challenges to the Navy’s continued relevancy and contribution to national security, and to devise a coherent approach to overcoming them. This fundamental role serves as the basis for this recommendation. A 2010 Center for Naval Analyses report bluntly stated that developing and implementing such guidance “for the Navy is the CNO’s number 1 job.”³⁸ Indeed, from what many senior OPNAV veterans have privately communicated to the author, if this responsibility is not “totally owned by CNO,” OPNAV has no strategic focus. They believe the CNO most important responsibility is identifying the biggest challenges to the Navy’s continued relevancy and contribution to national security, and devising a coherent approach to overcoming them.

Already working directly for the CNO, the Commander’s Action Group produces strategic documents such as the annual posture statements, congressional testimony, keynote speeches, and the 2022 Navigation Plan. Building upon this foundation, the proposed Navy Strategy Cell would be uniquely positioned to describe preferred outcomes for the whole Navy. OPNAV’s seven directorates, on the other hand, tend to focus on the outcomes of individual supporting programs. With expansion, empowerment, and augmentation, the Navy Strategy Cell would:

Enable the CNO to break away from the budget and programming processes that dominate so much of OPNAV’s time and thinking, and increase his or her focus on realistic and effective strategies and concepts for fighting at and from the sea;
Strengthen the CNO’s ability to align and coordinate the activities of Navy organizations; communicate with a single Navy voice to external and internal audiences; and assess Navy policies, budgets, plans, and programs, and the resultant allocation of scarce resources; and
Ensure capstone strategic documents reflect a consistent and aligned set of principles, concepts, and tenets regarding the Navy’s fundamental role in implementing national policy, as well as the CNO’s direction.

This recommendation mirrors what most corporate chief executive officers do, which is to make their capstone strategy functions a direct report to the chief executive officer. Consequently, this is no longer a lead role for N3/N5. Every CNO requires the direct support of a staff to provide a coherent, contemporary, authoritative body of Navy strategic thinking—comprehensive in scope—that they can use to help conceptualize, develop, coordinate, maintain, communicate, refine, and assess their thinking. The CNO needs to be optimally assisted and supported by a small, dedicated strategy staff, which is a corporate best practice. The production of capstone strategic guidance and other strategic documents requires a close relationship and physical proximity to the CNO, with no interlocutors. It is a one-on-one relationship between the CNO and, in effect, their “chief strategist” residing in the Navy Strategy Cell. The one-on-one relationship is needed to:

Implement explicit CNO guidance, not guidance altered by OPNAV directorate agendas;
Provide unfiltered advice, especially alternative views to CNO; and
Do it quickly and with a minimum of interference from others.

Capstone strategic guidance describes how CNO intends to overcome “the biggest challenges to the Navy’s continued relevancy and contribution to national security”³⁹ across different timeframes and security environments. These documents require significant CNO involvement, visibility, and signature. They provide overarching direction to the service for planning, programming, and budgeting future forces, force planning, and operational employment, and convey fundamental principles about the application of naval power to achieve national policy goals. They drive all subordinate force-planning efforts and connect the Navy’s annual budget submissions and investment plans with the Navy’s key priorities. These documents are truly primus inter pares. They are consequential and substantive, must be derived from national and joint policy and strategy, and reflect a comprehensive, global view informed by the Navy’s current and future capabilities. The Navy Strategy Cell would draft for the CNO’s signature classified and unclassified versions of these four documents that comprise the Navy’s capstone strategic guidance (i.e., its “crown jewels”).

Assessments of Current and Future Security Environments (classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist).
The Navy Strategy (classified version does not currently exist).
Navy Long-Range Plan (classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist).
CNO’s Annual Budget Guidance (classified).

Third recommendation: Stand up the force-planning directorate

The CNO should consolidate all OPNAV force-planning responsibilities into a new Force-Planning Directorate under a vice admiral reporting to the VCNO and disestablish N7 (See Figure 2).

The unprecedented wakeup call from Congress, when it established an independent National Commission on the Future of the Navy, is sufficient reason to consolidate Navy force-planning efforts under one roof and reform them.

The Navy’s current federated organizational construct to force planning is ineffective. It is unclear in 2023 what OPNAV staff element acts as the central entity to coordinate all OPNAV force-planning efforts conducted by decentralized and independent staff elements. The functions of force planning are expansive, complex, and critical, as Congress just reminded the Navy. In recognition of the weakness of the federated approach, the Navy should follow its own successful examples of non-federated entities reporting directly to the CNO—the Strategic Systems Programs and Naval Nuclear Propulsion—and consolidate all matters pertaining to force planning into a new and dedicated single entity.

This single, dedicated Force-Planning Directorate would have the authority, staffing, and analytical means, to align, integrate, and synchronize the force-planning efforts into a comprehensive whole-of-Navy strategic plan. The relationship among force development and force design, as well their connection to the production of new ships, aircraft, and weapons systems, demands alignment, integration, and synchronization into a comprehensive force-planning blueprint.

This Force-Planning Directorate would have the authority, personnel, and analytical means to align, integrate, and synchronize all force-planning efforts to produce a Navy fighting machine. The new directorate would assess and integrate the future operational environment, emerging threats, and technologies to develop and deliver concepts, requirements, and future force designs, and support delivery of modernization solutions. Most importantly, it would position the Navy for the future by setting strategic direction, integrating the Navy’s future force-modernization enterprise, aligning resources to priorities, and maintaining accountability for modernization solutions.

The budget dominates all OPNAV activities. The only way to guarantee the budget supports and serves the needs of Navy strategy and force planning is to ensure the CNO or VCNO has direct oversight via a dedicated senior leader who has no other writ. The director of the new Force-Planning Directorate should report to the CNO via the VCNO. A Force-Planning Directorate addressing force design with its long-range time horizons and long-range results will not survive in an environment dominated by short-term results unless OPNAV clearly understands that the Force-Planning Directorate is working directly for the CNO, and that the OPNAV directorates have a supporting relationship to this new staff. As the Navy historical record documents, anything less than a direct report will repeat OPNAV’s past mistakes and failed attempts.

The Force-Planning Directorate would draft for the CNO’s signature classified and unclassified version of these seven documents.

Warfighting concepts (current and future): Classified and unclassified versions do not exist for the 2045 timeframe. A classified version for the current timeframe exists (i.e., distributed maritime operations), but not an unclassified version. The Naval Warfare Development Center would support the development of these service-level concepts.
Red-blue net assessment: Classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist.
Description of a red-blue war (current and future): Classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist.
Force Structure Assessment: Unclassified versions do not currently exist. The June 2023 Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report will provide a classified version.
Navy force planning blueprint (current and future): Classified and unclassified versions do not currently exist.
Thirty-year shipbuilding plan: An unclassified version exists.
Battle force ship assessment and requirement report: A classified version exists. The June 2023 version of this report could potentially serve as a classified Force Structure Assessment.

The Warfighting Concepts would establish a baseline understanding to set conditions for effective concept-driven, threat-informed force planning, in order to produce a Navy Force Planning Blueprint. It would be based on a common understanding of the current and future security environments and a shared articulation of how the Navy fights as a whole, and not merely as a collection of individual classes of platforms. It would be the Navy’s comprehensive plan—not a strategy—to integrate, align, and synchronize all its force-planning efforts, including the efforts of force development and force planning along with the ongoing production of new ships, aircraft, and weapons systems to produce the Navy fighting machine (i.e., a unified combination of air, surface, and subsurface Navy lethality). Figure 2a depicts the consolidated production of the Navy’s eleven key strategic guidance documents from numerous OPNAV organizational elements to just two.

Establishment of this new Force-Planning Directorate topples the budget process as OPNAV’s dominant process. Force planning would become OPNAV’s center of gravity, with the budget in support, and no longer the other way around. It turns over the proverbial apple cart, with force planning reporting directly to the CNO and leading a strategic-centric staff dialogue, as opposed to a budget-centric dialogue. This reversal will generate strong resistance from N8 and N9 in particular. Because the Force Planning Directorate will be the primus inter pares, and as the other OPNAV directorates are all headed by a vice admiral, the new Force-Planning Directorate must likewise be headed by a vice admiral or else be doomed to failure.

This new Force-Planning Directorate requires the capability to conduct Navy net assessments for strategic analysis of red-blue interactions for informed and realistic plans. Net assessments (along with defense analysis) are diagnostic means, whereas force planning is a prescriptive means. The two belong together; if not, dysfunction will continue to hamstring efforts. This capability does not currently exist in OPNAV, and would require new personnel resources.

Resourcing the recommendations

The resources to make these recommendations real are readily available; it is just a matter of resetting priorities. The Navy is under heavy congressional fire for its strategy-development and force-planning efforts. Correcting this situation for the long term is surely one of the Navy’s highest priorities.

Given these circumstances, can the Navy say, for example, that the large number of officers assigned to the front office of its three-star leaders is more important than staffing its capability for strategy development and force planning? Again, it is a matter of priorities. If staffing these front offices is more important than retrieving control of force planning from the National Commission on the Future of the Navy, then so be it. It is simply a matter of priorities, and making the tough choices that many leaders say they like to do. Here is another opportunity.

For the reasons presented in this paper, leadership of the Navy Strategy Cell and Force-Planning Directorate requires senior flag officers. Disestablishing the N7 directorate would provide the vice admiral billet to lead the Force-Planning Directorate and a rear admiral billet to head the Navy Strategy Cell. The majority of N7’s functions can return to OPNAV N3/N5 and a portion of N7’s functions can relocate to staff the Navy Strategy Cell and the Force-Planning Directorate.

While there are no perfect organizational frameworks, there are organizational frameworks that better align a greater number of common functions, as outlined in these recommendations. A strategy office reporting to the corporate chief executive officer—in the Navy’s case, the CNO—is a proven practice, and a direct-report senior leader responsible for all Navy force planning is no different than having the Naval Nuclear Propulsion and Nuclear Weapons Program/Strategic Systems Programs as direct reports.

The emphasis of the proposals in this white paper is on strategy-development and force-planning reinvigoration and reasonable consolidation of similar functions, given the centrality of Navy strategy and force planning to all other OPNAV responsibilities. Force planning, if done properly with strategy in the lead and with its capstone strategic-guidance documents, will generate enormous benefits.

Conclusion

Congress has lost patience and confidence in the Navy. There is no way to sugarcoat this action. It is nothing less than a strong condemnation of the Navy’s approach to strategy development and force planning. When US Representative Rob Wittman (R-VA) in December 2022 penned his scathing commentary in Defense News, he was on target in stating, “if the Navy refuses to learn lessons from this year, it will be doomed to repeat them.”⁴⁰

The warning signs have been evident for years. However, much like the Navy’s Bureau of Ordnance’s stubborn, twenty-one-month resistance in World War II to correct three major defects of the Mark 14 torpedo, the Navy since the end of the Cold War has neglected its strategy enterprise and resisted effective force planning.⁴¹ It has repeatedly failed to understand and act on the mismatch between OPNAV’s robust organization for building the budget and its ineffective organization for developing and implementing Navy strategy.

The Navy needs to think and act like it did in the 1920s and 1930s, when it prepared to confront the Imperial Japanese Navy. The US Navy’s strategy, future security environment, and warfighting concept were all reflected in nineteen iterations to its War Plan Orange and updates to the Rainbow series of war plans. The Naval War College focused its curriculum and wargames throughout the 1930s on defeating the Imperial Japanese Navy, and almost every Navy flag officer was a war-college graduate. While far from perfect, the Navy of the past shared a common view of what a war with Imperial Japan entailed and clearly understood logistics were a top-tier priority for warfare across the vast distances of the Pacific. Likewise, in 2023, the Navy needs the same level of focus and preparation as its predecessor, and the proposed Navy Strategy Cell and Force Planning Directorate will help ensure it is ready for whatever lies ahead.

The author would like to be more of an optimist than a realist, but the Navy continues to allow mistakes to go uncorrected decade after decade. It is, like Winston Churchill stated, a “long dismal catalogue of the fruitlessness of experience and the confirmed unteachability of mankind.”⁴² It is foolish to believe that the Navy will change on its own to conduct more effective strategy development and force planning.⁴³ The only way the Navy will change is for Congress to direct it, or else the Navy will continue with its flawed ways.

About the author

Bruce Stubbs

As a member of the Senior Executive Service for the Department of the Navy, Bruce Stubbs served on the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) staff from June 2011 to September 2022 as the Director of Strategy and Strategic Concepts (OPNAV N7), the Director of Strategy (OPNAV N3/5), and the Deputy Director of Strategy and Policy (OPNAV N3/5). Prior to those assignments, he served on the Secretary of the Navy’s immediate staff from June 2008 to May 2011 with responsibility for the coordination and implementation of Maritime Domain Awareness programs, policies, and related issues across the Defense Department.

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

1 Borrowed from, Bradley A. Fiske, The Navy as a Fighting Machine (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1916). He wrote the Navy, “must first determine the units of the force and their relation to each other: it must, in other words, design the machine.” Its use herein represents the ultimate objective of Navy force planning, i.e., an integrated combination of air, surface, sub-surface, and cyberspace lethality for the Navy to fight as a unified whole.

2 Mac [R-TX-13] Rep. Thornberry, “H.R.2810 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018,” Pub. L. No. 115–91 (2017), http://www.congress.gov/; Mark T. Esper, “Chapter 7: The Politics of Building a Better Navy,” in A Sacred Oath: Memoirs of a Secretary of Defense During Extraordinary Times, First edition. (New York, NY: William Morrow, an imprint of HarperCollins Publishers, 2022), p.196.

3 Please see section 1017 of, Rick [R-FL] Sen. Scott, “S.1605 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022,” Pub. L. No. 117–81 (2021), http://www.congress.gov/.

4 Section 1092 of, Peter A. [D-OR-4] Rep. DeFazio, “H.R.7776 – James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023,” Pub. L. No. 117–263 (2022), http://www.congress.gov/.

5 Lara Seligman, Lee Hudson, and Paul McLeary, “Inside the Pentagon Slugfest over the Future of the Fleet,” POLITICO, July 24, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/24/pentagon-slugfest-navy-fleet-00047551.For further background see, Sam LaGrone, “Lack of Future Fleet Plans, Public Strategy Hurting Navy’s Bottom Line in Upcoming Defense Bills,” USNI News, June 18, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/06/18/lack-of-future-fleet-plans-public-strategy-hurting-navys-bottom-line-in-upcoming-defense-bills; Sam LaGrone, “Navy Lacks ‘Clear Theory of Victory’ Needed to Build New Fleet, Experts Tell House Panel,” USNI News, June 4, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/06/04/navy-lacks-clear-theory-of-victory-needed-to-build-new-fleet-experts-tell-house-panel; Mark Cancian Saxton Adam and Mark Cancian, “The Spectacular & Public Collapse of Navy Force Planning,” Breaking Defense, January 28, 2020, https://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/2020/01/the-spectacular-public-collapse-of-navy-force-planning/.

6 Captain Scott Mobley, US Navy, Retired, “How to Rebalance the Navy’s Strategic Culture | Proceedings – November 2022 Vol. 148/11/1,437,” U.S. Naval Institute, November 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/how-rebalance-navys-strategic-culture.

7 Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare, First edition. (New York, NY: Hachette Books, Hachette Book Group, 2020).

8 Peter M. Swartz and Michael C. Markowitz, “Organizing OPNAV (1970 – 2009),” January 1, 2010, https://www.cna.org/reports/2010/organizing-opnav-1970-to-2009.

9 Peter D. Haynes, Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2015), p. 246.

10 Dimitry Filipoff, “Irv Blickstein on Programming the POM and Strategizing the Budget | Center for International Maritime Security,” 1980s Maritime Strategy Series (blog), March 26, 2021, https://cimsec.org/irv-blickstein-on-programming-the-pom-and-strategizing-the-budget/.

11 Dr. James A. Russell et al., “Navy Strategy Development: Strategy in the 21st Century,” Naval Research Program (Naval Postgraduate School in support of OPNAV N3/ N5, n.d.), https://news.usni.org/2015/07/24/document-naval-post-graudate-school-study-on-u-s-navy-strategy-development.

12 Commander Gordon G. Riggle, “Looking to the Long Run,” U.S. Naval Institute, September 1980, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1980/september/looking-long-run.

13 CNO Admiral Mike Gilday, “Chief of Naval Operations Navigation Plan 2022,” CNO Navigation Plan (US Navy, July 22, 2023). .

14 Sam LaGrone, “CNO Gilday: Next-Generation Air Dominance Will Come Ahead of DDG(X) Destroyer,” USNI News, January 18, 2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/01/18/cno-gilday-next-generation-air-dominance-will-come-ahead-of-ddgx-destroyer.

15 A Navy problem statement can either be posed as a question about how to solve an issue or as a negative statement.

16 Mackubin Thomas Ownes, “Force Planning: The Crossroads of Strategy and the Political Process – Foreign Policy Research Institute,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 1, 2015, https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/07/force-planning-the-crossroads-of-strategy-and-the-political-process/.

17 Thomas Hone, Private memorandum to author, March 9, 2023.

18 Mackubin Thomas Ownes, “Force Planning: The Crossroads of Strategy and the Political Process – Foreign Policy Research Institute,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 1, 2015, https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/07/force-planning-the-crossroads-of-strategy-and-the-political-process/.

19 The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory generates and examines threat-informed, operating concepts and capabilities and provides analytically-supported recommendations to inform subsequent force design and development activities.

20 Captain Scott Mobley, Retired, “How to Rebalance the Navy’s Strategic Culture | Proceedings – November 2022 Vol. 148/11/1,437,” U.S. Naval Institute, November 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/how-rebalance-navys-strategic-culture..

21 Mobley, Retired, “How to Rebalance the Navy’s Strategic Culture | Proceedings – November 2022 Vol. 148/11/1,437.”

22 Megan Eckstein, “Memo Reveals US Navy Must Pick between Future Destroyer, Fighter or Sub for FY23 Plan,” Defense News, June 8, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/06/08/memo-navy-will-have-to-pick-between-its-future-destroyer-fighter-and-sub-in-fiscal-2023-planning/.

23 Sam LaGrone, “CNO Gilday: Next-Generation Air Dominance Will Come Ahead of DDG(X) Destroyer,” USNI News, January 18, 2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/01/18/cno-gilday-next-generation-air-dominance-will-come-ahead-of-ddgx-destroyer.

24 Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare, First edition. (New York, NY: Hachette Books, Hachette Book Group, 2020).

25 Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy DDG(X) Next-Generation Destroyer Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” In Focus (Congressional Research Service, March 23, 2023), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11679.

26 Captain Gerald G. O’Rourke, USN (Ret.), “Great Operators, Good Administrators, Lousy Planners,” U.S. Naval Institute, August 1984, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1984/august/great-operators-good-administrators-lousy-planners.
Jr Krepinevich, The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers (New Haven ; Yale University Press, 2023), https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300271584, p. 19.

27 Jr Krepinevich, The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers (New Haven ; Yale University Press, 2023), https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300271584, p. 19.

28 Formally titled as the Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year XXXX.

29 Mark Cancian Saxton Adam and Mark Cancian, “The Spectacular & Public Collapse of Navy Force Planning,” Breaking Defense, January 28, 2020, https://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/2020/01/the-spectacular-public-collapse-of-navy-force-planning/.As noted, “Planning for a 21st century Navy of unmanned vessels, distributed operations, and great power competition has collapsed. Trapped by a 355-ship force goal, a reduced budget, and a fixed counting methodology, the Navy can’t find a feasible solution to the difficult question of how its forces should be structured. As a result, the Navy postponed announcement of its new force structure assessment (FSA) from January to “the spring.” That means the navy will not be able to influence the 2021 budget year much, forfeiting a major opportunity to reshape the fleet and bring it in line with the national defense strategy.”

30 Mark T. Esper, “Chapter 7: The Politics of Building a Better Navy,” in A Sacred Oath: Memoirs of a Secretary of Defense During Extraordinary Times, First edition. (New York, NY: William Morrow, an imprint of HarperCollins Publishers, 2022), p. 200. Captain Scott Mobley, USN (Ret.), “How to Rebalance the Navy’s Strategic Culture | Proceedings – November 2022 Vol. 148/11/1,437,” U.S. Naval Institute, November 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/how-rebalance-navys-strategic-culture.

31 Captain Scott Mobley, USN (Ret.), “How to Rebalance the Navy’s Strategic Culture | Proceedings – November 2022 Vol. 148/11/1,437,” U.S. Naval Institute, November 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/how-rebalance-navys-strategic-culture.

32 Captain Gerald G. O’Rourke, USN (Ret.), “Great Operators, Good Administrators, Lousy Planners,” U.S. Naval Institute, August 1984, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1984/august/great-operators-good-administrators-lousy-planners.

33 O’Rourke, USN (Ret.), “Great Operators, Good Administrators, Lousy Planners.”

34 Jr Krepinevich, The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers (New Haven ; Yale University Press, 2023), https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300271584, p. 401.

35 Mark T. Esper, “Chapter 7: The Politics of Building a Better Navy,” in A Sacred Oath: Memoirs of a Secretary of Defense During Extraordinary Times, First edition. (New York, NY: William Morrow, an imprint of HarperCollins Publishers, 2022), p. 200.

36 Esper, “Chapter 7: The Politics of Building a Better Navy.”

37 Esper, “Chapter 7: The Politics of Building a Better Navy.”

38 Peter M. Swartz, William Rosenau, and Hannah Kates, “The Origins and Development of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2015),” 136 (Center for Naval Analyses, September 18, 2017), https://www.cna.org/reports/2017/origins-and-development-of-cooperative-strategy.

39 Rumelt, Richard P. Good Strategy Bad Strategy: The Difference and Why It Matters. Crown Publishing Group, Random House. New York. 2011.

40 Rob Rep. Wittman, [R-VA-1], “Congress Is Building a Stronger Fleet than the Navy,” Defense News, December 1, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/12/15/congress-is-building-a-stronger-fleet-than-the-navy/.

41 Clay Blair, Silent Victory: The U.s. Submarine War Against Japan., 1st edition (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975).

42 Robert Kagan, The Ghost at the Feast: America and the Collapse of World Order, 1900-1941, First edition. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2023), p. 468.

43 Leonard Dr. Wong and Stephen Dr. Gerras, “Changing Minds In The Army: Why It Is So Difficult and What To Do About It,” Monographs, Collaborative Studies, & IRPs, October 1, 2013, 48, p. 20.

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“What just happened?” The Wagner mutiny

Alia Brahimi — Fri, 30 Jun 2023 14:03:04 +0000

In Season 1, Episode 4 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi speaks with renowned Russia expert Mark Galeotti about the striking developments which saw mutinous mercenary forces from the Wagner Group take over two Russian cities and march towards Moscow. Professor Galeotti argues that the rebellion is both a symptom and an accelerator of the decay of the Putin state and of systemic capacity to deal with crisis. He points out that the plot was not picked up in a timely manner precisely because the Wagner Group is a mercenary force operating outside of the purview of counterintelligence and the units that ordinarily monitor the loyalty of the military. He describes how the Wagner’s group shadow status was doubly corrosive: on the one hand it was a mercenary group engaging in organised armed violence for profit, and on the other hand it was enough of a state institution that it could tap into the resources of the state and play both sides.

“It’s likely that this is the start of the real endgame… most crucially of all it was the spectacle of the security forces in the main not joining Wagner, but nor did they act to stop Wagner. They sat back and just thought, let’s see how this all plays out.”

Mark Galeotti, Professor and Russia expert

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The way for the US to ensure Gulf security is through partnership, not policing

David Mack — Tue, 20 Jun 2023 17:37:59 +0000

Earlier this month, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken traveled to Riyadh to meet with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) foreign ministers and the GCC secretariat. There, he mentioned how deeply the United States is invested in partnering with Gulf countries to build a brighter future for the region. In pursuit of that future, the United States should assist GCC countries with Gulf security as true partners—not as a policeman in the neighborhood.

The concept of Gulf security is not new. It was always top of mind for those who inhabited its shores. Historians have written of Russian Tsars’ desires to push south to the Gulf. This desire can be seen in the language of the purported will of Peter the Great from 1725. He advised his descendants to “approach as near as possible to Constantinople and India. Whoever governs there will be the true sovereign of the world. Consequently, excite continual wars, not only in Turkey but in Persia… Penetrate as far as the Gulf, advance as far as India.” The Carter Doctrine, outlined in US President Jimmy Carter’s State of the Union Address in January 1980, committed the United States to use military force, if necessary, to defend its national interests in the Gulf—the doctrine was a direct response to the Soviet Union’s entry into Afghanistan the year prior.

Generations of US strategic thinkers have spoken of US opposition to threats lodged by any country aiming to control the waters or air space of the Gulf and the adjacent Arabian Sea. Those thinkers focused on what would impede the peaceful relations that the United States and its allies have enjoyed with Gulf countries—countries that have energy resources that make them important for the global economy.

In over forty years, many realities have changed. US imports of Gulf energy supplies declined. By contrast, US exports to the region have expanded many times over. The parties and conditions that would likely pose a threat to US trade and other relationships with the Gulf are now largely located within the region. In the 1980s and early 1990s, it was the Iraq-Iran War and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Recently, it has been nonstate terrorist groups and Iran.

In addition, the countries with which the United States has friendly relations don’t depend on the United States to do the job of Gulf security for them. These countries do want Washington to be a reliable partner in support of their individual and collective defense efforts. This is also the goal of the United States. Through diplomacy and through working with the US private sector, Gulf countries’ militaries have been connected to military contacts with US companies and joint exercises conducted by the US Central Command. That fits what the Arab countries in the region need, and it fits what the US political system can accept.

This takes me back to the Iranian attacks on tankers and other commercial vessels in the final years of the Iran-Iraq War. I was the US ambassador to the United Arab Emirates at the time. Together with other US envoys to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, I was called back to Washington in early 1987 for consultations at the US State Department.

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The Kuwaiti government had formally requested that the United States put its flags on Kuwaiti oil tankers in order to gain the protection of US naval warships. The Kuwaitis promised to reimburse the United States handsomely for the flagging operation and to steadfastly maintain it was merely a commercial arrangement. Kuwait wished to shun any overt military alliance with the United States; for example, it did not even welcome US Navy ship visits. Indeed, the United States only had a small contingent of warships in the Gulf at the time, homeported in Manama, Bahrain. The answer from Washington was negative. The Kuwaitis then redirected their request to the Soviet Union.

When the group of US envoys and I gathered in the State Department, it was clear that the White House and top US politicians were still disinclined to make a major commitment to protect neutral-flag shipping in the Gulf, despite the unanimity among those of us coming from our posts in the region—we were in favor of some kind of positive response. After a half day of talks, we were told that then US President Ronald Reagan did not want to allow an opportunity for the Soviet Union to bring its military force into the Gulf. So, for that reason (however flawed it may be), Operation Earnest Will was born.

The United States committed to sending a military presence sufficient to protect neutral-flag commercial shipping without spending time quibbling over whether the GCC countries were actually neutral in the Iran-Iraq War. When I returned to Abu Dhabi, I received a warm welcome from Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, who was then the president of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and soon after from the rulers of the UAE’s other six emirates and from Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the minister of defense. At the time, the UAE was a confederation that granted only limited federal powers and separated military commands across Dubai and several other northern emirates. Even without actual authority outside Abu Dhabi, a young rising star in the Abu Dhabi military command, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed, along with Dubai’s Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, eventually became key contacts for me as the United States ramped up its military presence in the Gulf.

When I had arrived at my post in September 1986, the United States was limited to a mere four visits per year by its Navy warships and had very limited military relationships with the UAE emirates. By the time I left in October 1989, the United States had a large number of Navy ship visits, refueling and even making critical ship repairs at the large (and, at the time, new) port of Jebel Ali, as well as at established ports from Abu Dhabi to the city of Fujairah. The United States was also on its way to becoming a major supplier of military aircraft to the UAE. The rulers of the seven emirates were seeking joint military exercises as well as ship visits. Moreover, the leaders of these individual emirates had responded to the crisis of the tanker wars and various other demands by strengthening federal powers.

Because the United States responded to the GCC countries during their time of need (the so-called Tanker War), a strategic partnership formed—one that became the foundation for cooperation to reverse the Iraqi military occupation of Kuwait in 1990. The success of Operation Desert Storm gave the United States political credibility to bring GCC countries and other Arab countries to the Madrid Conference, a peace conference geared toward reviving the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, at the end of 1991. Those talks between Israel and the United States built upon peace between Egypt and Israel negotiated with the help of the United States at Camp David in September 1978 and the peace treaty between those two former military adversaries in March 1979. Camp David, the Madrid Conference, and Israel’s growing relationships with countries ranging from the UAE in the east and Morocco in the west laid the foundation for normalization. In a shrewd move, the Trump administration labeled this growing interaction as the “Abraham Accords.” The Biden administration has continued to play a role as a convenor and mediator.

As the Biden administration continues to play this role, it and Congress will find that the Arab countries of the GCC want to do their part when it comes to Gulf security. They are not expecting the United States to be the policeman of their neighborhood. Along with other key Arab and global leaders, they will welcome the United States as a partner in facing shared strategic interests.

Defense coalitions have historically been tricky, requiring skill and mid-course corrections. As the United States continues to work with the Gulf on security, expect blips, such as the report of a UAE withdrawal from the Combined Maritime Forces, a US-led maritime coalition. But if the United States shows that it is ready to work together with Gulf countries, Washington can get this partnership back on course. Read more about improving Gulf security frameworks in our latest report here.

David Mack is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, a former deputy assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, and a former US ambassador to the United Arab Emirates.

The post The way for the US to ensure Gulf security is through partnership, not policing appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Western companies are still financing the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Nataliya Popovych — Tue, 20 Jun 2023 11:39:15 +0000

Despite tremendous business interest in Ukraine’s reconstruction and development, a large number of Western companies continue to undermine Kyiv’s efforts by contributing to the Kremlin’s war chest. This ongoing corporate complicity must be stopped if Ukraine’s meaningful recovery is to happen any time soon.

The recent destruction of the Kakhovka dam is one of over 90,000 suspected Russian war crimes in Ukraine. Clearly, no reconstruction of Ukraine can succeed unless Russia is completely deprived of the resources to continue its invasion. The international community cannot have a meaningful conversation on recovery or reconstruction unless international companies that continue to feed Putin’s war chest cease their business operations in Russia entirely.

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When Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine first began in February 2022, some Western businesses demonstrated swift and early exits from the Russian market, putting values over profit. While these often high profile departures generated a lot of media coverage, in reality the majority of Western firms have chosen to remain in Russia.

According to data from the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE), out of 1,361 Western companies with Russian subsidiaries at the start of the full-scale invasion, only 241 (17%) have completely exited Russia. The remaining Western companies generated $136 billion in revenues during 2022, thus helping the Kremlin to finance the war in Ukraine.

Perhaps even more staggering than these numbers are the excuses used by the leadership of Western multinationals to justify their continued presence in Russia. The most common justifications for persisting with “business as usual” in Putin’s Russia primarily revolve around the provision of essential goods. This argument is widely cited despite the fact that it is rarely supported by the nature of the businesses in question.

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It should be crystal clear by now: All western companies that have not left the Russian market since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began almost seventeen months ago are complicit in the Putin regime’s war crimes and crimes against humanity. In a very real sense, Western businesses that refuse to leave Russia are silent enablers of Putin’s invasion. Any meaningful conversation about Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction should start by shedding a bright light on the issue of corporate complicity.

Ukraine’s true recovery can only happen when international businesses realize this is not just a war against Ukraine. They must acknowledge that this is a Russian war against the entire rules-based international order. It is a very deliberate Russian attack on the peace and stability that Western businesses have greatly benefited from over the years.

International efforts to advance Ukraine’s recovery are absolutely vital. Priorities should include rebuilding Ukrainian human capital and upgrading Ukraine’s energy infrastructure to set the country firmly on the path toward a green energy future. International companies have a tremendously important role to play in this process, but actions and values must also align.

By countering Russia, Ukraine is providing an invaluable service to the entire free world. Ukrainians who are risking their lives want to deal with international businesses that are ready to sacrifice part of their profit. We do not want to deal with war profiteers, but with those who understand that there is more at stake than just the bottom line. This is what the new era of corporate social responsibility is all about. In Ukraine, any company’s commitment to corporate social responsibility is measured by its willingness to accept a drop in revenues in order to disable the Russian war machine.

The flooding that resulted from the recent dam destruction in southern Ukraine is flushing down the reputation of companies still doing business with and in Russia. Western businesses carry an important responsibility in places where they operate, especially in conflict-ridden areas. Such companies can no longer afford to sit on two sides of the same fence. Either they are part of Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery efforts, or continue to support the destruction of its physical and human capital by feeding the Kremlin’s war chest.

Nataliya Popovych is a co-founder and steering committee member of B4Ukraine and the founder and president of One Philosophy.

China’s assumptions and lessons learned

Even as Beijing modulates its public statements in support of Moscow, China’s strategic assumptions from before the Ukraine invasion likely have not changed, and may depend on the longer-term outcome in Ukraine. That includes the prospect of an outcome that Vladimir Putin can claim as a Russian “victory,” in which Russia continues to hold territory and forecloses Ukraine’s NATO or European Union (EU) integration.

China is likely to apply the following strategic assumptions as it digests lessons learned from the Ukraine war.

According to Beijing, the United States is an adversarial, declining hegemony that will be antagonistic to China’s rise for the foreseeable future, and which will seek to foment instability within China and hostility on its periphery. In Beijing’s view, US antagonism to China is now structural and bipartisan. China’s previous self-imposed restraint, as it chose to prioritize stable US relations and drive economic reform and growth, is therefore moribund. For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the relatively peaceful global and regional environment that prevailed in the late bipolar Cold War and the post-Cold War period is severely challenged, as Xi told President Joe Biden in their March 18 call.“² Economic growth and rising prosperity are still important, but diminishing, sources of regime legitimacy. Defense of the CCP system, fueled by nationalism, expanded party control, while more active cooperation with Russia and other US adversaries, such as Iran, is becoming more prominent. Xi made this explicit in his speech to China’s National People’s Congress on March 6: “Western countries led by the United States have implemented all-around containment, encirclement and suppression of China, which has brought unprecedented severe challenges to our country’s development.”³

Economic growth and rising prosperity are still important, but diminishing, sources of regime legitimacy.

Giant screen displays a live broadcast of Chinese President Xi Jinping delivering a speech during the closing ceremony of the National People’s Congress (NPC), in Beijing. (Tingshu Wang via Reuters)

Another key view in Beijing is that Russia is China’s strategic partner. This status was further elevated on the eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when Russian President Putin and Xi met in Beijing and signed a joint statement on February 4, 2022.“⁴ Throughout the war in Ukraine, China’s leaders have reiterated their stance, most recently during visits to Moscow by Xi and by China’s top foreign affairs official Wang Yi in early 2023.⁵ The two countries are unlikely to ever have a formal mutual-defense treaty, but intensified cooperation in many spheres—including military coordination, intelligence sharing, energy, and trade—will continue and even accelerate.⁶ Even before its invasion of Ukraine, Russia was the junior partner in the bilateral relationship, but Beijing has deep strategic interest in ensuring that Moscow—and Putin personally—remains a viable ally in blunting US power and coordinating at the United Nations. Most importantly, Beijing has a strategic need to keep Russia from internal turmoil or international setbacks that could result in the rise of a regime that is hostile to China. One of the greatest gifts to Beijing of the Sino-Russian rapprochement that started during the 1990s, and truly took off from the mid-2000s, was a passive 4,200-kilometer border that enabled China to focus military modernization on naval, rather than land, warfare for potential conflict with the United States and Japan over Taiwan, or with India or Vietnam over border and maritime sovereignty disputes, respectively. The fact that Russia had dared to commit an estimated 97 percent of its entire forces to the fight in Ukraine by mid-February 2023 and, thus, baring its far-eastern borders, is a testament to this.⁷

Third, in the view of China’s leadership, the EU can act as a Western counterweight to perceived US hostility to China, and Beijing has at times tweaked its approach when deemed necessary to try to stabilize its ties to Europe. The EU lacked unanimity about following Washington’s lead, or did so only slowly and with less intensity, on hostile trade action and efforts to isolate China internationally prior to Russia’s invasion. In late April, inflammatory comments from China’s ambassador to France Lu Shaye, who essentially denied the sovereignty of former Baltic states, sparked an outcry across Europe and beyond.⁸ Shortly thereafter, Xi held his long-awaited call with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy,⁹ and separately, the Chinese Government voted in favor of a UN resolution containing language that explicitly acknowledges “the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine,” a sharp departure from Beijing’s previous neutral UN voting patterns on Ukraine.¹⁰ While these moves are largely symbolic and mark a slight tactical rather than a strategic shift, they underscore Beijing’s willingness to make adjustments to try to maintain favorable relations with Europe, given the value Chinese leaders place on the region as a counterbalance to the United States.

However, China’s refusal to condemn the war against Ukraine and its enabling stance toward Russia have galvanized worries, particularly in Eastern European countries, over the trustworthiness of the Chinese government.¹¹ On January 30, Czechia’s president-elect made it a point to accept a phone call from Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-Wen, in a stark departure from previous practice.¹² US intelligence made public in February 2023 that China was considering lethal arms supplies to Russia, causing grave concern in European capitals.¹³ Should Beijing actually deliver arms or ammunition to Russia despite its assurances to the contrary, China’s relations with much of Europe could be stretched past the breaking point and, indeed, there are signs of worsening strain, such as the aforementioned call between the Czech president-elect and President Tsai and his intention to plan a personal meeting with her, an unprecedented step from any Western leader; the withdrawal of the Baltic states from the Chinese 17+1 format; and, following similar decisions by many other European countries, Germany’s decision after long hesitation to finally ban and remove key components delivered by Chinese telecoms firms Huawei and ZTE from its fifth-generation (5G) network.¹⁴ At the same time, German leaders have continued to reach out diplomatically to China in the hopes of avoiding a complete Cold War-style economic decoupling scenario. On the other hand, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s March 30, 2023, speech on EU relations with China put the future of the shelved Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) firmly in doubt.¹⁵

How the CCP and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ultimately digest strategic lessons from Russia’s war on Ukraine, therefore, will depend on that conflict’s course, the longer-term effects of Western sanctions on Russia and the global economy, and myriad other aspects, including elections in the United States and Taiwan in 2024.

Beijing has deep strategic interest in ensuring that Moscow—and Putin personally—remains a viable ally in blunting US power.

Vladimir Putin and President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping made statements for the media following the Russian-Chinese talks on March 21, 2023. (Mikhail Tereshenko, TASS via Russian Presidential Press and Information Office)

Beijing likely is also watching closely to see how deeply entrenched in—or distracted by—the Ukraine conflict the United States becomes, where it contributes the lion’s share of direct military aid, including key munitions and weapons platforms that are in short supply; Ukraine is currently expending US annual production of nine thousand HIMARS missiles every two months.¹⁶ As Russia continues to achieve reduced war aims in the east and south, the war seems likely to continue for the foreseeable future. It presents new opportunities for fissures in the Alliance, and reduced US strategic standing headed into US presidential elections in 2024 that are likely to be even more disruptive than previous election campaigns after former US President Donald Trump’s March 30 grand-jury indictment on business-fraud charges.¹⁷ Partly because of Washington’s massive arms support for Ukraine, its deliveries of key weapons and munitions already sold to Taiwan have been significantly delayed.¹⁸

But one momentous strategic implication of Russia’s invasion is probably already clear to Xi and the CCP. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the prospect of major-power military conflict, and even nuclear-weapons use, is again a characteristic of the global order. Russia’s gamble in Ukraine that it could quickly defeat a non-NATO European neighbor and secure its near abroad has so far failed, but US-led Western unity and imposition of sanctions against Moscow have the earmarks of a protracted conflict that could drive new instability. If Beijing concludes that this is a characteristic of geopolitics and great-power competition in the twenty-first century, it could increase Chinese preparations for military conflict in Asia with either the United States or its proxies.

The deepening enmity of US-China strategic rivalry since 2017 has already eroded core CCP assumptions that competition would remain bounded by nuclear deterrence, deep economic integration, shared stewardship of financial stability, and cooperation on global challenges such as pandemics and climate. The Western reaction to the Russian war against Ukraine is likely to reinforce these judgments, and may be amplifying Beijing’s assessment that the United States is on a trajectory to pursue overthrow of the CCP as a strategic goal.

Even China’s February 24 “Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis” seemingly centers most around its affirmation of “sovereignty” as the key thing to be respected—crucially, without ever mentioning Ukraine’s sovereignty in particular, nor calling Russia’s invasion of Ukrainian sovereign territory an invasion, let alone illegal, despite this being a peace template for the Ukraine war.¹⁹ This implies the text has more to do with reaffirming China’s position on Taiwan and offering support to Russia than being an actual attempt to mediate. In calling to freeze the conflict, it would cement Russian territorial gains; ending the “unilateral” sanctions would again benefit Russia; and “promoting post-conflict reconstruction” would presumably benefit Chinese infrastructure companies. Beijing’s proposal on its face seems decidedly tilted toward Moscow or self-serving goals.

US assumptions and lessons learned

While dealing with the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the US government has not reduced its attention on the strategic challenge posed by China. At the time of the invasion, the Biden administration was aggressively focused on continuing and expanding Trump-era strategic competition with China. Even as Washington openly warned of intelligence regarding Moscow’s intentions, it continued adversarial policies and alliance building directed at China. It has since announced multiple rounds of technology restrictions on Chinese companies, and signed the CHIPS and Science Act to revitalize US semiconductor leadership.²⁰ Moreover, the president has personally eroded US strategic ambiguity on US military commitments to Taiwan—despite National Security Council (NSC) staff “clarifications” after each repeated instance that US policy has not, in fact, changed.

While dealing with the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the US government has not reduced its attention on the strategic challenge posed by China.

President Joe Biden talks to workers as CEO of TSMC C. C. Wei and Chairman of TSMC Mark Liu look on during a visit to TSMC AZ’s first Fab (Semiconductor Fabrication Plant) in P1A (Phase 1A), in Phoenix, Arizona. (REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst)

In its National Defense Strategy (NDS) released last year, the Biden administration focused on homeland defense challenges posed by Russia and China, rather than simply on military contingencies in the Indo-Pacific or Europe.²¹ This sends a strong message that the world is actively contested now, and that the Department of Defense and all of the US government are not just preparing for potential kinetic conflict, but engaged already in active operations to disadvantage China—tantamount to a new Cold War. Moreover, the NDS’ emphasis on “integrated deterrence” with allies and partners will underscore the threat to China of the United States designating Taiwan as a “key non-NATO ally,” potentially breaking existing US policy barriers to a virtual defense guarantee.

The United States is likely to apply the following lessons learned from the Ukraine war as it prepares for potential future conflict with China.

The United States sees public intelligence disclosures of Russian plans to invade Ukraine since November 2021 as a major success, despite failing to deter Russia or realize major pre-war Alliance (or Ukrainian government) preparation for the attack.²² The credibility that Washington gained when Russia invaded in February helped drive the immediate post-invasion international reaction (the reverse of the 2003 Iraq weapons of mass destruction (WMD) fiasco) and resulted in even more comprehensive sanctions than were threatened pre-invasion to deter Russia. Senior US military and administration warnings of Beijing’s “2027 plans” echo US intelligence warnings about Ukraine, albeit without the same specificity and high confidence.²³

Similarly for the United States, a Russian military “paper tiger” perception can be applied to the PLA in a Taiwan scenario that draws on the usual tropes.

“China hasn’t fought a major war since 1979” and, therefore, its military operational abilities may be more limited than expected.
“Amphibious invasion across 100NM Taiwan Strait is far more challenging than Russian land invasion of Eastern Ukraine,” due to the enormous inherent complexity of a Normandy-style amphibious landing and the PLA’s insufficient lift capacity for the task.
“Economic sanctions work, imposing a heavy burden for Moscow, thereby increasing regime insecurity, which can deter Beijing from taking action on Taiwan.”²⁴

The key lesson Washington probably finds applicable to a Taiwan 2027 scenario is the importance of providing both conventional and non-conventional support, including intelligence sharing and equipment, in the runup to, and during, any conflict. In the case of Ukraine, Kyiv’s ability to blunt Moscow’s invasion was enabled by the strengthening of Ukraine’s resilience and resistance post-2014. While the United States and its NATO allies have not directly intervened in Ukraine, they maintain military equipment, intelligence, and economic/communications lifelines that have helped deny Russia its original war aims. Specifically, deliveries of new weapons (Javelin, Stingers, artillery/HIMARS, antiship missiles), near-real-time battlefield intelligence and targeting, and initial success in the public-relations/propaganda/information domain seemed to have blunted Russian hybrid warfare and aligned developed world/Global North opinion behind Ukraine and NATO. However, it is far from clear how well Taiwan could be resupplied in the event of a blockade, if at all. As an island nation, Taiwan has no cross-border sanctuaries for stockpiling and delivery of key military and civilian supplies. And while Russia has been restrained from striking NATO members on Ukraine’s western and southwestern borders, US bilateral allies in the Pacific have no NATO-like structure for collective defense.

A lesson the United States so far seems resistant to learning from Ukraine is that nuclear deterrence by the aggressor (Russia in the case of Ukraine, China in Taiwan) enables conventional war and blunts outside major-power intervention.²⁵ The United States and its NATO allies are strongly united in resisting pressure from pundits to enforce a no-fly zone over Ukraine, break the Russian blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, or other ideas that could risk direct NATO-Russian war. China could very well conclude that inducing self-deterrence in Western capitals has worked well in Ukraine, and is a promising approach for Taiwan.²⁶ On the other hand, nuclear deterrence works both ways. One could speculate how things would stand today had Ukraine been given a security guarantee akin to NATO’s Article Five in time, and whether this would not have effectively deterred a Russian attack.²⁷ When President Biden conversely ruled out military intervention on behalf of Ukraine during the lead-up to the attack, deterrence was arguably weakened rather than strengthened. Rather than appreciating the transparency and reliability displayed by the United States, and accepting the olive branch it represents, an authoritarian aggressor might see preemptive self-constraint as a weakness to be exploited.

The more the United States talks up the prospect of a 2027 Taiwan war scenario, the more it will turn to buttressing Taiwan’s “resilience”—regardless of whether Taiwan wants this, given the island’s failure to buttress its own defense during twenty-five years of rapid PLA modernization and growing tensions on the strait.²⁸

The more the United States talks up the prospect of a 2027 Taiwan war scenario, the more it will turn to buttressing Taiwan’s “resilience”—regardless of whether Taiwan wants this

US Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) announces that he will unveil a new package of legislation to address competition with China. (REUTERS via Craig Hudson)

So far, the drumbeat in US media, from Congress, and among some members of the current administration is to be prepared for direct US military intervention to defend Taiwan from a Chinese military attack. The United States, and its allies and partners, should assume that China would be at least as determined as Russia to wield its rapidly expanding nuclear-capable forces (and space/counterspace and cyber capabilities) to deter direct US intervention. China has stated numerous times that it would be prepared to declare a state of war today if it saw Taipei, Washington, or Tokyo violate the understandings that have preserved the peace since at least 1979. The main potential triggers for this are: Chinese perceptions that Taiwan is moving irrevocably away from the possibility of unification and toward the founding of a new state under the moniker “Taiwan” at some future point; a renewed Taiwanese effort to acquire nuclear weapons; or a return to a quasi-formal US military-security relationship with Taiwan, including through stationing US forces on the island or integrating Taiwan into the US alliance sphere through actions such as inviting it to participate in regional or bilateral military exercises or in Alliance intelligence-sharing arrangements. At the same time, China itself through its threatening actions has been doing the most to upend the understandings that constituted the peaceful status quo in the Taiwan Strait, forcing Taiwan, other regional actors such as Japan, and the United States to reposition themselves.

Europe’s lessons learned

Europe as a whole—comprising not just the EU, but also the United Kingdom, Norway, and other key non-EU states—has rather divergent regional security cultures. Former Eastern Bloc countries, for instance, have been far more alert to the risks posed by a belligerent Russia than have Western European countries that have never been under Russian occupation. European lessons learned from the Ukraine war, therefore, differ markedly in each region. For countries with a traditional Russia-friendly outlook—in particular, Germany, France, and Austria—the Ukraine war came as a shock and was met with initial disbelief and disorientation, giving way to a painful process of finding a new security paradigm.²⁹ Other countries—such as the Nordics, Baltics, and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries—were not as surprised, and indeed felt vindicated after decades of open disregard for their warnings.³⁰ With the exception of Finland, most European countries discovered that their previous strategies of reaping a “peace dividend” by shrinking the armed forces and neglecting societal preparedness for crises and war had backfired.³¹ Collectively, Europe has learned (or is learning) five primary lessons.³²

First, a real effort to bolster collective defense through tangible capabilities was urgently required, after countries paid only lip service to NATO commitments (such as the pledge to commit 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to defense spending). This includes the need to ramp up production of defense goods in support of Ukraine during what could be a long struggle.³³

Second, Europe learned the dangers of energy dependence on Russia. Prior to the war, Germany had dismissed concerns voiced by its eastern neighbors, the United States, and especially Ukraine that Nord Stream 2 would make Germany dependent and vulnerable to coercion, while also massively weakening Ukraine’s geopolitical situation. These warnings were proven right and have led to a painful reorientation process in Germany (dubbed the “Zeitenwende”) that is still in full swing more than a year after the war started, and is far from concluded.³⁴ Intense debates still surround the questions of rebuilding German military capability, lethal arms supplies for Ukraine, and the future orientation of Germany’s Russia policy. As Germany is a key member state of both the EU and NATO, due to its size and geographic location, its unresolved security-political identity crisis negatively impairs both these organizations, leading to impatience—particularly among the Eastern European states—and a diminished German stance.³⁵

China’s dubious role in the Ukraine war definitely has the potential to make China “lose Europe,” even if China refrains from delivering arms and ammunition to Russia.

German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang attend a joint press conference at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing, China. (Suo Takekuma/Pool via REUTERS)

Third, Europe has recognized China’s apparent role in the Ukraine war as a covert supporter and enabler of the Russian aggressor, and the consequences this realization has for the security of critical infrastructures in Europe that were built with Chinese technology.³⁶ Rather than supporting Ukraine and using its influence on Russia to stop the war, China has bolstered Russia diplomatically and economically, stopping just short of violating Western sanctions that would endanger China’s economy, while failing to condemn the invasion and effectively calling in its February 2023 “Position” for a freezing of the conflict that would reward Russia’s aggression with territorial gains.³⁷ Particularly among the post-socialist EU and NATO member states in the Baltics and in CEE, this has led to intense distrust of China and disillusionment regarding the official EU formula of China as a “partner, competitor and rival” of the EU.³⁸ The final outcome of this reevaluation will largely depend on China’s further actions of support for Russia—or its refraining from such support, as it may be. Against the backdrop of negative experiences with Chinese “wolf warrior diplomats” during the pandemic, and following coercive diplomacy, China’s dubious role in the Ukraine war definitely has the potential to make China “lose Europe,” even if China refrains from delivering arms and ammunition to Russia.³⁹ Previous Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s hostile stance during the February 2023 Munich Security Conference, and a rather aggressive first speech by China’s new Foreign Minister Qin Gang, do not seem to offer much hope in this regard.⁴⁰

Moreover, Europeans have come to realize that war over Taiwan could break out, despite the risk of nuclear escalation and despite the huge economic constraints in place, and regardless of the political risk such a war would pose to China’s leaders.⁴¹ Given Putin’s complete disregard for such constraints when following through with his attack plan, Europeans have had to accept that their assumptions about the economic rationale as a deterring factor in security-political decision-making of autocratic countries can no longer be relied upon, and that military forms of deterrence are ultimately more meaningful.⁴² The notion that China’s even greater degree of economic dependence on the outside world than Russia’s would serve as sufficient deterrent against military adventurism, therefore, might not hold. Consequently, there has been a palpable uptick in European analyses and discussions surrounding the risk of escalation in the Taiwan Strait, possible military and economic consequences, and Europe’s role in such a scenario, while exchanges with Western and South Pacific NATO partner states have markedly increased. French President Macron’s initiative during his early April 2023 China visit of implying that Taiwan is not Europe’s problem was quickly rebutted across European capitals, and Germany’s Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock made it a point during her subsequent China visit to name war over Taiwan a “horror scenario” that would send “shock waves” around the world and deeply affect Europe.⁴³

Finally, European countries in general, and NATO members in particular, have a newfound appreciation of the United States as the ultimate security provider for European NATO member states. Particularly in Germany and France, the realization that a European “strategic autonomy” remains a pipe dream for the foreseeable future due to lack of capabilities, and the fact that Ukraine’s defense effort would likely not be viable without massive US support, has been an unwelcome, yet necessary, reality check.⁴⁴ Finland and Sweden’s applications for NATO accession are a testament to the indispensability of the nuclear umbrella provided by US forces to frontline NATO states. Russia’s decision to withdraw from the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the nuclear blackmail it employed to keep Western countries from intervening on behalf of Ukraine, and China’s massive expansion of its nuclear arsenal all run counter to European hopes of creating effective arms-control regimes and working toward nuclear threat reduction.⁴⁵ Six years after the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Europeans are needing to accept that there is currently no substitute for nuclear deterrence in the face of the Russian—and, potentially, the Chinese—threat, and that the global trend points toward more nuclear-armed states in the medium term rather than successful arms reduction.⁴⁶ This also implies a newfound sense of European vulnerability to exposure, should the United States become tied down in a conflict with China. All in all, Europe is still reeling from the shock of the war and the challenge it poses to long-held assumptions of economic interdependence and institutionalism as the effective and civilized way to resolve conflicts. Regardless of the war’s ultimate outcome, it is already clear that its humanitarian, economic, political, and security consequences massively complicates the way European states will calibrate their exchanges with China going forward.

Implications of conflicting lessons for deterrence

The collision of these conflicting “lessons” could result in a deterrence trap. If the US increasingly acts on its conviction that China plans to attack on its own initiative in the next few years, the United States is likely to put enormous pressure on Taiwan to prepare to become the next Ukraine, and its self-imposed restraints on security assistance will further erode. US fear of a Chinese attack would increasingly drive a deepening cycle that is bound to cross at least some of China’s red lines.

Deterrence traps, of course, usually have more than one moving part; for its part, China’s actions drive this dangerous dynamic more strongly than those of the United States. China keeps moving the red lines, conducting increasingly provocative military operations around Taiwan, creating provocative situations (such as its “blockade drill” after Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan, which included the unprecedented shooting of ballistic missiles over the island), and intensifying efforts to choke off Taiwan’s international breathing space.⁴⁷ Honduras’ switch to China leaves Taipei with only thirteen formal diplomatic partners as of April 2023, demonstrating that Beijing’s “checkbook diplomacy” threatens to flip others soon and making Taipei more reliant on the United States, Japan, and the EU to prevent greater isolation. And, crucially, if war over Taiwan ever breaks out, it will have been because China chose to use lethal force against Taiwan for the first time since 1958, not the other way around.

Upping the military ante to some degree seems necessary as long as China is changing its military posture and behaving aggressively.

An F/A-18E Super Hornet flies over the flight deck of the Navy’s only forward-deployed aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan in the South China Sea. (US Navy)

The key question, therefore, is what steps Washington, Taipei, and others can take to preserve a stable status quo without fueling tensions. Upping the military ante to some degree seems necessary as long as China is changing its military posture and behaving aggressively. The United States is far from alone in seeing a military threat from China, as that perception is shared within much of the region (including Japan, Australia, Vietnam, the Philippines etc.), and even Europeans are becoming increasingly worried, despite remaining relatively inattentive to the military details of China’s behavior.

The Ukraine war, therefore, offers all sides a chance to learn how such a situation can be avoided: signaling weakness and indecisiveness on the part of the West before February 24, in any case, was not helpful in avoiding the Ukraine war. In the case of China, there is no reason to assume that signaling weakness and indecisiveness will yield any better outcome. In other words, there is a chance to drive home to China the great risks of going to war, and to signal allied resolve in aiming to avoid a second scenario of the same type as that in Ukraine. However, the Ukraine example has limits when applied to Taiwan, where China’s decision to use force—either to convince Washington or Taipei to reverse actions that cross Beijing’s long-established “red lines” (formal independence, a US military alliance) or to compel unification—likely would not be as opportunistic, or as lacking in constructive strategic aims, as Moscow’s decision to invade Ukraine.

Policy recommendations

The collision of these conflicting “lessons” identified by the United States, China, and Europe could result in a deterrence trap, and China’s actions drive this dangerous dynamic more strongly than those of the United States. However, Washington, Taipei, Brussels, and others can still play important roles in preserving stability without fueling tensions.

Allies must analyze, and urgently address, the reasons why deterrence failed in Ukraine. A key lesson to draw from the Ukraine war should be the realization that deterrence failed for a number of reasons, including naiveté and wishful thinking; a willingness among allies to make themselves overly dependent on Russian energy supplies; a lack of resolve in showing a unified front before aggression; and disregard for basic military preparedness among most of the allies.
Non-kinetic scenarios might be China’s favored option for subduing Taiwan, and could be difficult to effectively address as allies. In light of the military difficulties Russia is experiencing in Ukraine, which came as a surprise to the Chinese leadership, it can be assumed that China might prefer non-military or less decisive options of coercing Taiwan if at all possible, short of a PRC perception that Taiwan has taken actions tantamount to a declaration of independence or an explicit US defense commitment. Allies should wargame and prepare for such non-kinetic scenarios, including blockades, hybrid attacks, and subversion, because a less than clear-cut case of aggression might prove far more difficult to react to as united allies than a clearly attributable violation of the United Nations (UN) Charter as in the case of the Ukraine war.
Information warfare over Taiwan presents a key challenge for allies. Just like Russia, China is highly effective at using information and psychological warfare to its advantage. Likeminded countries in the transatlantic and Indo-Pacific communities should identify and address, in a timely fashion, any false narratives China is spreading to sow discord among them or to shape perceptions in the Global South that are detrimental to the goal of upholding the UN Charter and the principles of the rules-based international order.
“Anti-colonial” and “anti-hegemonial” self-justifying narratives by aggressor states targeting audiences in the Global South should be countered more effectively. China and Russia are jointly positioning themselves as “anti-hegemonial” champions of a multipolar world order and, in some cases, are successful despite the fact that Russia is fighting to regain a former colony, or that the PRC threatens war as it seeks “reunification” over Taiwan, which it has never controlled. Transatlantic allies should, therefore, make sure to correct this self-representation by publicly addressing China’s violations of its own 2013 Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with Ukraine, signed by Xi Jinping himself, in which China reinforced the security guarantee extended to Ukraine in recognition of its voluntary relinquishment of its nuclear arms via the Budapest Memorandum (Article 2); pledged to assist Ukraine in the protection of its territorial integrity (Article 5), promised not to take any action prejudicial to the sovereignty, security or territorial integrity of Ukraine (Article 6), and is bound to hold “urgent consultations” with Ukraine to develop measures to counter a threat in case of a crisis (Article 7).⁴⁸ Despite China’s obligations under this treaty, Xi didn’t reach out to Zelenskyy until more than a year after the Russian invasion began.⁴⁹ Ukraine, for its part, has always upheld its treaty obligations to China.⁵⁰
Allies should not put too much hope in a “wedge” strategy. Though some political leaders still harbor hopes of driving a wedge between China and Russia, and incentivizing China to work against Russia, there is currently no reason to believe such an approach might yield viable results. Rather, based on recent Chinese leaders’ consistent actions and rhetoric, allies should assume that Beijing continues to share Russia’s strategic vision of challenging, and fundamentally revising, the international rules-based order (as laid out in their joint statement of February 4, 2022). China can, at best, be hindered from throwing its full weight behind Russia in this war, but not weaned from Russia as long as Xi Jinping is in power, due to the countries’ mutual synergies and shared geopolitical interests.⁵¹
Sharing intelligence can bolster credibility and unity among allies and beyond. The US strategy of sharing intelligence prior to the Ukraine war, and the accuracy of that intelligence, was highly effective in foiling a Russian surprise attack and bolstering US credibility among allies. This approach should also be continued with regard to China’s military actions in the Western Pacific. Care should be taken, however, not to repeat the mistake of sharing unreliable assessments, as in the infamous Iraq “weapons of mass destruction” analysis, which damaged US credibility in Europe at the time.

Although NATO is chiefly concerned with the European theater, its member states represent a sizeable share of global GDP, and the economic deterrence they can provide toward China is not to be discounted.

French President Emmanuel Macron talks to other European leaders during the second day of the European Union leaders summit in Brussels, Belgium October 18, 2019. (Aris Oikonomou/Pool via REUTERS)

Frustrations notwithstanding, European allies make valuable contributions to security. From the US perspective, notwithstanding its predilection toward working with the United Kingdom and its existing frustrations with large EU and NATO partners Germany and France, Europe as a whole should not be discounted as a valuable security partner—including as a partner for routine engagement to better understand and track China’s capabilities and intent toward Taiwan in the military, economic, information, and political domains. In particular, the Nordic, Baltic, and many CEE states, and NATO as an organization, have proven capable of quickly drawing meaningful security-related conclusions from the Ukraine war. NATO accession by Finland, soon followed by Sweden’s, can be expected to improve NATO’s effectiveness as a whole, since at least Finland is going to be a net security provider—for instance, in a scenario of the Baltic states coming under threat. Although NATO is chiefly concerned with the European theater, its member states represent a sizeable share of global GDP, and the economic deterrence they can provide toward China is not to be discounted.

Conclusion

The lessons that Washington and Beijing appear to be learning from Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and Ukraine’s resistance and counteroffensive, in terms of military effectiveness and deterrence, could set the stage for a crisis over Taiwan in the next few years if those lessons are not accompanied by simultaneous efforts to defuse tensions where that is possible. European allies, just like US allies in Asia, can—and should—play a key role in this. For that, it is necessary to think of Eastern Europe and the Western Pacific not as two distinct theaters, but as interlinked theaters where events in one will inevitably have repercussions in the other. In other words, despite the cost, supporting Ukraine is not a detraction from deterring China if it leads to an outcome in which Russian aggression is thwarted, as that also enhances deterrence regarding Taiwan. At the same time, when the United States is focusing more strongly on the Western Pacific, Europeans need to cease seeing this as “abandoning Europe,” and instead step up their own game to bolster the rules-based international order both at home and abroad, with the means at their disposal.

Understanding more closely why deterrence failed in Ukraine, and exploring how these lessons could be applied to enhancing deterrence, bolstering diplomatic initiatives, and, thereby, hopefully defusing tensions over Taiwan should be high on the agenda of the entire Alliance. After all, all members share the same interest, as does China: finding out how to avoid sleepwalking into a global war.

Acknowledgements

This publication was produced under the auspices of a project conducted in partnership with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs focused on the impact of China on the transatlantic relationship.

About the authors

Fellow

John K. Culver

Global China Hub

China East Asia

John K. Culver is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) senior intelligence officer with thirty-five years of experience as a leading analyst of East Asian affairs, including security, economic, and foreign-policy dimensions.

Previously as national intelligence officer for East Asia from 2015 to 2018, Culver drove the Intelligence Community’s support to top policymakers on East Asian issues and managed extensive relationships inside and outside government. He produced a large body of sophisticated, leading-edge analysis and mentored widely on analytic tradecraft. He also routinely represented the Intelligence Community to senior US policy, military, academic, private-sector and foreign-government audiences.

Culver is a recipient of the 2013 William L. Langer Award for extraordinary achievement in the CIA’s analytic mission. He was a member of the Senior Intelligence Service and CIA’s Senior Analytic Service. He was also awarded the Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal.

Fellow

Sarah Kirchberger

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

China Defense Industry

Dr. Sarah Kirchberger is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She serves as head of Asia-Pacific Strategy and Security at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK) and vice president of the German Maritime Institute (DMI). Her current work focuses on maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region, emerging technologies in the maritime sphere, Russian–Chinese military-industrial relations, China’s arms industries, and China’s naval and space development.

Before joining ISPK she was assistant professor of contemporary China at the University of Hamburg, and previously worked as a naval analyst with shipbuilder TKMS Blohm + Voss. She is the author of Assessing China’s Naval Power: Technological Innovation, Economic Constraints, and Strategic Implications (2015). Her earlier work includes a monograph on informal institutions in the Chinese and Taiwanese political systems as well as studies of reform discourses within the Communist Party of China and of Mainland Chinese perceptions of Taiwan’s post-war transformation. She completed undergraduate and graduate studies in Sinology, Political Science and Archaeology in Hamburg, Taipei, and Trier and holds an MA and a PhD in Sinology from the University of Hamburg.

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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47 Greg Torode and Yew Lun Tian, “Risks Mount from China Drills near Taiwan during Pelosi Visit—Analysts,” Reuters, August 3, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/risks-mount-china-drills-near-taiwan-during-pelosi-visit-analysts-2022-08-03.

48 “INDOPACOM Report: ‘PRC-Russia Cooperation—Spotlighting PRC’s Continued Support to Russia Despite Legal Commitments to Ukraine,’” Andrew S. Erickson (blog), February 25, 2023, https://www.andrewerickson.com/2023/02/indopacom-report-prc-russia-cooperation-spotlighting-prcs-continued-support-to-russia-despite-legal-commitments-to-ukraine; “中华人民共和国和乌克兰友好合作条约[PRC-Ukraine Treaty of Friendship & Cooperation]”, People’s Republic of China Treaty Database, Dec. 5, 2013, http://treaty.mfa.gov.cn/tykfiles/20180718/1531877012440.pdf.

49 Simone McCarthy, “With Zelensky call, Xi Jinping steps up bid to broker peace – but does he have a plan?” CNN, April 27, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/27/china/china-ukraine-xi-jinping-zelensky-call-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html .

50 “2013 PRC-Ukraine Treaty of Friendship & Cooperation/Joint Communiqué: Russian, Ukrainian & Chinese Documents, Context, Timeline,” Andrew S. Erickson (blog), August 21, 2022,https://www.andrewerickson.com/2022/08/2013-prc-ukraine-treaty-of-friendship-cooperation-joint-communique-russian-ukrainian-chinese-documents-context-timeline.

51 Kofman, “The Emperors League.”

The post US-China lessons from Ukraine: Fueling more dangerous Taiwan tensions appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Michèle Flournoy and Wendy Anderson promote rapid software acquisition in Breaking Defense

Atlantic Council — Tue, 13 Jun 2023 12:59:00 +0000

On June, two members of the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, former US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy and Palantir Senior Vice President Wendy Anderson, co-wrote an article in Breaking Defense discussing adopting and leveraging innovative software across the Department of Defense. In their op-ed, Flournoy and Anderson highlighted one of the recommendations from the Commission’s interim report for Congress to authorize funding for scaling operationally relevant and mature commercial technology demonstrated in major exercises, such as Rim of the Pacific.

The post Michèle Flournoy and Wendy Anderson promote rapid software acquisition in Breaking Defense appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s failing Ukraine invasion is exposing Putin’s many weaknesses

Anders Åslund — Mon, 12 Jun 2023 00:29:11 +0000

Vladimir Putin’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine is exposing all of his personal weaknesses as a ruler. It is also casting an unforgiving light on the extensive damage he has done to Russia.

In the early 1990s, I encountered Putin several times at international meetings in St. Petersburg, but I never really met him. I talked to the city’s friendly mayor, Anatoly Sobchak, and his first deputy Alexei Kudrin, but Putin, whose background in the KGB was well known, hid on the sidelines and did not really talk to anybody. He was perceived as a secretive nuisance.

Based on this early impression of Putin, I have always been surprised by his remarkable rise to the pinnacle of Russian politics. My view is that he was simply lucky and owed his many promotions to a handful of people close to Russia’s first post-Soviet president, Boris Yeltsin. Putin’s main benefactors were Yeltsin’s daughter Tatyana and last two chiefs of staff, Valentin Yumashev and Alexander Voloshin, along with oligarchs Boris Berezovsky and Roman Abramovich, who trusted his loyalty while Yeltsin was too sick to rule in 1998-99.

Putin arrived at a table of increasing abundance laid by Yeltsin and his reformers; he was further helped by an extended period of rising global oil prices. He has had a surprisingly long run, but nobody can expect to be lucky forever. For more than two decades, Putin thrived on personal loyalty and relied on his slow, deliberate approach to decision-making. However, as the invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel, his many flaws and weaknesses are now coming to the fore.

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Despite being in power for more than two decades, Putin has never broadened his expert base. Instead, he has stuck to his former KGB colleagues and old St. Petersburg technocrats along with a small number of economists and lawyers. How can anybody seriously listen to Nikolai Patrushev or Yuri and Mikhail Kovalchuk? They are considered among Putin’s closest advisers but they are full of old-style Soviet conspiracy theories.

Putin himself has consistently refused to rely on any sources of information other than his own intelligence agencies. In his big media events, he has repeatedly shown that he believes in all manner of conspiracy theories. In other words, he has consciously chosen to remain poorly informed.

He has never been a fast decision maker or crisis manager and has always taken his time. For much of his reign this has not been a major issue, but that is no longer true in the current wartime environment. Putin’s obvious lack of skill as a crisis manager is presumably one of the reasons why so many important decisions related to the war in Ukraine are late and inconsistent.

Putin is also a micromanager who is reluctant to delegate and prone to over-centralizing. He has persistently gone far too deep into details. Much of the failure of the war in Ukraine seems to have been caused by Putin insisting on deciding too much himself, just like Hitler during World War II. Military decisions require detailed knowledge which Putin simply does not possess. He is also physically far from the battlefield due to his lack of personal courage.

Eurasia Center events

Gen James E. Cartwright, USMC (ret.)

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Since 2000, Putin has systematically destroyed Russia’s state institutions and imposed extreme repression. One consequence is that his regime has very little capacity to generate, receive, or utilize negative feedback. Everybody around him has learned that he only wants to hear good news. As a result, neither he nor his administration learn much from their mistakes.

Many biographers of Putin have been reluctant to discuss allegations that he has been deeply involved in organized crime and kleptocracy for much of his political career. Nevertheless, awareness of this kleptocracy is vital for anyone seeking to understand today’s Russia. Far-reaching criminal influence has made the Russian state rot from within. It can neither manage processes nor produce things effectively.

A peculiarity of the Putin regime is that the ruler actually offers two-way loyalty, unlike Stalin. Putin recognizes only one crime, disloyalty. If one of his underlings happens to steal a billion or two, it is not typically seen as a problem. Nor does Putin fire anybody because of incompetence. Instead, incompetent senior officials are forgiven for their frequent blunders as long as they remain personally loyal to Putin.

The invasion of Ukraine has exposed widespread corruption and incompetence throughout the Russian military and defense sector, but Putin’s old friends and allies remain in their posts. Rather than dismissing the many incompetent Russian generals, Putin prefers to circulate them. The most outstanding failures, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, have not lost their jobs despite their obvious and costly mistakes.

With the invasion of Ukraine now in its sixteenth month, Putin’s limitations as a leader have left Russia heading for an historic defeat. During the early years of his reign, he benefited from the hard work done before him by 1990s reformers and enjoyed favorable international conditions, but his many sins and shortcomings are now clearly catching up with him.

Anders Åslund is a senior fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum and author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

In these times, business as usual at the department is not acceptable.

— Lloyd J. Austin, Secretary of Defense

Traditional joint force deterrence is no longer sufficient: a near-singular focus on armed conflict and platform-based capability development fails to deter strategic adversaries like China and Russia from their pursuit of strategic objectives while simultaneously increasing the risk of war. Simply owning the most advanced weaponry, while ceding ground in the competitive space left of conflict, is not enough to meet US deterrence needs, nor is it sufficient to ensure the joint force prevails in conflict. Expanding the joint force’s construct for targeting and effects generation will enable the Department of Defense (DOD) to more effectively deter future conflict while simultaneously shaping the environment to the joint force’s advantage in conflict should deterrence fail.

Why the twenty-first century security environment merits an updated approach

Today’s security threats span the competition continuum, cut across theaters and domains, and are intensified through the application of emerging technologies. The joint force faces challenges spanning the full competition continuum from high-end conflict to gray zone competition, including cyber threats and economic coercion, to cooperation. Technological advancements have changed the character of threats, the types of activities that the DOD can conduct, the speed at which it can act, and expanded its notion of physical and non-physical tools and effects. Specifically, the evolution of the cyber domain has enabled the joint force to gain access to non-physical spaces and generate options to achieve effects in a matter of milliseconds. The realities of twenty-first century competition drive the need to confront adversaries across a global contact layer to counter malign activities and proactively advance US strategic objectives. In other words, actions in one theater or domain can generate options and lead to outcomes in distant corners of the globe.

Moreover, the joint force faces a far more sophisticated adversary in China—qualitatively and quantitatively—than it did in countering violent extremist organizations over the past two decades. Strategic competition requires a significant mindset shift to effectively harness the effects of multiple instruments of power in a global, multi-domain, and coherent manner. DOD doctrine acknowledges this, but the department and joint force have yet to fully operationalize it.

While many activities executed along the competition continuum can enable success in conflict, specific operations, activities, and investments are necessary to ensure joint force superiority in direct combat, especially considering the criticality of combined arms warfare with allies and partners, as well as the seamless integration of multi-domain fires and effects. joint force activities must continually pursue positional advantage across the competition continuum to achieve the necessary balance between deterrence and conflict preparation. Yet, currently, the level of attention to and investment in preparation for armed conflict inhibits the joint force from leveraging the vast data, tools, and authorities at its disposal to prevent such conflict from occurring in the first place.

How joint force operations can meet an evolving threat landscape

The joint force must update its approach to targeting and effects generation to respond to the range of security challenges at hand, else it risks losing without going to war. Success across the full competition continuum will be enabled by the joint force’s ability to effectively harness data and a wide spectrum of tools and authorities with speed, precision, and lethality. This necessitates a deeper and more informed understanding of adversary capabilities, the operating environment, the interconnected nature of the physical and virtual domains, and the range of data sources available to operators. By “expanding its competitive mindset and competitive approach”¹ —to include and integrate tools, information, and actions that span the competition continuum—the joint force can exploit this understanding to apply the right effects to the right problems at the right times, advancing strategic objectives and maintaining informational, decisional, and combat dominance. An expanded competitive mindset will allow the joint force to view competition not as an inevitable march toward future conflict, but rather as a persistent effort to gain and maintain positional advantage across all domains.

The joint force is designed to excel at crisis response; it must make a deliberate mindset shift to plan prior to impending crisis (and prevent such scenarios from occurring in the first place). However, while the urgency of evolving the joint force’s targeting framework is evident across doctrine and policy,² the joint force has not yet taken to scale an assertive approach to dominating across the competitive space. Doctrine included in the DOD’s 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Joint Concept for Competing, for instance, make clear that the department and joint force are thinking about strategic competition more broadly, yet operationally—through authorities, combatant commands, and collaboration with different agencies and allies—DOD and the joint force have yet to fully realize integrated deterrence.

Explainer: Targeting and effects generation

Targeting: Traditional joint or dynamic targeting is “the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them.” In this paper, targeting is an enabler of options, characterized as a continuous activity that furthers the pursuit of objectives by addressing critical intelligence and operational requirements and shaping the environment through a multitude of proactive means. Targeting includes everything from illuminating human networks and key actors, to finding and fixing mobile capabilities, to identifying cyber access vectors and vulnerabilities.

Effects: While conventionally viewed as the “finish” of the targeting cycle—the kinetic fire or kill—effects generation here refers to the employment of instruments of national power (individually or in concert) to achieve a desired outcome. This ranges from traditional kinetic military fires to information operations, cyber tools, and electronic warfare, to targeted economic sanctions and law enforcement actions, to diplomatic démarche or other means of localized leverage.

What this report sets out to achieve

Operationally, the joint force has not adapted to an era of strategic competition, which requires targeting across theaters and domains, the entire competition continuum, and leveraging the range of data sources at its disposal. Doing so requires the joint force to stitch together the data, tools, and authorities needed to achieve global objectives—rather than viewing missions as constrained to a singular region or ends, as has been the status quo.

This report outlines a framework to leverage existing targeting models to more assertively and deliberately compete by: 1) incorporating an expanded use of military and interagency capabilities; 2) leveraging expansive public and private data and harnessing it for effect through emerging technologies; and 3) smartly balancing priorities and weight of effort related to competition and conflict preparation. The authors offer key action areas for implementation at scale.

Expanding the joint force’s competitive mindset

To achieve unity of effort, the joint force must seek opportunities to integrate its operations and activities in time, space, and purpose with the activities of interorganizational partners, proxies, and surrogates.

— Joint Concept for Competing³

While the Pentagon recognizes it must adopt a new mindset to prevail across the competition continuum, it continues to approach targeting and fires through a lens of armed conflict. Traditional approaches to targeting and fires still prevail across the joint force despite the recognition of a need to expand them. Traditionally, the joint force aligns “sensors to shooters” (i.e., targeting) to inflict damage on enemy personnel, materiel, or infrastructure (i.e., fires or effects generation). This sentiment is expressed through variations of the targeting cycle, whether it be the dynamic targeting kill chain (Find, Fix, Target, Track, Engage, Assess) or the Special Operations Forces-preferred cycle (Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate). These processes lend well to a temporal and kinetic approach to targeting and fires—exemplified by strikes on violent extremist organization (VEO) leadership networks or disabling mobile surface-to-air threats as part of a layered suppression of enemy air defenses effort—yet they are insufficient for generating the nonlethal and continuous effects necessary in today’s expansive security environment. This traditional approach to targeting and fires is incongruent with current DOD realities, given “most joint force activities occur in the context of cooperation and competition below armed conflict.”⁴

US Army Cyber Command hosts a town hall. Credit: US Army photo/ Candy Knight

As the DOD recognizes through its integrated deterrence concept, the joint force’s tool kit expands beyond the military arsenal, and solely relying on traditional approaches for targeting and effects is limiting. As articulated in the NDS, integrated deterrence campaigning calls for the joint force—in alignment with and often in a supporting role to other instruments of power found across the interagency—to execute “logically linked” activities to advance “strategy-aligned priorities over time” in order to counter or complicate competitors’ coercion across the globe.⁵ Linking activities across global campaigns require a high level of understanding of competitors’ intent and capabilities and their underlying geopolitical realities, enabled by prolonged access across multiple domains, which creates options to leverage multiple effects in achieving desired ends. For example, developing an understanding of how China’s coercive economic activities in Africa and Latin America support its broader global ambitions can inform the breadth (and complexity) of US response options. While the joint force typically excels at responding to crises, single-purpose platforms and the constant rotation of forces often prohibit the long-duration stare that integrated deterrence requires for proactive campaigning left of crisis.

Operationalizing integrated deterrence: A new model for targeting and effects

To achieve integrated deterrence, this paper outlines a model for operationalizing it. The joint force must meld the existing framework for joint targeting with a model that places a premium on gaining placement and access in a domain or region, enabling a focused understanding of an entity of interest, to facilitate a range of options for the joint force to execute in concert with other instruments of power, whether in a supported or supporting role. Each layer includes the concepts of persistence, local distinction, and global relevance, and can be in a near-constant state of change based on the sensing environment. For example, security cooperation with a partner in Southeast Asia requires access, understanding, and options that are: 1) persistent, to ensure ongoing understanding and to achieve effects over the long term; 2) locally distinct based on regional and local considerations; and 3) globally relevant, acknowledging that awareness and action related to one country affects global dynamics and goals. This layered model is represented in Figures 1 and 2 and further described below.

Integrated Deterrence Targeting. The figures above convey the elements of the joint targeting cycle and the dynamic targeting process (figure 1), with a philosophical and nonlinear pyramid approach to developing options for complex problems (figure 2). These two frameworks must be fused together to operationalize integrated deterrence. The joint force’s traditional targeting cycle must be informed by a foundation of situational awareness. Data, tools, and authorities are all necessary mechanisms to establish situational awareness.

Placement and access

virtual and/or physical proximity to an entity of interest

Focused understanding

situational awareness and perception of an entity (actor and/or location) and how it fits into broader geostrategic missions

Options

potential pathways forward to respond to a complex problem set and achieve outcomes, informed by focused understanding and placement and access

Explaining the model of a modified targeting and effects process

Adopting this layered model is critical for two reasons. First, the complex, global, and multi-domain problem sets the DOD faces today necessitate options that are similarly sophisticated in nature and cut across the competition continuum. By prioritizing a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of problem sets, the joint force is presented with a wider array of options to address key challenges. Such focused understanding is possible when the near-infinite amount of data available across the public and private sectors is transformed into usable information and, ultimately, intelligence.

Second, a new competitive mindset requires broadening the joint force’s tool kit beyond traditional military effects. The joint force has the authority to, and does, execute non-kinetic targeting, albeit insufficiently, yet it prioritizes kinetic fires as part of the traditional targeting cycle. Fusing kinetic and non-kinetic fires is critical not only from a deterrence perspective but also, more significantly, to enable victory in armed conflict. Yet, alone, the military instrument of power is insufficient for the problem sets germane to integrated deterrence. While the joint force has significantly advanced its organic non-kinetic capabilities, it primarily leverages kinetic effects, which neglects other instruments of power, disincentivizes creative thinking, and leads to poor integration with interagency partners.⁶ A high degree of awareness of the capabilities and authorities that other instruments of power bring to the table is critical such that they can be synchronized with, or amplified by, joint force activities at all echelons.

The process of generating placement and access, focused understanding, and options is not linear, and each stage can and should inform the others over time. Specific placement and access may be generated to understand a particular problem in a sophisticated manner such that novel options can be developed. Similarly, focused understanding may drive the need for additional or alternative access to close critical intelligence gaps and inform options. Likewise, commanders may demand options to address a particular problem, which in turn will inform the planning process to generate the necessary access and understanding. Below is an overview of the three foundational elements of the pyramid.

I. Placement and access

To develop the focused understanding required for integrated deterrence, the joint force cannot stare at problems from afar. Placement and access are foundational to developing an enhanced understanding of the problem sets facing the United States. Placement and access, however, does not necessarily mean physical proximity of the military to a particular interest area—it also encompasses virtual presence and can be developed by the joint force, interagency partners, and allied counterparts. It also implies some degree of usability, sustainability, and repeatability; simply visiting a location or gaining virtual access to a network does not equate to true placement and access. Rather, that access must be repeatable if it is temporal in nature, sustainable over operationally relevant time periods, and usable for alternate purposes such as data collection, security cooperation, or reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. Placement and access can be enhanced by leveraging data from a multitude of sources to enable the joint force insight into digital networks of value to access, or the nature of key partnerships required for physical access. Additionally, enhancing existing authorities and making them more flexible would allow units pursuing a mission set in one area to adapt and undertake additional mission sets that may be valuable for a broader or global mission set.

Evolving the joint force approach to placement and access will open a range of opportunities given the interconnected nature of global problem sets. For example, France’s historical security cooperation and counterterrorism activities in the Sahel region of West Africa, during the 2010s, could have also served as an access vector to increasing understanding of the growing threat of Russian private military corporations (PMC) like Wagner Group in the region. This physical proximity can enable a deeper understanding of Wagner’s activities in the region, potentially driving requirements for further physical or virtual access or informing options in line with global campaign plans to counter Russian malign influence. Critically, the joint force must explore means to creatively exploit access when mission convergences exist—units or platforms deployed for one purpose, such as countering VEO, may enable access vectors to support another mission, such as strategic competition, and vice versa. While clarity of primary and secondary objectives of missions would need to remain, the makeup of units and task forces, and the requisite authorities given to them, should be meaningfully considered to capitalize on mission convergences. Not only does this approach create efficiencies with respect to endeavors like security cooperation, but it also offers the opportunity to obfuscate strategic intentions.

II. Focused understanding

Focused understanding of an actor, environment, or relationship is required to solve complex problems, not only due to the sophisticated capabilities of strategic adversaries but also because integrated deterrence campaigns are global in nature. Transregional, multi-domain problems cannot be thoroughly addressed in compartmentalized and only localized ways. Rather, the joint force must stitch together regional understandings based on local access and conditions with broader knowledge informed by other global touch points. The roles of partners, both interagency and international, are critical in developing focused understanding. Not only do they enable multi-domain access, but they also provide unique perspectives. The vast amounts of commercial and government data can and should be harnessed and fused to improve focused understanding of actors and problem sets. While data from traditional sources is immensely valuable, open-source information—organized into actionable information—can drastically improve understanding of patterns and behavior. For example, social media data may help inform US forces of the presence of an adversarial force’s covert presence in a country that may be hard to identify or find evidence for using other means. Ultimately, the fusing of different data sources more consistently can help understanding across the competition continuum.

Building on the previous example, to address Wagner Group’s activities in the Sahel, the joint force should first understand how those activities tie into Russia’s global campaign to secure influence and create instability through expeditionary PMC activities. A holistic understanding of Wagner’s activities across the Sahel, Central Africa, Latin America, Syria, and Eastern Europe presents a more informed picture of the totality of the problem, as well as the associated pressure points, vulnerabilities, and opportunities. Moreover, the local US country team, elements of the intelligence community, French forces, and host-nation partners will all view the Wagner problem in different lights, which can enhance the joint force’s perspective and is necessary in developing viable options leveraging all instruments of power.

This combination of regional and global understanding, enabled by joint force and partner access and capabilities, ultimately informs a far greater range of options than is achieved strictly through a regional military lens, which has been the status quo. Critically, focused understanding better informs risk assessments at echelon, abating risk aversion frequently seen at higher levels of command authority that are farthest removed from the tactical edge.

III. Options

Senior leaders and commanders typically request a range of options to address problems, both to allow flexibility and enable sound decision-making in light of strategic priorities and risks. The Joint Concept for Competing calls for the joint force to:

Identify approaches that enable it to apply its military capabilities proactively, and differently in some cases, to gain influence, advantage, and leverage over adversaries to establish the necessary conditions to achieve strategic outcomes.

— Joint Concept for Competing⁷

While doctrinally this is clear, today’s traditional approach to targeting and competition limits the most effective suite of options from being generated. More-nuanced options may place the joint force in a supporting role to other departments and agencies: for example, conducting traditional manhunting activities (via military authorities) to enable a diplomatic action such as a démarche (via Department of State authorities). The level of sophistication required to achieve what the Joint Concept calls for, especially across activities below armed conflict, makes both risk and efficacy assessments challenging. It is far more difficult to quantify the effectiveness of a campaign to counter Chinese regional influence—for example, assessing long-duration efforts to obstruct effort by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to secure access, basing, and overflight—than it was to measure the success of kinetic drone strikes during the Global War on Terrorism. This challenge is met not only by prioritizing focused understanding but also by parlaying that understanding into a range of options that may be locally distinct but support global campaign plan objectives.

Ultimately, options for senior decision-makers are developed to achieve outcomes that are in service of more-aspirational objectives. Again, examining Wagner activity, a desired outcome of an operation could be to deny Wagner’s ability to securely communicate between several outstations across the Sahel. The aspirational objective is to critically degrade Wagner’s ability to conduct and sustain expeditionary activities globally.

Targeting throughout the competition continuum

This model for the generation of options for complex problems must be melded with an adaptation in the application of traditional joint force targeting processes. Joint targeting is not solely reliant on joint force tools, capabilities, and authorities; it can and should incorporate other instruments of power—by collaborating across departments and agencies—to bolster data and inform understanding, as well as “identify, develop, and affect targets to meet commander objectives.”⁸

Take, for example, a PRC network in Latin America that facilitates command and control of dual-use infrastructure. Here, data could be harnessed from the intelligence (e.g., National Security Agency) and diplomatic (e.g., Department of State Regional Security Office) instruments of power to identify a particular local criminal network that facilitates relevant PRC contracting activities. Host-nation law enforcement can then apply pressure on the criminal network to share information about the PRC actors with whom it engages routinely. Over time, this information can help generate several options to gain access to the objective network through Special Operations Forces-enabled cyber activities. Throughout, the military (e.g., Military Information Support Operations) and diplomatic (e.g., Department of State Global Engagement Center) instruments of power can expose malign PRC practices through information operations to positively shape narratives in line with strategic objectives. The joint targeting cycle could be leveraged multiple times for:

Employing traditional manhunting techniques to find and fix specific local criminal actors of interest, develop their pattern of life, then using non-kinetic fires to register their phones with specific networks that enable intelligence access to key digital data.
Leveraging data obtained through financial (e.g., Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control) instruments of power to target specific institutions that enable transactions between local criminal networks and the PRC. This data can be correlated with intelligence derived from the activities above, as well as populated to other portions of the joint force focused on countering PRC dual-use activities to further global understanding of their tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Conducting intelligence preparation of the cyber environment to find and fix key nodes that are vulnerable to offensive cyber fires (e.g., US Cyber Command), as well as to bolster and amplify information operations that counter local PRC propaganda strategies.

The myriad of joint targeting activities outlined above not only enable specific tactical actions but also inform or further placement and access that continuously matures the collective understanding of the operating environment. Given the nature of strategic competitors, much of this understanding can be exported to other locations to bolster awareness and enable the linking of activities in a logical way as outlined in the NDS. At the center of this process is data, and as stated by former Deputy Secretary of Defense David L. Norquist, “our ability to fight and win wars requires that we become world leaders in operationalizing and protecting our data resources at speed and scale.”⁹

Harnessing data to improve the targeting and effects process

Data is a strategic asset that must be operationalized in order to provide a lethal and effective joint force.

— DOD Data Strategy¹⁰

The joint force’s ability to leverage data at speed and scale, predicated on its adoption of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), enables this framework for targeting and effects generation. Data informs the nature of required access, feeds the focused understanding process, and enables the development of well-informed options that artfully balance desired outcomes with strategic risk. However, raw and unstructured data in isolation does not create a decisive advantage. Rather, it must be harnessed for effect, transforming data into both information and intelligence that is usable and accessible at the speed of relevance.

The US Space Command Joint Operations Center is responsible for integrating data and status from multiple operations centers, the services, and agencies to provide the commander with critical Command and Control capabilities. The capabilities are being increasingly leveraged by other services in support of joint global operations. Credit: US Space Command

While the importance of data is nothing new, the joint force must grapple with the explosion of available data spanning all domains, sectors, and sources. Technologies such as AI and machine learning (ML) present meaningful ways to navigate this near-infinite amount of data. The 2020 DOD Data Strategy envisions the department as a “data-centric organization that uses data at speed and scale for operational advantage and increased efficiency,” with particular focus on enabling all-domain operations, more rapid and informed decision-making, and organizational business analytics.¹¹ Moreover, AI makes determinations and finds data connections in ways humans alone cannot, encapsulating everything from making obvious connections more rapidly (e.g., using satellite data to geolocate battlefield equipment) to identifying valuable datasets overlooked by humans (e.g., how commercial shipping telemetry data can enable deeper understanding of the PRC’s fifth-generation [5G] infrastructure development in Africa).

Data

Data is obtained by a variety of automated or manual and physical or virtual means. Any entity that can obtain data is considered a sensor. Data becomes information once put into context prescribed with meaning by the observer. Often, the meaning prescribed by the observer can be adapted as understanding of the environment grows, making particular datasets more or less useful. The process by which information is transformed into intelligence is complex and combines both art and science as described in JP 2-0 Joint Intelligence:

Intelligence fuses and evaluates information from multiple sources to provide the most accurate assessment possible of the current state of the operating environment.
From current assessments, intelligence draws predictive estimates of the full range of potential alternative future states of the operating environment.
To inform decisions, intelligence illuminates how the operating environment may react to different friendly options under consideration.¹²

The flow from data to intelligence—known as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) cycle—is illustrated in Figure 3, overlaid with the targeting framework from Figure 2.

The automation of PED enhances and accelerates the path from raw data to actionable intelligence, or from “sensor to shooter.”

The nature of today’s security environment necessitates the execution of PED at greater speed and scale than is achievable by humans alone. Particularly, the operating environment below armed conflict—which encompasses most joint force activities—places a premium on scale. To effectively compete globally and deter China and Russia, large quantities of data must be triaged and transformed into intelligence to inform transregional and multi-domain activities that are logically linked. In contrast, armed conflict—the highest-risk joint force activity—places a premium on speed. Rapidly processing and disseminating targeting data, effectively integrating kinetic and non-kinetic fires against mobile targets, and incorporating virtual capabilities that can affect adversary nodes within milliseconds would be impossible without AI/ML and human-machine teaming. The Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concept describes the importance of this flow from data to intelligence based on the requirement for “joint force commanders to ‘sense,’ ‘make sense,’ and ‘act’ in the operational environment.”¹³ While this paper is not focused on the JADC2 and Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO) concepts, the employment of this paper’s updated targeting and effects process would support the more rapid implementation of JADO/JADC2 across the joint force.

Sense

The joint force must consider nearly all entities to be sensors, ranging from sensitive intelligence collection activities to open-source commercial datasets. Adopting a more competitive mindset requires the joint force to democratize data, allowing for a wide array of data-gathering streams to interact with AI algorithms trained to produce usable information. Much attention is placed on gathering data from the tactical edge, yet the edge can take many forms across physical and virtual spaces, regions, and domains. Critically, leveraging nonmilitary instruments of power, as well as allied and partner sensors, can both increase and diversify the data gathered. The role of commercial data is invaluable, with the private sector often having access to people, places, and things that are difficult, if not impossible, for overt government entities to replicate. However, while nontraditional data sources are crucial to building global situational awareness, the DOD does not currently have the communications infrastructure to integrate data from these various inputs at speed and scale—this change must be accelerated.

Make sense

Making sense of the operating environment correlates to the process depicted in Figure 2. The importance of AI/ML becomes paramount here, such that the joint force can achieve automation of prediction at speed and scale, while reserving judgment for human decision-makers on or in the loop. Ultimately, larger and more diverse datasets correlate to more sophisticated training of AI/ML algorithms, increasing the precision of predictive modeling to inform human decision-making. Analysis of the nature of adversary activities—and the subsequent options to address them—may look quite different when viewed through a whole-of-government versus strictly military lens. Furthermore, allies’ and partners’ perspectives on problem sets, especially those close to home, offer invaluable information to complement the joint force’s understanding of the operating environment.

Act

Taking action is a data-driven endeavor—not only in regard to the appropriate action but also the expected adversary reaction and the associated risks. Data-informed decision-making, given its bias toward empiricism, helps challenge assumptions, drive rigorous planning, and enable more-decentralized and potentially faster decision-making. Indeed, the focus of this framework is to utilize access-enabled understanding, coupled with sophisticated data-harnessing techniques, to ultimately provide commanders with a range of well-informed, data-driven options to act. It should be emphasized that to act does not signify finality of the process. As stated in the Joint Concept for Competing, “strategic competition is an enduring condition to be managed, not a problem to be solved.”US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, 7. In fact, the “act” could be a decision to develop further placement and access to address critical intelligence gaps, or to submit requirements to inform further capability development for an unaddressed operational need.

The process of sensing, making sense, and acting is continuous. The speed by which this process plays out is variable based on the nature of the domain, location along the continuum, commander’s intent, and both local and global risk considerations. Deliberate planning and preparation of the operating environment, to include the establishment of relationships and infrastructure, deployment of sensors, and data architecture, and other such activities are necessary to enable this process to occur with speed downstream. In particular, active conflict places a premium on achieving maximum speed for this process, which simultaneously necessitates extensive preparation and autonomy.

Using the competition space to prepare for high-end armed conflict

Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win.

— Sun Tzu, The Art of War¹⁴

Conflict preparation is the persistent, locally distinct, and global sensing of the target ecosystem. It is a dynamic process that constantly generates and updates the integrated targeting planning and execution decisions. Prevailing in armed conflict is the ultimate basis for the existence of the joint force, and places a significant premium on preparation to maintain a position of advantage, inform capability development, and hold adversaries at risk. Armed conflict exists on the far-right side of the competition continuum and represents the most consequential activity the joint force must prepare for and, when called upon, execute. While often referred to in sterilized terminology, a clear description of armed conflict—the application of violence to destroy an enemy’s will and means to resist—serves to highlight the care and attention that preparation for conflict requires. While any type of conflict requires serious attention, high-end armed conflict against a peer adversary represents the most potentially dangerous scenario for which the joint force must prepare. While the objective of integrated deterrence is to deter conflict from occurring in the first place, it is equally about shaping the environment to ensure joint force dominance should deterrence fail. As outlined in Joint Publication 3-0, “while commanders conduct activities of cooperation and adversarial competition, they are still preparing for armed conflict.”¹⁵

Trilateral exercises between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, Australian Defense Force, and US Navy support shared goals of peace and stability while enhancing regional security. Credit: US Navy/ Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Codie L. Soule

Conflict preparation is a balancing act. The joint force must weigh concerns of strategic risk and escalation management: “Tilting the competitive balance too far in one’s own favor will affect an adversary’s decision-making and behavior, but the effect may be vertical or horizontal escalation, not compliance.”¹⁶ Smartly preparing for conflict to create and maintain advantage over an adversary can be a campaign in its own right and must involve shaping activities as well as capability development. These activities will often nest within an overarching integrated deterrence campaign, but at times these endeavors may diverge, at which point the balance of priority and weight of effort must be considered. For example, winning a conflict to defend the Panama Canal would be a clear priority of the United States. However, preparation for such a conflict is not assigned the same weight of effort as, for example, the defense of Taiwan, which is being treated as a high-likelihood event by the Pentagon today.

The United States will not achieve a decisive warfighting advantage against a near-peer competitor through sheer mass or weapon systems alone—rather, the victor will be the military that stacks the deck in its advantage before conflict erupts. Russia’s current war in Ukraine highlights the severity of high-end armed conflict involving near-peer competitors. While great wartime effort is aimed at bolstering sustainment through industrial base and supply chain modernization, operational activities will eventually be curtailed to whatever pace can be sustained through resupply. The joint force’s future advantage will hinge on its ability to: 1) advantageously shape the environment and 2) field capabilities with greater speed, precision, and lethality than its adversary.

Shaping the environment

Shaping the environment is crucial to securing a position of advantage across multiple domains left of conflict. In the context of targeting and effects generation, activities to shape the environment must center around closing critical operational and intelligence gaps associated with a prioritized target list tied to operational plans. These activities are intended to enhance precision and lethality of engagement and shorten the kill chain once armed conflict begins. In line with the framework espoused in this report, focused understanding of the enemy’s order of battle, critical infrastructure, battle management tactics, techniques and procedures, and standard operating procedures is key to establishing and maintaining a prioritized target list. In this way, portions of the joint targeting cycle are accomplished prior to conflict, informing weaponeering recommendations across kinetic and non-kinetic effects, as well as the requirements necessary to develop new capabilities to counter enemy systems for which the joint force does not yet possess a solution.

Moreover, shaping activities can be geared toward increasing resiliency in the joint targeting process. Much attention is given to the challenges of contested, degraded, and operationally limited (CDO) environments and how they complicate traditional means by which the joint force projects combat power. Peer adversaries can contest environments in a multitude of ways such as anti-access/area denial capabilities, electromagnetic interference, countering space situational awareness, and defensive cyber operations. Shaping activities must prioritize alternate means of accomplishing warfighting functions given the potential for primary means to become denied or degraded. Ironically, the CDO nature of Russia’s war in Ukraine has led to a much more conventional and analogue fight than anticipated. This highlights the importance of bolstering resiliency through shaping operations, as peer adversary denial capabilities may effectively cancel out one another’s high-end platforms.

Shaping across the physical and virtual domains

As is the case throughout the competition continuum, the contact layer for armed conflict is both physical and virtual. Traditional physical targets include surface-to-air missile systems, radars, maritime vessels, and command posts, and they exist in quantities of hundreds or thousands; virtual targets include network nodes tied to communication systems, power infrastructure, situational awareness, and early warning, and they are quantified in the millions. When expanding the battlefield to the virtual domain, synchronization of kinetic and non-kinetic effects can lead to significant advantages across the joint warfighting functions¹⁷ and with regard to the principle of mass.

Gaining a competitive advantage traditionally depends on availability and posture: the forces available, and on what timeline, are determined by their current posture. In the physical world, this construct presents challenging time-distance problems when considering global conflicts, raising questions for both escalation management as well as force preservation. The virtual world can alter this paradigm by enabling virtual mass, leveraging cyber operations to hold adversary networks and capabilities at risk at unprecedented speed and scale. Even modest impact on adversary capabilities executed on this scale of mass and speed can complicate the enemy’s risk calculus and mitigate some risk associated with physical force flow into theater. Given the challenges of logistics and sustainment, efficiencies gained through the employment of virtual capabilities provide a significant advantage during a protracted conflict. Saying this, virtual capabilities are not a silver bullet and effects delivered through cyberspace are insufficient in isolation during armed conflict, and often require large up-front investment in time and resources.

The evolution of virtual targeting and effects, to include the integration with physical targeting and fires, drives a greater premium on shaping the environment prior to conflict. To hold millions of virtual targets at risk instantaneously necessitates significant preparation of the environment. Indeed, a multiyear campaign built around access and understanding—by, with, and through regional allies and partners—may be necessary to simply gain access to the right adversary networks. Development and installation of cyber capabilities would be executed in parallel, with the associated development and intelligence gaps feeding back into the overall campaign approach. Shaping campaigns can provide the decisive advantage once armed conflict begins, all while informing the joint force of its own potential vulnerabilities and thus allowing for continued defensive hardening in stride.

Capability development

While fielding innovative and advanced technologies is critical to maintaining a decisive battlefield advantage, technology (whether platform or software-based) does not on its own equate to capability.¹⁸ Rather, it is the combination of technology, tactics, and training that creates a true capability—for instance, the United States sells fifth-generation fighter jets to other nations, but those nations do not instantly gain the capability to execute low-observable deep strike operations. Technology development must be informed by an understanding of the operating environment, the capabilities of adversaries, and the nature by which the joint force executes operations. To that end, furthering capability development is an objective for the campaigning framework outlined in this paper.

Training AI/ML algorithms often emulates or requires real-world data, further underscoring the need for capability development to harness data for effect. While great strides have been made in emulation for training, the real world offers the most significant data, which is accessible through robust campaigning activities across the joint force in concert with interagency and international partners. The integration of emerging weapon system technology such as hypersonics, lasers, and space-based fires is equally critical. Capabilities such as JADC2 seek to establish the necessary datacentric architecture for seamless integration of information and effects, which span employment times from milliseconds to hours. However, without AI/ML-driven predictive capabilities in the loop, joint force commanders will be challenged to make appropriate targeting and weaponeering decisions amid a large-scale conflict, creating significant risk with respect to sustainment, logistics, and force protection. Without a similar distribution of situational awareness, authority, and capability to the tactical edge, the joint force will not be able to field a credible combat force in a CDO environment where being disconnected from higher headquarters is the norm.

Lastly, while security cooperation is a foundational activity underlying integrated deterrence, the execution of high-end combined arms warfare with allies and partners requires a great deal of specific investment. This includes years of combined training, exercises, and rehearsals to create a dependable capability, especially when factoring in the complexity of integrating emerging technology. Incorporating allies and partners into the joint force-led scheme of maneuver will be critical to maintaining an advantage in targeting and effects generation. However, information-sharing hurdles, disparate rules of engagement, authorities, and cultural considerations must be ironed out in advance of conflict such that the full force of allied firepower can be realized. Ensuring that key allies are fielding capabilities that are JADC2 compatible will be critical to achieving the shared situational awareness required for a common operating picture. Making strides of this nature and fielding a combat-credible combined force will not be accomplished through sporadic exercises, key leader engagements, or exchanges; the joint force must train with allies and partners in the same manner with which it trains internally.

In sum, high-end conflict with a peer adversary presents the most difficult and high-risk challenge, and it requires specific attention given the gravity of its nature. When adequately prioritized, preparation for armed conflict prescribes a unique set of requirements for the joint force and its partners to execute during cooperation and competition and across multiple domains and instruments of power, which at times may overlap or diverge from deterrence. Shaping activities of this nature fall expressly within the proposed proactive targeting and effects framework given that, in the event of war, “these capabilities will shape the environment to ensure combat dominance and our ability to end any conflict on our terms.”¹⁹

The way forward

If we don’t change – if we fail to adapt – we risk losing the certainty with which we have defended our national interests for decades. We risk losing a high-end fight.

— Gen Charles Q. Brown, Jr., US Air Force Chief of Staff²⁰

Implementing change is no easy task, especially when considering the massive scale of the joint force. Nonetheless, a tidal wave of contemporary strategies, guidance and policy documents, and service visions all speak to the urgent need for change. Culture—coupled with procedural and technological changes—will be key to enabling sustainable adoption of a new approach.

Culture: Adapting the joint force’s mindset to global problems across the competition continuum

First, to deter armed conflict the joint force must adopt and operationalize the competitive mindset shift outlined in recent strategic doctrine. While armed conflict is never desirable, regardless of scale, high-end warfare between nuclear-armed peer competitors is of such gravity that deterring it from ever occurring is crucial. General Mark A. Milley’s assertion that “traditional joint force deterrence” is “less effective,” alludes to the notion that owning the most sophisticated or greatest quantity of weaponry is inadequate on its own as a deterrent.²¹ Moreover, while an adversary’s belief in the joint force’s will to act is critical to deterrence, it cannot solely revolve around direct military force given escalation concerns. Rather, adopting a more proactive and creative approach to strategic competition can simultaneously deter malign behavior while complicating, confusing, and frustrating adversary decision-making. The spectrum of views on Russia’s war in Ukraine are informative in this regard: Some highlight US and NATO success in arming Ukraine in its valiant campaign to oppose Russia’s invasion, whereas others view the ongoing war as “a direct result of the West’s lack of resolve and failure to credibly deter Russia” from waging war on the European continent more broadly, regardless of NATO borders.²² This latter sentiment pushes the force to adopt cultural change in order to deter future conflicts. Of course, the United States cannot deter all conflicts from occurring. However, well-informed global campaign plans can and should inform the prioritization of operational activities tied to certain potential conflicts the joint force deliberately seeks to deter.

Incorporating all instruments of power

The joint force need not abandon its traditional strengths; rather, it ought to smartly evolve its approaches to incorporate all instruments of power to expand access, fuel understanding, and generate a range of options regardless of location within the competition continuum. Increased training and education on the nature of authorities and tools that the various instruments of power can bring to the fight is critical for joint leaders. In this way, entities like the State Department or Intelligence Community do not simply represent “concurrence” boxes that must be checked to get military operations approved. Rather, they can be incorporated as partners that offer unique access vectors, diverse understanding, and a variety of tools to support or be supported by military actions, whether at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels. As described in this framework, adopting this change bolsters the joint force’s capability to target within any domain, and similarly expands the nature of effects, fires, and actions available to achieve desired outcomes.

Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) exemplify this approach and could be scaled to enable joint targeting and effects generation. Scaling a similar approach to that of the JIATF, however, requires cultural adaptation. JIATFs are tailor-built to address singular problems and combine multiple instruments of power—and their accompanying authorities and capabilities—under a single chain of command to create unity of effort. However, unity of effort does not necessitate unity of command: The joint force can lead the integrated deterrence effort without being in charge, and it often does play a supporting role to its interagency counterparts. This requires senior leaders to establish a culture that moves beyond “coordination” and “deconfliction” and toward “collaboration.” Increased organizational trust, built upon real-world operational experiences, will increase trust both across departments and in the disparate datasets produced across the instruments of power, ultimately amplifying the predictive capabilities of the AI architecture this framework is reliant upon. Moving toward collaboration is similarly critical as it pertains to enhancing the aggregate power among allies and partners.

Embracing the global nature of problem sets

The joint force must also embrace the concept of a global, multi-domain contact layer. When viewing the world solely through the lens of armed conflict, the joint force focuses narrowly on Russia in Europe and the PRC in the Indo-Pacific. Targeting and effects generation in Latin America, Africa, or the Arctic are then insufficiently regarded as supporting, complementary, or niche efforts rather than as potential key components of integrated deterrence. Many operational efforts—such as security force assistance, building a partner’s combat capability, gaining access, and illuminating vulnerabilities of an adversary’s capabilities—require significant time and resource investments. Senior leaders must understand why, for example, a multiyear effort to gain placement and access in Equatorial Guinea fits within the global campaign to counter PRC malign influence; otherwise they will be less likely to resource it (in this case, Equatorial Guinea is a candidate for the establishment of what would be the PRC’s first Atlantic naval base).²³ As such, combatant commanders who lead global campaign plans, such as the global campaign plan for China, should prioritize regularly communicating their priorities to other combatant commands when activities take place in another geographic area of command. This is especially important when activity falls under the authority of a different combatant command.

Generating senior leader understanding is a by-product of cultivating a joint force that thinks with a competitive mindset. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph F. Dunford recognized, the United States “think[s] of being at peace or war…our adversaries don’t think that way.”²⁴ Altering the “peace or war” mentality to a deeper understanding of activities across the competition continuum—and adopting a strategy of proactive targeting harnessing all instruments of power—is necessary to simultaneously deter aggression and effectively prepare for conflict. Combatant command force structure changes; intergovernmental professional training, education, and exercises; and in-garrison and deployed intergovernmental cross-pollination are beyond the scope of this paper but are among concepts worth exploring to enable cultural changes at scale.

Technology and data: Building a resilient and holistic data architecture

The DOD must build a robust and extensive data architecture, fusing private sector data with government data, and build frameworks and standards to harness it into actionable information. Data fuels everything from access and understanding, to options, targeting, and analysis, to predictions and recommendations. For data to be usable, however, it must first be accessible. Accessibility must occur at echelon given the nature of CDO environments and the expectation that severed links between the tactical edge and higher headquarters elements will be the norm, not the exception.

The joint force needs a data architecture in line with, and as a central component of, the JADC2 concept that aggregates data from all sensors across all domains to enable a proactive framework for targeting and effect. The architecture must encompass the tactical edge, fusing commercial and government-procured data across a spectrum of classification levels. In line with the DoD Data Strategy, such an architecture must make data visible, accessible, understandable, linked, trustworthy, interoperable, and secure.²⁵ The DOD must involve the private sector in the process of building this architecture and consider how interoperability standards and technologies can be integrated and kept up to date. Not only will this help the joint force accelerate the PED cycle and act on intelligence, but it will also allow the joint force to operate across the scale of attribution to mitigate the operational and counterintelligence risks inherent to strategic competition.

Airmen from the 7th Reconnaissance Squadron communications flight conduct a satellite communications training course. Credit: US Air Force/ Senior Airman Ashley Richards

Moreover, the joint force must explore how classified intelligence can safely be used to facilitate AI/ML algorithmic training. Otherwise, it may inadvertently incur risk to sources, methods, or exquisite platforms. Alternatively, with the appropriate mechanisms, AI/ML algorithms can be trained to reach similar conclusions as classified analysis using only open-source data. This will greatly enhance the joint force’s ability to export capabilities to allies and partners without concern for security-sharing agreements or classification obstacles.

Authorities, rules of engagement, and risk: Updating DOD guidelines and standards

DOD guidelines and standards must be updated to harness all tools of national power and to enable combatant commands to prioritize global issues alongside their regional areas of responsibility. For distribution of data to achieve the desired effect, the joint force must explore changes in the distribution of authorities, rules of engagement, and the nature of assessing risk. While a lack of authorities is frequently cited as a barrier to accomplishing operational activities, it is often the cumbersome means by which to access existing authorities that stands in the way. If a joint force commander (JFC) can exercise kinetic strike authority at their level but require permission from several echelons higher to execute information operations, the JFC will increasingly rely on kinetic effects. Authorities often lack clear processes by which subordinate commanders can quickly access them. Similarly, when authorities are reserved at the highest echelons, the approval authority is farthest removed from the problem, lacks adequate understanding, and often leads to excessive risk aversion. This plays out with the array of authorities germane to the joint force and will only become more complex and burdensome when expanding the aperture to include other instruments of power. At a minimum, when the National Command Authority delegates authorities to combatant commanders, there ought to be a standardized and coherent process by which subordinate echelons of command can access them efficiently. Additionally, an effective JADO/JADC2 operating environment that collects, disseminates, and harnesses data requires more effective coordination across the US services and manufacturers. The development of standards must be pursued to advance capabilities that are interoperable across the joint force and with US allies. Doing so will help improve the speed and precision of the targeting cycle.

Second, streamlining the approach to accessing authorities goes hand in hand with updating the joint force’s rules of engagement. These concepts help mitigate the concerns around disparate joint force elements operating with degraded or nonexistent contact with higher headquarters elements. Rules of engagement allow for commanders to lead through intent instead of specific guidance, facilitating more rapid and creative localized targeting and effects generation. Distribution of authorities and associated rules of engagement could transform a unit’s guidance from “employ electronic warfare (EW) effects against Russian ORLAN-10s” to “disrupt Russian ISR below 5,000 feet AGL.” The former is prescriptive and limiting; the latter is intent based, provides greater flexibility, and informs the necessary capabilities for the tactical edge to operate autonomously for longer periods of time.

Finally, the department must rethink the way it assesses risk in light of integrated deterrence and a global contact layer. Making informed decisions on risk management is a key underpinning of this framework. Yet, risk assessments are traditionally conducted in a temporal manner: the risk associated with a particular activity, in a particular location, with a particular target. Risks associated with strategic competition are not, however, suited to traditional ways of thinking. Competing with adversaries across a global contact layer requires considering how local risk ties into strategic risk, whether that be transregional or trans-domain. This is further complicated by the imperative to effectively prepare the joint force for combat. If, for example, a particular PRC capability presented a significant problem for the joint force’s ability to execute a contingency response plan, significant investment may be required to mitigate the threat. This may lead to a scenario in which the joint force assumes greater risk elsewhere in the globe to gain access to locations where the PRC has proliferated similar capabilities to increase understanding and develop options for use during crisis. A similar situation could arise where the joint force makes the decision to reveal a capability it would otherwise hold in reserve to complicate an adversary’s decision-making and risk calculus, thus enhancing deterrence. Maturing the joint force’s ability to assess risk in this manner must begin with data-informed understanding, shared consciousness, and unity of effort across all instruments of power.

Conclusion

Cultivating a joint force that enables and supports a whole-of-government approach to integrated deterrence is a daunting yet achievable vision, requiring transformational leadership to achieve. “Humans are more important than hardware,” and how leaders harness the joint force’s enduring strategic advantage of human capital will dictate whether success is achieved.²⁶ This paper has outlined a vision to update the way the joint force conducts targeting and effects generation for an era of strategic competition. Evolving the joint force’s model for targeting and effects will require adopting a mindset shift that sees competition as key to setting the conditions for, and ideally avoiding, armed conflict. To truly operationalize integrated deterrence, the joint force must embrace targeting and effects across the competition continuum, leveraging the range of tools at its disposal across its domestic and international counterparts, and avoiding a solely military or kinetic lens. Moreover, through the power of AI, the DOD can harness data for effect and fuel the proactive, continuous, and global campaigning required for integrated deterrence.

About the authors

Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Department of Defense

Fellow

Justin M. Conelli

Senior US Air Force Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan National Security

Staff

Clementine G. Starling

Director, Forward Defense

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Staff

Julia Siegel

Associate Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, Intellectual Property—Patents, Patent Related Matters, Trademarks and Copyrights, 1 September 1998, this research paper is not copyrighted but is the property of the United States government.

1 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, February 2023, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23698400/20230213-joint-concept-for-competing-signed.pdf.

2 DOD guidance and Joint Doctrine, such as the integrated deterrence concept nested within the National Defense Strategy and the Joint Concept for Competing, recognize that security challenges facing the United States span the competition continuum. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, February 10, 2023, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23698400/20230213-joint-concept-for-competing-signed.pdf, and US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 2022, 8-11, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.

3 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, v.

4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfighting, Joint Publication 1 (JP 1), July 2019, II-13.

5 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 1.

6 Cesar Augusto Rodriguez, Timothy Charles Walton, and Hyong Chu, Putting the “FIL” into “DIME”: Growing Joint Understanding of the Instruments of Power, Joint Force Quarterly, April 2020, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1099537.pdf.

7 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, v.

8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Targeting, Joint Publication 3-60 (JP 3-60), September 2019, II-8 – 11-9.

9 Department of Defense, DOD Data Strategy, September 2020, i, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/08/2002514180/-1/-1/0/DOD-DATA-STRATEGY.PDF.

10 US Department of Defense, DoD Data Strategy, i.

11 US Department of Defense, DoD Data Strategy, 2.

12 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence, Joint Publication 2-0 (JP 2-0), May 2022, I-2.

13 US Department of Defense, Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) Strategy, March 2022, 4, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/17/2002958406/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-THE-JOINT-ALL-DOMAIN-COMMAND-AND-CONTROL-STRATEGY.PDF.

14 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 401.

15 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Campaigns and Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (JP 3-0), June 2022, xxx.

16 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, 22.

17 The joint warfighting functions include command and control, information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment.

18 Tate Nurkin, The Five Revolutions: Examining Defense Innovation in the Indo-Pacific Region, Atlantic Council, November 20, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Five-Revolutions-Report.pdf.

19 Department of Defense, Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy, October 2020, 1, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/02/2002510472/-1/-1/0/Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.PDF.

20 Charles Q. Brown, Accelerate Change or Lose, US Air Force, August 2020, https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/csaf/CSAF_22/CSAF_22_Strategic_Approach_Accelerate_Change_or_Lose_31_Aug_2020.pdf.

21 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing.

22 Liam Collins and Frank Sobchak, “U.S. Deterrence Failed in Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, February 20, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/20/ukraine-deterrence-failed-putin-invasion/.

23 David Vergun, “General Says China Is Seeking a Naval Base in West Africa,” US Department of Defense, March 17, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2969935/general-says-china-is-seeking-a-naval-base-in-west-africa/

24 Dunford: Challenges Require More Than ‘Buying New Hardware,’ Association of the United Stated Army, October 10, 2016, https://www.ausa.org/news/dunford-challenges-require-new-hardware.

25 US Department of Defense, DOD Data Strategy.

26 US Special Operations Command, “SOF Truths,” https://www.socom.mil/about/sof-truths.

The post Operationalizing integrated deterrence: Applying joint force targeting across the competition continuum appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Restocking US and allies’ arsenals starts with getting industry involved at the NATO summit

Giedrimas Jeglinskas and Viltaute Zarembaite — Thu, 08 Jun 2023 13:45:11 +0000

Defense industry chief executive officers and the leaders of NATO members and partner countries need to have an urgent discussion about insufficient stockpiles of ammunition and equipment. The NATO Leaders’ Summit July 11-12 in Vilnius, Lithuania, is a perfect opportunity to bring them together.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg summed up the problem last week. “So far allies have depleted stocks to be able to support Ukraine—that’s not a sustainable path so we need to ramp up production to fill these new and more ambitious targets,” he explained. The will to support Ukraine for “as long as it takes” is there, but the capacity to deliver support while also defending NATO members is also needed.

According to the Kiel Institute, Ukraine has received more than seventy billion dollars in military aid since Russia’s full-scale invasion started on February 24, 2022. While this figure is large and the aid has contributed to Ukraine’s ability to resist and later repel the Russian invasion, Ukrainian forces need more ammunition and equipment to finish the job. However, the countries supporting Ukraine are struggling to produce enough vital defense materiel. Ukraine is burning through ammunition a lot faster than NATO countries currently manufacture it.

Massive industrial bottlenecks in manufacturing of artillery shells and related equipment, if unresolved, threaten to undermine efforts to help the Ukrainians push out the invaders. Stoltenberg has dubbed it a “race of logistics,” and more than Ukraine’s future is at stake. The readiness of US and allied militaries is put at risk by ineffectively designed supply chains, cumbersome process-focused procurement, and political wrangling. This incapacity to replenish allies’ ammunition stocks and equipment undermines the deterrence posture of NATO as a whole.

Similarly, the US defense industry has been slow to deliver enough munitions to Taiwan as it faces increased saber-rattling from the People’s Republic of China. A recent report by Seth G. Jones at the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that, in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the United States would deplete certain long-range munitions in less than a week. As allies such as Australia and Japan start to ramp up defense spending, the US defense industry will need to deliver more weapons to meet the increasing demand.

In Europe, the defense industry revival is not fairing any better. In May, after weeks of negotiations, the European Union (EU) announced a one-billion-euro initiative to procure ammunition for Ukraine “via the European Union industry and Norway.” This initiative, however, has faced multiple stumbling blocks and delays as certain countries have prioritized defending the interests of national industries and using protectionist measures to purchase ammunition only from European companies. EU leaders appear to have decided to move forward, but it is clear that both the structure of the initiative and its lack of scale will not solve the long-term underinvestment issues in Europe. This is despite the level of ambition outlined in the EU’s Strategic Compass for Security and Defense last year and important progress made on the issue since.

What can be done?

Looking to history, the urgency and unity shown as allied—primarily US—industry mass produced equipment for World War II is nowhere to be found in today’s production process. The Atlantic Council’s Thomas S. Warrick recently advocated for “the Department of Defense to shift procurement to a wartime footing.” However, even short of this proposal, the United States and its allies and partners can nonetheless launch a coordinated effort to overcome industrial and bureaucratic constraints. It also must include both the governments and heads of industry responsible for stocking any future arsenal of democracy.

Representatives from the defense industry have already been invited by NATO to participate in a meeting of defense ministers in Brussels later this month. However, more is needed. The Vilnius summit in July is an important opportunity to further advance engagement with the defense industry, which NATO can do by holding an official side event for government officials to meet with the chief executive officers of the defense industry. Here they could all get on the same page about the true urgency of inadequate defense value chains. Defense contractors would benefit from direct awareness-raising conversations at the highest political level. In exchange, policymakers would benefit from hearing directly from defense contractors about what policies are necessary to streamline their production processes.

This would be taking a page out of Japan’s playbook. On the eve of last month’s Group of Seven (G7) Hiroshima summit, seven of the world’s largest semiconductor makers met with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in Tokyo to discuss plans to significantly increase Japan’s chipmaking capabilities. The unprecedented meeting demonstrated a concerted effort between the private and public sectors to reshape global commercial supply chains as tensions with China continue to grow.

Productive collaboration with the defense industry is essential not only for replenishing stockpiles and maintaining a steady supply of armaments, but also for addressing a wider range of future concerns, spanning from information sharing to cybersecurity and resilience. Developing a strong partnership with the defense industry will be vital for advancing in these areas. So, where might this collaboration start?

First, NATO’s Vilnius summit will be the second time in a row when Asia-Pacific partners are participating, offering opportunities to look into diversifying supply chains across Europe and North America and into the Indo-Pacific.

Second, allies need to rethink process-centered procurement, which avoids rather than manages risk and consumes massive financial and time resources rather than promptly delivering what is necessary. Anyone who has ever dealt with the notorious procurement schemes will agree that change is impossible without forceful political will. In Vilnius, heads of the defense industry and NATO member states could commit to pursue new and specific orders and deliverables, the fulfillment of which could help reorganize or override currently inefficient procurement processes.

Third, to truly empower NATO’s innovation efforts, such as the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic and the NATO Innovation Fund, industry leaders must commit to advancing these nascent initiatives. As disruptive technologies mature and become essential for future defense capabilities, a closer collaboration between the private sector and governments is needed to bridge the investment gaps and avoid the “valleys of death,” in which small but high-potential companies are left in limbo between initial development and production. In order to maintain technological edge and bring more companies and innovation into the defense space, NATO needs to boost investment in cutting-edge technologies and make its innovation cycle more efficient and robust.

The task of rebuilding the arsenal of democracy is a complex multi-stakeholder endeavor. What is required is a robust no-nonsense collaboration between an industry that can deliver and governments that can lead with political decisions to enable relevant industrial policies. Vilnius is a great place to start.

Giedrimas Jeglinskas is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He was previously assistant secretary general for executive management at NATO and deputy minister of defense of the Republic of Lithuania.

Viltaute Zarembaite is a visiting fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is also a career diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania. These views are her own and do not reflect those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania.

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Export controls: A surprising key to strengthening UK-US military collaboration

Deborah Cheverton — Wed, 07 Jun 2023 15:06:15 +0000

UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak arrived in Washington Tuesday night for talks with US President Joe Biden. According to the White House, discussions will focus on shared economic and security challenges including energy security, the climate crisis, and Ukraine. Both leaders are fresh off the Group of Seven (G7) Summit in Japan where these issues got a thorough airing, and these talks should be an opportunity to go deeper into the details on a bilateral basis. While Ukraine will likely grab the headlines from a national security perspective, another important, albeit under-the-radar issue should also be on the agenda: export controls reform.

Export controls are often thought of for their role in preventing the transfer of arms and other sensitive technologies to malign actors, or as a foreign policy tool used alongside economic sanctions to punish illegal activity. This was the angle taken at the G7 with specific reference to Russia and China, but that viewpoint obscures a different problem. The United States’ closest allies have been quietly frustrated for decades that the indiscriminate and extraterritorial application of these same export controls, in particular the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), seriously hinders efforts to share technologies and collaborate with allies on capability development projects. This is due to the costly and time-consuming processes associated with ITAR compliance. But this isn’t just a time-versus-cost-versus-quality issue for program managers to deal with. It’s much bigger than that. As William Greenwalt, a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, has said, “US government security policies related to export controls no longer support long-term national security interests and if not modified will likely result in the US military falling further behind in the competition with China.” ITAR was enacted during the Cold War, at a time when the United States enjoyed such technological and industrial dominance over its potential adversaries that it could afford to go it alone, write off allied contributions to military capability development, and absorb the consequences in time and cost when they did choose to partner up. None of those things are true anymore.

The Department of Defense has long recognized that it no longer holds complete technological advantage and recent administrations of both parties have promoted the critical role of allies and partners in their national security strategies. Yet ITAR directly prevents the United States from accessing some of the best allied technology and indirectly reduces the military capabilities of its allies. For example, the UK government estimated in 2017 that it costs UK companies almost half a billion dollars a year to comply with ITAR. That’s effectively a 0.7 percent tax levied by the United States on the national defense budget of a close ally, and money which could be far better spent on increased readiness or on more advanced capabilities that would benefit the United States. After all, depending on exchange rate fluctuations and production lot, half a billion dollars equates to four or five F-35B fighter jets. Even worse, that figure only covers those companies that have the resources and risk appetite to work with the United States in the first place. So-called “ITAR taint,” the risk that any technical cooperation with US entities will lead to the loss of control over their technology, prevents some non-US companies from engaging at all. Data is anecdotal as it mainly comes down to internal bidding decisions by individual companies, but it seems that small and medium size enterprises are especially affected. These are exactly the sort of cutting-edge companies that the United States needs in its corner on everything from quantum computing to materials science.

A focus for discussions at the White House

You would think that with such an obvious downside it would be an easy fix, but no. Unfortunately for the Department of Defense, it doesn’t own ITAR policy or its implementation. The State Department does, and it does not feel the pain of delayed programs and degraded technological advantage. Despite the efforts of many talented and hardworking officials who have dedicated their careers to keeping the United States’ most critical technological advancements out of enemy hands, the organizational incentives are not structured to support the pace or flexibility that modern technology and the current geostrategic and security situation demand. The outdated systems State Department officials are working within have become a mechanism of national self-harm and, at the end of the day, it is the warfighter that loses out.

The good news is that the right people in the legislative and executive branches of the US government are starting to take notice of the problem, particularly in the context of the nuclear submarine deal involving Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, known as AUKUS. To date, much of the press about AUKUS has been on the trilateral effort to support Australia in acquiring conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines under Pillar One of the agreement. Arguably though, it is the wider cooperation in critical technologies such as artificial intelligence, autonomy, cyber, and electronic warfare envisaged under Pillar Two that represents the real generational opportunity. Behind the scenes, officials and politicians in all three nations are realizing that Pillar Two just won’t stand with ITAR as it’s currently enforced. This is driving unprecedented interest on Capitol Hill, where congressional Republicans in the House and Senate are leading efforts to force the State Department to address the problem. They are advancing the fantastically named Truncating Onerous Regulations for Partners and Enhancing Deterrence Operations (TORPEDO) Act. To quote Senator Jim Risch (R-Idaho), the ranking member of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, this legislation “aims to speed up the implementation process by reforming the US regulatory system so we can cooperate in a timely and efficient manner on the capabilities we and our partners need.” This is extremely welcome, but in the complicated world of export controls reform the story begins with legislation but it doesn’t end there. Previous attempts at reform, such as the 2016 legal expansion of the National Technology Industrial Base and the 2022 Open General License pilot program, have stumbled on implementation issues which can only be fixed from within the State Department and will require coordinated action between the executive and legislative branches.

This is where Sunak and Biden should focus their discussions. With his reputation for pragmatism, Sunak should easily avoid the temptation to request a blanket ITAR exemption for the United Kingdom as this would be politically unpalatable and counterproductive. Biden, with his flagship foreign policy initiative in the balance, should commit to work with Congress on a bounded and enforceable exemption under the Arms Export Controls Act for AUKUS nations, and then incentivize the State Department to make it work in practice. Collaboration with longstanding allies and partners is critical to the United States’ success in combating the increasingly dynamic threat posed by its adversaries. To let that flounder on account of an out-of-date and inappropriately enforced export control regime should be an unacceptable outcome for all involved.

Deborah Cheverton is a visiting senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Cheverton is a career civil servant from the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MOD), where she has spent almost fifteen years working across a range of policy and delivery areas with a particular focus on science and technology policy, industrial strategy, capability development, and international collaboration. She writes here in her personal capacity as an Atlantic Council fellow, not in an official government capacity. Her views are her own.

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What’s so bad about mercenaries?

Alia Brahimi — Wed, 31 May 2023 13:38:39 +0000

In Season 1, Episode 3 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi speaks with the philosopher Professor Tony Coady about the key characteristics of mercenaries, including the motivation for private gain. They discuss the Geneva Conventions definition of mercenaries, the grey area of military contractors in support roles, and whether it’s possible to base a moral or legal judgement on an individual’s intentions. They also consider the main moral objections to mercenaries, with Professor Coady arguing that we should do as much as possible to tone down the resort to war as a standard political option.

“Mercenaries should be treated as combatants along with regular soldiers and have the same restrictions on their conduct and, where appropriate, protections.”

Tony Coady, Philosopher and Professor

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China, Iran, Belarus, and Armenia all fear a Russian defeat in Ukraine

Taras Kuzio — Tue, 23 May 2023 14:44:33 +0000

There is no question that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has dramatically undermined Russia’s global standing, but it is also true that international responses to the war have been far from uniform. The democratic world has almost universally condemned Russia’s invasion and has united in support of Ukraine, while many in the Global South have preferred to maintain a more neutral position.

Only a handful of countries have actually been prepared to stand with Russia and defend Moscow’s actions. Four nations in particular have emerged as key allies at a time when Vladimir Putin faces mounting international isolation. China, Iran, Belarus, and Armenia all have different motivations for supporting the Kremlin, but they are united by a common fear of what a Russian defeat in Ukraine might mean for their own countries.

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In recent months, China has sought to play an active role in efforts to negotiate a peace between Russia and Ukraine. However, many in Kyiv and throughout the West remain skeptical of China’s apparently contradictory views on the peace process. Critics have accused China of publicly supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity while also indicating the need for Kyiv to cede land as part of any potential settlement.

While stopping short of outright support for Russia’s invasion, China has adopted a public position that could be termed as Kremlin-friendly neutrality, and has accused the West of provoking the war. This posture is unsurprising. Beijing shares Moscow’s goal of challenging Western dominance and replacing it with what they see as a more multipolar world. China fears that if Russia loses the current war, it will greatly strengthen the West while undermining the global standing of China and other authoritarian regimes.

More specifically, a Russian defeat would considerably complicate any future Chinese efforts to invade Taiwan. If Western military aid helps Ukraine to secure victory over the once vaunted Russian army, this will increase the chances of similar Western support for Taiwan against possible Chinese aggression. The disastrous performance of Putin’s army in Ukraine has already undermined Russia’s claims to military superpower status and significantly boosted Western confidence. China is not eager for this unwelcome trend to gain further momentum.

On Russia’s western border, Belarus has emerged as something of a captive partner in the attack on Ukraine, with Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka serving as the single most vocal backer of Russia’s war while also allowing his country to be used as a platform for the invasion. Russian troops flooded into northern Ukraine from Belarus on the first days of the war in February 2022; Russia continues to launch airstrikes on Ukrainian targets from Belarusian territory.

Lukashenka has little choice but to back Putin. He only remains in power because Russia intervened in 2020 to prop up his regime in the wake of pro-democracy protests over a fraudulent presidential election. Lukashenka’s brutal Kremlin-backed crackdown against the Belarusian protest movement left him internationally isolated and heavily dependent on Moscow for his political survival. A Russian defeat in Ukraine would likely reignite domestic unrest inside Belarus and would almost certainly spell doom for the Lukashenka regime.

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While the failure of Putin’s invasion could lead to regime change in Belarus, some in Armenia sees the prospect of a Russian defeat in Ukraine in starkly existential terms. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reportedly warned Armenians recently: “If Russia loses the war in Ukraine, I have no idea what will happen to Armenia.”

Many Armenians remain heavily invested in the traditional view of Russia as a protector of the country against the perceived threats to national security posed by Azerbaijan and Turkey. This thinking has shaped Armenian politics and foreign policy for much of the post-Soviet era. The country is a founding member of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and backed out of an association agreement with the EU a decade ago following Kremlin pressure, instead joining Putin’s pet project, the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia maintains military bases in Armenia and has dominated efforts to regulate the ongoing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Pashinyan’s concerns are unsurprising but short-sighted. A Russian defeat in Ukraine would potentially allow Armenia to pursue a more independent foreign policy while expanding economic and political ties with the European Union. Alarm over the threat of renewed hostilities with Azerbaijan is understandable, but there is little prospect of Armenia itself being invaded, especially if US and EU-brokered talks produce a peace treaty that recognizes the Armenian-Azerbaijani border while providing satisfactory guarantees for Karabakh’s Armenian population.

As a staunch opponent of the West and critic of perceived Western influence over global affairs, Iran shares China’s geopolitical motivations for supporting Russia’s invasion. Many in the Iranian leadership are also fearful that a Russian defeat in Ukraine could increase demands for democratic change inside Iran itself and fuel a new round of domestic protests.

There are additional practical reasons for Tehran’s pro-Russian stance. Faced with tightening international sanctions and cut off from Western technologies, Russia has turned to Iran as an alternative source of military assistance. In exchange for Iranian drones and other supplies, Moscow is believed to be providing Tehran with everything from fighter jets to air defense systems, while also assisting Iran’s nuclear program.

This burgeoning military partnership between Russia and Iran is proving deadly for Ukraine, with Iranian drones regularly used to strike civilian targets across Ukraine. It also poses a significant threat to Israeli national security and has sparked heated debate over Israel’s apparent reluctance to provide military support to Ukraine. If cooperation between Moscow and Tehran continues to intensify, Russian air defense systems could limit Israeli operations in Syria and complicate any future preventative strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

With the full-scale invasion of Ukraine now in its sixteenth month, there appears to be little chance of an outright Russian victory of the kind envisaged by Putin when he first gave the order to invade in February 2022. Instead, the most likely scenarios are now either some form of stalemate or a Ukrainian military victory.

If Russia is defeated in Ukraine, the consequences will reverberate around the globe. China is powerful enough to survive such a shock but would be geopolitically weakened. The Belarusian and Iranian regimes would face a far more uncertain future and might not survive. Meanwhile, Armenia may find that despite its current misgivings, the defeat of Russia could allow Yerevan to return to the path of European integration.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. His latest book is “Genocide and Fascism. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

At the same time, it is important not to underestimate the enemy. Russian army commanders recognize the increasing importance of defense tech and are working hard to close the gap in areas where Ukraine has established a lead. To stay ahead, it is vital to constantly innovate. This requires a systematic approach to the development of Ukraine’s defense tech sector.

Ukraine’s immediate goal is to create a fast track for defense tech innovation that can make a powerful contribution to the defeat of Russia’s invasion. We must create an environment where startups flourish and innovative products can move rapidly toward mass production. Creativity must be tailored to the specific needs of the military, with the necessary expertise and state support readily available to turn great ideas into military advantages.

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This was the thinking behind the Brave1 defense tech cluster, which was launched by Ukraine in late April. A joint initiative of Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation, Defense Ministry, General Staff, National Security and Defense Council, Ministry of Strategic Industries, and Economy Ministry, Brave1 is designed to serve as a hub for the country’s defense tech industry. It is a platform to optimize cooperation between individual defense tech companies, the state, the Ukrainian military, investors, and other potential partners.

The scope of Brave1 is necessarily broad. Ukraine is seeking to promote new developments in a wide range of defense-related tech segments including supply and logistics, unmanned aerial vehicles, cybersecurity, navigation, and medical care. We have designed the initiative relying on international experience, though in the end, we have quite a unique Ukrainian story. Brave1 includes partner accelerators and incubators, investor engagement opportunities, and educational courses.

The Brave1 Defense Innovation Council is headed by Mark Lennon. Mr. Lennon has held senior leadership positions at Apple, Gartner, and in the US government, and has also served for 24 years as a US Naval Officer. His background and credibility will enable Brave1 to become a powerful platform capable of generating war-winning technologies.

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The long-term objective is clear: Ukraine must become one of the world’s leading defense tech countries. This is entirely realistic. After all, Ukraine is already acquiring unique wartime experience on a daily basis and boasts a very large number of highly skilled IT professionals and engineers. Moscow’s full-scale invasion has turned Ukraine into a testing ground for new military technologies. It is also transforming the country into a defense tech superpower.

This process has the potential to profoundly impact Ukraine’s national security and the country’s economy. I am confident that in the coming years, we will witness the emergence of powerful Ukrainian defense tech companies worth billions of dollars. The growth of this sector will play a critical role in Ukrainian defense policy for decades to come and will remain a top national priority.

All that lies ahead. The task now is to defeat Russia. The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin is unlikely to end soon. Instead, it should be viewed as a marathon. Ukrainians must be ready for a long fight. We must play to our strengths as a tech-savvy nation of innovators, and must do everything to maximize effective cooperation between creative minds, state bodies, and the military. Ukrainians have already demonstrated to global audiences that they are some the bravest fighters on the planet. They must now confirm that are also among the smartest.

Mykhailo Fedorov is Ukraine’s Vice Prime Minister for Innovations, Development of Education, Science and Technologies, and Minister of Digital Transformation.

Ideas to implementation: Priorities for NATO’s Vilnius Summit

After more than a year of Russia’s brutal, illegal, and unprovoked war in Ukraine, the transatlantic community remains at a critical juncture. The upcoming Vilnius summit is an opportunity for the Alliance to turn ideas into action.

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Responding to Russia, supporting Ukraine, and securing the region

NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept—a new strategy adopted at last year’s Madrid summit—named the Russian Federation as the “most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security.” Russia will remain at the top of NATO’s agenda in Vilnius, according to senior US and allied officials and experts at a recent Atlantic Council event—held in partnership with the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Lithuania—that mapped out priorities for the summit. The officials and experts at the event explained that it will be even higher a priority for the Alliance to make commitments that enable Ukraine’s victory as the current war continues and possibly becomes a protracted conflict.

Since the start of the war, NATO members have provided Ukraine with multipronged support ranging from humanitarian assistance to military aid. Solidarity and support from the West, according to Ukrainian Minister of Defense Oleksii Reznikov, is helping Ukraine face down Russia’s imperialist incursions and “[destroy] the military power targeting European values and freedoms.”

US Senator Jeanne Shaheen underscored the durability of allies’ support, explaining that “there is strong, continued, bipartisan support [for] the Ukrainians, appreciation for their courage [and] for how hard they are fighting, and a real commitment to continue to support this effort.” More can be done, however, to enable Ukraine’s victory and secure Euro-Atlantic stability. During the event, former US Permanent Representative to NATO Kay Bailey Hutchison emphasized that while the US Department of Defense’s new security assistance package and provision of high mobility artillery rocket systems are steps in the right direction, the United States and other NATO allies must expand coordinated military assistance and pivot towards “doing more and doing it faster” to help Ukraine ramp up activities for the coming counteroffensive. Reznikov added that “NATO should commit to meet Ukraine’s urgent military needs for military defense equipment, focusing on air defense systems, long-range artillery, and necessary ammo, tanks, and combat aircraft.” Expanded support, panelists added, will greatly enhance Ukraine’s ability to strike behind enemy lines and neutralize the bases that are launching attacks, killing Ukrainians, and destroying critical infrastructure in the next stage of the war.

NATO must also figure out how it will signal that Ukraine will be protected from future Russian assaults. For Reznikov, the answer is clear: The Vilnius summit must deliver a concrete path for Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance. But that is not all. Security guarantees and necessary military defense equipment are Ukraine’s top requests from NATO, and Reznikov is hoping NATO leaders will address these needs at the summit. In the long term, Western military presence within Ukraine will be the strongest deterrent against a future Russian attack, argued panelist Michael O’Hanlon, the Brookings Institution’s foreign policy director.

Securing the Euro-Atlantic area will require the Alliance to fortify its force posture on its eastern flank, according to Samuel J. Brannen, US deputy assistant secretary of defense for plans and posture. Although the United States has already begun to make force posture adjustments on NATO’s east, with the addition of a brigade combat team, rotational forces in the Baltic states, and prepositioned stocks, Brannen said that “having ready forces and having the plans to go with them” will have to remain at the top of NATO’s agenda in Vilnius. The increased readiness and capabilities that come with rotational forces can help NATO move towards deterrence by denial—reducing the likelihood of a future Russian attack and positioning the Alliance to prevail in the event one occurs.

On July 11-12, the Atlantic Council will host the NATO Public Forum, gathering experts and decision makers from the globe on the sidelines of the NATO Summit in Vilnius. Subscribe below to get updates about the forum.

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Assessing challenges on the horizon

An array of challenges—ranging from the rise of China to emerging disruptive technologies—will also feature on the agenda at the Vilnius summit.

Countering an assertive China amidst other evolving short- and long-term threats will require the Alliance to operationalize its 360-degree scope and, as Hutchison added, increase cooperation with NATO’s partners in the Pacific. That is because, as Sarah Kirchberger—head of the Center for Asia-Pacific Strategy and Security at Kiel University’s Institute for Security Policy and Atlantic Council nonresident senior fellow—put it, “anything can be a battlefield” in the eyes of China. Beijing has entrenched itself in Western economies, has forged a strategic partnership with Russia in its bid to undermine the rules-based international order, and (like Russia) employs hybrid tactics like information operations in an attempt to divide the Western alliance. Despite converging concern about the China challenge across the transatlantic, NATO will need to translate policy articulated in the 2022 Strategic Concept into action in Vilnius, a recent Transatlantic Security Initiative report argues.

What makes navigating the geopolitical environment difficult, according to Philippe Lavigne—a general and NATO’s supreme allied commander, transformation—is that today’s challenges are “more, faster, and everywhere.” He continued to explain that emerging and disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, and quantum technologies are changing how NATO operates and how wars are fought. There is more data, decision-making is faster, and conflict can happen in almost every domain. NATO’s digital transformation—through the integration of emerging technologies, interoperability of forces, and multi-domain operations—must ready the Alliance to tackle more challenges, do it rapidly, and operate everywhere. Lavigne said he is expecting a decision on the Digital Transformation Implementation Strategic Plan, an initiative he advises on and oversees at NATO, to maintain and sharpen the Alliance’s technological edge at the Vilnius summit.

As authoritarian leaders continue to take advantage of emerging technologies, experts argued that democracies can win the digital race—if they play to their strengths. Openness is NATO’s advantage, Kirchberger explained, so the Alliance must not “underestimate how innovative [its] ecosystem is.” To strengthen defense innovation, panelists pointed out, it will be important to both invest in emerging technologies and address urgent capability and critical-infrastructure gaps, which would require Allies to replenish weapons stocks and agree to spend more than two percent of their respective gross domestic products on defense (further military priorities for the summit are outlined in this recent Transatlantic Security Initiative issue brief).

Addressing the role of the private sector, Giedrimas Jeglinskas, former NATO assistant secretary general for executive management, said that the Alliance can leverage private capital to drive innovation, and Lavigne added that NATO should adopt best practices from the private sector. Jeglinskas proposed a practical solution for the Alliance at the summit, calling for NATO leaders to meet with top defense industry leaders in Vilnius to share those best practices. Lithuanian Minister of National Defense Arvydas Anušauskas stressed that the war “requires” NATO “to boost [its] defense industry as quickly as possible” and suggested that multinational contracts are signal to the defense industry.

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Gearing up for Vilnius

NATO allies and partners, according to Anušauskas, must “move full steam ahead” to “make [the] Vilnius summit [a] strategic win.” Experts and officials convening at the Atlantic Council conveyed that implementing NATO’s vision for Euro-Atlantic security will be of paramount importance. Allies must arrive ready to enable Ukraine’s victory, strengthen NATO’s forward presence, and tackle an increasingly contested security environment of evolving challenges—NATO’s adversaries, panelists emphasized, will be watching the summit’s outcomes closely.

Joslyn Brodfuehrer is an assistant director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Zelma Sergejeva is a visiting fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Money talks: Here’s what the president’s budget says about the US military edge

Clementine G. Starling, Marek Jestrab, Julia Siegel — Tue, 16 May 2023 17:23:57 +0000

President Joe Biden’s National Security Strategy says that the United States has entered a “decisive decade” when it comes to competition with China. But the first comprehensive look at how the administration hopes to implement that strategy—Biden’s $886-billion request for defense-related activities in his fiscal year (FY) 2024 budget—may be insufficient to meet the moment.

The budget does hit the mark in some ways. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin called it “the most strategy-driven [budget] request” ever produced for defense. The proposal prioritizes investments needed to implement the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and necessarily accepts risk in other areas. And the request focuses on improving readiness, boosting procurement of the most-valued munitions, and modernizing—making clear that the United States is highly concerned with preventing war with China in the near term and deterring conflict more generally in the long term.

However, the 3 percent funding increase from FY23 to FY24 may be entirely offset by inflation or even signify a decline in buying power. That means painful trade-offs for the Department of Defense’s (DOD) force structure in personnel and platforms.

The strengths: Implementing the NDS

First, the budget reinforces the view that China is the pacing challenge for the United States. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative, a set of defense investments established by Congress in 2021 in response to China’s growing military power, received its largest investment. Moreover, research-and-development and procurement requests were the largest in DOD history.

The budget places an emphasis on modernization programs that were long deferred, including those for hypersonic weapons, space, cyber, contested logistics, and platforms built for contested environments—all of which will be valuable in deterring China. Modernizing the entire kill chain is also a focus of this budget, in its requests for investments in elements of the DOD’s Joint All-Domain Command and Control strategy, enhanced sensors, and electronic-warfare capabilities. In response to the rapid build-up of China’s nuclear forces, this budget continues to fully fund the revitalization of all legs of the nuclear triad along with nuclear command, control, and communication systems.

The budget has a focus on ensuring that the United States’ advantages endure, as demonstrated through the president’s requested funding for critical emerging technologies, supply-chain resiliency, and the defense workforce. An advantage in technology—especially in artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, directed energy, biotechnologies, and microelectronics—is necessary to keep up with the changing nature of warfare in the coming decade. Shoring up supply chains, specifically ones that are needed to produce defense systems such as metal-fabrication and battery supply chains, is necessary for national security. The budget request, by investing in the research and development of tech across the defense-industrial base, forms the foundation for a self-sustaining defense economy. And, as the all-volunteer force clocks its fiftieth year, the budget shows that the military is, at its core, a people business: The president recommends the largest pay raise for defense personnel in decades (5.2 percent) and notes that military families are key to readiness.

This budget signals an uptick in demand to the defense-industrial base, particularly through increased investment in the most-valued munitions and the execution of a multiyear procurement authority. A stable topline across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)—part of the budget request that reflects detailed budget projections over the next five years—provides predictability for industry. Last year, the FYDP provided less predictability because it did not pace inflation each year between 2024 and 2027. Even though its overall increase from FY23 may be offset by inflation, the FY24 request is stable, pacing inflation each year between 2025 and 2028. Last year’s budget also confused industry by not making clear which production lines should be maintained or expanded—but the FY24 budget request makes it clear. The FY24 budget also provides industry-stable procurement counts for the highest-valued aircraft and maritime platforms needed to deter China.

The challenges: Every budget requires trade-offs

How the president chooses to invest in the country’s defense reveals the strategic assumptions he and his leadership team are making about the future fight—and in what areas they are willing to accept risk. The FY24 budget assumes risk in capacity, specifically for the Air Force’s and Navy’s force structures.

The Pentagon is shifting its focus from land wars in the Middle East to deterring high-end conflict with China, and the budget reflects this. The Army and Marine Corps continue to execute previous plans, reinvesting savings from reductions in the number of troops to fund modernization efforts needed for the Indo-Pacific. These modernization efforts include investments in long-range fires, sensing, and air defense. Meanwhile, the Air Force continues trading aircraft capacity for capability—retiring aircraft faster than they can be replaced by deliveries of next-generation or more modern aircraft—resulting in a decrease of total aircraft inventory by 190 in FY24. While modernization (and, accordingly, the trading of legacy systems for advanced capabilities) is necessary for deterring future wars, such decisions inherently assume some level of risk. For example, the Navy’s reduction in battle-force-ship numbers, included in the FY24 request, has implications for the United States’ maritime competitive edge. The decision to truncate production of the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock impacts all combatant commanders, as these ships are foundational for the United States’ response to contingencies or crises around the globe. Moreover, in the event of a naval blockade of Taiwan, the United States would possibly lack the number of platforms it needs to deploy its response. The People’s Liberation Army Navy is numerically the largest in the world in terms of battle force ships (approximately 340) and is projected to grow to four hundred ships by 2025. In contrast, Biden’s budget request shows a flatlining US naval inventory.

This budget follows guidance from the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review to cancel the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) program, even though the program earned bipartisan support as part of the FY23 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the DOD Appropriations Act. In a tripolar-nuclear-threat environment, the SLCM-N program is a valued capability that is survivable, is prompt, and helps expand the United States’ nuclear deterrence. Expect Congress to push back once again on this misguided request.

What’s next?

As Congress continues hearings on the FY24 NDAA and DOD appropriations bill in the coming months, lawmakers will need to monitor inflation projections and adjudicate whether defense spending should increase above the rate of inflation. They will also need to arbitrate the DOD’s long-term force-structure plans and determine whether deterrence is enhanced by continuing the SLCM-N program. Most importantly, Congress should work to ensure that appropriations are on time so that the DOD is not disadvantaged by the constraints and inefficiencies of beginning nearly every fiscal year under the burden of a continuing resolution.

As Forward Defense’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption recommends, Congress should provide increased spending flexibility by spelling out fewer line items, so that the DOD can easily add novel technologies to the force without requiring a new program. The budget process must remain agile, especially given that the services formulate their requests two years before funding is received and their capability needs will evolve within that time.

If the United States is committed to setting up the DOD for an era of strategic competition, it must commit to increasing the defense budget above the rate of inflation to provide the capacity required while not sacrificing readiness and modernization. Otherwise, the US military risks eroding its military edge in the face of a modernized and capable China.

Clementine G. Starling is the director of the Forward Defense program at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Lieutenant Commander Marek Jestrab is the 2022-2023 senior US Navy fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. These views do not represent the US Navy or the Department of Defense.

Julia Siegel is an assistant director with Forward Defense.

This article is part of the 21st Century Security Project by the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice with financial support from Lockheed Martin.

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Ukraine’s friends must show ‘we’ve got the grit’ in supporting its fight, says UK foreign secretary

Katherine Walla — Wed, 10 May 2023 17:42:12 +0000

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A conversation with UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly joined the Atlantic Council for a discussion on the United Kingdom’s role in an increasingly adversarial world.

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The world is watching closely to see if the United States, United Kingdom, and other allies will lose their stamina in the coming months to support Ukraine, warned UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly.

“If we signal to the world that we have only got about eighteen months’ worth of staying power, then we create a more dangerous environment for the future,” he said. “That’s why this is so very important.”

Cleverly spoke at an Atlantic Council Front Page event hosted by the Europe Center on Tuesday. He explained that failure in Ukraine would bring back a world order in which big and powerful countries prey on weak ones. “So we’d better spend the time and money defending those institutions now, or the costs—both in terms of financial costs and human costs—will be much, much, much higher in the future,” he said.

Cleverly said that instead of providing jets, the United Kingdom has been focusing on training the next generation of fighter pilots and working with the Ukrainian army. Ahead of an expected Ukrainian counteroffensive, “we have to keep looking at opportunities to enhance and speed up the support we give to Ukraine,” he said.

In response to critics who argue the West should limit its support to Ukraine at the risk of leaving its “military cupboards bare,” Cleverly replied that “if we’re saving stuff up for a rainy day, this is the rainy day.” With the invasion posing such a threat to the international security architecture, “we need to respond robustly.”

Below are more highlights from the event, moderated by Atlantic Council President and Chief Executive Officer Frederick Kempe, which covered the United Kingdom’s refreshed foreign-policy strategy.

A change of pace

In the UK Integrated Review Refresh foreign-policy plan, released in March this year, “the thing that has changed is more… pace rather than direction,” Cleverly explained.
He said that his office still stands by the assumptions, reflections, and observations made in the 2021 Integrated Review, which said that the United Kingdom would have to think carefully about its posture toward China, that Russia was a risk, and that allies and partners would be vitally important to the national interest.
But that strategy needed a touch-up, Cleverly argued, after a whirlwind year-and-a-half: Beijing became closer with Moscow, Russia invaded Ukraine, and the Kremlin weaponized energy and food supplies. In addition, the “geopolitical center of gravity” began to shift more quickly toward the Indo-Pacific and Global South, Cleverly explained. “We are not either alarmed by or shocked by that gentle shift… but we do have to respond to it,” he said.

The China challenge

There are critics who say that the West should redirect its focus from Ukraine to China; but “we can’t just pretend Ukraine isn’t happening,” Cleverly said, adding that the world is closely watching how the West responds to Russia’s full-scale invasion. “[Beijing] will make decisions based on what they observe us doing.”
On the possibility of China playing a peacemaking role in the war, Cleverly said he’d “welcome” an intervention that brings “a just and sustainable conclusion,” no matter where it comes from. However, “it needs to be more than just headline-grabbing stuff,” he added. “It needs to be genuine.”
At the same time, China is “big,” “influential,” and “powerful,” Cleverly noted, which means that London will need to “engage” with Beijing.
But the United Kingdom cannot ignore the fact that “China does many things that we fundamentally disagree on,” Cleverly said, pointing to its abuses against Uyghurs, its assertiveness in the South China Sea, and its failures to protect intellectual property. When such issues come up, “we raise [them] directly,” he said, in addition to taking self-protective measures and strengthening long-term alliances in the region.

“In cooperation, collaboration, and concert”

The foreign secretary noted that the United Kingdom will need to strengthen its “pre-existing relationships” with its partners and allies—including the United States and Commonwealth countries—to make sure that they’re “meaningful and mutually beneficial” for their national security and “not just some romantic narrative.”
Cleverly said that rebuilding Ukraine will take public and private money (in addition to Russia paying for the damage it caused). The West needs to “make the case that [investments] will be safe and secure” and that Ukraine won’t be invaded again, Cleverly explained. “The exact mechanism for doing so… certainly is open to discussion,” he added, saying that he is “definitely not closing the door to NATO membership” for Ukraine.
The United Kingdom, Cleverly said, will need to work closely with allies and partners on all areas of defense “simultaneously.” Whereas past conflict was primarily kinetic, he explained, future challenges are more likely to be in domains such as cyberspace and the economy: “Isolation in any of those fields would be counterproductive.”
In March, Chancellor of the Exchequer Jeremy Hunt said the United Kingdom wouldn’t engage in a global clean-energy subsidy race following the passage of the US Inflation Reduction Act. Cleverly said that he understands why the United States would want to “protect its people” in “an increasingly unpredictable and competitive world,” but he also encouraged the United States to “do that in cooperation, collaboration, and concert with [its] like-minded friends around the world.”
Cleverly said that King Charles III, whose coronation took place this past weekend, also plays a part in shaping the United Kingdom’s global role and its relationship with allies. His majesty’s focus on the environment, diversity, and alleviating poverty are “issues which will define the modern era and the future,” Cleverly explained, adding that this focus makes the monarchy “very relevant” today.

Katherine Walla is the associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

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Putin’s embarrassing one-tank parade hints at catastrophic losses in Ukraine

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 09 May 2023 21:58:17 +0000

It would be hard to image a more fitting symbol of Russia’s declining military fortunes than the sight of a solitary Stalin-era tank trundling across Red Square during the country’s traditional Victory Day celebrations on May 9. For the past two decades, Vladimir Putin has used Victory Day to showcase modern Russia’s resurgence as a military superpower, with dozens of the very latest tanks typically taking part in each annual parade. This year, however, the only tank on display was a T-34 model dating back to World War II.

Inevitably, the embarrassing absence of tanks at this year’s Victory Day parade has been widely interpreted as further evidence of Russia’s catastrophic losses in Ukraine. Social media was soon buzzing with posts poking fun at the Kremlin. “Modern Russian military equipment can be found much more easily at Ukrainian military trophy exhibitions than at the Victory Parade in Moscow,” noted the Ukrainian Defense Ministry’s official Twitter account. Others were less subtle. “There was one tank at the parade in Moscow! We laugh all over Ukraine,” posted Ukrainian MP Oleksiy Goncharenko. “There are farmers in Ukraine with more tanks than that,” quipped another Twitter user.

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Tuesday’s one-tank parade was the latest in a series of blows that had already cast a shadow over preparations for this year’s Victory Day celebrations. In the month preceding the holiday, more than twenty cities across Russia canceled plans to hold military parades. While security concerns were officially cited, these cancellations fueled speculation that Russia simply doesn’t have enough military equipment available to stage regional parades, with the vast majority of tanks and other vehicles having already been sent to Ukraine.

The complete cancellation of this year’s Immortal Regiment marches was an even bigger blow. This mass participation event, which sees members of the public marching through Russian towns and cities while displaying portraits of family members who served in the Red Army during World War II, has become an integral part of Russia’s Victory Day rituals over the past decade and has been endorsed by Putin himself. Nevertheless, the Kremlin decided to ban marches this year amid fears that family members of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine may seek to participate. With Russian officials still in denial over the disastrous consequences of the Ukraine invasion, the last thing the Kremlin wanted was for thousands of grieving relatives to gather in public and draw attention to the scale of the tragedy.

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The negative optics surrounding this year’s Victory Day celebrations are personally damaging for Vladimir Putin, who has been instrumental in placing the holiday at the very heart of modern Russia’s national identity. It is often assumed that Victory Day has always dominated the Russian calendar, but this is simply not true. In fact, during the 46-year period between the end of World War II and the fall of the USSR, the Soviet authorities held just three Victory Day military parades. Other holidays such as May Day and the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution were considered far more significant.

It was not until Putin came to power at the turn of the millennium that Victory Day began to assume its current position as Russia’s most important public holiday. Over the past two decades, Putin has transformed Victory Day into the centerpiece of a pseudo-religious victory cult complete with its own sacred symbols, feast days, saints, and dogmas. The hysteria surrounding the holiday has come to be known as “Pobedobesie” or “victory mania,” with anyone who dares question the Kremlin’s highly sanitized version of World War II likely to be treated with the kind of severity once reserved for medieval heretics.

The veneration of Russia’s role in the defeat of Nazi Germany has proven extremely politically profitable for Putin. It has helped him rebuild Russian national pride following the humiliation of the 1990s, and has paved the way for a return to authoritarianism in today’s Russia by rehabilitating Stalin and minimizing the crimes of the Soviet era. Putin has also revived the lexicon of World War II as a convenient way to attack his enemies, with domestic and foreign opponents routinely branded as “fascists.” Indeed, in modern Russia the term “Nazi” has lost all meaning and has come to indicate anyone viewed as “anti-Putin.”

This toxic trend is most immediately apparent in relation to Ukraine. Kremlin leaders have spent years demonizing Ukrainians as “Nazis,” despite the complete absence of any actual far-right politicians in the Ukrainian government. Predictably, when Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he declared the “de-Nazification” of the country to be his chief war aim. The Russian dictator returned to this theme again during Tuesday’s Victory Day address, directly comparing his unprovoked attack on Ukraine to the struggle against Nazi Germany.

Putin’s endless appeals to the memory World War II are clearly designed to mobilize the Russian public in support of the current war, but they cannot completely disguise the grim realities of his rapidly unraveling Ukraine invasion. What was initially envisaged as three-day campaign to overthrow the Ukrainian government and seize control of the country has become the bloodiest European conflict since the days of Hitler and Stalin. Over the past fifteen months, Russian military losses have been so heavy that senior US intelligence officials are now openly questioning whether Putin’s army still retains the capacity to “sustain even modest offensive operations.” With a major Ukrainian counteroffensive expected to begin in the coming weeks, there is little cause for optimism in Moscow.

It is in some ways poetic that developments surrounding this year’s Victory Day holiday have brought Russian audiences closer to the unpalatable truth. From the cancellation of regional parades and public marches to the lack of tanks on Red Square, it is now becoming painfully obvious to the average Russian that things are not going according to plan in Ukraine. An event conceived as a propaganda spectacle to project the strength of the Putin regime has instead served to underline Russia’s growing weakness. Putin is often accused of living in the past, but this is one Victory Day he will wish to forget.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

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Rich Outzen joins TRT World to Turkey’s defense industry

Grady Wilson — Fri, 05 May 2023 18:29:22 +0000

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The NewSpace market: Capital, control, and commercialization

Robert Murray — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 13:00:07 +0000

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Commercial opportunities in space-based technologies are expanding rapidly. From satellite communications and Earth observation to space tourism and asteroid mining, the potential for businesses to capitalize on these emerging technologies is vast and known as “NewSpace.”¹

The NewSpace model is important for governments to understand because the dual-use nature of space, specifically its growing commercialization, will influence the types of space-based technologies that nations may leverage, and consequently, impact their national security paradigms. By capitalizing on the private sector’s agility and combining it with the essential research efforts and customer role played by the public sector, the NewSpace industry can play a critical function in addressing current and future national security challenges through public-private codevelopment.

As the NewSpace industry expands, the role of government is evolving from being the primary developer and operator of space assets to facilitating their commercialization, while still prioritizing key advancements. US and allied governments can capitalize on this competitive landscape by strategically investing in areas that align with their national security objectives. However, it is crucial for them to first understand and adapt to their changing roles within this dynamic environment.

Indeed, the benefits of the burgeoning NewSpace industry extend beyond the United States. International collaboration and competition in this area can lead to faster technological advancements and economic gains. The global NewSpace landscape is driving down costs, increasing access to space, and fostering innovation that can improve not only economic well-being, but also impact national security models.

To that end, this memo will examine the broad state of the space market, discuss the industry drivers, and propose recommendations for US and allied policymakers as they consider future government investments in those enabling space-based activities that support wider national security ambitions.

The commercial context

In recent years, the space industry has undergone significant commercialization (NewSpace) in which governments have partnered with private companies and invested more into the commercial space sector. NewSpace companies often carry many of the following characteristics.²

Figure 1: Characteristics of NewSpace Companies

NewSpace contrasts with the historical approach to space-based technologies, which typically involved a focus on standardization to ensure the reliability and quality of space components. This standardization was (and still is) essential for the safety of manned space flight, the longevity of systems, and the overall success of missions. Despite the increased collaboration between the public and private sectors, the failed January 2023 Virgin Galactic launch in the United Kingdom, the failed March 2023 Mitsubishi H3 launch in Japan, and the failed June 2022 Astra launch in the United States serve as clear reminders of the challenges associated with NewSpace technology.³

Today, when considering who is spending what on space-based technology research, US and allied governments can be viewed more as customers than as creators. This is in stark contrast to former US President John F. Kennedy’s famous 1962 speech launching the Apollo program, which put NASA at the forefront of driving the necessary technology and engineering needs.⁴ Indeed, the capital flows of research and development (R&D) from the US government relative to the private sector have shifted significantly since the era of Sputnik (1957), a pattern that also is evident across many allied nations (see Figure 2).⁵

Figure 2: Ratio of US R&D to gross domestic product, by source of funds for R&D (1953-2021)

For US space technology, this financial shift from public sector to private sector is arguably no surprise given the findings of a 2004 presidential commission on US space exploration, which recommended that:

NASA recognize and implement a far larger presence of private industry in space operations with the specific goal of allowing private industry to assume the primary role of providing services to NASA. NASA’s role must be limited to only those areas where there is irrefutable demonstration that government can perform the proposed activity.⁶

As a result of the commission’s findings, Congress created the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services Program, which sought to create new incentives to support the privatization of both upstream and downstream space activities.⁷ In short, the aim of this legislation was to create market forces that would enhance innovation while driving down costs through competition.

To do this, a new approach was developed to shape the relationship between NASA and its private contractors. Instead of being a supervisor, NASA became a partner and customer of these companies. This shift was reflected in the change of contract type, replacing cost-plus procurement with fixed-price payments for generic capabilities such as cargo delivery, disposal, or return, and crew transportation to low-Earth orbit (LEO).⁸ As a result, the risk was transferred from NASA to private firms, leading to less intensive government monitoring of cost-plus contracts and more encouragement of innovation.

Ripple effects

In recent years, the European Space Agency (ESA) has also prioritized commercialization activities. This, too, was an outcome of political and economic pressure to rethink European space policy to provide products and services for consumers, with a specific focus on downstream space activities. This policy shift toward greater commercialization was driven, in part, by those structural changes (i.e., competition) emerging from the United States (NASA).⁹

Likewise, in India—following a 2020 change in Indian space policy—private firms are no longer only suppliers to the government, but the government is now supporting and investing in them, similar to the NASA model.¹⁰ These and other shifts in public policy have shaped much of the market we have today.¹¹

However, this market arguably represents a challenge to government control over NewSpace firms and their technologies. NewSpace companies operate with more agility and flexibility than traditional government-led programs.¹² This rapid pace of innovation and commercial competition can make it difficult for governments to keep up with regulatory frameworks and oversight. Additionally, the increasing role of the private sector in space activities is arguably leading to a diffusion of state control, making it more challenging for governments to ensure the responsible use of space and manage potential security risks associated with dual-use technologies. Therefore, governments should look to partner, co-develop, and invest in NewSpace firms as alternative ways to influence the sector. Such an approach carries impacts not only on public-sector capital flows but also on national security paradigms.

This image from April 24, 2021, shows the SpaceX Crew Dragon Endeavour as it approached the International Space Station less than one day after launching from Kennedy Space Center in Florida. Source: NASA

The global space market

The space industry is a rapidly growing market that can bring about both commercial and national security benefits: the total sector was valued at $464 billion in 2022 and is expected to reach around $1.1 trillion by 2040, with a projected compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of around 7 percent.¹³ Of today’s total market, the commercial sector accounts for around 75 percent.¹⁴ To put this in perspective, the 2021 global aerospace industry saw the top ten earning companies generate a combined revenue of $417.15 billion.¹⁵ Breaking this down further, the United States is currently the largest market for both public and private space activity, holding a 32 percent market share, while Europe and the United Kingdom hold a combined 23 percent.¹⁶

However, Asia has experienced the most significant growth in this market over the last five years and now holds 25 percent of the market share.¹⁷ In terms of satellite launches, China has been the most active country in the region, with a total of sixty-four launches in 2022, placing it behind only the United States, which launched 87 times that year.¹⁸ Trailing China is India, which deployed over fifty satellites across four separate launches in 2022.¹⁹

In China and India alike, commercial firms are supported by both government R&D and public programs designed for national needs (including requisite contracts), as well as mature commercial markets that demand advanced satellite systems. What this translates to is an upstream market that relies on government funding to thrive, while the downstream market is more evenly distributed and does not require significant upfront investment or government contracts to sustain itself. This downstream market is currently driven by NewSpace demand for connectivity and location-based services, and its growth is influenced by demographic and regional economic trends, as well as government efforts to close the digital divide as governments finance satellite connectivity.²⁰

Challenges to and opportunities for NewSpace industry growth

The key challenges to NewSpace industry growth are the regulatory landscape and access to financing. This is evidenced by the European NewSpace ecosystem where, at a structural level, regulatory frameworks do not facilitate the scaling of the financial resources (public and/or private) necessary to match the political and commercial intent (demand) espoused by European political and business leaders. This mismatch between demand and financial firepower results in slower development and uptake of NewSpace opportunities despite significant engineering and entrepreneurial talent residing within Europe.²¹ Figure 3 shows the breakdown of global government investment in space technologies between 2020 and 2022 in real terms, and figure 4 shows how such expenditure relates to GDP, while figure 5 shows the global private sector space investment breakdown, which highlights a significant role for venture capital (VC) firms.²²

Noting that the United States accounts for almost half of the world’s available VC funds, while Europe only accounts for around 13 percent, it is evident that the sheer scale of investment from the United States enables NewSpace to flourish within the US market, while many allies and partners struggle to access private funding.²³ For Europe to embrace the NewSpace model, conditions must foster timely connections between both public and private finance and NewSpace opportunities.²⁴ That said, given the deep technology nature of NewSpace, and the long time horizons for venture capitalists to see a return, financing this sector writ large remains a challenge.

Figure 3: Government expenditure on space programs in 2020 and 2022, by major country (in billions of dollars)

Figure 4: Government space budget allocations for selected countries and economies (measured as a share of GDP in 2020)

Figure 5: Value of investments in space ventures worldwide from 2000 to 2021, by type (in billion U.S. dollars)

In addition to attracting financing, the business models of NewSpace companies rely on foundational technologies—often resourced by governments—to be in place. Such technologies include: access to low-cost launch capabilities; conditions for in-space manufacturing and resource extraction for space-based production; foundational research to support space-based energy collection, combined with reliable radiation shielding; and debris mitigation efforts in an increasingly busy orbital environment. This indicates that there is a persistent role for governments to actively invest in deep technologies to help foster the commercial markets that NewSpace can bring about. Only governments have the financial risk tolerance (a tolerance that takes one beyond risk and into uncertainty) to undertake such endeavors.

While each of these foundational technologies has limited profitability, together they form a self-sustaining system with enormous potential for profit when subsequently exploited through relatively cheap NewSpace technologies. Indeed, the economics of human space activities often mean that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. To that end, one might envisage how a potential self-reinforcing development cycle would support the space economy, with cheaper and more frequent rocket launches enabling short-term tourism and industrial and scientific experimentation, leading to demand for commercial space habitats, which would then create demand for resources in space. However, it is doubtful that this path will be easily achieved without government support.²⁵

In addition to traditional space-based areas of monitoring, observation, and communications, the sectors listed below offer further commercial opportunities NewSpace is likely to exploit.²⁶

Figure 6: Commercial opportunities for NewSpace companies

Allied advancements in NewSpace

While the above table represents a broad perspective, many US allies and partners are already at the leading edge of aggregating NewSpace technologies to take advantage of growing markets.

In Denmark, the government and private commercial actors are working on project BIFROST, with plans to launch in early 2024. BIFROST is a satellite-based system for advanced on-orbit image and signal analysis that aims to demonstrate artificial intelligence-based surveillance from space. The satellite will have versatile payloads on board to provide information on applied AI in space for Earth-observation missions—detecting ships, oil spills, and more. The main purpose of the mission is to establish: “a platform in space for gaining further experience in AI-based surveillance and sensor fusion using multiple on-board sensors. The satellite will also test means of communication between different satellites to achieve real-time access to intelligence data and demonstrate the feasibility of tactical Earth observation.”²⁷ Additionally, the mission will evaluate the capability of changing AI models during its lifespan to improve the surveillance system.²⁸

In Sweden and Germany, OHB (a German-based European technology company) is working with Swiss start-up ClearSpace SA for its space debris removal mission, ClearSpace-1. OHB will provide the propulsion subsystem and be responsible for the complete satellite assembly, integration, and testing. The mission is aimed at demonstrating the ability to remove space debris and establishing a new market for future in-orbit servicing. The mission will target a small satellite-sized object in space and be launched in 2025. Carrying a capture system payload—“Space Robot,” developed by the ESA and European industry—it will use AI to autonomously assess the target and match its motion, with capture taking place through robotic arms under ESA supervision. After capture, the combined object will be safely deorbited, reentering the atmosphere at the optimum angle to burn up.²⁹

In Belgium, entities such as Interuniversity Microelectronics Centre, aka imec, are at the leading edge of developing nanotechnology that is being commercialized for space. Imec’s Lens Free Imaging system is a new type of microscopic system that is not dependent on traditional optical technologies and fragile mechanical parts. Instead, it operates through the principle of digital holography, which allows images to be reconstructed afterward in software at any focal depth. This eliminates the need for mechanical focusing and the stage drift that occurs during time-lapse image acquisition, making it a more robust and compact system suitable for use in space.³⁰ Imec is also perfecting manufacturing in space leveraging microgravity, which minimizes “gravitational forces and enables the production of goods that either could not be produced on Earth or that can be made with superior quality. This is particularly relevant for applications such as drug compound production; target receptor discovery; the growth of larger, higher-quality crystals in solution; and the fabrication of silicon wafers or retinal implants using a layer-by-layer deposition processes,”³¹ all of which are enhanced in microgravity.

The SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket carrying the Dragon capsule lifts off from Launch Complex 39A at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Florida on July 14, 2022. Source: SpaceX

In the United Kingdom, collaboration between the agricultural and space sectors seeks to enhance societal resilience through more efficient and self-sustaining crop production. Research entities such as the Lincoln Institute for Agri-Food Technology is commercializing technologies on LEO satellites to improve the spatial positioning of robots in agriculture to enhance their precision weeding, nutrient deployment, and high-resolution soil sampling capabilities.³² Furthermore, UK start-ups such as Horizon Technologies have developed novel ways of creating signals intelligence focusing on specific parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, allowing the company to leverage meta data for both commercial and government clients. An important component to Horizon’s success is the reduction in productions costs combined with accessibility to space launches.

Across Europe, the ESA is conducting R&D to harness the sun’s solar power in space and distribute that energy to Earth. Under Project Solaris, space-based solar power is harvested sunlight from solar-power satellites in geostationary orbit, which is then converted into microwaves, and beamed down to Earth to generate electricity. For this to be successful, the satellites would need to be large (around several kilometers), and Earth-surface rectennas³³ would also need to be on a similar scale. Achieving such a feat would enhance Earth’s energy resilience, but would first require advancements in in-space manufacturing, photovoltaics, electronics, and beam forming.³⁴

The United States also partners with allied firms on foundational research to support upstream and downstream NewSpace technologies. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Space-Based Adaptive Communications Node (BACN) is a laser-enabled military internet that will orbit Earth. The Space-BACN will create a network that piggybacks on multiple private and public satellites that would have been launched regardless, using laser transceivers that are able to communicate with counterparts within 5,000 km. The satellite network will be able to offer high data rates and automatic rerouting of a message if a node is disabled, and it will be almost impossible to intercept transmissions. DARPA is working with Mynaric, a German firm, which designs heads for Space-BACN, and MBryonics, an Irish contractor, which uses electronic signals to alter light’s phase, with the aim of having a working prototype in space in 2025.³⁵

While US allies and partners offer a plethora of specific space-based commercial opportunities, the criteria for successful development remains constant: the combination of multiple technologies, reduction in production and maintenance costs, and safe access to operate in space. With that in mind, the US government can play two roles to help further expand this market:

Act as a reliable, adroit customer who can issue contracts quickly (noting that many NewSpace firms do not carry large amounts of working capital and therefore cannot wait months for contractual confirmation).
Continue to invest in deep technologies and develop those foundational upstream building blocks that NewSpace will seek to leverage.

Notably, however, some US executives are deliberately registering firms in allied jurisdictions and conducting all research and patenting there, too, to avoid the bureaucratic challenges of dealing with US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and, specifically, the tight controls associated with exporting NewSpace dual-use products for commercial use. This suggests two things: The first is that, while allies may lack financial firepower, they have jurisdictional strengths that can attract NewSpace firms to their shores; and the second is that US ITAR controls impacting dual-use technologies need to be updated to enable NewSpace firms to thrive. If such companies are blocked from selling to allied and partner markets, then the very model of dual-use becomes diminished and governments will be unable to benefit from the competition and iterative technology development that spill over from such commercial settings into the public sector. As Figure 2 shows, the US government does not currently invest enough in technologies relative to the private sector to enable such a stringent export controls program in the context of NewSpace. The two policies are incongruous: limited government R&D spending and excessive export controls.

Recommendations for US and allied policymakers

Taking all the above into account, US and allied policymakers should focus on enhancing regulations and financial resources. Governments need to continue to create the conditions for the NewSpace market to prosper by playing the roles of a nimble customer and deep technology investor, enabling NewSpace companies to quickly access government contracts, while also helping mature next-generation space-based technologies. This helps such companies grow, become competitive, and enhance the sector. Specifically, US and allied governments should consider the following.

Recommendation #1: US and allied governments must continue to provide a stable and progressive regulatory environment for the NewSpace industry. This includes providing a clear and predictable legal framework for commercial space activities, as well as ensuring that regulations are flexible and adaptable to the rapidly changing technology and business models of the industry. ITAR is one area that needs urgent reform, given the dual-use nature of many new space technologies. This problem is exemplified by US talent establishing next-generation space companies in Europe to avoid overly controlling and outdated ITAR constraints, according to interviews with industry participants.³⁶ Given the cross-cutting nature of ITAR, the US National Security Council should examine ITAR rules and their utility for dual-use technologies impacting NewSpace, assessing such rules from a holistic perspective covering defense, trade, and economics.

Recommendation #2: US and allied governments should maximize coinvestment with industry in R&D to support the codevelopment of new technologies and capabilities for both the public and private sectors. This includes funding for research into new propulsion systems, as well as materials and nanotechnologies that will enable more cost-effective and reliable access to space. To support such funding—and noting the challenge of private investment finding its way to allied entrepreneurs and engineers—the US government should consider establishing with allies and partners a new multilateral lending institution (MLI) focused on space technology to provide funding and other forms of support to companies in the commercial space industry. The MLI or “space bank” could provide loans, grants, loan guarantees, insurance, and other forms of financial assistance to companies engaged in commercial space activities, helping to mitigate the high costs and risks associated with space ventures. This could be modeled after any of the MLIs of which the United States is already a member.³⁷

Recommendation #3: Furthermore, the US government could provide tax credits and grants to NewSpace firms (US and allied) based on certain provisions that support wider government objectives—such as manufacturing locations, supply network participants, and expected labor market impacts.

Any such credits and grants should be complemented by leveraging a suitable financial vehicle to conduct direct investment to take equity in NewSpace firms both at home and abroad. Crucially, this should be conducted without the government owning any of the intellectual property, as this impacts export opportunities and thus undermines the dual-use model. Such an effort would go some way in minimizing the socialization of risk and the privatization of rewards, and could be a role for either In-Q-Tel and/or the Department of Defense’s new Office of Strategic Capital.³⁸

Recommendation #4: To further support such an approach, the US government might create a national space co-R&D center of excellence for government and industry to work hand in glove to drive the codevelopment of breakthrough technologies, taking inspiration from a conceptually similar UK model of designing government contracts to address specific problems and awarding them to capable small companies.³⁹

An increasing number of nations are launching an increasing number of space missions. United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket carries Cygnus cargo vessel OA-6 for commercial resupply services supporting the International Space Station. Credit: United States Air Force Flickr

Conclusion

NewSpace is making significant strides in developing cost-effective and innovative technologies for both public- and private-sector customers. This is important because it drives economic growth and can enhance national security through the delivery of new, cost-effective, and resilient technologies. Indeed, the NewSpace market is unquestionably growing, and governments, including the United States and its allies, have a critical role to play in shaping this market by acting as both customers and codevelopers with NewSpace firms. Such an approach allows governments to exert a degree of influence in the sector without constraining its creativity. However, this way of working may carry wider implications for national security paradigms in terms of dual-use technologies and public/private partnerships.

While use cases for NewSpace are almost limitless, multiple US allies and partners are already forging niche NewSpace areas of excellence that can bring about a degree of comparative advantage. To make best use of such opportunities, the United States should:

Keep its market as open as possible to encourage competition and thus drive innovation.
Provide specific programs and locations for codevelopment between allied academia, government, and industry without taking any intellectual property.
Act as a nimble customer.
Ensure there is a pragmatic balance between regulations that protect US space interests (i.e., ITAR) and those that unleash innovative dual-use endeavors.
Create new financial instruments with allies through an MLI bank to support the financial investment needed to help the private sector commercialize the next generation of breakthrough space-based technologies.

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About the author

Robert Murray
Senior Lecturer and Director, Master of Science in Global Innovation and Leadership Program, Johns Hopkins University

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1 Ken Davidian, “Definition of NewSpace,” New Space: The Journal of Space Entrepreneurship and Innovation 8, no. 2 (2020), https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/space.2020.29027.kda.

2 Roger Handberg, “Building the New Economy: ‘NewSpace’ and State Spaceports,” Technology in Society 39 (2014): 117–128, https://www-sciencedirect-com.iclibezp1.cc.ic.ac.uk/science/article/pii/S0160791X14000505.

3 Peggy Hollinger, “Virgin Orbit Pledges to Return for New UK Satellite Launch,” Financial Times, January 12, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/250b6742-a0a6-4a96-bca6-d7a61883a975; Tariq Malik, “Astra Rocket Suffers Major Failure during Launch, 2 NASA Satellites Lost,” Space.com, June 12, 2022, https://www.space.com/astra-rocket-launch-failure-nasa-hurricane-satellites-lost; “Mitsubishi/Rockets: Launch Failure Points to Drain on Resources,” Financial Times, March 7, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/30386ff6-eaea-442d-b285-82c19dbb1b19.

4 President John F. Kennedy, “Address at Rice University on the Nation’s Space Effort,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, September 12, 1962, https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/historic-speeches/address-at-rice-university-on-the-nations-space-effort.

5 Gary Anderson, John Jankowski, and Mark Boroush, “U.S. R&D Increased by $51 Billion in 2020 to $717 Billion; Estimate for 2021 Indicates Further Increase to $792 billion,” National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, January 4, 2023, https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf23320 and https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/eda—defence-data-2021—web—final.pdf

6 A Journey to Inspire, Innovate, and Discover, Report of the President’s Commission on the Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy, June 2004, https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/60736main_M2M_report_small.pdf.

7 The upstream market can be thought of as: satellite manufacturing; launch capabilities; and ground control stations. The downstream market can be thought of as: space-based operations and services provided, such as satellites and sensors.

8 Matthew Weinzierl, “Space, the Final Economic Frontier,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 32, no. 2 (Spring 2018): 173–192, https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.32.2.173.

9 Douglas K. R. Robinson and Mariana Mazzucato, “The Evolution of Mission-oriented Policies: Exploring Changing Market Creating Policies in the US and European Space Sector,” Research Policy 48, no. 4 (2019): 936-948, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2018.10.005.

10 “Indian Startups Join the Space Race,” Economist, November 24 2022, https://www.economist.com/business/2022/11/24/indian-startups-join-the-space-race.

11 Robinson and Mazzucato, “The Evolution of Mission-oriented Policies.”

12 Amritha Jayanti, “Starlink and the Russia-Ukraine War: A Case of Commercial Technology and Public Purpose,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, March 9, 2023, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/starlink-and-russia-ukraine-war-case-commercial-technology-and-public-purpose.

13 “Space Foundation Releases the Space Report 2022 Q2 Showing Growth of Global Space Economy,” Space Foundation News, July 27, 2022, https://www.spacefoundation.org/2022/07/27/the-space-report-2022-q2/; and “Space: Investing in the Final Frontier,” Morgan Stanley, July 24, 2020, https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/investing-in-space.

14 “Space Economy Report 2022,” Ninth Edition, Euroconsult, January 2023, https://digital-platform.euroconsult-ec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Space-Economy-2022_extract.pdf?t=63b47c80afdfe.

15 Erick Burgueño Salas, “Leading Aerospace and Defense Manufacturers Worldwide in 2021, Based on Revenue,” Statista, November 27, 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/257381/global-leading-aerospace-and-defense-manufacturers/.

16 “Space Economy Report 2022,” Ninth Edition, Euroconsult, January 2023, https://digital-platform.euroconsult-ec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Space-Economy-2022_extract.pdf?t=63b47c80afdfe.

17 “Space Economy Report 2022.”

18 Andrew Jones, “China Wants to Launch Over 200 Spacecraft in 2023,” Space.com, January 27, 2023, https://www.space.com/china-launch-200-spacecraft-2023.

19 2022: A Year of Many Firsts for Indian Space Sector,” World Is One News (WION), updated December 30, 2022, https://www.wionews.com/science/2022-a-year-of-many-firsts-for-indian-space-sector-heres-a-recap-548099; and “List of Satish Dhawan Space Centre Launches,” Wikipedia, accessed April 12, 2023, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Satish_Dhawan_Space_Centre_launches.

20 “Space Economy Report 2022.”

21 OECD Space Forum, Measuring the Economic Impact of the Space Sector, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, October 7, 2020, https://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/space-forum/measuring-economic-impact-space-sector.pdf.

22 “Space Industry Worldwide,” Statista, 2020, https://www.statista.com/study/59030/space-exploration/; and OECD Handbook on Measuring the Space Economy, Second Edition, OECD, July 12, 2022, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/8bfef437-en.pdf?expires=1678223695&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=34A62A18C888485A89F58BE6E5841B30.

23 “Value of Venture Capital Financing Worldwide in 2020 by Region,” Statista, April 13, 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1095957/global-venture-capita-funding-value-by-region/.

24 Matteo Tugnoli, Martin Sarret, and Marco Aliberti, European Access to Space: Business and Policy Perspectives on Micro Launchers (New York: Springer Cham, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78960-6.

25 Weinzierl, “Space, the Final Economic Frontier.”

26 James Black, Linda Slapakova, and Kevin Martin, Future Uses of Space Out to 2050, RAND Corporation, March 2, 2022, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA609-1.html.

27 “BIFROST: Danish Project with International Collaboration to Explore AI-based Surveillance Applications from Space,” Gatehouse Satcom (website), August 22, 2022, https://gatehousesatcom.com/bifrost-danish-project-with-international-collaboration-to-explore-ai-based-surveillance-applications-from-space/.

28 “Terma Delivers AI Model for Danish Surveillance Satellite Project,” Defence Industry Europe, January 28, 2023, https://defence-industry.eu/terma-delivers-ai-model-for-danish-surveillance-satellite-project/.

29 “OHB Sweden Contributes to ClearSpace-1 Mission,” December 8, 2020, OHB, https://www.ohb.de/en/news/2020/ohb-sweden-contributes-to-clearspace-1-mission.

30 “Imec Technology Taking Off to Space,” Imec (website), January 25, 2021, https://www.imec-int.com/en/articles/imec-technology-taking-space.

31 “Imec Technology Taking Off.”

32 “Lincoln Institute for Agri-Food Technology,” homepage accessed February 2023, https://www.lincoln.ac.uk/liat/.

33 A rectenna (rectifying antenna) is a special type of receiving antenna that is used for converting electromagnetic energy into direct current (DC) electricity.

34 “Wireless Power from Space,” European Space Agency, September 11, 2022, https://www.esa.int/ESA_Multimedia/Images/2022/11/Wireless_power_from_space.

35 “DARPA, Lasers and an Internet in Orbit,” Economist, February 8, 2023, https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2023/02/08/darpa-lasers-and-an-internet-in-orbit.

36 Author’s video interview with multiple American NewSpace executives, December 2022.

37 Rebecca Nelson, Multilateral Development Banks: U.S. Contributions FY2000-FY2020, Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2020, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RS20792.pdf.

38 In-Q-Tel is an independent, nonprofit strategic investor for the US intelligence community, created in 1999, https://www.iqt.org; The US Secretary of Defense created the Office of Strategic Capital (announced December 2022), https://www.cto.mil/osc/.

39 “Niteworks,” UK Ministry of Defence, March 28, 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/niteworks; and “UK MOD Front Line Commands Set to Benefit from New Decision Support Capability That Replaces Former Niteworks Service,” Qinetiq, June 4, 2021, https://www.qinetiq.com/en/news/futures-lab.

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Harnessing allied space capabilities

Robert Murray, Tiffany Vora, and Nicholas Eftimiades — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 13:00:00 +0000

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The United States’ vast network of alliances and partnerships offers a competitive advantage—this is especially evident in outer space. Often characterized as a global commons, space holds value for all humankind across commercial, exploration, and security vectors. As technological advancements trigger a proliferation in spacefaring nations, the United States and its allies and partners are confronted with new challenges to and opportunities for collective action.

This series examines how US space strategy can recognize the comparative advantages of allies and partners in space and best harness allied capabilities:

Robert Murray examines the state of the commercial space market and key drivers, considering how government investments in enabling activities can support broader national imperatives.

Tiffany Vora analyzes current US space exploration goals and the capabilities that will be critical to achieving them, highlighting arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned for integration.

Nicholas Eftimiades assesses the potential benefits to US national security offered by allied integration, identifying pathways for cooperating with allies and partners on their space capabilities.

The way forward for US and allied coordination in space

Several common themes emerge across this series. First, outer space is characterized by a transforming landscape and market. Commercial tech advancements—including the introduction of small satellites, advancements in Earth observation and asteroid mining, and the rise of space tourism—drive the development of what Murray terms the “NewSpace” market. The way in which the United States and its allies do business in space is changing, with the private sector leading in capability development and the government becoming the consumer. The burgeoning space sector, totaling $464 billion in 2022, is attracting allies and adversaries alike to invest in and expand their space operations. Strategic competitors recognize they can now target US and allied commercial and national security imperatives from space.

Second, this increasingly competitive environment further accentuates the value of alliances and partnerships in space. As Vora highlights, US and allied cooperation in space today rests on the Artemis Accords, which advances shared principles for space activity, and is a key mechanism for the international transfer of expertise, technology, and funding. The US Department of Defense also houses the Combined Space Operations Vision 2031, which offers a framework to guide collective efforts with several allies, and a host of collaborative exercises and wargames. Eftimiades describes the cross-cutting benefits of this collaboration: it alters the decision calculus for hostile actors, threatening a response from a coalition of nations; offers the ability to share capabilities, responsibilities, and geostrategic locations; and creates consensus in setting the norms for responsible space behavior. Current collective efforts in the space domain are limited, albeit expanding, considering the benefit allies and partners bring to the table.

Third, in order to promote stronger collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners, it is necessary to address and overcome the barriers that stand in the way. Vora identifies protectionist policies and regulations that act as hurdles to the transfer of key technologies and information. Murray explains that lengthy government contract timelines, coupled with insufficient investment in technologies critical to NewSpace, hinder US and allied commercial advancement. Eftimiades argues that the United States has yet to articulate a strategy for space coordination, highlighting a lack in transparency with allies and partners on capability and data gaps.

The authors put forth ideas to pave the way forward for US and allied space development. Recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners include conducting gap analysis on where allied investments can complement existing US capabilities, establishing a “space bank” to support NewSpace actors, and formulating a US and allied strategy for space development, building upon the Artemis Accords. To maintain its competitive advantage in space, the United States cannot go at it alone.

Read the full papers:

The NewSpace market: Capital, control, and commercialization

By Robert Murray

Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes

By Tiffany Vora

Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

By Nicholas Eftimiades

Acknowledgements

To produce this report, the authors conducted a number of interviews and consultations. Listed below are some of the individuals consulted and whose insights informed this report. The analysis and recommendations presented in this report are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the individuals consulted. Moreover, the named individuals participated in a personal, not institutional, capacity.

Allen Antrobus, strategy director, air and space, Serco
John Beckner, chief executive officer, Horizon Technologies
Dr. Mariel Borowitz, associate professor, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology
Steven J. Butow, director, space portfolio, Defense Innovation Unit
Chris Carberry, chief executive officer and co-founder, Explore Mars
Darren Chua, EY space tech consulting partner and Oceania innovation leader, Ernst & Young Australia
Kenneth Fischer, director for business development North America, Thales Alenia Space
David Fogel, nonresident senior fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Dr. Yasuhito Fukushima, senior research fellow, National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan
Peter Garretson, senior fellow in defense studies, American Foreign Policy Council
Sqn Ldr Neal Henley, chief of staff, Joint Force Space Component, UK Space Command
John Hill, deputy assistant secretary of defense for space and missile defense, US Department of Defense
Komei Isozaki, Japan Chair fellow, Hudson Institute
Mat Kaplan, senior communications adviser, The Planetary Society
Cody Knipfer, director of government engagement, GXO, Inc.
Dr. Jerry Krasner, independent consultant, US Department of Defense
Massimiliano La Rosa, director, marketing, sales, and business, Thales Alenia Space
Ron Lopez, president and managing director, Astroscale U.S. Inc.
Douglas Loverro, president, Loverro Consulting, LLC; former deputy assistant secretary of defense for space policy, US Department of Defense
Russ Matijevich, chief innovation officer, Airbus U.S. Space & Defense, Inc.
Jacob Markish, vice president, strategy and corporate development, Thales North America
Brig Gen Bruce McClintock, USAF (ret.), lead, RAND Space Enterprise Initiative, RAND Corporation
Col Christopher Mulder, USAF, active-duty officer, US Air Force; 2020-2021 senior US Air Force fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Dr. Eliahu Niewood, vice president, Air and Space Forces Center, MITRE Corporation
Dr. Jana Robinson, managing director, Prague Security Studies Institute
Audrey Schaffer, director for space policy, National Security Council
Paul Szymanski, director, Space Strategies Center
Dr. Christian Willmes, doctor of philosophy, University of Oxford

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About the authors

Robert Murray
Senior Lecturer and Director, Master of Science in Global Innovation and Leadership Program, Johns Hopkins University

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Tiffany Vora

Nonresident Fellow

GeoTech Center

Space Space Security

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Nicholas Eftimiades

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

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Clementine Starling and Stephen Rodriguez write op-ed in Defense News on the Atlantic Council Commission Defense Innovation Adoption’s interim report

Atlantic Council — Mon, 17 Apr 2023 13:56:00 +0000

Forward Defense Director Clementine Starling and FD Senior Advisor Stephen Rodriguez emphasize that the United States does not have an innovation adoption, but the US Department of Defense has an innovation adoption problem. To address this, they discuss in this Defense News piece the findings and key recommendations of the Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption’s interim report. They argue that in order to accelerate adoption of critical technologies at the Pentagon, Congress and DoD will need to work hand-in-hand to provide greater flexibility to defense procurement.

ORIGINAL sOURCE

Innovation is a defining characteristic and competitive advantage of the United States — both of the vaunted private sector as well as the rich history of the U.S. military. Yet increasingly, our men and women in uniform are going to war with technology that lags behind not only Russia and China, but their civilian peers.
Quoted from Defense News

Read the Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption’s interim report.

Staff

Clementine G. Starling

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Fellow

Stephen Rodriguez

Senior Advisor

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

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Poland and Ukraine: The emerging alliance that could reshape Europe

Taras Kuzio — Thu, 13 Apr 2023 01:18:45 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s recent high-profile visit to Poland underlined the deepening cooperation between these two neighboring countries and the increasingly prominent role their partnership is playing in European politics. At a time when the likes of Germany and France are struggling to find the right response to resurgent Russian imperialism, Poland has emerged as Ukraine’s most steadfast European supporter in the fightback against Putin’s invasion. This is now sparking debate over a possible eastward shift in Europe’s geopolitical center of gravity. If ties between Warsaw and Kyiv continue to strengthen, today’s budding Polish-Ukrainian alliance could become a key factor shaping the future of Europe.

During his visit to Poland, President Zelenskyy reflected on the deep roots of today’s close bilateral relationship. “We Ukrainians and Poles have known each other for a long time,” he noted. Polish President Andrzej Duda praised Ukraine for saving Europe from what he called “the deluge of Russian imperialism,” while Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki confirmed his country’s strong backing for Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership aspirations, commenting, “we know that when Ukraine is in NATO, we will be even safer.”

Since the start of Russia’s invasion fourteen months ago, Poland has been among the largest suppliers of military aid to Ukraine. Polish deliveries have included vast qualities of ammunition, hundreds of tanks, and a growing number of fighter jets. The country has also served as a key transit point for weapons bound for Ukraine, and is set to begin joint production of ammunition with Ukrainian partners. In addition to this military support, Poland also hosts Europe’s largest Ukrainian refugee community, with over 1.3 million Ukrainian refugees currently thought to be resident in the country.

Zelenskyy’s trip to Poland was only his third wartime international visit, highlighting the importance of Polish-Ukrainian ties. This strategic partnership is driven by an acute awareness in both Kyiv and Warsaw that they share a common enemy in Putin’s Russia. It also reflects the success of a much longer term Ukrainian-Polish reconciliation process that dates back to the post-World War II era and has enabled the two countries to slowly but surely move beyond the historical grievances that once poisoned bilateral relations.

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Poland and Ukraine’s improving relationship stands in stark contrast to the almost complete absence of any progress toward historical reconciliation between Ukraine and Russia. While Ukrainian ties with Russia have reached a new low following the full-scale invasion of February 2022, relations had been deeply dysfunctional throughout the Soviet era and remained troubled during the post-Soviet period, with a marked deterioration following the start of Vladimir Putin’s reign.

Unlike Poland, Russia never reconciled itself to the reality of Ukrainian independence or the permanence of the internationally recognized borders established in 1991. The modern Russian state that emerged from the wreckage of the USSR missed the opportunity to become a post-imperial nation, choosing instead to embrace the unapologetically imperialistic sense of national identity shared by its Czarist and Soviet predecessors.

Earlier Soviet era efforts by members of Ukrainian and Russian diaspora communities to advance ideas of historical reconciliation between the two nations came to nothing, largely due to the continued dominance of imperialistic thinking within much of the Russian diaspora. Attempts to engage with Russian dissident author Alexander Solzhenitsyn illustrate why any meaningful reconciliation proved elusive. While revered in the West for his principled stance against Soviet totalitarianism, Solzhenitsyn was deeply reluctant to support demands for Ukrainian independence. He refused to attend a 1975 conference on Russian-Ukrainian relations and would later advocate in favor of a post-Soviet Russian Empire incorporating both Ukraine and Belarus. In his final years, Solzhenitsyn praised Putin for his “resurrection of Russia” and his “sensible foreign policy.”

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In contrast to the unresolved tensions with Russia, the dynamic between the Soviet era Ukrainian and Polish diasporas was broadly constructive, with reconciliation efforts undertaken on the pages of emigre journals and newspapers, in letters between intellectuals, and at conferences. Leading the process were the US-backed Prolog Research Corporation, which published the Ukrainian-language Suchasnist in Munich, and its Polish counterpart the Instytut Literacki, which published the monthly journal Kultura in Paris.

The Instytut Literacki was headed by Polish diaspora intellectual Jerzy Giedroyc, who is widely recognized as one of the driving forces behind the push for historical reconciliation between Poland and Ukraine. Giedroyc and his colleagues are credited with dropping Polish territorial pretensions toward Ukraine and calling for mutual forgiveness while consciously linking the future fates of the two countries. Their slogan “For your freedom and ours” was subsequently adopted in the 1980s by Poland’s Solidarity movement, and has remained a key principle of Polish foreign policy ever since.

Another prominent voice calling for Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation in the final decades of the twentieth century was Pope John Paul II. Elected to head the Catholic Church in 1979, this “Polish Pope” backed efforts to heal historic wounds between Poland and Ukraine while also supporting the liberation of both countries from Soviet Communism. In the 1980s, official Catholic journals in Poland with large circulations published a number of relatively objective articles about Ukraine. During the same period, Poland’s Solidarity movement and other opposition groups published thousands of journals, newspapers, books, and leaflets that supported reconciliation with Ukrainians.

Solidarity was legalized in 1988 at around the same time as Ukraine’s Rukh movement emerged as the main opposition force in Soviet Ukraine. The two opposition movements cooperated to develop their activism, with Solidarity leaders attending the September 1989 inaugural congress of Rukh in Ukraine. Fifteen years later, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa would appear on the stage in Kyiv during Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution. Poland was also prominently represented during the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution, with many Polish politicians and activists visiting the Ukrainian capital to show their support.

It is now clear that the foundations of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation had already been laid when the Soviet Empire disintegrated in 1991. Subsequent Polish support for independent Ukraine built on decades of efforts to overcome conflicts, stereotypes, and mutual distrust. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has now further cemented the deep understanding between Warsaw and Kyiv that their fates and security are irrevocably linked.

Today’s Poland stands shoulder to shoulder in support of Ukraine as it shields Europe from the renewed threat of Russian imperialism. If Putin’s invasion is defeated, this Polish-Ukrainian partnership will likely grow stronger still and could become a major force in European politics.

With a combined population of over eighty million along with two of Europe’s most powerful armies, a shared strategic vision, and huge scope for further economic growth, Poland and Ukraine have the potential to form a formidable geopolitical double act. Together, they could prove capable of challenging the traditional dominance of Western Europe and permanently altering the balance of power on the continent.

Taras Kuzio is professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the recently published “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

Commission staff: Mark J. Massa, Delharty M. Manson II, and Jacob Mezey

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Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption: Interim Report Launch

Former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and former Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James discuss a new report on the challenges the United States faces in maintaining its technological and military advantage over its adversaries and what adaptations Congress, the Pentagon, and the defense sector should make to increase the pace of innovation adoption.

Defense Industry Defense Policy Defense Technologies National Security

Commissioners

The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD, Board Director, Atlantic Council; 27th Secretary of Defense; Co-Chair, Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption
The Hon. Deborah Lee James, Board Director, Atlantic Council; 23rd Secretary of the Air Force; Co-Chair, Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption
Ambassador Barbara Barrett, Board Director, Atlantic Council; 25th Secretary of the Air Force
General James E. Cartwright, USMC (ret.), Board Director, Atlantic Council; 8th Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Frank A. Finelli, Managing Director, The Carlyle Group
The Hon. Michèle Flournoy, Co-founder and Managing Partner, WestExec Advisors; Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, US Department of Defense
Scott Frederick, Managing Partner, Sands Capital
The Hon. James “Hondo” Geurts, Distinguished Fellow, Business Executives for National Security; Former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, US Department of Defense
Peter Levine, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Defense Analyses; Former Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, US Department of Defense
The Hon. Ellen M. Lord, Former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, US Department of Defense
Major General Arnold L. Punaro, USMC (ret.), CEO, The Punaro Group; Member, Advisory Council, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Nick Sinai, Senior Advisor, Insight Partners; Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs and Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School
Josh Wolfe, Co-founder and Managing Partner, Lux Capital
The Hon. Robert O. Work, Senior Counselor for Defense and Distinguished Senior Fellow for Defense and National Security, Center for a New American Security; 32nd US Deputy Secretary of Defense

Industry commissioners

Steven Escaravage, Executive Vice President and AI Lead, Booz Allen Hamilton
Wendy R. Anderson, Senior Vice President, Palantir Technologies
Prashant Bhuyan, Founder and CEO, Accrete AI
Mark Brunner, President, Primer Federal, Primer AI
Colin Carroll, Director of Government Relations, Applied Intuition
Adam Hammer, Counselor, Schmidt Futures
Chris Lynch, CEO, Rebellion Defense
Mara Motherway, Senior Vice President, Peraton
Michael Niggel, CEO, ACT1 Federal
Doug Philippone, Co-founder, Snowpoint Ventures

Foreword
Overview

Recommendations:

Introduce a new capability portfolio model
Consolidate program elements
Reset reprogramming authorities
Modernize DoD to align with the 21st century industrial base
Strengthen alignment of capital markets to defense outcomes
Incentivize tech companies to do business with DoD
Modernize budget documents
Establish bridge fund for successfully demonstrated technologies
Scale the Space Development Agency model
Modernize DoD’s requirements system

Conclusions and next steps
Biographies
Acknowledgements
List of acronyms

Foreword

The US Department of Defense (DoD) needs to accelerate the adoption of cutting-edge technology from the leading edge of the commercial and defense sectors. Doing so will enable the Pentagon to deliver high-impact operational solutions to the Warfighter in a much timelier manner. That is why we are co-chairing the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, which has released this interim report.

In our time serving in the Defense Department, we have found that the United States does not have an innovation problem, but rather an innovation adoption problem. That is to say, our Nation leads in many emerging technologies relevant to defense and security—from artificial intelligence and directed energy to quantum information technology and beyond. But the DoD struggles to identify, adopt, integrate, and field these technologies into military applications.

The persistence of this challenge is not for lack of trying. The Air Force’s Rapid Capabilities Office has cut through bureaucratic constraints to accelerate even the most complicated major acquisitions. The Defense Innovation Unit stands out for expanding the range of firms involved in innovation for national security purposes. Army Futures Command has accelerated modernization in ground forces through its cross-functional team model. The new Office of Strategic Capital has a promising new approach to engaging capital markets in support of national security goals.

But the growing national security challenges facing our country and the threat they pose to the rules-based international order require actionable reform across the DoD. We and a group of distinguished Commissioners, with decades of service between us in government, the private sector, and capital markets, believe that time is running out to do so. The United States faces simultaneous competition with two nuclear-armed, autocratic great-power rivals. Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and China’s revanchism not only spur urgent geopolitical considerations, but also cast into sharp relief the US industrial base’s ability to produce and field innovative technologies at scale.

To address the DoD’s innovation adoption challenge in light of the urgency of the geopolitical environment we face, this interim report advances ten policy recommendations for Congress and the Pentagon, focusing on the three key areas of reforming acquisition; overcoming barriers to innovation; and revising specific Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution structures.

To that end, the DoD should adapt the way it conducts its acquisition programs to provide additional flexibility in the year of execution, and Congress can authorize that flexibility. We recommend that five DoD program executive offices be empowered to operate in a portfolio model so that they can more easily shift funding among possible products that meet their mission needs. Congress should appropriate money to DoD with fewer but larger discrete budget line items and reset reprogramming authorities so that acquisition professionals have greater flexibility.

To better leverage innovation in the commercial sector, Congress should restore at least the traditional ratio of procurement funding to other defense spending, and the DoD should more intentionally engage a much broader innovation base. Allocating a higher percentage of the DoD’s budget to procurement will clearly signal a larger market to nontraditional defense firms.

Additionally, the deputy secretary of defense, with the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) as a direct report, should take a leadership role in aligning and harnessing stakeholders within the Pentagon and the existing defense industrial base for the twenty-first century. The DIU should be resourced and empowered to broaden the defense ecosystem by robustly engaging start-ups, nontraditional vendors, and capital market players.

The DoD must develop approaches to more rapidly validate its needs for commercial capabilities, rather than waiting years after identifying a key capability to write a requirement and submit a budget request. The DoD should both reform the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to operate more swiftly and develop a military need validation system outside of JCIDS for mature commercial capabilities. Congress and the DoD should expand both eligibility for, and the award size of, Small Business Innovation Research grants. To provide additional mechanisms for rapidly matching key capabilities with funding, they should also provide funds to procure capabilities successfully demonstrated in exercises.

As the 2022 National Security Strategy states, we are living through a “decisive decade,” a sentiment shared by the previous administration as well. Congress and the DoD must seize this opportunity to enact near-term changes that will help get our service members the capabilities they need to defend our country and its interests.

The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD

27th US Secretary of Defense

The Hon. Deborah Lee James

23rd US Secretary of the Air Force

* Eric Lofgren served as a project author until February 2023, when he transitioned to a position in government service. All of his contributions were made before his transition to that role.

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Overview

Mission statement

Accelerate the DoD’s ability to adopt cutting-edge technology from commercial and defense sectors and deliver high-impact operational solutions to the Warfighters.

Enterprise challenges

The DoD faces the following enterprise challenges in adopting defense innovations:

1. Outdated R&D model

The DoD’s requirements and acquisition processes were designed for a time when the DoD was the largest funder of global research and development (R&D). By 2020, however, the federal government’s share of national R&D had fallen below 20 percent, and yet its processes have not adapted to this new leader-to-follower reality. Today, while the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), national and service laboratories, and universities continue to innovate, many of the most critical technologies are driven by the commercial sector. The DoD struggles to adopt commercial technology at a relevant speed. Innovations from noncommercial R&D organizations are infrequently tied to a commercialization and adoption pipeline. Traditional prime contractors orient their independent R&D (IRAD) toward near-term defense requirements that are prescriptive relative to solutions rather than broadly defining warfighter gaps that allow applications of advanced technologies. As a result, the DoD is unable to effectively apply leading technologies to its weapon systems.

2. Long timelines and inflexible execution

Too often, the DoD delivers systems to meet requirements defined more than a decade earlier. It is difficult to insert new technology to effectively respond to dynamic adversary threats, technological opportunities, advances in warfighting concepts, or macroeconomic and supply-chain disruptions, especially within fiscal years. Hardware-centric models ineffectively integrate rapid software updates.

3. Fewer companies providing defense solutions

The DoD’s industrial base has shrunk by 40 percent over the past decade, due to both consolidation and exit. This decline stems from multiple causes, including a pivot to fewer more-complex major systems, long timelines, complex regulations, and the high compliance cost of doing business with the DoD. Many start-up, commercial, and international businesses are unable or unwilling to enter the DoD ecosystem. As a result, reduced competitive pressure has increased costs and decreased adoption of innovation.

4. Valleys of death

The DoD spends billions annually on research and prototypes, yet only a small percentage transitions to production contracts with revenue to sustain operations and scale output. Consequently, one must question why the DoD continues to fund so many defense research organizations when most technology innovation comes from the commercial sector. Long timelines for contracts and funding, program constraints, and a disconnected ecosystem are among the transition challenges for companies that have developed viable products or services.

5. Hamstrung workforce

The DoD acquisition workforce is subject to a bureaucratic culture of excessive compliance and oversight, a challenging environment for innovation. Creative problem-solving and measured risk-taking are not often rewarded, and too few individuals with an industry background agree to take senior leadership roles at the DoD.

6. Program-centric acquisition

Defining requirements, securing budgets, and acquiring capabilities are done for hundreds of individual programs. The DoD invests a significant percentage of its funds in complex major systems for which prime contractors offer closed, propriety solutions. This impedes interoperability and responsiveness to changes in operations, threats, and technologies. Open-system architectures with well-defined interface control documents are rarely adopted, which constrains the ability to insert innovative technology.

7. Cumbersome reporting from DoD to Congress

Budget justification documents run dozens of volumes and tens of thousands of pages. Document format, detail, and supporting information is inconsistent among military services and agencies. This impedes Congress’s ability to understand program objectives in a timely manner. In turn, Congress does not trust that delegated decisions will consistently result in more rapid technology adoption.

8. Limited understanding of emerging technology

The DoD struggles to effectively leverage critical emerging technologies (like biotechnology and quantum information technology) due to a lack of understanding of their state-of-the-art applications among those who generate requirements and draft requests for proposals. As these technologies mature, the DoD is challenged to have meaningful conversations about how to adopt, leverage, and defend against these technologies.

Top recommendations

To address these challenges, the Commission recommends that DoD leaders, congressional defense committees, and other executive branch agencies take the following ten high-priority actions to accelerate DoD innovation adoption:

Introduce a new capability portfolio model
Consolidate program elements
Reset reprogramming authorities
Modernize the DoD to align with the twenty-first century industrial base
Strengthen alignment of capital markets to defense outcomes
Incentivize tech companies to do business with the DoD
Modernize budget documents
Establish bridge fund for successfully demonstrated technologies
Scale the Space Development Agency model
Modernize the DoD’s requirements system

Recommendation 1: The DoD and Congress empower and resource five Program Executive Officers (PEOs) to operate via a new capability portfolio model in 2024.

Addresses challenges 2, 4, and 6.

Congress authorizes in the FY24 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and/or the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) implements via a memo empowering five PEO portfolios to operate via a new capability portfolio model. Component acquisition executives from the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Special Operations Command, and a defense agency will each select a PEO portfolio.
Service requirements organizations capture portfolio requirements in a concise, high-level document that provides overarching, joint, enduring capability needs and key mission impact measures that focus on warfighter-informed needs and mission outcomes. The Joint Staff validates the portfolio requirements within thirty days. The portfolio requirements document enables leaner program requirements and shapes future research and prototypes.
Selected PEOs negotiate with congressional defense appropriations staff the consolidation of at least 20 percent of the smallest budget line items within their portfolios. This enables reprogramming flexibility to meet evolving, warfighter-informed requirements. These merged budget accounts must provide Congress with sufficient visibility of major elements within each.
Selected PEOs develop a set of portfolio strategies, processes, road maps, contracts, infrastructure, and architectures to enable programs to leverage for greater speed and success. Portfolio contracting strategies will look beyond individual contracts or programs to promote a robust industrial base by enabling continuous competition, iterative development, supply chain risk mitigation, greater participation of nontraditional companies, commercial service acquisition, and economies of scale.
Selected PEOs may lay out plans to decompose large programs into modular acquisitions; leverage common platforms, components, and services; and maximize use of commercial solutions and DoD research. Portfolios will scale and align prototyping, experimentation, and testing infrastructure. They will invest in a common suite of engineering tools, platforms, and strategies to enable interoperability, cybersecurity, and resiliency.
PEOs require portfolio leaders to actively engage the DoD’s R&D community, industry, and academia to communicate joint-warfighter portfolio needs and business opportunities, scout technologies, engage companies, and drive novel solutions to address portfolio needs.
Congress appropriates at least $20 million to each portfolio per year for three years to enable PEOs to implement the new model with appropriate staff, analytic tools, and strategies. The five PEOs work out the details for others to adopt. In time, the department will realize savings and return on investment through greater program efficiencies and mission impact.
PEOs provide the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Congress a short annual report to share insight into the new portfolio model progress, including issues, successes, and inputs to scale adoption.

Success measure: By the end of 2023, five PEO portfolios are identified to operate via the new portfolio model. By the end of 2024, these portfolios begin operating with clear direction, leadership support, and initial implementation plans.

Notional example: A command-and-control PEO shapes a portfolio strategy that invests in a software factory and enterprise services as a common infrastructure, with smaller programs tapping a diverse vendor base to regularly and iteratively deliver a suite of applications that work together seamlessly.

Recommendation 2: Acquisition executives propose consolidated program elements to congressional staff and negotiate what can be included in the FY 2024 Appropriations Act joint explanatory statement.

Addresses challenges 2, 6, and 7.

The deputy secretary of defense (DepSecDef) directs acquisition executives to propose a list of program elements (PEs) and budget line items (BLIs) to consolidate. This will simplify budget submissions and enable greater flexibility within the year of execution to respond to rapid changes in warfighter needs and technology advancement within capability or mission portfolios.
- Determine criteria for consolidation, such as BLIs and PEs under $20 million, software-defined technologies, and supply chain-affected efforts.
- Determine constructs for consolidation, such as capability areas, mission areas, and organizational alignment.
Reduce BLI and PE count from more than 1,700 today in the investment accounts by at least 200 BLI and PEs each year, starting with the FY 2024 markup, for three years to enable cost-schedule-performance trade-offs, including the prototyping and fielding of novel systems that meet defined capability or mission areas.
Allow PEOs, warfighters, and other DoD stakeholders to provide input to acquisition executives. Senior leadership in the resourcing process should propose the items to be consolidated and negotiate with congressional staff in advance of FY 2024 appropriations.
Identify line items that enable opportunistic efforts to insert technologies into existing weapons programs without requiring a new start. Identify best practices for broadly justifying activities within a capability set.

Success measure: The number of BLIs in the investment accounts is reduced by at least 200 in time for the passage of regular appropriations in FY 2024.

Notional example: A PEO identifies a novel technology from DARPA or industry to integrate into one of its programs to improve performance and accelerate capability delivery. With investment funds spread across fewer budget accounts, the PEO is able to reprogram funds from a lower-priority development within the year of execution.

Recommendation 3: Congressional appropriations committees reset reprogramming authorities to historical norms in their FY 2024 joint explanatory statements.

Addresses challenges 2 and 7.

Appropriations committees write into FY 2024 joint explanatory statements the following changes:
- Current reprogramming thresholds will be maintained, but above-threshold actions will revert from congressional prior approval to the historical norm of congressional notification with a thirty-day window for briefing or rejection. This streamlines the process and enables greater reprogramming while still providing Congress “veto authority” to block reprogramming actions they oppose. Prior approval will remain in place for items omitted, deleted, or specifically reduced; general transfer authorities; or above threshold new starts.
An alternative approach: Raise reprogramming thresholds from the lesser of $10 million or 20 percent to at least $40 million for Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and $100 million for procurement appropriation titles. Historical norms for reprogramming thresholds were $15 million for RDT&E and $40 million for procurement yet were progressively lowered to this historically low threshold. This change would revert thresholds to account for decades of inflation.
- Letter notifications for new starts will be “for the fiscal year,” not “for the entire effort.” This enables programs greater flexibility to start small programs while Congress retains the right to veto any new starts it opposes.

Success measure: Recommended language is included in the FY 2024 Appropriations Act joint explanatory statement by the time regular appropriations are passed.

Notional example: An acquisition program is “early to need” for procurement funds due to delays in finalizing development. Another program desperately seeks additional funds to accelerate and scale production of its weapon system. Service leadership decides to reprogram $50M in procurement funds between the programs to optimize investments.

Recommendation 4: Congress directs the DoD to elevate the DIU to a direct report to DepSecDef and resource it effectively to align and harness the nontraditional defense industrial base for the twenty-first century no later than six months of the enactment of this act.

Addresses challenges 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8.

Re-align DIU as a direct report to DepSecDef with the necessary staffing and resources to engage start-ups, nontraditional vendors, and capital market players in aligning capability requirements to harness solutions from the twenty-first-century industrial base per the 2022 National Defense Strategy.
- DIU’s expanded role should complement existing efforts in USD(R&E) and USD(A&S) in terms of traditional industrial policy and technology scouting, respectively, by better connecting the nontraditional industry and its resources, intelligence, and technologies to the needs of the warfighter.
  - DIU, USD(R&E), USD(A&S), and service partners should regularly integrate their efforts, in communicating to the industrial base the department’s needs, planned investments, and business opportunities. In addition, they should share among themselves what is being discovered in industry that aligns with the department’s missions.
  - In its expanded role, DIU should be resourced to regularly engage with acquisition organizations (PEOs, program offices), science and technology (S&T) organizations (labs, DARPA), and combatant commands to share the insights it gets from nontraditional industry players throughout the DoD. Additionally, DIU will communicate back to industry where it can align its technologies to the needs of the warfighter as communicated by acquisition organizations and combatant commands.
  - Prioritization for expanded staffing for DIU should be for new billets from the services over funding for contractors. The billets would be priority assignments, selected from relevant PEOs and service acquisition executives (SAEs).
  - DIU should track the intelligence, insights, and inputs it receives from industry trade associations, venture capitalists (VCs), private equity firms, primes, nontraditional defense companies (NDCs), Other Transaction (OT) Consortia, and innovation hubs. This information should be interoperable with USD(R&E)’s existing repository of research and intelligence for the department’s needs.
- DIU, USD(A&S), and SAEs charter a team, including joint warfighter perspectives, to streamline processes, reviews, and documents for acquiring commercial solutions. The team will reinforce “buy before build” commercial practices in the early phases of programs by baking it into acquisition strategy templates and program reviews. It will also collaborate with defense industry, capital markets, and Congress to develop a broader set of rapid funding tools and approaches to demand signals consistent with the speed of commercial innovation cycles. It will publish an initial commercial pathway or guide by December 2023, with a comprehensive version in 2024.
  - Joint Staff and service requirements organizations develop a rapid “military need validation” process, involving feedback from the warfighter, for commercial solutions in lieu of traditional Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) requirements documents. This new process will enable hundreds or even thousands of commercial solutions to be validated by empowered, distributed officials, and not subject to the JCIDS process managed by the Joint Staff and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).
  - The Defense Acquisition University and related organizations should modernize guidance and training for commercial acquisition, to include:
    - Collaborating with industry, traditional and otherwise, in the early phases of an acquisition program to inform concepts, alternatives, and designs. The focus should be on feeding into mission objectives, not market research for system specifications.
      - Contracting strategies focused on commercial solutions (e.g., Commercial Solutions Openings, Other Transactions, Federal Acquisition Regulation Parts 12 and 13).
      - Testing, experimentation, exercises, rapid deliveries, and iteration.
      - Scaling programs like DIU’s Immersive Commercial Acquisition Program.

Success measures: Higher number of DIU projects that transition to a program of record; increased number of vendors entering the federal market and competing for contracts; better alignment of capital market investment and lending to DoD missions; alignment of DoD R&D and prime IRAD funds to help a wider number of entrants across the Valley of Death; increased transparency with the industrial base on DoD’s priorities; a commercial pathway, guidance, and training enabling workforce to rapidly and successfully acquire commercial solutions; increased transparency and collaboration within the department on tech-related initiatives and intelligence; resources saved and efficiencies gained from central repository information from traditional and nontraditional industrial base like market intelligence, technology landscape analysis and due diligence on vendors.

Notional example: Expanded engagement with nontraditional industrial base helps DIU identify the commercial sector’s leader in autonomous software for ground vehicles and through the streamlined, well-defined process for rapid acquisition, the Army begins adopting it across its fleet of logistics vehicles on CONUS bases.

In their quarterly engagement, the US Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) talks to DIU about its desire to procure better mission planning tools at the edge. DIU identifies and provides three viable commercial options for demonstrations. Before presenting them to MCWL, DIU leverages VC firm relationships to get existing due diligence on the potential vendors and discovers one of them draws components of its chips from China. DIU finds an alternative.

In its engagements with capital market players, DIU discovers there are several critical bottlenecks in the quantum computing supply chain due to either a severe lack of redundancy or routing through adversary nations. DIU flags this to R&E, the Office of Strategic Capital, and A&S Industrial Policy to determine how to address this. As part of this, DIU and OSC engage with capital market players to inform them this is now a department priority, helping to direct capital market funding toward these enabling technologies critical to the US broader tech competition vis-à-vis China.

Recommendation 5: Strengthen existing capital market programs and create new pathways for mission-critical technologies.

Addresses challenges 1, 3, 4, and 8.

US capital markets represent a critical yet underutilized strategic advantage for the DoD. To better leverage vast capital market resources for defense innovation and mission outcomes, the DoD should broaden programs through which capital market-backed companies can participate and create new pathways for DoD program offices to leverage capital market funding for mission-critical technologies.

Congress directs in legislation the Small Business Agency (SBA), in coordination with the General Services Administration (GSA), to enhance the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) grants program no later than six months after enactment.

To better scale SBIRs, the SBA should:

Generate direct to Phase III SBIR grants in which early successful performers in Phase I can be fast-tracked to more-flexible contract vehicles, for which performers have exemptions from SBA size standards for procurement; no limits on dollar size of procurement; the right to receive sole-source funding agreements; and the ability to pursue flexible ways to add value to an end user, whether that be research, R&D, services, products, production, or any combination thereof.
Direct the SBIR offices of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps to pilot a Strategic Funding Increase (STRATFI) program to help bridge the Valley of Death between Phase II and Phase III SBIR grants, no later than twelve months after designated. Service pilots would replicate the STRATFI program in that SBIR funding ($15 million) would receive matched funding from customers ($15 million) and private funding (up to $30 million).

To increase competition and widen the aperture of firms competing for SBIR grants, the SBA should:

Remove the barrier preventing companies with more than 50 percent backing by VCs or other capital market players to compete for SBIR grants. Small businesses often rely on VC funding to cover the costs of operating as they work to commercialize their products and generate sufficient revenue to sustain their business. This is particularly true in the case of software development, where highly skilled software engineers are the single most expensive operating cost. Placing strict limitations on the ability of these small businesses to compete for SBIR grants is contrary to the SBIR program goal of supporting scientific excellence and technological innovation.
Remove the barrier preventing companies that meet the requirements of being a small business, but are publicly traded, to compete for SBIR grants. Small, high-tech R&D firms go public to continue their ability to raise funds for their capital-intensive technologies. By disallowing them from competing for SBIR grants, the DoD is limiting technology competition among some of the most technology-proficient corners of the industrial base.

To drive deep tech adoption, OSC should develop tools for leveraging external capital market funding for pilot projects to service R&D organizations in FY 2024, with a formalization plan in conjunction with the president’s FY 2025 budget request.

OSC to be given expanded authorities to access capital markets to develop revenue, investment, and credit approaches for defense programs contracting with small-, mid-, and large-cap companies. As an initial step, direct $15 million of external capital market funding to the R&D organization of each military branch to pilot projects that identify two
novel use cases in one or more of R&E’s deep-tech priority areas of quantum technology, biotechnology, or advanced materials that could be leveraged to achieve service-specific missions. The period of performance would be eighteen months. Service end users would provide matched funding of up to 25 percent of total outside funding to pilot these projects.
This would assist in directing capital market funding to the DoD’s mission, providing additional R&D funding and incentives for deep-tech companies to commercialize their technologies, and creating optimization loops that connect technology to warfighter use cases that can help turn basic research into relevant products and services. Lastly, exposure to deep-tech applications would allow service end users to better understand emerging technologies’ applications to future defense requirements. This will help accelerate the well-aligned adoption of these capabilities to meet services’ unique missions at the speed of relevance.
R&D leads will report to DIU’s director and USD(R&E) no more than 180 days past the period of performance on the pilot’s utility, lessons learned, and challenges DoD would face if technology were to be adopted at scale.

Success measures: Meaningful increase in capital market funding for defense-related companies; increased number of companies crossing Valley of Death and program offices integrating commercially developed technology to speed innovation milestones; increased number of production contracts from nontraditional vendors, with more vendors competing for each contract; increased touchpoints between cutting-edge tech and the warfighter/end users; and the identification of specific tech adoption challenges that can be addressed ahead of requirements process for more-seamless tech adoption and integration.

Notional examples: 1) A majority VC-backed company demonstrates a novel capability that provides an advantage over a near-peer adversary and is fast-tracked to SBIR Phase III, through which the firm begins production at scale and crosses the Valley of Death. 2) A publicly traded deep-tech company that qualifies as a small business, now allowed to compete for SBIR grants, begins to develop the foundation of a quantum network for the US military. 3) The army discovers through a biotech pilot project that an advanced material it hoped to put into a program of record does not provide meaningful benefit for the cost and pursues another alternative. 4) The navy uses its OSC pilot to buy hours of time on a quantum computer provided over the cloud, through which the navy discovers the quantum computer’s utility in improving logistics and maintenance. However, the navy does not know how to manage the data being generated and needs an extra data scientist to oversee the process. The navy begins to generate a data governance process, forms a new billet to manage it, and begins determining the best acquisition pathway in anticipation of purchasing quantum computing as a service.

Recommendation 6: Congress, OSD, and SAEs increase incentives and reduce barriers for leading technology companies to do business with the DoD by September 2024.

Addresses challenges 1 and 3.

Increase incentives

Production Contracts. The DoD and Congress in future defense budgets rebalance the ratio of RDT&E and Procurement funding to historical norms over the past thirty years. From 1990 to 2019, the ratio was 39 percent to 61 percent, respectively. This would provide more than $20 billion in additional procurement funds to acquire production quantities faster, leverage commercial R&D, and fuel a broader market for leading technology firms. Increasing production and lowering barriers to entry will attract venture capital firms and bring private research and development funding to the defense market. As most of USD(R&E)’s fourteen critical technologies are commercially driven, this rebalance would enable faster fielding of warfighter priorities.
Set Precedent. USD(A&S) and SAEs report the number of large contracts (i.e., more than $50 million) awarded to start-ups and NDCs annually to measure and convey the trends of the DoD investing in these companies beyond small SBIR awards.
Innovation Funds. USD(R&E) and services include start-ups and NDCs as part of selection criteria for congressionally directed innovation funds.
Show Support. USD(A&S) and SAEs scale the direction, goals, and guidance for working with small and disadvantaged businesses to include technology start-ups and NDCs. Include NDCs as part of the small-business integration working group being established for FY23 NDAA Section 874.
Broaden Access to Capital Markets. Congress and USD(A&S) modernize the use of Defense Production Act Title III and credit loan authorities available to other agencies and departments to dynamically access capital, embrace commercial terms, and strengthen the domestic industrial base capabilities, based on lessons learned from COVID and the war in Ukraine. This use could include purchase commitments and loan guarantees, similar to how the Export-Import Bank works with US companies overseas, to increase incentives and reduce risk for companies seeking to scale production of critical technologies.

Decrease barriers

Congress should raise the cost accounting standards (CAS) threshold to at least $100 million; revise the commercial item exemption in 48 CFR 9903.201-1(b)(6); and make related CAS reforms as recommended by the Section 809 Panel to reduce compliance costs, which are the biggest barrier to entry in defense.
DoD, GSA, and Office of Management and Budget invest in modernizing SAM.gov and related DoD websites that publish contract opportunities to improve user design, alerts, DoD-industry collaboration, processes, and status. Many find SAM.gov onerous to use.

Fully resource and drive the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency to streamline processes, increase staffing, and pursue novel approaches to reduce the large backlog of individual and facility security clearances that impose long delays on contractors to begin work or scale.
USD(A&S) and SAEs assign visible leaders for SBIR, OT (including OT Consortia), Middle Tier of Acquisitions, and Commercial Solutions Openings to champion adoption; set vision; simplify processes; curate leading strategies; and improve guidance, training, structures, and direction to continuously improve adoption. Update policies and guidelines to ensure efforts conducted under OTs count for past performance and small disadvantaged business goals to incentivize industry and government use.
USD(A&S), USD(R&E), and services establish a team to map and improve processes to scale successful research and prototypes into new or existing acquisition programs. This includes requirements, acquisition, budget, contracting, engineering, and testing, among others.

USD(A&S) and SAEs establish a working group, to include primes and NDCs, to explore how to incentivize primes to better leverage technology start-up companies. The objective is to fuel disruptive defense innovation from novel tech companies and leverage the primes to scale integration and production of weapon systems to create an enduring battlefield advantage.

Success measure: USD(A&S) reports an increase in the number of new companies in the industrial base by 5 percent, offsetting the recent trend of 5 percent decrease annually. At least ten NDCs are awarded contracts of more than $50 million that address validated defense requirements. Defense primes significantly increase partnerships, subcontracts, and acquisitions of start-ups and NDCs to integrate their technologies into weapon systems.

Notional example: A leading technology company with viable solutions for defense that historically avoided defense contracts is now receptive (with board support) to pursue contracts given the higher CAS thresholds, reduced unique compliance requirements, and improved clearance processes.

Recommendation 7: USD comptroller proposes streamlined budget justification and chief digital and artificial intelligence officer (CDAO) modernizes supporting details in congressionally accessible information system for the president’s FY 2026 budget request.

Addresses challenge 7.

USD comptroller proposes a format for streamlining budget justification documents in the investment accounts, focusing on cogent six-page program overviews at the BLI/PE level (R-1 and P-1) with hyperlinks to supporting details.
- Seek implementation for the president’s FY 2026 budget request.
CDAO leads the effort to create a query tool and dashboard tied to Advana’s backend data that delivers insight down to the existing level of justification material, allowing for more frequent updates.
- This tool should be capable of replicating Financial Management Regulation Volume 2B, Chapters 4 and 5 presentations.
- Prototype early access to congressional staff with the president’s FY 2025 budget request, in addition to the traditional format.
- This tool should seek to incorporate budget execution data such as quarterly DD1416s and contract obligations as data integration improves.

Success measure: Congressional staff use the new information system for their budgetary and program analysis; staff desires expansion into other accounts, including Operations and Maintenance and Military Personnel.

Notional example: Congressional staff can find up-to-date information on DoD program activities without having DoD officials provide the information directly to a committee.

Recommendation 8: Tying experimentation to acquisition outcomes: Scaling and accelerating successful demonstrations

Addresses challenges 1, 4, and 8.

The DoD and industry invest significant time, funding, and resources to conduct operational exercises that experiment and demonstrate emerging capabilities and technologies in an operationally relevant environment. Even after a major exercise in which senior commanders agree on the success of demonstrated capabilities and demand to acquire these at scale, there is often a two- to four-year lag time for DoD to formally define requirements, secure funding, and shape acquisition and contract strategies. For example, even successful capabilities selected by USD(R&E)’s Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve (RDER) still must go through the Program Objective Memorandum and Deputy Secretary’s Management Action Group processes to begin scaling.

Congress to pilot providing $250 million to scale operationally relevant technologies demonstrated at operational exercises that address the preeminent challenge of deterring the People’s Republic of China, such as RDER. The funds will facilitate the acceleration and scaling of novel capabilities into the hands of the warfighter at the speed of relevance, help vendors cross the Valley of Death, and incentivize new nontraditional companies to work with the DoD. This will significantly shorten the traditionally long lag times for successful vendors to receive funding while the DoD finalizes requirements, funding, and contracts. The associated funds would be particularly useful for the technology needed to integrate military forces that will revolve around digital tools and other foundational “middleware” technologies that sometimes fall in the seams of traditional major hardware-centric acquisition.

The fund should:

Be allocated in FY 2024 spending bill to specific programs or initiatives no later than 180 days from completion of the exercise on discovered solutions.
Be limited to five or fewer high-potential capabilities to ensure they are properly resourced to meaningfully scale.
Be directly allocated to an acquisition organization, such as a program executive office, to rapidly acquire capabilities that have demonstrated success in order to address priority operational risks or opportunities.
Use Defense Production Act Title III or adapt authorities available to other agencies and departments to provide credit guarantees or other funding approaches in support of technology and capability providers.

Success measures: Increased number of technologies and capabilities demonstrated successfully that are transitioned at scale to the warfighter; increased number of vendors incentivized to demonstrate at exercises.

Notional example: A company demonstrates a swarm of small undersea intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance drones at the Rim of the Pacific 2024 exercise. The firm is awarded a low-rate initial production contract within sixty days and deploys its capability with the navy in 2025.

Recommendation 9: USD(A&S) and acquisition executives propose realigning existing organizations to adopt the Space Development Agency (SDA) model, and Congress grants additional enabling authorities to those organizations in FY25 NDAA.

Addresses challenges 2 and 4.

USD(A&S) and SAEs charter a small team to build out a model, structure, key elements, and a framework replicating the SDA and lessons learned from rapid acquisition.
- SDA provides an early model for preemptive disruption within the Space Force. The disruptive units should focus on current technologies from the labs and industry that can be quickly fielded and scaled within existing rapid acquisition authorities. Mature defense and commercial capabilities, along with broader portfolio requirements, can shape a streamlined process. This model builds upon successful organizations like the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, Big Safari, and Special Operations Command’s acquisition and SOFWERX organizations.
Service leadership identifies priority capability areas that are ripe for disruption—ones where the current operational model is outmoded for the digital age and/or where novel technologies offer radically different operational capabilities at greater speed and scale to achieve mission priorities.
Each identified service and defense agency employs an SDA model to a priority capability area and repurposes organizations, funding, and resources to implement.
- Identify the right charismatic leader who embodies these characteristics: high technical acumen, proven product manager, well-defined vision, extensive personal network in warfighting and industry communities, commitment to a five-year tenure, and an intangible “wild card” quality. Provide statutory protections to extend top cover beyond the length of time of political appointees for the new organizations to disrupt entrenched mindsets on major systems, operations, and force structures employed for decades.
DoD leaders continually discuss and iterate on the new model with key stakeholder organizations across the DoD and congressional defense committees.

Success measure: Congressional buy-in, with a small set of targeted projects identified for each organization and underway in FY 2024 to prepare for rapid scaling in FY 2025 with capabilities initially fielded by FY 2027.

Notional example: Navy leadership, in its commitment to autonomous systems, bundles PEO Unmanned and Small Combatants, Task Force 59, Unmanned Task Force, and the director of unmanned systems into a new naval autonomy organization with authorities and flexibilities similar to SDA and related rapid-innovation organizations.

Recommendation 10: Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) and services establish a team to collaboratively modernize JCIDS and service requirements processes by September 2024.

Addresses challenges 2, 4, and.

The DoD’s JCIDS is a complex, disjointed bureaucracy across Joint Staff and the services. The DoD requires a streamlined, tailored requirements framework and processes that iterate operational needs and threats with technology solutions, while also aligning requirements, acquisition, and budget systems.

VCJCS and services charter a team or multiple teams to modernize DoD’s requirements enterprise to include:

Design a requirements framework that better incorporates bottom-up capability requirements from the warfighter and addresses joint strategic capability concerns. It must align service/agency and JROC core processes while allowing some tailoring and flexibility.
Enable a requirements system that breaks from the mindset of locking down all requirements up front to a dynamic model that enables software-intensive commercial solutions and emerging technologies that meet changing or evolving warfighting needs to iteratively shape capability developments.
Overhaul, streamline, and tailor requirements documents based on capability size, urgency, product vs. service, and hardware vs. software. Develop new process to rapidly validate the military utility of a commercial solution instead of the traditional JCIDS.
Aggressively streamline capability requirement development, coordination, and approval timelines from operational commands, through component commands, and Joint Staff. Impose tripwires for exceeding six months for software and twelve months for hardware to get senior leader involvement.
Develop enduring overarching requirements for capability portfolios. Include a set of mission impact measures to focus investments and acquisitions to continuously improve.
Retire the outmoded DoD Architecture Framework and focus on application programming interfaces per DepSecDef’s data decree, architectures, and standards to enable interoperability. Strike the right balance between enterprise, service, and portfolio orchestration with flexibility for program and industry solutions.
Modernize the analysis of alternatives processes to enable a more streamlined and iterative approach that values prototypes, experiments, minimum viable products, and commercial solutions with warfighter and other user feedback over lengthy headquarters staff analysis.
Better integrate threat and technology assessments early and throughout the process.
The team must include external change management experts and collaborate with industry (traditional and nontraditional) and the DoD S&T community to get their input and feedback on providing options to inform DoD requirements.
Develop a career path, structure, and improved training for DoD requirements managers.
Publish new policies, guidance, and templates in dynamic online formats instead of five-hundred-page PDFs.
Congress directs the Government Accountability Office to assess the DoD’s requirements management processes, policies, and practices to include timelines; alignment to the DoD
budget and acquisition processes, mission outcomes, portfolio management; and harnessing commercial technologies.
The Senate Armed Services Committee and/or House Armed Services Committee hold hearings with the VCJCS and the service chiefs on modernizing DoD requirements processes to enable greater speed, agility, and innovation.

Success measure: Joint Staff and service stakeholder organizations collaboratively develop a modern approach to managing defense requirements. The new requirements system integrates the key elements outlined above by September 2024.

Notional example: The Air Force establishes an uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) portfolio requirements document that aggressively streamlines all future UAS requirements, bakes in interoperability standards, and enables many novel commercial solutions.

Conclusions and next steps

This interim report is focused on providing elected officials and senior DoD leaders with actionable recommendations that can be enacted promptly. The Commission discussed and acknowledged broader, strategic matters that will take time to flesh out and implement. These include establishing a more fulsome capital market engagement strategy, harnessing a modern workforce, and exploring digital transformations of enterprise systems to enable broader reforms and opportunities. The Commission’s final report, which is planned for September 2023, will expand upon these ten recommendations to include a broader set of reforms to strengthen defense innovation adoption. It will include case studies that highlight successes in adopting dual-use technologies within short time frames. After all, living through the “decisive decade” means that Americans deserve decisive capabilities to provide for the common defense, in this decade.

Biographies

The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD

Board Director and Co-Chair of the Commission, Atlantic Council; 27th US Secretary of Defense

The Honorable Mark T. Esper is a partner and board member of the venture capital firm Red Cell Partners and a board director at the Atlantic Council. He was sworn in as the 27th Secretary of Defense on July 23, 2019, and served in that capacity until November 9, 2020. He previously served as acting secretary of defense from June 24, 2019, to July 15, 2019. Esper was confirmed as the 23rd secretary of the US Army in November 2017.

In the private sector, Esper was vice president for government relations at the Raytheon Company.

He earlier served concurrently as executive vice president of the US Chamber of Commerce’s Global Intellectual Property Center and as vice president for European and Eurasian affairs from 2008 to 2010. From 2006 to 2007, He was chief operating officer and executive vice president of defense and international affairs at the Aerospace Industries Association.

In addition to his work in the private sector, Esper served in a range of positions on Capitol Hill and in the Defense Department. He served as legislative director and senior policy advisor to former Senator Chuck Hagel. He was a senior professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations and Senate Governmental Affairs committees, policy director for the House Armed Services Committee, and national security advisor for former Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist. During the President George W. Bush administration, he served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for negotiations policy at the Pentagon. He was national policy director to the late Senator Fred Thompson for his 2008 presidential campaign and was a Senate-appointed commissioner on the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 

Esper began his career in the US Army. He is a 1986 graduate of the United States Military Academy and received his commission in the infantry. Upon completion of Ranger and Pathfinder training, he served in the 101st Airborne Division and participated in the 1990-91 Gulf War with the “Screaming Eagles.” He later commanded a rifle company in the 3-325 Airborne Battalion Combat Team in Vicenza, Italy. He retired from the army in 2007 after spending ten years on active duty and eleven years in the National Guard and Army Reserve. After leaving active duty, he served as chief of staff at the Heritage Foundation think tank.

He is a recipient of the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service. Among his many military awards and decorations are the Legion of Merit, a Bronze Star Medal, the Kuwait Liberation Medal, Kuwait Liberation Medal-Saudi Arabia, and the Combat Infantryman Badge. Esper holds a PhD from the George Washington University.

The Hon. Deborah Lee James

Board Director and Co-Chair of the Commission, Atlantic Council; 23rd US Secretary of the Air Force

The Honorable Deborah Lee James is chair of the Defense Business Board and board director at the Atlantic Council. Previously, she served as the twenty-third secretary of the US Air Force and was responsible for the affairs of the Department of the Air Force, including the organizing, training, equipping, and providing for the welfare of its nearly 660,000 active-duty, National Guard, Reserve, and civilian airmen and their families. She also oversaw the Air Force’s annual budget of more than $139 billion. James has thirty years of senior homeland and national security experience in the federal government and the private sector.

Prior to her Air Force position, James served as president of Science Applications International Corporation’s (SAIC’s) technical and engineering sector, where she was responsible for 8,700 employees and more than $2 billion in revenue.

For twelve years, James held a variety of positions with SAIC, including senior vice president and director of homeland security. From 2000 to 2001, she was executive vice president and chief operating officer at Business Executives for National Security, and from 1998 to 2000 she was vice president of international operations and marketing at United Technologies. During the Bill Clinton administration, from 1993 to 1998, James served in the Pentagon as assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs. In that position, she was senior advisor to the secretary of defense on all matters pertaining to the 1.8 million National Guard and Reserve personnel worldwide. In addition to working extensively with Congress, state governors, the business community, military associations, and international officials on National Guard and Reserve component issues, James oversaw a $10 billion budget and supervised a one-hundred-plus-person staff. Prior to her Senate confirmation in 1993, she served as an assistant to the assistant secretary of defense for legislative affairs.

From 1983 to 1993, James worked as a professional staff member on the House Armed Services Committee, where she served as a senior advisor to the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee, the NATO Burden Sharing Panel, and the chairman’s Member Services team.

James earned a BA in comparative area studies from Duke University and an MA in international affairs from Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs.

Eric Lofgren

Professional Staff Member, Seapower and Acquisition Lead, US Senate Committee on Armed Services; Author, Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, Atlantic Council

Eric Lofgren is a professional staff member and the seapower and acquisition lead for the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services. His work on this Commission was completed while he was a research fellow at the Center for Government Contracting in the George Mason University (GMU) School of Business, where he performed research, wrote, and led initiatives on business, policy, regulatory, and other issues in government contracting.

He manages the daily blog Acquisition Talk and produces the Acquisition Talk podcast, on which he interviews leading experts in the field. Lofgren was an emergent ventures fellow at GMU’s Mercatus Center. Prior to joining GMU, he was a senior analyst at Technomics Inc., supporting the Defense Department’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office. He has also supported government analyses for the Government Accountability Office, Naval Sea Systems Command, Canada Public Works, and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Cost and Economics.

Whitney M. McNamara

Vice President, Beacon Global Strategies; Author, Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, Atlantic Council

Whitney McNamara is a vice president at Beacon Global Strategies. Prior to that, McNamara worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, where she served as the S&T portfolio lead at the Defense Innovation Board, whose mission is to provide the secretary of defense, deputy secretary of defense, and other senior leaders with recommendations on emerging technologies and innovative approaches that DoD should adopt to ensure US technological and military dominance.

Before that, McNamara was an emerging technologies policy subject matter expert supporting the Department of Defense’s Chief Information Officer (CIO). Prior to that, she was a senior analyst at national security think tank the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, focusing on emerging technologies, future operating concepts, and informationized warfare in the context of long-term technological and military competition with great powers.

Peter Modigliani

Defense Acquisition Lead,MITRE Corporation; Author, Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, Atlantic Council

Peter Modigliani is a defense acquisition leader within the MITRE Corporation enabling the DoD and intelligence community to deliver innovative solutions with greater speed and agility. He works with acquisition and CIO executives, program managers, the Section 809 Panel, congressional staffs, industry, and academia to shape acquisition reforms, strategic initiatives, and major program strategies.

Modigliani champions digitally transforming the acquisition enterprise to modernize and accelerate operations. He launched MITRE’s digital acquisition platform, AiDA. Prior to MITRE, Modigliani was an Air Force program manager for C4ISR programs and an assistant vice president with Alion Science and Technology, supporting the Air Force Acquisition Executive’s Information Dominance division.

Stephen Rodriguez

Senior Advisor and Study Director of the Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Stephen Rodriguez is a senior advisor with the Forward Defense program at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and founding partner of One Defense, a next-generation strategic advisory firm that leverages machine learning to identify advanced software and hardware commercial capabilities and accelerate their transition into the defense industrial base. He is also a venture partner at Refinery Ventures, an early-scale fund investing in dual-use technologies across the country. Rodriguez began his career at Booz Allen Hamilton supporting its national security practice.

In his capacity as an expert on game-theoretic applications, he supported the US intelligence community, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security as a lead architect for wargames. He subsequently was a vice president at Sentia Group, an artificial intelligence company, and served as chief marketing officer for NCL Holdings, an international defense corporation. Rodriguez serves as a board director or board advisor of ten venture-backed companies—Duco, Edgybees, Hatch Apps, HighSide, Omelas, Uniken, Ursa Major Technologies, Vantage Robotics, War on the Rocks, and Zignal Labs—as well as the nonprofit organizations Public Spend Forum and Training Leaders International. He is also senior innovation advisor at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Clementine G. Starling

Director, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Clementine G. Starling is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program and a resident fellow within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In her role, she shapes the Center’s US defense research agenda, leads Forward Defense’s team of nine staff and forty fellows, and produces thought leadership on US security strategies and the evolving character of warfare. Her research focuses on long-term US thinking on issues like China’s and Russia’s defense strategies, space security, defense industry, and emerging technology. Prior to launching Forward Defense, Starling served as deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security team, specializing in European security policy and NATO.

From 2016, she supported NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division at two NATO summits (Brussels and London) and organized and managed three senior Atlantic Council task forces on US force posture in Europe, military mobility, and US defense innovation adoption. During her time at the Atlantic Council, Starling has written numerous reports and commentary on US space strategy, deterrence, operational concepts, coalition warfare, and US-Europe relations. She regularly serves as a panelist and moderator at public conferences. Among the outlets that have featured her analysis and commentary are Defense One, Defense News, RealClearDefense, the National Interest, SpaceNews, NATO’s Joint Air and Space Power Conference, the BBC, National Public Radio, ABC News, and Government Matters, among others. Starling was named the 2022 Herbert Roback scholar by the US National Academy of Public Administration. She also served as the 2020 Security and Defense fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy. Originally from the United Kingdom, Starling previously worked in the UK Parliament focusing on technology, defense, Middle East security, and Ukraine. She also supported the Britain Stronger in Europe campaign, championing for the United Kingdom to remain within the European Union. She graduated with honors from the London School of Economics with a BS in international relations and history and is an MA candidate in security studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

Mark J. Massa is an associate director in the Forward Defense program. His work focuses on nuclear deterrence strategy and policy. He holds an MA in security studies and a BSFS in science, technology, and international affairs from Georgetown University.

Delharty M. Manson II is a program assistant in the Forward Defense program. His work focuses on defense innovation and operational concepts. He holds a BA in public policy from the College of William & Mary.

Jacob Mezey is a program assistant in the Forward Defense program. His work focuses on nuclear security, space security, and defense innovation. He holds a BA in history from Yale University.

Acknowledgments

This interim report was written and prepared with the support and input of its authors, Commissioners on the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, and the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

This effort was conducted under the supervision of Commission Director Stephen Rodriguez, Forward Defense Director Clementine Starling, and Forward Defense Associate Director Mark J. Massa. Thank you to Julia Siegel and Christian Trotti for earlier contributions. Special thanks to Atlantic Council CEO Fred Kempe and Barry Pavel for their support of this effort.

This effort has been made possible through the generous support of Booz Allen Hamilton as the Foundational Sponsor as well as sponsorship from Accrete AI, ACT1 Federal, Applied Intuition, Palantir, Peraton, Primer AI, Rebellion Defense, Schmidt Futures, and Snowpoint Ventures.

Foundational sponsor

List of acronyms

ATR: Above threshold reprogramming
BLI: Budget line item
CAS: Cost Accounting Standards
CDAO: Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer
DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DepSecDef: Deputy Secretary of Defense
DIU: Defense Innovation Unit
DoD: US Department of Defense
FFRDC: Federally Funded Research and Development Center
GSA: General Services Administration
IRAD: Independent research & development
JCIDS: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
JROC: Joint Requirements Oversight Council
MCWL: US Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
NDAA: National Defense Authorization Act
NDC: Nontraditional defense companies
OSC: Office of Strategic Capital
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense

OT: Other transaction
PE: Program elements
PEO: Program executive officer / office
RDER: Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve
RDT&E: Research, development, testing, and evaluation
S&T: Science and technology
SAE: Service acquisition executive
SBA: Small Business Agency
SBIR: Small Business Innovation Research program
SDA: Space Development Agency
SOCOM: US Special Operations Command
STRATFI: Strategic Funding Increase
UAS: Uncrewed aerial system
USD(A&S): Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
USD(R&E): Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
USD: Under Secretary of Defense
VC: Venture capital / venture capitalist
VCJCS: Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The post Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption interim report appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Rich Outzen quoted in Middle East Eye on Turkey’s drone carrier

Grady Wilson — Mon, 10 Apr 2023 18:34:52 +0000

The post Rich Outzen quoted in Middle East Eye on Turkey’s drone carrier appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Belarus accuses Ukraine of plotting terrorist attack

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 07 Apr 2023 18:23:57 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Belarus accuses Ukraine of plotting terrorist attack against Russian consulate

On April 4, Belarusian state-controlled TV channel ONT aired a documentary titled “Loud failures of the Ukrainian special services in Belarus. Gaspar did not get in touch.” Reports from Belarus’ State Security Committee (KGB) informed much of the program, which asserted that, under the leadership of Ukrainian special services, a network of Russian and Belarusian citizens planned several terrorist attacks in the Belarusian city of Grodno. The alleged perpetrators reportedly planned to target several facilities, including the Consulate General of Russia, a military enlistment office opposite Zhiliber Park, a military unit in southern Grodno, and two oil depots.

The KGB claimed that Vyacheslav Rozum, an alleged employee of the Main Directorate of Intelligence in the Ukrainian defense ministry, planned the attacks. Ukrainian authorities had not commented on the accusations at the time of writing. According to the documentary, Rozum asked Russian citizen Daniil Krinari, known as Kovalevsky, to form a network of people to carry out terrorist acts. Krinari was reportedly arrested in Grodno in December 2022 and extradited to Russia at the request of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). He was charged in Russia for cooperating with Ukraine and acting in the interests of Ukraine. The Belarusian KGB asserted that, before his extradition, Krinari managed to recruit at least two people, Russian citizen Alexei Kulikov and Belarusian citizen Vadim Patsenko. Kulikov had allegedly fled Russia in 2022 to avoid conscription and moved to Belarus.

The ONT documentary includes interviews with Kulikov and Patsenko, who argue that Rozum asked them to take photos and videos of the target facilities in Grodno. Moreover, Patsenko argued that Vyacheslav tasked him with blowing up an oil depot with a drone. The program claims Ukrainian special services promised Kulikov and Patsenko $10,000 each. While Patsenko and Kulikov allege that Ukrainian security services were involved in the operation, the ONT program does not include concrete evidence to prove this claim.

The documentary also contains an interview with Nikolai Shvets, the main suspect behind a February 26, 2023, attack on an AWACS A-50 Russian military aircraft at Machulishchy airfield in Belarus. Shvets is reported to be a Russian-Ukrainian dual citizen and served in the Ukrainian army. In the ONT interview, he claimed he was working with a person from the Ukrainian security service while planning the sabotage. The Belarusian independent media outlet Nasha Niva reported that Maxim Lopatin, one of arrested suspects in the Machulishchy attack, had a broken jaw when he filmed the ONT doumentary. Nasha Niva suggested that he was possibly beaten by Belarusian law enforcement authorities. Belarus arrested more than twenty people in connection to the February aircraft incident and announced on April 3 that the suspects were charged with committing an act of terrorism, for which the maximum sentence is capital punishment. However, the ONT program again provides no concrete evidence linking Shvets to Ukrainian security services.

In addition, the ONT documentary aired on the same day that Alyaksandr Lukashenka met Sergey Naryshkin, the head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, in Minsk to discuss joint counterterrorism measures undertaken by Belarus and Russia.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Identifying potential host sites for Russian tactical nuclear weapons

On March 28, Belarus confirmed it would accept Russian tactical nuclear weapons. The announcement came after Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on March 25 plans to store tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, promising to build a nuclear weapons storage facility in the country. Putin made the comments after the United Kingdom said it would supply Ukraine with ammunition containing depleted uranium. “The heavy metal is used in weapons because it can penetrate tanks and armour more easily due to its density, amongst other properties,” Reutersreported. On April 4, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu reported the transfer of Iskander-M tactical missiles, which are nuclear capable and have been utilized by the Russian military against Ukraine.

Two days after the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, on February 26, 2022, Belarus approved via referendum constitutional amendments to remove the country’s non-nuclear status. The constitutional change allows Belarus to host nuclear weapons for foreign states.

Amidst the speculation surrounding Russia’s nuclear deployment to Belarus, the most pressing questions concern the potential location of airfields capable of nuclear deployment and which type of equipment is nuclear capable in terms of maintenance and modernization efforts.

Along with the confirmed transfer of the Iskander-M missiles (a mobile, short-range ballistic missile system with a range of up to 500 kilometers), Sukhoi Su-25 fighter jets are also a top contender in the Russian and Belarusian aviation arsenals. This aircraft is capable of carrying two nuclear bombs, which the Russian military categorizes as “special aviation bombs.” In June 2022, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka personally called on Putin to help upgrade and retrofit the Belarusian Su-25 fleet to be nuclear-capable. This resulted in a long-term project to enable Belarusian nuclear capabilities, legalize hosting Russian nuclear technology and nuclear-capable craft, enable joint-training programs for aviation sorties, and direct training for Belarusian pilots.

In conjunction with the Su-25’s capabilities against Ukraine’s current air defence networks and Russia’s non-strategic nuclear policy, Belarus’ acceptance of Russian tactical nuclear weapons can be viewed as escalatory. Video footage showed the Su-25’s capacity to evade Ukraine’s man-portable air defence system (MANPAD).

https://twitter.com/ua_ridna_vilna/status/1569048817110077445

Video footage from the cockpit of a SU-25 aircraft demonstrating its maneuverability and evasion of MANPAD systems. (Source: ua_ridna_vilna/archive)

On April 2, the Russian envoy to Minsk announced that the nuclear weapons deployment would occur along Belarus’ western border. The exact location has not been specified, but Belarus has a number of bases along its western border, including Osovtsy, Ross, and Bereza. However, Lida is a primary staging base for the Belarusian fleet of SU-25s, and open-source researchers have confirmed a large presence of the aircraft on the base. Currently, Osovtsy is not one of the highly utilized bases in Belarus, but its proximity to the western border, especially in terms of proximity to Poland and the northern border of Ukraine, makes it a primary location to watch for potential signs of development, land-clearing operations, and heightened military activity.

Map showing Belarus’ western border and highlighting the locations of the Lida, Ross, and Osovtsy airbases. (Source: DFRLab via Google Maps)

—Kateryna Halstead, Research Assistant, Bologna, Italy

Individuals linked to Russian army form ‘angry patriots club’

On April 1, former Russian army commander Igor Strelkov (also known as Igor Girkin) published a video announcing the formation of the “angry patriots club” (Клуб рассерженных патриотов). According to Strelkov, the club aims “to help Russian armed forces” and “meet the stormy wind that will soon whip our faces as one team.” In the video, Strelkov says that Russia “is moving toward military defeat” because “we got into a long, protracted war for which our economy turned out to be completely unprepared. Neither the army nor the political system was ready for it.” In a Telegram post, Strelkov said the club “was created two weeks ago. So far, organizational issues have not been resolved publicly.” Strelkov previously played a crucial role in forming a separatist movement in the Donbas region.

The video also featured a statement from Pavel Gubarev, who in 2014 proclaimed himself the commander of the Donbas People’s Militia. In the video, he says, “We are angry that we are going from one defeat to another, and nothing changes.” He called the system in Russia “thievish and corrupt” and said the Russian elite are “elite in catastrophe.”

The video further featured Vladimir Grubnik, who in 2015 was arrested in Ukraine in connection to an explosion near a Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) building in Odesa; in 2019, he was part of a prisoner exchange and returned to the Russian forces in Donbas. Grubnik said that defeat would lead to Russia falling apart.

Vladimir Kucherenko, an Odesa-born Russian propagandist better known by his pen name Maksim Kalashnikov, said, “We are not afraid to criticize the actions of the government. Why? Because it can somehow help victory. Otherwise, they will do nothing, they will not move.” He called the Russian elite “looters,” “resource grabbers,” and “corrupts.” He predicted the war would turn into “carnage to death” and that the “corrupt Russian elites” would organize a coup that would “betray the country” by agreeing to Russia’s “separation” and “giving up of nuclear arms” in order to “earn the forgiveness of the West.” In 2015, the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture included Kucherenko in the list of Russians “threatening national security.”

Another figure in the video is Maksim Klimov, a pro-Kremlin military expert, who said, “The authorities do not know the real situation.” He added, “They do not hear nor see what is happening in the special military operation zone.” Klimov also did not rule out Russia’s defeat.

The video gained some traction online, garnering 177,000 views on YouTube at the time of writing and 623,600 views and 2,500 shares on Strekov’s Telegram channel. According to TGStat, most of the shares on Telegram came from private accounts. Many Ukrainian media outlets reported on the newly founded club. The DFRLab did not identify any mainstream Russian media outlets reporting on the club besides Kommersant, a Kremlin-approved media outlet focused on business.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Resident Fellow, Riga, Latvia

Russian propaganda reaches Ukrainian users via Facebook ads

This week, the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security (CSCIS) and Ukrainian civil society members reported that Facebook advertising campaigns are being used to spread negative content about Ukraine. The ads range from posts that claim “Romania wants to annex Ukrainian territories” to videos that claim “This is the end. There are no men to fight for Ukraine.” While these campaigns were quickly de-platformed and the pages sharing them were banned, the DFRLab was able to investigate some of the ads via the Facebook Ad Library. The DFRLab previously reported on Facebook ads promoting pro-Russia disinformation to Ukrainian users.

The ads included links to the website luxurybigisland.net, with some ads sharing variations of the URL, such as luxurybigisland.net/rbk or luxurybigisland.net/pravda. The website was built using the Russian website builder Tilda, and its the landing page featured German text that translates to, “Nothing that can’t be removed. We care for your textiles as gently as possible with the utmost care, iron and steam, so that you can enjoy your clothes for a long time. We care.” The same phrase appeared on the now-defunct Tilda-made website google-seo-top.com and the website of a German textile care company. Registration data for luxurybigisland.net is redacted, but WhoIs data for google-seo-top.com shows that the website was registered in Russia. Both luxurybigisland.net and google-seo-top.com include metadata, shown in Google results, that states, in German, “the USA are against the entire world.”

A composite image of a Google search result showing google-seo-top.com (top) and an archive of luxurybigisland.net (bottom) sharing an identical German phrase in their metadata. (Source: Google/Google cache, top; Luxurybigisland.net/archive, bottom)

One URL shared in the ads, luxurybigisland.net/pravda, remained online at the time of writing. The URL redirects to a forged article mimicking the Ukrainian news outlet Pravda. The article shared in the ads never appeared on the authentic Pravda website, but its byline cited a genuine journalist working at the outlet. The DFRLab confirmed the article was a forgery by reviewing the journalist’s author page on the authentic Pravda website, reviewing Pravda’s archived section, conducting a Google search for the forged headline, and then a more specific website search via Google.

Visually the forged website is identical to the authentic one and even features links to contact information copied from the original website. However, the forged website’s image format is different. The text of the forged article claims that the Ukrainian economy is heavily damaged and that “continuation of the war will lead to even greater losses in the economy.” The data shared in the article appears to be copied from multiple media sources and is not false, but the article’s framing contains pro-Russian sentiments as it calls for Ukraine’s surrender.

A second forged article, discovered by CSCIS, was shared on the now-offline URL luxurybigisland.net/RBK. The article mimicked the website of the reputable Ukrainian outlet RBC.

Meta itself has taken – and continues to take – action against similar cross-platform, pro-Russia networks that push users to websites designed to impersonate legitimate news organizations. The DFRLab could not tie its identified assets to those previous Meta actions, but there is some probability that they were related given the similarity of behavior.

A Facebook page with “Cripto” in its name shared some of the ads. The DFRLab identified another Facebook page with the word Cripto in the name sharing pro-Kremlin narratives via Facebook ads. The ads pushed a false story claiming there was a “riot in Kyiv over losses.” CSCIS previously debunked another narrative pushed by a similarly named page that also fomented anti-Ukrainian military sentiment.

A composite image of two ads from pages with “cripto” in the name. The first, at left, is the Facebook page identified by the DFRLab, while the second, at right, is an earlier ad previously identified by CSCIS. (Source: Cripto ukijed, left; Cripto nucergeq, right)

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Poland and Ukraine sign cooperation deal for production of tank shells

During Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Poland, Polish manufacturer Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa and Ukroboronprom signed a cooperation agreement for the joint production of 125-mm tank ammunition. The agreement assumes that the deployment of new production lines will be in Polish cities and the agreement indicates that they plan to produce a large amount of ammunition for 125-mm guns. The decision to start production in Poland was made due to the high risks of Russian missile attacks on production facilities if they were to be based in Ukraine. In place of locating the production in the country, the Ukrainian side will provide technologies and highly qualified specialists with experience in production. This will be the second factory that will produce 125-mm tank shells.

The supply of shells is of particular importance to Ukrainian forces, which are preparing a counter-offensive in southern and eastern Ukraine as heavy fighting with the Russian army continues in the Bakhmut and Donetsk regions.

Separately, German manufacturer Rheinmetall is building a service center for Western military equipment used by Ukraine’s armed forces in Romania, Reuters reported on April 2. The construction for the center is already underway in the Romanian city of Satu Mare, close to the country’s border with Ukraine. The hub is expected to open later this month.

This development is happening against the background of diplomatic activity and statements. Ukraine is not ready to sign any peace agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin, but the war could end as early as this year, according to an April 5 interview with Ukraine’s Minister of Defense Oleksii Rezniko, who said, “I think this war will end soon. Of course, I would like it not to start, but I personally believe in this year as a year of victory.”

Rezniko also commented on a statement made in March by Czech Republic President Petr Pavel, who claimed that Ukraine had only one chance to conduct a successful counter-offensive this year. “I think that the president of the Czech Republic now speaks more like a military man than a politician, and the logic of the military is such that they constantly calculate the worst options. But even if this is his assessment, it is subjective, and he still lays down useful for us. The message is that European countries should unite more powerfully and strengthen assistance to Ukraine,” said Reznikov. Later, Andriy Sybiha, an adviser to Zelenskyy, told the Financial Times that Kyiv is willing to discuss the future of Crimea with Moscow if its forces reach the border of the Russian-occupied peninsula.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

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Game-changers: Implications of the Russo-Ukraine war for the future of ground warfare

T.X. Hammes — Mon, 03 Apr 2023 16:30:00 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

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Public Event Mon, April 3, 2023 • 3:30 pm ET

What does the record of combat in the year since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine herald about the future character of ground war? Defense analysts are split on whether the conflict manifests transformative change or merely reinforces the verities of ground combat. On the one hand, the bulk of each side’s formations are armed with decades-old equipment and trained in Soviet-era tactics. However, both forces are adapting, and the Ukrainian military is demonstrating an impressive propensity to improvise and innovate. In particular, Russia was not prepared for Ukraine’s convergence of new capabilities in command and control, persistent surveillance, and massed, precision fires which are changing the game of ground warfare.

Want to learn more? Watch the launch event.

Game-changers or little-changed? Implications of ground combat in Ukraine

Experts discuss what lessons policymakers should draw from land warfare in Ukraine and what adaptations the United States, as well as allies and partners, should make to their force posture and plans.

Conflict Defense Policy Defense Technologies National Security

Verities of ground combat

The Russo-Ukraine war has reinforced important continuities in military operations. These include the importance of preparation, logistics, and industrial capacity which are the core components needed to sustain a capable force. The war has also driven home the importance of both massed and precision fires. Cannon artillery has played a central role in the war, firing about two million rounds to date. Ukrainian forces have also adeptly employed long-range High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) to dramatically damage Russian ammunition resupply. Artillery fires have been, and will continue to be, crucial for supporting maneuver, degrading adversary communications and logistical capabilities, and destroying or suppressing adversary artillery. Consequently, the industrial capacity to produce the necessary ammunition, maintenance equipment, and systems to replace losses, will remain a defining feature of military preparedness.

Game-changers

The Ukrainian military has combined existing and new technologies to develop three capabilities that are dramatically altering the dynamics on the battlefield. First, Ukraine has developed truly connected, high-speed command and control. Second, Ukraine has access to near-persistent surveillance of the battlespace. Third, Ukraine’s skilled use of precision artillery, drones, and loitering munitions demonstrated how their smaller, lighter forces could defeat Russia’s offensive.

Recommendations

Recognize that these game-changing capabilities are giving new and powerful advantages to defenders in ground combat.
Structure and organize forces to operate in an environment of ubiquitous surveillance.
Prepare for ground combat in which large numbers of “semiautonomous” loitering munitions dominate the battlefield.
Recognize ground-based missiles and drones as key instruments of air power.
Engage the commercial sector as a key source of technology and innovation.

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About the author

T.X. Hammes

Distinguished Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Dr. Thomas X. Hammes joined Institute for National Strategic Studies in June 2009. His areas of expertise include future conflict, the changing character of war, military strategy, operational concepts, and insurgency. Dr. Hammes earned a Bachelor of Science from the Naval Academy in 1975 and holds a Masters of Historical Research and a Doctorate in Modern History from Oxford University. He is a Distinguished Graduate from the Canadian National Defence College. He has published three books: Deglobalization and International Security; The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century; and The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, the Corps’ Ethos, and the Korean War. He has also published over 160 articles. His publications have been used widely in staff and defense college curricula in the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and Singapore. Dr. Hammes has lectured extensively at leading academic and military institutions in the United States and abroad. Prior to his retirement from active duty, Dr. Hammes served 30 years in the Marine Corps to include command of an intelligence battalion, an infantry battalion and the Chemical Biological Response Force. He participated in military operations in Somalia and Iraq and trained insurgents in various locations.

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The 5×5—Conflict in Ukraine’s information environment

Simon Handler — Wed, 22 Mar 2023 04:01:00 +0000

This article is part of The 5×5, a monthly series by the Cyber Statecraft Initiative, in which five featured experts answer five questions on a common theme, trend, or current event in the world of cyber. Interested in the 5×5 and want to see a particular topic, event, or question covered? Contact Simon Handler with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at SHandler@atlanticcouncil.org.

Just over one year ago, on February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of neighboring Ukraine. The ensuing conflict, Europe’s largest since World War II, has not only besieged Ukraine physically, but also through the information environment. Through kinetic, cyber, and influence operations, Russia has placed Ukraine’s digital and physical information infrastructure—including its cell towers, networks, data, and the ideas that traverse them—in its crosshairs as it seeks to cripple Ukraine’s defenses and bring its population under Russian control.

Given the privately owned underpinnings of the cyber and information domains by technology companies, a range of local and global companies have played a significant role in defending the information environment in Ukraine. From Ukrainian telecommunications operators to global cloud and satellite internet providers, the private sector has been woven into Ukrainian defense and resilience. For example, Google’s Threat Analysis Group reported having disrupted over 1,950 instances in 2022 of Russian information operations aimed at degrading support for Ukraine, undermining its government, and building support for the war within Russia. The present conflict in Ukraine offers lessons for states as well as private companies on why public-private cooperation is essential to building resilience in this space, and how these entities can work together more effectively.

We brought together a group of experts to provide insights on the war being waged through the Ukrainian information environment and take away lessons for the United States and its allies for the future.

#1 How has conflict in the information environment associated with the war in Ukraine compared to your prior expectations?

Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Baltics, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council:

“As the war in Ukraine started, everyone was expecting to see Russia conducting offensive information influence operations targeting Europe. Yes, we have identified and researched Russia’s coordinated information influence campaigns on Meta’s platforms and Telegram. These campaigns targeted primarily European countries, and their execution was unprofessional, sloppy, and without much engagement on respective platforms.”

Silas Cutler, senior director for cyber threat research, Institute for Security and Technology (IST):

“A remarkable aspect of this conflict has been how Ukraine has maintained communication with the rest of the world. In the days leading up to the conflict, there was a significant concern that Russia would disrupt Ukraine’s ability to report on events as they unfolded. Instead of losing communication, Ukraine has thrived while continuously highlighting through social media its ingenuity within the conflict space. Both the mobilization of its technical workforce through the volunteer IT_Army and its ability to leverage consumer technology, such as drones, have shown the incredible resilience and creativity of the Ukrainian people.”

Roman Osadchuk, research associate, Eurasia, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council:

“The information environment was chaotic and tense even before the invasion, as Russia waged a hybrid war since at least the annexation of Crimea and war in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. Therefore, the after-invasion dynamic did not bring significant surprises, but intensified tension and resistance from Ukrainian civil society and government toward Russia’s attempts to explain its unprovoked invasion and muddle the water around its war crimes. The only things that exceeded expectations were the abuse of fact-checking toolbox WarOnFakes and the intensified globalization of the Kremlin’s attempts to tailor messages about the war to their favor globally.”

Emma Schroeder, associate director, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council:

“The information environment has been a central space and pathway throughout which this war is being fought. Russian forces are reaching through that space to attack and spread misinformation, as well as attacking the physical infrastructure underpinning this environment. The behavior, while novel in its scale, is the continuation of Russian strategy in Crimea, and is very much living up to expectations set in that context. What has surpassed expectations is the effectiveness of Ukrainian defenses, in coordination with allies and private sector partners. The degree to which the international community has sprung forward to provide aid and assistance is incredible, especially in the information environment where such global involvement can be so immediate and transformative.”

Gavin Wilde, senior fellow, Technology and International Affairs Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:

“The volume and intensity of cyber and information operations has roughly been in line with my prior expectations, though the degree of private and commercial activity was something that I might not have predicted a year ago. From self-selecting out of the Russian market to swarming to defend Ukrainian networks and infrastructure, the outpouring of support from Western technology and cybersecurity firms was not on my bingo card. Sustaining it and modeling for similar crises are now key.”

#2 What risks do private companies assume in offering support or partnership to states engaged in active conflict?

Aleksejeva: “Fewer and fewer businesses are betting on Russia’s successful economical future. Additionally, supporting Russia in this conflict in any way is morally unacceptable for most Western companies. Chinese and Iranian companies are different. As for Ukraine, supporting it is morally encouraged, but is limited by many practicalities, such as supply chain disruptions amid Russia’s attacks.”

Cutler: “By providing support during conflict, companies risk becoming a target themselves. Technology companies such as Microsoft, SentinelOne, and Cloudflare, which have publicly reported their support for Ukraine, have been historically targeted by Russian cyber operations and are already familiar with the increased risk. Organizations with pre-conflict commercial relationships may fall under new scrutiny by nationally-aligned hacktivist groups such as Killnet. This support for one side over the other—whether actual or perceived—may result in additional risk.”

Osadchuk: “An important risk of continuing business as usual [in Russia] is that it may damage a company’s public image and test its declared values, since the continuation of paying taxes within the country-aggressor makes the private company a sponsor of these actions. Another risk for a private company is financial, since the companies that leave a particular market are losing their profits, but this is incomparable to human suffering and losses caused by the aggression. In the case of a Russian invasion, one of the ways to stop the war is to cut funding for and, thus, undermine the Russian war machine and support Ukraine.”

Schroeder: “Private companies have long provided goods and services to combatants outside of the information environment. The international legal framework restricting combatants to targeting ‘military objects’ provides normative protection, as objects are defined as those ‘whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage’ in a manner proportional to the military gain foreseen by the operation. This definition, however, is still subject to the realities of conflict, wherein combatants will make those decisions to their own best advantage. In the information environment, this question becomes more complicated, as cyber products and services often do not fall neatly within standard categories and where private companies themselves own and operate the very infrastructure over and through which combatants engage. The United States and its allies, whether on a unilateral of supranational basis, work to better define the boundaries of civilian ‘participation’ in war and conflict, as the very nature of the space means that their involvement will only increase.”

Wilde: “On one hand, it is important not to falsely mirror onto others the constraints of international legal and normative frameworks around armed conflict to which responsible states strive to adhere. Like Russia, some states show no scruples about violating these frameworks in letter or spirit, and seem unlikely to be inhibited by claims of neutrality from companies offering support to victimized states. That said, clarity about where goods and services might be used for civilian versus military objectives is advisable to avoid the thresholds of ‘direct participation’ in war outlined in International Humanitarian Law.”

#3 What useful lessons should the United States and its allies take away from the successes and/or failures of cyber and information operations in Ukraine?

Aleksejeva: “As for cyber operations, so far, we have not seen successful disruptions achieved by Russia of Ukraine and its Western allies. Yes, we are seeing constant attacks, but cyber defense is much more developed on both sides than before 2014. As for information operations, the United States and its allies should become less self-centered and have a clear view of Russia’s influence activities in the so-called Global South where much of the narratives are rooted in anti-Western sentiment.”

Cutler: “Prior to the start of the conflict, it was strongly believed that a cyber operation, specifically against energy and communication sectors, would act as a precursor to kinetic action. While a WannaCry or NotPetya-scale attack did not occur, the AcidRain attack against the Viasat satellite communication network and other attacks targeting Ukraine’s energy sector highlight that cyber operations of varying effectiveness will play a role in the lead up to a military conflict.”

Osadchuk: “First, cyber operations coordinate with other attack types, like kinetic operations on the ground, disinformation, and influence operations. Therefore, cyberattacks might be a precursor of an upcoming missile strike, information operation, or any other action in the physical and informational dimensions, so allies could use cyber to model and analyze multi-domain operations. Finally, preparation for and resilience to information and cyber operations are vital in mitigating the consequences of such attacks; thus, updating defense doctrines and improving cyber infrastructure and social resilience are necessary.”

Schroeder: “Expectations for operations in this environment have exposed clear fractures in the ways that different communities define as success in a wartime operation. Specifically, there is a tendency to equate success with direct or kinetic battlefield impact. One of the biggest lessons that has been both a success and a failure throughout this war is the role that this environment can play. Those at war, from ancient to modern times, have leveraged every asset at their disposal and chosen the tool they see as the best fit for each challenge that arises—cyber is no different. While there is ongoing debate surrounding this question, if cyber operations have not been effective on a battlefield, that does not mean that cyber is ineffective, just that expectations were misplaced. Understanding the myriad roles that cyber can and does play in defense, national security, and conflict is key to creating an effective cross-domain force.

Wilde: “Foremost is the need to check the assumption that these operations can have decisive utility, particularly in a kinetic wartime context. Moscow placed great faith in its ability to convert widespread digital and societal disruption into geopolitical advantage, only to find years of effort backfiring catastrophically. In other contexts, better trained and resourced militaries might be able to blend cyber and information operations into combined arms campaigns more effectively to achieve discrete objectives. However, it is worth reevaluating the degree to which we assume offensive cyber and information operations can reliably be counted on to play pivotal roles in hot war.”

A parallel terrain: Public-private defense of the Ukrainian information environment

Untangling the Russian web: Spies, proxies, and spectrums of Russian cyber behavior

Hackers, Hoodies, and Helmets: Technology and the changing face of Russian private military contractors

#4 How do comparisons to other domains of conflict help and/or hurt understanding of conflict in the information domain?

Aleksejeva: “Unlike conventional warfare, information warfare uses information and psychological operations during peace time as well. By masking behind sock puppet or anonymous social media accounts, information influence operations might be perceived as legitimate internal issues that polarize society. A country might be unaware that it is under attack. At the same time, as the goal of conventional warfare is to break an adversary’s defense line, information warfare fights societal resilience by breaking its unity. ‘Divide and rule’ is one of the basic information warfare strategies.”

Cutler: “When looking at the role of cyber in this conflict, I think it is critical to examine the history of Hacktivist movements. This can be incredibly useful for understanding the influences and capabilities of groups like the IT_Army and Killnet.”

Osadchuk: “The information domain sometimes reflects the kinetic events on the ground, so comparing these two is helpful and could serve as a behavior predictor. For instance, when the Armed Forces of Ukraine liberate new territories, they also expose war crimes, civilian casualties, and damages inflicted by occupation forces. In reaction to these revelations, the Kremlin propaganda machine usually launches multiple campaigns to distance themselves, blame the victim, or even denounce allegations as staged to muddy the waters for certain observers.”

Schroeder: “It is often tricky to carry comparisons over different environments and context, but the practice persists because, well, that is just what people do—look for patterns. The ability to carry over patterns and lessons is essential, especially in new environments and with the constant developments of new tools and technologies. Where these comparisons cause problems is when they are used not as a starting point, but as a predetermined answer.”

Wilde: “It is problematic, in my view, to consider information a warfighting ‘domain,’ particularly because its physical and metaphorical boundaries are endlessly vague and evolving—certainly relative to air, land, sea, and space. The complexities and contingencies in the information environment are infinitely more than those in the latter domains. However talented we may be at collecting and analyzing millions of relevant datapoints with advanced technology, these capabilities may lend us a false sense of our ability to control or subvert the information environment during wartime—from hearts and minds to bits and bytes.”

#5 What conditions might make the current conflict exceptional and not generalizable?

Aleksejeva: “This war is neither ideological nor a war for territories and resources. Russia does not have any ideology that backs up its invasion of Ukraine. It also has a hard time maintaining control of its occupied territories. Instead, Russia has many disinformation-based narratives or stories that justify the invasion to as many Russian citizens as possible including Kremlin officials. Narratives are general and diverse enough, so everyone can find an explanation of the current invasion—be it the alleged rebirth of Nazism in Ukraine, the fight against US hegemony, or the alleged historical right to bring Ukraine back to Russia’s sphere of influence. Though local, the war has global impact and makes countries around the world pick sides. Online and social media platforms, machine translation tools, and big data products provide a great opportunity to bombard any internet user in any part of the world with pro-Russia massaging often tailored to echo historical, racial, and economic resentments especially rooted in colonial past.”

Cutler: “During the Gulf War, CNN and other cable news networks were able to provide live coverage of military action as it was unfolding. Now, real-time information from conflict areas is more broadly accessible. Telegram and social media have directly shaped the information and narratives from the conflict zone.”

Osadchuk: “The main difference is the enormous amount of war content, ranging from professional pictures and amateur videos after missile strikes to drone footage of artillery salvos and bodycam footage of fighting in the frontline trenches—all making this conflict the most documented. Second, this war demonstrates the need for drones, satellite imagery, and open-source intelligence for successful operations, which distances it from previous conflicts and wars. Finally, it is exceptional due to the participation of Ukrainian civil society in developing applications, like the one alerting people about incoming shelling or helping find shelter; launching crowdfunding campaigns for vehicles, medical equipment, and even satellite image services; and debunking Russian disinformation on social media.”

Schroeder: “One of the key lessons we can take from this war is the centrality of the global private sector to conflict in and through the information environment. From expedited construction of cloud infrastructure for the Ukrainian government to Ukrainian telecommunications companies defending and restoring services along the front lines to distributed satellite devices, providing flexible connectivity to civilians and soldiers alike, private companies have undoubtedly played an important role in shaping both the capabilities of the Ukrainian state and the information battlespace itself. While we do not entirely understand the incentives that drove these actions, an undeniable motivation that will be difficult to replicate in other contexts is the combination of Russian outright aggression and comparative economic weakness. Companies and their directors felt motivated to act due to the first and, likely, free to act due to the second. Private sector centrality is unlikely to diminish and, in future conflicts, it will be imperative for combatants to understand the opportunities and dependencies that exist in this space within their own unique context.”

Wilde: “My sense is that post-war, transatlantic dynamics—from shared norms to politico-military ties—lent significant tailwinds to marshal resource and support to Ukraine (though not as quickly or amply from some quarters as I had hoped). The shared memory of the fight for self-determination in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s to early 1990s still has deep resonance among the publics and capitals of the West. These are unique dynamics, and the degree to which they could be replicated in other theaters of potential conflict is a pretty open question.”

Simon Handler is a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative within the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab). He is also the editor-in-chief of The 5×5, a series on trends and themes in cyber policy. Follow him on Twitter @SimonPHandler.

The Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, under the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), works at the nexus of geopolitics and cybersecurity to craft strategies to help shape the conduct of statecraft and to better inform and secure users of technology.

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Improving Gulf security: A framework to enhance air, missile, and maritime defenses

The Gulf Security Task Force — Tue, 14 Mar 2023 20:00:00 +0000

This report is the final product of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative‘s Gulf Security Task Force, a team of experts whose US government experience includes senior roles at the Department of Defense, Department of State, White House, and Intelligence Community. The Task Force joined together to shape this new strategy, with an eye on sustainable success in protecting both US and allies in the Gulf. The views expressed in the report are those of the authors and not their respective institutions.

Looking at decades of US support and operations in the Gulf and recognizing a continued, arguably growing, air and maritime threat from Iran, the Atlantic Council Gulf Security Task Force developed a framework on how to best protect US and allies’ interests in this sensitive, always relevant region. The report provides US decision-makers with an updated, fact-based strategy for protecting its interests in the air and maritime domain from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea, while ensuring Gulf partners’ ability to assume this responsibility, with the assistance and leadership of the United States.

In this capstone report, “Improving Gulf Security: A Framework to Enhance Air, Missile, and Maritime Defenses“, the Gulf Security Task Force brings together their cross-section of expertise to address the nature of the threats and provide practical policy solutions for the development of an integrated air, missile, and maritime defense in the Gulf, that provides long-term, reliable protection for the US and our partners’ security in the region.

Competing Security Interests in the Arab Gulf

Authors

Michael S. Bell

Former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Middle East Affairs, National Security Council

Dr. Mike Bell is the Executive Director of the Jenny Craig Institute for the Study of War and Democracy. Commissioned in Armor following graduation from the US Military Academy at West Point, he is a combat veteran, historian, and strategist who has served at every level from platoon through theater army, as well as with US Central Command, the Joint Staff, the West Point faculty, and the National Defense University. As a civilian faculty member at the National Defense University, he also served details to the Office of the Secretary of State and as a National Security Council Senior Director and Special Assistant to the President of the United States. His monograph on the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was published by the Strategic Studies Institute.

Clarke Cooper

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, Middle East Programs, Atlantic Council
Former Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs

R. Clarke Cooper recently served as the assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State from 2019 to 2021. During his tenure, Cooper implemented reforms to streamline arms export licensing and improve government support to the US defense industry. By enabling security partnerships and through advocacy for burden sharing to counter shared threats, Cooper continued his advocacy for performance measures across United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions, women in active peacekeeping roles, and accountability measures for troop and police contributing countries. In 2021, Cooper was awarded the Superior Honor Award for interagency coordination and implementation of the security cooperation elements of the Abraham Accords.

Kirsten Fontenrose

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, Middle East Programs, Atlantic Council
Former Senior Director for the Gulf, National Security Council

Kirsten spent 2018 as Senior Director for the Gulf at the National Security Council, leading the development of U.S. policy toward nations of the GCC, Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan. Prior to this service at the White House, Kirsten spent a year in the private sector consulting on specialized projects in the national security space. Her interagency experience includes five years at the Department of State leading the Middle East and Africa team in the interagency Global Engagement Center. Prior to this, Kirsten worked with a field team studying foreign populations for the US Department of Defense Theater Special Operations Commands.

Greta Holtz

Chancellor, College of International Security Affairs National Defense University
Former US Charge d’Affaires in Qatar and former US Ambassador in Oman

Ambassador (Ret.) Greta C. Holtz enjoyed 35 years as a career diplomat with extensive experience in the Middle East region. She retired in April 2021 with the personal rank of Minister Counsellor. Ambassador Holtz served as Senior United States Coordinator for Operation Allies Refuge in Qatar from August – October 2021 and as Chargé d’affaires in Qatar from June 2020 until April 2021. She was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the State Department’s Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, and she was the Senior Foreign Policy Advisor (POLAD) to the Commanding General of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) from 2017-2019. She served as the United States Ambassador to the Sultanate of Oman from 2012 to 2015 and was the Vice-Chancellor at National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs from 2016 to 2017. Ambassador Holtz was Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and she ran the United States Provincial Reconstruction teams in Iraq from 2009-2010.

Richard LeBaron

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East programs, Atlantic Council Former US Ambassador to Kuwait

Ambassador (Ret.) Richard LeBaron is a career diplomat with over thirty years of experience abroad and in Washington. His most recent overseas posting was as deputy chief of mission at the US embassy in London from August 2007 to August 2010. Amb. LeBaron served as chargé d’affaires in London from February to August 2009. Previous to his assignment to London, Amb. LeBaron served as the US ambassador to Kuwait (2004 to 2007). From September 2001 to July 2004, Amb. LeBaron served as deputy chief of mission at the Embassy of the United States in Tel Aviv, Israel.

Fozzie Miller

Former Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East programs, Atlantic Council Former Commander, US Naval Forces Central Command/Combined Maritime Forces/US Fifth Fleet

In 2015, Vice Admiral (Ret.) John W. “Fozzie” Miller retired from the US Navy after serving as the Commander, US Naval Forces Central Command; Commander, Combined Maritime Forces; and Commander, US Fifth Fleet. Miller spent a considerable amount of his naval career focusing on the Middle East—beyond his role as Commander of the US Fifth Fleet, he also served as Deputy Commander to US Naval Forces Central Command/United States Fifth Fleet; Deputy Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J5); and Chief of Staff of US Central Command. In 2015, Miller received the Navy Distinguished Service Medal.

Daniel Vardiman

Senior US Navy Fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security (2021-2022), Atlantic Council *

Commander Daniel Vardiman was the intelligence lead for Expeditionary Strike Group Two from August 2019 through July 2021. In this role, he also served as the acting information warfare commander; supported staff certification, contingency operations, and integration with the Marines; participated in exercises in Europe and off the East Coast of the United States; and assisted with defense support to civil authorities. For his lieutenant commander milestone tour, he was the intelligence lead for Amphibious Squadron Six from June 2014 through June 2016, and on the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group and Wasp Amphibious Ready Group deploying to the US Fifth and Sixth Fleet areas of responsibility.

* The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not reflect those of the U.S. Navy or Department of Defense.

Brett McGurk sets out the ‘Biden doctrine’ for the Middle East

White House Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa, Brett McGurk, delivered remarks in support of “enabling an integrated air and maritime defense architecture in the region, something long talked about, which is now happening through innovative partnerships and new technologies,” at the Atlantic Council’s inaugural Rafik Hariri Awards, celebrating the tenth anniversary of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, in Washington on February 14, 2023.

full remarks

Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

The Atlantic Council’s work on Middle East security honors the legacy of Brent Scowcroft and his tireless efforts to build a new security architecture for the region. Our work in this area addresses the full range of security threats and challenges including the danger of interstate warfare, the role of terrorist groups and other nonstate actors, and the underlying security threats facing countries in the region.

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Former secretaries Mark Esper and Deborah Lee James publish op-ed in The Hill

Atlantic Council — Thu, 09 Mar 2023 18:00:00 +0000

On March 9, Mark T. Esper and Deborah Lee James, Atlantic Council Board Directors and Co-Chairs of the Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, published an op-ed in The Hill. They lay out ways that the Department of Defense can accelerate its ability to harness commercial technology in order to stay ahead of US adversaries. Access the article here or at the button above.

Quickly adopting cutting-edge technology, which is mostly found in the commercial sector, is the key to guaranteeing U.S. military dominance critical to deterring war and winning one if all else fails.

Mark Esper and Deborah Lee James. Originally published in The Hill.

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The US needs to reform security cooperation and arms transfer processes—not create new policies

R. Clarke Cooper — Thu, 09 Mar 2023 14:48:18 +0000

Around the world, the United States is the most common preferred partner, or “partner of choice,” for security cooperation, but it is not the only option. Dictatorial adversaries of democracy and freedom in Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran consistently seek opportunities for disruption wherever the United States might project power. The ready access to low-cost, but effective, commercially available technologies from China, Russia, and Iran render the appeal of working with these adversaries even more potent.

So, one wonders why the Biden administration would roll out a new, unnecessary, and potentially more cumbersome interpretation and implementation of Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) policy in late February—the same week as the one-year anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the same week that Russia officially announced withdrawal from the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the same week that China and Russia conducted military drills with South Africa, and the very same week that US industry competed against a flood of Chinese defense firms at the 2023 International Defense Exhibition hosted by the United Arab Emirates.

Arms transfers and security cooperation have long been important tools for policymakers in Washington and for ambassadors in the field to help implement US foreign policy. The consideration and fulfillment of security cooperation and security assistance, while led by the State Department, incorporates a broad and deep set of executive branch interagency processes and congressional review and oversight. Some of these processes are statutory mandates under the Arms Export Control Act and others are informal voluntary processes.

Both the Obama administration and the Trump administration, which I served in the State Department, recognized that rising global competition in a post–Cold War world required reforming Cold War bureaucratic practices, which which were based on the presumption of absolute technological superiority and no real near-peer competition. Both administrations in varying degrees sought to refine processes, provide greater transparency and predictability for US allies and partners, and, yes, actively advance US aerospace and defense industries as the preferred choice in a global market. The State Department drafted CAT policies in 2014 and 2018 that supported US interests and strategic ends, which yielded broadly similar approval and denial rates, revealing that neither administration was overly restrictive or wildly loose in arms transfers. Both the Obama and Trump administrations also worked to reduce bureaucracy, update the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and US Munitions List (USMIL), modernize export licensing platforms, decrease case review timelines, and address increasingly parochial and lengthy non-statutory congressional review periods.

The Biden administration’s long-deliberated 2023 CAT policy does indeed align with Biden-Harris campaign promises, and it does not come as a surprise to those of us who were consulted during the drafting process that human rights would be elevated among the categories of consideration. Also, no one would argue against the CAT consideration of human rights. In fact, it was the Trump administration that first articulated human rights as a consideration in the 2018 CAT policy.

The issue today, however, is not one of policy, but of the systems and layers of process in the implementation of arms transfers and security cooperation. US industry and foreign US security partners care less about a new policy but do care more how CAT processes may be measured, implemented, or further reformed to improve the efficacy of US security cooperation. As the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) recently noted, “The arms transfer process is too slow and impedes our ability to get critical capabilities delivered when and where they are needed the most.”

Such a statement from AIA was an extremely diplomatic response compared to the candid dismay uttered in the privacy of industry offices and board rooms of my clients at the defense consultancy I lead, but it does capture the essence of concern by operative security cooperation practitioners regardless of their respective diplomatic, military, or industry role. For the United States to remain a leader in a multipolar world, it must move away from a Cold War–style mindset that the United States is the only available option, cut down on an increasingly overlapping federal bureaucracy, be an advocate for US industry, and not introduce reforms that expand already layered processes that will impede security cooperation with stalwart allies and partners or put at risk US interests.

The United States must address the competitive environment it faces. It is true that the United States remains by far the greatest provider of direct security, via its global force posture and alliances. It is also true that the United States remains the single biggest provider of financial security assistance and defense equipment and training for countries around the world. But it is equally true that US competitors, even when tested by their own overreach, like Russia in Ukraine and China’s exploitive Belt and Road Initiative, have turned to arms sales and security assistance as key tools to build their own influence around the world and weaken the United States’.

The application of CAT should enhance and enable the defense capabilities of US allies and partners, but rolling out a new CAT policy minus implementation reform makes this more difficult and helps US adversaries. To best protect US interests and further enable US allies and partners to provide for their own defense, President Joe Biden should focus on fulfillment and augmentation of tangible CAT implementation reforms started by his two predecessors, who had interagency teams experienced in security cooperation and deterrence that sought to refine ITAR, update the USMIL, and foster US industry innovation. The ability for the United States to win friends and maintain its edge over its rivals is at stake.

R. Clarke Cooper is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, the president of defense consultancy Guard Hill House, LLC, a former assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State, and a former senior intelligence officer for the US Joint Special Operations Command.

The post The US needs to reform security cooperation and arms transfer processes—not create new policies appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A parallel terrain: Public-private defense of the Ukrainian information environment

Emma Schroeder and Sean Dack — Mon, 27 Feb 2023 05:01:00 +0000

Executive summary

In the year since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the conventional assault and advances into Ukrainian territory have been paralleled by a simultaneous invasion of the Ukrainian information environment. This environment, composed of cyber infrastructure, both digital and physical, and the data, networks, and ideas that flow through and across it, is more than a domain through which the combatants engage or a set of tools by which combatants interact—it is a parallel territory that Russia is intent on severing from the global environment and claiming for itself.

Russian assaults on the Ukrainian information environment are conducted against, and through, largely privately owned infrastructure, and Ukrainian defense in this space is likewise bound up in cooperative efforts with those infrastructure owners and other technology companies providing aid and assistance. The role of private companies in this conflict seems likely to grow, along with the scale, complexity, and criticality of the information infrastructure they operate.

Examining and mitigating the risks related to the involvement of private technology companies in the war in Ukraine is crucial and looking forward, the United States government must also examine the same questions with regard to its own security and defense:

What is the complete incentive structure behind a company’s decision to provide products or services to a state at war?
How dependent are states on the privately held portions of the information environment, including infrastructure, tools, knowledge, data, skills, and more, for their own national security and defense?
How can the public and private sectors work together better as partners to understand and prepare these areas of reliance during peace and across the continuum of conflict in a sustained, rather than ad hoc, nature?

Russia’s war against Ukraine is not over and similar aggressions are likely to occur in new contexts and with new actors in the future. By learning these lessons now and strengthening the government’s ability to work cooperatively with the private sector in and through the information space, the United States will be more effective and resilient against future threats.

Introduction

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 held none of the illusory cover of its 2014 operation; instead of “little green men” unclaimed by Moscow, Putin built up his forces on Ukraine’s border for the entire international community to see. His ambitions were clear: To remove and replace the elected government of Ukraine with a figurehead who would pull the country back under Russia’s hold, whether through literal absorption of the state or by subsuming the entire Ukrainian population under Russia’s political and information control. In the year since the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s defense has held back the Russian war machine with far greater strength than many thought possible in the early months of 2022. President Zelenskyy, the Ukrainian government, and the Ukrainian people have repeatedly repelled Russian attempts to topple the state, buttressed in part by the outpouring of assistance from not just allied states, but also local and transnational private sector companies.

Amidst the largest conventional land war in Europe since the fall of the Third Reich, both Russia and Ukraine have directed considerable effort toward the conflict’s information environment, defined as the physical and digital infrastructure over and through which information moves, the tools used to interact with that information, and information itself. This is not only a domain through which combatants engage, but a parallel territory that the Kremlin seeks to contest and claim. Russian efforts in this realm, to destroy or replace Ukraine’s underpinning infrastructure and inhibit the accessibility and reach of infrastructure and tools within the environment, are countered by a Ukrainian defense that prioritizes openness and accessibility.

The information environment, and all the components therein, is not a state or military dominated environment; it is largely owned, operated, and populated by private organizations and individuals around the globe. The Ukrainian information environment, referring to Ukrainian infrastructure operators, service providers, and users, is linked to and part of a global environment of state and non-state actors where the infrastructure and the terrain is largely private. Russian operations within the Ukrainian information environment are conducted against, and through, this privately owned infrastructure, and the Ukrainian defense is likewise bound up in cooperative efforts with those infrastructure owners and other technology companies that are providing aid and assistance. These efforts have contributed materially, and in some cases uniquely, to Ukraine’s defense.

The centrality of this environment to the conduct of this war, raises important questions about the degree to which states and societies are dependent on information infrastructure and functionalities owned and operated by private actors, and especially transnational private actors. Although private sector involvement in the war in Ukraine has generally been positive, the fact that the conduct of war and other responsibilities in the realm of statehood are reliant on private actors leads to new challenges for these companies, for the Ukrainian government, and for the United States and allies.

The United States government must improve its understanding of, and facility for, joint public-private action to contest over and through the information environment. The recommendations in this report are intended to facilitate the ability of US technology companies to send necessary aid to Ukraine, ensure that the US government has a complete picture of US private-sector involvement in the war in Ukraine, and contribute more effectively to the resilience of the Ukrainian information environment. First, the US government should issue a directive providing assurance and clarification as to the legality of private sector cyber, information, capacity building, and technical aid to Ukraine. Second, a task force pulling from agencies and offices across government should coordinate to track past, current, and future aid from the private sector in these areas to create a better map of US collaboration with Ukraine across the public and private sectors. Third, the US government should increase its facilitation of private technology aid by providing logistical and financial support.

These recommendations, focused on Ukraine’s defense, are borne of and provoke larger questions that will only become more important to tackle. The information environment and attempts to control it have long been a facet of conflict, but the centrality of privately owned and operated technology—and the primacy of some private sector security capabilities in relation to all but a handful of states—pose increasingly novel challenges to the United States and allied policymaking communities. Especially in future conflicts, the risks associated with private sector action in defense of, or directly against, a combatant could be significantly greater and multifaceted, rendering existing cooperative models insufficient.

The Russian information offensive

The Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs defines information space—of which cyberspace is a part—as “the sphere of activity connected with the formation, creation, conversion, transfer, use, and storage of information and which has an effect on individual and social consciousness, the information infrastructure, and information itself.¹ Isolating the Ukrainian information space is key to both the short- and long-term plans of the Russian government. In the short term, the Kremlin pursues efforts to control both the flow and content of communications across the occupied areas.² In the longer term, occupation of the information environment represents an integral step in Russian plans to occupy and claim control over the Ukrainian population.

In distinct opposition to the global nature of the information environment, over the past decade or so, the Kremlin has produced successive legislation “to impose ‘sovereignty’ over the infrastructure, content, and data traversing Russia’s ‘information space,’” creating a sectioned-off portion of the internet now known as RuNet.³ Within this space, the Russian government has greater control over what information Russian citizens see and a greater ability to monitor what Russian citizens do online.⁴ This exclusionary interpretation is an exercise in regime security against what the Kremlin perceives as constant Western information warfare against it.⁵ As Gavin Wilde, senior fellow with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes, the Russian government views the information environment “as an ecosystem to be decisively dominated.”⁶

To the Kremlin, domination of the information environment in Ukraine is an essential step toward pulling the nation into its fold and under its control. Just as Putin views information domination as critical to his regime’s exercise of power within Russia, in Ukraine, Russian forces systematically conduct offensives against the Ukrainian information environment in an attempt to create a similar model of influence and control that would further enable physical domination. This strategy is evident across the Kremlin’s efforts to weaken the Ukrainian state for the last decade at least. In the 2014 and 2022 invasions, occupied, annexed, and newly “independent” regions of Ukraine were variously cut off from the wider information space and pulled into the restricted Russian information space.

The Crimean precedent – 2014

The Russian invasion of Ukraine did not begin in 2022, but in 2014. Examining this earlier Russian incursion illustrates the pattern of Russian offensive behavior in and through the information environment going back nearly a decade—a combination of physical, cyber, financial, and informational maneuvers that largely target or move through private information infrastructure. In 2014, although obfuscated behind a carefully constructed veil of legitimacy, Russian forces specifically targeted Ukrainian information infrastructure to separate the Crimean population from the Ukrainian information environment, and thereby the global information environment, and filled that vacuum with Russian infrastructure and information.

The Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 was a direct response to the year-long Euromaidan Revolution, which took place across Ukraine in protest of then-President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to spurn closer relations with the European Union and ignore growing calls to counter Russian influence and corruption within the Ukrainian government. These protests were organized, mobilized, and sustained partially through coordination, information exchange, and message amplification over social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Ustream—as well as traditional media.⁷ In February 2014, after Yanukovych fled to Russia, the Ukrainian parliament established a new acting government and announced that elections for a new president would be held in May. Tensions immediately heightened, as Russian forces began operating in Crimea with the approval of Federal Assembly of Russia at the request of “President” Yanukovych, although Putin denied that they were anything other than “local self-defense forces.”⁸ On March 21, Putin signed the annexation of Crimea.⁹

During the February 2014 invasion of Crimea, the seizure and co-option of Ukrainian physical information infrastructure was a priority. Reportedly, among the first targets of Russian special forces was the Simferopol Internet Exchange Point (IXP), a network facility that enables internet traffic exchange.¹⁰ Ukraine’s state-owned telecommunications company Ukrtelecom reported that armed men seized its offices in Crimea and tampered with fiber-optic internet and telephone cables.¹¹ Following the raid, the company lost the “technical capacity to provide connection between the peninsula and the rest of Ukraine and probably across the peninsula, too.”¹² Around the same time, the head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), Valentyn Nalivaichenko, reported that the mobile phones of Ukrainian parliament members, including his own, were blocked from connecting through Ukrtelecom networks in Crimea.¹³

Over the next three years, and through the “progressive centralization of routing paths and monopolization of Internet Service market in Crimea … the topology of Crimean networks has evolved to a singular state where paths bound to the peninsula converge to two ISPs (Rosetelecom and Fiord),” owned and operated by Russia.¹⁴ Russian forces manipulated the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)—the system that helps connects user traffic flowing from ISPs to the wider internet—modifying routes to force Crimean internet traffic through Russian systems, “drawing a kind of ‘digital frontline’ consistent with the military one.”¹⁵ Residents of Crimea found their choices increasingly limited, until their internet service could only route through Russia, instead of Ukraine, subject to the same level of censorship and internet controls as in Russia. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) monitored communications from residents of Crimea, both within the peninsula and with people in Ukraine and beyond.¹⁶ Collaboration between ISPs operating in Crimea through Russian servers and the FSB appears to be a crucial piece of this wider monitoring effort. This claim was partially confirmed by a 2018 Russian decree that forbade internet providers from publicly sharing any information regarding their cooperation with “the authorized state bodies carrying out search and investigative activities to ensure the security of the Russian Federation.”¹⁷

From March to June 2014, Russian state-owned telecom company Rostelcom began and completed construction of the Kerch Strait cable, measuring 46 kilometers (about 28.5 miles) and costing somewhere between $11 and $25 million, to connect the Crimean internet with the Russian RuNet.¹⁸ Rostelcom, using a local agent in Crimea called Miranda Media, became the main transit network for several Crimean internet service providers (ISPs), including KCT, ACS-Group, CrimeaCom, and CRELCOM in a short period of time.¹⁹ There was a slower transition of customers from the Ukrainian company Datagroup to Russian ISPs, but nonetheless, the number of Datagroup customers in Crimea greatly decreased throughout 2014. According to one ISP interviewed by Romain Fontugne, Ksenia Ermoshina, and Emile Aben, “the Kerch Strait cable was used first of all for voice communication … The traffic capacity of this cable was rather weak for commercial communications.”²⁰ But by the end of 2017, remnant usage of Ukrainian ISPs had virtually disappeared, following the completion of a second, better internet cable through the Kerch Strait and a series of restrictions placed on Russian social media platforms, news outlets, and a major search engine by Ukrainian President Poroshenko.²¹The combination of the new restrictions, and the improved service of Russian ISPs encouraged more Crimeans to move away from Ukrainian ISPs.

Russia’s efforts to control the information environment within Crimea, and the Russian government’s ability to monitor communications and restrict access to non-Russian approved servers, severely curtailed freedom of expression and belief—earning the region zero out of four in this category from Freedom House.²² Through physical, and formerly private, information infrastructure, Russia was able to largely take control of the information environment within Crimea.

A parallel occupation – 2022

Digital information infrastructure

Just as in 2014, one of the first priorities of invading Russian forces in 2022 was the assault of key Ukrainian information infrastructure, including digital infrastructure. Before, during, and following the invasion, Russian and Russian-aligned forces targeted Ukrainian digital infrastructure through cyber operations, ranging in type, target, and sophistication. Through some combination of Ukrainian preparedness, partner intervention, and Russian planning shortfalls, among other factors, large-scale cyber operations disrupting Ukrainian critical infrastructure, such as those seen previously in 2015 with BlackEnergy and NotPetya, did not materialize.²³ This could be because such cyber operations require significant time and resources, and similar ends can be more cheaply achieved through direct, physical means. Russian cyber operators, however, have not been idle.

Preceding the physical invasion, there was a spate of activity attributed to both Russian and Russian-aligned organizations targeting a combination of state and private organizations.²⁴ From January 13 to 14, for example, hackers briefly took control of seventy Ukrainian government websites, including the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, adding threatening messages to the top of these official sites.²⁵ The following day, January 15, Microsoft’s Threat Intelligence Center reported the discovery of wiper malware, disguised as ransomware, in dozens of Ukrainian government systems, including agencies which “provide critical executive branch or emergency response function,” and an information technology firm that services those agencies.²⁶ A month later, on February 15, Russian hackers targeted several websites with distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, forcing Ukrainian defense ministry and armed forces websites, as well as those of PrivatBank and Oschadbank, offline.²⁷ Around the same time, according to Microsoft’s special report on Ukraine, “likely” Russian actors were discovered in the networks of unidentified critical infrastructure in Odessa and Sumy.²⁸ The day before the invasion, cybersecurity companies ESET and Symantec reported that a new destructive wiper was spreading across Ukrainian, Latvian, and Lithuanian networks, as a second round of DDoS attacks again took down a spate of government and financial institution websites.“²⁹ This activity centered around information—with defacements sending a clear threat to the Ukrainian government and population, DDoS attacks impairing accurate communication, and wiper malware degrading Ukrainian data—and gaining access to Ukrainian data for Russia. Although many of these operations targeted Ukrainian government networks, the attacks moved through or against privately operated infrastructure and, notably, the first public notification and detailing of several of these operations was undertaken by transnational technology companies.

After February 24, Russian cyber activity continued and the targets included a number of private information infrastructure operators. A March hack of Ukrtelecom—Ukraine’s largest landline operator, which also provides internet and mobile services to civilians and the Ukrainian government and military—resulted in a collapse of the company’s network to just 13 percent capacity, the most severe disruption in service the firm recorded since the invasion began.³⁰ Another such operation targeted Triolan—a Ukrainian telecommunications provider—on February 24 in tandem with the physical offensive and a second time on March 9. These incursions on the Triolan network took down key nodes and caused widespread service outages. Following the March 9 attack, the company was able to restore service, but these efforts were complicated by the need to physically access some of the equipment located in active conflict zones.³¹ These attacks against Ukraine-based information infrastructure companies caused service outages that were concurrent with the physical invasion and afterwards, restricted communications among Ukrainians and impeded the population’s ability to respond to current and truthful information.

This unacceptable cyberattack is yet another example of Russia’s continued pattern of irresponsible behaviour in cyberspace, which also formed an integral part of its illegal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine.¹

Council of the European Union

These types of operations, however, were not restricted to Ukraine-based information infrastructure. A significant opening salvo in Russia’s invasion was a cyber operation directed against ViaSat, a private American-based satellite internet company that provides services to users throughout the world, including the Ukrainian military.³² Instead of targeting the satellites in orbit, Russia targeted the modems in ViaSat’s KA-SAT satellite broadband network that connected users with the internet.³³ Specifically, Russia exploited a “misconfiguration in a VPN [virtual private network] appliance to gain remote access to the trusted management segment of the KA-SAT network.”³⁴ From there, the attackers were able to move laterally though the network to the segment used to manage and operate the broader system.³⁵ They then “overwrote key data in flash memory on the modems,” making it impossible for the modems to access the broader network.³⁶ Overall, the effects of the hack were short-lived, with ViaSat reporting the restoration of connectivity within a few days after shipping approximately 30,000 new modems to affected customers.³⁷

SentinelOne, a cybersecurity firm, identified the malware used to wipe the modems and routers of the information they needed to operate.³⁸ The firm assessed “with medium-confidence“ that AcidRain, the malware used in the attack, had ”developmental similarities” with an older malware, VPNFilter, that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the US Department of Justice have previously linked to the Russian government.³⁹ The United States, United Kingdom, and European Union all subsequently attributed the ViaSat hack to Russian-state backed actors.⁴⁰

The effectiveness of the operation is debated, although the logic of the attack is straightforward. Russia wanted to constrain, or preferably eliminate, an important channel of communication for the Ukrainian military during the initial stages of the invasion. Traditional, land-based radios, which the Ukrainian military relies on for most of their communications, only work over a limited geographic range, therefore making it more difficult to use advanced, long-range weapons systems.⁴¹ It should be expected that landline and conventional telephony would suffer outages during the opening phases of the war and struggle to keep up with rapidly moving forces.

Initially, it was widely reported that the Russian strike on ViaSat was effective. On March 15, a senior Ukrainian cybersecurity official, Viktor Zhora, was quoted saying that the attack on ViaSat caused “a really huge loss in communications in the very beginning of the war.⁴² When asked follow-up questions about his quote, Zhora said at the time that he was unable to elaborate, leading journalists and industry experts to believe that the attack had impacted the Ukrainian military’s ability to communicate.⁴³ However, several months later, on September 26, Zhora revised his initial comments, stating that the hack would have impacted military communications if satellite communications had been the Ukrainian military’s principal medium of communication. However, Zhora stated that the Ukrainian military instead relies on landlines for communication, with satellites as a back-up method. He went on to say that “in the case land lines were destroyed, that could be a serious issue in the first hours of war.”⁴⁴ The tension, and potential contradictions, in Zhora’s comments underlines the inherent complications in analyzing cyber operations during war: long-term consequences can be difficult to infer from short-term effects, and countries seek to actively control the narratives surrounding conflict.

The effectiveness of the ViaSat hack boils down to how the Ukrainian military communicates, and how adaptable it was in the early hours of the invasion. However, it is apparent how such a hack could impact military effectiveness. If Russia, or any other belligerent, was able to simultaneously disrupt satellite communications while also jamming or destroying landlines, forces on the frontlines would be at best poorly connected with their superiors. In such a scenario, an army would be cut off from commanders in other locations and would not be able to report back or receive new directives; they would be stranded until communications could be restored.

The ViaSat hack had a military objective: to disrupt Ukrainian military access to satellite communications. But the effects were not limited to this objective. The operation had spillover effects that rippled across Europe. In Germany, nearly 6,000 wind turbines were taken offline, with roughly 2,000 of those turbines remaining offline for nearly a month after the initial hack due to the loss of remote connectivity.⁴⁵ In France, modems used by emergency services vehicles, including firetrucks and ambulances, were also affected.⁴⁶

ViaSat is not a purely military target. It is a civilian firm that counts the Ukrainian military as a customer. The targeting of civilian infrastructure with dual civilian and military capability and use has occurred throughout history and has been the center of debate in international law, especially when there are cross-border spillover effects in non-combatant countries. Both the principle of proportionality and international humanitarian law require the aggressor to target only military objects, defined as objects “whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage” in a manner proportional to the military gain foreseen by the operation. ⁴⁷ What this means in practice, however, is that the aggressor determines whether they deem a target to be a military object and a beneficial target and, therefore, what is legitimate. Konstantin Vorontsov, the Head of the Russian Delegation to the United Nations, attempted to justify Russian actions in October 2022 by saying that the use of civilian space infrastructure to aid the Ukrainian war effort may be a violation of the Outer Space Treaty, thereby rendering this infrastructure a legitimate military target.⁴⁸ Similar operations like that against ViaSat are likely to be the new norm in modern warfare. As Mauro Vignati, the adviser on new digital technologies of warfare at the Red Cross, said in November 2022, insofar as private companies own and operate the information infrastructure of the domain, including infrastructure acting as military assets, “when war start[s], those companies, they are inside the battlefield.”⁴⁹

Physical information infrastructure

In February 2022, as Russian forces moved to seize airfields and key physical assets in Ukraine, they simultaneously assaulted the physical information infrastructure operating within and beneath the Ukrainian information environment. Russian forces targeted this infrastructure, largely privately operated, by taking control of assets where possible and destroying them where not, including through a series of Russian air strikes targeting Ukrainian servers, cables, and cell phone towers.⁵⁰ As of June 2022, about 15 percent of Ukrainian information infrastructure had been damaged or destroyed; by July, 12.2 percent of homes had lost access to mobile communication services, 11 percent of base stations for mobile operators were out of service, and approximately 20 percent of the country’s telecommunications infrastructure was damaged or destroyed.⁵¹ By August “the number of users connecting to the Internet in Ukraine [had] shrunk by at least 16 percent nationwide.”⁵²

In some areas of Ukraine, digital blackouts were enforced by Russian troops to cut the local population off from the highly contested information space. In Mariupol, the last cell tower connecting the city with the outside world was tirelessly tended by two Kyivstar engineers, who kept it alive with backup generators that they manually refilled with gasoline. Once the Russians entered the city, however, the Ukrainian soldiers who had been protecting the cell tower location left to engage with the enemy, leaving the Kyivstar engineers alone to tend to their charge. For three days the engineers withstood the bombing of the city until March 21, when Russian troops disconnected the tower and it went silent.⁵³

Russian forces coerced Ukrainian occupied territories onto Russian ISPs, once again through Rostelcom’s local agent Miranda Media, and onto Russian mobile service providers.⁵⁴ Information infrastructure in Ukraine is made up of overlapping networks of mobile service and ISPs, a legacy of the country’s complicated post-Soviet modernization process. This complexity may have been a boon for its resilience. Russian forces, observed digital-rights researcher Samuel Woodhams, “couldn’t go into one office and take down a whole region … There were hundreds of these offices and the actual hardware was quite geographically separated.⁵⁵ Across eastern Ukraine, including Kherson, Mlitopol, and Mariupol, the Russians aimed to subjugate the physical territory, constituent populations, and Ukrainian information space. In Kherson, Russian forces entered the offices of a Ukrainian ISP and at gunpoint, forced staff to transfer control to them.⁵⁶

Russian bombardment of telecommunications antennas in Kiev (Attribution: Mvs.gov.ua)

Routing the internet and communications access of occupied territories through Russia meant that Moscow could suppress communications to and from these occupied areas, especially through social media and Ukrainian news sites, sever access to essential services in Ukraine, and flood the populations with its own propaganda, as was proved in Crimea in 2014. Moving forward, Russia could use this dependency to “disconnect, throttle, or restrict access to the internet” in occupied territories, cutting off the occupied population from the Ukrainian government and the wider Ukrainian and international community.⁵⁷

The Kremlin’s primary purpose in the invasion of Ukraine was and is to remove the Ukrainian government and, likely, install a pro-Russian puppet government to bring to an end an independent Ukraine.⁵⁸ Therefore, isolating the information environment of occupied populations, in concert with anti-Ukrainian government disinformation, such as the multiple false allegations that President Zelenskyy had fled the country and abandoned the Ukrainian people,⁵⁹ were a means to sway the allegiances, or at least dilute the active resistance, of the Ukrainian people.⁶⁰ Without connectivity to alternative outlets, the occupying Russians could promote false and largely uncontested claims about the progress of the war. In early May 2022 for example, when Kherson lost connectivity for three days, the deputy of the Kherson Regional Council, Serhiy Khlan, reported that the Russians “began to spread propaganda that they were in fact winning and had captured almost all of Mykolaiv.”⁶¹

Russia used its assault on the information environment to undermine the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and its ability to fulfill its governmental duties to the Ukrainian people. Whether through complete connectivity blackouts or through the restrictions imposed by Russian networks, the Russians blocked any communications from the Ukrainian government to occupied populations—not least President Zelenskyy’s June 13, 2022 address, intended most for those very populations, in which he promised to liberate all occupied Ukrainian land and reassured those populations that they had not been forgotten. Zelenskyy acknowledged the Russian barrier between himself and Ukrainians in occupied territories, saying, “They are trying to make people not just know nothing about Ukraine… They are trying to make them stop even thinking about returning to normal life, forcing them to reconcile.”⁶²

Isolating occupied populations from the Ukrainian information space is intended, in large part, said Stas Prybytko, the head of mobile broadband development within the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation, to “block them from communicating with their families in other cities and keep them from receiving truthful information.”⁶³ Throughout 2022, so much of what the international community knew about the war came—through Twitter, TikTok, Telegram, and more—from Ukrainians themselves. From videos of the indiscriminate Russian shelling of civilian neighborhoods to recordings tracking Russian troop movements, Ukrainians used their personal devices to capture and communicate the progress of the war directly to living rooms, board rooms, and government offices around the world.⁶⁴The power of this distributed information collection and open-source intelligence relies upon mobile and internet access. The accounts that were shared after Ukrainian towns and cities were liberated from Russian occupation lay bare just how much suffering, arrest, torture, and murder was kept hidden from international view by the purposeful isolation of the information environment and the constant surveillance of Ukrainians’ personal devices.⁶⁵ The war in Ukraine has highlighted the growing impact of distributed open source intelligence during the conduct of war that is carried out by civilians in Ukraine and by the wider open source research community though various social media and messaging platforms.⁶⁶

Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian news outlets justified a war of aggression against Ukraine

Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin employs information operations to erode global confidence in Ukraine

Russian operations against, especially transnational, digital infrastructure companies can mostly be categorized as disruption, degradation, and information gathering, which saw Russian or Russian-aligned hackers moving in and through the Ukrainian information environment. The attacks against Ukrainian physical infrastructure, however, are of a slightly different character. Invading forces employed physically mediated cyberattacks, a method defined by Herb Lin as “attacks that compromise cyber functionality through the use of or the threat of physical force” to pursue the complete destruction or seizure and occupation of this infrastructure.⁶⁷ Both ends begin with the same purpose: to create a vacuum of information between the Ukrainian government, the Ukrainian people, and the global population, effectively ending the connection between the Ukrainian information environment and the global environment. But the seizure of this infrastructure takes things a step beyond: to occupy the Ukrainian information environment and pull its infrastructure and its people into an isolated, controlled Russian information space.

Reclaiming the Ukrainian information environment

Preparation of the environment

The Russian assault on the Ukrainian information environment is far from unanswered. Russian efforts have been countered by the Ukrainian government in concert with allied states and with technology companies located both within and outside Ukraine. Russia’s aim to pull occupied Ukrainian territory onto Russian networks to be controlled and monitored has been well understood, and Ukraine has been hardening its information infrastructure since the initial 2014 invasion. Ukraine released its Cyber Security Strategy in 2016, which laid out the government’s priorities in this space, including the defense against the range of active cyber threats they face, with an emphasis on the “cyber protection of information infrastructure.”⁶⁸ The government initially focused on centralizing its networks in Kyiv to make it more difficult “for Russian hackers to penetrate computers that store critical data and provide services such as pension benefits, or to use formerly government-run networks in the occupied territories to launch cyberattacks on Kyiv.”⁶⁹

As part of its digitalization and security efforts, the Ukrainian government also sought out new partners, both public and private, to build and bolster its threat detection and response capabilities. Before and since the 2022 invasion, the Ukrainian government has worked with partner governments and an array of technology companies around the world to create resilience through increased connectivity and digitalization.

Bolstering Ukrainian connectivity

Since the 2014 invasion and annexation of Crimea, Ukraine-serving telecommunications operators have developed plans to prepare for future Russian aggression. Lifecell, the third largest Ukrainian mobile telephone operator, prepared its network for an anticipated Russian attack. The company shifted their office archives, documentation, and critical network equipment from eastern to western Ukraine, where it would be better insulated from violence, added additional network redundancy, and increased the coordination and response capabilities of their staff.⁷⁰ Similarly, Kyivstar and Vodafone Ukraine increased their network bandwidth to withstand extreme demand. In October 2021, these three companies initiated an infrastructure sharing agreement to expand LTE (Long Term Evolution) networks into rural Ukraine and, in cooperation with the Ukrainian government, expanded the 4G telecommunications network to bring “mobile network coverage to an estimated 91.6 per cent of the population.”⁷¹

The expansion and improvement of Ukrainian telecommunications continued through international partnerships as well. Datagroup, for example, announced a $20 million partnership in 2021 with Cisco, a US-based digital communications company, to modernize and expand the bandwidth of its extensive networks.⁷² Since the February 2022 invasion, Cisco has also worked with the French government to provide over $5 million of secure, wireless networking equipment and software, including firewalls, for free to the Ukrainian government.⁷³

This network expansion is an integral part of the Ukrainian government’s digitalization plans for the country, championed by President Zelenskyy. Rather than the invasion putting an end to these efforts, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov claimed that during the war “digitalization became the foundation of all our life. The economy continues to work … due to digitalization.⁷⁴ The digital provision of government services has created an alternate pathway for Ukrainians to engage in the economy and with their government. The flagship government initiative Diia, launched in February 2020, is a digital portal through which the 21.7 million Ukrainian users can access legal identification, make social services payments, register a business, and even register property damage from Russian missile strikes.⁷⁵ The Russian advance and consequent physical destruction that displaced Ukrainians means that the ability to provide government services through alternate and resilient means is more essential than ever, placing an additional premium on defending Ukrainian information infrastructure.

Backing up a government

As Russian forces built up along Ukraine’s borders, Ukrainian network centralization may have increased risk, despite the country’s improved defense capabilities. In preparation for the cyber and physical attacks against the country’s information infrastructure, Fedorov moved to amend Ukrainian data protection laws to allow the government to store and process data in the cloud and worked closely with several technology companies, including Microsoft, Amazon Web Services, and Google, to effect the transfer of critical government data to infrastructure hosted outside the country.⁷⁶ Cloud computing describes “a collection of technologies and organizational processes which enable ubiquitous, on-demand access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources.”⁷⁷ Cloud computing is dominated by the four hyperscalers—Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and Alibaba—that provide computing and storage at enterprise scale and are responsible for the operation and security of data centers all around the world, any of which could host customer data according to local laws and regulations.⁷⁸

According to its April 2022 Ukraine war report, Microsoft “committed at no charge a total of $107 million of technology services to support this effort” and renewed the relationship in November, promising to ensure that “government agencies, critical infrastructure and other sectors in Ukraine can continue to run their digital infrastructure and serve citizens through the Microsoft Cloud” at a value of about $100 million.⁷⁹ Amazon and Google have also committed to supporting cloud services for the Ukrainian government, for select companies, and for humanitarian organizations focused on aiding Ukraine.⁸⁰ In accordance with the Ukrainian government’s concerns, Russian missile attacks targeted the Ukrainian government’s main data center in Kyiv soon after the invasion, partially destroying the facility, and cyberattacks aggressively tested Ukrainian networks.⁸¹

Unlike other lines of aid provided by the international community to strengthen the defense of the Ukrainian information environment, cloud services are provided only by the private sector.⁸² While this aid has had a transformative effect on Ukrainian defense, that transformative quality has also raised concerns. Microsoft, in its special report on Ukraine, several times cites its cloud services as one of the determining factors that limited the effect of Russian cyber and kinetic attacks on Ukrainian government data centers, and details how their services, in particular, were instrumental in this defense.⁸³ In this same report, Microsoft claims to be most worried about those states and organizations that do not use cloud services, and provides corroborating data.⁸⁴ Microsoft and other technology companies offering their services at a reduced rate, or for free, are acting—at least in part—out of a belief in the rightness of the Ukrainian cause. However, they are still private companies with responsibilities to shareholders or board members, and they still must seek profit. Services provided, especially establishing information infrastructure like Cloud services, are likely to establish long-term business relationships with the Ukrainian government and potentially with other governments and clients, who see the effectiveness of those services illustrated through the defense of Ukraine.

Mounting an elastic defense

Working for wireless

Alongside and parallel to the Ukrainian efforts to defend and reclaim occupied physical territory is the fight for Ukrainian connectivity. Ukrainian telecommunications companies have been integral to preserving connectivity to the extent possible. In March 2022, Ukrainian telecom operators Kyivstar, Vodafone Ukraine, and Lifecell made the decision to provide free national mobile roaming services across mobile provider networks, creating redundancy and resilience in the mobile network to combat frequent service outages.⁸⁵ The free mobile service provided by these companies is valued at more than UAH 980 million (USD 26.8 million).⁸⁶ In addition, Kyivstar in July 2022 committed to the allocation of UAH 300 million (about USD 8.2 mil) for the modernization of Ukraine’s information infrastructure in cooperation with the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital transformation.⁸⁷ The statements that accompanied the commitments from Kyivstar and Lifecell—both headquartered in Ukraine—emphasized each company’s dedication to Ukrainian defense and their role in it, regardless of the short-term financial impact.⁸⁸ These are Ukrainian companies with Ukrainian infrastructure and Ukrainian customers, and their fate is tied inextricably to the outcome of this war.

As Russian forces advanced and attempted to seize control of information infrastructure, in at least one instance, Ukrainian internet and mobile service employees sabotaged their own equipment first. Facing threats of imprisonment and death from occupying Russians, employees in several Ukrtelecom facilities withstood pressure to share technical network details and instead deleted key files from the systems. According to Ukrtelecom Chief Executive Officer Yuriy Kurmaz, “The Russians tried to connect their control boards and some equipment to our networks, but they were not able to reconfigure it because we completely destroyed the software.”⁸⁹ Without functional infrastructure, Russian forces struggled to pull those areas onto Russian networks.

The destruction of telecommunications infrastructure has meant that these areas and many others along the war front are, in some areas, without reliable information infrastructure, either wireless or wired. While the Ukrainian government and a bevy of local and international private sector companies battle for control of on-the-ground internet and communications infrastructure, they also pursued new pathways to connectivity.

Searching for satellite

Two days after the invasion, Deputy Prime Minister Fedorov tweeted at Elon Musk, the Chief Executive Officer of SpaceX, that “while you try to colonize Mars — Russia try [sic] to occupy Ukraine! While your rockets successfully land from space — Russian rockets attack Ukrainian civil people! We ask you to provide Ukraine with Starlink stations and to address sane Russians to stand.”⁹⁰ Just another two days later, Fedorov confirmed the arrival of the first shipment of Starlink stations.⁹¹

Starlink, a network of low-orbit satellites working in constellations operated by SpaceX, relies on satellite receivers no larger than a backpack that are easily installed and transported. Because Russian targeting of cellular towers made communications coverage unreliable, says Fedorov, the government “made a decision to use satellite communication for such emergencies” from American companies like SpaceX.⁹² Starlink has proven more resilient than any other alternative throughout the war. Due to the low orbit of Starlink satellites, they can broadcast to their receivers at relatively higher power than satellites in higher orbits. There has been little reporting on successful Russian efforts to jam Starlink transmissions, and the Starlink base stations—the physical, earthbound infrastructure that communicates directly with the satellites—are located on NATO territory, ensuring any direct attack on them would be a significant escalation in the war.⁹³

Starlink has been employed across sectors almost since the war began. President Zelenskyy has used the devices himself when delivering addresses to the Ukrainian people, as well as to foreign governments and populations.⁹⁴ Fedorov has said that sustained missile strikes against energy and communication infrastructure have been effectively countered through the deployment of Starlink devices that can restore connection where it is most needed. He even called the system “an essential part of critical infrastructure.”⁹⁵

Starlink has also found direct military applications. The portability of these devices means that Ukrainian troops can often, though not always, stay connected to command elements and peer units while deployed.⁹⁶ Ukrainian soldiers have also used internet connections to coordinate attacks on Russian targets with artillery-battery commanders.⁹⁷ The Aerorozvidka, a specialist air reconnaissance unit within the Ukrainian military that conducts hundreds of information gathering missions every day, has used Starlink devices in areas of Ukraine without functional communications infrastructure to “monitor and coordinate unmanned aerial vehicles, enabling soldiers to fire anti-tank weapons with targeted precision.”⁹⁸ Reports have also suggested that a Starlink device was integrated into an unmanned surface vehicle discovered near Sevastopol, potentially used by the Ukrainian military for reconnaissance or even to carry and deliver munitions.⁹⁹ According to one Ukrainian soldier, “Starlink is our oxygen,” and were it to disappear, “our army would collapse into chaos.”¹⁰⁰

The initial package of Starlink devices included 3,667 terminals donated by SpaceX and 1,333 terminals purchased by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).¹⁰¹ SpaceX initially offered free Starlink service for all the devices, although the offer has already been walked back by Musk, and then reversed again. CNN obtained proof of a letter sent by Musk to the Pentagon in September 2022 stating that SpaceX would be unable to continue funding Starlink service in Ukraine. The letter requested that the Pentagon pay what would amount to “more than $120 million for the rest of the year and could cost close to $400 million for the next 12 months.” It also clarified that the vast majority of the 20,000 Starlink devices sent to Ukraine were financed at least in part by outside funders like the United States, United Kingdom, and Polish governments.¹⁰²

After the letter was sent, but before it became public, Musk got into a Twitter spat with Ukrainian diplomat Adrij Melnyk after the former wrote a tweet on October 3 proposing terms of peace between Russia and Ukraine. Musk’s proposal included Ukraine renouncing its claims to Crimea and pledging to remain neutral, with the only apparent concession from Russia a promise to ensure water supply in Crimea. The plan was rejected by the public poll Musk included in the tweet, and Melnyk replied and tagged Musk, saying “Fuck off is my very diplomatic reply to you @elonmusk.”¹⁰³ After CNN released the SpaceX letter to the Pentagon, Musk seemingly doubled down on his decision to reduce SpaceX funding at first. He responded on October 14 to a tweet summarizing the incident, justifying possible reduced SpaceX assistance stating, “We’re just following his [Melnyk’s] recommendation,” even though the letter was sent before the Twitter exchange. Musk then tweeted the following day, “The hell with it … even though Starlink is still losing money & other companies are getting billions of taxpayer $, we’ll just keep funding Ukraine govt for free.”¹⁰⁴ Two days later, in response to a Politico tweet reporting that the Pentagon was considering covering the Starlink service costs, Musk stated that “SpaceX has already withdrawn its request for funding.”¹⁰⁵ Musk’s characterization of SpaceX’s contribution to the war effort has sparked confusion and reprimand, with his public remarks often implying that his company is entirely footing the bill when in fact, tens of millions of dollars’ worth of terminals and service are being covered by several governments every month.

The Starlink saga, however, was not over yet. Several weeks later in late October, 1,300 Starlink terminals in Ukraine, purchased in March 2020 by a British company for use in Ukrainian combat-related operations, were disconnected, allegedly due to lack of funding, causing a communications outage for the Ukrainian military.¹⁰⁶ Although operation was restored, the entire narrative eroded confidence in SpaceX as a guarantor of flexible connectivity in Ukraine. In November 2022, Federov noted that while Ukraine has no intention of breaking off its relationship with Starlink, the government is exploring working with other satellite communications operators.¹⁰⁷ Starlink is not the only satellite communications network of its kind, but its competitors have not yet reached the same level of operation. Satellite communications company OneWeb, based in London with ties to the British military, is just now launching its satellite constellation, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine required the company to change its launch partner from Roscosmos to SpaceX.¹⁰⁸ The US Space Development Agency, within the United States Space Force, will launch the first low earth orbit satellites of the new National Defense Space Architecture in March 2023. Other more traditional satellite companies cannot provide the same flexibility as Starlink’s small, transportable receivers.

UA Support Forces use Starlink (Attribution: Mil.gov.ua)

With the market effectively cornered for the moment, SpaceX can dictate the terms, including the physical bounds, of Starlink’s operations, thereby wielding immense influence on the battlefield. Starlink devices used by advancing Ukrainian forces near the front, for example, have reported inconsistent reliability.¹⁰⁹ Indeed CNN reported on February 9^th that this bounding was a deliberate attempt to separate the devices from direct military use, as SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell explained “our intent was never to have them use it for offensive purposes.”¹¹⁰ The bounding decision, similar to the rationale behind the company’s decision to refuse to activate Starlink service in Crimea, was likely made to contain escalation, especially escalation by means of SpaceX devices.¹¹¹

But SpaceX is not the only satellite company making decisions to bound the area of operation of their products to avoid playing—or being perceived to play—a role in potential escalation. On March 16, 2022, Minister Fedorov tweeted at DJI, a Chinese drone producer, “@DJIGlobal are you sure you want to be a partner in these murders? Block your products that are helping russia to kill the Ukrainians!”¹¹² DJI responded directly to the tweet the same day, saying “If the Ukrainian government formally requests that DJI set up geofencing throughout Ukraine, we will arrange it,” but pointed out that such geofencing would inhibit all users of their product in Ukraine, not just Russians.¹¹³

While Russia continues to bombard the Ukrainian electrical grid, Starlink terminals have grown more expensive for new Ukrainian consumers, increasing from $385 earlier this year to $700, although it is unclear if this price increase also affected government purchasers.¹¹⁴ According to Andrew Cavalier, a technology industry analyst with ABI Research, the indispensability of the devices gives “Musk and Starlink a major head start [against its competitors] that its use in the Russia–Ukraine war will only consolidate.”¹¹⁵ Indeed, the valuation of SpaceX was $127 million in May 2022, and the company raised $2 billion in the first seven months of 2022.¹¹⁶ For SpaceX, the war in Ukraine has been an impressive showcase of Starlink’s capabilities and has proven the worth of its services to future customers. The company recently launched a new initiative, Starshield, intended to leverage “SpaceX’s Starlink technology and launch capability to support national security efforts. While Starlink is designed for consumer and commercial use, Starshield is designed for government use.”¹¹⁷ It is clear that SpaceX intends to capitalize on the very public success of its Starlink network in Ukraine.

Reclaiming Territory

The Russian assault is not over, but Ukraine has reclaimed “54 percent of the land Russia has captured since the beginning of the war” and the front line has remained relatively stable since November 2022.¹¹⁸ Videos and reports from reclaimed territory show the exultation of the liberated population. As Ukrainian military forces reclaim formerly occupied areas, the parallel reclamation of the information environment, by or with Ukrainian and transnational information infrastructure operators, follows quickly.

In newly liberated areas, Starlink terminals are often the first tool for establishing connectivity. In Kherson, the first regional capital that fell to the Russian invasion and reclaimed by Ukrainian troops on November 11, 2022, residents lined up in public spaces to connect to the internet through Starlink.¹¹⁹ The Ministry of Digital Transformation provided Starlink devices to the largest service providers, Vodaphone and Kyivstar, to facilitate communication while their engineers repaired the necessary infrastructure for reestablishing mobile and internet service.¹²⁰ A week after Kherson was recaptured, five Kyivstar base stations were made operational and Vodaphone had reestablished coverage over most of the city.¹²¹

Due to the importance of reclaiming the information space, operators are working just behind Ukrainian soldiers to reconnect populations in reclaimed territories to the Ukrainian and global information environment as quickly as possible, which means working in very dangerous conditions. In the Sumy region, a Ukrtelecom vehicle pulling up to a television tower drove over a land mine, injuring three of the passengers and killing the driver.¹²² Stanislav Prybytko, the head of the mobile broadband department in the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation, says “It’s still very dangerous to do this work, but we can’t wait to do this, because there are a lot of citizens in liberated villages who urgently need to connect.”¹²³ Prybytko and his eleven-person team have been central to the Ukrainian effort to stitch Ukrainian connectivity back together. The team works across a public-private collaborative, coordinating with various government officials and mobile service providers to repair critical nodes in the network and to reestablish communications and connectivity.¹²⁴ According to Ukrainian government figures, 80 percent of liberated settlements have partially restored internet connection, and more than 1,400 base stations have been rebuilt by Ukrainian mobile operators since April 2022.¹²⁵

Key Takeaways

The information environment is a key domain through which this war is being contested. The Russian government has demonstrated for over a decade the importance it places on control of the information environment, both domestically and as part of campaigns to expand the Russian sphere of influence abroad. Yet, despite this Russian focus, the Ukrainian government has demonstrated incredible resilience against physical assaults, cyberattacks, and disinformation campaigns against and within the Ukrainian information environment and has committed to further interlacing government services and digital platforms.

The centrality of this environment to the conduct of this war means that private actors are necessarily enmeshed in the conflict. As providers of products and services used for Ukrainian defense, these companies are an important part of the buttressing structure of that defense. The centrality of private companies in the conduct of the war in Ukraine brings to light new and increasingly important questions about what it means for companies to act as information infrastructure during wartime, including:

What is the complete incentive structure behind a company’s decision to provide products or services to a state at war?
How dependent are states on the privately held portions of the information environment, including infrastructure, tools, knowledge, data, skills, and more, for their own national security and defense?
How can the public and private sectors work together better as partners to understand and prepare these areas of reliance during peace and across the continuum of conflict in a sustained, rather than ad hoc, nature?

Incentives

The war in Ukraine spurred an exceptional degree of cooperation and aid from private companies within Ukraine and from around the globe. Much of public messaging around the private sector’s assistance of Ukrainian defense centers around the conviction of company leadership and staff that they were compelled by a responsibility to act. This is certainly one factor in their decision. But the depth of private actor involvement in this conflict demands a more nuanced understanding of the full picture of incentives and disincentives that drive a company’s decision to enter into new, or expand upon existing, business relationships with and in a country at war. What risks, for example, do companies undertake in a war in which Russia has already demonstrated its conviction that private companies are viable military targets? The ViaSat hack was a reminder of the uncertainty that surrounds the designation of dual-use technology, and the impact that such designations have in practice. What role did public recognition play in companies’ decisions to provide products and services, and how might this recognition influence future earnings potential? For example, while their remarks differed in tone, both Elon Musk on Twitter and Microsoft in its special report on Ukraine publicly claimed partial credit for the defense of Ukraine.

As the war continues into its second year, these questions are important to maintaining Ukraine’s cooperation with these entities. With a better understanding of existing and potential incentives, the companies, the United States, and its allies can make the decision to responsibly aid Ukraine much easier.

Dependencies

Private companies play an important role in armed conflict, operating much of the infrastructure that supports the information environment through which both state and non-state actors compete for control. The war in Ukraine has illustrated the willingness of private actors, from Ukrainian telecommunications companies to transnational cloud and satellite companies, to participate as partners in the defense of Ukraine. State dependence on privately held physical infrastructure is not unique to the information environment, but state dependence on infrastructure that is headquartered and operated extraterritorially is a particular feature.

Prior to and throughout the war, the Ukrainian government has coordinated successfully with local telecommunication companies to expand, preserve, and restore mobile, radio, and internet connectivity to its population. This connectivity preserved what Russia was attempting to dismantle—a free and open Ukrainian information environment through which the Ukrainian government and population can communicate and coordinate. The Ukrainian government has relied on these companies to provide service and connectivity, working alongside them before and during the war to improve infrastructure and to communicate priorities. These companies are truly engaging as partners in Ukrainian defense, especially because this information infrastructure is not just a medium through which Russia launches attacks but an environment that Russia is attempting to seize control of. This dependence has not been unidirectional—the companies themselves are inextricably linked to this conflict through their infrastructure, employees, and customers in Ukraine. Each is dependent to some degree on the other and during times of crisis, their incentives create a dynamic of mutual need.

The Ukrainian government has also relied on a variety of transnational companies though the provision of technology products or services and information infrastructure. As examined in this report, two areas where the involvement of these companies has been especially impactful are cloud services and satellite internet services. Cloud services have preserved data integrity and security by moving information to data centers distributed around the world, outside of Ukrainian territory and under the cyber-protection of those cloud service companies. Satellite services have enabled flexible and resilient connectivity, once again located and run primarily outside of Ukraine. These companies can provide essential services within the information environment and the physical environment of Ukraine, but are not fundamentally reliant on the integrity of the country. This dynamic is heightened by the fact that cloud service providers like Microsoft, Amazon Web Services, Google, and satellite internet service providers like Space X’s Starlink are operating within a market with global reach and very few competitors. While these companies and others have made the laudable decision to contribute to Ukrainian defense, the fact is that had they not, there are only a few, if any, other companies with comparable capabilities and infrastructure at scale. Additionally, there’s very little Ukraine or even the US government could have done to directly provide the same capabilities and infrastructure.

Coordination

Built into the discussions around dependency and incentives is the need for government and the private companies who own and operate information infrastructure to coordinate with each other from a more extensive foundation. While coordination with Ukrainian companies and some transnational companies emerged from sustained effort, many instances of private sector involvement were forged on an ad hoc basis and therefore could not be planned on in advance. The ad hoc approach can produce rapid results, as seen by Minister Fedorov’s tweet at Elon Musk and receipt of Starlink devices just days later. While this approach has been wielded by the Ukrainian government, and the Ministry for Digital Transformation in particular, to great effect, this very same example illustrates the complexity of transforming ad hoc aid into sustainable partnerships. Sustainability is especially important when states are facing threats outside of open war, across the continuum of insecurity and conflict where many of these capabilities and infrastructures will continue to be relied upon. Security and defense in the information environment requires states to work in coordination with a diverse range of local and transnational private actors.

Recommendations

Key recommendations from this paper ask the US government, in coordination with the Ukrainian government, to better understand the incentives that surround private sector involvement, to delineate states’ dependency on private information infrastructure, and to improve long-term public-private coordination through three pathways:

Define support parameters. Clarify how private technology companies can and should provide aid
Track support. Create a living database to track the patterns of technological aid to Ukraine from US private companies
Facilitate support requests. Add to the resilience of the Ukrainian information environment by facilitating US private aid.

Define support parameters

Private information infrastructure companies will continue to play a key role in this war. However, there are a number of unresolved questions regarding the decisions these companies are making about if, and how, to provide support to the Ukrainian government to sustain its defense. A significant barrier may be the lack of clarity about the risks of partnership in wartime, which may disincentivize action or may alter existing partnerships. Recent SpaceX statements surrounding the bounding of Starlink use is an example, at least in part, of just such a risk calculous in action. The US government and its allies should release a public directive clarifying how companies can ensure that their involvement is in line with US and international law—especially for dual-use technologies. Reaffirming, with consistent guidelines, how the United States defines civilian participation in times of war will be crucial for ensuring that such actions do not unintentionally legitimize private entities as belligerents and legitimate targets in wartime. At the direction of the National Security Advisor, the US Attorney General and Secretary of State, working through the Office of the Legal Advisor at the State Department, should issue public guidance on how US companies can provide essential aid to Ukraine while avoiding the designation of legitimate military target or combatant under the best available interpretation of prevailing law.

Track support

While a large amount of support for Ukraine has been given directly by or coordinated through governments, many private companies have started providing technological support directly to the Ukrainian government. Some private companies, especially those with offices or customers in Ukraine, got in touch directly with, or were contacted by, various Ukrainian government offices, often with specific requests depending on the company’s products and services.¹²⁶

However, the US government does not have a full and complete picture of this assistance, which limits the ability of US policymakers to track the implications of changing types of support or the nature of the conflict. Policymakers should have access to not only what kind of support is being provided by private US companies, but also the projected period of involvement, what types of support are being requested and denied by companies (in which case, where the US government may be able to act as an alternative provider), and what types of support are being supplied by private sector actors without a significant government equity or involvement. A more fulsome mapping of this assistance and its dependency structure would make it possible for policymakers and others to assess its impact and effectiveness. This data, were it or some version of it publicly available, would also help private companies providing the support to better understand how their contributions fit within the wider context of US assistance and to communicate the effect their products or services are having to stakeholders and shareholders. Such information may play a role in a company’s decision to partner or abstain in the future.

The US government should create a collaborative task force to track US-based private sector support to Ukraine. Because of the wide equities across the US government in this area, this team should be led by the State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy and include representatives from USAID, the Department of Defense’s Cyber Policy Office, the National Security Agency’s Collaboration Center, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security’s Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative. This task force should initially focus on creating a picture of public-private support to Ukraine from entities within the United States, but its remit could extend to work with allies and partners, creating a fulsome picture of international public-private support.

Facilitate support requests

Tracking the technical support that is requested, promised, and delivered to the Ukrainian government is an important first step toward gaining a better understanding of the evolving shape of the critical role that the private sector is increasingly playing in conflict. But closer tracking, perhaps by an associated body, could go further by acting as a process facilitator. Government offices and agencies have long been facilitators of private aid, but now states are increasingly able to interact with, and request support from, private companies directly, especially for smaller quantities or more specific products and services. While this pathway can be more direct and efficient, it also requires a near constant churn of request, provision, and renewal actions from private companies and Ukrainian government officials.

Private organizations have stepped into this breach, including the Cyber Defense Assistance Collaboration (CDAC), founded by Greg Rattray and Matthew Murray, now a part of the US-based non-profit CRDF Global. CDAC works with a number of US private technology companies, as well as the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine and the Ukrainian think tank Global Cyber Cooperative Center, to match the specific needs of Ukrainian government and state-owned enterprises with needed products and services offered by companies working in coordination.¹²⁷

The growth and reach of this effort demonstrate the potential impact that a government-housed, or even a government-sponsored mechanism, could have in increasing the capacity to facilitate requests from the Ukrainian government, decreasing the number of bureaucratic steps required by Ukrainian government officials while increasing the amount and quality of support they receive. In addition, government facilitation would ease progress toward the previously stated recommendations by building in clarity around what kind of support can be provided and putting facilitation and aid tracking within a single process. As discussed above, this facilitation should start with a focus on US public-private support, but can grow to work alongside similar allied efforts. This could include, for example, coordination with the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) program, which “enables Ukrainian agencies to access the services of commercial cybersecurity companies.”¹²⁸ Crucially, this task force, helmed by the State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy, would act as a facilitator, not as a restricting body. Its mission in this task would be to make connections and provide information.

In line with tracking, US government facilitation would enable government entities to communicate where assistance can be most useful, such as shoring up key vulnerabilities or ensuring that essential defense activities are not dependent on a single private sector entity, and ideally, avoiding dependency on a single source of private sector assistance. A company’s financial situation or philanthropic priorities are always subject to change, and the US government should be aware of such risks and create resilience through redundancy.

Central to this resilience will be the provision of support to bolster key nodes in the Ukrainian telecommunications infrastructure network against not just cyber attacks but also against physical assault, including things like firewalls, mine clearing equipment, and power generators. Aiding the Ukrainian government in the search for another reliable partner for satellite communication devices that offer similar flexibility as Starlink is also necessary, and a representative from the Pentagon has confirmed that such a process is underway, following Musk’s various and contradictory statements regarding the future of SpaceX’s aid to Ukraine back in October.¹²⁹ Regardless, the entire SpaceX experience illustrates the need to address single dependencies in advance whenever possible.

A roadblock to ensuring assistance redundancy is the financial ability of companies to provide products and services to the Ukrainian government without charge or to the degree necessary. While the US government does provide funding for private technological assistance (as in the Starlink example), creating a pool of funding that is tied to the aforementioned task force and overseen by the State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy, would enable increased flexibility for companies to cover areas of single dependence, even in instances that would require piecemeal rather than one-to-one redundancy. As previously discussed, many companies are providing support out of a belief that it is the right thing to do, both for their customers and as members of a global society. However, depending on whether that support is paid or provided for free, or publicly or privately given, a mechanism that provides government clarity on private sector support, tracks the landscape of US private support to Ukraine, and facilitates support requests would make it easier for companies to make the decision to start or continue to provide support when weighed against the costs and potential risks of offering assistance.

Looking forward and inward

The questions that have emerged from Ukraine’s experience of defense in and through the information environment are not limited to this context. Private companies have a role in armed conflict and that role seems likely to grow, along with the scale, complexity, and criticality of the information infrastructures they own and operate. Companies will, in some capacity, be participants in the battlespace. This is being demonstrated in real time, exposing gaps that the United States and its allies and partners must address in advance of future conflicts.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has created an environment in which both public and private assistance in support of Ukrainian information infrastructure is motivated by a common aversion toward Russian aggression, as well as a commitment to the stability and protection of the Ukrainian government and people. This war is not over and despite any hopes to the contrary, similar aggressions will occur in new contexts, and with new actors in the future. It is crucial that in conjunction with examining and mitigating the risks related to the involvement of private technology companies in the war in Ukraine, the US government also examines these questions regarding its own national security and defense.

The information environment is increasingly central to not just warfighting but also to the practice of governance and the daily life of populations around the world. Governments and populations live in part within that environment and therefore atop infrastructure that is owned and operated by the private sector. As adversaries seek to reshape the information environment to their own advantage, US and allied public and private sectors must confront the challenges of their existing interdependence. This includes defining in what form national security and defense plans in and through the information environment are dependent upon private companies, developing a better understanding of the differing incentive structures that guide private sector decision-making, and working in coordination with private companies to create a more resilient information infrastructure network through redundancy and diversification. It is difficult to know what forms future conflict and future adversaries will take, or the incentives that may exist for companies in those new contexts, but by better understanding the key role that private information and technology companies already play in this domain, the United States and allies can better prepare for future threats.

About the Authors

Emma Schroeder is an associate director with the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, within the Digital Forensic Research Lab, and leads the team’s work studying conflict in and through cyberspace. Her focus in this role is on developing statecraft and strategy for cyberspace that is useful for both policymakers and practitioners. Schroeder holds an MA in History of War from King’s College London’s War Studies Department and also attained her BA in International Relations & History from the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

Sean Dack was a Young Global Professional with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative during the fall of 2022. He is now a Researcher at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, where he focuses on the long-term strategic and economic implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Dack graduated from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in December 2022 with his MA in Strategic Studies and International Economics.

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Justin Sherman, Gregory Rattray, and Gavin Wilde for their comments on earlier drafts of this document, and Trey Herr and the Cyber Statecraft team for their support. The authors also thank all the participants, who shall remain anonymous, in multiple Chatham House Rule discussions and one-on-one conversations about the issue.

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1 ”The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Convention on International Information Security (2011), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/RUSSIAN-DRAFT-CONVENTION-ON-INTERNATIONAL-INFORMATION-SECURITY.pdf.

2 To learn more about Russian disinformation efforts against Ukraine and its allies, check out the Russian Narratives Reports from the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab: Nika Aleksejeva et al., Andy Carvin ed., “Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian News Outlets Justified a War of Aggression against Ukraine,” Atlantic Council, February 22, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/narrative-warfare/; Roman Osadchuk et al., Andy Carvin ed., “Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin Employs Information Operations to Erode Global Confidence in Ukraine,” Atlantic Council, February 22, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/undermining-ukraine/.

3 Previously, the term RuNet described Russian language portions of the global internet accessible anywhere in the world. However, since Russia passed a domestic internet law in May 2019, RuNet has come to refer to a technically isolated version of the internet that services users within the borders of Russia. Gavin Wilde and Justin Sherman, No Water’s Edge: Russia’s Information War and Regime Security, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 4, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/01/04/no-water-s-edge-russia-s-information-war-and-regime-security-pub-88644; Justin Sherman, Reassessing Runet: Russian Internet Isolation and Implications for Russian Cyber Behavior, Atlantic Council, July 7, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/reassessing-runet-russian-internet-isolation-and-implications-for-russian-cyber-behavior/.

4 Adam Satariano and Valerie Hopkins, “Russia, Blocked from the Global Internet, Plunges into Digital Isolation,” New York Times, March 7, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/07/technology/russia-ukraine-internet-isolation.html.

5 Gavin Wilde and Justin Sherman, No Water’s Edge: Russia’s Information War and Regime Security, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 4, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/01/04/no-water-s-edge-russia-s-information-war-and-regime-security-pub-88644; Stephen Blank, “Russian Information Warfare as Domestic Counterinsurgency,” American Foreign Policy Interests 35, no. 1 (2013): 31–44, https://doi.org/10.1080/10803920.2013.757946.

6 Gavin Wilde, Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Russia’s Unmet Expectations, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 12, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/12/cyber-operations-in-ukraine-russia-s-unmet-expectations-pub-88607.

7 Tetyana Bohdanova, “Unexpected Revolution: The Role of Social Media in Ukraine’s Euromaidan Uprising,” European View 13, no. 1: (2014), https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-014-0296-4; Megan MacDuffee Metzger, and Joshua A. Tucker. “Social Media and EuroMaidan: A Review Essay,” Slavic Review 76, no. 1 (2017): 169–91, doi:10.1017/slr.2017.16.

8 Jonathon Cosgrove, “The Russian Invasion of the Crimean Peninsula 2014–2015: A Post-Cold War Nuclear Crisis Case Study,” Johns Hopkins (2020), 11–13, https://www.jhuapl.edu/Content/documents/RussianInvasionCrimeanPeninsula.pdf.

9 Steven Pifer, Ukraine: Six Years after the Maidan, Brookings, February 21, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/02/21/ukraine-six-years-after-the-maidan/.

10 Kenneth Geers, ed., Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression Against Ukraine (Tallinn: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2015), 9; Keir Giles, “Russia and Its Neighbours: Old Attitudes, New Capabilities,” in Geers, Cyber War in Perspective, 25; ‘Кримські регіональні підрозділи ПАТ «Укртелеком» офіційно повідомляють про блокування невідомими декількох вузлів зв’язку на півострові’ [Ukrtelekom officially reports blocking of communications nodes on peninsula by unknown actors], Ukrtelekom, February 28, 2014, http://www.ukrtelecom.ua/presscenter/news/official?id=120327.

11 Pavel Polityuk and Jim Finkle, “Ukraine Says Communications Hit, MPs Phones Blocked,” Reuters, March 4, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-cybersecurity/ukraine-says-communications-hit-mps-phones-blocked-idINL6N0M12CF20140304.

12 Jen Weedon, “Beyond ‘Cyber War’: Russia’s Use of Strategic Cyber Espionage and Information Operations in Ukraine,” in Geers, Cyber War in Perspective, 76; Liisa Past, “Missing in Action: Rhetoric on Cyber Warfare,” in Geers, Cyber War in Perspective, 91; “Ukrtelecom’s Crimean Sub-Branches Officially Report that Unknown People Have Seized Several Telecommunications Nodes in the Crimea,” Ukrtelecom, February 28, 2014, http://en.ukrtelecom.ua/about/news?id=120467; “Feb. 28 Updates on the Crisis in Ukraine,” New York Times, February 28, 2014, https://archive.nytimes.com/thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/latest-updates-tensions-in-ukraine/?_r=0; “The Crimean Regional Units of PJSC ‘Ukrtelecom’ Officially Inform About the Blocking by Unknown Persons of Several Communication Nodes on the Peninsula,” Ukrtelecom, February 28, 2014, https://web.archive.org/web/20140305001208/, http://www.ukrtelecom.ua/presscenter/news/official?id=120327.

13 Polityuk and Finkle, “Ukraine Says Communications Hit”; John Leyden, “Cyber Battle Apparently under Way in Russia–Ukraine Conflict,” The Register, April 25, 2018, https://www.theregister.com/2014/03/04/ukraine_cyber_conflict/.

14 Fontugne, Ermoshina, and Aben, “The Internet in Crimea.”

15 Frédérick Douzet et al., “Measuring the Fragmentation of the Internet: The Case of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) During the Ukrainian Crisis,” 2020 12th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon), Tallinn, Estonia, May 26–29, 2020, 157-182, doi: 10.23919/CyCon49761.2020.9131726; Paul Mozur et al., “‘They Are Watching’: Inside Russia’s Vast Surveillance State,” New York Times, September 22, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/09/22/technology/russia-putin-surveillance-spying.html.

16 Yaropolk Brynykh and Anastasiia Lykholat, “Occupied Crimea: Victims and Oppressors,” Freedom House, August 30, 2018, https://freedomhouse.org/article/occupied-crimea-victims-and-oppressors.

17 Halya Coynash, “Internet Providers Forced to Conceal Total FSB Surveillance in Occupied Crimea and Russia,” Kyiv Post, February 2, 2018, https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/halya-coynash-internet-providers-forced-conceal-total-fsb-surveillance-occupied-crimea-russia.html.

18 Joseph Cox, “Russia Built an Underwater Cable to Bring Its Internet to Newly Annexed Crimea,” VICE, August 1, 2014, https://www.vice.com/en/article/ypw35k/russia-built-an-underwater-cable-to-bring-its-internet-to-newly-annexed-crimea.

19 Cox, “Russia Built an Underwater Cable.”

20 Romain Fontugne, Ksenia Ermoshina, and Emile Aben, “The Internet in Crimea: A Case Study on Routing Interregnum,” 2020 IFIP Networking Conference, Paris, France, June 22–25, 2020, https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03100247/document.

21 Sebastian Moss, “How Russia Took over the Internet in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine,” Data Center Dynamics, January 12, 2023, https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/analysis/how-russia-took-over-the-internet-in-crimea-and-eastern-ukraine/; “Ukraine: Freedom on the Net 2018 Country Report,” Freedom House, 2019, https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/freedom-net/2018.

22 “Crimea: Freedom in the World 2020 Country Report,” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/country/crimea/freedom-world/2020.

23 Kim Zetter, “Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid,” Wired, March 3, 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/; Andy Greenberg, “The Untold Story of Notpetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History,” Wired, August 22, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/.

24 “Special Report: Ukraine An Overview of Russia’s Cyberattack Activity in Ukraine,” Microsoft Digital Security Unit, April 27, 2022, https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RE4Vwwd; Kyle Fendorf and Jessie Miller, “Tracking Cyber Operations and Actors in the Russia–Ukraine War,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 24, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/blog/tracking-cyber-operations-and-actors-russia-ukraine-war.

25 Jakub Przetacznik and Simona Tarpova, “Russia’s War on Ukraine: Timeline of Cyber-Attacks,” European Parliament, June 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/733549/EPRS_BRI(2022)733549_EN.pdf; Catalin Cimpanu, “Hackers Deface Ukrainian Government Websites,” The Record, January 14, 2022, https://therecord.media/hackers-deface-ukrainian-government-websites/.

26 Tom Burt, “Malware Attacks Targeting Ukraine Government,” Microsoft, January 15, 2022, https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/01/15/mstic-malware-cyberattacks-ukraine-government/.

27 Roman Osadchuk, Russian Hybrid Threats Report: Evacuations Begin in Ukrainian Breakaway Regions, Atlantic Council, February 18, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-hybrid-threats-report-evacuations-begin-in-ukrainian-breakaway-regions/#cyberattack; Sean Lyngaas and Tim Lister, “Cyberattack Hits Websites of Ukraine Defense Ministry and Armed Forces,” CNN, February 15, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/15/world/ukraine-cyberattack-intl/index.html.

28 Microsoft, “Special Report Ukraine.”

29 ESET Research: Ukraine Hit by Destructive Attacks Before and During the Russian Invasion with HermeticWiper and IsaacWiper,” ESET, March 1, 2022, https://www.eset.com/int/about/newsroom/press-releases/research/eset-research-ukraine-hit-by-destructive-attacks-before-and-during-the-russian-invasion-with-hermet/; “Ukraine: Disk-Wiping Attacks Precede Russian Invasion,” Symantec Threat Hunter Team, February 24, 2022, https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ukraine-wiper-malware-russia; “Ukraine Computers Hit by Data-Wiping Software as Russia Launched Invasion,” Reuters, February 24, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-government-foreign-ministry-parliament-websites-down-2022-02-23/.

30 Britney Nguyen, “Telecom Workers in Occupied Parts of Ukraine Destroyed Software to Avoid Russian Control over Data and Communications,” Business Insider, June 22, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/telecom-workers-ukraine-destroyed-software-avoid-russian-control-2022-6; Net Blocks (@netblocks), “Confirmed: A major internet disruption has been registered across #Ukraine on national provider #Ukrtelecom; real-time network data show connectivity collapsing …,” Twitter, March 28, 2022, 10:38 a.m., https://twitter.com/netblocks/status/1508453511176065033; Net Blocks (@netblocks), “Update: Ukraine’s national internet provider Ukrtelecom has confirmed a cyberattack on its core infrastructure. Real-time network data show an ongoing and …,” Twitter, March 28, 2022 11:25 a.m., https://twitter.com/netblocks/status/1508465391244304389; Andrea Peterson, “Traffic at Major Ukrainian Internet Service Provider Ukrtelecom Disrupted,” The Record, March 28, 2022, https://therecord.media/traffic-at-major-ukrainian-internet-service-provider-ukrtelecom-disrupted/; James Andrew Lewis, Cyber War and Ukraine, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 10, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/cyber-war-and-ukraine.

31 Thomas Brewster, “As Russia Invaded, Hackers Broke into A Ukrainian Internet Provider. Then Did It Again As Bombs Rained Down,” Forbes, March 10, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/03/10/cyberattack-on-major-ukraine-internet-provider-causes-major-outages/?sh=51d16b9c6573.

32 “Global Communications: Services, Solutions and Satellite Internet,” ViaSat, accessed November 14, 2022, http://data.danetsoft.com/viasat.com; Matt Burgess, “A Mysterious Satellite Hack Has Victims Far beyond Ukraine,” Wired, March 23, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/viasat-internet-hack-ukraine-russia/.

33 Michael Kan, “ViaSat Hack Tied to Data-Wiping Malware Designed to Shut down Modems,” PCMag, March 31, 2022, https://www.pcmag.com/news/viasat-hack-tied-to-data-wiping-malware-designed-to-shut-down-modems.

34 “Ka-Sat Network Cyber Attack Overview,” ViaSat, September 12, 2022, https://news.viasat.com/blog/corporate/ka-sat-network-cyber-attack-overview.

35 Lee Mathews, “ViaSat Reveals How Russian Hackers Knocked Thousands of Ukrainians Offline,” Forbes, March 31, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2022/03/31/viasat-reveals-how-russian-hackers-knocked-thousands-of-ukrainians-offline/?sh=4683638b60d6; ViaSat, “Ka-Sat Network.”

36 ViaSat, “Ka-Sat Network.”

37 Andrea Valentina, “Why the Viasat Hack Still Echoes,” Aerospace America, November 2022, https://aerospaceamerica.aiaa.org/features/why-the-viasat-hack-still-echoes.

38 Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade and Max van Amerongen, “Acidrain: A Modem Wiper Rains down on Europe,” SentinelOne, April 1, 2022, https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/acidrain-a-modem-wiper-rains-down-on-europe/.

39 Guerrero-Saade and Van Amerongen, “Acidrain.”

40 Joe Uchill, “UK, US, and EU Attribute Viasat Hack Against Ukraine to Russia,” SC Media, June 23, 2022, https://www.scmagazine.com/analysis/threat-intelligence/uk-us-and-eu-attribute-viasat-hack-against-ukraine-to-russia; David E. Sanger and Kate Conger, “Russia Was Behind Cyberattack in Run-Up to Ukraine War, Investigation Finds,” New York Times, May 10, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/10/us/politics/russia-cyberattack-ukraine-war.html.

41 Kim Zetter, “ViaSat Hack ‘Did Not’ Have Huge Impact on Ukrainian Military Communications, Official Says,” Zero Day, September 26, 2022, https://zetter.substack.com/p/viasat-hack-did-not-have-huge-impact; “Satellite Outage Caused ‘Huge Loss in Communications’ at War’s Outset—Ukrainian Official,” Reuters, March 15, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/satellite-outage-caused-huge-loss-communications-wars-outset-ukrainian-official-2022-03-15/.

42 ”Reuters, “Satellite Outage.”

43 Sean Lyngaas, “US Satellite Operator Says Persistent Cyberattack at Beginning of Ukraine War Affected Tens of Thousands of Customers, CNN, March 30, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/30/politics/ukraine-cyberattack-viasat-satellite/index.html.

44 Zetter, “ViaSat Hack.”

45 Burgess, “A Mysterious Satellite Hack” Zetter, “ViaSat Hack”; Valentino, “Why the ViaSat Hack.”

46 Jurgita Lapienytė, “ViaSat Hack Impacted French Critical Services,” CyberNews, August 22, 2022, https://cybernews.com/news/viasat-hack-impacted-french-critical-services/.

47 International Committee of the Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1125 UNTS 3 (June 8, 1977), accessed January 18, 2023, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36b4.html; Zhanna L. Malekos Smith, “No ‘Bright-Line Rule’ Shines on Targeting Commercial Satellites,” The Hill, November 28, 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/3747182-no-bright-line-rule-shines-on-targeting-commercial-satellites/; Anaïs Maroonian, “Proportionality in International Humanitarian Law: A Principle and a Rule,” Lieber Institute West Point, October 24, 2022, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/proportionality-international-humanitarian-law-principle-rule/#:~:text=The%20rule%20of%20proportionality%20requires,destruction%20of%20a%20military%20objective; Travis Normand and Jessica Poarch, “4 Basic Principles,” The Law of Armed Conflict, January 1, 2017, https://loacblog.com/loac-basics/4-basic-principles/.

48 “Statement by Deputy Head of the Russian Delegation Mr. Konstantin Vorontsov at the Thematic Discussion on Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects) in the First Committee of the 77th Session of the Unga,” Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, October 26, 2022, https://russiaun.ru/en/news/261022_v.

49 Mauro Vignati, “LABScon Replay: Are Digital Technologies Eroding the Principle of Distinction in War?” SentinelOne, November 16, 2022, https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/are-digital-technologies-eroding-the-principle-of-distinction-in-war/.

50 Matt Burgess, “Russia Is Taking over Ukraine’s Internet,” Wired, June 15, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/ukraine-russia-internet-takeover/.

51 Nino Kuninidze et al., “Interim Assessment on Damages to Telecommunication Infrastructure and Resilience of the ICT Ecosystem in Ukraine.”

52 Adam Satariano and Scott Reinhard, “How Russia Took Over Ukraine’s Internet in Occupied Territories,” The New York Times, August 9, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/08/09/technology/ukraine-internet-russia-censorship.html; https://time.com/6222111/ukraine-internet-russia-reclaimed-territory/

53 Thomas Brewster, “The Last Days of Mariupol’s Internet,” Forbes, March 31, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/03/31/the-last-days-of-mariupols-internet/.

54 Matt Burgess, “Russia Is Taking over Ukraine’s Internet,” Wired, June 15, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/ukraine-russia-internet-takeover/; Satariano and Reinhard, “How Russia Took.”

55 ”Vera Bergengruen, “The Battle for Control over Ukraine’s Internet,” Time, October 18, 2022, https://time.com/6222111/ukraine-internet-russia-reclaimed-territory/.

56 Herbert Lin, “Russian Cyber Operations in the Invasion of Ukraine,” Cyber Defense Review (Fall 2022): 35, https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/Portals/6/Documents/2022_fall/02_Lin.pdf, Herb Lin, “The Emergence of Physically Mediated Cyberattacks?,” Lawfare, May 21, 2022, https://www.lawfareblog.com/emergence-physically-mediated-cyberattacks; “Invaders Use Blackmailing and Intimidation to Force Ukrainian Internet Service Providers to Connect to Russian Networks,” State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, May 13, 2022, https://cip.gov.ua/en/news/okupanti-shantazhem-i-pogrozami-zmushuyut-ukrayinskikh-provaideriv-pidklyuchatisya-do-rosiiskikh-merezh; Satariano and Reinhard, “How Russia Took.”

57 Gian M. Volpicelli, “How Ukraine’s Internet Can Fend off Russian Attacks,” Wired, March 1, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/internet-ukraine-russia-cyberattacks/; Satariano and Reinhard, “How Russia Took.”

58 David R. Marples, “Russia’s War Goals in Ukraine,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 64, no. 2–3 (March 2022): 207–219, https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2022.2107837.

59 David Klepper, “Russian Propaganda ‘Outgunned’ by Social Media Rebuttals,” AP News, March 4, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-volodymyr-zelenskyy-kyiv-technology-misinformation-5e884b85f8dbb54d16f5f10d105fe850; Marc Champion and Daryna Krasnolutska, “Ukraine’s TV Comedian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy Finds His Role as Wartime Leader,” Japan Times, June 7, 2022, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/02/26/world/volodymyr-zelenskyy-wartime-president/;“Российское Телевидение Сообщило Об ‘Бегстве Зеленского’ Из Киева, Но Умолчало Про Жертвы Среди Гражданских,” Агентство, October 10, 2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20221010195154/https://www.agents.media/propaganda-obstreli/.

60 To learn more about Russian disinformation efforts against Ukraine and its allies, check out the Russian Narratives Reports from the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab: Nika Aleksejeva et al., Andy Carvin ed., “Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian News Outlets Justified a War of Aggression against Ukraine,” Atlantic Council, February 22, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/narrative-warfare/; Roman Osadchuk et al., Andy Carvin ed., “Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin Employs Information Operations to Erode Global Confidence in Ukraine,” Atlantic Council, February 22, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/undermining-ukraine/.

61 Олександр Янковський, “‘Бояться Спротиву’. Для Чого РФ Захоплює Мобільний Зв’язок Та Інтернет На Херсонщині?,” Радіо Свобода, May 7, 2022, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/novyny-pryazovya-khersonshchyna-okupatsiya-rosiya-mobilnyy-zvyazok-internet/31838946.html.

62 Volodymyr Zelenskyy, “Tell People in the Occupied Territories about Ukraine, That the Ukrainian Army Will Definitely Come—Address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy,” President of Ukraine Official Website, June 13, 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/govorit-lyudyam-na-okupovanih-teritoriyah-pro-ukrayinu-pro-t-75801.

63 Satariano and Reinhard, “How Russia Took.”

64 Michael Sheldon, “Geolocating Russia’s Indiscriminate Shelling of Kharkiv,” DFRLab, March 1, 2022, https://medium.com/dfrlab/geolocating-russias-indiscriminate-shelling-of-kharkiv-deaccc830846; Michael Sheldon, “Kharkiv Neighborhood Experienced Ongoing Shelling Prior to February 28 Attack,” DFRLab, February 28, 2022, https://medium.com/dfrlab/kharkiv-neighborhood-experienced-ongoing-shelling-prior-to-february-28-attack-f767230ad6f6; https://maphub.net/Cen4infoRes/russian-ukraine-monitor; Michael Sheldon (@Michael1Sheldon), “Damage to civilian houses in the Zalyutino neighborhood of Kharkiv. https://t.me/c/1347456995/38991 …,” Twitter, February 27, 2022, 4:15 p.m., https://twitter.com/Michael1Sheldon/status/1498044130416594947; Michael Sheldon, “Missile Systems and Tanks Spotted in Russian Far East, Heading West,” DFRLab, January 27, 2022, https://medium.com/dfrlab/missile-systems-and-tanks-spotted-in-russian-far-east-heading-west-6d2a4fe7717a; Jay in Kyiv (@JayinKyiv), “Not yet 24 hours after Ukraine devastated Russian positions in Kherson, a massive Russian convoy is now leaving Melitopol to replace them. This is on Alekseev …,” Twitter, July 12, 2022, 7:50 a.m., https://twitter.com/JayinKyiv/status/1546824416218193921; “Eyes on Russia Map,” Centre for Information Resilience, https://eyesonrussia.org/.

65 Katerina Sergatskova, What You Should Know About Life in the Occupied Areas in Ukraine, Wilson Center, September 14, 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/what-you-should-know-about-life-occupied-areas-ukraine; Jonathan Landay, “Village near Kherson Rejoices at Russian Rout, Recalls Life under Occupation,” Reuters, November 12, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/village-near-kherson-rejoices-russian-rout-recalls-life-under-occupation-2022-11-11/.

66 Andrew Salerno-Garthwaite, “OSINT in Ukraine: Civilians in the Kill Chain and the Information Space,” Global Defence Technology 137 (2022), https://defence.nridigital.com/global_defence_technology_oct22/osint_in_ukraine; “How Has Open-Source Intelligence Influenced the War in Ukraine?” Economist, August 30, 2022, https://www.economist.com/ukraine-osint-pod; Gillian Tett, “Inside Ukraine’s Open-Source War,” Financial Times, July 22, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/297d3300-1a65-4793-982b-1ba2372241a3; Amy Zegart, “Open Secrets,” Foreign Affairs, January 7, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/open-secrets-ukraine-intelligence-revolution-amy-zegart?utm_source=twitter_posts&utm_campaign=tw_daily_soc&utm_medium=social.

67 Lin, “The Emergence.”

68 “Cyber Security Strategy of Ukraine,” Presidential Decree of Ukraine, March 15, 2016, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/NationalCyberSecurityStrategy_Ukraine.pdf.

69 Eric Geller, “Ukraine Prepares to Remove Data from Russia’s Reach,” POLITICO, February 22, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/02/22/ukraine-centralized-its-data-after-the-last-russian-invasion-now-it-may-need-to-evacuate-it-00010777.

70 Kuninidze et al., “Interim Assessment.”

71 Kuninidze et al., “Interim Assessment.”

72 “Datagroup to Invest $20 Million into a Large-Scale Network Modernization Project in Partnership with Cisco,” Datagroup, April 8, 2021, https://www.datagroup.ua/en/novyny/datagrup-investuye-20-mln-dolariv-u-masshtabnij-proyekt-iz-m-314.

73 Lauriane Giet, “Eutech4ukraine—Cisco’s Contribution to Bring Connectivity and Cybersecurity to Ukraine and Skills to Ukrainian Refugees,” Futurium, June 22, 2022, https://futurium.ec.europa.eu/en/digital-compass/tech4ukraine/your-support-ukraine/ciscos-contribution-bring-connectivity-and-cybersecurity-ukraine-and-skills-ukrainian-refugees; “Communiqué de Presse Solidarité Européenne Envers l’Ukraine: Nouveau Convoi d’Équipements Informatiques,” Government of France, May 25, 2022, https://minefi.hosting.augure.com/Augure_Minefi/r/ContenuEnLigne/Download?id=4FFB30F8-F59C-45A0-979E-379E3CEC18AF&filename=06%20-%20Solidarit%C3%A9%20europ%C3%A9enne%20envers%20l%E2%80%99Ukraine%20-%20nouveau%20convoi%20d%E2%80%99%C3%A9quipements%20informatiques.pdf.

74 ”Atlantic Council, “Ukraine’s Digital Resilience: A conversation with Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Mykhailo Fedorov,” December 2, 2022, YouTube video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vl75e0QU6uE.

75 “Digital Country—Official Website of Ukraine,” Ukraine Now (Government of Ukraine), accessed January 17, 2023, https://ukraine.ua/invest-trade/digitalization/; Atlantic Council, “Ukraine’s Digital Resilience.”

76 Brad Smith, “Extending Our Vital Technology Support for Ukraine,” Microsoft, November 3, 2022, https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/11/03/our-tech-support-ukraine/; “How Amazon Is Assisting in Ukraine,” Amazon, March 1, 2022, https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/community/amazons-assistance-in-ukraine; Phil Venables, “How Google Cloud Is Helping Those Affected by War in Ukraine,” Google, March 3, 2022, https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/how-google-cloud-is-helping-those-affected-by-war-in-ukraine.

77 Simon Handler, Lily Liu, and Trey Herr, Dude, Where’s My Cloud? A Guide for Wonks and Users, Atlantic Council, July 7, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/dude-wheres-my-cloud-a-guide-for-wonks-and-users/.

78 Handler, Liu, and Herr, “Dude, Where’s My Cloud?”

79 Brad Smith, “Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War,” Microsoft On the Issues, November 2, 2022, https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/06/22/defending-ukraine-early-lessons-from-the-cyber-war/; Smith, “Extending Our Vital Technology.”

80 Amazon, “How Amazon Is Assisting”; Sebastian Moss, “Ukraine Awards Microsoft and AWS Peace Prize for Cloud Services and Digital Support,” Data Center Dynamics, January 12, 2023, https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/ukraine-awards-microsoft-and-aws-peace-prize-for-cloud-services-digital-support/; Venables, “How Google Cloud”; Kent Walker, “Helping Ukraine,” Google, March 4, 2022, https://blog.google/inside-google/company-announcements/helping-ukraine/.

81 Catherine Stupp, “Ukraine Has Begun Moving Sensitive Data Outside Its Borders,” Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-has-begun-moving-sensitive-data-outside-its-borders-11655199002; Atlantic Council, “Ukraine’s Digital Resilience”; Smith, “Defending Ukraine.”

82 Nick Beecroft, Evaluating the International Support to Ukrainian Cyber Defense, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 3, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/11/03/evaluating-international-support-to-ukrainian-cyber-defense-pub-88322.

83 Smith, “Defending Ukraine,” 5, 6, 9.

84 Smith, “Defending Ukraine,” 3, 11.

85 Thomas Brewster, “Bombs and Hackers Are Battering Ukraine’s Internet Providers. ‘Hidden Heroes’ Risk Their Lives to Keep Their Country Online,” Forbes, March 15, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/03/15/internet-technicians-are-the-hidden-heroes-of-the-russia-ukraine-war/?sh=be5da1428844.

86 Kuninidze et al., “Interim Assessment,” 40.

87 Kuninidze et al., “Interim Assessment,”40; ““Київстар Виділяє 300 Мільйонів Гривень Для Відновлення Цифрової Інфраструктури України,” Київстар, July 4, 2022, https://kyivstar.ua/uk/mm/news-and-promotions/kyyivstar-vydilyaye-300-milyoniv-gryven-dlya-vidnovlennya-cyfrovoyi.

88 Київстар, “Київстар Виділяє”; “Mobile Connection Lifecell—Lifecell Ukraine,” Lifecell UA, accessed January 17, 2023, https://www.lifecell.ua/en/.

89 Ryan Gallagher, “Russia–Ukraine War: Telecom Workers Damage Own Equipment to Thwart Russia,” Bloomberg, June 21, 2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-21/ukrainian-telecom-workers-damage-own-equipment-to-thwart-russia.

90 Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), Twitter, February 26, 2022, 7:06 a.m., https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1497543633293266944?s=20&t=c9Uc7CDXEBr-e5-nd2hEtw.

91 Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), “Starlink — here. Thanks, @elonmusk,” Twitter, February 28, 2022, 3:19 p.m., https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1498392515262746630?s=20&t=vtCM9UqgWRkfxfrEHzYTGg.

92 Atlantic Council, “Ukraine’s Digital Resilience.”

93 “How Elon Musk’s Satellites Have Saved Ukraine and Changed Warfare,” Economist, January 5, 2023, https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/01/05/how-elon-musks-satellites-have-saved-ukraine-and-changed-warfare.

94 Alexander Freund, “Ukraine Using Starlink for Drone Strikes,” Deutsche Welle, March 27, 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-is-using-elon-musks-starlink-for-drone-strikes/a-61270528.

95 Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), “Over 100 cruise missiles attacked 🇺🇦 energy and communications infrastructure. But with Starlink we quickly restored the connection in critical areas. Starlink …,” Twitter, October 12, 2022 3:12 p.m., https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1580275214272802817.

96 Rishi Iyengar, “Why Ukraine Is Stuck with Elon (for Now),” Foreign Policy, November 22, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/22/ukraine-internet-starlink-elon-musk-russia-war/.

97 Economist, “How Elon Musk’s.”

98 Freund, “Ukraine Using Starlink”; Nick Allen and James Titcomb, “Elon Musk’s Starlink Helping Ukraine to Win the Drone War,” Telegraph, March 18, 2022, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/03/18/elon-musks-starlink-helping-ukraine-win-drone-war/; Charlie Parker, “Specialist Ukrainian Drone Unit Picks off Invading Russian Forces as They Sleep,” Times, March 18, 2022, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/specialist-drone-unit-picks-off-invading-forces-as-they-sleep-zlx3dj7bb.

99 Matthew Gault, “Mysterious Sea Drone Surfaces in Crimea,” Vice, September 26, 2022, https://www.vice.com/en/article/xgy4q7/mysterious-sea-drone-surfaces-in-crimea.

100 Economist, “How Elon Musk’s.”

101 Akash Sriram, “SpaceX, USAID Deliver 5,000 Satellite Internet Terminals to Ukraine Akash Sriram,” Reuters, April 6, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/technology/spacex-usaid-deliver-5000-satellite-internet-terminals-ukraine-2022-04-06/.

102 Alex Marquardt, “Exclusive: Musk’s Spacex Says It Can No Longer Pay for Critical Satellite Services in Ukraine, Asks Pentagon to Pick up the Tab,” CNN, October 14, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/13/politics/elon-musk-spacex-starlink-ukraine.

103 Elon Musk (@elonmusk), “Ukraine-Russia Peace: – Redo elections of annexed regions under UN supervision. Russia leaves if that is will of the people. – Crimea formally part of Russia, as it has been since 1783 (until …” Twitter, October 3, 2022 12:15 p.m., https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1576969255031296000; Andrij Melnyk (@MelnykAndrij), Twitter, October 3, 2022, 12:46 p.m., https://twitter.com/MelnykAndrij/status/1576977000178208768.

104 Elon Musk (@elonmusk), Twitter, October 14, 2022, 3:14 a.m., https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1580819437824839681; Elon Musk (@elonmusk), Twitter, October 15, 2022, 2:06 p.m., https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1581345747777179651.

105 Elon Musk (@elonmusk), Twitter, October 17, 2022, 3:52 p.m., https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1582097354576265217; Sawyer Merrit (@SawyerMerritt), “BREAKING: The Pentagon is considering paying for @SpaceX ‘s Starlink satellite network — which has been a lifeline for Ukraine — from a fund that has been used …,” Twitter, October 17, 2022, 3:09 p.m., https://twitter.com/SawyerMerritt/status/1582086349305262080.

106 Alex Marquardt and Sean Lyngaas, “Ukraine Suffered a Comms Outage When 1,300 SpaceX Satellite Units Went Offline over Funding Issues” CNN, November 7, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/04/politics/spacex-ukraine-elon-musk-starlink-internet-outage/; Iyengar, “Why Ukraine Is Stuck.”

107 Ryan Browne, “Ukraine Government Is Seeking Alternatives to Elon Musk’s Starlink, Vice PM Says,” CNBC, November 3, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/11/03/ukraine-government-seeking-alternatives-to-elon-musks-starlink.html.

108 William Harwood, “SpaceX Launches 40 OneWeb Broadband Satellites, Lighting up Overnight Sky,” CBS News, January 10, 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/spacex-launches-40-oneweb-broadband-satellites-in-overnight-spectacle/.

109 Marquardt and Lyngaas, “Ukraine Suffered”; Mehul Srivastava et al., “Ukrainian Forces Report Starlink Outages During Push Against Russia,” Financial Times, October 7, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/9a7b922b-2435-4ac7-acdb-0ec9a6dc8397.

110 Alex Marquardt and Kristin Fisher, “SpaceX admits blocking Ukrainian troops from using satellite technology,” CNN, February 9, https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/09/politics/spacex-ukrainian-troops-satellite-technology/index.html.

111 Charles R. Davis, “Elon Musk Blocked Ukraine from Using Starlink in Crimea over Concern that Putin Could Use Nuclear Weapons, Political Analyst Says,” Business Insider, October 11, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-blocks-starlink-in-crimea-amid-nuclear-fears-report-2022-10; Elon Musk (@elonmusk), Twitter, February 12, 2022, 4:00 p.m., https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1624876021433368578.

112 Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), “In 21 days of the war, russian troops has already killed 100 Ukrainian children. they are using DJI products in order to navigate their missile. @DJIGlobal are you sure you want to be a …,” Twitter, March 16, 2022, 8:14 a.m., https://twitter.com/fedorovmykhailo/status/1504068644195733504; Cat Zakrzewski, “4,000 Letters and Four Hours of Sleep: Ukrainian Leader Wages Digital War,” Washington Post, March 30, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/30/mykhailo-fedorov-ukraine-digital-front/.

113 DJI Global (@DJIGlobal), “Dear Vice Prime Minister Federov: All DJI products are designed for civilian use and do not meet military specifications. The visibility given by AeroScope and further Remote ID …,” Twitter, March 16, 2022, 5:42 p.m., https://twitter.com/DJIGlobal/status/1504206884240183297.

114 Mehul Srivastava and Roman Olearchyk, “Starlink Prices in Ukraine Nearly Double as Mobile Networks Falter,” Financial Times, November 29, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/f69b75cf-c36a-4ab3-9eb7-ad0aa00d230c.

115 Iyengar, “Why Ukraine Is Stuck.”

116 Michael Sheetz, “SpaceX Raises Another $250 Million in Equity, Lifts Total to $2 Billion in 2022,” CNBC, August 5, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/05/elon-musks-spacex-raises-250-million-in-equity.html.

117 “Starshield,” SpaceX, accessed January 17, 2023, https://www.spacex.com/starshield/; Micah Maidenberg and Drew FitzGerald, “Elon Musk’s Spacex Courts Military with New Starshield Project,” Wall Street Journal, December 8, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/elon-musks-spacex-courts-military-with-new-starshield-project-11670511020.

118 “Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” New York Times, February 14, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/world/europe/ukraine-maps.html#:~:text=Ukraine%20has%20reclaimed%2054%20percent,for%20the%20Study%20of%20War; Júlia Ledur, Laris Karklis, Ruby Mellen, Chris Alcantara, Aaron Steckelberg and Lauren Tierney, “Follow the 600-mile front line between Ukrainian and Russian forces,” The Washington Post, February 21, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2023/russia-ukraine-front-line-map/.

119 Jimmy Rushton (@JimmySecUK), “Ukrainian soldiers deploying a Starlink satellite internet system in liberated Kherson, allowing local residents to communicate with their relatives in other areas of Ukraine,” Twitter, November 12, 2022, 8:07 a.m., https://twitter.com/JimmySecUK/status/1591417328134402050; José Andrés (@chefjoseandres), “@elonmusk While I don’t agree with you about giving voice to people that brings the worst out of all of us, thanks for @SpaceXStarlink in Kherson, a city with no electricity, or in a train from …,” Twitter, November 20, 2022, 1:58 a.m., https://twitter.com/chefjoseandres/status/1594223613795762176.

120 Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), “Every front makes its contribution to the upcoming victory. These are Anatoliy, Viktor, Ivan and Andrii from @Vodafone_UA team, who work daily to restore mobile and Internet communications …,” Twitter, April 25, 2022, 1:13 p.m., https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1518639261624455168; Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), “Can you see a Starlink? But it’s here. While providers are repairing cable damages, Gostomel’s humanitarian headquarter works via the Starlink. Thanks to @SpaceX …,” Twitter, May 8, 2022, 9:48 a.m., https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1523298788794052615.

121 Thomas Brewster, “Ukraine’s Engineers Dodged Russian Mines to Get Kherson Back Online–with a Little Help from Elon Musk’s Satellites,” Forbes, November 18, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/11/18/ukraine-gets-kherson-online-after-russian-retreat-with-elon-musk-starlink-help/?sh=186e24b0ef1e.

122 Mark Didenko, ed., “Ukrtelecom Car Hits Landmine in Sumy Region, One Dead, Three Injured,” Yahoo!, October 2, 2022, https://www.yahoo.com/video/ukrtelecom-car-hits-landmine-sumy-104300649.html.

123 Vera Bergengruen, “The Battle for Control over Ukraine’s Internet,” Time, October 18, 2022, https://time.com/6222111/ukraine-internet-russia-reclaimed-territory/.

124 Bergengruen, “The Battle for Control over Ukraine’s Internet.”

125 Atlantic Council, “Ukraine’s Digital Resilience: A conversation with Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Mykhailo Fedorov,” December 2, 2022, YouTube video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vl75e0QU6uE; “Keeping connected: connectivity resilience in Ukraine,” EU4Digital, February 13, 2022, https://eufordigital.eu/keeping-connected-connectivity-resilience-in-ukraine/.

126 Greg Rattray, Geoff Brown, and Robert Taj Moore, “The Cyber Defense Assistance Imperative Lessons from Ukraine,” The Aspen Institute, February 16, 2023, https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Aspen-Digital_The-Cyber-Defense-Assistance-Imperative-Lessons-from-Ukraine.pdf, 8.

127 CRDF Global, “CRDF Global becomes Platform for Cyber Defense Assistance Collaborative (CDAC) for Ukraine,” News 19, November 14, 2022, https://whnt.com/business/press-releases/cision/20221114DC34776/crdf-global-becomes-platform-for-cyber-defense-assistance-collaborative-cdac-for-ukraine/; Dina Temple-Raston, “EXCLUSIVE: Rounding Up a Cyber Posse for Ukraine,” The Record, November 18, 2022, https://therecord.media/exclusive-rounding-up-a-cyber-posse-for-ukraine/; Rattray, Brown, and Moore, “The Cyber Defense Assistance Imperative Lessons from Ukraine.”

128 Beecroft, Evaluating the International Support.

129 Lee Hudson, “‘There’s Not Just SpaceX’: Pentagon Looks Beyond Starlink after Musk Says He May End Services in Ukraine,” POLITICO, October 14, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/10/14/starlink-ukraine-elon-musk-pentagon-00061896.

The post A parallel terrain: Public-private defense of the Ukrainian information environment appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The arsenal of democracy has hit a snag. Congress needs to step in.

Thomas S. Warrick — Fri, 24 Feb 2023 16:34:14 +0000

In the year since Russian President Vladimir Putin issued the order for his full-scale invasion of Ukraine—the most naked aggression seen in Europe since Adolf Hitler started World War II by invading Poland in 1939—Biden administration officials and members of Congress from both parties have echoed former US President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s famous description of the United States as the “arsenal of democracy.” Over the past year, the United States—just as it aided the United Kingdom in its finest hour—provided Ukraine with munitions and weapons systems to hold back Russian invaders. US President Joe Biden reiterated his administration’s commitment during his February 20 visit to Kyiv, saying that the United States is prepared to support Ukraine for “as long as it takes.”

However, the arsenal of democracy here in the United States has hit a snag: Even with a Russian offensive about to start, US procurements of the munitions and weapons systems Ukraine urgently needs—and that Washington has promised—are delayed because the Pentagon cannot process and sign new or expanded procurement contracts fast enough. Congress needs to urge the administration to cut through these delays and move procurement from a peacetime to a wartime footing.

A series of conversations over the past months by several Atlantic Council experts with knowledgeable officials in government and private industry have revealed a concerning pattern. Administration policy officials at the White House and the Pentagon have publicly (and often with fanfare) promised, both to Ukraine and to Congress, that they would deliver much-needed munitions and weapons systems, including by drawing from existing US and allied stockpiles that are in excess of training requirements. However, the services, especially the US Army, need to sign procurement contracts with defense contractors to produce new munitions or backfill systems being sent to Ukraine. This is where the bottleneck exists.

White House and Pentagon policy officials should be praised when they recognize the urgency of getting Ukraine the munitions it needs to blunt Russian offensives. The fast delivery of munitions has strategic importance: It could mean the difference between a victory for democratic Ukraine, which would deter further aggression from Putin, and a war that drags on for years.

However, government contracting officials and the private-industry executives that supply the military each follow a different set of priorities. Government contracting regulations are complex, and contracting officers are taught, with only a few exceptions, that if they sign contracts without appropriated funds in the right account and without formal authorization, they could lose their jobs or even go to jail. Corporate executives are accountable to boards of directors and shareholders if they start up production lines and build systems without a paying customer and a signed contract in hand.

The delivery of munitions is being slowed down at this crucial moment because the procurement bureaucracy—the thousands of people required to prepare, review, authorize, and approve defense procurement contracts—is not moving fast enough to keep production lines running at capacity and turning out the munitions and weapons that Ukraine urgently needs. There currently aren’t enough procurement officials, and those working hard on the job are not currently authorized to work overtime on evenings and weekends, as they would if procurement were on a wartime footing. For example, when Washington goes into crisis mode, according to lore, pizza deliveries to the Pentagon soar. Emails from contracting officials to defense contractors would regularly arrive late at night or on Saturdays and Sundays. We have seen no such reports that defense procurement is currently in crisis mode—but it should be.

Moreover, if there were ever a situation that called for contractual incentives for accelerated performance and penalties for delays, the urgent need to get munitions to Ukraine would be it.

US leadership, which has been a hallmark of the Biden administration’s approach to defending Ukraine, extends to defense production and procurement. Accelerating Pentagon contracting and procurement would also send a strong signal to US allies to do the same with their own deliveries to Ukraine’s forces in the field.

The recent visit of US Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-WI) to Taiwan revealed that officials there are also concerned about the slow delivery of munitions that Taiwan will need to deter a Chinese invasion. Officials in both Washington and Taipei appreciate that successful Western support for Ukraine against Russia could influence Chinese thinking about a possible invasion of Taiwan. Among the best ways to deter a Chinese attack are Western help to Ukraine to repel Russian invaders and munitions ready in sufficient quantities to repel an amphibious assault against Taiwan. If China sees its defeat as likely, the Indo-Pacific will remain at peace.

Congress can help accelerate the production and delivery of urgently needed munitions and weapons. Although a few Republicans have called for a slowdown in US support for Ukraine, which would only strengthen Putin’s brutal hand, a strong majority of both parties understands the United States’ national interest in helping defend Ukraine against Russian aggression. Generalized statements calling for faster delivery of munitions to Ukraine would be welcome, but far more valuable would be highly focused congressional calls on the Pentagon to accelerate contracting and authorize overtime for procurement officials and contractors. Meanwhile, Congress should schedule urgent hearings on what can be done to accelerate contracting and procurement without compromising public integrity. Cautious bureaucrats need to see a strong, bipartisan congressional demand for urgency.

The world needs the United States, again, to be the arsenal of democracy. The United States urgently needs to get munitions to Ukraine to thwart an imminent Russian spring offensive and to build up US and allied stockpiles to deter a future China attack on Taiwan. Congress should urge the Department of Defense to shift procurement to a wartime footing. Victory for Ukraine and peace in the Indo-Pacific are worth having the arsenal work overtime.

Tom Warrick is a senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice at the Atlantic Council. He served in the Department of State from 1997 to 2007 and as a deputy assistant secretary in the Department of Homeland Security from 2008 to 2019. Follow him on Twitter: @TomWarrickAC.

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Zeiten-when? Scholz needs to stop standing in the way of Germany’s foreign-policy turning point.

Noah DeMichele — Thu, 23 Feb 2023 21:38:51 +0000

Germany’s relationship with its own security looks fundamentally different one year after the war in Ukraine prompted Chancellor Olaf Scholz to announce a Zeitenwende, or turning point, before the Bundestag. The idea represented an about-face that promised greater investment in the German armed forces and a rethink of Berlin’s relationship with Moscow—raising hopes on both sides of the Atlantic. But as the meaning of Zeitenwende has grown to represent broader transformations to Berlin’s security, defense, and economic policies, the chancellor has routinely missed the mark and gotten in the way of his own big idea.

The Zeitenwende is the chancellor’s brainchild, yet he has been its major roadblock. Since announcing the speech, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) leader has habitually hesitated when faced with key decisions, best encapsulated by the Leopard 2 battle tank saga. Despite the international pressure, which eventually reached a fever pitch, for Germany to send its Leopards and approve European shipments to Ukraine, Scholz abdicated, only making Leopards contingent on US deliveries of less logistically viable Abrams tanks. Looking ahead, the early debate about fighter jets for Ukraine is following the same pattern. Scholz already appears to have labeled planes for Ukraine a red line.

The repeated public diplomacy disasters do Scholz and Germany a disservice. Navel-gazing in Berlin diverts attention away from the fact that Germany is, among European Union member countries, the largest supporter of Ukraine—supplying heavy machinery, Patriot missiles, and more. Despite that, international focus has landed on Germany’s delay in approving or providing critical materiel. During instances in which Germany is given the opportunity to advance the Zeitenwende agenda by displaying leadership from Berlin, Scholz squanders the moment acting only after maximum pressure is applied by governments in Washington, Tallinn, and everywhere in between. A true Zeitenwende will require Germany to lead from the front, not defer to a US decision for fear of Germany “going it alone.” The Leopards debate showcases this: Inaction on the highly desired Leopard tanks was Germany going it alone.

Nobody expects the sea change in German foreign-policy thinking that is Zeitenwende to happen overnight. Even so, Berlin should seize the opportunities it has to move the strategy forward and prove Germany’s willingness to be the leader in Europe.

Others in Berlin recognize this opportunity. Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, the Green Party’s first candidate for chancellor with a significant shot, has been the most outspoken voice in favor of transforming German security and projecting strength vis-à-vis Russia and China, as exemplified by her August speech to the New School in New York in which she called on Germany to “seize this transatlantic moment.” Elsewhere, SPD Chair Lars Klingbeil, in a new foreign-policy strategy paper for the party, recently advocated for Germany to take a strong leadership role in the world. German Economy Minister Robert Habeck, of the Green Party, has previously urged against “stupid trade” with China—showing a shift in German foreign-policy thinking away from the belief that economic ties with autocracies is the best way to bring about change.

This next generation of German policymakers is prepared to reinvigorate German foreign policy—that is a good sign for Zeitenwende hopefuls. In the meantime, Scholz needs to stop inhibiting the foreign-policy transformation. The first opportunity for the chancellor to recoup lost trust is ensuring the successful, swift delivery of the now-promised Leopards to Ukraine. The implementation cannot resemble the decision process. Yet Germany’s new defense minister, Boris Pistorius, was noncommittal on a delivery date for the Leopards in a February 16 interview with the Washington Post.

Scholz must also apply today’s lessons to challenges beyond Ukraine. Looking to Germany’s neighborhood, Scholz has emphasized the need for a strong and capable Europe that is not reliant solely on the United States for security. Yet, following the chancellor’s “you first, Washington” approach to sending tanks to Ukraine, countries such as Poland and the Baltic states will need reassurances that he is serious about reducing Europe’s reliance on the United States. In an effort to recover confidence in Germany’s European leadership abilities, Scholz should look for avenues for easy cooperation with his European neighbors. One easy win for Scholz and Pistorius could be coordinating with allies to refill tank stockpiles.

The Zeitenwende needs to look beyond Europe as well. The chancellor’s latest writing on the Zeitenwende pays little attention to China, while the development of Germany’s much anticipated national security strategy has reportedly been paused by the chancellery for being too sharp on Beijing after the strategy left Baerbock’s foreign ministry. To avoid falling into a renewed economic-dependence trap with China, Scholz should follow Baerbock’s lead in treating Beijing as a competitor, consistent with the renewed emphasis on German and European security prescribed by the Zeitenwende. You can bet this will be a topic of discussion when Scholz meets with US President Joe Biden at the White House on March 3.

The Zeitenwende is a process that will take time and require patience from Berlin’s allies. Yet, it is also one that requires clarity from Germany’s highest levels. At February’s Munich Security Conference, the chancellor remarked that Germany will assume the responsibility required of it in times like these. In the interest of turning words into action, a break from the ever-repeating cycle of hesitancy and seesawing would be a welcome development from the chancellery and will help ensure the Zeitenwende becomes reality.

Noah DeMichele was a fall 2022 young global professional with the Europe Center and is currently working on transatlantic relations at Bertelsmann Foundation North America.

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Leonardo CEO Alessandro Profumo on Italy’s role in unifying Europe and ‘selective decoupling’ from China

apavia — Thu, 23 Feb 2023 14:30:00 +0000

Alessandro Profumo, chief executive officer of Leonardo, one of Italy’s leading defense companies, joined the Atlantic Council for a discussion about emerging technologies, the future of transatlantic relations, decoupling from China, and the deep cultural affinity between the United States and Italy. As the war in Ukraine reaches the one-year mark and with Profumo’s tenure as CEO of Leonardo slated to end in May of this year, the CEO reflected on the state of the industry at a pivotal moment. Concerns are growing about diminished weapons stockpiles across the NATO alliance (with deliveries to Ukraine continuing). What does the US and allied defense industry’s response to this crisis reveal about the defense sector’s ability to ramp up production in a conflict?

Full interview

Featured quotes

Here are a few highlights from Profumo’s conversation with Matthew Kroenig, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

On emerging technologies

“We have to consider that there are some areas of the technological advancement where the civil world is more advanced—typically artificial intelligence, big data, simulation. But there are threats like hypersonic or direct energy weapons which are not civil, but we must invest in them as an industry.”

On the future of transatlantic relations

“A strong and unified Europe can be a pillar in defense of the Western value system. This is very important. Italy can be the bridge that connects all these elements.”

On the challenge posed by China and the possibility for the West to decouple its economy from Beijing’s

“Completely decoupling from China is not possible. We must manage selective decoupling. …It is important in any situation to diversify your sources of suppliers to ensure your survivability no matter what.”

On US-Italy relations

“The largest exporting sector is machinery, not fashion, because we can have the right solutions to specific problems with a tailor-made production capability. We are capable of finding solutions in very difficult situations.”

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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How Biden’s Ukraine trip was received in Kyiv and Moscow

Atlantic Council — Mon, 20 Feb 2023 17:21:02 +0000

JUST IN

That’s one way to celebrate Presidents’ Day. US President Joe Biden staged a surprise trip to Kyiv on Monday that included a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the presidential palace and a walk in central Kyiv as air-raid sirens blared. How was Biden’s trip viewed in Ukraine and Russia? What message does it send about US support for Ukraine? And how can Biden follow photo ops with military muscle? Our experts have the answers.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried): Weiser Family distinguished fellow and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia
Melinda Haring (@melindaharing): Nonresident senior fellow at the Eurasia Center
Oleh Shamshur (@Shamshur_O): Nonresident senior fellow at the Eurasia Center and former Ukrainian ambassador to the United States
Peter Dickinson (@Biz_Ukraine_Mag): Editor of UkraineAlert

The sounds of history

Dan says Biden’s dramatic trip to Kyiv “ranks with other great presidential moments of leadership in defense of freedom” best known for a single line delivered in Berlin: John F. Kennedy’s “Ich bin ein Berliner” and Ronald Reagan’s “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.”
In Biden’s case, the indelible memory may not be a line in a speech but the sound of air-raid sirens as he walked through Kyiv with Zelenskyy. Melinda described the visit as “pitch-perfect,” from the enthusiastic air-raid stroll to Biden’s blue and yellow tie—matching the Ukrainian flag.
While the visit was kept under strict secrecy until he was on the ground, much like other presidential trips to war zones, Dan says this undertaking was “much harder” than, for example, a Baghdad visit during the Iraq War, “where the US had massive military assets on the ground.”
Given the risks and logistical hurdles—including a nearly ten-hour train ride from Poland—the fact that Biden went forward with the trip “suggests he means what he says about supporting Ukraine for the long haul,” Dan says. “It’s a powerful and welcome message.”

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The view from Kyiv… and Moscow

Before official word got out, rumors started to spread through Kyiv that Biden was likely in town, Oleh tells us, given the large security presence. “Biden’s visit was one of those events when the emotional reaction of the Ukrainian governing class and the population was equally positive and even enthusiastic.”
In Moscow, the reaction was “predictably hysterical,” Oleh adds. Prominent pro-Kremlin journalist Sergei Mardan called it a “demonstrable humiliation of Russia.” And Peter points out that on state TV, “pundits discussing the visit attempted to spare Putin’s blushes by insisting that Moscow must have given Washington prior ‘security guarantees’ in order for the trip to go ahead.”
The mood was even darker on social media, where Oleh says Russians called “for new missile and bomb attacks against Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities. There is no doubt that Biden’s visit will be used by the Russian propaganda machine to fan even stronger the feelings of chauvinism and anti-American animosity already well-embedded with the majority of Russians.”

The great weapons debate

Biden used the Kyiv visit to announce an additional $460 million in artillery and other military equipment going to Ukraine, but that package did not include new systems Zelenskyy has requested such as long-range missiles known as ATACMS. This indicates that “discussion in Washington about the fighting range and power of weapons provided to Ukraine is still far from being over,” Oleh says.
Melinda points out that Biden’s visit “raised expectations” for more assistance to come, “but every additional large assistance package Congress authorizes will be hard-fought.”
While it is “remarkable” that US public support for backing Ukraine in a long fight has held steady—a recent Gallup poll found it at 65 percent—Melinda notes that “there are serious partisan differences between Republicans and Democrats, and we should only expect them to grow” as the 2024 US presidential campaign heats up.

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Boris Johnson: Stop worrying about Putin and ‘focus entirely on Ukraine’

Katherine Walla — Thu, 02 Feb 2023 01:16:31 +0000

Former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson wants the West to stop tiptoeing around Russian President Vladimir Putin’s threats and narratives.

“How can we seriously worry about provoking him when we have seen what he will do without the slightest provocation?” he asked at an Atlantic Council event on Wednesday. “We need to stop focusing on Putin and focus entirely on Ukraine” as it continues to fight for its sovereignty, European security, and democratic values.

That focus, Johnson urged, entails equipping Ukraine with “the stuff they need.” That includes Ukrainian requests for long-range missile systems, more armored vehicles, and fighter planes.

And what about escalation? Putin “won’t use nuclear weapons,” Johnson argued, because in such a case, China would likely draw back its support; India, African countries, and Latin American countries would likely turn against Russia; and the Russian people would face steep economic consequences. Not to mention, a nuclear strike wouldn’t end the war, and “the Ukrainians will probably fight on and win anyway,” he said.

Below are more highlights from the conversation, moderated by Atlantic Council Eurasia Center Senior Director John Herbst, a former US ambassador to Ukraine, as they discussed holding Russia accountable for war crimes, Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership, and more.

Weapons, stat

If allies can equip Ukraine with what it needs to win the war quickly, Johnson explained, they would save countless lives. But they would also “lift the threat of aggression” in places such as Georgia, Moldova, the Baltic states, and Eastern Europe—and end the risk of further disruption to the economy, energy supply, and food system.
By contrast, if allies fail to help Ukraine “win decisively,” that would ensure that Putin remains a threat to all those countries and regions—meaning that Americans will continue incurring costs for generations to help secure Europe, Johnson said. He warned those concerned about costs not to be “penny wise and pound foolish, or cent wise and dollar foolish, however you would put it here.”
Johnson said he doesn’t think it would take long to train Ukrainians up on Western fighter jets, as they “have proved themselves able to use our technology to massively destructive effect.” He also pushed back against critics who say that helping Ukraine drains Western arsenals, asking if there is any point in deploying tanks and planes in secure places such as North Carolina or Alsace. “The Ukrainians could be using them now, exactly where [the weapons] are needed” to protect the West’s collective security, Johnson said.
Johnson, who served as prime minister during the war’s early months before resigning amid scandal in July, claimed that “it was because of Brexit” that the United Kingdom was able to make decisions and take approaches that were “distinct from the old EU [European Union] approach” on Ukraine. “If we’d stuck to that,” he said, “I don’t believe we would have delivered” next generation light anti-tank weapons (NLAWs).
In addition to equipping Ukraine, the country’s allies must help hold Russia accountable for its apparent war crimes, said Johnson, who remains a Conservative Party member of Parliament. “We should give every possible support to the Ukrainians” throughout the efforts to collect evidence and the legal process “to allow them to assemble the cases against those who have committed atrocities.” Johnson added that it is “essential” that any Ukrainians who may have committed war crimes “should be brought to justice as well.”

The nightmare that could have been

Johnson commended US “military and financial” support, saying that without the United States’ efforts, “Putin would have taken Kyiv in the blitzkrieg that he planned,” which could have brought a “terrible darkness” to a “young and entirely innocent European democracy.” If the Kremlin had succeeded in its invasion, that would have emboldened it to “increase the intimidation and threats toward every country and region on the fringes of the Soviet empire,” Johnson added.
The fall of Kyiv, explained Johnson, would have told China “all they need to know about [the West’s] reluctance to stand up for freedom and democracy” and it would signal to every “opportunist autocrat” that international borders are “fungible” and could “be changed by force.”
Johnson warned that China is still watching how this invasion unfolds: “This is a dry run for Xi Jinping… [China wants] to see how it will go” because it has “objectives of [its] own.”

NATO’s “mistake”

Johnson reflected on how, before Russia’s invasion last February, there wasn’t a clear consensus among NATO allies about Ukraine’s membership—an ambiguity that Putin ultimately exploited. “We made a mistake,” Johnson explained, in telling Ukraine that NATO membership “was [in] the cards” without offering “any kind of real security guarantees.” Putin used that reassurance of membership “as a pretext” for invasion, Johnson said.
Johnson looked back at the argument that Ukrainian membership would provoke Russian aggression, calling it “now transparently absurd.” He pointed out that Russian aggression has unfolded even despite NATO’s “failure” to admit Ukraine into the Alliance. “Not having Ukraine in NATO produced the worst war in Europe [in] eighty years,” he said.
Now, Putin has “demolished any objections to Ukrainian membership,” Johnson explained. While he said he doesn’t believe that Ukraine “should be admitted forthwith” into NATO, he explained that “once the Ukrainians have won” the war, they should “begin the process of induction, both to NATO and of course to the EU.”

Katherine Walla is an associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

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Sweden has a chance to transform European security—even before it officially joins NATO

Franklin D. Kramer — Mon, 30 Jan 2023 17:29:28 +0000

Sweden’s decision to undertake NATO membership reflects a monumental change in the European security environment. But while twenty-eight NATO countries have voted to approve Sweden’s accession to the Alliance, the Nordic country’s bid may be in jeopardy. Last week, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told Sweden not to expect “benevolence” for its bid following protests near the Turkish embassy in Stockholm, then on Sunday floated the idea of approving Finland’s NATO membership but not Sweden’s. Whether or not a definitive decision, the Turkish president’s statements highlight how much Sweden’s membership is dependent on Turkey—and Turkey’s decision will likely not be concluded until after the country’s elections in May.

Nonetheless, in the interim, Sweden can significantly add to European security during its presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU)—a role it assumed in January and will hold through June—by ensuring that the EU plays a role, as outlined in the recent Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation, that complements and reinforces NATO’s actions. Sweden can wield the agenda-setting powers of its presidency to push debate forward on a fully resourced EU security and defense budget directed toward three crucial aims: mobility, sustainment, and critical infrastructure protection. Each of these aims is a prerequisite to defending Europe—but none of them has been adequately achieved yet.

The EU has long asserted the importance of European defense. As EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell has described, the EU’s history has been “full of plans and initiatives to strengthen the EU’s security and defence policy.” But, he added, “most have come and gone.” Rather, as a comprehensive study by the EU itself concluded, “years of defence underspending… has led to an accumulation of gaps and shortfalls” in the group’s collective military capabilities.

However, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year, European nations have begun taking steps to improve their defense capabilities. The EU itself has provided useful support through its peace facility fund that has backfilled national weapons deliveries to Ukraine, and the EU is in the process of legislating a five-hundred-million-euro fund to support common procurement. But responding to the threat that Russia presents requires much more significant action. Sweden should use its presidency to focus on substantially improving Europe’s capabilities through the establishment of an EU security and defense budget directed toward three key elements of collective defense.

1. Mobility

NATO’s defense against a Russian attack will require moving a large number of NATO forces. According to the NATO Force Model, the Alliance will provide “well over” one hundred thousand forces in under ten days and around two hundred thousand forces between ten to thirty days. Those are very substantial requirements, and NATO needs to ensure that it has the mobility capability to deliver forces in the requisite time frame. With the Alliance’s current capabilities, NATO likely cannot meet those demands.

The deficiencies can be inferred from the EU’s recent “Action plan on military mobility 2.0.” The new plan does recognize that with Russia’s war in Ukraine, the EU has “learned how important it is to move military aid as quickly and smoothly as possible.” But what the plan does not do is describe how well over one hundred thousand forces could be moved in under ten days, nor how around two hundred thousand forces could be moved in ten to thirty days—though this is what the new NATO Force Model requires.

Sweden should ensure that the EU’s implementation of the new military mobility action plan is, in the words of Borrell, “result-oriented and avoid[s] our usual European tendency to go for conceptual or institutional discussions.” Achieving the necessary results will, first and foremost, require sufficient funding.

In the context of the original mobility plan, the European Commission proposed a budget of approximately 6.5 billion euros. However, that proposal was reduced to 1.69 billion euros in the enacted budget, far from what would have been necessary prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and even less so now. The new action plan does not remedy this deficiency, stating only that the Commission will “consider” strengthening the military mobility budget “within the overall review of priorities in the mid-term review of the Multiannual Financial Framework.” Yet given the changes in the security environment, even the 6.5 billion number would be inadequate. Sweden should utilize its presidency to build a consensus that the budget will be revised substantially upward to support what will be necessary to meet the requirements of the NATO Force Model.

2. Sustainment

Here too, adequate resources will be critical. The Russian war in Ukraine has underscored that a European defense against a Russian attack could result in an extended conventional conflict. But for European forces to be able to effectively engage in such a conflict, the EU will need to close what it called one of the “most urgent capability gaps”—inadequate stockpiles of military equipment. While resupplying those stockpiles, the EU should ensure that they include anti-armor capabilities and man-portable and medium-range air defenses, unmanned aerial vehicles for both sensing and attack, long-range fires, and precision-guided munitions.

Nations are increasing their own spending, but the EU has the fiscal capability to provide complementary resources—though the currently planned five-hundred-million-euro fund for common procurement is far from sufficient. Sweden should advocate to include a sustainment initiative in the EU security and defense budget that will provide complementary resources to nations so that they have the conventional capabilities required for an extended conflict.

3. Resilience of critical infrastructure

The EU recently issued important directives requiring that nations enhance the resilience of their critical infrastructure—one set of directives focused on cybersecurity and the other on physical threats. But implementing the directives will require significant fiscal expenditures. For example, the cybersecurity directive tells nations to adopt “cyber hygiene practices” such as “zero-trust principles, software updates, device configuration, network segmentation, identity and access management.” Similarly, the directive tasks national computer security incident response teams with “incident handling”—not an insignificant job during conventional conflict, as shown by the efforts needed to respond to Russian cyber attacks on Ukraine. Accordingly, to achieve the required levels of cybersecurity, Sweden should advocate for a budget that provides complementary fiscal support for following the new directives, rather than leaving those responsibilities solely to nations.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has required Europe to change the way it approaches security and defense, amounting to what German Chancellor Olaf Scholz calls a Zeitenwende—a turning point. That Zeitenwende applies just as much to the EU as it does to Germany. Contending with the new demands of Europe’s security architecture will require establishing an EU security and defense budget that supports mobility, sustainment, and resilience. Sweden’s presidency can help the EU achieve that goal.

Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished fellow and a board member of the Atlantic Council. He is a former US assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

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Tanks are vital but Ukraine will need much more to defeat Putin’s Russia

Jeffrey Cimmino, Shelby Magid — Wed, 25 Jan 2023 21:16:04 +0000

For nearly a year, Ukrainian forces have shown their ability to heroically defend their land and their people against Russia’s invading army. However, despite some genuine triumphs on the battlefield, Ukrainian soldiers and civilians continue to die. Meanwhile, Russian forces are seeking to consolidate their gains and a major new Russian offensive may be looming in the near future.

In this context, after tense and drawn-out wrangling among Western allies and partners, Germany has finally agreed to send (and allow others to send) Leopard 2 main battle tanks to Ukraine, while the United States will provide 31 M1 Abrams tanks. Ukrainians and their supporters have welcomed these long-awaited decisions. Leopard print is now all the rage in Ukraine.

Such decisions are worth celebrating as they were hard fought and will make a difference in saving Ukrainian lives. But while the landmark step of sending tanks demonstrates further Western resolve in support of Kyiv, Ukraine’s partners cannot afford to take a victory lap. Instead, they must remain firmly focused on the work ahead. Tanks are a vital element in Ukraine’s fight, but timing is everything and more is still needed to win the war. Ukraine’s allies and partners must continue to prepare for the long haul in order to defeat Russia.

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In the short term, Ukraine’s Western partners need to ensure the country has what it needs to defend against Russian attacks and launch additional counteroffensives to push back Russian forces. In addition to main battle tanks, the announcement earlier this month by France, Germany, and the United States that they would provide newer infantry fighting vehicles, as well as other countries stepping up to provide critical equipment including Czechia, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden, were important steps toward ensuring Ukraine will be able to pack a substantial punch. Meanwhile, Patriot missile systems will further augment Ukraine’s air defense against Russian missile attacks that have terrorized civilians.

While this support is meaningful, there is no time for complacency. Speed in both decision-making and delivery must now be prioritized. As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said to the latest Ramstein Format meeting on January 20, “time remains a Russian weapon. We have to speed up.”

New weapons systems will require training and logistical support networks to handle everything from maintenance to refueling. Moreover, Russian forces continue to launch attacks, while their terror tactics remain a major threat to the civilian population and infrastructure. Crucially, Putin’s troops are also digging in and fortifying their positions in an effort to better defend and consolidate their gains.

Ukraine’s Western partners should not stop with tanks and armored fighting vehicles. While tanks have long been a Ukrainian priority, a range of other important items featured on Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov’s wish list before the latest Ramstein meeting, including more air defense systems and systematic ammunition supplies. And just as HIMARS devastated Russian supply depots, transportation nodes, and command centers during summer 2022, setting the stage for Ukraine’s autumn counteroffensives, the United States should now give Ukraine longer range systems and UAVs, including ground-launched small diameter bombs and ATACMS, to better enable Ukraine to lay the groundwork for future counteroffensives.

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The international coalition of nations backing Ukraine’s war effort cannot confine themselves to short-term thinking alone. Evidence suggests Russian President Vladimir Putin is preparing for a long war, overseeing the mobilization of new recruits and ordering the country’s defense industry to boost production. Western leaders must make it abundantly clear, in word and action, that Putin cannot wait them out.

It is also vital to consistently and clearly reaffirm and communicate the interests and values at stake in this war. Most notably, Russia under Putin has proven itself to be irredeemably revanchist, undermining European security and flagrantly violating international norms in an unjustified war of aggression. In the long-term, transatlantic security is best served by a strong, committed response to Putin’s aggression.

Furthermore, Western partners need to ensure they are able to produce what is necessary to support Ukraine and account for their own security. There are positive indicators toward this end. For example, a recent New York Times report stated that the Pentagon is planning to substantially increase the monthly production of 155 mm artillery shells, critical for the howitzers Ukraine has used to counter Russia’s artillery advantage. The United States, along with allied and partner governments, will need to continue to work with the private sector to ensure long-term support for Ukraine is feasible.

Finally, Western leaders should prepare for a world in which Ukraine is victorious and Russia is defeated. Indeed, there ought to be shared strategic clarity that this is the desired end state. Fear of the consequences of Russia’s defeat must not delay further support for Ukraine.

A defeated Ukraine would be a disaster, inviting further aggression from Putin once he rebuilds his battered military. That outcome seems less likely at this point, though a hypothetical collapse of Western support in conjunction with a major renewed Russian offensive means it cannot be ruled out. A concession-laden compromise remains more likely, spurred by fatigued Western allies and partners losing the will and capacity to support Ukraine. This, too, would be far from ideal, as it would show Putin (and other autocrats) that aggression can pay, even if it is costly.

The best outcome is one in which Ukraine is victorious and well-positioned to become an integrated part of Western institutions capable of deterring any future aggression. This scenario would see Russia defeated and Putin’s dreams of empire shattered against the steely resolve of Ukraine and its Western partners. With continued and heightened support, there is a viable path to this outcome.

A Ukrainian victory would bring its own uncertainties. What would a defeated Russia mean for the future of Putin and his regime? Would the regime collapse and unleash democracy or a new autocracy? The possibility of instability in a country with massive amounts of nuclear weapons must also be taken into account. These are genuine concerns and Ukraine’s Western partners should be thinking through how to navigate them. It is clear, however, that the devil we know is a callous, genocidal, cosplaying Peter the Great who only stands to destabilize and destroy unless he is stopped for good.

Jeffrey Cimmino is associate director in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Shelby Magid is deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Ukraine has been calling for Leopards since the early days of Russia’s full-scale invasion, which began almost one year ago on February 24, 2022. The Leopard is viewed as the ideal tank model for Ukraine as it is technically superior to anything Russia can field and is widely available in Europe. There are currently thought to be approximately 2,000 Leopards in service, making both maintenance and resupply relatively convenient.

Following today’s green light from Berlin, Ukraine is now expecting to receive commitments from a growing coalition of countries ready to deliver Leopards. This could initially be sufficient to create two battalions of Leopard tanks. However, training and logistical issues mean that it may take up to three months before these tanks reach the front lines in Ukraine.

The Leopard tank drama has served to highlight ongoing international concerns over the nature of Germany’s political ties to the Putin regime. It has also reignited accusations from some quarters that Berlin is not a reliable team player, both in terms of NATO and the European Union.

Such claims are nothing new. In April 2022, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki accused Germany of “standing in the way” of harder sanctions against Russia. “Anyone who reads the notes of EU meetings knows that Germany is the biggest impediment when it comes to more decisive sanctions,” he told journalists in Warsaw.

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For a number of years, Germany’s unwavering commitment to Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline project served as a symbol of the problematic relationship between Moscow and Berlin. German leaders now acknowledge that the pipeline was a serious strategic mistake. However, Berlin earlier ignored fierce opposition from both Brussels and Washington over the project’s grave security implications for Ukraine and Europe as a whole.

The Nord Stream II pipeline was designed to increase Europe’s dependence on Russian energy while allowing Moscow to bypass Ukraine’s gas transit system, thereby exposing the country to greater risk of a full-scale military invasion. It was the brainchild of Vladimir Putin and former German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who has built a controversial career as a Russian energy executive since leaving the front ranks of German politics.

Schroeder is a Social Democratic Party colleague of Germany’s current chancellor, Olaf Scholz, as well as new defense minister Boris Pistorius, who reportedly also shared a close relationship with one of Schroeder’s ex-wives. The pipeline received strong backing from former German chancellor Angela Merkel during her time in office. In spring 2021, Merkel convinced US President Joe Biden to relax Nord Stream 2 sanctions imposed by Congress.

Nord Stream 2 was abruptly canceled by Scholz following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. In summer 2022, the pipeline was damaged along with is predecessor, Nord Stream 1, by unknown saboteurs. While no longer a political issue, Nord Stream 2 still serves as a reminder of Germany’s deep ties to the Russian elite.

The decision to send Leopard tanks to Ukraine will go some way to reassuring Germany’s partners that the country is no longer looking to prioritize its relationship with Russia over Europe’s common strategic interests. At the same time, the long delay that proceeded this decision underlines the domestic challenges that remain for any German leader seeking to adopt policies deemed hostile to the Kremlin.

Diane Francis is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, editor-at-large with the National Post in Canada, author of ten books, and author of a newsletter on America.

John Herbst (@JohnEdHerbst): Senior director of the Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine
Chris Skaluba (@ACScowcroft): Director of the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and former principal director for European and NATO policy at the US Defense Department
Leah Scheunemann (@LeahScheun): Deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and former Pentagon official focused on international security policy and Senate Armed Services Committee professional staff member
Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried): Weiser family distinguished fellow and former US ambassador to Poland

Treads on the ground

The tanks are a “significant step forward” in the race to arm Ukraine, John tells us, and the timing is critical.
With Russia making “minor gains” near Bakhmut and Soledar in eastern Ukraine, as well as launching “small offensive operations in the Zaporizhzhia region,” John says, “the tanks will help Ukraine defend its positions with fewer casualties in both locations. They will also prove invaluable if Moscow launches a major offensive from Belarus or elsewhere this year—something that Ukraine’s intelligence services expect.”
And if the promised tanks arrive in the next few months (which is no sure thing), they could be a part of Ukraine’s next big push, John adds: “On the flat terrain in Ukraine’s east and south, they could spearhead the counteroffensive.”
Those will need to be Leopards, because the thirty-one pledged US Abrams tanks won’t be arriving soon. Leah points out that the Abrams will be drawn from the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, “which is on a longer timeline and a pot intentionally meant to secure Ukraine over the long term. This isn’t the decisive assistance needed for spring offensives.”
But Leah says these delays should not be cause for concern in Kyiv. They are, rather, a signal of US long-term backing: “This package could take months to arrive, will take months to train on, and would likely include sustainment and repair assistance for the future—further solidifying the promise of US support for Ukraine’s victory.”
In recent weeks, the intensifying public squabbling over whether to send the tanks had exposed divisions in the West. “Ukraine clearly believed that the tactical advantages the tanks will provide on the battlefield were worth the risk of public infighting among Ukraine’s supporters,” Chris says. “It looks like that bet has paid out.”

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‘Zeitenwende’ zeitgeist

The pressure was greatest on Germany, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and allied countries—particularly Poland, Dan points out—pressing for the Leopards. In Dan’s view, “the Germans were working through the collapse of their long-held assumptions about Russia, namely that dialogue was always the answer and cooperation was achievable.”
While the outside pressure mattered, Dan says Berlin acted because “Germans could see for themselves what Putin’s Russia has become: a bloodthirsty aggressor bent on conquest and killing.”
The move signifies a new approach to Russia across the West, Dan argues: “That policy starts with support for Ukraine on the battlefield and in the future, and realism about Russia as an adversary that needs to be contained and weakened so it can no longer start wars or otherwise commit aggression.”

The next ask

The tanks are welcome, but “Zelenskyy will no doubt return to his successful playbook to pressure allies for more,” such as longer-range artillery and fighter jets, Chris says.
That dynamic contributed to Germany’s “brake-pumping,” Chris said, based on Berlin’s “misguided belief” that it could control whether the war escalates. “The intensity of this most recent debate suggests Zelenskyy’s balancing act will only become more difficult as he keeps pushing for help.” And any serious disagreement among allies represents a “strategic victory for the Kremlin,” he adds.
Long-range artillery and missiles—with a range up to three hundred kilometers—“would enable a fast and successful counteroffensive,” John says, by enabling Ukraine to hit Russian logistical centers that are set up just outside the current artillery range.
“At some point, Washington will likely relent and send these systems,” John tells us. “But the delay only increases the cost for Ukraine in casualties and lengthens the war. The United States can and should do better.”

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Leopard tank saga: Germany remains haunted by history

Bohdan Vitvitsky — Tue, 24 Jan 2023 19:37:42 +0000

As the Russian invasion of Ukraine approaches the one-year mark, Germany faces accusations of stalling over the critical issue of providing Ukraine with Leopard tanks. Ukrainian officials have long identified the German-made Leopard 2 model as one of the country’s top priorities, but Germany has so far refused to deliver any tanks or grant other countries permission to transfer their own Leopards to Ukraine.

While officials in Berlin have offered mixed messages regarding the Leopards, the final decision rests with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who is believed to be deeply reluctant to take any steps that may be viewed in Moscow as escalatory. Scholz has been accused of employing delaying tactics and dodging the issue, and has recently suggested that he would only give the green light to send Leopards if the US also agreed to deliver Abrams tanks to Ukraine.

Germany’s stance has provoked widespread anger across Europe, particularly in Ukraine itself and in neighboring countries such as Poland. In a bid to pressure Berlin, the Poles have now submitted an official request to send some of their Leopard tank fleet to Ukraine. Germany has promised to treat this request with “the urgency it deserves,” but many observers continue to doubt whether Berlin has the necessary political will to deliver the tanks.

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As international pressure mounts on Germany, Britain has already confirmed plans to deliver a squadron of Challenger 2 main battle tanks. However, Ukrainian officials say this is not enough to “achieve operational goals” or overcome Russia’s “substantial qualitative advantages in troops, weapons, and military equipment.” They remain insistent that the country must receive Leopards in significant quantities.

The Leopard 2 tank is seen as the ideal fit for Ukraine’s needs for a number of reasons. Unlike the US-made M1 Abrams tank, it runs on diesel fuel and is less complicated to maintain. Crucially, thousands of Leopards are currently in use throughout Europe and beyond, creating a network of partner countries with existing training capabilities and maintenance facilities.

Germany has already sold Leopolds to a long list of countries including Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Canada. Presumably these tanks were not only sold so that the recipients could parade them in their capital cities during national holidays, but could also be used to defend themselves against external aggression. If Germany is comfortable selling its tanks to so many countries, why is supplying Ukraine viewed in Berlin as such a problem?

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It would appear that Germany’s reluctance is tied to the country’s profound sense of guilt for the crimes of the Nazi era. This historic legacy continues to shape German society in ways that outsiders do not always fully appreciate, and has instilled a strong sense of pacifism that is particularly pronounced when it comes to relations with Russia due to the staggering losses incurred by the Soviet Union during World War II.

When it comes to addressing the crimes of the Nazis, modern Germany’s emphasis on Russia leaves many Ukrainians perplexed and deeply offended. Hitler’s armies occupied all of Ukraine along with Belarus and the Baltic states during World War II, while only a comparatively small portion of Russia was ever under German occupation. This is reflected in casualty figures, with Ukraine and Belarus suffering proportionately far greater losses than Russia. And yet German society seems incapable of recognizing the difference between “Soviet” and “Russian,” while being apparently ignorant of Ukraine’s far more central role in the carnage.

This has reawakened dark memories for millions of Ukrainians, who understandably feel that Russians are for some reason seen as more important to Germany than Ukrainians. They are reminded of the wicked racial hierarchies of the Nazi occupation, and the treatment of Ukrainians as second-class citizens in their own country.

Modern Germany’s Russo-centric approach to the issue of war guilt is all the more maddening given the crystal clear moral clarity of the current situation. Russia has invaded Ukraine despite the fact that Ukraine posed no threat whatsoever to Russia. The invading Russian army has already killed tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians while forcing millions to flee their homes. Russian soldiers have systematically engaged in war crimes including mass executions, sexual violence, torture, and forced deportations.

Dozens of towns and cities have been reduced to rubble by the advancing Russians. In every single region that has fallen under Russian control, the same pattern of atrocities has been repeated. Most recently, we have witnessed a nationwide airstrike campaign specifically designed to deprive millions of Ukrainian civilians of access to daily necessities such as heat, light, and water. Russia has also launched countless targeted missile strikes against residential buildings in cities across Ukraine including Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Mykolaiv. Faced with these horrors, why does Germany still delay?

Germany’s sensitivity to the crimes of the Nazi past is commendable, but the current conflict has exposed a problematic focus on Russia at Ukraine’s expense. As Yale historian Timothy Snyder has noted, the main purpose of World War II, from Hitler’s point of view, was the conquest of Ukraine. It is therefore no surprise that Ukraine served as the epicenter of the apocalyptic fighting on the Eastern Front. This simple fact should loom large as Berlin ponders whether to send the tanks that Ukraine so desperately needs in order to defend itself.

If Germans truly seek redemption for the country’s genocidal past, they will never have a better opportunity than now. Sending Leopard tanks could prevent a new genocide in Ukraine. Failure to do so may add another dark chapter to Germany’s troubled history.

Bohdan Vitvitsky has served as a Resident Legal Advisor at the US Embassy in Kyiv and as Special Advisor to Ukraine’s Prosecutor General. He has also served as a federal prosecutor in the US.

Drone warfare offers a solid example in this respect. Turkish drones, specifically Baykar’s Bayraktar TB-2, marked a significant footprint in the Russia-Ukraine War. Turkey is also contributing to rebuilding Ukraine’s navy with indigenous Ada-class MILGEM corvettes, and supporting the Ukrainian army with Kirpi MRAP (mine-resistant and ambush-protected) fighting vehicles.

Moreover, drone sales have helped the country improve ties with Turkic states such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, and even establish new ties with various other countries such as Poland, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia.

Overall, Turkish industries can now design, produce, modernize, and export—at varying levels of domestic contribution—some core conventional arms and equipment such as corvettes, fire support systems, unmanned aircraft systems, gliding munitions for drones, joint-direct attack munitions, across-the-spectrum land warfare platforms (except for main battle tanks), grenade launchers, and tactical anti-material rifles. On the other hand, the defense sector demands international cooperation, marking the limits of independence, at least at the time being, on strategic weapons and high-end arms, such as exo-atmospheric ballistic missile defense, fifth-generation tactical military aviation, air-independent propulsion submarines, and space-based assets. The country’s sensor and radar infrastructure is deeply integrated into NATO architecture and connected through a web of data links to the transatlantic network. Turkish defense modernization plans cannot quickly alter this critical sensor architecture given Turkey’s current shortfalls in high-tech command-control nodes, algorithmic warfare capacity, and battle networks. In these areas, Turkish military capacity will keep relying on NATO capabilities for the foreseeable future. When it comes to drone warfare, however, Turkish unmanned systems proliferation is a pioneering force for the rest of the allies, especially in the eastern flank.

Enter the Powerhouse

The driving success behind the Turkish defense technological and industrial base is not merely about weapon systems proliferation, not even drone proliferation on its own. In essence, the country’s defense economics remain in good shape despite the Covid-19 pandemic’s shrinking effects.

Between 2020 and 2021, defense revenue increased by almost 15 percent, while the revenue coming from foreign contracts went up by 42 percent. Some figures optimistically suggest that this number might be as high as 48 percent. As for certain actors, first and foremost Baykar, foreign contracts constitute more than 90 percent of the revenue, marking an impressive outlook.

Most importantly, the volume of research and development activities, the main force that drives the technological edge of the defense industry, recently increased by 30 percent. Furthermore, in 2021, the industry employed over seventy-five thousand people. In other words, the Turkish defense technology generation has a sharp and reliable base. Therefore, despite the negative effects of the pandemic, the industry recovered quickly and revenue climbed back to pre-pandemic levels. Most of the growth in the country’s defense industry came from land platforms (with revenue of $2.347 billion, followed by the weaponry & ammunition and missile segments. The two latter categories showed a significant increase compared with 2020. The highest number of transactions was made in the civil aviation and weaponry & ammunition segments. Since 2020, Turkey also made progress in terms of reducing its defense imports (with a reduction of 4.58 percent) while maintaining somewhat stable export levels. This was a difficult balance to strike, especially given the disruptive impact that the pandemic had on global production and supply chains. The most sensational segment, namely drone warfare assets, is fast rising too. Together, Tusaş and Baykar, the two primary drone makers, secured more than $1 billion in exports in 2021, though the former has a broader export portfolio.

Turkish drone warfare solutions are growing large in diversity and concepts of operations flexibility. Akinci of Baykar, for example, is a high-end system with a heavy combat payload capacity, including cruise missile certification. Aksungur of Tusaş, on the other hand, can be equipped with anti-submarine warfare and maritime patrol assets. The country is offering other solutions too, such as the anti-radiation loitering munitions of Lentatek, Kargu, and the soon-to-be-unveiled turbofan-engine loyal wingman Kizilelma, along with a rising naval unmanned surface combat fleet.

In early 2022, Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) announced that the industry will be upscaling and catalyzing ongoing indigenous projects to shield the country from potential external sanctions.

Even more importantly, the nation’s defense industry is expanding with a growing number of stakeholders, making it a more diverse effort. The number of projects in the industry has reached 750, made by over 1,500 local defense firms. In 2022, Turkey reached a record defense export volume of over $3 billion and might come close to $4 billion by the end of the year, making the country’s export volume comparable to some European nations’ overall defense budgets. Finally, clients are diversifying. The number of customers in the defense export portfolio has reached 170 countries. The Turkish weapons market is also a lucrative one for foreign suppliers. Despite the pandemic, defense spending is steady. Open-source works reveal that in 2018, Ankara spent some $12.98 billion in defense, ranking it seventh within NATO and eighteenth in the world. In 2021, even amid the global health crisis, Turkey spent more than $15 billion on defense and military projects. Moreover, its indigenous defense industries reported a turnover of more than $10 billion.

Marking the critical mass: Limits and prospects

The affordability of Turkish arms, flexibility of Turkey’s arms exports policy, and the country’s willingness to run technology transfers remain Turkey’s advantages compared with its Western competitors.

The technological and industrial base of Turkey’s defense sector has reached a critical mass in some ways. Still, given present defense economics trends and the sophistication of technological knowledge, Turkey’s defense ecosystem will continue to rely on bilateral and multilateral collaboration. The direction of Turkey’s fifth-generation airpower, as well as long-range and high-altitude air and missile defense weapon systems, thus remains to be seen.

Can Kasapoglu is a non-resident senior fellow at Hudson Institute, and the director of the Security & Defense Research Program at Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) in Istanbul. Follow him on Twitter @ckasapoglu1.

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The National Defense Strategy shows the Pentagon’s increased focus on the gray zone. Here’s what that means.

Gray Zone Task Force experts — Tue, 13 Dec 2022 16:18:06 +0000

The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) marks a change in the Pentagon’s tone in several ways, but the most distinctive change may be the emphasis on operating in the gray zone—which was entirely absent from the 2018 summary. With the publication of the 2022 strategy, the Department of Defense (DOD) is officially recognizing that the escalation of competitors’ coercive and malign activities in the gray zone present a challenge to US security; it also calls for campaigning across all spectrums of conflict, pushing the department to make a deliberate effort to coordinate its activities and investments across various theaters and domains. Our experts from the Gray Zone Task Force within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice, which aims to develop an integrated strategic framework for US operations in the gray zone, map out what this new focus means for the US defense industry in the coming years.

1. What exactly does the Pentagon mean by activities in the gray zone?

The NDS defines gray zone methods as “coercive approaches that may fall below perceived thresholds for US military action and across areas of responsibility of different parts of the US government.” That definition acknowledges that strategic competitors are increasingly taking the fight off the physical battlefield and using unconventional and nonmilitary means to undermine US and allied security. Adversaries such as China and Russia are not solely—or even primarily—targeting military assets, but rather they are fueling societal and cultural fissures, shaping the information domain, and disrupting economic markets and trade. This is not a new concept: China’s and Russia’s use of nonmilitary means of warfare dates back to Operation Desert Storm, wherein the United States walked away celebrating a decisive battlefield victory while US adversaries began visualizing a future fight in which they could compensate for unparalleled US conventional power through hybrid means.

The DOD’s definition of gray zone activities can be interpreted as purposefully broad, implying that a discussion of modern warfare today is incomplete without discussing threats permeating from the gray zone. However, it is notable that the NDS opted to characterize only competitor or adversary methods as falling within the gray zone, even while mentioning comparable US and allied capabilities and approaches.

Overall, this NDS’s definition of gray zone methods broadens the US defense community’s understanding of who is being targeted in the gray zone and thus who should be implicated in the DOD’s response—and more significant than the definition itself is the prioritization placed on the gray zone. However, this is only one step in the right direction, as different US agencies and departments are currently working under different understandings of what does and does not fall within the gray zone. This lack of consensus or coordination, coupled with an overall lack of direction as to whether and how the United States should fight in the gray zone, hinders an effective whole-of-nation response to a whole-of-nation problem.

—Julia Siegel is an assistant director with the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice.

2. How do gray zone activities fit into the DOD’s integrated deterrence concept?

Integrated deterrence is, at its heart, about shaping behavior to “convince potential adversaries that the costs of their hostile activities far outweigh any possible benefits,” as Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin explained. Integrated deterrence ultimately relies on a full spectrum of incentives, disincentives, messaging, and negotiation, underwritten by credible deterrents of conventional and/or strategic military action. Unsurprisingly, a good amount of the spectrum below the threshold of active armed conflict will reside in the gray zone.

The United States must react to adversarial activity in the gray zone, especially in areas that adversaries perceive as important, to reduce their efficacy; that will require responses that are appropriate, proportionate, and effective. Equally important, the United States must engage proactively in the gray zone to shape competitors’ behavior. Some of the capabilities needed for engaging in the gray zone exist within the DOD, with many housed within US Special Operations Forces core activities, as well as theater security cooperation activities and those at a national level that transcend a single geographic combatant command such as coordination with Five Eyes partners (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) across the globe. Other capabilities, while not organic to the department, are at its disposal through effective partnerships with the intelligence community, other departments (e.g. State, Treasury, and Commerce), and alliances and partnerships. Improving the way the DOD leverages partnerships can potentially result in better outcomes than replicating the partners’ capabilities.

A critical part of integrated deterrence will be how the United States articulates its so-called “red lines,” or adversarial actions that trigger a US military response. In order to effectively shape behavior that supports US and allied interests, US strategy and execution must erase any doubt that such limits and consequences do exist, while simultaneously reducing adversary confidence about their knowledge of precisely where those red lines lie. That deliberate ambiguity keeps adversaries from thinking that everything up to the red line would be “fair game,” and avoids inviting lower-level malign activity. It also avoids the optics of a United States’ “bluff” being called, in part, to avoid walking back on pronounced lines. Lastly, engaging in the gray zone will buy the maneuver time and space required to maintain its competitive edge and deter aggression in the future—the United States cannot waste this advantage with denial, handwringing, and partisanship—especially when it comes to China.

—Arun Iyer is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice and leads its project Adding Color to the Gray Zone.

3. The NDS differentiates between China as the pacing threat and Russia as an acute threat. What does that look like in the gray zone?

The NDS correctly notes that China and Russia pose unique challenges to the United States. The two countries differ in how they impact the United States and in how long their threats last. China’s advances in technology, access to third-country governments and resources, and role as a key global manufacturer means that the United States and allied countries face a strategic, long-term competition against China. All-out war against China would devastate the global economy and cripple US-owned multinational businesses. In contrast, Russia lacks the reach of its Soviet Union days and its impacts on global markets are mostly limited to petrochemicals. As highlighted in its efforts in Ukraine, the Russian military’s decline has been noticed in the waning professionalism of its forces, reliability of material, and overall investment and research and development. Russia would struggle to project traditional military power much outside its border areas.

China, despite recent economic troubles, is a nation on the rise and one that feels it deserves a place at the top of the world order. Although its population is forecasted to decline in the coming years, China will be a global force for decades to come—and its network of businesses, investments, and expatriates provide the country unique access to capabilities that it can leverage both in the gray zone and to meet traditional military goals. For example, TikTok may offer China the ability to push specific anti-US government content to users of the app in North America or in locations where there are ongoing US or NATO military operations. China’s continued investment in technology, education, and international relationships means that the country will continue to build this access in business, academia, and local politics in countries around the world—levers that can be pulled to meet China’s goals without the use of traditional military operations.

In contrast, Russia’s gray-zone capabilities are limited outside of its use of the paramilitary Wagner Group, information manipulation in the digital space, and traditional diplomatic efforts which include foreign intelligence operations to project power and contribute to paramilitary, influence, and harassment operations. As the political elite focuses on ways to make the domestic Russian audience feel powerful during a period of population and economic decline, gray-zone efforts will likely focus on meeting specific needs such as port access or supporting international political leaders. The Kremlin will aim to look strong to domestic and regional audiences, especially in Eastern Europe and South Asia, where Russia typically has influence. Moscow’s overarching threat to global interests will be its use of information operations to sow discord, clearing entry ways for Russian intelligence and business leaders to access locations of interest and providing localized support to fighting parties where political interests align.

—Jennifer A. Counter is a nonresident senior fellow within the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice and is a member of its Adding Color to the Gray Zone Task Force.

4. Deterrence is inherently a messaging game. What does this NDS say about the DOD’s approach to information operations?

Deterrence depends on the adversary’s perception of the United States’ capabilities and intent to use them. It also depends on an impression that if the adversary were to present a challenge, the United States would be able to cause enough damage to outweigh any gain for the adversary and its interests. Gauging an adversary’s perception, therefore, is necessary to understand the current deterrent threshold. Moving the threshold, if necessary, is dictated by how well a military manages the information domain. If a deterrent threshold is evaporating or degrading over time, then adjustments must be made to capabilities and perceived intentions, and then adequately conveyed to the adversary to restore the value of the deterrent. The NDS highlights the Pentagon’s aim to enhance its ability to operate in the information domain as a necessary component of this strategy.

Yet questions remain. The NDS highlights several new features with significant information elements to help organize and subsequently execute military activities across the entire conflict spectrum. First, the NDS’s focus on integrated deterrence calls for improvements across domains, agencies, and countries to better manage conflict in the information domain. Second, campaigns that cover the entire conflict spectrum—overlayed with the increased demands of implementing integrated deterrence—will require significant additional resources for all information components of the DOD. Who will manage a global information campaign in which all departmental information resources must be coherent, synchronized, and operationally relevant? Will the president’s budget for fiscal year 2024 reflect the need for additional resources to adequately coordinate campaigns that are overlapping and will run simultaneously across agencies, partners, and allies? Finally, is the department adequately organized to elevate information operations as a preeminent component of national power needed to implement integrated deterrence? The NDS is a good step forward, but organization and resourcing leading up to fiscal year 2024 will determine whether it can be implemented.

—Robert J. Giesler is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice and is a member of its Adding Color to the Gray Zone Task Force.

5. How can the US government and private sector complement traditional military efforts?

In roughly eighty pages, the 2022 NDS references economic tools fewer than a dozen times. While not surprising given that the document sets forth the DOD’s strategy, which consists primarily of non-economic tools, this underscores the importance of relying on other government agencies and departments to address what the NDS refers to as “economic coercion” carried out by the China against the United States and its allies and partners. China’s Belt and Road Initiative is the shining example of this coercion, as it forces recipient nations to forfeit direct or indirect control over key strategic assets (such as a ports, airports, rail lines, and highways) if they fail to pay commercial loans. However, myriad other examples of economic coercion exist, including currency manipulation, technology transfer requirements (i.e., China requiring foreign firms to transfer technology to local firms in exchange for market access), and punitive tariffs.

So how can the United States combat economic hybrid warfare? The NDS acknowledges that DOD ought to rely on other agencies to take the lead on economic matters in the gray zone, stating that in many cases, tools such as economic measures “conducted by other US departments and agencies may prove more effective” than DOD’s military tools. This is where the panoply of US trade agencies—in conjunction with the Treasury and Commerce departments—can play a key role by establishing consistent, cross-agency policies regarding foreign investment, credit finance, trade policy, and sanctions to protect US defense interests and regain economic advantage. Still, DOD plays a significant role in advising these agencies on how to prioritize geographic focus areas and in evaluating where the greatest economic threats to US national security exist.

—David Fogel is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice and is a member of its Adding Color to the Gray Zone Task Force.

6. How should the DOD change its approach to counterintelligence (CI) under the integrated deterrence framework?

Integrated deterrence ought to include the use of CI capabilities resident within DOD’s authorities via Title 10 of the US Code, which outlines the DOD’s role in conducting military activities; Title 50 of the US Code, which grants the DOD and the intelligence community the authority to conduct intelligence and CI activities; and Executive Order 12333, which initially laid out the DOD’s intelligence and CI responsibilities. As the NDS notes, the United States can strengthen deterrence by conducting actions that raise an adversary’s cost with respect to the “perceived benefits of aggression.” One of the ways this can be accomplished is through synchronized messaging, complemented by real-world open activities and actions that utilize offensive CI operations in concert with the DOD planning community. For example, the DOD might use CI assets to pass information about a policy intent that complements a stated White House or State Department decision, all while moving DOD personnel and material into the theater to reinforce the United States’ overall intent.

Similarly, leveraging CI capabilities can help improve the resiliency of the vital networks and critical infrastructure supporting the cyber and space domains, as they utilize the same personnel, equipment, networks, and supply chains feeding into CI. The first order of business should be securing US supply chains in line with the Pentagon’s vision of delivering uncompromised, which is a DOD program aiming to bolster security across the entire defense enterprise by ensuring that foreign intelligence entities haven’t compromised technology (for example with insider threats or compromised chips) in the manufacturing process, which would assist with building enduring advantages throughout the defense ecosystem. To do so, the United States must move the manufacture of critical components back onshore to the United States and then use the tools and tradecraft of CI to ensure that the personnel, networks, intellectual property, and manufacturing processes associated with these “can’t lose” technologies are both vetted and protected.

—Thomas Ferguson was a member of Forward Defense’s Adding Color to the Gray Zone Task Force before assuming a position in government.

7. How can the Pentagon better leverage domestic and international partners, and the capabilities they own across domains, to fortify its integrated deterrence?

The NDS mandate to leverage every capability and advantage at DOD’s disposal, particularly to use advantages that DOD does not organically own, is astute and could not come at a better time for the United States. The two-decade war on terror provides a strong precedent for cross-government cooperation, which is potentially still applicable even as the US government shifts its focus from counterterrorism to strategic competition with China and Russia.

As a former Central Intelligence Agency leader, I saw first-hand the development, implementation, and impact of what was nicknamed “Title 60”—the portmanteau of titles 10 and 50 of US code—wherein the DOD and intelligence community (IC) worked seamlessly on the counterterrorism mission. This integrated cooperation between exquisite capabilities is the textbook example of what the NDS calls for, particularly in addressing competition in the gray zone. For example, both the IC and Special Operations Forces worked together to become experts at man-hunting in the war on terror, fusing signals intelligence, human intelligence, and overhead capabilities to ensure few places globally were out of reach in conducting “find, fix, finish” missions against terrorist targets. Such capabilities can similarly be used against today’s strategic competitors—why not merge joint talents to find hostile foreign intelligence officers working against US interests across the globe?

In sum, successes in the US war on terror were critically dependent on bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Both the IC and DOD deeply understand the value of partners, justifying integration on many levels such as intelligence sharing and (at times) cross-training. To meet the NDS remit to address gray zone threats, the DOD must build on these relationships and lessons and not let a new issue set cause formerly integrated capabilities to atrophy.

—Marc Polymeropoulos is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice and is a member of its Adding Color to the Gray Zone Task Force.

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Rich Outzen joins TRT World to discuss the potential sale of F-16s to Turkey

Grady Wilson — Fri, 09 Dec 2022 19:08:00 +0000

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Taiwan: The key to containing China in the Indo-Pacific

John B. Barranco — Mon, 05 Dec 2022 16:41:25 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

REPORT RELEASE

2021-22 Senior US Marine Corps Fellow

China is the pacing challenge for the United States, posing the most consequential global threat to US and allied security. As China flexes its military and economic muscles, Beijing’s increasingly coercive behavior tests the defense of its neighbors—and none more so than Taiwan. Much of the United States’ ability to prevent Chinese power projection in the Indo-Pacific hinges upon its relationship with Taiwan. This paper proposes a US strategy for strengthening the relationship between Taiwan and the United States in order to deter Chinese military aggression in the Indo-Pacific.

Taiwan as a flashpoint for Sino-US tensions

Taiwan offers a key strategic link, both within the Indo-Pacific and on the global stage. The island is strategically situated in the middle of the first island chain off the East Asian coast, making it geo-strategically important to Chinese military ambitions. Taiwan is also the primary supplier of semiconductors (which are used to make microchips underwriting advanced military systems) to the United States and its allies, winning Taipei a spot as a major player in the global economy.

While Taiwan is not a formal US ally due to the “One China” policy—recognizing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legal government of China—Taiwan still falls under the US security umbrella. However, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s desire to reunify Taiwan is clear, and efforts to test Taiwanese and US resolve on this issue are increasingly bold. Security analysts often point to a potential Taiwan conflict scenario, positing that a failure to deter Chinese aggression could escalate into a war with global consequences.

China as the pacing threat

When China entered the World Trade Organization in 2001, the threat posed by Beijing was still unrecognized by leadership in Washington, DC. Since then, China’s voice on the global stage has only gotten louder: The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) naval fleet exceeds the size of the US Navy, and China’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy allows it to rapidly develop artificial intelligence, machine learning, and other emerging technologies for military purposes. Moreover, Beijing’s annual economic growth rate has been three-to-four times that of the United States over the past two decades, and Chinese gross domestic product is projected to surpass that of the United States by 2030.

However, the China challenge is not just military or economic in nature—it is also ideological, posing a serious threat to the US-led rules-based global order. The 2018 National Defense Strategy recognized this for the first time, offering a strategic shift and reaching bipartisan consensus by identifying China as a major revisionist rival acting counter US interests.

Major elements of the strategy

In this report, John Barranco identifies the interests of key players in the Indo-Pacific region, which then flow into his strategic plan. Particularly, he identifies the following as key goals of the United States and China:

The United States aims to preserve and revitalize the US-led, rules-based global system, as well as to prevent the rise of regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region and Europe.

China seeks to overthrow the traditional balance of power, supplanting the United States as the world’s preeminent power, and ensure regime stability through both domestic policy successes and establishing regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific.

China sees Taiwan as central to achieving all its interests. Therefore, the United States ought to consider this lens when crafting strategies to deter China and understand how the defense of Taiwan fits into its own plans.

The way forward for US-Taiwanese relations

The goals of this strategy are to contain China in the Indo-Pacific, deter China from attacking Taiwan, and, if necessary, deny it from taking Taiwan upon attack. To achieve these objectives, the United States must bring Taiwan into the fold, tying it more closely with potential allies and partners diplomatically, economically, and defensively. US strategy can do so in myriad ways, to include:

Strengthening regional security and trade relations with Taiwan;
Accelerating and realigning US force posture in the Indo-Pacific; and
Increasing bilateral US-Taiwanese military cooperation through joint military exercises.

An effective strategy for containing China in the Indo-Pacific must include consideration of Taiwan’s role in the region. Read the full strategy for more details on the path ahead.

About the author

Former fellow

John B. Barranco

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Americas Iraq

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Our military insiders’ views of the new National Defense Strategy

Atlantic Council military fellows — Mon, 21 Nov 2022 21:28:27 +0000

Last month, the US Department of Defense (DOD) released its 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). This document outlines clear priorities for the department, namely: defense of the homeland; deterring strategic attacks on the United States, allies, and partners; deterring Chinese and Russian aggression while simultaneously maintaining readiness for conflict; and building a resilient Joint Force.

While the document’s strategic prioritization is clear, what remains uncertain is how this strategy will ultimately be implemented across DOD. Defense leadership recognizes this, as the document states that “this strategy will not be successful if we fail to resource its major initiatives or fail to make the hard choices to align available resources with the strategy’s level of ambition.”

How can DOD meet the strategic priorities laid out in the 2022 NDS? The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s military fellows—active-duty officers who are serving a one-year rotation at the Atlantic Council—weighed in, addressing potential gaps between budgets and strategy, force employment mechanisms, sustainment and logistics, and security partnerships. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied here are solely those of the authors and do not represent the views of DOD or any other US government agency.

Investing in security partnerships: The US should take larger risks to bolster Taiwan’s defense

Security cooperation has long played an essential role in US defense policy, but this NDS amplifies its role in competition for the next decade. The 2022 NDS states that “mutually beneficial Alliances and partnerships are our greatest global strategic advantage—and they are a center of gravity for this strategy.” The decisions to defend treaty allies have already been adjudicated, but the decision to support security partners such as Ukraine and Taiwan remains foggy. Overall, this NDS implies that DOD will likely need to take more significant risks to support Taiwan and to prevent a Chinese invasion.

The current war in Ukraine provides a case for security cooperation. Had the United States and NATO invested more heavily in Ukraine before Russia’s February 2022 invasion, they may have deterred Russia from attacking in the first place. In the past several months, the United States has invested approximately $17.6 billion in security assistance for Ukraine. In comparison, it only invested $2.7 billion from 2014 until February. The United States’ concerns about escalation with Russia were pervasive early in the Ukraine crisis, but along with NATO it has since taken much greater risks to help Ukraine survive and to contain Russia. US and NATO leaders are now likely pondering whether it may have been smarter and cheaper to invest earlier to prevent the war than to help Ukraine fight it.

When the United States invests in alliances and partnerships, it invests directly and indirectly to prevent (and, if necessary, respond to) any potential crisis. For instance, Operation Desert Storm (1990-91) included a coalition of thirty-nine countries worldwide. Desert Storm’s success relied heavily on a NATO alliance that was built for the Cold War threat but trained and ready for a crisis in the Middle East. US leadership in NATO has helped deepen the capability and willingness of European countries to cooperate in support of Ukraine. After Russia invaded, the speed and unity of the US, NATO, and European Union response were exemplary. The rate of armament shipments, funding supplied to Ukraine, sanctions on Russia, and the response to the humanitarian crisis should all serve as blueprints for coordination among allies and partners in the future. Enhancing US investments in Indo-Pacific alliances and partners will improve resilience for a potential conflict scenario in Taiwan or elsewhere.

The United States should implement an audacious strategy to help build Taiwan’s self-defenses and strengthen other Indo-Pacific allies and partners to help surge in a crisis. According to the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), Taiwan is a security partner. The TRA places Taiwan a tier above Ukraine in terms of US commitment to its security. The additional ten billion dollars over four years in Foreign Military Financing for Taiwan proposed in the 2023 NDAA could further solidify US commitment to the partnership. Ideally, a US funding increase would spur other Taiwan security partners to increase their support and potentially create a NATO-like framework for deterrence.

The West will likely never know for certain whether heavily arming Ukraine pre-invasion would have caused Russian escalation or prevented the invasion entirely. However, given that Russia has repeatedly threatened red lines since invading and the West has routinely surpassed them, the United States and NATO likely could have been more aggressive without triggering a broader war. US defense leaders should use the lesson of Ukraine to push the limits of investment in Taiwan—along with other Indo-Pacific allies and partners—to prevent an invasion.

—COL Benjamin Johnson is the 2022-2023 senior US Army fellow at the Scowcroft Center.

Follow the money: DOD is betting on research but not sending the right signals to industry

At every opportunity, DOD leadership has sought to highlight the linkages between the 2022 NDS and the president’s fiscal year 2023 (FY23) budget request. Yet, while this strategy and budget were developed concurrently, fiscal constraints lead to necessary tradeoffs across programs.

Consistent with the NDS, DOD cut costs from the current force structure to make significant investments in building enduring advantages. The Defense-Wide funding request increased significantly when compared to projections in the Trump administration’s final budget request (9 percent compared to an overall DOD increase of 5 percent), with these accounts containing the offices of the undersecretaries of defense for research and engineering, and for acquisition and sustainment. Notably, these two offices will execute the increases to building enduring advantages programs, to include $3.3 billion for microelectronics, $1.1 billion for artificial intelligence, and $700 million for submarine industrial-base resiliency. Such investments were partially funded by reductions to current force structure, including the retirement of sixteen Navy battle force ships before their estimated service life, a reduction of twelve thousand regular Army troops, and 102 Air Force aircraft early retirements.

Moreover, the FY23 budget contains the largest research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDTE) request in DOD history, with funding requests of $130 billion for RDTE and $146 billion for procurement. Focusing too much on RDTE at the expense of procurement contributes to the “valley of death”—or the arduous journey commercial companies take to win DOD contracts—further underscoring that DOD does not have an innovation problem, but rather an innovation adoption problem. To field cutting-edge technologies, more funds ought to shift toward procurement over future budget cycles.

However, while all eyes are on the current budget year, the out-year funding projections in the Future Years Defense Program are concerning, as they result in real growth of -1.2 percent in FY25, -0.6 percent in FY26, and -1.4 percent in FY27 (using a projected 2.2 percent inflation rate, which is far below what we’ve seen lately). This demonstrates that additional force structure reductions may be required in future budget cycles, and that heavy RDTE investments may not necessarily lead to transformational technologies in the field—if there won’t be enough money for production. The NDS prioritizes a resilient defense ecosystem and healthy industrial base, but out-year projections do not send a demand signal to industry for sustained investment and will impact NDS implementation in the long term.

Now, Congress has the next move: Work remains ongoing to finalize the FY23 National Defense Authorization Act and appropriations bills. Throughout committee mark-ups, there has been strong bipartisan support for additional FY23 defense funding.

—LCDR Marek Jestrab is the 2022-2023 senior US Navy fellow at the Scowcroft Center.

Something old and something new: Force employment modernization must match an ambitious strategy

As outlined in the NDS, the “principal approach to advancing these priorities is integrated deterrence,” which is a whole-of-government approach to deter aggressive and malign actions by US adversaries, gain and maintain advantage throughout the competition continuum, and mitigate risk in advance of potential conflicts.

As discussed above and articulated by others, there appears to be a gap between NDS objectives and budgetary realities. However, much of what is discussed as new within the NDS bears strong resemblance to strategy and guidance that has existed for several years. It can be argued that the 2018 NDS, 2018 Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning, and the 2020 Irregular Warfare Annex to the NDS already created the necessary strategy framework to drive the department toward the strategic ends outlined in the 2022 NDS. What has remained constant, however, are the mechanisms by which joint force employment is planned and executed. The new points of emphasis—in particular the reliance on campaigning, as well addressing gray-zone activities simultaneously with conflict preparation—require a modernization of joint force employment concepts.

The NDS explicitly states that “campaigning is not business as usual,” but rather a more sophisticated approach to “aggregate focus and resources” to ensure that operations, activities, and investments are linked to the stated priorities, while critically incorporating “feedback loops” ostensibly to course correct in the midst of dynamic long-term campaigns. Devising a long-term strategy to deter Chinese and Russian malign influence globally is decidedly more complex than a campaign to dismantle a violent extremist organization in a single theater. Integrated deterrence campaigns require a high degree of focused understanding about US adversaries, the effects of military operations in concert with other instruments of power, and mitigation of strategic and escalatory risks.

However, current force employment mechanisms are more conventionally rigid, generally tying expeditionary forces to operating locations and adjudicating objectives years in advance of action, making it difficult to incorporate feedback loops and adjust to adaptive adversaries. Similarly, the rotational model employed by the military often caps the amount of time a particular problem can be focused on by expeditionary units or joint task forces, which can limit understanding and ultimately the options presented to commanders. As opposed to executive branch organizations that often focus on specific problems for decades, military units may shift from divergent problem sets over several years. Given the premium the NDS places on coordination and collaboration with not only the executive branch but also allies and partners, DOD must allow more flexibility in how it aligns multi-domain capabilities against priority operational problems.

The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is critical to the ways and means in which force employment supports the strategic objectives outlined in the NDS. The military speaks in the language of requirements, which are specific and tangible activities that capability owners can use to develop operational concepts. Requirements and intermediate military objectives are defined in campaign plans, and the JSPS directs the development of Global Campaign Plans (GCP), Functional Campaign Plans, and Combatant Command Campaign Plans. In particular, GCPs “address the most pressing transregional and multi-functional strategic challenges across all domains… are global in scope and focus on integrating activities oriented against specific problems designed to achieve unity of effort for day-to-day activities,” according to the JSPS. Each GCP has a designated Coordinating Authority (CA) who has overall responsibility for the planning and execution of their associated GCP, and it is in this area where modernization is needed. Competing with Russia and China is a global endeavor, thus CAs must be armed with a global understanding of the problems sets to ensure that their campaign plans logically connect with each other and can be resourced and adjusted dynamically. The department should look to devise cross-functional teams from across the executive branch as well as key allies to provide CAs with holistic understanding of these global problem sets to better inform the development and modernization of the GCPs.

The NDS makes it clear that the United States should not look at Russia as solely a problem in the European theater, nor China as solely an Indo-Pacific issue. Nonetheless, the force employment modernization to foster global deterrence campaigning must also account for the necessary preparations for regional conflict. Creative leadership is the key, as the NDS states that “we must not over-exert, reallocate, or redesign our forces for regional crises that cross the threshold of risk to preparedness for our highest strategic priorities.” This means that the department and CAs should encourage operational activities that satisfy requirements related to conflict preparation, as well as the ability to fight in the gray zone. Often referred to as “two-fers,” these types of operations can allow for a more efficient force employment model that can be scaled as required depending on prioritization.

—Lt. Col. Justin Conelli is the 2022-2023 senior US Air Force fellow at the Scowcroft Center.

The Iron Triangle: Tradeoffs and challenges in building a sustainable, survivable logistics infrastructure

The 2022 NDS prioritizes a future force logistics capability able to operate in a contested environment and withstand attack from an adversary. Sustainability and survivability are key elements of effective logistics support, but current US sustainment, throughput, and distribution information technology (IT) systems are optimized toward neither. The pace at which the United States addresses these gaps, and the resources put toward closing them, will have an outsized impact on the nation’s ability to execute campaigns as outlined in the NDS.

Referred to as the “Iron Triangle,” the “good, fast, and cheap rule” encapsulates the tension between quality, speed, and investment in meeting stated priorities. Better understanding the tough choices confronting modernization of sustainment systems better informs the risk calculus of tradeoffs between effectiveness, speed, and cost, potentially closing the gap between possibility and probability.

The 2018 NDS made mention of logistics only insofar as to state a need for resiliency and agility “while under persistent multi-domain attack.” In contrast, the 2022 NDS’s call-out for a modernized sustainment and logistics capability is a step in the right direction in confronting changes within the operating environment. Investing big (or not) is a critical choice if the United States’ intent is to operationalize DOD’s role in strategic deterrence, maintain the edge within a campaigning construct, or buy decision space in order to maintain strategic options. Doing any of these things without aggressively resourced, suitably reinforced logistics IT systems will result in an inability to deliver effective sustainment as a means to generate combat power during enemy disruption or attack, or to credibly enforce strategic deterrence.

However, US IT logistics systems are unclassified, lacking interoperability, and multi-domain incapable, making them ill-suited to effectively support the joint force in a contested environment. While these capability gaps are nothing new, they are increasingly prime for exploitation within a competitive environment as vast as the Indo-Pacific theater. Numerous upgrade options exist across the commercial sector—to name a few, Amazon, Walmart, Maersk, and FedEx all leverage artificial intelligence, predictive algorithms, and myriad tech advancements in support of throughput/distribution models. These commercial systems capitalize on speed and quality in terms of delivering products on time and on target, possessing the elements of flexibility and resiliency long sought by DOD. Sure, ordering and receiving a personalized beer koozie within twenty-four hours is wildly different from large-scale sustainment operations in a maritime campaign—and these commercial systems are not yet wartime tested—but they are available now, offering a starting point from which to build.

Done right, the logistics systems modernization called for in the 2022 NDS will not come cheap, and developing and integrating commercially available systems will incur risk in areas that are left without funding as a result. Historically, logistics and sustainment do not compete well with high-end, exquisite tech capabilities. While a necessary function, logistics is often considered mundane and does not capture the imagination in the same way as the high-end technological advancements set out in the NDS. For now, the services are responding to the realities of logistics system limitations by experimenting with how to leverage current resources and new methods of employment. As an example, the Marine Corps, in concert with our naval counterparts, continues to develop and implement expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO), a form of expeditionary warfare involving mobile, low-signature naval expeditionary forces whose express purpose is to conduct sea denial, support sea control, or enable fleet sustainment in an austere, contested maritime environment. In sum, the United States will get what it is willing to pay for in logistics and sustainment, and its urgency in mitigating the gaps will reflect the choice to (or not to) invest heavily.

Sustainment is indeed a warfighting function, but it is often resourced as a supporting effort. The results are as one would expect when the investment is “cheap.” Setting the force specifically for operational plans looks different than multi-domain logistics when operating in the gray zone. Adapting a proactive approach to sustainment as a warfighting function, similar to intelligence and more recently communications and information in the targeting cycle, will enable effective campaigning, allowing the US to preserve strategic options and decision space in the changing security and operational environment.

—Lt. Col. Michelle Melendez is the 2022-2023 senior US Marine Corps fellow at the Scowcroft Center.

This article is part of the 21st Century Security Project by the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice with financial support from Lockheed Martin.

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Advancing the dialogue on how the United States and its allies and partners can deter, fight, and win future wars.

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Can the US keep pace with increasing global threats? Our experts decode the National Defense Strategy.

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 04 Nov 2022 16:39:32 +0000

The suspense is over: The Biden administration’s first National Defense Strategy is finally here. Last week, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin unveiled the long-awaited document, which details the Department of Defense’s (DOD) plans to face up to critical challenges ahead: Russian aggression; increasing threats from North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations; and—chief among the challenges—China’s moves to reshape the international order. But is this strategy likely to bring about any significant change? And how are the United States’ allies reading the strategy?

Experts from the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security translated all the security speak—everything from “integrated deterrence” to “campaigning”—to reveal what it all means for the United States’ role in the world. Check out their illuminating notes throughout the text.

Introducing our annotators for this edition of Markup

Leah Scheunemann, deputy director, Transatlantic Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
John T. Watts, nonresident senior fellow, Forward Defense practice, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Clementine Starling, deputy director, Forward Defense practice, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Ian Brzezinski, senior fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Dive into the National Defense Strategy and our annotations below

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Power projection: Accelerating the electrification of US military ground vehicles

Reed Blakemore, Tate Nurkin — Thu, 03 Nov 2022 13:45:28 +0000

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To date, the US military has been driven by climate imperatives to begin to transition its ground vehicle fleet to electric power (in place of fossil fuels). But just as compelling rationales, if not more so, are the tactical, operational, and strategic advantages offered by electric power for military ground vehicles. This issue brief recommends an aggressive yet phased approach to vehicle electrification that will allow the US ground services to better compete in a future electrified battlefield that will support key elements of the future fight, from artificial intelligence to directed energy.

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Power projection: Accelerating the electrification of US military ground vehicles

Policy and industry experts discuss the way forward for the electrification of US military ground vehicles as part of the Defense Industrial Policy Series, hosted by the Global Energy Center and Forward Defense.

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Battlefield electrification and the future fight

Today, Ukrainian troops are using quiet electric bicycles to slip past Russian front lines and wreak havoc against Russian units. In the future fight, many of the concepts that planners imagine–from human-machine teaming to edge-computing-powered platforms–will rely on electric power. To support that, future ground vehicles will require significant charging ability.

Military electrical vehicles and climate change

Climate change is neither a necessary nor a sufficient motivator for the US military to adopt electrified ground vehicles, although it has been a primary driver to date. Military electric vehicles can today offer tactical and operational advantages over their internal-combustion-powered peers quite apart from their climate bona fides. Indeed, adoption of electrified military vehicles would not be sustainable if the only benefit was to climate goals.

More than climate: The military value of electrical vehicles

Key advantages of electrified military vehicles lie in performance, power distribution, new and enhanced missions, sustainment, and logistics. Electric and hybrid vehicles have better torque and performance at low speeds, making for improved off-road handling. Moreover, they can move and idle with low sonic and thermal signatures, allowing for stealthier movement and silent reconnaissance watch. Electric tactical vehicles can serve as a power source for a range of onboard capabilities, from sensors, to small uncrewed systems, to directed-energy systems. Electric vehicles generally have fewer moving parts and can collect better data, allowing for less maintenance overall and a greater ability to maintain proactively.

Understanding the challenges of EV adoption

The US military will not adopt military EVs fleet-wide overnight. Years of progress must be made in energy density before heavier vehicles (tanks, for example) can be propelled by electric motors. Still, lighter vehicles can be fully electrified and heavier vehicles equipped with auxiliary power systems in the near term. Generating, storing, and distributing electric power to future formations of many electric vehicles will require advances in technology and in ground force operational concepts to be successful. Achieving electrification will also require the ground services to set forth clearer requirements and work better with the commercial sector–a persistent challenge for the Pentagon–to capture the innovation in electrified mobility that is primarily occurring in civilian contexts. The ground services will also have to manage supply chain risks introduced by existing bottlenecks for battery components.

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Forward Defense Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

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How the US can prepare to deter China and defend Taiwan in the 2020s

Atlantic Council — Wed, 12 Oct 2022 21:10:15 +0000

Watch the full event

How can we deter China in the 2020s? A conversation with Michèle Flournoy

Michèle Flournoy discusses how the United States can maintain a credible deterrent against China in the next decade and beyond as part of the Council’s Forward Defense Forum.

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On October 6, former US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy joined the Atlantic Council to discuss, ahead of China’s Twentieth Communist Party Congress, how the United States should invest in military capabilities in the short term to deter China in the 2020s. Below, edited for length and clarity, is her conversation with Clementine Starling, the deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice.

CLEMENTINE G. STARLING: We’ve heard CIA Deputy Director David Cohen report recently that Xi Jinping has directed the People’s Liberation Army to be ready to take Taiwan by 2027. A lot of what we’ve been preparing for in the United States is, really, deterrence in the 2030s. So this 2027 timeframe is, obviously, a lot shorter than we’ve been really preparing for. So no one can predict when we are likely to see conflict in the Indo-Pacific and, hopefully, we won’t.

On this timeframe question and the urgency of deterring China, is the United States prepared today to deter China? Are our allies, and, if not, how do we improve deterrence?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: I think the urgency around deterring China’s aggression against Taiwan has really been heightened recently for a number of reasons. I think it’s important to note that Xi Jinping would prefer to reunify Taiwan with the mainland using nonmilitary means. He’d prefer not to risk a war with the United States.

He’d prefer to use political coercion, economic envelopment, other means of pressure, and, for the moment, he certainly has his hands full with his failed COVID policy, frankly; economic downturn in China, which has slowed the growth of the economy, which is always a very threatening thing for the Chinese Communist Party; he’s got the Twentieth Party Congress coming up, which is a moment for consolidating his power and putting new people in place around him.

I think this is not something he’s focused on at the moment. But I do think that the Chinese aggressive overreaction to Nancy Pelosi’s visit there, basically, opened rehearsal of a blockade of Taiwan: Their use of the crisis to set a new normal of a much more aggressive posture of constantly violating Taiwanese airspace, coming across the median line in the Taiwan Strait, and so forth. All of that is a little bit of a warning shot for us to wake us up.

And then you noted that he seems to have now directed the People’s Liberation Aarmy to be ready by 2027 and we’ve seen him call to accelerate the development and fielding of a number of critical systems, particularly longer-range munitions.

And so I think it’s possible that Xi, seeing our investments focused on the 2030s, could say, well, yes, I’d prefer to resolve this without resorting to force, but if I have to use force maybe there’s a window in which it’s better to use force before the Americans and their allies have fully set the region with the right posture and capability mix because I’ll have a better chance of success sooner than later.

And so that, I think, that’s what’s really contributed to this greater sense of urgency. And dealing with that nearer-term prospect requires a set of actions that are somewhat different than what the Pentagon is focused on and sort of fall into a gap or a seam between the longer-term preparations of the service chiefs and the services and the very near-term operational focus of the combatant commands.

But if you look at the two-to-five or two-to-seven-year window, there’s no one in charge of that window and so that’s where I think we need to focus and really ask ourselves what can we do in that window to meaningfully enhance deterrence so that we undermine Xi’s confidence in using force and we avoid the conflict if at all possible.

CLEMENTINE G. STARLING: You talked about the acceleration in military modernization that we’re seeing in China at the moment, and China invested $225 billion in military modernization in 2022 alone, which is an uptick of 7.3 percent on 2021 spending. So what are the capabilities, the force structure changes, that we’re seeing in China that most worry you and what could those changes potentially indicate for suggesting what a more likely scenario in Taiwan might look like?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: I think there are a couple of categories.

One is this most recent directive to accelerate the development of longer-range systems. The Chinese are trying to develop a set of capabilities that can really hold US forces at risk, not only in the first island chain and even to the second island chain, but even maybe beyond and so trying to push out the threat ring, if you will, and, therefore, force US forces to be based at longer ranges, to operate in a larger contested environment, to be at risk at much greater ranges than has previously been the case. So I think that’s one thing.

The other is anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare. I mean, this is a maritime environment. One of the most critical elements of our force structure and responding to a Taiwan crisis will be our naval forces and the fact that the Chinese are doubling down on capabilities that will try to either hold those forces at risk kinetically or disrupt their operations through electronic warfare, cyber, and so forth. I think those are areas that are troubling, and we need to develop some responses to.

I don’t mean to suggest we don’t have responses; we have lots of responses. But we need to enhance our toolkit.

CLEMENTINE G. STARLING: So you’ve talked about the significant challenge but also the necessity for the Department of Defense to really dramatically accelerate and scale the fielding of new capabilities. But we all know that kind of there are systemic challenges that exist for the rapid acceleration. The US budget and acquisition system is, obviously, set up to design and build and, really, deploy these systems over decades, not years, so this timeframe question that we’re coming to: How can the US accelerate the development and adoption of new technologies and the concepts really needed in the short term?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: I think there’s sort of three key things that we need to do.

One is it’s sort of the Apollo 13 problem of “Houston, we have a problem,” and they focused on what do we have in hand that we could use in new ways to address the operational problems that we’re having.

I think we need to have that kind of effort on an urgent basis where we look at not buying new things but how do you take existing munitions, put them on different platforms, augment them with some additional capability, use them in a new way that gets a new result. That’s, really, it’s more about creative thinking and putting things together in new ways and new operational concepts to get a different outcome. That’s bucket one.

Bucket two is leveraging commercial systems and accelerating and scaling our adoption of innovative commercial systems. These are off the shelf. We don’t need to spend years writing a military requirement and then more years putting out a bid and more years procuring them. We can take these systems—for example, commercial drone swarms—figure out how to integrate them into our own existing military capabilities in a way that dramatically complicates Chinese attack planning and would dramatically reduce their effectiveness.

And then the third is there are lots of things we have in production. We need to do a survey and take a look, is there anything that if with more resources and more focus we could actually accelerate the fielding timelines or accelerate the scaling of production. There may be some systems in that basket as well.

So this is something we need to do comprehensively and sort of pull out all the stops to see what’s possible.

CLEMENTINE G. STARLING: You’ve reflected in the past on the value of dual-use technology and looking at the war in Ukraine we’ve seen the heavy reliance on dual-use technology such as commercial satellites, autonomous drones, even kind of cellular communications having a really significant impact on the battlefield. So as we think about what Taiwan needs in terms of modernization and enhancing its self-defense capabilities, is the answer more of an emphasis on these dual-use capabilities and how do we integrate that with more exquisite capabilities that Taiwan and others need also?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: I think it’s a mix. I think the first thing is Taiwan needs a multi-layered defense plan that really leverages asymmetric approaches. They’re never going to match the quantity and just the sheer mass of Chinese capabilities, but they can, certainly, make themselves more of a porcupine and really challenge the Chinese plans and also buy time. The critical thing is buying time for the international community to respond.

So things like sea mines, things like anti-ship and anti-submarine weapons, things like drones that can complicate the execution of operations, things like mobile, air, and missile defenses. The list goes on and there’s been a good amount written about this.

Most of that is going to be defense hardware. Some of it could be augmented with readily available commercial technologies, and the key, though, is marrying that together with new operational concepts and training and exercising so this is fully baked into the DNA of the Taiwanese military.

One of the things that people forget is that in the seven years between Crimea and the Russian invasion in February NATO members had intensive training and assisting efforts with Ukraine to help reorient their whole approach to defending against Russia, and that those years of developing new concepts and training on them and exercising them is part of what has led to the success of Ukraine on the battlefield against the expectations of most.

So we need to be doing that kind of work with Taiwan. That is just as important as the provision of the additional equipment they will need.

The one other thing I’ll note that’s a difference Ukraine has very favorable geography in terms of bordering NATO frontline states and allowing us to have open supply lines in the midst of conflict.

Taiwan is an island. It will be an island that is surrounded by Chinese forces. We have to do a lot more upfront precrisis to stockpile the systems they will need to fend off the Chinese and buy time should it come to that, and we can’t expect to do that once a crisis has started.

CLEMENTINE G. STARLING: You talked about the security assistance efforts to Ukraine, and I think there aren’t tons of shiny examples of security assistance working really well and maybe part of that is because we haven’t really seen it challenged, tested. But I think what experts have really drawn out from the Ukraine crisis is that a lot of the security assistance programs’ efforts of the United States and European allies was really focused on building up the basics of the Ukrainian military, like, very much focusing on command and control, civil-military relations, and less on the flash bang of kind of training in high-tech systems. Is that a lesson that we could be drawing and applying to the way we approach security assistance with Taiwan and other countries?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: Absolutely. I think training the people, developing the concepts, developing leadership down to the field level, robust command and control, the ability to integrate intelligence and have intelligence-driven operations, these are the fundamentals, and you can have lots of shiny objects and an arsenal of all kinds of sophisticated equipment but if you don’t have a force that’s really trained and ready to use that equipment you’re going to have poor results, and I think this is an area where we absolutely need to focus with Taiwan.

CLEMENTINE G. STARLING: I think we’ve seen a lot of comparisons or people are posing questions of what have we learned from the Russia-Ukraine war, what are the assumptions that we went into the war expecting to see. Like, I think a lot of people expected to see a much more highly technological war and, in some respects, this war has been not that. What are some of the lessons that we are at risk of potentially over learning or applying to different contexts and scenarios like in the Indo-Pacific that, perhaps, don’t apply?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: Well, I think everybody was surprised at the degree of the poor performance of the Russian military, from failure to be able to conduct combined arms operations, failure to have strong leadership and command and control in the battlefield, failure to be able to support their forces in the field with logistics and sustainment. The list goes on and I think there’s a temptation because the Chinese military is untested from a combat perspective to sort of say, well, maybe they’re just as feckless as the Russian forces were.

I think that would be a mistake. I don’t think we should say they’re ten feet tall, but they have their own problems and their own challenges, and they are untested. But they’ve also made tremendous strides in the professionalization of the force, particularly over the last decade, and I don’t think we should underestimate them.

I also think that another key lesson has been the strength of the Ukrainian resistance that, I think, surprised everyone, particularly the Russians. I think the Chinese have taken note of that and they’re now studying the question of will the Taiwanese people resist, what if they did resist, what would that mean for our ability to actually take control of the island. And I think it’s an open question and that is something where, again, our assistance needs to not just be military equipment, but to the extent Taiwan needs to develop the organizational infrastructure to enable an effective resistance by the society and sort of plug that into a coherent national plan, again, that’s an area where I know they’ve asked for assistance and I believe that the United States is providing some of that.

But that’s another area we can’t just assume that another society would stand up and resist in a way that has been as effective as what’s happened in Ukraine.

CLEMENTINE G. STARLING: I think on that point the will of the people is a very important part to resilience and any porcupine defense strategy or concept. So I think it’s interesting as we reflect on kind of this timeframe issue from the perspective of Xi Jinping he has made very, very clear that reunifying China with Taiwan is a legacy issue. But the longer that things go on, I think there is more of a trend within Taiwan to see themselves as being very separate from China.

How do you think Xi Jinping is thinking about the tradeoff between letting so much time go by that, perhaps, there is less support within Taiwan for reunification as younger generations become more and more focused on independence with the need to build up capabilities that the People’s Liberation Army would need in order to, potentially, execute unification.

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: Yeah. No, I think that this is a central challenge for Beijing, that every year that goes by, there are fewer and fewer members of Taiwanese society who have any interest in being part of the mainland and so I don’t think the political and economic coercion measures that Xi has used or may use in the future are likely to work and I do think that the use of force would be a huge gamble for Xi.

He would be putting his entire position of power on the line because if, in fact, its unprovoked aggression against Taiwan, the US and its allies respond, the international community condemns China, pushes back against China, sanctions China, this could be a very costly and uncertain and possibly failed effort by Xi.

And so I do think that that argues for a different way of thinking about this: Can China think about allowing Taiwan to coexist in a different way for an indefinite period of time rather than trying to force its will on the island because I think that, again, the more time that goes by the more resistance and the higher costs they’re going to face in trying to force the issue.

CLEMENTINE G. STARLING: So the Department of Defense kind of announced these fourteen critical technology areas for modernization and so it’s a wide-spanning list from kind of quantum to biotech to trusted artificial intelligence.

As we kind of reflect on the potential gaps between what the United States kind of has today to deter China and what it needs to, what do you think those kind of short-term technological big bets should really be?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: Well, I like to focus on, start with what are the operational problems that we have to solve to be effective in deterring and, if necessary, defeating Chinese aggression. And so I would start, first and foremost, with how do we build a resilient, self-fueling network of networks that give us robust manned control of communications, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance—C4ISR—in a contested environment, meaning an environment where we’re going to have electronic warfare, cyberattacks, all kinds of kinetic attacks on our systems and, yet, the network of networks is able, like an electrical grid, to reroute traffic and keep the lights on, basically, for our commanders in the field.

So that’s priority number one. So every technology that can enable that should be high on the list.

I think a second near-term opportunity, as I’ve suggested before, is opportunities for human-machine teaming and a lot of people kind of create a false tradeoff, I think, between we’re either going to divest of all of our legacy systems and we create all these new capabilities—we’re going to do one or the other and the answer is that’s wrong. It’s we are going to have a, largely, legacy force for the foreseeable future. That’s just a fact.

The challenge is and the opportunity is how do you marry those platforms with new technologies and capabilities—some defense, some commercial—that are emerging that gives them meaningfully different capabilities. Maybe it buys back range. Maybe it allows us to hold parts of the Chinese force at risk that we couldn’t hold at risk before.

But in that regard, I think very mature defense technologies that are already coming online and commercial technologies that are available off the shelf, particularly unmanned systems that can be operated by a manned platform, because one of the biggest problems we have trying to deter or fight in China’s backyard is they will always have the quantitative advantage. And so leveraging critical systems that can buy us some greater mass in the near term and really complicate the adversary’s chances of success, I think those are both two examples—obviously, not the whole list, but two examples of priority areas where we could make some significant progress in the near term if we focused on it.

CLEMENTINE G. STARLING: So if 2027 is kind of the pacing marker—right now we’re going through the process of preparing for congressional budget markups—so what do we need to seed in terms of potential language into the 2024 budget markup so that certain capabilities are budgeted for for 2025?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: I would like to see, number one, someone put in charge of this effort in this interim period. As I mentioned before, the service chiefs have the 2030 and beyond perspective. The COCOM has the next two or three years perspective. There’s no one focused on this problem every day, accountable to the secretary every day, for making progress in this area. So authorize someone to be in charge.

Congress needs to give the department greater flexibility for reprogramming resources to get after some of these urgent shortfalls—one example, munition stocks. Anytime there’s any kind of budget pressure, the services will cut munitions buys in order to keep more new platforms in the budget.

That is going to put us in a world of hurt if it comes to actually having to deter or respond to China. And so restocking our munitions, prepositioning, making sure any posture changes that are needed to set the theater.

We really need to be focused on setting the theater for deterrence in that timeframe, and I would love to see Congress give the department both flexibility to move money to do that and also some additional funding to support that.

CLEMENTINE G. STARLING: I think that’s a very helpful laundry list of things for the administration to be considering, for Congress to be considering.

We have a question from Lieutenant General Michael Groen here. He is a kind of distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council. He says, we are watching as Ukrainian soldiers destroy Russian armored formations with precision shoulder-launched munitions and we’ve seen how unmanned systems can provide small big kills. What do these battlefield trends imply for US defense capabilities and investments, going forward?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: So I think we need to replenish our own stocks of those systems and, certainly, expand some of our stocks of some of the UAV systems, which, frankly, we don’t have in number in our force.

There’s a real industrial base challenge here. Some of the, for example, the Stinger line, the Javelin line, some of these really critical weapon systems are no longer in active production and so we’ve got to figure out, do we try to fund the reopening of those? Do we try to bring forward the next generation that we’re investing in for the future? How do we replenish those systems that we’ve rightly given to Ukraine but is very important for us to replenish our own stocks as well and, oh, by the way, have enough to share with a country like Taiwan.

So I do think in seeing some of the Ukrainian success with integrating some of these systems into their operations and allowing them to be very successful, I’m hoping that planners across the services are looking at some of those lessons and saying, OK, how could we apply that, whether it’s in the European theater in a future situation or the Indo-Pacific theater in a very different situation vis-à-vis Taiwan.

But I’m hoping that we are taking some of those lessons and starting to experiment with new concepts enabled by those technologies.

CLEMENTINE G. STARLING: OK. So we have another great question here by Michael Spirtas, who’s from RAND. He highlights that the scale of US military aid to Ukraine is very large—it’s $18 billion to $25 billion that has been sent—whereas, in comparison, the State Department has proposed selling $1.1 billion to Taiwan and another initiative that calls for 6.5 billion [dollars]. That’s dwarfed by what has been kind of given to support Ukraine.

So he asks, even if both of those initiatives come to fruition they are just a fraction of what would likely be required to successfully arm Taiwan. How can we incentivize Congress and the Pentagon to take the steps necessary to aid Taiwan?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: I think one of the things that would really help build congressional support for additional assistance and, frankly, build support and trying to get other allies to contribute is a very compelling concept, a fulsome concept of here’s what asymmetric layered defense looks like and this is what we think would give Taiwan the ability to meaningfully contribute to deterrence and also buy time should that deterrence fail and sort of have a holistic approach.

I think if that broader picture were in place and each of the requests kind of made sense as how it would contribute that would go a long way. I do want to give credit to the department. They’ve been spending a lot of time going up to the Hill, showing the members classified war games of what a China-Taiwan conflict could look like to try to create some sense of urgency and some sense that we need to lean forward into this deterrence challenge, and so they’ve been kind of setting the table for this.

Now I think we need to help the Taiwanese come up with a compelling concept that could then be resourced in a comprehensive and coherent way, not just by the United States but by the Taiwanese themselves and then other allies and partners who might want to contribute.

CLEMENTINE G. STARLING: OK. Speaking of Congress, we have a question here from Russell Brooks from the House of Representatives. He asks: Regarding budgets is it time to provide unequal funding to the services? The Indo-Pacific is a maritime theater, so should we emphasize funding to the Navy and the Marines to counter the pacing threat from China?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: I agree with the premises. We shouldn’t be dividing the pie a third, a third, and a third; or a quarter, quarter, quarter. And now with the Space Force, what are the new fractions? We need to be funding services based on the capabilities they bring to bear against the specific challenges that we face. And, obviously, in the Indo-Pacific, it is a maritime theater where air and naval forces will be predominant. Doesn’t mean that ground forces will be irrelevant, but they will play relatively less of a role.

However, as Russia has reminded us, we need to also invest in making sure that we can deter and respond to aggression in the European theater where ground forces have a very substantial role to play. So we’ve got to focus on a balance.

I don’t think the answer is coming up with an arbitrary fraction. It really is deriving the budget and the resource allocation from the operational needs of deterrence and defeating aggression in these theaters.

CLEMENTINE G. STARLING: So we have a question from Matt Kroenig, who’s the acting director of the Scowcroft Center here at the Atlantic Council and he says, you’ve now famously said that to deter China we need the ability to sink the Chinese navy in seventy-two hours. Is that the right standard? Can you elaborate on how best we can reach that goal?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: That’s not exactly what I said—but it kind of is.

I was making the point that we want to have a number of arrows in our quiver so that if we really think that Xi Jinping is contemplating aggression against Taiwan unprovoked that we have a number of options to give him pause. One of those options would be to be able to truthfully say are you sure you want to do this. We do have the capacity by putting long-range precision strike munitions on our strategic bombers who can stand off to actually hold at risk any ships in your fleet that are coming across to Taiwan.

And so, basically, are you willing to, potentially, lose a good portion of your navy in the next three days for the sake of attacking Taiwan. It’s really a way of introducing risk into his calculus and causing him to decide, well, maybe not today.

And so it was just one example that came out of a particular experiment where the Strategic Capabilities Office put Navy munitions called LRASMs on Air Force bombers and showed that you could dramatically improve our capability to hold Chinese naval forces at risk.

Now, the interesting follow-on to that is, OK, well, that’s exciting. That’s interesting—maybe we want that tool in our toolkit. So, unfortunately, nobody’s actually funded the purchase of the necessary munitions nor the necessary modifications to the aircraft nor the exercising of the capability.

So it remains theoretically possible but it’s not actually being funded and fielded as a ready capability. But it’s not a magic bullet. It is one example of the kind of thinking that I’m talking about. You take two, the Navy munition and Air Force platform, you put it in together in new way. You get a different result. That’s the kind of thinking and experimentation we need to be doing urgently to meaningfully enhance deterrence.

CLEMENTINE G. STARLING: Just because you’re raising this and I have not yet asked you about the administration’s new concept of integrated deterrence, which is meant to be kind of getting at some of this of how do we integrate kind of all tools of US national power to really improve our deterrence posture and to do so with allies and partners.

I’d love to hear you kind of reflect on what you think kind of the opportunity for integrated deterrence could be. I mean, it’s a large concept and I think in some ways some folks have asked how is that different from the way we’ve been approaching deterrence in the past.

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: Yeah. No, I think integrated deterrence is the right idea and I think, frankly, the focus of the National Defense Strategy, although we haven’t seen the full unclassified document yet, it is absolutely in the right direction.

So integrated deterrence talks about integrating all instruments of national power, integrating allies, integrating and making sure that we can deter across domains whether it’s undersea, on the sea, on land, in the air, in space, in cyberspace.

So, conceptually, it’s absolutely the right way to go. I think the challenge is now how do you implement that in a way that is relevant to the timelines we’re facing and to the challenges that we’re facing, and that’s really where the rubber meets the road is, how do you meaningfully enhance deterrence in this timeframe.

I think another key element of this is the whole question of conceal and reveal. We are a very open book as a transparent democracy, which is generally a good thing. But it also means that potential adversaries and competitors are very aware of what’s in our defense budget.

They watch our experiments. They watch our exercises. They watch our training. They have a sense of what we’re capable of. But there are some things that we’ve managed to keep secret or quiet. There are things that are in development that have not been revealed.

But I think a strategic approach that says of the things that they don’t know that we have when and how should we reveal those to get the maximum deterrent effect and to create maximum doubt and loss of confidence on the part of Chinese decision makers, I think that is a strategic question that needs to be part of the strategy as well.

CLEMENTINE G. STARLING: And so a lot of what we were kind of talking about and would really need to be kind of preparing for is joint warfare, and joint warfare is hard until you really test it and try to integrate your forces in certain ways. We don’t have tons of good examples of truly testing integration of our joint force.

So what can we do? You mentioned experimentation, the need for kind of creative thinking, maybe novel operational concepts. What can we be doing through operational experimentation and simulations and things today to really test a truly kind of joint combined and multi-domain type of warfare?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: Yeah. Well, again, I applaud the department. Particularly, the deputy secretary has put together an experimentation program to encourage this kind of work. The problem is that for people who are applying now with concepts the money doesn’t come until 2024 just because of the slowness of the department, a budgeting process.

So I think we need to be more on an emergency footing. You think about the kind of experimentation that the Navy did with carrier-based aviation in the run up to World War II. Big Navy didn’t like it. Big Navy still thought the name of the game was battleships. But they tolerated it and they let some of their best people spend time on figuring out what carrier aviation would look like and how it could contribute. And thank God they did.

So I think what I’d like to see within each of the services is not only toleration but a real resourcing and protection of taking some of their best and brightest, putting them in a room, and saying: Here are the available tools you can deal with. Here are the operational problems you’re trying to solve, and the only requirement is you do it in a way that breaks current doctrine. And see what they come up with and, really, reward and incentivize that behavior. And have the services bring some of that work forward and then start experimenting, obviously, first at the service level and then at a joint level to see which of these concepts really works, what could be matured and brought into reality within the next five to seven years. That’s the kind of urgent work that is critical.

CLEMENTINE G. STARLING: We have a question here from Harlan Ullman, who’s a senior advisor here at the Atlantic Council, and he reflects on kind of the number of war games that have taken place, really, kind of assessing a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and he says, China has many alternative routes of attack beyond just an amphibious assault by sea, including seizing small islands, leveraging its economic power, cyberattacks.

He asks, why are US defense planners focusing on a conventional attack scenario, which could easily be prevented through a porcupine defense of Taiwan, and far less on alternative unconventional forms of attacks by China?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: It’s a really good point. We need to look at a range of scenarios because invasion may not be the preferred scenario. It may be blockade. It may be seizing islands. It may be other gray zone tactics that would be more difficult for us to deal with unless we really put our minds to it now.

And so I think you’re raising a really important cautionary point, that we don’t want to prepare for a point solution for one scenario. We need to look at the range of possibilities of how China could coerce Taiwan and really prepare for the broad range and that has to include a whole of government approach because a lot of the response options, a lot of the critical instruments, will not be military in nature. So a really, really important point to keep in mind.

CLEMENTINE G. STARLING: We have a question here from Douglas Carr from the National Review and he says, legacy Navy ships are likely not ideally suited to a Taiwan battle, that by 2027 they’re all we’ve got. Should we spend more defense money to maintain the present fleet numbers or focus on building an advanced force more tailored to a Taiwan contingency?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: This is the key question, and the truth is we do need to evolve the fleet for the future but in the meantime recognize, as you say, that if this happens in 2027, we go to war with the force that we have—the famous Donald Rumsfeld quote.

And so, therefore, that’s why I’m so focused on, OK, take those platforms. What are the additional capabilities you can put on them? How do we operate them in new ways, operate across joint service lines to have leverage capabilities and a more joint configuration to get a meaningfully different result. That is the challenge.

And so in the near term it’s about integrating those additional capabilities and adopting new concepts. In the longer term it is about evolving the capabilities of the force of the future because we, obviously, need a more robust force for the more contested environments in the future.

These are very tough tradeoff decisions and this is exactly where the budget fights are happening of how exactly do we make those tradeoffs.

CLEMENTINE G. STARLING: So I’ve not yet asked you any nuclear questions and I’d be remiss not to. So China has really embarked on an unprecedented buildup of its nuclear arsenal and it also seems to be making pretty significant shifts to its nuclear strategy. And, obviously, the United States’ nuclear posture has really been focused on bipolarity with Russia for a long time.

So this reality of, perhaps, nuclear tripolarity dealing with Russia and China as nuclear threats at the same time, what are the challenges that tripolarity poses that bipolarity doesn’t and how do we set ourselves up, especially as the United States is thinking about its nuclear posture, to be able to deter two significant adversaries with growing nuclear arsenals and capabilities?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: So I think the challenge is we now need to not only have a sufficient deterrent to deter Russia but also to deter China. Many people have raised the possibility of trilateral arms control.

I do not think that is in the cards because I don’t think China sees itself as a nuclear power that’s reached parity, and so I don’t think they have any interest in arms control or mutual constraints at this point, and any constraints that we accept with Russia we have to also view in the context of what does it mean for our deterrence vis-à-vis China.

So it makes the calculus of what is enough, what’s adequate as a deterrent for us—it makes it a much more complex multi-variable equation. It also means that we have to really think about how we reassure our allies that in this context that extended deterrence is still viable and so that they don’t have to go nuclear themselves. And this is also true because of North Korea’s aspiration and, we think, nearing the capability of being able to mate a nuclear warhead to an intercontinental ballistic missile.

So the nuclear arena is really very dynamic at the moment and it is changing in ways that are unprecedented, and I think there’s a lot of fresh conceptual work for places like the Atlantic Council to help planners at STRATCOM and elsewhere sort of think through these challenges, particularly when you have two nuclear competitors who have a very different approach doctrinally and are not interested in arms control or constraint or risk reduction at the moment.

CLEMENTINE G. STARLING: The United States faces a strategic simultaneity problem, as some people have coined it, having to position itself in terms of capability development, force posture, working with allies and partners to deter two adversaries and to potentially fight them at the same time. So all of that, I think, behooves probably a need for more of a reliance on our allies and partners to be able to balance the threats that we face.

So where can allies complement US efforts and where are there, potentially, glaring capability gaps where our allies can plug in? [Look toward] the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy. Those are two big strategic documents that not only our adversaries but our allies look at to understand where US defense planning is going. Are there ways that we could be thinking about doing, really, total defense planning with our allies and partners in a different way, given they have a stake in their insecurity and the security of the Indo-Pacific and Europe?

And the reality is, is that the United States cannot do everything on its own all at once. And so do you have any kind of wisdom for us on how we should be approaching that strategic simultaneity problem and integrating allies and partners more effectively into our defense planning?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: Well, first of all, I think the strategy is right to think about deterrence in more than one region at a time. We are a global power with global interests and we’ve got to be able to deter aggression in more than one place at one time.

I do think allies are critical. In Europe, we have the most developed alliance structure with NATO. I think Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has, ironically, produced more alliance cohesion and determination and political commitment to spend more on defense than anything we’ve seen in years.

So Putin has succeeded in galvanizing NATO and the NATO member states, and so I think that presents a new opportunity for the alliance to come together and do some shared planning to say, OK, given the additional resources that are about to be committed how do we get the most out of every single dollar that is spent; how do we make sure that the sum of what NATO has as an alliance is greater than the parts. And I think that means a lot of transparency, coordination, shared planning, and a little bit of a division of labor in that not everybody has to have every capability in equal measure.

There are some countries that are going to do better really focusing on what they can contribute in some areas, and others will focus on other areas and, collectively, we can stitch that together into something that’s stronger as NATO. So I think that NATO has a huge opportunity here, going forward.

On Asia, it’s different. We don’t have a NATO structure nor do I think we ever will. It’s really a hub and spoke system of bilateral alliances and partnerships and so, first and foremost, the contributions of basing and whether it’s permanent basing or, more likely, occasional visits, places where the US forces can visit, where we can stockpile, where we can preposition, where we can exercise, that’s really, really important to our posture, and then looking on a bilateral basis of where can they invest in capabilities that really contribute not only to their own national defense but also their ability to contribute to collective defense should a Taiwan scenario or something else arise, and I think those are exactly the conversations that are happening with Australia, Japan, with Korea, and other partners in the region.

We can’t succeed without our allies is the bottom line. But it’s a source of tremendous strategic advantage. Now is the time to kind of bring them inside the tent and really be very collaborative in our planning for how we’re going to make sure we get the most out of our defense spending, definitely.

CLEMENTINE G. STARLING: So, to close this out, I did want to give you the opportunity to provide any kind of concluding thoughts that you have. We have a lot of the policymaking community and folks in the media and from Congress tuning in to this event.

So if you were to leave our audience with any kind of one parting thought or priority for what we can be doing in the near term to enhance the United States’ deterrence what would you leave our audience with?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: I think this is a time where we need to try to transcend some of our political polarization and realize that this is, truly, a national security moment. It is a moment where decades from now we’ll look back and see that the tectonic plates of geopolitics were shifting underneath us and the world is realigning.

It is a moment where if we want to deter a conflict that is the most likely candidate for becoming World War III we need to make some different investments now and we need to transcend our politics to make sure that we have a very strong hand, a better hand than China but we need to be allowed to play it as best we can to get to the deterrence outcome that we’re looking for because no one wants a war with China.

It would be devastating for all concerned, even the winners, and, certainly, for the global economy and for the security and prosperity of Americans and our friends and allies. So the stakes are really, really high and it’s just a moment where we really need some transcendent leadership to focus on what needs to be done to prevent a conflict of this nature.

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Outer space has reached a “tipping point” as activity outpaces space traffic management

Aidan Poling — Wed, 14 Sep 2022 21:00:00 +0000

On September 14, the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice hosted an event on “Space Traffic Management: Time for Action.” The discussion launched an issue brief on the same topic.

This event included opening remarks by Forward Defense Deputy Director Clementine Starling and Maxar Chief Technology Officer Walter Scott; a keynote address by Deputy Commander of US Space Command Lt Gen John E. Shaw, USSF, who characterized the transition from military- to civilian-led space traffic management (STM); and a panel discussion featuring Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Mir Sadat, Associate Professor at the Georgia Institute of Technology Mariel Borowitz, and Walter Scott.

The panel articulated the urgency of STM and the role both commercial and government entities can play in addressing the problem.

Why is now the time for action?

As several panelists emphasized, humanity is quickly reaching a “tipping point” in space. This tipping point will come with both tremendous benefits and new challenges. Lieutenant General Shaw observed that “if space in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s was the Arctic Ocean—rather sparse, traveled by rather few platforms, and many of them national security related—then the space of tomorrow is the Mediterranean: It is being crisscrossed by actors, and platforms, and capabilities of every conceivable kind.” The report notes that an exponential growth in satellites and space objects in orbit is underway with a projected increase from 4,800 to 25,000 satellites. Of course, the more objects in space, the greater the risk of collision between objects. Mitigating this danger is where STM comes into play.

What is space traffic management?

Lieutenant General Shaw defined STM by breaking it into its two component parts: “space traffic” and “management.” He first characterized the “space traffic” component as those objects and electromagnetic spectrum entering, exiting, or moving over one hundred kilometers above sea level. He then noted that “management” encompasses not only space object tracking and collision warnings, but also the creation of “rules of the road” and behavioral norms. All panelists agreed with the General, stating that the creation of norms is central to achieving a functional STM system.

How is STM different from Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and Space Domain Awareness (SDA)?

While often used interchangeably, STM, SSA, and SDA all have important differences. According to Borowitz, SSA is foundational to STM but more limited in scope as it encompasses the monitoring of space objects. SDA, while similar, is the more targeted tracking of space objects for national security purposes. Essentially, if SSA equates to air traffic control radar, SDA is equivalent to military early warning radar.

Moving from the Department of Defense to the Department of Commerce

Under Space Policy Directive-3, the Department of Defense (DoD) was instructed to shift its responsibility for STM to the Department of Commerce. This change was necessary, as highlighted by Lieutenant General Shaw, due to the changing nature of the space environment. The military infrastructure and systems that currently handle STM were originally designed to track a much smaller number of satellites while providing early warning against a nuclear first strike. Lieutenant General Shaw noted that fulfilling STM functions is becoming increasingly taxing to DoD resources that are otherwise needed to fulfill its original SDA mission set. With the Department of Commerce assuming authority over SSA and STM, DoD can now refocus on SDA.

Moreover, Borowitz observed that the switch will allow for the creation of a space traffic management system that, by its nature, is more open and responsive to commercial and international partners. However, all the panelists expressed the same concern: The Department of Commerce needs not just the authority, but also the resources, to adequately implement a new STM infrastructure.

The role of the private sector

All panelists agreed that the private sector will play a leading role in paving the way forward for space traffic management. Scott repeatedly emphasized that private-sector satellite companies are leading by example when it comes to creating norms and rules of behavior, highlighting Maxar’s longtime practice of sharing its orbit and maneuvering data with the DoD. Moreover, commercial companies can also contribute to STM by providing SSA data as a service, such as LeoLabs’ recently announced a data-sharing partnership with the Department of Commerce. Importantly, Scott pointed out that the creation of norms for STM should not be seen by industry as burdensome, given standardization reduces uncertainty and increases stability when it comes to operating space.

Working with international partners

Outer space is, by its nature, a shared environment that requires cooperation. As Sadat noted, “if people don’t get along in space, then nobody gets to benefit from space.” Unfortunately, the creation of international STM norms is stymied by the lack of clearly appropriate international forums for the purpose. Borowitz and Sadat argued that US engagement with likeminded allies and partners on a bilateral and multilateral basis would be valuable, as it could serve as the basis for larger international frameworks regarding responsible STM practices.

Leading by example: Next steps in STM

Given the difficulty of establishing an international STM regime, the panelists agreed that the most concrete next steps would require the US government and industry to lead by example. A strong emphasis was placed on promoting transparency and data sharing. Sadat noted that different countries and companies often calculate the risk of conjunctions differently. Publicly sharing how the risk of a conjunction is calculated would help reduce tensions while simultaneously promoting STM as a global standard. Similarly, robust data sharing between governments and the private sector regarding planned orbits and maneuvers would help improve the accuracy of conjunction calculations.

You can re-watch “Space traffic management: Time for action” here. You can also read the issue brief here. For more information about the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense practice or to read our latest reports, op-eds, and analyses, please visit the website here. You can also sign up for updates from Forward Defense to hear the latest on the trends, technologies, and military challenges shaping tomorrow.

Aidan Poling is a Young Global Professional for Forward Defense in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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The Ukrainian military must reorganize to defeat Russia

Richard D. Hooker, Jr. — Tue, 30 Aug 2022 18:48:37 +0000

As Ukraine struggles to defend its sovereignty and retake Russian-occupied territory, modern weapon systems supplied by Western powers are badly needed but reorganizing Ukrainian ground forces is just as important.

Ukraine began the war with some 38 maneuver (infantry and tank) brigades and nine artillery brigades, organized on the Russian model. Each brigade numbers around 4000 soldiers commanded by a colonel. Unlike Western armies, Ukraine does not use the higher-level division and corps structures common to NATO, relying instead on “regional” commands. These lack true battle staffs that can integrate airspace, deep fires, logistics, intelligence, and higher-level command and control.

The current organization suffers from span-of-control problems and prevents Ukraine from conducting large-scale offensive operations. A better approach is to convert the regional commands into true corps headquarters commanded by a three-star lieutenant general with trained battle staffs, and to introduce divisions commanded by a two-star major general as an intermediate echelon of command. Both should include support formations (artillery, air defense, aviation, engineer, signal, logistics, intelligence, medical, and reconnaissance units) that are crucial to success in modern warfare. Standing up these structures in wartime will be challenging, but they could be fielded by 2023 with the right support.

This move would result in the creation of four regionally-oriented corps with anywhere from two-three divisions (including territorial defense forces) based on the terrain and threat. To transition to the offense and counter-attack, Ukraine also requires a fifth corps in general reserve composed of at least three tank and mechanized divisions. This would serve as an “armored fist” led by its most accomplished and successful commanders to conduct decisive operations to drive the Russian army from Ukrainian territory. To coordinate these corps, Ukraine should establish a four-star field army headquarters, to be led by the Commander, Ukrainian Ground Forces.

Many of the building blocks of these formations already exist in current force structure and standing headquarters, which need only to be converted or augmented for battlefield use. These staffs need not be particularly large as US and NATO staffs tend to be, and key staff positions can be filled at least partially by officers not available for front line service due to wounds or age.

Women are already present in the Ukrainian Armed Forces in large numbers and can play a key role here as well. Using a cadre of staff officers who have already received Western training at staff and war colleges, and with support from NATO and the EU, these staffs could be formed by the end of 2022 and could theoretically be mission-ready by late spring of 2023.

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As the war drags on with no end in sight, Ukraine faces an urgent need to replace losses on the battlefield with fresh recruits. Unlike Russia, Ukraine can draw on virtually its entire manpower pool in this national emergency. Commanders will be tempted to throw partially trained soldiers as individual replacements into the fight, an urge which must be resisted if Ukraine is to field combat capable forces.

A better approach is to withdraw damaged units temporarily for rest and reinforcement by fully trained replacements, who can then be “shown the ropes” by veterans in cohesive units. Units need not be manned at full peacetime strength as long as key weapons and combat vehicles are manned. Here, the selection and training of junior leaders, namely NCOs, lieutenants, and captains, is of paramount importance. The best should be assigned to combat units where the demands and complexities of the battlefield are highest.

More generally, careful use of human resources can maximize the performance of Ukrainian forces in the field. Initial reporting suggests problems here. Some recently retired officers are manning checkpoints, while at least one Sandhurst graduate was posted to the territorial forces. By carefully combing the civilian workforce, Ukraine can identify recruits with skills that translate into military specialties while taking care to preserve essential sectors of the economy and civil service. Here, performance in the field must be the key criterion for rapid advancement. Commanders who have proven themselves on the battlefield must be identified and promoted without regard to seniority and placed where they can provide decisive results.

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All of this requires institutional support and infrastructure to recruit, train, equip, and sustain forces in the field. Ukraine must also develop the capacity of the country’s defense industry to manufacture, repair, and replace combat systems and to produce the ammunition, spare parts, and other classes of supply that are essential for the war effort.

Building up these capabilities while at war will be difficult, particularly when Russian ballistic and cruise missiles regularly target industrial plants in rear areas. Reform of chaotic bureaucratic practices and increased efficiencies in production and distribution is also needed. Foreign assistance can be helpful here, but internal defense reform must be Ukrainian-led.

The effort to reorganize in the midst of an ongoing war will be wrenching. Nevertheless, it is necessary if Ukraine is to wrest back its national territory. One advantage is the crisis itself. After all, nothing removes obstacles or focuses action quite like an existential threat.

Time and again, Ukraine has shown it can adapt and transform under great pressure and stress. Reorganizing the Ukrainian military is no different. By following this road map, Ukraine can posture for success next year and end the conflict. This will ensure Ukraine’s own survival and will restore peace in Europe.

Richard D. Hooker Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. He previously served as Dean of the NATO Defense College and as Special Assistant to the US President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia with the National Security Council.

Survivability

Nonetheless, focusing solely on the drone’s survivability on a modern battlefield misses the point about its true value. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that TB2 operators can absorb high rates of attrition, but they can quickly replenish stockpiles of the drone to keep aircraft in the air. These aircraft can then be used to augment Ukrainian capabilities for certain missions and continue to pressure Russian forces (without risking the lives of Ukrainian pilots). The drone’s commercial components and low cost of production makes this possible: The TB2 is so inexpensive that an operator can suffer high rates of drone attrition and keep on fighting with models that roll off the assembly line.

At this stage of the conflict, and with the information available to outside analysts, it would be unwise to make any definitive, broad-sweeping conclusions about the future of airpower. However, the TB2’s performance across conflicts in Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and now in Ukraine allow for some basic conclusions. Owing to the TB2’s slow speed, the design of certain Russian radars, and when the drone is flown by savvy operators, it can sometimes avoid detection from Russian ground-based radar. This evasion allows the TB2 to penetrate lightly defended airspace and to strike surface-to-air launchers and radars. In aggregate, the losses of TB2s to ground-based missiles are mitigated because the drone has a favorable rate of exchange, especially compared to more modern air-defense weapons tasked to kill it.

Tactics

TB2s can also be flown in ways that confuse fighters devoted to shooting them down. In Ukraine, according to interviews with people familiar with the air picture, Ukrainian TB2 operators would fly at less than one thousand feet, in order to get lost in the ground clutter and hide from patrolling fighters. In areas where Russian ground forces and accompanying ground-based surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) were thinly dispersed, the TB2 would use terrain to hide from longer-range acquisitions radar and then pop up and strike targets of convenience. In areas where Russian defenses have been built up, the TB2 would fly out of range of Russian missiles and then support artillery strikes or scout for Ukrainian ground forces using its powerful optics to see far out on the battlefield. In certain instances, the TB2 could then be used to lure Russian fighters tasked with destroying them into the weapon-engagement zone of ground-based missiles, according to author interviews with American officials.

A mission-specific weapon

As the war has progressed, the TB2’s ability to operate in lightly defended airspace has decreased, as the war has shifted from Russia’s early operation, and Moscow has deployed heavier concentrations of low- and high-altitude radars and associated missiles. In the first few weeks of the war, Russian military officers chose to fight on multiple different axes, with lightly supported units. The TB2 feasted on this chaotic war plan. As Russia has recalibrated, shortened supply lines, and focused on Donetsk and Luhansk, the lack of propaganda videos released by Ukraine suggests that the TB2’s role has become more limited, perhaps it only serves as a scout for Ukrainian ground forces or to strike naval targets of opportunity in lightly defended airspace.

The challenge inherent in analyzing the TB2’s overall effectiveness is that the only available data for outside analysts is released by the Ukrainians themselves. Nonetheless, looking beyond the tactical vignettes, one lesson is to internalize how attrition would impact the US joint force. The TB2 is well suited for a war of attrition because it is inexpensive and, despite high rates of attrition in the conflicts where Russian SAMs are deployed, its producers have been able to rapidly make more, and Ukraine has been able to procure more to continue combat operations. This type of system, which is “good enough” for niche roles, has inherent value and packs a punch when an adversary gets lazy or makes a mistake. Thus, there does appear to be some value in producing commercially derived systems, or something equivalent, that can be rapidly fielded and used by ground forces. The concept appears similar to what the Marine Corps is currently experimenting with as part of the Force Design 2030 planning document. A cheap, mission-specific drone like the TB2 could be leveraged by smaller groups of soldiers for a bevy of missions, ranging from surveillance to strike, and could be used in nonpermissive areas to support evolving concepts to challenge great-power adversaries.

The TB2 is not a game-changer, nor does it represent some revolution of military affairs. It does, however, show how a well-built, commercially derived product can sustain attrition and keep on fighting. Such a capability is invaluable for all wars.

***

Aaron Stein is the chief content officer at Metamorphic Media and the author of The US War Against ISIS: How America and its Allies Defeated the Caliphate.

Airpower after Ukraine: The future of air warfare

Airpower experts and practitioners examine interim lessons from the war in Ukraine and consider applications for twenty-first century air and space forces.

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The Ukraine war and its impact on Russian development of autonomous weapons

Samuel Bendett — Tue, 30 Aug 2022 13:00:00 +0000

Today’s discussion of Russian military drone and robotics capabilities—the use of unmanned and autonomous aerial, ground, and maritime systems—is generally conducted against the backdrop of such technologies’ performance in the Russia-Ukraine war. The pre-February 2022 discussions and deliberations across the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD), its affiliated research and development institutions, and academies generally point to a common theme: such systems are supposed to safeguard soldiers’ lives and make military missions more effective. This reasoning led the Russian military to conceptualize the use of loitering munitions and aerial swarms, long-range combat and “loyal wingmen” drones that can operate autonomously, small aerial drones that can be launched from both piloted and uncrewed platforms, and other systems that target and overwhelm adversary weapons and defenses.

The Russian military and the country’s defense industry are also considering other concepts for Russia’s envisioned high-tech warfare—unmanned and autonomous ground vehicle (UGVs) that work together with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as well as numerous uncrewed maritime systems that work with ships and with other manned and unmanned assets. These research and development efforts paint a picture of a military seeking to combine legacy and modern systems in a networked environment, where artificial intelligence is not intended to replace humans just yet, but to make a human operator’s job more effective. Overall, the MOD envisioned this technology operating autonomously, where adversary tactics aim to negate the advantage and capabilities of such systems. The MOD’s plan to get to that point was and still is contingent on multiple factors, such as favorable economic-industrial conditions, continuous growth and development of domestic high-tech ecosystems, and a human-centric military that will be amenable to the introduction of such advanced technology in existing formations.

The war in Ukraine and Russia’s response

Despite Russia’s plans, the reality of the battlefield often defies expectations, rewrites assumptions, or reveals significant technological gaps in the preconceived notions of specific systems’ place in war and in combined arms operations. The above-mentioned robotic technologies, assuming they are fielded eventually, work well if they are integrated into existing formations over time, and with a good understating of an adversary’s countermeasures and capabilities.

Right up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Russian MOD maintained a relatively sizeable UAV fleet, with years-long technology training and integration into the force structure. Nonetheless, in February and March 2022, the Russian military seemed unable to meet its combat objectives as articulated by its leadership and government. The notable absence of aerial drones early on in the war raised questions about Russia’s ability to integrate modern high-tech equipment and lessons learned into an ongoing military operation. By July 2022, the Russian military improved its capabilities and started using relatively short-range, remote-controlled UAVs and UGVs, along with very few longer-ranged unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). The initial Russian inability to field large numbers of UCAVs and loitering munitions to target Ukrainian forces underscored a significant gap in the MOD’s force structure, even after years of reviewing the impact of this technology in recent conflicts. The question of the centrality of human soldiers to Russia’s current military operation will be debated long after this war concludes, given the MOD’s continued emphasis on sending soldiers on missions and operations that have ultimately resulted in heavy casualties.

Despite the MOD’s seemingly clear understanding of the advantages that autonomous and unmanned systems bring to the warfighter, significant tactical, on-the-ground gaps in this war are filled by crowdsourced and volunteer efforts, such as the continued delivery of civilian DJI Mavic drones to frontline Russian troops. Such remote-controlled systems are providing key data and intelligence for subsequent, follow-on attacks. These gaps taken together expose a much deeper need to reconcile current combat reality with a more realistic assessment of the technologies the Russian military actually needs today, rather than in the distant automation-enabled future.

At this point in the Ukraine war, the remote-piloted UAVs are widespread and pivotal to successful tactical operations. Russia’s relatively unsophisticated military drones and commercial short-range UAVs provide essential round-the-clock intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities for long-range artillery, as well as mortar and missile batteries. The MOD’s incremental use of Uran-6 and Prohod-1 demining UGVs is indicative of a military that wants to implement systems that replace dangerous human work, but at this point, Russian combat engineers still conduct the bulk of this work on foot. Combat UGVs will probably be slower to implement in this war, considering command, control and communications issues inherent in complex environments like Ukraine. The fielding of maritime autonomy would also depend on Russia’s understanding of where such a capability can be better used, given Ukraine’s targeting of Russian maritime assets in the Black Sea with its own heavy UAVs, as well as the impending acquisition of unmanned surface vessels by the Ukrainian military.

Lessons learned?

Going forward, as the Russian MOD ecosystem incorporates the lessons from this war, the current application of unmanned technology in Ukraine might lead to the discussion and mass-scale acquisition of combat UAVs, eventual use of swarms and groups that combine multiple UAV types, and the deployment of loitering munitions in sufficient numbers to degrade adversary defenses (especially with Iranian assistance). Still, sophisticated technology like military robotics does not by itself win wars. For all the praise such systems reaped from the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, with Azerbaijani drone and loitering munitions devastating Armenian defenses, the infantry bore the brunt of the fighting. This key lesson might drive Moscow to acquire a large number of Iranian drones, which presumably might include loitering munitions to strike Ukrainian high-value targets like HIMARS artillery systems. Any future Russian attempts at developing and integrating sophisticated technology such as combat UAVs or UGVs, loitering munitions, self-directing swarms, and UAV-UGV teams will require lengthy testing and evaluation periods. This is necessary for the manufacturers to work out the issues and problems, for end users to understand and familiarize themselves with new technologies, and for the command structure to develop new tactics and concepts that incorporate these new systems into the combined fighting force.

Prior to February 2022, the Russian military had the luxury of slow-rolling such technology in domestic drills and occasionally fielding such technology in Syria. Currently, with so many resources already committed to fighting Ukraine’s capable defenders, it remains to be seen whether the Russian military would be able to undertake the testing of these new systems directly in combat, or if it would delay such evaluation in favor of fielding imported technology. Even as the war rages on, the Russian MOD has no intention of abandoning its more futuristic plans for integrating autonomous and robotic technology, even if its vastly degraded force in Ukraine is using decades-old, less-than-sophisticated systems, relies on crowdsourcing of certain items key to frontline warfare, or may be dependent once again on imported drones to plug a key capability gap.

In the end, myriad factors—domestic politics, economic health, the state of a country’s military-industrial capacity, understanding the adversary intentions and plans, getting a good grasp of global technological developments and trends—play a role in shaping a country’s military planning. The current war in Ukraine and the resulting sanctions might delay some of Russia’s more ambitious plans for autonomous and unmanned technology, thereby giving the United States and its allies more time and opportunity to test and refine such concepts. However, as long as major military powers continue to integrate military autonomy into their force structures, Russia will “shadowbox” such developments with its own efforts, apparently ignoring the heavy toll that the current war can take on its industry and society. Eventually, the Russian military could approach the point where using a growing share of autonomous systems will become organic to its sprawling force structure. Whether that day comes in five, ten, or twenty years is less relevant than the desire of the Russian MOD to fight with greater impact, which is what robotic technologies are supposed to deliver. Russia still plans to successfully compete with high-tech adversaries like NATO. Its current performance in Ukraine could be a key, if very bloody, experience on its path to military strength underwritten by new technologies.

***

Samuel Bendett is an Analyst, Center for Naval Analysis Russia Studies Program and Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security Technology and National Security Program.

Airpower after Ukraine: The future of air warfare

Airpower experts and practitioners examine interim lessons from the war in Ukraine and consider applications for twenty-first century air and space forces.

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Early lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war as a space conflict

David T. Burbach — Tue, 30 Aug 2022 13:00:00 +0000

The 1991 Persian Gulf War is often called “the first space war” owing to the American military’s use of global positioning systems and other space-based technologies—the first of several US conflicts against opponents with no space capabilities. Three decades later, the Russia–Ukraine war is perhaps the first two-sided space war.

As a potential harbinger of the future, Russia’s war in Ukraine offers four preliminary lessons for political and military leaders. First, despite having no indigenous space capability, Ukraine has made effective battlefield use of space-based communications and intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) assets from US and European commercial providers. Second, for all the attention on kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, Russian counterspace attacks have been limited to the cyber domain—achieving some success and causing collateral damage in NATO countries. Third, commercial space will only grow in importance in conflicts, while policy makers in Western countries have yet to make clear when and how they would protect commercial assets. Last, Russia is gaining surprisingly little advantage from its space capabilities, reflecting the long-term weaknesses of the Russian space industry—weaknesses not shared by China, however.

Combatants can conduct space-enabled operations without owning space assets

In 2022, Ukraine had no national space capability. Nevertheless, space systems, in the form of third-party commercial and government assets, have played an important role in the Ukrainian war effort. The Ukrainian military makes extensive use of commercial satellite communications, in particular satellite links share data for its networked artillery system (GIS Arta, sometimes called “Uber for Artillery,” is an android app that collects target information from drones, US and NATO intelligence feeds, and conventional forward observers, then distributes orders to fire among multiple artillery units to make counterbattery fire more difficult.). Ukraine obtains high-resolution imagery from Western commercial firms, including synthetic-aperture radar that can “see” at night and through clouds. Specifics on Ukraine’s military use of commercial images are scarce, but the available resolution and timeliness of such images should make them tactically valuable. Commercial imagery can show individual military vehicles, and constellations of multiple satellites can image any target every few hours. This capability provides enough information to enable warfighters to attack fixed targets, or to cue assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles to the vicinity of mobile targets. The United States is also reportedly sharing imagery or signals intelligence from classified collection satellites.

The war in Ukraine demonstrates that what matters is having access to the products of space systems, not owning the satellites. With the explosion in commercial communications and imaging services, many combatants will have such products. Access will not be universal, however. Western companies are far in the lead in their capabilities and are subject to formal and informal limits on the customers to whom they sell data. Iran or North Korea could not buy the level of space-based services that Ukraine has at any price. Western governments should see this as a comparative advantage in supporting partners relative to what Russia or China can provide to their clients. Facilitating commercial access, supplying funding, and offering training in the use of commercial space products (or sharing classified products) can affect battlefield performance in a tangible way; moreover, such efforts are relatively low cost and perhaps less visibly provocative than weapons shipments.

Counterspace operations are more likely to be cyber or electronic than kinetic

In November 2021, Russia tested its Nudol kinetic ASAT weapon and created a cloud of orbital debris that threatened astronauts and satellites of many nations. Whether or not that demonstration was meant as a warning to NATO regarding Ukraine, there are no reports of physical space attacks being attempted. Russian cyberattacks, however, have succeeded. On the first day of the conflict, a Russian operation used destructive malware to disable tens of thousands of user terminals of ViaSat, a US-based commercial network, requiring factory repair of the devices before they could function again. The Ukrainian military was a heavy ViaSat user and the obvious target. Following that attack, SpaceX collaborated with Ukraine to deploy Starlink terminals. SpaceX leaders report that Russia has also attacked their service, so far unsuccessfully.

Space experts had assessed that cyber and electronic jamming would be more likely than physical space attacks, for several reasons. Cyberattacks do not create debris, they are less expensive than building interceptor missiles, offer deniability, and are probably less likely to spur armed retaliation. Developments in Ukraine also demonstrate the value of redundancy against ASAT attacks, that is, relying on large numbers of individually expendable satellites instead of a handful of large satellites. Starlink has twenty-five hundred satellites in service—too many for Russia to shoot down with its few, expensive interceptors. Communications and remote sensing services will continue to shift toward these so-called “mega-constellations.” The success of Russia’s attack on ViaSat, however, shows that an invulnerable satellite fleet is irrelevant if cyberattacks can impair its ground-based control systems and user access.

Commercial firms as important actors—and targets?

The Russia-Ukraine war highlights the explosive growth of the commercial space sector. Although the US military has long leased bandwidth on commercial satellites, the integration of Starlink at the battlefield level and the tactical use of commercial remote sensing is groundbreaking. Unsurprisingly, Russia says the satellites of companies working directly with the Ukrainian military are legitimate military targets—and the Russians are probably correct under international law. The international community accepts the established principle that third parties directly and knowingly contributing to a combatant’s war effort can be attacked, within the limits of proportionality and when causing minimal collateral damage. Recent articles in Chinese military newspapers suggested the Chinese also believe Starlink could be valid target in a future conflict.

It is unclear how the United States and its allies would respond to attacks on commercial space systems, whether by physical or cyber means. Russia’s successful ViaSat attack caused significant property damage to civilians in NATO nations, requiring tens of thousands of terminals to be replaced and causing disruptions, such as knocking thousands of wind turbines off the European electric grid for days. Satellite operators have been asking governments for more assistance in securing their systems and for more clarity about what governments will do to protect them; the current lack of clarity risks causing miscalculation by adversaries.

Evaluating Russian space capabilities (and lessons about China?)

Despite the long history of Soviet and Russian spaceflight, it is not obvious that the Russian military has benefited more from space than the Ukrainian side. Russian command-and-control difficulties, the absence of an apparent ISR advantage, and surprisingly large errors from Russian precision munitions (presumably GLONASS-guided), all hint at less effective employment of space systems than that of the United States or its more capable allies. This is not entirely surprising, however. Russian military communications and surveillance satellites lag far behind those of the United States in numbers and technology–Russia may only have two operational military imaging satellites. Technology sanctions imposed in 2014 set back the development of Russian space capabilities. Some Russian munitions may have been built with chips pulled from consumer appliances, but there is no alternative source for the unique radiation-hardened chips needed in satellites. Strict technology sanctions and the likely decline in Russian government revenues make it doubtful that Russia can close the space gap.

In the future, China would most likely be a more adept military space power than Russia. Beijing has launched dozens of military ISR satellites in the last five years. China has an emerging commercial space sector, and, unlike Russia, it has a sophisticated domestic electronics industry that can supply components for advanced military satellites. Russia might still lead China in ASAT missiles and a few other areas, but in most respects Chinese military space capabilities have surpassed those of Russia in quantity and technology. How the Chinese military fares at exploiting and integrating space capabilities in a real conflict remains to be seen.

Policy recommendations

Several implications flow from these observations:

Space-based information services are a key enabler that the United States and its allies can provide to partner nations, especially “middle powers” with some technical proficiency (as opposed to less developed militaries, as in Afghanistan or Iraq).
Redundant mega-constellations offset adversaries’ kinetic ASAT weapons, but cybersecurity at all levels must be a critical design and operational focus of space systems.
The US commercial space sector is a strategic asset, but the United States and its allies need to develop clear policies for protecting commercial systems, whether through defense or deterrence.
Although China has long been seen as “behind” Russia in space, that view is outdated. US military planners should assume China will likely make more effective use of space capabilities in a future conflict than Russia has in Ukraine.

***

David T. Burbach is an Associate Professor of National Security Affairs, US Naval War College. The ideas expressed in this essay are the author’s personal views and do not represent those of the Naval War College or the US government.

Airpower after Ukraine: The future of air warfare

Airpower experts and practitioners examine interim lessons from the war in Ukraine and consider applications for twenty-first century air and space forces.

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Will robotized fire power replace manned air power?

Peter Wilson — Tue, 30 Aug 2022 13:00:00 +0000

Russia’s war in Ukraine entered the summer of 2022 with no clear military victor in sight. What began as a war of expected bold Russian maneuvers coupled with a paralyzing aerospace and cyber campaign has degenerated into a massive tube-and-rocket-artillery duel, a World War I-style battle of attrition on a battlefield largely confined to the eastern Donbas region and along the Ukrainian border north and west of Crimea.

Although it is important to exercise caution in drawing any major conclusions, some powerful signs about the future of warfare can be derived from this conflict.

Emergent robotized deep-strike operations

At the strategic and operational levels of war, the Russian aerospace campaign points to an ongoing trend toward the increased robotization of deep-strike systems. The extensive use of long-range precision-guided cruise and ballistic missiles gave Russia the ability to strike a wide range of high-value targets without the use of a fleet of Russian manned combat aircraft. In fact, the Russian strategic bomber fleet acted as a standoff launch platform for long-range cruise missile and occasional hypersonic weapons. Noteworthy is the extensive use of ground- and sea-launched long-range cruise missiles, as well as the launching of precision-guided short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to strike high-value targets.

This development is not unprecedented: The Islamic Republic of Iran used similar systems during the late summer of 2019 and conducted a precision SRBM bombardment of a US airfield in Iraq during January 2020. Meanwhile, the US Navy and Air Force have extensively leveraged long-range land attack cruise missiles (LACMs). This began with the NATO aerial campaign against Serbia in 1995. Now the diffusion of this robotized deep-strike capability has spread to major military actors in Eurasia and its periphery.

The development of next-generation long-range strike systems by the United States, China, and Russia—to include the rocket-propelled boost glide vehicle (BGV) and the hypersonic cruise missile (HCM)—demonstrates a far more damaging and sustained nonnuclear bombardment campaign.

Battlefield fires superiority vice air superiority

The character of the Russo-Ukrainian battlefield has revealed several interesting features. First, the mass diffusion of tactical anti-armor and anti-aircraft munitions has imposed very high attrition against ground and air forces that were not protected by a wide range of individual and collective countermeasures. This diffusion of guided anti-aircraft weapons had denied the Russian Aerospace Force the opportunity to gain operational and tactical air superiority over the battlefield.

Second, the war has witnessed the full operational emergence of Ukrainian and Russian reconnaissance fire complexes—the closed-looped systems that couple robotic aerial surveillance systems with tube and rocket artillery—which can use precision-guided munitions (PGMs). These new-generation artillery systems are now complemented by the employment of increasingly large numbers of loitering munitions that can simultaneously provide infantry with over-the-hill intelligence and a quick direct-strike capability. A further hint of this new feature of twenty-first century combined-arms warfare was the successful use of these systems by the Azerbaijani armed forces during their short 2020 war against the heavily entrenched and armored Armenian forces. This refined indirect fire system has largely replaced the use of combat aircraft armed with PGMs to provide close and direct air support to ground forces—a shift prompted by the presence of proliferated, mobile, and internetted air defense systems.

The Russo-Ukrainian war may answer the question of whether the employment of guided munitions and robotic fighting vehicles has returned disproportionate power to the tactical defense (not unlike the military circumstance the European armies faced in the summer of 1914). The tactical offensive must be reconstituted to respond to a battlefield wherein the main battle tank and its supporting cast of armored fighting vehicles are vulnerable to rapid discovery and destruction by robotic systems.

The answer might be revealed during the current Russo-Ukrainian war. This late summer, the Ukrainians could gain fire superiority over a very badly attritted Russian combined arms force—not unlike the Israeli defeat of the Egyptian Army in the Sinai during the Six Day War of 1967—thereby demonstrating that traditional armored forces have a major role in the future of combined arms operations. The design of future armored fighting vehicles could be radically altered with the widespread use of unmanned fighting vehicles to precede and compliment the offensive use of their larger and much more expensive manned systems. This concept is being vigorously explored by air forces in the form of developing increasingly autonomous combat aircraft to act as “loyal wingmen” for the piloted combat aircraft.

The Russian long-range missile bombardment campaign has been severely limited by its rather small prewar inventory and lack of industrial capacity to mass produce these weapons quickly. Overall, the Russian strategic bombardment campaign has not been decisive. On the other hand, NATO and the great powers of Asia will take note of the extreme vulnerability of their critical infrastructure to long-range PGM strikes. One of the pressing defense policy questions is how NATO and Washington’s Asian allies should respond to this clear and present danger. To make critical infrastructure resilient to precision bombardment, for example, the United States and its allies and partners should consider putting a portion of their military industrial production capacity, especially robotized instruments of war, underground to complement any major investment in homeland aerospace defense systems.

***

Peter A. Wilson is an adjunct senior national security researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and teaches courses on national security policy and the history of military technological innovation at the Osher Lifelong Learning Institute.

Airpower after Ukraine: The future of air warfare

Airpower experts and practitioners examine interim lessons from the war in Ukraine and consider applications for twenty-first century air and space forces.

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“An analogous gold spike”: Harnessing the space industrial base for twenty-first century prosperity

Delharty Manson — Wed, 24 Aug 2022 16:26:00 +0000

On August 26, the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense (FD) practice hosted a virtual event, “State of the Space Industrial Base 2022: Advancing prosperity, sustainability, and US leadership in outer space.” The event served as a launch and discussion of the State of the Space Industrial Base 2022 report, a joint effort of the US Space Force, Defense Innovation Unit, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Air Force Research Laboratory. The report lays out the critical juncture that the United States is facing in the space domain. At the event, a panel of space experts and report authors discussed how the United States can maintain its competitive edge in the space domain.

A second space race emerges

Director of the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) Michael Brown set the stage for the discussion by harkening back to the US-Soviet space race during the Cold War, which marks the last time in which the United States set out a definitive national strategy and vision for space. Brown noted that these investments, while large at the time, produced later economic and strategic benefits that were indiscernible at the time. He argued that there is a second space race today, this time against China as it catches up to the United States with its rapid research and development programs.

Brown highlighted recommendations from the report, including the need for the United States to increase its space technology investments both within the government and through private partnerships to maintain the United States’ edge in space. The United States must rely on private companies because they are able to research and produce innovative space technology far faster than the US government. For example, Brown stated that there will be an estimated one thousand commercial satellites for every government satellite by 2030. The United States has a history of engaging the private sector to achieve national aims such as it did with the transcontinental railroad. Today, the US government can provide the foundational investments to encourage private innovation and production.

What has changed in the space domain since 2021?

Dr. Mir Sadat, a nonresident senior fellow with Forward Defense moderated the ensuing conversation between the panelists on the State of the Space Industrial Base 2022 Report. Panelists Steven J. Butow, director of DIU’s Space Portfolio, and Maj Gen John M. Olson, USSF, both discussed how the United States has grown in the space domain since 2021. They pointed out notable achievements such as NASA’s new James Webb Space Telescope, the upcoming launch of the Artemis I, and a record-setting $15 billion investment into the commercial space sector. However, they also noted that industry leaders believe that the United States should be moving faster in research, development, and production by outlining a national strategy that sets out a “whole-of-nation” approach. Mandy Vaughn, chief executive officer and founder of GXO, Inc, agreed, stating that industry representatives are waiting on a national plan and funding on space innovation from the government.

The China factor. When asked by Dr. Sadat about China’s recurring theft of US intellectual property, Col Eric J. Felt, USSF, relayed that there is worry among some experts that China is now reaching a stage of its technological innovation in which it may be able to leapfrog the United States in innovation rather than rely on reproducing from stolen designs. There must be a balancing act in protecting intellectual property throughout the research and development process. Vaughn agreed, arguing that private companies need better training and education, particularly for new start-ups before they go into the classified space of research and development with the government.

The Artemis Accords and private industry. Next, Maj Gen Olson and Col Felt laid out the critical nature of unity with allies and partners in pursuing a comprehensive space strategy. Col Felt noted that since 2021, more nations have signed unto the Artemis Accords that sets out rules and guidelines for exploring and extracting resources in space. Vaughn added that private companies are excited to join the US government in its space strategy. Investors are waiting on cues from the US Congress and the Department of Defense (DoD) that they will support investments into space technology and exploration. Speaking from his experience within the Pentagon, Maj Gen Olson agreed that policies within the DoD need to be changed to provide incentives to investors and private companies to support space innovation.

The time for change is now

The panel closed out its discussion on their favorite recommendation from the State of the Space Industrial 2022 report. Overall, the panelists overwhelmingly agreed on the need for the United States to urgently tear down government barriers such as over-classification and bureaucratization to allow for smoother cooperation with allies, partners, and the private industry. The State of the Space Industrial 2022 report comes out at a critical time, as the United States continues competing for space superiority with adversaries like China and Russia, concepts of warfare (and targeting in space) are changing, and climate change threatens US and allied security objectives. In the words of the report authors, “in order to save the planet, you have to get off the planet.” This report lays out how the US government can partner with the private sector to do just that.

You can re-watch “State of the Space Industrial Base 2022: Advancing prosperity, sustainability, and US leadership in outer space” here. You can also read the report here. For more information about the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense practice or to read our latest reports, op-eds, and analyses, please visit the website here. You can also sign up for updates from Forward Defense to hear the latest on the trends, technologies, and military challenges shaping tomorrow.

Delharty Manson is a Project Assistant for Forward Defense in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Grundman in Aviation Week on defense innovation

Atlantic Council — Tue, 16 Aug 2022 19:45:00 +0000

On August 16, Steven Grundman published a column in Aviation Week on the challenges of embracing defense innovation. In the article, Grundman advocated that the Pentagon restrain the exercise of its market power and shared some of his takeaways from the launch the Atlantic Council’s new Defense Commission.

I think the Pentagon’s market power is the ironic crux of the problem. A strategy to engage the tech sector with defense innovation imperatives will require the Pentagon to untie that central knot, foregoing the reflexive exercise of its market power

Steven Grundman

Fellow

Steven Grundman

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

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Grundman quoted in Defense News on defense industry growth

Atlantic Council — Tue, 09 Aug 2022 19:40:00 +0000

On August 8, Steven Grundman was quoted in Defense News commenting on the diversification of defense firms in response to supply chain issues and market volatility.

I think the Pentagon’s market power is the ironic crux of the problem. A strategy to engage the tech sector with defense innovation imperatives will require the Pentagon to untie that central knot, foregoing the reflexive exercise of its market power

Steven Grundman

Fellow

Steven Grundman

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

The post Grundman quoted in Defense News on defense industry growth appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Trotti in Inside Unmanned Systems on autonomous systems

Atlantic Council — Wed, 06 Jul 2022 13:50:00 +0000

On July 6, Forward Defense assistant director Christian Trotti was interviewed by Inside Unmanned Systems. Trotti answered questions on how uncrewed systems are impacting the traditional paradigm for warfare.

Fellow

Steven Grundman

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

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Eftimiades in Bolly Inside on DoD purchasing practices with the commercial space industry

Atlantic Council — Thu, 30 Jun 2022 15:56:00 +0000

On June 30, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades‘s report on “Small Satellites: The Implications for National Security” was the focus of an article in Bolly Inside.

If we don’t make these changes and do it now, we are going to lose space superiority to China within the next 10 years

Nicholas Eftimiades

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

The post Eftimiades in Bolly Inside on DoD purchasing practices with the commercial space industry appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Eftimiades in Industry Update on the satellite industry

Atlantic Council — Sat, 25 Jun 2022 22:32:00 +0000

On June 25, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Nicholas Eftimiades was mentioned in Industry Update regarding his recent Atlantic Council report on small satellites.

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

The post Eftimiades in Industry Update on the satellite industry appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Cole in Politico on defense acquisition and bureaucracy

Atlantic Council — Thu, 23 Jun 2022 23:19:22 +0000

On June 23, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow August Cole discussed defense procurement and the challenges and risks of bureaucracy in Politico.

If we don’t make these changes and do it now, we are going to lose space superiority to China within the next 10 years

Nicholas Eftimiades

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

The post Cole in Politico on defense acquisition and bureaucracy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Turkey’s wartime bridge to the West is collapsing

Yevgeniya Gaber — Wed, 22 Jun 2022 17:06:16 +0000

Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression in Ukraine has forced countries around the world to reexamine their geopolitical choices. Turkey, a strategic partner to both of the states at war, has been affected more than most nations. Caught in a lose-lose situation where taking any side in the conflict would lead to a major rupture with the other partner, it has tried to maintain amicable relations with both Russia and Ukraine.

At the same time, the war has given Turkish leadership a chance to turn the challenges of this shaky equilibrium into an opportunity by positioning Ankara as a potential mediator between Moscow and Kyiv.

While brokering a quick peace or even a ceasefire in this war is highly unlikely in the short term, Turkey nonetheless had a unique opportunity to mend its shattered relations with the West.

However, nearly four months into the war, hopes for such a rapprochement are starting to fade, as Turkey’s balancing act gives way to a tilt toward Moscow. If Turkey wants to use the crisis to build bridges with the West, its time is running out.

Promising start

Prior to Russia’s invasion, Turkey and Ukraine had begun to develop a defense industry partnership that served as a security boost for both nations. It also drew praise for anchoring Turkey in the West, seemingly at the cost of deeper military ties between Ankara and Moscow.

Turkey has been firm in its political support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine and has consistently refused to recognize Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. Over the past few months, it has dismissed Russian criticism to deliver “Bayraktar” drones to Ukraine. In the early stages of the war, it closed off the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits to Russian ships, further raising hopes that it would align with the rest of NATO in Ukraine’s defense.

Meanwhile, Turkey’s active diplomatic efforts for a peaceful resolution of the conflict have also garnered public praise from its NATO allies—something Turkish leadership highly appreciated after years of frosty relations with the West and with national elections looming in 2023. Senior American diplomats have made several visits to Turkey since the April launch of a new US-Turkey Strategic Mechanism aimed at normalizing bilateral relations. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu has traveled to the United States to meet Secretary of State Antony Blinken in the first bilateral meeting of cabinet officials since President Joe Biden took office.

For the first time in a while, Turkey was not only acting in line with transatlantic allies but also taking a lead in the region in a way that has bolstered its importance as a key NATO member. US officials have gone as far as to suggest that Turkey transfer its S-400 missile-defense systems to Ukraine in a bid to finally solve the problem of Russian air defense systems stationed in a NATO member state and the consequent Western sanctions imposed on Ankara.

Turkey has bluntly rejected that proposal.

Instead, it has slowly allowed domestic problems, regional geopolitics, and pragmatism to dictate its approach to the war. As a result, Turkish leadership once again appears eager to continue business as usual with an increasingly isolated Russia.

Shifting winds

Though only obliged to close the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits for the naval ships of states at war under Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, Ankara has denied access to non-littoral NATO states as well. Turkey’s fears of losing out to the West in its ambitions for a kind of regional ownership of the Black Sea prevailed over the security threats posed by Russia.

Turkey’s desire to limit the presence of NATO vessels in the Black Sea, which might lead to further escalation with Russia, is understandable—even if not in line with the Alliance’s objectives. It is harder to justify the statements of Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar wondering whether mines discovered in the Black Sea had been laid there deliberately to create an excuse for NATO minesweepers to enter those waters.

Turkey is also blocking the quick addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO, trying to use the situation to solve its own problems and voice its own security concerns. It is highly unlikely that Turkish leadership will block the membership of the two Nordic countries in the long term. Nevertheless, its current diplomatic bargaining has revealed major differences in threat perceptions as seen from Ankara and other capitals. While for most of the European states, the major threat on NATO’s eastern borders is a revisionist Russia, for Turkey it is Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) fighters operating in Syria and allegedly finding a safe haven in Finland and Sweden.

Obviously, skyrocketing anti-American sentiments in Turkey and a traditional mistrust for the West limit the possibilities for cooperation on Ukraine. Whereas the majority of Turks support Ukraine in this war, polls show that more than 48 percent blame the United States or NATO for the conflict while only 34 percent hold Russia responsible. There is a widespread belief in Turkish society that the war in Ukraine is just another regional conflict instigated by Western powers after Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and others. Russia’s invasions and aggression in in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh, Transnistria, and more recently in Ukraine and Syria don’t evoke a similar response among Turks.

Populist rhetoric, burgeoning ahead of next year’s elections, as well as massive anti-Western propaganda on Turkish media mostly featuring retired generals, nationalist pundits, and (pro-)Russian experts with a strong Eurasianist agenda, do not help either.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s economic and strategic agendas also depend on close coordination with Moscow. Russia supplies almost half of Turkish domestic gas demand, provides technology for the country’s first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, and serves as the source of more than five million tourists annually. The Kremlin’s support is also vital for Turkey to maintain its presence in the South Caucasus and Middle East.

The recent meeting of Çavuşoğlu with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov in Ankara clearly showed that Turkey is keen to stick to mechanisms for cooperation with Russia, like the Astana Platform in Syria or the 3+3 format in the South Caucuses (which also involves Iran, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan). Instead of using this crisis as a chance to decrease its strategic dependence on Russia, Turkey seems eager to bind itself even more to Moscow within new formats.

Money matters

Ukraine has so far largely respected Turkey’s sensitivities and not pushed too hard on sanctions, instead focusing on arms supplies and Ankara’s mediator role. However, that dynamic is coming under stress with Russian oligarchs using Turkey as a safe haven to bypass European Union restrictions.

According to Lavrov’s recent statements, Russia-Turkey bilateral trade doubled in the first quarter of 2022, and there are now ongoing talks on expanding the use of Russia’s MIR payments system in Turkey. In March, Erdoğan suggested to Putin that their countries switch to national currencies or gold in commercial deals instead of the dollar or euro. Izzet Ekmekcibashi, the head of the Turkish-Russian Business Council (DEIK), said that more than one thousand new Russian companies opened in Turkey in March alone. Most recently, a well-connected Turkish journalist reported on a Russian-Turkish agreement to move the European headquarters of forty-three leading Russian companies including Gazprom to Turkey.

Turkish-Russian cooperation in tourism has also quickly developed. Turkish media outlets have reported that Turkish carriers are operating 438 flights per week to Russia this summer at a time when sanctions have made it difficult for Moscow to arrange flights. According to the pro-government Sabah newspaper, Turkish Airlines has signed a deal to bring 1.5 million Russian tourists over in 2022. The newspaper’s report suggests that Ankara also plans to issue loans under state guarantees to support Turkish travel companies working with Russian tourists and back a new airline with the specific mandate of transporting Russian tourists to Turkey.

Ankara, which earlier called on Moscow to end its blockade of Ukrainian ports so grain exports could restart, is now taking a more pro-Russia position, advocating for the international community to help unblock not only Ukraine’s but also Russia’s trade in grain and fertilizers through safe logistics, ship insurance, and a return of Russian banks to the SWIFT system. During Lavrov’s recent visit to Turkey, Çavuşoğlu said that Turkey considered Moscow’s demands “reasonable” and “feasible” and backed easing Western sanctions against Russia.

There is also ample evidence of Ankara’s involvement in the illegal shipment and trade of Ukrainian grain stolen by Russian forces to the Middle East via the Turkish ports of Samsun, Derince, Bandırma, and Iskenderun. So far, despite strong evidence of Russian crimes and official appeals from Ukraine, Turkish authorities have remained silent on these cases.

These moves by Turkey don’t just undermine its credibility as a mediator between Ukraine and Russia but also raise questions about Ankara’s geopolitical choices in a broader regional and transatlantic framework. As it leans toward Russia in a bid for stability at home, Turkey risks finding itself estranged from the West and aligned with a pariah state on the international arena. The Ukrainian case will become a major test for Turkey. Whether Ankara prefers to use it to bridge the gaps with the West or to burn the bridges remains to be seen.

Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and at the Center in Modern Turkish Studies, Carleton University. Follow her on Twitter @GaberYevgeniya.

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Visualizing the NATO Strategic Concept: Five ways to look at the Alliance’s future

Atlantic Council experts — Thu, 16 Jun 2022 21:08:26 +0000

This section is part of the Transatlantic Security Initiative’s Stronger with Allies series, which charts the course forward for the Alliance in conjunction with the 2022 NATO Summit.

At the upcoming NATO Summit in Madrid, the Alliance’s attention will be on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked and illegal war is transforming how the Euro-Atlantic—not to mention global—community views its security environment. The war is having a profound effect on NATO’s strategy, which is due for a refresh at the summit with Alliance members set to agree on their new Strategic Concept—a critical document that will guide NATO’s political and military development for the foreseeable future

Yet even before the invasion, NATO faced a dramatically changing security landscape. The systemic challenge from China, the existential threat of climate change, the emergence of disruptive technologies, the use of cyberattacks as a core instrument of power, supply-chain problems, democratic backsliding among allies and partners, questions about adequate defense investment, and more all combine to present a complex and unsettling future for the Alliance.

NATO’s forthcoming Strategic Concept will need to grapple with all of these issues while finding commonality among the diverse perspectives and priorities of its thirty members (with two more likely on the way).

So we asked our experts: With so much happening in the global arena, what critical but underappreciated topics will be featured in the Strategic Concept—and how should NATO think about addressing them?

Dual-use technologies

Natasha Lander Finch is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and former advisor on countering weapons of mass destruction to the US Department of Defense.

The Future of NATO’s Partnerships

As NATO reconceptualizes its role to focus on defense and deterrence while also addressing non-traditional challenges such as emerging technologies and climate change, the Alliance should look for opportunities to strengthen climate and technology cooperation with partners, especially with its closest partner states and like-minded international organizations.

NATO’s network of partners extends to forty states around the world, and it includes some of the most innovative economies and global leaders in addressing climate change. According to the United Nations World Intellectual Property Organization Global Innovation Index, eight of the top twenty most innovative global economies are NATO partners. And according to the MIT Green Future Index, which evaluates countries’ ability to transition to a low-carbon future, six of the top twenty states are also NATO partners.

New Partnership Priorities

NATO should identify a set of priorities for cooperation that leverages not only its allies but the strengths of its partners. As evidenced in the data, partner states are international leaders on climate policy, sustainability, and clean technology. They also manage sophisticated markets and innovation ecosystems. They invest heavily in research and development. And they possess world-class human capital. They have as much to offer the Alliance as NATO can offer them in conversations about emerging and disruptive technologies, building climate resilience, science and technology standards, and responding to natural disasters and crises, among others.

The Madrid Strategic Concept will redefine the Alliance’s core tasks. The focus will be on defense and deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic, but cooperative security and relations with partners are still relevant given the myriad non-traditional challenges posed by climate, technology, and authoritarianism. Cooperative security is a means of strengthening the Alliance’s relationships with these global innovation and climate leaders, and leveraging their strengths and experiences to help shape and sustain the rules-based international order.

Lisa Aronsson is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and a research fellow at National Defense University.

Brett Swaney is an associate research fellow at National Defense University focused on NATO, Europe, and the Baltic Sea region. The views expressed are the authors own and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.

Threat perceptions across the alliance

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has helped to sharpen the focus on the threat posed by the Kremlin, but it is not the only security challenge confronting NATO. To discern the diversity of allied threat perceptions and how the next Strategic Concept should address them, we studied the security strategies (produced before Russia’s war in Ukraine) from France, Germany, Italy, Poland, the United States, and the United Kingdom to see what the word count in each strategy might say about each country’s perceived greatest threats (e.g. words like China and cyber) as well its priorities (e.g. words like Europe/European and NATO).

Geographical concerns abound with Poland rather focused on Russia, Germany very Europe-centric, Italy biased towards the Mediterranean, and France particularly invested in Africa. France and the United Kingdom made the only mentions of the Arctic among the group. China was of some concern to all these allies, with the United States and France most invested in Indo-Pacific security–which reinforces why France was so bruised following the AUKUS agreement, as the region is a definite priority for Paris. Germany made the most mentions of NATO, alliances, and Europe, and its strategy very much reflects the long-held standard of a Federal Republic nestled at the heart of Europe and multilateral institutions. The challenge with the NATO Strategic Concept will be for drafters to reconcile US interest in the Asia-Pacific region against the more local interests of other allies. What role, if any, does NATO have regarding great-power competition in Asia? How exactly does the Alliance square the circle of requirements from the Artic to the Mediterranean?

The regional divergence was somewhat offset by similar perceptions of the primary challenges with cyber issues featuring across the board. Terrorism and societal resilience to terrorist attacks remains a prominent issue. The rise of authoritarianism and concerns about the strength of democratic societies are shared by many, but such concerns are not mentioned by Poland— not a surprise considering its own democratic backsliding. Nearly all the documents, especially the more recent ones, assert the challenge to the “liberal international order” and call for reinforcement and support for global norms and international law. Nuclear weapons proliferation is a worry for some but not all, and migration featured in the documents of countries that expressed more concern with instability in NATO’s near abroad.

Michael John Williams is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and director of the international relations program at the Maxwell School for Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.

Natalie Petit is a graduate student in international relations at the Maxwell School for Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.

NATO’s Military Capacity Post-Ukraine

Moscow’s war against Ukraine has altered the European security environment. As allies reorient NATO’s focus back toward collective defense in the Strategic Concept, it is time for the Alliance to get serious about defense spending and move the discussion beyond rhetoric and toward measurable contributions to defense and deterrence. As this graphic indicates, though a number of allies already spend above 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, if all allies were to meet or exceed the pledge (agreed to in 2014), they would have nearly one hundred billion dollars more to invest where it’s needed most: readiness, capabilities, and capacity. Not to mention what Finland and Sweden can bring to the Alliance.

Readiness

Unit and individual readiness should be dramatically increased. Expanded NATO training and exercise programs should integrate advanced command and control, logistics support, and military mobility initiatives.

Capabilities

Technology applications should be accelerated, particularly cyber defense, artificial intelligence, autonomy, precision engagement, power, energy, and logistics.

Capacity

NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence in Poland and the Baltics should be expanded beyond battalion strength, leveraging $1-2 billion of US European Deterrence Initiative funding. Naval operations in the High North, Mediterranean, and Black Sea should be expanded, providing NATO with opportunities to increase maritime presence and awareness.

Numerous current and future allies have renewed the 2 percent pledge and already committed substantial new resources to defense. Yet allies have far more capacity to act, and the Strategic Concept must both reassert this pledge and clearly prioritize for a public audience where these new resources should be spent. With a substantial and focused increase in defense investment, NATO could enhance European defense and deterrence by responding to the increased Russian threat with essential readiness, capability, and capacity upgrades. NATO allies must summon the will to respond to the new security environment Putin has created. Spending at the 2 percent level should be considered a floor, and not a ceiling, as we move toward the new NATO Strategic Concept. At this moment, NATO must lay out a clear level of ambition to realign national defense programs to the actual needs of transatlantic security.

Wayne Schroeder is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and a former US deputy undersecretary of defense for resource planning and management.

Attributing Russian cyber activity

It is a common saying among cyber practitioners that there are two types of victims: “those who know that they have been hacked and those who have, but don’t know it yet.” Attribution of an attack through cyberspace requires technical information and the willingness to name names. Attribution can be tricky, though it happens with increasing frequency in hints and outright statements from governments as well as a sea of claims from private sector firms. To establish attribution, analysts might try to determine if the cyberattack looks like—or originated from similar places in cyberspace—as attacks on other targets, if the software program used in the attack shares similarities with others, or even the language and time zone of the program (as simple as that may sound).

While government attribution against other states is more common now than even five years ago, it is still seen as a significant action in part because of the political will necessary to publicly decry offending states. This map identifies the NATO governments that have attributed an incident of cyber espionage and reconnaissance to Russia. As can be seen, the majority of NATO governments have publicly attributed cyber operations targeting sensitive official files and government personnel to Russia in recent years. In particular, the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Poland have all reported breaches, and in some cases a multitude of them. Russia’s continued efforts to spy on the computer networks and classified systems of NATO governments, even when revealed in public, would suggest that the Kremlin is impervious to “naming and shaming” for these activities in cyberspace.

While cyberspace has taken its place firmly with air, land, sea, and space as one of the domains of modern warfare, the ease of connecting digitally across borders, significant role of the private sector, and a host of other factors can make cyberspace a challenging domain to manage. This is especially so when attacks are so common and, seemingly, useful to attackers. Until the United States and its NATO allies either increase the risks or lower the rewards for such attacks, Russia has no incentive to change course.

Paul Gebhard is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and a vice president at the Cohen Group in Washington, DC.

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Experts: Long neglected, the Black Sea is now a crucial piece of strategic puzzle

Alvina Ahmed — Thu, 16 Jun 2022 16:25:00 +0000

This article is part of the Transatlantic Security Initiative’s Stronger with Allies series, which charts the course forward for the Alliance in conjunction with the 2022 NATO Summit.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the consensus seems to be that Europe took peace for granted for seventy years. Its leaders became so preoccupied with newer concerns, such as China’s malign influence, tech threats, and aggression in the Indo-Pacific, that they neglected a crucial strategic problem: Russia’s threat to the Black Sea region, a geopolitical meeting point between democracy and authoritarianism.

“We are living in historical times,” Pavel Popescu, chairman of the Romanian parliament’s defense committee, stated during the exclusive Atlantic Council event, “Strengthening Black Sea Security and Defense in A New Era.” For too long, he believes, experts dismissed security concerns as theoretical—but now realize the importance of securing the Black Sea against Russian aggression, enhancing cooperation among NATO allies and partners in the region, and bolstering NATO’s southeastern flank.

For its part, Romania—which shares the largest EU border with Ukraine—“felt it [the impact of the invasion] very strongly,” Popescu added. But he also said Romanians view the war as an opportunity to step up as a regional leader by staying observant of further aggression from Russia and advocating for greater partnership with the US and major players in the EU.

Former Pentagon officials Jim Townsend, a senior advisor at the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative (TSI), and Catherine Sendak, a nonresident senior fellow at TSI, shared Popescu’s views about the lack of concern among experts. “Over the past fifteen years, [few] have tried to ring the alarm bell,” Townsend said, arguing that NATO leaders need to address the issue simultaneously with other challenges facing the alliance. Sendak agreed, expressing that while it is laudable that officials and security experts from both sides of the Atlantic are finally acknowledging the strategic importance of the Black Sea region, “it is something that we should have been talking about for the past decade.” Sendak also said the upcoming NATO summit in Madrid is an opportunity for the Alliance to address the region’s strategic vulnerability.

The event also covered the importance of the bilateral relationship between the United States and Romania and the steps Bucharest has taken to respond to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Popescu explained that Romania is increasing defense spending to demonstrate to Russian President Vladimir Putin that the capabilities of NATO’s southeastern flank match those of the northern flank. Strengthening the economy and combatting hybrid warfare and disinformation are also top priorities, he added. Such efforts would signal to hostile actors that local Alliance members in the Black Sea region contribute fruitfully to collective defense.

When asked about how NATO should prioritize confronting both short-term challenges—such as Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Turkey’s blockage of Sweden and Finland’s application to the Alliance—and long-term security issues—such as China’s influence in Europe and hybrid warfare—Sendak offered a simple answer: “We must walk and chew gum at the same time.” Referencing the upcoming Madrid summit and NATO’s new Strategic Concept, Townsend said the Alliance must ultimately translate strategies into action. For instance, it should work with allies in the Black Sea region to strengthen collective security, perhaps by increasing maritime presence in the Black Sea, and must also push back against illiberal trends within the Alliance.

Finally, Popescu highlighted the urgency of signaling to Putin that the West is united against him, and that the short-term sacrifices its citizens would need to make would not change that. “At the end of the day, we need to raise our voice and say, ‘These things cannot happen,’” he said, adding that this would help “preserve common values of the US and Europe in the long term.”

Watch the full event

Public Event Wed, June 8, 2022 • 12:30 pm ET

Strengthening Black Sea security and defense in a new era

Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally altered the security situation in the Black Sea. To ensure continued stability and effective defense the United States must work with allies like Romania to forge a new strategic approach.

Europe & Eurasia Maritime Security NATO Politics & Diplomacy

Alvina Ahmed is a project assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, part of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Konaev in Head Topics Indonesia on military technology and Ukraine

Atlantic Council — Tue, 14 Jun 2022 15:38:00 +0000

On June 14, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Margarita Konaev was quoted in Head Topics Indonesia discussing US military assistance to Ukraine.

If we don’t make these changes and do it now, we are going to lose space superiority to China within the next 10 years

Nicholas Eftimiades

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

The post Konaev in Head Topics Indonesia on military technology and Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Konaev in Government CIO Media on the defense industry and AI

Atlantic Council — Tue, 07 Jun 2022 14:45:00 +0000

On June 7, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Margarita Konaev was quoted in GovernmentCIOMedia discussing the tension between the defense industry procurement process and the adoption of artificial intelligence.

If we don’t make these changes and do it now, we are going to lose space superiority to China within the next 10 years

Nicholas Eftimiades

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Public Event Tue, May 31, 2022 • 1:30 pm ET

The post Konaev in Government CIO Media on the defense industry and AI appeared first on Atlantic Council.

NATO allies must not take their unity on Ukraine for granted, says Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth

Atlantic Council — Thu, 02 Jun 2022 21:28:57 +0000

Watch the full event

A conversation with Secretary Christine Wormuth on the Army’s role in the National Defense Strategy

US Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth discusses the Army’s role in meeting the priorities laid out in the forthcoming National Defense Strategy as a part of Forward Defense’s Commanders Series.

China Defense Industry Defense Policy Defense Technologies

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Welcome remarks

Michael Andersson
Board Director, Atlantic Council; Head of Strategic Partnerships and International Affairs, Saab

Introductory remarks

Jane Holl Lute
Advisory Council Member, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and Board Director, Atlantic Council; President and Chief Executive Officer, SICPA North America

Speaker

Christine Wormuth
Secretary of the Army, US Department of Defense

Moderator

Vivian Salama
National Security Reporter, the Wall Street Journal

MICHAEL ANDERSSON: On behalf of Saab and the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, as well as its Forward Defense practice, I would like to welcome you to this exciting second installment of our 2022 Commanders Series, “A Conversation with Secretary Wormuth on the Army’s Role in the National Defense Security Strategy.” Secretary Wormuth, thank you so much for joining us today.

When Saab and the Atlantic Council first launched the Commanders Series in 2009, our vision was to establish a flagship speakers forum for senior military and defense leaders to discuss the most important security challenges both now and in the future. This series has been very useful for defense companies like Saab, helping us better understand challenges and priorities in order to inform our investments and partnerships, particularly when it comes to research and development, while better preparing ourselves to meet future capability needs.

Today’s event is the second installment of the Commanders Series in 2022. Last year, we were honored to kick off our series with a discussion on advancing Army priorities with then-Acting Secretary of the US Army John Whitley and Army Chief of Staff General James McConville. General McConville has been a frequent guest at the Commanders Series. The year prior, he also featured in a discussion on adapting Army operations to prevail in near-peer competition. Today’s event will add to our proven track record of insightful engagement with the Army leadership.

We’re delighted, again, to host the secretary of the US Army, the Honorable Christine Wormuth, to build upon these previous discussions. There is no leader better situated today to discuss the Army’s role in deterring malign actors across the board. Secretary, thank you again for spending time with us today. We’re looking forward to hearing your insights during the upcoming hour.

With that, it is my great pleasure to introduce my colleague Jane Holl Lute, who will make a couple of announcements and further introduce our esteemed guests. Jane is also an Atlantic Council board director and the president and CEO of SICPA North America, a company that specializes in providing solutions to protect the integrity of products, processes, and documents. Jane has held previous roles as deputy secretary in the Department of Homeland Security, as assistant secretary-general of the United Nations, and as a member of the National Security Council under the Bush and Clinton administrations. She’s also had a distinguished career in the US Army, including service in the Gulf during Operation Desert Storm. She deeply understands the importance and the topics we will discuss today.

Jane, thank you for joining us today. Over to you.

JANE HOLL LUTE: Thank you very much, Michael for that introduction and for Saab’s generous, longstanding support for the Scowcroft Center’s Commanders Series.

It’s a pleasure to hear from many senior defense and military officials and leaders here at the Council that we have hosted over the years, and I’m particularly looking forward to our discussion with today’s remarkable guest. We’re joined by the United States secretary of the Army, Christine Wormuth. Thank you very much for joining us, Madam Secretary, and we look forward to your insights over the next hour.

Here at the Atlantic Council, our Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States, its allies, and partners. The Center seeks to honor General Brent Scowcroft’s legacy of service and embodies his ethos of nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security and peace. While we are working together on these issues related to security and peace, the United States and its partners and allies really have so much to thank General Scowcroft for.

Consistent with his ethos and with the mission, the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice is designed to shape the debate around the greatest military challenges facing the United States and its allies, and creates forward-looking assessments of the trends, technologies, and concepts that will define the future of warfare. That future is only becoming more complex, as we are currently seeing with the evolving crisis and war in Ukraine.

This year the Biden administration is set to release the National Defense Strategy, which will provide a roadmap for the Department of Defense’s near-term priorities. The recently-released National Defense Strategy fact sheet provides a glimpse into the department’s strategic thinking, stressing integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantages as the three main lines of effort.

The United States Army, alongside its sister services, will need to coordinate with allies and partners and defend across all domains and theaters of warfare to maintain military advantage now and into the future. Additionally, deterring China and then Russia remains both a top priority for the United States’ defense.

As Russia challenges the United States and allied leadership abroad, US troops are reinforcing NATO countries and Ukraine in response to the intensifying aggression. Meanwhile, the United States continues to recognize China as the pacing threat. While the current administration gradually shifts resources to the Indo-Pacific, the Army makes the case for its value to joint force operations there.

In response to an evolving defense landscape, the United States Army must adapt its posture and update its arsenal to support US and allied security imperatives. Secretary Wormuth will sit down with us to discuss the Army’s role in meeting the national and global defense priorities today and tomorrow.

As secretary of the Army, Christine Wormuth is the Defense Department’s senior civilian official responsible for all matters related to the United States Army. In her role, she is responsible for the function and readiness of the Army ranging from personnel to financial matters. She is formerly—she has formerly held senior national security roles in the Obama administration, special assistant to the president, and as the National Security Council’s senior director of defense. Secretary Wormuth also served as deputy undersecretary of defense for strategy, plans, and forces, including the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. She has also served as undersecretary of defense for policy, advising the secretary of defense on a range of functional and regional issues. I’d be remiss not to mention that she also served as the founding director of the Atlantic Council’s Resilience Center, which strives for sustainable solutions to climate, migration, and security problems.

Secretary, thank you for taking on the myriad security challenges now facing the nation.

Moderating today’s conversation is Vivian Salama, who serves as a national security reporter at The Wall Street Journal. She has covered US foreign policy and national security for nearly two decades and has reported from over seventy nations.

Before I hand it over to Secretary Wormuth for keynote remarks, I would like to remind everyone that this event is a public event and on the record. We encourage our audience on Zoom to direct any questions to the secretary using the Q&A tab, which you can find at the bottom of your screen. Be sure to identify yourself, please, and your affiliation as you ask your questions. We’ll be collecting them throughout the event and then Vivian will pose some questions to our guest at the end. We also encourage our online audience to join the conversation on Twitter by following @ACScowcroft and using the hashtag #ForwardDefense.

Thank you all for joining the Atlantic Council for what I know will be a stimulating, captivating conversation. Secretary Wormuth, without any further ado, over to you.

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: Good afternoon, and it is delightful to be back at the Atlantic Council. It’s great to see some of my former colleagues who I so enjoyed working with.

And, Jane, thank you so much for that introduction. I really appreciate it. You have been a woman leader in our national security community, in our homeland security community. And like everyone who served in our Army, you are also a soldier for life. So thank you so much. It’s great to be here.

I’ve spent the last few weeks testifying with General McConville, the chief of staff of the Army, in front of Congress, and meeting with senators and representatives, and talking about really the Army’s top three priorities—people, modernization, and readiness—and talking about how we’re trying to strike the balance between meeting the demands of today while also preparing for the future. But given this audience and given everything I know about the Atlantic Council, I thought this afternoon that I would talk a little bit about how the Army is going to play its part in implementing the National Defense Strategy, which the department has just issued in the last several weeks.

There are three primary lines of effort in the National Defense Strategy. The first is campaigning or active campaigning. The next is integrated deterrence. And then the third pillar is building enduring advantages. And the Army has a role to play in all three of these pillars, and I just thought I would talk briefly about our role in each part of the strategy.

First, the Army is campaigning out in the world every single day. Campaigning strengthens deterrence and it enables us to give advantages against the full range of competitors’ actions. Really, the core of campaigning is using operating forces and synchronizing them and aligning our US government activities with other instruments of national power—non-military instruments of national power—all to undermine acute forms of competitor coercion and to complicate adversaries’ military preparations as we develop our own warfighting capabilities with our allies and partners around the world.

And we in the Army are campaigning every day in Europe and in the Indo-Pacific and in other regions all around the world. In Europe, for example, the Army invested $2.4 billion just in FY 2022 for the European Deterrence Initiative. And we’ve seen the return of that, frankly, on that investment, when our troops were able to deploy and basically go to Europe, fall in on the Army pre-positioned sets of equipment, and be out in the field doing live-fire training with that equipment all in about a week’s time. That would not have been possible had we not made the investments in EDI that we’ve made in the last couple of years.

The Army also established—reestablished V Corps in 2020 and stood up a forward headquarters element, which I visited, in Poznan, Poland. And that forward headquarters has been very important in everything we’re doing right now as we confront Russia’s completely unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

The EDI investments have also allowed us to build up infrastructure throughout NATO territory and to undertake considerable training with our NATO allies. We actually just wrapped up the signature exercise for the region, DEFENDER-Europe 2022, and that took place across nine different countries. It included more than 3,400 US troops and 5,100 multinational members from eleven allied and partner nations. And this is, frankly, on top of everything that we’re already doing to, again, deter aggression against NATO territory and to help Ukraine defend itself.

Turning to the Indo-Pacific and what we’re doing to campaign there, in the Indo-Pacific we’ve invested over a billion dollars in FY 2023 on the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which was modeled on, you know, EDI, which the Obama administration established when Russia went into Ukraine the first time in 2014. And our marquee event in the Indo-Pacific is called Operation Pathways, and that encompasses about seven major exercises in the region. We have Cobra Gold in Thailand, Balikatan in the Philippines, Keris Strike in Malaysia, Tiger Balm in Singapore, Talisman Sabre in Australia, Garuda Shield in Indonesia, and Salaknib in the Philippines again. And as we do all of those different exercises, General Flynn, who is our four-star commander of US Army Pacific, is working closely with allies and partners in all of those countries to deepen the complexity and to expand the scope of those exercises so that they will be more and more useful to use and more and more useful in terms of developing interoperability with our allies and partners.

We are also looking in the Indo-Pacific theater, as we’ve done in Europe, at how we can get the best use of our Army pre-positioned stocks. We are looking at how we can make better use of our APS Afloat in the Indo-Pacific, since we want to be able to use that equipment as much of the year as possible. And in parallel with our exercises, we are also making good use of what we call in the Army our Security Force Assistance Brigades. These are teams that are largely comprised of mid- to senior-level noncommissioned officers, and they are—they were designed, frankly, originally to go into Afghanistan and to help build partner capacity with the Afghan security forces. But we have taken that concept and really used it as the centerpiece for how we’re thinking about building partner capacity around the world.

And in just the last two years, the Fifth Security Force Assistance Brigade, which is aligned to INDOPACOM, has sent advisory teams to over fourteen different countries. And those—anytime I talk to a combatant commander, whether it’s the Indo-Pacific Command or Admiral Aquilino or AFRICOM—Steve Townsend—they always want another Security Force Assistance Brigade, which I think speaks to the utility of that particular formation.

Another really important part of what we’re doing in INDOPACOM in terms of campaigning is using our Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center. And I would describe this as sort of an exportable combat-training system. Those of you who know the Army know that we send our brigades to do major training at the brigade and battalion levels to Fort Irwin in California and to Fort Polk in Louisiana. And now what we’re doing with the JPMRC in the Pacific is allowing our troops who are stationed all the time in Hawaii to be able to engage in that kind of complicated training from home station, and we are also able to take some of the capabilities of the JPMRC and use that with our allies and partners in the region. So we’re looking forward to building out on that.

And while I focused on talking about what the Army is doing in Europe and the Indo-Pacific in terms of campaigning, I would be remiss if I didn’t mention that we are also in the Middle East, in Africa, in Latin America, and we are also—of course, we have our Army Special Forces, who are working all around the world in all of those continents every day. And I would just highlight, focusing on Europe, in the last seven years it’s really been Army SOF substantially that have deployed to train and assist Ukraine’s military to help them build up their resilience and build up their resistance capabilities, and I think we see the return on that investment very much with what we’re seeing right now.

And when Russia went into Ukraine in late February, we sent the Tenth Special Forces Group to develop a coalition planning cell that enabled us to bring together twenty different nations to coordinate information with international SOF partners and allies. And that has, again, I think contributed significantly with the effectiveness and the speed of the assistance and training that we’ve been able to provide.

Turning to integrated deterrence, first, I would note that everything we’re doing on campaigning contributes to building integrated deterrence. Any time our adversaries or potential adversaries can see combat-credible forces out operating in the field, that is helping to build integrated deterrence. And as of right now, Russia can see 48,000 Army soldiers in Europe standing firm in defense of NATO territory and standing firm with Ukraine in its efforts to defend itself.

But we’re not just thinking about combat-credible forces today. We’re also, in the Army, thinking about strengthening integrated deterrence by developing and building the forces we need for tomorrow. So I wanted to talk a little bit about our modernization strategy.

I spend a lot of time thinking about modernization for the Army, first in making sure that we’re investing enough in our enduring systems that we are going to need in addition to thinking about what are the new systems we need to develop for the future battlefield. For example, the Army is currently updating and investing in the Abrams tank version SEPv3. And that is the same tank, I would point out, that we will be selling to Poland. Poland will be buying, you know, the most advanced, lethal American tank that one can possibly buy, and I think that will be fantastic for strengthening interoperability and deterrence with NATO.

We are also continuing—thinking about enduring systems—to modernize and invest in our Apache attack helicopters, for example. We are now developing the Echo model, which is going to be improving the lethality and survivability of that helicopter. The Echo model will be equipped with an open system architecture, which will incorporate the latest communications, navigation, sensors, and weapons systems.

And then when it comes to developing new systems, we are thinking about our modernization effort in terms of six different portfolios.

First, long-range precision fires.

Next-generation combat vehicles. So this is thinking about how are we going to replace the Bradleys, for example.

Future vertical lift. That will be two new helicopters that will eventually replace the Black Hawk and replace the capabilities of the Kiowa, which has not been in the Army’s fleet for some time.

We’re also improving our air and missile defenses, our soldier lethality systems, and the network which really underpins all of those other five portfolios.

Starting with the development and the establishment of Army Futures Command in 2018 in Austin, we have been working really hard on modernization in the last few years and I think we’re starting to see that effort pay dividends. We are now at the point where we will be putting prototypes and, in some cases, fielding actual new systems, getting them into the hands of soldiers.

In fiscal year 2023 alone, for example, we will have twenty-four systems go into the hands of soldiers either in terms of prototypes where our soldiers will be giving us feedback on the designs to help us as we move into procurement or in terms of actually putting programs of record into the hands of soldiers.

For example, in FY 2023 we will be putting out in the field four long-range precision systems: first, the long-range hypersonic weapon; second, the precision strike missile; third, our ship-killing mid-range capability; and then last, the extended-range cannon artillery. These systems will allow us to strike targets at ranges that have never been possible for the Army.

We’re also modernizing, as I said, our air and missile defense systems so that we have more capability when it comes to cruise missiles, for example, and we are funding the development of two new helicopters that we will field probably several years from now in the 2030s.

And we’re not just building new weapon systems. We are also developing new formations that will be able to use these systems and the one I would highlight is what we call the multi-domain task force, which will actually allow us to combine kinetic effects, you know, using, for example, some of those long-range precision fire systems that I just talked about but also to allow the Army to conduct non-kinetic types of attacks, for example, using cyber capabilities, using electronic warfare, using space capabilities.

We have three multi-domain task forces now and we will eventually be building to a total of five, and all of these new systems help us build integrated deterrence.

The last part of the strategy, I think, where I see a big role for the Army is in building enduring advantages and this is, really, thinking about how do we continue to outpace our competitors over time.

To build enduring advantage we have to be able to innovate and experiment with new concepts, new technologies, and start figuring out, you know, how can we really build a joint force that can work together and, really, then going beyond just the US joint force, how can we work together with allies and partners because, basically, as we’ve seen in the last couple of decades, we rarely go someplace alone. We usually go with our allies and partners.

And the primary way that the Army has been pursuing experimentation and innovation is through a series of activities called Project Convergence. This was a set of experiments that we started two years ago in 2020 and we’ve been sort of slowly building the complexity, sort of widening the aperture in terms of organizations that are participating in the PC series, and looking to Project Convergence 2022 we will be working with all of the sister services, looking at how can we—first, using scenarios that will be kind of anchored in the European theater, the Indo-Pacific theater, looking at what are the operational challenges in those two theaters that we have to solve and how can we, as a joint force, solve that together, and a big part of what we’re doing in Project Convergence is looking at how can we connect the best sensors to the best shooters.

So, for example, we’d like to get to a place where you might have an Army early warning radar system send that sensor data to, perhaps, an Air Force F-35, who then sends it to the best shooter, which could be, again, an Army platform, something like the precision strike missile, all working together to neutralize the threat. That is what we’re building to. That is what we’re trying to do when you hear people talk about JADC2. We have work to do to get there. But I am very proud of what the Army is doing in Project Convergence to contribute to helping us get to that goal.

And, finally, building enduring advantage isn’t just about hardware and software for the Army. It’s also about our people. Our people really is our best asset, our best weapon system. So we are looking at how can we get the most and the best from our people, and a lot of what we’re doing there is trying to take much more of a talent-based approach to developing our people.

The Army, you know, we’re about a million people at this point and we, for a long time, have used an Industrial Age approach to human resources and we’re really trying to move to a Digital Age approach where we are recognizing the individual capabilities and talents of individual soldiers, NCOs, and officers and really trying to think about how can we have a talent-based approach to our workforce.

In closing, I thought I would just talk a little bit, since I know it’s on everyone’s mind, what we’re seeing in Ukraine and what lessons learned there are for the Army. We are very much looking every single day in real time at what’s happening in Ukraine and what we’re seeing with the Russian military and trying to glean as many lessons learned as we can for what we think that means for the Army in the future, and I think there are a couple of lessons that really leap out.

First, if you look at the Russian military’s failures, I think it underscores the importance of leadership, training, and discipline. The Russians do not train like us. They don’t have an NCO corps, which is, I think, a very significant competitive advantage for the United States, and I think the terrible civilian atrocities that you’ve seen some of the Russian military commit is directly due to the lack of leadership, training, and discipline that they appear to have in their ranks. And, again, I think, you know, for us you would not see that because we have an NCO corps that is really the backbone of the force for the US Army.

Something else you see, I think, the Russians really struggling with is delegating responsibilities down to lower echelons. That is something the United States Army does extremely well. It’s one of our strengths, and I think you’ve seen, you know, the Russians struggle to adapt and show initiative on the battlefield. That is another place, I think, where the US Army is doing very well.

A third lesson is logistics, logistics, logistics. You often hear the expression, you know, amateurs do strategy and professionals do logistics. I think everything we’re seeing right now in Ukraine, certainly, underscores that. You can be the best equipped military in the world but if you can’t sustain your forces it doesn’t matter, and the Russians have displayed a notable and somewhat surprising deficiency in this area.

But I think, you know, this is also a strength for the US Army but, nevertheless, given the distances that would be involved in the Indo-Pacific, I think it underscores that we have really got to focus on how do we provide logistics effectively in a contested environment like the one we know we would face in the future, and that’s one of the reasons, for example, that we’re investing in more modernized watercraft so that we will be able to move supplies and personnel around the Pacific where you see just incredibly vast distances.

Another lesson, I think, you see coming out of what’s happening in Ukraine is the importance of secure communications and the consequences of when soldiers use their cell phones. Whether it’s because that’s just everyone is used to using cell phones or because secure communication systems and radios are not working, when soldiers use unencrypted comms that makes them targetable and I think, you know, we are going to have to think about that.

You know, certainly, most of our young soldiers are used to having their phones with them everywhere they go. But, more broadly, I think it speaks to the fact that we’re going to have to look at how can we reduce our signatures, the signatures of our formations on the battlefield, as much as possible because the battlefield of the future will be highly transparent.

Two last lessons I would highlight. One, everything we’re seeing in Ukraine underscores, again, the growing drone threat, something we saw in Nagorno-Karabakh as well. Drones and other unmanned systems are going to pose significant challenges for us, again, part of why we’re looking at modernizing our air and missile defense systems, and I would say drones are an issue not just overseas but here at home as well.

We, the Army, have been appointed the executive agent for the Joint Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems Office at the Department of Defense. We’re working hard on this, but there’s quite a bit more work to do.

And then, lastly, I would just say everything we’re seeing in Ukraine underscores the importance of maintaining our industrial base and our munitions stockpiles. Again, munitions are going to be very important in the future, particularly if we get into a protracted conflict. We’ve just signed contracts with a couple of our major industry partners to begin replenishing our stocks of Javelins and Stingers, and we’re also talking with industry, more broadly, about, you know, what can we do to think about stockpiling some of the longer lead items that we may have in some our critical munitions in the future.

There are, undoubtedly, I think, you know, ten more lessons that you could cite from what’s happening in Ukraine but in the interest of time I will stop here. Again, it is such a pleasure to be back at the Atlantic Council and I really look forward to my conversation with Vivian.

VIVIAN SALAMA: Thank you so much, Madam Secretary. It’s great to be here and to back at the Atlantic Council. We appreciate it.

Actually, you and I were supposed to have this discussion in late February and the war sort of upended both of our schedules. So I’m glad we made it happen. Of course, I just got back from a long stint in Ukraine two days ago so it’s definitely fresh on my mind as well.

The invasion—the Russian invasion has, obviously, thrown into sharp focus the debate over US troops being permanently stationed in Europe. Right now, there’s been a bit of maneuvering, including Army personnel. Today, there are about one hundred thousand, the highest number of US troops deployed to Europe since 2005, and President Biden has made clear that their mission will, largely, focus on reinforcing the eastern flank allies.

And so the expectation now among a lot of close observers is that we need a permanent presence to show Russia that we are there and committed to reinforcing those allies. And so we’re hoping to make a little bit of news here today. Of course, blame it on the day job. Can you tell us if a decision has been made about a permanent US troop presence there and if not—in Europe, I mean, specifically—and if not, do you anticipate reinforcing troop levels on rotation currently?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: I don’t think I’ll be breaking any news. Sorry. But what I can say is, you know, obviously, the issue of sort of future posture and presence in Europe is going to be, I think, you know, one of the centerpieces of the conversation at the NATO summit in Madrid coming up and, certainly, you know, in the Department of Defense we are looking at that and looking at what makes sense.

First of all, you’ve probably seen, you know, we have announced the replacement of the units that are there in Europe right now. So we will be, I think, you know, seeing that same number of about 48,000 Army troops continuing to stay in Europe, you know, over the next, certainly, several months.

I think the question of, ultimately, whether that enhanced force posture will be permanent or rotational is really kind of the key issue and, frankly, you know, I’m no longer in a role where I’m in the situation room and sort of, you know, actively participating in those kinds of discussions. You know, I think there are those, like Chairman Milley, who would say that rotational heel to toe deployments are just as effective from a deterrence standpoint as permanent presence and—but don’t come with, frankly, some of the costs associated with permanent presence like building schools, you know, building recreational facilities for families that then go and move.

There are others, you know, and, certainly, I think our sort of eastern flank allies in NATO like the Baltic countries, like Poland, would very much like permanent troops and feel that permanent troops are more effective in deterring. I think that’s really the heart of the discussion right now is sort of what is the best and most effective way to provide deterrence. But I do think you will see an enhanced posture overall when we are on the other side of this, you know, whenever that is.

VIVIAN SALAMA: President Biden has repeatedly made it clear that there are not going to be boots on the ground in this conflict so long as it’s isolated within Ukraine’s borders. Something I heard repeatedly while I was there is that military leaders and the president’s office even are concerned that as this conflict increasingly becomes prolonged, momentum to assist, to keep on fueling them with weapons, with assistance, with other kinds of training, could start to wane and especially when we have our own domestic priorities to worry about.

And so how do you see the US sustaining this level of support for Ukraine in a way that could actually make a difference in embattled regions like the Donbas, which is suffering significantly right now?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: I think—you know, I think the administration has done, frankly, an admirable job, you know, helping the alliance come together and have the very, very strong unified position that we’ve had against the Russian invasion, and I think we’ll continue to see that unity, frankly. It will take work. I know from my own experience, you know, back in 2014 and 2015 it takes a lot of active diplomacy to be able to sustain that alliance unity. But I think, you know, all of the NATO countries see what is at stake, frankly, in what’s happening, and that alone, I think, is an incentive for us to maintain unity. I think, you know, in a practical way, we are looking—you know, certainly in the Department of Defense and in the Army—at how—you know, what do we need to be doing to allow us to continue to sustain the kind of lethal assistance that we’re providing to the Ukrainians? And that’s why we’ve signed contracts to replenish our Stingers and replenish our Javelins. You know, we have really leaned into trying to provide, you know, everything that the policymakers deem essential to get to the Ukrainians, and, you know, we have taken some risk to our own readiness, not an unacceptable level of risk at all. But I think we will continue to do that, and I think, you know, again, we can’t take that unity for granted, but I think the NATO countries know what’s at stake.

VIVIAN SALAMA: Where does the US draw the line? I mean, we’re hearing a lot these days, and I was hearing it in Ukraine, about multiple-launch rocket systems and other long-range rocket systems that they so desperately need; the US has sort of wavered on this a little bit in recent weeks, and so, you know, a lot of reporting that it’s going to be announced this week. Can you tell us, you know, where the US stands as far as those types of systems getting into the hands of Ukrainian fighters?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: I think where the US stands is, you know, wanting to provide all of the assistance that we can to the Ukrainians without escalating the situation to a point where, you know, the war spills over or, frankly, you know, goes in a terrible direction. I mean, there’s been, you know, discussion about if Putin starts to feel cornered, you know, would he lash out? Would he contemplate using chemical weapons, for example, or even, you know, more horrifically, potentially some sort of a tactical nuclear demonstration? So I think, you know, we in the administration have to very prudently measure those risks, you know, and to think very carefully about, you know, how can we best, again, give the Ukrainian military what they need? We are in, obviously, a grinding artillery battle right now that I think—you know, it’s going to be more challenging, frankly, to sustain the morale of the Ukrainian forces, you know, given the bombardment that they’re being subject to. But again, you know, we cannot allow this war to escalate. Then I think you will see—if you want to talk about concerns to NATO unity, concerns for the American support for this conflict, if it escalates, I think that unity will be much more challenging to sustain.

VIVIAN SALAMA: You actually beat me to one of my questions in your discussion just about the performance of the Russian military where you said that they’ve shown their deficiency in the fact that they can’t sustain their forces, and that’s quite interesting. It surprised a lot of observers who expected, perhaps, its mightiness, its notorious mightiness might be a bit too much for the Ukrainians. And so moving forward, and especially you’re talking about this prolonged artillery war, where can the US kind of plug holes and to make a difference to get the Ukrainians over the line in some of these problem spots still in the country? Are you going to start training more people on newer systems? How is it going to work to really make—be a game changer at this point?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: I think what—we have started providing more training to the Ukrainians as we’ve been giving them more complex systems, you know. So, for example, the Javelins and the Stingers are not particularly complex systems; I actually, not too long ago, went to the simulator that the US Army has to teach our soldiers how to use Stingers, and even I was able to sort of take out a target in the simulator. So that’s—you know, that’s a more basic system. But, for example, as we’ve, you know, more recently given the Ukrainians M777 towed artillery, that system takes more training, and we have beefed up the training that we’re providing to the Ukrainian military. Another very important thing I think we’ve done is to help the Ukrainians learn how to sustain those types of systems—you know, not just how to use them to hit targets but how to make sure that the—you know, to maintain the tires, to load the shells, you know, accurately so that the system can keep working, and I think that will be something that will be increasingly helpful to the Ukrainian armed forces as this conflict goes forward.

VIVIAN SALAMA: There’s been a bit of troop movement again in Belarus in recent days and there’s definitely a lot of concern that there could be a renewed campaign against Kyiv or other parts in Ukraine. Are you monitoring that? Do you think that that is a likely scenario at this stage?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: Well, I certainly look carefully at the intelligence and I wouldn’t want to say more about that, but I think, you know, what we’re—what I’ve mainly seen is, you know, small advances now that the Russians are starting to make and I think, you know, that’s due to the fact that they clearly scaled back their objectives and really started to just focus on the east, focus on the Donbas, and the fact that the terrain there, I think, is a little more favorable to the sort of grinding bombardment campaigns that the Russians are notorious for.

VIVIAN SALAMA: Before we move on to another subject, just a really blunt question, being that there is concern that President Putin could resort to nuclear weapons at some stage, especially if he gets desperate in this conflict. What is the Army’s role in preventing that kind of a scenario, especially absent direct military involvement in Ukraine?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: You know, I think what we can do—I mean, first of all, I think it’s important to say that, you know, we are undoubtedly looking at that type of contingency and trying to think through what our options—you know, what options would be available to policymakers if that were to happen? The Army, I think what we can most, you know, helpfully do is to try to provide training for how to operate under those kinds of conditions. You know, we have personal protective equipment and things like that. But I think, you know, if Putin were to decide to use some sort of tactical nuclear demonstration, I think, you know, that would erase, in my mind, any possibility that he could be anything other than a pariah leader and a—leader of a pariah state, you know, for decades going forward. So I think that Putin would have to think extremely long and hard about that, since he clearly wants to try to bring Russia back into the international community at some point. I don’t see how he does that if he goes nuclear.

VIVIAN SALAMA: OK, a really quick programming note for folks out there, in case you missed it: We are definitely looking forward to your questions here so please do send us any questions that you have for Madam Secretary; we’ll get to them shortly. But I wanted to move on to the Indo-Pacific, which is obviously also a big focus over there at the Pentagon. How does the Army, then, balance the increased requirements in Europe with the country’s ambitions to have a more robust presence in the Indo-Pacific, and specifically I’d like you to talk about what the Army’s role—I mean, why not the Air Force or the Navy? What is the Army going to do specifically in this case?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: Sure. Well, first of all, I think it’s important, you know, we have a tremendous military and a tremendous Army and we can walk and chew gum at the same time, so I think, you know, as we have done everything that we’ve been doing in Europe since late February, we have continued to do all of the activities that we had otherwise planned in the Indo-Pacific, all of the exercises, for example, that I talked about. I think, you know, one of the things that the Army really brings to the Indo-Pacific, you know, perhaps that is a little bit different from our sister services, is the relationships with the armies in the region. You know, most of the militaries and the countries in the Indo-Pacific are dominated by the armies. If you looked, for example, at, you know, the counterparts for our chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Milley, in most of the countries in the Indo-Pacific those are going to be army generals and we have relationships with those generals that we’ve built up over time. So a lot of what we’ve done, I think, really, is build on interoperability, build relationships that can then sort of increase the potential for us to have access in the future if there were to have a conflict. So I think that’s something important that the Army does.

And if we were to get into a conflict in the Indo-Pacific, a lot of what the Army would be doing, in my view, is being a supporting force; you know, we would be helping to set up staging bases; we would be helping to secure those bases; we would be, again, using our incredible planning power to help, you know, plan for the entire joint force; we would be doing a lot to provide logistics and sustainment, you know, for all of the services that would be operating: the Air Force, the Navy, the Marine Corps. But then offensively, I think, again, with the new long-range precision-fire systems that we have, we would be able to, you know, bring that to bear as well, so I think the Army has a very important role. But clearly, you know, any kind of a future conflict in Asia will be a joint force effort.

VIVIAN SALAMA: Absolutely. President Biden last week said that the US could intervene militarily if China attempts to take Taiwan by force. The White House downplayed his remarks and said there was not a change in US policy currently, but from the Army’s perspective, what are the options for involvement? And particularly, can you help us understand sort of how it compares to Ukraine, also a US ally, where the US has not committed to get involved militarily, directly involved militarily? But this could be the case for Taiwan, potentially.

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: Yeah, again, I mean, I think, first of all, I would note that, you know, any attempt by China to forcibly reunify Taiwan, from a military perspective, would be an incredibly complex undertaking, you know? And I’m sure President Xi and his generals are looking at the challenges that the Russians have had to frankly undertake a simpler kind of military operation, and that is probably giving them pause in terms of looking at, again, you know, an amphibious and probably an airborne assault kind of operation onto Taiwan.

I think, again, the Army’s role would be in that kind of a conflict, in my mind, along the lines of what I just said. I think, you know, we would be providing air and missile defenses. You know, obviously the Chinese military has deep magazines and has, you know, missiles that can strike targets at many different ranges. But again, you know, we, with something like our midrange capability system that we’ll be fielding in FY 2023, that’s a land-based system that can sink ships, you know, sink ships that are going across the straits for an invasion. So I think the Army will have a number of roles.

But really what we want to do through campaigning, through integrated deterrence, is to make sure that every day President Xi wakes up and his generals wake up, they decide today is not the day to try to forcibly reunify Taiwan.

VIVIAN SALAMA: Or tomorrow either.

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: Or tomorrow.

VIVIAN SALAMA: I really quickly want to ask you a technology question before we turn to the audience. The Army has been discussing with folks on Capitol Hill the need for further innovation in emerging-technology spaces like artificial intelligence, robots, cybersecurity. I mean, the list goes on. So can you just talk in layman’s terms—and you did briefly mention it in your remarks—talk in layman’s terms about why this will make a real-life difference for our soldiers. And, you know, how does it kind of play out in terms of enforcing and modernizing our military?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: Sure. I would pick two examples and try to keep them, you know, very accessible. First of all, we are developing robotic combat vehicles. So these are, you know, autonomous vehicles that can, you know, navigate complex, difficult terrain without having soldiers in them. And obviously, you know, doing that means any soldier, you know, or any vehicle that’s able to go out on unexplored terrain and potentially, you know, if there are mines in that terrain, you know, a soldier is not going to be at risk anymore in a robotic vehicle, whereas today’s soldiers, you know, we are going out and they’re on the front lines. And I think if you think about, you know, the IED threat that we had in the last twenty years in Afghanistan and the Middle East, you can see how robotic combat vehicles would be helpful for soldiers.

Another example of where we’re bringing artificial intelligence into our—you know, into our formations and into our weapon systems is we have a program that we’re developing called Rainmaker that really is a software program that is able to take data from all sorts of different sources, different weapon systems, and knit it together, again, so that we are able to share data from different sensors to different shooters in a way that we are not able to do before. And that will allow us to be able to bring combat power to bear much more quickly than we ever have before.

VIVIAN SALAMA: Excellent.

I want to turn, Madam Secretary, to a couple of our audience questions. I’m juggling gadgets here. Thank goodness the military is better at technology than I am, but we’re going to try this out. Byron Callan asks, do you have any goals for the Army recruitment that could change between 2022 and 2024 in terms of where people are recruited from geographically, gender diversity, and whether recruits come from military families? What is the Army doing to change how and where it recruits?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: Great question. We have already started recruiting in different ways than we have before. So, you know, to the question about sort of where we are recruiting, we targeted two years ago twenty-two cities across the country in urban areas where you have, say, for example, higher concentrations of African-Americans or higher concentrations of Hispanic Americans, to try to, you know, reach demographic communities that we haven’t perhaps reached in the past as successfully.

That’s just—we’ve set up internships for, again, Hispanic-American and African-American officers, particularly to try to encourage them to come into the combat arms, infantry armor, field artillery, for example.

But I think we need to do more of that, frankly. You know, we are facing some significant recruiting headwinds right now because the economy is doing so well. You know, every private-sector employer is competing for talent. We’re competing against that too. So I think we have to do more to figure out how we can really talk to a wider band of Americans about what the value proposition is for them in the Army.

VIVIAN SALAMA: A really interesting question here from Steven Chu. He asks: A lot of allies have supported Ukraine with Soviet-era equipment, which, while this supports the US efforts, in encouraging those allies to divest from Soviet-era equipment and NATO-compatible equipment, those allies are now requesting equipment from the US to backfill those capabilities. What is the Army doing to support those NATO allies?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: What we are trying to do for the most part is, you know, A, you know, we are working with NATO countries that, if they have, you know, divested their Soviet-era equipment, we are trying to make it as easy as possible to buy American, to buy American equipment. And in some cases what we’re doing, you know, I would say, first and foremost with the Ukrainians, is, you know, some of the, again, the artillery systems I mentioned, the M777s that we’re providing to them, that is allowing us to buy new systems. So instead of replacing old with old, we’re actually replacing old with new.

VIVIAN SALAMA: There’s a number of Ukraine questions that we’re getting here today. Can you speak to the impact—this is from Michael Hauser, by the way—can you speak to the impact of Putin’s war in Ukraine—that Putin’s war in Ukraine has had on strengthening the relationship between NATO and US Army leadership in Europe? And what is necessary to maintain the strength of that relationship in the decades to come?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: Sure. Well, we have very strong relationships with, you know, NATO country—with the armies of NATO countries. General McConville does, you know, counterpart meetings every year. There is an entire land conference for European allies—or European armies, excuse me. So we will try to keep those relationships very, very strong.

I think another thing I would highlight is through the Army National Guard state partnership program, we actually have very deep relationships with not just Ukraine, but again, all of the NATO countries. And one of the real values of that particular program is that the general officers in the National Guard, you know, their tenures can be quite a bit longer. Their personnel are not rotating as much as they do in the active component. And that allows them to sometimes have relationships with NATO countries that last for years, you know, not just a couple of years. So you’re able to have, I think, a much deeper kind of set of connections through that program.

VIVIAN SALAMA: I mean, that question sort of raises one in my mind about also the potential new members that are joining NATO and how the US military is working with Sweden and Finland to potentially get them up to speed and get them integrated into the alliance smoothly, especially with things so tense in their backyards.

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: You know, I think it’s been a little while since I’ve been deep in kind of NATO activities, but my recollection is that even though Sweden and Finland were not actually NATO members, they were very close to NATO. And, you know, when it came to participating in exercises, for example, you know, the Swedes and the Finns participated pretty deeply. So I think it will not be—you know, there’s not a big gap there to bridge. I think, you know, they will come into NATO pretty quickly and assimilate and be, you know, right up there with all of their soon-to-be counterpart countries.

VIVIAN SALAMA: Absolutely.

Anka Valasenchi—I hope I pronounced that right: What is the US Army’s force-posture strategy in Oceana in light of the improbable but not impossible confrontation with Taiwan?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: You know, what we’re trying to do, obviously, is, you know, first and foremost, the State Department has the lead on diplomacy. But we are certainly, you know, having conversations very actively with the countries of Oceana and trying to explore, you know, whether we can have greater access, greater basing.

You know, I would say we have—the Army has very good relationships, for example, with Australia and we are looking at, you know, can we do even more with Australia? Can we do more with the Philippines? But that is kind of a series of ongoing dialogues. But a lot of what we’re doing right now is, again, you know, really trying to maximize what we’re getting out of those Operation Pathways exercises that I talked about in my remarks.

VIVIAN SALAMA: Speaking of the Indo-Pacific, China and Russia last week held their first joint military exercises since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, sending bombers over the seas in Northwest Asia—Northeastern Asia, sorry—while President Biden was in the region. Do you think it was a purely symbolic move in your assessment? And how concerned are you about that partnership, especially given how stretched thin the Russian military is at the moment? Do you think the Chinese could make a difference for them?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: I think, you know, undoubtedly, you know, when a head of state goes to visit in a situation like what we have, you know, there are going to be probably some symbolic military operations to sort of make a point publicly, if you will.

You know, I do think it’s concerning that the relationship between Russia and China has deepened to the extent that it has. And you have seen over the last years, you know, increasing participation with Chinese forces coming to the Zapad series of exercises that Russia conducts, for example.

But again, I think there are going to be eventually limits to that partnership. I’m not—you know, I think eventually, as you look out over time, Russia is likely to be the junior partner in that relationship, which is not something that I think President Putin enjoys. And I think right now, again, a lot of what China is seeing in terms of what’s happening to Russia is probably raising some questions in their mind.

VIVIAN SALAMA: Absolutely.

Michael Nauvikov asks: What is the Army’s strategy on small-business innovation and research grants to encourage technology, advance startups, to solve your specific need?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: We’ve really been trying to work closely with small businesses. And, you know, everyone talks about in the acquisition world, you know, the valley of death. You’ve got all these great startups that have all these cool, you know, relevant new technologies. And because it can be very difficult and heavily bureaucratic to work with the Department of Defense, it can be hard sometimes to bring those programs into fielding.

What we’ve really tried to do, first and foremost, is through Army Futures Command in Austin—and again, we chose to locate Futures Command in Austin because Austin is such a technology hub. And we’ve really tried to, through Futures Command, develop partnerships with small businesses. We have monthly and quarterly sort of, you know, fairs and forums where we try to invite small businesses in to work with us, because we’re very interested in, you know, leveraging new technologies and trying to bring in commercial off the shelf wherever possible.

VIVIAN SALAMA: Lee Schafer, a US Army captain, asks: One of the things the Ukrainian war has shown us is how quickly equipment destruction can outpace replacement for that equipment. With equipment becoming more and more complex as technology progresses, it’s clear that replacing the equipment will take longer and longer. Do you see a role for platforms that are less complex to enable faster combat replacement in the future?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: Yeah, great question. I do think we need to look at sort of, you know, systems that we can afford to have be attritable, if you will, you know; cheaper, more numerous. You know, one of the things that does is make it harder for the enemy to know what they should care about and what they should be targeting.

But another thing that we’re trying to do to get after this particular program is looking at advanced manufacturing and 3D printing and things like that, so that basically, you know, instead of having forces that are out in the field having to requisition spare parts and supplies all the way back, you know, to wherever, is having the ability to actually build those parts in the field and to, you know, be much quicker to be able to replenish.

VIVIAN SALAMA: Another Ukraine question from someone anonymous. The Ukrainian army has proved effective at destroying Russian tanks and armored vehicles. Do you see the Russian invasion of Ukraine as an example of a future for combined-arms warfare? And how will the Army adapt its maneuver units to better face the threats posed by expensive equipment by comparatively cheap drones and antiarmor systems?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: I think, you know, a couple of reactions, I would say, to that. You know, we absolutely have to be thinking about protection systems for our tanks, you know, particularly sort of over-the-top threats to the tanks, where tanks are traditionally more vulnerable. So that is a focus area for us.

But I would also say, you know, somewhat surprisingly, you know, what you haven’t seen the Russian military really do very effectively is combined arms. You know, they put their tanks out there. They’ve had them on the roads. But they haven’t used infantry, you know, to be able to do screening for them. They haven’t used infantry to go and find the Ukrainian resistance fighters who are shooting the Javelins at them. And, you know, that—we would be operating with our tanks very, very differently than what we’ve seen the Russians do.

VIVIAN SALAMA: There’s a question here about the Marine Corps gave up its tanks a few years ago, signaling a shift to lighter, faster force focus on the Indo-Pacific. How is the Army undertaking the famous pivot to Asia that President Obama talked about? Are you rethinking the Army’s commitment to heavy combined armed formations?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: I think, you know, if anything, what we see in Ukraine, you know, underscores that there is a need for heavy forces, for armored forces, you know. And frankly, you know, I look at the European theater and I talk about the Army being the supported force. The Army would really be the center of gravity in a NATO fight, whereas in the Indo-Pacific I see the Army as more being the supporting service, you know. And certainly our heavy tanks, you know, are not as relevant to the Indo-Pacific as they are to the European theater.

But we’re also, you know, to that point, designing a new lighter tank called Mobile Protected Firepower that kind of gives you some of the lethality of a tank but a lot more mobility when compared to our very heavy, you know, most modernized Abrams.

VIVIAN SALAMA: As far as getting equipment into the hands of Ukrainian forces, obviously there’s a lot of logistics at play. It’s going through Poland in a lot of cases or elsewhere. And, you know, the one thing that Ukrainians kept on telling us is it’s not a question of allies sending us equipment, because they’re trying to send us, but a lot of it is logistics and pipeline issues of trying to get it in the hands of the soldiers that need it.

And so how is the US working with Ukraine and other allies to kind of ease that transfer so that they get them a lot faster, as they need them, and especially as we’re talking about with destruction being so rapid in a lot of this equipment?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: I think, you know, what we’re in the Army, at least, trying to do is really focus in a couple of different ways. You know, one is to try to provide coordination and synchronization. And again, you know, I talked about that combined-action cell, you know, really trying to help bring the lethal assistance to where it’s most needed, recognizing that that’s going to be dynamic as the Ukrainians try to move that around and evade the Russians potentially trying to target convoys. You know, we are trying to be able to help coordinate moving all of those different sort of shipments.

Another thing I think we can help with is, you know, without saying too much, is intelligence about where the threats to those convoys may be. But I think, you know, it is going to be a continuing challenge, because, of course, you know, to the extent that a lot of that assistance is being provided by road and by truck, you’ve got the logistics challenges there with, you know, fuel and things like that.

So we’re going to do everything possible, I think. But that is going to be, I think, a challenge, a growing challenge, as time goes by.

VIVIAN SALAMA: We have about thirty seconds left, if you could just tell us, you know, what’s keeping you up at night? What are the main pressing issues on your mind these days?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: Always hard. You know, I think probably the—one of the—a pressing problem for me as I think ahead to the Army is our recruiting challenges, because, you know, we—people talk about the all-volunteer force. We are really the all-recruited force. You know, it’s relatively rare to have a young American walk through the door completely cold and say I’d like to join the US Army.

So as we see, you know, fewer Americans eligible to join the military, whether it’s because of weight issues or behavioral issues, and as we see just the lowest percentage of young Americans wanting to serve in the US military, that is something that concerns me. We need to have an Army big enough to grapple with all of the challenges that we have in this world today, and I think we’ve got work to do to make sure we can keep us as big as we need to be.

VIVIAN SALAMA: Sadly, we have to leave it there. Secretary Wormuth, thank you so much for joining me.

Thanks to the Atlantic Council for hosting us and for all the great questions. I hope you all have a wonderful afternoon.

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Lockheed Martin CEO James D. Taiclet on 21st century security and the Russia-Ukraine war

Caroline Steel — Thu, 26 May 2022 15:42:38 +0000

21^st Century Security is really about… connecting and moving data.

James Taiclet

On April 29, the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense (FD) practice hosted Lockheed Martin Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer James D. Taiclet for a conversation on “Understanding the Challenges of US & Allied Defense Innovation.”

This was the inaugural event of the new Forward Defense Forum, designed for defense visionaries to put forth creative ideas for the future of US and allied security. The Forum is part of FD’s recently launched project on “21^st Century Security,” generously supported by Lockheed Martin, which will advance the dialogue on how the United States and its allies and partners can deter and, if necessary, fight and win future wars.

As the leader of the world’s largest defense contractor, Taiclet has a unique perspective on emerging security and defense challenges. He joined Forward Defense in conversation with Courtney Kube, a national security and military correspondent with NBC News. They discussed how the United States and its allies and partners can integrate existing weapon systems and sensor networks to deter and defeat adversarial aggression.

Read on for some key takeaways from the Forum:

The US is taking notes on the Russia-Ukraine war.

Advanced, expendable weapons play a critical role in warfare.

The Javelin has become a symbol of Ukrainian resistance, proving essential to Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian tanks and get within range of Russian troops. The dramatic impact of Javelins and similar fire-and-forget munitions, such as kamikaze drones, has underscored the notion that cheaper yet advanced weapons can have a sizable impact on the battlefield.

Military power hinges on aerospace dominance.

Ukraine has also demonstrated the importance of mobile, layered air defense, utilizing potable Stingers, short-range Tor surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and long-range S-300 SAMs to deny the Russian Air Force. In anticipation of greater demand from the United States and its allies, and to replenish stores depleted by the war, Lockheed is ramping up production of Javelins and air defense systems, such as THAAD and Patriot missiles.

Integrated defense is key.

On a larger scale, the war in Ukraine has also underlined the importance of integrated defense: optimizing the sensor-to-shooter pipeline by connecting existing technologies. To achieve integration, the defense enterprise will need to make use of 5G network speeds, predictive artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, satellite constellations, and advanced weapons. This open architecture Internet of Military Things (IoMT) will connect the dots in existing systems and lay the groundwork for US and allied deterrence.

COVID-19 exposed core supply chain vulnerabilities.

Over two years since the start of the pandemic, defense contractors are still recovering from chip shortages. Even before the war on Ukraine began to drain weapon stockpiles, COVID-19 was already effecting shortages in microprocessors—that is, computer chips that allow modern weapons systems to function. As the number one chip producer, Taiwan remains critical to the US defense supply chain—but Chinese aggression could threaten access to Taiwanese chipmakers in the future, underscoring the need to secure the supply chain today to protect 21^st century security challenges tomorrow.

China is the big picture threat.

While Russia poses an acute threat, China remains the pacing challenge to the United States. In addition to Javelins, Stingers, and other affordable, portable weapons, Lockheed also anticipates rising demand for more complex, advanced weapons systems—such as the Patriot and THAAD missiles, F-16 multi-role fighter aircraft, counter-battery radars, sixth-generation aircraft, and other capabilities with lengthy production timelines. For the time being, however, networked systems of existing capabilities can help bridge the divide, multiply, and set the stage for the long play. Integrated, networked defense, in coordination with allies and partners, will be critical to the United States’ ability to combat simultaneous threats in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.

The key to secure networks is partnering with the private sector.

So we can apply this concept of really bringing together the Newtonian world, the technologies that the defense and aerospace industry’s really good at, and this digital world, where companies like Microsoft and Verizon and AT&T and others [excel]—and let’s bring them together and solve national problems.
James Taiclet

Private companies will always have the edge over public defense contractors, in their ability to attract talent and innovate at speed. Partnership between the commercial and defensive realms can help accelerate defensive capabilities and solve sticky problems. Rather than innovating separately, defense contractors can team up with private industries to bring cutting-edge technologies and security to national defense. In other words: connecting the “Newtonian” and digital worlds.

21^st century security is more than just defense.

Connecting platforms across domains is a concept that can be applied to more than just defense: in fact, 21^st century security means integrating technologies across industries, to safeguard national interests at every level. Taiclet defines 3 key areas of focus:

Defense

21^st century defense connects fifth-generation fighters with advanced missile batteries, cutting edge radar systems, and human operators. Integrated defense is a force multiplier for the Department of Defense because it amplifies existing technologies in order to meet current and future threats from competitors and adversaries.

Climate

Climate change is an emergent challenge to national security: it threatens citizens, property, and utilities. Taiclet brought in the example of wildfires: right now, it takes around twenty- four hours for fire commanders to receive updated thermal infrared satellite data on a fire. Using airborne, ground-borne and spaceborne sensors, it is possible to predict, prepare for, and monitor fires—but that information is not getting where it needs to go, because of a lack of data infrastructure.

Space

Finally, Taiclet identifies latent opportunities in space, where 21^st century security concepts can help reinforce US interests on the next frontier of innovation. Combining autonomy, battery life extension, next-generation communications, and artificial intelligence, a lunar rover would be able to operate independently between astronaut missions. Satellites can secure communications on earth, increase data speeds, and enable other technologies. Innovation in space feeds into scientific discovery, but also rolls back into defense, and reinforces the entire national security pipeline.

The bottom line

As competition creeps into new spheres, 21^st century security will help protect US citizens and interests against a broad spectrum of growing threats. The US defense-industrial base must leverage existing technologies, develop future capabilities, and reach across the aisle to work with commercial enterprise, in order to fend off simultaneous threats and edge out multi-fronted competition.

Caroline Steel is a Young Global Professional with the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Online Event Fri, April 29, 2022 • 1:00 pm ET

Understanding the challenges of US & allied defense innovation: A conversation with James D. Taiclet

President, Chairman, and CEO of Lockheed Martin James D. Taiclet discusses the urgent need for the United States and its allies to innovate or fail on the future battlefield for the inaugural Forward Defense Forum.

China Conflict Defense Industry Defense Technologies

More about 21st century security

The Forward Defense Forum is designed for defense visionaries to put forth novel ideas for how the United States and its allies and partners can adapt, innovate, and win on the future battlefield. Built for creative thinking, this interactive public forum provides a space for the defense community to engage on issues core to the future of US and allied security.

Explore the series

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The post Lockheed Martin CEO James D. Taiclet on 21st century security and the Russia-Ukraine war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Konaev in the news on artificial intelligence and the Department of Defense.

Atlantic Council — Wed, 25 May 2022 21:14:00 +0000

Following her May 25 report on AI, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Margarita Konaev was quoted in FCW on May 26 and on June 1 in FocusTechnica.

“[The US Department of Defense is] working on a common goal but, unfortunately, on parallel tracks.”

Fellow

Steven Grundman

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

The post Konaev in the news on artificial intelligence and the Department of Defense. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Eye to eye in AI: Developing artificial intelligence for national security and defense

Tate Nurkin, Margarita Konaev — Wed, 25 May 2022 17:29:12 +0000

As artificial intelligence (AI) transforms national security and defense, it is imperative for the Department of Defense (DoD), Congress, and the private sector to closely collaborate in order to advance major AI development priorities.

However, key barriers remain. Bureaucracy, acquisition processes, and organizational culture continue to inhibit the military’s ability to bring in external innovation and move more rapidly toward AI integration and adoption. As China—and, to a lesser extent, Russia—develop their own capabilities, the stakes of the military AI competition are high, and time is short.

It is now well past time to see eye to eye in AI. Therefore, Forward Defense’s latest report, generously supported by Accrete AI, addresses these key issues and more.

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Executive summary

Introduction

Defining AI

Military competition in AI innovation and adoption

Overview of US military progress in AI

Accelerating DoD AI adoption

Key takeaways & recommendations

Conclusion

Acknowledgements

About the authors

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Executive summary

Over the past several years, militaries around the world have increased interest and investment in the development of artificial intelligence (AI) to support a diverse set of defense and national security goals. However, general comprehension of what AI is, how it factors into the strategic competition between the United States and China, and how to optimize the defense-industrial base for this new era of deployed military AI is still lacking. It is now well past time to see eye to eye in AI, to establish a shared understanding of modern AI between the policy community and the technical community, and to align perspectives and priorities between the Department of Defense (DoD) and its industry partners. Accordingly, this paper addresses the following core questions.

What is AI and why should national security policymakers care?

AI-enabled capabilities hold the potential to deliver game-changing advantages for US national security and defense, including

greatly accelerated and improved decision-making;
enhanced military readiness and operational competence;
heightened human cognitive and physical performance;
new methods of design, manufacture, and sustainment of military systems;
novel capabilities that can upset delicate military balances; and
the ability to create and detect strategic cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and influence operations.

Recognition of the indispensable nature of AI as a horizontal enabler of the critical capabilities necessary to deter and win the future fight has gained traction within the DoD, which has made notable investments in AI over the past five years.

But, policymakers beyond the Pentagon—as well as the general public and the firms that are developing AI technologies—require a better understanding of the capabilities and limitations of today’s AI, and a clear sense of both the positive and the potentially destabilizing implications of AI for national security.

Why is AI essential to strategic competition?

The Pentagon’s interest in AI must also be seen through the lens of intensifying strategic competition with China—and, to a lesser extent, Russia—with a growing comprehension that falling behind on AI and related emerging technologies could compromise the strategic, technological, and operational advantages retained by the US military since the end of the Cold War. Some defense leaders even argue that the United States has already lost the military-technological competition to China.¹

While this paper does not subscribe to such a fatalist perspective, it argues that the stakes of the military AI competition are high—and that time is short.

What are the obstacles to DoD AI adoption?

The infamous Pentagon bureaucracy, an antiquated acquisition and contracting system, and a risk-averse organizational culture continue to inhibit the DoD’s ability to bring in external innovation and move more rapidly toward widespread AI integration and adoption. Solving systemic problems of this caliber is a tall order. But, important changes are already under way to facilitate DoD engagement with the commercial technology sector and innovative startups, and there seems to be a shared sense of urgency to solidify these public-private partnerships in order to ensure sustained US technological and military advantage. Still, much remains to be done in aligning the DoD’s and its industry partners’ perspectives about the most impactful areas for AI development, as well as articulating and implementing common technical standards and testing mechanisms for trustworthy and responsible AI.

Key takeaways and recommendations

The DoD must move quickly to transition from a broad recognition of AI’s importance to the creation of pathways, processes, practices, and principles that will accelerate adoption of the capabilities enabled by AI technologies. Without intentional, coordinated, and immediate action, the United States risks falling behind competitors in the ability to harness game-winning technologies that will dominate the kinetic and non-kinetic battlefield of the future. This report identifies three courses of action for the DoD that can help ensure the US military retains its global leadership in AI by
catalyzing the internal changes necessary for more rapid AI adoption and capitalizing on the vibrant and diverse US innovation ecosystem, including

prioritizing safe, secure, trusted, and responsible AI development and deployment;
aligning key priorities for AI development and strengthening coordination between the DoD and industry partners to help close AI capability gaps; and
promoting coordination between leading defense-technology companies and nontraditional vendors to accelerate DoD AI adoption.

This report is published at a time that is both opportune and uncertain in terms of the future trajectory of the DoD’s AI adoption efforts and global geopolitics. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has placed in stark relief the importance of constraining authoritarian impulses to control territory, populations, standards, and narratives,
and the role that alliances committed to maintaining long-standing norms of international behavior can play in this effort. As a result, the authors urge the DoD to engage and integrate the United States’ allies and trusted partners at governmental and, where possible, industry levels to better implement the three main recommendations of this paper.

Introduction

AI embodies a significant opportunity for defense policymakers. The ability of AI to process and fuse information, and to distill data into insights that augment decision-making, can lift the “fog of war” in a chaotic, contested environment in which speed is king. AI can also unlock the possibility of new types of attritable and single-use uncrewed systems that can enhance deterrence.² It can help safeguard the lives of US service members, for example, by powering the navigation software that guides autonomous resupply trucks in conflict zones.³ While humans remain in charge of making the final decision on targeting, AI algorithms are increasingly playing a role in helping intelligence professionals identify and track malicious actors, with the aim
of “shortening the kill chain and accelerating the speed of decision-making.”⁴

AI development and integration are also imperative due to the broader geostrategic context in which the United States operates—particularly the strategic competition with China.⁵ The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) budget for AI seems to match that of the US military, and the PLA is developing AI technology for a similarly broad set of applications and capabilities, including training and simulation, swarming autonomous systems, and information operations—among many others—all of which could abrogate the US military-technological advantage.⁶

As US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin noted in July 2021, “China’s leaders have made clear they intend to be globally dominant in AI by the year 2030. Beijing already talks about using AI for a range of missions, from surveillance to cyberattacks to autonomous weapons.”⁷ The United States cannot afford to fall behind China or other competitors.

To accelerate AI adoption, the Pentagon must confront its demons: a siloed bureaucracy that frustrates efficient data-management efforts and thwarts the technical infrastructure needed to leverage DoD data at scale; antiquated acquisition and contracting processes that inhibit the DoD’s ability to bring in external innovation and transition successful AI technology prototypes to production and deployment; and a risk-averse culture at odds with the type of openness, experimentation, and tolerance for failure known to fuel innovation.⁸

Several efforts are under way to tackle some of these problems. Reporting directly to the under secretary of defense, the chief data and artificial intelligence officer (CDAO) role was recently announced to consolidate the office of the chief data officer, the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC), and the Defense Digital Service (DDS). This reorganization brings the DoD’s data and AI efforts under one roof to deconflict overlapping authorities that have made it difficult to plan and execute AI projects.⁹ Expanding use of alternative acquisition methods, organizations like the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) and the Air Force’s AFWERX are bridging the gap with the commercial technology sector, particularly startups and nontraditional vendors. Still, some tech leaders believe these efforts are falling short, warning that “time is running out.”¹⁰

As the DoD shifts toward adoption of AI at scale, this report seeks to provide insights into outstanding questions regarding the nature of modern AI, summarize key advances in China’s race toward military AI development, and highlight some of the most compelling AI use cases across the DoD. It also offers a brief assessment of the incongruencies between the DoD and its industry partners, which continue to stymie the Pentagon’s access to the game-changing technologies the US military will need to deter adversary aggression and dominate future battlefields.

The urgency of competition, however, must not overshadow the commitment to the moral code that guides the US military as it enters the age of deployed AI. As such, the report reiterates the need to effectively translate the DoD’s ethical AI guidelines into common technical standards and evaluation metrics for assessing trustworthiness, and to enhance cooperation and coordination with the DoD’s industry partners—especially startups and nontraditional vendors across these critical issues.

We conclude this report with a number of considerations for policymakers and other AI stakeholders across the national security ecosystem. Specifically, we urge the DoD to prioritize safe, secure, trusted, and responsible AI development and deployment, align key priorities for AI development between the DoD and industry to help close the DoD’s AI capability gaps, and promote coordination between leading defense technology companies and nontraditional vendors to accelerate the DoD’s AI adoption efforts.

Defining AI

Artificial intelligence, machine learning, and big-data analytics

The term “artificial intelligence” encompasses an array of research approaches, techniques, and technologies spread across a wide range of fields, from computer science and engineering to medicine and philosophy.

The 2018 DoD AI Strategy defined AI as “the ability of machines to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence—for example, recognizing patterns, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making predictions, or taking action.”¹¹ This ability to execute tasks traditionally thought to be only possible by humans is central to many definitions of AI, although others are less proscriptive. The National Artificial Intelligence Act of 2020 merely describes AI as machine-based systems that can “make predictions, recommendations or decisions” for a given set of human-defined objectives.¹² Others have emphasized rationality, rather than fidelity to human performance, in their definitions of artificial intelligence.¹³

As the list of tasks that computers can perform at human or near-human levels continues to grow, the bar for what is considered “intelligent” rises, and the definition of AI evolves accordingly.¹⁴ The task of optical character recognition (OCR), for instance, once stood at the leading edge of AI research, but implementations of this technology, such as automated check processing, have long since become routine, and most experts would no longer consider such a system an example of artificial intelligence. This constant evolution of the definition is, in part, responsible for the confusion surrounding modern AI.¹⁵

This report adopts the Defense Innovation Board’s (DIB) definition by considering AI as “a variety of information processing techniques and technologies used to perform a goal-oriented task and the means to reason in the pursuit of that task.”¹⁶ These techniques, as the DIB explains, can include, but are not limited to, symbolic logic, expert systems, machine learning (ML), and hybrid systems. We use the term “AI” when referring to the broad range of relevant techniques and technologies, and “ML” when dealing with this subset of systems more specifically. For alternative conceptualizations, the 2019 RAND study on the DoD’s posture for AI offers a useful sample of relevant definitions put forth by federal, academic, and technical sources.¹⁷

Much of the progress made in AI over the past decade has come from ML, a modern AI paradigm that differs fundamentally from the human-driven expert systems that dominated in the past. Rather than following a traditional software-development process, in which programs are designed and then coded by human engineers, “machine learning systems use computing power to execute algorithms that learn from data.”¹⁸

Figure 1. The progression from, and variance among, big-data analytics, predictive big-data analytics, and
machine learning, three terms that are occasionally conflated in discussions of AI. Source: authors.

Three elements—algorithms, data, and computing power—are foundational to modern AI technologies, although their relative importance changes depending on particular methods used and, inherently, the trajectory of technological development.

Given that the availability of very large data sets has been critical to the development of ML and AI, it is worth noting that, while the fields of big-data analytics and AI are closely related, there are important differences between the two. Big-data analytics look for patterns, define and structure large sets of data, and attempt to gain insights, but are an essentially descriptive technique unable to make predictions or act on results. Predictive data analytics go a step further, and use collected data to make predictions based on historical information. Such predictive insights have been extremely useful in commercial settings such as marketing or business analytics, but the practice is nonetheless reliant on the assumption that future patterns will follow past trends, and depends on human data analysts to create and test assumptions, query the data, and validate patterns. Machine-learning systems, on the other hand, are able to autonomously generate assumptions, test those assumptions, and learn from them.¹⁹

ML is, therefore, a subset of AI techniques that have allowed researchers to tackle many problems previously considered impossible, with numerous promising applications across national security and defense, as discussed later in the report.

Limitations of AI

There are, however, important limitations and drawbacks to AI systems—particularly in operational environments—in large part, because of their brittleness. These systems perform well in stable simulation and training settings, but they can struggle to function reliably or correctly if the data inputs change, or if they encounter uncertain or novel situations.

ML systems are also particularly vulnerable to adversarial attacks aimed at the algorithms or data upon which the system relies. Even small changes to data sets or algorithms can cause the system to malfunction, reach wrong conclusions, or fail in other unpredictable ways.²⁰

Another challenge is that AI/ML systems do not typically have the capacity to explain their own reasoning, or the processes by which they reach certain conclusions, provide recommendations, and take action, in a way that is evident or understandable to humans. Explainability—or what some have referred to as interpretability—is critical for building trust in human-AI teams, and is especially important as advances in AI enable
greater autonomy in weapons, which raises serious ethical and legal concerns about human control, responsibility, and accountability for decisions related to the use of lethal force.

A related set of challenges includes transparency, traceability, and integrity of the data sources, as well as the prevention or detection of adversary attacks on the algorithms of AI-based systems. Having visibility into who trains these systems, what data are used in training, and what goes into an algorithm’s recommendations can mitigate unwanted bias and ensure these systems are used appropriately, responsibly, and ethically. All these challenges are inherently linked to the question of trust explored later in the report.

Figure 2. Understanding AI limitations. Source: Authors. Lower right icon created by Ranah Pixel Studio.

Military competition in AI innovation and adoption

Much of the urgency driving the DoD’s AI development and adoption efforts stems from the need to ensure the United States and its allies outpace China in the military-technological competition that has come to dominate the relationship between the two nations. Russia’s technological capabilities are far less developed,
but its aggression undermines global security and threatens US and NATO interests.

China

China has prioritized investment in AI for both defense and national security as part of its efforts to become a “world class military” and to gain advantage in future “intelligentized” warfare—in which AI (alongside other emerging technologies) is more completely integrated into military systems and operations through “networked, intelligent, and autonomous systems and equipment.”²¹

While the full scope of China’s AI-related activities is not widely known, an October 2021 review of three hundred and forty-three AI-related Chinese military contracts by the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) estimates that PLA “spends more than $1.6 billion each year on AI-related systems and equipment.”²² The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence’s (NSCAI) final report assessed that “China’s plans, resources, and progress should concern all Americans. It is an AI peer in many areas and an AI leader in some applications.”²³

CSET’s review and other open-source assessments reveal that China’s focus areas for AI development, like those of the United States, are broad, and include²⁴

intelligent and autonomous vehicles, with a particular focus on swarming technologies;
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR);
predictive maintenance and logistics;
information, cyber, and electronic warfare;
simulation and training (to include wargaming);
command and control (C2); and
automated target recognition.

Progress in each of these areas constitutes a challenge to the United States’ capacity to keep pace in a military-technological competition with China. However, it is worth examining China’s advancing capabilities in two areas that could have a particularly potent effect on the military balance.

Integration

First, AI can help the PLA bridge gaps in operational readiness by artificially enhancing military integration and cross-domain operations. Many observers have pointed to the PLA’s lack of operational experience in conflict as a critical vulnerability. As impressive as China’s advancing military modernization has been from a technological perspective, none of the PLA’s personnel have been tested under fire in a high-end conflict in the same ways as the US military over the last twenty years. The PLA’s continuing efforts to increase its “jointness” from an organizational and doctrinal standpoint is also nascent and untested.

The use of AI to improve the quality, fidelity, and complexity of simulations and wargames is one way the PLA is redressing this area of concern. A 2019 report by the Center for a New American Security observed that “[for] Chinese military strategists, among the lessons learned from AlphaGo’s victory was the fact that an AI could create tactics and stratagems superior to those of a human player in a game that can be compared to a wargame” that can more arduously test PLA decision-makers and improve upon command decision-making.²⁵ In fact, the CSET report found that six percent of the three hundred and forty-three contracts surveyed were for the use of AI in simulation and training, including use of AI systems to wargame a Taiwan contingency.²⁶

During the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DAPRA)’s AlphaDogfight Trials, an operational F-16 pilot flies in a virtual reality simulator against the champion F-16 AI agent developed by Heron Systems. The Heron AI agent defeated the human pilot in five straight dogfights to conclude the trials. Source: DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2020-08-26.

The focus on AI integration to reduce perceived vulnerabilities in experience also applies to operational and tactical training. In July 2021, the Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece publication Global Times reported that the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has started to deploy AI as simulated opponents in pilots’ aerial combat training to “hone their decision-making and combat skills against fast- calculating computers.”²⁷

Alongside virtual simulations, China is also aiming to use AI to support pilot training in real-world aircraft. In a China Central Television (CCTV) program that aired in November 2020, Zhang Hong, the chief designer of China’s L-15 trainer, noted that AI onboard training aircraft can “identify different habits each pilot has in flying. By managing them, we will let the pilots grow more safely and gain more combat capabilities in the future.”²⁸

Notably, the PLAAF’s July 2021 AI–human dogfight was similar to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) September 2020 AlphaDogFight Challenge in which an AI agent defeated a human pilot in a series of five simulated dogfights.²⁹ Similarly, the United States announced in September 2021 the award of a contract to training-and-simulation company Red 6 to integrate the company’s Airborne Tactical Augmented Reality System (ATARS)—which allows a pilot flying a real- world plane to train against AI-generated virtual aircraft using an augmented-reality headset—into the T-38 Talon trainer with plans to eventually install the system in fourth-generation aircraft.³⁰ AI-enabled training and simulation are, therefore, key areas in which the US military is in a direct competition with the PLA. As the Chinese military is leveraging AI to enhance readiness, the DoD cannot afford to fall behind.

Autonomy

A second area of focus for Chinese AI development is in autonomous systems, especially swarming technologies, in which several systems will operate independently or in conjunction with one another to confuse and overwhelm opponent defensive systems. China’s interests in, and capacity for, developing swarm technologies has been well demonstrated, including the then record-setting launch of one hundred and eighteen small drones in a connected swarm in June 2017.³¹

In September 2020, China Academy of Electronics and Information Technology (CAEIT) reportedly launched a swarm of two hundred fixed-wing CH- 901 loitering munitions from a modified Dongfeng Mengshi light tactical vehicle.³² A survey of the Unmanned Exhibition 2022 show in Abu Dhabi in February 2022 revealed not only a strong Chinese presence—both China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) and China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) had large pavilions—but also a focus on “collaborative” operations and intelligent swarming.³³

An example of collaborative swarming drones on display at the UMEX 2022 exhibition in Abu Dhabi in February. Source: Tate Nurkin.

This interest in swarming is not limited to uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs). China is also developing the ability to deploy swarms of autonomous uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs) to “intercept, besiege and expel invasive targets,” according to the Global Times.³⁴ In November 2021, Chinese company Yunzhou Tech—which in 2018 carried out a demonstration of a swarm of fifty-six USVs— released a video showing six USVs engaging in a “cooperative confrontation” as part of an effort to remove a crewed vessel from Chinese waters.³⁵

It is not difficult to imagine how such cooperative confrontation could be deployed against US or allied naval vessels, or even commercial ships, to develop or maintain sea control. This capability is especially powerful in a gray-zone contingency in which escalation concerns may limit response options.

Russia

Russia lags behind the United States and China in terms of investments and capabilities in AI. The sanctions imposed over the war in Ukraine are also likely to take a massive toll on Russia’s science and technology sector. That said, US national decision-makers should not discount Russia’s potential to use AI-enabled technologies in asymmetric ways to undermine US and NATO interests. The Russian
Ministry of Defense has numerous autonomy and AI-related programs at different stages of development and experimentation related to military robotics, unmanned systems, swarming technology, early-warning and air-defense systems, ISR, C2, logistics, electronic warfare, and information operations.³⁶

Russian military strategists see immense potential in greater autonomy and AI on future battlefields to speed up information processing, augment decision-making, enhance situational awareness, and safeguard the lives of Russian military personnel. The development and use of autonomous and AI-enabled systems are also discussed within the broader context of Russia’s military doctrine. Its doctrinal focus is on employing these technologies to disrupt and destroy the adversary’s command-and-control systems and communication capabilities, and use non-military means to establish information superiority during the initial period of war, which, from Russia’s perspective, encompasses periods of non-kinetic conflict with adversaries like the United States and NATO.³⁷

The trajectory of Russia’s AI development is uncertain. But, with continued sanctions, it is likely Russia will become increasingly dependent on China for microelectronics and fall further behind in the technological competition with the United States.

Overview of US military progress in AI

The Pentagon’s interest and urgency related to AI is due both to the accelerating pace of development of technology and, increasingly, the transformative capabilities it can enable. Indeed, AI is poised to fundamentally alter how militaries think about, prepare for, carry out, and sustain operations. Drawing on a previous Atlantic Council report outline, the “Five Revolutions” framework for classifying the potential impact of AI across five broad capability areas, Figure 3 below illustrates the different ways in which AI could augment human cognitive and physical capabilities, fuse networks and systems for optimal efficiency and performance, and usher in a new era of cyber conflict and chaos in the information space, among other effects.³⁸

The DoD currently has more than six hundred AI-related efforts in progress, with a vision to integrate AI into every element of the DoD’s mission—from warfighting operations to support and sustainment functions to the business operations and processes that undergird the vast DoD enterprise.³⁹ A February 2022 report by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found that the DoD is pursuing AI capabilities for warfighting that predominantly focus on “(1) recognizing targets through intelligence and surveillance analysis, (2) providing recommendations to operators on the battlefield (such as where to move troops or which weapon is best positioned to respond to a threat), and (3) increasing the autonomy of uncrewed systems.”⁴⁰ Most of the DoD’s AI capabilities, especially the efforts related to warfighting, are still in development, and not yet aligned with or integrated into specific systems. And, despite notable progress in experimentation and some experience with deploying AI-enabled capabilities in combat operations, there are still significant challenges ahead for wide-scale adoption.

In September 2021, the Air Force’s first chief software officer, Nicolas Chaillan, resigned in protest of the bureaucratic and cultural challenges that have slowed technology adoption and hindered the DoD from moving fast enough to effectively compete with China. In Chaillan’s view, in twenty years, the United States and its allies “will have no chance competing in a world where China has the drastic advantage in population.”⁴¹ Later, he added that China has essentially already won, saying, “Right now, it’s already a done deal.”⁴² Chaillan’s assessment of the United States engaged in a futile competition with China is certainly not shared across the DoD, but it reflects what many see as a lack of urgency within the risk-averse and ponderous culture of the department.

Lt. General Michael Groen, the head of the JAIC, agreed that “inside the department, there is a cultural change that has to occur.”⁴³ However, he also touted the innovative capacity of the United States and highlighted the establishment of an AI accelerator and the finalization of a Joint Common Foundation (JCF) for AI development, testing, and sharing of AI tools across DoD entities.⁴⁴ The cloud-enabled JCF is an important step forward that will allow for AI development based on common standards and architectures. This should help encourage sharing between the military services and DoD components and, according to the JAIC, ensure that “progress by one DoD AI initiative will build momentum across the entire DoD enterprise.”⁴⁵

Toward perfect situational awareness: Perception, processing, and cognition

Speeding up processing, integration, and visualization of large and complex datasets to improve situational awareness and
decision-making
Predictive analysis to anticipate likely contingencies or crises or pandemic outbreaks

Hyper-enabled platforms and people: Human and machine performance enhancement

Improving and making training more accessible and less costly and also improving the complexity and fidelity of simulations
and wargaming
Enhancing cognitive and physical capacities of humans
Human-machine teaming and symbiosis, including brain-computer interfaces and AI agents performing mundane tasks to allow humans to focus on mission management

The impending design age: Manufacturing, supply chain, and logistics

Enabling digital engineering, advanced manufacturing, and new supply chain management tools to speed up and reduce costs associated with defense production
Predictive maintenance to enhance platform and system readiness and increase efficiency of sustainment

Connectivity, lethality, and flexibility: Communication, navigation, targeting, and strike

Cognitive sensing, spectrum management, threat detection and categorization, cognitive electronic warfare
Autonomous systems
AI enabled or supported targeting
Swarms

Monitoring, manipulation, and weaponization: Cyber and information operations

Detecting and defending against cyber attacks and disinformation campaigns
Offensive cyber and information operations

While progress should be commended, obstacles remain that are slowing the adoption of AI capabilities critical to deterring threats in the near future, and to meeting China’s competitive challenges in this decade and beyond.

The three case studies below provide examples of the technological, bureaucratic, and adoption advancements that have occurred in DoD AI efforts. These cases also highlight the enduring issues hindering the United States’ ability to bring its national innovation ecosystem fully to bear in the intensifying military-technological competition with China and, to a lesser extent, Russia.

Figure 4: The stages of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center’s (JAIC’s) AI adoption journey. Source: JAIC, https://www.ai.mil/.

Use case 1: The irreversible momentum, grand ambition, and integration challenges of JADC2

Among the Pentagon’s most important modernization priorities is the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) program, described as a “concept to connect sensors from all the military services…into a single network.”⁴⁶ According to the Congressional Research Service, “JADC2 intends to enable commanders to make better decisions by collecting data from numerous sensors, processing the data using AI algorithms to identify targets, then recommending the optimal weapon—both kinetic and non-kinetic—to engage the target.”⁴⁷ If successful, JADC2 holds the potential to eliminate silos between service C2 networks that previously slowed the transfer of relevant information across the force and, as a result, generate more comprehensive situational awareness upon which commanders can make better and faster decisions.

Figure 5. The JADC2 Placemat reflects the complexity and ambition associated with the Department of Defense’s JADC2 Implementation Plan. Source: US Department of Defense.

AI is essential to this effort, and the DoD is exploring how best to safely integrate it into the JADC2 program.⁴⁸ In December 2021, reports emerged that the JADC2 cross-functional team (CTF) would start up an “AI for C2” working group, which will examine how to leverage responsible AI to enhance and accelerate command and control, reinforcing the centrality of responsible AI to the project.⁴⁹

In March 2022, the DoD released an unclassified version of its JADC2 Implementation Plan, a move that represented, in the words of General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “irreversible momentum toward implementing” JADC2.⁵⁰

However, observers have highlighted several persistent challenges to implementing JADC2 along the urgent timelines required to maintain (or regain) advantage in perception, processing, and cognition, especially vis-à-vis China.

Data security and cybersecurity, data-governance and sharing issues, interoperability with allies, and issues associated with integrating the service’s networks have all been cited as challenges with recognizing the ambitious promise of JADC2’s approach. Some have also highlighted that all- encompassing ambition as a challenge as well.
The Hudson Institute’s Bryan Clark and Dan Patt argue that “the urgency of today’s threats and the opportunities emerging from new technologies demand that Pentagon leaders flip JADC2’s focus from what the US military services want to what warfighters need.”⁵¹

To be sure, grand ambition is not necessarily something to be avoided in AI development and integration programs. However, pathways to adoption will need to balance difficult-to-achieve, bureaucratically entrenched, time-consuming, and expensive objectives with developing systems that can deliver capability and advantage along the more immediate threat timelines facing US forces.

Use case 2: Brittle AI and the ethics and safety challenges of integrating AI into targeting

Demonstrating that the age of deployed AI is indeed here, in September 2021 Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall announced that the Air Force had “deployed AI algorithms for the first time to a live operational kill chain.”⁵² According to Kendall, the objective of incorporating AI into the targeting process is to “significantly reduce the manpower-intensive tasks of manually identifying targets— shortening the kill chain and accelerating the speed of decision-making.”⁵³ The successful use of AI to support targeting constitutes a milestone for AI development, though there remain ethical, safety, and technical challenges to more complete adoption of AI in this role.

For example, a 2021 DoD test highlighted the problem of brittle AI. According to reporting from Defense One, the AI-enabled targeting used in the test was accurate only about 25 percent of the time in environments in which the AI had to decipher data from different angles—though it believed it was accurate 90 percent of the time—revealing a lack of ability “to adapt to conditions outside of a narrow set of assumptions.”⁵⁴ These results illustrate the limitations of today’s AI technology in security-critical settings, and reinforce the need for aggressive and extensive real-world and digital-world testing and evaluation of AI under a range of conditions.

The ethics and safety of AI targeting could also constitute a challenge to further adoption, especially as confidence in AI algorithms grows. The Air Force operation involved automated target recognition in a supporting role, assisting “intelligence professionals”—i.e., human decision-makers.⁵⁵ Of course, DoD has a rigorous targeting procedure in place, of which AI-enabled targeting algorithms would be a part, and that, thinking further ahead, autonomous systems would have to go through. Still, even as they are part of this process and designed to support human decisions, a high error rate combined with a high level of confidence in AI outputs could potentially lead to undesirable or grave outcomes.

Use case 3: The limits of AI adoption in the information domain

Intensifying competition with China and Russia is increasingly playing out in the information and cyber domains with real, enduring, and disruptive implications for US security, as well as the US economy, society, and polity.

For cyber and information operations, AI technologies and techniques are central to the future of both offensive and defensive operations, highlighting both the peril and promise of AI in the information domain.

Concern is growing about the threat of smart bots, synthetic media such as deepfakes—realistic video or audio productions that depict events or statements that did not take place—and large- language models that can create convincing prose and text.⁵⁶ And, these are just the emerging AI-enabled disinformation weapons that can be conceived of today. While disinformation is a challenge that requires a societal and whole-of-government response, DoD will undoubtably play a key role in managing and responding to this threat— due to its prominence in US politics and society, the nature of its functional role, and the impact of its ongoing activities.

AI is at the forefront of Pentagon and other US government efforts to detect bots and synthetic media. DARPA’s MediaForensics (MediFor) program is using AI algorithms to “automatically quantify the integrity of an image or video,” for example.⁵⁷

Still, there is concern about the pace at which this detection happens, given the speed of diffusion of synthetic media via social media. As Lt. General Dennis Crall, the Joint Staff’s chief information officer, observed, “the speed at which machines and AI won some of these information campaigns changes the game for us…digital transformation, predictive analytics, ML, AI, they are changing the game…and if we don’t match that speed, we will make it to the right answer and that the right answer will be completely irrelevant.”⁵⁸

Accelerating DoD AI adoption

As the discussion above illustrates, the DoD has a broad set of AI-related initiatives across different stages of development and experimentation, building on the successful deployment of AI-enabled information-management and decision-support tools. As the focus shifts toward integration and scaling, accelerating these adoption efforts is critical for maintaining US advantage in the strategic competition against China, as well as effectively containing Russia.

In this section, the paper highlights some of the incongruencies in the relationship between the DoD and its industry partners that may cause lost opportunities for innovative and impactful AI projects, the positive impact of expanding the use of alternative acquisition methods, and the growing urgency to align processes and timelines to ensure that the US military has access to high- caliber technological capabilities for future warfare. Additionally, this section discusses the DoD’s approach to implementing ethical AI principles, and issues related to standards and testing of trusted and responsible systems.

DoD and industry partnerships: Aligning perspectives, processes, and timelines

Although the DoD has issued a number of high-level documents outlining priority areas for AI development and deployment, the market’s ability to meet, or even understand, these needs is far from perfect. A recent IBM survey of two hundred and fifty technology leaders from global defense organizations reveals some important differences in how defense-technology leaders and the DoD view the value of AI for the organization and the mission.⁵⁹ For instance, only about one-third of the technology leaders surveyed said they see significant potential value in AI for military logistics, medical and health services, and information operations and deepfakes. When asked about the potential value of AI-enabled solutions to business and other noncombat applications, less than one-third mentioned maintenance, procurement, and human resources.⁶⁰

These views are somewhat incongruent with the DoD’s goals in AI. For example, military logistics and sustainment functions that encompass equipment maintenance and procurement are among the top DoD priorities for implementing AI. Leidos’ work with the Department of Veterans Affairs also illustrates the potential of AI in medical and health services.⁶¹ Finally, with the use of AI in disinformation campaigns already under way, and as the discussion in the previous section highlights, there is an urgent need to develop technical measures and AI-enabled tools for detecting and countering AI-powered information operations.⁶²

The DoD and its industry partners have different priorities and incentives based on their respective problem sets and missions. But, divergent perspectives on valuable and critical areas for AI development could result in lost opportunities for impactful AI projects. That said, even when the Pentagon and its industry partners see eye to eye on AI, effective collaboration is often thwarted by a clumsy bureaucracy that is too often tethered to legacy processes, structures, and cultures.

The DoD’s budget planning, procurement, acquisition, and contracting processes are, by and large, not designed for buying software. These institutional barriers, coupled with the complex and protracted software-development and compliance regulations, are particularly hard on small startups and nontraditional vendors that lack the resources, personnel, and prior knowledge required to navigate the system in the same way that defense primes do.⁶³

The DoD is well aware of these challenges. Since 2015, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military services have set up several entities—such as DIU, AFWERX, NavalX, and Army Applications Laboratory—to interface with the commercial technology sector, especially startups and nontraditional vendors, with the aim of accelerating the delivery of best-in-class technology solutions. Concurrently, the DoD has taken other notable steps to promote the use of alternative authorities for acquisition and contracting, which provide greater flexibility to structure and execute agreements than traditional procurement.⁶⁴ These include “other transaction authorities, middle-tier acquisitions, rapid prototyping and rapid fielding, and specialized pathways for software acquisition.”⁶⁵

The DIU has been at the forefront of using some of these alternative acquisition pathways to source AI solutions from the commercial technology sector. The Air Force’s AFWERX has also partnered with the Air Force Research Lab and the National Security Innovation Network to make innovative use of the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) funding to “increase the efficiency, effectiveness, and transition rate” of programs.⁶⁶ In June 2021, for instance, the USAF SBIR/STTR AI Pitch Day awarded more than $18 million to proposals on the topic of “trusted artificial intelligence, which indicates systems are safe, secure, robust, capable, and effective.”⁶⁷

These are steps in the right direction, and it has indeed become easier to receive DoD funding for research, development, and prototyping. Securing timely funding for production, however, remains a major challenge. This “valley of death” problem—the gap between the research-and-development phase and an established, funded program of record—is particularly severe for nontraditional defense firms, because of the disparity between venture-capital funding cycles for startups and how long it takes to get a program into the DoD budget.⁶⁸

The Pentagon understands that bridging the “valley of death” is crucial for advancing and scaling innovation, and has recently launched the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve to deal with these issues.⁶⁹ Still, the systematic changes necessary to align budget planning, acquisition, and contracting processes with the pace of private capital require congressional action and could take years to implement. Delays in implementing such reforms are undermining the DoD’s ability to access cutting-edge technology that could prove essential on future battlefields.

Building trusted and responsible AI systems

Ensuring that the US military can field safe and reliable AI-enabled and autonomous systems and use them in accordance with international humanitarian law will help the United States maintain its competitive advantage against authoritarian countries, such as China and Russia, that are less committed to ethical use of AI. An emphasis on trustworthy AI is also crucial because the majority of the DoD’s AI programs entails elements of human-machine teaming and collaboration, and their successful implementation depends, in large part, on operators trusting the system enough to use it. Finally, closer coordination between DoD and industry partners on shared standards and testing requirements for trustworthy and responsible AI is critical for moving forward with DoD AI adoption.

Alongside the DoD’s existing weapons-review and targeting procedures, including protocols for autonomous weapons systems, the department is also looking to address the ethical, legal, and policy ambiguities and risks raised more specifically by AI.⁷⁰ In February 2020, the Pentagon adopted five ethical principles to guide the development and use of AI, calling for AI that is responsible, equitable, traceable, reliable, and governable. Looking to put these principles into practice, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks issued a memorandum directing a “holistic, integrated, and disciplined approach” for integrating responsible AI (RAI) across six tenets: governance, warfighter trust, product-and-acquisition lifecycle, requirements validation, responsible AI ecosystem, and AI workforce.⁷¹ While JAIC was tasked with the implementation of the RAI strategy, it is unclear how this effort will unfold now that it has been integrated into the new CDAO office.

Meanwhile, in November 2021, the DIU released its responsible-AI guidelines, responding to the memo’s call for “tools, policies, processes, systems, and guidance” that integrate the ethical AI principles into the department’s acquisition policies.⁷² These guidelines are a tangible step toward operationalizing and implementing ethics in DoD AI programs, building on DIU’s experience working on AI solutions in areas such as predictive health, underwater autonomy, predictive maintenance, and supply-chain analysis. They are meant to be actionable, adaptive, and useful while ensuring that AI vendors, DoD stakeholders, and DIU program managers take fairness, accountability, and transparency into account during the planning, development, and deployment phases of the AI system lifecycle.⁷³

The success of the DoD’s AI programs will depend, in large part, on ensuring that humans develop and maintain the appropriate level of trust in their intelligent-machine teammates. The DoD’s emphasis on trusted AI is, therefore, increasingly echoed throughout some of its flagship AI projects. In August 2020, for instance, DARPA’s Air Combat Evolution (ACE) program attracted a great deal of attention when an AI system beat one of the Air Force’s top F-16 fighter pilots in a simulated aerial dogfight contest.⁷⁴ Rather than pitting humans against machines, a key question for ACE is “how to get the pilots to trust the AI enough to use it.”⁷⁵ ACE selected the dogfight scenario, in large part, because this type of air-to-air combat encompasses many of the basic flight maneuvers necessary for becoming a trusted wing-mate within the fighter-pilot community. Getting the AI to master the basic flight maneuvers that serve as the foundation to more complex tasks, such as suppression of enemy air defenses or escorting friendly aircraft, is only one part of the equation.⁷⁶ The AlphaDogfight Trials, according to the ACE program manager, are “all about increasing trust in AI.”⁷⁷

AI development is moving fast, making it difficult to design and implement a regulatory structure that is sufficiently flexible to remain relevant without being so restrictive that it stifles innovation. Companies working with the DoD are seeking guidelines for the development, deployment, use, and maintenance of AI systems compliant with the department’s ethical principles for AI. Many of these industry partners have adopted their own frameworks for trusted and responsible AI solutions, highlighting attributes such as safety, security, robustness, resilience, accountability, transparency, traceability, auditability, explainability, fairness, and other related qualities.⁷⁸ That said, there are important divergences in risk- management approaches, organizational policies, bureaucratic processes, performance benchmarks, and standards for integrating trustworthiness considerations across the AI system lifecycle.

Currently, there are no shared technical standards for what constitutes ethical or trustworthy AI systems, which can make it difficult for nontraditional AI vendors to set expectations and

navigate the bureaucracy. The DoD is not directly responsible for setting standards. Rather, the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) expanded the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) mission “to include advancing collaborative frameworks, standards, guidelines for AI, supporting the development of a risk mitigation framework for AI systems, and supporting the development of technical standards and guidelines to promote trustworthy AI systems.”⁷⁹ In July 2021, the NIST issued a request for information from stakeholders as it develops its AI Risk Management Framework, meant to help organizations “incorporate trustworthiness considerations into the design, development, use, and evaluation of AI products, services, and systems.”⁸⁰

A US Army soldier uses the tactical robotic controller to control the expeditionary modular autonomous vehicle as a practice exercise in preparation for Project Convergence at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, on October 19, 2021. During Project Convergence 21, soldiers experimented with using this vehicle for semi-autonomous reconnaissance and re-supply. Both on and beyond the battlefield, trust in AI-enabled capabilities like autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles is crucial to success. Source: US Army photo by Sgt. Marita Schwab, US Army flickr. https://www.flickr.com/photos/35703177@ N00/51690959553/

There are no easy solutions to this challenge. But, a collaborative process that engages stakeholders across government, industry, academia, and civil society could help prevent AI development from going down the path of social media, where public policy failed to anticipate and was slow to respond to the risks and damages caused by disinformation and other malicious activity on these platforms.

Related to standards are the challenges linked to testing, evaluation, verification, and validation (TEVV). Testing and verification processes are meant to “help decision-makers and operators understand and manage the risks of developing, producing, operating, and sustaining AI-enabling systems,” and are essential for building trust
in AI.⁸¹ The DoD’s current TEVV protocols and infrastructure are meant primarily for major defense acquisition programs like ships, airplanes, or tanks; it is linear, sequential, and, ultimately, finite once the program transitions to production and deployment. With AI systems, however, “development is never really finished, so neither is testing.”⁸² Adaptive, continuously learning emerging technologies like AI, therefore, require a more agile and iterative development-and-testing approach—one that, as the NSCAI recommended, “integrates testing as a continuous part of requirements specification, development, deployment, training, and maintenance and includes run-time monitoring of operational behavior.”⁸³

An integrated and automated approach to development and testing, which builds upon the commercial best practice of development, security, and operations (DevSecOps), is much better suited for AI/ML systems. While the JAIC’s JCF has the potential to enable a true AI DevSecOps approach, scaling such efforts across the DoD is a major challenge because it requires significant changes to the current testing infrastructure, as well as more resources such as bandwidth, computing support, and technical personnel. That said, failing to develop new testing methods better suited to AI, and not adapting the current testing infrastructure to support iterative testing, will stymie efforts to integrate and adopt trusted and responsible AI at scale.

The above discussion of standards and TEVV encapsulates the unique challenges modern AI systems pose to existing DoD frameworks and processes, as well as the divergent approaches commercial technology companies and the DoD take to AI development, deployment, use, and maintenance. To accelerate AI adoption, the DoD and its industry partners need to better align on concrete, realistic, operationally relevant standards and performance requirements, testing processes, and evaluation metrics that incorporate ethical AI principles. A defense-technology ecosystem oriented around trusted and responsible AI could promote the cross-pollination of best practices and lower the bureaucratic and procedural barriers faced by nontraditional vendors and startups.

Key takeaways and recommendations

Fully exploiting AI’s capacity to drive efficiencies in cost and time, support human decision-makers, and enable autonomy will require more than technological advancement or development of novel operational concepts. Below, we outline three key areas of prioritized effort necessary to more successfully integrate AI across the DoD enterprise and ensure the United States is able to deter threats and maintain a strategic, operational, and tactical advantage over its competitors and potential adversaries.

Prioritize safe, secure, trusted, and responsible AI development and deployment

The intensifying strategic competition with China, the promise of exquisite technological and operational capabilities, and repeated comparisons to the rapid pace of technology development and integration in the private sector are all putting pressure on the DoD to move faster toward fielding AI systems. There is much to gain from encouraging greater risk tolerance in AI development to enable progress toward adopting AI at scale. But, rushing to field AI-enabled systems that are vulnerable to
a range of adversary attacks, and likely to fail in an operational environment, simply to “one-up” China will prove counterproductive.

The ethical code that guides the US military reflects a fundamental commitment to abiding with the laws of war at a time when authoritarian countries like China and Russia show little regard for human rights and humanitarian principles. Concurrently, the DoD’s rigorous approach to testing and assurance of new capabilities is designed to ensure that new weapons are used responsibly and appropriately, and to minimize the risk from accidents, misuse, and abuse of systems and capabilities that can have dangerous, or even catastrophic, effects. These values and principles that the United States shares with many of its allies and partners are a strategic asset in the competition against authoritarian countries as they field AI-enabled military systems. To cement the DoD’s advantage in this arena, we recommend the following steps.

The DoD should integrate DIU’s Responsible AI Guidelines into relevant requests for proposals, solicitations, and other materials that require contractors to demonstrate how their AI products and solutions implement the DoD’s AI ethical principles. This will set a common and clear set of expectations, helping nontraditional AI vendors and startups navigate the Pentagon’s proposal process. There is recent precedent of the DoD developing acquisition categories for programs that required industry to pivot its development process to meet evolving DoD standards. In September 2020, for example, the US Air Force developed the e-series acquisition designation for all procurement efforts that required vendors to use digital engineering practices—rather than building prototypes—as part of their bid to incentivize industry to embrace digital engineering.⁸⁴
DoD industry partners, especially nontraditional AI vendors, should actively engage with NIST as the institute continues its efforts to develop standards and guidelines to promote trustworthy AI systems, to ensure their perspectives inform subsequent frameworks.
Among the challenges to effective AI adoption referenced in this paper were brittle AI and the potential for adversary cyberattacks designed to corrupt the data on which AI algorithms are based. Overcoming these challenges will require a continued commitment within the DoD to increase the speed, variety, and capability of test and evaluation of DoD AI systems to ensure that these AI systems function as intended under a broader range of different environments. Some of this testing will need to take place in real-world environments, but advances in model-based simulations can allow for an increasing amount of validation of AI system performance in the digital/virtual world, reducing the costs and timelines associated with this testing.
Moreover, the DoD should also leverage the under secretary of defense for research and engineering’s (USDR&E) testing practices and priorities to ensure planned and deployed AI systems are hardened against adversary attacks, including data pollution and algorithm corruption.
The DoD should leverage allies and foreign partners to develop, deploy, and adopt trusted AI. Engagement of this nature is vital for coordination on common norms for AI development and use that contain and counter China and Russia’s authoritarian technology models. Pathways for expanding existing cooperation modes and building new partnerships can include the following.

Enhancing an emphasis on ethical, safe, and responsible AI as part of the JAIC’s Partnership for Defense, through an assessment of commonalities and differences in the members’ approaches to identify concrete opportunities for future joint projects and cooperation.
Cross-sharing and implementing joint ethics programs with Five Eyes, NATO, and AUKUS partners.⁸⁵ In addition to supporting interoperability, this will add a diversity of perspectives and experiences, as well as help to ensure that AI development efforts limit various forms of bias. As one former general officer interviewed for this project noted, “diversity is how we ensure reliability. It is essential.”⁸⁶
Broadening outreach to allies and partners of varying capabilities and geographies, including India, South Africa, Vietnam, and Taiwan, to explore opportunities for bilateral and multilateral research-and-development efforts and technology-sharing programs that address the technical attributes of trusted and responsible AI.⁸⁷

Align key priorities for AI development and strengthen coordination between the DoD and industry partners to help close DoD AI capability gaps.

The DoD will not be able to fulfill its ambitions in AI and compete effectively with the Chinese model of sourcing technology innovation through military- civil fusion without close partnerships with a broad range of technology companies. This includes defense-industry leaders with long-standing ties to the Pentagon, technology giants at the forefront of global innovation, commercial technology players seeking to expand their government portfolio, and startups at the cutting edge of AI development. But, the DoD’s budget-planning, procurement, acquisition, contracting, and compliance processes will likely need to be fundamentally restructured to effectively engage with the entirety of this vibrant and diverse technology ecosystem.

Systemic change is a slow, arduous process. But, delaying this transition risks the US military falling behind on exploiting the advantages AI promises to deliver, from operational speed to decision dominance. In the meantime, the following actions could help improve coordination with industry partners to accelerate the DoD’s AI adoption efforts.

The DoD should assess its communications and outreach strategy to clarify and streamline messaging around the department’s priorities in AI.
The DoD should partner with technology companies to reexamine their assessments regarding the potential value of AI solutions in certain categories, including, but not limited to, logistics, medical and health services, and information operations.
The DoD should implement the NSCAI’s recommendation to accelerate efforts to train acquisition professionals on the full range of available options for acquisition and contracting, and incentivize their use for AI and digital technologies.”⁸⁸ Moreover, such acquisition- workforce training initiatives should ensure that acquisition professionals have a sufficient understanding of the DoD’s ethical principles for AI and the technical dimensions of trusted and responsible AI. The DIU’s ethical guidelines can serve as the foundation for this training.

The DoD should implement the NSCAI’s recommendation to accelerate efforts to train acquisition professionals on the full range of available options for acquisition and contracting, and incentivize their use for AI and digital technologies.”88 Moreover, such acquisition- workforce training initiatives should ensure that acquisition professionals have a sufficient understanding of the DoD’s ethical principles for AI and the technical dimensions of trusted and responsible AI. The DIU’s ethical guidelines can serve as the foundation for this training.

Promote coordination between leading defense technology companies and nontraditional vendors to accelerate DoD AI adoption.

Rather than building entirely new AI-enabled systems, in the short to medium term, the DoD will be integrating AI into a range of existing software and hardware systems—from cyberdefense architectures to fighter jets to C2. Progress toward implementing AI will, therefore, also depend upon streamlining collaboration between the startups and nontraditional AI vendors that the DoD has been courting for their innovative and cutting-edge technologies and the defense primes responsible for integrating new capabilities into legacy systems.

The NSCAI recommends identifying “new opportunities for defense primes to team with non-traditional firms to adopt AI capabilities more quickly across existing platforms.”⁸⁹ We echo this recommendation: improved coordination between defense primes and nontraditional firms can help ensure AI solutions are robust, resilient, and operationally relevant, as well as usher promising prototypes through the “valley of death.”

Without a doubt, moving from concept to practice can be tricky. This paper’s research revealed a significant disconnect in perspectives on where the main challenges to moving innovative new technologies from the lab to adoption in programs of record reside. Startups tend to view system integrators as resistant to engaging, while startups may be viewed as lacking understanding of the
acquisition process and of developing technologies that are difficult to integrate into, or scale for, programs of record.⁹⁰

Bridging this gap will require new government approaches to resolving concerns of nontraditional suppliers around intellectual property. Most are reticent to give ownership of sensitive technologies that are sold largely to customers outside the defense market. It will also involve the DoD helping small businesses navigate the federal acquisition process through steps such as speeding up cyber certification and the Authority To Operate (ATO) process, as well as helping interesting companies develop use cases for different components of the DoD. Such proactive facilitation will help nontraditional suppliers that have worked with DoD through research-and-development grants come to a partnership with systems integrators more prepared.

Most importantly, optimizing the benefits of both large systems integrators and smaller innovators will require the DoD to play a more active interlocutor role in connecting small companies with those that are running programs of record. There is currently some understandable hesitancy for the DoD to demand that companies work together, largely for fear of running afoul of Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). But, as one industry expert interviewed for this project argued, the DoD could be more aggressive in understanding what is permissible under the FAR and helping companies connect, especially to meet a specific acquisition priority or program.

Conclusion

Over the last several years, interest and investment in AI have gained momentum. This is especially true in the national security and defense community, as strategists, policymakers, and executives seek decisive advantages amid rising geostrategic competition and prepare for future operating environments characterized by complexity, uncertainty, and, most importantly, speed. AI is now at the center of military-technological competition between the United States and China, and both countries, as well as other militaries throughout the world, are already deploying AI-enabled systems with the goal of dominating the battlefield of the future.

The United States cannot risk falling behind China— not in AI innovation, not in AI adoption, and not in the full-scale integration of AI across the national defense enterprise. Urgency is required in addressing the range of technical and bureaucratic processes, and cultural issues that have, to date, dampened the pace of AI adoption within the DoD. Specifically, the DoD should prioritize the following.

Building trust in AI: Rather than replacing humans, DoD AI efforts are primarily centered on technologies that augment human understanding, decision-making, and performance. Building trust and confidence between humans and their intelligent-machine teammates is, therefore, a critical aspect of the successful development and deployment of military AI.
Developing and implementing standards for trusted and responsible AI: Currently, there are no commonly held standards or system- performance requirements for what constitutes trusted and responsible AI. The Pentagon and its industry partners must, therefore, work collaboratively with bodies like NIST to develop and implement operationally relevant standards, testing processes, and evaluation metrics that incorporate ethical, trustworthy, and responsible AI principles. This will help advance successful AI research prototypes into production-ready solutions.
Facilitating the optimization of the US innovation ecosystem and defense industrial base: Bringing cutting-edge AI technologies into the DoD also requires the Pentagon to reduce the bureaucratic challenges frequently associated with the DoD acquisition process, especially for innovative companies that are outside the traditional defense-industrial base. Developing new means of supporting and incentivizing engagement of these companies and promoting intra-industry partnerships between leading defense-technology companies and startups and nontraditional suppliers will be crucial.
Engaging allies and partners: As noted at the outset of this paper, the war in Ukraine has reinforced the importance of allies and partners in enforcing geopolitical norms and standards. The same is likely to be true of the future of AI development and adoption. The DoD will benefit not only from collaboration across industry and the national security community, but also with allies and foreign partners to ensure establishment and promulgation of norms and standards that will enable trusted, responsible, and interoperable AI development and deployment.

Acknowledgments

This report is the culmination of an eight-month research project on the national security and defense implications of AI, conducted under the supervision of FD Deputy Director Clementine Starling and Assistant Director Christian Trotti, and enabled by research and editing support from FD Young Global Professionals Timothy Trevor and Caroline Steel. It is made possible through the generous support of Accrete AI.

To produce this report, the authors conducted a number of interviews and consultations. They list alphabetically below, with gratitude, some of the individuals consulted and whose insights informed this report. The analysis and recommendations presented in this report are those of the authors alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of the individuals consulted. Moreover, the named individuals participated in a personal, not institutional, capacity.

Mr. Prashant Bhuyan, Founder and CEO, Accrete AI
Gen James Cartwright, USMC (Ret.), Board Director, Atlantic Council; Former Vice Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff; Former Commander, US Strategic Command
Mr. Jonathan Doyle, Partner, Axion Partners
Mr. Brian Drake, Federal Chief Technology Officer, Accrete AI
Ms. Evanna Hu, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Mr. Ron Keesing, Senior Vice President for Technology Integration, Leidos
Mr. Stephen Rodriguez, Senior Advisor, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

The authors would also like to thank the following individuals for their peer review of various drafts of this report, listed below in alphabetical order. The analysis and recommendations presented in this report are those of the authors alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of the peer reviewers. Moreover, the named individuals participated in a personal, not institutional, capacity.

Gen James Cartwright, USMC (Ret.), Board Director, Atlantic Council; Former Vice Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff; Former Commander, US Strategic Command
Mr. Jonathan Doyle, Partner, Axion Partners
Mr. Brian Drake, Federal Chief Technology Officer, Accrete AI
Ms. Evanna Hu, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Mr. Justin Lynch, Director, Research and Analysis, Special Competitive Studies Project
Ms. Kelley Sayler, Analyst, Advanced Technology and Global Security, Congressional Research Service

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1 Katrina Manson, “US Has Already Lost AI Fight to China, Says Ex-Pentagon Software Chief,” Financial Times, October 10, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/f939db9a-40af-4bd1-b67d-10492535f8e0.

2 2 Yuna Huh Wong, et al., Deterrence in the Age of Thinking Machines, RAND, 2020, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2700/RR2797/RAND_RR2797.pdf

3 Maureen Thompson, “Utilizing Semi-Autonomous Resupply to Mitigate Risks to Soldiers on the Battlefield,” Army Futures Command, October 26, 2021, https://www.army.mil/article/251476/utilizing_semi_autonomous_resupply_to_mitigate_risks_to_soldiers_on_the_battlefield.

4 Amy Hudson, “AI Efforts Gain Momentum as US, Allies and Partners Look to Counter China,” Air Force Magazine, July 13, 2021, https://www.airforcemag.com/dods-artificial-intelligence-efforts-gain-momentum-as-us-allies-and-partners-look-to-counter-china.

5 On AI and the strategic competition, see: Michael C. Horowitz, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power,” Texas National Security Review 1, 3 (May 2018), https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/65638/TNSR-Vol-1-Iss-3_Horowitz.pdf; Michael C. Horowitz, et al., “Strategic Competition in an Era of Artificial Intelligence,” Center for National Security, July 2018, http://files.cnas.org.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/CNAS-Strategic-Competition-in-an-Era-of-AI-July-2018_v2.pdf.

6 Ryan Fedasiuk, Jennifer Melot, and Ben Murphy, “Harnessed Lightning: How the Chinese Military is Adopting Artificial Intelligence,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University, October 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/harnessed-lightning.

7 C. Todd Lopez, “Ethics Key to AI Development, Austin Says,” DOD News, July 14, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/ Article/2692297/ethics-key-to-ai-development-austin-says/.

8 Danielle C. Tarraf, et al., The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence: Assessment and Recommendations, RAND, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4229.html.

9 Brian Drake, “A To-Do List for the Pentagon’s New AI Chief,” Defense One, December 14, 2021, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/12/list- pentagons-new-ai-chief/359757.

10 Valerie Insinna, “Silicon Valley Warns the Pentagon: ‘Time Is Running Out,’” Breaking Defense, December 21, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/12/silicon-valley-warns-the-pentagon-time-is-running-out.

11 11. “Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy: Harnessing AI to Advance Our Security and Prosperity,” US Department of Defense, 2018, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDF.

12 “12. Artificial Intelligence,” US Department of State, accessed May 4, 2022, https://www.state.gov/artificial-intelligence.

13 13. Stuart J. Russell and Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, Fourth Edition (Hoboken, NJ: Pearson, 2021), 1. For further definitions of AI, see, for example: Nils J. Nilsson, The Quest for Artificial Intelligence: A History of Ideas and Achievements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Shane Legg and Marcus Hutter, “A Collection of Definitions of Intelligence,” Dalle Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence, June 15, 2007, https://arxiv.org/pdf/0706.3639.pdf.

14 14. Robert W. Button, Artificial Intelligence and the Military, RAND, September 7, 2017, https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/09/artificial-intelligence-and- the-military.html.

15 15. Ibid.

16 16. “AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use of Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense,” Defense Innovation Board, October 2019, https://admin.govexec.com/media/dib_ai_principles_-supporting_document-embargoed_copy(oct_2019).pdf.

17 17. Danielle C. Tarraf, William Shelton, Edward Parker, Brien Alkire, Diana Gehlhaus, Justin Grana, Alexis Levedahl, Jasmin Léveillé, Jared Mondschein, James Ryseff, et al., The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence, RAND, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4229.html

18 18. Ben Buchanan, “The AI Triad and What It Means for National Security Strategy,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University, August 2020, iii, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/the-ai-triad-and-what-it-means-for-national-security-strategy.

19 19. Ibid.

20 20. Alexey Kurakin, Ian Goodfellow, and Samy Bengio, “Adversarial Machine Learning at Scale,” Arxiv, Cornell University, February 2017, https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.01236.

21 21. Fedasiuk, Melot, and Murphy, “Harnessed Lightning,” 4.

22 22. Ibid., iv.

23 23. “Final Report,” National Security Commission on AI, 2021, https://www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf.

24 24. Fedasiuk, Melot, and Murphy, “Harnessed Lightning,” 13.

25 25. Elsa Kania, “Learning Without Fighting: New Developments in PLA Artificial Intelligence War-Gaming,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, 19, 7 (2019), https://jamestown.org/program/learning-without-fighting-new-developments-in-pla-artificial-intelligence-war-gaming.

26 26. Fedasiuk, Melot, and Murphy, “Harnessed Lightning,” 22–23.

27 27. Liu Xuanzun, “PLA Deploys AI in Mock Warplane Battles, ‘Trains Both Pilots and Ais,’” Global Times, June 14, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/ page/202106/1226131.shtml.

28 28. Liu Xuanzun, “China’s Future Fighter Trainer Could Feature AI to Boost Pilot’s Combat Capability: Top Designer,” Global Times, November 16, 2020, http://en.people.cn/n3/2020/1116/c90000-9780437.html.

29 29. Joseph Trevithick, “Chinese Pilots Are Also Dueling With AI Opponents in Simulated Dogfights and Losing: Report,” Drive, June 18, 2021, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/41152/chinese-pilots-are-also-dueling-with-ai-opponents-in-simulated-dogfights-and-losing-report.

30 30. “Red 6 to Continue Support ATARS Integration into USAF T-38 Talon,” Air Force Technology, February 3, 2022, https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/red-6-atars-integration.

31 31. Xiang Bo, “China Launches Record Breaking Drone Swarm,” XinhuaNet, June 11, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017- 06/11/c_136356850.htm.

32 32. David Hambling, “China Releases Video Of New Barrage Swarm Drone Launcher,” Forbes, October 14, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2020/10/14/china-releases-video-of-new-barrage-swarm-drone-launcher/?sh=29b76fa12ad7.

33 33. An author of this paper attended the exhibition.

34 Cao Siqi, “Unmanned High-Speed Vessel Achieves Breakthrough in Dynamic Cooperative Confrontation Technology: Developer,” Global Times, November 28, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202111/1240135.shtml.

35 35. Ibid.

36 36. Jeffrey Edmonds, et al., “Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy in Russa,” CNA, May 2021, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/centers/CNA/sppp/rsp/ russia-ai/Russia-Artificial-Intelligence-Autonomy-Putin-Military.pdf.

37 37. “Advanced Military Technology in Russia,” Chatham House, September 2021, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/advanced-military- technology-russia/06-military-applications-artificial-intelligence.

38 38. Tate Nurkin, The Five Revolutions: Examining Defense Innovation in the Indo-Pacific, Atlantic Council, November 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-five-revolutions-examining-defense-innovation-in-the-indo-pacific-region.

39 39. Hudson, “AI Efforts Gain Momentum as US, Allies and Partners Look to Counter China.”

40 40. “Artificial Intelligence: Status of Developing and Acquiring,” US Government Accountability Office, February 2022, 17, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104765.pdf.

41 41. Nicolas Chaillan, “Its Time to Say Goodbye,” LinkedIn, September 2, 2021, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/time-say-goodbye-nicolas-m-chaillan.

42 42. Manson, “US Has Already Lost AI Fight to China, Says Ex-Pentagon Software Chief.”

43 43. Patrick Tucker, “Pentagon AI Chief Responds to USAF Software Leader Who Quit in Frustration,” Defense One, October 26, 2021, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2021/10/pentagon-ai-chief-responds-usaf-software-leader-who-quit-frustration/186368.

44 44. Ibid.

45 45. “AI Adoption Journey,” Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, https://www.ai.mil/#:~:text=The%20JAIC’s%20Joint%20Common%20Foundation%20
%28JCF%29%20is%20a,will%20build%20momentum%20across%20the%20entire%20DoD%20enterprise.

46 46. Jackson Bennett, “2021 in Review: JADC2 Has Irreversible Momentum, but What Does That Mean?” FedScoop, December 29, 2021, https://www.fedscoop.com/2021-in-review-jadc2-has-irreversible-momentum.

47 47. “Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) In Focus Briefing,” Congressional Research Service, January 21, 2022.

48 48. Ibid.

49 49. Jackson Bennett, “JADC2 Cross Functional Team to Stand Up AI-Focused Working Group,” FedScoop, December 16, 2021, https://www.fedscoop.com/jadc2-cft-stands-up-ai-working-group.

50 50. “DoD Announces Release of JADC2 Implementation Plan,” US Department of Defense, press release, March 17, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2970094/dod-announces-release-of-jadc2-implementation-plan.

51 51. Bryan Clark and Dan Patt, “The Pentagon Should Focus JADC2 on Warfighters, Not Service Equities,” Breaking Defense, March 30, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/the-pentagon-should-focus-jadc2-on-warfighters-not-service-equities.

52 52. Amanda Miller, “AI Algorithms Deployed in Kill Chain Target Recognition,” Air Force Magazine, September 21, 2021, https://www.airforcemag.com/ai-algorithms-deployed-in-kill-chain-target-recognition.

53 53. Ibid.

54 54. Patrick Tucker, “Air Force Targeting AI Thought It Had a 90% Success Rate. It Was More Like 25%,” Defense One, December 9, 2021, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2021/12/air-force-targeting-ai-thought-it-had-90-success-rate-it-was-more-25/187437.

55 55. Miller, “AI Algorithms Deployed in Kill Chain Target Recognition.”

56 56. Alex Tamkin and Deep Ganguli, “How Large Language Models Will Transform Science, Society, and AI”, Stanford University Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence, February 21, 2021, https://hai.stanford.edu/news/how-large-language-models-will-transform-science-society-and-ai.

57 57. Matt Turek, “Media Forensics (MediFor),” Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, accessed May 4, 2022, https://www.darpa.mil/program/media-forensics.

58 58. Patrick Tucker, “Joint Chiefs’ Information Officer: US is Behind on Information Warfare. AI Can Help,” Defense One, November 5, 2021, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2021/11/joint-chiefs-information-officer-us-behind-information-warfare-ai-can-help/186670.

59 59. “Deploying AI in Defense Organizations: The Value, Trends, and Opportunities,” IBM, May 2021, https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/ EJBREOMX.

60 60. Ibid.

61 61. Authors’ interview with a defense technology industry executive.

62 62 Katerina Sedova, et al., “AI and the Future of Disinformation Campaigns, Part 1: The RICHDATA Framework,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University, December 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/ai-and-the-future-of-disinformation-campaigns/; Katerina Sedova et.al, “AI and the Future of Disinformation Campaigns, Part 2: A Threat Model, Center for Security and Emerging Technology,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University, December 2021, 1, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-AI-and-the-Future-of-Disinformation-Campaigns-Part-2.pdf; Ben Buchanan, et al., “Truth, Lies, and Automation: How Language Models Could Change Disinformation,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University, May 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/truth-lies-and-automation.

63 63. Daniel K. Lim, “Startups and the Defense Department’s Compliance Labyrinth,” War on the Rocks, January 3, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/01/startups-and-the-defense-departments-compliance-labyrinth.

64 64. Moshe Schwarz and Heidi M. Peters, “Department of Defense Use of Other Transaction Authority: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, February 22, 2019, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R45521.pdf.

65 65. “Final Report.”

66 66. “SBIR Open Topic,” US Department of the Air Force, Air Force Research Laboratory, https://afwerx.com/sbirsttr.

67 67. “Trusted AI at Scale,” Griffiss Institute, July 26, 2021, https://www.griffissinstitute.org/about-us/events/ev-detail/trusted-ai-at-scale-1.

68 68. Insinna, “Silicon Valley Warns the Pentagon: ‘Time is Running Out.’”

69 69. Jory Heckman, “DoD Seeks to Develop New Career Paths to Stay Ahead of AI Competition,” Federal News Network, July 13, 2021, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/artificial-intelligence/2021/07/dod-seeks-to-develop-new-career-paths-to-stay-ahead-of-ai-competition.

70 70. “DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence,” US Department of Defense, February 24, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/News/ Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-adopts-ethical-principles-for-artificial-intelligence/.

71 70. “DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence,” US Department of Defense, February 24, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-adopts-ethical-principles-for-artificial-intelligence/.

72 72. Ibid.

73 73. Jared Dunnmon, et al., “Responsible AI Guidelines in Practice,” Defense Innovation Unit, https://assets.ctfassets.net/3nanhbfkr0pc/acoo1Fj5uungnGNPJ3QWy/3a1dafd64f22efcf8f27380aafae9789/2021_RAI_Report-v3.pdf.

74 74. Margarita Konaev and Husanjot Chahal, “Building Trust in Human-Machine Teams,” Brookings, February 18, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/building-trust-in-human-machine-teams/ ; Theresa Hitchens, “AI Slays Top F-16 Pilot in DARPA Dogfight Simulation,” Breaking Defense, August 20, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/08/ai-slays-top-f-16-pilot-in-darpa-dogfight-simulation.

75 75. Sue Halpern, “The Rise of A.I. Fighter Pilots,” New Yorker, January 17, 2022, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/01/24/the-rise-of-ai- fighter-pilots.

76 76. Adrian P. Pope, et al., “Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning for Air-to-Air Combat,” Lockheed Martin, June 11, 2021, https://arxiv.org/pdf/2105.00990.pdf.

77 77. “AlphaDogfight Trials Go Virtual for Final Event,” Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, July 2020, https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2020-08-07.

78 78. A recent IBM survey of two hundred and fifty technology leaders from global defense organizations revealed that about 42 percent have a framework for deploying AI ethically and safely; notably, formalized plans for the ethical application of AI are more common in organizations whose mission functions include combat and fighting arms than organizations with non-combat missions. These leaders surveyed represent organizations from a broad range of mission functions, including combat and fighting arms (18 percent), combat support (44 percent), and combat service-support (37 percent) organizations. “Deploying AI in Defense Organizations,” 4, https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/EJBREOMX; “Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence: Ensuring Data-Driven Decisions,” C4ISR, January 2021, https://hub.c4isrnet.com/ebooks/ai-autonomy-2020; “How Effective and Ethical Artificial Intelligence Will Enable JADC2,” Breaking Defense, December 2, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/12/how-effective-and-ethical-artificial-intelligence-will-enable-jadc2.

79 79. Pub. L. 116-283, William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, 134 Stat. 3388 (2021), https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ283/PLAW-116publ283.pdf.

80 80. “Summary Analysis of Responses to the NIST Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF)—Request for Information (RFI),” National Institute of Standards and Technology, October 15, 2021, https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2021/10/15/AI%20RMF_RFI%20Summary%20Report.pdf.

81 81 Michele A. Flournoy, Avril Haines, and Gabrielle Chefitz, “Building Trust through Testing: Adapting DOD’s Test & Evaluation, Validation & Verification (TEVV) Enterprise for Machine Learning Systems, including Deep Learning Systems,” WestExec, October 2020, 3–4, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Building-Trust-Through-Testing.pdf.

82 82. Flournoy, Haines, and Chefitz, “Building Trust through Testing,” 3.

83 83. “Final Report,” 384.

84 84. “Air Force Acquisition Executive Unveils Next E-Plane, Publishes Digital Engineering Guidebook,” US Department of the Air Force, January 19, 2021, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2476500/air-force-acquisition-executive-unveils-next-e-plane-publishes-digital-engineer.

85 85. Zoe Stanley-Lockman, “Responsible and Ethical Military AI: Allies and Allied Perspectives,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University, August 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-Responsible-and-Ethical-Military-AI.pdf.

86 86. Authors’ interview with a former US military general.

87 87. Zoe Stanley-Lockman, “Military AI Cooperation Toolbox: Modernizing Defense Science and Technology Partnerships for the Digital Age,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University, August 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/military-ai-cooperation-toolbox/.

88 88. “Final Report,” 65.

89 89. Ibid., 305.

90 90. Authors’ interview with a defense technology executive.

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Nexus 22 in review

Alyxandra Marine, Caroline Steel, Christian Trotti — Wed, 25 May 2022 13:27:43 +0000

On May 17, 2022, the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice collaborated with Applied Intuition, a Bay-area based tech startup, to host Nexus 22, a symposium at the intersection of defense and autonomy.

The event consisted of twelve panels, spotlight remarks, and keynote addresses by senior leaders including Michèle Flournoy, Marc Andreessen, Representative Mike Waltz, Representative, James Langevin, Chris Lynch, and Mike Brown, who came together to discuss issues at the intersection of autonomy, defense, and national security. The symposium addressed and answered the following key questions on the future of autonomous systems:

Why does the United States need to invest in autonomous systems?

Preparing for the conflict of the future. Despite speculation that the wars of the future would be fought differently, the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shown that some conflicts will rely on the same tanks and ground maneuvers that were prevalent in the twentieth century. Nevertheless, as Atlantic Council NRSF Margarita Konaev pointed out, we often conflate capabilities of the future with the technology that is “battle ready.” As Michèle Flournoy noted later in the day, the next 5-7 years will be a critical time for innovating and integrating these technologies, which many panelists suggested will be fielded by our adversaries during that time. Adversaries have been clear on their intentions to achieve next-generation capabilities first and dominate the defense space. The United States must keep pace.

What are the upshots to autonomous systems?

Sensing and deciding. Humans are not excellent decision-makers, notes Marc Andreessen. Taking an example from commercial autonomy, he noted that humans are distracted drivers. They text, drink, put on makeup, and multi-task. On the flipside, autonomous vehicles have 360-degree awareness at all times; they do not get drunk or put on makeup, and can multi-task, much more effectively than humans. Human in the loop, or HITL, autonomous systems, are a good starting point—and in some cases, may be the ethical choice, when it comes to lethal decision-making. But in many cases, the ethical choice may be autonomous systems that don’t get distracted.

What are the main pain points in fielding autonomous systems?

Speed. Technology is moving quickly—and US defense is falling behind. While the war in Ukraine and growing tension over Taiwan will help drive faster action, the Department of Defense (DoD) needs to also learn how to think and act more like private industry. After all, “five years in Silicon Valley is fifty years compared to everywhere else,” says Katherine Boyle of Andreessen Horowitz. By integrating commercial stakeholders and innovating with greater speed, the DoD can reduce procurement-to-capability timelines and compete with authoritarian systems such as China, where public-private partnership is woven (or coerced) into the institutional tapestry. Capitalism may not be a perfect system, but it can encourage technological breakthroughs. While the DoD should move with what Direcotr of Emerging Capabilities Policy Dr. Michael Horowitz calls “responsible speed,” the Department can still learn from these Silicon Valley’s mantra: Move fast. Break things

Communication. A dialogue between the public and private sectors must take place. On the public side, decisionmakers and warfighters will need to up their digital fluency, and understand emerging technologies, in order to work with them efficiently. While many private companies have shied away from DoD collaboration, panelists throughout the day noted that Silicon Valley engineers are increasingly patriotic and willing to work on dual-use capabilities. To work with the private sector, the DoD can help by educating private companies on growing threats and clearly communicate their intentions, which will build better understanding and foster lasting a partnership. Parts of private industry is caught up in a version of reality that doesn’t exist, rather than an increasingly multipolar world where the US is losing its competitive advantage. Communication—of intentions, of threats—will allow the public and private sectors to collaborate more closely, field autonomous systems faster, and deter future threats.

How can DoD accelerate cutting-edge capabilities?

Focusing in on the “meat” of acquisition. If US defense innovation is a sandwich, then it is missing the middle. The bread (and butter) of US defense acquisition is cutting-edge tactical concepts, and joint warfighting capabilities (think JADC2). However, cautioned Michèle Flournoy, the “meat” of campaign-level concepts is missing: how forces operate in any given theater, how tasks get assigned, how US forces amass resilience and redundancy—this critical middle component will be key to unlocking the full potential of emerging technologies and applying them to US defensive capabilities.

Managing talent. An essential component of bolstering US defensive capabilities is retaining and managing talent. Right now, the DoD does not effectively leverage STEM talent in order to make use of the STEM grads currently in service, nor does it effectively integrate outside talent into the DoD—which could look like, for example, creating a 100% digital reserve unit. Furthermore, the DoD does not effectively take advantage of private sector innovation, despite the fact that part of the entrepreneur ecosystem is driven by what Bilal Zuberi of Lux Capital called “the desire to protect the freedoms that we all cherish.” Improving on these pain points and building bridges with the private sector will allow DoD to develop existing talent and incorporate outside talent much more efficiently.

Measuring the right performance indicators. The number of tanks, planes, and ships, is the wrong qualitative paradigm for measuring US capabilities. Instead, measuring speed, accuracy, and resilience of decision-making and command and control (C2) can help benchmark DoD success and shortcomings. Artificial intelligence, machine learning, and human-machine teaming will help activate US capabilities and improve US warfighting.

How do we build trust in autonomous systems?

Testing & evaluation. Trust—or “justified confidence,” as it is known within DoD—is not so much built, as it is calibrated, says Jane Pinelis. Core to calibrating trust, is initial (and continual) testing and evaluation (T&E) designed to identify risks and improve success. Here, simulation can also play a big role, allowing for diverse use case testing before live trials.

Training and education of human operators, in tandem with academia and private industry, can also help establish confidence and reliance. Optimizing the talent acquisition and retention pipeline will allow DoD to up-level servicemember knowledge and advance autonomous applications.

Practical application. Finally, the practical application of autonomous and machine learning systems will help demonstrate emerging capabilities and build confidence in new technologies. Though it is important to mitigate unwarranted trust and operator complacency, repeated observation of autonomous systems in use will organically build trust at the public and operational levels.

Emerging technologies are more important than ever in the safeguarding of US values domestically and abroad. Building a bedrock of trust from the outset will help lay the foundations for asymmetric advantage in the long-run.

Defense keynote with Michèle Flournoy

What are the takeaways from the Russia-Ukraine war?

Russia is not ten feet tall. Systemic issues in authoritarian governments can affect how they wage war. Limits on dissent kneecap strategic advice; corruption siphons off resources; deficits in training and personnel inhibit combined arms campaigns and domain dominance. In the end, Russia’s “asymmetry of interest and resolve” contrasted sharply against the strong Ukrainian will to fight—and taken in totality, the Kremlin offensive so far has failed to achieve substantive gains.

Agility and tech matter. After the invasion of Ukraine, several NATO allies (including the US, Canada, and the UK) deployed special operators to help train the Ukrainian military in asymmetrical tactics, to use against a larger force such as Russia. During the war, Ukrainian troops have shown remarkable aptitude in nimbly integrating old technologies with new ones.

Sanctions must be strategic. Sanctions are a useful tool for effecting change without resorting to military force (read more on this “gray zone” of conflict here)—but they have their downsides. Though the war in Ukraine has pushed allies together, catalyzing well-coordinated action on sanctions, it has also pushed China to re-evaluate its dependence on the dollar. In the future, the US must calibrate sanctions to meet its goals without producing unpleasant side effects.

How has the Russia-Ukraine war mobilized the transatlantic community?

Sounding the alarm. The combination of Russian aggression in Ukraine with Chinese assertive behavior in the Indo-Pacific has awakened the transatlantic community. In particular, partnerships built around technology development will be a key area for transatlantic cooperation. Flournoy imagines “tech clusters” built around core technologies—and even a “T10” or “T12” (Similar to the G7, or Group of Seven, forum) framework to help foster collaboration and unity.

How can the US manage security in the Indo-Pacific?

Don’t fall asleep at the wheel. The US can’t rest on its laurels. Already, China is developing asymmetric capabilities that will challenge the traditional way of war. The US must start thinking more like the underdog, and focus on developing capabilities that will impose costs on China early on in a conflict where it will not have home-court advantage.

Prioritize the next 5-7 years. According to Flournoy, the next five-to-seven years will be critical. While Chinese president Xi Jinping is distracted by the COVID crisis, a struggling economy, and 2022 Party Congress, the US must act with speed to develop new capabilities to deter and defend against a new type of adversary. In the medium-term, as Xi begins to consider his legacy, he may also see a window of opportunity to incorporate Taiwan, while the US is still wondering where it put its wallet.

Venture capital keynote with Marc Andreessen

What is American Dynamism?

Building things. Buildings, bridges, dams; US cities; the United States itself—are all startups. At its core, “American Dynamism” is building big things. But since the 1960s, the United States has begun to move away from enterprise projects: it has become what Andreessen calls a “vetocracy,” or a system where a lot of people get a veto, and get to block new projects (such as housing units in San Francisco, or even hospitals). This means that less things are getting built, and the United States is becoming its own bottleneck.

Innovating. But the United States is also inherently resilient: a naturally defensible territory with a natural wealth of resources. Unlike China, the United States has the physical resources to become energy independent. The heavy lift lies not in tangible or intangible assets, but in breaking through rigid market structures and enabling innovation.

How has the Russia-Ukraine war shifted Silicon Valley bubble culture?

By bringing national security threats into focus. Silicon Valley has deep roots in defense and intelligence—but twenty years ago, a cultural rift began to form as the public-private technology flow inverted, and new technologies are deployed first to consumers, and then to the government. In many cases, that meant partnering with Chinese companies, who are obligated to share data with the Chinese military. The defense-commercial divide grew as Silicon Valley workers grew comfortable on the peninsula, and oblivious to growing global threats. The war in Ukraine is starting to move the needle again in the other direction as Americans become more aware of nascent threats to national security, and setting the playing field for small companies a chance to break back into defense. In addition to a Silicon Valley culture shift, the government is also shifting into higher gear and leaning in on emerging technologies, in order to prepare for twenty-first century threats.

How can small tech firms play to their strengths?

Innovating at pace. The US market, comments Andreessen, is not a free market system: it is an oligopoly entwined with government interests. Banking conglomerates, once deemed “too big to fail,” have grown even larger than they were at the time of the 2008 crash; new bank charters are at an all-time low; and a revolving door policy ensures that regulators and banking conglomerates are inextricably linked. But this presents an opportunity for agile startup businesses, who can innovate faster and better than bloated, restricted incumbents. If they can maneuver past big interests and hone in on unique opportunities, small companies can remain competitive in a choked market.

What is post-COVID market volatility doing to venture capital and tech startup funding cycles?

Putting them in a holding pattern. Right now, the market is in a holding pattern. Investors are still reeling from COVID-19 whiplash, where markets dropped, then rose, then dropped again—similar, noted Andreessen, to Wiley Coyote stepping over the edge of a cliff, hovering for an instant in mid-air. The volatility increases uncertainty: is this a temporary drop—in other words, a time to buy? Or is it a sustained downturn? The next six-nine months will help clarify larger trends, but, in the meantime, startups are raising capital at old prices, or not at all.

The post Nexus 22 in review appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Viva la space: Why the commercial small satellite revolution matters for the US government

Madison Littlepage — Wed, 18 May 2022 19:13:04 +0000

On May 5, the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice launched a report, generously supported by Thales, and hosted a virtual event on “The National Security Implications of Small Satellites.”

The event included opening remarks by Atlantic Council president and chief executive officer Frederick Kempe and Thales North America chief executive officer Alan Pellegrini, along with a panel of experts and officials from across the space community. Featured on the panel were author of the report and Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades; Space Development Agency policy chief and legislative affairs director Paula Trimble; space policy and warfighter expert at the University of Leicester Dr. Bleddyn Bowen; and chief executive officer of COMSPOC Paul Graziani. Moderated by SpaceNews senior staff writer Sandra Erwin, the panel articulated the importance of harnessing small-satellite developments to guarantee US competitive edge in the future of warfare.

What’s the big deal with small satellites?

Today’s small satellites provide the same–if not more–capabilities than traditionally large satellites at a fraction of the cost and size. Small satellites provide for critical US government functions and facilitate the everyday lives of Americans (from communications to remote sensing). Small satellites enhance space situational awareness (SSA), and large constellations of small satellites foster redundancy and resilience. While traditionally large space assets provided one “big juicy target” ripe for attack, small satellite constellations make it difficult for adversaries to target and shut down a system with just one strike. These constellations also provide back-ups in case of inadvertent collisions knocking out communications.

Can we sustain the influx of small satellites?

As more and more companies launch small satellites into space, the congestion and likelihood of collusion in low-Earth orbit (LEO) increases. According to Dr. Bowen, little research has been done to determine the actual orbital capacities of LEO and, furthermore, he raised concern that a general trend toward disposable satellites will only increase the amount of space debris clogging up LEO. To account for the influx of satellites in space, experts advocate for the establishment of a space traffic management (STM) system to prevent collusions. However, while STM continues to be conceptualized, it is not yet implemented. Graziani argues that part of the problem is that STM implies that there will be a unilateral manger–with the connotation being that the United States will lead. Instead of STM, Graziani, proposes the term space traffic coordination to promote multilateralism.

Where does China fit in?

According to Eftimiades, the United States will lose space superiority–continued safe and secure access to the space domain–to China in ten years at its current rate. Currently, the US Space Force maintains superior global SSA as it maintains over a hundred SSA agreements with allies and partners. While China’s current SSA is comparatively weaker to the United States, Eftimiades believes this balance of power will soon shift. Over sixty countries are participating in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its Digital Silk Road program. If half of the world is depending on China for space capabilities and information, then this could inhibit US counterspace actions. The capabilities of small satellites could push back the timeline of Chinese space superiority to ensure Americans and allies continued access to critical space assets like communication and early missile warning satellites.

How are small satellites faring during Russia’s war in Ukraine?

In March 2022, Elon Musk provided Starlink satellite terminals to aid Ukraine’s resistance to the Russian invasion, which have since been recognized as a game-changer for Ukraine’s offensive. Graziani agrees that small satellites have revolutionized the conflict, asserting that, because Ukraine is facing an existential threat, Ukraine was pressed to effectively adopt small satellites technology to survive. Conversely, while the United States is faced with multitude threats, Graziani doubts they will be enough to drive the US military to widely adopt small satellites.

However, Dr. Bowen disagrees that the use of small satellites in Ukraine is groundbreaking. Rather, he argues that it is simply a continuation of militaries integrating space assets into warfighting, a common practice since Operation Desert Storm. The current war illustrates an interesting example: While the conflict has seen an abundance of open-source intelligence, and Russian military locations and assets are commonly broadcasted to the public, the same cannot be said of Ukrainian locations and assets. States can control the flow of information–even with private companies–and Dr. Bowen concludes that there must be information blocking in Russia’s war.

How does the current acquisition process help or hinder the United States?

To maintain US space superiority, the US government must acquire small satellites. However, Graziani asserts that the traditional acquisition systems reinforce failure. While companies are paid for a finished product in the commercial sector, defense contractors are not paid until they deliver a government solution. This outdated model can incentivize defense contractors to purposefully stall innovation as they receive a steady paycheck, whereas companies spend their internal research and development (IRAD) funds without the guarantee of a profit. Until this mindset changes, the commercial sector innovation will always exceed that of the US government.

To speed up the acquisition process, the Space Development Agency (SDA) has made their acquisition process more flexible. According to Trimble, SDA is prioritizing speed and staying on schedule over cost and performance in the procurement process. To address past complaints of private space companies, SDA now clearly outlines their material needs and corresponding time frame from development to launch. This timeline enables the Department of Defense (DoD) to get critical assets into orbit and stimulates the commercial space industry.

The DoD has a mutually beneficial relationship with space industry, as the DoD gets its hands on the latest technology to fill vulnerability gaps and the companies make a profit. One way that SDA is streamlining the acquisition process is with its warfighter council. The council works with practitioners to understand what their near-term needs are so that SDA can being the research and development process early. The acquisition process is critical for the DoD to create a resilient warfighting capability in space.

You can watch “The national security implications of small satellites” here and you can read the corresponding report here. For more information about Forward Defense, visit the website here and subscribe for more.

Madison Littlepage is a Young Global Professional for Forward Defense in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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How can the US and NATO help bring about Russia’s ‘strategic failure’ in Ukraine?

Connor McPartland — Wed, 11 May 2022 23:38:27 +0000

This article is part of the Transatlantic Security Initiative’s Stronger with Allies series, which charts the course forward for the Alliance in conjunction with the 2022 NATO Summit.

With Ukraine having repelled Russian forces near Kyiv, the Kremlin’s war of aggression has entered a new phase: a more limited offensive in eastern Ukraine. As the United States and its transatlantic allies and partners formulate fresh strategies for what will likely be a protracted conflict, there are several factors they must consider, senior officials and experts said at a recent Atlantic Council event.

The US objective is Russian “strategic failure”—militarily, politically and economically— US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander said at the May 2 conference, titled “Priorities for the NATO Summit and Security in Europe.” That would involve in the long term “holding the Russian leadership to account in front of its own population and in front of the global stage,” she said. Wallander’s comments expanded on US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s recent statement that the United States “want[s] to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.”

Priorities for the NATO Summit and security in Europe

As the Russian-initiated war in Ukraine continues and NATO leaders prepare for the upcoming Madrid Summit, the alliance should consider how to adapt to the new strategic reality and maintain a unified transatlantic response to Russian aggression.

Eastern Europe Europe & Eurasia NATO Northern Europe

What Russian accountability will look like is unclear at this point. However, US Senator Thom Tillis (R-NC), speaking at the conference, argued that the United States has to “look ahead to a regime change before we could ever have anything in the way of a productive working relationship with Russia,” and describing Russian President Vladimir Putin as “not fit to serve.”

At the same time, Michael Kofman, research program director at the Russia Studies Program of CNA, cautioned against treating Russia’s comprehensive strategic failure in the war as a foregone conclusion. Indeed, the “trend lines favor Ukraine,” he said. However, changes in Russia’s tactics such as full mobilization could lead to a longer, more drawn-out conflict, Kofman added, addressing the event ahead of the NATO summit scheduled for late June.

The United States and NATO must not learn the wrong lessons from the war, he said. The Russian military, despite taking a beating so far, still presents a real threat. “I’m worried that I’m going to have to spend a lot of years now arguing that [the Russian military] isn’t four feet tall,” said Kofman. When it comes to new defense investments, Alliance members should also avoid relying on broad conclusions about the effectiveness of capabilities in Ukraine, warned former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen (Ret.) James Cartwright.

The United States and NATO allies need to continue and expand their supply of ammunition and heavier artillery weapons that have been a key part of Ukrainian battlefield success against Russia, according to Kofman. Yet, nations supplying Ukraine must also take care that they do not deplete their own stocks of critical weapons systems too much, with the pipeline to produce and replace advanced weapons sent to Ukraine being “quite narrow” in many cases, as described by Kofman. The United States can play a critical role here as the “arsenal of democracy,” harking back to the role it played in World War II, some speakers suggested. US Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT) said that the United States was “going to have to look at ramping up production… to make sure that all of our allies have what they need” to supply Ukraine while maintaining their own supplies.

The Alliance will also need to make major adjustments to its strategy and posture in Eastern Europe, speakers said. Already, allies have shifted significant forces further east, making NATO’s conventional deterrence “the strongest that it has been… in our lifetimes” according to US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities Mara Karlin. Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe Gen (Ret.) Philip M. Breedlove added that NATO has to be ready to “seize the moment” and “move readiness and capability forward” in Europe. More ready and capable forces, including persistent, rotational US deployments to Eastern Europe will help move NATO from a deterrence by punishment posture to deterrence by denial, making it harder for any future Russian attack to take and hold NATO territory.

NATO will also move to finalize its new Strategic Concept this summer, the first new guiding strategy for the Alliance since 2010. “The 2022 edition will definitely be the most challenging,” said Alexander Vershbow, Atlantic Council distinguished fellow, former NATO deputy secretary general, and former US ambassador to Russia. Vershbow agreed with Breedlove, saying that the Strategic Concept should revamp NATO’s defense and deterrence posture by shifting more forces forward. Many of these forces, if and when they are deployed, will go to the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—frontline nations that are some of the Alliance’s most vulnerable members. These countries have long been advocates for increased allied presence in the region. Speaking at the conference, Lithuanian Minister of National Defense Arvydas Anušauskas highlighted increased spending by the country on facilities to enable it to host larger numbers of allied forces in the future.

Throughout the discussion, panelists emphasized that the conflict and the new strategic circumstances that Russia has created in Europe will shape the security dynamic there for the foreseeable future, and the Untied States and its allies in NATO will need to remain focused and united to adapt to this challenge and ensure Russia meets strategic failure. In the words of Michael Kofman, “Security in Europe is an unfinished business, and to me this conflict reflects that.”

Watch the full event

Connor McPartland is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, part of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The post How can the US and NATO help bring about Russia’s ‘strategic failure’ in Ukraine? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Small satellites: The implications for national security

Nicholas Eftimiades — Thu, 05 May 2022 13:00:00 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

REPORT LAUNCH

The small satellites revolution, or the commercial-led launch of smaller and lower-cost satellites, is impacting space security. This Forward Defense report, authored by nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades and produced in partnership with Thales, explores how the US government can leverage small-satellite developments to ensure safe and secure access to and within space.

You can read the Executive summary and select report excerpts below. To read the full report, please click the “Download PDF” button above.

Executive summary

If the United States is to maintain space superiority, it will need to make substantive cultural, doctrinal, and operational changes to its multidimensional relationship with the commercial space industry.
Nicholas Eftimiades

This report examines the relationship between what is often called the commercial “small-satellite revolution” and US national security. The relationship is complex and has many dimensions, not the least of which are organizational behavior, government’s lack of understanding of commercial markets, outdated institutional processes, and a defense bureaucracy unwilling or unable to adapt to the changing environment. It may be worth noting that several of these same problem areas brought about the catastrophe of September 11, 2001. This is not to suggest a “Space Pearl Harbor” event is imminent. However, the threat to space systems will increase proportionately to the degradation of the United States’ ability to maintain space superiority; that is, the ability to ensure safe and secure access to, and in, space.

If the United States is to maintain space superiority, it will need to make substantive cultural, doctrinal, and operational changes to its multidimensional relationship with the commercial space industry. This is because, over the next decade or so, commercial space activities will increase the number of operational satellites by nearly a full order of magnitude, mainly through the development of small satellites. With the growth in the number of satellites come increased capabilities in remote sensing, communications, data processing, and on-orbit operations. A new space ecosystem is coming into being, with profound implications for the world’s security and economic development. The speed at which commercial space companies are putting thousands—soon to be tens of thousands—of satellites into orbit presents unique challenges for US security in space, as well as for deployed armed forces. There will be increased congestion in certain orbits, competition for communications bandwidth, new types of space operations, increased transparency, and a changing threat paradigm. Competing in this changing environment will require the United States to make substantial changes in long-established defense acquisition processes, research and investment strategies, data classification and distribution, and the commercial space regulatory environment.

Key findings

This report explores the trends and technological developments defining the future of the space domain. In doing so, it arrives at six key conclusions.

The United States will most likely lose space superiority to China within the next decade.
The Department of Defense (DoD) and the Intelligence Community (IC) are trying to take advantage of the small-satellite revolution. The IC is increasingly investing in commercial small-satellite data, to increase collection capabilities and provide military support.
The DoD does not generally take a “buy commercial first” approach to space services. Rather, there is an established culture that ignores legislated “commercial first” mandates, and that behavior has become increasingly detrimental to national security interests. Over the last decade, this negative culture has eroded US space superiority, and will continue to do so as the world moves toward quickly developed and deployed, low-cost commercial space systems. For decades, presidential policies directed the executive-branch agencies to buy commercial goods and services before developing government solutions. Almost all of the government and industry experts interviewed for this study believe DoD and the IC ignore those mandates for commercial space capabilities.
To date, no commercial small-satellite service has proven itself viable without government support. Yet, the growth of this industry will dramatically impact US national security.
DoD acquisition processes are designed to reduce risk and, as a result, are ill prepared for the high-speed commercial space environment. Senior DoD leaders are making efforts to speed up acquisition processes for small satellites and associated technologies. The results to date are mixed.
The US Department of Commerce (DoC) Office of Space Commerce (OSC) has made little progress over the last year in executing its responsibilities for Space Traffic Management (STM) and on-orbit mission authorities. Being subordinate to the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) does not allow the office to function at the level required to effectively execute its mission.

Source: Airman 1st Class Dalton Williams, US Air Force Flickr

Commercial space development trends

Technology drivers

Commercial innovation in space launch is one of three significant factors driving the small-satellite revolution. The others are miniaturization of technology and increasing computer processing power. Over the last decade, the cost of launching a kilogram of mass to LEO has decreased by 90 percent.¹ SpaceX reduced satellite launch costs from approximately $200 million (at United Launch Alliance) to approximately $60 million. SpaceX aims to reduce these launch costs to about $5 million.² As the cost of launch is reduced, many more space missions become profitable business models.

Advances in several key technology categories are changing the cost-benefit analysis of the commercial and national security business case to employ small satellites.

Mass Production of Satellites: The cost of creating a satellite could be reduced from its current cost, which is in the tens of millions of dollars, by approximately 10 percent through integrating mass production, according to OneWeb (a proposed network of up to nine hundred satellites providing Internet services). ³ Production time could then be reduced from years to a single day.⁴ Advancing miniaturization technology will continue to reduce satellite size and cost.
Processing Power: Planet, an Earth-imaging satellite company, recently launched eighty-eight “Dove” CubeSat satellites, each about the size of a shoebox.⁵
Time to Market: Production time is significantly lower for small-satellite manufacturers. According to Planet’s website, “the most advanced satellites [are] launching into orbit every 3-4 months,” compared to years between ViaSat 1 and ViaSat 2. (In 2012, ViaSat-1 was a record holder for highest-capacity Ka-band satellite in the world, providing broadband coverage to the continental United States.)

Commercial small-satellite growth trends

Overall, the entire commercial space sector has grown significantly in recent years. Startup space companies garnered 1,212 investments between 2000 and 2020. In the year 2020 alone, three hundred and forty-two companies and individuals invested in one hundred and twenty-four startup space companies in more than one hundred and forty business deals. Total investments in 2020 amounted to $7.6 billion. New investors continue to enter the ecosystem. Among two hundred and eleven first-time investors in 2020, one hundred and seventeen were venture-capital firms, twenty-nine were angel investors, and thirty-eight were corporations. Investors from the United States accounted for 36 percent of all investors in 2020.⁶ It should be noted that not all investors care about advancing the small-satellite industry. Part of the planning cycle for many investors in small-satellite startup companies is a profit-bearing exit strategy.⁷

The global commercial space market is valued annually at $349 billion. In 2018, Morgan Stanley predicted that the space industry would triple in size by 2040. Morgan Stanley’s research identified ninety private companies as being on “the forefront of space disruption.”⁸ Launch and satellite manufacturing companies make up 39 percent of Morgan Stanley’s list of the private space economy, by far the largest segment. In another study, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch projected that the global space industry would reach a value of at least $2.7 trillion in the next three decades (that is, by 2050).⁹

Demographics, consumer markets, and small satellites

Global demographic changes expected over the next decade are creating a large market for small-satellite services, including mobile and broadband communications, entertainment, and remote sensing. According to the European Commission, by 2030

The global middle class is expected to reach 5.3 billion people. This means an additional 2 billion people with more purchasing power than the earth contains today. Most of this growth will be in Asia. By 2030, China and India together will represent 66% of the global middle-class population and 59% of middle-class consumption.¹⁰

With the rise of the global middle class, Morgan Stanley expects demands for space-based and associated services to increase significantly.

“We estimate that the ~$350b Global Space Industry will grow to a $1.1t+ Global Space Economy by 2040. Our Bull Case of ~$1.75t (+400 bps v. Global GDP) assumes global internet penetration goes to 100% by 2040, while our Bear Case of ~$600b (-60 bps v. Global GDP) assumes that the new satellite networks fail.”¹¹

The services feeding into the global space economy are consumer television, consumer broadband, mobile satellite services, remote-sensing services, ground equipment, satellite manufacturing, and space-launch services. In time, other services, such as on-orbit satellite servicing and lunar/asteroid mining, may increase the above numbers.

A view of the BIRDS-2 Satellite Deployment during JSSOD-9 operations. The JEM Small Satellite Orbital Deployer (J-SSOD) provides a novel, safe, small satellite launching capability to the International Space Station (ISS). Source: Serena Aunon-Chancellor, NASA, August 10, 2018, https://images.nasa.gov/details-iss056e130478.

Adversarial space developments

Constellations of hundreds of satellites change the targeting dynamics for US and foreign counterspace capabilities. It is easier for a foreign anti-satellite capability to attack one large target than hundreds of smaller ones… A LEO constellation can suffer the loss of one satellite, or even multiple satellites, and still maintain a degraded capability.
Nicholas Eftimiades

Gen. David Thompson, the Space Force’s vice chief of space operations, has stated that the Space Force responds to “reversible attacks” on US government satellites “every single day,” Thompson further opined that China would surpass the United States as the world’s global space power by the end of the decade.¹ This report concurs with that assessment.

Any foreign small-satellite service, whether government owned or commercial, could put secondary payloads on its satellites to collect against or destroy US systems. For example, on July 15, 2020, Russia demonstrated anti-satellite capabilities by detaching a small subject from its satellite Cosmos 2543 to trail a US National Reconnaissance Office satellite.² Russian satellites conducted similar tests in 2017. These actions threaten US satellites because they can characterize capabilities, interfere with operations, or even destroy the US satellites.

Determining capabilities on foreign small satellites would require exquisite intelligence collection and characterization capabilities, which are difficult now and will be much more so when the numbers of potential threats exponentially increase. The difficulty in determining satellite capabilities was noted as recently as November 2021. The US Space Force reported China’s Shijian 21 in elliptical geostationary transfer orbit as high as 35,813 kilometers above Earth, with an inclination of 28.5 degrees to the equator.³ On November 3, a new object with the international designator 2021-094C was cataloged alongside Shijian (SJ)-21 by Space Force’s 18th Space Control Squadron. The object was believed to be an apogee kick motor (AKM) used to modify its transfer orbit to enter geostationary orbit.

Source: Lewis Carlyle, U.S. Space Command

Uncharacteristically, SJ-21 and the AKM flew alongside each other, which was unusual for a discharged AKM. Based on the synchronized orbits, the unidentified object was suspected to be conducting counterspace operational testing, to include rendezvous and proximity operations or manipulation using SJ-21’s robotic arm.⁴ If the AKM had performed maneuvers, it would not be the first time China deployed a small satellite that flew in formation with its larger host. The Tongxin Jishu Shiyan-3 (TJS-3) satellite released a payload in 2018 that performed coordinated maneuvers (perhaps an attempt to confuse space-tracking networks).⁵ In January 2022, the SJ-21 maneuvered to capture a defunct Chinese satellite (Compass G2) and towed it to a higher (graveyard) orbit. The SJ-21 then returned to its original geosynchronous orbit.

China’s National Defense in the New Era report stated in 2019 that “Outer space is a critical domain in international strategic competition.”⁶ The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) incorporated its plans for space development in its foreign and economic policies. For example, the flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a trillion-dollar global infrastructure-development program engaging one hundred and thirty-eight countries. This program is generally considered the largest of its kind in history.

One component of China’s BRI is the Space Information Corridor. In addition to supporting all the companies China has in the BRI, the Space Information Corridor provides remote sensing, communications, and position, navigation, and timing data to all nations.⁷ The Space Information Corridor almost certainly supports the newly established Belt and Road National Security Intelligence System, which is China’s Ministry of Public Security using private security companies to provide force-protection information relative to the global BRI infrastructure.

In 2015, Beijing launched the Digital Silk Road (DSR) as an integrated part of the BRI and the Space Information Corridor. Chinese telecommunications companies (Huawei, ZTE, Hikvision, etc.) develop the DSR, which supports BRI companies operating overseas. The DSR develops countries’ “telecommunications networks, artificial intelligence capabilities, cloud computing, e-commerce and mobile payment systems, surveillance technology, and smart cities.”⁸ Some reports assess one third of BRI participants have contracts for DSR support.⁹ Press reports over the years identified instances in which collected data through the DSR have been sent to China. China’s cybersecurity law requires Chinese companies to store all data in the People’s Republic of China. China’s National Intelligence Law mandates that Chinese companies assist the government when requested.

The BRI includes other space-related initiatives, including university collaborations and engineering education throughout the emerging world. Through BRI, DSR, and the Space Information Corridor, China has effectively integrated its space programs, intelligence collection, economy, and foreign policy. This is being achieved throughout emerging economies globally by weaving space capabilities and digital infrastructure into China’s global strategy for economic growth and development. If participation continues to grow as expected, China will democratize space for the world. In so doing, it will also dominate space information globally.

Adversarial governments are likely to leverage commercial small satellites for military and intelligence purposes. This threat is difficult to assess, because there is so little information in the public domain and competitor commercial small-satellite networks are not yet fully deployed. It is likely that the threat to US space systems will increase based on

Russia’s use of small satellites to surveil US reconnaissance platforms;
China’s on-orbit proximity operations (testing); and
China’s Academy of Military Science writings on the use of national security space, along with similar publications like the 2019 Defense White Paper and Space Science & Technology Plan 2050

Recommendations

The following key recommendations address areas of US space policy, the regulatory environment, coordination and cooperation with US allies, and support for the commercial space industry. These recommendations have the same goals: to enhance global space security and advance the US commercial space industry. Advancing the US commercial space industry is a critical component of maintaining global space leadership, and ensuring the safety and security of space systems and national security.

Source: SpaceX, Wikimedia Commons

US military, government and civil space

Department of defense and intelligence community

The DoD should ensure the resilience of US space systems by using commercial systems, including responsive space launch and satellite architectures across multiple orbits, and incorporating allied space capabilities.¹⁰
Congress should direct DoD and ODNI to conduct a study to identify national security missions that can be accomplished through commercial space, related services, space communications, and SSA.
Congress should earmark DoD and IC funds for the purchases of those commercial services. This action will force compliance with US law and increase commercial space services driving innovation through competition.
Congress and the administration must conduct rigorous oversight to ensure DoD and Intelligence Community organizations enforce policies (including their own) to “buy commercial first.”
DoD should prototype and acquire small-satellite and related cyber capabilities using OTA and Section 804 authorities. Use of other standard acquisition processes should require a waiver.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff should establish a program to ensure OPSEC is integrated into doctrine and operational activities employing current awareness of commercial space remote-sensing capabilities and intelligence. This program should include training on foreign and commercial technical capabilities to defeat OPSEC. The program should also be integrated with DoD Perception Management and denial and deception efforts.
To ensure deterrence against hostile nations, DoD should develop, coordinate, and exercise response strategies to cyberattacks against US and allied commercial space systems. These CONOPS should be done with the IC, DHS, allies, and private industry. This activity could include the National Guard.
Protocols, treaties, operating rules, etc. will eventually be established by commercial companies as well as governments. The US government (particularly DoD OSD/Space Policy, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the Intelligence Community) should have a well-developed, well-thought-out, brilliantly designed plan for verification and compliance (sensors, networks, analysis standards, communication protocols, etc.) This plan should recognize that much of the data will necessarily be shared globally and, therefore, must be unclassified. The plan will support overall US national security and commercial space strategies.

Other US government actors

DHS plays an important role in supporting the commercial space industry in developing standards and best practices. In May 2021, DHS Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) established a Space Systems Critical Infrastructure Working Group. The working group is a mix of government and industry participants developing strategies to minimize risks to space systems that support the nation’s critical infrastructure.¹¹ CISA has also produced several cybersecurity publications and recommended standards relevant to small-satellite systems.

DHS should lead a study to determine if space systems should be included as one of the national critical-infrastructure sectors. If so, Congress should designate space systems as critical infrastructure, with Department of Commerce as the Sector-Specific Agency.
DHS should continue to strongly advocate private industry’s adoption of the NIST SP 800-37 Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations: A System Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy. This document provides a recommended cybersecurity risk-management framework for commercial satellite operators.
DHS should work with the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency to develop programs that enhance supply-chain security in the commercial space industry.
Programs should include training and information sharing enabled through the Space ISAC.

Department of commerce

The DoC plays a significant role in regulating, overseeing, and advancing the US commercial small-satellite industry. It also has a critical function in establishing US leadership in global Space Traffic Management.

The DoC should purchase commercial SSA data and services, to the maximum extent possible, and secure international data-sharing agreements. DoC should incentivize the private sector to develop innovative analytical tools and advanced services to conduct STM.
Move the Office of Space Commerce out from under NOAA. OSC’s recently expanded responsibilities for STM and mission authorities make it a poor fit under an entity focused on oceanographic and atmospheric administration. Being buried in NOAA puts the OSC in poor position to conduct the required interagency and international coordination.
Congress should affirm that the DoC Office of Space Commerce has the requisite on-orbit authorities to allow it to promulgate regulations for on-orbit mission operations that fall outside the current licensing and supervision framework.
Congress should ensure DoC has appropriate funding to conduct the STM mission and execute it with a “commercial first” approach.
OSC should fully embrace commercial SSA providers through contracts. It is imperative that this office live up to the requirement to “buy commercial first,” which it has not done to date.
The OSC should provide clear, deliberate direction to acquire, prioritize, implement, and deploy existing commercial SSA and STM services.

Commercial space actors

One of the challenges facing the small-satellite industry is educating and helping to reorient the DoD and IC. For generations, the US defense and intelligence communities had little concern for economic security and advancing domestic commercial industries. A hostile and competitive rising China has altered the global situation, necessitating closer cooperation between the US national security community and commercial space providers.

Small-satellite and related industry associations should enhance and coordinate efforts to educate relevant government departments on capabilities, emerging technologies, and the market case for commercial satellites.

US allies and partners

The US faces many foreign policy challenges, including a rising hostile authoritarian China and aggressive military actions from Russia. Space security is a foundational element of ensuring peace with these strategic competitors. The United States must expand its efforts in space diplomacy to ensure coordinated action with allies and establish global standards with partners.

The Department of State, DoD Office of Space Policy, and Department of Commerce should enhance space diplomatic efforts with the following goals.
Increase the urgency to establish behavioral norms for space systems, particularly
Rendezvous and proximity operations;
notifications and guidelines;
orbital debris and guidelines; and
cybersecurity standards.
Support commercial space industry efforts to enhance Track 2 international collaboration and coordination.
Establish the US as the global leader and provider of STM.
Develop an interagency process for unclassified and classified STM and SSA data to be used in international forums.

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About the author

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Nicholas Eftimiades