Conflict - Atlantic Council

Dispatch from Odesa: Russia escalates its naval war against Ukraine

Michael Bociurkiw — Fri, 21 Jul 2023 17:56:02 +0000

In recent days, the front line of Moscow’s aggression against Ukraine appears to have shifted south toward the Black Sea—placing major port cities such as Mykolaiv and Odesa directly in the crosshairs of a Russian naval buildup that began just before its full-scale invasion in February 2022.

While exact numbers are difficult to come by, the bulk of recent missile strikes on Ukrainian targets such as Odesa have originated in the Black Sea. One estimate put the Russian amphibious assault ship increase at the start of the full-scale invasion as equivalent of an additional one-and-a-half battalion tactical groups. Earlier this week, Russia carried out a live fire “exercise” against potential maritime targets in the northwestern part of the sea.

Russia’s daily strikes on Ukrainian targets along the Black Sea coast represent an extraordinary escalation. They mark a shift in Russian strategy toward leveraging missile batteries in occupied Crimea with Kh-22 and P-800 Oniks anti-ship cruise missiles, which typically fly at extremely high speed and, as they reach their targets, can descend to low altitude (as low as thirty-two feet) along the water or land, making them difficult to intercept.

Some residents here in Odesa have responded by heading to safer ground in the countryside or overseas, but for the most part I’m detecting the same irrepressible resilience that was on display in the earlier months of the war.

While it’s doubtful Russia plans to decimate Odesa to the extent that it laid waste to Mariupol, the force with which it is pounding the southern port region has folks here worrying. After all, in one night alone, Russian forces launched at least thirty cruise missiles, primarily from ships in the Black Sea, according to the Ukrainian Air Force. One strike came dangerously close to the Chinese consulate and damaged a wall of the building. Some residents here in Odesa have responded by heading to safer ground in the countryside or overseas, but for the most part I’m detecting the same irrepressible resilience that was on display in the earlier months of the war.

The Kremlin has significantly escalated tensions after torpedoing the Black Sea Grain Initiative on Monday, attacking Odesa port infrastructure and then issuing a unilateral declaration from the Russian Ministry of Defense that all Black Sea vessels sailing to Ukrainian ports will be considered potential carriers of military cargo. The statement added that no matter which flags the vessels carry, they would be considered on Kyiv’s side.

If there are any lingering doubts about the lengths Russia will go to choke off Ukraine’s agricultural exports, just read the words of RT editor-in-chief and Kremlin propagandist Margarita Simonyan: “All our hope is in a famine… The famine will start now, and they will lift the sanctions and be friends with us, because they will realize it is necessary.”

The Ukrainian Defense Ministry said in a Telegram post on Thursday that the move “deliberately creates a military threat on trade routes, and the Kremlin has turned the Black Sea into a danger zone.”

In a savvy retaliatory move, Ukraine’s defense ministry shot back with its own announcement that, starting July 21, it, too, will begin to consider all Russia-bound vessels as carrying military cargo. Kyiv also declared the northeastern part of the Black Sea a closed military area. That could potentially make it more expensive—if not impossible—for commercial ships bound for Russian ports, such as major oil exporting harbor Novorossiysk, to obtain insurance.

A wild card in all of this is Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, one of the few NATO leaders able to speed dial both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. While Erdoğan was unable to salvage the grain deal, he does have the ability to turn up the heat on Putin by, for example, insisting that ships sailing to and from Russia have sufficient insurance coverage. A few weeks back, Turkey made life difficult for Russian and Belarusian airlines by suspending the provision of refueling and servicing of their Boeing and Airbus aircraft at Turkish airports. Erdoğan and Putin are reportedly scheduled to meet in person in August.

Russian friends in the Middle East and Africa, such as Egypt, which relies heavily on Ukrainian grain imports, need to further step up pressure on Moscow to reopen commercial shipping lanes across the Black Sea. Ethiopia, the host country to the African Union, received almost 300,000 tons of food from Ukraine under the grain initiative—and another 90,000 tons of grain as part of a separate initiative, Zelenskyy said. Ethiopia is one of seven countries in East Africa experiencing unprecedented levels of food insecurity, according to the World Food Program. South Africa and the African Union can help stave off further hunger on the continent with sanctions against Russia should Moscow continue to blockade food exports from Ukraine.

Meanwhile, on land, at the northern end of a 620-mile front line, Russia has been quietly amassing 100,000 soldiers at the Lyman-Kupiansk axis, according to Serhii Cherevatyi, spokesman for the Eastern Group of Ukraine’s armed forces. Cherevatyi said that the manpower buildup is almost equal to the 120,000 troops Moscow had deployed to Afghanistan during the height of Soviet invasion in 1979-1989. The Russian soldiers are reportedly being backed up with 900 tanks, 555 artillery systems and 370 multiple launch rocket systems.

With two of Odesa’s main industries seriously hampered—the port and the tourism and hospitality sector—it is unclear how much longer Ukraine’s jewel on the Black Sea coast can endure Russia’s onslaught without stronger support from Western allies. Now that Russia has crossed yet another red line with the targeting of infrastructure crucial to the global food supply chain, Western capitals need to counter Russian aggression with fresh responses—including the deployment of armed flotillas to escort commercial ships carrying agriculture products from Ukrainian ports or providing significantly more Patriot missile batteries that can intercept incoming Russian cruise missiles.

At the end of the day the question needs to be asked: Why is it that a small group of men in the Kremlin get to decide the fate of hundreds of millions of people around the world and whether they have food on their plates?

Michael Bociurkiw is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Prepare for the worst: Five steps for leaders in an age of crises

Elizabeth Sizeland and Veera Parko — Fri, 21 Jul 2023 10:37:06 +0000

Crises are guaranteed: war and pandemics, infrastructure failures and terror threats, extreme weather and climate disasters. In a world in which extreme events seem to be increasing in frequency and severity, policymakers and government officials need to do more to prepare for them.

That means gleaning emerging lessons on preparedness from crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, even if they take years to fully understand, while also preparing for worst-case scenarios in other areas. Doing so is time-consuming and expensive, but ultimately sensible and proportionate. Ukraine, for instance, withstood Russia’s cyber aggression in the early part of Moscow’s 2022 military campaign by drawing on lessons learned from prior threats, investing in cybersecurity, and building effective international partnerships.

Why does proactive leadership matter in a time of crisis? Preparedness and resilience—including a genuine commitment and actual follow-through—are the cornerstones of a government’s ability to address the emerging impacts of a crisis effectively while simultaneously accomplishing broader goals. Areas of crisis work such as mass fatalities management, mass evacuation and shelter, and continuity of government can feel almost fanciful or alarmist for officials who are not in the day-to-day business of understanding relative risk. And this kind of work competes for resources with more politically attractive and immediate needs. Yet, to protect societies in a manner proportionate to the risks they face, it is essential that politicians across the political spectrum, together with senior officials, consistently champion the resourcing needs of national preparedness and shepherd them through often reluctant governmental systems. Insufficient preparation and a lack of up-front investment will have severe consequences, both economically and in terms of human welfare.

No government will say it doesn’t care about these issues, but the practical steps and leadership focus on long-term improvement and innovation are often lacking. Yes, it can be a daunting task for any government. But the last few years have shown that addressing some of the fundamentals will never be a bad investment. With that in mind, here are five steps policymakers should take to build resilience for the next crisis.

1. Shore up the foundations

Now is the time to focus on the undervalued but important work of organizing systems for success. A government’s ability to assess and, crucially, to communicate relative risk lies at the heart of this. Governments with a clear national strategy that sets out priority activities for the whole of society will give themselves a solid foundation: Finland’s comprehensive security model is a good example of this, and the United Kingdom recently published its own resilience framework. The basics of governance and resourcing are especially important to ensure that key institutions locally and nationally are engaged and have the leadership, skills, resources, and facilities needed to plan for and respond to crises.

Evidence shows that it’s a false economy not to invest in crisis preparation and resilience. Munich Re, a multinational insurer based in Germany, estimates that natural disasters in 2021 cost $280 billion globally—of which only $120 billion was insured. And that doesn’t include the unquantifiable individual and societal impacts of such events. Crisis preparation needs to be protected even when new priorities appear because stripping resources from preparedness functions inevitably results in critical gaps when future crises hit.

In addition, governments need to place a high value on the deeply unglamorous work of putting in place structures and governance to ensure momentum and oversight to deliver a clear plan of work—the absence of which will quickly become a critical weakness. Consistent and energetic leadership together with clear accountability on resilience really matters.

2. Exploit technology wisely

Many governments have vastly underestimated and underimagined the utility of science and technology in risk management. Governments need more curiosity among leadership teams about how technology can be harnessed to assess risk and support decision makers. Challenging the status quo to develop new capabilities that fuse the best of technical knowledge with traditional risk-management expertise offers some exciting potential.

The United Kingdom’s new National Situation Centre is a vanguard example of how data science can help officials anticipate and navigate unfolding emergencies by bringing together public and government information to answer tough questions. Fusing all-source data in this way has already proved useful in managing risks around major national events, such as the 2021 Group of Seven (G7) summit, as well as anticipating risk during periods of extreme weather. Synthetic environments could also provide safe and low-cost ways of working through crises and decisions, using data and information to simulate a crisis scenario and testing different courses of action to see what the impacts might be. In addition, recent advances in artificial intelligence can help professionals by flagging risks to consider and manage before they become acute.

3. Understand supply chains

The interdependencies of supply chains are extremely complex, and the threat of disruption is now a regular occurrence. The impacts of supply chain disruptions on national security can be severe, even life-threatening. The COVID-19 pandemic provided a salutary lesson in how medical supply chains can unravel, leaving countries struggling for basic resources to manage the critical health of the population. And much of the world’s production of key technology components happens in areas with considerable risk of natural hazards or geopolitical conflict.

Most worryingly, the West’s adversaries often have a better understanding of supply chain vulnerabilities than Western governments do. Investing in professional technical teams to collate and exploit data will help to anticipate risk and support both governments and the commercial sector to shore up vulnerabilities before they are exposed by events or deliberately exploited.

4. Invest in practical international partnerships

The cost of preparedness for high-impact but low-probability events is huge. Investing in outreach, understanding work in other countries, and finding like-minded international partners are smart options for governments. International cooperation can create extra capacity to respond to many kinds of events.

Why do it alone if you can pool resources such as niche medical capacities or highly specialized chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) expertise? Many countries are already doing this: for example, the European Union is coordinating its civilian aid to Ukraine through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and building CBRN equipment stockpiles in different countries. Governments should continually benchmark each other’s best practices, bilaterally or through multilateral bodies—something NATO does well. Governments could make use of guidelines and objectives developed in international fora, such as NATO’s seven baseline requirements for national resilience. In a moment of crisis, close personal contacts between crisis management officials is extremely useful; key officials need time to develop these relationships before crises hit.

5. Adopt a whole-of-society approach

There are some things only a nation-state can do to prepare and respond to crises, but that is only one piece in the jigsaw puzzle. Local governments, individuals, academia, commercial entities, and charities all play an extremely important part in underpinning a country’s resilience: supporting this at a national level is vital.

Governments need to engage across society to develop a “preparedness mindset” that inspires everyone to understand their role and take responsibility. This means sharing as much information as possible before and during crises to empower everyone in society to make sensible decisions. It also means engaging early with parts of industry to generate solutions, something that worked well during the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of developing new vaccines in record time with support from governments. Engagement in government-led risk scenario exercises and improvements to governments’ crisis communication also are key factors in broad societal resilience in the face of serious disasters. For example, both Sweden and Finland have invested in upskilling individuals and organizations so that they can understand risk and can act in their own best interest. This reduces the burden on government, leaving officials to manage only what governments alone can handle.

Heeding the wake-up call

The COVID-19 pandemic and the horrors of conventional warfare in Ukraine should have had a profound impact on how seriously governments take the work of resilience professionals, both nationally and locally. Yet, this area of national security is still underinvested in and rarely placed center stage. Chronic risks like climate change only reinforce the need to prepare and equip the whole of society to be more resilient. Western governments cannot afford to sleep through the wake-up call that recent emergencies have sounded.

With so many live, high-pressure issues to manage, it is hard for any government to prioritize planning for future risk. But, when severe crises inevitably arise, governments rarely regret having invested time, resources, and consistent focus in this field. Now is the time for governments to learn from the past and place resilience and preparedness at the heart of their national security strategies.

Elizabeth Sizeland is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and a former UK deputy national security adviser.

Veera Parko is a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Congress and the Presidency and director of international affairs at the Finnish Ministry of the Interior (currently on leave).

The post Prepare for the worst: Five steps for leaders in an age of crises appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Wagner is still in business in Africa

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 20 Jul 2023 20:22:35 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Ukrainian attack damages Kerch Bridge

Russia accused Ukraine of conducting a drone strike against the Kerch Strait Bridge on July 17. The bridge, also known as the Crimean Bridge, connects Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula with Russia’s Krasnodar region. The bridge is used for civilian movement and as an essential logistical route for the Russian army.

Explosions were reported at around 3:00 a.m. local time. Footage of the aftermath indicates that a span of the bridge’s road had collapsed while another suffered damage but remained intact. Traffic reportedly resumed several hours after the explosion, but in the interim, occupation authorities asked civilians to consider alternate evacuation routes. Russian Telegram channels reported extensive traffic jams in Crimea’s Dzhankoi area and in the occupied Kherson region towards Melitopol.

Ukraine defense intelligence spokesperson Andrii Yusov told Suspilne News that damage to the bridge could create logistical difficulties for Russian forces, but said Kyiv would not comment on the cause of the explosion. CNN, citing a source in the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), reported that the attack on the bridge was a joint operation of the SBU and Ukrainian naval forces. Ukrainian media outlet LIGA also reported that the SBU and Ukrainian naval forces were responsible for the attack, citing sources in the SBU. LIGA also noted that the strike was likely conducted with surface drones. The SBU said that information about the incident would only be revealed once the war ended. Some Russian military bloggers, including former Russian officer and pro-war nationalist Igor Girkin, stated that Russian authorities had focused too heavily on road security and not enough on maritime security. Alexander Kots, another prominent blogger and Kremlin-appointed Russian Human Rights Council member, also blamed Russian authorities for focusing too much on land security.

Natalia Humeniuk, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command, speculated without evidence that the attack may have been a provocation by Russia amid talks on prolonging the Black Sea Grain Initiative. The grain deal, brokered by Turkey and the United Nations in July 2022, has been essential for stemming a global surge in food prices. The agreement, necessitated after the Russian navy blocked all Ukrainian ports, permits Ukraine to export products. It has has been prolonged several times, with the last extension expiring on July 17. The Kremlin announced on July 17 that it had suspended its participation in the initiative but claimed that the decision was unrelated to the bridge attack.

Meanwhile, about twenty-four hours after the attack on the Kerch Bridge, explosions were heard in Odesa in southern Ukraine. Unconfirmed reports claimed the explosions were a response from Russia. The attack on Odesa continued for a second night on July 19, described by Ukrainian officials as “hellish.” Odesa is an essential port for Ukrainian exports and was allowed to remain open under the conditions of the grain deal.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Wagner moves soldiers to Belarus following apparent disbandment in Russia

The Wagner Group appears to have disbanded its operations in Russia and relocated to Belarus, according to footage reviewed by the DFRLab documenting the movements of Wagner military columns in the days following the mutiny through July 18. Additionally, satellite imagery captured the entry of troops and equipment at the Tsel military camp, located near the Belarusian town of Asipovichy.

On July 17, a video shared on Telegram depicted Wagner soldiers taking down the Russian flag and the Wagner flag at the group’s original military base in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, Russia. In another video published on July 19, Prigozhin addressed Wagner fighters as they left the Molkino base, describing the situation on the front as “a shame.” In addition, he declared that the group is relocating to Belarus and will focus on its activities in Africa. For the time being, he said, Wagner soldiers are no longer participating in Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, although they “will perhaps return to the special military operation at the moment when [they] are sure [they] will not be forced to shame ourselves.”

Russian "military correspondent" published a video of the flags taken down in a Wagner PMC camp in Molkino, Ryazan region.

The base is now officially closed. pic.twitter.com/d3tqVXzqr0
— Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) July 17, 2023

Shortly after the mutiny ended, Russian authorities conducted raids on Wagner’s accounting divisions in Saint Petersburg, according to information purportedly shared by the wives and mothers of Wagner fighters in an online forum. Additional raids took place on Prigozhin’s residence. The movements of Prigozhin’s private jet also indicate frequent travel to Belarus over the past three weeks.

An investigation by Belarusian opposition media outlet Motolko.help revealed a photograph of a man resembling Prigozhin in his undergarments allegedly at the Tsel military base, where he reportedly spent the night on July 12. According to flight data posted on the online portal Radarbox, Prigozhin’s personal Embraer Legacy 600 jet, registration number RA-02795, completed four round-trip flights between Belarus’ Machulishchy air base and Russia.

Radar imagery acquired on July 17 also shows the tents where Wagner fighters appear to be housed and several places for vehicles parked inside the military base.

SAR imagery of Tsel military camp in Belarus, taken on July 17, 2023. (Source: DFRLab via Capella Space)

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Wagner vehicle columns are seen driving from Voronezh to Belarus

On July 16, several videos emerged on Telegram documenting Wagner vehicles departing Voronezh Oblast along Russia’s M-4 Don highway. Utilizing social media footage, the DFRLab determined the location of the vehicles and identified forty registration plates. At least two-thirds of these vehicles displayed military registration plates from the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic. However, the Belarusian monitoring project Belaruski Hajun reported that many other vehicles used tape to cover their registration plates.

The columns are composed of various buses and trucks, of which only a few could transfer construction equipment. Most of the convoys consist of UAZ Patriot pickup trucks, Ural vans, and Lada cars. No heavy military equipment was observed at the time of writing.

Screenshots show a UAZ Patriot pickup truck (top) and a Mitsubishi pickup truck (bottom) bearing military registration plates from the Luhansk People’s Republic. A police car escorted the trucks one hundred kilometers south of Voronezh on July 14, 2023. (Source: Telegram/archive)

Another video shared on the Russian Telegram channel VChK-OPGU revealed a Wagner convoy of soldiers entering Belarusian territory. According to a post by Belaruski Hajun, at least sixty vehicles entered Belarus through Mogilev Oblast in the early hours of June 15 using the R-43 and M-5 roads. A photograph on Telegram showed the Russian and Wagner Group flags flying at a border outpost.

According to Belaruski Hajun, since July 14, nine distinct military convoys have entered Belarusian territory. They are likely located at the Tsel military camp near Asipovichy. The camp is home to military unit 61732 and was previously identified by Verstka Media as a potential site to accommodate Wagner soldiers. Further, the Belarusian military TV channel VoyenTV posted a video on July 14 showing Wagner soldiers arriving in Belarus and training local forces. According to updated estimates from Belaruski Hajun, as many as 2,500 Wagner members may have relocated to the Tsel military camp since last week.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Russian officials and state media change their tune about the Kerch Bridge attack after Kremlin announces terror investigation

In the immediate aftermath of the July 17 attack on the Kerch Bridge, Russian officials and state media were relatively mild in their initial language addressing the incident, referring to it as an “emergency.” However, once Kremlin agencies began referring to the attack as a “terror act,” state media and officials began changing their language to follow the Kremlin.

“Traffic was stopped on the Crimean bridge: an emergency occurred in the area of the 145th support from the Krasnodar territory,” Sergei Aksenov, the Russian-installed head of occupied Crimea, wrote on his Telegram channel at 4:21 a.m. local time. Notably, Aksenov did not use the words “explosion,” “attack,” or “terror” to describe the destruction of the bridge. Two subsequent posts, made at 5:03 a.m. and 6:59 a.m., also avoided these terms. It wasn’t until 1:51 p.m. that Aksenov used the phrase “terror act” to describe the attack.

In between Aksenov’s posts, Russia’s National Antiterrorism Committee reported at 10:04 a.m. that they had assessed the Kerch Bridge explosion as a “terror act,” according to Kremlin-owned news agency TASS. Several minutes later at 10:07 a.m., Russia’s Investigative Committee announced that it would open a criminal case investigating the “terror act” on the Kerch Bridge.

Several Kremlin-owned Russian media outlets, including RIA Novosti and TASS, also used the term “emergency” (“чрезвычайное прошествие” or ЧП) to first describe the bridge explosion before later pivoting to using “terror act.” Neither outlet referred to the destruction of the Kerch Bridge as a “terror act” prior to the official announcements from the Investigative Committee and Antiterrorism Committee. In the case of RIA Novosti, they published a story using the word “emergency” in the headline at 11:41 a.m., more than ninety minutes after the terror investigation announcement, while TASS used the term as late as 7:31 p.m., even though it had already published a report on the investigation. Similarly, many other Kremlin-controlled media outlets, like Komsomolskaya Pravda, Gazeta.ru, RBC, Lenta.ru, and Izvestiya used both “emergency” and “terror act” in their publications throughout the day interchangeably.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

FSB colonel alleged to be behind popular Telegram channel detained for extortion

According to Russian media outlet RBC, former Federal Security Service (FSB) Colonel Mikhail Polyakov, the purported administrator of the Telegram channel Kremlevskaya Prachka (“Kremlin Laundress”), was detained for suspected extortion. The press office for the Moscow court released a statement that said Polyakov is “suspected of extorting 40 million rubles [around $440,000] from JSC Lanit, the leader of the Russian industry of information technology.”

“According to the prosecution, from 2020 to 2023, Polyakov received a large sum of money from a group of IT companies for not publishing information (the so-called ‘negative block’) that could cause significant harm to the rights and legitimate interests of Lanit JSC and the management of Lanit JSC,” the Moscow court continued. The “negative block” is a guarantee that a channel will not mention a particular person or a company in a negative light in exchange for money; this is reportedly a popular practice among Russian Telegram channels.

The independent Russian media outlet Vazhnyye Istorii (“Important Stories”), citing a source close to Russian intelligence services, reported that Polyakov was behind the Kremlevskaya Prachka Telegram channel. According to the outlet, Polyakov supervised an unnamed service at the FSB’s Office for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. In addition, he reportedly oversaw pro-government Telegram channels and was engaged in promoting the Kremlin’s agenda via media and social networks. According to Important Stories, he worked in coordination with Vladimir Putin’s deputy chief of staff, Sergey Kiriyenko.

Important Stories noted that the Telegram channel 112 also named Polyakov as Kremlevskaya Prachka’s administrator, along with the Telegram channels Siloviki, Nezigar, and Brief, which are not as staunchly pro-govern cited by Kremlin propagandists and proxies.

Kremlevskaya Prachka has not posted since the evening of July 13, corresponding with the reported detainment of Polyakov.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Wagner continues to advertise its services in Africa

On July 16, the Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel REVERSE SIDE OF THE MEDAL posted an advertisement offering Wagner’s services to African states. The post included an image from the Prigozhin-funded film, Granite, as well as an email address, seemingly for interested African countries to communicate with Wagner.

In French, the advertisement reads: “PMC Wagner offers its services to ensure the sovereignty of states and protect the people of African from militants and terrorists.” The fine print emphasizes that “various forms of cooperation are possible,” as long as the cooperation does not “contradict Russia’s interests.” Russia’s interests are not specified.

While the Telegram channel claimed the advertisement was replicated on African social media channels, the DFRLab has not found additional evidence to support this claim.

Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel shared an advertisement for Wagner’s services in Africa, claiming it was widely circulated on the continent. (Source: rsotmdivision)

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Wagner troops arrive in Central African Republic ahead of critical referendum

Alexander Ivanov, director of the Officer’s Union for International Security (COSI), released a statement on COSI’s Telegram channel regarding the recent arrival of dozens of Wagner operatives in Central African Republic. According to US authorities, COSI is a front company for the Wagner Group in Central African Republic.

In the statement, Ivanov confirmed the Wagner troop rotation while stressing that the new personnel have no contract with Russia’s Ministry of Defense. He reiterated that both in CAR and across the continent, “security work is carried out by private companies that enter into contracts directly with the governments of sovereign states,” and that these private companies have nothing to do with official Russian state entities. Ivanov also indicated that this staff rotation should not impact the activities of Russia in Ukraine, and he claimed to have been in contact with Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Notably, Ivanov stated that despite the recent changes in the structure of Wagner’s “African business,” Prigozhin “intends not to curtail, but to expand his presence in Africa.” This is somehow consistent with what some analysts are observing: Wagner appears to be trying to expand its presence in West African coastal states increasingly threatened by a spillover of the jihadist insurgency from the Sahel, or possibly taking advantage of upcoming elections in several fragile African countries.

Although Ivanov has often remarked on Wagner activities in CAR and Africa in the past, this statement, coupled with other recent comments, suggest that the COSI director might be now exercising a wider role as spokesman for all Wagner activity in Africa, as Wagner reorganizes its structure in the wake of last month’s failed mutiny.

The statement comes as a U-turn in recent communications over Wagner’s presence in CAR. In past weeks both CAR and Russian officials stated that the African republic had an agreement with Russia and not with a private military company. Ivanov seems to be returning to earlier narratives in which Wagner claimed that the CAR government signed an agreement with the PMC and not the Russian government. This narrative seems to confirm DFRLab reporting in the June 30 edition of the Russian War Report, in which we noted that denying direct links to Wagner’s actions in Africa has become more difficult for the Kremlin after recent events damaged the principle of plausible deniability, which had previously been a key aspect of Wagner’s success in Africa. However, Russia does not want to waste the network of influence built by its state proxy forces and is now attempting to reorganize, rebrand and develop a new narrative around Wagner and the Kremlin’s ability to conduct hybrid warfare.

The arrival of dozens of troops from Russia’s Wagner in CAR comes at a critical time as the country prepares to hold a constitutional referendum on July 30 that would eliminate presidential term limits and allow President Faustin-Archange Touadéra to extend his term. The CAR government stated earlier this month that Wagner operatives will help in securing the referendum. This could be seen as a strong signal from Moscow to reiterate the strategic importance of its influence in CAR and reassure local partners of its continued support, while sending a message of continuity and strength to other countries in the region where Wagner operates.

—Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

Lavrov to replace Putin at BRICS summit

The Office of South Africa’s Presidency announced on July 19 that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov would replace President Vladimir Putin at the upcoming Summit of BRICS Nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) “by mutual agreement.”

In Russian media, pro-Kremlin and opposition news outlets alike posted articles claiming that Russia had refused South Africa’s proposal to send Lavrov as head of the country’s delegation on July 14. Quoting an interview with South Africa’s deputy president, the Russian pro-Kremlin news outlet RTVI suggested that “negotiations are still ongoing.”

Putin is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged war crimes committed during Russia’s war in Ukraine. A warrant for the arrest of both the Russian president and Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova alleges that they were involved in organizing and participating in the deportation of Ukrainian children. As a signatory to the Rome Statute, which established the ICC, South Africa would have been obligated to arrest Putin had he attended the BRICS Summit in August.

South Africa’s largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, took to court in a petition to force the government to arrest Putin if he did attend. In a responding affidavit, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa stated that Russia would view South Africa arresting Putin as a “declaration of war.”

The Kremlin denied claims that Moscow had threatened South African authorities. However, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said on July 19 that “it is clear to everyone in the world what an attempt to encroach on the head of the Russian Federation means.”

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate, London, United Kingdom and Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

The post Russian War Report: Wagner is still in business in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“Pariah” Putin forced to cancel travel plans over fears of war crimes arrest

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 20 Jul 2023 19:52:16 +0000

Vladimir Putin will not be traveling to South Africa in August for a summit of BRICS leaders, it was confirmed this week. The change of plan reflects fears in Moscow that the Russian dictator may face arrest for war crimes if he attends the annual event in Johannesburg. In early 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Putin over his alleged role in the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. As an ICC signatory nation, South Africa would have been expected to arrest Putin if he entered the country.

South African officials will likely be relieved by Putin’s decision to skip the summit. For months, they have sought to prevent a potential confrontation with the Kremlin over the issue, with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa even reportedly requesting permission from the International Criminal Court for some form of exemption in order to avoid arresting Putin during the summit. with tensions mounting ahead of the summit, South Africa Deputy President Paul Mashatile admitted in a July 14 interview that the best option would be for Putin to stay away. “The Russians are not happy, though,” he commented. “They want him to come.”

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Moscow’s earlier eagerness for Putin to attend the summit is easy to understand. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia’s relationship with the Western world has reached its lowest point since the Cold War. The Kremlin has sought to counter perceptions of mounting international isolation by emphasizing continued engagement with non-Western nations such as the BRICS grouping, which brings together Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. With this in mind, Putin’s attendance of the August summit was seen as an important signal that Russia could not be isolated and remained a major force in global affairs.

With Russian prestige at stake, Kremlin officials reportedly pressed their South African counterparts hard over the issue. Indeed, in a court affidavit made public earlier this week, President Ramaphosa claimed any attempt to detain Putin could lead to war between Russia and South Africa. “I must highlight, for the sake of transparency, that South Africa has obvious problems with executing a request to arrest and surrender President Putin,” he said. “Russia has made it clear that arresting its sitting president would be a declaration of war.”

Russia’s efforts to pressure South Africa clearly failed, leading to the July 19 announcement that Putin would not be attending. This exercise in damage limitation makes perfect sense. Speculation over Putin’s possible arrest in South Africa was rapidly becoming a PR disaster for the Kremlin, drawing attention to his status as a suspected war criminal and undermining his strongman persona. Meanwhile, headlines claiming Moscow had threatened South Africa with war if the country dared to arrest Putin for war crimes did little to enhance Russia’s reputation as a credible partner. With South African officials unwilling or unable to provide the necessary assurances, the only remaining option was to cancel the visit entirely.

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This forced cancellation is the latest in a series of very public humiliations for Putin, who is struggling to maintain his authority as the full-scale invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel. The March 2023 ICC decision to charge him with war crimes dealt a powerful blow to Putin’s standing at a time when unprecedented sanctions and revelations of Russian atrocities in Ukraine had already made him a toxic figure. Weeks later, he was forced to cancel traditional Victory Day parades in cities across Russia amid rumors of shortages in both troops and tanks due to heavy losses in Ukraine.

Putin’s most humiliating moment came in late June, when units of Russia’s state-funded paramilitary Wagner Group staged a mutiny and briefly threatened to seize control of the country. The Wagner uprising ended as suddenly as it had begun, but not before mutinous troops had captured one of Russia’s largest cities without a fight and marched virtually unopposed to within 200 kilometers of Moscow. The mutiny exposed the fragility of the current regime and the lack of popular support for Putin himself; while crowds of ordinary Russians flocked to cheer Wagner rebels, nobody rallied to defend the country’s current ruler.

The Wagner episode may have played a role in this week’s decision to miss the forthcoming summit in South Africa. With Putin looking weaker than at any point in his 23-year reign, there is widespread speculation that it is only a matter of time before he faces fresh domestic challenges. Coups are often staged when dictators leave the security of their capitals and few in Moscow will have forgotten the failed KGB coup of 1991, which took place in August while Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was in Crimea.

The Kremlin’s inability to find a way for Putin to attend next month’s BRICS summit in South Africa is a clear indication of Russia’s declining influence on the global stage. Ten years ago, Putin was a respected statesman and the leader of a G8 nation. Today, he must plan his international travel based on the likelihood of being arrested for war crimes. Commenting on Putin’s canceled South Africa visit, US State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller said there was “no better illustration” of Russia’s vastly diminished standing in the world. “President Putin can hardly leave his own borders now,” he noted. “He’s an international pariah who can barely leave his own borders for fear of arrest.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Prior to the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the Ukrainian tech sector boasted around 5,000 companies. Ukrainian IT Association data for 2022 indicates that just two percent of these companies ceased operations as a result of the war, while software exports actually grew by 23% during the first six months of the year, underlining the sector’s robustness. Thanks to this resilience, the Ukrainian tech sector has been able to continue business relationships with its overwhelmingly Western clientele, including many leading international brands and corporations. According to a July 2022 New York Times report, Ukrainian IT companies managed to maintain 95% of their contracts despite the difficulties presented by the war.

In a world where digital skills are increasingly defining military outcomes, Ukraine’s IT prowess is also providing significant battlefield advantages. Of the estimated 300,000 tech professionals in the country, around three percent are currently serving in the armed forces, while between 12 and 15 percent are contributing to the country’s cyber defense efforts. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s IT ecosystem, hardened by years of defending against Russian cyber aggression, is now integral to the nation’s defense.

A range of additional measures have been implemented since February 2022 to enhance Ukrainian cyber security and safeguard government data from Russian attacks. Steps have included the adoption of cloud infrastructure to back up government data. Furthermore, specialized teams have been deployed to government data centers with the objective of identifying and mitigating Russian cyber attacks. To ensure effective coordination and information sharing, institutions like the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection serve as central hubs, providing updates on Russian activities and the latest threats to both civilian and government entities.

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Today’s Ukraine is often described as a testing ground for new military technologies, but it is important to stress that Ukrainians are active participants in this process who are in many instances leading the way with new innovations ranging from combat drones to artillery apps. This ethos is exemplified by initiatives such as BRAVE1, which was launched by the Ukrainian authorities in 2023 as a hub for cooperation between state, military, and private sector developers to address defense issues and create cutting-edge military technologies. BRAVE1 has dramatically cut down the amount of time and paperwork required for private sector tech companies to begin working directly with the military; according to Ukraine’s defense minister, this waiting period has been reduced from two years to just one-and-a-half months.

One example of Ukrainian tech innovation for the military is the Geographic Information System for Artillery (GIS Arta) tool developed in Ukraine in the years prior to Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion. This system, which some have dubbed the “Uber for artillery,” optimizes across variables like target type, position, and range to assign “fire missions” to available artillery units. Battlefield insights of this nature have helped Ukraine to compensate for its significant artillery hardware disadvantage. The effectiveness of tools like GIS Arta has caught the attention of Western military planners, with a senior Pentagon official saying Ukraine’s use of technology in the current war is a “wake-up call.”

Alongside intensifying cooperation with the state and the military, members of Ukraine’s tech sector are also taking a proactive approach on the digital front of the war with Russia. A decentralized IT army, consisting of over 250,000 IT volunteers at its peak, has been formed to counter Russian digital threats. Moreover, the country’s underground hacktivist groups have shown an impressive level of digital ingenuity. For example, Ukraine’s IT army claims to have targeted critical Russian infrastructure such as railways and the electricity grid.

Ukraine’s tech industry has been a major asset in the fightback against Russia’s invasion, providing a much-needed economic boost while strengthening the country’s cyber defenses and supplying the Ukrainian military with the innovative edge to counter Russia’s overwhelming advantages in manpower and military equipment.

This experience could also be critical to Ukraine’s coming postwar recovery. The Ukrainian tech industry looks set to emerge from the war stronger than ever with a significantly enhanced global reputation. Crucially, the unique experience gained by Ukrainian tech companies in the defense tech sector will likely position Ukraine as a potential industry leader, with countries around the world eager to learn from Ukrainian specialists and access Ukrainian military tech solutions. This could serve as a key driver of economic growth for many years to come, while also improving Ukrainian national security.

David Kirichenko is an editor at Euromaidan Press, an online English language media outlet in Ukraine. He tweets @DVKirichenko.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was never about NATO

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 18 Jul 2023 22:01:29 +0000

Sweden is poised to become the thirty-second member of the NATO Alliance and Russia does not appear to be at all concerned by the prospect. The breakthrough moment for the Swedes came ahead of last week’s NATO summit in Vilnius, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan agreed to end months of opposition and back the Scandinavian nation’s bid to join the Alliance. Russia’s response to Sweden’s imminent NATO accession has been muted to say the least, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov limiting himself to promises of “appropriate measures” and Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov warning about unspecified “negative consequences.”

This apparent lack of concern mirrors the Kremlin position over Finland’s NATO membership, which was confirmed in April 2023. On that occasion, Russia also downplayed the significance of the news while making vague commitments to strengthen its own military posture in the region. Indeed, in the fourteen months since the two Nordic nations first announced their intention to join the Alliance, Moscow has done almost nothing to protest or obstruct this process, despite having a vast array of military, cyber, economic, informational, and diplomatic tools at its disposal. If Putin genuinely believed the NATO Alliance posed a security threat to the Russian Federation, he would at the very least have increased the Russian military presence close to the Finnish border. Instead, Russia reportedly reduced its troop deployments in the region by approximately 80%. These are obviously not the actions of a nation under siege.

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Russia’s remarkably relaxed reaction to the NATO accession of Finland and Sweden stands in stark contrast to the hysteria over Ukraine’s far less substantial ties to the military alliance. In the months leading up to Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin and other Kremlin leaders told the world that the escalating crisis was due to years of provocative NATO expansion, while warning that deepening ties between the Alliance and Ukraine represented a red line. In reality, however, Ukraine in early 2022 was not even remotely close to joining NATO. Far from pursuing Ukraine, the Alliance had repeatedly sidestepped appeals from Kyiv for a Membership Action Plan, refusing to offer even a clear signal regarding future accession. On the eve of Russia’s invasion, the most optimistic forecasts indicated that Ukraine’s dream of joining NATO was still decades away.

It is hard to see any military logic behind the dramatically different Russian reactions to NATO’s Nordic enlargement and the Alliance’s involvement in Ukraine. After all, while a theoretical future NATO presence inside Ukraine could pose a range of major headaches for military planners in Moscow, the recent accession of Finland has already doubled the length of Russia’s shared border with the Alliance overnight. Swedish membership will arguably be even more consequential for Russia, transforming the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake. If Russia is so apparently unconcerned by these very real military challenges, why was Putin prepared to launch the biggest European war since World War II over the far more distant prospect of Ukrainian NATO membership?

It is clear from Putin’s own actions that he understands perfectly well NATO will never attack Russia. This should come as no surprise. Indeed, the entire notion of NATO invading Russia is recognized as absurd by all but the terminally swivel-eyed. This does not mean Russian objections to NATO’s post-1991 enlargement are entirely insincere; on the contrary, the growing presence of the Alliance in the former Eastern Bloc over the past thirty years is perhaps the leading source of geopolitical bitterness and resentment throughout the Russian establishment. However, it is critical to clarify that this indignation has nothing to do with legitimate security concerns. NATO is not a threat to Russian security; NATO is a threat to Russian foreign policy because it prevents Russia from bullying its neighbors. In other words, NATO enlargement is no more or less provocative than a burglar alarm is to a thief.

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None of this has prevented Putin from using the NATO issue as a smokescreen for his imperial ambitions. For years, he has skillfully exploited anti-Western sentiment and widespread international suspicion of US foreign policy to distract from Russia’s own acts of international aggression. This tactic has proved remarkably successful; in the seventeen months since Russian troops began the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a wide range of academics, commentators, and politicians around the world have all echoed Putin in blaming NATO for provoking the war. They have continued to do so even as Putin himself has compared his invasion to the imperial conquests of eighteenth-century Russian Czar Peter the Great.

The fact that so many prominent personalities remain ready to accept Russia’s dishonest NATO narrative is evidence of fundamental misconceptions regarding the role of the Alliance and the nature of its post-Cold War enlargement. NATO is routinely depicted by critics as an expansionist military institution seeking to impose Western dominance, but this is entirely at odds with the growth of the Alliance over the past three decades. Nobody has ever been forced to join NATO; instead, every single new member since 1991 has asked for membership and has been obliged to meet a series of strict standards in order to qualify. Indeed, the loaded term “NATO expansion” may itself be misleading, as unlike Russia, the Alliance only ever expands on a voluntary basis. It is also worth underlining that while Putin plays the victim card and complains of being encircled, fear of Russian aggression has been by far the leading cause of all new membership applications.

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine now approaching the one-and-a-half-year mark, it is time to retire the NATO narrative. Putin has demonstrated that he is not at all threatened by the growing presence of the Alliance on Russia’s northwestern border, and is increasingly open about his imperial agenda in Ukraine. It is this Russian imperialism that poses a grave threat to international security, not the defensive guarantees offered by NATO.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The similarity between the imperial and Soviet views is unmistakable, albeit with one dissonant nuance: Soviet nationality policy, while doing all it could to erase Ukrainian national identity, at the same time officially recognized the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a state entity and Ukrainians as a separate nationality. Putin has been highly critical of Lenin for this approach, and has claimed the Bolshevik leader was personally responsible for “creating” Ukraine. This line of thinking reached what may be seen as its logical conclusion with Putin’s insistence that Ukrainians and Russians are “one people.” By denying the existence of a separate Ukrainian national identity, Putin brought the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood into question and set the stage for the current war.

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Russian misconceptions about Ukraine are in part due to the simplistic notion that ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine, as well as those who express an affinity for Russian culture or share Russia’s antagonism toward the EU, NATO, and the West in general, all fall within the same “pro-Russian” category. Likewise, Many Russians have been all too ready to assume that any Ukrainian expressing nostalgia for the Soviet era is waiting to be “liberated” by Moscow. These misconceptions have been echoed by numerous commentators in the West, who have similarly treated evidence of favorable Ukrainian attitudes toward modern Russia or the Soviet past as indications of a desire for some form of Russian reunion.

In reality, being “pro-Russian” is understood one way in Ukrainian cities like Donetsk, Kramatorsk, or Mariupol, and quite differently in Moscow, Omsk, or Tomsk. During the initial stages of Russian aggression against Ukraine in April 2014, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology conducted a wide-ranging poll in the eight southeastern Ukrainian provinces (excluding Crimea) targeted by the Kremlin. This revealed that 70 percent of respondents were against separation from Ukraine and unification with Russia, while just 15 percent were in favor.

If separation from Ukraine was not on their wish list, what did they in fact want? A relative majority of 45 percent preferred the decentralization of power and greater rights for their region; another 25 percent favored a federated Ukraine, while only 19 percent were happy with the existing relationship with Kyiv. Other surveys conducted at around the same time yielded similar findings.

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Unsurprisingly, Russia’s full-scale invasion has further shaped Ukrainian attitudes toward issues of national identity. Today, the people of Ukraine are more consolidated as a political nation than at any time since regaining independence more than thirty years ago. According to the Razumkov Centre, 94 percent of respondents in a May 2023 survey expressed pride in their Ukrainian citizenship; 74 percent expressed feelings of patriotism and love for their country; and 71 percent were ready to come to its defense, either with weapons in hand or as participants in volunteer support groups.

Meanwhile, negative attitudes toward Russia and Russian citizens have skyrocketed. At the end of 2019, only 20 percent of Ukrainians held negative attitudes toward Russians; six months after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in September 2022, 80 percent of respondents asserted that they would not allow Russians into Ukraine. In terms of attitudes toward Russia, the turnaround has been even more drastic. In early February 2022, about a week before the Russian invasion, 34 percent of Ukrainians held positive views of Russia. That number dropped to just two percent three months later, with 92 percent saying they viewed the country in a negative light.

With the war clearly going badly for the Kremlin, there could now be a glimmer of hope for some reality-based adjustments to Russian illusions about Ukraine. Russian MP Konstanin Zatulin, who is well known for championing the plight of Russian “compatriots” abroad and promoting aggressive policies toward Ukraine, has recently questioned the wisdom of denying Ukrainian identity. “I would be happy if there was no Ukraine, but if we continue to constantly repeat that there is no Ukraine and no Ukrainians,” this will only strengthen their resistance on the battlefield, he noted at a June 2023 forum in Moscow.

Zatulin’s comments hint at growing recognition in Russia that widely held beliefs about Ukraine’s indivisibility from Russia are both inaccurate and unhelpful. However, resistance to the entire notion of Ukrainian statehood is so deeply ingrained in Russian society that it may take generations before the attitudes underpinning the current war are no longer dominant.

Roman Solchanyk is author of “Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition” (2001). He has previously served as a senior analyst at the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute and the RAND Corporation.

Russia just quit a grain deal critical to global food supply. What happens now?

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 17 Jul 2023 19:31:09 +0000

That ship has sailed. Just after 8:00 a.m. local time on Sunday, the bulk carrier TQ Samsun pulled out of the Ukrainian port of Odesa en route to Istanbul. It was the last vessel to leave under the United Nations (UN) and Turkey-brokered deal to export grain and fertilizer by sea from Ukraine amid Russia’s full-scale invasion. On Monday, the Kremlin announced that it would halt the deal, curtailing vital Ukrainian food exports that fed four hundred million people worldwide before 2022, according to the World Food Programme.

Below, Atlantic Council experts answer four pressing questions about what just happened and what to expect next.

1. Why did Russia pull out of the deal?

Moscow’s notification to the UN, Kyiv, and Ankara that it was suspending participation in the grain deal and would not renew the deal further is part of a negotiating strategy to loosen sanctions and gain more freedom of maneuver. Russian standard practice is to make humanitarian measures conditional upon concessions that serve its military, economic, and political interests—as it has with earlier negotiations on the grain deal and numerous times over relief and aid deliveries in Syria.

Specific demands in this case include readmitting the Russian agricultural lender Rosselkhozbank back into the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) mechanism, allowing Russia to import repair parts for agricultural machinery, and unfreezing other assets. Moscow claims that the deal, known as the Black Sea Grain Initiative, has not delivered on points that were to benefit Russia, but this round of pressure is certainly about more than the letter of the deal; it is about easing sanctions pressure.

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a geopolitical analyst and consultant currently serving private sector clients as Dragoman LLC.

2. What’s the next move for Ukraine and its Western partners?

In October 2022, Russia left the grain deal, actually suspended its participation, and there were only three parties left: the UN, Turkey, and Ukraine. The grain corridors at that time functioned well, in part because the Russian inspectors had been disrupting the grain deals from inside. The most rational way to react to this withdrawal is to proceed in the trilateral format with the UN, Ukraine, and Turkey. I don’t think Russia has a lot of options now. In the northwestern part of the Black Sea, Russia lacks capacity to inflict any major damage. Since Ukrainian armed forces retook Snake Island last year, the maritime area has been largely controlled by the Ukrainian side. So there is little possibility for a major disruption by Russian vessels in this part of the Black Sea.

Russia could say that continuing the deal in a trilateral format crosses a “red line.” But if Russian forces attack a vessel transporting grain, it could trigger a major reaction that Moscow would not want to face, depending on which country the vessel belongs to, who is the owner, and who the sailors are. I would not be surprised if after a meeting or phone conversation with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the next few weeks, Russia rejoins the grain deal.

Meanwhile, messages from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy have been very clear that there has been no deal between Ukraine and Russia. The deal is among Ukraine, Turkey, and the UN. What Putin undermines now is his agreement with the UN and Turkey, not with Ukraine. Russia’s halt of its participation in the deal will likely further increase insurance costs, but in June the Ukrainian government approved a maritime compensation scheme so that vessels calling at Ukrainian ports will be compensated if they are damaged due to Russian military activity. So, from the Ukrainian side, there is readiness to proceed with the deal.

While trying to keep the grain corridors functioning, it’s also important to step up efforts to restore freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, a basic principle of international law. Crimea must be de-occupied and should not become a bargaining chip in negotiations with Moscow, because Russia will continue to use Crimea to threaten security in the Black Sea and global food markets for as long as it is allowed to do so.

—Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a former foreign-policy adviser to the Ukrainian prime minister.

In practice, the deal had pretty much collapsed some time ago when ships started to disappear from the horizon off of Odesa’s Black Sea coast. Normally, up to a dozen bulk carriers are waiting to be loaded; in the past couple weeks, one or two at best—indicating things weren’t working well at the joint clearance center in Istanbul. (Ukrainians have blamed Russian inspectors for deliberately slowing down clearance procedures.)

So what happens next? The UN and Western nations should not succumb to the Kremlin’s blackmailing tactics. Russia should not be given another chance to weaponize food—nor be given sanctions relief in exchange for allowing ships carrying food to sail through international waters.

A global food emergency should be declared and, as I told BBC World News this morning, arrangements made for ships to sail under armed escort through the Black Sea. Of course, such a measure would never get past Russia’s veto in the UN Security Council. So creative diplomacy is required, perhaps with the European Union taking the lead.

In the near term, Ukraine should also be assisted with moving grain transport onto alternative arteries such as the Danube River and onto trains and trucks. Poland can play a key role by alleviating the days-long waits truck drivers currently face entering Poland from Ukraine.

—Michael Bociurkiw is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center based in Odesa, Ukraine.

3. What are the prospects for getting the deal back, and what could the UN and Turkey do right now?

The deal will likely survive because Ukraine, Turkey, and Europe more broadly, as well as a number of developing nations, benefit from it, which likely makes modest concessions to the Russian position acceptable to the leaders of those countries. Given the disinclination of either the Turks or NATO to directly intervene in the conflict, it is unlikely that there will be direct military escorts for grain ships rather than a negotiated deal. Nor do the Russian forces appear ready for a major naval escalation in the Black Sea, so there is a fair chance they will settle in the end. The reputational and economic costs of a prolonged end to grain shipments will hurt Russia, too, so I do not expect a prolonged or permanent cancellation of the deal.

—Rich Outzen

4. What impact does this have on the developing world?

The threat to global economic landscape and food security—especially in Africa and other developing regions—is hard to overstate. While once soaring food prices amid pandemic supply chain disruptions and Russia’s war had begun to stabilize, thanks in large part to the more than thirty million tons of wheat exported from Ukraine under this deal, the situation remains volatile. Down from its peak of 160 in March of 2022, the Food and Agriculture Organization’s Food Price Index was at 122 in June, still a third higher than June 2020, when it was 93. Globally, food price inflation remains higher than 5 percent per year in more than 60 percent of low-income countries and nearly 80 percent of lower-middle-income and high-income countries. Real food inflation is as high as 80 percent in Zimbabwe, 30 percent in Egypt, and 14 percent in Laos. And within countries, women and already vulnerable communities tend to be hardest hit. In just the last two weeks, the World Bank reported that wheat prices had decreased by 3 percent globally—gains Monday’s announcement are all but certain to reverse.

—Nicole Goldin is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and global head, inclusive economic growth at Abt Associates.

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Charai in the National Interest: Sweden’s NATO Accession Limits Putin’s Options

Atlantic Council — Mon, 17 Jul 2023 18:16:12 +0000

Original Source

The Western powers are now more united with the Baltic nations than ever before. After months of diplomatic delays, Sweden can now join NATO—a genuine triumph for the Biden administration. This development has enormous geostrategic implications for the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

While European leaders are starting to realize that the Russian bear’s teeth and claws are not as sharp as they once feared, it would be a mistake to believe that the Russians can no longer wreak vast harm across Europe, even without resorting to nuclear weapons. Now is the time for realism about Russia, not over-confidence.

Ahmed Charai, 2023

Ahmed Charai is a Moroccan publisher and an Atlantic Council Board Director. He is also an international counselor of the Center for a Strategic and International Studies, a board of trustees member of International Crisis Group, and a member of the Advisory Board of The Center for the National Interest in Washington and Global Board of Advisors at The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security in Jerusalem.

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Dispatch from Vilnius: Inside a NATO Summit of high drama on Ukraine—and historic opportunity

Frederick Kempe — Sat, 15 Jul 2023 11:30:00 +0000

VILNIUS—Drafting NATO Summit communiqués is usually less the stuff of high drama and more mind-numbing bureaucracy.

But that wasn’t the case this week. The NATO Summit in Lithuania will be remembered both for the public fireworks over Ukraine’s aspirations for Alliance membership and outcomes that included a breakthrough on Swedish membership, the most detailed and robust defense plans since the Cold War, and unprecedented Group of Seven (G7) defense commitments to Kyiv.

Let’s start with the fireworks, unusual in a consensus-driven Alliance that values decorum and discretion, and end with the historic outcomes.

Tensions began simmering long before the summit among Biden administration officials and other NATO allies—with Ukraine lobbing arguments from the outside—over just how far to go in committing the Alliance to a time-linked invitation and roadmap for Ukraine’s membership.

For the Biden administration, it was a matter of geopolitical prudence to oppose any fixed timeline for an invitation for fear it would draw NATO, and hence the United States, into a direct conflict with Russia. With one eye on the 2024 US presidential election and the other on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear capabilities, why take the risk, particularly as full Ukrainian membership wasn’t likely to come before the war ended anyway?

For Ukraine’s more impatient supporters—particularly, but not exclusively, those geographically closer to the Russian threat—it was a matter of strategic imperative and moral obligation to draft language that provided more clarity on the pathway and potential timing of a NATO membership invitation than Washington considered acceptable. Several of those supporters had previously been occupied and repressed by Moscow, so they understand the value of NATO security guarantees.

Even if membership itself wouldn’t come for some time, they wanted to demonstrate maximum common cause for a people who miraculously and at enormous human cost are countering Russia’s war and revanchist ambitions.

The behind-the-scenes simmer boiled over when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, apparently having read a draft of the summit communiqué about to be released, threw a Twitter bomb into the negotiating room.

What he objected to was text at the end of paragraph eleven, which read: “We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when allies agree and conditions are met.”

Zelenskyy shot back before the draft could be released:

“It’s unprecedented and absurd when time frame is not set neither for the invitation nor for Ukraine’s membership. While at the same time vague wording about ‘conditions’ is added even for inviting Ukraine. It seems there is no readiness neither to invite Ukraine to NATO nor to make it a member of the Alliance. This means that a window of opportunity is being left to bargain Ukraine’s membership in NATO in negotiations with Russia. And for Russia, this means motivation to continue its terror. Uncertainty is weakness. And I will openly discuss this at the summit.”

Before long, word spread in Vilnius that at least one ally had “broken silence,” which in NATO-speak means that during an agreed period after the communiqué has been finalized and before it is publicly released, any ally may come back with an objection and reopen negotiations.

Though it’s unclear what transpired next, officials involved in the negotiations described scenes during the summit in which US President Joe Biden and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stood over the document and hand-drafted changes. In the end, the US stance on Ukrainian membership proved immovable, even resisting attempts by at least one other ally to at the very least state that it was NATO’s intention to explore ways to invite Ukraine to join the Alliance as soon as the seventy-fifth-anniversary summit in Washington next July.

Given all that, there was more than a little buzz when Biden, in his fiery speech in Vilnius—in which he hailed the “unbroken” Ukrainian people—neglected to mention or encourage their NATO membership aspirations.

Even after NATO made the communiqué public, tensions still simmered.

At the NATO Public Forum, (a side event for the summit that the Atlantic Council co-hosted), Daria Kaleniuk, a Ukrainian anti-corruption activist, provocatively asked Sullivan how to explain to her young son, who is sleeping in their corridor due to air raids, that Biden isn’t ready to accept Ukraine into NATO. She suggested it might be “because he is afraid of Russia, afraid of Russia losing, afraid Ukraine winning,” or even suggested, “because there are back-channel negotiations with Russia” that ostensibly had Ukraine’s NATO hopes as a bargaining chip.

Sullivan was warm but firm to his questioner, acknowledging that the world stands in “awe” at the way Ukrainians have made sacrifices with “hell raining down from the skies” around them. At the same time, he scolded Kaleniuk for making “insinuations” that were “unfounded and unjustified” and asked that those insinuations “get checked at the door, so that we can talk to one another in goodwill and good faith.”

Beyond that, Sullivan added, “I think the American people do deserve a degree of gratitude” from both the US government and the rest of the world “for their willingness to step up” to provide such plentiful military assistance to Ukraine.

With tensions high, British Defense Minister Ben Wallace hit a similar theme, “providing a slight word of caution” that Ukraine should express more appreciation to its supporters.

When asked by reporters for his response to Wallace, Zelenskyy replied, “he can write to me about how he wants to be thanked.”

Were it not for the fireworks, the world’s focus would have been more singularly on the summit’s results.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan dropped his objections to Sweden’s membership, opening the way for it to join the Alliance. That leaves Putin facing a bigger and more unified NATO, strengthening defense in the Baltic states and the High North.

Real progress also came through a pledge by G7 countries (all in NATO except Japan), although it is not binding, to provide Ukraine “enduring” support—which each country will determine individually—including more defense equipment, increased intelligence sharing, and expanded training, dramatically reducing the likelihood of eroding resolve.

There was plenty more in the NATO Summit communiqué on defense plans, strengthened commitments to defense investment, and deeper global partnerships, particularly with leaders on hand from Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea; there was also robust language on China and warnings not to provide lethal support to its Russian friends for their Ukraine war.

By summit’s end, and by the convening of the renamed and reconstituted NATO-Ukraine Council, tempers had calmed some and diplomacy had intervened on the Ukraine issue, though some bad blood will likely linger.

Zelenskyy went home not with a NATO invitation but with family photo-like pictures alongside NATO leaders, as mentioned in my Inflection Points column last week, and a dramatically different tone than his earlier missive, as shown in a video he tweeted from his train ride home to Kyiv:

“We are returning home with a good result for our country and, very importantly, for our warriors… For the first time since independence, we have formed a security foundation for Ukraine on its way to NATO. These are concrete security guarantees that are confirmed by the top seven democracies in the world. Never before have we had such a security foundation, and this is the level of the G7… Very importantly, during these two days of the [NATO] Summit, we have put to rest any doubts and ambiguities about whether Ukraine will be in NATO. It will! For the first time, not only do all the allies agree on this, but a significant majority in the alliance is vigorously pushing for it.”

At a closing session for the NATO Public Forum, I asked Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis how history would remember the Vilnius summit.

“Strategically, we won,” he said. “We committed ourselves to Ukrainian membership in NATO.” Unlike the 2008 commitment at the Bucharest NATO Summit that had no follow up, Landsbergis said the Alliance and Ukraine this time won’t waste another day, because of the urgency that Putin’s war had placed on everyone.

The Vilnius summit “was not the last stop,” he said. “We have to see it as a bridge. And the next stop is Washington. So, we have a full year. Lots to do…. Washington can actually be even more historic than Vilnius.”

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 NATO’s promises to Ukraine mark real progress
ECONOMIST

The Economist reports that although NATO allies could have done more at this week’s summit in Vilnius, they dealt a number of blows to Putin that went far beyond Ukraine.

“Putin’s first defeat was over a different expansion of NATO,” the Economist writes. “Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, said he is dropping his objections to Sweden’s membership, enabling it to follow its Nordic neighbor, Finland, into the alliance. That will strengthen the Baltic states and the High North, and tie up more of Putin’s resources should he attempt mischief against NATO anywhere along its frontier.”

Further, with increased military assistance from G7 countries, it will become harder for Putin to maintain his resolve. “The G7 members promise that this will be an ‘enduring’ commitment, and that each country will, individually, craft its own security guarantees for Ukraine that will give it a ‘sustainable force capable of defending Ukraine now and deterring Russian aggression in the future.’… This matters because it helps disabuse Putin and his elites of the belief that Western resolve will crumble if only Russia clings on.”

Although delaying Ukraine’s NATO membership process until after the war will likely give Russia incentive to prolong the war, the Economist argues, the additional military assistance should prevent that from happening. “That is where the summit made real progress.” Read more →

#2 The ‘Israel Model’ Won’t Work for Ukraine
Eliot A. Cohen | ATLANTIC

In this important Atlantic piece, Eliot Cohen argues that the “Israel model”—in which the West would arm Ukraine to the teeth to guarantee its ability to defeat any credible military threat—is a poor policy choice based on flawed reasoning.

Cohen writes that the main difference between 1973 Israel and 2023 Ukraine is that Israel had a military edge over its neighbors, which Ukraine currently lacks over Russia. “Israel staged bombing raids against targets deep in Syria and Egypt, including their capitals, from the 1960s forward, and unlike the Ukrainian drones flying to Moscow, these were not mere symbolic strikes. The Six Day War, in 1967, was an overwhelming Israeli victory, which involved the annihilation of its neighbors’ air forces and the advance of Israeli armor and infantry across the de facto 1949 border. The 1973 war similarly ended with Israeli forces within artillery range of Damascus and on the verge of destroying half the Egyptian force that had crossed the Suez Canal.”

Most provocatively, Cohen writes about the difference between an Israel with a nuclear arsenal and a Ukraine that gave up its nuclear weapons in 1994 in a deal under which Moscow promised to safeguard its sovereignty and security. “Unless, of course,” Cohen warns in his conclusion, “[Biden] prefers to be the father of the Ukrainian atom bomb.” Read more →

#3 Russia’s Nuclear Option Hangs Over Ukraine and NATO
Robbie Gramer | FOREIGN POLICY

To gain an understanding of how fears of nuclear conflict played into this week’s decision, read Robbie Gramer in Foreign Policy.

“The nuclear question is an existential one for the alliance,” he writes, “one that’s driven Washington’s calculations on what military aid to send to Ukraine and when, and it has also influenced the debate on when and how to allow Ukraine to join the military alliance as a full-fledged member.”

According to Gramer, US and allied officials are divided over the validity of Russian threats. “Some US and other NATO defense officials believe there could be an increased risk of Russia launching a limited nuclear strike with a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon to stave off a major battlefield defeat if its forces look to be on the verge of a rout, or if Ukraine appears poised to capture Crimea and large swaths of occupied territory in southern and eastern Ukraine. Others say that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling won’t go further than that, and bowing to such threats will only embolden Russia to use such ‘nuclear blackmail’ in the future.”

“At the same time, Ukrainian and Western officials also fear that Russia could mount an attack on Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant to attempt to trigger a major radiological event, irrespective of whether it launches a nuclear strike—though it’s unclear how successful those efforts would be.” Read more →

#4 Biden Pledges Long-Term Backing for Ukraine, but a U.S. Election Looms
Zolan Kanno-Youngs | NEW YORK TIMES

For insight into the role of US domestic politics on the NATO summit and Biden’s decision making, look no further than Zolan Kanno-Youngs’s reporting in the New York Times.

“Despite Biden’s repeated promises of staying by Ukraine’s side in its war against Russia, questions about the shelf life of support among American people and lawmakers hung over the summit of Western allies,” Kanno-Youngs writes. “Even as the US president was giving a long-term commitment, a group of far-right Republican lawmakers in Washington was pushing legislation that would scale back aid to Ukraine, exposing fractures in the Republican Party and raising doubts about its commitment should it capture the White House next year.”

According to Kanno-Youngs, to sway domestic public opinion to favor providing aid to Ukraine, Biden has framed the war as an existential battle between democracy and autocracy. In Vilnius, Biden was determined to address the doubts about continued US support for Ukraine. “We will not waver,” Biden said. “I mean that. Our commitment to Ukraine will not weaken.” Read more →

#5 Should Ukraine Negotiate with Russia?
Dmytro Natalukha; Alina Polyakova and Daniel Fried; Angela Stent; Samuel Charap | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In dialogue with Samuel Charap, who previously urged the use of diplomacy as a tool to end the war with Ukraine, Dmytro Natalukha, Alina Polyakova and Daniel Fried (an Atlantic Council distinguished fellow), and Angela Stent argue that negotiations with Russia are bound to fail. Read this multifaceted analysis to understand the pros and cons of negotiation with Russia.

Natalukha claimed that the only way to secure Ukraine’s future is to remove Putin from power. “If the goal is to prevent Russia from threatening democracies around the world, allowing it to reach an armistice with Ukraine won’t do much good,” he writes. “Ukraine and its allies must aim to make Russia less anti-Western. Regardless of what happens at the negotiating table, therefore, Putin cannot remain in power.”

Polyakova and Fried believe that although negotiation will most likely happen, the battlefield is Ukraine’s best position from which to win the war: “A military stalemate is indeed possible. And at some point, negotiations with Russia will be needed to end this war. But Ukraine should start negotiating only when it is in the strongest possible position; it should not be rushed into talks when Russia shows no interest in any settlement terms other than Ukraine’s surrender. Starting negotiations now would mean accepting Putin’s maximalist terms. If Russia suffers further setbacks on the battlefield, however, talks could proceed from a better starting place.”

Polyakova and Fried continue, “The most important point, which Ukraine’s allies agree on, is that Ukraine must define the right moment for negotiations. That may or may not be when all of Ukraine’s territory is liberated. The key is for Ukraine to maintain flexibility in its decisions about its territory and the path toward a just peace.” Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

New Atlanticist Jul 11, 2023

Experts react: What NATO’s Vilnius summit means for Ukraine and the Alliance’s future

By Atlantic Council experts

Atlantic Council experts decode the summit’s implications for Ukraine’s membership, NATO’s approach to China, and more.

Belarus Central Europe

UkraineAlert Jul 11, 2023

NATO summit leaves Ukrainians frustrated

By Peter Dickinson

The 2023 NATO summit failed to deliver on hopes for a clear commitment on future Ukrainian membership, leaving many in Ukraine deeply frustrated by the apparent lack of urgency among the country’s allies, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Corruption

New Atlanticist Jul 10, 2023

Experts react: Erdogan just agreed to support Sweden’s NATO bid. What does that mean for Turkey, Sweden, and the Alliance?

By Atlantic Council experts

Atlantic Council experts weigh in on what’s behind this dramatic and consequential turnabout from Erdoğan and what to expect next.

Europe & Eurasia European Union

The post Dispatch from Vilnius: Inside a NATO Summit of high drama on Ukraine—and historic opportunity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With re-election behind him, Erdogan is turning toward the West

Grady Wilson — Fri, 14 Jul 2023 22:13:53 +0000

In a reprise of the accession drama at last year’s NATO Summit, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan flashed Turkey’s long-awaited green light for Sweden’s NATO membership on the eve of this year’s summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. But that green light signals much more than “go” for Stockholm: It also signals that Turkey has taken the opportunity to greater align itself with the West in the months since Erdoğan secured re-election.

Sweden’s journey to accession seems to be playing out along Turkey’s preferred timeline, coming one month after Sweden’s tougher anti-terror laws came into force and having been affirmed at the Alliance’s marquee gathering for maximum effect. Recent developments—including fresh pro-Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) demonstrations and a Quran burning in Sweden—threatened to derail the process, but Turkey should be credited for not giving in to these provocations.

The agreement is the latest and greatest signal that Turkey has decided to align more with the West. Other notable signals came in the form of Turkey’s hosting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (during which Ankara reiterated its longstanding support for Ukraine’s NATO membership and angered Moscow by releasing Azov battalion commanders) and the reiteration of the value it places on European Union membership. All these signals happened in a span of three days. The developments stand in stark contrast to speculation—that has arisen since before Turkey first raised an issue with Sweden’s accession—that Turkey, under Erdoğan, is pivoting toward Russia and the East.

Two months ago, when in the heat of a tough re-election campaign, Erdoğan accused Western countries (including the United States) of colluding with the opposition to remove him from power. At that point, the trajectory of Turkey’s relations with transatlantic allies appeared much less clear. Once Erdoğan won the presidential elections and the parliament became distinctly more nationalist, there were fears an emboldened Turkey would move toward the East. The first hint that this would not be the case, and that the president’s pragmatism would once again emerge, appeared in the selection of the post-election cabinet, which broadly elevated several pro-Western voices—including widely respected Mehmet Şimşek, who was brought back as minister of treasury and finance—and sidelined the most outspoken transatlantic skeptics.

Analysts close to the Turkish government were quick to assert that Turkey’s moves constitute not so much a pivot to the West but a push to balance relations and mend troubled relationships in line with a course Turkey has been pursuing for many years. On the other hand, there is speculation that part of the impetus lies in the perception of a weakened Russia following the Wagner Group mutiny in June and its aftermath. What is clear is that a weaker Russian President Vladimir Putin renders Moscow a less reliable partner for Turkey. Particularly since the 2016 coup attempt against Erdoğan’s government, Turkey-Russia relations have been driven from the top down by leader-to-leader chemistry. While Turkey and Russia’s deep economic relations are unlikely to be interrupted or curtailed, the idea or illusion of Russia as a balance or alternative to the West in any kind of strategic sense will begin to fray.

This move from Erdoğan is a major win for Sweden, Turkey, and the whole Alliance. It’s also a big win for the Biden administration and for NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who both worked very hard behind the scenes to make the agreement possible.

The breakthrough followed soon after a phone call between the US and Turkish presidents and after a flurry of contact between US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and their counterparts. A major, yet unofficial, sweetener to the agreement appears to be the United States’ assurance, issued one day after Erdoğan’s agreement, that it will sell F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, which Turkey first requested in October 2021 (after its ejection from the F-35 program) but has been thus far blocked by Congress.

In a pre-NATO Summit interview over the weekend, Biden alluded to boosting support for both Greece and Turkey’s defense capabilities simultaneously as a way to push the F-16 deal through Congress. That hearkens back to how the United States has historically balanced its two key allies in Southeastern Europe through aid dating back to the Truman Doctrine, which laid the groundwork for the eventual inclusion of both in NATO. It also underlines the importance of Turkey’s warming of ties with Greece in the wake of the devastating earthquake this February. These factors may play a role in overcoming the concerns of key members of the US Congress, including Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez (D-NJ), who confirmed that he is in talks with the Biden administration on the F-16 sale.

Finalizing Sweden’s NATO accession—which still needs to be ratified by Turkey’s parliament (as well as Hungary’s)—and completing the F-16 deal would be big steps toward rebuilding trust between Turkey and its transatlantic partners. In a speech on July 12, Erdogan announced that Turkey’s parliament will take up ratification after the long recess in October, in line with the parliamentary calendar.

One grievance from Turkey regarding its troubled transatlantic relationship is the perception that its Western allies have never fully appreciated Turkey’s security concerns. Despite officially designating the PKK—Turkey’s number one security threat—as a terrorist organization, the United States and Europe have not shown Turkey the deference that it feels due on this issue. This is in part due to the United States’ cooperation with the PKK’s Syrian affiliate to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. Turkey’s temporary block on Sweden afforded Turkey the opportunity, in high-stakes fashion, to remind the Alliance that its concerns need to be taken more seriously moving forward.

One way to read Turkey’s post-election foreign-policy posture is a willingness to improve its relations with the West. Over the past three years, Turkey has aggressively pursued and concluded rapprochements with many countries in its neighborhood including Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. While Turkey’s relations with its NATO allies never deteriorated as much as they did with the aforementioned countries, there is without question room to improve. Turkey, Sweden, the United States, and NATO have all committed to win-win moves that would contribute to a more positive and productive atmosphere. Now, they all need to follow through.

Grady Wilson is associate director at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. Follow him on Twitter @GradysWilson.

The post With re-election behind him, Erdogan is turning toward the West appeared first on Atlantic Council.

After Wagner: Could the Russian army now turn against Putin?

Mercedes Sapuppo — Thu, 13 Jul 2023 20:52:09 +0000

The Wagner mutiny in late June was a brief affair, but it is casting a long shadow over Putin’s Russia. In less than forty-eight hours, Wagner chief Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his troops succeeded in shattering the carefully constructed myth of Putin the strongman, while exposing the weakness at the heart of his regime. Although the immediate danger has passed, many now believe it is only a matter of time before the Russian dictator faces new threats to his authority. However, with all genuine political opposition inside Russia long since eliminated, the real question is: Who could realistically challenge Putin?

It is easy to understand why many observers believe Putin is currently weaker than at any time in his entire twenty-three-year reign. During their short-lived uprising, Wagner forces managed to capture one of Russia’s largest cities, Rostov-on-Don, without a fight. A column of Wagner troops then advanced across Russia virtually unopposed, coming to within 200 kilometers of Moscow before choosing to turn back. As the drama unfolded, neither the Russian establishment nor the public rallied around Putin, who was conspicuously absent. Instead, there were widespread reports of panic across the country, while crowds in Rostov actively cheered Wagner troops.

The exact nature of the deal that ended the mutiny remains unclear, but the few details that are publicly known have done little to repair the damage done to Putin’s reputation. Neither Wagner leader Prigozhin nor his soldiers have been arrested or otherwise punished for their revolt, despite the fact that they downed a number of Russian aircraft and killed Russian servicemen. Instead, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has recently confirmed that Putin personally met with Prigozhin and dozens of other Wagner commanders just five days after the mutiny. Remarkably, Peskov revealed that Putin spoke about future job opportunities during his three-hour discussion with the leaders of the mutiny.

Putin’s apparent readiness to compromise has created the impression of a vulnerable dictator who lacks both the support and the military strength to follow through on his earlier vow to “crush” the mutiny. This has led to widespread speculation that the Wagner revolt may now inspire other anti-regime uprisings. In a 9 July interview with ABC News, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy suggested the Wagner mutiny might serve as a catalyst for further domestic destabilization in Russia. “There is a signal that there might be another mutiny in Russia, a revolution,” he noted. “More than that, there are many people who might support such a mutiny.”

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Who could lead the next uprising? One obvious candidate is Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. Like Wagner chief Prigozhin, Kadyrov enjoys a high degree of autonomy and has large numbers of troops under his personal command. With the Kremlin’s blessing, he rules Chechnya as his personal fiefdom. He also has a long history of clashes with Russian governmental institutions and has joined Prigozhin in criticizing the conduct of the war in Ukraine. However, Kadyrov was ultimately one of the few prominent figures to publicly back Putin during the Wagner mutiny, and also sent Chechen fighters to Rostov-on-Don.

Kadyrov’s eagerness to support Putin was telling. While he might have the manpower and independence to take action challenging Putin’s power, it is not clear that he sees any advantage in doing so. Secure in his autonomy, Kadyrov may have calculated that it would be more beneficial to preserve his place in the current system than to back a risky rebellion with uncertain prospects.

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Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

A more substantial challenge to the Putin regime may yet emerge from within the ranks of Russia’s increasingly disgruntled military. The Kremlin’s meek response to the Wagner mutiny has exacerbated already declining morale among Russian troops and commanders currently serving in Ukraine.

For more than half a year, a steady stream of video addresses posted to social media by Russian soldiers complaining of suicidal orders and catastrophic losses have pointed to growing demoralization. Meanwhile, recent developments indicate that dissatisfaction with the Kremlin has now reached the level of senior commanders. A July 13 report in the Wall Street Journal claimed that numerous high-ranking officers including top Russian general Sergei Surovikin had been detained in the wake of the Wagner revolt. Surovikin, who formerly commanded the Russian invasion of Ukraine, is reportedly still being held and interrogated in Moscow over possible links to the mutiny.

In a further sign of mounting tension within Putin’s military, a senior Russian commander in charge of forces based in southern Ukraine claimed on July 12 that he had been suddenly dismissed from his post after raising the alarm over the mismanagement of the invasion. In a recorded audio statement, General Ivan Popov accused Russia’s military leadership of “treacherously and vilely decapitating the army at the most difficult and tense moment.”

Popov’s explosive accusations suggest that many in the Kremlin prefer to silence critics within the Russian military rather than address uncomfortable truths about the war in Ukraine. Unless this problematic approach is abandoned, it is likely to fuel further anger among front line commanders and troops as casualties continue to mount amid Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive.

If disgruntled officers and demoralized soldiers from the regular Russian army do turn against the Putin regime, they may be joined by thousands of former Wagner fighters along with members of Russia’s many other private military companies. These mercenary formations typically enjoy a significant degree of operational independence from the Kremlin and will have noted with interest the precedent set by the apparent lack of negative consequences following the Wagner mutiny.

For more than two decades, Vladimir Putin has ruthlessly suppressed any potential sources of domestic opposition to his rule. With the Russian media muzzled and his political opponents imprisoned, exiled, or dead, the force most capable of mounting a serious challenge to the regime is the Russian military. Putin has been careful to keep loyalists in top positions, but as the invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel, there are growing indications of disaffection among both commanders and troops. With Russian generals now reportedly being detained and dismissed, the scale of the threat should not be underestimated. In the months ahead, this may lead to fresh challenges to Putin’s rule that will dwarf the Wagner mutiny.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Many in Ukraine expressed frustration over the failure to secure a clear signal over NATO membership, but others argued that expectations had been unrealistically high and noted that the annual gathering in Lithuania brought plenty of good news for Ukraine. The Atlantic Council invited a number of Ukrainian commentators to share their assessment of the Vilnius summit.

Danylo Lubkivsky, Director, Kyiv Security Forum: The NATO summit in Vilnius calls for sober assessment. The alliance has clearly failed to seize the strategic initiative or achieve a political breakthrough. Naturally, this has provoked a wave of disappointment and concern.

Unlike the Ukrainian military, NATO leaders still appear to trapped in defensive thinking. This is unfortunate as Western caution only encourages the enemy. Gradual provision of arms prolongs the war and increases the number of casualties. Far from protecting NATO members, ambiguity over Ukraine’s future membership serves to undermine the alliance’s international authority.

Despite these reservations, I do not think there was much for Russia to cheer in Vilnius. The summit demonstrated that while there is no consensus over Ukraine’s NATO ambitions, the entire Western world remains firm and unwavering in its support for the Ukrainian war effort. This message will have been well understood in Moscow.

Attention must now turn toward next year’s summit in Washington DC. This jubilee summit marking 75 years of NATO will take place against a backdrop of the 2024 US presidential election campaign. The historic nature of the summit may work in Ukraine’s favor, creating a climate for historic decisions. After Vilnius, it is clear that the Ukrainian authorities must work consistently with all partners to secure a positive outcome next summer. Ultimately, much will also depend on the Ukrainian military and its ability to create the conditions for NATO accession by succeeding on the battlefield.

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Olena Halushka, Board Member, Anti-Corruption Action Center (AntAC): Many practical steps were taken during the Vilnius summit to strengthen Ukraine’s war effort. These included new commitments to supply weapons, F-16 jet fighter training for Ukrainian pilots, and the establishment of the NATO-Ukraine Council.

However, Kyiv’s key goal was to receive an official invitation to join NATO. Based on the understanding that full NATO membership would not be possible as long as hostilities continue, Ukrainians saw no legal or practical obstacles to issuing an invitation and beginning the accession process. Instead, the summit declaration made vague references to membership “when allies agree and conditions are met.” This was disappointing but not discouraging. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg called this year’s Vilnius summit historic for Sweden. We now hope next year’s summit in Washington DC will finally make history for Ukraine, too.

Oleksiy Goncharenko, Ukrainian MP, European Solidarity Party: This was definitely not an historic summit from a Ukrainian perspective. While Ukraine dominated the summit agenda, NATO leaders chose not to take the bold step of officially inviting Ukraine to join the alliance. It is somewhat ironic that 15 years ago at the NATO summit in Bucharest, the United States was leading the push to offer Ukraine membership. This year, the roles were reversed.

The language adopted in the summit communique was not strong enough. This was a big mistake as the only language Vladimir Putin understands is strength. Instead, NATO leaders opted for the language of caution and hesitation.

There were also some reasons for optimism in Vilnius. The communique included the word “invitation” and also acknowledged that Ukraine can sidestep the Membership Action Plan (MAP) stage of the accession process, which is good news. We must now focus our efforts on securing an historic breakthrough at next year’s summit in the US. Further failure could have a profoundly negative impact on Ukrainian public opinion at a time when Ukrainians overwhelmingly back the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration.

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Volodymyr Dubovyk, Associate Professor, Odesa Mechnikov National University: I did not have high expectations for the summit and did not think it was likely to become a breakthrough moment in Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership, so I cannot say I was particularly disappointed. At the same time, it is clear that the wording of the final communique was not good. It was reminiscent of the vague language used in Bucharest back in 2008, and reflected the widely acknowledged lack of agreement among NATO allies over Ukrainian membership. Some of the passages from the communique, such as the references to interoperability between Ukraine and the alliance, gave the impression that the dramatic events of the past year and a half had not happened at all.

Having said that, my main concern was that tension over the NATO membership issue could damage ongoing military, political, and financial support for Ukraine in its war of liberation. This did not happen. There was some evidence of emotions flying high, with President Zelenskyy’s angry tweet on the way to the summit provoking a defensive reaction from some allies, but the overall mood was one of constructive cooperation and partnership.

Iuliia Mendel, former press secretary to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy: Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians demonstrate their commitment to Ukrainian democracy and independence every day as they defend the country along the front lines of the war with Russia. This NATO summit was an opportunity to send a positive signal to them that their sacrifices are acknowledged and appreciated. Unfortunately, the summit communique was too vague to send a clear message.

Instead of decisive action, I saw a lot of bureaucratic discussion. This was frustrating, especially as an invitation would not have meant immediate Ukrainian accession to NATO. It would not have triggered Article 5 or plunged NATO into a war with Russia. Ukrainians find this approach hard to stomach. For us, NATO is a matter of national survival, not a box-ticking exercise.

There are two main reasons for the diplomatic compromises we witnessed in Vilnius. Firstly, some Western leaders are still concerned that issuing Ukraine with an invitation to join NATO could lead to an escalation and expansion of the current war. Secondly, there are also legitimate reservations over Ukraine’s readiness for membership, particularly in terms of the country’s domestic reform agenda.

Despite the disappointment of the Vilnius summit, I remain confident that Ukraine has earned the right to join NATO and will achieve membership sooner or later. Nevertheless, there is no denying that an important opportunity to demonstrate international support for Ukraine has been missed.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Russia strikes humanitarian aid delivery point in Zaporizhzhia Oblast

Russian military chief makes first public appearance since Wagner’s attempted mutiny

Russian forces continue to conduct offensive actions in Donetsk and Luhansk, with Ukrainian armed forces reporting thirty combat engagements between July 10 and 11 near Hryhorivka, Syeverne, Marinka, Krasnohorivka, and Novomykhailivka. According to the same report, Russian forces shelled villages and towns in the direction of Zaporizhzhia, Lyman, Kupiansk, and Kherson. Ukrainian Telegram channels also reported explosions on the morning of July 11 in Novooleksiivka, Kherson Oblast.

The Ukrainian counteroffensive advanced slowly amid heavy fighting along well-fortified Russian positions. On July 8, a video posted by RFE/RL’s Ukraine service showed how fighters from the 47th Separate Mechanized “Magura” Brigade, alongside soldiers from the Zaporizhzhia Brigade of the Territorial Defense Forces, occupied elevated Russian army positions in the direction of Zaporizhzhia near Novodarivka. However, Russia’s use of remote-controlled landmines has made it difficult for Ukraine to advance. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar announced on July 10 that Ukrainian forces had taken control of elevated positions around Bakhmut, allowing them to establish fire control over Bakhmut. Russian military bloggers have expressed fears that Ukrainian forces could encircle Russian forces in Bakhmut.

The Russian Ministry of Defense published footage on July 10 of Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, his first public appearance since Wagner’s attempted mutiny. In the footage, Gerasimov receives reports about alleged Ukrainian attempts to strike Russian targets in occupied Crimea, Rostov, and Kaluga. The ministry published the footage the same day the Kremlin acknowledged President Vladimir Putin’s June 29 meeting with Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin.

On July 11, the Russian Telegram channel Military Informant reported that Ukraine had used British-made Storm Shadow cruise missiles to strike a Russian army post near Berdyansk. The strike killed Oleg Tsokov, deputy commander of the Southern Military District. On the same day, explosions were reported in occupied Tokmak, Skadovsk, and Berdyansk. Also that day, the Russian army shelled Sofiivka, Kherson Oblast, with Grad multiple rocket launcher systems, killing at least one person and wounding another.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian army is increasingly using equipment created by volunteers and local engineers in an attempt to diversify its supplies. On July 9, a team of Ukrainian engineers known as Immaterium reported that a first-person view (FPV) drone destroyed a Russian observation tower located nine kilometers from the departure point. Immaterium also claimed that the drone strike set a distance record for an FPV drone developed and produced locally.

Elsewhere, Armin Papperger, head of the German defense company Rheinmetall, said on July 10 that an armored vehicle repair plant would open in Ukraine within twelve weeks. Papperger added that he hopes to increase Rheinmetall’s production of shells within one year so the company can provide Ukrainian forces with up to 60 percent of their needs. Meanwhile, Ukrainian Minister for Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin said construction was underway on a new plant to produce Bayraktar drones in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s defense ministry announced on July 8 that five former Azov commanders who fought in the battle over Mariupol were released from Turkey and returning to Ukraine alongside Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Ukraine’s ambassador to Turkey, Vasily Bodnar, said that Turkey did not put any conditions on Ukraine for the return of the Azov commanders. Bodnar added that their release was preceded by months of detailed diplomatic work. The commanders ended up in Turkey as a result of a prisoner swap brokered by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The commanders participated in the Azovstal steelworks plant siege, regarded by Ukrainians as a heroic effort to resist Russian advancements. Russian forces eventually captured the commanders, among the highest-profile fighters to be captured. The commanders have vowed to return to the battlefield. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Ukraine and Turkey had “violated” the prisoner exchange agreement.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia strikes humanitarian aid delivery point in Zaporizhzhia Oblast

On June 9, Ukraine’s interior ministry posted footage on Telegram showing the aftermath of a Russian air strike on a humanitarian aid delivery point in Orikhiv, Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The attack reportedly killed at least seven people and injured thirteen. Cross-referencing the shared footage with images posted on Google Maps, the DFRLab determined the location of the incident to be Communal School No. 3, located on the corner of Myru Street and Pokrovska Street. Initial damage analysis, via the images, indicates that the strike destroyed two-thirds of the school’s facilities.

A picture posted by Karyna Ola on Google Maps shows the rear of the school compound, left. A picture posted by the Russian opposition Telegram channel Sota shows the same rear staircase, top right. A picture posted by Ukraine’s interior ministry shows another part of the school compound, bottom right. (Source: Google Maps, left; Telegram/archive, top right; Telegram/archive, bottom right)

Reports from several Russian-speaking news outlets on Telegram confirmed that the school was converted into a humanitarian aid delivery point. Russian opposition media outlet Doxa indicated that a Russian jet may have dropped two guided bombs to attack the delivery point, though this information is not confirmed. According to the office of the prosecutor-general of Ukraine, the attack occurred around 1:30 pm local time.

The following morning, Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration head Yurii Malashko shared additional photos from the incident, including one featuring what appears to be a damaged canvas sign featuring the logo for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

(Screenshot of Telegram post, including an image featuring torn canvas with the UNHCR logo clearly visible. Source: zoda_gov_ua/archive)

The Zaporizhzhia Regional Prosecutor’s Office has launched an investigation into the “violation of the laws and customs of war, combined with intentional murder.”

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

The post Russian War Report: Russian airstrike hits humanitarian aid station appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why deepening Russia-Azerbaijan ties should worry the United States

Sheila Paylan — Thu, 13 Jul 2023 16:01:21 +0000

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has left it with few friends, but Azerbaijan is an important exception. In fact, Moscow and Baku are effectively allies now. Just two days before the February 2022 invasion, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a wide-ranging political-military agreement, following which Aliyev declared that the pact “brings our relations to the level of an alliance.” A few months later, Azerbaijan signed an intelligence-sharing agreement with Russia.

This has proven catastrophic for Armenia, which has maintained close security ties with Russia since joining the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 1992. In September 2022, Azerbaijan launched what the European Parliament called a “large-scale military aggression” against Armenia and, according to Armenia’s foreign minister, took over 150 square kilometers of Armenian territory. But the CSTO—to which Azerbaijan does not belong—refused to intervene on Armenia’s behalf. Washington stepped in to broker a ceasefire, and the European Union (EU) followed suit by sending a monitoring mission to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, much to Russia’s and Azerbaijan’s discontent.

The Putin-Aliyev partnership has also spelled disaster for the breakaway republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, whose remaining 120,000 ethnic Armenians live under Russian protection after Azerbaijan’s 2020 offensive to reclaim the territory. Forty-four days and thousands of deaths later, Russia brokered a ceasefire stipulating the five-year deployment of 1,960 Russian armed peacekeepers along the line of contact in Nagorno-Karabakh and in control of the “Lachin Corridor,” the only road linking it to Armenia. At the time, analysts opined that Putin’s imposition had cemented Russia’s role in the region. According to the decree authorizing the deployment, Russia’s reason for sending peacekeeping troops was to “prevent the mass death of the civilian population of Nagorno-Karabakh.”

But the deployment has not prevented Azerbaijan from continuing to try to expel ethnic Armenians from what’s left of Nagorno-Karabakh. Last December, a group of Azerbaijanis set up a roadblock along the Lachin Corridor claiming to advocate for environmental rights in the region. But the roadblock in effect slowed the flow of goods into Nagorno-Karabakh, creating a humanitarian crisis. The United States and the EU, as well as Human Rights Watch and others, have called for Azerbaijan to unblock the Lachin Corridor. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has ordered Azerbaijan to do the same.

Instead, Azerbaijan solidified the blockade by installing an armed checkpoint at the mouth of the Lachin Corridor, thus effectively seizing control over it. The move was further condemned by the United States and EU, and led Armenia to seek renewed intervention from the ICJ. Russia issued tepid statements and then replaced its peacekeeping force commander in Nagorno-Karabakh. But such a fundamental change in the regime over the Lachin Corridor could not possibly exist without approval—however tacit—from the Kremlin. Video footage taken last month purports to show Russian peacekeepers accompanying Azerbaijani forces to install a concrete barrier near the checkpoint and hoist an Azerbaijani flag in adjacent Armenian territory.

Since the blockade began, traffic along the Lachin Corridor has been reduced to an all-time low. This makes it more difficult for essential humanitarian aid to pass into Nagorno-Karabakh. In the last seven months, Nagorno-Karabakh has turned into an open-air prison, with ethnic Armenian inhabitants increasingly deprived of food and medicine, and energy resources almost entirely drained. They may soon be forced to flee their ancestral homeland for good just to survive.

What the United States should—and shouldn’t—do

In May, Aliyev demanded the surrender of Nagorno-Karabakh authorities, suggesting that he might offer them amnesty should they accept Azerbaijani rule. Oddly, the US State Department praised Aliyev’s remarks on amnesty, glossing over other parts of his speech in which he threatened violence if the authorities did not surrender: “[E]veryone knows perfectly well that we have all the opportunities to carry out any operation in that region today… Either they will bend their necks and come themselves or things will develop differently now.”

But Washington’s seemingly tactful acquiescence to Azerbaijan’s growing aggression against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in fact hurts US efforts to curb malign Russian influence and end Moscow’s war on Ukraine. The Russo-Azeri pact provides for enhanced economic ties, including in the gas and energy sectors, and has proven successful in helping preemptively circumvent Western sanctions against Russia. A deal between Baku and Brussels in July 2022 to double the flow of gas to Europe to wean it off Russian gas was soon followed by a deal in November 2022 between Baku and Moscow to increase gas imports from Russia to enable Azerbaijan to meet its new obligations to Europe.

In May, Russia and Iran agreed to complete a railroad that would link Russia to the Persian Gulf through Azerbaijan, thus providing a route through which Iran can directly send Russia more weapons and drones. One week later, during a summit of the Eurasian Economic Union, in which Aliyev participated as a guest for the first time, Putin stated that cooperation on developing this North-South railway is carried out “in close partnership with Azerbaijan.” Baku knows it can play both sides because it has backing from Moscow, while the West is blinded by non-Russian energy imports and dreams of regional stability.

If the West seeks to reduce tensions in the South Caucasus, it needs to step up its pressure on Azerbaijan. In the short term, this might include the threat of sanctions in response to further military action against Armenia and the continued refusal to unblock the Lachin Corridor, as well as lending support to Russia. By law, Azerbaijan cannot receive US military or foreign assistance unless it eschews military force to solve its disputes with Armenia, but the White House keeps letting Azerbaijan off the hook by waiving Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act and sending millions of dollars in military aid to Baku. Washington should treat Baku’s actions against Armenia as attempts at coercion, just as it does with Russian aggression against Ukraine.

For its part, Armenia has sought to unwind some of its security arrangements with Russia. Yerevan has refused to host CSTO military drills, send a representative to serve as CSTO deputy secretary general, sign a CSTO declaration to provide defense aid to Armenia, or accept the deployment of a CSTO monitoring mission in lieu of the EU-led mission. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has even threatened to terminate or freeze Armenia’s CSTO membership.

Even so, the West cannot reasonably expect Armenia to leave the CSTO and break with Russia without significantly helping Armenia diversify and mitigate its security, energy, and economic reliance on the Kremlin. As part of this, the United States may want to consider inviting Armenia to become a Major Non-NATO Ally. Washington should provide training and equipment to enhance Armenia’s defense capabilities and help it develop a more robust and independent security apparatus. The United States could also push forward on the prospect of building a small modular nuclear power plant in Armenia, providing an incentive for Armenia to decide against partnering with Russia on energy.

The West has stepped up its diplomatic efforts to facilitate a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which is good, but these efforts should not come at the cost of abetting the unfolding humanitarian disaster in Nagorno-Karabakh. Now is the time to compel Baku to cease its bellicose rhetoric and consent to an international presence in Nagorno-Karabakh to mediate dialogue with residents there and promote a more meaningful transition from war to lasting peace.

Sheila Paylan is a human rights lawyer and former legal advisor to the United Nations. She is currently a senior fellow in international law at the Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia.

The post Why deepening Russia-Azerbaijan ties should worry the United States appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s Andriy Yermak and Lithuania’s Gabrielius Landsbergis on the path ahead for Ukraine to join NATO

Atlantic Council — Wed, 12 Jul 2023 15:08:24 +0000

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Online Event Tue, July 11, 2023 • 9:00 am ET

NATO Public Forum

On the margins of the NATO Summit in Vilnius, the Alliance’s leaders and experts from across the transatlantic community gather for the NATO Public Forum on July 11 – 12. At a time of unprecedented public interest in the Alliance and the defence and security of the Euro-Atlantic area, the NATO Public Forum brings together leading experts and decision-makers from around the world to reflect on these issues and provide perspectives on the Summit’s agenda.

Europe & Eurasia NATO Security & Defense

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speaker

Andriy Yermak
Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine

Gabrielius Landsbergis
Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moderator

Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council

FREDERICK KEMPE: So, Mr. Yermak, how wonderful to see you; Minister Landsbergis. Because the [NATO-Ukraine Council] is about to start and because of the bravery and courage that you’ve shown Ukraine, we actually think we’re going to throw protocol to the wind and turn first to you.

And I wonder if you could talk about—I was with you not so long ago, a few weeks ago, with President Zelenskyy in his office during a time of attacks, and President Zelenskyy said if he didn’t get what he wanted at the NATO Summit, that he wouldn’t come because he would consider it a betrayal to the Ukrainian people. So he came. He hasn’t gotten entirely what we wanted. We read that in his Twitter feed. Give us your feeling of why he decided to come.

And then some people argue the communiqué was a prudent outcome. NATO doesn’t want to go to war with Ukraine. Others call it a missed opportunity. I’d love to have your view.

ANDRIY YERMAK: Thank you very much.

First of all, of course President Zelenskyy, president of Ukraine, [came] to Vilnius because it’s important to be here and to be the partners, to be the alliance. And first of all, the unity of NATO and the support which we really received during [the] more than five hundred days of this war, it’s a very, very strong signal to the aggressor that—first of all, that [the] Alliance and partners not just believe, they’re sure about our victory. The second, let’s see, it’s [that] today, it’s not finished. And we are looking for some very serious results of the summit.

And of course, our president, he’s a very principled person. And of course, everything which he said before and our estimate and our feelings you can listen, you can see he is very honest, he is always very clear, declared on the position of our country. But let’s see. We really will have in several minutes starting this very important, the—I think the maybe most important for Ukraine—meetings with the NATO alliance in which we will discuss, first of all, of course, the [continuation] of the military aid, which [is] very important for us to win this war, and of course we will continue—and I hope it will be today—one very important moment for the security guarantees for Ukraine and the way to be a member of NATO.

FREDERICK KEMPE: And just a quick follow-up, then, on that. In this balance between prudent outcome/missed opportunity, are you saying it all depends on how things go from now? Because if you had listened to President Zelenskyy’s or read President Zelenskyy’s tweet from yesterday where he’s calling the language about Ukraine and NATO absurd, it seems to me that this is a movement in another direction, though.

ANDRIY YERMAK: I hope that this summit [will not] be the missed opportunity, but once again you can… listen and see in the result of this day. We have very positive bilateral [meetings] already with some partners and… the positives of the results from this summit.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you. And then just finally, how has it been received in Ukraine thus far?… This summit and the outcomes, how are Ukrainians receiving this and responding to it inside Ukraine?

ANDRIY YERMAK: You know, we have more than [five hundred] days of war. And you know, all [of] us in Ukraine, we are living in very specific reality, the reality of the war. And of course, Ukrainians looking for this summit and for the results, very concrete things. And of course, you know in these seconds, these minutes, our heroes continue to [fight]. For us, sometimes these days it’s [a] very special atmosphere because here at peace, here the silence, here is not you listen—not listen the sirens. And you personally and my colleague and friends personally can see this reality in Ukraine.

But you know, our nation [shows] all these five hundred days how we are brave, how it’s possible to not be afraid, how it’s possible to fight for independence, for freedoms. And of course, we hope that today’s results of this summit will be more inspired and give not just emotional, some very practical support of our people for our soldiers to go forward.

And I’d like to say very important things: that we [are] not stopping our [fight]. No [forces] exist [that] can stop us until we [liberate] all our territories, we back all our people, and really win this war. And I absolutely sure that this will be our joy and victory.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So, Mr. Yermak, I think that’s a great transition to the prime minister. Having been with you recently in Kyiv, I slept a lot better at night because of Patriot missiles. Here I can sleep well at night not because of the Patriot missiles that are out there right now for your airport.

Minister Landsbergis, I followed your history [for] a long time. I was here when you were in the Warsaw Pact and in the final days and at the time of the Vilnius 10 ahead of your 2004 membership. Talk about this summit in the context of history, but also how you think history might remember this summit.

GABRIELIUS LANDSBERGIS: Well, that’s an excellent question. We tend to look at Vilnius and Vilnius summits in a way that they sometimes do not offer a tactical change, but they offer strategic opportunity. And it happened in 2014, when tactically at that day, some of us felt that we might not have won the day, but at the end we won Ukraine and Ukraine has won.

I believe that something of that [sort] is happening these days, that quite a lot of those here in this room and in this country expected more that happened today. But I think that in strategy—strategically, we won. We committed ourselves to Ukrainian membership in NATO. That’s the biggest achievement, I would say, strategically.

Now, where the problem lies. The way that I look at history, the promise in Bucharest, it was a strong statement: Georgia and Ukraine will become members of NATO. It was a strong statement. The problem was not with the statement itself; it was with our lack of commitment afterwards. We did not come back. We came back to the statement three invasions later. That was a problem. So now I’m quite sure that we are committed that we won’t waste another year, another month, and another day staying on the question and doing everything in our power so that we stay true to the meaning that we put into the declaration.

And that means that Vilnius Summit was not the last stop. We have to see it as a bridge. And the next stop is Washington. So we still have a full year. Lots to do. And I count on every single one of you to do your part so that Washington can actually be even more historic than Vilnius.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that. And it being the seventy-fifth anniversary, I hope that’s true.

A follow-up question on that. Some say the actual communiqué language, because of how conditional it was made, is weaker than 2008 in Bucharest. But am I interpreting weaker language but stronger commitment toward the goal?

GABRIELIUS LANDSBERGIS: Yeah. I was not there in the room in 2008, unfortunately, so I’ve just read about it and I was told about it. I think that the way it is being presented, that the consensus in 2008 was weaker, it was not there. Now it’s much wider, definitely. You don’t see an objection, you know, from the people in the room who would say Ukraine should not be part of NATO, we cannot commit ourselves to that idea. There is nobody saying that. So that is a step forward.

Again, you know, coming from [the] eastern flank, we tend to see the situation a tiny bit different. And for us, actually, the history has changed since the last year. That’s why our wording is stronger. That’s why our stance is stronger. That’s why our support to Ukraine, you know, is more vocal, because for us the history runs a different course right now.

And I tend to use the example of [the] Berlin Wall. I think it’s a very monumental time in European history, in world history, in 1989. So for us, last year the wall [was] rebuilt or it’s being rebuilt. So basically, in that principle, we’re back into—for us, it’s cold war. For Ukraine, it’s hot war. But we’re back in 1989 and going backwards.

So this is where our mentality is. This is how we see the situation. And therefore, we are building on a different reality than it was in 2008.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So we all know that an alliance has to balance the long term and the short term. We also know that—and Jake Sullivan was talking about that earlier today—unity doesn’t mean you don’t disagree. And press reports have it that at least eight countries of the thirty-one were fighting very hard for different language, stronger language toward invitation for Ukraine… Where is the alliance unified? Where is it un-unified? What is the crux of the differences in the room?

GABRIELIUS LANDSBERGIS: I would say in some cases there is difference in horizon. We tend to see that problems that we are trying to solve, the way that we’re helping Ukraine, the way that Ukraine should be helped, we’re talking decades of a new reality in Europe and decades of Putin, who’s still in power, who will be a dangerous neighbor, who might attack again, who might assault other neighbors, even try Article 5, how that works. We are thinking in this term. It might not happen next year. In some cases, the horizon is way shorter—way, way shorter. We’re talking years; in some cases, it’s months. How do we survive this month? How do we survive until next year? How do we survive until the next election?…

FREDERICK KEMPE: One more question for you, then I want to go back to Mr. Yermak. The Baltic aerospace agreement, in all the reporting about everything else, very little has been [placed] on this. And then put that in the context of Swedish membership. Obviously, this was the big success of this week, in many respects unanticipated. Put together this Baltic aerospace agreement, the Swedish membership; how does that change your region? How does it change security around the Baltics and Lithuania?

GABRIELIUS LANDSBERGIS: Well, I think that Swedish membership is monumental, definitely. If we, you know, remain on the example of a bridge, so it’s a pillar, definitely. It’s a very strong pillar.

And you know, the way that we frame it currently, the promise of swift accession—Swedish swift accession has been made, and now we’re very much looking forward to it. But it changes the situation in the Baltic Sea dramatically. It affects defense plans that are being voted for, that were adopted, but it changes them as well. Sweden is a very strong element in all of our defense—not just Lithuania, but also Poland, also—I mean, I’m not even talking about Sweden itself, but also Finland, also Estonia. The whole Baltic Sea, you know, becomes a different, different concept. That’s a very strong thing.

When it comes to the air defense, we’re saying that, look, we have to talk about the content. Things don’t happen overnight. So it’s a very strong step forward, but now we—will be looking for, you know, how it will be materialized.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that.

Mr. Yermak, so not a prudent outcome, not a missed opportunity, but a bridge. What would you like to see this week’s events in Vilnius be a bridge to on behalf of Ukraine? You talked about Washington. What do you hope will happen between now and Washington?

And obviously, we have a spring offensive we’re talking about at the same time. So there are two battles, one of them very real and on the frontlines for Ukraine against the aggressor, Putin’s troops, and the other is the bureaucratic contest in NATO of where we want to land by next summer in Washington.

ANDRIY YERMAK: First of all, I hope that during this period of time we will win this war. This is—will be, first of all, the most important for us, and I’m sure will be very important for all the world.

The second, of course, as we are looking this way and to the Washington summit, of course, we will receive the fixed security guarantees, because security guarantees to Ukraine is the [guarantee] of the security of the whole Europe. And as I said, we hope that just today we will have very important stage of issue of the security.

And of course, I [agree] with my colleagues that we are looking [at] a bridge and we hope that—you know, during these five hundred days Ukraine a lot of times surprised everybody in the world.

First of all, we [were] surprised, when it started, this [invasion], and somebody gave us three days, one week, one month. We [were] surprised and we still not just defended, we liberated our lands.

The second, you remember [how] then President Zelenskyy, the speaker of the parliament, the head of the government [sent] the documents for the candidate states. Many people [were] very skeptical. We already received this status. We [were] talking about coalitions of our jets. We [were] talking about coalitions of tanks. We [were] talking about the coalitions of air defense. Already, it’s reality.

And I think that we try everything from our side to surprise in Washington. And of course, we are looking, finally, as how said President Erdoğan in his—in the last meeting with President Zelenskyy in Istanbul, that Ukraine [has] everything to be a member of the NATO. And of course, we believe in it.

And I’m glad that today we—I think nobody in the world don’t think that it’s happened. Of course, we’re looking for the prospective, for the future, but not hesitation that it’s happen.

And about—I’m sorry, about your second part of the—of the—I mean the reforms. And you know, in the beginning when Volodymyr Zelenskyy [went] for the presidential campaign in 2019, one of his [priorities] was the [reforming] of Ukraine. I can say it’s in our blood. And of course, I can say that [it] may be, will be difficult to find another country in the world who just, in the circumstances of this terrible war, [is] not stopping any reforms, and we go forward. And I think many people, and Ursula von der Leyen, and the European leaders many times said how really impressed by the reforms, which we continue doing just during this war.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So final question. We’ve run out of time, so final question for each of you, Mr. Yermak and then Minister Landsbergis. You have said, President Zelenskyy has said that strategic commitments can’t replace NATO membership. Do you still believe that? Strategic support.

ANDRIY YERMAK: Yes, of course. Yes, of course. Of course, it’s—you know, we are living in so region of life that immediately back to Ukraine we continue to do all the best from our side. That—just if somebody [has] some hesitations in the colleagues, there is [none], and to do and go forward and not stopping, because this is the goal and this is the [decision] of Ukrainian society. Today, more than 90 percent of Ukrainian [support] and believe that very soon Ukraine will be the members of the NATO.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you, Mr. Yermak.

Minister Landsbergis, the bridge, Vilnius to Washington. How should that bridge be built?

GABRIELIUS LANDSBERGIS: I think that there are some very practical steps that could be taken and should be taken. First of all, there was a discussion about the need for additional reforms in Ukraine. At least this is what allies agreed upon. And Ukraine has shown a tremendous, unbelievable capacity to reform under duress. This has happened on the path to EU. So I think that if concrete requirements are being presented to Ukraine, I’m absolutely 100 percent convinced that Ukraine will deliver on those so that we could have, you know, to show up for the allies that—because the statement goes that when allies agree and the conditions are met. So I’m sure that Ukraine can deliver on part of [the] conditions.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So an invitation in Washington would be potentially possible, would be possible?

GABRIELIUS LANDSBERGIS: I’m convinced that it could be historic, not just because of the years.

FREDERICK KEMPE: I think that’s a good spot to end on. So let me thank Mr. Yermak not just for being here, but for the courage of your country. And please send our best wishes to President Zelenskyy and all Ukrainians.

And then, Minister Landsbergis, what wonderful hosts you’ve been. And what an incredibly well-executed and organized summit. We’ve been taken care of so well here by every citizen of this country.

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The post Ukraine’s Andriy Yermak and Lithuania’s Gabrielius Landsbergis on the path ahead for Ukraine to join NATO appeared first on Atlantic Council.

NATO summit leaves Ukrainians frustrated

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 11 Jul 2023 20:45:19 +0000

As Ukrainians digested the outcome of the NATO summit on July 11, the mood across the country was one of frustration. While the annual gathering of NATO leaders in Vilnius brought a number of tangible gains for Ukraine including confirmation of new weapons deliveries and the creation of a coalition to train Ukrainian pilots to fly F-16 fighter aircraft, the all-important summit declaration failed to provide a clear timetable for Ukraine’s NATO membership. Instead, the communique spoke of “additional democratic and security sector reforms” before concluding: “We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the alliance when allies agree and conditions are met.”

This vague wording represented modest progress but fell far short of Ukrainian expectations. In the run-up to the summit, Ukraine and many of the country’s international allies had been calling for a clear signal from NATO regarding future Ukrainian membership. However, while a number of countries have publicly backed Ukraine’s bid to join NATO, there is no unanimity on the issue among the 31-nation alliance. On the eve of this week’s meeting in Lithuania, US President Joe Biden said Ukraine was not ready for membership and claimed it was “premature” to start the accession process in the middle of a war.

Supporters of Ukraine’s bid to join NATO see it as the only way to end Russian aggression against the country and achieve a sustainable peace in Eastern Europe. Anything less, they say, will merely result in a pause before a new Russian invasion as Moscow seeks to achieve its overriding foreign policy goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and returning the country permanently to the Kremlin orbit. Skeptics have responded by noting that the promise of fast-track Ukrainian NATO membership after the war would be likely to convince Putin of the need to prolong hostilities indefinitely. This lack of consensus resulted in what was an underwhelming NATO summit outcome in Vilnius.

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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy traveled personally to Lithuania on Tuesday, but his last-minute intervention was unable to sway the doubters and secure the kind of unambiguous membership commitment Ukraine has long sought. “Today I embarked on a trip here with faith in decisions, with faith in partners, with faith in a strong NATO. In a NATO that does not hesitate, does not waste time, and does not look back at any aggressor,” he wrote in a carefully worded but emotionally charged post following publication of the summit declaration. “I would like this faith to become confidence; confidence in the decisions that all of us deserve and every warrior, every citizen, every mother, every child expects. Is that too much to expect?” In a social media commentary posted earlier on Tuesday, he was significantly more outspoken, criticizing NATO’s failure to state a specific membership timeline as “unprecedented and absurd.”

Others were in even less diplomatic mood. “No amount of spin will turn this into a “great” or “historic” summit. Best not even to start,” posted former Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves. Some fellow politicians in the Baltic region clearly agreed. “This is not leadership,” tweeted Lithuanian MP Zygimantas Pavilionis. “This is appeasement that normally leads to final defeat.” In Kyiv, Ukrainian Ambassador for Strategic Communications Olexander Scherba questioned the logic behind the apparent fear among some NATO members of provoking Putin. “The strategy of “not provoking Russia” is in reality a strategy of provoking Russia,” he wrote. “That’s how it goes with bullies. Will the West ever see it?”

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Meanwhile, many in Ukraine expressed anger at the apparent lack of urgency among the country’s international partners. These feelings of frustration were summed up in a powerful post by veteran Ukrainian anti-corruption activist Daria Kaleniuk: “Ukraine needs “strategic patience”. Should I patiently wait until a Russian missile strikes my apartment in Kyiv with my kids inside? Or should I patiently wait for my son to turn eighteen and go to fight in a war against the largest threat to NATO? Delays cost lives!”

Despite the undeniable mood of anti-climax in Ukraine, the country’s famed wartime spirit of resilience was also on display as Ukrainians reacted to news from Lithuania. “Disappointment but not discouragement. Next stop, Washington DC,” posted Alyona Getmanchuk, director of the Kyiv-based New Europe Center think tank and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, in reference to next year’s NATO summit, which is scheduled to take place in the US capital.

Ukrainian MP Oleksiy Goncharenko echoed this sentiment regarding the need to focus on securing a firm membership commitment at the 2024 summit, but warned that further delays could have grave consequences for public opinion in Ukraine. If there is no progress toward joining NATO by this time next year, he wrote, Ukrainians will ask: “So we are good enough to die for democracy and not good enough to live together with other free nations in one alliance?”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The NATO Summit’s underwhelming support for Ukraine

Atlantic Council — Tue, 11 Jul 2023 19:57:23 +0000

JUST IN

It’s a fast track with a slow start. NATO leaders meeting in Vilnius today released their summit communiqué, in which they said that Ukraine no longer needs to complete a membership action plan to join the Alliance—but that an invitation would only be extended “when allies agree and conditions are met.” In the meantime, the allies pledged to work closely with Kyiv through a newly established NATO-Ukraine Council. With Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s biggest request—a timeline for membership—unfulfilled, have allies truly bolstered Ukraine’s security as it battles against Russia’s full-scale invasion? What else did the Alliance agree to regarding Russia and Ukraine? Our experts, who are all at the center of the action in Vilnius, decode the communiqué.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

John E. Herbst (@JohnEdHerbst): Senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine
Rachel Rizzo (@RachelRizzo): Nonresident senior fellow at the Europe Center
Christopher Skaluba: Director of the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and former principal director for European and NATO policy at the US Defense Department

Roadmap or roadblock?

John tells us that the communiqué’s conditional language and lack of timeline amounts to “not much movement beyond the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit language noting that Ukraine would eventually be a member.”
That’s remarkable given that the 2008 language, which also encompassed prospective Georgian membership, “has been derided for years for placing both Georgia and Ukraine in the worst strategic position possible,” Rachel observes, with multiple Russian invasions of both countries occurring in the intervening years. “The problem with vague language like this is that it kicks the can down the road.”
“Inside the geeky NATO universe, the upgrading of the NATO-Ukraine Commission to Council status and the removal of formal membership action plan requirements for Ukraine are significant developments,” Chris adds. “But neither packs a political punch or will be viewed as real progress on the membership question.”
There was also no mention in the communiqué of security guarantees for Ukraine “that were broadly promised in the run-up to the summit,” Chris notes. “The combination of these things makes for an underwhelming package for Ukraine, though some small hope remains for better outcomes at tomorrow’s inaugural NATO-Ukraine Council meeting.”

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DC drama

John relays that the communiqué’s release was delayed due to the “clear disagreement” between the United States and Germany on one side, and Nordic, Eastern European, and some Western European allies on the other with regard to Ukraine’s membership. Both sides had to bend a bit to get to the final consensus language. “The end result was not quite inspiring,” he says.
But inspiration could always strike: The Alliance will celebrate its seventy-fifth anniversary next year with a Washington summit, which offers US President Joe Biden “a chance to establish a legacy as an outstanding national security president,” John argues. To make that happen, he adds, Biden will need to “provide Ukraine all the weapons it needs to defeat the Kremlin on the battlefield” and “move beyond caution to hasten the anchoring of Ukraine in NATO.”
Rachel fears more disappointment ahead, whether at the Washington summit or ten years from now, when “NATO allies will come face to face with the undeniable truth that all allies might not ever be on the same page regarding Ukraine’s NATO membership. That’s a tough pill for many to swallow, but it might just be reality.”

Defensible moves

John welcomed the communiqué’s labeling of Russia as “the most significant and direct threat” to the Alliance. “This is an important reminder that US and NATO support for Ukraine is not philanthropy, but the smart way to defend our vital interests,” he explains.
Chris points out that on the positive side, the Vilnius gathering will be remembered as another “enlargement summit” because of Monday’s deal with Turkey paving the way for Sweden’s accession.
Flying under the radar, the allies also agreed to adopt “some four thousand pages of classified regional plans for the defense of NATO territory,” Chris says. This move “completes a shift, started in 2014 after Russia’s invasion of Crimea, to a deterrence-by-denial strategy absent since the waning days of the Cold War. Heady stuff.”

The post The NATO Summit’s underwhelming support for Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What’s behind Erdogan’s backing of Sweden’s NATO bid?

Atlantic Council — Tue, 11 Jul 2023 00:03:53 +0000

JUST IN

The wait is (nearly) over. After more than a year of ups and downs since Sweden applied to join NATO in May 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has agreed to back Stockholm’s bid to become the Alliance’s thirty-second member. The announcement came on the eve of the NATO Summit in Vilnius after Erdoğan, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson held a lightning round of negotiations. Erdoğan agreed to advance ratification of Sweden’s NATO accession to Turkey’s legislature, with Hungary expected to follow suit to complete the process. What changed Erdoğan’s mind? What’s next for the Alliance? Our experts on the ground in Vilnius and beyond share their insights.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

Rich Outzen (@RichOutzen): Nonresident senior fellow at Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, former US State Department official, and former US Army foreign area officer
Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried): Weiser family distinguished fellow and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe
Christopher Skaluba: Director of the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and former principal director for European and NATO policy at the US Defense Department
Anna Wieslander (@AnnwieAnna): Director for Northern Europe and secretary-general of the Swedish Defence Association

How done is this deal?

The joint memorandum from Monday’s meeting spells out increased counterterrorism efforts by NATO to address Turkey’s security concerns and fresh support from Sweden for Turkey’s bid to join the European Union, among other provisions—and came as a surprise, following Erdogan’s skeptical comments in recent days about the prospects for an agreement.
“It is a typical Erdoğan move to take a maximalist position in a high-stakes negotiation, show readiness to walk, then compromise for progress on key demands,” Rich tells us.
Not (yet) in writing is a looming deal for Turkey to buy F-16 fighter jets from the United States, a likely carrot for Turkish approval of Sweden’s membership. “The practice of international relations is not an art for the purist,” says Dan. “If the Biden team made some understanding, I would look favorably on it.”
Chris, who’s in Vilnius, notes that Erdoğan is only sending the decision on Sweden’s NATO accession to the Turkish parliament, which his party controls, so this is not a done deal. Erdoğan made a show of lending his support to an invitation for Finland and Sweden to join NATO a year ago in Madrid before drawing out the process until now. “There is a non-zero chance that some intervening circumstance (like another public Quran burning [in Sweden]) could serve as pretext for derailing the process again,” he says. “I want to be optimistic, but worry that I have seen this movie before. NATO should not spike the football until it is over the goal line.”
With the action now moving to the Turkish legislature, Erdoğan “retains the ability to kill or delay accession if Sweden backs off on counterterror” measures that Turkey wants or if an F-16 deal doesn’t materialize, Rich adds.
Nevertheless, there was a palpable sense of celebration and relief in Vilnius. “It is unclear how long it will take, but the agreement undoubtedly removes the risk of Sweden falling into a limbo situation—that is, being close to, but not fully in, the Alliance,” Anna tells us from the summit.

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The Wagner factor

Erdoğan’s turnabout comes two weeks after mercenary leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s short-lived mutiny in Russia—and on the same day that news broke of Russian leader Vladimir Putin meeting with Prigozhin in the days after the revolt—developments that “suggest [Putin] regime weakness,” according to Dan.
“Erdoğan’s reaction to the failed 2016 coup in Turkey showed no such mixed messages,” Dan adds. In choosing to advance Sweden’s efforts to join NATO, “Erdoğan might have concluded that betting on Putin after the mutiny seemed less wise.”
Rich argues that the Prigozhin drama was not much of a factor, since this agreement was all part of a long-term push for NATO to help address Turkish security concerns such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK): “The Turks need a functional relationship with Russia but see more common cause with the West; the approach to Sweden should be seen in those terms, as how to prove bona fides to the Western Alliance while extracting necessary concessions to their own security.”
If its security concerns are addressed, Turkey actually favors a bigger NATO with countries such as Sweden, Finland, Ukraine, and Georgia, Rich tells us, “because by NATO structure and bylaws” Turkey, like other Alliance members, “gets a veto on the world’s most powerful security organization.” So “the bigger the better.”

All for one

“The deal means that the Vilnius Summit is off to a good start,” Anna says, as the Alliance “faced the risk of appearing fragmented and weak” with its members not yet fully united around Sweden’s NATO membership. Now focus turns to a possible membership roadmap and security guarantees for Ukraine, where “tough decisions” await, she says.
Erdoğan also gets to bask in the limelight. “He has lost no real leverage,” Rich notes, “but gained a tremendous optic of Turkey supporting the Atlantic Alliance.”

The post What’s behind Erdogan’s backing of Sweden’s NATO bid? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Moldova must seize opportunity to end energy dependence on Russia

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti — Mon, 10 Jul 2023 16:22:04 +0000

When Moldova acceded to the EU Energy Community Treaty in 2010, it pledged to restructure away from Soviet centralization and reform its natural gas sector to comply with the EU’s anti-trust laws. More than 13 years later, the path ahead toward unbundling remains long and winding. The issue is urgent, however, because without gas sector reforms that break Russia’s stranglehold on Moldova’s energy sector and allow for real competition, Europe’s poorest country cannot hope to achieve energy security.

Moldova simply cannot afford to delay reforming its gas sector any longer. It is completely dependent on imports to keep itself heated and lit. Landlocked between Ukraine and Romania, 99% of oil is imported, along with 100% of natural gas. That gas fuels heating and the country’s lone power plant, located in Kremlin-controlled separatist region Transnistria.

This alone would be a recipe for energy disaster (and has been). Additionally, the country’s gas sector is almost entirely controlled by a monopoly called Moldovagaz, which is 51% owned by Russia’s gas monopoly Gazprom, with a 36% share owned by the Moldovan government and 13% by Transnistria. Moldovagaz’s wholly owned subsidiaries dominate all of the various subsectors of the energy industry. For example, Moldovatransgaz runs 98% of the distribution network.

This arrangement has afforded Moscow decades of informal control over Moldova. Indeed, allegations of Russia’s manipulation, coercion, and malign influence over the tiny country as exercised through Moldovagaz are too extensive to illuminate in full. A few highlights are the 2006 and 2009 gas shutoffs by Gazprom, which left tens of thousands of Moldovans without heating in the dead of winter. There have also been several rounds of brutal gas supply negotiations that have left Moldova with deeply disadvantageous gas contracts.

The most recent contract was signed in October 2021 and committed Moldova to another five years of Gazprom supplies. At the same time, President Maia Sandu’s new government, its lawyers, and its Western supporters are struggling with the fact that either pro-Russian actors in the former government or Moldovagaz officials appear to have wiped the files necessary to untangle several of the legal instruments that keep the country in its unhappy marriage with Gazprom.

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Modovagaz also faces various accusations of accounting shenanigans. These include claims that it supplies Transnistria with gas that the breakaway region doesn’t pay for, and then charges the debt to the Moldovan government. Coupled with sometimes dubious debts Moldova has incurred buying gas, Gazprom claims the government now owes it $9 billion. This represents $760 million in purported Moldovan government debt, and $8.24 billion in debt tied to Transnistria. For comparison, Moldova’s GDP is under $14 billion.

Meanwhile, during October 2021 negotiations with Gazprom, Moldovagaz committed “not to carry out a forced reorganization” until this debt is settled. Critics believe this is a further indication that unbundling would be good for Moldova and bad for Russia. Signed in the midst of the mounting energy crisis of late 2021 and with Moldova running entirely out of gas, this agreement has been widely branded as an example of inappropriate Russian influence over the Moldovan energy sector.

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The obvious solution to break Russia’s energy dominance over Moldova is for the authorities to finally implement the unbundling of the gas sector and vertically de-integrate Moldovagaz. The EU Third Energy Package requires the three tiers of a natural gas market (upstream/production, midstream/transmission, and downstream/distribution) not be controlled by the same entity. In practice, this means separating the gas transmission system operator, Moldovatransgaz. The original deadline for unbundling was in 2016, with extensions then granted until January 2020, and then February 2021. In 2021, EU officials opened infringement proceedings against Moldova for its continued failure to unbundle Moldovagaz. In June 2023, the Ministry of Energy announced it was “determined” to complete Moldovagaz unbundling by September 2023. We shall see.

What form any unbundling will take also remains unclear. The Moldovan government may believe it lacks the capacity to manage Moldovatransgaz and the transmission system and may look for an external company to operate it. This would be a major mistake because giving critical infrastructure assets over to foreign entities would be repeating the same error as with Gazprom and Moldovagaz. It would also preclude Moldova’s learning to be self sufficient, a key aspect of energy independence and security. Another theoretical option is privatization, but that requires finding a buyer. Given Moldova’s history of defaults and disputes with private investors, there’s close to zero chance of that happening.

The best option is almost certainly finding a different government entity other than Moldovagaz to take control of Moldovatransgaz. This would replicate how Ukraine unbundled its gas monopoly, Naftogaz, by spinning off the transmission system operator into a separate entity controlled by a different ministry. There is some tangential precedent: Using a revolving EBRD credit of €300 million, the gas trading team at state agency Energocom, led by Maciej Wozniak, has pushed Gazprom out of the Moldovan market. Along the same lines, another state agency could step into the distribution business. This would have the added benefit of being more efficient because nothing new would need to be created; the unbundling would be a matter of paperwork.

There has probably never been a better time for Moldova to get serious about this; the cessation of gas transit from Gazprom into Europe means Russia has already played its energy trump card and has relatively little leverage left.

At the same time, Western interest and willingness to support Moldova during the transition should help cover any gaps. Politically, Moldova taking control of assets ultimately owned by Russia is good optics for Sandu’s government. And the political turmoil in Moscow coupled with the Kremlin’s distraction from its stalled war in Ukraine could make Moldovan maneuvers less likely to elicit an aggressive response. If everything goes right, becoming the supplier to Transnistria could even forge something of a path to national reconciliation. There’s never been a better moment to try, and there’s no time to waste.

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The structure built by Putin has become a snake pit. Perhaps a “house of cards” is a more fitting term. Having previously refrained from sanctioning Yevgeniy Prigozhin, the ruthless leader of the Wagner paramilitary group, Putin spoke following the mutiny of punishing his enemies, even if such efforts are complicated by Wagner’s penetration into the Russian elite. The first arrest related to these consequences (still unconfirmed) appears to be that of Russian General Sergey Surovikin.

Prigozhin had been engaged in a power struggle with the military leadership for some time. Specifically, his attacks have targeted Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. The confrontation was exacerbated after last February’s invasion by the increasing relevance that the head mercenary and his followers have gained. Their relative effectiveness compared to the regular Russian army—which collapsed in the early onslaught of the war—brought Wagner into the spotlight inside and outside of Russia. In addition to its military actions, the group’s cruelty went viral on social media, as did its sermons in the courtyards of the prisons Wagner forces toured, recruiting convicted criminals of all kinds.

The mercenary leader’s strong connection with the great leader—a connection forged during the murky stage of the president’s public debut in Saint Petersburg in the 1990s—seemed to give Prigozhin a blank check. He first emerged on the scene as “Putin’s chef,” a nickname earned from managing the catering service of someone well acquainted with the dangers at the table, himself being a master in the use of poison as a political weapon.

Before the insurrection, the outspoken warrior had been making accusations of all kinds of irregularities, misconduct, and mistreatment against his two enemies: that they had claimed credit for Wagner’s victory in Bakhmut, that men were dying so they could “get fat in their mahogany offices,” and that they had denied his fighters necessary ammunition and support. And, most importantly, that they had deceived Putin about the progress of the military campaign.

The speech that kicked off the mutiny goes even further. No one had dared to question Putin’s justification of the invasion based on a victim mentality incessantly fed to the Russian people. The few in Russia who dared to dissent, such as Vladimir Kara-Murza, immediately found themselves behind bars.

Thus, Prigozhin’s words should be considered inflammatory: a qualified member of the establishment dared to openly and boldly denounce the falsehood of “the story that there was insane aggression on the part of Ukraine, and they were going to attack [Russia] together with the entire NATO bloc.” Careful not to mention the president by name, he stated that, contrary to Kremlin messaging, the war served “not to demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine,” but rather “it was launched for completely different reasons.” He implied that the disaster was orchestrated by high-ranking military officials (driven by economic greed and vanity), in combination with “some oligarchs.”

[The] turmoil has shattered the thesis that the Euro-Atlantic community must not humiliate Putin for fear of provoking him, with the unpredictable consequences regarding the use of nuclear weapons that doing so would entail.

Putin’s response was not long in coming. In his televised address on June 24, he labeled the uprising as “a stab in the back of [the] country and [the] people.” His references to the Russian Empire—a frequent topic of his outdated musings—were to be expected, but his implicit identification with the ill-fated Tsar Nicholas II was surprising.

He equated the situation triggered by Prigozhin to the prelude of the upheaval of 1917, which led to the collapse of the system. Was he seeking, in his association with the tragic figure, a symbolic reincarnation of the tsar—in his case, having made the right decisions to avoid falling into the black hole of violence that characterized those years when “Russians killed Russians, brothers killed brothers”? It was a diatribe made with his citizens in mind, who retain a collective memory of that terrible period and who found their livelihoods crushed during the 1990s following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

During the uprising, the lack of response was salient, both from the siloviki (the economic and political elite) and the common people. There was no notable support of—or clear opposition to—Putin, who exploits the fact that people cling to the status quo out of fear of the unknown.

Prigozhin has nonetheless proven to be a torpedo aimed at Putin’s narrative. He punctured the myth of a war of necessity, of an inevitable war for historical justice. He undermined Putin’s explanation of an existential struggle against US aggression disguised as NATO. Furthermore, the turmoil has shattered the thesis that the Euro-Atlantic community must not humiliate Putin for fear of provoking him, with the unpredictable consequences regarding the use of nuclear weapons that doing so would entail. This thesis has justified the countries’ stinginess in sending to Ukraine certain equipment classified as offensive and the West’s delay in accepting stark realities, such as the urgent need for full operational readiness in the air.

The Euro-Atlantic community must move away from the habit of delaying decisions based on speculation about the consequences of its actions for third parties. It needs to look beyond the pipe dream of an immediate peace negotiation based on the stalemate on the front or a Kremlin-asserted “right” to subjugated areas. NATO allies’ opportunity to demonstrate determination when facing Russia will come soon—on July 11 in Vilnius at the NATO Summit.

Ana Palacio is a former minister of foreign affairs of Spain (2002-2004) and former senior vice president and general counsel of the World Bank Group. She is also a member of the Atlantic Council’s Board of Directors.

A version of this article originally appeared in El Mundo. It has been translated from Spanish by the staff of Palacio y Asociados and is reprinted here with the author’s and publisher’s permission.

The post Prigozhin was a torpedo to the idea that the West must not humiliate Putin appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why local officials must participate in Ukraine’s reconstruction

Zachary Popovich, Michael Druckman — Mon, 10 Jul 2023 13:58:58 +0000

It is now beyond question: Putin’s dream of decapitating Ukraine’s central leadership and subjugating the country has turned into a nightmare for Russia. Rather than finding Ukraine’s society divided and malleable, Russia has encountered a confident citizenry animated by commitments to a free and democratic future. While many of Ukraine’s national figures have provided commendable leadership examples, local leaders and mayors have also emerged as pivotal sources of resilience and hope.

Since Moscow’s invasion began in February 2022, cities across Ukraine have experienced significant destruction from Russia’s frequent artillery bombardments, drone attacks, and missile strikes. Ongoing fighting around Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine is a reminder of how cities remain central battlefields in the war.

Local officials and mayors have courageously stepped up to the challenge of wartime governance, with citizens increasingly turning to them to address emergency humanitarian and security challenges. Ukrainian mayors often serve as primary lines of defense responsible for processing medical aid, engaging directly with international organizations, and repairing damaged infrastructure.

According to a recent survey conducted across twenty-one cities, between 87% and 96% of Ukrainian residents wish to remain in their cities after the war, with 39% to 62% of respondents agreeing that local officials should decide reconstruction priorities. Clearly, leaders who have managed local response systems are well equipped to identify local needs and mobilize available resources for future targeted reconstruction projects.

For this reason, it is crucial that Ukraine’s nascent reconstruction strategies incorporate local leaders and mayors as primary actors charged with directing and managing redevelopment initiatives. Although any Ukrainian “Marshall Plan” will certainly prioritize financing redevelopment projects and infrastructure repair, Ukrainian officials and the country’s international partners should also work to establish new relationships that empower leaders at the local level.

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Numerous plans to address Ukraine’s future economic and political engagement with transatlantic and other recovery institutions are already underway. During the recent Ukraine Recovery Conference in London, public and private leaders from over 60 countries pledged significant financial resources to address humanitarian needs and outline investments in Ukraine’s battered economy.

Kyiv had earlier presented a draft Recovery and Development Plan at the 2022 Ukraine Recovery Conference in Lugano, Switzerland. This plan outlined the need for approximately 850 reconstruction projects set over ten years with total costs estimated at $750 billion dollars.

In January 2023, the European Commission also unveiled its Multi-Agency Donor Coordination Platform, which is designed to streamline future Ukrainian international recovery assistance and establish clear, transparent, and accountable financial standards. While such initiatives help secure much-needed funds, Ukraine and its allies must also seek to utilize these global opportunities and engage Ukraine’s local leaders as vital partners in their country’s recovery.

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Expanding on Ukraine’s decentralization experience is not only a pragmatic wartime imperative necessary for distributing equipment and supplies; it will also build upon established reforms necessary for Ukraine’s democratic consolidation. Beginning in 2014 as part of the many sweeping reforms enacted after the Euromaidan Revolution, political decentralization has been an important way of reducing Soviet-style centralization in Kyiv while combating corruption.

Over the past nine years, Ukraine’s mayors have started to gain experience developing and managing public policies and directly responding to constituent needs. Over this period, more than 10,000 informal local councils were merged into officially recognized municipalities and granted formal administrative oversight and financial regulatory powers. Up until Russia’s 2022 invasion, decentralized economic and political reforms introduced unprecedented positive changes in quality of life for millions of Ukrainians; the share of citizens living below subsistence levels fell from 52% to 23% between 2015 to 2019.

Ukraine’s continued success in creating resilient local governance systems will require cooperation with national political leaders with clear expectations outlined in legal commitments. Meanwhile, examples of renewed political centralization in response to wartime demands have highlighted possible fault lines between local and national figures. This trend threatens to exacerbate tensions if left unchecked.

In the city of Chernihiv, located approximately 90 miles north of Kyiv, Mayor Vladyslav Atroshenko was removed by courts following an investigation by Ukraine’s National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC) into the alleged use of a municipally-owned car by the mayor’s wife to evacuate from the city during the opening days of the war. Mayor Atroshenko himself stayed in Chernihiv to oversee the defense of the city which withstood a siege and partial occupation in spring 2022.

In the city of Rivne in western Ukraine, rumblings grow of Mayor Oleksandr Tretyak potentially being removed in relation to an NAPC investigation into the payment of bonuses to city officials in 2020. At the same time, Mayor Tretyak claims he has come under increasing pressure to move limited city budget money to the region’s civil military administration, something he has so far refused to do, claiming that the city has already fulfilled all budgetary support requirements. These examples have fueled speculation over the direction of wartime centralization and should give pause to local authorities and regional civic leaders.

Any future national reconstruction policy will be best served by building upon Ukraine’s localized leadership assets and incorporating local councils, mayors, and officials in decision-making processes. By directing incoming aid at the local level, global partners can help expand technical, strategic, and administrative capacities and ensure resources are used effectively across targeted issues. Ukraine’s dedication to continued decentralization reforms is not only necessary to achieve reconstruction goals but is also a critical component of the country’s mission to develop transparent democratic systems from the ground up moving forward.

Zachary Popovich is a senior program associate at the International Republican Institute. Michael Druckman is the resident program director for Ukraine at the International Republican Institute.

If Zelenskyy doesn’t come to Vilnius, allied leaders will have missed a crucial opportunity to signal to Ukrainians and the world their unflinching commitment to defeating Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s criminal war and revanchist designs in Europe—at a crucible moment in the five-hundred-day-old war.

Zelenskyy was in Turkey on Saturday as part of a pre-summit European tour, shoring up support from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who is still withholding his support for Sweden’s membership in NATO. Regarding Kyiv, however, Erdoğan said: “There is no doubt that Ukraine deserves NATO membership.”

Though much still could change before the summit opens on Tuesday, Central European alliance members say that the Biden administration has led the recalcitrance to a stronger, time-linked roadmap to NATO membership for Ukraine.

One Central European senior official, who asked that his name and that of his country not be named, compared the tone coming from the White House to that of Jacques Chirac in 2003, when the French president lectured Central Europeans who were supporting the United States on Iraq that they had “missed a good opportunity to shut up.”

What’s on the table for Ukraine thus far in Vilnius is, among other measures, the renaming of a NATO consultative group to give it more weight, security assurances similar to those the United States has with Israel, and the removal of the bureaucracy of a membership action plan (MAP)—though US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said on Friday that Ukraine “needs to take additional reforms,” hinting that it will still face a MAP-like process. Zelenskyy told us in Kyiv that such moves would be insufficient given his country’s service to democracies everywhere.

To be sure, the Biden administration deserves high praise for its handling of Russia’s war thus far, starting with its early leaking of intelligence predicting the invasion so that Ukraine and Europe were forewarned (not to mention China). Without concerted US military and financial support, Ukraine likely would have failed.

At the same time, if Ukrainians had received the weaponry and equipment they wanted faster and in greater quantities, thousands of Ukrainians would still be alive and the battlefield gains would have been greater.

Softening the potential blow of a disappointing summit outcome for Ukraine, the Biden administration cleared the way this week to provide Ukrainians with the cluster munitions they have long sought, prompting Zelenskyy to praise Biden’s “decisive steps.”

A form of air-dropped or ground-launched explosives that release smaller submunitions, cluster munitions have been widely used by Russia but are outlawed by many allies, though not by the United States. With Ukraine running low on 155 mm artillery shells, which are in low supply globally, cluster munitions are the fastest, most plentiful way to flush out dug-in Russian positions that are blocking the Ukrainian counteroffensive.

The Biden administration’s green light for cluster munitions has followed a pattern: The White House at first blocks the provision of certain weapons, from High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and Abrams tanks to Patriot air defenses, only to agree to their provision months later. The administration’s go-slow approach to Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations reflects that caution, born of a desire to defend Ukraine without provoking greater Russian escalation, including tactical nuclear weapons use.

All NATO summits have to balance the longer-term needs of the Alliance with immediate demands. However, officials from non-US NATO member countries who I spoke to last week said there are several reasons why Ukraine’s immediate needs should take on greater priority:

Mercenary leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s short-lived rebellion in June underscored both the fissures in Russia’s leadership and the low morale and discipline of its military. It’s thus an ideal time to double down on support for Ukraine, recognizing that only significant ground gains can force useful negotiations.
Despite the economic and military cost of supporting Ukraine, the costs will grow exponentially if Putin prevails, and the threats go beyond Ukraine. One Biden administration official told me that the geopolitical importance of Ukraine to Washington is far greater than either Afghanistan or Iraq ever was, yet Ukraine can stop Russia at far lower cost and without risking American or other allied soldiers.
To argue that NATO membership for Ukraine can only come after the war ends and Russia leaves Ukrainian territory only provides Moscow an incentive to continue the war. Holding back due to concern about Russian nukes rewards Putin’s nuclear blackmail—and will encourage other unsavory leaders to acquire nukes as well.
Much is said about why Ukraine needs NATO, but not enough is said about why the Alliance needs Ukraine, now one of the strongest and most battle-hardened militaries in the world. The lesson of NATO in Central and Eastern Europe is that it brings stability to its neighbors and more peaceful and secure relations with Russia. The countries that Russia invaded—Georgia and Ukraine—were gray zones outside any military alliance. “Gray zones are green lights” for Putin, argues former US ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker.
Putin thus far has been wrong to count on Ukrainian failure and Western fatigue, but the dangers will grow in 2024 when the United States and much of Europe face elections. Bold decisions that can be made in 2023 will be much more difficult to achieve next year. Ukraine’s biggest threat might be the election year of 2024, and not just in the United States.

“We don’t any longer have the luxury of time,” one senior European official told me. “We certainly don’t have the luxury of getting it wrong. The stakes are too large—they are generational and go far beyond NATO’s borders.”

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 The war in Ukraine shows how technology is changing the battlefield
ECONOMIST

The Economist breaks down the lessons of the Ukraine war and what they mean for the future of warfare. Read the whole report to gain a deep and nuanced understanding of the implications for future military planning.

“[T]he paradox of the war,” the Economist writes, “is that mass and technology are intimately bound together. Even the artillery war shows this. Weeks before the invasion, America sent Ukraine Excalibur shells. Inside each was a small, rugged chip that could receive GPS signals from America’s constellation of navigation satellites. Whereas Russia often relied on barrages over a wide area, Ukrainian gunners could be more precise.”

This, the Economist argues, portends a shift towards the defensive, analogous to the late nineteenth century. “Precision warfare can counter some advantages of mass: Ukraine was outnumbered 12 to one north of Kyiv. It can also complement mass. Software-based targeting saves around 15-30% in shells, according to sources familiar with the data. But what precision cannot do, says Michael Kofman of the Centre for Naval Analyses (CNA), a think-tank, is substitute for mass.” Read more →

#2 Ukraine wants and expects an invitation to join NATO. Allies are not sure.
David L Stern, Emily Rauhala, and Isabelle Khurshudyan | WASHINGTON POST

For an understanding of what Ukraine seeks at the upcoming NATO summit in Vilnius, what might happen, and what the Ukrainians are worried about, read this excellent piece of reporting from David Stern, Emily Rauhala, and Isabelle Khurshudyan in the Washington Post.

“With or without membership,” they write, “Ukrainian officials are looking for security commitments by Western nations ‘without delay and as soon as possible,’ which would potentially encourage Moscow to withdraw its forces. Many analysts say Russian President Vladimir Putin is counting on Ukraine’s Western supporters to grow exhausted and halt the expensive flow of weapons and economic aid they have been sending to Kyiv. Such security guarantees could also serve to deter Russia from any major acts of aggression in the future. ‘I am sure that if the regime in the Kremlin does not change in the coming years, even after our victory, there will be — in their heads — a desire for revenge,’ [Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii] Reznikov said.” Read more →

#3 Putin’s Real Security Crisis
Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

For another angle on the implications of Prigozhin’s failed coup, read this smart analysis of the failure of the Russian security services during the coup and Putin’s apparent non-response to that failure.

“Then, as Wagner forces made their move,” Soldatov and Borogan write, “both the FSB and Russia’s National Guard, the main body assigned to maintain internal security and suppress unrest in Russia, failed as rapid response forces. The National Guard made every effort to avoid a direct confrontation with Wagner; for its part, the FSB—which also has several elite special forces groups—did not appear to take any action at all. Instead, the most powerful security agency in the country issued a press release calling on Wagner’s rank and file to stay out of the uprising and to go arrest Prigozhin—on their own.”

And yet, they note, no one has yet been punished.

“This lack of repercussions for the security services is particularly startling in view of the FSB’s performance in the crisis. When Prigozhin captured the headquarters of the Southern Military District—where he spoke to [Deputy Minister of Defense Yunus-Bek] Yevkurov and [First Deputy Head of the GRU Vladimir] Alekseyev—it looked almost like a hostage taking of several of Russia’s top military commanders. Yet according to sources in the FSB, in response to the arrival of Wagner forces, the FSB agents in Rostov-on-Don simply barricaded themselves in their local headquarters… While a column of Wagner mercenaries marched toward Moscow, taking down helicopters and shooting into the houses of civilians on the way, these brave generals failed to show up—not at the scene or in front of the public at all.” Read more →

#4 Multilateral Man Is More Powerful Than Putin Realized
Anne Applebaum | THE ATLANTIC

In this must-read profile of NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Anne Applebaum makes a powerful case for why Stoltenberg’s brand of quiet multilateral leadership will ensure Ukraine’s long-term integration into Europe from behind the scenes.

“[A]lthough historians will argue about whether NATO countries could have done more to deter Russia, they did much more to help Ukraine than Putin expected once the war began. Putin not only underestimated Ukraine; he also underestimated Multilateral Men—the officials who, like Jens Stoltenberg and his counterparts at the European Union, helped the White House put together the military, political, and diplomatic response. Putin believed his own propaganda, the same propaganda used by the transatlantic far right: Democracies are weak, autocrats are strong, and people who use polite, diplomatic language won’t defend themselves. This turned out to be wrong. “‘Democracies have proven much more resilient, much stronger than our adversaries believe,’ Stoltenberg said. And autocracies are more fragile: ‘As we’ve just seen, authoritarian systems can just, suddenly, break down.’” Read more →

#5 Evan Gershkovich, Detained for 100 Days
WALL STREET JOURNAL

As a former Wall Street Journal reporter and longtime advocate for press freedom, I remain determined to do what’s possible to end the Russian imprisonment of WSJ reporter Evan Gershkovich, which is now at one hundred days and counting. I urge Inflection Points readers to follow the WSJ’s guide on what you can do to support Evan and his family.

Writes Emma Tucker, the WSJ’s editor-in-chief, “In the days since Evan was arrested we have been inspired by the support that you, our readers, have provided. It has helped us to keep Evan’s plight at the top of the news agenda. As we reflect on this difficult milestone, we encourage you to continue sharing Evan’s reporting and the latest updates on his situation. Journalism is not a crime, and we will not rest until Evan is released.”

Amen. Read more →

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The post Dispatch from Vilnius: Will Zelenskyy show at the summit? It depends on whether Biden listens to frontline NATO allies. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A looming US-Turkey F-16 deal is about much more than Sweden’s NATO bid

Rich Outzen, Pınar Dost — Sat, 08 Jul 2023 19:47:16 +0000

The NATO Summit in Vilnius starting on July 11 will mark milestones in several strategic processes of vital importance to the Alliance. These include assessing progress on the Strategic Concept adopted in Madrid last year, recognizing Finland’s successful accession, debating the path forward on Ukraine’s application, and consideration of the end game towards Swedish membership. A long-awaited deal for the United States to sell F-16 fighter jets to Turkey is also on the table in Vilnius, but it’s about much more than unlocking Sweden’s accession: It is a puzzle piece in a broader strategic calculation about Ankara’s role in NATO’s Southeast.

At the 2022 summit, Finland and Sweden signed a trilateral Memorandum of Understanding outlining a path for accession through progress on Turkey’s security concerns. After Finland officially became a member country on April 4, 2023, the United States and other NATO member countries started to exert pressure on Turkey to accelerate approval for Sweden prior to the Vilnius summit. Sweden, with two hundred years of military non-alignment, and Finland, neutral throughout the Cold War, applied for membership only after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February last year. Enhancing Ukraine’s security is high on the agenda at the NATO Summit, necessitating attention to direct support for Ukraine’s defense, Alliance enlargement, and effective cooperation in the Black Sea region.

For Ankara the primary consideration in approving Sweden is tougher enforcement of counter-terror laws against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), an internationally recognized terrorist group, and its offshoots. Washington has dangled possible approval of Turkey’s proposed purchase of F-16 fighter jets and upgrade kits in attempts to influence Ankara’s calculation. Ankara, which is a long-time F-16 producer and user, desires reasonable compensation for its earlier expulsion from the F-35 program, after it went ahead with the purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile defense system which also led to the imposition of US sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Both the United States and Turkey see Turkish air power as a NATO anchor in the Black Sea region.

Securing the Black Sea

Alongside Romania and Bulgaria, Turkey is the largest of three NATO member countries in the Black Sea region and controls access to it under the Montreux Convention. With the Alliance’s second largest military and unique geographic positioning, Turkey has been a crucial player in the Russia-Ukraine war both diplomatically and militarily. Turkey has managed to maintain trade and diplomatic ties with Russia while providing vigorous support to Ukraine’s defense, and it has built a record of frustrating Russian military ventures in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Securing NATO’s interests in the Black Sea depends on a strong Turkey. Ukraine understands this, leading its officials to consider Turkey as one of the few potential security guarantor countries.

Turkey has provided support to NATO maritime operations in the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions, and most recently agreed to sell Bayraktar drones to Romania. Yet Turkey’s ability to deter Russia depends in part on the health of its F-16 fleet—the third largest in the world but feeling its age. Ankara’s request for forty new F-16s and upgrade packages for its seventy-nine existing fighters to sustain its air capabilities has made little headway over the past two years, and members of the US Congress have added Swedish accession as a new condition to the frozen sale. At the same time, many members of Congress have indicated that Turkey agreeing to Sweden’s accession will not be enough for them to approve Ankara’s F-16 request.

Ironically, Turkey is not an ordinary F-16 buyer. It has been an important F-16 manufacturer through Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ) established in 1984, according to the company, as a “Turkish-U.S. joint investment company to carry out the manufacture of F-16 aircraft, integration of on-board systems and flight tests” following the initial Turkish decision to acquire F-16s. Working with US defense giants such as General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, and General Electric, TUSAŞ manufactured and tested almost all of the Turkish F-16 fleet—nearly three hundred aircraft in various configurations.

Additionally, TUSAŞ produced forty-six F-16s for the Egyptian Air Force between 1993 and 1995, and helped modernize the F-16 fleet of the Royal Jordanian Air Force. In short, Turkey has been a critical partner in the F-16 program for decades—and a further sale remains in the mutual interest of Ankara, Washington, and NATO.

A de facto arms embargo?

In February 2023, the US Senate NATO Observer Group co-chairs, Senators Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Thom Tillis (R-NC), presented a bipartisan letter to President Joe Biden requesting that “F-16 fighter jet sales to Türkiye should not begin until the NATO protocols [for Finland and Sweden] are ratified.” This followed, according to a report in Defense News, multiple congressional holds of US arms sales to Turkey starting in 2018 or earlier.

Turkey has not added any new F-16s to its inventory since 2012 as the country was expecting to receive more than one hundred F-35 jets, for which it has already paid $1.4 billion. After Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program in March 2020, Ankara requested F-16s in exchange for the amount it had already paid.

The Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries also remains sanctioned by the United States under CAATSA. There has been a sustained campaign by congressional opponents of Turkey to deny major new arms sales to Ankara, spearheaded by the Hellenic and Armenian caucuses. Ironically, 1970s-era congressional sanctions against arms sales to Turkey catalyzed the drive for defense industrial autonomy that drove Turkey’s rise as a defense exporter. The ongoing replay of similar resistance from the US Congress is only reinforcing Turkey’s view that the United States is not a reliable arms provider in the long run. The resulting drive for self-sufficiency has increased the domestic share of Turkish defense production from roughly 20 percent to 80 percent and established the Turkish arms industry as a major international player.

Defense industrial decoupling

Consequently, Turkey has dropped from the seventh-largest US arms importer between 2013-17 to the twenty-seventh largest between 2018-2022. Meanwhile, Turkey’s defense exports skyrocketed by 69 percent during the same period, making the country the twelfth largest exporter of arms globally. In 2022, it set a new arms export record of $4.3 billion—an increase of nearly 37 percent from the previous year.

In order to produce a national fighter aircraft that can replace the aging F-16, the Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries signed a contract with TUSAŞ in 2016 to develop the fifth-generation National Combat Aircraft. The first successful taxi test of the prototype was completed in March this year, and it is expected that the first Kaan (previously known as the TF-X) will join the Turkish air force by 2030.

In the medium to long term, defense industrial decoupling of Turkey from the United States would seem to suit both sides. Ankara will be free from the strings that come with US systems, and Congress will be able to satisfy select constituencies that it is not complicit in Turkish military actions. Bilateral relations can move on to happier and less complicated storylines—like the drive towards one hundred billion dollars in bilateral trade. Turkey will continue to partner with countries with a more streamlined defense cooperation model, such as the United Kingdom and Ukraine.

In the short term, a deal on F-16s could restore a modicum of mutual trust, meet the needs of the Alliance, and close the chapter of US-Turkish defense cooperation on a positive note. For those reasons, far more than to spur Swedish accession, US and Turkish leaders continue to push for progress.

Approval of Swedish accession before the Vilnius Summit is unlikely not because of F-16 haggling, but due to the early stage of implementation of Sweden’s new counter-terror laws. The arrest and conviction of a PKK financier in Stockholm in early July, a first of its kind under Sweden’s newly strengthened anti-terror laws, could mark a new phase of progress. It is unlikely that enough can be done in a few days to conclude the process. More likely, and encouraging nonetheless, would be positive signals out of the summit that real progress is being made: in counter-terror implementation, in F-16 talks, and in eventual Swedish accession. Vilnius probably will not mark the completion of these processes, but it could mark the start of a decisive and positive stage toward their conclusion.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on Twitter @RichOutzen.

Pınar Dost is a historian of international relations with a PhD dissertation on the history of US-Turkey relations (Sciences Po Paris). Follow her on Twitter @pdosting.

The post A looming US-Turkey F-16 deal is about much more than Sweden’s NATO bid appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Oleksii Reznikov: Ukraine’s defense doctrine will define country’s future

Oleksii Reznikov — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 18:49:23 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has recently initiated a national debate over the creation of a Ukrainian Doctrine that will shape the future development of the country. I am confident that defense policy will be at the heart of this national dialogue and see a number of key points that are worth underlining.

The first point to note is the global nature of Ukrainian security. For decades to come, the entire world will live by the rules established by the outcome of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin has demonstrated its readiness to weaponize everything from energy resources and food supplies to cyberspace and social media. Moscow has engaged in nuclear blackmail, interfered with maritime freedoms, and called into question the very idea of territorial integrity. These challenges are not local or even regional in scope; they are global threats that resonate equally around the world.

How we respond to these issues in Ukraine will define the international security climate. Any attempts to address the Russian invasion on a purely local level by freezing the conflict or forcing Ukraine into territorial concessions will result in failure and will only fuel further international instability. Instead, we must acknowledge that the threats posed by Russia are global in character and demand a global response.

The second key point is the need to define Ukraine’s position in regional and global security systems. In simple terms, the desired trajectory should include security guarantees followed by full NATO accession, with internal transformations taking place in parallel that implement the best lessons from Ukraine’s wartime experience and enable the country to acquire the necessary domestic defense capabilities. These processes can and must be advanced during the current active phase of the war.

The third key point is the need to develop a defense doctrine that meets the security expectations of both Ukraine and the country’s partners. It is now clear that Ukraine is capable of serving as a shield on Europe’s eastern frontier. Indeed, Ukraine is currently carrying out NATO’s core mission of defending Europe against Russian military aggression. At the same time, over the past eighteen months Ukraine has received direct and indirect military aid worth more than the country’s entire defense budget since the restoration of Ukrainian independence in 1991. Without continued external assistance, Ukraine will not be able to carry out rapid rearmament or acquire the kind of defense capabilities it needs. The best solution would be to move toward greater reliance on internal resources while maintaining strong levels of international support.

Clearly, Ukraine’s partners will be reluctant to invest in a security model that differs significantly from established NATO standards, or one that conflicts with their own military, industrial, or economic interests. Finding the right balance between strengthening Ukraine’s domestic defense sector capabilities and optimizing international cooperation will be crucial.

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Efforts to develop a practical vision for Ukraine’s army of the future have been underway since June 2022, when I ordered a capacity review. These findings, coupled with Ukraine’s unique wartime experience, form the basis of a concept paper on the transformation of Ukraine’s defense sector submitted to Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal at the beginning of June 2023. The next stage will involve consultations to coordinate interagency efforts required to create the right legislative framework and ensure effective cooperation between different government bodies. This synergy will be the key to success.

Russia’s invasion has underlined that defense is an investment not an expense. For instance, strengthening Ukraine’s naval capabilities will help guarantee maritime security in the Black Sea and Azov Sea, which secures vital income from trade. Likewise, failure to provide adequate security measures will leave Ukraine unable to rebuild and trapped in costly wartime insecurity. All of Ukraine’s security policy decisions must reflect these fundamental truths.

Complex defense capabilities revolve around three main factors: people, weapons, and financial resources. Each has their own planning specifics. Successful weapons and financing policies take years to plan; when it comes to human resources, it often takes a generation or longer to get it right.

Ukraine is now looking to coordinate the country’s defense sector transformation under conditions of extreme uncertainty. We know the current war will end in Ukrainian victory, but we do not know when this will be. This makes it difficult to begin the process of optimizing the range of weapons in use by the Ukrainian armed forces. After all, in order to defeat Russia, Ukraine needs to receive as many weapons as it can, and needs to get them as quickly as possible.

We also don’t know exactly when Ukraine’s partners will make the final decision to fully integrate the country into the Euro-Atlantic security community. This is fundamental. It is one thing to reform the Ukrainian military as part of a collective defense strategy in cooperation with partners; it is quite another to build defense capabilities in relative isolation with some external support.

One of my main requests to our partners is therefore to make a decision on Ukraine’s NATO accession as soon as possible. This will make it far easier for all parties to conduct long-term defense planning. If a decision is not forthcoming, Ukraine’s partners will be obliged to include the country’s security needs in their own planning on a bilateral and multilateral basis.

A further priority for Ukraine’s defense doctrine is the de-Sovietization of defense policy and planning. This needs to be addressed in a practical manner that goes beyond mere slogans. Eighteen months ago, many military analysts believed a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine would mean a fight between a large Soviet army against a small Soviet army. In reality, it soon became clear that the Ukrainian army had undergone significant change. However, the same cannot be said for the broader state systems underpinning Ukrainian defense policy. A wide range of political, social, and economic changes are still needed.

For example, the system of registration for military service is still linked in the Soviet fashion with place of work or study. This means that entrepreneurs along with the self-employed and unemployed are often outside the system. Far-reaching changes are needed in order to establish and maintain the right kind of reserve and effectively mobilize the country’s human, material, and financial resources. Efforts to overcome quality problems with quantity must be set aside. In conditions of resource scarcity, such an approach is suicidal.

The human dimension of future Ukrainian defense is a professional army. This must be based on the transparent logic of a military career and an extensive social protection package, relying on well-trained reserves formed of all men liable for military service and of women on a voluntary basis (with the exception of those categories of women who are liable for military service).

The registration of people liable for military service should be fully digitized. This process is underway. We also need to implement separate training policies for different groups in order to create a genuine rather than nominal reserve. This should look to maximize citizen engagement by improving the motivation system.

Statements about there being seven million Ukrainians liable for military service are meaningless if the country is not capable of structuring the reserve in ways that make efficient use of these people. Similarly, declarations that anyone subject to military service must complete their compulsory period in uniform do little to help the state capitalize on existing resources. Instead, basic training should be supplemented by the development of specific groups within the country’s military reserve forces. This should include a combat reserve consisting of those with combat experience; a territorial reserve for territorial defense units; an operational reserve of military veterans without combat experience; a mobilization reserve of those who previously passed through basic training; and a general reserve register featuring individuals with no prior military training.

The development of an efficient reserve is only possible in conjuction with an effective Heroes Policy, which has been identified as a priority by President Zelenskyy. This is a good example of the need for interagency synergies and is also an area where a sense of justice must serve as a cornerstone. Meanwhile, the task of managing military registration should be taken away from the General Staff and the Land Forces Command. Instead, it is necessary to establish a separate and tailored agency within the Ministry of Defense.

Similar efforts are required for the civil reserve. Over the past eighteen months of Russia’s full-scale invasion, it has become clear that a significant portion of the almost one million Ukrainian men and women in uniform perform purely civilian functions. It makes no sense to bunch all of these people together with the military until the end of hostilities. Instead, a more nuanced approach is required. When society sees that the state seeks to engage people in defense tasks as rationally and reasonably as possible, we will witness a decline in negative phenomena associated with military service. After all, many of those who seek to avoid military service do so in order to escape perceived uncertainty, injustice, and abuses.

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A new mobilization and reserve policy will require a new regulatory framework. This will involve comprehensive legislative changes. The entire mobilization system for central and local authorities, enterprises, and institutions should undergo revision, with mobilization tasks in their current form abolished. In its place, the emphasis should be on practical needs and common sense. Training for reservists should be synchronized with real life requirements and skills, with citizens aware of opportunities at the level of school leaver, university undergraduate, employee, or entrepreneur.

Professional military education and career management must be developed according to NATO principles and standards to ensure interoperability. At the same time, all training and education should be adjusted to reflect Ukraine’s unrivalled combat experience. This is the country’s unique advantage and should shape Ukraine’s defense doctrine as much as possible.

Work is already underway on the transformation of Ukraine’s military education system, with a concept approved by the government in December 2022. Over the coming decade, Ukraine’s military education will be fully integrated into the broader European military education environment in terms of both form and content. A separate element here is military-patriotic education. At the moment, this is governed by two laws and a presidential decree which contain a number of apparent conflicts and contradictions. We must achieve a clearer division of tasks and harmonization.

Ukraine’s entire defense doctrine should be underpinned by solid economic foundations. At present, the Ukrainian defense industry is not capable of meeting the demands of the military, but the sector has huge potential. Indeed, if managed correctly, a highly profitable Ukrainian defense industry could realistically become a major engine driving the country toward the goal of a one trillion dollar GDP.

I have repeatedly stated my position that self-sufficiency in the defense sector is a core component of genuine national sovereignty. Moving forward, Ukraine should be aiming to produce as much as possible itself. Once again, Ukraine’s unique combat experience creates exciting opportunities in this area. In order to make the most of the country’s experience and its industrial capabilities, a new defense industry development strategy is required. This should take international defense sector trends into account while also focusing on other economic factors and Ukraine’s specific strengths.

The time has come to turn away from the old Soviet model governed by unprofitability and resource consumption. Instead, Ukraine must strive to become a global defense sector leader and an attractive international partner. This will require a unified center capable of establishing and implementing policy, with exceedingly flexible R&D assets responding rapidly to the latest requirements. Procurement should be synchronized with budget planning, while efforts must be made to move away from lingering problems relating to blurred responsibilities. Efforts in this direction are already underway and must continue.

The overall objective of Ukraine’s defense doctrine is to defend the state against any possible threat. This requires new approaches to everything from managing mobilization and maintaining an effective reserve, to reforming the defense industry and boosting domestic production at every level. The country’s needs will inevitably evolve over time. Five years after victory in the current war, will Ukraine need a mobilization reserve of 500,000 or two million? This is why scalability is so critical.

In the defense sector, Ukraine has huge untapped potential and much to offer the international community. In the drone sector alone, Ukraine is at the cutting edge of current innovations and is well-placed to remain a key source of solutions for European and other markets. This military tech prowess will help open doors to new cooperation that are currently closed. Ukraine can build on its experience and expertize to become a major player in the global defense industry, but this requires solid foundations and a strong domestic sector.

Every day, our defenders are bringing victory closer. This progress is taking place in a rapidly changing world, and is contributing to these changes. Ukraine must be ready to capitalize on the opportunities this creates in ways that guarantee the safety of all Ukrainians while enabling the country to prosper.

Oleksii Reznikov is Ukraine’s Minister of Defense.

New narrative accuses US and Ukraine of planning false flag attack on Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

Media policy

Former employees share details about Prigozhin’s media group and troll farms

Kremlin-owned RT offers jobs to former employees of Prigozhin’s troll factory

Russian missile strike in Lviv kills ten civilians, injures dozens

At least ten people were killed and thirty-seven injured in Russia’s July 6 attack on Lviv, in western Ukraine. Regional Governor Maksym Kozytskyy said that a Russian missile struck a residential building in the city, destroying more than fifty apartments.

Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to launch offensive actions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Ukrainian forces reported thirty-eight combat engagements against Russian troops near Novoselivske, Novohryhorivka, Berkhivka, Bohdanivka, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka. In the direction of Lyman, Russian forces shelled Nevske, Bilohorivka, Torske, Verkhnokamyanske, and Rozdolivka in Donetsk. Russian aviation conducted an airstrike in Bilohorivka. Russia also attacked villages in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts, including Levadne, Olhivske, Malynivka, Huliaipole, and Bilohirka. On July 6, Russian troops shelled Chervonohryhorivka and Nikopol, damaging civilian infrastructure.

On July 5, reports from Russian military bloggers suggested that Ukrainian forces had advanced southwest of Berkhivka, west of Yahidne, and southwest of Bakhmut. The Ukrainian army said it conducted offensive operations south and north of Bakhmut and is moving on Bakhmut’s southern flank. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that the Ukrainian army conducted offensive operations near Lyman, Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka front, on the border between Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk, and in western Zaporizhzhia.

The Ukrainian army appears to have launched a coordinated attack on Russian army logistical and communications hubs. On July 4, Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an ammunition depot in occupied Makiivka, Donetsk. Russian sources claimed without evidence that Ukraine had struck a hospital. Former Russian army commander Igor Strelkov, also known as Igor Girkin, said the attack demonstrates how Ukraine regularly launches missile strikes against Russian rear targets. Other unconfirmed reports from July 5 indicate Ukraine may have struck Russian positions near Debaltseve. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces hit Russian positions near Yakymivka in the Melitopol area and attempted to strike Berdyansk in the Zaporizhzhia region.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

New narrative accuses US and Ukraine of planning false flag attack on Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

Ahead of next week’s NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, allegations that the United States and Ukraine will launch a false flag operation on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant are spreading on various platforms, including Twitter, 4chan, and Instagram. The allegations seemingly aim to create panic and, in the event of a future attack on the plant, establish a narrative the West and Ukraine are to blame.

On July 3, a post appeared on 4chan from an anonymous user who introduced himself as a US Marine Corps veteran now working for the government in electronic espionage. The user claimed that the Ukrainian and US governments are working together to bomb the Zaporizhzhia power plant. According to the conspiracy theory, after the false flag operation, the United States will be able to use “nuclear warheads” against Russia. At the time of writing, the post had been deleted from 4chan. However, similar posts remain on the platform.

Screencap of an anonymous 4chan post claiming the US and Ukraine are planning a false flag attack. (Source: 4chan)

However, the false flag claims did not originate on 4chan. Russian Twitter accounts posted similar claims building the false flag narrative. After the 4chan post, the claim circulated again on Twitter.

A similar narrative was also shared by Renat Karchaa, an adviser to Rosenergoatom, a subsidiary of the Russian state nuclear agency Rosatom. Karchaa claimed on Russian state television channel Russia-24 that on the night of July 5, the Ukrainian army would attempt an attack on the Zaporizhzhia plant. Without evidence, he accused the United States and the West of planning a false flag incident to damage Russia’s reputation. The claims were further amplified by Russian state media outlets.

The allegations escalated on social media after July 4, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy repeated Ukraine’s concerns about the status of the nuclear power plant. In an address, Zelenskyy restated that Russia plans to attack the plant and that Russian troops have placed explosive-like objects on the building’s roof. In June, Ukrainian military intelligence made similar claims when it reported that the plant’s cooling pond had been mined by Russian troops.

On July 5, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that it was aware of reports that mines and other explosives had been placed around the plant. The IAEA said their experts inspected parts of the facility and did not observe any visible indications of mines or explosives. IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi added, “The IAEA experts requested additional access that is necessary to confirm the absence of mines or explosives at the site.” On July 7, the IAEA announced that Russia had granted its experts further access, “without – so far – observing any visible indications of mines or explosives.”

—Sayyara Mammadova, research assistant, Warsaw, Poland

Former employees share details about Prigozhin’s media group and troll farms

Several independent Russian media outlets published stories this week interviewing former employees of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Patriot Media Group, which dissolved on June 30.

In a video published on Telegram, Yevgeny Zubarev, director of Patriot Media Group’s RIA FAN, said the goal was to “work against the opposition, such as Alexei Navalny and others who wanted to destroy our country.” Zubarev confirmed key details previously reported by independent Russian journalists at Novaya Gazeta in 2013 and the now-Kremlin-controlled RBC in 2017 about the existence of paid commentators and the creation of Prigozhin-affiliated media outlets. Zubarev added that, after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2018 re-election, the group hired “foreign affairs observers.” The timing corresponds with attempts by Prigozhin’s Internet Research Agency to meddle in the 2020 US presidential election.

Further, independent Russian media outlets Sever.Realii, Bumaga, and Novaya Gazeta interviewed former employees of Prigozhin’s media group. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, the former employees confirmed that Prigozhin’s “troll factory” and “media factory” conducted coordinated information attacks on opposition leaders, published fabricated or purchased news “exclusives,” praised Putin, and deliberately ignored particular individuals who criticized Wagner Group. Bumaga and Sever.Realii described a smear campaign against Saint Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov. In 2019, Prigozhin’s media group supported and promoted Beglov, but in 2021, Prigozhin reportedly launched a smear campaign, as Beglov allegedly prevented him from developing a waste collection business in the city. Novaya Gazeta’s report also provided evidence that Prigozhin’s troll farm activities extended beyond Russia, with employees portraying skinheads and fascists in the Baltic region, specifically in Lithuania.

In recent years, additional revelations about Prigozhin’s media group have come to light. For example, Bumaga reported that prospective hires had to pass a “lie detector test” in which “security service specialists” asked candidates about their attitudes toward the opposition and Alexei Navalny in particular. Once hired, employees were closely surveilled. One former employee Bumaga interviewed characterized the atmosphere as being in a “closed military company.” Both Bumaga and Novaya Gazeta’s interviewees said that most of the employees did not believe in the mission. In one example, an employee left after refusing to launch a smear campaign against Ivan Golunov, a journalist at the independent news outlet Meduza who was detained in 2019 under false pretenses. Bumaga, citing an unnamed former employee, also reported that at one point an employee had hacked the system, erased a database, and fled to Poland. The same interviewee claimed they employed two Telegram administrators who also administered pro-Ukraine channels.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

Kremlin-owned RT offers jobs to former employees of Prigozhin’s troll factory

RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan offered to hire employees of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Patriot Media Group, which reportedly housed his troll factories. In the latest episode of the program Keosayan Daily, Simonyan praised the work of “Wagner’s media empire.” She said their work “was super professional” and that anyone left without a job can join “them,” referring to Russian propaganda outlets. She added, “We know you as professional colleagues of ours.”

The fate of Patriot’s former employees is being actively discussed in Russia. According to Russian outlet Novie Izverstia, Pavel Gusev, editor-in-chief of the pro-Kremlin outlet MK.ru, volunteered to help find jobs for former employees of Patriot. In addition, the chairman of the Saint Petersburg branch of the Union of Journalists of Russia stated that the union would contact the heads of media outlets to help find opportunities for dismissed employees and would provide additional informational support.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Russian conspiracy alleges false flag at Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The view from Vilnius: NATO needs speed and scale to ensure deterrence

Giedrimas Jeglinskas — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 16:31:04 +0000

Preparations are underway here in Vilnius for the upcoming NATO leaders’ summit, but there is difficult and important diplomatic work ahead. If there is one thing the summit needs to accomplish, it’s to confidently demonstrate the scale and the speed of the Alliance’s ability to defend freedom.

The run-up to the July 11-12 summit in Lithuania has revealed both continuity and chaos: Continuity in that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg will now stay on in his role for another year, after he had earlier said he would step down in the coming weeks; chaos in the fascinating but incomplete coup d’état in Russia. But at this juncture of history—with war raging in Ukraine, uncertainty complicating relations with China, and shifting internal political landscapes in some member states—the Alliance has more work to do to ensure that the international rules-based order remains relevant and potent.

Ukraine’s desire for a firm commitment on joining NATO is likely to hover over the summit. The secretary general and other national leaders have expressed reservations about taking any groundbreaking action on the issue, tempering the expectations of Ukrainians and their most vocal supporters. Yet there is still time to formulate consensus language that goes beyond the empty narrative of the 2008 Bucharest Summit, which only said that Ukraine would become a member at some point.

Assessing the threat picture

Defense spending is a perennial focus at these summits. Since the Alliance’s founding seventy-four years ago, the issue of Europe’s underspending on defense and security has haunted the halls of NATO. While the current ambition to set 2 percent of gross domestic product as a floor is a step in the right direction, success remains far-fetched: Only seven of the then thirty allies met the guideline in 2022 (before Finland’s accession). At the same time, success is very real in strengthening the cyber pledge and the official launch of the NATO Innovation Fund, the first-of-its-kind one billion euro multi-sovereign venture capital fund. Good things can happen in Vilnius.

The question is, will those good things include welcoming Sweden to the Alliance? The puzzle of the Turkish hayir, or no, on Sweden’s accession initially seemed like a misunderstanding, later evolved into a national election issue, and now, unfortunately, has become an example of allied disunity. The same goes for Hungary’s unacceptable drag of the ratification. Yes, allies argue all the time, and NATO offers a forum to align on all the important issues. Democracies know how to deal with these disagreements without compromising members’ security. Without Sweden, NATO is weaker, the Baltic Sea is less secure, and Turkey and Hingary, too, will be less secure.

Taking a step back and looking at the threat picture—and at the elevated volatility due to Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine—one cannot help but ask: What do allies need to do to ensure that NATO remains relevant in deterring aggression against the Alliance and beyond? Are NATO members sufficiently protecting its most vulnerable members and its vast geographic boundary to the east? Does “tripwire” deterrence still work? Can deterrence succeed without proper defense?

Last year, NATO leaders in Madrid made huge promises to be specified and agreed in due course—kicking the can down the road?—on strengthening the eastern perimeter with more troops and better readiness. In other words, the initial enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battalions no longer seem to suffice for effective deterrence on the eastern flank. The same goes for reinforcements, which had been signaled as up to 300,000 troops (and now 400,000 troops), yet whose deployment requires both logistical support and prepositioned equipment and armaments for their deterrent role. All of the above is to be underscored by NATO’s new defense plans, which are in the works.

A speed-and-scale mindset

To make deterrence and defense credible, NATO must make key decisions to act at relevant speed and scale. “Tripwire” deterrence is, hopefully, outmoded thinking—and the realization that defense is a key element of deterrence is slowly setting in. To be fair, it took three years for NATO to set up its eFP in the form of multinational forces in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Can the Alliance be taken seriously if it continues to build its defense at this pace?

The same goes for scale. Will the “brigade-per-country” principle become obsolete in a year or two? A piecemeal approach to defense yields great public relations benefits, many pats on the back, and self-congratulatory speeches. But at the end of day, when an adversary moves further, allies are left scrambling precisely because they underdelivered.

Speed and scale call for more allied troops in place, more prepositioned equipment and ammunition, and swift reinforcement—plus the autonomy of NATO’s supreme allied commander. Essentially, it is a resource question, yet it is affected by how urgently the Western public views the existential threat. If the military and economic support the West has provided to Ukraine so far is a gauge of its threat perception, then there is something to be proud of. Yet much more could have probably been done and faster.

The test in Vilnius will be this: Can leaders adopt a speed-and-scale mindset for a stronger deterrence?

Giedrimas Jeglinskas is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served as the assistant secretary general for executive management at NATO and as the deputy minister of defense of Lithuania in charge of capability development, defense acquisition, industry, and technology partnerships.

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Mercenary bloodline: The war in Sudan

Alia Brahimi — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 13:19:16 +0000

In Season 1, Episode 5 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by two guests. She speaks with Cameron Hudson, the former US government expert on Sudan, about the mercenary pedigree of one of the two main belligerent parties, the Rapid Support Forces, and the determinative impact this has had on the current conflict in Sudan. By fighting as mercenaries in Libya, and especially Yemen, the RSF secured a cash windfall that let it recruit in numbers to rival the size of the national army, it forged regional relationships that are now central to its resupply, and it has committed crimes and abuses in the conduct of the war which represent a detached mercenary mindset.

Alia also chats with Professor Munzoul Assal of the University of Khartoum about the danger of two parallel governments emerging in Sudan along the lines of the bifurcation in Libya; the presence of RSF fighters at the Sudanese border with the Central African Republic where the Wagner Group is deeply entrenched; and the clear and alarming possibilities of a regional conflagration.

“The origin story of the wealth is really sending the RSF out into the region as a mercenary force… Hemedti has now been able to return back to his fighting roots but doing it with a war chest that has allowed him to recruit and to resupply in such a way that he is now a rival to the authority of the country.”

Cameron Hudson, Former US government expert on Sudan

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About the podcast

The Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalisation of contract warfare tells us about the world as we currently find it, but also about the future of the international system and about what war could look like in the coming decades.

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Does Taiwan’s massive reliance on energy imports put its security at risk?

Joseph Webster — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 09:55:00 +0000

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has launched many useful comparisons about how Ukraine’s efforts to survive and repel Russian forces might be applicable to Taiwan’s defense against a potential attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Taiwan and its partners, for example, could directly apply a number of military and economic statecraft lessons against China. Energy security is more complicated, however. The Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine clearly demonstrated that energy security and national security are inseparable, yet Ukraine was a thoroughfare of Russian gas pipelines before the invasion and still has substantial coal reserves and nuclear power. Taiwan, in contrast, is one of the world’s most energy-insecure economies, relying on maritime imports for about 97 percent of its energy.

A review of Taiwan’s energy security challenges is urgently needed to assess its specific vulnerabilities and strengths in the face of attempted coercion by the PRC. Beijing appears increasingly capable of launching a quarantine, blockade, siege, or even invasion of the island.

It’s worth defining these terms. In a PRC quarantine of Taiwan, Beijing would employ the People’s Liberation Army Navy, or PLAN, to interdict all shipping under the guise of inspecting for military kit but allow food and some supplies to pass through. It is possible the PRC believes this insidious tactic is its most attractive option in a Taiwan scenario, due to the limited costs and commitments it would require; the ambiguities it would impose on Western policymakers; and the potential that world public opinion, at least in parts of the developing world, would side with Beijing over the West as economic costs mounted.

Other options appear less probable, but much more coercive and potentially violent. In a blockade scenario, the PLAN would prevent all shipments from entering Taiwan, aiming to coerce the island into surrendering. A siege is a subset of both a blockade and invasion. In this scenario, Beijing would degrade the island’s defensive capability for months before launching an invasion. In the invasion scenario, Beijing would attempt a snap assault, hoping to leverage the element of surprise and secure Taiwan with minimal resistance. A snap invasion is extremely unlikely, however. The weeks that Russia built up its forces on its border with Ukraine before its full-scale invasion—in full view of the world—suggest that the PRC will almost certainly be unable to conceal mobilization for an extremely complicated, massive amphibious assault.

The risks of each scenario are real. The PLAN conducted blockade and quarantine trial runs as recently as April, suggesting Beijing is considering disrupting Taipei’s trade, including its maritime energy imports. Military deterrence is the ultimate guarantor of Taiwan’s freedom, but there are additional nonmilitary steps Taiwan can take with the United States and its allies to ensure its energy needs are met in the event of a crisis.

Taiwan’s Middle Eastern oil imports can be replaced, if necessary

The first issue is whether Taiwan can sustain a reliable supply of energy, which means tracing the energy back to its source. The island is highly dependent on maritime crude oil imports. They accounted for 44 percent of Taiwan’s total energy needs in 2022, and most of this oil comes from the Middle East. Last year, it sourced about 72 percent of its crude oil supply from Saudi Arabia (33 percent), Kuwait (21 percent), the United Arab Emirates (9 percent), Oman (7 percent), and Iraq (2 percent).

The PRC’s economic footprint is expanding in the Middle East and exceeds the Taiwanese or even US presence. Beijing’s crude and condensate oil imports have more than quadrupled since 2006 and stood at over 508 million tons in 2022. China, the world’s largest oil importer, is vital for Middle Eastern economies. In 2022, exports to China accounted for 8 percent of Saudi Arabia’s gross domestic product, 15 percent of Kuwait’s, 9 percent of the United Arab Emirates’, and a shocking 33 percent of Oman’s. Gulf Cooperation Council countries exported nearly 8.5 times more crude oil to China than to the United States in 2022; China’s oil imports are projected to rise further even as US imports plateau or recede. Taiwan imported 41 million tons of crude oil and condensates in 2022, just 8 percent of the PRC’s total.

The PRC’s increasing influence in the Middle East is undeniable, but the risks vis-à-vis Taiwan are manageable. Even in a worst-case scenario—Gulf producers abandoning Taiwan under PRC pressure—the island could find alternative suppliers, though not easily. While oil is a globally traded and largely fungible commodity, refineries require different grades of crude oil, as barrels have distinct sulfur content and densities. If the PRC ever successfully pressured Gulf exporters to halt shipments to Taiwan, the United States and Canada could export a mix of heavy and sulfuric grades—notably Western Canada Select—to supply the island’s refineries. If they have not already, US and Canadian energy officials should hold quiet conversations with their counterparts in Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan about how North American crude oil and oil products could manage disruptions in the event of a blockade.

What about coal, LNG, and nuclear energy?

Taiwan also imports coal and liquefied natural gas (LNG). Of the island’s total energy needs in 2022, coal and coal products imports stood at nearly 30 percent, and LNG imports reached 19 percent. Australia accounted for more than half of Taiwan’s total 2022 coal imports; produces more than enough metallurgical and thermal coal to supply the island; and is not vulnerable to Chinese pressure, particularly since Beijing recently imposed an unofficial, two-year ban on Australian coal imports that was walked back only in February. Taiwan’s LNG outlook is also favorable. The island can count on future LNG imports from the United States, Australia, and Canada, while an active LNG fleet is highly dispersed across European and Asian democracies. Taiwan’s coal and LNG import outlook is relatively positive, outside of a physical blockade.

Nuclear energy plays a largely positive role in Taiwan’s energy security. Nuclear imports—that is, imports of nuclear fuel for use in domestic reactors—stood at 5 percent of Taiwan’s total energy needs in 2022. Once nuclear fuel is shipped to Taiwan, the island’s nuclear power plants can continuously produce zero-emission power for approximately eighteen to twenty-four months. Still, there are reasons why Taiwan’s energy planners consider nuclear energy to be an energy import. Russia is deeply embedded in nuclear energy supply chains, while nuclear exports from Kazakhstan could easily be interdicted by the PRC. Kazakhstan accounted for 43 percent of the world’s uranium production from mining in 2022 and Beijing and Moscow, working together, might work to blockade Kazakhstani energy exports.

Taiwan is currently phasing out its nuclear energy use, as the Democratic Progressive Party and the bulk of the island’s voters are opposed to the technology. Nuclear energy is clean and reliable, and it plays a positive role in the island’s energy security. Still, Taiwan’s concerns about its supply chain—especially in the event of a long-duration quarantine or blockade—are not unfounded.

Beware of the PRC’s maritime blockade capabilities

Taiwan’s dependency on seaborne energy imports heightens the risks of maritime disruption. The PRC navy appears increasingly capable of imposing a physical blockade or quarantine of Taiwan. The PLAN had 351 warfighting-capable ships in 2022 and now outnumbers the entire US Navy by more than fifty ships. Moreover, due to the US Navy’s dispersed global responsibilities, the PLAN enjoys an even larger numerical advantage in the Indo-Pacific theater. The PRC also continues to improve its fleet both qualitatively and quantitatively. The latest US Department of Defense China Military Power Report projects that the PLAN’s battle force will grow to four hundred ships by 2025 and 440 ships by 2030. The US Office of Naval Intelligence predicts that PRC blockade-relevant maritime platforms could exceed eight hundred ships by 2030, after units from the Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia are included.

The PRC does not just enjoy numerical superiority; it also has a home field advantage. Although some ships and subs are permanently forward deployed in Japan and Guam, the United States and allied navies would have to transit hundreds or even thousands of miles to reach the Taiwan theater. Meanwhile, the PRC’s anti-ship missile range extends several thousand kilometers off its coastline, implying that US and coalition ships would be forced to break a blockade while sailing within the PRC’s anti-access/area denial envelope. Finally, since Taiwan’s large ports are on the western side of the island, US and coalition ships would have to sail directly opposite the PRC coastline.

Coalition policymakers and naval strategists need to consider how a potential PRC maritime blockade can be defeated along every level of the escalation ladder. Some steps include enhancing the credibility of the United States’ and the coalition’s conventional military deterrent; holding key PRC economic, energy, and financial nodes liable to severe sanctions in the event of a prolonged blockade; addressing gaps in overcoming a long-duration blockade; expanding the merchant marine and convoy escort fleet; ensuring ships from allied and partner civilian fleets can “re-flag” as US vessels; and back-stopping shipping insurance markets, as insurance risk premiums would surely spike in the event of a confrontation over Taiwan. Fortunately, US allies comprise six of the top ten owners of the world’s civilian fleet, as measured in deadweight tons carrying capacity.

Indigenous clean energy generation: opportunities and constraints

Taiwan can further reduce its energy security vulnerabilities by developing its indigenous renewable energy resources. While solar and wind cannot solve all of Taiwan’s energy challenges, the PRC will find it relatively difficult to disrupt production of local renewables, especially distributed solar.

Distributed solar can be installed on any rooftop and is extremely difficult to disrupt via cyber or kinetic means if microgrids are employed. However, it suffers from low utilization rates and unfavorable bespoke installation costs. Utility-scale solar is more efficient and less expensive but may be more susceptible to cyberattacks, due to its concentration of panels. More broadly, Taiwan’s solar potential is also constrained by frequent cloudy skies and land scarcity.

Onshore wind potential is greatest on the western side of the island but land use tradeoffs constrain development—especially since Taiwan imports about 65 percent of its food. Still, onshore wind should be a higher priority than food production, as the Berlin airlift demonstrated that airborne food supply chains can break non-kinetic blockades. Additionally, since prepackaged Meals Ready-to-Eat have a shelf life of eighteen months even at ninety degrees Fahrenheit, there are relatively few risks of the PRC “starving out the island.”

Offshore wind is a promising technology for Taiwan. A nine hundred-megawatt wind farm off Taiwan’s west coast first produced electricity in early 2022; once fully complete, the installation could power approximately one million homes. Taiwan aims to install 5,700 megawatts of offshore wind capacity by 2025, which would substantially improve its energy security. Still, the Taiwanese military is concerned about offshore wind farms’ radar profile and the vulnerability of turbines and transmission cables to attack. Offshore wind has great potential, but Taiwan needs to balance its military and energy security needs carefully.

There are relatively few risks of Taiwan falling prey to sole-supplier dependency in either solar or wind, despite the PRC’s leading role in both technologies. There is limited international trade in wind turbines due to unfavorable weight-to-value ratios. Taiwan’s offshore wind projects have very strict local content requirements, and the island is establishing more wind turbine facilities. The PRC currently dominates solar market supply chains, producing 75 percent of all finished panels, but the United States and its allies and partners are increasing their own manufacturing capacity. Taiwan will be able to procure wind and solar components from non-PRC sources.

Taiwan’s most effective energy security tool may be to raise electricity tariffs, which would help rationalize demand and incentivize domestic clean energy generation. Raising electricity prices would encourage conservation efforts and make new renewables projects more economically viable, reducing Taiwan’s energy import needs.

Defending Taiwan from a military or energy shock

Taiwan’s energy security challenges are serious, but its chief problems are fundamentally military and naval. If the United States and its allies and partners cannot deter a PRC military invasion or naval blockade of Taiwan, disaster will likely result. US, Taiwanese, and other coalition forces must maintain credible conventional and strategic military deterrents against the PRC.

The West must walk a diplomatic tightrope to maintain its policy of dual deterrence. While Beijing’s increasingly provocative behavior vis-à-vis Taiwan is worrisome and warrants firm responses, the United States and its allies should also continue to discourage Taipei from undertaking any irresponsible moves toward independence. The West should continue to communicate to Beijing its vital interests in Taiwan while signaling its intent to avoid any unnecessary confrontation or conflict.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, where he leads its Chinese energy security and offshore wind programs; he also edits the China-Russia Report. This article represents his own personal opinion.

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Wagner fallout: Time to begin preparing for a post-Putin Russia

Oleksiy Goncharenko — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 20:48:03 +0000

The recent revolt by Russia’s Wagner Group was a short-lived affair but the repercussions continue to be felt throughout the Russian Federation and beyond. Perhaps the biggest single lesson from the aborted coup is the fragility of the Putin regime. For many years, the Kremlin has sought to present Vladimir Putin as a powerful and popular ruler exercising complete control over a loyal and disciplined power vertical. The Wagner uprising has now shattered this myth of Putin the strongman.

Ever since coming to power at the turn of the millennium, Putin has sought to portray himself as an uncompromising and macho leader. He has frequently employed vulgar slang when promising to dispatch his opponents, and has notoriously engaged in a series of PR stunts including posing topless on horseback and scuba-diving to “discover” ancient Greek urns. However, there was little sign of this tough guy persona during the early stages of the Wagner revolt in late June. As Wagner troops captured Rostov-on-Don and began to march on Moscow, the Russian dictator was nowhere to be seen. He did not appear until the second day of the mutiny, when he delivered a brief video address.

The Kremlin appears to recognize the seriousness of the situation, and has since embarked on an intensive post-putsch PR offensive designed to repair public perceptions of Putin. In the days following the Wagner drama, the Russian dictator has made a flurry of carefully choreographed appearances emphasizing national unity and regime stability. However, this sudden burst of activity has only served to highlight the damage done by Putin’s earlier absence. In a little over twenty-four hours, the Putin regime was exposed as significantly weaker than almost anybody had previously imagined. Despite the best efforts of the Kremlin propaganda machine, this fact is plain as day to both the international community and the Russian elite.

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Nobody will have failed to notice that while Putin has continued to talk tough, he failed to crush the Wagner uprising and instead struck some kind of deal with Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his mutinous troops. Putin demonstrated a readiness to compromise despite the fact that Wagner fighters reportedly shot down a number of Russian aircraft and killed numerous Russian airmen. This indicated an apparent lack of concern for the lives of Russian servicemen at a time when tens of thousands of Russian soldiers have already been killed as a result of Putin’s fateful decision to invade Ukraine.

The brief Wagner uprising also revealed a remarkable shortage of Russian military strength and fighting spirit on the home front. Wagner troops were able to seize one of Russia’s largest cities, Rostov-on-Don, without a fight. Perhaps even more significantly, they were cheered and supported by crowds of locals. Wagner forces then advanced to within 200 kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed before choosing to turn back.

Meanwhile, there was no surge in street-level or elite support for Putin. Instead, pro-war propagandists fell largely silent as rumors swirled of establishment figures fleeing Moscow. For a brief period, Russia looked to be leaderless and defenseless. The immediate danger has now passed, but these stunning developments have changed attitudes toward Putin and his regime in fundamental ways.

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It would appear that history repeats itself. Just as in 1990 very few foresaw the looming collapse of the USSR, Russia now once again looks suddenly fragile. Unsurprisingly, this is regarded as good news in Ukraine, where any sign of Russian instability is welcomed. Attitudes elsewhere are not so clear-cut. Many international observers are openly alarmed by the potential demise of the Russian Federation in its current form. They worry about the fate of Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal, and also question the legitimacy of the many new states that could potentially emerge from the wreckage of Putin’s Russia.

These concerns mirror attitudes during the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union. Indeed, it is often forgotten that US President George Bush H. W. Bush came to Kyiv in the weeks before Ukraine’s August 1991 declaration of independence to argue against such a move in his “Chicken Kiev” speech. Many of today’s leaders share these fears over the potential disintegration of Russia. Nevertheless, the Wagner revolt has demonstrated that the Putin regime may well collapse due to its own internal weaknesses, regardless of the Western world’s wishes.

Elements of the international community, including in the West, also cling to the idea of reaching some kind of compromise and returning to business as usual with Russia. While it is obvious to almost everyone in Ukraine and in nearby countries including Poland and the Baltic states that Russia will only stop when it is decisively defeated, there are still many observers elsewhere who believe they can turn back the clock to 2021 or even 2013. They fondly recall a time when Vladimir Putin was the respected leader of a economically strong nation at the heart of global affairs, and dream of returning to this state of affairs. Such thinking is dangerously delusional.

In reality, there can be no way back to international respectability for Putin. As a result of the disastrous invasion of Ukraine, he will be an enemy of the entire Western world for as long as he remains in power. Crucially for the future of his regime, Putin is also clearly no longer able to guarantee domestic security or protect the interests of the Russian elite on the international stage.

As the international community assesses the fallout from the Wagner revolt, it no longer makes sense to be afraid of a new Russian collapse. On the contrary, the time has come to begin preparing for the possibility of a post-Putin Russia. Western policymakers should now be thinking seriously about how to make any future transition as smooth as possible. This means preparing for the emergence of a democratic Russia, and also exploring what a breakup of the current Russian Federation into a number of smaller states would mean for international security.

When similar processes were underway in the early 1990s, the international community prioritized stability above all else, paving the way for the eventual rise of a revisionist Russia under Putin. This time, a new Russian collapse should be managed in order to bring about a sustainable shift toward democracy. The experience of the past three decades has demonstrated that this is the only way to secure a durable peace. Today’s Western leaders must learn from the mistakes of their predecessors in order to avoid repeating them.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a member of the Ukrainian parliament with the European Solidarity party.

Wagner putsch is symptomatic of Russia’s ongoing imperial decline

Richard Cashman, Lesia Ogryzko — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 20:14:43 +0000

The attempted putsch by Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his Wagner troops in late June is perhaps best understood as a symptom of Russia’s ongoing imperial decline. Much like the invasion of Ukraine itself, it is part of a broader historical process that can be traced back to 1989 and the fall of the Soviet incarnation of the Russian Empire in Central and Eastern Europe.

Anyone looking to make sense of recent events in Russia should begin by noting that Prigozhin’s dramatic actions were not aimed at ending the war in Ukraine or steering Russia away from its increasingly totalitarian course. On the contrary, he sought to correct mistakes in the conduct of the invasion by effecting changes in the country’s military leadership.

This should come as no surprise. The vast majority of Prigozhin’s public statements about the invasion of Ukraine align him with prominent ultranationalists, which in the Russian context translates into imperial reactionaries. This group is demanding a fuller commitment to the war against Ukraine which, with Belarus, it sees as the core of Russia’s imperial heartlands. Ideally, this group wants to see full mobilization of Russia’s citizens and the country’s productive capacity for the war effort.

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Prigozhin is not generally regarded as a member of Putin’s inner circle, but he is believed to have supporters within the Kremlin elite, some of whom may have backed or sympathized with his uprising. This support reflects widespread demands among members of the Russian establishment for national leadership that can arrest and reverse the process of imperial retreat which began in 1989.

It is also clear that Prigozhin enjoyed significant backing from ordinary Russians and, probably, ordinary soldiers. Support for Prigozhin amongst the Russian public is rooted in anger over the mismanagement of the invasion and endemic state corruption along with dissatisfaction over the prospect of increasing costs without identifiable gains in Ukraine.

The scale of public sympathy for the putsch could be seen in videos of Rostov-on-Don residents congratulating Wagner troops on capturing the city while bringing them food and water. It was also striking that Rostov-on-Don and its Southern Military District headquarters were seized without a fight, while Wagner troops were able to advance to within two hundred kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed, despite passing close to numerous Russian army bases. Prigozhin’s tough rhetoric and hawkish attacks on Russia’s military leadership clearly resonate widely among large numbers of ordinary Russians.

Prigozhin’s abruptly abandoned putsch reinforces the lesson that coups are relatively common in Russia, whereas genuine revolutions are not. Vladimir Putin and the clan which took control of Russia at the turn of the millennium in many ways see themselves as the heirs to the 1991 coup plotters who attempted but failed to prevent the unravelling of the USSR. Their own vulnerability to being overthrown in similar fashion has now been laid bare before the Russian public and the wider world.

The course of the war to date, including cross-border incursions by Ukrainian-backed Russian militias into Russia’s Belgorod and Bryansk regions, had already fractured the facade of monolithic strength so carefully projected by the Kremlin throughout Putin’s twenty-three-year reign. Prigozhin’s putsch has further exposed the brittleness of the regime and of the Russian state. It has highlighted the very real possibility of turmoil and transformation within the country, which so many observers previously thought impossible.

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Policymakers around the world must now prepare for a range of dramatic scenarios in Putin’s Russia. This planning should involve studying the more than 100 nationalities within the Russian Federation, their cultures and political aspirations, as well as possible fracture lines between regional and business interests.

More specifically, governments must begin to plan for a post-Putin Russia. Putin’s elderly clan represents the last of the Soviet-era elites and their distinct embrace of Russia’s imperial consciousness. That imperial identity will not disappear overnight, but Putin’s obvious overreach in Ukraine and events like Prigozhin’s putsch are likely to engender a less certain sense of imperial destiny.

Putin has emerged from the Wagner putsch a significantly weakened figure, especially among members of the Russian establishment who once saw him as a guarantor of stability. He has also been embarrassed internationally and now looks a far less reliable partner for countries such as China, India, and Brazil that have so far sought to remain neutral over the invasion of Ukraine.

Moving forward, there will be considerable paranoia within the Russian establishment as suspicion swirls regarding potentially shifting loyalties. Rumors continue to circulate regarding measures targeting military and security service personnel who failed to oppose the Wagner uprising. The invasion of Ukraine has already seriously eroded trust within Russian society; Prigozhin’s actions and Putin’s timid response will intensify this negative trend.

Ukraine’s partners cannot control the processes set in train by the Wagner episode, but they can surge military support for Ukraine and embrace bolder policies that reflect the revealed weakness of the Putin regime. The fact that Putin was apparently prepared to strike a deal with Prigozhin further demonstrates that the Russian dictator is inclined to back down rather than escalate when confronted by a resolute opponent or faced with the prospect of possible defeat.

Prigozhin’s putsch was a brief but revealing event in modern Russian history. It hinted at deep-seated dissatisfaction among both the elite and the Russian public over the country’s inability to reclaim what it perceives as its imperial heartlands, and served as a reminder that the imperial Russian state is still collapsing.

The Russian decline that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall is ongoing, with Putin and his clan seeking but failing to reverse the settlement of 1991. This path has led to a war based on imperial fantasies that may now hasten the real end of empire. The Wagner putsch did not bring down Putin’s regime which seeks to maintain empire, but it may come to be seen as the beginning of its end.

Richard Cashman and Lesia Ogryzko are fellows at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

Here’s the ‘concrete’ path for Ukraine to join NATO

Franklin D. Kramer, Hans Binnendijk, Christopher Skaluba — Wed, 05 Jul 2023 21:05:02 +0000

As Ukraine continues its determined defense against Russia’s brutal invasion, NATO nations seem ready at their upcoming summit in Vilnius on July 11-12 to take two important steps to provide for Ukraine’s long-term security. NATO is expected to affirm an enduring pledge of arms support for Ukraine and upgrade the NATO-Ukraine Commission to a “Council,” thus providing a more regularized and effective consultative mechanism. But a third step is urgently needed as well. NATO allies should, as French President Emmanuel Macron described it, establish a “concrete” path for Ukraine to join the Alliance.

Other forms of deterrence have failed Ukraine twice since 2014, and only NATO membership will prevent a third failure. There are obstacles to be overcome, not least of which is that Ukraine is at war and Russian forces occupy some of its internationally recognized sovereign territory. But creating a concrete path for future membership at Vilnius is crucial to enhance Ukrainian morale during its difficult counteroffensive and to strengthen its position in any future negotiations with Russia. It will allow NATO to bolster its credibility by taking an overdue step toward a membership pathway, consistent with its 2008 statement that Ukraine “will become” a member of NATO.

With the Vilnius Summit only a few days away, differences remain among allies about Ukraine’s aspirations, and those differences need to be resolved. There is, however, a way forward that all NATO nations should be able to accept. Namely, the summit should establish a High Level Group reporting to NATO’s secretary general to design a roadmap for Ukraine’s fast-track membership. All NATO nations would have a voice in the group. This roadmap should be delivered no later than next year’s NATO summit in Washington.

The High Level Group could include either ambassadors from the North Atlantic Council or senior officials from member nations, an approach NATO has previously undertaken to analyze and resolve difficult issues. In effect, this would allow for an expedited process akin to the one utilized to extend membership offers to Finland and Sweden. In the case of Ukraine, it is possible that there might be divergent views among members of the group. While unanimity is obviously desirable, the group should be authorized to present alternative analyses if agreement cannot be reached.

As part of its remit, the group would stay apprised of the ongoing military interactions between NATO, its members, and Ukraine. Given the high degree of NATO standardization that Ukraine has already achieved, it should be expected that such efforts would proceed smoothly and that the group would not find any standardization issues as a bar to membership.

The two most complex issue areas for the group to assess will be:

Issues of corruption, judicial independence, and protection of minority rights, and
The conditions in the conflict that would generate circumstances in which a membership offer would be extended.

With respect to the first set of issues, Ukraine has been taking significant steps. It has established a Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, a National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, a High Anti-Corruption Court, and a High Qualification Commission of Judges. Independent international experts have been engaged in such efforts, as has civil society. These efforts have borne fruit. By way of example, the head of Ukraine’s Supreme Court is facing corruption charges related to an alleged $2.7 million bribe. More efforts are nonetheless required.

Meanwhile, the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) has undertaken intensive reviews of the minority rights situation in Ukraine. Its June 2023 report “welcome[d] the adoption of a long-expected new Law on National Minorities, which provides a number of guarantees in conformity with international standards.” The report further stated that “to ensure full conformity with such standards, a number of provisions of that Law should be reconsidered.”

In judging Ukraine’s progress on these issues, the group would have the benefit of the Venice Commission’s report, discussions with Ukrainian authorities and civil society, and consultations with the European Union, which has included such issues as part of extending candidacy status to Ukraine.

The more complicated set of issues for resolution by the group involves deciding under what conditions of conflict a membership offer should be extended. The most desirable circumstance, of course, would be a victory by Ukraine that regains the country’s pre-2014 borders and is followed by a settlement with Russia. Were that to happen by the time of the Washington summit, there would be strong reasons for the Alliance to extend a membership offer. Given the uncertainty of war, however, it would also be valuable for the group to evaluate at least two other circumstances.

First, it could be the case that Ukraine succeeds in achieving significant control of much of its territory but not all. The group might consider whether membership with a guarantee covering only that portion of territory should be considered. This is an option that would likely have a higher degree of clarity closer to the Washington summit. As noted above, different NATO nations may have different views with respect to such an approach, but the group could design relevant recommendations and propose a roadmap for each.

Second, it might be the case that Ukraine is entirely—or very substantially—successful in regaining its pre-2014 borders but that Russia continues sporadic or low-level attacks, so the conflict is somewhat diminished but not ended. Again, the group could make recommendations as to whether a membership offer should be extended in such circumstances.

In sum, heads of state and government should establish a High Level Group in Vilnius tasked to provide an evaluation of the key issues affecting Ukraine’s potential membership and to present specific recommendations at the Washington summit that constitute the “concrete” path suggested by Macron. This would be a significant step forward politically for Ukraine. It would prompt NATO to define the conditions for membership while not immediately altering the status quo. It is a proper compromise between those who want to extend an immediate membership offer and those who prefer to avoid the membership question until the war is settled.

Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished fellow and board member at the Atlantic Council. He is a former US assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He previously served in the White House as special assistant to the president for defense policy and as director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies.

Christopher Skaluba is the director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He formerly served as the principal director for European and NATO policy and the principal director for strategy and force development in the office of the US secretary of defense.

The post Here’s the ‘concrete’ path for Ukraine to join NATO appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Rich Outzen joins WION TV to discuss Ukrainian counter-offensive

aozen — Sat, 01 Jul 2023 13:34:06 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

The post Rich Outzen joins WION TV to discuss Ukrainian counter-offensive appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Kremlin denies that it targeted civilians in a missile attack on a pizza restaurant

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 30 Jun 2023 19:00:00 +0000

Security

Military camps for Wagner reportedly under construction in Belarus

Tracking narratives

Pro-Kremlin sources spreading disinformation to justify missile strike in Kramatorsk

Kremlin blames Colombian victims for the injuries they sustained in the Kramatorsk attack

Media policy

Prigozhin’s online assets reportedly blocked in Russia

International Response

Questions abound over the future of Wagner contracts and Prigozhin-linked businesses in Africa

Analysis: With Wagner mutiny, Russia’s loses plausible deniability about its involvement in Africa

Investigation sheds light on how Putin’s childhood friends allegedly evade sanctions

Military camps for Wagner reportedly under construction in Belarus

Russian independent outlet Verstka reported on the construction of camps for Wagner forces near Asipovichi, Mogilev Oblast, located in Belarus approximately two hundred kilometers from the Ukraine border. According to Verstka’s local forestry source, the area will cover 2.4 hectares (5.9 acres) and accommodate eight thousand Wagner fighters. The source also claimed that there will be additional camps constructed. Family members of Wagner fighters also confirmed to Verstka that they were deploying to Belarus.

Radio Svaboda, the Belarusian-language edition of Radio Liberty, reviewed satellite imagery from Planet Labs that suggested signs of expansion at the Unit 61732 military camp adjacent to the village of Tsel, twenty kilometers northwest of Asipovichi. The outlet interviewed Ukrainian military analyst Oleg Zhdanov, who suggested it was “too early to tell” as to whether the military camp’s expansion is specifically for Wagner forces. “Very little time has passed to start building a camp specifically for the Wagnerites—it’s unreal,” Zhdanov told Radio Svaboda.

Location of possible construction at the Unit 61732 military camp in Tsel, Belarus. (Source: Planet Labs)

On June 27, in his first speech after the Wagner mutiny, Russian President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed the deal that ended the rebellion on June 24 in which Yevgeniy Prigozhin would relocate to Belarus. Putin praised those Wagner fighters who did not participate in the revolt and said they could sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense of other services. He added that other mercenaries who do not want to join could go either home or follow Prigozhin to Belarus.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Pro-Kremlin sources spreading disinformation to justify missile strike in Kramatorsk

Pro-Kremlin sources denied Russia targeted civilians when a missile struck a crowded pizza restaurant in Kramatorsk, killing at least twelve civilians and injuring more than fifty others. According to this narrative, RIA Pizza was actually a military base hosting US and Ukrainian soldiers. To support the claims, pictures taken after the strike were published on Telegram and Twitter.

To support the claim that soldiers of 101st Airborne Division were located at the pizza “military base,” pro-Kremlin sources circulated grisly footage of the attack aftermath recorded by freelance journalist Arnaud De Decker. The clip shows a man wearing a morale patch of a US flag with the words “Always Be Ready: 5.11 Tactical.” 5.11 Tactical is a military apparel company that sells branded merchandise, including morale patches, worn to offer support to various causes and slogans but not used official unit patches. Various types of 5.11 Tactical’s “Always Be Ready” patches are readily available for purchase online.

Top: A 5.11 Tactical morale patch for sale on its website. Bottom: Image taken during the aftermath of the Kramatorsk attack showing a man wearing the same morale patch on his helmet. (Source: 5.11 Tactical/archive, top; @arnaud.dedecker/archive, bottom)

Similarly, another post from Aleksandr Simonov’s Telegram channel that a man wearing an 101^st Airborne t-shirt was a member of the US Army division. These t-shirts are also readily available from online retailers.

Montage of three screenshots from online retail websites selling 101^st Airborne t-shirts. (Sources: top left, Etsy/archive; bottom left, Predathor/archive; right, Allegro/archive)

Montage of three screenshots from online retail websites selling 101st Airborne t-shirts. (Sources: top left, Etsy/archive; bottom left, Predathor/archive; right, Allegro)

—Sayyara Mammadova, research assistant, Warsaw, Poland

Kremlin blames Colombian victims for the injuries they sustained in the Kramatorsk attack

In addition to pro-Kremlin accusations that the Kramatorsk attack targeted a base housing US Army soldiers, Kremlin influencers also targeted citizens of Colombia, three of whom were injured in the attack, for being at the site of the incident. Colombian President Gustavo Petro said the attack targeted “three defenseless Colombian civilians” in violation of the protocols of war and called for the Colombian Foreign Ministry to submit a note of diplomatic protest to Russia. While the Kremlin acknowledged launching the attack, it insisted the assault struck military personnel rather than civilians.

The three Colombian citizens injured in the attack include acclaimed Colombian writer Hector Abad Faciolince; Sergio Jaramillo Caro, who previously led Colombia’s peace negotiations with FARC rebels; and Ukrainian-based journalist Catalina Gomez. According to the New York Times, Abad and Jaramillo were in Kramatorsk “collecting material” in support of their initiative, ¡Aguanta Ucrania! (“Hang On Ukraine!”), which seeks to garner support for Ukraine in Latin America.

Following the attack, Colombian influencers and officials criticized the attack through media outlets and social media accounts in Spanish. Danilo Rueda, Colombia’s current high commissioner for peace, issued a statement expressing support for the victims without mentioning Russia, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its “strongest condemnation of the unacceptable attack by Russian forces on a civilian target.”

Gomez, who was injured in the attack, broadcast a video for France 24 from the site of the explosion. Meanwhile, Abad and Jaramillo conducted interviews with Colombian media outlets such as El Tiempo in which they described the incident.

Actualidad RT, a Russian media outlets with enormous reach in the Spanish-speaking world, insisted that the victims of the attack were mercenaries and instructors of NATO and Ukraine rather than civilians. Actualidad RT quoted statements from Igor Konashenkov, spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Defense, and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov, who said the attack struck “military targets” and that “Russia does not attack civilian infrastructure.” Actualidad RT promoted its claims via Twitter and Facebook multiple times on June 28.

Colombian radio station WRadio interviewed Kremlin foreign policy spokesperson Maria Zakharova on the morning of June 28. Zakharova stated that the restaurant was a Russian military target and called for an investigation into Victoria Amelina, a Ukrainian writer who was gravely injured while purportedly hosting the Colombians at the restaurant, claiming without evidence that Amelina had prior knowledge that the restaurant was a military target. Zakharova reiterated this statement after a WRadio journalist asked her to confirm the accusation. In contrast, Abad stated that it was Gomez who suggested they visit the restaurant, and that she apologized for doing so after the attack.

The Russian embassy in Colombia amplified Zakharova’s narrative later that same afternoon and evening. On Twitter, the embassy insisted that the city was “an operational and logistical-military hub, not a suitable place to enjoy Ukrainian cuisine dishes.” It also seemed to celebrate that the “reckless trip [of the Colombians] did not turn into an irreparable tragedy.”

—Daniel Suárez Pére z, research associate, Bogota, Colombia

Prigozhin’s online assets reportedly blocked in Russia

Over the course of the thirty-six-hour Wagner mutiny, the Kremlin attempted to limit information about Yevgeniy Prigozin on Russian social media and search engines, eventually blocking websites affiliated with Prigozhin. On June 24, the Telegram channel of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet RT reported that several Prigozhin-controlled media outlets including RIA FAN, People’s News, and Patriot Media Group were no longer accessible in parts of Russia. RT added that the reason for their disappearance was unknown. Similar reports appeared in Mediazona and several Telegram channels.

The DFRLab used the Internet censorship measurement platform OONI to verify the claim and check the accessibility of RIA FAN within Russia. OONI detected signs that riafan.ru was blocked in the country.

Internet censorship measurement platform OONI detected the apparent blocking of Prigozhin-owned media outlet RIA FAN. (Source: OONI)

On June 29, independent Russian outlet The Bell claimed the Kremlin was searching for a new owner for Patriot Media Group, which includes media assets associated with Prigozhin. The following day, multiple Russian outlets reported that Prigozhin had dissolved Patriot Media Group.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Questions abound over the future of Wagner contracts and Prigozhin-linked businesses in Africa

For years, Wagner has acted as Russia’s primary form of influence in Africa—spreading disinformation and propaganda, securing military contracts, and exporting natural resources to support Putin’s war effort. Following Prigozhin’s attempted mutiny, the future of Wagner’s operations on the continent has come into question. While it is highly unlikely the Kremlin would willingly abandon its influence in Africa, if Wagner is retired or its troops absorbed into the Ministry of Defense, it is uncertain who would maintain the group’s operations on the continent.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov confirmed that Russia’s work in Africa will continue. In a TV interview with Russia Today, Lavrov said, “In addition to relations with this PMC the governments of CAR and Mali have official contacts with our leadership. At their request, several hundred soldiers are working in CAR as instructors.”

A top advisor to Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadéra appeared unconcerned about the weekend’s events. Speaking of Wagner’s military instructors, Fidèle Gouandjika said, “If Moscow decides to withdraw them and send us the Beethovens or the Mozarts rather than Wagners, we will have them.” In a statement released to its Telegram channel, the Officer’s Union for International Security—a US-sanctioned Wagner front company operating in CAR—claimed CAR’s defense minister had apologized for Gouandjika’s remarks. It quoted Defense Minister Claude Rameaux Bireau as saying, “The people of the CAR are grateful to the Russian instructors of Wagner, ask any Central African on the streets of Bangui or in the village of the CAR—he will confirm my words.”

In Mali, where Wagner forces have taken over responsibility for pushing back jihadists after the departure of French forces, the online outlet Mali Actu reported that the situation could dramatically impact Mali. “This situation raises major concerns about the security, stability and sovereignty of Mali, as well as the impact on the local population and counter-terrorism efforts,” it wrote.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Analysis: With Wagner mutiny, Russia loses plausible deniability about its involvement in Africa

While Wagner’s future in Africa remains uncertain, it is important to consider that the Wagner Group not just a paramilitary force. It is also a conglomerate of companies active in different sectors, from mining and logistics to political warfare and moviemaking, able to travel the spectrum between private entrepreneurism to state proxy. This flexibility has previously allowed Moscow to deploy Wagner to act as a force multiplier in Africa while simultaneously denying Russia’s direct presence on the continent. In Africa, Russia has used Wagner multiple times as part of a strategy to help authoritarian leaders stay in power and gain a pro-Russian military presence on the ground, all while maintaining plausible deniability. Until now, the positive outcomes of this strategy have far exceeded the costs for the Kremlin, as Russia has built a strong network of African influence with relatively little effort, securing concessions in strategic extractive industries, and expanding military-to-military relations on the continent.

However, this principle of plausible deniability, which made Wagner so successful and so useful for Moscow as an extension of its foreign policy and influence, is now damaged. As previously noted, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, as well as Putin, publicly confirmed direct links between Wagner and the Russian state apparatus.

Africa is intimately linked to Wagner: In the wake of Wagner’s involvement in Syria, Africa became the scene of the group’s expansion. Engaging in Sudan, the Central African Republic, Libya, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Mali, Wagner employed an opportunistic strategy of supplying security while taking concessions to mine natural resources. While its forces were in most cases invited to stabilize fragile states, its actions actively invited further instability, creating more opportunities and a greater demand signal for its services, ultimately granting renewing opportunities to Moscow to reinforce its footprint in the continent.

While denying direct links to Wagner’s actions in Africa might have become more difficult for the Kremlin, Russia is unlikely to waste the network of influence built by the group in recent years. Instead, Moscow will likely continue to deploy hybrid tools such as Wagner, although organized in different shapes and forms, so Russia can continue displacing Western influence, exploiting natural resources, and evading sanctions through dozens of front companies.

—Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

Investigation sheds light on how Putin’s childhood friends allegedly evade sanctions

On June 20, the Organized Crime and Corruption reporting project (OCCRP) published a series of investigations titled “The Rotenberg Files” that shed light on the business dealings and alleged sanctions evasion attempts of Boris and Arkady Rotenberg, close friends of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The report is based on fifty thousand leaked emails and documents, examined by journalists from seventeen outlets. The OCCRP said the leak came from a source who worked for the brothers at a Russian management firm. The OCCRP investigation was conducted in partnership with the Times of London, Le Monde, and Forbes, among others.

Boris and Arkady Rotenberg are childhood friends of Putin. The billionaire brothers faced Western sanctions amid Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, but their lavish lifestyles do not appear to have been impacted.

According to the OCCRP, the leaked documents demonstrate how the Rotenberg brothers allegedly used Western lawyers, bankers, corporate service providers, and proxies to evade sanctions.

One of the report’s findings also alleges the brothers maintain business links to Prince Michael of Kent, a cousin of the late Queen Elizabeth II who was previously accused by the Sunday Times and Channel 4 of profiting off close access to the Kremlin. According to the latest investigation, “Prince Michael distanced himself from earlier ties to the Putin regime in the wake of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. But leaked emails and corporate records show he co-owns a company with two Russian businessmen who helped billionaire oligarch and Putin ally Boris Rotenberg dodge Western sanctions.”

Another investigation from the Rotenberg files reported that Putin’s eldest daughter regularly visited a holiday property financed by Arkady Rotenberg in an exclusive Austrian skiing destination. Documents reviewed by the OCCRP suggest that the house was purchased by a Cypriot company in 2013 with a loan from a bank then owned by Arkady, using funds invested by another company he owned. Other records suggested that the former romantic partner of Putin’s daughter is connected to the company that owns the Austrian property. Residents claim to have seen Putin himself at the Kitzbühel residence, though this has not been confirmed.

The Rotenberg brothers and Prince Michael declined to comment to the OCCRP investigative consortium.

—Ani Mejlumyan, research assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

The post Russian War Report: Kremlin denies that it targeted civilians in a missile attack on a pizza restaurant appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“What just happened?” The Wagner mutiny

Alia Brahimi — Fri, 30 Jun 2023 14:03:04 +0000

In Season 1, Episode 4 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi speaks with renowned Russia expert Mark Galeotti about the striking developments which saw mutinous mercenary forces from the Wagner Group take over two Russian cities and march towards Moscow. Professor Galeotti argues that the rebellion is both a symptom and an accelerator of the decay of the Putin state and of systemic capacity to deal with crisis. He points out that the plot was not picked up in a timely manner precisely because the Wagner Group is a mercenary force operating outside of the purview of counterintelligence and the units that ordinarily monitor the loyalty of the military. He describes how the Wagner’s group shadow status was doubly corrosive: on the one hand it was a mercenary group engaging in organised armed violence for profit, and on the other hand it was enough of a state institution that it could tap into the resources of the state and play both sides.

“It’s likely that this is the start of the real endgame… most crucially of all it was the spectacle of the security forces in the main not joining Wagner, but nor did they act to stop Wagner. They sat back and just thought, let’s see how this all plays out.”

Mark Galeotti, Professor and Russia expert

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The post “What just happened?” The Wagner mutiny appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin’s Wagner weakness is a signal to support Ukraine’s counteroffensive

Taras Kuzio — Thu, 29 Jun 2023 20:57:02 +0000

The recent Wagner mutiny in Russia was a short-lived affair but it has succeeded in exposing the myth of Vladimir Putin as a formidable political strongman who will go to extremes to achieve his goals. In reality, Putin’s failure to punish mutinous troops who seized a major Russian city and marched on Moscow has revealed him as a weak leader who is more inclined to capitulate than escalate.

This makes a mockery of longstanding international concerns over “provoking Putin” that have done so much to slow down the flow of Western military aid to Ukraine over the past sixteen months. The Russian dictator’s feeble response to the Wagner rebellion should now serve as a strong signal to increase Western support for Ukraine’s current counteroffensive.

Putin’s handling of the Wagner mutiny compares unfavorably to the conduct of his predecessor in the Kremlin, Boris Yeltsin, and that of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Yeltsin famously led opposition to the failed coup in August 1991 that sealed the fate of the USSR. When the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Zelenskyy rejected offers to evacuate and instead announced that he was staying in Kyiv. In contrast, Putin was notably absent during the first day of the Wagner mutiny when Russia appeared to be in real danger. Subsequent attempts to minimize the damage via a series of carefully choreographed public appearances have merely served to highlight Putin’s earlier absence.

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In hindsight, none of this is surprising. Throughout his career, Putin has made a habit of backing down whenever he has found himself confronted by a determined adversary. In 2014, Putin occupied Crimea without a fight but then got cold feet when faced with fierce resistance in eastern Ukraine. Instead of pressing home his overwhelming military advantage and seizing the whole of eastern and southern Ukraine, he settled for less than half of the Donbas region. Likewise, Putin ordered no direct military response when Turkey shot down a Russian jet in 2015, and took no action three years later when clashes with US forces in Syria led to the heavy casualties among Russian Wagner troops.

Like a true bully, Putin only embarked on the full-scale invasion of Ukraine because he believed the country was an easy target. His intelligence agencies claimed the Ukrainian military would not fight back and assured him that most ordinary Ukrainians would welcome his invading army as liberators. Crucially, Putin was also confident the Western response would be as half-hearted as it had been in 2014 when he invaded Crimea and eastern Ukraine. These miscalculations have proven extremely costly for Russia.

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Ukraine’s resolute resistance and the West’s powerful military support have placed Putin in a quandary. He has responded with empty bluster, declaring a series of meaningless red lines while refraining from any attacks on the NATO countries engaged in arming Ukraine. Throughout the war, Putin has used nuclear blackmail in a bid to intimidate Western leaders, but even this extreme measure is proving increasingly ineffective. In September 2022, he vowed to use nuclear weapons to defend recently annexed Ukrainian lands, declaring, “I’m not bluffing.” However, when Ukrainian forces called his bluff and continued to advance, he did not act on his earlier nuclear threats.

This lack of decisive leadership has contributed to the poor battlefield performance of the Russian army in Ukraine. Demoralized Russian troops have barely advanced since summer 2022, and spent more than ten months capturing the small city of Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine. Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin was at pains to state that his recent mutiny was against Russia’s army chiefs rather than Putin himself, but the Russian dictator must ultimately accept personal responsibility for the disastrous invasion. After all, he has stood by his failing commanders despite their obvious shortcomings, and has consistently placed loyalty above competence.

Putin’s emphasis on loyalty reflects his fear of domestic opposition. For much of his reign, he has been preoccupied with the idea of losing power through a popular uprising or palace coup. This has led to the elimination of all political opponents and the silencing of independent media in today’s Russia. It has also shaped the conduct of the current war, with Putin deeply reluctant to undertake a new round of mobilization that could further destabilize the situation inside Russia.

The Wagner mutiny demonstrated that these fears of a domestic uprising are entirely justified. Wagner troops were able to capture Rostov-on-Don without a fight and then advance virtually unopposed across Russia to within 200 kilometers of Moscow. Strikingly, thousands of ordinary Russians in Rostov-on-Don welcomed the Wagner takeover of the city and openly demonstrated their backing for the mutiny.

Meanwhile, there was little evidence of any surge in support for Putin, either among the public or within the ranks of the Russian military and security services. Putin’s obvious reluctance to hold Prigozhin or his troops accountable for their actions has now further undermined morale within the armed forces and raised the prospect of infighting engulfing Russia.

Putin’s toothless response to Prigozhin’s mutiny has sent a signal that he is far from the all-powerful ruler of Kremlin propaganda, and is in fact much weaker than previously imagined. Many within the Russian elite now recognize this reality and are growing increasingly alarmed over the fragility of the current regime. They understand that Putin has lost his legitimacy as a strongman ruler and is leading Russia toward an uncertain future of deepening domestic divisions and international isolation. Understandably, thoughts are now turning to the post-Putin era.

Western leaders should respond to the Wagner affair by doubling down on their military aid to Ukraine. Ever since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, misplaced concerns over possible Russian escalation have served to limit weapons deliveries to Kyiv, when a more decisive approach might have already ended the war. With Putin’s weakness now on display for all to see, the time has come to provide Ukraine with everything it needs to secure victory.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. His latest book is “Genocide and Fascism. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – A conversation on the United States’ efforts to advance global LGBTQI+ human rights and USAID’s commitment to global inclusion.

Human Rights Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speaker

Samantha Power
Administrator, United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

Moderator

Jonathan Capehart
Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, the Washington Post and MSNBC

VICENTE GARCIA: Hello. Welcome to this special Pride edition of #ACFrontPage. I’m Vicente Garcia, senior director of engagement and external affairs at the Atlantic Council, and we’re delighted for today’s conversation featuring USAID Administrator Samantha Power on a topic important to me as a member of the LGBTQI+ community, but also to the Atlantic Council in our mission to shape the global future together through US global leadership and global engagement.

Today’s conversation will be led by Pulitzer-winning journalist Jonathan Capehart, who is the host of his own show on MSNBC, serves on the Washington Post Editorial Board, and a frequent commentator on PBS, and the list goes on. We welcome participation by those here joining us today in person during our Q&A session, but also welcome those joining online by using the hashtag #ACFrontPage.

Administrator Power, thank you for joining us here today. We’re very eager to hear from you about the Biden administration’s and USAID’s priorities at addressing global LGBTQI+ human rights. And so now I’ll turn it over to Jonathan to lead our discussion. Thank you.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Thank you very much, Vicente, for the invitation to be here. Thank you all. One more thing, Vicente. As someone who reads teleprompter for a living, I really felt for you because that print is so small.

SAMANTHA POWER: Yeah, seriously. We’re just old, dude.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: I know, it’s true, given the distance. But thank you very much for that introduction. And, Administrator Power, thank you very much for being here and taking the time to be a part of this important conversation.

So, as you well know, within the first month of taking office President Biden issued a memorandum that directed various parts of the US government responsible for foreign policy, such as USAID, to prioritize efforts to advance LGBTQI+ rights around the world. How are those efforts going? And what have been the biggest challenges?

SAMANTHA POWER: Thank you so much. And thanks to everybody for turning out. It’s a great energy in the room, great energy this month, and much needed, because we harness this energy to try to do this work in the world.

Well, first to say that USAID is one of fifteen agencies that is being responsive to President Biden’s direction to promote and protect and respect the human rights of LGBTQIA+ people around the world. And I’d say I feel very fortunate every day, no matter what issue I’m working on, to be at USAID, because we have this toolkit. We have programming in public health on maternal and child health. Of course we have PEPFAR, where we work with the State Department and CDC, which has, of course, made a major difference, saving twenty-five million lives and 5.5 million babies is the estimate for the good that it has done over time. And that’s had a particular effect on LGBTQIA+ communities around the world.

But beyond that, we do agriculture. We do economic growth and inclusion, livelihoods work. We’ve helped vaccinate the world. In many parts of the world, if you are LGBTQIA+, coming forward to seek social services may risk something near and dear to you, depending on the legal environment in which you’re working.

When the fallout from COVID occurred and you saw such economic devastation around the world, given the fact that LGBTQIA+ people are often working in the informal sector and may have had, in some instances, less backup, the kinds of crises that have befallen the planet have a disparate impact on marginalized communities and those that have, in a sense, faced preexisting conditions, you might say, including discrimination, stigmatization, violence, et cetera.

So we went forth. We have tripled the size of our staff. We have the great Jay Gilliam, who many of you work with, as our lead LGBTQIA+ coordinator at USAID. That position had been unfilled in the previous administration. This fiscal year we’ve had a dedicated pool of resources of around sixteen million dollars, which does everything from spot emergency assistance to people who need legal defense because they’re being rounded up in some cases or evicted to working really closely with the State Department to help identify people who would be eligible for asylum or to become refugees because of their vulnerability, because of their sexual orientation or gender identity.

So, you know, I’d say you see a massive surge in programming, in attention. But for me, I think the—and the thing that Jay has helped us so much with and the team, if you believe in development in 2023—I mean, and actually seeing development outcomes that matter and reversing development setbacks that have occurred—it’s not enough to have, like, a little pot of money, or a big pot of money, even, dedicated to LGBTQIA+. All the programming we do on food security, on education, on health, needs to be—and the list goes on—needs to be attentive and intentional about going out of our way to make sure that we are not just practicing development but inclusive development.

And the biggest challenges—I’m sure we’ll get into them, and I know many in the audience are seized with them—is criminalization, and even in countries that already have criminalized LGBTQIA+ status, you know, new moves, desire to render more salient laws that may be on the books but being ignored by some communities, work in places like Uganda, because of the introduction of the anti-homosexuality act, vigilantes and citizens and others taking what’s happening in the legal space or in the parliament and getting signed into law and viewing it as license to do whatever the hell they want to vulnerable people.

And so it’s not just happening in Uganda. That’s, of course, something that has happened very recently. But we see the instrumentalization of the human-rights agenda that so many in the world aspire to see progress, that being turned on its head. And in places where anti-democratic forces are ascendant or are getting either support or abetted or at least not counteracted by authorities, you see those voices getting louder. And even when there’s not a law and that kind of legal ballast behind those voices, that, in and of itself, is terrifying and exclusionary and a deterrent, again, for these communities to come forward and access these programs at the very time where we’re really seeking to make sure that we’re leaving no one behind.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: So since you brought up Uganda and also your point about, you know, USAID has all of these programs. But there are countries where just presenting yourself to make yourself—avail yourself of these programs could put you in danger. So the question is what is the United States government doing or can it do to push back on what’s happening in countries like Uganda?

SAMANTHA POWER: Well, to start—and I would start with what I consider a statement of the obvious but, nonetheless, I think does need to be said because it’s not always the way things are done, which is you start from the proposition of nothing about you without you. This question of tactics and how to prevail or how to counteract are super complicated, right.

Imagine, like, being part of the Biden administration and the tactical questions about how we moved the Inflation Reduction Act and, you know, convinced Joe Manchin to be part of the—I mean, when we’re operating in someone else’s country, you know, understanding, you know, the complex ecosystem in which we work, drawing, I should say, at USAID very heavily on the expertise of our local staff, two-thirds of—at least-two thirds of USAID staff abroad are nationals of the countries in which we work so they can be a great resource, but fundamentally it is the communities that are going to be affected by these laws that provide cues to us on how vocal to be, how much to signal in a deterrent way in advance of the movement of a piece of legislation, which risks then putting the United States at the center of a national drama and potentially triggering nationalism and other forces or some, you know, historical, you know, dynamics—let’s put it that way.

And so—but even what I’ve just said is kind of simplistic because there is no one view. I mean, even within an organization people are debating at fever pitch, you know, what the right approach is. This is just really, really hard.

But we do come in with humility and really try to be in lockstep with the groups who we may have funded in the past or may be funding currently, and in the case of the anti-homosexuality act in—that Uganda has moved forward with President Biden was very clear that the law should be repealed. Came out with a public statement. Has talked—and this is one of the approaches that we have taken not only in Uganda but in other places that are threatening to put in place similar laws—talking about the effects, Jonathan, on this incredibly successful partnership that we’ve had in combating HIV/AIDS.

There’s one report in Uganda that shows that service utilization is down by more than 60 percent since the law was introduced and that’s people who are afraid of coming forward for vital health services because they’re afraid it could lead to their arrest or it could lead to their eviction or it could lead to vigilante violence.

And so here we are, you know, trying to get this epidemic under control by 2030 and we’re part of this grand global coalition and at the same time these steps are being taken that would set back not only the health of LGBTQI+ communities but the health in this instance of all Ugandans.

And so, in a sense, you know, really looking at what the practical effects are of being seen to license community involvement in discrimination, stigmatization, and even law enforcement as you see citizens, again, taking things into their own hands but trying to find also arguments that have broad appeal in terms of services or programs that a broad swath of the societies in which we work are enthusiastic about, you know, showing the link between those—for example, private sector investment. There’s not one country in which USAID works that isn’t interested in fueling economic growth recovering from COVID, getting young people to work.

Well, what does it mean if the multinational companies that we and the Commerce Department and the State Department have been working with to try to encourage them to invest in these countries? Their own anti-discrimination policies and values are not going to make that an attractive place for investment.

So it’s a combination of, you know, the State Department taking steps now potentially to sanction individuals involved in this measure in Uganda. That’s been something that’s been messaged publicly and, again, these sort of practical effects that are going to extend practical harms, that are going to extend beyond if this law is not repealed.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: And so let’s talk about another country. I was thinking when you say, in response to my question about Uganda, talking to the groups on the ground, getting their input into what USAID and what the US government should do, let’s talk about Ukraine. There’s a war going on, but hopefully at some point that war will end and reconstruction will begin. Where does the LGBTQI+ community play—come into the conversation about rebuilding? Both from making sure that they are whole in Ukrainian society, but also that their rights are protected and respected?

SAMANTHA POWER: Well, this is a complex issue and a complex question, and I could come at it a few different ways. But, first, let me just say that, you know, part of Putin’s motivation, as we well know, for invading Ukraine was watching Ukrainian society, the Ukrainian government, move at really rapid pace to integrate itself into Europe. And, yes, that carries with it a lot of economic benefit for young people in Ukraine, but much of the impetus behind what was, you know, between really 2013 and last year, such a shift, right, in an orientation that went in one direction and then shifted in another direction. Much of it was values-based.

That doesn’t mean everybody was with all aspects of the European agenda, or the European program, or the European Convention on Human Rights immediately. We’ve seen that, of course. But, you know, part of what Ukraine is fighting for and part of what Russia is trying to squelch is liberalization, is broad understanding of who human rights protections apply to. Now, again, that’s a kind of general statement.

What we do—then, shall I say, of course, following Russia’s invasion Ukraine’s work to liberalize and build checks and balances and build in human rights protections, although not making headlines in the American or even the European headline, that work has accelerated. Which is, frankly, remarkable that a country that’s fighting for its life and its people can walk and chew gum at the same time. But meaning, you know, you see [LGBTQI+] protections progressing not only through legislative measures, and regulation, and as we vet—as the Ukrainians vet and we support programs to vet judges, you know, their human rights credentials being assessed in this much more comprehensive way.

But also, again, as the economy—parts of the economy actually flourish—I know this is hard to believe. But, like, the tech sector grew by, I think, seven or eight percent last year. You know, that itself, young people being out and being integrated in the world, there’s just things happening in the society that I think is going to put Ukraine, you know, and above all [LGBTQI+] communities and individuals, in a much more supportive legal and social ecosystem as the whole rationale for the war is about integrating into Europe. And the criteria by which—that Ukraine is going to need to meet, the roadmap and so forth, is going to entail much stronger protections than have existed in the past.

To your point, I think, if I understood it, about reconstruction, again, that’s incumbent on this intentionality that I was talking about. USAID is a critical partner. I was just meeting with the minister of finance yesterday talking about reconstruction out of the recent conference in the United Kingdom. You know, as we think about procurement and nondiscrimination in procurement, you know, how are those checks and those protections built in? As we think right now about health services and making sure that those are restored every place we can, even places close to the front line or as territory is liberated, how does USAID support flow in a manner where we are constantly vigilant to how inclusive those services are, and whether or not they are provided?

I mean, you know, we’ve actually managed to distribute I think it’s something like sixteen million antiretrovirals in Ukraine, you know, just since the war, you know, has started. So, you know, in terms of the mainstream PEPFAR and HIV/AIDS programs, like, those have continued. We’ve managed to be able to keep those afloat. And that took real intentionality on the part of our health team and our Ukraine team.

But I think, again, the principle that we want to bring to everything we do in terms of inclusive development is just that it’s a design feature of any program that we do that we are looking to make sure we are going out of our way, just as we would for religious minorities and on behalf of religious freedom or for women in countries where women are discriminated against, to make sure that we are reaching the full spectrum of beneficiaries, and that any kind of social deterrent or normative factors are ones that we try to circumvent to make sure that we are being inclusive because that’s going to be in the interests of all—again, all individuals living in a country economically and in terms of their ability to—in this instance, to integrate into Europe.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: So what would you—what do you say to people who question why supporting LGBTQI+ rights should be a part of American foreign policy? Because you could see there might be some people around the world, or even in our own country, who think, you know, I’m down with the community, but why make that part of our foreign policy.

SAMANTHA POWER: Well, I think one way to take that question, which we do hear a lot and you might even say increasingly in certain quarters, but—is to imagine the counterfactual. You know, imagine a world in which US taxpayer resources are expended in a manner that, you know, in a sense perpetuates or deepens exclusion of individuals who are really vulnerable. I mean, that would be bad. And not only that, it would have the flavor, I think, in many of the countries we work, for a country that for all of our imperfections has long stood for human rights, it would have—it would have the effect, I believe, of being seen to kind of legitimate some of the rhetoric and actions and legal measures that are being put forward.

So, you know, there’s not, like, some place of neutrality here, right? We are the United States. We, you know, for many, many years in a very bipartisan way have stood for human rights. We have stood behind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which doesn’t have exceptions or footnotes excluding particular communities. We stand for implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, which explicitly say that no person should be left behind—again, without footnotes or caveats. So I think there are really hard questions about tactics, about in some places how vocal to be to not, again, put ourselves at the center of a narrative, because that in some sense is just what people who would seek to repress or terrorize vulnerable communities would like to see happen. So, again, it’s very, very difficult on the ground to find the right balance of tools.

You know, if you look at the Anti-Homosexuality Act in Uganda, the—you know, we spoke out with thirty-one countries. We spoke out with the United Nations independent expert that US diplomacy, when I was the UN as ambassador, was absolutely critical in securing the creation of that position. And the fact that that position has been renewed three times now, including most recently last year, speaks to, again, changing norms. The fact that international instruments more and more are including—sometimes explicitly, sometimes less so—[LGBTQI+] rights as human rights, the fact that we see same-sex marriage legalized this last year in Estonia and Slovenia, but also decriminalization in places as varied as Barbados and Singapore means that these principles are getting traction.

And these international instruments—and this is a critical part of President Biden’s agenda—are really important, Jonathan, because it gives citizens in a country, you know, where on the books there’s lots of happy talk about human rights, but it gives [LGBTQI+] organizations and individuals, you know, something to hang their arguments on; something to say, look, but the United Nations Human Rights Council just appointed this individual, this individual says this. And so when we can act in company, in a coalition, I think that’s always advantageous, and that is something we seek to do.

When the norms themselves—I was part of getting the Security Council for the first time in what at that time was the seventy-five-year history of the UN to condemn the targeting of individuals on their—on the basis of their sexual orientation—that had never happened before—and hearing from around the world what it meant for the United Nations Security Council to have done that. I mean, this was something that was a consensus document; you know, the Russian Federation, a number of African governments that had laws that were not respectful of these human rights on the books went along with that.

And so, again, thinking tactically about how to do it and how these norms become more salient in international law, I think, is very important. But it is in our interest to have maximum economic inclusion that’s consistent with our economic objectives as a country and our foreign-policy interests. It is in our interest to fight repression against whomever it is being carried out. And it is in our foreign-policy interest to stand up for our values.

President Biden’s polling, I think, reflects broad approval, surging poll numbers; I think a tripling in global polls about—when the question is posed, do you think Joe Biden will do the right thing, a tripling from his predecessor. And if you talk to people around the world and sort of get a sense of why, the fact that human rights are so central to President Biden’s argument and democracy and the importance of democracy delivering, that’s a major distinguishing feature not only of this administration but really of US foreign policy from some of the big geopolitical actors who are more and more active.

So if we go quiet, just in the same way that if we were to go quiet on the rights of Christians in societies in which they are being persecuted, and just defer to prevailing, you know, what is taken as prevailing popular sentiment, I think we would really shortchange what is distinguishing about American foreign policy.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: One more question from me before we open it up to Q&A, and that’s this. Everything you say is, you know, terrific and wonderful in terms of what the administration is doing, American values. But I just wonder, when you travel around the world or talk to your counterparts, particularly those in, say, Uganda and elsewhere, how do you respond to what they might say, such as, you know, well, your own country’s, you know, no—you know, no garden party. You’ve got book bans and drag-queen story hours being banned and don’t-say-gay laws. And we’re awaiting a Supreme Court decision, possibly tomorrow, definitely by Friday, on whether a cake decorator can say, no, I’m not going to decorate your cake because your same-sex marriage, you know, goes against my beliefs.

How do you deal with that when that is thrown back in your face from foreign leaders?

SAMANTHA POWER: You know, we have a policy that Jay has helped shepherd through USAID which will be the first-of-its-kind LGBTQIA+ policy that’ll be out soon. And one of its many, I think, important features is it speaks of the importance of going forth in a spirit of humility and ally-ship. And I’ve already spoken, I think, a little bit about the ally-ship point.

But in general—you know, you didn’t mention the insurrection. You know, like—

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Well, I mean, it wasn’t—

SAMANTHA POWER: There’s plenty—there’s—

JONATHAN CAPEHART: It wasn’t an LGBTQIA+ insurrection. So I figured I’d just leave—

SAMANTHA POWER: No, that’s a good point.

JONATHAN CAPEHART:—leave that out. But go on.

SAMANTHA POWER: No, but what I mean is in general we are standing up for democracy and human rights as we are facing domestically very, very significant challenges. And I’ve broadened the aperture a little bit from your question, though your question is very valid, you know, as focused on our discussion, our topic for today.

But I don’t even think we can think about LGBTQIA+ rights outside of the broader context of the anti-democratic movements that exist all over the world, including—you know, which include not recognizing results of elections, including resorting to violence, including, you know, some cases partnering with, you know, outside repressive actors who would seek to widen divisions within democracies.

So, you know, the statistics, it’s—you know, I think it’s sixteen years of freedom in decline around the world. And what we see is attacks on minorities generally—sometimes religious minorities; sometimes LGBTQI+ communities—are often the canary in the coal mine about a broader set of measures and a broader kind of consolidation of power away from the people and in the center. And certainly, a diminishment of checks and balances. I think that’s the abiding feature. And minority rights and the rights of marginalized communities fundamentally are checks on majoritarianism in our country and globally.

So, you know, I think if you go—and I’m not saying that we don’t have, you know, as you put it, kind of thrown back at us things that are happening in this country. But I think really since President Obama, and very much carried through with President Biden, we tend to kind of preempt that moment by situating the dialogue about [LGBTQI+] rights in our own struggles, and not leaving the elephant in the room, you know, over here. But to say, look, we’re—this is—we’re in the midst of, you know, many of these same challenges. There are forces in our countries—in our country that would also wish to go back to what is remembered as a simpler time.

And, you know, often I think that actually sets the stage for a more productive conversation, because it’s not a finger-wagging—you know, you may condemn something that has happened and use the leverage of the United States to demand, you know, a repeal. But it is not from a glass house that we are having conversations like this. And I was just in Africa, and I’ll be traveling again. I mean, the dialogue that we have is a humble dialogue. But it is one that has a North Star that I think can animate us both and that is rooted, fundamentally, not only in American values, at their core, but in international instruments and in universal values.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: And so we’re going to open it up to questions. There is a microphone, oh, I thought it was on a stand. It’s an actual person. Thank you. Thank you very much. We’re going to go until about—if I can find my thing—until about quarter to four. So the microphone is there. Short questions, so we can get more answers in. Go ahead.

Q: Hi, Administrator Power. My name is Ryan Arick. I’m an assistant director here at the Atlantic Council. I’m really thrilled to have you here today.

I wanted to ask a question related to US development assistance to Ukraine, and specifically how we’re looking at the LGBTQI+ angle as far as our assistance during the ongoing war. I would appreciate your thoughts. Thank you.

SAMANTHA POWER: You want to go one by one, or?

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Yeah.

SAMANTHA POWER: OK.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Quickly.

SAMANTHA POWER: OK. So in brief, one of the things you’ll see, again, in the forthcoming policy, is a broad emphasis on thinking within USAID and within our humanitarian emergency programing about inclusion and about proactive outreach and services. I think there’s been—we’ve always, of course, been for an inclusive process to find and to serve beneficiaries. But to think—you know, to think that all beneficiaries will come forward equally in all communities is not accurate. And so, you know, how this plays out in any specific crisis area, you know, that’s going to be fundamentally up to our engagement with our implementing partners, like the World Food Program, like the ICRC and others. But there is a broad embrace of inclusive response and a broad recognition that gravity alone is not going to get you there.

Again, we’re quite far along in Ukraine because I think the government has every incentive—you know, not saying that there isn’t discrimination that occurs in Ukraine, or that some of those fears don’t still exist. But there are a lot of incentives pulling policy and enforcement in a constructive direction, given the European journey that they are very committed to. But imagine, you know, in other parts of the world where there isn’t that, you know, legal framework or that political will at high levels and so that’s why crisis is going to be very important.

The other thing I’d say is, of course, just continuing our HIV/AIDS work full speed ahead, any work we do in human rights, thinking—so, again, there’s the dedicated LGBTQI+ work and then there’s making sure that all of our programming in these other areas is inclusive of that.

So just—and, finally, just we’ve done a lot with hotlines. There’s so much trauma, so much need for psychosocial service and care. We work very closely with Mrs. Zelensky as well, who has really pushed mental health and so forth. So you will see both in our development programming and in our emergency humanitarian programming, provided the resources are there, which we have to work with Congress to continue to mobilize, but a very significant allocation as well to recognizing the trauma and then the unique traumas that may apply to different communities, including this one.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. We’ve got six questions, ten minutes. So what I want to really try to do is two questions at a time. And, Madam Administrator, if you could—a little more brief—to the first two, ask the questions and then we’ll have the administrator answer. Quick questions.

Q: Hi, Administrator Power. My name is Katie. I’m a graduate student at Johns Hopkins SAIS right in Dupont Circle.

And my question for you kind of revolves around the other countries we haven’t talked about. We’ve talked a lot about Ukraine, Uganda. But what should the USAID and other people in the United States what other countries should we focus on for human rights violations, especially in the community?

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. Great.

I’m going to get one more.

Q: Hi, Administrator. My name is Divya. I’m an undergraduate at Stanford University and I’m currently an intern at the Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency.

My question for you is how and if you have handled and talked about tech governance in regards to LGBTQI+ rights and misinformation, perhaps, regarding HIV/AIDS, vaccines, and more.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. Two simple questions—in nine minutes. I’m going to—I’m keeping us on time.

SAMANTHA POWER: So on the first question, I would say that there is a spate now of laws, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa but not only, that are at various stages of legislative movement. Let’s put it that way.

Now, what focus entails, again, you know, I think filtering it through what do our partners on the ground think would be most advantageous for any particular individual or entity or institution to do, as we’ve discussed, it’s—you know, figuring that out is no easy proposition. But I think the New York Times recently did a study that did a lay down of how many country—what stage of passage, you know, these laws were.

I mean, it’s kind of—it’s kicked up what’s happened in Uganda and even our response to it has kicked up, you know, more vocal leadership to push through further exacerbating criminalization measures as, by the way, have really important positive decisions that have been made in Africa.

That, in turn, has generated a backlash and we’ve seen something very similar here, of course, over many, many decades where anti-discrimination ordinances, for example, in Florida—you know, I mean, decades ago—then kicked off major—you know, very, very pronounced counter reactions, massive fundraising, et cetera. That’s happening, too, where for a step forward it then, you know, ignites, you know, certain forces and antibodies and then you see, you know, proactive moves that really can set back those rights.

So, again, the tactics I think we’d have to be very, very case specific. But, you know, where I would—especially for those of you who are in civil society or not in the government per se, the actual support for the organizations. And you’ll have the chance, as well, in this country—those of you who are active in the LGBTQI+ community—through the Welcome Corps at the State Department—this is—I’m sorry I’m going on, but this is a very exciting development that we will actually have the chance—in addition to processing people who are being persecuted on the grounds of their sexual orientation or gender identity, we will have the chance as community members to welcome these individuals. Now, that infrastructure is being built and it’s not, you know—you know, yet where there’s a number for you to call, but all of us will have a—well, there’s a number to call for Welcome Corps, but I’m saying very specifically—

SAMANTHA POWER: For—from this—OK. I was told that we were—we were still some weeks away from that. Well, what is the number that people should call, then, if they want—

AUDIENCE MEMBER: There’s a link on—

SAMANTHA POWER: What is the link?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: RainbowRailroad.org.

SAMANTHA POWER: OK. That’s the State Department program?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: No.

SAMANTHA POWER: No, no, no, OK. So I’m—sorry, I was talking—

AUDIENCE MEMBER:—to Welcome Corps.

SAMANTHA POWER: OK, great. OK. So RainbowRailroad.org will refer you. I think the State Department piece we are still moving out to make sure that these partnerships can be ignited in rapid fire.

And then the second question, Jonathan, was?

JONATHAN CAPEHART: I wrote in my notes tech governance.

SAMANTHA POWER: Tech governance.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Yes.

SAMANTHA POWER: Yes is the short answer. I’ve engaged them—

JONATHAN CAPEHART: We have—we have five minutes and five questions to go.

SAMANTHA POWER: Yes. I have—I have engaged them on disinformation generally, and this is a very important subcomponent. Discrimination isn’t new. Persecution isn’t new. The amount of disinformation, including deepfakes showing President Biden vilifying LGBTQI+—I mean, you know, these things are really exacerbating an already very challenging situation.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. And so we have one, two, three, four, five questions, five minutes. Lord Jesus. All right.

Here’s what I want to do. I want you each to ask your very brief question so your question at least gets articulated, and then Administrator Power will answer. Real quickly.

SAMANTHA POWER: All five.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: All five. All five. Because now we have four minutes.

Q: Thank you very much.

Very quickly, what would you say to other countries that stand on principle of noninterference, we don’t get to tell other governments how to treat their people? Very briefly. Thank you.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. Thank you.

Q: Yes. My name is Bishop Joseph Tolton.

Domestically in our country, White supremacy one can argue is cradled by the far religious right in our country. These actors are also responsible for the racialization of homophobia across Africa. Are there whole-of-government conversations about how to hold these actors accountable for their racialized efforts?

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Great question.

Q: Hi. David Stacy, Human Rights Campaign.

As you know, nondiscrimination is a touchstone of equality, and the administration right now is reviewing the requirements for grantees and cooperative agreements and across the foreign assistance agencies. Can you speak to the need to do that and USAID’s role in helping the other agencies do something where we’re applying it across the board with all of the agencies on an equal basis?

Q: Hi. Mark Bromley with Council for Global Equality.

You spoke about the value of both dedicated LGBTQI+ funding and integrated funding, and we’re excited that that fifteen million is increased to twenty-five million this year. But on the integration point, how are you thinking about measuring integration for LGBTQI+ persons, particularly in places where, you know, being [LGBTQI+] may be criminalized, it’s difficult/dangerous to measure? How do we make sure that’s more than lip service and that that integration is really happening? Because that is where the true value lies.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: OK. Last question.

Q: Hi there. My name is Bryce Dawson from Counterpart International.

You mentioned the difficulties of minimizing intrusion and tactically advocating for LGBTQI+ rights in other nations, as well as mentioned potential procurement policies to ensure [LGBTQI+] protections. Do you have any in the pipeline that you’re working on or anything in the future?

JONATHAN CAPEHART: I want to thank everyone for their—for their questions, all five of you or seven altogether. Madam Administrator, you have two minutes.

SAMANTHA POWER: Thirty seconds.

Well, you know, I think that in general we—in our engagements on human rights issues, we hear a lot about noninterference. I mean, there’s no question. I heard about it a lot at the UN. We hear it often from, you know, countries like the Russian Federation that have invaded another country and tried to take over the other country. We hear it from countries that are providing surveillance technology, you know, to other countries, or fueling disinformation in the countries in which we are working.

So, you know, it is a shield. It is an important one to take seriously, because we also, of course, respect sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and so forth. So USAID is active across sectors and involved in these countries. And this agenda, I think, is—and, by that, it’s the human rights agenda more broadly—is central to how we believe as well that we will get the most out of the programs that we are doing across sectors.

And that brings me—and that’s the kind of conversation we have. Is, like, I was using Uganda as an example about making sure that we are also making the pragmatic case for people who are very skeptical because, again, they—there is a kind of seamlessness to the way our work across governance and human rights in citizen security and in the broad sweep of development sectors—from agriculture, to education, to health, et cetera—they do come together in service of development objectives. And that’s what the SDG’s also enshrine.

And then I’m not going to be able to do justice to the other questions in full, beyond I think the point about measuring integration is very important. You know, for those who are not making their identity known to us, that’s not going to be something that, you know, we will be able to measure in that sense. But I think these are the kinds of things that we are working through, through this policy, to make sure that this isn’t just, yes, here’s our standalone programming, and then by everything else we do, you know, operates in the way that we’ve always done it.

And so it’s not going to be, you know, instant, where everything is happening all at once. But all of our missions have to have inclusive development advisors or somebody—and this will be evident out of the policy—but somebody who is a focal point for working on LGBTQI+ rights and programming. So we’re hopeful that that, plus our new office of chief economist, will help us develop a kind of methodology that will be responsive to this concern that somehow it’s going to be invisible and not done, which is certainly our objective is for it to be done and, when appropriate, visible. And certainly, at least visible to us so we know whether we’re achieving what we’re setting out to achieve.

And then, lastly, I would just say, because it’s coming, the point about nondiscrimination among beneficiaries is just really important. And that guidance will be forthcoming, we hope, soon.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: Do you have any thoughts on the other question about—I wrote it down real fast, but I know I got it wrong—about the racialized religious efforts on LGBTQI+ rights that have been happening?

SAMANTHA POWER: Well, I guess all I would say on that—because there are others in our government, I think, who are working on the kind of conversation that was asked about—is just this is another part of the response to the noninterference charge, is—that we do hear from people who don’t want to be engaged on human rights issues. And that is that there are a lot of actors from outside who are very active actually in pushing certain forms of legislation that would have these discriminatory, and these exclusionary, and these dangerous effects. And so, again, the noninterference claim is usually made in a selective way.

JONATHAN CAPEHART: And with that, and just two minutes overtime, Samantha Power, nineteenth administrator of USAID. Thank you very, very much for being here.

SAMANTHA POWER: Thank you.

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Wagner drama drags Belarus deeper into Russia’s wartime turbulence

Hanna Liubakova — Wed, 28 Jun 2023 22:06:15 +0000

Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka appears eager to take full credit for his role in countering Russia’s short-lived but hugely significant recent Wagner rebellion. Speaking on June 27 just days after the uprising came to an abrupt end, Lukashenka provided a detailed and highly flattering account of negotiations with Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin that contrasted his own strong leadership with Russian ruler Vladimir Putin’s apparent indecisiveness.

This was a bold move by Lukashenka, who has been heavily dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival ever since Russia intervened to prop up his regime during a wave of Belarusian pro-democracy protests in the second half of 2020. Clearly, Lukashenka feels emboldened by Putin’s apparent weakness and sees the Wagner affair as an opportunity to burnish his own credentials as both a wise ruler and a skilled negotiator.

Lukashenka’s version of events is certainly convenient but may not be entirely accurate. In reality, he is more likely to have served as a messenger for Putin. The Russian dictator had good reason to avoid any direct talks with rebel leader Prigozhin, who he had publicly branded as a traitor. It is also probably no coincidence that Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rather than Lukashenka announced news of Prigozhin’s subsequent departure for Belarus. This has reinforced perceptions of Belarus as a vassal state of Russia that serves as a place of exile for disgraced members of the Kremlin elite. Indeed, Putin himself went even further and offered thousands of Wagner troops who participated in the rebellion the choice of relocating to Belarus if they wish.

It is not yet clear whether significant numbers of Wagner fighters will accept Putin’s invitation and move to Belarus. For now, Lukashenka claims to have offered Wagner the use of an abandoned military base. He has hinted that Wagner troops may serve in a training capacity for his own military, praising their performance in Ukraine and hailing them as “the most prepared unit in the Russian army.”

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Many ordinary Belarusians do not share Lukashenka’s enthusiasm and worry that the potential arrival of Wagner fighters will drag Belarus further into the turmoil engulfing Putin’s Russia. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, research has consistently found that the overwhelming majority of Belarusians oppose any involvement in the war. Belarusian railway workers and other activists have sabotaged the movement of Russian troops and military equipment across the country, while Belarusian military volunteers have joined the fight against Russia inside Ukraine.

News that Belarus may now serve as a place of exile for large numbers of Wagner fighters is certain to deepen existing concerns over the country’s role as a junior partner in Russia’s faltering invasion of Ukraine. Lukashenka granted Putin permission to use Belarus as a springboard for an attempt to seize Kyiv during the initial stages of the war in early 2022. He continues to supply Russia with military equipment and ammunition, while also allowing Russian troops to train at Belarusian bases. Most recently, Belarus has reportedly begun the process of receiving Russian nuclear weapons.

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The delivery of Russian nukes and the proposal to host Wagner forces underscore the significance of Belarus in Putin’s regional strategy. The continued presence of Lukashenka in Minsk gives Moscow options in its confrontation with the West and enables the Kremlin to enhance its influence in the wider region. This appears to suit Lukashenka, who knows the Kremlin is unlikely to abandon him as long as he remains indispensable to the Russian war effort.

The outlook for Belarus as a whole is less promising. If large numbers of Wagner troops begin arriving in the country, this will dramatically increase Russia’s overall military presence and spark renewed speculation over a possible fresh Russian offensive from Belarusian territory to capture the Ukrainian capital. This would force Ukraine to strengthen its defenses along the country’s northern border and could potentially make Belarus a target.

The stationing of Wagner units in Belarus would also cause alarm bells to ring in nearby European Union and NATO member states such as Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Many of these countries have already taken steps to increase border security with Belarus. The arrival of Russia’s most effective and battle-hardened military units in the country would likely lead to a new iron curtain and the further isolation of the Belarusian population from their European neighbors.

In all likelihood, Lukashenka probably had very little say in the decision to use Belarus as a place of exile for mutinous Wagner forces. At the same time, he may view these troops as a means of protecting himself against any form of domestic opposition. Lukashenka remains vulnerable to the kind of widespread anti-regime protests that swept the country in 2020, and is well aware that his decision to involve Belarus in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is deeply unpopular. Having thousands of Wagner fighters on hand might be the perfect insurance against an uprising aiming to topple his regime.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. She tweets @HannaLiubakova.

Wagner forces in these areas have many incentives to be uncooperative. Those in the Middle East and Africa might be especially resistant in order to protect the income they generate from “protecting” governments and warlords. Wagner mercenaries in both the Middle East and Africa also fear redeployment to Ukraine, where, in May, Prigozhin claimed that twenty thousand Wagner fighters died in the 2023 battle over Bakhmut alone.

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Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad might be sympathetic to any effort by Russian President Putin to assert control over the Wagner forces stationed in his country. Centralized dictatorial control is, after all, a principle he seeks to apply in his own country. Assad, though, will not want to see a conflict between regular Russian armed forces and Wagner forces, as this could encourage Assad’s many opponents to revive their opposition to his regime. Perhaps he will try to imitate Belarusian leader Aleksandr Lukashenko by attempting to mediate between rival Russian forces.

By contrast, General Khalifa Haftar in Libya and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo—also known as Hemedti—in Sudan are much more reliant on support from Wagner. In April, CNN revealed that Wagner has been arming Hemedti’s Rapid Support Forces in its war against Sudan’s military leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, with whom Moscow maintains good relations, through Haftar-controlled territory in neighboring Libya. Anything that weakens or diminishes Wagner’s ability to support Haftar and Hemedti would be most unwelcome, especially since they have no assurance that the Russian MOD will pick up where Wagner forces left off. Of course, since the Wagner Group may not be dependent on financing from Moscow in many places—due to local sources of income, such as some degree of control over natural resources—Wagner-protected governments or opposition leaders controlling parts of countries may be able to continue collaborating with local Wagner bosses without involving a Moscow that is distracted by issues closer to home.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that the recent Wagner crisis affects not just those Middle Eastern countries with a Wagner presence, but all Middle Eastern countries cooperating with Russia—which is basically all Middle Eastern governments. To begin with, the rebellion of security forces whom Putin had strongly relied upon is not something that the Middle East’s many authoritarian leaders want to see repeated in their own countries. Additionally, for all those Middle Eastern governments that came to see Russia as an effective security partner—partly based on Russia’s successful intervention in Syria compared to America’s unsuccessful ones in Iraq and Afghanistan—the Wagner rebellion raises questions about Putin’s capability to act outside of Russia, as internal matters are necessarily his immediate focus.

For some, of course, this might offer opportunities. Turkey, for example, might take this as a chance to exercise greater freedom in places where Russia and Turkey have backed opposing sides (e.g. Syria, Libya, and the Armenia–Azerbaijan territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh).

Iran might see the possibility of declining Russian focus on Syria as more than just an opportunity to increase its activity in Syria. Tehran may even regard it as necessary to do so out of fear that the Assad regime might start to unravel otherwise. Increased Iranian activity there would heighten Israel’s already strong concerns about Iranian activity in Syria and could lead to a clash between them.

Elsewhere, Putin’s focus on internal affairs and the war in Ukraine may accelerate the trend among Middle Eastern governments—including those in the oil-rich Gulf—of viewing China, and not Russia, as a counterbalance to the United States.

Perhaps more than anything else, the Wagner rebellion will force Middle Eastern governments to lower their expectations about what Putin’s Russia can do for them, and adjust their foreign policies accordingly.

Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

The post The Wagner rebellion is over—for now. But how will the events reverberate in the Middle East and North Africa? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

An expert briefing on the Wagner mutiny and what’s next for Russia and Ukraine

Atlantic Council — Tue, 27 Jun 2023 21:12:44 +0000

On Monday, the Atlantic Council organized a briefing for its global leadership on Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s Wagner Group rebellion, its potential consequences around the world, and how the drama could unfold next. Top experts and former officials helped make sense of the stunning events—and what they mean for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s hold on power, Russia’s relations with other countries, and its war against Ukraine. Below, edited and condensed for length and clarity, is the conversation, moderated by Frederick Kempe, president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. Watch the full briefing here.

Speakers

Stephen Hadley, Chairman, International Advisory Board, Atlantic Council; Former US National Security Advisor

Ambassador John Herbst, Senior Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council; Former US Ambassador to Ukraine

President Kersti Kaljulaid, Member, International Advisory Board, Atlantic Council; Former President of Estonia

Angela Stent, Senior Advisor at the Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies, Georgetown University

General Wesley K. Clark (Ret.), Member, Board of Directors, Atlantic Council; Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe

General Curtis Scaparrotti (Ret.), Member, Board of Directors, Atlantic Council; Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe

FREDERICK KEMPE: Stephen Hadley, how have you been working this weekend’s events through your head? And if were you briefing the president of the United States right now, how might you do that?

STEPHEN HADLEY: This is a work in progress, a lot of uncertainty. We’re through act one. We don’t know whether this is a one-act play or a five-act play. We don’t really know the terms of this settlement that has been worked out with Wagner Group leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s blessing. We don’t know whether it will be complied with. But even if it turns out to be act one of a one-act play, this has been an earthquake within the Russian political system and it’s going to take a while for its effects to be clear as—over time as it plays out over time.

So in light of that, one of the things the president would say would be: Well, what are our objectives here? And I think our objectives in this situation are twofold.

One, to continue to try to get Russian forces out of Ukraine and to assure that Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and viability as a secure and prosperous state is maintained.

And the second objective, I think, is we do not want to encourage a Russian civil war. The consequences of that for regional instability, for refugee flows into our allies, from questions about who controls the nuclear weapons, these are troubling questions that we’d like to avoid.

So those would be the objectives.

Second question is: Well, what do you say about this publicly? Because the administration is going to have to talk about it publicly. And I think the statements made over the weekend are pretty close to right—watching the situation, internal matter to be resolved among the Russians themselves. But I think we should emphasize that it’s further evidence that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine was a strategic mistake for Russia, that Russian troops should leave Ukraine—whether they are withdrawn or whether it’s 1917 style, they put down their arms and they decide to walk home—and because Russia clearly has to attend to a lot of internal affairs. That’s clear from what we’ve seen over the week.

The president would ask about what to watch for going forward. Well, Putin has clearly been weakened by this. Prigozhin’s forces got within something like 150 miles of Moscow. They received tacit support, I would have to say, or at least not active opposition from the Russian security forces. That’s a problem for Putin internally, and I would expect you’re going to see some purges of his security services and further crackdown internally. His problem is whether he can pull it off. It’s a little bit like kids playing with mud pies. Sometimes, you know, the tighter you squeeze, the more mud squeezes out between your fingers. We’ll have to see how Putin does.

I think the other thing for Putin is he’s going to have to try to frustrate the Ukrainian counteroffensive, because the more Ukrainians are able to take back territory from Russian forces the more Putin looks weak and the more the Ukrainian war looks like, as Prigozhin has been saying, a strategic mistake for Russia.

There’s a question about Prigozhin. He’s got to stay alive. He’s been called traitor by Putin. People who are called traitors by Putin don’t usually have a very long life expectancy. He’s got to decide whether this is over or whether this is act one of his effort to confront the minister of defense, Sergei Shoigu, and General Valery Gerasimov, chief the Russian General Staff, and whether he wants to continue this campaign or not, and if so how he would do it.

There’s a question about the future of the Wagner Group. They’re supposed to be either demobilized or brought within the Russian Ministry of Defense. Will they do that? Will they continue to be a force? If not in Ukraine, what about their continued presence in Africa? A lot of uncertainties there.

Questions for Ukraine: This is potentially an opportunity for them to more effectively push their counteroffensive, because if you are already demoralized Russian troops on the frontline with Ukraine and you look at what’s going on at home, it may make you even less willing to fight. That may be an opportunity for Ukraine.

Questions for China: Xi Jinping cannot afford for Putin to go down, and China and Xi may decide that the best way to save Putin is to put pressure on him to bring this war to a close, which has to involve withdrawal of Russian troops. Question of how this affects China.

And finally, I would expect the administration to be going around with friends and allies, but particularly with fence-sitters around the world—South Africa, Brazil, India—saying: Do you really want to be neutral and be perceived as supporting someone who is as weak as Putin? This was a bad bet. Now it’s time for you to change your bet.

Seems to me those are the things that the president would want to be watching to understand where this is heading over the longer term.

Watch Stephen Hadley’s brief for the president

FREDERICK KEMPE: The way it’s been described to me by one really interesting analyst is that there were four sorts of power centers. One of them was the FSB, special ops, all the troops around there, including the presidential guard, which is a very terrific bunch of troops around Putin that he can rely on. The second power is the military, the Defense Ministry. The third is the Wagner Group. And the fourth is the Chechens.

What we do know is if these are the power pillars, that they’ve been shaken; that whatever stability there was, however fragile it was, it’s shaken. So how unstable does the situation remain? And then what role does the president of the United States with his allies play in this kind of situation?

STEPHEN HADLEY: Unknown. So why did Putin do this deal six or eight hours after he called Prigozhin a traitor and promised the most draconian kinds of punishment? I think there are probably three reasons.

One, the progress Prigozhin made moving towards Moscow and the fact that it was really fairly unobstructed… if you look at the preparations that were going on in Moscow, they took this push very seriously. I think that was one reason.

Secondly, I think Putin realized that the longer this went on, the more likely Prigozhin’s narrative that the Ukraine war was a mistake—that Ukraine did not threaten Russia, and the brotherly relations between Ukrainians and Russians could have been restored without force—might catch on within Russia.

And third, I think Putin had to worry about schisms and breaches within the security services themself.

Putin has been balancing these various groups you talked about for a long time and fairly effectively. He either didn’t see this one coming or didn’t step in soon enough. Where this goes depends a little bit on whether Putin regains his footing, is able to do a crackdown and a purge for those that were disloyal, and is able to restore the sort of balancing act that he was doing before. So in some sense, his future is in some measure in his own hands.

In terms of the US role, I think it’s very difficult to know what’s going on, and I think our effort to try to affect what’s going on from the outside just would justify all kinds of anti-Western, anti-US narratives that Putin has based his rhetorical strategy on. So my guess is the administration would and should stay out of this matter.

This is the opportunity to accelerate help to Ukraine. This is the opportunity for the Ukrainians to exploit what looks like chaos in Russia and maybe a degraded morale among Russian troops to try to effectively retake Ukrainian territory from Russian forces if they can.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So I’m going to turn next to views on what is going on inside Russia. President Kaljulaid, how have you been looking at this over the weekend and in general?

PRESIDENT KERSTI KALJULAID: The Estonian people have been extremely happy to be watching this time from the front row rather than being on the scene, like thirty years ago. But I also have to say that many people, interestingly—even if it is the only happy-end military coup in the last century, the one which we witnessed 1991—are drawing parallels. And many were actually hoping that this would be the end, and people are quite disappointed that it wasn’t. But of course, well, you don’t get the fairytale military coup every thirty years in Russia.

What is very clear from here is that Putin is now weak and he’s much more perceived to be weak by people inside Russia. And if we were concentrating only on Putin and what he might do, then I think we are overlooking the fact that he’s not alone. There is a regime, what Putin actually is presenting and is representing. But that means this regime is now fully aware that Putin cannot project power and might inside the country, and this is becoming critical. And that is why I think that his days at the helm of Russia are also relatively numbered.

But do not be fooled; we might be seeing somebody else there, but it will still be the same regime, which knows very well that Putin has no way out, but Russia and the regime has a way out. And the way out, the logical way out, is that Putin is somehow replaced. Things might happen. I mean, things might naturally happen. And they might want, then, of course, to end the war in Ukraine, but also for us to believe that this is now the new Russia, and therefore start a new cycle, and therefore start to rebuild Russian military forces having learned from the catastrophe in Ukraine and continue with their imperialistic ambition. This, for me, is the real danger scenario from Russia now.

I’m less worried about Russia turning into a tribal kind of war terrain of domestic war because, frankly speaking, outside of Prigozhin and Wagner, there don’t seem to be contenders who would be able to amass such a force and march on Moscow. So if Prigozhin truly is out of the picture—and he might well be out of the picture, alive or soon dead; I do also think that his life expectancy is not long—there simply doesn’t seem to be anybody else who would be able to stage this kind of coup.

But regime change will not happen, but presenting us a new face might very well happen. And then it is not—it’s very important that we are not fooled.

Concerning Ukraine: There is nothing better than, I mean, continuing our effort and intensifying out effort indeed so that Ukraine is able to take this opportunity, that Russia military command is a little bit at least confused. Keep also in mind it was said before that Russian military might be actually demotivated by the events. I don’t think so. I think that the normal Russian soldier has no access to social media or media online. They’re not on phones—well, very few are—and even if they were they would not be drawing too many conclusions. So my understanding is that we need to continue and help Ukraine to win this war, because the sooner Russia realizes that it really and truly has lost this war the regime will try to wriggle out. And then it is for us to be vigilant, to not accept that this is now the new and democratic Russia until we really and truly see changes in Russia—and real changes, not what we saw in 1991, accepting for a change which in reality which was not change.

Our view from here: Continue towards Vilnius strongly. Continue after Vilnius strongly. Make sure Ukraine wins. Make sure Russians all understand that they are losing. And then not to be fooled by what comes next. And also, not to be too afraid of what comes next.

Russia is not going to turn into a kind of a tribal competition ground. There will be someone who will replace Putin as we know him in a relatively orderly way and represent the old regime in a new way.

That seems to be what we here in the front row are thinking collectively.

FREDERICK KEMPE: As you were watching this on Saturday, what did you think was going to be the best outcome for Estonia? And where do you think you are right now?

PRESIDENT KERSTI KALJULAID: I am afraid it might be the best outcome that, I mean, Russian people are starting to realize Putin is weak, but they were given a time period to decide what to do about it. Because, indeed, if things had unraveled very quickly like they did in 1991, we would be looking at somebody taking power in Russia today—not Prigozhin, I think he was only able to create disturbances—but somebody else would have stepped into the void and taken responsibility, then we would be already in the position which I am personally and many Estonians are most fearing. And this, our fear, is that everybody in the West again believes this is the new Russia, but it would not have been. It would have been the same Russia with a new face in front of it.

So right now, the current outcome, that we all know Putin is weak and we can prepare ourselves, is much better. So we also stepped up our border controls and everything, but I think we need to stay the course and focus more on what we can do in Ukraine and how we can help Ukraine to benefit from this situation. But I mean, nothing massively changed.

FREDERICK KEMPE: NATO membership for Ukraine in July? Would you move that fast? Maybe not give it there, but the road map? Should this change anything at the Vilnius summit in July?

PRESIDENT KERSTI KALJULAID: Precisely not. I mean, this is what we have been saying from this corner of the world: Let’s do what is right, and let’s stop guessing what is going on and what will happen thereafter in Russia and with Russia. Let’s do what is right. And we have heard hopeful noises also, for example, from France on this subject a few days ago, before even this occasion. Nothing has changed in this sense.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So, Angela Stent, you’ve been following this leader of Russia for a long time. Love to hear your situation report, what you think is going on. Is this just the beginning of a Game of Thrones that we’re going to see? Is this the beginning of the end of Putin? What is your take on all this?

ANGELA STENT: When I look at just what happened on Saturday, I think of the title of Peter Pomerantsev’s book, Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible. So what we saw happening doesn’t compute for me because you had Prigozhin starting off in the last week telling the Russian people that the war was unnecessary, that Ukraine didn’t threaten them, and the reason why Russia went to war with Ukraine is because Russian oligarchs wanted to get their hands on Ukrainian assets.

Then, you know, what Wagner was facing, obviously, was its dissolution and the Ministry of Defense saying that the Wagner fighters had to join the regular armed forces, so that clearly was not to his liking. His forces have done so much of the fighting in Bakhmut.

Then you see him go to Rostov, and the Wagner troops were really welcomed there, and they were like heroes.

Then you have Putin giving this very angry speech on Saturday morning likening what was happening to 1917, to the beginning of the Russian Civil War, to the intervention by Western powers in Russia at that time, saying that the Wagnerites were traitors and that they had to be brought to justice.

And then you have the march on Moscow. You have Prigozhin stopping within two hundred kilometers. And then you suddenly have this announcement by Dmitry Peskov, the press secretary—not by Putin or any one of his colleagues—that an agreement had been reached and that Prigozhin wasn’t going to be tried, he could go to Belarus, and the same would be true for the Wagner troops. I think there were, in the end, about eight thousand of them who had followed him, who would have gone to Moscow. It doesn’t really make any sense at all.

We haven’t seen any of Putin’s close colleagues publicly support him; radio silence in Moscow. We had a video today of the defense minister, Shoigu, allegedly in Ukraine. I’m not sure that anyone has verified that that was from today and not from sometime last week or sometime a few weeks ago. Clearly, one of the major demands that Prigozhin has made is that both Shoigu and Gerasimov, the chief of the General Staff, should be fired. As far as we know, they haven’t been fired.

So one has to wonder what it was that Prigozhin got for agreeing to stand down and not going to Moscow. One suspects that he was maybe waiting for more indications of support in Moscow. We don’t know if he had a plan about what he would have done had he gone to Moscow. And we do know that Wagner has been very closely related to the GRU, the military intelligence, but there are now people also saying that the FSB was somehow also involved to some extent supporting him. There’s so much that we don’t know.

But I think what we can say is that Putin certainly does look weaker than he did before that. And the fact that the message that Prigozhin has sent has clearly fallen on fertile ground among some of the Russians, even though the public opinion polls show—if you believe them—that a majority of the people still support this war. I think there are certainly more questions. And because we haven’t seen anything from any of his colleagues in supporting him, we have really no clue about what’s going on there.

But I certainly agree that the war in Ukraine will go on. I’m not sure that this necessarily benefits the Ukrainians at this point. I’m going to be very interested to hear what our other colleagues have to say about that. But clearly, the West should continue supporting Ukraine, and we’ll wait and see if there’s any change.

I think most of us believed before this happened that Putin believed that he could wait the West out; that our unity would weaken; and that if he waits to the end of the year, the beginning of next year—and who knows what’s going to happen in the US elections—that that would be to his advantage. I’m not really sure whether he can really believe that anymore. I think there should be a big question mark.

However, I think if this is the beginning of the unraveling of his regime, it’s probably not going to happen quickly. Having said that, of course, anyone who studies Russia knows that you can be surprised. It may be a slower process, but one just does have to assume that this erodes some of the support that he has. But he still has his own national guard, the Rosgvardiya. He’s got three hundred thousand troops that are allegedly loyal to him. So it’s not as if he’s left without any support.

FREDERICK KEMPE: John Herbst, can you give us what your situation report is right now? On the one hand, Putin looks weak. The troops have to question whether they want to die right now for this leader and this country in a time where they’ve just seen what happened over the weekend. On the other hand, you have Prigozhin in Belarus, and there were some rumors that maybe he could open up a new front in Belarus, which would be a great problem for Ukraine. But does Putin really embrace a person he’s called a traitor opening up a new front?

JOHN HERBST: I would underscore that this is certainly a sign of, a) Putin’s weakness; and, b) fissures in the Putin regime—things that have been evident, albeit much less clear to people who don’t follow it closely, since last October, when the extent of the success of Ukraine’s 2022 counteroffensive became clear and Prigozhin began, with some help from Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, going after Gerasimov and Shoigu. But Prigozhin became increasingly louder, and already about two-and-a-half months ago he gave a peculiar speech in which he foreshadowed his clear criticism of the war in Ukraine and the unjustifiable pretext for that war. So this has all been building, again, since last fall.

We don’t know what the senior power players in Moscow have been doing and thinking. We do know, however, that this is truly Putin’s war, and very few people—including among his siloviki, closest pals—wanted this big invasion. And everyone understands that Russia’s paid a large price for this, as has Putin’s regime. The interesting thing about Prigozhin is saying this publicly, with at this point no pushback.

One more small indicator of perhaps the continuing weakening of the Putin regime: There is a member of the Duma, a think tanker as well, Sergei Markov, who’s a very reliable indicator of people who are close to Putin, or rather want to be close to Putin, and are trying to position themselves for the future. He’s had several Telegram posts this morning essentially saying that Russian spinmeisters are putting out the following instructions for explaining what happened, such as: It’s all over. This demonstrates the stability and the wisdom of the Putin regime. The fact that he’s putting that out suggests he’s trying to hedge. He doesn’t think that the regime is doing that well, and I think that’s true.

Now, what’s going on in Ukraine and the war? At an absolute minimum, this is a plus for the Ukrainians because the already demoralized Russian soldiers have one more reason to be demoralized. Also—and this actually predates the coup attempt—Wagner has essentially pulled out of the fight after it “took Bakhmut” several weeks ago. And Wagner, whatever its liabilities, remains the most potent force fighting on the field in Ukraine. So them being at least partly out of the fight is important. If now they are going to meekly go into the Ministry of Defense, become part of the regular Russian military, and they will be notably less effective. They’re not going to strengthen the already demoralized troops; they will just be a part of the morass. So this is another plus for Ukraine.

As for what we should do, I mean, my views have not been hidden. I think we should be stronger than we’ve been for the last several years. That predates Joe Biden’s presidency, though it includes Biden. And I think that we should be sending the weapons Ukraine needs to ensure that they can break the land bridge in the next six months. So far, the administration’s not willing to go there. Maybe this will help them move in that direction.

We should also be planning for a much more robust Vilnius NATO summit than Washington seems to be interested in, although the White House has been embarrassed by being behind most of the allies now, including the French, regarding NATO and Ukraine. And they are trying to come up with something, and hopefully they’ll come up with more than they were planning a few weeks ago.

One major part of the debate on our policy towards Ukraine and Russia has been what I consider to be the well-played by the Kremlin-Putin nuclear bluff. The Russians have spent twenty years building the elaborate metaphor of Putin as the rat in a corner who would lash out if cornered. But we just saw what the rat in the corner does when he was confronted with a a flying column heading towards Moscow: He headed for the tall grass. This should also inform our understanding of what Putin might do if Ukraine were to take the land bridge. In other words, I don’t think we have to always have to take into account the possibility of, but we should not be intimidated by, his increasingly hollow nuclear threats.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Angela, does jockeying begin now among the fissures in the Putin regime? What do we know and what’s your reading of the silence?

ANGELA STENT: It really is a black box. I mean, I’m not talking about the very inner circle. We certainly know that there are significant numbers of people among the elite who are very dissatisfied with what’s been happening, not the least because they can’t travel to Europe or the US or whatever, they can’t visit their bank accounts in their homes, and they thought that they were part of this globalized elite and now they’re stuck in Russia and sanctioned, many of them. And I think that was very evident even at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum a couple of weeks ago, how different it was from what it used to be before this war began.

Now, having said that, a lot of those people understand that they can’t leave and have been told that, so they’re stuck. But as for Putin’s very inner circle, we really don’t know much about that at all. I mean, that is Nikolai Patrushev, the head of his security council; probably the heads also of the foreign and domestic intelligence services, the SVR and the FSB. And then there are people who are close friends of Putin who don’t have official jobs in the administration like Yuri Kovalchuk, who owns one of the big banks there. And probably Igor Sechin, who is the head of Rosneft. And those are the people he talks to.

There has been some speculation—when people talk about a potential successor to Putin, people go back now to Sergey Kirienko, who was actually prime minister briefly in 1999 and now is an enthusiastic supporter of the war and has a much more public profile. And there are a few younger governors whose names pop up as potential successors. But of course, until now, you know, Putin hasn’t wanted to be a lame duck, and therefore he clearly hasn’t named that. But again, I come back to the fact that none of the people who hold these positions—and including the prime minister, Mikhail Mishustin, who’s been very, very quiet, really, since the war began (who would, by the way, if something happened to Putin, he would actually succeed him for the first few months until there was an election)—have come out and supported him.

So I wouldn’t be able to come up with a name for you, but I would say if there’s an orderly succession then you would still have someone coming to power who shares Putin’s views. If there is some discontinuity, then that could all change. But if there’s an orderly one, it would be a similar regime.

Now, would it continue to prosecute the war in Ukraine? I mean, that’s a huge question. Or it might decide that it wanted to think about ways of getting out and saving face. But we really know very little about all of this just because it’s the people who surround him are mainly from the intelligence services, and they know how to suppress information.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So, General Clark first and General Scaparrotti, let’s do this round. What is your situation report?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, the first thing is to make sure the Russian soldiers know what’s happened so they can be demoralized. One of the things the Russian forces have done is take away the mobile communications from their soldiers when they reach a certain point on the battlefield. So the Ukrainians have been running information operations for some time. They’ve been encouraging Russian soldiers to surrender, threatening them, doing other things. They need to intensify those information operations now, make sure that they take advantage of their situation to exact the most demoralization they can from the Russian forces that they’re facing.

Secondly, got to understand that these Ukrainian forces are facing a huge problem with minefields. Virtually the whole front is mined. They’ve got to find a way through it. That’s slow. It’s painstaking. And we didn’t give them sufficient equipment to do this. In particular, they need more mine-clearing line charges, probably by a factor of ten. The only way you’re going to get through this is to blow your way through it. You can’t have a soldier on his belly with a knife probing for mines and expect you’ll really make a breakthrough on this. And you can’t put your mine-clearing tanks up front in broad daylight, or even at night, and think you can drill a path through this. These are really deep minefields. They can be reinforced with artillery-delivered mines and have been. So this is the significant problem.

The third thing is we need to continue to push equipment to the Ukrainians. In particular, they need 155 artillery systems. Not just the ammunition, the systems. They are in a tough counter-fire fight with Russian artillery. They started the fight outnumbered. They’re now perhaps on par in terms of being able to return shell for shell, but when they take losses, they can’t fix it. If it’s Western, they have to send it out. So they need more tubes. You cannot advance against this kind of a defense without winning the counter-fire battle. They need more air defense that’s available to protect mobile forces. We need to give the ATACMS right away. And we don’t need to announce it. We just need to put it in there. It’s fired from the same launcher, minimal train-up; put a few hundred systems in there and let’s get rid of the Russian reserves and the Russian artillery positions that can be detected.

Are we giving the Ukrainians real time battlefield intelligence? The latest, I believe, is we’re not. But the Brits are, and I guess they’re taking ours. Can we do anything to focus this and get the information down to the individual units that are trying to breach these minefields? If we go back with our imagery records, we know exactly where the defenses are, when they were put in, what was put in there. It doesn’t do any good to have it published in the Financial Times. It has to be down at the tank crewman level, down to sixty-degree coordinates. So if we haven’t done that, we need to do that. So those would be the immediate things on the battlefield.

Where did Prigozhin’s forces go? Now, the newspapers say that we saw this buildup happening. Well, if we saw the buildup happening, surely we’ve got listening devices in there. We can hear who’s talking. We know who they are. What are they saying? We’re not hearing anything from national sources on this. I hope we know where they went. Is Prigozhin really going to Belarus? Is he going to really link up with the nuclear warheads that are there? Is he going to run a coup against leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka? Has this all been a Kabuki dance?

Probably not, but could they make something of it later? Maybe. I’d say the chances are remote on that. I think it’s 90 percent what you see is what there was—a weak chain of command, no real support for Putin, and the Russian military in the field being vulnerable. But if we don’t get that information down to the individual soldier on the Russian side and erode his confidence in his chain of command, then all this talk at high levels about Putin being weak and so forth doesn’t affect the military situation on the ground.

Final point, if I were Ukraine, I would strengthen my observation of what’s going on at the border with Belarus. You just never know.

We’ve got to get Ukraine into NATO. And this looking around for security guarantees that will let us avoid this, it’s like we want to hold back the NATO decision to use it as a bargaining chip with Putin. Surely what we’ve seen here is that Putin is weak. Put it out that Ukraine will join NATO next year. Create some conditions. And if Putin wants to come forward and preemptively surrender rather than have NATO come into Ukraine, good, good. But use the bargaining chip the correct way, not by looking weak but by looking strong, and showing strength to Russia.

FREDERICK KEMPE: I could argue this both ways: that this is a time to really double down in supporting Ukraine because there’s a moment of weakness, but there are some in the administration that would say, no, that could trigger a response, nuclear or otherwise, where out of desperation Putin does something really truly crazy. What is your situation analysis?

GENERAL CURTIS SCAPARROTTI: I’ve been one that believed that our administration has been too timid. I respect the leadership within NATO, and what we have done for Ukraine, and that we’ve been focused on that. But I think we’ve been too cautious in what we’ve provided Ukraine and when we provided it—i.e., doing it in somewhat of an incremental way.

So because of that, I think this is a real opportunity. And now is the time to make sure the Ukrainians have what they need and they get it quickly. I think we’ve just done this in too slow of a fashion. So now is the time to show strength and now is the time to reinforce them. I would be less concerned about provocation. From my point of view, Putin’s in a very, very bad spot right now, with lots of problems. But I just don’t—I don’t think that supporting Ukraine at this point, exploiting the situation—certainly being aware of indicators—but I don’t believe that that’s a reason for extreme concern.

I would also say that this has got to be undermining the Russian troops’ morale. Certainly, they don’t have full access, but I’m sure the command and them know that there’s things happening. And we have ways within information operations to make sure we get that out. And I would certainly be working those aspects of it. And I hope that we’re helping the Ukrainians be effective at that. And, if I were the Ukrainians, I would exploit this as much as I possibly could.

One of the things that I wonder about, there’s a lot that we don’t know, which has been sad. But it’s interesting to me as this thing unraveled that, you know, typically the Russians put their private armies or commercial armies, if you will, under their intelligence apparatus, under the FSB or those. And that’s what they’ve done throughout history. And so for this to occur, and not see more of a response than we did, even over the indicators over the past couple of weeks, is really surprising to me. And that leads me to believe that there’s a lot that we don’t know about what’s going on.

I was also surprised that Putin didn’t react as quickly as one might expect. So I think there’s a lot that we don’t know yet, and certainly watching it closely. But on the part of the United States, being also somewhat cautious in our response. Let’s wait and see how this unrolls in terms of policy. Having said that, I also would probably be in contact with China to see what their thoughts are on this, and leverage that for their assistance. Because it’s just another indicator that this is a strategic mistake by Putin.

FREDERICK KEMPE: What was China’s response over the weekend?

STEPHEN HADLEY: I don’t think we know. I think China’s initial reaction, from what I’ve seen in the press and that’s my only source, has been very cautious. I think they’re watching and waiting. But this can’t be reassuring to Xi, to see his life partner have a column get within 150 miles of Moscow. So I think this is an opportunity for the administration to get China to double down on a potential effort to pressure Putin to bring this war to an end in a way that involves getting Russian troops out of Ukraine. Because that’s, in a way, the way you save Putin at this point in time. I hope the administration is making that argument to the Chinese.

BRIAN KELLY: How should we be thinking about the EU, US, and China coordinating on a response? Is there some coordination on leverage between the three kind of legs of the stool? And if there is coordination, does that actually create a counter-reaction from Putin kind of lashing out, as in a corner?

GENERAL CURTIS SCAPARROTTI: I think that should occur. And I think it’s in the manner in which it’s approached as to how Putin reacts to that. I think it’s valuable to collaborate like that. And I think a message from the three could be powerful, from those entities for Putin, informing him. And again, I think part of that is how it is messaged to him. What’s the message? And I think there’s ways to do that that could be helpful. All along I’ve believed that the United States bringing together as many countries as we can to message the stance is always the best route.

JOE NYE: What, if anything, did we learn from the weekend’s events about Lukashenka and his role? I mean, the conventional wisdom has been that Lukashenka was Putin’s puppet. On the other hand, if he has alliances with other factions, and Putin has been weakened, he may have more leeway for Belarusian policy than before. Is he able, or even willing, to protect Prigozhin?

ANGELA STENT: I would caution: we were told that Lukashenka was negotiating all day on Saturday with Prigozhin. And maybe that’s true. One reason why he might have been given that role is because if something goes wrong, then Putin himself wouldn’t get the blame for it. They could always blame Lukashenka if there are things that don’t go the way they want them to do. Otherwise, it’s difficult to see because until now we’ve seen Lukashenka in a very subordinate position to Putin. He’s totally dependent on Putin for staying in power. And therefore, it was surprising to think that he would take any initiative like that.

We don’t know whether Prigozhin really is in Belarus or not. I mean, there was a cryptic message yesterday on his internet platform from Wagner saying that he would communicate with people when he had better cellphone service, which is pretty funny because that raises the question of why he doesn’t have better cellphone service now. So I don’t have a good answer to this. I can’t imagine that there would be any kind of an alliance between Lukashenka and Prigozhin. It’s already been raised, the question of would Prigozhin be using Belarus as a way of going back with his soldiers into Ukraine. But I doubt that, because I think they want to resolve Wagner, the Russian MOD does. So I’m not sure what its future is there.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Prigozhin just denied trying to overthrow the Russian government. And the truth is, all he said was he wanted Gerasimov and Shoigu replaced. In fact, he didn’t talk about Putin at all on Saturday. But, Stephen, I know you wanted to comment on how the talks unfolded.

STEPHEN HADLEY: I will just say what the press was saying over the weekend in answer to Joe’s question. One, Lukashenka said that he spoke with Putin before he undertook this role with Prigozhin. And, secondly, Angela, I saw a press report that said that Lukashenka was supported by Putin’s chief of staff and by the Russian ambassador to Belarus. So while he was the figurehead, I’m not sure he was a disinterested third party negotiating this. It seems to me more he was doing it on instructions and with coaching from Putin forces. But that’s just press reports.

GENERAL JAMES L. JONES: I think one of the big issues as a result of this is the issue of whether Ukraine should join NATO now or later. Prior to this event, I think the consensus was that a NATO membership would come later, although there’d be some affirmation at Vilnius that it would come, and some guarantees. But, you know, in view of Putin’s weakness at this point, I would think that this is a matter that will be openly discussed as to the timing of NATO membership.

Second, on getting the Ukrainians the arms that they need, I completely agree that it should be now, and as quickly as possible. And then I think another question is, what’s the future of the Wagner Group? What are they going to do? And I don’t think that’s been resolved yet. And Belarus’ role is, I think, worthy of waiting to see what happens there. I can’t imagine that an exile to Belarus with whatever guarantees Putin or Lukashenka may have given Prigozhin would have much value. I think Prigozhin’s life expectancy in Belarus would be quite short.

And I’ll say we should really engage with China on this as much as we can, as these things go on, because I’m sure that leader Xi Jinping is watching this unfold with asking himself a lot of questions about the future that China might contemplate on Taiwan.

JOHN HERBST: Regarding Prigozhin and Belarus, whoever took the initiative—whether it was Lukashenka trying to get some leverage or the Kremlin seeking to use Lukashenka, this is kind of a coup for him. Since his failed election, after which he claimed himself president despite the results in 2020, he has become more and more under Putin’s control. So this may give him a little bit of a standing to push back. But Prigozhin in Belarus is going to be under Putin’s control in some fashion.

A lot of people are speculating that he is not long for this world, and that’s possible because Putin looks weak for having allowed Prigozhin to get out of this mess after he launched the coup. But there’s a good reason for Putin not to take him down, because Prigozhin remains a figure of some popularity and legitimacy in Russia. And while Putin could try and do this, you might say, behind closed doors, everyone will assume it’s him. And I think Putin has to worry about that.

FREDERICK KEMPE: President Kaljulaid, you’re closer to Belarus than any of us are. How do you look at the situation in Belarus, Prigozhin going there, and the whole role that Lukashenka could end up playing, or Prigozhin could end up playing, on that long border that Belarus has with Ukraine?

PRESIDENT KERSTI KALJULAID: I actually don’t think Lukashenka is playing any important role here in this game. I’m quite sure that he was not the initiator, and he was not the negotiator. He was chosen as someone who could resolve, immediately, the problem. And to resolve the problem immediately was, indeed, to get Prigozhin somehow out of the way. I definitely don’t think that any promises given to him relating to Shoigu or Gerasimov will be kept. And definitely he’s just put aside and then those people who really decide, they will think about how to handle this situation.

Whether Prigozhin’s twenty-five thousand soldiers will even follow him to the region, which is now indicated, in Belarus where they would have a new camp, I have serious doubts. Many might actually go back to Syria and to Africa, and some might take up the opportunity to join the regular army. But those who will go there, I don’t see them anymore as a risk to Ukraine, after what Prigozhin has been saying. That, I mean, this war was a mistake, it is just serving Shoigu, it is serving the Russian oligarchs who is enriching themselves. I do think Lukashenka is a pawn. And I do think that Prigozhin will face his fate sooner rather than later.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Could somebody give me the potential impact on Africa? The Wagner Group is playing an outsized role there. The troops—are they listening to Prigozhin? Is he still their commander? Is Putin their commander? But there are knock-on impacts all over the world from this.

STEPHEN HADLEY: I think part of it is the money. It’s been a terrific source of income for Prigozhin and supporting his forces. And the question is whether people will decide this is now up for grabs. I suspect Putin is already getting his cut. The question is whether others will want some kind of cut. Don’t know. There’s a question of when we talk about incorporating the Wagner Group into the Ministry of Defense, does that include the forces in Africa? Because for the moment, Putin and Russia have been basically one step behind and have had a certain amount of deniability. Do they really want to take explicit responsibility for what the Wagner troops have been doing in Africa?

So I think there are a lot of questions. I don’t think we know the answer at this point in time.

Wagner has become a very important arm of the Russian state in terms of projecting its influence, particularly on the African continent. Wagner owns very lucrative gold, diamond, and other precious minerals, assets in the Central African Republic, in other parts of Africa. It’s very active in Sudan, in a number of places. It’s not only that Prigozhin and the other commanders benefit from this financially, but so does the Kremlin. I mean, we know that.

So I would find it very hard to believe that they’re going to suddenly dismantle Wagner, particularly at this time when the Russian regular forces are fighting in Ukraine—and have someone else take over their activities in Africa. So I think this is something to watch very carefully. Will they continue doing what they’re doing there? And they’ve expanded their activities in the last year. Or is there going to be another big struggle, because we’re talking about huge assets and then the support of a number of authoritarian leaders there who are very dependent on Moscow.

FREDERICK KEMPE: What are the odds that we’re actually not going to have a permanent break at all between Putin and Prigozhin? Putin said things about Prigozhin on Saturday, but Prigozhin said nothing critical about Putin at all. They’ve been awfully close for awfully long. Is this really the breaking point between the two of them, or not?

ANGELA STENT: Yeah, so, I mean, Prigozhin did criticize Putin a few weeks ago, indirectly. He talked about the war not going well, and then about “the happy grandfather” who’s a little bit removed from reality. So this was seen to get a gentle criticism of Putin. I’m not sure that there will be a break between them. And they have been dependent on each other. And we get back to the question, there are obviously great tensions within the inner circle there, between the ministry of defense and other groups. We’ll just have to wait and see. I mean, we might see Prigozhin now recant and then come back to the field. Or he could meet with an unfortunate accident any day.

JOHN HERBST: There’s also a significant Wagner presence in Syria and in Libya. And that, apparently, has not changed in recent weeks. And there are vested interests. Both commanders in the field and others who have profited from Wagner’s activities in the Middle East and in Africa. And chances are, those activities will continue. They’ll just make sure that Prigozhin’s hands are not on them.

GENERAL JAMES L. JONES: What’s the feeling about, going into Vilnius, about NATO membership for Ukraine now that this has happened?

PRESIDENT KERSTI KALJULAID: Everything that we can do to fast-forward the messaging towards Russia, that they are really losing everything on every ground, this is what we need to do. And therefore, the clearer the message Ukraine will join NATO, the better. There is no other way forward, to drive home to Russians—to ordinary Russians—that they really are losing.

FREDERICK KEMPE: How do you navigate the following? The argument is that you can’t bring a country into NATO when part of the country is occupied, or it’s at war with somebody. On the other hand, all that does is reinforce Putin’s position to continue to occupy and to continue to be at war. And I just wonder if there is some sort of workaround here, so that we don’t give him the wrong incentives.

PRESIDENT KERSTI KALJULAID: I’m quite sure that whatever linguistic acrobatics we would use, Russia will understand our intent. I mean, we will continue. We will help Ukraine to get rid of partial occupation. And we will help Ukraine to join NATO. We don’t need to be specific about what will be the conditions, what will be the timeframe. But I think we need to be very clear that we see Ukraine in NATO when they have restored their territorial integrity. But also pointing out that history knows occasions when countries have joined while having been partially occupied or broken, like for example Germany.

So I don’t think that trying to be particularly nimble with the words will help. Russians will get the message, one way or the other. One message is we are weak, we are afraid. And the other message is, we are strong, and we will persevere, and we will make this happen for Ukraine in a safe timeframe, in a safe format. And there is no third way, I believe. And my feeling is that in Europe for months, thinking also back to discussions which we’ve had here in Europe for a couple of months, there has been—also in Germany and in France—kind of coming to the common conclusion, which is not publicly mentioned yet, but there is no other way that Ukraine has to be within NATO.

STEPHEN HADLEY: One of the lessons I think I would draw from our experience in 2008 at Bucharest where we, on the one hand the Germans and the French, split on this issue of a membership action plan for Ukraine and Georgia: I think rather than being a provocation for Putin it was an opportunity for Putin, because he saw that the French and the Germans were really unalterably opposed to any near-time consideration of membership for Ukraine. And he took that as an opportunity. It is interesting that the only two countries Putin has invaded in this neighborhood, Georgia and Ukraine, are the ones that are not in NATO.

So I think it actually was an opportunity. But the lesson for it is that whatever comes out of Vilnius has to be unified. We cannot have a split between one group of allies and another. It would present another opportunity for Putin. But furthermore, it might undermine the existing steadfast and, I think, very strong consensus between the United States and Europe for support for Ukraine. So I think that that’s the risk. So it’s got to be won by consensus. And there will be those in the administration who will say that if we move forward with NATO membership for Ukraine in any way now, it will bail Putin out because it will be to justify and seem to validate his notion that he is defending Russia against a NATO moving eastward.

I don’t agree with that. I think we’re going to have to answer that argument. There’s a proposal that Sandy Vershbow and Ian Brzezinski did that basically said you would upgrade the current relationship between NATO and Ukraine. You would set a timetable for the next NATO summit to develop two things: One, a robust plan for readying Ukraine for NATO membership and, separately, supporting and institutionalizing acceleration of support militarily for Ukraine so that by that same NATO date it is in a position, as best as it can, to defend itself by itself. Which is the commitment we’ve really given to Israel.

I think there is something there. And it also puts a time out there where we would consider firmly bringing Ukraine into NATO. I think something like that may be able to get a consensus within the alliance. But I do think we need a consensus. We don’t need a falling out among US and the European allies at this point on anything over

FREDERICK KEMPE: What are you watching now? I mean, this is a difficult situation to sort out. What are you going to watch in the next few days? I’m certainly going to watch whether the Chief of Staff Gerasimov and the Secretary of Defense Shoigu stay in power. And I’m going to watch where Prigozhin appears and what Putin and Prigozhin say about each other.

GENERAL CURTIS SCAPARROTTI: I mean, I’d certainly watch the leadership. I’m surprised, frankly, that Shoigu and Gerasimov have stayed in positions as long as they can. So I think to see how this shakes out with them, given that Prigozhin’s attacks have been directed primarily at them throughout this time. The second thing is just watching the responsiveness of their chain of command and their troops, and what we can learn about their performance and their response to this. What do they know? I think that will be quite interesting.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: I think it’s very strange that we haven’t heard anything about the people—the troops in Rostov. And they surrendered their garrison to Prigozhin. Is that going to be acceptable or are they going to be punished for that? And again, we’ve got to locate those Wagner troops. Where are they? What are they doing? And where is Prigozhin? What is his plan? So those are things I’d be watching.

One thing on NATO. I do think that the Vershbow-Brzezinski plan is good, but not sufficient. I think, to go back to what the president said, we’ve got to have an agreement they will be in NATO. Maybe it’s not in twenty-four months. Maybe it’s not in twelve months. But we’ve got to put NATO in there. We don’t want to try to push Ukraine into an Israel solution, and I hear that being discussed. That’s not a lasting solution in Europe. That’s a gray zone in Europe. They need to be in NATO. And we need to say it at this summit.

I’m in France, and the French are telling me that France wants them in NATO and the Americans are saying to the French: You’re trying to escape your responsibilities by making us take your security responsibilities. So they believe that our administration is ducking the responsibility for bringing Ukraine into NATO. That’s what I’m getting from French people associated with the leadership.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So I can share with this group, because President Zelenskyy allowed us to use this on the record and John Herbst, John Rogers, and General David Petraeus were in our meeting with Zelenskyy a couple of weeks ago. And he said that if NATO doesn’t come further than it’s agreed to come so far—and that included the Vershbow-Brzezinski piece, which I thought was quite good and forward-leaning—but he would not be able to come to Vilnius because the Ukrainian people would consider it a betrayal of them; that there they are, dying on the frontlines in order to stop an authoritarian who threatens us all and threatens freedoms more generally, and that they really need a stronger sign and stronger security guarantees for him to actually come to the summit, which I thought was very interesting. And it was in an off-record conversation, and then we went back to him later and I asked whether I could use it on record, and his people said that they were willing to do that.

So it’s not that he’s anti-NATO. I mean, without the US and the US’s support, he wouldn’t be able to fight the war right now. But on the other hand, this is a difficult time for Ukraine as well, as you can well imagine.

JOHN HERBST: Watch Prigozhin very closely, watch Putin very closely. I’d also be looking for any statements coming from any of the siloviki—Patrushev, Dvornikov, people who are usually quiet—but see if there’s any indication there.

But the one place where you have people who are willing to talk is on Telegram and the Russian military bloggers, who have often been criticizing the way the war has been conducted but not, in fact, the decision to go to war. So they are worth watching because they could provide some indication of where developments are going to head.

PRESIDENT KERSTI KALJULAID: I wouldn’t be watching Shoigu and Gerasimov. I think they are safer in their jobs for the next months than they have been for the last year because Putin needs to save face, and giving in to Prigozhin would be really not something.

I think I would watch whether Prigozhin is alive two weeks or a month from now, because the only way for Putin to reestablish that he’s still strong with the Russian people would be, actually, that he would be able to show that he was able to deal with Prigozhin—somehow. And he has to demonstrate that, some way, somehow. If he’s not able to do it, then I think we should really be watching how Putin gets weaker and weaker, and who are the people who will then speak out against him.

For example, Russian nationalists who have been strongly supporting the war in Moscow, the really radical, you would say Russian neo-Nazi groups, have been yesterday also criticizing Putin. This is new.

So things will continue. Putin will either be weakened, or he will be able to demonstrate somehow that he has regained the upper hand. My guess is he will not be able to, so his power will kind of be downgraded gradually and then we will see something happening when the rest of the decisionmakers decide they can do without him. That is something which I think is the most probable. But Shoigu was inspecting the troops, he’s been visible, rather than before he wasn’t, actually, so I think they are safe in their jobs for a couple of weeks.

ANGELA STENT: I am going to be watching whether Shoigu and Gerasimov stay in place, and they probably will. I will be watching to see whether Prigozhin resurfaces, where he is. And I will also be watching to see what any of the siloviki around Putin, what they’re saying. And I’ll be watching Putin, too—where does he appear, what does he say, what does he not say.

And let me just add my two cents: I do not think that the Israel solution is the solution for Ukraine, and I think it certainly has to get into NATO sooner rather than later.

STEPHEN HADLEY: I want to watch what we do. First, my view is it’s not “Israel” as a substitute for NATO; it’s NATO membership plus the kind of support for Ukraine we give Israel. So in my view, it’s NATO plus “Israel.” We need to try to get that out of Vilnius, but it needs to be a consensus among the alliance. And the message, I think, to the Russians is if you don’t like this direction this is heading, then get out of Ukraine.

Secondly, I think we’ve got to watch whether the US administration is going to take the advice from General Clark and General Scaparrotti and really ramp up our support militarily for Ukraine so they can take advantage of the situation.

And, three, monitoring Russian troop morale and everything we can do to encourage its undermining.

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Ukrainians have good reason to cheer Russia’s Wagner rebellion

Andriy Zagorodnyuk — Tue, 27 Jun 2023 10:38:50 +0000

As the Wagner mutiny unfolded in Russia over the weekend, Ukrainian social media was flooded with memes about popcorn as millions of Ukrainians settled down to enjoy the spectacle. This gleeful reaction was perhaps predictable, given the unimaginable horror and suffering Russia has brought to Ukraine over the past sixteen months, but there may also be a number of good practical reasons for Ukrainians to cheer Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s short-lived revolt. The exact terms of the deal that caused the Wagner warlord to call off his mutiny are not entirely clear and may still be subject to revision, but it is already safe to say that the affair has left Russia weakened and demoralized in ways that favor Ukraine.

The first point to note is that the drama is likely to continue. As Russia’s neighbors can all testify, Vladimir Putin does not honor agreements. He is also notorious for never forgiving traitors. Whatever happens next, we will almost certainly witness the end of Wagner as an independent military force. Individual units will either be broken up, exiled to Belarus, or integrated into the regular Russian army. Putin and his military chiefs simply cannot run the risk of allowing the mercenary group to maintain its powerful military potential.

This will have a considerable impact on the invasion of Ukraine. Wagner troops were responsible for virtually all of Russia’s modest advances over the past year, including the much-hyped seizure of Bakhmut. Wagner’s success was largely down to a distinctive and brutal military doctrine heavily dependent on human wave tactics. These shock troops will find life very different in the ranks of the regular Russian military. Russian generals will view all former Wagner fighters with suspicion and will be reluctant to give them prominent offensive roles. This is a sensible security response to recent events, but it will undermine the Russian military’s already extremely limited ability to advance in Ukraine.

With Russia’s most effective troops no longer playing a prominent role in the invasion, this will increase the options for Ukrainian commanders as they look to develop the country’s current summer counteroffensive. This may have particular significance for the frontline sector close to Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine, where Wagner units were instrumental in securing earlier Russian gains. Ukrainian forces have already made significant advances to the north and south of Bakhmut, and will now be looking to capitalize on the destabilizing impact of the Wagner rebellion in order to push further.

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Ukraine’s military planners may also be encouraged to expand on earlier incursions into the Russian Federation itself. The Wagner mutiny exposed a shocking lack of military defenses inside Russia, with Russian army officials scrambling to assemble units and gather equipment from across the country. Prigozhin was able to seize the major Russian city of Rostov-on-Don without a fight, including the military headquarters of the entire Ukraine invasion. His troops then advanced virtually unopposed through the Russian heartlands before unilaterally deciding to end their march on Moscow less than two hundred kilometers from the capital city. In the space of a single day, an apparently defenseless Russia found itself on the brink of either civil war or collapse.

This remarkable state of affairs was possible because Putin has deployed the vast majority of Russia’s military potential to Ukraine. The Wagner revolt demonstrated conclusively that there are no more reserves to draw upon. Putin is already close to the maximum of his capacity and has very limited possibilities to escalate the invasion of Ukraine, even if he wished to do so.

This creates all manner of tempting opportunities for Ukraine, which has so far been careful to limit the scope of its military activities inside Russia, in part due to concerns voiced by Kyiv’s international partners. That may now change. In the weeks prior to the start of Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive, Ukrainian-backed Russian militias launched a number of cross-border raids from Ukraine into Russia’s Belgorod region. While these thrusts were largely symbolic, Ukraine could soon become more ambitious. With the Putin regime seemingly unable to defend itself and in no position to escalate, we may witness bolder Ukrainian military operations on Russian territory.

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Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of the whole Wagner drama from a Ukrainian perspective was the obvious weakness and division it exposed within Russia. Any country fighting a major war needs unity, and today’s Russia is clearly not united. Members of the public in Rostov-on-Don and elsewhere appear to have enthusiastically backed the rebellion, while others were indifferent. The limited military presence inside Russia made no serious attempts to intervene, while there was little indication of any surge in public support for Putin or condemnation of Prigozhin. This is all a very long way from the propaganda image promoted by the Kremlin of a strong Russian state supported by a proudly patriotic populace.

The situation in Russia is not yet comparable to the mood in 1917 on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, but the Wagner mutiny is an extremely dangerous signal for Russian society. Any infighting is bad for morale, and the spectacle of Russia’s most successful military force turning against the country’s military leaders is particularly demoralizing. This will damage the fighting spirit of Russian troops in Ukraine while also seriously undermining Putin’s personal authority on the home front.

For Ukraine, the outlook is more promising. The Wagner mutiny was a brief affair, but it has led to the sidelining of Russia’s most effective fighting force while also highlighting the weaknesses and limitations of the Putin regime. This could create practical opportunities for Ukraine’s current counteroffensive, and will boost confidence in the country’s ultimate ability to achieve a decisive victory over Russia.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk is chairman of the Center for Defence Strategies and an advisor to the Ukrainian Government. He previously served as Ukraine’s minister of defense (2019–2020).

If the Ukrainians can exploit the advantage of their superior tanks supplied by NATO members, they can drive deep into the rear area of Russian-occupied territory and split the Russian force in two with a combination of armor and HIMARS strikes guided by unmanned aircraft systems. This would enable the Ukrainian military to break the land bridge that Russia has created by occupying a continuous swath of Ukrainian territory from the Russian border to Crimea.

If Ukraine can breach the Russian defensive line of obstacles and minefields in two or three locations, it could provide multiple axes of advance to exploit and keep the Russians off balance, or allow the Ukrainians to at least feint in one or more spots and tie down Russian defenders. At the same time, Ukrainian tanks could rapidly move to exploit their success before the Russians recognize these advances, and could ideally penetrate the Russian rear area before they can deploy their reserves. This scenario would offer the Ukrainians the best chance they have had thus far in this war to liberate large swaths of occupied territory. But it would also in all likelihood be a long battle with significant casualties.

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It is unlikely that this counteroffensive will result in the liberation of Crimea. The narrow isthmus that connects the peninsula to the mainland of Ukraine makes it the most easily defensible piece of Russian-occupied territory. Because the Ukrainian military lacks an amphibious capability, the Russians can concentrate all their forces there, making any attempt at a southward advance extraordinarily deadly.

Yet the Ukrainians are savvy enough to realize that the actual value of Crimea to the Russians is the port of Sevastopol, despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claims of solidarity with the largely Russian-speaking population of the peninsula.

Ukraine has the ability to render the strategic value of Crimea moot and make Russia’s Black Sea Fleet pay a high price every time it attempts to leave the port of Sevastopol. Ukraine can achieve this by deploying advanced naval mines offensively as effectively as they did defensively close to the Ukrainian port city of Odesa; and by employing their Neptune anti-ship missiles as they have done to deadly effect in the past.

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The addition of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine’s arsenal will provide another weapon to strike Russia’s naval base in Sevastopol and is a welcome change in US policy. Although still a fourth-generation aircraft and susceptible to Russia’s S-400 surface-to-air missile system, the F-16 is superior to anything the Ukrainian Air Force currently operates as a fighter or an air-to-ground attack aircraft.

Unlike the MiG-29, Su-27, Su-24, and Su-25 of the Ukrainian Air Force, the F-16 can carry the entire range of US and NATO laser-guided and GPS-guided air-to-ground ordnance, which will be vital for striking Russian targets deep in occupied territory including Crimea while avoiding collateral damage and civilian casualties. Additionally, its superior radar and ability to employ the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and AIM-9X Sidewinder make it superior to Russia’s Mig-29 and Su-27 in aerial combat. But since it will take three to four months to transition Ukrainian pilots to the F-16, these fighters will not play a significant role in the current counteroffensive.

The Ukrainians have demonstrated their commitment to their cause through superior leadership, morale, and courage under fire. At the same time, Russia’s shift to prepared defenses may allow them to shore up the flagging confidence of their largely conscripted army. While the current Ukrainian counteroffensive is a welcome step toward victory in this war, it will be one of many campaigns over the course of what will likely be a long and arduous struggle.

Col. John B. Barranco (Ret.) was the 2021-22 US Marine Corps senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is currently executive vice president of Potomac International Partners.

Five steps toward Ukrainian victory and a lasting peace with Russia

Arseniy Yatsenyuk — Mon, 26 Jun 2023 11:07:48 +0000

A few years ago, against the backdrop of a national pro-democracy uprising in Belarus, I called on European leaders to develop a clear strategy for Eastern Europe. This envisaged EU and NATO membership for Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and a free Belarus. Alas, many European politicians preferred to wait and see.

It is admittedly difficult to make historic political decisions, but the price of not doing so is often horrendously high. In this case, the price is obvious: By failing to integrate Ukraine and bring the countries of Eastern Europe out of the geopolitical grey zone, Western leaders set the stage for the full-scale Russian invasion of 2022.

Further mistakes will be just as costly. Thankfully, there is now a growing consensus throughout the West that only Ukrainian victory can end the global security crisis sparked by Russia’s invasion. Nevertheless, there is still a need for greater clarity on what would constitute victory and how Europe can achieve a lasting peace.

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Defeating Russia and securing peace will require a series of interrelated measures that go far beyond the battlefield. I have identified five key elements to a sustainable settlement that will end the current carnage and prevent any repetitions in the years ahead.

The first element is arming Ukraine sufficiently for victory. This process is well underway, but serious issues remain in terms of both quantities and timing. Every single delay in military aid costs Ukrainian lives and emboldens Russia. Ukraine’s Western partners must overcome their misplaced fear of provoking Putin and should instead seek to streamline the delivery of weapons. After all, it is now widely recognized that Russia must be defeated on the battlefield.

The second element is the strategic deterrence of Russia and creation of a new NATO-centered security architecture in Europe. There should now be no illusions: NATO alone can provide Europe with a credible and efficient security system. This means NATO membership for Ukraine. Nothing less will force Moscow to retreat. The upcoming NATO summit in Vilnius should conclude by inviting Ukraine to join the alliance. No bilateral guarantees or other compromise measures can hope to replace NATO’s Article Five or stop Russia.

The third element is Ukrainian membership of the European Union and restoration of the Ukrainian economy in close unison with the wider European economy. There has been significant progress toward this objective since the outbreak of Russia’s full-scale invasion, but overall results remain disappointing and fall far short of the many political statements on the importance of Ukraine’s European integration.

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The fourth key task is undermining Russia’s potential to act aggressively. It is hard to assess how long Russia will remain capable of waging the current war, but financial issues will play an important role in any decision-making process. Last year, official Russian military expenditure amounted to approximately $85 billion. This year, the figure is set to reach at least $108 billion. Unofficially, the total sum spent on the war is likely to be far higher. Clearly, sanctions must continue and need to intensify. Additional steps could include the prevention of dual-purpose goods transit through Russia and the maximum implementation of secondary sanctions.

In parallel, it is also vital to protect and strengthen Ukraine’s economy. Further measures are necessary to facilitate Ukrainian exports. NATO-led naval convoys should break Russia’s Black Sea blockade and enable Ukraine to resume international exports throughout the country’s southern ports. Ukraine’s external debt should undergo restructuring.

The fifth element necessary for a sustainable peace in Eastern Europe is perhaps the most important and at the same time the most intangible. Genuine victory will only be possible when Russian imperialism is no longer a threat to the region.

Once Ukraine is liberated and secure under the collective umbrella of NATO membership, the top priority for the international community will be addressing the imperial ideology that encourages Russians to commit acts of international aggression with impunity and contempt for human life. Russia must bear full legal and financial responsibility for its aggression against Ukraine and for the genocide of the Ukrainian nation. The era of Russian impunity for war crimes must end.

Unless the underlying issue of Russian imperialism is addressed at the international level, the liberation of Ukraine will provide little more than temporary relief. Confronting Russia’s imperial identity is the only way to achieve a lasting peace. This would pave the way for a new global security system and the much-needed reform of international bodies such as the UN Security Council. World peace will remain elusive until Russian imperialism is consigned to the dustbin of history.

Arseniy Yatsenyuk is Chairman of the Kyiv Security Forum and former Prime Minister of Ukraine (2014-16).

Short-lived Wagner mutiny will undermine Russia’s Ukraine invasion

Peter Dickinson — Sun, 25 Jun 2023 23:13:23 +0000

As suddenly as it had begun twenty-four hours earlier, Wagner chief Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s rebellion against Russia’s military leadership came to an abrupt end on Saturday evening. The details of the deal struck between Prigozhin and the Kremlin remain murky, but the Russian warlord appears to have emerged from the drama relatively unscathed, at least for now.

The same cannot be said for Vladimir Putin, who has been very publicly humiliated by the affair and now looks weaker than at any point in his twenty-three-year reign. While the mutiny itself was remarkably brief, the consequences are likely to be profound, with serious repercussions in particular for the already faltering Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The most obvious practical consequence of the Wagner mutiny is a weakening of Russia’s force posture inside Ukraine. More than twenty thousand Wagner troops reportedly withdrew from Ukraine to participate in the revolt, representing around five percent of the entire Russian invasion force. Crucially, these were by far the most effective fighting units in the Russian military and had been responsible for almost all of the advances achieved over the past year.

Depending on the exact nature of the agreement to end the mutiny, many Wagner fighters may well return to the frontlines, possibly integrated into the regular Russian army. However, their non-Wagner comrades and commanders will understandably treat them with extreme suspicion, limiting their impact on the battlefield. Whatever happens next, the days when Wagner troops led the Russian invasion of Ukraine look to be over.

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The revolt also highlighted the relative defenselessness of Russia itself. Wagner troops took almost a year to occupy the small Ukrainian city of Bakhmut but seized the nearly twenty times larger Russian city Rostov-on-Don without a fight in a matter of hours. Indeed, it is worth underlining that Rostov-on-Don is by far the biggest city captured by Russian troops since the start of Putin’s so-called “Special Military Operation” sixteen months ago. Russia’s lack of domestic defenses was further exposed by the unhindered progress of Prigozhin’s armored column, which advanced to within two hundred kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed before deciding to turn back.

While the immediate threat of a march on Moscow is now over, drastic measures are clearly required to bolster Russian domestic security. Putin knows the watching world has noted this vulnerability. He must now urgently take visible steps to prevent another ambitious Russian warlord or Ukrainian army commander from launching a new campaign inside his unprotected borders. Where will Putin find the necessary troops and equipment for this? With the vast majority of Russia’s military currently deployed in Ukraine, the answer to this question is both obvious and awkward. Russia will have no choice but to reduce its invasion force in order to address the country’s serious domestic security issues.

Russia’s vast military and state security apparatus will also now find itself engaged in the hunt for traitors and possible turncoats, which will inevitably distract attention and resources away from the task of defeating Ukraine. Infighting between the various different military clans has been a debilitating factor throughout the Russian invasion of Ukraine; this trend will now intensify as the Russian authorities look to settle scores with the many police chiefs, local officials, and military commanders who either stood aside or discreetly backed the Wagner mutiny.

Meanwhile, the mutiny has raised some fundamental questions over Putin’s continued ability to rule. He was notably absent during the initial hours of the crisis, only appearing the following morning in a brief video address to the nation. He also seems to have been sidelined in negotiations with Prigozhin, allowing Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka to take the lead. These are not the actions of a strongman ruler. As Atlantic Council Eurasia Center Senior Director and former US Ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst noted on CNN, “It’s like Prigozhin is the person who looked behind the screen at the Wizard of Oz and saw the great and terrible Oz was just this little frightened man. Putin has been diminished for all time by this affair.”

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While these factors will all undermine the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the most important impact is likely to be on morale within the ranks of the Russian military. Demoralization was already a major issue for Putin’s invasion force, with a steady stream of video addresses on social media during the first half of 2023 testifying to widespread dissatisfaction among Russian troops over “human wave” attacks and catastrophic losses. These problems will now intensify as Russian troops question the loyalties of their leaders and the entire purpose of the invasion.

On the eve of the mutiny, Prigozhin published an explosive video address in which he accused the Kremlin of deliberately misleading the Russian public over its justifications for the war in Ukraine. The Wagner chief, whom many in Russia see as one of the few credible commentators within the establishment, dismissed key elements of the official Kremlin narrative—including claims that the invasion preempted an imminent NATO-backed Ukrainian offensive against Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine and Crimea. He also directly denied widespread Russian allegations that the Ukrainian military had been bombing eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region for eight years prior to the full-scale invasion. Instead, Prigozhin blamed the war on the personal ambitions of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and individual Russian oligarchs.

Such statements will inevitably undermine fighting spirit among Russian troops and cause many to question exactly what they are fighting for in Ukraine. This has long been an issue for the Russian authorities, who have struggled to articulate their war aims amid lurid but unsubstantiated claims of “Ukrainian Nazis” and “Western imperialists.” Prigozhin’s damning comments exposing the lies used to justify the war have now cast an unforgiving light on the Kremlin’s credibility problems and will further fuel discontent among the Russian troops who are fighting and dying on the frontlines.

The short-lived Wagner mutiny has also exposed deep divides within Russia’s military and security establishment that indicate remarkably low levels of loyalty to the Putin regime. There has been some speculation that Prigozhin received support from within the military when planning and executing his mutiny, given that he was able to capture Rostov-on-Don with such apparent ease despite the fact that the city serves as the headquarters of the entire Ukraine invasion. Prigozhin’s armored column of Wagner troops then travelled hundreds of kilometers through the heart of Russia without encountering any significant military resistance.

The remarkable initial success of the Wagner mutiny in seizing control of a major city and advancing on the capital has sent shock waves through Russia that will also be felt by Putin’s occupation forces in Ukraine. If Russian soldiers and commanders are not prepared to defend their own country, why should troops deployed to Ukraine sacrifice themselves for such an apparently dubious cause? If Prigozhin and his private army can go unpunished for declaring war on the Russian state, why should ordinary mobilized Russians feel obliged to follow suicidal orders in Ukraine?

For obvious reasons, the Kremlin will now attempt to downplay the significance of the short-lived Wagner mutiny. In reality, however, the ramifications of this unprecedented event will reverberate for some time to come and will shape Russia’s future, including the outcome of the war in Ukraine. One year ago, Putin was boasting of returning historically Russian lands and comparing himself to Peter the Great. Today, he looks far more like Czar Nicholas II, whose military failures and weak leadership sparked mutiny and the eventual collapse of the Russian Empire.

The Wagner mutiny is further proof that Putin’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine has left Russia divided, demoralized, and weakened. With his own personal authority now rapidly evaporating, the Russian dictator may soon face domestic problems so grave that they will overshadow even the prospect of defeat in Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Brian Whitmore: If Prigozhin doesn’t pay a heavy price, Putin’s regime is in serious danger

Olga Khakova: Russian instability further endangers Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

Yevgeniya Gaber: The Russian colossus is standing on feet of clay

Daniel Fried: Is it 1917 or 1991?

Ariel Cohen: Frankenstein’s monster cooks up a coup

Doug Klain: In the mutiny’s aftermath, Russia’s soldiers face a crisis of trust

Hanna Liubakova: For Lukashenka, a short-term win that could undermine his long-term standing in Belarus

John “Buss” Barranco: Ukraine can take advantage of Russian confusion

William F. Wechsler: “When you strike at a king, you must kill him.”

John K. Culver: A stumbling Russia means greater isolation for China

Joseph Webster: Prigozhin is the devil Beijing doesn’t know

Rama Yade: Without Wagner, Putin loses a substantial part of his African foothold

Jacob Mezey: What does Prigozhin’s coup attempt mean for Ukraine’s counteroffensive?

Vladislav Davidzon: This is the start of the end of the war

If Prigozhin doesn’t pay a heavy price, Putin’s regime is in serious danger

Prigozhin’s rebellion needs to be viewed in several contexts. First, the war against Ukraine has divided the Russian elite into two factions—hawks who want nothing short of the conquest of Kyiv and a military parade on the Khreshchatyk and kleptocrats who want to go back to the pre-February 24, 2022 world. Neither of these things are going to happen, so nobody is happy. Of these two factions, the hawks are by far the more powerful and the more serious threat to the regime. This has put Putin in a very precarious position regardless of how Prigozhin’s rebellion is resolved.

Second, Prigozhin’s rebellion also illustrates the perils of Putin’s “venture-capital foreign policy,” which outsources key tasks to nominally private-sector actors outside the normal chain of command. The Russian system is based not on institutions but on informal patronage networks with Putin as the ultimate arbiter. When Putin is strong, this approach works, to a point. But when Putin is weakened, it can spin out of control.

Third, Prigozhin’s kryshas in this informal system appear to be abandoning him. General Sergei Surovikin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov have already disavowed him. It is also hard to imagine another alleged ally, Rosgvardia leader Viktor Zolotov, siding with Prigozhin over Putin. This probably accounts for Prigozhin’s tactical retreat. But even if the immediate crisis is resolved, its underlying cause will continue to weaken the regime.

Fourth, if Prigozhin doesn’t pay a heavy price for his rebellion, it will put the Putin regime in serious danger. This is because political change comes to Russia when three factors are present: a divided elite (check), a dissatisfied public (check), and an absence of fear. If fear is removed from the equation, then the regime will be in peril.

Finally, this crisis will further undermine Russia’s warfighting capabilities in Ukraine just as Kyiv is ramping up its counteroffensive. The Russian elite is not behaving like it expects to win this war.

—Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and founder and host of the Power Vertical Podcast.

Russian instability further endangers Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

Despite the internal power struggle, Prigozhin and Putin are unified by their dedication to the continued assault on Ukraine, including crimes against humanity at scale, albeit through diverging approaches. This shared interest is of particular concern, as Ukraine is once again raising alarms about the ticking time bomb of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant’s unsafe conditions. Russia’s leadership instability is heightening these risks and could lead to contradictory or unclear orders for the plant’s illegal occupiers. Moreover, Russia has been emboldened by the weak response by the West to their destruction of the Kakhovka dam, and the absence of unity in calling out Russia’s culpability in the horrific incident, notwithstanding ample evidence pointing to Russia. Zaporizhzhia’s safety can only be guaranteed when the Russians give up control of the plant, which they are unequipped to manage. The international community must prioritize securing this transfer in order to prevent a looming catastrophe.

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center (GEC). She leads GEC’s portfolio on synchronizing climate and energy security efforts through transatlantic cooperation.

The Russian colossus is standing on feet of clay

Prigozhin’s mutiny has exposed Russia’s major defense blind spots and highlighted Putin’s weakening grip on power. The Kremlin’s strongman turned out to be a strawman; and a colossus of Russian military power appeared to be standing on feet of clay.

While this may sound reassuring to Ukrainians, who may have an easier time fighting against a demotivated army of conscripts and convicts rather than against well-paid professional mercenaries, Kyiv and the West must nevertheless face a sobering reality.

It took sixteen months of fighting, three successful Ukrainian counteroffensives (in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson), and occasional raids by pro-Ukrainian Russian groups into the Belgorod region to ruin the myth of Russian military power. It required the flagship cruiser Moskva to be sunk, Ukraine to spend months waiting for Western weapons and EU candidate status, and Finland to join NATO before the West began to question the credibility of the Kremlin’s “red lines.”

While the West has spent months trying to de-escalate, save Putin’s face, mitigate nuclear threats, and avoid provoking Russia, a rival warlord with a criminal past showed how easy it was to overtake the Russian military’s initiative and paralyze state structures. In its current state, Russia is likely to face an internal power struggle with more destabilization in sight. Putin will most likely use Prigozhin to present himself as the “best out of the worst,” and to redirect public attention from internal turmoil to more violence in Ukraine, including new acts of ecocide and nuclear saber-rattling. This must not be allowed.

The West’s choice is not between two Russian war criminals, who are equally engaged in the crimes of genocide and mass murder in Ukraine, Syria, and Africa. The choice is between maintaining illusions of European stability and taking the steps that are necessary to secure it. These include abandoning self-deterrence, developing a clear-eyed Russia strategy, and equipping Ukraine to win the war, with full-fledged NATO membership as a key element of Kyiv’s long-term victory.

The Russian colossus, as it is now, is likely to collapse sooner rather than later. Ukraine is the only country in the region that can protect NATO from its ruins when it finally falls apart.

—Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey. She worked as a foreign policy advisor to the prime minister of Ukraine from February to December 2021.

Is it 1917 or 1991?

What does the fast and apparently ended Prigozhin mutiny mean for Putin and for Russia’s war against Ukraine? Was it a 1917 moment or a miserable failure like the attempted coup against the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991?

In terms of numbers of forces available, Prigozhin didn’t stand a chance. Putin commands the regular Russian army and airforce, the National Guard, and other armed groups theoretically at government command. But Tsar Nicholas II also had a preponderance of force when he fell in February 1917; so did the Provisional Government when it fell to Lenin’s Bolsheviks in November 1917. The problem the tsar and Provisional Government leader Alexander Kerensky faced was not the availability of forces in theory but forces in practice. The tsarist regime was decrepit, hollowed out by many things, but especially by its failure in World War I. Kerensky’s government stuck with that war and also failed. By the time they were overthrown, the tsar and Kerensky had lost the confidence of Russian society and huge portions of the state they nominally commanded.

That was Putin’s problem: Prigozhin mounted a mutiny in protest of another failing Russian war, Putin’s war against Ukraine.

And now Prigozhin has announced he is turning around his forces short of Moscow. He seems to have worked out some sort of deal.

But a deal with whom and for what? Does this deal include a change of Russia’s military leadership that had been prosecuting the Russo-Ukrainian War that Putin launched? Prigozhin has been attacking Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov for their failures in Ukraine. But why would Putin cave to pressure by accepting such demands? What does that do to Putin’s authority? It’s Putin’s war in any case.

Whatever arrangements Prigozhin has extracted, Putin’s authority is diminished, as was Gorbachev’s after Boris Yeltsin defeated the 1991 coup attempt. And this is worse: In 1991 the coup failed. But Prigozhin seems to have pulled off something.

Russia’s war against Ukraine has not been going well, and Prigozhin’s attack on it as unjustified and incompetently led is now stronger than ever.

It may not be a 1917 moment for Russia. But the hot breath of failure is coming closer to Putin.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former US ambassador to Poland.

Frankenstein’s monster cooks up a coup

In his effort to bypass Russia’s regular military and governance structures, while personally dipping into the country’s military budget, it appears that Putin has created a monster that threatened the very foundations of his security services–based regime, and possibly the scope of his personal power.

Prigozhin, once known as “Putin’s cook” and head of the private military Wagner Group, demonstrated that he can run circles around Shoigu and Gerasimov. He and his Wagner military company quickly captured Rostov-on-Don, a large Russian city in the south, which is the headquarters of the Russian southern military district. Wagner then rapidly extended their control all the way up to Voronezh and to the boundaries of the Moscow region—850 kilometers.

During Wagner’s lightning advance, Russian ground forces failed to oppose them, and only minimal aerial attacks were conducted against them.

For a moment it appeared that Putin had left Moscow and Prigozhin might enter the city and finish off a coup despite the lack of outright support from any representatives of the Russian ruling circles. Yet, many Russian leaders, including the powerful Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev refrained from criticizing Prigozhin, suggesting that he may have at least some support at the highest echelons of power.

And then Prigozhin stopped. He turned around his troops, amid claims of a deal brokered by Lukashenka. Putin’s press secretary Dmitri Peskov confirmed that the criminal charges of incitement to armed rebellion against Prigozhin would be dropped, he would be allowed to move to Belarus (and pursue his African business), and the Wagner members would be pardoned.

The Wagner rebellion is the most serious challenge to the Russian state’s foundations since 1993, when the Supreme Soviet rebelled against Boris Yeltsin, who brought in tanks to suppress the attempted coup.

Prigozhin has demonstrated just how weak the Putin regime is and how the Russian president’s own “chef” could potentially put nuclear-armed Russia into the hands of a fragile and extremely dangerous dictatorship of former KGB officers and hardened criminals—Vory v Zakone.

Russia’s international stature, and its future military performance in Ukraine, are likely to suffer from these events, as will Putin’s power.

—Ariel Cohen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

In the mutiny’s aftermath, Russia’s soldiers face a crisis of trust

Plainly, it’s difficult to tell what on earth happened in Prigozhin’s supposed twenty-four-hour rebellion, now apparently called off after negotiations with the Belarusian strongman Lukashenka. How Putin and his elites rally to reassert dominance after an open challenge will prove decisive for determining what comes next and whether Russian forces substantially waver in the battlefield in Ukraine. Authoritarian regimes like Putin’s rely on creating a sense of invulnerability, and challenges from warlords like Prigozhin call that myth into question.

While Prigozhin claims he called on his forces to stand down to avoid spilling Russian blood, it’s likely that the Wagner Group chief received significant concessions personally or serious enhancements to Wagner’s role in the war effort. At the end of the day, this “rebellion” was purportedly about a disagreement over how best to prosecute Russia’s unprovoked war of annihilation against Ukraine.

If Prigozhin’s challenge does indeed come to a speedy conclusion with Wagner returning to the front, Kyiv may not get the all-out chaos it was likely hoping to exploit for battlefield gains. But even so, the fact that a significant portion of Moscow’s fighting force is not apparently loyal to Russia and can be swayed will have real impact on the battlefield, with Russian army forces having to question to an even greater extent than before just how much they can trust those they’re supposed to be fighting alongside.

Putin’s regime may have survived Prigozhin’s challenge, but almost every aspect of this episode indicates that the Russian system is more brittle than ever. This all occurred because Russia is performing disastrously in its war—and Ukraine’s main effort in the counteroffensive is still to come.

—Doug Klain is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, where he focuses on Russia’s war on Ukraine, authoritarianism in Russia, and Ukraine’s democracy-building process.

For Lukashenka, a short-term win that could undermine his long-term standing in Belarus

In a stunning turn of events on Saturday, Lukashenka said he had negotiated with Prigozhin an end to the movement of his mercenary troops inside Russia in order to deescalate the situation.

Prigozhin himself confirmed the turning back of the Wagner columns of the mercenaries and returning them to field camps in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine.

While Lukashenka’s position could be strengthened by this unexpected mediation, in the longer term, his regime will face the repercussions of the insurrection led by the Wagner paramilitary group.

The growing demotivation and demoralization regarding Russia’s actions may raise concerns among the power vertical, military, and elite circles within Belarus. Such chaotic developments in the neighboring country will lead to questioning Lukashenka’s policies and decision making. With Putin’s authority weakened, the regime in Minsk may find itself with reduced backing and support from Russia.

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Lukashenka has declared unwavering loyalty to the Kremlin, allowing attacks and using Belarusian territory as a training ground, disregarding the will of most Belarusians.

Lukashenka placed a risky bet on Russia’s swift victory in the war against Ukraine, essentially banking everything on that outcome. Pro-regime propaganda in Belarus claimed the notion that Russia was incapable of losing. However, this strategy could potentially have negative consequences. Prigozhin’s armed rebellion indicates a political crisis within Russia and shatters the myth of Russia’s invincibility and overwhelming power.

The Belarusian democratic forces and the Kalinouski regiment fighting in Ukraine against the Russian troops used these chaotic developments to appeal to the elites and the military to side with them. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Lukashenka’s rival in the disputed 2020 election, has stated once again that this is an opportunity to free Belarus from dictatorship. The Wagner insurrection will become yet another argument for her to present Russia as a source of instability and conflict. It appeals to Belarusians who want to keep away from the war against Ukraine.

—Hanna Liubakova is a freelance journalist and researcher from Belarus. She is currently a journalist with Outriders, an international multimedia platform that produces in-depth multimedia and interactive reporting and focuses on solutions journalism.

Ukraine can take advantage of Russian confusion

Is the Wagner Group marching on Moscow or heading back to the front? Is Prigozhin attempting a coup d’etat, part of a false flag operation to allow Putin to purge his failing military leadership, or is he trying to change the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense, as he claims, perhaps to prevent them from absorbing his private militia into the Russian Army? It is impossible to know for sure, but we do know that the recent turn of events in Russia could not come at a better time for Ukraine.

Ukraine’s best chance for a successful counteroffensive is to attack deep behind the current Russian front line and force the Russians to fall back from their six hundred miles of layered defense-in-depth fighting positions to prevent Ukraine from cutting Russia off from its supply lines. It is unlikely even the most audacious among the Ukrainian military leadership ever envisioned launching an attack on Russia’s Southern Military District headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, where Russia’s war in Ukraine is being run, but that is precisely what the Wagner Group’s sudden rebellion has done.

Whatever Prigozhin’s real motivations are, or the outcome of his revolt and then apparent about-face, a few things remain clear: Massive amounts of confusion have been sown in Russia’s rear area, and whatever confidence rank and file Russian soldiers had left in their leadership is gone. Once an army loses confidence in its leaders, morale collapses and the will to fight goes with it. The Wagner Group will almost certainly be gone soon as well, and it was the most effective unit fighting for the Russians in Ukraine, admittedly a low bar. Whether it is absorbed into the Russian army or disbanded, its members reassigned piecemeal to various units, remains to be seen. Still, it is hard to imagine Prigozhin holding onto his private army or his life.

—John “Buss” Barranco was the 2021-22 senior US Marine Corps fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

“When you strike at a king, you must kill him.”

Some things are constants in this changing world, and one of them is that only a relatively small number of people make all of the important decisions in Russia, and they each have lots of money, lots of guns, or both. At certain points in history, these elites compete among themselves to determine who leads, resulting in one person in charge, some dead, and the others falling into line. Recent events should be understood as the latest episode in this centuries-long storyline.

But today’s agreement that halted the immediate Wagner threat to Moscow and consigned Prigozhin to Belarus is not likely to be the end of this story, but just the beginning. On the surface it may appear to be a victory for Putin, but he has been weakened by both the very fact that it occurred and the reality that it was resolved only through a negotiated compromise rather than a public demonstration of physical power. The military, historically the institution most esteemed by the Russian people, has been humiliated once again under Putin and shown to be corrupt, ineffective, and led by lackeys. As has been the case since his failure to take Kyiv last year, Putin’s primary focus must be to secure his standing, and thus his survival, among that small number of Russians who matter, with shows of strength. Thus, those who stubbornly hope for a negotiated resolution to Putin’s war in Ukraine will continue to be disappointed. As for Prigozhin, he will need to reflect on Ralph Waldo Emerson’s famous admonition, “when you strike at a king, you must kill him.” Indeed, for the time being he may want to steer clear of any upper-floor windows, as in recent years Putin’s adversaries tend to be especially clumsy around them. In any case, as this story continues to develop, the people behind the 2017 movie The Death of Stalin should be busy taking notes in case there’s soon need for a sequel.

—William F. Wechsler is the senior director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. His most recent government position was US deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combating terrorism.

A stumbling Russia means greater isolation for China

Chinese President Xi Jinping is famous for proclaiming that “the world is undergoing changes unseen in a century!” Yet his prognostication probably didn’t include Putin’s former caterer and mercenary army founder/funder Yevgeniy Prigozhin directing an armed assault toward Moscow.

I hesitate to call relationships between autocrats “friendships,” but to the extent either Putin or Xi has friends, their bond is certainly stronger and more substantive than others. They seem to share a view of the world as straining against “American hegemony,” and poised to accelerate toward a multipolar order where both Russia and China can dominate respective spheres of influence free of “Western interference.” But Xi—being more traditionally Marxist—saw this new world emerging over the course of this century, while Putin undertook direct actions—in Georgia, Syria, Ukraine, and Ukraine again—to hasten changes and reassert Russia’s position as a great power. Beijing’s reaction can be summarized as “Bold! But strategically incompetent!”

But as I noted in a recent Atlantic Council publication, “Beijing has deep strategic interest in ensuring that Moscow—and Putin personally—remains a viable ally in blunting US power… Most importantly, Beijing has a strategic need to keep Russia from internal turmoil or international setbacks that could result in the rise of a regime that is hostile to China. One of the greatest gifts to Beijing of the Sino-Russian rapprochement [has been] a passive 4,200-kilometer border.”

In that context, China will support Putin if he remains in charge in Moscow. If Putin falls, Beijing will wait for the dust to settle and cultivate the new power structure, perhaps with a fresh chance to counsel that Russia extricate itself from Ukraine and refocus on long-term competition with the United States/Western alliance.

But for Xi and China, Russian internal turmoil and stumbles in the face of successful Western-backed Ukrainian military opposition and sanctions will further threaten greater isolation. A pragmatic option would be to reduce tensions with the United States and Europe, but Xi has proven to be more ideological than his recent predecessors. The loss of China’s main strategic partner is more likely to deepen strategic mistrust of the United States rather than greater diplomatic or economic accommodation.

—John K. Culver is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) senior intelligence officer with thirty-five years of experience as a leading analyst of East Asian affairs, including security, economic, and foreign-policy dimensions.

Prigozhin is the devil Beijing doesn’t know

While China has been preparing for a range of political and military outcomes amid the Ukrainian counteroffensive, it appears surprised by Prigozhin’s astonishing rebellion.

Beijing will seek to avoid taking any public side in the Russian domestic political struggle, at least explicitly. Still, authoritative state media such as the People’s Daily, are hinting that Beijing prefers that Putin prevail over Prigozhin. It’s not hard to understand why: Putin has been a reliable supporter of the relationship with China, has deep personal connections with the Chinese leadership, tacitly accepts Moscow’s “junior partnership” with Beijing, and has, up to now, largely maintained political stability within Russia.

Prigozhin is the devil Beijing doesn’t know. The head of the Wagner mercenary group has a mercurial (arguably volcanic) temperament which the Chinese leadership could find difficult to manage. Beijing was also likely troubled by his comment that Russia “needs to take a page out of North Korea’s book for a certain number of years,” as China can ill afford another nuclear-armed pariah state on its borders.

Beijing will struggle to find ways to assist Putin, however, although it appears, as of this writing, that he has prevailed over Prigozhin, who has reportedly accepted exile in Belarus.

People’s Republic of China (PRC) intelligence support for Putin seems risky and unlikely if Prigozhin resumes his apparent coup attempt. While Prigozhin has a complicated and often fraught relationship with the Russian security services, he appears to have ties with elements of the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service, as well as other elements of the force structures. Wagner Group’s stunning advance before Prigozhin’s about-face implies at least the tacit compliance of some figures in Russian military intelligence. Moreover, Wagner and the GRU shared a base in Russia’s Krasnodar district as late as 2020. Accordingly, if Chinese security services share intelligence with their Russian counterparts on anti-Putin coup plotters, they face a high probability of discovery and risk long-term damage to bilateral relations if an “anti-Putin” ascends to the power vertical in Russian politics. Moreover, sharing any intelligence on potential coup plotters would not only risk the compromise of methods and sources but also be an admission that PRC security services are spying within Russia.

If matters escalate again, Beijing might attempt to enable the Kremlin to rush troops back to Moscow from Central Asia, in a tacit, unspoken arrangement with Russia. Tajikistan hosts up to seven thousand Russian troops, while another five hundred are reportedly deployed to Kyrgyzstan (some troops have already been shifted to the front in Ukraine). China could offer security guarantees to Central Asian governments, indirectly enabling the Kremlin to further draw down in the region and shift forces to Moscow. This measure carries risks for the Kremlin and Zhongnanhai, however, and may be ineffectual. Putin’s fate will largely be determined by the loyalty of his subordinates, not the number of military personnel in Moscow.

If tensions between Putin and Prigozhin escalate again, Xi might decide that a direct or implied expression of support for Putin, perhaps through a phone call, is his best course of action. An intervention into Russian domestic politics would mark a bold step, however, and risks damaging bilateral relations with Putin’s eventual successor.

Unless it chooses to run significant risks, Beijing has little ability to influence events in Russia. Despite the considerable risks a Prigozhin regime would hold for the PRC, the Chinese leadership will likely observe events, rather than attempt to shape them.

—Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, where he leads the center’s efforts on Chinese energy security. Webster edits the China-Russia Report, an independent, non-partisan newsletter exploring developments in Sino-Russian relations.

Without Wagner, Putin loses a substantial part of his African foothold

Prigozhin has not been defeated yet. The way he decided to turn around to avoid bloodshed gives the impression that he controls not only the narrative, but also the future of Putin’s twenty-three-year hold on power. Should Putin leave Prigozhin out there without arresting him? What about his actions and influence in Africa, where he has ongoing military operations?

Undoubtedly this rebellion will impact the African theater, particularly Mali, Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, and Sudan where Wagner has settled its troops. Whereas until now the interests of the Russian government and the Wagner group aligned, it will now be necessary for these countries to do business with two Russian actors with rival interests. This rivalry will put their African allies in an awkward position.

Prigozhin’s uprising will lead to a clarification on the nature of Russia’s partnership with these African countries. Moscow, which knows how influential Wagner is in these countries, may be tempted to cut off its supplies on the continent. These governments born from military coups rely on Wagner mercenaries to keep their power and/or secure their countries against jihadist movements. Wagner made very profitable deals in Mali, Sudan, and CAR on everything from gold to coffee to sugar to diamonds.

The rebellion of Wagner’s boss and the need for Putin to show that he still has the situation under control could force Bamako and Bangui to distance themselves from Prigozhin in order to maintain their alliances with Moscow.

Indeed beyond Wagner, Moscow has become the leading exporter of arms in Africa, but also of wheat. Russian state-owned companies are also active in the mining, hydrocarbons, and even civil nuclear sectors. But if Russia seems to be a more reliable partner, what about Putin, whose power seems weakened?

Finally, Wagner’s most visible impact is actually on the information front: Prigozhin—who was closely tied with the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service—used CAR and Mali to foster anti-Western sentiment, gain sympathy for Putin, and fuel his propaganda via RIA FAN, the flagship of Prigozhin’s Patriot Media Group. Without this powerful tool, I’m not sure that the Russian influence will remain strong in these countries.

—Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

What does Prigozhin’s coup attempt mean for Ukraine’s counteroffensive?

How will Prigozhin’s brief mutiny against the Russian Ministry of Defense ultimately impact the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive? On the immediate frontline, many obstacles facing Ukrainian forces such as landmines, fortifications, and the Russian troops defending them will likely remain unchanged. However, Wagner’s disruption of Russia’s military command and logistics network may increase the possibility of a Ukrainian breakthrough on the battlefield.

Wagner’s seizure of the Southern Military District headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, which has largely served as the forward command center for the Russian war effort, will degrade the timely command and control of Russian forces. A confused or disrupted chain of command will significantly impact the Russian military’s ability to conduct an effective defense-in-depth and prevent a coordinated response to Ukrainian offensive efforts. Roadblocks set up by the Russian government, and even deliberate damage to the M4 highway, designed to contain the Wagner group, will also restrict its military’s ability to shift forces and supplies between fronts in Ukraine. Evidence that Wagner fired on military helicopters will require Russian aviation in the area to operate more cautiously and complicate their ability to strike Ukrainian forces. Reports that some Russian units did not oppose Wagner’s initial march may also lower Moscow’s confidence in the loyalty of its forces and officers. While Prigozhin’s rebellion ultimately may be short-lived, his actions will create weaknesses within the Russian military’s command structure which Ukraine can exploit on the battlefield.

—Jacob Mezey is a program assistant in the Forward Defense program in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

This is the start of the end of the war

The attempted coup d’etat that the Wagner mercenaries sprung on the Kremlin in the middle of the evening on Friday has come to a rather unexpected and dissatisfying conclusion. What looks like a backroom deal allegedly brokered by Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has turned the Wagner convoy around. The Wagner group had a serious battle plan with the Russian armed forces and security services seemingly unconsolidated enough to respond quickly. Prigozhin and the Kremlin both let loose the cry of war and stepped over their own self-proclaimed red lines before Prigozhin decided to fold the operation at seemingly the last moment. However, this rebellion has shown that the Putin regime was on its last legs (though they may now reconsolidate the power structures with Prigozhin holding a great deal more power than before).

That the rebel forces were even able to get as far as they did with little opposition and to take over Rostov-on-Don—which is also the headquarters of the Russian war against Ukraine—has shown the Putin regime to be weak and incoherent beyond all previous suppositions. It is hard to know how the Putin regime can regain its legitimacy after this. Putin had voiced his fears when he compared the situation to 1917, although 1905 may have been a better parallel. One way or the other, this is the payout stage of the gamble to invade Ukraine and this is the start of the end of the war. The Russian population and Putin’s elites had countenanced this war when it was far away—they will certainly think twice about doing so again after the conclusion of this farce.

—Vladislav Davidzon is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, based in France. Since 2018, he has served as a co-producer for a television series on the effects of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The post Experts react: What Russia’s Wagner Group rebellion means for Putin, Ukraine, China, and more appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Prigozhin walks away. Where does his halted mutiny leave Putin?

Atlantic Council — Sat, 24 Jun 2023 22:20:53 +0000

JUST IN

What’s done cannot be undone. Wagner Group founder Yevgeniy Prigozhin launched a mutiny against the Russian ministry of defense this weekend, taking over the Southern Military District headquarters in the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don before turning toward Moscow. Then just as suddenly, he halted his advance without a violent confrontation. Hours after charging Prigozhin with treason, Russian President Vladimir Putin today agreed to drop the charges and Prigozhin was set to move to Belarus, whose strongman president negotiated the deal. What happened, and what does it say about the stability of Putin’s regime and its war in Ukraine? Our experts are here to make sense of it all.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

John Herbst (@JohnEdHerbst) Senior director of the Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine
Hanna Liubakova (@HannaLiubakova) nonresident fellow with the Eurasia Center, and journalist and researcher from Belarus
Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried) Weiser family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe

Why now?

“This crisis has been building since last fall,” explains John, when in the wake of Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive, Prigozhin began to criticize Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and General Valery Gerasimov for their failures on the battlefield in Ukraine.
The Kremlin recently tried to rein in Prigozhin by requiring private defense company soldiers to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense by July 1. “Prigozhin loudly refused to do so. It may well be that he struck now because he saw that deadline as a danger to his control of his troops,” John adds. As part of today’s deal struck with Prigozhin, the Kremlin said Wagner troops will sign agreements with the Ministry of Defense.
A main takeaway for Hanna is that “Prigozhin’s armed rebellion indicates a political crisis within Russia and shatters the myth of Russia’s invincibility and overwhelming power.”
“In terms of numbers of forces available, Prigozhin didn’t stand a chance,” says Dan. But, he adds, “Putin’s problem” is that the forces were available in theory but not in practice, with many Russian military personnel and resources instead fighting a failing war in Ukraine.

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What stopped him?

An unexpected figure stepped in to negotiate and claimed credit for the deal that ended the coup attempt: Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka. “Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Lukashenka has declared unwavering loyalty to the Kremlin,” Hanna notes, even though this is unpopular with the Belarusian public.
While Lukashenka’s position could be strengthened by this mediation, his regime might face long-term repercussions. “The Belarusian democratic forces and the Kalinouski regiment fighting in Ukraine against the Russian troops may use these chaotic developments to appeal to the elites and the military to side with them,” Hanna says.
“Whatever arrangements Prigozhin has extracted,” Dan says, “Putin’s authority is diminished, as was Gorbachev’s after Boris Yeltsin defeated the coup. And this is worse: In 1991 the coup failed. But Prigozhin seems to have pulled off something.”

What’s next?

“It’s like Prigozhin is the person who looked behind the screen at the Wizard of Oz and saw the great and terrible Oz was just this little frightened man,” says John. “Putin has been diminished for all time by this affair.”
“It may not be a 1917 moment for Russia,” says Dan, drawing a comparison with the fall of Czar Nicholas II of Russia. “But the hot breath of failure is coming closer to Putin.”

The post Prigozhin walks away. Where does his halted mutiny leave Putin? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin is losing control of Russia

John E. Herbst — Sat, 24 Jun 2023 19:13:09 +0000

This article was updated on June 24 to reflect the deal between Wagner Group forces and the Russian government.

Over the past forty-eight hours, the news out of Russia has been riveting. Yevgeniy Prigozhin, leader of the Wagner group of mercenaries, announced that the Russian military bombed his troops’ camps in Ukraine and that he would march with his troops for a reckoning with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. As armored cars appeared on the streets of Moscow, Wagner forces took control of the city of Rostov-on-Don, a major logistics hub for the war on Ukraine, and sent a column toward the capital. The Federal Security Service (FSB) indicted Prigozhin for instigating an armed rebellion, and Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a speech labeling Prigozhin’s actions as treasonous (without using his name) and claimed that all of the resources of the government would be used to end this threat to the nation. Prigozhin meanwhile issued a statement that stressed his quarrel was with Shoigu and did not mention Putin.

Then just as suddenly, Prigozhin called off his advance and withdrew, saying that he wanted to avoid Russian bloodshed and that this had always been part of the plan. But then Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka negotiated a settlement with Prigozhin on behalf of Putin that, according to Putin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, led Prigozhin to send his troops back from the approach to Moscow and from Rostov-on-Don to their base. The settlement involved the Russian government dropping its criminal charges against Prigozhin and allowed him to depart peacefully to Belarus.

What does all this mean? This crisis has been building since last fall, when in the wake of Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive, Prigozhin began to criticize publicly both Shoigu and General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the General Staff, for their failures on the battlefield and also for not sending Wagner the weapons and supplies necessary to conduct operations. Last year at times, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov would join Prigozhin in criticizing Shoigu and Gerasimov. Earlier this month, it appeared that Prigozhin would be reined in as all private defense company soldiers were ordered to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense, which would mean that Prigozhin’s mercenaries would actually be paid for and under the control of the Ministry of Defense. While the stated deadline was announced as July 1, Prigozhin loudly refused to do so. It may well be that he struck now because he saw that deadline as a danger to his control of his troops.

Of course, all the resources at the ostensible command of Putin—the army and air force, Rosgvardiya (the presidential guard), and the FSB—greatly overmatch Wagner. But Prigozhin’s forces in Ukraine were notably more effective than the army in Ukraine and were widely seen as responsible for the few victories Moscow has achieved since Ukraine’s 2022 counteroffensive. So, he has a standing in Russia not matched by Shoigu or any army commander. Prigozhin has also enjoyed a reputation for taking better care of his troops than the army does. These things are important because Prigozhin, like Putin, is appealing to the loyalty of the soldiers on the other side. There are reports that the forty-fifth airborne brigade and other Russian units refused to leave their barracks to stop Wagner. In short, Putin could not be sure that an order to crack down on Wagner would be carried out successfully. This was true despite the fact Kadyrov said that his Chechens would stop Wagner and some of his forces were apparently en route to Rostov-on-Don before Prigozhin stood down. But this is a double-edged development as Kadyrov is despised by the FSB and the Ministry of Interior. They do not want to see Kadyrov’s position in Russia strengthened.

All this is not the picture of a strongman in full control of his country’s politics or his own fate.

So, what is the meaning of this high-stakes melodrama? Most analysts have been saying even recently that Putin’s control in Russia was rock solid. That Prigozhin got this far demonstrates something rather different. Despite the incessant efforts of the Russian media, the Russian elite has long understood that Putin’s big invasion of Ukraine has been a disaster. In his frequent criticism of Shoigu and Gerasimov over the past nine months, Prigozhin has also spoken about the overall problems in Russia’s war on Ukraine and suggested that perhaps it was a mistake.

It is true that the denouement seems to remove Prigozhin as a not quite controllable player on Moscow’s political field. His feud with the military and increasingly loud criticism of both the conduct of the war and the decision to launch the big invasion now seem a thing of the past—a clear gain for the Kremlin. At the same time, Prigozhin challenged Putin and elicited a threat to punish him for treason, but then Putin let him walk away unscathed. All this is not the picture of a strongman in full control of his country’s politics or his own fate.

There is some speculation now that in Belarus Prigozhin should stay away from windows in multistory buildings and watch carefully what he ingests. And yes, Putin could easily reach Prigozhin in Belarus. But that too would make the Russian dictator look dishonorable and weak. Nor would it remove the impression that Putin was unable by force to stop Prigozhin’s marching troops, who were greeted as heroes in Rostov-on-Don. Those images cannot be erased.

While Putin did not have to divert significant resources from the war on Ukraine to deal with the Prigozhin challenge, the turmoil certainly hindered planning at the Wagner-occupied headquarters in Rostov-on-Don. It also sent a clear signal of unsteady leadership to the already demoralized Russian troops in Ukraine. This can only help Ukrainian forces as they continue their counter-offensive.

John Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine.

The post Putin is losing control of Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report Special Edition: Prigozhin and Wagner forces mutiny against Moscow

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Sat, 24 Jun 2023 17:04:28 +0000

On the evening of Friday, June 23, Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin effectively broke ties with Moscow and initiated a mutiny against the Russian military, successfully occupying Rostov. Russian President Vladimir Putin condemned Prigozhin’s actions in an address to the nation as Russian authorities secured Moscow and reportedly engaged Wagner forces around Rostov. At the time of writing on the afternoon of Saturday, June 24, Prigozhin appears to have accepted a pause in further escalation, stating that Wagner forces will return to base. Today’s special edition of the Russian War Report provides an overview of the last thirty-six hours, including details on how Prigozhin’s rhetoric escalated into open conflict, open-source analysis of the latest footage, and a review of some of the competing narratives on Telegram and across the Russian information ecosystem.

Tracking narratives

How Prigozhin used Telegram to declare war on the Russian Ministry of Defense – and then suddenly pull back

Putin calls Prigozhin’s “criminal adventure” an “armed mutiny” and “treason”

Security

Wagner forces enter Rostov, occupy Russian Southern Military District headquarters

Wagner forces emerge south of Moscow in Lipetsk

Explosion at oil depot in Russian city of Voronezh

Media policy

Amid chaos in the Russian information space the Kremlin attempts to limit information on Prigozhin

How Prigozhin used Telegram to declare war on the Russian Ministry of Defense – and then suddenly pull back

The Russian-founded messaging platform Telegram, which became a primary tool circulating pro-Kremlin narratives throughout Russia’s war in Ukraine, achieved an unprecedented level of influence on June 23, with Prigozhin wielding it to vent his rage at the Russian defense establishment and launch a mercenary mutiny. For months, Prigozhin has engaged in rhetorical warfare against his rivals in the Kremlin, in particular Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Valery Gerasimov. The Wagner founder blamed them for ineptitude over the course of the war in Ukraine, including a months-long public argument about supplying his forces with adequate munitions during its siege of Bakhmut.

Prigozhin’s one-man war against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reached new heights in a series of Telegram posts that began on Friday, June 23, and continued into Saturday. At 10:50 am Moscow time, he posted a thirty-minute video to his Prigozhin Press Service Telegram channel excoriating the MoD, accusing its leadership of deceiving Putin and the Russian public in early 2022 into believing that Ukrainian aggression was imminent, and that Russia had no choice but to invade Ukraine.

Sitting in a chair in front of a Wagner Group flag pinned to an otherwise blank wall, Prigozhin proceeded to make his case against the MoD and its entire war effort. “Right now, the [MoD] is trying to deceive society and the president and tell a story that there was insane aggression from the Ukrainian side and they were going to attack us together with the whole NATO bloc,” Prigozhin said effectively undermining the Kremlin’s entire case for war. “Therefore, on February 24, the so-called special operation was launched for completely different reasons.” He described Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a “monstrous shame show” and an “incompetently planned operation” conducted by “a bunch of creatures” and “mentally ill scum” who “don’t have the balls” to fight aggressively with the necessary decisiveness to win the war, including their unwillingness to use tactical nuclear weapons. “The grandfathers are rather weak. They cannot get out of their comfort zone,” he added.

“A handful of dipshits decided for some reason that they were so cunning that no one would realize what they were doing with their military exercises, and nobody would stop them when they went to Kyiv,” Prigozhin said. He went on to blame Shoigu for killing thousands of capable Russian soldiers, and he directed his ire at Russian oligarchs enriching themselves on the war while seeking to return former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to power. “Our sacred war against those who wrong the Russian people has turned into racketeering, into theft,” he said.

Prigozhin later added that he would follow up the video with a second “interview,” but this would turn out to be a gross understatement, as the initial video was merely the first of more than a dozen messages he would post to his Prigozhin Press Service Telegram channel over the next thirty-six hours.

Later in the day at 5:10 pm Moscow time, Prigozhin amped up his criticism of the MoD even further with a Telegram audio post in which he accused it of committing “genocide” against Russians. Calling out Shoigu and Gerasimov directly, Prigozhin said “they should be held responsible for the genocide of the Russian people, the murder of tens of thousands of Russian citizens, and the transfer of Russian territories to the enemy.”

As angry audio clips of Prigozhin continued to appear into the evening, multiple pro-Wagner Telegram channels circulated a video around 9:00 pm Moscow time purporting to document the aftermath of a Russian airstrike on a Wagner encampment. The video shows scenes of a wooded area lined with stone paths subjected to a moderate amount debris and several fires burning in trenches; a body is briefly seen towards the end of the clip. It is unclear where or when the footage was filmed, and it brought to mind similar suspicious footage contextually devoid footage circulated prior to the February 2022 invasion accusing Ukraine of engaging in sabotage and other aggression against Russia.

The drama continues. Prigozhin publishes a video which he claims shows the aftermath of a rocket attack by the Russian ministry of defence on a Wagner camp. “Many of our guys died…We will make a decision how to respond to this evil. The next move is ours” pic.twitter.com/o7l14yVBMX
— Pjotr Sauer (@PjotrSauer) June 23, 2023

Within ten minutes, Prigozhin posted another angry statement, this time accusing the MoD of attacking his forces at the camp. “Today, seeing that we aren’t broken, they decided to launch rocket attacks on our rear camps,” he exclaimed. “A huge number of fighters were killed, our comrades in arms. We’ll decide how to respond to this atrocity. The ball’s in our court.”

Approximately fifteen minutes later, Prigozhin effectively declared war against the MoD in another Telegram audio clip. “The Wagner Group commanders’ council has made a decision,” he announced. “The evil that the country’s military leadership is carrying out must be stopped. They neglect soldiers’ lives. They’ve forgotten the word ‘justice’ and we’re bringing it back. Those who destroyed our guys today, those who destroyed many tens of thousands of Russian soldiers’ lives will be punished.” Later, he described his forces as “25,000 strong,” adding, “We’re going to get to the bottom of the lawlessness in this country.”

As Prigozhin continued posting additional threats and taunts on Telegram, the MoD described the alleged footage circulated on pro-Wagner channels as fake, while Russia’s National Anti-Terrorism Committee announced that the Federal Security Service, or FSB, would initiate a criminal case against Prigozhin “on the fact of calling for an armed rebellion.”

Prigozhin continued posting on and off throughout Saturday as his forces advanced north in the direction of Moscow. Then just before 8:30pm local time, he uploaded another message, stating he would return Wagner forces to their camps. It remains unclear whether he intends to keep that promise.

Prigozhin just now: "They wanted to disband Wagner. We set out on June 23 for the "March of Justice". In a day we marched just short of 200 km from Moscow. During this time, we have not shed a single drop of the blood of our fighters. Now is the moment when blood can be shed.…
— Mary Ilyushina (@maryilyushina) June 24, 2023

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington, DC

Putin calls Prigozhin’s “criminal adventure” an “armed mutiny” and “treason”

After spending Friday night away from cameras, Putin released a televised statement late Saturday morning. Addressing the Russian public as well as the armed forces and security personnel “who are now fighting in their combat positions, repulsing enemy attacks,” Putin described Prigozhin’s actions as a “criminal adventure” and an “armed mutiny.”

“Today, Russia is waging a tough struggle for its future, repelling the aggression of neo-Nazis and their patrons,” he stated. “The entire military, economic, and informational machine of the West is directed against us. We are fighting for the lives and security of our people, for our sovereignty and independence, for the right to be and remain Russia, a state with a thousand-year history.”

“This battle, when the fate of our nation is being decided, requires consolidation of all forces,” Putin continued. “It requires unity, consolidation, and a sense of responsibility, and everything that weakens us, any strife that our external enemies can use and do so to subvert us from within, must be discarded. Therefore, any actions that split our nation are essentially a betrayal of our people, of our comrades-in-arms who are now fighting at the frontline. This is a knife in the back of our country and our people.”

Comparing the mutiny to 1917, when “Russians were killing Russians and brothers were killing brothers,” Putin declared, “We will not allow this to happen again. We will protect our people and our statehood from any threats, including from internal betrayal…. Inflated ambitions and personal interests have led to treason—treason against our country, our people and the common cause which Wagner Group soldiers, and commanders were fighting and dying for.”

“Once again, any internal revolt is a deadly threat to our statehood and our nation. It is a blow to Russia, to our people,” he continued. “Our actions to defend the fatherland from this threat will be harsh. All those who have consciously chosen the path of betrayal, planned an armed mutiny, and taken the path of blackmail and terrorism, will inevitably be punished and will answer before the law and our people…. Those who staged the mutiny and took up arms against their comrades—they have betrayed Russia and will be brought to account. I urge those who are being dragged into this crime not to make a fatal and tragic mistake but make the only right choice: to stop taking part in criminal actions.”

“I am certain that we will preserve and defend what we hold dear and sacred, and together with our motherland we will overcome any hardships and become even stronger,” Putin concluded.

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington, DC

Wagner forces enter Rostov, occupy Russian Southern Military District headquarters

Over the course of Prigozhin’s Telegram posts, he boasted that his “25,000 strong” Wagner forces had marched across the border from Ukraine into Russia before claiming they had shot down a Russian armed forces helicopter before entering the city of Rostov. For many hours overnight, he provided no evidence to back his claims. This finally began to change as footage emerged on Russian Telegram, ultimately confirming that Prigozhin had indeed occupied Rostov.

At 3:47 am Moscow time, the pro-Wagner channel VChK-OGPU posted a video in which a helicopter can be heard circling over Rostov at night. The channel noted, however, “No one has yet seen the video of the Wagner PMC column and the battles with the Ministry of Defense.” Two minutes later, the channel changed its tune by sharing a second video appearing to show rocket fire and bursts of assault rifles, describing it as the “first video reportedly showing fighting between PMC Wagner and Ministry of Defense units.” The footage circulated widely on Telegram but remained unverified.

Less than twenty minutes later, at 4:09 am, VChK-OGPU shared a third clip showing what appeared to be a convoy of Wagner tanks, trucks, and other vehicles crossing a checkpoint without any opposition. Unlike the previous clips, however, the footage was easily visible, as it appeared to have been recorded during the pre-dawn twilight. According to open-source sun-tracking data, the sun rose in Rostov this morning at 4:25 am, with twilight commencing at 3:50 am, putting the video’s release squarely in the middle of pre-dawn twilight. The exact location of the footage is still under review and cannot be confirmed.

At 5:01 am, not long after sunrise, the Verum Regnum Telegram channel circulated video clips of what appeared to show Wagner forces arriving in central Rostov, just outside the MoD’s Southern Military District headquarters at the intersection of Pushkinskaya Ulitsa and Budonnovskiy Prospekt. One of the videos appeared to show forces beginning to set up a perimeter around the MoD building.

Telegram footage allegedly of Wagner forces in central Rostov. (Source: Verum Regnum/archive)

Top: Highlights from the video showing a tank in front of the southwest corner of Pushkinskaya Ulitsa and Budonnovskiy Prospekt (top left) and a man recording footage on his phone in front of the intersection’s northwest corner in front of the MoD’s Southern Military District building (top right). Bottom: Google Street View of the same intersection facing westward, where both corners are visible. (Source: Verum Regnum/archive, top left and top right; Google Street View/archive, bottom)

A second clip showed how that presence had expanded with the placement of additional armored vehicles blocking the entire intersection from vehicle traffic.

Wagner soldiers (left) and armored vehicles (center and right) block the intersection in front of the Southern Military District building in Rostov. (Source: Verum Regnum/archive)

Around 7:30 am Moscow time, a pair of videos appeared on the WAGNER Z GROUP/Z PMC WAGNER’Z Telegram channel and Prigozhin’s press channel respectively. The first video showed Prigozhin and his entourage entering the inner courtyard of the Southern Military District building. Prigozhin is later seen bragging about his successes with Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov while demanding that Yevkurov speak to him respectfully. In the second video, he addressed the camera and bragged that he had captured Rostov without firing a single shot.

Just wow. A video has surfaced showing Prigozhin at the Southern Military District HQ in Rostov-on-Don talking to (and HUMILIATING) Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov. He threatens to blockade Rostov and head for Moscow!

I have extreme trouble understanding Yevkurov and… pic.twitter.com/jGr9gaLB1i
— Kevin Rothrock (@KevinRothrock) June 24, 2023

#UPDATE Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, leading a mutiny to bring down Moscow's top brass, said Saturday his fighters captured the army HQ in Russia's Rostov-on-Don "without firing a single shot" and claimed to have the support of locals. pic.twitter.com/5F0uC0pDFQ
— AFP News Agency (@AFP) June 24, 2023

Later, prior to 2:00 pm Moscow time, new footage emerged showing people running from the neighborhood of the MoD building. Initial reports suggested it was a Russian Armed Forces attack within the vicinity, but this has not been confirmed.

The explosion occurred near the headquarters of the Southern Military District in Rostov. pic.twitter.com/CUuygkpiZq
— Maria Drutska (@maria_drutska) June 24, 2023

The many civilians running from the sound of an explosion were likely due to the crowds that came out to observe Wagner’s occupation of the MoD building. In one video, people can be seen chatting with Wagner soldiers and thanking them.

Rostov – people approaching the mercenaries to thank them and shake hands. pic.twitter.com/teLqMGtMWh
— Dmitri (@wartranslated) June 24, 2023

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington, DC

Wagner forces emerge south of Moscow in Lipetsk

The governor of Lipetsk, Igor Artamonov, announced Saturday afternoon that Wagner forces had entered the region, approximately 400 km south of Moscow. The Associated Press noted that the governor added, “The situation is under control.” Meanwhile, footage emerged that appeared to show excavators destroying the highway between Lipetsk and Moscow.

Digging up the road to make roadblocks. Lipetsk. pic.twitter.com/ObDcEHFPOo
— Michael Weiss (@michaeldweiss) June 24, 2023

At the time of writing there were conflicting reports as to whether the Wagner convoy had traveled from Rostov or was comprised of defectors from the Russian Armed Forces.

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington, DC

Explosion at oil depot in Russian city of Voronezh

On June 24, videos depicting an explosion at an oil depot in the region of Voronezh were widely circulated online. The DFRLab identified the precise location of the explosion and confirmed the videos as authentic.

The video published online was captured from buildings in close proximity to the Leroy Merlin store in Voronezh, as clearly observed in the footage. The DFRLab also corroborated the location of the oil depot Red Flag Oil Combine (Комбинат Красное знамя) and identified approximate coordinates for the area where the video was recorded. Below, the screenshot on the left is extracted from the video, while the image on the right is from Google Maps, illustrating the precise positions of the oil depot, store, and the recorded video.

Photo shows the locations of oil depot, store, recorded video, marked as blue, yellow, red respectively. (Source: Left Twitter/archive, Right Google Maps/archive)

Additional footage documented the shelling of a residential area in Voronezh. The footage reveals visible damage to cars. In order to verify the location of the building, the DFRLab utilized reverse image search via Google and Yandex, then cross-referenced the results with Google Maps, verifying the location of the shelling.

Imagery from Google Maps (left) shows the location of residential area in Voronezh (center and right). (Source: Google Maps/archive left; RtrDonetsk/archive, center; @christogrozev/archive, right)

The location of residential area as seen on Yandex Maps. (Source: Yandex/archive)

—Sayyara Mammadova, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Amid chaos in the Russian information space the Kremlin attempts to limit information on Prigozhin

According to TASS, Russian social network VKontakte (VK) and search engine Yandex are blocking content related to Prigozhin. Reportedly, instead of Prigozhin’s statement that was published on June 23 at 9:52 pm Moscow time, a VK page for Prigozhin’s Concord company displayed a message that the material was blocked on the territory of Russia on the basis of the decision of the Prosecutor General’s Office. At the time of the writing, Prigozhin’s posts on Concord VK page were available, though none of them correspond to 9:52 pm Moscow time. TASS added that the Yandex search results for Prigozhin notifies a reader that some of the search results are hidden in accordance with federal law. Using a virtual private network (VPN), the DFRLab replicated the search of the content mentioned by TASS and found that they are accessible from other locations. The restrictions seem to be geofenced to Russia.

Separately, TASS reported that there are Telegram-access disruptions detected in various Russian cities, including Moscow, St. Petersburg, Voronezh, and Volgograd Oblasts.

Russia’s internet regulator Roskomnadzor warned that the government can place internet performance restrictions in locations where counter-terrorist operations might take place, such as Moscow, Voronezh, or Rostov. Roskomnadzor also added that the use of Telegram is not limited for now.

Meanwhile, the Telegram channel Faridaily reported that residents of Moscow and the surrounding region are receiving calls from unknown mobile numbers with messages from Wagner. According to the Telegram post, one person received a call on their Viber messenger with a recording of Prigozhin’s appeal about “restoring justice.” Another person received a call on behalf of Wagner with an automated voice encouraging them to join Wagner when their units move toward Moscow.

Meanwhile, footage from Russian state media Rossiya 24 surfaced online showing a confused news anchor. Apparently lacking instructions from the Kremlin on how to report about the armed insurrection in Russia, they said, “Next we are going for short commercial and then… commercial.”

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report Special Edition: Prigozhin and Wagner forces mutiny against Moscow appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Yevgeniya Gaber joins Nevşin Mengü for Bugün Ne Oldu (What Happened Today) to discuss Ukraine war

aozen — Fri, 23 Jun 2023 13:58:05 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

The post Yevgeniya Gaber joins Nevşin Mengü for Bugün Ne Oldu (What Happened Today) to discuss Ukraine war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Wagner attempts to draft gamers as drone pilots

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 18:12:27 +0000

Security

Ukrainian counteroffensive sees advances in Zaporizhzhia and eastern Ukraine

Wagner attempts to draft gamers as UAV pilots

Tracking narratives

Deripaska blames hackers after his website briefly takes credit for potential war crime

Rumors of alleged death of popular pro-Kremlin war correspondent gain traction on Twitter

Ukrainian counteroffensive sees advances in Zaporizhzhia and eastern Ukraine

On June 19, Ukrainian forces launched counteroffensive actions in at least three areas and appear to have made gains in Zaporizhzhia and eastern Ukraine. The Telegram channel of Russian military blogger WarGonzo reported that Ukrainian forces continued attacks northwest, northeast, and southwest of Bakhmut and advanced near Krasnopolivka. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar announced that over the past week Ukrainian troops advanced up to seven kilometers in the direction of Zaporizhzhia and retook 113 square kilometers of territory. Russian Telegram channels also reported that fighting was ongoing south and southwest of Orikhiv on June 19. Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk oblasts continue to be the most active areas of the frontline, as the Ukrainian army attempts to advance in the directions of Novodarivka, Pryutne, Makarivka, Rivnopil, Novodanylivka, and Robotyne.

On June 17, the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks west and south of Kreminna. It also stated that the Russian army had repelled Ukrainian attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk sector. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces continued operations around Velyka Novosilka near the border between Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

According to Ukrainian forces, Russian forces conducted offensive actions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The Ukrainian military reported forty-five combat engagements with Russian forces near Yampolivka, Torske, Hryhorivka, Spirne, Avdiyivka, Krasnohorivka, Marinka, Pobieda, Novomykhailivka, and Donetsk’s Dibrova and Orikhovo-Vasylivka. According to Ukraine, the Russian army continued to shell villages in the direction of Marinka, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Lyman, and Kupiansk. Ukraine also alleged that Russian forces launched Kalibr cruise missiles from a submarine in the Black Sea and Shahed drones from the eastern coast of the Sea of Azov.

On June 20, Kyrylo Budanov, chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence for the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, alleged that Russian troops mined the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant’s cooling pond, which is necessary for the safe operation of the plant. According to Budanov, if Russia triggers an explosion, there is a “high probability that there will be significant problems.” Budanov did not provide any evidence to support the allegation, and the statement cannot be independently verified at this time. If true, however, it would put the nuclear plant at greater risk of a significant accident. The power plant complex, Europe’s largest, has been under occupation since February 2022.

On January 22, the governor of Russian-occupied Crimea accused Ukraine of targeting a bridge that connects the peninsula to Kherson Oblast, near the village of Chonhar. In a Telegram post, Vladimir Sal’do alleged that Ukraine struck the bridge with “British Storm Shadow missiles,” creating a hole in the middle of the bridge.

As fierce hostilities continue in eastern and southern Ukraine, there are signs of a new wave of arrests in Russia, including of people with ties to Ukraine. On June 20, Russian state media outlet RIA Novosti announced that a woman of Ukrainian origin was detained in Saransk and charged with treason.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Wagner attempts to draft gamers as UAV pilots

A June 19 Telegram post from Russian opposition news outlet Verstka claimed that Wagner Group is encouraging gamers to apply to serve as unmanned aerial vehicle pilots in the war against Ukraine. The media outlet reported that no prior military experience was required to apply for the position. Posts from Wagner emerged on Vkontakte the same day, inviting gamers with experience in “manipulating joysticks in flight simulators” to enroll.

Wagner ad recruiting gamers as UAV pilots. (Source: VK)

Verstka, which contacted a Wagner recruiter as part of its reporting, stated that the campaign aims to recruit soldiers to pilot “copters and more serious machines.” In this particular context, “copters” (коптеры) is a reference to commercial drones that are sold to the public and have been widely used in the war against Ukraine. A May 19 investigation published by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project found that Chinese manufacturers have reportedly continued to provide Russian armed forces with DJI drones through third parties in Kazakhstan.

Verstka also noted that in 2022, the Russian defense ministry attempted to recruit gamers with a targeted ad campaign that invited them to play “with real rules, with no cheat codes or saves.”

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Deripaska blames hackers after his website briefly takes credit for potential war crime

The Russian-language website of Russian industrialist and US-sanctioned oligarch Oleg Deripaska briefly displayed an article appearing to take credit for deporting Ukrainian children to Russian-occupied Crimea in partnership with Kremlin official Maria Lvova-Belova, who is already facing an International Criminal Court arrest warrant for allegedly deporting children.

Yaroslav Trofimov, chief foreign affairs correspondent at the Wall Street Journal, noted the article’s appearance and disappearance in a June 15 tweet. Trofimov shared screengrabs of the article, which by that time had already been deleted from Deripaska’s Russian-language website, deripaska.ru. A complete copy of the article can be found at the Internet Archive.

Later in the article, it added, “Separately, the Fund and personally Oleg Vladimirovich [Deripaska] express their gratitude to Maria Lvova-Belova and her project ‘In Hands to Children,’ which not only provided methodological materials, but also found an opportunity to send employees for psychological work with affected babies.” In March 2023, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Lvova-Belova and Russian President Vladimir Putin, alleging they are responsible for unlawful deportation and transport of children from Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.

In a response to Russian independent news outlet Meduza, which also covered the incident, a team of representatives for Deripaska called the article a “gross fake press-release” and blamed hackers for the article’s appearance. “The team added that Deripaska ‘unequivocally condemns the separation of children from their parents’ and that he is ‘one of the very few prominent Russian industrialists who openly criticizes the fratricidal war and consistently advocates for peace in Ukraine, as well as a reduction in global military spending,’” Meduza noted.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Rumors of alleged death of popular pro-Kremlin war correspondent gain traction on Twitter

Rumors are spreading online that claim Ukrainian forces killed pro-Kremlin war correspondent Semyon Pegov, who operates an influential group of social media accounts under the name Wargonzo. The rumor first spread on Twitter on June 19 following the release of a graphic video from the 73rd Naval Center of Operations documenting how Ukrainian special forces unit had shot Russian soldiers in trenches. On June 19, Pegov’s Twitter account disregarded the allegations as fake. Wargonzo’s Telegram account has continued to operate as usual.

DFRLab analysis conducted with the social media monitoring software Meltwater Explore revealed that the most retweeted tweet came from the pro-Ukraine Twitter account @GloOouD, which stated, “LOOKS LIKE RUSSIAN TERRORISTS AND WAR REPORTER SEMEN PEGOV WAS KILLED BY UKRAINIAN SPECIAL FORCES.” The account shared a screenshot of a low-quality video frame depicting a red-bearded man that bears resemblance to Pegov.

Screenshot of @GloOouD’s tweet suggesting that Semyon Pegov was killed by Ukrainian special forces. (Source: @GloOouD/archive)

The DFRLab confirmed that the video frame depicting Pegov’s look-alike was extracted from the graphic video posted posted by the 73rd Naval Center of Operations. The video’s metadata indicates the clip was created on June 18, 2023, at 22:16:07 GMT+0300. However, the video shows events occurring in daylight.

Pegov’s most recent public appearance was on June 13 during a meeting between Putin and Russian war correspondents. The Kremlin-controlled Channel One Russia broadcast the meeting on June 18.

Comparison of the red-bearded man from the 73rd Naval Center of Operations’ video and Pegov talking at a press conference. (Source: @ukr_sof/archive, top; Perviy Kanal/archive, bottom)

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

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Will Ukraine join NATO? Here’s a top Ukrainian official and former NATO leader’s game plan for the Vilnius summit.

Katherine Walla — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 17:57:36 +0000

Watch the full event

Online Event Wed, June 21, 2023 • 11:30 am ET

Securing Ukraine’s future in NATO with Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Andriy Yermak

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – A conversation on Western efforts to establish security guarantees for Ukraine and strategies to prepare for a productive NATO Summit in July.

NATO Security & Defense Security Partnerships Ukraine

If Ukraine’s friends want to see faster progress in the recently launched counteroffensive, they should look in the mirror, said Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former secretary general of NATO: “So far we have provided weapons for Ukraine just to survive. Now [the] time has come to provide weapons for Ukraine to win.”

Rasmussen spoke at an Atlantic Council Front Page discussion with Andriy Yermak, head of the Office of the President of Ukraine. Yermak added that aside from seeking more and better weapons, the people of Ukraine are keeping a close eye on next month’s NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. They “expect that Ukraine will be invited to NATO,” Yermak said. If not, they will feel a “very, very strong demotivation” on the battlefield, Yermak argued.

Yermak and Rasmussen have delivered a plan to Ukraine’s supporters called the Kyiv Security Compact. It includes large-scale weapons transfers, enhanced intelligence sharing, and support to Ukraine’s defense industry so that it can more independently produce weapons and ammunition.

With both security guarantees and NATO membership potentially on the table in Vilnius, Rasmussen clarified that “these security guarantees will not replace Ukrainian membership [in] NATO.” They will, however, “build the bridge and will allow Ukraine to defend itself until it is covered by NATO’s Article 5.”

Below are more highlights from the conversation on Ukraine’s road to NATO membership and Western efforts to establish security guarantees, moderated by John E. Herbst, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Battlefield needs

The “incremental, step-by-step approach” by Ukraine’s supporters, Rasmussen argued, won’t help achieve victory. “You have to surprise and overwhelm your adversary,” he said. “So that’s why we need to use the big hammer to put a quick end to this conflict.”
That big hammer, according to Rasmussen, should be forged from battle tanks, longer-range missiles, and eventually fighter jets. Yermak added that long-range missiles—including the oft-discussed Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMs)—are certainly on Ukraine’s wish list. He believes a decision on long-range missiles will be reached with supporters in the “very, very near future.”
To get around the obstacles blocking the supply of advanced weapons systems, Rasmussen said it would take “determined political leadership” to break the habit of taking long periods of time to decide what to send—and of incrementally providing support. In the meantime, Russian President Vladimir Putin “has exploited our long decision-making processes to fortify Russian defenses,” he warned.

Joining the club

One of the arguments against admitting Ukraine as a NATO member is that it is currently at war. Rasmussen argued that making NATO membership dependent on the cessation of hostilities gives “Putin an incentive to continue the war.”
Plus, there’s precedent: West Germany joined the Alliance in 1955, and Article 5 covered its territory—not that of East Germany. “We could use exactly the same formula when it comes to Ukraine,” Rasmussen proposed. But doing so would still require “careful consideration,” he explained, as there will be “outstanding questions” about how Article 5 applies to areas such as the Donbas and Crimea.
For Ukraine’s path to NATO, Rasmussen backed the removal of the membership action plan (MAP) requirement, saying that “Ukraine already fulfills all the criteria within the MAP” because it has “demonstrated such efficiency on the battlefield.” Yermak also said that he believes Ukraine “has already passed all exams” and “is passing them every day [on the] battlefield.”
Rasmussen predicted that “there will be no consensus” on NATO membership for Ukraine at the Vilnius summit. But compromise is still possible: “The second-best option,” he said, would be to outline Ukraine’s path to NATO membership clearly. That would include removing the need for a MAP, pledging to review NATO’s enlargement at the 2024 summit, and establishing a NATO-Ukraine Council to identify what Kyiv needs to do before it can join the Alliance.
The current lack of clarity surrounding Ukraine’s path to NATO membership is dangerous, Yermak argued: It is precisely in that “gray zone” that “Russia has the advantages,” he said.

What’s at stake

Rasmussen said that NATO membership for Ukraine would help tell Putin that he “cannot stop this process” and that NATO’s door is open for Ukraine—and “[Putin is] not the doorman.”
“Simply restoring the status quo [is] not [an] option,” Yermak said, explaining that any Western uncertainty about the outcome of this war will amount to a Russian victory. “It will reinforce the Kremlin’s narratives of Russia fighting against an Alliance expansion in Ukraine—and winning.”
And with Russian presidential elections slated for next year, that narrative would only strengthen support for Putin’s regime, Yermak added, both at home and across the Global South countries that are watching Russia closely.
Ultimately, an invitation to join NATO would be a “supporting element” in a quicker Ukrainian victory, Yermak said. “I am sure about it.”

Katherine Walla is the associate director for editorial at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

The post Will Ukraine join NATO? Here’s a top Ukrainian official and former NATO leader’s game plan for the Vilnius summit. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s counteroffensive is a marathon not a blitzkrieg

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 17:44:48 +0000

Less than two weeks since he first confirmed that Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive was finally underway, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy already finds himself forced to hit back at criticism over the pace of military operations. “Some people believe this is a Hollywood movie and expect results now. It’s not,” he told the BBC on June 21. “Whatever some might want, including attempts to pressure us, with all due respect, we will advance on the battlefield the way we deem best.”

Zelenskyy’s comments reflect frustration in Kyiv over reports in the mainstream international media and widespread claims on social media platforms suggesting Ukraine’s counteroffensive is already floundering. Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak was one of many Ukrainian commentators to suggest this trend is part of a coordinated Kremlin disinformation operation. In a June 20 post, he accused Moscow of fueling media hysteria about the alleged failure of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in order to secure a ceasefire and “freeze the conflict at any cost.”

Kremlin-tied or Russia-friendly sources are likely to be behind at least some of the recent criticism over the initial pace of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. At the same time, negative assessments are also a consequence of the unrealistically high expectations that built up in the half-year period prior to the start of the campaign.

In the final months of 2022, the Ukrainian military stunned the watching world by liberating large areas of the country from Russian occupation. A lightning September offensive saw most of northeastern Ukraine’s Kharkiv region de-occupied, while a more methodical push in the south eventually resulted in the liberation of Kherson. These successes encouraged many to expect similarly rapid progress during the current campaign. In reality, Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive represents a far greater challenge in almost every sense.

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Ukraine must overcome a vast Russian invasion force strengthened by 300,000 mobilized troops that is dug in behind successive lines of sophisticated defensive fortifications stretching for over one thousand kilometers. They must do so without air superiority and while outgunned by Russian artillery at many points along the front. Nor can they count on the element of surprise. This incredibly ambitious task would challenge the world’s most powerful militaries. Understandably, Ukrainian commanders are adopting a methodical approach to the campaign.

Progress so far has been very slow but steady. During the first few weeks of the counteroffensive, Ukraine claims to have liberated at least eight settlements. While most represent sparsely populated frontline villages with little strategic value, the sight of the Ukrainian flag raised in liberated communities provides all Ukrainians with a massive morale boost. Meanwhile, the big battles still lie ahead.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

For now, the Ukrainian military is focusing on probing attacks at numerous points along the front in order to identify weaknesses and thin out Russian defenses. Ukraine is also carrying out a comprehensive campaign of airstrikes against Russian military and logistical targets deep inside occupied territory. Britain’s May 2023 decision to provide Ukraine with long-range Storm Shadow cruise missiles is playing an important role in these air attacks, making it possible to hit targets virtually anywhere in occupied Ukraine. For example, Storm Shadow missiles are believed to have been used in the June 22 attack on a strategically important bridge connecting Crimea with Russian-occupied southern Ukraine.

These tactics are reminiscent of the early stages of last year’s ultimately triumphant Ukrainian campaign to liberate Kherson. At the beginning of August 2022, Ukraine very publicly signaled the start of a counteroffensive to free the southern port city and surrounding region. Progress was initially slow, leading to widespread criticism and pessimistic forecasts. However, Ukraine’s strategy of systematically targeting key bridges across the Dnipro River which Russian troops relied upon for resupply eventually paid off. Hemmed in and cut off, Russian commanders ordered a humiliating retreat in early November.

While the Kherson counteroffensive was on a far smaller scale than the current operation, it offers perhaps the best guide to Ukraine’s current objectives and envisioned timeline. The campaign to liberate Kherson involved tens of thousands of troops and took approximately three months to complete. Today’s counteroffensive involves hundreds of thousands of troops on both sides, with an area equal to a medium-sized European country at stake. It may be months before Ukraine’s commanders feel the conditions are right to attempt a major push to achieve a comprehensive breakthrough.

Ukraine’s international partners seem to appreciate the need for patience and are now emphasizing a long-term commitment to Ukraine that goes far beyond the current counteroffensive. At the Ukraine Recovery Conference in London on June 21, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak reiterated his promise to “stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes.” Other Western leaders have made similar pledges in recent weeks.

These statements are particularly important at a time when Russian hopes of rescuing their faltering invasion increasingly hinge on a weakening of Western resolve and a reduction in support for Ukraine. Despite the many setbacks of the past sixteen months, Putin and other senior regime figures in Moscow are apparently still convinced they can ultimately outlast the democratic world in Ukraine. European and American leaders are attempting to dampen such expectations by signaling the strength of their commitment to Ukrainian victory.

As international anxiety grows over the perceived lack of progress in Ukraine’s big summer counteroffensive, it is vital that this message of Western unity and resolution remains clear and unambiguous. The campaign to defeat Russia’s invasion is a marathon not a blitzkrieg, but it has every chance of success as long as Ukraine and the country’s partners are unwavering in their commitment.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Prospects for US-Turkish convergence on Syria

Rich Outzen — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 12:02:06 +0000

Syria has been a point of deep contention in US-Turkish relations for the past decade, despite the fact that the two NATO allies have cooperated on diplomatic pressure campaigns against Bashar al-Assad’s regime, humanitarian relief, and refugee assistance. History offers relatively few examples of two countries committed to the same outcome of a war but largely incapable of cooperation within it. In fact, the two are fighting parallel wars in Syria—the Turks against forces affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terror group (the People’s Protection Units, or the YPG), the Americans against the Islamic State (IS) using those same affiliates—with neither effort focused on the mutual opponent (Assad and his sponsors). Is there any prospect for change in this odd equation?

A rift opens up

The war in Syria has grown into a major wedge between the United States and Turkey. Many Turks believe that Washington wants to erect a PKK-aligned state in Syria, and many in Washington believe Turkey has been insufficiently focused on eradicating Sunni extremism. Yet it was not always so; once upon a time there was a sense of shared purpose. National leaders from both countries demanded Assad’s ouster at the outset of the war. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan pledged Turkish support should the United States impose a no-fly zone and saw general overlap on Syria with then US president Barack Obama.

Obama came to view the war as more about the IS than Assad, his support to the Syrian opposition evaporated and the war became overwhelmingly a matter of counterterrorism policy. The United States and Turkey each demurred from new military commitments while urging the other to take the lead. Between the fall of Mosul to the IS in 2014 and the fall of Aleppo to Assad in 2016, the United States exited the war against Assad and refocused on the war against the IS; this removed the common, if tenuous, shared political logic.

Unwilling to commit large US forces to Syria and disappointed in hopes that Turkey might, Obama in 2014 struck a bargain of “naked practicality” to support the PKK-aligned YPG. While the move was billed as “temporary, transactional, tactical,” its open-ended nature constituted a “ticking time bomb” by disregarding Turkish concerns over empowering PKK networks. Over time, some in Washington came to think that a rebranded YPG might be able to create an autonomous Kurdish region on the cheap, analogous to the Kurdish region in Iraq and useful as a long-term platform for US forces. The YPG seemed to offer what had eluded Washington for a generation: effective counterterrorism without the need for state building or a political theory of success.

A multiaxial proxy game

It became clear after 2014 that the YPG’s ambitions extended beyond the defense of Kurdish-majority areas right up to security and political control over northern Syria and a key role in shaping the political future of Syria. This comported with the broader PKK project of carving self-ruled regions out in Syria, Turkey, and elsewhere under a common ideological banner. Because the US “by-with-through” operational approach abjured strategic control over the YPG while arming and equipping it, the United States became a de facto sponsor of that project.

The Euphrates River became a proverbial Rubicon in 2016 when YPG forces crossed it and remained in control of Arab-majority areas, despite US assurances of withdrawal. This proved to be a watershed moment for Ankara, as the Turks adopted an increasingly militarized approach to strengthening the anti-Assad opposition and rolling back YPG gains. A series of Turkish military operations in Syria eviscerated the YPG’s ambitions for autonomy, leaving them much-reduced territory and growing dependence on Damascus. Yet they retained a singular strategic asset—massive US military aid and a free hand in local and regional politics.

Northern Syria has become a region of intricate balances and overlapping conflicts. The Turkish-supported Syrian National Army (SNA) and the US-supported Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF, the core of which is the YPG) skirmish and spar uneasily while Ankara contemplates further action against the YPG. The SDF works with Assad’s forces in some places, claiming official status under Assad, while the United States provides its salaries and logistical support. Turkish and Russian forces conduct joint patrols in sensitive areas. Iran-backed militias target US bases in the east, while YPG and Iran-backed militias confront the SNA in northern Aleppo.

Meanwhile, SDF forces appear increasingly enmeshed in the struggle for control of the neighboring Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). The YPG’s parent organization, the PKK, has come into open conflict with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which the United States and Turkey support, while parlaying the weakening of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) into greater control of Iraq’s border with Iran. Meanwhile, highly trained elite counter-terror units (YAT) from the SDF have been operating in PUK-controlled Iraqi territory using PUK helicopters, likely with the knowledge of US forces. Even as Iran instrumentalizes the PKK to undermine the KDP, the PKK appears to be instrumentalizing the SDF to support its drive to supplant the KDP. The US war against the IS has morphed into something else—a multiaxial proxy game with no clear end game and multiplying side effects—and the biggest beneficiary may be Iran, in Syria as well as Iraq.

A narrowing path

Turkish commitment to prevent a PKK-aligned entity from ruling northern Syria or northern Iraq has been amply demonstrated. Washington, too, seems committed to keeping troops in Syria, less for a clear political goal than to prevent any other power from filling in when they leave. The modus vivendi of simply staying in Syria but out of one another’s way satisfies no one (not even the YPG). Are there ways to find convergence between the respective national policies, other than one or both parties exiting Syria and leaving it to Assad and the Iranians?

One theoretical path would be the YPG and its political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), renouncing the broader PKK movement and its armed campaigns against Turkey. This could result in the movement being seen as authentically Syrian, and cooperating with the Syrian opposition in negotiations to end the war. Yet YPG fighters consider themselves inextricably linked to the PKK and its ideology, rendering distinctions more cosmetic than substantive. Further, the US interest in sustained use of the YPG as a counter-IS force requires continued arming and training that by definition poses a threat to Damascus, Ankara, and other Syrians, making reconciliation unlikely. The PKK uses the YPG as connective tissue to the Assad regime, and PKK-appointed commissars or “kadros” in Syria ensure that key decisions taken by the YPG or PYD comply with the political line set by the PKK’s senior leaders. The United States lacks the means, or the will, to reform the PKK control mechanism to placate Ankara or promote power sharing with other Syrians.

Former US Syrian envoy James Jeffrey argued that a reasonable compromise for Ankara and Washington lies in physical separation between Turkish-backed groups and the SDF, with consistent efforts to address specific Turkish sensitivities. Yet how long can the United States keep nine hundred troops on Syrian soil while they are subject to increasing attacks from Iranian proxies and there is no discernible end state? Other observers have argued that the time has come to negotiate with Moscow and Damascus a US withdrawal that returns nominal control to Assad but maintains SDF control in fact. It is hard to conceive of a more blatant repudiation of US values than to reward, and trust, Assad as guarantor of what follows.

The path forward

One obstacle to the United States simply declaring victory and leaving is al-Hol and prison camps like it. These camps hold tens of thousands of IS members, supporters, and relatives, and the SDF guards them; US withdrawal would likely lead to their release. In a sense, the United States is prisoner to the prisoners; with fewer IS targets in SDF-controlled areas, preventing a new wave of IS attacks by keeping IS members in prison has become a key measure of “enduring defeat.” The assumption of this contingent form of stability that outside actors—Turkey, Iran, Russia, or Damascus—will refrain in perpetuity from disrupting it appears tenuous.

US forces will depart Syria in the coming years, and the YPG and its political wing lack the resources and legitimacy to maintain control of majority-Arab northeast Syria on their own. A reasonable political strategy for the United States must recognize that protecting US geopolitical and humanitarian interests, as well as effective counterterrorism, in the long run rest more on cooperation with Ankara and Erbil than on propping up the YPG. A soft landing of sorts for those that fought the IS with the United States should be part of the strategy but can only be achieved if Ankara and Erbil receive assurances that the massive US military subsidies and political license granted the movement will be removed, forcing it into compromises with them, rather than with the United States’ enemies in Tehran and Damascus.

In short, the United States might signal an off-ramp from the YPG to Ankara and Erbil while incentivizing authentically Syrian components of the YPG and PYD to seek peace and political cooperation with the Syrian opposition—and with the KDP. Ironically, the best protection for US interests in Syria may rest in building down the power of its current proxy in a deliberate and transparent manner and negotiating a new relationship between it and our other friends in the region. This is no mean task but offers much-needed clarity to all sides. The alternatives of propping up an unsustainable status quo or matchmaking between the YPG and Assad, whatever their other results, will perpetuate the deep Syria rift in US-Turkish relations.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on Twitter @RichOutzen.

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The new Ukraine will be a country worthy of its heroes

Yulia Svyrydenko — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 01:22:19 +0000

People often talk about achieving strength through adversity. In Ukraine, this is the everyday reality for millions of people. Over the past sixteen months, Ukrainian courage has stunned the world. This is not just a matter of resilience; Ukrainians know that we face destruction if we do not win.

Thanks to Ukrainian bravery and determination, almost nobody now doubts our ability to survive the war and defeat Russia’s invasion. However, many international observers are now starting to ask a new question: What will Ukraine do next?

I was recently in my hometown of Chernihiv. Russia tried to seize it in the first weeks of the full-scale war. For a period, the city was surrounded. One year later, Chernihiv is humming with activity. Ruins are gradually being rebuilt and businesses are working. During my trip, I talked to a local entrepreneur, Andrii, who owns a small store. He donates half of his profits to the Ukrainian military. Andrii asked me: “Of course, we will win, but what happens next? How will the country develop?”

I answered him and I can answer the whole world. We have a clear vision of what Ukraine must become and how to achieve it. Our plan for Ukraine has three pillars: security, freedom, and drive.

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Security comes first. All other efforts will be futile without this key ingredient. Ukraine needs a strong army to ensure the safety of our people and our economy. This is also the only way to make sure NATO’s eastern border remains secure.

Freedom is the second pillar. This is a central aspect of Ukraine’s European identity. As a nation, we stand for human rights and against international aggression. The new Ukraine will be a place where citizens and businesses have the freedom to innovate and succeed. We aim to remove unnecessary barriers to business development while ensuring inclusion and equality through social policies.

The third pillar is drive, shaping our goal for dynamic growth. We want Ukraine to become a global competitor and contributor, not a state dependent on others. By attracting investment and promoting innovation, Ukraine will become a new engine of European economic growth.

Ultimately, Ukraine’s goal is to join the Trillion Dollar Club. We need to finance a strong army of 500,000 personnel and a highly developed defense sector, as well as social services, education, and healthcare. A GDP of $1 trillion will enable ample funding for these sectors without imposing a critical burden on the budget.

At present, we see an investment potential in the region of $500–900 billion toward the rebuilding of Ukraine over the next 20 years. Additionally, replacing Russian and Chinese exports to EU and G7 countries could generate very large volumes annually.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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The construction industry and infrastructure development are top priorities. Currently, the damage inflicted by Russia on Ukraine’s residential sector alone amounts to over $54 billion. Reconstruction will require a significantly larger investment, creating unprecedented challenges and opportunities for the entire sector. We envisage a generational infrastructure upgrade that moves Ukraine away from the post-Soviet model and toward a modern European approach.

In the longer term perspective, we intend to rely on sectors where Ukraine already has proven potential and can offer globally competitive solutions. This includes food security, green transition, high-end technology, and industry.

We are committed to participating in the green transition, which is essential for Europe. This will make it possible to replace Russian energy resources. Our understanding of the green transition goes beyond energy to include the development of green metallurgy and a shift toward green logistics. Furthermore, Ukraine’s large reserves of strategic minerals position us as a major player in the production of lithium-ion batteries and nuclear fuel. The availability of resources provides an opportunity for high-tech production, opening the way for the EU to replace supplies from China.

Industrial development will generate demand for technological solutions and innovation. We expect to see a new boom in the Ukrainian IT sector, as well as the emergence of sectoral R&D centers capable of meeting the needs of other industries and the digital economy.

We are focused on technological development, but we are also very much aware that 350 million people are currently facing starvation worldwide. We aim to boost food security and become a food provider for 600 million people globally.

None of the above would be possible without the people who will make it happen and for whom all of this is intended. We aim to create conditions for millions of Ukrainians to return home and to persuade others to relocate to Ukraine by implementing attractive social policies and citizenship rules.

Simultaneously, we need to do the same for investors. The task we face is enormous. Ukraine’s record annual foreign direct investment (FDI) total remains the $11 billion received in 2007. We must attract at least that amount every single year for the next two decades.

We understand that investors need to see tangible results not just ambitious plans. Key steps include reform of Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies and courts, along with the establishment of strong and independent regulators. If successfully implemented, this will provide an institutional framework to ensure fair play and anti-corruption policies.

Setting up a business in Ukraine will become easy. We will simplify and digitize all processes involved in the creation of a new business, from construction permits and environmental regulations to turnkey utilities connections. We will reform monetary, tax, and labor policies by revising rates and tariffs and liberalizing the labor market. Ukraine will become one of the most convenient places on the planet to do business.

Ukraine’s future goes beyond sectoral growth. We envision ourselves as an integral part of the European community and a driving force for global development. We will contribute to international security, propose solutions for shared challenges, and establish good governance practices.

Over the last 10 years, Ukraine has already made significant progress toward countering corruption. Further advances are crucial as we seek to become a NATO member to protect our nation, and as we pursue EU membership to open up new business opportunities and consolidate reforms.

There is no alternative for us. Ukrainians must turn these ambitions into reality to ensure the country’s future safety and preserve freedom. Otherwise, Russia will remain a threat and will inevitably make another attempt to destroy Ukraine.

We call on all Ukrainians to return home and invite the global community to join us on this transformative journey. We invite them to invest in our resilient nation and to become shareholders in the prosperity that Ukraine’s success will surely bring. This is more than a national task; it is a global call to action. It will show how ordinary people in extraordinary times can turn adversity into strength.

Yulia Svyrydenko is Ukraine’s First Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Development and Trade.

Russia has occupied Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia plant since the first weeks of the invasion. Last summer, the Kremlin allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor its operational safety remotely. But in April 2023, IAEA officials began warning of growing risks and calling for additional measures to protect the plant. With Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive now underway, alarm is mounting.

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Zelenskyy’s claims that the Kremlin is planning to orchestrate a nuclear disaster in Ukraine are not at all far-fetched, given how Putin’s forces have been purposely laying waste to the country for the past sixteen months. The invading Russian army has planted landmines across an area the size of Switzerland, displaced more than ten million people, and destroyed dozens of Ukrainian towns and cities. Countless residential apartment buildings, schools, and hospitals have been reduced to ruins. A comprehensive and methodical nationwide bombing campaign has targeted the country’s civilian infrastructure.

In recent weeks, Russia is suspected of having blown up the Khakovka dam in southern Ukraine, causing an ecological catastrophe. However, even this unprecedented act of ecocide failed to stop Ukraine’s counteroffensive. With Russia’s military predicament expected to become increasingly grim in the weeks and months ahead, the likelihood of further extreme measures will grow. “They constantly need destabilization here. They want the world to put pressure on Ukraine to stop the war,” commented Zelenskyy.

Putin has been making nuclear threats since the very first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion. During the initial stages of the war, he very publicly placed his nuclear forces on high alert. With the invasion in danger of unravelling in September 2022, he again hinted at a possible nuclear response while warning, “I’m not bluffing.”

Not everyone is convinced. Former Russian diplomat Boris Bondarev, who resigned after last year’s invasion, told Newsweek in early 2023: “today [Putin is] bluffing and we know that he has bluffed about nuclear threats. Ukrainians recovered some parts of their territory, and there was no nuclear retaliation. If you’re afraid of Putin using nukes, then you already lose the war against him and he wins.”

Others warn against possible complacency. The recent destruction of Kakhovka dam has caused many observers to reassess their earlier skepticism over Russia’s readiness to go nuclear in Ukraine. Putin has also crossed another red line by vowing to place nukes in Belarus. The Russian dictator is currently holding all Europeans hostage with the threat of a deadly explosion at the continent’s largest nuclear plant, and is moving nuclear weapons closer to the heart of Europe.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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The world must heed Ukraine’s warnings before it is too late. Zelenskyy first raised the alarm about the Kakhovka dam in October 2022 but the international community failed to react. Since the destruction of the dam, the relatively weak and ineffective international response has fuelled fears that Russia will read this as a green light to go further.

For now, most international attention appears to be focused on Putin’s placement of nukes in Belarus. “I absolutely believe that moving weapons to Belarus demands an unequivocal response from NATO,” Polish President Andrzej Duda said recently before meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Significantly, Russia’s decision to deploy nukes to Belarus even drew a critical response from Chinese officials, who renewed calls for de-escalation and reminded Russia that its leaders had reaffirmed their opposition to nuclear war at their March 2023 summit with China in Moscow.

Ultimately, there is no way of knowing whether Russia’s nuclear threats are genuine or not, but Western leaders cannot afford to let Putin’s nuclear blackmail tactics succeed. If the Russian dictator’s nuclear saber-rattling enables him to rescue the faltering invasion of Ukraine, he will do it again and others will follow. To prevent this nightmare scenario, the West must respond forcefully by escalating support for Ukraine militarily, diplomatically, and economically. The only sensible answer to Russia’s reckless nuclear intimidation is a heightened international commitment to Ukrainian victory.

In parallel to increased support for Ukraine, international watchdogs must be dispatched to monitor the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and other Ukrainian infrastructure sites that Russia could potentially target. Strong pressure must also be placed on China and India to condemn Russia’s nuclear threats. The invasion of Ukraine has already transformed the international security climate; Putin must not be allowed to normalize nuclear blackmail.

Diane Francis is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, editor-at-large with the National Post in Canada, author of ten books, and author of a newsletter on America.

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – A conversation on Western efforts to establish security guarantees for Ukraine and strategies to prepare for a productive NATO Summit in July.

NATO Security & Defense Security Partnerships Ukraine

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speakers

Anders Fogh Rasmussen
Former Secratary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Former Prime Minister of Denmark

Andriy Yermak

Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine

Moderator

John E. Herbst
Senior Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council

JOHN HERBST: We have a Front Page event for you today, a very special event. We have two very distinguished speakers. We have Mr. Andriy Yermak, who is the head of the president’s office in Kyiv in Ukraine. We have Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, a former Danish prime minister and former secretary general of NATO. And they’re going to talk today about the upcoming NATO summit, the question of the NATO-Ukraine relationship, and also—critical to the security guarantees for Ukraine—how do you ensure Ukraine’s stable, secure future? They were both the authors of the Kyiv Compact, which addressed the issue of security guarantees for Ukraine. And with that, we’ll turn it over to Mr. Yermak for some introductory remarks and then to Mr. Rasmussen. So, please.

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Thank you very much, Ambassador Herbst, and I would also like to thank the Atlantic Council for organizing this event. It’s indeed very timely. Next month, NATO leaders meeting in Vilnius have the opportunity to make history. Let me be completely clear right from the outset. I am personally in favor of extending an invitation to Ukraine to join NATO. It would be the first time that we invite into NATO a country that is at war. And that requires careful consideration. Not least, resolving practicalities regarding Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, and which areas and eventualities it would cover in the current conflict. I have reached this conclusion for three reasons.

First, in 2008, we decided that Ukraine will become a member of NATO, but we did not provide a roadmap. Now Ukraine has been in the waiting room for fifteen years. It is not a safe place. The time has come to move Ukraine into a safe place, as we are doing with Finland and Sweden.

Second, it is often argued that the prospect of NATO enlargement incited Putin. The truth is the opposite: It was the failure to extend security guarantees to Ukraine that incited Putin. Gray zones are danger zones. Neutrality provides no security. Finland and Sweden realized that.

Third, often I hear the argument that we cannot give Ukraine neither security guarantee nor membership of NATO while there is a war going on. That is an extremely dangerous argument. If you make security guarantees and NATO membership dependent on cessation of hostilities, you are giving Putin an incentive to continue the war. By extending an invitation now, we tell Putin Ukraine will become a member of NATO. It will not happen overnight, but you cannot stop this process. Our door is open for Ukraine and you are not the doorman.

Now, if allies cannot find consensus on an invitation to Ukraine in Vilnius, the second-best option would be to outline the path toward NATO membership in three steps.

First, to remove the need for a Membership Action Plan, as was the case with Finland and Sweden. The fact is the Ukrainian army is probably the most combat-ready army in Europe.

Second could be a pledge to review the question of NATO enlargement at the NATO summit in Washington, DC, next year.

And then, third, we could establish a NATO-Ukraine Council with a mandate—with a mandate to identify the conditions that must be met in order to join NATO. The deadline for the report should be the NATO summit next year.

Regardless, Ukraine will need security guarantees until it is a full member of NATO. We need strong methods to deter any further Russian aggression. And that’s the purpose of the Kyiv Security Compact that I coauthored with President Zelenskyy’s chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, who I’m very pleased joined us today.

The compact is based on four parts. First, deliver weapons on such a scale that Ukraine can repel or deter any further Russian aggression. Second, enhance intelligence sharing. Third, training of Ukrainian forces under EU and NATO flags. And fourth, support to build Ukraine’s defense industry so that Ukraine can produce weapons and ammunition itself. These security guarantees, similar to those that Israel received from the United States, will not replace Ukrainian membership of NATO, but they will build the bridge and allow Ukraine to defend itself until it is covered by NATO’s Article 5.

The summit in Vilnius is the most important NATO summit in a generation and let us not repeat the mistake of the Bucharest summit in 2008. Any pledge to Ukraine should be followed by a clear path forward. And NATO leaders must be prepared to be bold; otherwise, we risk constant war and instability on the European continent. Thank you.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you.

Mr. Yermak, over to you.

ANDRIY YERMAK: Yes. Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador Herbst.

Good day for everybody. I’m glad to welcome all of you here in the Atlantic Council.

There are about four hundred ways to prove fundamental Pythagorean theorem in mathematics, four hundred ways to prove the obvious. Sometimes it seems to me that during this war year we have provided not less explanation as to why Ukraine should get all the assistance it needs—why it requires reliable security guarantees, and the clear and understood prospect of the join NATO. In other words, throughout this year we, too, have to prove the obvious over and over again.

But the truth is simple: The Russian dictator’s desire to restore the empire is an existential threat to the Ukrainian state and nation. But it also poses a spectrum of the threats from the military to environmental to the Western civilization and humanity and the world. Therefore, Ukraine must win. It must integrate into Euro-Atlantic community. It must get reliable security guarantees for the transitional period. Not losing, it’s not [an] option for us. Simply restoring the status quo, it’s not [an] option. Any uncertainty involved outcome of this war, any ambiguity in NATO’s response to our inspiration will be equal to Russian victory. It will reinforce the Kremlin’s narratives of Russia fighting against an Alliance expansion in Ukraine and winning.

However, we cannot be—by war and sanctions, Russia will increasingly depend on China. Thus, by defending Ukraine, the West itself will have all the strategic advantages to Russia and geographical advantages to China in Europe.

The Ukrainian people have proven they will not give up their rights to stay free. They have paid with their blood, sweat, and tears for their place in the ranks of the world democratic community… To deny them now is to betray everything Ukraine has paid for the—with tens of thousands of lives and destructions unseen in Europe since World War II. It will be a defeat for democratic community far greater than Afghanistan. It will be a triumph for dictatorship. This must be prevented, not only for the sake of Ukraine but for the sake of all democracies on the planet.

Words about Russia having no way to power in the Alliance must finally be supported by actions. The fifteen-year schedule ban of Ukraine must come to end. Otherwise, Putin will get a huge bonus for his next presidential term, which is next year they have the elections… It will, obviously, strengthen support for his regime. It will increase the illusion of the legitimacy for the invasion among the Russian public—but also among the Global South countries, for, as we know, elections will be—inevitably be furnished in the occupied territories. Therefore, preparatory actions is needed. We must connect the dots once and for all. No arguments against Ukraine’s NATO membership go beyond… fear.

Throughout this war year, Ukraine has repeatedly been providing that the Russian threats are more a bluff than menace. The current wave of the alliance expansions has also proven this. Ultimately, it was the uncertainty in the Budapest and… in Bucharest that made the attack on Ukraine possible. Uncertainty… precisely the gray zone where Russia has the advantages, and we have got to deprive it of these advantages.

The state of war cannot be an obstacle to inviting Ukraine into Alliance because in that case Russia will do everything to indefinitely prolong this state. Our Alliance and partners prepared support Ukraine fighting for independence individually. Do we have enough resources to provide such support? I am afraid these are rhetorical questions.

Therefore, the solution is evident: The prospect of the membership when circumstances allow along with the reliable security guarantees for the transitional period. They will be not replace Ukraine’s participation in the Alliance, but we will be provided sufficient opportunity for defense until the possibility of actual NATO membership arise.

The International Working Group Anders Fogh Rasmussen and I co-chair has developed and presented our view of the guarantees in the Kyiv Security Compact documents. These documents has great potential for modifications to maintain a balance of the interest between Ukraine and the guarantor states for our common good.

We must win together, and together we must lay the base for reliable and secure peace in the future. It’s not the theorem. This is actual. And as such, it requires not proof. Thank you very much for your attention.

JOHN HERBST: OK. Thank you, Mr. Yermak.

All right. I have a few questions and then we will turn to audience questions.

So, Mr. Rasmussen, you made clear what you would like to see in Vilnius. You are, obviously, very well connected. What do you expect to happen there?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Well, I made clear that I would favor to extend an invitation to Ukraine already in Vilnius. My impression is there will be no consensus on that at this stage and that’s why I tried to outline the second best option and actually I think that could be possible to reach a compromise to remove MAP; to review the whole question again in Washington next year; and to establish, for instance, a NATO-Ukraine council with a clear mandate to identify the conditions that must be met.

That gives Ukraine a pledge but also a clear roadmap, and allies have still the control of the process. So, in my opinion, that should be achievable. So but, overall, I hope that Vilnius will demonstrate unity, and the worst thing would be a split and that would only serve the purpose of Putin.

JOHN HERBST: All right. Just one quick follow-up here, though.

You laid out a variety of things that I think would be a reasonable outcome, a good outcome, for Vilnius short of actual Ukrainian membership. We’ve seen—it looked like the United States was moving partly in that direction when they seemed that they were dropping MAP as required—the Membership Action Plan. But then President Biden said something over the weekend which wasn’t so clear about that. So do you think that MAP is still something that needs to be argued away or is this something which has been decided?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Yeah, I took notes of the same as you did. I would interpret the statement of President Biden as a negotiating position. I think everybody is now positioning themselves in the run-up to the Vilnius Summit.

Still, I think it would be a natural step forward to go beyond the 2008 language. Back in 2008 we decided that Ukraine will become a member of NATO and then we added next step in that process would be a Membership Action Plan, a so-called MAP.

Now, I mean, we—it’s easy to remove that precondition partly because we didn’t require a MAP for neither Finland nor Sweden before we extended an invitation to them and actually Ukraine already fulfills all criteria within a Membership Action Plan. They have demonstrated such efficiency on the battlefield that they don’t need a Membership Action Plan.

So I think it’s essential that Vilnius goes beyond the language of 2008.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you.

Mr. Yermak, as you know, I was in Kyiv. I spent ten days there last month, and the—it was clear from talking to many Ukrainians that there are high expectations for Vilnius. What are the Ukrainian people expecting in Vilnius and what is the president of Ukraine expecting in Vilnius, and you yourself?

ANDRIY YERMAK: I try to be—will answer very specifically. We really—the Ukrainians, because now—and, John, I’m sure that you can feel your—you know our country very, very good and you feel how united Ukrainians, how strong Ukrainians, and the—our position, the position of the president, the position of the team, it’s absolutely same that the positions of the—all Ukrainians, and the position is following.

We expect that Ukraine will be invited to NATO with open date but with concrete signal. And I agree with Anders that we need and everybody in the world need to receive strong signal the way to membership of Ukraine in NATO nobody can change; it’s decided and it’s happened.

And of course, in this way we want to receive and our expectation to receive the concrete security guarantees. We a lot of times talk about it. I mentioned in my speech about the Kyiv Security Compact. We can, on the base of these documents, continue to work with the partners.

This is two most important expectation of Ukraine, Ukrainians, president of Ukraine, and all our team.

JOHN HERBST: OK. Thank you. Let’s—well, let’s pursue this a bit more.

Mr. Rasmussen laid out four points from the Kyiv Security Compact regarding security guarantees and that started with substantial weapon supplies to make sure that Ukraine could defend itself.

I’ve been advocating, Ukraine has been requesting, various advanced weapons right now to conduct its counteroffensive and it’s gotten some—it’s gotten some of those weapons. It’s not gotten others.

Given the caution we see in the weapon supplies coming from the West to Ukraine just to fight the war, do you think they’d be willing to consider substantial weapon supplies now not just to fight the war but to insure you going forward? In other words, might that not be something you can’t quite count on at this point?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Me or—

JOHN HERBST: We’ll start with you, Mr. Secretary.

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Well, first of all, I appreciate, of course, all the deliveries of weapons we have seen so far. However, so far we have provided weapons for Ukraine just to survive. Now time has come to provide weapons for Ukraine to win. And that should be the overall goal. We should define the overall goal very clearly. We want a victory, and everything we do is with the goal to ensure a Ukrainian victory. And victory ultimately, of course, is to kick out all Russian troops from Ukrainian soil.

Next, you cannot win a war by an incremental, step-by-step approach. You have to surprise and overwhelm your adversary. We—so that’s why we need to use the big hammer to put a quick end to this conflict. So I’m in favor of lifting all self-imposed restrictions on weapon deliveries. We should deliver everything the Ukrainians need, not only heavy battle tanks, longer-range missiles, but eventually also fighter jets. We have seen how the Ukrainians lack air superiority during the first phases of their counteroffensive. So we should deliver fighter jets as soon as possible.

JOHN HERBST: Mr. Yermak, do you have anything you’d like to add to this?

ANDRIY YERMAK: I’m agreed with Anders. And, of course, you know that we are sure about our victory. But, of course, it depends of how in time we will receive everything which we need. We need very important things. We need strong character of our people, of our heroes. They are very motivated. And we receive enough people to be successful in the battlefield. And you can know that we have some success, and I hope we will see it more in the nearest future.

And of course, all this issue and all this kind of weapons which mentioned Anders, it’s, of course, very important. I just can add that we still have one option which still not open for us. It’s long-range missiles. But I hope and believe that it’s a question of the—of the very, very near future. Another—you know that this opportunity, it’s open. And we now closely working with the partners about the time and—for our jets and before it about tanks.

But the question is time. You know, every day it cost Ukraine the lives of our heroes, the lives of our civilians. You know that the Russian not stop this terroristic attack to our city. I’d like just to say just in the day when the delegation of the African countries was here, and they definitely know that next day they go to the—to the St. Petersburg, and they know exactly—they in Kyiv—they sended the twelve ballistic rockets to the Kyiv. Thanks God and thanks our heroes and thanks to United States for Patriot, we destroy all of them.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you.

Mr. Secretary General, you mentioned earlier that it’s very important for there to be unity in Vilnius. And I think everyone understands that. Sometimes that understanding is used to argue for a more cautious policy, because some members of the Alliance don’t want to be as strong in confronting Kremlin aggression as others. But now you have an interesting situation where a group of members of NATO, particularly in the east, want a stronger policy. So you have to worry about how you get to unity.

Now, I mention that as an introduction to this question-slash—well, this question. If NATO in Vilnius were willing to make commitments on weapons that we have not seen yet—of course, the US ATACMS, but of course, clear signal with clear delivery dates for F-16s and other fighter jets—while being more cautious on some of the other elements that we’ve discussed already, might that be a compromise which in fact could still—would help Ukraine have a more successful counteroffensive and pave the way for other direct NATO-Ukraine missions in the future? Would this be a suitable compromise that could work for everyone’s benefit?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: First of all, let me stress, it is not NATO as such that delivers weapons. NATO is not, as you know, a party to the conflict. But NATO allies—you’re right—NATO allies deliver the weapons. And actually, they are right to do so. They are parties to the conflict, and they have every reason and right to do so because, according to Article 51 in the UN Charter, Ukraine obviously has every right to defend itself against Russian aggression. But furthermore, Ukraine has the inherent right to ask its allies to help it to counter this Russian aggression. So when the US and the European allies deliver weapons to Ukraine, it’s on firm legal ground.

So I’ve never, ever understood this ridiculous discussion where the Russians time and again are complaining about NATO allies being engaged in this conflict. We are. Obviously, we are. And of course we are. Because we have every right to help Ukraine. Now, on weapon deliveries actually let me be very clear. I don’t understand why we have any restrictions on weapon deliveries. To make sure that Ukraine is winning this war, we need to deliver everything the Ukrainian people need. The Ukrainians have the will to fight. We have one thing to do, to give them the means to fight. And this is actually a winning formula.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you.

Mr. Yermak, you spoke about Ukrainian heroes. You’ve talked about the morale. Some people say that if there is a—

ANDRIY YERMAK: Sorry.

JOHN HERBST: I’m sorry?

ANDRIY YERMAK: John, we lost you.

JOHN HERBST: OK, I’ll repeat. You spoke about the Ukrainian heroes fighting off the Russians against great odds, in terms of numbers. And, for that matter, amount of weapons. You’ve spoken about the strong morale of the Ukrainian people. Some observers have expressed concern that if in Vilnius NATO does not offer something substantial in support of Ukraine, morale might be impacted. So here’s my question: If in fact—taking into account what Mr. Rasmussen just said—if the United States, Germany, the UK were to announce decisions on, you know, more robust weapon supplies in Vilnius, even if progress towards Ukraine’s eventual membership in NATO was not so much, would that be an outcome that can suit Ukraine? In other words, might that prevent any fall in morale because people would think, oh, news of weapons systems?

ANDRIY YERMAK: Yes. I think that of course the expectation of the Ukrainian society, the expectation of Ukrainian soldiers, it’s very high because we have historical unity around Ukraine. We have the historical unity with all our partners. And of course, no strong decisions in the—in the Vilnius, of course, it will be—that will be very, very strong demotivation of the people. And I absolutely agree with Mr. Rasmussen that he said—his phrase that it’s impossible to give Putin to be like not just right, like feel like a doorman in the—in the door of the NATO. It will be after the catastrophe in Kakhovka, after all these terrible things which continue to happen every day in Ukraine, it will be very bad signal.

And very—and, of course, the Russian, the Russian machine, it will be used against Ukraine. And of course, we very respect the opinion of our partners. But we also believe that Ukraine has already passed all exams and passing them every day in battlefield. I mean, exams to be—exams to be a real—to be a real member of the NATO. And I can say very openly that now the level of the professionalism, the level of the average soldier, we showed for all the world. I think we—I will be very surprised that still existing somebody in the planet who not be sure that Ukrainian army, Ukrainian people, one of the most strongest in the world.

And be very honest, let’s back to the first day of invasion. Many people in the world give to us three days, one week, one month. But look at it, one year and we have—we not just defend, we already show how we’re able to liberate our lands, how we can be real guarantors in the future of the security of our neighbors. I think it’s necessary to not forget about them because, you know, how in our childhood many people—you can listen many people, but you trust when you really see how your friends can fight it, and how your friends can be fighting himself and you. And Ukraine show this.

And I think now it depends for the final political points. It’s necessary to do. It’s necessary not give any more chance in the world to afraid any dictators, to afraid any countries who is breaking international law, who is not respect independence, who is not respect freedom, who is not respect territorial integrity and sovereignty of any countries. It’s great historical chances. We, Ukrainians, back the faith that it’s possible in our world—be free, be independent, be strong, and be secure.

JOHN HERBST: That’s very clear. We’ll turn now to audience questions. We’ve got a bunch. The first one I have here is from Jonathan Landay of Reuters.

He notes that—this is to you, Minister Yermak—he notes that Ukraine has agreed with NATO that it cannot join the alliance while the war continues. But you’ve spoken about, and other NATO members have spoken about, the need for security guarantees. But his question is this. He says: The Biden administration speaks only of security commitments to be considered from Vilnius. He asks, how has the Biden administration explained to you, to Ukraine, what these security commitments might look like and how they would bolster Ukraine’s security? Is this a question you feel comfortable answering?

ANDRIY YERMAK: Thank you. First of all, I’d like to say that we are very appreciative and always not tired to repeat the words of thanks personally President Biden, his administration, both parties, Congress, and Americans. It’s mean that for us very important that we in the every day’s dialogue, and now we continue consultation of the workings of these guarantees. I can say that administration absolutely understands our positions, our idea. And I didn’t listen any refuse or any not agreements that Ukraine need to have concrete security guarantees. Yes, we discussed wordings. Yes, we have that experience, and we remember Budapest. And of course, we have today war in our lands.

But I think we found the solutions. I hope in this. I very appreciate that we have very friends, very partners, conversations with other areas and, first of all, with United States. This job, it continues. It’s not easy, honestly. But I hope that this consultation will be continue all these days which we have before Vilnius. I optimist by my life. I do all my best from myself. I know the all best doing from the allied team. And I hope we found the forums which give to Ukraine can create a very serious working what is important, working security guarantees.

Look, I can say that when we are start with Mr. Rasmussen, our group understand, agree with me. We have mostly skeptics. Now I can say our documents in the table of all leaders—practically all leaders in the world. And now nobody discuss that this is very serious, very fundamental, a very strong document. We continue to work.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you. Mr. Rasmussen, we have a request from—a question from Volodymyr Svyryda. He asks: What is the likelihood of Russia using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, or for that matter in Poland?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Yeah. I am very often—I’m very often asked that question. And my answer is also very clear. I don’t think there is any risk of Putin using nuclear weapons in neither Ukraine, nor Poland, nor any other country. Why? Because the Russian military knows that it would face no strategic advantage in using nuclear weapons. It’s been clearly communicated to the Russian military that the response from the United States and its allies would have a devastating effect on the Russian military.

Further to that, we know that the rest of the world would probably turn its back to Russia if they were to use nuclear weapons. So, in conclusion, the Russian military would refuse to abide by orders from Putin, and their own alternative would be to remove Putin and install a new leader. So and any attempt to try to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine would be the end of the Putin era and the Putin regime. And for that reason, I’m not concerned about risk of Putin using nuclear weapons.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you. That was clear.

I have a question from Nino Gelashvili, who’s of the RFE/RL Georgian Service, and—well, actually, this is also for you, Mr. Rasmussen, but I’ll ask—well, then see if Mr. Yermak wants to add as well: Why are NATO members hesitant on moving towards Ukraine’s NATO membership? Are they afraid of being involved in a war with Russia? Is there something else, maybe the issue of nuclear escalation?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Yeah. Sometimes I’m asking exactly the same question because I think we should learn lessons from the past, and the ultimate security guarantee for Ukraine would be membership of NATO, let’s face it. Until Ukraine can join NATO Ukraine will need security guarantees and that’s why there’s a clear link between security guarantees and a future membership of NATO.

There may be allies who are concerned about the fact that a country that is currently at war would have difficulties in defining the coverage of Article 5. But I think where there is a will there is also a way forward.

We have precedents for solving that kind of problems in the past. Germany joined NATO back in 1955, the whole of Germany, actually, but as we all know at that time Germany was divided in a West Germany and an East Germany.

So when Germany—when western Germany joined NATO it was clearly stated that Article 5 covered only the territory controlled by the western German government in Bonn. We could use exactly the same formula when it comes to Ukraine. We could say, OK, Article 5 covers the territory controlled by the government in Kyiv but still we would have some outstanding questions, including in Donbas and Crimea we still have a war going on—maybe we still have a war going on and you have a borderline that move forth and back and you have continual clashes between the Ukrainian forces and Russian forces. And then, of course, the question is if Russia attacks Ukraine in Donbas would that invoke Article 5 or not? How should we respond in that case?

These are not trivial questions. They are crucial questions to guard the credibility of Article 5 and security guarantees in Article 5. So we have to work to sort out all those practicalities in confidential negotiations with Ukraine. That’s not for public use. But we have to spend some time in sorting out those questions and that’s why I think we should extend an invitation to Ukraine sooner rather than later and then spend some time sorting out those practical issues in confidential negotiations with Ukraine before you can actually access NATO.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you.

OK. We have a question from Roman Zakaluzny from Calgary, Canada, and it’s for Mr. Yermak: Can we say today that a Ukrainian victory in this war is not—not—a precondition for Ukrainian membership in NATO?

ANDRIY YERMAK: Yes. Yes, absolutely. I’m absolutely can confirm this phrase, this principle. I think vice versa. The membership of the—of the NATO, and just we are talking about invitation, will be—work as help and supporting element of the more sooner victory of Ukraine. I am sure about it.

I think that I can add one very important thing. We’re now in the stage when the authority and the power of the NATO very, very high. And today, NATO need one very important element after Sweden and Finland, Ukraine. It will be elements which fits everybody and now understand that NATO is the most strongest alliance in the world. And everybody understand only NATO can give the 100 percent guarantees of the security, because you can see in reality any countries of NATO not involved in the war, and the people—any potential aggressors understood it. I just can confirm this phrase.

JOHN HERBST: OK. Thank you.

We have a question which almost answers itself, but I’ll pose it anyway. It’s from Dr. Wayne Schroeder at the US Naval War College. He asks: Should the US provide long-range strike capabilities such as ATACMS on an urgent basis? And what is the likelihood that Ukraine will receive ATACMS, and when? So, Mr. Yermak, for you.

ANDRIY YERMAK: Yes, of course. Thank you for these questions.

Yes, of course we need it so much as soon as possible. We’re waiting for decisions. And my attitude that we are very near of these decisions, and I hope that it happens very soon. And I can say that as soon as possible it’s happened, it give to us possibility, first of all, to survive lives of our people. With Mr. President Zelenskyy it’s a lot of times and the represent of our team said one example is Kherson, which we occupied, but we have not how to protect our people because the enemy’s attack from another side of the river. And you can see terrible photos and videos how their rockets destroyed supermarkets, the civilian infrastructure. Of course, we will be more strong with the ATACMS.

Waiting. Waiting. And I can say, you know, maybe just for the positive things when we are talking about this very, very big tragedy for my country, I don’t know the person in Ukraine who is exactly know all these words: HIMARS, ATACMS, Leopards, and many others. I think because this is symbolic for our people. It’s—Patriot, of course. It’s symbolic of life. It’s symbolic of surviving. And what is very important, that you can see that you—I mean Americans—when you deliver these weapons, how it’s really work and how it’s strengthening our able—how we, with these weapons, more able to defend our country. I think it’s we—you can see the real evidence how these weapons really survive people, really survive children, really survive old people, women.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you.

We have a very large question from Albert Lee. It’s for you, Mr. Rasmussen: What can be done to further break down the mental, bureaucratic, and institutional obstacles blocking not just the supply of advanced weapons systems, but also future security guarantees and NATO membership for Ukraine?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Yeah.

JOHN HERBST: It’s a big one.

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: That’s a big question.

But first of all, I think it will take determined political leadership, because I fully agree we really have to overcome all those obstacles. As I said before, we cannot—we cannot conduct warfare in this bureaucratic way of an incremental, step-by-step approach because we are concerned about provoking Putin. Let’s face it, Putin has exploited our long decision-making processes to fortify Russian defenses in Donbas and Crimea, so it’s being even more complicated for Ukraine to conduct its counteroffensive because of our hesitation. So we really have to step up to the plate.

And that’s why I think it’s quite simple: We should deliver everything the Ukrainians need without any restrictions. And we shouldn’t be concerned about Putin’s reaction because he has been the one who has escalated the war already, and we are always two or three steps behind him. So I fully agree, and I think first and foremost it will take determined political leadership.

And let me stress if we are to ensure long-term peace and stability on the European continent, we need a strong and stable Eastern European ally like Ukraine to serve as a bulwark against a still-aggressive Russia. Because when this war is over you will still have an aggressive Russia, so we have to protect not only Ukraine but the whole of Europe against that threat. And to that end, we need Ukraine as a NATO ally.

JOHN HERBST: I can’t help but step out of my role to say that it would be wonderful if the problem was described the way you’ve described it by President Biden and other Western leaders, making it clear that this is a war of Putin not just on Ukraine but also, ultimately, on us.

OK. Mr. Yermak, question from Trudy Rubin from the Philadelphia Enquirer: Is retaking Crimea or cutting it off, making it impossible for Russia to hold it, a necessary goal for Ukraine’s counteroffensive? And are some NATO countries, including the US, opposed to this?

ANDRIY YERMAK: We are very open for our goals. And we said that our victory, it’s to back all our territory over the international-recognized border. And we’re very clear of this. And of course, Donbas, it’s Ukraine; and Crimea, it’s Ukraine.

I can say about—if the question is about the position of our partners, I know that the partners very respect this our positions. And I—me personally—never listen that somebody just try to talk with us about any compromise of this.

And I can say that, for example, today I have the meetings with the G7 ambassadors here in Kyiv and we discussed the Ukrainian peaceful plan. And what is—and our position is very clear and very principled—that we are ready to listen and to talk and to take some idea with all countries in the world who respect our territorial integrity, our sovereignty, our independence.

It’s my answer.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you.

OK. We have one minute and we have one more question. This one’s for Mr. Rasmussen, also from Trudy Rubin: What do you think would be Putin’s reaction if Ukraine were, in fact, to take back Crimea?

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Yeah. Putin attaches strong importance to keeping Crimea, but as Andriy Yermak just stated Crimea is, according to international law, a part of Ukraine. So I wouldn’t be concerned about how Putin would react. He would, of course, react militarily in a very strong way. But why should we care about that? I mean, this is Ukrainian territory.

And actually, back in 1994, when Ukraine gave up her nuclear weapons and handed them over to Russia, of all countries, and Ukraine signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in exchange Ukraine received so-called security guarantees from Russia in which Russia pledged not to attack Ukraine. They violated that. And Russia also confirmed that they would respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine within these internationally-recognized borders, including Crimea. So Crimea is Ukrainian territory.

And if we accept that Putin can keep Crimea, it sends an extremely dangerous signal to the whole world because Xi Jinping would argue and he would conclude if Putin can take Crimea, I can take Taiwan. And I also say this as a message to the American public, where I have met the argument we should reduce—we Americans should reduce our support for Ukraine because we need the resources to protect Taiwan. The fact is those two conflicts are interrelated. A clear defeat—a clear Russian defeat in Ukraine will also tell Xi Jinping not to attack Taiwan.

So the two conflicts are interrelated. Crimea is Ukrainian territory. So I don’t care about how Putin would react. For me, a Ukrainian victory includes taking back Crimea.

JOHN HERBST: Well, I would agree with that.

And I would thank both of you for a wonderful and extensive conversation. I hope—in fact, I’m confident—that you’ve contributed to moving the debate in the right direction, and now we wait and see what happens.

So thank everyone for tuning in. We will be doing more stuff on Russia’s war on Ukraine and how the United States and the West should respond, and perhaps more stuff on NATO-Ukraine in the year to come.

Do pobachenn’a.

ANDERS RASMUSSEN: Thank you.

Watch the event

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Western companies are still financing the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Nataliya Popovych — Tue, 20 Jun 2023 11:39:15 +0000

Despite tremendous business interest in Ukraine’s reconstruction and development, a large number of Western companies continue to undermine Kyiv’s efforts by contributing to the Kremlin’s war chest. This ongoing corporate complicity must be stopped if Ukraine’s meaningful recovery is to happen any time soon.

The recent destruction of the Kakhovka dam is one of over 90,000 suspected Russian war crimes in Ukraine. Clearly, no reconstruction of Ukraine can succeed unless Russia is completely deprived of the resources to continue its invasion. The international community cannot have a meaningful conversation on recovery or reconstruction unless international companies that continue to feed Putin’s war chest cease their business operations in Russia entirely.

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When Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine first began in February 2022, some Western businesses demonstrated swift and early exits from the Russian market, putting values over profit. While these often high profile departures generated a lot of media coverage, in reality the majority of Western firms have chosen to remain in Russia.

According to data from the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE), out of 1,361 Western companies with Russian subsidiaries at the start of the full-scale invasion, only 241 (17%) have completely exited Russia. The remaining Western companies generated $136 billion in revenues during 2022, thus helping the Kremlin to finance the war in Ukraine.

Perhaps even more staggering than these numbers are the excuses used by the leadership of Western multinationals to justify their continued presence in Russia. The most common justifications for persisting with “business as usual” in Putin’s Russia primarily revolve around the provision of essential goods. This argument is widely cited despite the fact that it is rarely supported by the nature of the businesses in question.

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It should be crystal clear by now: All western companies that have not left the Russian market since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began almost seventeen months ago are complicit in the Putin regime’s war crimes and crimes against humanity. In a very real sense, Western businesses that refuse to leave Russia are silent enablers of Putin’s invasion. Any meaningful conversation about Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction should start by shedding a bright light on the issue of corporate complicity.

Ukraine’s true recovery can only happen when international businesses realize this is not just a war against Ukraine. They must acknowledge that this is a Russian war against the entire rules-based international order. It is a very deliberate Russian attack on the peace and stability that Western businesses have greatly benefited from over the years.

International efforts to advance Ukraine’s recovery are absolutely vital. Priorities should include rebuilding Ukrainian human capital and upgrading Ukraine’s energy infrastructure to set the country firmly on the path toward a green energy future. International companies have a tremendously important role to play in this process, but actions and values must also align.

By countering Russia, Ukraine is providing an invaluable service to the entire free world. Ukrainians who are risking their lives want to deal with international businesses that are ready to sacrifice part of their profit. We do not want to deal with war profiteers, but with those who understand that there is more at stake than just the bottom line. This is what the new era of corporate social responsibility is all about. In Ukraine, any company’s commitment to corporate social responsibility is measured by its willingness to accept a drop in revenues in order to disable the Russian war machine.

The flooding that resulted from the recent dam destruction in southern Ukraine is flushing down the reputation of companies still doing business with and in Russia. Western businesses carry an important responsibility in places where they operate, especially in conflict-ridden areas. Such companies can no longer afford to sit on two sides of the same fence. Either they are part of Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery efforts, or continue to support the destruction of its physical and human capital by feeding the Kremlin’s war chest.

Nataliya Popovych is a co-founder and steering committee member of B4Ukraine and the founder and president of One Philosophy.

Beyond the battlefield: Why we should invest in Ukraine’s democratic future

Peter Erben, Gio Kobakhidze — Mon, 19 Jun 2023 12:31:50 +0000

With all eyes on Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive aimed at liberating the country from Russian occupation, there is also much talk throughout Ukraine and beyond on what happens next. This will be one of the main issues on the agenda at this year’s Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC), which the United Kingdom and Ukraine will host jointly in London in late June. The forthcoming conference will bring together leaders from the international community, international financial institutions, the private sector, and civil society to mobilize international support for Ukraine’s postwar economic and social stabilization.

International support will unquestionably continue to be critical for Ukraine’s ability to withstand and prevail in the face of Russia’s ongoing war of aggression, as it will be for Ukraine’s further recovery and reconstruction. In this vein, it is crucial to acknowledge that Ukraine’s commitment to democratic resilience, both during the war and in the post-war phase, is essential to maintaining and expanding these much-needed investments.

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Prior to the February 2022 full-scale invasion of their country, Ukrainians already had a long history of fighting hard for their rights and freedoms. During the decades following the Soviet collapse, independent Ukraine saw significant progress toward mostly free and fair elections and other basic human rights. The nation also decentralized political and budgetary powers, brought greater transparency to government spending, overhauled its banking sector, and made headway on improving the governance of state-owned enterprises, many of which are slated for privatization.

Despite the horrors of the Russian invasion, a number of current indications suggest Ukraine is ready for further progress. The Ukrainian military is now one of the most powerful in Europe. An influential civil society and a relatively free press are among the stronger pillars of this vibrant democracy. The technology sector is thriving and is helping to dismantle what had been a stifling bureaucracy, one of many hangovers from the Soviet Union. But much work remains.

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Today, military victory is obviously Ukraine’s top national priority. At the same time, any Ukrainian will tell you that one of the many realities separating them from Russia is that Ukrainians have a clear military objective and, unlike Russia, know what they are fighting for: freedom. The steps needed to achieve this freedom will extend beyond the battlefield and will include further advances in decentralization, political pluralism, press freedoms, adherence to the rule of law, anti-corruption, human rights, and democratic elections.

It will, for example, be critical for Ukraine to ensure free and fair elections when the country returns to party politics following the end of armed hostilities with Russia. For this to happen, time will be needed to ensure that necessary legislative amendments are passed in an open manner; that political competitors have reasonable and equitable access to the media; that the electoral infrastructure is ready; that financial reporting for political contestants resumes; and that voter registration lists are up to date. As the international community gathers to plan support for Ukraine’s recovery, it is essential that Ukraine’s allies stand ready to support this critical aspect of the nation’s future.

Just as Ukraine has surpassed all expectations in its courageous fight against Russia’s full-scale invasion launched 16 months ago, the nation must also outperform reform expectations once it defeats Russia’s military. After all, this embodies what the nation is fighting for. Further reform measures are also critical as a means of securing continued and expanding support from the country’s international partners, including for recovery and reconstruction.

Ukraine’s heroic resistance to Russia’s war of aggression is the story of a progressing democracy’s resistance to autocracy. The free world is providing military, economic, and humanitarian support for Ukraine because most view Ukraine’s struggle as their own. In this sense, Russia’s full-scale invasion is not only a criminal assault against a sovereign country, but against democracy everywhere. The world needs to see Ukraine’s recovery in the same light as a chance to advance shared democratic values.

Peter Erben is Principal Advisor at the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) (global) and Senior Country Director at IFES Ukraine. Gio Kobakhidze is Deputy Country Director at IFES Ukraine.

Russian War Report: Anti-Ukrainian counteroffensive narratives fail to go viral

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 15 Jun 2023 18:59:00 +0000

Security

Deadly Russian barrage targets residential building in Kryvyi Rih as fighting continues in south and east

Putin confirms Russian conscripts are protecting Belgorod Oblast against raids

Tracking narratives

Narrative targeting Ukraine’s counteroffensive fails to gain traction on Twitter

Deadly Russian barrage targets residential building in Kryvyi Rih as fighting continues in south and east

On June 13, Russia attacked a residential building in Kryvyi Rih, killing at least twelve people and injuring at least thirty-four. Rescue operations continued the morning of June 14.

Elsewhere, the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine said at least three people were killed and thirteen wounded after Russia launched Kalibr cruise missiles against Odesa on the night of June 13. The air force said it shot down three of four Kalibr cruise missiles and nine of ten Shahed drones. In addition, shelling in Karyerne, in Kherson Oblast, killed a nine-year-old girl, according to the Prosecutor General’s Office.

Further, a Donbas Telegram channel citing Governor Pavlo Kyrylenko reported at least two people killed and two others wounded after Russian missile strikes in Kramatorsk. In the Dnipropetrovsk region, Governor Serhiy Lysak said three Shahed drones were shot down, while in Svitlovodsk, Kirovohrad Oblast, a Shahed drone reportedly struck an unnamed “infrastructure object.” Russian Tu-22M3 bombers also launched Kh-22 missiles against targets in Donetsk Oblast. Meanwhile, shelling was reported in Russia’s Kursk region, targeting Glushkovo, Korovyakovka, Tetkino, and Popovo-Lezhachi. A police station in Glushkovo was reportedly damaged.

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported on June 13 twenty-eight clashes between its forces and the Russian army. Near Bakhmut, Russian forces attempted to carry out attacks in the areas of Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Ivanivske, and Bila Hora. Attacks were also reported in the direction of Lyman near Vesele and Rozdolivka.

The office of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that evacuations are planned in Armyansk, a Russian-occupied town in north Crimea, prompted by the collapse of the Nova Kakhovka dam. Operations at the Titan titanium dioxide plant in Armyansk were critically disrupted as a result of the dam collapse. The presidential office said an attack against the Titan plant could release up to two hundred tons of ammonia into the air, posing a significant threat to north Crimea and south Kherson Oblast. Flooding is also silting up the North Crimean Canal; Reuters noted that the canal has traditionally supplied 85 percent of Crimea’s water.

Ukrainian volunteer Roman Donik reported on June 13 that the 47th Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, known as Magura, is advancing through continuous minefields. Ukraine’s current de-mining equipment is reportedly insufficient for handling the density of the minefields. Despite the risks, the soldiers of the brigade are moving forward on foot. The following day, Speaker of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Andriy Kovalev announced that Ukrainian forces had advanced in various areas in the direction of Berdyansk at a distance of 200 to 1,400 meters. Currently, the main battles are taking place in Makarivka, Novodanylivka, and Novopokrovka.

The investigative unit of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Ukraine service reported that satellite imagery shows Russia transferred twenty helicopters to the Berdyansk airfield after the launch of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the direction of Zaporizhzhia. Currently, there are at least twenty-seven Russian military helicopters at the occupied airfield, as well as five Ka-52 units, nine Mi-8 or Mi-24 units, and thirteen Ka-29 units. According to the report, these aircraft are designed to support Russian ground forces with the operational transfer of troops or equipment closer to the battlefield, in addition to possible evacuation operations.

According to Mykola Kolesnyk, a Ukrainian paramilitary leader, a Russian ammunition depot was hit in occupied Staromlynivka by the aerial reconnaissance unit of the 129th Territorial Defense Forces Brigade and the artillery unit of the 55th Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Footage from the 53rd Brigade of Ukraine’s Armed Forces shows strikes against Russian equipment, warehouses, and bases.

Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced a new military assistance package for Ukraine, which will include additional munitions for national advanced surface-to-air missile systems (NASAMS), Stinger anti-aircraft systems, missiles for high mobility artillery rocket systems (HIMARS), 155mm and 105mm artillery shells, fifteen Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, ten Stryker armored personnel carriers, Javelin anti-armor systems, and more than 22 million rounds of small arms ammunitions and grenades, in addition to demining and communications systems. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom announced a new $116 million aid package for Ukraine, which will include a radar system to track Russian missiles, artillery, and ammunition.

Lastly, Danish military instructors will train Ukrainian crews on German Leopard 1A5 tanks, according to a Danish media. Denmark is scheduled to send Ukraine eighty restored Leopard 1A5DK tanks this month. The machines were bought by the private German company FFG after they were withdrawn from the Danish army in 2005. Denmark and Germany allocated $3.2 million to repair and modernize the tanks. In early February, the German company Krauss-Maffei Wegmann began preparing the tanks for delivery to Ukraine.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Putin confirms Russian conscripts are protecting Belgorod Oblast against raids

In a June 13 address, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke about the situation in Russian regions bordering Ukraine. Since May 22, Belgorod Oblast has been the target of two incursions allegedly led by the Russian Volunteer Corps, an anti-Putin military unit made of Russian pro-Ukrainian partisans. In a meeting with Russian military bloggers and war correspondents, Putin reportedly said, “If this continues, then we will need to examine the question—and I say this carefully—of creating on Ukraine’s territory a sanitary zone at such a distance from where it could be impossible to reach our territory.” While this appears to be the first time the term “sanitary zone” has been used in reference to the war in Ukraine, the Russian president is likely referring to the creation of a demilitarized buffer zone in Ukraine.

In sharing an anecdote about a battalion commander in Belgorod Oblast, Putin confirmed Russian conscripts had been deployed to the region. When asked how many mobilized soldiers and conscripts were under his command, the commander reportedly replied, “They’re all conscripts,” adding, “None of them shivered!”

Russia’s spring conscription kicked off on March 30, 2023, with future recruits called to undergo military preparation. Although Putin declared in March 2022 that no conscript would fight in the war, suspicions were raised following the reported death of three conscripts after a June 1 attack against Belgorod. The three soldiers served in the 43rd Railway Brigade. In a VKontakte post, a Russian official said the conscripted soldiers had been relocated from the Sverdlovsk region to Belgorod. According to pro-Russian media outlet Lenta, Russian MP Leonid Slutsky reportedly proposed a legal mechanism so that “conscripts, fighting the enemy in the Belgorod Oblast, could be recognized as participants of combat operations and receive all the payments due under the law.”

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Narrative targeting Ukraine’s counteroffensive fails to gain traction on Twitter

A small number of influential Twitter accounts are spreading a narrative that frames the Ukrainian counteroffensive as unsuccessful. The DFRLab conducted a query using the social media analysis platform Meltwater Explore to identify tweets that mention the Ukrainian counteroffensive. It returned 352,000 results from 118,000 users, which averages almost three tweets per user. The results indicate organic traffic.

Chart comparing the sentiment of tweets about Ukraine’s counter-offense, determined by number of tweets, average number of retweets, and total retweets of top 100 most retweeted posts. (Source: @nikaaleksejeva/DFRLab via Meltwater Explore)

Three of the five most-retweeted tweets claimed the counteroffensive was unsuccessful. All three tweets came from @KimDotcom, a controversial hacker, entrepreneur, and activist currently based in New Zealand. In his tweets, he suggested that sanctions against Russia do not work, implied that Ukrainian soldiers are suffering enormous casualties, and amplified a tweet from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs allegedly showing destroyed Western military vehicles. The second most-active account declaring the counteroffensive a failure was the anonymous account @WarMonitors, which shared allegedly destroyed Western military equipment and praised Russian equipment.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

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Give Africa’s peace delegation for Ukraine a chance

Rama Yade — Thu, 15 Jun 2023 16:39:46 +0000

A delegation of African presidents and diplomats—from Senegal, Uganda, Egypt, Republic of Congo, Zambia, and South Africa—will soon present Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in Moscow and Kyiv respectively, a peace plan for ending Russia’s war on Ukraine.

The initiative is rare enough to draw some sarcasm about African presidents who are seeking to stop a European war when they can’t stop wars closer to home. For those critics—who overlook the work done in an effort to end the conflict in Ethiopia last year—it is hard to remember the last time such a delegation of African presidents assembled together to respond to a war on African soil. They point to cases in Khartoum, Sudan, and Goma, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where any conflict-resolution efforts were ineffectual.

Other observers see this new delegation of African leaders as an attempt by South Africa to distract people from troubles at home. The announcement of the delegation came just days after US Ambassador to South Africa Reuben Brigety’s allegation that a Russian cargo ship stocked up on ammunition and arms at a port in Cape Town in December 2022.

The recent (albeit cautious) support from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, Washington, and European capitals—along with the varied geopolitical positions of these African countries—lent enough credit to the initiative to give it a chance. In the United Nations General Assembly’s recent vote to condemn Russia over its invasion of Ukraine—held on February 23 this year, around the one-year mark of the full-scale invasion—thirty African countries voted to condemn Russia, twenty-two countries abstained, and two supported Russia. These African leaders, representing both countries who voted to condemn Russia and countries who abstained, form the optimal group to propose a peace plan, as several of them see this as an opportunity to justify their varied positions—including neutrality—and find a diplomatic end to the war.

What does this peace plan say? Frankly, not much—at the moment. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa spoke of vague preparations and of having separate phone calls, but avoided critical details. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said he was looking forward to seeing the delegation’s “concrete initiatives.”

What African leaders are weighing

Russia’s links to the African continent date back to the Cold War and a desire to support communist regimes (in places such as Guinea, Congo, and Ethiopia) and social-democratic or socialist political movements (in places such as South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe). The Soviet Union deployed forty thousand advisers across Africa between 1970 and 1975, and, over the course of the Cold War, received about sixty thousand African students—notably at the Patrice Lumumba Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, which drew students from developing countries across the world. Some major African infrastructure projects are products of partnerships with the Soviet Union, Russia, or Russian companies. Those include the Aswan Dam in Egypt, the Capanda hydroelectric dam, and power plants planned in Congo and Nigeria. These are all countries that Putin hopes to rely on in order to find the support he lacks in the Global North.

Yet, while the USSR and, later, Russia have supported Africa in these ways, Africans are unlikely to blindly align themselves with Russia. It is impossible to ignore that previous support was more inspired by a desire to compete against the United States than by a love for freedom or Africa. Today, outside observers and African publics alike cannot ignore the humanitarian cost posed by Russia’s Wagner Group militias in the Sahel, Libya, the Central African Republic, or Mozambique. It is also difficult to see African youth seduced by the Russian way of life rather than the American dream, the latter of which has been able to increase its appeal to African youth via Netflix and Silicon Valley.

In fact, even if the West can’t see what Russians could seriously offer to Africans now, it has not been very difficult for Russia to fuel the very real African resentment towards the West. For Russia and the West, Africa is a coveted asset—one that holds 28 percent of the votes at the United Nations. In the post-Cold War period, Ukraine had neither the resources nor the geopolitical interest to engage in Africa like Russia did. That gave Russian views justifying aggression a hearing in Africa that it otherwise would not have received.

The complicated relations between African countries and also between African countries and global competitors such as Russia, the United States, and others leaves African policymakers in a bind. Those policymakers must carefully balance their economic interests and historical ties.

Further complicating the choice for African policymakers is the overwhelming US and Western support for Ukraine, in contrast to the lack of support and attention for African countries facing conflict. African countries, out of national interest, are looking to diversify their partnerships; they will need to balance their specific needs and local contexts in this geopolitical chaos.

A change in the narrative

The delegation of African presidents aiming to bring an end to Russia’s war in Ukraine offers a unique opportunity for these leaders to be a part of the solution to a global problem and no longer rest on the sidelines of geopolitics as collateral victims.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine caused a considerable increase in the price of grains, worsening food security particularly in the Horn of Africa; at the same time,it has also allowed Africa to step up as an alternative producer of some critical goods. For example in the energy sector, as Europe diversified away from Russian energy supplies, Africa helped fill the void, with Algeria now among the top four exporters of gas to Europe and with Egypt also bolstering its gas-export capacity, according to its Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources. Recent hydrocarbon discoveries in Senegal and Mozambique are set to come online in the years ahead. These significant actions show that Africa is playing a leadership role and refusing to sit on the sidelines as a victim of geopolitical fallout.

Africa has the peace and conflict-resolution experience to put forward in ending Eastern Europe’s geopolitical crisis. Even if African efforts have not always been successful, these efforts are valuable; the leaders behind them still have crucial experience in conflict management. Some might argue that the existence of countless conflict resolution tools, demobilization programs, peace-building mechanisms, and strategic frameworks such as the Peace and Security Council of the African Union indicate that African leaders fail to settle the conflicts and wars happening in their own countries; but in reality, the existence of these initiatives shows that African leaders have created dialogue where there were voids, demobilized fighters so they could return home, and, in some cases, helped societies address the horrors of war and build a lasting peace. Several of the leaders in the African peace delegation have participated in responding to violent conflict or have worked to end conflict. That experience may be usefully applied to Russia’s war on Ukraine.

By bringing the unique peace initiative together, African presidents are attempting to advance their leadership on the global stage. This is an incredible challenge for a continent that has often been applauded for its potential, but which must now deliver.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow at the Europe Center. She is a professor at Sciences Po Paris and Mohammed 6 Polytechnic University in Morocco. She was a member of the French cabinet, serving as deputy minister for foreign affairs and human rights and ambassador to UNESCO.

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Why Ukrainian NATO membership would actually be good for Russia

Leonid Gozman — Wed, 14 Jun 2023 07:42:05 +0000

Vladimir Putin claims one of the main goals of his Ukraine invasion is to prevent the country joining NATO. This objective may at first glance appear broadly reasonable, but on closer inspection, it actually goes directly against Russia’s own national interests.

The idea that Ukrainian NATO membership would pose a security threat to Russia ranks among Putin’s most enduring myths. In reality, however, no NATO member has ever threatened to attack Russia. On the contrary, Russia’s shared borders with NATO have always been strikingly calm and secure. Notably, this was also the case throughout the Soviet era and stands in contrast to some other Russian borders. If Ukraine joins NATO, it would significantly increase Russia’s own border security.

The interests of the Russian people are best served by a sustainable and lasting peace rather than wars of conquest. Ukraine’s NATO accession would strengthen the alliance and improve its ability to resist Russian aggression. This would greatly reduce the risk of a new war in Ukraine, as not even Putin is ready to enter into an open war with NATO. Instead, the Russian population would be much likelier to live peaceful lives.

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Crucially, Ukrainian NATO membership would mean an end to dreams of restoring the Russian Empire. This would be good news for all Russians, who have no need of an empire. In today’s world, imperial ambitions bring crushing economic and moral burdens that hamper the development of a country and lead to stagnation.

It is also inaccurate to assume, as many currently do, that a majority of Russians share the same imperial aspirations promoted by Putin himself. In fact, during the years of the Soviet collapse, there were literally zero rallies calling on Moscow to prevent the various Soviet republics from securing independence, despite the fact that protests were possible at that time. Indeed, following the tragic events of January 1991 in Vilnius, when Soviet troops killed 13 Lithuanians, around a million people attended a massive rally in central Moscow demanding recognition of Lithuanian independence. These people took to the streets not in defense of empire but in support of freedom.

Back then, nobody saw the fall of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” as Putin would later state. According to polling data, the Russian public only began showing signs of “imperial nostalgia” some 15 years later in the mid-2000s. This change in mood was due to official propaganda rather than any deep-seated notions of imperial identity.

Far from marking a regrettable retreat from empire, the collapse of the Soviet Union was an undeniably positive development for Russia. Similarly, the current revival of imperialism in Russia poses an existential threat to the country’s future. Ukrainian NATO membership would be a big step toward abandoning the idea of empire entirely, and that would be a positive development for all Russians.

It is clearly in Russia’s interests to have stable, predictable, and non-aggressive neighbors. NATO member states represent exactly this kind of neighbor. If Ukraine joins the alliance, this would go a long way to allaying fears within Russia over possible future Ukrainian revenge after the current war ends.

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Ukrainian accession to NATO would help raise living standards in the country by obliging the Ukrainian authorities to implement vital reforms. This would be particularly good news for Russia. Like any other country, Russia has an interest in the prosperity of neighboring states and stands to benefit from improved trade and other economic ties if Ukraine achieves a higher standard of living.

Joining NATO would also strengthen Ukraine’s democratic institutions. This would help demonstrate to the Russian public that democracy can thrive in the post-Soviet space. Russians are just as interested in personal freedoms and democratic values as anyone else, but they are bombarded with propaganda from the Kremlin convincing them that freedom and democracy are only possible in the West and will never take root inside Russia.

The Putin regime supports this incompatibility argument by pointing to various aspects of Russian society that allegedly make the country unsuitable for democracy, such as Russia’s dominant Slavic Orthodox culture. However, as a fellow predominantly Slavic Orthodox nation that many Russians view as extremely similar to their own country, Ukraine can debunk such arguments. Indeed, this is a key reason why the Kremlin views Ukrainian democracy as such a threat.

Unless Ukraine joins NATO, even the complete liberation of the country will not bring sustainable peace. Putin will not accept defeat and will inevitably attack again. This is exactly what Hitler would have done if the allies had not destroyed his criminal regime along with his war machine. Just as lasting peace was only possible after World War II due to the removal of the Nazi system, future peace in Eastern Europe will depend on the end of the Putin regime. This is clearly in the interests of the Russian people, and will be much more likely if Ukraine joins NATO. Membership of the alliance would provide Ukraine with long-term security, but the benefits to Russia itself would be no less profound.

Leonid Gozman is a Russian politician and commentator.

Beyond the counteroffensive: 84% of Ukrainians are ready for a long war

Peter Dickinson — Mon, 12 Jun 2023 23:31:15 +0000

As Ukraine’s long awaited counteroffensive gets underway, a new survey has found that the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians are ready to continue the war beyond the summer campaign if necessary in order to complete the liberation of the country. The poll, conducted in late May and early June by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), found that 84% of Ukrainians opposed making any territorial concessions to Russia, even if this means prolonging the war.

In line with other surveys of public opinion in wartime Ukraine, the KIIS poll identified strikingly similar attitudes across the country, with 75% of respondents in eastern Ukraine ruling out any territorial concessions compared to 84% in central Ukraine and 86% in both the south and west. This illustrates the unifying impact the Russian invasion has had on Ukrainian public opinion, and underlines the significance of the ongoing war as a major milestone in modern Ukraine’s nation-building journey.

Until very recently, international media coverage of Ukraine often depicted the country as deeply divided between pro-Russian east and pro-European west. This was always an oversimplification and is now clearly no longer the case. Instead, attitudes toward key issues such as the war with Russia and membership of NATO have converged, with strong support for Euro-Atlantic integration evident in every region of Ukraine. Meanwhile, pro-Russian sentiment has plummeted to record lows, especially in the predominantly Russian-speaking regions of southern and eastern Ukraine that have witnessed the worst of the fighting.

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This latest poll is an important data point that confirms Ukrainian resolve to achieve the complete de-occupation of the country. It also highlights the problems of viewing the current counteroffensive as a make-or-break moment in Ukraine’s war effort.

Some commentators have argued that failure to achieve a major military breakthrough in the coming months would cause a sharp decline in international support for Ukraine and force Kyiv to accept the necessity of some kind of compromise with the Kremlin. In reality, however, the Ukrainian public is staunchly opposed to the kind of land-for-peace deal that would likely form the basis of any negotiated settlement. As long as Ukrainians remain determined to fight on, few Western leaders will be prepared to abandon them.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy seems to have a good grasp of the public mood in wartime Ukraine. He has consistently stated that Ukraine’s goal is the liberation of all regions currently under Russian occupation. This uncompromising position has attracted some international criticism, with China pushing for the resumption of peace talks and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva urging Ukraine in April to cede Crimea to Russia in order to end the war.

Ukraine’s Western partners have been far more supportive, providing growing quantities of vital military aid while emphasizing that it is up to Kyiv alone to define what would constitute an acceptable peace. Following some initial hesitation, most Western leaders now also recognize the need for Russia’s invasion to end in a decisive defeat, and acknowledge that anything less would have disastrous consequences for international security.

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It is easy to understand why so many Ukrainians reject the idea of striking a deal with Moscow, despite the terrible toll of the war and the inevitability of further trauma.

Perhaps more than anything else, this determination to liberate the whole of Ukraine reflects an acute awareness of the genocidal agenda underpinning Russia’s invasion and the horrors taking place in Russian-occupied regions. Every time the Ukrainian army advances and liberates territory, officials uncover the same grim evidence of war crimes including summary executions, torture, abductions, sexual violence, and mass deportations. For the vast majority of Ukrainians, the idea of condemning millions of their compatriots to this fate is simply unthinkable.

Many in Ukraine are also convinced that attempts to strike a bargain with the Kremlin are both futile and dangerous. Opponents of a compromise settlement note that the current war is no mere border dispute requiring minor territorial concessions, and point to Russia’s increasingly undisguised commitment to extinguishing Ukrainian statehood. They warn that Russian leaders would view any negotiated peace deal as a pause in hostilities, which they would then use to regroup before launching the next stage of the invasion.

Based on Russia’s own actions over the past sixteen months of full-scale war, it is difficult to see how any kind of compromise would prove workable. Putin himself has openly compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great, and in September 2022 announced the annexation of four partially occupied Ukrainian regions representing around 20% of the entire country. If he is not decisively defeated on the battlefield, he will almost certainly seek to go further and attempt to seize more Ukrainian land.

A further factor fueling Ukraine’s commitment to complete de-occupation is the strong desire to free the country once and for all from the historic threat of Russian imperialism. This reflects widespread Ukrainian perceptions of the current war as the latest episode in what is actually a far longer history of imperial aggression that stretches back many hundreds of years.

For centuries, Russian imperial influence has shaped Ukrainian history in ways that have caused untold suffering to generations of Ukrainians while keeping the country trapped in a state of arrested development. Unless Russia is defeated and forced to withdraw entirely from Ukrainian land, this bitter cycle will continue. Ukrainians are under no illusions regarding the high price of victory, but most feel that the price of a premature peace would be far higher, and refuse to pass this burden on to their children and grandchildren. Anyone seeking to end the war without Russian defeat must first reckon with this resolve.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Should NATO extend Stoltenberg’s term as leader?

Charles Barry — Mon, 12 Jun 2023 17:25:36 +0000

As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg meets with US President Joe Biden at the White House on Tuesday, there is a lot for them to discuss. Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive has just begun, and key decisions will face allies at the NATO Summit in Vilnius less than a month away. One of those decisions may be confirming the “who”—and also the “when”—of changing NATO’s top leader in the midst of an ongoing war.

Stoltenberg has announced he will conclude his secretary general tenure as planned at the end of September. He has served since October 2014*, just a few months after Russia invaded Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region and Crimea. Since then, Stoltenberg has shown himself to be NATO’s most impactful wartime secretary general. It would surprise no one should historians ultimately deem him the strongest, most capable secretary general in Alliance history. He has kept NATO out of direct combat with Russia while boldly marshaling allied support for Ukraine with mountains of nonlethal matériel and the promise of political backing for “as long as it takes.” (NATO members themselves provide Ukraine lethal warfighting matériel outside of NATO structures, as the core of the fifty-nation Ukraine Defense Contact Group.)

Should NATO members accept Stoltenberg’s decision to step down? Or should he be pressed to stay on as NATO navigates the fierce fighting and political choices ahead; until the path of the war in Ukraine is better known, perhaps in early 2024? Alliance members may decide as soon as their July 11-12 NATO Summit in Vilnius.

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There is a good case for Stoltenberg staying longer. He has been remarkably successful at countering Russian propaganda and nuclear threats and in parrying the internal disruptions of highly contentious members, including by former US President Donald Trump and current Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. He has also skillfully guided Alliance responses to China’s growing presence and influence in Europe. Above all, Stoltenberg has been the stalwart pillar of Alliance cohesion. As the war in Ukraine intensifies this summer and into the fall, and especially should Russia up the ante on nuclear threats, NATO would do well to have Stoltenberg’s seasoned leadership.

Allies might feel an urgency to select Stoltenberg’s replacement at the upcoming Vilnius summit, but they are not required to at that time. That decision could be made later in 2023 or early 2024, still in time for a new secretary general to be installed at the seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington DC. If Stoltenberg does indeed step down this September, he will have already completed nearly ten years of service, making him the second-longest serving NATO secretary general after Joseph Luns, who served from 1971 to 1984. Stoltenberg has given NATO a full measure of service. Yet changing captains in the heat of battle should give some NATO capitals pause.

Key calculations in choosing Stoltenberg’s eventual successor

Whether in September or later, when Stoltenberg does depart and a new secretary general is needed, whom should the allies select?

Some members chafe at the fact that twenty years after new members from Eastern Europe joined the Alliance, no candidate from those seven countries has been selected as secretary general. Other members, including the United States, have shown notable interest in seeing women chosen for high leadership positions. Women leaders have been elected as heads of state for many NATO members, as well as for international organizations such as the European Commission (Ursula Von der Leyen), the International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank (Christine Lagarde), the World Trade Organization (Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala), and the United Nations General Assembly (Maria Fernanda Espinosa Garcés).

To be sure, NATO is past due to join the growing club of glass ceiling breakers. That achievement must be weighed in the context of giving both any prospective candidate and the Alliance the best conditions for success. The conditions facing the next secretary general could not be more challenging. There will be no quiet time for a transition before assertive transatlantic leadership and momentous decisions will be required.

Most immediately, it is critical that NATO solidarity and momentum not slacken in backing Ukraine’s military success over Russia. By the end of this year, the war in Ukraine will likely have moved into a new stage, either—and hopefully—toward a full Ukrainian victory or into a steady stalemate. Until then, and as Vilnius approaches, the war and other major issues—Sweden’s NATO membership, defense spending levels, confronting China’s challenges—will demand unrelenting leadership and diplomacy. The months ahead are not optimum for farewelling NATO’s most capable leader—or for welcoming a new one. Proceed with caution!

Correction: An earlier version of this piece incorrectly stated Stoltenberg began his role as secretary general in March 2014. He was appointed as secretary general designate in March 2014, but formally began the role in October 2014.

Charles Barry is a visiting research fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Since 1990, he has assisted senior US and NATO officials in developing three NATO Strategic Concepts and preparing for fourteen NATO summits. These views are his own and do not reflect those of the US Department of Defense or the National Defense University.

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Russia’s failing Ukraine invasion is exposing Putin’s many weaknesses

Anders Åslund — Mon, 12 Jun 2023 00:29:11 +0000

Vladimir Putin’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine is exposing all of his personal weaknesses as a ruler. It is also casting an unforgiving light on the extensive damage he has done to Russia.

In the early 1990s, I encountered Putin several times at international meetings in St. Petersburg, but I never really met him. I talked to the city’s friendly mayor, Anatoly Sobchak, and his first deputy Alexei Kudrin, but Putin, whose background in the KGB was well known, hid on the sidelines and did not really talk to anybody. He was perceived as a secretive nuisance.

Based on this early impression of Putin, I have always been surprised by his remarkable rise to the pinnacle of Russian politics. My view is that he was simply lucky and owed his many promotions to a handful of people close to Russia’s first post-Soviet president, Boris Yeltsin. Putin’s main benefactors were Yeltsin’s daughter Tatyana and last two chiefs of staff, Valentin Yumashev and Alexander Voloshin, along with oligarchs Boris Berezovsky and Roman Abramovich, who trusted his loyalty while Yeltsin was too sick to rule in 1998-99.

Putin arrived at a table of increasing abundance laid by Yeltsin and his reformers; he was further helped by an extended period of rising global oil prices. He has had a surprisingly long run, but nobody can expect to be lucky forever. For more than two decades, Putin thrived on personal loyalty and relied on his slow, deliberate approach to decision-making. However, as the invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel, his many flaws and weaknesses are now coming to the fore.

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Despite being in power for more than two decades, Putin has never broadened his expert base. Instead, he has stuck to his former KGB colleagues and old St. Petersburg technocrats along with a small number of economists and lawyers. How can anybody seriously listen to Nikolai Patrushev or Yuri and Mikhail Kovalchuk? They are considered among Putin’s closest advisers but they are full of old-style Soviet conspiracy theories.

Putin himself has consistently refused to rely on any sources of information other than his own intelligence agencies. In his big media events, he has repeatedly shown that he believes in all manner of conspiracy theories. In other words, he has consciously chosen to remain poorly informed.

He has never been a fast decision maker or crisis manager and has always taken his time. For much of his reign this has not been a major issue, but that is no longer true in the current wartime environment. Putin’s obvious lack of skill as a crisis manager is presumably one of the reasons why so many important decisions related to the war in Ukraine are late and inconsistent.

Putin is also a micromanager who is reluctant to delegate and prone to over-centralizing. He has persistently gone far too deep into details. Much of the failure of the war in Ukraine seems to have been caused by Putin insisting on deciding too much himself, just like Hitler during World War II. Military decisions require detailed knowledge which Putin simply does not possess. He is also physically far from the battlefield due to his lack of personal courage.

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Since 2000, Putin has systematically destroyed Russia’s state institutions and imposed extreme repression. One consequence is that his regime has very little capacity to generate, receive, or utilize negative feedback. Everybody around him has learned that he only wants to hear good news. As a result, neither he nor his administration learn much from their mistakes.

Many biographers of Putin have been reluctant to discuss allegations that he has been deeply involved in organized crime and kleptocracy for much of his political career. Nevertheless, awareness of this kleptocracy is vital for anyone seeking to understand today’s Russia. Far-reaching criminal influence has made the Russian state rot from within. It can neither manage processes nor produce things effectively.

A peculiarity of the Putin regime is that the ruler actually offers two-way loyalty, unlike Stalin. Putin recognizes only one crime, disloyalty. If one of his underlings happens to steal a billion or two, it is not typically seen as a problem. Nor does Putin fire anybody because of incompetence. Instead, incompetent senior officials are forgiven for their frequent blunders as long as they remain personally loyal to Putin.

The invasion of Ukraine has exposed widespread corruption and incompetence throughout the Russian military and defense sector, but Putin’s old friends and allies remain in their posts. Rather than dismissing the many incompetent Russian generals, Putin prefers to circulate them. The most outstanding failures, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, have not lost their jobs despite their obvious and costly mistakes.

With the invasion of Ukraine now in its sixteenth month, Putin’s limitations as a leader have left Russia heading for an historic defeat. During the early years of his reign, he benefited from the hard work done before him by 1990s reformers and enjoyed favorable international conditions, but his many sins and shortcomings are now clearly catching up with him.

Anders Åslund is a senior fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum and author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

Ukraine’s counteroffensive will likely create new reintegration challenges

Lesia Dubenko — Sun, 11 Jun 2023 23:58:10 +0000

As Ukraine’s long anticipated counteroffensive gets underway, international attention is firmly fixed on military developments. If the Ukrainian Armed Forces are able to achieve significant advances, the authorities in Kyiv will also be faced with the challenge of reintegrating communities that have lived for more than a year, and in some cases over nine years, under Russian occupation.

The obstacles to successful reintegration should not be underestimated. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine first began in 2014, Moscow has prioritized control of the information space and has subjected the population in occupied regions of Ukraine to relentless propaganda. Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that the communities living in occupied Ukraine can be successfully reintegrated following liberation if the right policies are adopted.

Much to the Kremlin’s disbelief, Ukrainian national identity has proven far stronger than anyone in Moscow anticipated in 2014. Similarly, it should now be abundantly clear that the percentage of Ukrainian citizens who speak Russian in their daily lives or embrace aspects of Russian popular culture is in no way indicative of political loyalty to the Kremlin.

Even in regions of Ukraine where the Russian language remained dominant in everyday life following the Soviet collapse, and where cultural connections to post-Soviet Russia appeared strongest, there has also been significant exposure to Ukrainian culture, language, and national identity since the 1990s. For many years, everything from TV advertising to movies have been broadcast in Ukrainian, while education has predominantly been in Ukrainian as the official state language. An entire generation of Russian-speaking Ukrainians grew up and reached adulthood with an awareness of their Ukrainian identity prior to the initial Russian invasion of 2014.

Policymakers in the Kremlin appear to have bet that historic ties to Russia would trump any emerging sense of Ukrainian identity. This confidence was no doubt reinforced by Russia’s prominence in Ukrainian popular culture, with Russian pop singers, film stars, comedians, and literary figures all enjoying widespread popularity. However, the rapid decline since 2014 of Russian cultural influence in parts of Ukraine not subject to direct Kremlin control has illustrated the fragility of Russia’s informal empire.

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Since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, Ukraine has consistently stated that it will settle for nothing less than the liberation of the entire country within the international borders recognized in 1991. This is a massive military undertaking that will involve defeating a Russian invasion force numbering in excess of 300,000 soldiers. Beyond that, Ukraine must also reintegrate perhaps five million people who have spent an extended period living under Russian occupation.

While millions of Ukrainians fled Russia’s initial invasion in 2014 and the subsequent full-scale invasion of 2022, many more remained behind. They have been fed a diet of Kremlin propaganda portraying Ukraine as both a Nazi state and a puppet of the West. Russia has focused particular attention on indoctrinating young Ukrainians to convince them that their future lies with Moscow.

Despite these challenges, there is reason to believe that Russia’s efforts will ultimately fail. Ukrainians as a whole have been subjected to many decades of russification but have demonstrated in recent years that they are not convinced by the Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian messaging. Indeed, the past nine years of Russian aggression have sparked a sharp rise in Ukrainian patriotism across the country, particularly in regions previously regarded as being highly russified. The shared sense of Ukrainian identity forged since 1991 has proven far stronger than the Kremlin had anticipated, while Russian aggression has had a powerful unifying impact on Ukrainian society.

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Crucially, none of the Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine has been fully cut off from the rest of Ukraine since 2014. Until the launch of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, regular interaction across the front lines in Crimea and eastern Ukraine was the norm. Even the intensification of hostilities over the past 16 months has not led to a complete breakdown in communication.

Victims of Russian aggression will have a key role to play in the reintegration process. In every region liberated from Russian occupation, Ukrainian officials have uncovered evidence of widespread war crimes including summary executions, torture, sexual violence, abductions, and mass deportations. It is vital that survivors share their experiences with their wider communities to underline the horrors of the Russian occupation. Local residents will be seen as far more credible than government officials.

It will also be important to communicate in Russian as well as Ukrainian. While growing numbers of Ukrainians are embracing the Ukrainian language, many communities in southern and eastern Ukraine remain predominantly Russian-speaking and have been cut off from the Ukrainian language by Russia’s invasion. They will likely be far more receptive to Russian-language messaging, especially during the initial period following de-occupation, regardless of their personal attitudes toward issues of national identity.

It goes without saying that Ukraine’s top priority is to win the war. At the same time, military victories will prove hollow if the Kyiv authorities are unable to successfully reintegrate millions of Ukrainian citizens who have spent extended periods living under Russian occupation. In order to win hearts and minds, it is vital to underline to liberated communities that they are coming home to a nation that values and embraces them.

Lesia Dubenko is a Ukrainian analyst and journalist. Her articles have appeared in the Financial Times, Politico Europe, New Eastern Europe, and the Atlantic Council.

Could Russia be held accountable for the destruction of the Kakhovka dam?

Danielle Johnson — Thu, 08 Jun 2023 20:48:50 +0000

In the early hours of June 6, the Kakhovka dam spanning the Dnipro River in Russian-occupied southern Ukraine collapsed, sparking a major humanitarian and ecological disaster in the surrounding area. The unfolding catastrophe has been labeled as a war crime and an act of ecocide, but holding anyone legally accountable will likely prove challenging.

The sheer scale of the disaster in southern Ukraine remains difficult to grasp. Floodwaters have already displaced thousands of people. Many more are trapped or at risk, including elderly or ill residents who were unable to leave the area earlier on in the war. Initial reports indicate that the authorities in areas under Russian occupation have restricted access to emergency services while preventing residents from leaving. There have also been widespread reports of the Russian military shelling evacuees and rescuers.

Dozens of towns, cities, and farms have been or will be destroyed as the waters continue to rise and move downstream, while large numbers of people throughout a vast area face a lack of access to clean drinking water and essential services. Much of the surrounding farmland is now unusable, which will impact the livelihoods of thousands of Ukrainians and potentially undermine global food security.

There are additional concerns over a potential nuclear disaster as the reservoir behind the collapsed dam supplies the cooling water for the nearby Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest in Europe. Floodwaters are also thought to have dislodged significant numbers of mines, creating further potential for civilian casualties.

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While the Kremlin has denied blowing up the dam and has instead accused Ukraine, initial analysis strongly suggests Russian responsibility. A New York Times article citing engineering and munitions experts concluded that a “deliberate explosion” inside the Russian-controlled dam “most likely caused it to collapse.” Only Russian forces could have carried out such an explosion.

Many have also questioned the credibility of Moscow’s counterclaims suggesting the dam was destroyed by Ukrainian missile or artillery fire. Independent experts have confirmed that the Cold War era dam, which was built to withstand a nuclear attack, would be extremely difficult to destroy via external bombardment, according to The Times.

Russia also has a clear military motive and a long record of attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. At the time of the dam collapse, Russian forces were preparing to face a long anticipated Ukrainian summer counteroffensive. The widespread flooding produced by the disaster effectively ruled out the possibility of Ukrainian troops attempting a river crossing along an entire section of the 1000-kilometer front. Meanwhile, Russia spent much of the winter and spring seasons conducting a methodical nationwide bombing campaign designed to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and freeze the country into submission. While the destruction of a major dam would mark an escalation in this campaign, it would clearly not be unprecedented.

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Despite the likelihood that Russia is responsible for the dam collapse, in legal terms it is still too early to hold anyone directly accountable. First, there would need to be incontrovertible proof that this was actually an attack rather than some kind of horrible accident, miscommunication, or mistake made amid the “fog of war.” Then, the issue of attribution would have to be dealt with. This means that Russia’s responsibility for the attack would need to proven beyond doubt.

If it can be established that Russia intentionally carried out an attack on the dam, there are many potential pathways to justice. For example, Ukraine could pursue accountability through its own domestic courts; international actors could establish a regional tribunal; the International Criminal Court could investigate and potentially indict a responsible individual; or countries could choose to exercise universal jurisdiction in order to prosecute Russia for its actions.

Unfortunately, there are many obstacles to overcome in pursuing accountability through these mechanisms. History has shown that the wheels of justice are excruciatingly slow in international war crimes cases. Prosecutors and Ukrainians alike would have to show extraordinary patience in waiting for these approaches to pay dividends. It would also be difficult to prove who ordered the attack and get that person in the dock, barring unlikely regime change within Russia itself. These are neither fair nor easy circumstances for Ukrainians to accept in the face of such trauma.

Furthermore, there are still huge information gaps. There would need to be a committed fact-finding effort, starting in the immediate present, to fill these gaps for a case that might not be prosecuted for many years or even decades. Ukrainians have shown an unprecedented ability to document abuses in real time throughout the current war. The onus would be on them to identify the individual Russian units and commanders responsible for blowing up the dam.

The challenges are even greater if Ukraine or the international community wants to pursue specific accountability for ecocide. Although there has been a lot of momentum in this direction, ecocide is not yet codified as a crime under international law (although it is under Ukrainian law). Even if this were to be accomplished in the near future and ecocide came to fall under the Rome Statute that established the ICC, there would still be enough ambiguity and lack of legal precedent to potentially deter prosecutors from pursuing the charge of ecocide in the Kakhovka dam case. There would also need to be an extensive investigation, which would not be easy given bureaucratic and financial barriers along with the fact that many affected areas remain under Russian control or are heavily mined.

In light of these obstacles, what can be done in the short-term to help hold Russia accountable for the destruction of the Kakhovka dam and its devastating consequences? First, the international community needs to broaden its view of what might constitute justice beyond the courtroom. This means listening to and supporting local civil society in Ukraine. It also means investing in Ukraine not only in the short-term, but in sustainable ways that bolster the country’s longer-term recovery and reconstruction, quite possibly by using frozen Russian assets to finance it. This requires helping the Ukrainian authorities combat corruption and build the capacity of the country’s own judicial system to pursue accountability.

In the pursuit of justice for Ukraine, the most meaningful steps are those that ensure Russia’s decisive defeat. Accountability will be much more difficult to achieve if the conflict becomes protracted or frozen. In such circumstances, it is highly unlikely that anyone will ever face prosecution over the destruction of Kakhovka dam. Ultimately, the only way to achieve a just and durable peace is through Ukrainian victory.

Danielle Johnson holds a PhD in Politics from Oxford University and is currently a Senior Ukraine Analyst at ACAPS.

Kakhovka dam collapse threatens Europe’s largest nuclear plant

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti — Thu, 08 Jun 2023 20:06:08 +0000

The blowing up of the Kakhovka dam in Russian-occupied southern Ukraine in the early hours of June 6 has produced a range of catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences. The resultant draining of the Kakhovka reservoir also creates significant risks for the nearby Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. The plant, which is the largest in Europe, is not believed to be in any immediate danger, but rapidly dropping water levels in the reservoir will make it difficult to access the water necessary to cool the plant’s six reactors.

Nuclear power plants work by splitting atoms to create tremendous heat, which turns turbines to generate electricity. The heat created is so extreme that advanced cooling systems are required to keep temperature levels under control and prevent a meltdown. The Fukushima disaster was the result of a cooling system failure when a tsunami caused by a major earthquake disabled the Japanese nuclear power plant’s cooling system and three reactors melted down from their own heat. By contrast, the 1986 Chornobyl disaster in Soviet Ukraine was due to human error that caused the graphite reactor cores to burn.

The Zaporizhzhia plant features VVER-1000 pressurized light water reactors. This means that a Chornobyl-style meltdown is not possible as there is no graphite to burn, but the risk of a cooling system failure is a grave concern. The plant has been carefully monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since it was first captured by Russian troops in March 2022 during the early weeks of the full-scale Russian invasion.

Since then, Russia has repeatedly struck the transmission lines that power the plant’s cooling systems, necessitating the use of back-up generators to keep the cooling system operational. Despite regular alarms over the close proximity of combat operations and the deployment of Russian troops at the plant, the risk of a nuclear disaster has been seen as present but never pressing due to numerous residual safety features. For example, the plant can run on its own power for short periods of time if power grid access and generators simultaneously fail. So far, this hasn’t happened.

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The Kakhovka dam collapse has now increased the risk of disaster. In addition to electricity, the plant needs large quantities of water to run its cooling system. The plant was built in the 1980s, decades after the Kakhovka dam was constructed, and features a design that relies on reservoir water for its cooling system. And although the plant’s six reactors have been turned off for more than eight months to reduce the likelihood of wartime nuclear accidents, it will still be a decade before the reactor fuel rods are cool enough to be moved into dry storage.

Water levels in the reservoir have plummeted since the blast on Tuesday morning. At this stage, nobody can say with any certainty how far the water levels will eventually drop before leveling out. The IAEA commented on June 7 that if water levels fall below 12.7 meters, the lowest level at which water can be pumped upstream to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, there are alternative options that can be used to source cooling system water. One day later, this point was reportedly reached. With the Kakhovka dam beyond repair and no clear way to stop it hemorrhaging water from the reservoir, it seems likely that external water sources will be necessary.

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At present, IAEA officials say there is “no immediate risk” to the plant, while officials from Ukraine’s nuclear operator Energoatom have stated that water supplies stored close to the facility are sufficient for the next few months. However, others have noted that summer heat could speed evaporation and exhaust existing reserves far sooner.

The destruction of Kakhovka dam is widely viewed as the latest and most reckless in a series of attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure carried out by Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began almost sixteen months ago. While Moscow has officially denied destroying the dam, initial analysis points to Russian responsibility. A New York Times article citing engineering and munitions experts concluded that a “deliberate explosion” inside the Russian-controlled dam “most likely caused its collapse.” Meanwhile, independent experts have confirmed that the Cold War era dam, which was built to withstand a nuclear attack, would be extremely difficult to destroy via external bombardment, according to The Times.

In addition to the heightened risk to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the destruction of the dam has also unleashed an ecological disaster throughout the region. Tens of thousands of local residents whose homes have been flooded are in urgent need of care and shelter. Significant quantities of oil and chemicals have poured into the Dnipro River and must be contained, along with munitions. These are the most immediate challenges facing the Ukrainian authorities.

The risks posed to Europe’s largest nuclear power plant by the loss of access to reservoir water must also be addressed without delay before the situation becomes critical. Beyond this pressing logistical issue, the blowing up of the Kakhovka dam is also fueling speculation over whether Russia may be prepared to adopt similarly drastic measures at the Zaporizhzhia plant itself. With this in mind, the international community must send a clear message to Moscow that it will be held accountable for any further attempts to intimidate the world with the threat of nuclear disaster.

Suriya Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Satellite imagery analysis captures flood threat after dam’s destruction

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 08 Jun 2023 12:00:00 +0000

Security

Nova Kakhovka dam rupture floods acres of civilian settlements in Kherson Oblast

Fighting between Russian volunteers and Russian army escalates in Belgorod Oblast

Interference on satellite imagery points to enhanced military activity on the border between Belgorod and Kharkiv prior to saboteur raid

Tracking narratives

Pro-Kremlin sources contradict each other in laying blame for Nova Kakhovka dam destruction

Deepfake impersonating Putin ‘declares’ martial law in Russian regions bordering Ukraine

Russia recycles false narrative that Ukraine plans to use a ‘dirty bomb’

Nova Kakhovka dam rupture floods acres of civilian settlements in Kherson Oblast

On June 6, satellite imagery published by Maxar confirmed the collapse of the Nova Kakhovka dam in Ukraine. The dam is located downstream of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, and upstream of the city of Kherson, in southeast Ukraine. Ukraine and Russia continue to blame each other for its destruction.

For months, Russian and Ukrainian armed forces have been facing each other on either side of the riverbank, as Ukraine retook the city of Kherson after Russia claimed to have evacuated the city as “a gesture of good will.” The contents of the Kakhovka reservoir have been flowing downstream into the Kherson region ever since the dam’s rupture, resulting in the flooding of acres of civilian settlements stretching from near the dam down to the mouth of the river along the Black Sea.

The DFRLab collected data from MapZen using Sentinel’s EOBrowser platform. The imagery notably contains a digital elevation model enabling the DFRLab to model high risk areas subject to floods. Using geographic analysis relying on raster calculations, a technique for mapping individual pixels to altitude data, the DFRLab assessed two scenarios of potential flooding downstream of Nova Kakhovka. This information was cross-referenced with other data posted by Russian opposition Telegram channel Agentstvo to assess the extent of the flood.

An animated map showing potential locations subjected to flooding hazards as a result of the rupture of the Nova Kakhovka dam. (Source: MapZen via ESA/Sentinel EOBrowser, annotations: DFRLab)

Agentstvo geolocated footage taken by civilians on either side of the river. The DFRLab added these locations to the above map in an attempt to compare the modeled area to the actual reported locations of flooding. As of June 6, the mapped locations are consistent with areas that would flood if the river rose by just two meters. Footage shows parts of Kherson also subjected to inundation.

Additionally, security concerns are growing as mines located on both sides of the riverbank are at risk of exploding as a result of the rising water level. The Ukrainian Independent Information Agency reported that some Russian mines had already detonated. Villagers and inhabitants on alluvial islands and in Kherson were forced to leave their homes. Furthermore, Russia and Ukraine are blaming one another for the destruction of the dam. While Ukrainian officials accused Russia of bombing the Kakhovka dam to undermine Ukraine’s counteroffensive efforts, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said Ukraine committed a “terrorist attack” to “prevent a Russian attack.”

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, security, Brussels, Belgium

Fighting between Russian volunteers and Russian army escalates in Belgorod Oblast

The fighting continues in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast, a short distance from Ukraine’s northeastern border, but details about the situation remain murky. The Russian Volunteer Corps, an anti-Putin military unit made of Russian pro-Ukrainian partisans, and the Freedom of Russia Legion said they carried out a number of attacks in the region, while Moscow claims to have repelled several attacks.

The Freedom of Russia Legion announced it had destroyed two Russian army tanks, one BMP infantry fighting vehicle, and one BRDM armored vehicle near the Shebekino border crossing in Belgorod on the night of June 4. The veracity of the claim has not been independently verified, however. On June 4, another unconfirmed report appeared on the Telegram channel of Ukrainian journalist Andrii Tsaplienko, citing an unnamed military officer, claiming the Russian army shelled a settlement in the Belgorod region. There have been signs of fighters from the Russian Volunteer Corps being active in Belgorod, so shelling the region could signal an escalation. In addition, the Russian Telegram channel Brief reported that the Ukrainian army shelled Novaya Tavolzhanka in Belgorod Oblast on June 5; this too has not been confirmed. Another Russian Telegram channel reported explosions in Grayvoron, Belgorod Oblast that same day.

One day earlier, the Russian Volunteer Corps said on Telegram that a Polish volunteer unit has been fighting “shoulder-to-shoulder for the freedom and independence of Ukraine for several months.” According to the statement, Russian and Polish fighters jointly carried out “a number of operations” in the areas of Orikhiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Bakhmut. The Polish unit, known as the Polish Volunteer Corps (Polski Korpus Ochotniczy), has published videos of its operations in Bakhmut and Zaporizhzhia on their Telegram channel, which was created in February 2023. According to the Russian Volunteer Corps, the Polish fighters are providing military and medical logistics only within the state borders of Ukraine. The information published by the two military units on Telegram have not been verified independently.

The Polish government has denied it has any involvement with Polish volunteer units. Stanisław Żaryn, the secretary of state for the chancellery of the prime minister of Poland, said on Twitter that the Polish Volunteer Corps are “in no way associated with the Polish Armed Forces or any Polish institution.” According to Polish media outlet Defence 24, the Polish Volunteer Corps was created in February 2023 and operates as part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The Polish Volunteer Corps reportedly posted on its Telegram channel that they participated in the combat mission in Belgorod alongside the Russian Volunteer Corps. The Telegram post reportedly argued that “all returned from the mission safely. The task was completed successfully.” However, it appears that the post was later removed, as there are currently no posts in the Telegram channel containing information about the participation of Polish units in the Belgorod raid.

Russian Volunteer Corps fighters also claimed to be holding captive Russian soldiers who were handed over to Ukrainian forces because authorities in Belgorod had shown no desire to retrieve them. At the 1:26 mark in a video posted on June 4 to the Telegram channel of the Russian Volunteer Corps, a dozen men in Russian uniforms are seen. It is possible the men were captured during fighting between the militants and the Russian army in the village of Novaya Tavolzhanka in Belgorod Oblast, though this is unconfirmed. According to The New Voice of Ukraine, the volunteer fighters reached out to Belgorod Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov with an offer to return the captured soldiers as a goodwill gesture. In return, they asked for a private audience with the governor to discuss the present state of the region. The governor has reportedly not responded to the request. Previously, Gladkov described the fighters as “those fascists,” and said they were responsible for “daily civilian deaths.” The Freedom of Russia Legion also claimed to be holding Russian soldiers captive in a video published on their Telegram channel on June 5.

Meanwhile, the Armed Forces of Ukraine stated that Russian forces on June 4 and 5 conducted offensive actions in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, with the Ukrainian military fighting the Russian army near Novoselivske and Bilohorivka in Luhansk and Ivanivske and Marinka in Donetsk. Ukrainian forces also alleged that a Russian saboteur group attempted to infiltrate the border near Zelene in Kharkiv Oblast. Ukraine added that settlements in Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson were shelled by Russia, including a building belonging to Kherson State University.

Meanwhile, Sky News obtained a purported arms contract detailing a purchase agreement between Russia and Iran. According to the contract, Iran supplies Russia with tank and artillery ammunition, as well as barrels for T-72 tanks and howitzers. The sixteen-page document, which has not been independently verified, is dated September 14, 2022, and presents samples of variously sized artillery and tank shells and rockets worth just more than one million dollars.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

—Givi Gigitashivili, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

Interference on satellite imagery points to enhanced military activity on the border between Belgorod and Kharkiv prior to saboteur raid

A map showing interference patterns caught on SAR Imagery by Sentinel-1 on May 18, 2023 (Source: ESA/Sentinel-1, annotations: DFRLab)

Satellite Aperture Radar (SAR) imagery from May 18 released by the European Space Agency’s Sentinel-1 satellite shows massive levels of interference in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast. The DFRLab previously reported on similar interference patterns observed in the Black Sea and in Belgorod throughout April 2023. The May 18 imagery indicates that more prominent interference activity took place in Belgorod Oblast, with patterns stretching several hundred kilometers. The imagery was obtained just after midnight local time that morning as the satellite was flying over the border with Kharkiv.

Simultaneously, consistent reports of aerial activity in Belgorod, including missile launches, emerged on Telegram. These patterns were observed nearly one week prior to the Russian Volunteer Corps’ raids in Russia’s border outposts of Shebekino and Grayvoron.

Several smaller interference patterns also stretch east of Kharkiv in Ukraine. These could also be consistent with reports from the Telegram channel Kharkiv Live which indicated Russian aviation raids and artillery rocket launches between 11:58 pm and 12:31 am local time. Local authorities issued an air raid alert between 12:31 and 1:01 am.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Pro-Kremlin sources contradict each other in laying blame for Nova Kakhovka dam destruction

Pro-Russian Telegram channels, sometimes referred to as “Z channels,” began reporting on the Nova Kakhovka dam around 3:00 am Moscow time, stating that the shelling of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant occurred at 2:35 am. Initially, Vladimir Leontev, the Russian-installed mayor of occupied Novaya Kahovka, denied any explosion, shelling, or damage to the dam. In an interview with Kremlin-owned RIA Novosti, Leontev said, “That’s bullshit! Everything is fine, everything is fine everywhere; I just got on the [police] radio. Everywhere everything is normal in the city; everything is quiet and calm.” Further, Kremlin-owned TASS quoted an unnamed source from the Russian authorities as saying, “It was quiet at night. There was no shelling. The dam could not stand, one support collapsed, and flooding began.”

Later, the narrative changed. In a video, Leontev said, “At about 2:00 am there was shelling on Kahovka dam and its valves were destroyed.” RIA Novosti blamed the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the damage that caused the “unregulated discharge of water.” The pro-Kremlin Telegram channel Swodki commented, “Russian positions are located on the lower Dnipro riverbank. The flow of water can erode the line of [Russian] defense on the coast and prevent and repel a potential boat landing of an aircraft of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.” In addition, former Russian commander Igor “Strelkov” Girkin, who played a crucial role in forming the separatist movement in the Donbas, suggested that the dam’s destruction helped Ukrainian forces advance militarily.

The exact cause of its destruction remains unknown. The New York Times reported that some experts believe it was “probably breached” by an “internal blast,” but acknowledged this assessment should be treated “cautiously.” Pro-Ukraine social media pointed fingers at Russia causing the breach, but at times the debate was muddled due to sharing of old footage capturing the explosion of a bridge adjacent to the facility in November 2022.

Meanwhile, some social media posts from pro-Kremlin fighters suggested the dam’s destruction benefits Russia. For example, Russian solider Yegor Guzenko suggested on his Telegram channel Separ13_13 that the destruction of the dam was in Russia’s favor. In one video, he said, “Whoever did it, it is good if no Russian Army soldier suffers. Then it does not matter who did it even if it were [Ukrainians] themselves.” Later, he posted about why the destruction might have been in Ukraine’s favor.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

Deepfake impersonating Putin ‘declares’ martial law in Russian regions bordering Ukraine

On June 5, Russian television and radio stations broadcast a clip featuring a deepfake of President Vladimir Putin. In the fabricated “emergency address,” the impersonated Russian president reportedly declared, “Ukrainian troops, armed by the NATO bloc with the consent and support of Washington, invaded the territories of the Kursk, Belgorod, and Bryansk regions.” The Putin deepfake then “announced” martial law in these regions and said that he plans to sign an executive order declaring a general mobilization throughout the country.

The incident was reported in the Russian oblasts of Voronezh, Bryansk, and Belgorod. These regions sit along the border with Ukraine, where frequent drone attacks are reported and armed group incursions forced some to evacuate in May. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov declared that Putin did not address the nation and confirmed that “a hack occurred in several regions.” According to Peskov and information posted on the Telegram channel Ukraine Informer, radio stations also broadcast the same message.

Russian State Duma members of parliament have set out to draft a law enforcing the labeling of content created by neural networks.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Russia recycles false narrative that Ukraine plans to use a ‘dirty bomb’

On June 6, the same day the Novo Kakhovka dam was destroyed, Russia shared a new iteration of its narrative that accuses Ukraine of planning to use a “dirty bomb” against Russia.

Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) published a statement in which the agency claimed to have “received additional information on the involvement of the Ukrainian special services in the planning and preparation of acts of international terrorism.” The FSB claimed that Ukraine created an air unit to supply “sabotage and reconnaissance groups on Russian territory” with “dirty bombs.” The statement alleged that Ukraine planned to place dirty bombs in various places, detonate them simultaneously, and “make areas [in Russia] unsuitable for human habitation.”

The DFRLab has previously covered Russian attempts to spread similar disinformation in order to prime audiences for the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and justify the war. Since then, the DFRLab have observed multiple instances of Russian officials accusing Kyiv of plotting to use a “dirty bomb.”

— Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Satellite imagery analysis captures flood threat after dam’s destruction appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive will aim to keep the Russians guessing

Peter Dickinson — Wed, 07 Jun 2023 21:00:33 +0000

Is Ukraine’s hotly anticipated counteroffensive finally underway? That is the question dominating much of the international media this week following reports from both the Ukrainian and Russian sides of a significant upswing in activity along the front lines in southern and eastern Ukraine.

This speculation is understandable; after all, expectations have been mounting since early 2023 over an offensive that is being widely billed as a potential turning point in the sixteen-month war. It may be more helpful, however, to view Ukraine’s counteroffensive as a rolling series of local probes and thrusts rather than a single big push to penetrate Russian defenses and secure a decisive breakthrough.

Talk of a coming Ukrainian counteroffensive began following the liberation of Kherson from Russian occupation in late 2022. In the six months since that last major military success, Ukraine has sent tens of thousands of fresh troops for training in NATO countries and received unprecedented amounts of Western military aid including modern battle tanks, cruise missiles, armored personnel carriers, and enhanced air defense systems. With these newly trained and equipped formations now believed to be largely in position, observers have been watching for indications that the offensive is indeed underway. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy added to the sense of anticipation by declaring in a June 3 interview with the Wall Street Journal: “We are ready” for the counteroffensive.

Anyone expecting to witness major battles is set to be disappointed, at least for the time being. While the long lines of opposing trenches and emphasis on artillery duels has led many to compare the fighting in Ukraine to the horrors of World War I, few expect the Ukrainian military to begin its counteroffensive by going “over the top” and attempting to smash through Russian lines with their newly formed brigades. Instead, Ukrainian commanders will likely seek to test Russian defenses at a number of locations along the length of the 1,000-kilometer front in a bid to stretch Vladimir Putin’s invasion force and identify weak points to exploit.

A series of recent cross-border incursions into the Russian Federation conducted by Ukrainian-backed Russian militias may be part of these efforts. While militarily insignificant in terms of size or territorial gains, the raids have proved a major personal embarrassment for Putin and could force Moscow to reduce its military presence in Ukraine in order to bolster the badly exposed home front.

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As they look to advance, Ukraine’s troops will face formidable obstacles. Russia has not sat idly by during the past half-year; it has created a defense in depth in anticipation of Ukraine’s coming attack that includes several lines of trenches and other fortifications.

Russia appears to have provided an indication of its resolve early on June 6 by blowing up the Kakhovka dam and power plant on the Dnipro River in southern Ukraine. While Moscow officially denies destroying the dam, initial analysis points to Russian responsibility. A June 7 New York Times article referencing engineering and munitions experts concluded that a deliberate explosion inside the Russian-controlled dam “most likely caused its collapse.” The ensuing ecological disaster has flooded the surrounding area, virtually ruling out a Ukrainian thrust across the river toward Crimea.

Moscow’s preparations for the Ukrainian counteroffensive certainly look impressive, but questions remain over the morale of Russian troops, with a steady stream of video addresses posted to social media in recent months indicating widespread demoralization among mobilized Russian soldiers complaining of poor conditions, suicidal tactics, and heavy losses. In contrast, Ukrainian morale is believed to be high, despite the large numbers of casualties incurred during intense fighting over the winter and spring months around the eastern Ukrainian city of Bakhmut.

Crucially, Ukraine’s troops are defending their homes and have a clear vision of what they are fighting for, while Russia has struggled to articulate its war aims or define what a potential victory could look like. In the heat of the coming summer counteroffensive, this morale factor could play a critical role.

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Most commentators agree that the primary military objective of Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive is to cut the land bridge running across southern Ukraine that connects Russia itself and the occupied Donbas region with the Crimean peninsula. If this is achieved, it would isolate large numbers of Russian troops in Crimea and south Ukraine while dealing a painful blow to Russian prestige.

Ultimately, Ukraine’s stated goal remains the liberation of Crimea itself, which has been under Russian occupation since 2014. A successful advance toward Crimea would leave the peninsula exposed to Ukrainian airstrikes and could spark a political crisis inside Russia. The military failures of the past sixteen months have already led to significant infighting among different elements within the Russian establishment; if Crimea itself is threatened, the international community must brace for a major escalation in Putin’s nuclear threats as he attempts to ward off what would be a catastrophic defeat.

Many believe a showdown over the fate of Crimea will serve as the end game of the entire war. But before we approach that point, Ukraine must first deploy its fresh forces effectively and overcome Russia’s deeply entrenched army on the mainland. This will involve much maneuvering and diversionary attacks before any major advances are attempted.

Ukraine’s successful 2022 campaigns may offer the best indication of what to expect from the summer counteroffensive. In August 2022, Ukrainian officials loudly trumpeted a counteroffensive in the south to retake Kherson. When Russia duly dispatched many of its best units to meet the expected Ukrainian attack, Ukraine struck instead in the thinly defended east and liberated most of the Kharkiv region. With Russia still reeling from this defeat and scrambling to hold the line, the Ukrainian military then renewed its southern offensive and forced Russia to abandon Kherson.

This masterclass in the art of military deception rightfully won Ukraine considerable plaudits. Ukrainian commanders will be looking to spring some similar surprises in the months ahead. Their stated goal is the complete liberation of Ukrainian territory, but they will aim to keep the Russians guessing as to exactly how they plan to achieve this.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Has Ukraine’s counteroffensive really begun?

Atlantic Council — Wed, 07 Jun 2023 18:56:09 +0000

JUST IN

Will we know it when we see it? Ukrainian forces are probing front lines and attacking multiple Russian positions, even as leaders in Kyiv remain cagey on whether Ukraine’s much-anticipated summer counteroffensive has begun. Russia is sending its own signals. After digging in along the front line, Russian forces have ramped up air attacks on Kyiv in recent days and, on Tuesday, may have destroyed a major dam in southern Ukraine (more here), possibly in an attempt to derail Ukrainian offensive plans already underway. Where to start? As always, with our experts.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

Dan Fried (@AmbDanFried): Weiser family distinguished fellow and former US ambassador to Poland
Andriy Zagorodnyuk (@Andriypzag): Distinguished fellow and former minister of defense of Ukraine
John Herbst (@JohnEdHerbst): Senior director of the Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine
Peter Dickinson (@Biz_Ukraine_Mag): Editor of UkraineAlert

Is the offensive underway?

Dan assesses that the counteroffensive has probably begun. But he adds that it’s not yet clear whether Ukrainian forces are focused on severing the land bridge in southern Ukraine connecting Russia and the occupied Donbas region with the Crimean peninsula, which “seems the logical direction,” or on making gains in eastern Ukraine, which is “a less-anticipated move but possible for just that reason.”
Andriy judges that the offensive is only in its preliminary stages. “When it starts, we will see a full use of the brigades trained and equipped for that operation and, of course, the magnitude of the operational activities will be much higher.”
John just returned from Kyiv, where he spoke with Ukraine’s political and military leadership. He says the offensive’s start date is less important than Ukraine’s overall capability. “Suffice it to say that the Ukrainian military is ready and the Ukrainian people determined.”
Rather than looking out for “a single big push to penetrate Russian defenses and secure a decisive breakthrough,” Peter, from his vantage point in Ukraine, advises thinking about Ukraine’s counteroffensive as “a rolling series of local probes and thrusts,” at least in its initial stages.

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What’s coming next

“We can expect at least a modest [Ukrainian] success—the liberation of hundreds of square kilometers” of territory currently occupied by Russia, John tells us. “More is certainly possible, including breaking Moscow’s land bridge to Crimea.” But he counsels observers to be “patient watching this drama play out.”
Early actions by Ukrainian forces have centered on the long-contested city of Bakhmut, notes Andriy. “If Ukrainian forces encircle Bakhmut, then they deny the Russians an opportunity to use any benefits of capturing the territory, and set themselves up to eventually recapture it.”
Russian troops are dug in along the front line, but that doesn’t mean the coming fighting will resemble World War I–style trench warfare. The Ukrainian military is unlikely to launch its offensive by going “over the top” of Russian lines in major battles, explains Peter. Instead, Ukrainian forces will likely test Russian defenses at numerous locations along the front to “stretch” Russian forces and “identify weak points.”
A major Ukrainian military objective is cutting Russia’s land bridge to Crimea and thus isolating Russian forces in the region, but the ultimate goal remains retaking Crimea itself. “Many believe a showdown over the fate of Crimea will serve as the end game of the entire war,” Peter tells us (a point Dan and John expand on here).

Reading the Russian tea leaves

In recent days, senior Russian officials have trumpeted supposedly successful but small-bore efforts to beat back Ukrainian moves along the Dnipro River near Kherson and in the Zaporizhzhia oblast, explains John.“Like Moscow’s over-the-top celebration of finally taking Bakhmut, this reflects the paucity of good news for the Russian military to report.”
Dan spots “tensions in Russia’s ruling elite, and even signs of panic,” adding that “Ukrainian victory on the battlefield does not have to expel all Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory to change the strategic balance and make Putin’s maximal demands untenable.”
Morale could prove a decisive variable in the coming summer offensive, concludes Peter, pointing to Russian soldiers complaining on social media of “poor conditions, suicidal tactics, and heavy losses.”
In contrast, Ukrainian morale seems high, says Andriy: “I am in Ukraine. The mood is very resolved.”

The post Has Ukraine’s counteroffensive really begun? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Three questions (and expert answers) about the dam collapse in Ukraine

Atlantic Council experts — Tue, 06 Jun 2023 21:15:26 +0000

It’s set off a cascade of problems.

Early Tuesday, large sections of the Nova Kakhovka dam and hydroelectric power plant in southern Ukraine gave way. Since 1956, the dam has pinched the Dnipro River, creating a massive reservoir upstream as far as Zaporizhzhia and, downstream, a succession of towns and villages along the river terminating in Kherson, all of which could now be flooded.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has accused Russian forces of blowing up the dam–a claim US intelligence reportedly appears to support. The Kremlin, which currently controls the area around the dam, has blamed Ukrainian forces.

Below, Atlantic Council experts answer our most pressing questions about what the damaged dam means for the ongoing war.

1. If Russia is behind the dam collapse, what would it reveal about Russian strategy and tactics at this stage in the war?

That they have no red lines that can’t be crossed and that they have no regard for human lives or ecology. I’m afraid that if the Russians are capable of blowing up such a large piece of critical infrastructure, they’re also capable of striking at the occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant—the consequences of which would be horrific. There is little left in the West’s toolbox to restrain Russia, but a tightening of the noose of sanctions and providing Kyiv with all the fighting kit it is asking for would be a logical starting point.

—Michael Bociurkiw is a Ukraine-based nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

It would reveal nothing new compared with what we have already known about Vladimir Putin’s Russia and its efforts to destroy the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian people. Putin’s regime has already systematically committed crimes against humanity and pursues a policy of genocide, showing total disregard for human lives. Destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam appears to be one more piece of evidence of the dark nature of Putin’s regime—a terrible and extremely dangerous act aimed at inflicting maximum suffering on people and maximum damage on the environment. Putin is still trying to escalate and terrorize Ukraine and its partners. It’s long overdue that we deny him this possibility.

—Oleh Shamshur is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former Ukrainian ambassador to the United States.

2. What are the implications for the environment and other parts of Ukraine such as Kherson and Crimea?

Ukrainian officials are already reporting the deaths of zoo animals near the dam. Some eighty settlements are at risk of substantial flooding and countless hectares of land are in the path of floodwaters. What is more, the flooding could trigger another wave of displaced people or asylum seekers. If people in the West feel they won’t be impacted, they should think again and brace themselves for higher food prices and a fresh wave of refugees.

—Michael Bociurkiw

Since last fall, Ukraine has implored the international community to prevent a Russian terrorist attack on the Nova Kakhovka dam. The immeasurable suffering today should be a wakeup call regarding how Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure must be protected in the future and the importance of trusting Ukraine’s experts on risk assessment and mitigation strategies, in particular regarding nuclear power plants. While there are no evident immediate risks to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, which relies on water from the reservoir for cooling and operations, its continued safety is anything but guaranteed. The international community should be treating Russia’s apparent escalation as a ramp-up for broader genocide and ecocide in Ukraine. Western allies, including multilateral bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, cannot entrust Zaporizhzhia’s safety and that of other massive energy installations to the Russians.

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

The destruction of Ukraine’s Nova Kakhovka dam will result in short- and long-term environmental, humanitarian, military, and economic consequences. Given the global impacts, especially for Global South food security, Russia, if it was behind the destruction, has cemented its reputation as one of the world’s largest orchestrators of civilian suffering.

Damage is still unfolding, but there are fears that hundreds of thousands among Ukraine’s already-battered civilian population may be left without their homes, water, electricity, or other access to vital infrastructure in the Kherson region, Crimea, and beyond. Known disaster-related flood risks—like mold-caused health impacts and downed power lines in the water—are exacerbated by reports of Russian troops shelling evacuations, floating mines, and more than a hundred tons of engine oil polluting the Dnipro River.

Europe’s largest steppe, Askania Nova, is endangered, along with the native zebras, buffaloes, and wildebeests that call the steppe their home. Untold ecosystem damage may unfold. Springtime births make animal populations and the ecosystems they support especially vulnerable. In light of the economic damage to Ukraine’s agribusiness and metallurgy industries, which require extensive water supplies, Western governments will need to take decisive action to redirect frozen Russian assets for Ukraine’s recovery. Concerns about the long-term cooling of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant will rise.

—Kristina Hook is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center specializing in genocide and mass atrocity prevention, emerging technologies, and post-conflict reconstruction.

3. Could the dam destruction constitute a war crime?

As more details are clarified, the legal implications potentially could be vast, with prohibitions of attacks on such facilities inscribed in the Geneva Conventions. Concrete steps on accountability for war crimes are needed, and global humanitarian aid must surge. None of the ecological crimes unfolding over the past sixteen months were inevitable, given Ukraine’s robust environmental management and monitoring prior to 2014. All trace back to Russia’s nearly decade-long war against Ukraine. The ensuing damage to Ukraine and the global economy lies squarely at Russia’s feet.

Given months of Ukrainian and international warnings about the possibility of Russia attacking the dam, global condemnation is not sufficient. Anything less than a tangible response alerts the Kremlin that it can get away with the environmental equivalent of a weapon of mass destruction, encouraging Russia to climb further up an escalation ladder aimed directly at Ukraine’s civilians. This day offers a painful snapshot of Ukrainian life under Russia’s terror: nine months of violent occupation in Kherson, with torture camps, rape, and summary executions, followed by relentless shelling, and now, apparently, flooding—losing everything in a day.

—Kristina Hook

Destruction of the dam absolutely violates the Geneva Conventions and fits the definition of a crime against humanity as described in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. So it should be recognized as such and its perpetrators should be held accountable. We’re seeing a developing humanitarian disaster, primarily due to the massive displacement of the population of flooded areas and a sharp drop in the supply of drinking water. If Russia committed the destruction, it would be one more reason to see Putin and company in The Hague, hopefully in the near future.

—Oleh Shamshur

The post Three questions (and expert answers) about the dam collapse in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Is China preparing for a post-Putin Russia?

Anders Åslund — Tue, 06 Jun 2023 21:05:22 +0000

One of the greatest mysteries of the Russo-Ukrainian War is China’s actual policy. While China moves cautiously, it appears to be gradually distancing itself from Vladimir Putin. A little-noticed fact is that Chinese President Xi Jinping is cultivating Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin in quite a blatant fashion.

Just two weeks before Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he extracted a commitment from Xi Jinping of “friendship without limits” at their meeting during the Beijing Olympics. However, some significant limits have since became evident. China has apparently refused to deliver arms and sanctioned technology to Russia. China has also abstained on half a dozen United Nations General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

In February 2023, China presented its own twelve-point peace plan to end the war in Ukraine. Supporters of Ukraine have complained that this plan does not condemn Russia or call for a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine, but in fact the first point of China’s plan reads: “Respecting the sovereignty of all countries. Universally recognized international law, including the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, must be strictly observed. The sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all countries must be effectively upheld.” Implicitly, China suggests that Russia has to withdraw its troops from Ukraine.

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Both Xi and Putin have limited public appearances and abstained from traveling because of their fears of Covid-19, and Putin has become ever more isolated because of his war of aggression against Ukraine. Therefore, it was perceived as a great event when Xi Jinping went on an official three-day visit to Russia in March 2023. It was Xi’s first international meeting since his re-election as president during the 2023 National People’s Congress, and it offered Putin a rare break in his international isolation.

While we don’t know what the two leaders said in their long private meetings, nothing seems to have gone right for Putin. His big official project was a large second “Power of Siberia” gas pipeline from western Siberia to China, but Xi clearly said no, limiting Russia’s possibilities to export gas to China for the foreseeable future. Nor does Xi appear to have approved of arms or sensitive technology sales to Russia. Curiously, Xi had a separate meeting with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, contrary to strict Chinese protocol.

As a follow up, Chinese Prime Minister Li Qiang invited Mishustin, his Russian counterpart, to Beijing for an official visit in late May. Mishustin is the highest-ranking Russian official to visit China since the start of the Ukraine invasion in February 2022. On the second day of his visit, Xi Jinping received Mishustin at the Great Hall of the People, once again completely beyond the ordinary bounds of Chinese and Russian protocol.

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If there is a greater stickler of protocol than the Chinese leaders, it is probably Putin. In spite of all the greetings to and from Putin that Xi and Mishustin exchanged, the obvious question arises: Why was Mishustin invited and not Putin? This cannot have gone down well with the Russian leader.

Putin appears to have given his response. Mishustin is one of thirteen permanent members of the Security Council, Russia’s highest policy-making body which meets about every tenth day, always chaired by Putin. Usually all but one or two of the permanent members are present. Mishustin attended on May 15, the last meeting before his trip to China, but he was missing both on May 26 and June 2 after his return from his triumphant visit. Reasons for absence from a Security Council meeting are never officially given.

This old-style Kremlinology is perhaps the best evidence we have that China may be looking beyond Putin and seeking to cultivate alternative relationships in Russia. Such objective observations are better than dubious rumors and can potentially tell us a lot. First of all, it seems clear that China’s “friendship without limits” with Russia actually has many limits, as indicated above. China is presumably more afraid of US and EU secondary sanctions than interested in supporting Russia in its war against Ukraine.

Second, China does claim that universally recognized international law, including the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, must be strictly observed, which means that it opposes Russia’s invasion in principle. Third, the Chinese have indicated distrust in Putin and they may be looking to Mishustin as a credible alternative. Whether this is realistic is not all that relevant.

Fourth, by apparently excluding Mishustin from his two most recent Security Council meetings, Putin has indicated that he has paid attention and dislikes these recent developments. The standard procedure would have seen Putin calling Mishustin to the Security Council to report what he had learned in China.

Mishustin has carefully avoided saying anything in public about the war in Ukraine or his visit to China. His father is considered to have served in the KGB, and he has been both the head of the Russian tax service and a wealthy investment banker. Mishustin is often overlooked in analysis of power dynamics in today’s Russia, but his relationships with both Putin and China should be watched carefully.

Anders Åslund and Andrius Kubilius have just published the book “Reconstruction, Reform, and EU Accession for Ukraine.”

Ukraine still has good chances of advancing, of course. Its armed forces are nimble and highly motivated, and they’ve made a habit of surprising both Western analysts and their Russian adversaries. The Russians also face problems of their own. In defending occupied cities, they can be cut off from support and supplies. Ukrainians have been training to exploit these weaknesses. But even with larger troop formations and Western hardware, they will be swimming against the current.

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Second, as well as tactical constraints, Ukraine has tighter than usual policy constraints. This is easy to forget. More than fifteen months since Russia’s full-scale invasion began, Ukraine’s balance sheet is a tally of hard-earned battlefield successes. However, these have come despite a handicap. Unlike Russia, Ukraine is fighting on home soil; this limits its capacity to make war.

This has a lot to do with civilians. In urban battles, attackers can lessen their casualties by bombarding defended buildings before boots-on-the-ground assaults. Yet unlike jungles or deserts, cities are not neutral. The presence of civilians changes what attackers may be prepared or permitted to do.

International law plays a role here. Under the Geneva Conventions, which both Ukraine and Russia are party to, warring states must take constant care to protect civilians and civilian objects. This doesn’t mean that collateral damage is always illegal, but losses should be in proportion to an expected military gain and not the work of indiscriminate targeting. Russia has ignored these laws on a scale that many regard as part of a wider genocide. Ukraine has not. This is a key reason why Ukrainian forces have not engaged in the wholesale shelling of occupied cities, and has also repeatedly warned civilians to take precautions, such as during the campaign to liberate Kherson late last year.

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The high potential for civilian casualties will impact Ukraine’s coming counteroffensive. This will be particularly challenging in densely populated areas. While many local residents of affected towns and cities may choose to evacuate, some will inevitably stay put. Faced with a Russian adversary positioned behind or alongside significant numbers of Ukrainian civilians, Ukraine will be constrained in terms of how it attacks and maneuvers.

Russia has already forced Ukraine to accept war as the price of freedom, but it will not succeed in erasing Ukraine’s humanity. Military planners in Kyiv are therefore tasked with the gut-wrenching calculus of places and populations. They must decide where to fight and what it might cost. For now, these are guarded secrets. Yet it will surely be harder to liberate Ukraine than defend it.

With this in mind, international resolve is more crucial than ever. Since February 2022, support from Ukraine’s allies has played a key part in the fight against Russia’s invasion. Ongoing diplomatic efforts, intelligence sharing, and military assistance remain vital and must not be tied to short-term objectives. This is why any signs of overconfidence in the summer counteroffensive are troubling, because disappointment too easily leads to disillusionment.

In reality, a decisive Ukrainian military victory may still be far off. It will also be costly, but not nearly as costly as a premature peace. With many in the West already keen to see a return on investment, and with talk of a “high-water mark” for US aid gaining ground in some quarters, Ukraine needs systematic backing that stays the course. The coming Ukrainian counteroffensive is an important moment in the war, but it should not be seen as Ukraine’s last chance to achieve victory.

Tennyson Dearing is a policy officer at the Australian Department of Defence based in Paris. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Australian government.

Mercifully on that Thursday morning, US-provided Patriot air defense systems took out all of the incoming Iskanders, but the fragments still killed three Ukrainians (including a woman and her nine-year-old child) and injured eleven others, adding to the victims from Russia’s murderous war. Dozens more would have been killed this week, the deadliest week in Kyiv in months, had the United States and other allied systems not been put in place in April, after long months of discussions.

After Ukrainian reports that Patriot missiles shot down a Russian hypersonic weapon for the first time on May 4 and six more in a single night two weeks later, Zelenskyy reflected with one of his top advisers on how many hundreds more Ukrainian lives might have been saved had the deliveries come faster. He also pondered how many more Ukrainians might die on the front lines in the coming summer offensive because the F-16s won’t be providing air cover for months to come, telling the Wall Street Journal that the lack of protection means “a large number of soldiers will die.”

However, in our meeting with Zelenskyy this week, where we presented him with the Atlantic Council Global Citizen Award, he adopted his more familiar public posture of looking forward and doing what he can to maintain domestic and international unity.

“I’m not looking at the past, but rather to the future,” he said. “We have to achieve comparable airpower to Russia in the sky.” He spoke about the historic cost not just to Ukraine, but also to Europe, the United States, and the world, should his country come up short. “We can’t be losers,” he said.

And that brought him to NATO’s upcoming Vilnius summit.

His advisers have briefed him on the options allies are said to be discussing regarding Ukraine, ranging from a security relationship akin to that between the United States and Israel, of robust weapons deliveries and intelligence exchanges, to the renaming and repurposing of a body at which NATO meets regularly with Ukraine in order to give it more heft.

Zelenskyy noted that Ukraine lacks the deterrent power of Israel’s nuclear capabilities, which it gave up along with Kazakhstan and Belarus after signing the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in 1994, when Russia provided assurances that it wouldn’t use military force or economic coercion against Ukraine or the others.

Given the urgency of their war with Russia, most Ukrainians would see a more robust consultative body within NATO as window dressing if it didn’t come with membership certainties. More NATO members are coming to realize that as well, with French President Emmanuel Macron telling the GLOBSEC conference in Slovakia this week that Ukraine deserved to be included “in an architecture of security.”

As Zelenskyy said to our delegation, “if Ukraine will not be given some hope at Vilnius, it will be demoralizing for our soldiers. It will be seen as a big message to our soldiers and people.”

If NATO doesn’t come forward with “more ambitious ideas” at its summit, Zelenskyy indicated to us, it might not be appropriate for him to accept the Alliance’s invitation to attend. “I don’t want to betray our people,” he said, sensing Ukrainians would feel underappreciated for the irreplaceable role they are playing on Europe’s front lines against Russian aggression.

“We need the world not to be afraid of Russia,” he said. His unstated message was clear: The world’s fears about Russia’s potential escalation of its war in Ukraine, up to and including the use of tactical nuclear weapons, have prevented more robust support at earlier stages—but that was the opposite of what would better deter Putin.

A short week’s stay in Ukraine underscores two inescapable realities as the country braces for its long-anticipated summer counteroffensive, which is expected to begin in the coming days.

The first reality is that without the remarkable level of US and partner support thus far, it would have been impossible for Ukrainians to have held the line against Russian adversaries, who are more numerous, are well-armed, and maintain still far superior airpower.

The second reality, however, is that the cautiousness and relative slowness in those deliveries of support have prevented the Ukrainians from making more rapid gains, made it harder to prevent civilian casualties, and made it harder for Ukraine to retake enough territory to force Russia to the negotiating table, prolonging the war.

As certainly as West Berlin’s survival was a pre-condition for Cold War victory, and as certainly as Poland’s Solidarity movement and democratic change laid the ground for Soviet collapse, so it is now Ukraine’s fate as a free and democratic nation—integrated into the European Union and NATO—that will be at the center of the context for Europe’s future.

Our Kyiv interlocutors (Ukrainian military strategists) see three potential scenarios for their coming summer counteroffensive.

The first, and most desired but least likely outcome, would be a complete Russian military collapse and retreat. The second, and more likely outcome, would be for Ukraine to achieve sufficient battlefield and territorial gains in the nearly twenty percent of Ukraine that remains in Russian hands to force a Putin reassessment and better negotiating terms. The third, and the most feared outcome, would be a Ukrainian failure in the summer offensive that would demoralize Ukrainians and dishearten their international backers.

The stakes for Ukraine in the coming months are enormous. Yet the stakes for the United States and Ukraine’s other friends may be even greater over time. In recognizing that, it will be easier to make the tough decisions regarding weapons and NATO membership that are so urgently required.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 Fake Signals and American Insurance: How a Dark Fleet Moves Russian Oil
Christiaan Triebert, Blacki Migliozzi, Alexander Cardia, Muyi Xiao, and David Botti | NEW YORK TIMES

In this powerful report, New York Times reporters track several cargo ships moving oil between Russia and China in violation of US sanctions and explain the technology and methodology these cargo ships use.

“The vessels,” they report, “are part of a so-called dark fleet, a loose term used to describe a hodgepodge array of ships that obscure their locations or identities to avoid oversight from governments and business partners.”

Moreover, as the Times points out, such tactics are not isolated to Russia. “[The dark fleet’s ships] have typically been involved in moving oil from Venezuela or Iran—two countries that have also been hit by international sanctions,” the authors write. “The latest surge of dark fleet ships began after Russia invaded Ukraine and the West tried to limit Moscow’s oil revenue with sanctions.” Read more →

#2 Bakhmut and the spirit of Verdun
ECONOMIST

The Economist compares the Russian assault on Bakhmut with the German assault on Verdun over one hundred years ago during World War I, and considers how Ukraine’s heroic defense has ground down the Russians and upheld the Ukrainian spirit of heroic defiance.

“Above all,” the Economist writes, “each place has acquired a symbolic importance that outweighs its original strategic value. At Verdun, the French were caught ill-prepared. Under Philippe Pétain’s command, they built resistance around the rotation of forces, limiting soldiers’ time at the front and supplying the effort by road from Bar-le-Duc. ‘They shall not pass’ became the Verdun battle cry, a defiant call to hold the town, just as President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called Bakhmut ‘our fortress.’”

“‘What Bakhmut shares with Verdun is the notion of prestige,’ says Nicolas Czubak, a historian at the Verdun Memorial. The war was not won or lost at Verdun; but the French turned it into an emblem of strength that made retreat unthinkable.” Read more →

#3 How the US is deepening military alliances in China’s backyard
Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille | FINANCIAL TIMES

To understand the Biden administration’s increased efforts to counter China using alliances, read this Financial Times report on the steps the United States has taken to build up a Pacific security architecture and what remains to be done.

The FT notes that “the US is not only focused on its biggest allies. It has also been forced to step up cooperation with smaller Pacific Island nations after Beijing shocked Washington last year by signing a security pact with the Solomon Islands. In response, the US last week signed a security pact with Papua New Guinea and extended so-called Compact of Free Association agreements with Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia—deals that will give the US military exclusive access to facilities for two decades.”

“Arguably the biggest challenge for the US, however,” the FT reports, “is to get its allies to the point where they are conducting joint operational exercises based on actual joint war plans. This particularly applies to Japan and Australia, the nations most likely to fight alongside the US in a war in the region.” Read more →

#4 The Illusion of China’s AI Prowess
Helen Toner, Jenny Xiao, and Jeffery Ding | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

As this smart Foreign Affairs analysis explains, one of the great ironies of Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s much touted authoritarian model is that the censorship it necessitates also hobbles China’s development of artificial intelligence (AI), by drastically limiting what Chinese scientists can include in the large language models, or LLMs, that underlie AI chatbot technology.

“Over the past three years,” Toner, Xiao, and Ding write, “Chinese labs have rapidly followed in the footsteps of US and British companies, building AI systems similar to OpenAI’s GPT-3 (the forerunner to ChatGPT), Google’s PaLM, and DeepMind’s Chinchilla. But in many cases, the hype surrounding Chinese models has masked a lack of real substance. Chinese AI researchers we have spoken with believe that Chinese LLMs are at least two or three years behind their state-of-the-art counterparts in the United States—perhaps even more. Worse, AI advances in China rely a great deal on reproducing and tweaking research published abroad, a dependence that could make it hard for Chinese companies to assume a leading role in the field. If the pace of innovation slackened elsewhere, China’s efforts to build LLMs—like a slower cyclist coasting in the leaders’ slipstream—would likely decelerate.” Read more →

#5 To Protect Europe, Let Ukraine Join NATO—Right Now
Andriy Zagorodnyuk | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In this must-read essay, former Ukrainian defense minister Andriy Zagorodnyuk (an Atlantic Council distinguished fellow) makes a strong case for immediate Ukrainian membership of NATO.

“It is time, then, to let Ukraine join—not sooner or later, but now,” Zagorodnyuk writes. “By entering the Alliance, the country will secure its future as part of the West, and it can be sure the United States and Europe will continue to help it fight against Moscow. Europe, too, will reap security benefits by allowing Ukraine to join the Alliance. It is now apparent that the continent is not ready to defend itself and that its politicians have largely overestimated its security. Indeed, Europe will never be secure from Russia until it can militarily stop Moscow’s attacks. And no state is more qualified to do so than Ukraine.”

“Ukraine should join NATO right away,” Zagorodnyuk adds. “But unfortunately, it will almost certainly have to wait. It takes a unanimous vote to add a country to the Alliance, and there are still far too many governments that remain opposed to the country’s ascension. But in Vilnius, NATO should at least move beyond vague promises about Ukraine’s future and get down to the specifics of helping Kyiv join the organization. It is time for Western states to stand firm against bullies and stop giving Russia (or any other outside state) a voice in the security architecture of an organization that considers it an adversary. Instead, now is the time for NATO to start strengthening itself, and bringing in Ukraine is essential to accomplishing this task. No state, after all, knows more about how to fight back against the Kremlin. In fact, no country has more current experience fighting large-scale wars anywhere. Ukraine’s only peer is Russia itself.” Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

New Atlanticist Jun 2, 2023

Five questions (and expert answers) about the recent clashes in Kosovo

By Atlantic Council experts

Protests this week in Kosovo when local officials took office resulted in injuries to NATO peacekeeping troops—and in fears of a further escalation of violence. Atlantic Council experts answer the critical questions.

Conflict Crisis Management

Fast Thinking May 28, 2023

What the world should expect from Erdogan now

By Atlantic Council

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan triumphed in his re-election bid on Sunday. Our experts break down what to expect next on the war in Ukraine, NATO enlargement, Syria, and more.

Conflict Elections

New Atlanticist Jun 1, 2023

China stands to gain from a weakened Russia. The West should prepare now.

By Andrew A. Michta

A protracted war of attrition in Ukraine serves Beijing’s interests in that it will lead to the long-term weakening of Russia, thereby fundamentally shifting the Sino-Russian power balance in China’s favor.

China Politics & Diplomacy

The post Dispatch from Kyiv: Ukraine deserves NATO membership and even more robust weapons appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Five questions (and expert answers) about the recent clashes in Kosovo

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 02 Jun 2023 21:03:44 +0000

All politics is local, all consequences are not. In April, the Serb majority population in the north of Kosovo boycotted municipal elections, which were held after their representatives left the official Kosovo government institutions following a dispute between Kosovo and Serbia, in part about car license plates. With Kosovo Serbian candidates and voters boycotting, Kosovo Albanian candidates won the local elections in the north, in which only 3.5 percent of the local population participated. Protests erupted when four mayors took office under instruction from Kosovo’s Albanian dominated central government and under special police protection, resulting in injuries to intervening NATO peacekeeping troops. Now, Europe and the world watch, trying to prevent an escalation of ethnic violence. Atlantic Council experts answer the critical questions below.

1. How did we get here?

Based on all the information we received from our contacts in civil society, including both Kosovo Serbs and Albanians, the question was not so much “if” but rather “when” the long-lasting crisis would escalate. There were numerous potential triggers for escalation that were plainly evident to those willing to acknowledge them. Many of these triggers stemmed from a series of escalatory decisions made by political leaders on both sides.

Just to highlight a few examples: the withdrawal of Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo institutions, particularly the police force; the deployment of Kosovo special police forces to the streets in the northern region; the expropriation of land in municipalities predominantly inhabited by Serbs; the refusal to participate in the elections; and ultimately, violent clashes between the Serbian minority and NATO soldiers this week triggered by four newly elected Kosovo Albanian mayors taking office in northern Kosovo after April elections that were boycotted by Kosovo Serbs.

—Maja Piscevic is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and representative of the Center in the Western Balkans.

The Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo have long been the flashpoint in the protracted dispute between Kosovo and Serbia. The escalation earlier this week followed a series of tit-for-tat actions on both sides after the most recent tense standoff over license plate enforcement on the Kosovo-Serbia border in late 2022.

What is different this time is the series of political miscalculations the government in Pristina seems to have made about its US and European allies’ postures. Having invested significant political capital into the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue led by the European Union (EU) for normalizing relations between both sides, Washington and its allies from Brussels to Paris and Berlin warned Pristina not to escalate the situation further. Instead, US and EU partners wanted to focus on progress in the dialogue. The government’s decision to double down on enforcing the outcome of the April local elections, which the Serb majority boycotted and in which less than 3.5 percent of the population in northern Kosovo participated, added fuel to the fire. With this escalation, Kosovo now risks losing part of what used to be largely unqualified US and European support.

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Europe Center at the Atlantic Council.

The situation in the north of Kosovo reached its current point due to a combination of factors and events. The lack of implementation of the Ohrid agreement to normalize relations and the failure to deliver on the establishment of the Association of Serb Municipalities created a growing frustration in the international community. One crucial factor is the lack of maturity displayed by leaders involved in the dialogue process and their challenges in engaging and moving forward through strong political will. It appears that the incentives for both sides to adhere to the agreements were not strong enough and therefore progress was hindered.

The catalyst for the situation in the north can be traced back to Kosovo Serbs’ deliberate withdrawal from local institutions, including by mayors and police officers. This helped create a vacuum which Kosovo’s government seized upon—by insisting on holding local elections and enforcing the mayors’ taking office to demonstrate that the north exists as a separate political reality outside Kosovo’s institutional framework.

—Ilva Tare is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and was most recently a broadcaster with EuroNews Group.

2. What could tip this into a more serious conflict?

Even if it seems that all sides are trying to lower the temperature in recent days, a combination of factors could further escalate the situation. Russia has long been an opportunist meddler in the region with significant disinformation tools, especially among Serbian media and audiences. A rally-around-the-flag effect among Kosovo’s majority Albanian population could put government decisionmakers in Pristina on the spot. They repeatedly seem to have chosen standing on principle over politically constructive solutions and have doubled down on symbolic actions, despite warnings by Western allies to avoid escalation. That could make it harder for them to back down. And Serbia has influence over gangs that can inflame the situation if they choose—or are instructed—to.

—Jörn Fleck

There are any number of potential flashpoints, but it is important to focus on the region, to recognize what the citizens of the area see as their grievances, and seek, in good faith, long-term solutions. The recent events are clearly a setback to this process.

—Cameron Munter is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and Europe Center. He spent three decades in the US Foreign Service, where he served as US ambassador to Serbia during the Kosovo independence crisis.

3. What should EU countries and the US do right now?

First of all, the United States and the EU should stop considering the Western Balkans as a peripheral issue, which they have for the last decade. Some progress has been made, but, for example, the five members of the EU that have not recognized Kosovo (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain) should not be allowed to simply pretend their actions do not make a difference. They, along with their fellow EU members, should make new efforts to seek resolution and not simply wait for someone else to address the issues.

—Cameron Munter

The current status quo in the north is unsustainable, as it is dominated by parallel structures, as the Kosovo government states. Addressing this issue and stopping the violent elements from the north should not distract from the broader political dialogue, which is brokered by the EU and supported by the United States.

The escalation of events in the north of Kosovo in recent days was an unfortunate distraction for Kosovo and Serbia in their efforts to normalize relations through political dialogue. The situation is back to square one, with the same requests for both sides and the urge for the parties to demonstrate loyalty to their Western allies and show that they can be credible and trustworthy partners in their Euro-Atlantic aspirations—especially for Kosovo, which cannot afford to lose the support of the United States or of key members of the EU.

—Ilva Tare

The United States and Europe should not reward spoilers of the progress made in the normalization process in recent months, following significant US and EU political investment. The current escalation is helping leaders in Pristina and Belgrade avoid executing on some tough steps toward normalization and dealing with domestic political challenges. Europe and the United States should make clear that the only way out of the current situation ultimately runs through the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue.

—Jörn Fleck

4. Will new elections defuse this situation?

In order to move toward a resolution, new elections should be held with preconditions such as the involvement of Kosovo Serbs, the establishment of working conditions for Kosovo police and mayors, and the complete withdrawal of special police units of the Kosovo government deployed in the north, which is one of Kosovo Serbs’ stated requirements to take part in local elections. Progress with the Association of Serb Municipalities by mid-November is now a concrete condition with a deadline for the Kosovo government to deliver.

—Ilva Tare

It’s worth discussing. Clearly, new elections would have to be conceived and implemented very carefully, to ensure their result would be recognized by all sides as legitimate. Thus, it’s not a guarantee of solving the problem, but it’s one possible way to address it.

—Cameron Munter

5. Are there any more creative solutions for Serbia and Kosovo to get to more stable relations?

In the current atmosphere of deep-seated distrust and personal animosity between the two political leaders, it is challenging, if not impossible, to envision any innovative solutions. This is a harsh reality that the West still appears hesitant to acknowledge, despite the events unfolding over the past two years involving Prime Minister Albin Kurti of Kosovo and President Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia. It is becoming increasingly clear that, at some point, the West will need to pause and reconsider its approach, asking itself a crucial question: Are the current political leaders genuinely willing and capable of achieving and ensuring a lasting normalization between the Serb and Albanian populations in Kosovo?

—Maja Piscevic

If the context is right, other initiatives, such as those described in the Berlin Process and discussed as part of Open Balkans, might make a difference. They would open the aperture, so to speak, going beyond the tense immediate points of contention to the larger, more substantive solutions to the local problems. But these more strategic and long-term solutions are hard to develop if the situation on the ground remains as tense as it now is.

—Cameron Munter

The post Five questions (and expert answers) about the recent clashes in Kosovo appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In an endless series of Israeli operations, Operation Shield and Arrow in Gaza was yet another name on the list

Ksenia Svetlova — Fri, 02 Jun 2023 16:46:41 +0000

On May 2, Khader Adnan, a senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) leader in the West Bank, died as a result of an eighty-seven-day hunger strike while being detained in an Israeli prison. In response, a hundred rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel.

After waiting a week, on May 9, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) performed a pre-dawn raid on Gaza, killing Islamic Jihad military leaders and ten civilians. Operation Shield and Arrow, the first military operation under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s current government, had been officially launched.

So, what were its goals and consequences? And how will it affect the balance of power between Israel, Hamas, and PIJ in the Gaza Strip and West Bank in the near future?

Israel versus PIJ

Operation Shield and Arrow targeted Palestinian Islamic Jihad, but not Hamas—the real ruler of the Gaza Strip and the actor that has effectively governed Gaza since 2006. This strategy is not new for Israel, as Operation Breaking Dawn, launched in August 2022, followed the same logic: divide and rule. In other words, engage with the smaller and weaker PIJ and avoid involvement with Hamas.

Breaking Dawn started with the arrest of an Islamic Jihad operative, Bassam al-Saadi, in the West Bank. This followed a months-long escalation and rise in terror activity inside and outside the so-called green line—the demarcation line set out in the 1949 Armistice Agreements between Israel and Arab armies. PIJ leaders in Gaza threatened to retaliate, and soon Israel targeted a few of them. In return, hundreds of rockets were fired into southern Israel.

Israel currently identifies PIJ as one of the most volatile forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It intentionally targets the group, leaving Hamas—the stronger organization of the two—out of the picture. The three Islamic Jihad leaders killed in this latest operation had been key members of the IDF’s most wanted list for some time. Thus, it’s safe to assume that, if it weren’t for the death of Adnan in detention, some other trigger would have led Israel and PIJ to violence.

This was best highlighted with a Hebrew language meme that circulated on social media during the operation, which included a list of fifteen Israeli military operations in Gaza over the last two decades and sarcastically claimed, “For sure, this one will be different,” reflecting the public mood in Israel.

During a speech on the first day of the operation on May 9, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Galant spoke at length about returning to deterrence against terrorist organizations in Gaza. Still, right-wing analysts attacked them for failing to create a new power equation against the PIJ. In essence, Shield and Arrow was just another operation in a long line of IDF military campaigns in Gaza, and its objectives were achieved when top PIJ figures in the strip were killed.

Israeli citizens—especially those living in southern Israel—are well aware that the attacks against senior PIJ leaders, such as Baha’a Abu al-Ata in November 2019, induce fierce rocket fire from Gaza (while the breaks between the operations become shorter and shorter).

It’s important to note that Israel did succeed in driving a wedge between Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. Despite fiery statements, Hamas never joined PIJ’s military effort and left it to handle Israel’s attacks by itself. However, Israel already achieved this goal during Operation Black Belt in 2019 and Operation Breaking Dawn in 2022.

It can be argued that some violent energy was released before Jerusalem Day, an official Israeli holiday that marks the reunification of Jerusalem after the 1967 war. During this day, right-wing supporters in Israel participated in a controversial “Dance of Flags” and a parade organized by Am Kalbiya, a non-governmental organization, and the followers of the recently deceased Rabbi Haim Drukman. The procession usually passes the Muslim quarter of the Holy City and provokes angry reactions from Palestinians in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip. According to Arabic language media, PIJ demanded for the cancellation of the Flag Dance during indirect negotiations on a ceasefire, which was rejected.

It’s worth noting that Operation Shield and Arrow positively influenced Netanyahu’s domestic poll performance. Polling also indicated a bit of a comeback for Likud after bleeding mandates for a while. On the question of compatibility for the role of prime minister, Netanyahu scored better. However, despite the operation’s outcome, his opponents are still leading in the polls.

The limitations of Israeli power

During the last few years, the goal of PIJ has been to interconnect Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. An attack inside the Al-Aqsa Mosque, a flag march in Jerusalem, or the death of one of their leaders in jail will result in terror attacks in the West Bank and rocket fire from Gaza. At the same time, Hamas has developed a dual resistance strategy to strengthen its presence in the West Bank while keeping Gaza as quiet as possible to avoid fierce confrontation with Israel. After Operation Breaking Dawn, Israel stated that it “claimed a heavy price from the terrorists,” effectively undermining Hamas’ goal. Yet, in May, the equation seemed unchanged.

During the recent escalation around Al-Aqsa amid the holy month of Ramadan, Israel had to deal not only with rocket fire from Gaza and terrorist activity in the West Bank: its territory was also attacked from the North. At that time, Israel didn’t blame its archenemy Hezbollah but put full responsibility on Hamas in Lebanon and retaliated against it. It seemed that Hamas was able after to maintain unity.

In addition, even if badly hit, Islamic Jihad was still able to make half of Israel’s population run to shelters, even before launching a single rocket from Gaza. This was no small achievement for a medium-sized organization that has been overshadowed for years by Hamas.

Just one day into the operation, Egyptian mediators had already proceeded with the drill: shuttling between Israel and PIJ to produce a ceasefire as soon as possible.

This round of fighting took more time to negotiate and was more difficult this time around, according to Egyptian sources. During these extended hours, Israeli citizens sought shelter against the occasional rocket that could prove deadly. Those in Israel who loudly wished for the return of deterrence were disappointed; as always, the limitations of power were quickly drawn by Egypt, the United States, and Israel’s new allies in the Arab world: the Emiratis, who didn’t waste any time in condemning the military operation.

Others in the region joined the condemnation, including Jordan, Qatar, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the Arab League. However, Saudi Arabia, the primary target of Netanyahu’s normalization efforts in the Arab world, remained silent.

From a strategic point of view, the situation in Gaza hasn’t changed. Netanyahu’s current government is just as unable as previous ones to produce a solution that would provide long-term security to the south and prevent terrorist organizations from growing. Palestinian Islamic Jihad will undoubtedly continue its malign activities in the West Bank, and another military operation in the West Bank and Gaza might be imminent.

Hamas currently enjoys better relations with Cairo and receives goods that enter Gaza through Egypt, as well as a strategic détente with Israel, which allows for 17,000 Gazan workers to enter Israel and bring wages home. Furthermore, this gentlemen’s agreement allows Hamas to grow its military capabilities without Israel attacking the militant group. Since 2014, Israel has carefully avoided any ground operations in the sector, perpetuating the existing status quo. Thus, Hamas doesn’t seem to be eager to change the existing equation in order to challenge Israel.

It seems that the next Israeli operation in Gaza is inevitable. Everyone in Israel, Gaza, and Egypt knows how it will look and how many days it might take. The only unknown factor is the operation’s future name.

Ksenia Svetlova is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, and is the director of the Israel-Middle East Relations Program at Mitvim. Follow her on Twitter: @KseniaSvetlova.

The post In an endless series of Israeli operations, Operation Shield and Arrow in Gaza was yet another name on the list appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The fight against courtroom corruption continues in wartime Ukraine

Olena Halushka — Thu, 01 Jun 2023 15:30:28 +0000

The head of Ukraine’s Supreme Court, Vsevolod Kniaziev, was detained in mid-May on corruption charges based on an alleged $2.7 million bribe. The charges were brought by Ukraine’s leading anti-corruption bodies, the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) and National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU). This landmark case reflects the considerable progress made in Ukraine’s struggle against corruption within the judiciary, while also highlighting the key issues that must still be addressed in order to create a rule of law environment that will allow Ukraine to prosper.

The charges against Kniaziev are not entirely unprecedented. In the three-and-a-half years since the creation of Ukraine’s High Anti-Corruption Court, 23 judges have been convicted. Anti-corruption investigations have also led to changes in Ukraine’s judicial infrastructure, such as the liquidation of the controversial Kyiv District Administrative Court, which had long been a focus of major anti-corruption probes.

In summer 2022, Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts received a boost with the appointment of Oleksandr Klymenko as new head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office in line with Ukraine’s obligations regarding EU candidate country status. Klymenko’s appointment was widely seen as a watershed moment that signaled an end to the collective sense of impunity within the Ukrainian establishment. The recent arrest of the Supreme Court head has confirmed that earlier reform failures are not irreversible. It is now important to draw the right conclusions as Ukraine looks to finalize the reform of judicial governance bodies and repair the country’s Constitutional Court.

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The relaunch of Ukraine’s Supreme Court was one of the initial efforts to reform the country’s widely discredited judiciary in the initial aftermath of the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. However, it did not produce the desired results as a number of factors robbed the court of true independence. Unreformed judicial governance bodies were tasked with hiring Supreme Court judges, with civil society offered a superficial role in the selection process and Ukraine’s international partners largely standing aside. As a result, civil society observers assessed that around a quarter of all selected candidates were questionable.

The creation of the High Anti-Corruption Court in 2017-2019 was a more positive experience, with all candidates scrutinized by an independent panel composed of international experts. This paved the way for the cleansing of two judicial governance bodies, the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges, with foreign experts once more playing a crucial role.

In January 2023, Ukraine appointed eight new members to the country’s key judicial governance body, the High Council of Justice (HCJ), thereby enabling it to resume its work. On June 1, the HCJ appointed new members to the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ), which is another significant step forward. However, it is important to highlight that no agents of change from civil society were appointed, while two of the new members have questionable reputations. The next challenge is for the HQCJ to finish qualification assessments and hire judges to fill more than 2,500 vacancies. In addition, further measures are also expected in order to restore public trust in the Supreme Court.

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The next big issue on the path toward rule of law and EU accession is the selection procedure of Constitutional Court judges. EU candidate country status has opened up an historic opportunity to repair the Constitutional Court, which has long wielded effective veto power over any reform efforts in Ukraine. Reforming the Constitutional Court is widely seen as the most politically challenging element of judicial reform for the Ukrainian government to implement.

Additionally, some anti-corruption initiatives that were justifiably put on hold following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion must now be revived. This includes asset declarations for all state officials. The recent bribery charges brought against the head of the Supreme Court underline the urgency of a return to the asset declaration submission and verification process. Concerns regarding this issue have recently been voiced by the International Monetary Fund and EU Ambassador to Ukraine Matti Maasikas.

An independent judiciary and the rule of law have long been recognized as vital pillars for Ukraine’s future success. As the country looks toward the post-war recovery period, these factors are now more important than ever. During the rebuilding process, Ukraine’s partners will demand transparency and security for all state and private sector investments. Additionally, judicial reform has a central role to play in Ukraine’s further EU integration. Crucially, creating a fair legal environment free from corruption is also a key demand of Ukrainian society, including the hundreds of thousands currently defending the country against Russian invasion.

Olena Halushka is a board member at AntAC and co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory.

Georgian prime minister blames NATO for Russia’s war in Ukraine

Alleged Ukrainian drones conduct attack in Moscow region

One week after the incursion in the Belgorod region allegedly orchestrated by Russian Volunteer Corps, Russia’s border has become more permeable to Ukrainian attacks. Nearly a month after the first attack against the Kremlin’s Senate building in Moscow, another drone attack was reported in the morning of May 30.

Reports posted on Telegram channel SHOT revealed footage taken by civilians showing drones and explosions in suburban Moscow. Throughout the day, Moscow Oblast Governor Andrey Vorobyov and Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin confirmed several drones had struck various locations, which resulted in evacuation of civilians. According to Russian media outlet Mediazona, drones hit residential buildings in three different parts of the city. Two civilians were reportedly injured, although their condition did not require them to be hospitalized; there were no reported fatalities.

Russian officials, including government spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, accused “the Kyiv regime” of orchestrating the attack as “retaliation for effective drone attacks against Kyiv’s decision-making centers on Sunday [May 29]”. This theory was also embraced by Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose comments also referenced the “effective work of the air defense systems.” Meduza reported that the Kremlin ordered Russian media to cover the drone attacks using specific talking points, though this has not been independently confirmed. In contrast, the Moscow Prosecutor’s Office recommended that bloggers and the media refrain from commenting on the incident, as unverified claims would be punishable by law. The Moscow Investigative Committee launched an investigation into the drone attacks as an act of “terrorism.”

Meduza additionally geolocated drones that appeared in open-source footage, and estimated that between five to seven UAVs were downed in the Moscow area. Other unconfirmed reports from the opposition Telegram channel Baza claimed twenty-five drones took part in the attack, while Telegram channel SHOT reported on thirty-two drones. These figures remain unconfirmed, however. There were also conflicting estimates on the number of drones successfully intercepted by Russian air defense systems; while Russia’s defense ministry claimed only eight drones were shot down, SHOT reported nineteen drones as intercepted and destroyed.

Although Ukraine has not claimed responsibility for the attack, one piece of footage points at an alleged UJ-22 airborne drone of Ukrainian fabrication. Despite circumstantial evidence which could indicate Ukraine’s direct involvement, presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak denied the allegations. Information posted by opposition media outlet Agentstvo quoting a tweet by Foreign Policy Research Institute Senior Fellow Rob Lee, indicated that the drones responsible for the May 30 attack appear to be the same ones that conducted another attack on May 26 in Russia’s Krasnodar region.

Meanwhile, a report posted by Mediazona quoting a list published by Russian MP Alexander Khinshtein regarding the alleged locations of the drone suggested they may have targeted the houses of oligarchs in Moscow’s wealthy Rublyovka neighborhood. While this has not been confirmed, a separate report posted by the Telegram channel Baza alluded to an orchestrated attack in the same area.

This is the second drone attack reported in the Russian capital city since the May 3 drone attack against the senate building of the Kremlin. The DFRLab reported on that incident and assessed that defense countermeasures, including a ban on flying commercial drones, would likely be enforced as a defensive measure. GPS interference data also indicated elevated levels of GPS interference on May 30 in the Moscow area. This information would be consistent with an assessment expressed by Russian businessman and former Roskosmos chief Dmitry Rogozin, who proposed suspending GPS across Russia.

Lastly, on June 1, multiple sources reported movements of the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Free Russia Legion in the villages Shebekino and Novaya Tavolzhaka in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast, adjacent to the Ukrainian border. The oblast’s governor reported shelling by Grad rockets and initiated an evacuation of the local population to Belgorod Arena stadium, in the region’s capital. The DFRLab will continue to monitor the situation.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Georgian prime minister blames NATO for Russia’s war in Ukraine

Speaking at the GLOBSEC forum in Bratislava, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili claimed that NATO enlargement was to blame for Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a long-standing Kremlin narrative used to justify Russia’s war in Ukraine.

“I think everybody knows the reason… one of the main reasons was NATO, NATO enlargement,” Garibashvili said, adding that “Ukraine’s determination” to become a NATO member state had its “consequences.” According to recent polling by IRI, 80 percent of Georgians support the country joining NATO.

Several Kremlin-owned and pro-Kremlin outlets quoted Garibashvili and used his remarks to reinforce pro-war narratives. The outlets also reported on additional comments made by the prime minister during GLOBSEC on how the Georgian government is “setting a good precedent by maintaining peace and stability in a turbulent environment.”

The DFRLab has previously covered how the Georgian Dream-led government and the Kremlin spread similar narratives blaming the West for orchestrating protests in Georgia.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Moscow is on edge after the latest drone attack appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What’s so bad about mercenaries?

Alia Brahimi — Wed, 31 May 2023 13:38:39 +0000

In Season 1, Episode 3 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi speaks with the philosopher Professor Tony Coady about the key characteristics of mercenaries, including the motivation for private gain. They discuss the Geneva Conventions definition of mercenaries, the grey area of military contractors in support roles, and whether it’s possible to base a moral or legal judgement on an individual’s intentions. They also consider the main moral objections to mercenaries, with Professor Coady arguing that we should do as much as possible to tone down the resort to war as a standard political option.

“Mercenaries should be treated as combatants along with regular soldiers and have the same restrictions on their conduct and, where appropriate, protections.”

Tony Coady, Philosopher and Professor

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Ukraine’s Diia platform sets the global gold standard for e-government

Anatoly Motkin — Wed, 31 May 2023 01:30:31 +0000

Several thousand people gathered at the Warner Theater in Washington DC on May 23 for a special event dedicated to Ukraine’s award-winning e-governance platform Diia. “Ukrainians are not only fighting. For four years behind the scenes, they have been creating the future of democracy,” USAID Administrator Samantha Power commented at the event.

According to Power, users of Diia can digitally access the kinds of state services that US citizens can only dream of, including crossing the border using a smartphone application as a legal ID, obtaining a building permit, and starting a new business. The platform also reduces the potential for corruption by removing redundant bureaucracy, and helps the Ukrainian government respond to crises such as the Covid pandemic and the Russian invasion.

Since February 2022, the Diia platform has played a particularly important part in Ukraine’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion. According to Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov, in the first days of the invasion the platform made it possible to provide evacuation documents along with the ability to report property damage. Other features have since been added. The e-enemy function allows any resident of Ukraine to report the location and movement of Russian troops. Radio and TV functions help to inform people who find themselves cut off from traditional media in areas where broadcasting infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed.

Today, the Diia ecosystem offers the world’s first digital passport and access to 14 other digital documents along with 25 public services. It is used by more than half the Ukrainian adult population. In addition to consumer-oriented functions, the system collects information for the national statistical office and serves as a digital platform for officials. Diia is widely seen as the world’s first next-generation e-government platform, and is credited with implementing what many see as a more human-centric government service model.

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In today’s increasingly digital environment, governments may find that they have a lot of siloed systems in place, with each system based on its own separate data, infrastructure, and even principles. As a result, people typically suffer from additional bureaucracy and need to deal repeatedly with different official organizations. Most e-government initiatives are characterized by the same problems worldwide, such as technical disparity of state systems, inappropriate data security and data protection systems, absence of unified interoperability, and inefficient interaction between different elements. Ukraine is pioneering efforts to identify more human-centric solutions to these common problems.

One of the main challenges on the path to building sustainable e-government is to combine user friendliness with a high level of cyber security. If we look at the corresponding indices such as the Online Services Index and Baseline Cyber Security Index, we see that only a handful of European countries have so far managed to achieve the right balance: Estonia, Denmark, France, Spain, and Lithuania. Beyond Europe, only Singapore and Malaysia currently meet the necessary standards.

Ukraine has a strong record in terms of security. Since the onset of the Russian invasion, the Diia system has repeatedly been attacked by Russian cyber forces and has been able to successfully resist these attacks. This is an indication that the Ukrainian platform has the necessary reserve of cyber security along with a robust and secure digital public infrastructure.

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The success of the IT industry in Ukraine over the past decade has already changed international perceptions of the country. Instead of being primarily seen as an exporter of metals and agricultural products, Ukraine is now increasingly viewed as a trusted provider of tech solutions. The Ministry of Digital Transformation is now working to make Diia the global role model for human-centric GovTech. According to Samantha Power, the Ukrainian authorities are interested in sharing their experience with the international community so that others can build digital infrastructure for their citizens based on the same human-centric principles.

USAID has announced a special program to support countries that, inspired by Diia, will develop their own e-government systems on its basis. This initiative will be launched initially in Colombia, Kosovo, and Zambia. Ukraine’s Diia system could soon be serving as a model throughout the transitional world.

As they develop their own e-government systems based on Ukraine’s experience and innovations, participating governments should be able to significantly reduce corruption tied to bureaucratic obstacles. By deploying local versions of Diia, transitional countries will also develop a large number of their own high-level IT specialists with expertise in e-government. This is an important initiative that other global development agencies may also see value in supporting.

Anatoly Motkin is president of the StrategEast Center for a New Economy, a non-profit organization with offices in the United States, Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

On the rare occasions when Putin has traveled abroad since launching the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, his interactions with other heads of state have tended to underline his reduced status. For years, Putin was notorious for making world leaders such as Angela Merkel, Donald Trump, and Pope Francis wait while he arrived hours after the appointed time. With his position seriously undermined by the disastrous war in Ukraine, Putin is now the one doing the waiting. During a September 2022 conference in Uzbekistan, the leaders of Turkey, Azerbaijan, India, and Kyrgyzstan all left Putin standing as they arrived fashionably late for bilateral meetings.

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Putin’s geopolitical isolation looks even uglier when compared to the remarkable recent international ascent of his nemesis, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. In recent weeks, Zelenskyy has been lionized during high-profile visits to Rome, Berlin, Paris, and London; he has grabbed the headlines at the Arab League summit in Saudi Arabia and was the center of attention at the G7 summit in Japan. While everyone apparently wants to be seen alongside the Ukrainian leader, very few appear eager to stand with Putin.

This is not just a problem for Putin alone. Indeed, the toxicity engulfing his personal reputation has also led to Russia’s international ostracism. When the owner of popular dating apps Tinder and Hinge announced its departure from the Russian market in May 2023, company officials made clear that they could not afford the reputational damage of association with Vladimir Putin. “It’s not a good look for a trusted brand to be continuing operations in a nation where the head of state has been indicted by the International Criminal Court,” commented Match Group executive director Jeff Perkins.

Dating apps are only the tip of the iceberg, of course. A long list of global brands including McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, Nike, and Starbucks have exited or begun the process of leaving Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. European countries have pivoted away from Russian energy imports, leading to an historic loss of market share for the Kremlin. Russia is also finding it increasingly difficult to source the spare parts it needs to keep its war machine rolling due to chronic shortages caused by the unprecedented sanctions imposed by the West over the attack on Ukraine.

None of this was anticipated by Putin when he first gave the order to invade Ukraine early last year. Based on his prior experience of Western weakness following the 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 seizure of Crimea, Putin fully expected the democratic world to respond to his latest act of international aggression with vocal protests and symbolic sanctions before getting back to business as usual. This was an extremely costly miscalculation that has left Russia more isolated than at any time since the immediate aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution one hundred years ago.

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As something of an amateur historian, Putin must be painfully aware that he has brought his own country to one of its lowest points in centuries. He has long been preoccupied with his place in Russian history and has authored a number of lengthy historical essays that have been carefully crafted to justify his own deeply revisionist worldview. This obsession with the past has defined Putin’s entire reign and lies at the heart of his fateful decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Since coming to power at the turn of the millennium, Putin has consistently expressed his bitterness over the perceived historical injustice of the Soviet collapse. This has fed a vicious contempt for Ukrainian statehood, which he has come to view as the primary obstacle to his sacred mission of reuniting “historical Russia.” Putin is notorious for claiming Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), and has called Ukraine “an inalienable part of Russia’s own history, culture, and spiritual space.” In February 2022, he resolved to settle the matter once and for all.

From the very beginning of Russia’s invasion, the baleful influence of Putin’s historical baggage has been abundantly clear. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov acknowledged this on day one of the war, when he reportedly quipped that Putin only has three advisors: “Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and Catherine the Great.” Speaking months later in summer 2022, Putin confirmed the accuracy of Lavrov’s observation by publicly comparing his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Czar Peter.

With the war now in its sixteenth month, it is fair to say things have not gone according to plan for the would-be conqueror. Putin originally envisioned a blitzkrieg campaign that would rapidly extinguish Ukrainian independence and mark the dawn of a new Russian Empire. Instead, his soldiers have suffered a string of humiliating defeats that have shattered Russia’s reputation as a military superpower, and stand accused of sickening war crimes that have horrified the watching world.

For now, Putin remains defiant and insists his war aims will eventually be achieved, but it is difficult to see how Russia can hope to repair the damage done to its international standing. Instead, the decision to invade Ukraine looks set to be remembered as one of the greatest geopolitical blunders of the modern era. It has left Russia shunned and greatly diminished on the world stage, while earning Putin himself a place in infamy alongside history’s greatest criminals. He dreamed of emulating Peter the Great, but he has become Putin the Pariah.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Defne Arslan (@defnesadiklar): Senior director of the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and Turkey programs, former chief Turkey economist and senior energy policy adviser in the US embassy in Ankara
Yevgeniya Gaber (@GaberYevgeniya): Nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and former foreign-policy adviser to the Ukrainian prime minister
Rich Outzen (@RichOutzen): Nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and former military and civilian adviser in the US State Department

Pivotal position

Erdoğan winning about 52 percent of the vote against challenger Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, combined with the parties supporting him having secured a majority in parliament, means Turkey will be entering another period of “centralized decision making” but also one of “political stability,” Defne tells us.
“Turkey’s ambivalent stance on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, trading and developing economic cooperation with the former while providing support for the self-defense of the latter, will likely remain unchanged,” explains Yevgeniya. But secure in his power, “Erdoğan might play hard this time,” she adds, by asking Russia for more in negotiations over grain exports from Ukraine and even pushing both sides for a ceasefire.
Turkey’s foreign policy will likely continue with its strategic semi-independence and its balancing and hedging among great powers, explains Rich. Yet within NATO, “the prospects for Swedish accession are looking up,” he adds, especially with Sweden’s new counter-terror legislation taking full effect next month.

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An economic rethink?

At home, Erdoğan’s first priority will be the Turkish economy, which is currently battling slow growth, low reserves, and high inflation due in part to the government’s low interest rate policy. “If Turkey’s economy team can go back to credible and more conventional economic policies that can fix the current problems,” Defne says, the country could become a destination for foreign capital once again.
In his victory remarks, Erdoğan referenced this year’s one hundredth anniversary of the Turkish Republic and discussed the Turkish economy at length, which Defne interprets as a signal “that he is determined to deliver a stronger road map for the economy.”
It will take “setting strong economic benchmarks and implementing crucial structural reforms,” Defne adds, to reestablish “confidence in the Turkish economy both for domestic and foreign investors.”
Expect Russia to remain high among Turkey’s economic partners, as Ankara seeks to refuel its exhausted central bank reserves, explains Yevgeniya. She underscores that Erdoğan’s message at the close of his campaign was: “[Turkey’s] relations with Russia are no less important than those with the United States.” It’s no surprise, she adds, that Russian President Vladimir Putin was quick to congratulate Erdoğan on the victory—even before the official results were announced.
But for Ukraine, Yevgeniya notes that Erdoğan is likely to continue “Turkey’s military support and ongoing projects in the defense sphere.”

Contesting the ‘zone beyond NATO’

“Syria stands out as a matter of personal legacy for Erdoğan,” says Rich. The Turkish president wants to remove the Kurdistan Workers’ Party–linked People’s Defense Units (YGP) from the Turkish border and facilitate the return of a significant number of refugees to Syria, he explains.
Rich warns that “a major new [military] operation against the YPG this year or next cannot be ruled out.” However, if Turkey can sufficiently weaken the YPG and bring Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad to negotiations through drone and artillery strikes alone, then it may forgo a large ground operation.
Turkish security concerns extend beyond Syria, Rich points out, to Libya, the Caucasus, and the Mediterranean and Aegean seas—all of which require deft negotiation with regional powers. “In this ‘zone beyond NATO’ for Turkish security,” he says, “Erdoğan is likely to leave the door open for deals while rattling the saber occasionally for effect.”

The post What the world should expect from Erdogan now appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Exploring the secrets of Ukraine’s successful wartime diplomacy

Yuna Potomkina — Sat, 27 May 2023 21:42:19 +0000

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion fifteen months ago, Ukraine has been forced to fight for national survival on the battlefield while at the same time creating and maintaining a broad international coalition of partners prepared to arm the country. Ukraine’s ability to address these unique challenges offers a range of potentially important lessons for the wider international community.

One key lesson learned by Ukrainian officials since February 2022 is the importance of seizing the moment. Time and again, Ukraine’s political and military leaders have demonstrated an ability to act quickly and decisively. One obvious example is President Zelenskyy’s fateful decision during the first days of the invasion to stay in Kyiv rather than accepting offers to evacuate. His famous quote, “the battle is here, I need ammunition not a ride,” captured the imagination of the watching world and was instrumental in helping persuade Western leaders to stand with Ukraine.

Another important lesson has been the need to adopt an interest-oriented approach to building international alliances by focusing on the underlying interests of each party. Ukraine has been highly successful at getting across the message that Russia’s invasion is a clash of civilizations with global implications. While some have sought to portray the war as a mere territorial dispute, Ukraine has been consistent in explaining what Russian success would mean for the future of international security. This has played a crucial role in consolidating Western support for the Ukrainian war effort. By identifying and addressing the core security interests of its partners, Ukraine has been able to establish clear objectives and build trust.

Ukraine’s experience of international negotiations since the eve of the Russian invasion also demonstrates the benefits of adopting a straightforward approach rooted in shared values and common goals. A good example of this principle in practice is the Ramstein Format, which unites 50 countries based on a readiness to act against Russian aggression. Thanks to Ramstein, Ukraine has been able to secure critical military aid in an efficient manner through close coordination with a large number of partners. While individual participating countries all have their own particular agendas and national interests, Ukraine has managed to keep the focus fixed firmly on the overriding need to defeat Russia.

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One of the main factors behind Ukraine’s successful diplomacy has been perseverance. In terms of acquiring new weapons systems and other forms of military aid, Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov has adopted a strategy of demonstrating a willingness to negotiate while proceeding in parallel with the necessary technical preparations. As a result, Ukraine has typically been ready to act once political decisions have been reacted and the right moment has arrived. Time and again, Reznikov and his colleagues in the Ukrainian government have been told by the country’s partners that certain new categories of military aid simply cannot be supplied. However, with sufficient patience and perseverance, the impossible has repeatedly become possible.

Similarly, it has often been best to adopt an incremental approach to negotiations rather than trying to achieve comprehensive breakthroughs immediately. Many of the steps Ukraine has been calling on its partners to make represent major foreign policy watersheds that cannot be taken lightly or rushed. However, it has often proved possible to move from one step to the next and build momentum toward ever more significant decisions.

This incremental approach can be seen in the expansion of military aid to Ukraine. In the weeks prior to Russia’s February 2022 invasion, many countries questioned the wisdom of supplying the Ukrainian military with hand-held anti-tank weapons. Over the past fifteen months, the range of weapons being delivered to Ukraine has evolved dramatically to include artillery, air defense, tanks, and cruise missiles. Perhaps the best single example of the incremental approach was the creation of a “tank coalition” to provide Ukraine with Leopard 2 main battle tanks. It took months of negotiations and many small steps such as agreements on training and maintenance before Germany finally gave the green light to supply Ukraine with Leopards.

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The clarity of Ukraine’s position on peace talks has helped the country to consolidate international support. While some international politicians and commentators continue to argue that negotiations between Ukraine and Russia are inevitable, Ukraine has insisted on the complete liberation of all Ukrainian territory and provided compelling arguments to justify this stance. The consistency of Ukraine’s position has helped to gradually win over the country’s partners. While many European leaders spoke earlier of the need to avoid isolating or humiliating Russia, there is now a growing consensus throughout the West that Russia must be defeated.

With the war still far from over, Ukraine seems set to remain on a steep diplomatic learning curve. One increasingly important focus is long-term defense planning. Ukrainian security needs to become a central pillar of the broader security strategies adopted by NATO and the EU. At present, NATO’s strategic concept until 2030 identifies Russia as “the most significant and immediate threat to the security of allies, as well as peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.” Ukraine’s unique experience of confronting Russian aggression in all its forms can make a major contribution to countering this threat.

Rather than seeking to push Ukraine into some form of compromise with Russia, the international emphasis should now be firmly on pressuring Russia to end its invasion. This could include providing expanded military aid to Ukraine, imposing additional sanctions on Russia, and pursuing international war crimes litigation. Ukrainian officials will be looking to advance all three of these objectives, and will be utilizing diplomatic skills honed in the exceptional circumstances created by Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Yuna Potomkina is an advisor to the Ukrainian Minister of Defense.

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To attract the huge volumes of investment, especially private capital, needed to kick start reconstruction and get the economy back on its feet, Ukraine will need to pivot away from war economy measures toward a strategy of private sector growth. The numerous emergency nationalizations that took place last year were understandable at a time when arms production and energy supply were the most urgent priorities. But in the battles that lie ahead, Ukraine’s survival will be determined as much by its economic strength as by its military prowess.

The role of the state was already outsized before Russia’s invasion, with more than 3,500 state-owned enterprises accounting for one-tenth of Ukraine’s output and about 18% of employment. The demands of war mobilization have created a public sector that is now far larger than in any existing EU member state. In the banking sector alone, the state’s share has reached nearly 60%, stifling competition to the point where the Ministry of Finance has been forced to acknowledge that there is currently no functioning financial services market.

Although the prewar target of reducing the state’s share to less than a quarter remains, the Ukrainian parliament is now debating a draft law intended to permit the nationalization of even more banks. The law is designed to deal with a single case, the proposed nationalization of the Sens Bank. However, it is drawn so broadly that critics fear it will give the state discretionary powers to take over almost any bank it wishes. This includes not only those banks that have been targeted with official state sanctions, but also those included on the “shame list” of businesses that continue to trade with Russia.

While it is perfectly understandable that Ukraine should wish to penalize businesses that have failed to cut their ties to Russia, the satisfaction of seizing their assets may come at a high cost if market confidence is undermined by the weakening of property rights. Some legal experts have also questioned whether these widely drawn powers are in line with the Ukrainian Constitution, and have argued that only the National Bank of Ukraine is empowered to approve the nationalization of a bank in cases of insolvency. Nationalizations pushed through by the government for political reasons are likely to be challenged successfully in the courts, according to legal observers.

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An additional consideration is that any increase in the state’s control of the economy is likely to fuel concern about corruption, which remains one of the main obstacles on the path to EU accession. The boundaries between political and economic power, which too often remain blurred in the characteristically post-Soviet style, need to be much more sharply delineated. As numerous scandals have shown, state-controlled banks and enterprises create huge opportunities for self-enrichment and abuses of power by those who control them ostensibly on the nation’s behalf, including kickbacks, nepotism, excessive salaries, and favoritism in the awarding of public contracts.

Instead of considering new measures to extend the state’s reach into the economy, the Ukrainian government should be thinking about how the state can divest itself of assets it has already acquired in a way that is fair, transparent, and most likely to foster the economic growth Ukraine badly needs.

If one of the few beneficial effects of the war has been to accelerate Ukraine’s deoligarchization, one of the emerging risks in its aftermath will be the danger of reoligarchization via privatizations that are opaque and marred by favoritism. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy must resist the temptation to use patronage to create a business class loyal to him. That would leave Ukraine looking less like an EU member-in-waiting and more like a miniature version of Putin’s crony capitalism. There would be no victory in such an outcome.

David Clark was Special Adviser on Europe at the UK Foreign Office 1997-2001 and now works as an independent analyst specializing in foreign policy and European affairs.

Richard Cashman — Thu, 25 May 2023 20:02:54 +0000

Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev gave a lengthy interview to Russian publication Izvestia in early May that read like a script for Russian officials and sympathisers seeking to justify the invasion of Ukraine. Patrushev’s arguments should not be taken lightly; he is one the most influential figures in today’s Russia, perhaps the second most powerful person in the country after President Putin himself.

Ukraine and its partners ought to push back against and debunk many of Patrushev’s assertions and theories. In particular, Patrushev made several references to British geographer Halford Mackinder and his so-called “Heartland Theory” of geopolitics, which the Russian official identified as the inspiration behind NATO’s eastward enlargement since 1997 and its support for Ukraine since 2014.

In his 1904 article The Geographical Pivot of History, Mackinder conceived of a global struggle between sea powers and land powers, with Britain, the United States, and Japan representing the foremost sea powers, and Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary the leading land powers. Mackinder ascribed a special importance to the area approximating to modern Ukraine, Belarus, and Western Russia, which he called the Heartland within the Eurasian World Island, and which he said was largely impervious to coercion by the sea powers. Who controls the Heartland, argued Mackinder, controls the World Island, and therefore the world.

Mackinder’s ideas have long held a fascination for those inclined to deterministic and reductive interpretations of international history. For most serious historians and foreign policy practitioners, however, his ideas are far too simplistic and doctrinaire to explain the full gamut of reasons for events in the past, or to facilitate realistic policy formulation in the present.

Mackinder’s arguments were very much of their time, especially in respect of the early twentieth century’s pervasive imperial thinking. His conclusions also reflect the military technologies then available. Attitudes toward imperialism have radically altered since Mackinder was writing, and technological development has generally acted to undermine many of his core assumptions.

Moreover, with the establishment of the Warsaw Pact following World War II, Moscow did establish control over Mackinder’s Heartland, which it then enjoyed for several decades. However, this in no way enabled the Kremlin to dominate the rest of the world.

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Far from being a story of Euro-Atlantic sea power moving to dominate the Heartland, NATO enlargement since 1997 has overwhelmingly been a response to dynamic lobbying by former Warsaw Pact members. Some, such as Poland, immediately sought sanctuary without waiting to see what sort of country the new Russian Federation might become. Others made applications once Putin and the clan which captured the Russian state at the turn of the millennium revealed their intention to reverse rather than manage Russia’s imperial decline.

In most cases, applications were met with initial skepticism by existing NATO members. Yet Patrushev ignores this and wholly removes agency from what he terms as the small states of Eastern Europe when he implies that NATO membership was imposed on them.

Overtures toward Moscow at the end of the Cold War that might have been read as condoning a sphere of influence were made in the expectation that the Russian Federation would develop into a democratic and rule of law-based society. Indeed, many of the applications to join NATO by former Warsaw Pact nations would not have been made if Russia had evolved meaningfully in that direction. Instead, Russia’s unreconstructed imperial mindset has been instrumental in persuading countries in Central and Eastern Europe that NATO membership is the only way to guarantee their national security.

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Patrushev promotes a conspiracy-driven view of the world that is all-too-common in today’s Russia. In reality, strong international support for Ukraine derives not from outdated geopolitical dogmas or anti-Russian agendas, but from a principled and realistic assessment of what is at stake for democratic, rule of law-based societies around the world should Russia prevail in its aggression. In other words, it is the gallantry of Ukrainians in defending the principles they have chosen, not the space Ukraine occupies on the map, which begets such broad support.

Patrushev’s interview contained a number of other idiosyncratic and occasionally lunatic assertions, which any countries engaging with Russia would do well to take note of when deciding how to calibrate their relations with Russia and Ukraine. His arguments may often appear absurd, but similar claims are regularly repeated by other Russian officials when addressing both domestic and international audiences.

Broad-based support for Ukraine and its Euro-Atlantic integration is far more about ideas and values than about early twentieth century geopolitical abstractions or other obscure theories. Indeed, it is Ukraine’s adoption and defense of core democratic principles which lie at the heart of Moscow’s fear and loathing.

Richard Cashman is an Adjunct Fellow at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

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Some residents here in Odesa have responded by heading to safer ground in the countryside or overseas, but for the most part I’m detecting the same irrepressible resilience that was on display in the earlier months of the war.

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