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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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This forced cancellation is the latest in a series of very public humiliations for Putin, who is struggling to maintain his authority as the full-scale invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel. The March 2023 ICC decision to charge him with war crimes dealt a powerful blow to Putin’s standing at a time when unprecedented sanctions and revelations of Russian atrocities in Ukraine had already made him a toxic figure. Weeks later, he was forced to cancel traditional Victory Day parades in cities across Russia amid rumors of shortages in both troops and tanks due to heavy losses in Ukraine.

Putin’s most humiliating moment came in late June, when units of Russia’s state-funded paramilitary Wagner Group staged a mutiny and briefly threatened to seize control of the country. The Wagner uprising ended as suddenly as it had begun, but not before mutinous troops had captured one of Russia’s largest cities without a fight and marched virtually unopposed to within 200 kilometers of Moscow. The mutiny exposed the fragility of the current regime and the lack of popular support for Putin himself; while crowds of ordinary Russians flocked to cheer Wagner rebels, nobody rallied to defend the country’s current ruler.

The Wagner episode may have played a role in this week’s decision to miss the forthcoming summit in South Africa. With Putin looking weaker than at any point in his 23-year reign, there is widespread speculation that it is only a matter of time before he faces fresh domestic challenges. Coups are often staged when dictators leave the security of their capitals and few in Moscow will have forgotten the failed KGB coup of 1991, which took place in August while Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was in Crimea.

The Kremlin’s inability to find a way for Putin to attend next month’s BRICS summit in South Africa is a clear indication of Russia’s declining influence on the global stage. Ten years ago, Putin was a respected statesman and the leader of a G8 nation. Today, he must plan his international travel based on the likelihood of being arrested for war crimes. Commenting on Putin’s canceled South Africa visit, US State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller said there was “no better illustration” of Russia’s vastly diminished standing in the world. “President Putin can hardly leave his own borders now,” he noted. “He’s an international pariah who can barely leave his own borders for fear of arrest.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The institutions can adapt. Every enlargement round has been accompanied by calls for institutional reform and treaty change. No way, it was said, can the EU operate at fifteen, at twenty-five, or twenty-seven. Yet, the EU institutions continue to function. Indeed, during the COVID-19 pandemic and in response to the invasion of Ukraine, the EU has made more difficult decisions more quickly than at any time in its history.
The accession process offers too many opportunities for existing members to settle historical scores with potential members, slowing the process. Too often, this is due to niche historical grievances exploited by member state politicians; see Bulgaria’s efforts to slow down the accession of North Macedonia or Spain’s failure to countenance Kosovo’s bid.
Rigorous benchmarking of regulations does not prevent democratic backsliding. The twelve mostly postcommunist states admitted in 2004 and 2007 had to meet much higher standards of regulatory cohesion than earlier entrants. Yet today, members of the class of 2004 Poland and Hungary face charges that they have strayed from basic EU values on the rule of law, especially regarding the judiciary and media. Other member states have also had questions raised about the state of their democracies.
The biggest lesson of them all is that politics is the key element in the accession process. What will be the reaction of the radical left and extreme right that has become such a factor in EU domestic politics? Will ratification of each accession by existing members be too high of a hurdle? Ukraine and Moldova have benefited from politics so far, but as the accession process moves forward and membership seems closer, the politics—especially among the current member states—will only get harder.

—Frances Burwell is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

United Kingdom

Albania: Strong momentum to overcome rule-of-law concerns

Albania was granted EU candidate status in June 2014. The EU grouped Albania’s accession bid with North Macedonia’s (which was stalled due to a dispute with Greece over naming issues), and it wasn’t until July 2022 that Albania had its first intergovernmental conference with the EU to actually launch negotiations officially.

Albania’s greatest progress toward accession thus far has been its substantial judicial reform, which is unprecedented in its ambition in the Western Balkans. The reform, which implemented serious vetting of the judiciary, led to the dismissal of more than 60 percent of judges and prosecutors across the country who were found to have criminal ties, concealed wealth, or otherwise unprofessional behavior.

Despite this initiative, Albania still has a long way to go on rule-of-law reform to meet EU standards. With so many judges and prosecutors dismissed, there is a serious shortage of officials available to deal with continued criminal cases. And while the reform is strong on paper, international assessments find Albania to still suffer from significant corruption (even compared to other Western Balkans countries) and needs to strengthen its record on indictments in high-level corruption cases, prioritize anti-money laundering initiatives, and increase transparency in consolidating property rights.

But Albania has the drive to continue with these reforms: EU membership remains incredibly popular and is supported by nearly 96 percent of Albanians according to a 2022 Euronews Albania poll. The same poll showed that more than 35 percent of Albanians think the country will join the EU by 2027. Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama has consistently expressed his willingness to keep the country on track to meet EU reforms and he has been transparent in his appeal for pre-accession EU funds to enable the country to meet EU benchmarks. Within the region, he’s an ardent supporter of regional cooperation opportunities such as the Berlin Process and Open Balkan Initiative that would allow for the movement of people and trade throughout the region as a good exercise to prepare for future EU membership.

Although Albania had a late start in the EU accession process, its substantial judicial reforms, clear messaging from its leader on the value of EU membership, and overwhelming popular support for the effort have given it unique momentum within the region to continue on its path toward joining the bloc.

—Lisa Homel is an assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bumpy accession progress leaves an opening for Russia and China

Twenty years ago, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was promised EU membership at the Thessaloniki Summit. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU entered into force in June 2015, and BiH applied for membership in February 2016. Candidate status was granted six years later, in December 2022, as result of a new geopolitical situation in Europe, propping up the EU’s renewed engagement with the Western Balkans as vital for European security.

The long and bumpy EU integration process, lack of sustainable reforms in the country, dysfunction in the government, ethnic divisions, weak economic development, and systemic corruption of ethno-political elites controlling institutions have increased apathy and skepticism in BiH. EU membership is supported by half of the population, but when it comes to expectations of citizens, 35 percent believe that the country will never join the EU. The risk of competing visions for the future of the country is increasing, and the EU’s strategic competitors, Russia and China, are gaining more space. Young people have opted for the easier way to join the EU, through massive emigration into Western Europe. Migration and brain drain have become new security challenges, as BiH is among the countries that have lost the largest share of their population since the early 1990s (33 percent).

The new government in BiH has prioritized EU integration, and the main focus should be on implementing the fourteen priorities of the European Commission, dealing mostly with the functionality of the government focusing on the rule of law and judiciary reform and by creating a clear division of competencies between different levels of government. To be successful, the EU’s higher focus on fundamentals and stricter conditionality and accountability should be paired with earlier access to structural funds to promote socioeconomic convergence and a gradual phasing-in of candidate countries in various sectors of the EU market.

—Valbona Zeneli is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Georgia: Backsliding and Russian influence put the EU in a bind

In June 2022, the European Commission decided not to grant Georgia candidate status, unlike Moldova and Ukraine. Instead, the Commission granted it a “European perspective” and provided twelve recommendations for issues that the country must tackle first. Despite widespread agreement in the West that the government has been backsliding in key indicators such as independence of the judiciary and state institutions, the Commission’s June 2022 decision was questionable because Georgia has completed far more of the legislative and technical requirements for candidate status than Ukraine or Moldova and has a vibrant, if tenuous, democratic system. In a March 2023 International Republican Institute poll, 89 percent of the Georgian population said it supports the country joining the EU. Widespread public protests erupted that month when the government attempted to introduce a foreign agent law, modeled on a similar Russian law, that was undemocratic and in direct conflict with the Commission’s recommendations. The government withdrew the bill in response.

The EU now finds itself in a bind, as the Georgian government has not implemented many reforms addressing the most serious problems and its commitment to this Western course is somewhere between fickle and self-sabotaging. The EU is in a position where if it grants candidate status now, it risks rewarding a government that is backsliding in terms of democratic reform. Conversely, if it refuses to give candidate status, it risks consigning Georgia to a bureaucratic gray zone where it could find itself increasingly unable or unwilling to counter Russian influence. However, so far, the country remains an imperfect but spirited and pluralistic democracy with a population deeply committed to a European future.

—Laura Linderman is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Kosovo: Progress is stalled as the Serbia standoff continues

Kosovo signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU in 2015 and submitted its application for candidate status in 2022. Although 85 percent of Kosovars want to join the EU, Kosovo faces the unique obstacle of not being able to advance further in EU accession because five EU member states do not recognize its independence (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain). A key precondition set by the EU for Kosovo to move forward has been the conclusion of the normalization agreement with Serbia, which has effectively stalled since 2015. A recent European proposal on normalization agreed to in principle by both sides is also on the brink of failure due to tensions in Kosovo’s Serbian-majority north.

The deterioration in the security situation and Kosovo’s stagnant EU accession process undermines the country’s recent progress in democratic reforms and in tackling corruption. The lack of clear EU prospects for Kosovo and the Western Balkans in general—especially many years of delays in approving visa liberalization for Kosovo (it comes into force in January 2024)—have fueled frustrations with the EU and brought anti-EU narratives to the mainstream of public discourse.

—Agon Maliqi is an independent analyst and researcher from Kosovo working on security and democracy issues in the Western Balkans.

Moldova: Corruption and Transnistria remain challenges

In June 2022, the European Council announced it would grant Moldova and Ukraine candidacy status—almost eight years to the day since Chisinau earned an association agreement with the EU in 2014. Candidacy was a major symbolic boon for Moldova, which had endured a maddeningly stop-start progression toward EU reforms and candidacy. But pro-European president Maia Sandu has her country on the right track: She is tough enough to enact real reforms and as a former International Monetary Fund official, has the right combination of technocratic and diplomatic skills to lead Moldova toward Europe.

Yet Moldova faces major roadblocks to pass through before its eventual accession. The EU’s June 2022 announcement carried with it nine political conditions before accession talks, compared to seven for Ukraine. With a population of less than three million people, Moldova lacks the capacity of Ukraine but faces similar challenges of outside influence. Chisinau continues to battle corrupt politicians and oligarchs who consistently threaten to blow Sandu’s reform drive off course. Moldova will also likely need to solve the fate of Transnistria, the Russia-dominated statelet that broke away in 1992. EU countries will rightly want to strengthen border controls with a Russian client statelet.

Greater EU diplomatic engagement with Chisinau and technical support for market and judicial reforms can help shore up Moldova’s capacity to make meaningful progress on EU conditions. Additional Western sanctions on Shor, Plahotniuc, and their proxies can mitigate their malign influence in Moldovan politics and help consolidate the country’s democracy.

—Andrew D’Anieri is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Montenegro: A stable political coalition is necessary for progress

Montenegro started negotiations for EU membership eleven years ago. So far, Podgorica has opened all the chapters but has only closed three. The negotiations came to a halt in 2018 when Brussels made it clear that progress in the EU accession process would be directly conditioned by advancements in the rule of law and democratic institutions. Since the former regime of President Milo Đukanović turned Montenegro into a so-called captured state, with a corrupt judiciary and police and where organized crime thrived, the EU accession process has de facto been slowed down, if not halted.

The process of forming a new government is underway in Podgorica. The winning party in the recent elections is the Europe Now Movement (PES). The main challenge for PES leader Milojko Spajić, the likely prime minister in the future government, will be to form a stable coalition capable of executing necessary reforms which would unlock Montenegro’s path to the EU.

The biggest problems in Montenegrin society are organized crime and corruption. They cannot be resolved without appointing new prosecutors and judges and adopting and implementing reforms in the judiciary and police. While Russia’s influence in Montenegro exists, it is limited. The pro-Russian sentiment among certain segments of Montenegrin society, which dates back to the eighteenth century, is often mistakenly interpreted as a result of Russian influence rather than historical heritage.

Public support for Montenegro’s accession to the EU consistently ranges between 70 and 80 percent, indicating that this is one of the few issues in the country with a fairly broad consensus. Therefore, the implementation of the so-called EU agenda is a crucial tool in forming a new government and creating a stronger parliamentary majority.

—Maja Piscevic is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and representative of the Center in the Western Balkans.

North Macedonia: Amid delays, public support for EU membership is plunging

North Macedonia’s perspective on EU membership has drastically shifted in the past two decades, replacing initial enthusiasm with caution and diminished optimism. Despite obtaining candidate status in 2005, the country has endured eighteen years of uncertainty, waiting for the European Commission recommendations to translate into official negotiations from the European Council. The Prespa Agreement, considered a significant compromise five years ago, failed to deliver on its promise of faster progress toward EU membership, further dampening hopes.

In November 2020, Bulgaria’s blockade on North Macedonia’s EU accession negotiations, demanding constitutional changes for the Bulgarian minority, worsened the situation. The opposition’s refusal to join votes for the necessary constitutional changes, requiring a two-thirds parliamentary majority, has led to an impending political crisis. Trust has eroded, significantly undermining the EU’s credibility compared to sentiments held two decades ago.

To tackle this challenge, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed an effective strategy: immediate and generous allocation of pre-accession funds to facilitate North Macedonia’s transformation and benefit other Western Balkan countries. However, the specific amount of funds remains unspecified, leaving room for uncertainty.

The forthcoming Balkan Barometer report from the Regional Cooperation Council reveals a diminishing perception of EU membership in North Macedonia, once a fierce supporter. In 2019, 70 percent of citizens viewed EU membership as a positive development, but the 2023 Balkan Barometer shows that only 50 percent of respondents consider it a positive prospect, with 34 percent neutral and 13 percent negative.

These survey findings serve as a wake-up call for North Macedonian leaders, EU officials, and US policymakers. Urgent measures are necessary to address citizens’ concerns and doubts. Open dialogue, trust-building, and effective communication about the advantages and opportunities of EU membership are crucial. Specific challenges must be tackled, aligning the EU integration process with citizens’ expectations. Mere promises and kind words will not suffice to reverse the current gloomy narrative. Boosting the local economy through investments and improving standards of living would be a highly welcomed step, revitalizing the path to EU membership and restoring faith in the process, ultimately bringing back hope to the citizens for the once-promised European future.

At this critical juncture, Bulgaria must refrain from employing vetoes or placing undue pressure on North Macedonia and should foster a constructive and cooperative relationship free from unnecessary obstacles. Additionally, the EU member states should collectively exert pressure on Sofia, urging responsible actions based on European values towards its neighbor.

—Ilva Tare is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and was most recently a broadcaster with EuroNews Group.

Serbia: ‘Sitting on two stools’ means no movement toward EU

For most Serbs, EU membership increasingly seems like a mirage, and certainly the prospect does not have the power and gravitational pull that it had in the years immediately following the wars of Yugoslav succession. Serbia officially applied for membership in December 2009, and all governments since that time have professed pro-EU sentiments. But over the last decade, Serbia has not made progress on reforms necessary for accession and has continued its reputation as trying to “sit on two stools” (claiming commitment to a Western course while remaining closely tied to Russia). Moreover, the current leadership has been deft at looking to other sources of support and investment (China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Gulf states) for visible development projects even as the EU provides the overwhelming amount of its foreign assistance. And in certain areas, such as press freedom, Serbia has a way to go to achieve EU standards.

So even as 65 percent of Serbs support EU reforms, only 43 percent are actually in favor of joining the EU. The fate of Russia’s attack on Ukraine may have an impact on the leadership and public opinion in Serbia, but for now, there is great “EU fatigue” and a lack of confidence that membership in the union is anywhere near. Finally, relations with Kosovo will be key to Serbia’s prospects in the EU, and recent events have not been encouraging there, despite the best efforts of the transatlantic community.

—Cameron Munter is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and Europe Center and a former US ambassador to Serbia.

Turkey: Rule of law and Cyprus hamper a long-stalled process

Turkey’s EU accession history goes back a long way, starting in 1959 when it applied for associate membership to what was then known as the European Economic Community (EEC). Turkey officially applied for full membership in the EEC in 1987, and Turkey became eligible to join the EU in 1999. The same year, during the Helsinki European Council, the EU recognized Turkey as a candidate and official negotiations for accession began in 2005. However, progress has been slow and to date, only sixteen of thirty-five accession chapters have been opened, and only one has been completed. A total of fourteen chapters are blocked due to the decisions of the European Council and Cyprus. Meanwhile, the war in Syria led to a refugee crisis for the EU—with Turkey on the front line. In the 2015 and 2016 EU summits, burden-sharing in migration management was a major topic between Turkey and the EU. As a result, currently Turkey hosts almost four million Syrian refugees under temporary protection status.

The most important step for overcoming this period and helping to normalize relations was the Turkey-EU summit in March 2018, in Varna, Bulgaria, which was beneficial to reestablishing confidence in Turkey-EU relations. But just three months later, the General Affairs Council stated that “Turkey has been moving further away from the European Union. Turkey’s accession negotiations have therefore effectively come to a standstill and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing and no further work towards the modernization of the EU-Turkey Customs Union is foreseen.”

The 2022 enlargement report released by the European Commission offered an assessment of where things stand now: “The Turkish government has not reversed the negative trend in relation to reform, despite its repeated commitment to EU accession,” the report reads. “The EU’s serious concerns on the continued deterioration of democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights, and the independence of the judiciary have not been addressed.”

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who just won another term to rule for the next five years, is pushing for membership less than he did in his prior twenty years leading the country. However, Erdoğan recently called for increased communications for Turkey’s EU membership. According to a 2022 poll by the German Marshall Fund, 59 percent of Turks support EU membership. The big issues Turkey needs to overcome before being admitted are the rule of law and a resolution to the Cyprus dispute with the EU. Despite these issues, Turkey has stepped up recently to de-escalate tensions with Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially after Turkey’s devastating earthquake early this year, which led to a warm earthquake diplomacy between the two countries.

—Alp Ozen is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY program.

Ukraine: As reforms advance, accession talks could begin this fall

The dramatic events of the 2014 Revolution of Dignity made clear to the world the Ukrainian people’s desire to pursue the path of European integration. Now, the Ukrainian people are fighting an existential war to protect that vision against a full-scale Russian invasion.

In the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine was officially granted EU candidacy status in June 2022. Brussels set out seven conditions before accession talks could begin. In June 2023, the EU reported that Ukraine had satisfied two of these conditions, made good progress in one other area, and made some progress in the remaining four. The two conditions already met relate to the judiciary and media, while Ukraine must still pass laws regarding the Constitutional Court, anti-corruption efforts, anti-money laundering efforts, de-oligarchization, and the protection of minority rights in order to align its legislation with EU standards.

Ukraine could begin accession talks as soon as this fall, once all seven conditions are fulfilled. That process will be a long and technical one, but Ukrainian officials and the Ukrainian people have demonstrated their strong commitment to the process. The February 2023 visit to Kyiv by von der Leyen and fifteen EU commissioners to meet with their Ukrainian counterparts underscored the leaders’ commitment, while the people’s commitment was resounding in a recent poll finding that 92 percent of Ukrainians want the country to join the EU by 2030, with all regions of the country squarely in support: 88 percent, 94 percent, 93 percent, and 91 percent in the east, north, west, and south, respectively.

—Benton Coblentz is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, where he facilitates the center’s work on Ukraine and the wider Eurasia region.

United Kingdom: A post-Brexit reexamination of the relationship is underway

Few slogans have been as effective in British politics as “Get Brexit Done,” which helped carry Boris Johnson to victory in the 2019 general election after three years of uncertainty about whether or not the United Kingdom would actually leave the European Union. However, the mood in Britain suggests that Brexit—if understood to mean a stable, fixed, relationship with the bloc outside the EU—is anything but done.

Two trends are pushing toward a reexamination of the relationship. Firstly, a growing number of Britons regret the decision to leave by a margin as wide as 60 percent to 40 percent. In addition, as many as 20 percent of those who voted to “leave” now signal to pollsters that they would have chosen to “remain” instead. Secondly, the opposition Labour Party, a “remain” spirited party, is now seeing poll leads as high as 25 percent. The chances are that Britain will be led by a Labour government by the end of 2024, with strong public support for a closer relationship with the EU.

That doesn’t mean Britain is on the verge of rejoining the EU. Opposition leader, and probably soon-to-be prime minister, Keir Starmer has committed the party not to rejoin the EU’s single market or customs union, which are the arrangements as far as trade is concerned, but to push for better ties beneath that. The EU and its supporters in the United States need to start paying attention to what Labour is saying. David Lammy, the shadow foreign secretary, has proposed a “security pact” between the EU and the United Kingdom as a first step to rebuilding the relationship.

This should be encouraged but more needs to be done. With the European economy in general in such a bad way, Washington should encourage Britain and the EU to go for the most ambitious form of new relationship politically possible within Starmer’s constraints—with economics and trade at the heart of it. Throttled trade benefits nobody, and the failure of Brexit in practice means the EU can afford to be generous. No other EU country is keen to copy what made the United Kingdom “the sick man of Europe.”

—Ben Judah is director of the Europe Center’s Transform Europe Initiative and the author of “This is Europe.”

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Short-lived Wagner mutiny will undermine Russia’s Ukraine invasion

Peter Dickinson — Sun, 25 Jun 2023 23:13:23 +0000

As suddenly as it had begun twenty-four hours earlier, Wagner chief Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s rebellion against Russia’s military leadership came to an abrupt end on Saturday evening. The details of the deal struck between Prigozhin and the Kremlin remain murky, but the Russian warlord appears to have emerged from the drama relatively unscathed, at least for now.

The same cannot be said for Vladimir Putin, who has been very publicly humiliated by the affair and now looks weaker than at any point in his twenty-three-year reign. While the mutiny itself was remarkably brief, the consequences are likely to be profound, with serious repercussions in particular for the already faltering Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The most obvious practical consequence of the Wagner mutiny is a weakening of Russia’s force posture inside Ukraine. More than twenty thousand Wagner troops reportedly withdrew from Ukraine to participate in the revolt, representing around five percent of the entire Russian invasion force. Crucially, these were by far the most effective fighting units in the Russian military and had been responsible for almost all of the advances achieved over the past year.

Depending on the exact nature of the agreement to end the mutiny, many Wagner fighters may well return to the frontlines, possibly integrated into the regular Russian army. However, their non-Wagner comrades and commanders will understandably treat them with extreme suspicion, limiting their impact on the battlefield. Whatever happens next, the days when Wagner troops led the Russian invasion of Ukraine look to be over.

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The revolt also highlighted the relative defenselessness of Russia itself. Wagner troops took almost a year to occupy the small Ukrainian city of Bakhmut but seized the nearly twenty times larger Russian city Rostov-on-Don without a fight in a matter of hours. Indeed, it is worth underlining that Rostov-on-Don is by far the biggest city captured by Russian troops since the start of Putin’s so-called “Special Military Operation” sixteen months ago. Russia’s lack of domestic defenses was further exposed by the unhindered progress of Prigozhin’s armored column, which advanced to within two hundred kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed before deciding to turn back.

While the immediate threat of a march on Moscow is now over, drastic measures are clearly required to bolster Russian domestic security. Putin knows the watching world has noted this vulnerability. He must now urgently take visible steps to prevent another ambitious Russian warlord or Ukrainian army commander from launching a new campaign inside his unprotected borders. Where will Putin find the necessary troops and equipment for this? With the vast majority of Russia’s military currently deployed in Ukraine, the answer to this question is both obvious and awkward. Russia will have no choice but to reduce its invasion force in order to address the country’s serious domestic security issues.

Russia’s vast military and state security apparatus will also now find itself engaged in the hunt for traitors and possible turncoats, which will inevitably distract attention and resources away from the task of defeating Ukraine. Infighting between the various different military clans has been a debilitating factor throughout the Russian invasion of Ukraine; this trend will now intensify as the Russian authorities look to settle scores with the many police chiefs, local officials, and military commanders who either stood aside or discreetly backed the Wagner mutiny.

Meanwhile, the mutiny has raised some fundamental questions over Putin’s continued ability to rule. He was notably absent during the initial hours of the crisis, only appearing the following morning in a brief video address to the nation. He also seems to have been sidelined in negotiations with Prigozhin, allowing Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka to take the lead. These are not the actions of a strongman ruler. As Atlantic Council Eurasia Center Senior Director and former US Ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst noted on CNN, “It’s like Prigozhin is the person who looked behind the screen at the Wizard of Oz and saw the great and terrible Oz was just this little frightened man. Putin has been diminished for all time by this affair.”

Eurasia Center events

Putin calls Prigozhin’s “criminal adventure” an “armed mutiny” and “treason”

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

While these factors will all undermine the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the most important impact is likely to be on morale within the ranks of the Russian military. Demoralization was already a major issue for Putin’s invasion force, with a steady stream of video addresses on social media during the first half of 2023 testifying to widespread dissatisfaction among Russian troops over “human wave” attacks and catastrophic losses. These problems will now intensify as Russian troops question the loyalties of their leaders and the entire purpose of the invasion.

On the eve of the mutiny, Prigozhin published an explosive video address in which he accused the Kremlin of deliberately misleading the Russian public over its justifications for the war in Ukraine. The Wagner chief, whom many in Russia see as one of the few credible commentators within the establishment, dismissed key elements of the official Kremlin narrative—including claims that the invasion preempted an imminent NATO-backed Ukrainian offensive against Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine and Crimea. He also directly denied widespread Russian allegations that the Ukrainian military had been bombing eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region for eight years prior to the full-scale invasion. Instead, Prigozhin blamed the war on the personal ambitions of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and individual Russian oligarchs.

Such statements will inevitably undermine fighting spirit among Russian troops and cause many to question exactly what they are fighting for in Ukraine. This has long been an issue for the Russian authorities, who have struggled to articulate their war aims amid lurid but unsubstantiated claims of “Ukrainian Nazis” and “Western imperialists.” Prigozhin’s damning comments exposing the lies used to justify the war have now cast an unforgiving light on the Kremlin’s credibility problems and will further fuel discontent among the Russian troops who are fighting and dying on the frontlines.

The short-lived Wagner mutiny has also exposed deep divides within Russia’s military and security establishment that indicate remarkably low levels of loyalty to the Putin regime. There has been some speculation that Prigozhin received support from within the military when planning and executing his mutiny, given that he was able to capture Rostov-on-Don with such apparent ease despite the fact that the city serves as the headquarters of the entire Ukraine invasion. Prigozhin’s armored column of Wagner troops then travelled hundreds of kilometers through the heart of Russia without encountering any significant military resistance.

The remarkable initial success of the Wagner mutiny in seizing control of a major city and advancing on the capital has sent shock waves through Russia that will also be felt by Putin’s occupation forces in Ukraine. If Russian soldiers and commanders are not prepared to defend their own country, why should troops deployed to Ukraine sacrifice themselves for such an apparently dubious cause? If Prigozhin and his private army can go unpunished for declaring war on the Russian state, why should ordinary mobilized Russians feel obliged to follow suicidal orders in Ukraine?

For obvious reasons, the Kremlin will now attempt to downplay the significance of the short-lived Wagner mutiny. In reality, however, the ramifications of this unprecedented event will reverberate for some time to come and will shape Russia’s future, including the outcome of the war in Ukraine. One year ago, Putin was boasting of returning historically Russian lands and comparing himself to Peter the Great. Today, he looks far more like Czar Nicholas II, whose military failures and weak leadership sparked mutiny and the eventual collapse of the Russian Empire.

The Wagner mutiny is further proof that Putin’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine has left Russia divided, demoralized, and weakened. With his own personal authority now rapidly evaporating, the Russian dictator may soon face domestic problems so grave that they will overshadow even the prospect of defeat in Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Security

Wagner forces enter Rostov, occupy Russian Southern Military District headquarters

Wagner forces emerge south of Moscow in Lipetsk

Explosion at oil depot in Russian city of Voronezh

Media policy

Amid chaos in the Russian information space the Kremlin attempts to limit information on Prigozhin

How Prigozhin used Telegram to declare war on the Russian Ministry of Defense – and then suddenly pull back

The Russian-founded messaging platform Telegram, which became a primary tool circulating pro-Kremlin narratives throughout Russia’s war in Ukraine, achieved an unprecedented level of influence on June 23, with Prigozhin wielding it to vent his rage at the Russian defense establishment and launch a mercenary mutiny. For months, Prigozhin has engaged in rhetorical warfare against his rivals in the Kremlin, in particular Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Valery Gerasimov. The Wagner founder blamed them for ineptitude over the course of the war in Ukraine, including a months-long public argument about supplying his forces with adequate munitions during its siege of Bakhmut.

Prigozhin’s one-man war against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reached new heights in a series of Telegram posts that began on Friday, June 23, and continued into Saturday. At 10:50 am Moscow time, he posted a thirty-minute video to his Prigozhin Press Service Telegram channel excoriating the MoD, accusing its leadership of deceiving Putin and the Russian public in early 2022 into believing that Ukrainian aggression was imminent, and that Russia had no choice but to invade Ukraine.

Sitting in a chair in front of a Wagner Group flag pinned to an otherwise blank wall, Prigozhin proceeded to make his case against the MoD and its entire war effort. “Right now, the [MoD] is trying to deceive society and the president and tell a story that there was insane aggression from the Ukrainian side and they were going to attack us together with the whole NATO bloc,” Prigozhin said effectively undermining the Kremlin’s entire case for war. “Therefore, on February 24, the so-called special operation was launched for completely different reasons.” He described Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a “monstrous shame show” and an “incompetently planned operation” conducted by “a bunch of creatures” and “mentally ill scum” who “don’t have the balls” to fight aggressively with the necessary decisiveness to win the war, including their unwillingness to use tactical nuclear weapons. “The grandfathers are rather weak. They cannot get out of their comfort zone,” he added.

“A handful of dipshits decided for some reason that they were so cunning that no one would realize what they were doing with their military exercises, and nobody would stop them when they went to Kyiv,” Prigozhin said. He went on to blame Shoigu for killing thousands of capable Russian soldiers, and he directed his ire at Russian oligarchs enriching themselves on the war while seeking to return former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to power. “Our sacred war against those who wrong the Russian people has turned into racketeering, into theft,” he said.

Prigozhin later added that he would follow up the video with a second “interview,” but this would turn out to be a gross understatement, as the initial video was merely the first of more than a dozen messages he would post to his Prigozhin Press Service Telegram channel over the next thirty-six hours.

Later in the day at 5:10 pm Moscow time, Prigozhin amped up his criticism of the MoD even further with a Telegram audio post in which he accused it of committing “genocide” against Russians. Calling out Shoigu and Gerasimov directly, Prigozhin said “they should be held responsible for the genocide of the Russian people, the murder of tens of thousands of Russian citizens, and the transfer of Russian territories to the enemy.”

As angry audio clips of Prigozhin continued to appear into the evening, multiple pro-Wagner Telegram channels circulated a video around 9:00 pm Moscow time purporting to document the aftermath of a Russian airstrike on a Wagner encampment. The video shows scenes of a wooded area lined with stone paths subjected to a moderate amount debris and several fires burning in trenches; a body is briefly seen towards the end of the clip. It is unclear where or when the footage was filmed, and it brought to mind similar suspicious footage contextually devoid footage circulated prior to the February 2022 invasion accusing Ukraine of engaging in sabotage and other aggression against Russia.

The drama continues. Prigozhin publishes a video which he claims shows the aftermath of a rocket attack by the Russian ministry of defence on a Wagner camp. “Many of our guys died…We will make a decision how to respond to this evil. The next move is ours” pic.twitter.com/o7l14yVBMX
— Pjotr Sauer (@PjotrSauer) June 23, 2023

Within ten minutes, Prigozhin posted another angry statement, this time accusing the MoD of attacking his forces at the camp. “Today, seeing that we aren’t broken, they decided to launch rocket attacks on our rear camps,” he exclaimed. “A huge number of fighters were killed, our comrades in arms. We’ll decide how to respond to this atrocity. The ball’s in our court.”

Approximately fifteen minutes later, Prigozhin effectively declared war against the MoD in another Telegram audio clip. “The Wagner Group commanders’ council has made a decision,” he announced. “The evil that the country’s military leadership is carrying out must be stopped. They neglect soldiers’ lives. They’ve forgotten the word ‘justice’ and we’re bringing it back. Those who destroyed our guys today, those who destroyed many tens of thousands of Russian soldiers’ lives will be punished.” Later, he described his forces as “25,000 strong,” adding, “We’re going to get to the bottom of the lawlessness in this country.”

As Prigozhin continued posting additional threats and taunts on Telegram, the MoD described the alleged footage circulated on pro-Wagner channels as fake, while Russia’s National Anti-Terrorism Committee announced that the Federal Security Service, or FSB, would initiate a criminal case against Prigozhin “on the fact of calling for an armed rebellion.”

Prigozhin continued posting on and off throughout Saturday as his forces advanced north in the direction of Moscow. Then just before 8:30pm local time, he uploaded another message, stating he would return Wagner forces to their camps. It remains unclear whether he intends to keep that promise.

Prigozhin just now: "They wanted to disband Wagner. We set out on June 23 for the "March of Justice". In a day we marched just short of 200 km from Moscow. During this time, we have not shed a single drop of the blood of our fighters. Now is the moment when blood can be shed.…
— Mary Ilyushina (@maryilyushina) June 24, 2023

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington, DC

Putin calls Prigozhin’s “criminal adventure” an “armed mutiny” and “treason”

After spending Friday night away from cameras, Putin released a televised statement late Saturday morning. Addressing the Russian public as well as the armed forces and security personnel “who are now fighting in their combat positions, repulsing enemy attacks,” Putin described Prigozhin’s actions as a “criminal adventure” and an “armed mutiny.”

“Today, Russia is waging a tough struggle for its future, repelling the aggression of neo-Nazis and their patrons,” he stated. “The entire military, economic, and informational machine of the West is directed against us. We are fighting for the lives and security of our people, for our sovereignty and independence, for the right to be and remain Russia, a state with a thousand-year history.”

“This battle, when the fate of our nation is being decided, requires consolidation of all forces,” Putin continued. “It requires unity, consolidation, and a sense of responsibility, and everything that weakens us, any strife that our external enemies can use and do so to subvert us from within, must be discarded. Therefore, any actions that split our nation are essentially a betrayal of our people, of our comrades-in-arms who are now fighting at the frontline. This is a knife in the back of our country and our people.”

Comparing the mutiny to 1917, when “Russians were killing Russians and brothers were killing brothers,” Putin declared, “We will not allow this to happen again. We will protect our people and our statehood from any threats, including from internal betrayal…. Inflated ambitions and personal interests have led to treason—treason against our country, our people and the common cause which Wagner Group soldiers, and commanders were fighting and dying for.”

“Once again, any internal revolt is a deadly threat to our statehood and our nation. It is a blow to Russia, to our people,” he continued. “Our actions to defend the fatherland from this threat will be harsh. All those who have consciously chosen the path of betrayal, planned an armed mutiny, and taken the path of blackmail and terrorism, will inevitably be punished and will answer before the law and our people…. Those who staged the mutiny and took up arms against their comrades—they have betrayed Russia and will be brought to account. I urge those who are being dragged into this crime not to make a fatal and tragic mistake but make the only right choice: to stop taking part in criminal actions.”

“I am certain that we will preserve and defend what we hold dear and sacred, and together with our motherland we will overcome any hardships and become even stronger,” Putin concluded.

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington, DC

Wagner forces enter Rostov, occupy Russian Southern Military District headquarters

Over the course of Prigozhin’s Telegram posts, he boasted that his “25,000 strong” Wagner forces had marched across the border from Ukraine into Russia before claiming they had shot down a Russian armed forces helicopter before entering the city of Rostov. For many hours overnight, he provided no evidence to back his claims. This finally began to change as footage emerged on Russian Telegram, ultimately confirming that Prigozhin had indeed occupied Rostov.

At 3:47 am Moscow time, the pro-Wagner channel VChK-OGPU posted a video in which a helicopter can be heard circling over Rostov at night. The channel noted, however, “No one has yet seen the video of the Wagner PMC column and the battles with the Ministry of Defense.” Two minutes later, the channel changed its tune by sharing a second video appearing to show rocket fire and bursts of assault rifles, describing it as the “first video reportedly showing fighting between PMC Wagner and Ministry of Defense units.” The footage circulated widely on Telegram but remained unverified.

Less than twenty minutes later, at 4:09 am, VChK-OGPU shared a third clip showing what appeared to be a convoy of Wagner tanks, trucks, and other vehicles crossing a checkpoint without any opposition. Unlike the previous clips, however, the footage was easily visible, as it appeared to have been recorded during the pre-dawn twilight. According to open-source sun-tracking data, the sun rose in Rostov this morning at 4:25 am, with twilight commencing at 3:50 am, putting the video’s release squarely in the middle of pre-dawn twilight. The exact location of the footage is still under review and cannot be confirmed.

At 5:01 am, not long after sunrise, the Verum Regnum Telegram channel circulated video clips of what appeared to show Wagner forces arriving in central Rostov, just outside the MoD’s Southern Military District headquarters at the intersection of Pushkinskaya Ulitsa and Budonnovskiy Prospekt. One of the videos appeared to show forces beginning to set up a perimeter around the MoD building.

Telegram footage allegedly of Wagner forces in central Rostov. (Source: Verum Regnum/archive)

Top: Highlights from the video showing a tank in front of the southwest corner of Pushkinskaya Ulitsa and Budonnovskiy Prospekt (top left) and a man recording footage on his phone in front of the intersection’s northwest corner in front of the MoD’s Southern Military District building (top right). Bottom: Google Street View of the same intersection facing westward, where both corners are visible. (Source: Verum Regnum/archive, top left and top right; Google Street View/archive, bottom)

A second clip showed how that presence had expanded with the placement of additional armored vehicles blocking the entire intersection from vehicle traffic.

Wagner soldiers (left) and armored vehicles (center and right) block the intersection in front of the Southern Military District building in Rostov. (Source: Verum Regnum/archive)

Around 7:30 am Moscow time, a pair of videos appeared on the WAGNER Z GROUP/Z PMC WAGNER’Z Telegram channel and Prigozhin’s press channel respectively. The first video showed Prigozhin and his entourage entering the inner courtyard of the Southern Military District building. Prigozhin is later seen bragging about his successes with Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov while demanding that Yevkurov speak to him respectfully. In the second video, he addressed the camera and bragged that he had captured Rostov without firing a single shot.

Just wow. A video has surfaced showing Prigozhin at the Southern Military District HQ in Rostov-on-Don talking to (and HUMILIATING) Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov. He threatens to blockade Rostov and head for Moscow!

I have extreme trouble understanding Yevkurov and… pic.twitter.com/jGr9gaLB1i
— Kevin Rothrock (@KevinRothrock) June 24, 2023

#UPDATE Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, leading a mutiny to bring down Moscow's top brass, said Saturday his fighters captured the army HQ in Russia's Rostov-on-Don "without firing a single shot" and claimed to have the support of locals. pic.twitter.com/5F0uC0pDFQ
— AFP News Agency (@AFP) June 24, 2023

Later, prior to 2:00 pm Moscow time, new footage emerged showing people running from the neighborhood of the MoD building. Initial reports suggested it was a Russian Armed Forces attack within the vicinity, but this has not been confirmed.

The explosion occurred near the headquarters of the Southern Military District in Rostov. pic.twitter.com/CUuygkpiZq
— Maria Drutska (@maria_drutska) June 24, 2023

The many civilians running from the sound of an explosion were likely due to the crowds that came out to observe Wagner’s occupation of the MoD building. In one video, people can be seen chatting with Wagner soldiers and thanking them.

Rostov – people approaching the mercenaries to thank them and shake hands. pic.twitter.com/teLqMGtMWh
— Dmitri (@wartranslated) June 24, 2023

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington, DC

Wagner forces emerge south of Moscow in Lipetsk

The governor of Lipetsk, Igor Artamonov, announced Saturday afternoon that Wagner forces had entered the region, approximately 400 km south of Moscow. The Associated Press noted that the governor added, “The situation is under control.” Meanwhile, footage emerged that appeared to show excavators destroying the highway between Lipetsk and Moscow.

Digging up the road to make roadblocks. Lipetsk. pic.twitter.com/ObDcEHFPOo
— Michael Weiss (@michaeldweiss) June 24, 2023

At the time of writing there were conflicting reports as to whether the Wagner convoy had traveled from Rostov or was comprised of defectors from the Russian Armed Forces.

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington, DC

Explosion at oil depot in Russian city of Voronezh

On June 24, videos depicting an explosion at an oil depot in the region of Voronezh were widely circulated online. The DFRLab identified the precise location of the explosion and confirmed the videos as authentic.

The video published online was captured from buildings in close proximity to the Leroy Merlin store in Voronezh, as clearly observed in the footage. The DFRLab also corroborated the location of the oil depot Red Flag Oil Combine (Комбинат Красное знамя) and identified approximate coordinates for the area where the video was recorded. Below, the screenshot on the left is extracted from the video, while the image on the right is from Google Maps, illustrating the precise positions of the oil depot, store, and the recorded video.

Photo shows the locations of oil depot, store, recorded video, marked as blue, yellow, red respectively. (Source: Left Twitter/archive, Right Google Maps/archive)

Additional footage documented the shelling of a residential area in Voronezh. The footage reveals visible damage to cars. In order to verify the location of the building, the DFRLab utilized reverse image search via Google and Yandex, then cross-referenced the results with Google Maps, verifying the location of the shelling.

Imagery from Google Maps (left) shows the location of residential area in Voronezh (center and right). (Source: Google Maps/archive left; RtrDonetsk/archive, center; @christogrozev/archive, right)

The location of residential area as seen on Yandex Maps. (Source: Yandex/archive)

—Sayyara Mammadova, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Amid chaos in the Russian information space the Kremlin attempts to limit information on Prigozhin

According to TASS, Russian social network VKontakte (VK) and search engine Yandex are blocking content related to Prigozhin. Reportedly, instead of Prigozhin’s statement that was published on June 23 at 9:52 pm Moscow time, a VK page for Prigozhin’s Concord company displayed a message that the material was blocked on the territory of Russia on the basis of the decision of the Prosecutor General’s Office. At the time of the writing, Prigozhin’s posts on Concord VK page were available, though none of them correspond to 9:52 pm Moscow time. TASS added that the Yandex search results for Prigozhin notifies a reader that some of the search results are hidden in accordance with federal law. Using a virtual private network (VPN), the DFRLab replicated the search of the content mentioned by TASS and found that they are accessible from other locations. The restrictions seem to be geofenced to Russia.

Separately, TASS reported that there are Telegram-access disruptions detected in various Russian cities, including Moscow, St. Petersburg, Voronezh, and Volgograd Oblasts.

Russia’s internet regulator Roskomnadzor warned that the government can place internet performance restrictions in locations where counter-terrorist operations might take place, such as Moscow, Voronezh, or Rostov. Roskomnadzor also added that the use of Telegram is not limited for now.

Meanwhile, the Telegram channel Faridaily reported that residents of Moscow and the surrounding region are receiving calls from unknown mobile numbers with messages from Wagner. According to the Telegram post, one person received a call on their Viber messenger with a recording of Prigozhin’s appeal about “restoring justice.” Another person received a call on behalf of Wagner with an automated voice encouraging them to join Wagner when their units move toward Moscow.

Meanwhile, footage from Russian state media Rossiya 24 surfaced online showing a confused news anchor. Apparently lacking instructions from the Kremlin on how to report about the armed insurrection in Russia, they said, “Next we are going for short commercial and then… commercial.”

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report Special Edition: Prigozhin and Wagner forces mutiny against Moscow appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Pavia joins i24NEWS to discuss President Kais Saied’s ongoing crackdown on key opposition figures.

Atlantic Council — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 19:51:56 +0000

Original Source

The post Pavia joins i24NEWS to discuss President Kais Saied’s ongoing crackdown on key opposition figures. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Addressing multidimensional inequality

Pepe Zhang — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 16:00:00 +0000

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

This is the 4th installment of the Unlocking Economic Development in Latin America and the Caribbean report, which explores five vital opportunities for the private sector to drive socioeconomic progress in LAC, with sixteen corresponding recommendations private firms can consider as they take steps to support the region.

How does the private sector perceive Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)? What opportunities do firms find most exciting? And what precisely can companies do to seize on these opportunities and support the region’s journey toward recovery and sustainable development? To answer these questions, the Atlantic Council collaborated with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to glean insights from its robust network of private-sector partners. Through surveys and in-depth interviews, this report identified five vital opportunities for the private sector to drive socioeconomic progress in LAC, with sixteen corresponding recommendations private firms can consider as they take steps to support the region.

Addressing multidimensional inequality

A fourth private-sector-led opportunity for accelerating socioeconomic development in LAC is tackling one of the region’s most long-standing issues: inequality. Inequality in LAC is multidimensional in that it affects a wide range of issues and population groups based on gender (recommendation 1 below), geography (recommendation 3 below), socioeconomic status, occupational sector, age, ethnicity, digital access, healthcare, and other factors.¹ Tackling these multidimensional and often interrelated inequalities can improve economic wellbeing. For example, evidence suggests that reducing gender inequality alone—in terms of lifetime earnings losses—could boost regional GDP by at least 8 percent.² Since these and other inequalities are often interconnected, mitigating them will often require a holistic approach.

Recommendations for the private sector

Tapping into the financing, expertise, and technological capabilities of private firms will be crucial to mitigating multidimensional inequality in LAC. Practical training, mentoring, capacity building, supply-chain integration, and other programs help bring new talent into the region’s workforce, expand business operations, and increase productivity in LAC. This will particularly benefit underprivileged groups such as women, SMEs, and rural populations, making LAC’s growth more inclusive and resilient against future shocks.

Addressing gender-based inequality: Companies must empower female professional advancements, e.g., by addressing constraints arising from caregiving and unpaid domestic work, or by providing skills, entrepreneurial, or other training for women.
Empowering SMEs: Larger firms can shore up SME competitiveness by facilitating access to financing, supply-chain integration, and capability-building opportunities.
Tackling place-based inequality: Public-private collaboration and investment can make rural areas more accessible to basic services (like water and Internet) and more economically productive, thus reducing the rural-urban divide.
Preparing for shocks: Employer-led relief initiatives not only serve to cushion the impact of financial, climate, and other shocks on the lives and livelihoods of employees, but fortify societal cohesion and broader economic resilience.

About the author

Staff

Pepe Zhang

Senior Fellow

China Coronavirus

Report Jun 5, 2023

Enhancing market size, scalability, and regional integration in Latin America and the Caribbean

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. The private sector can strengthen the hard and soft infrastructure supporting Latin America and the Caribbean’s economies, while drawing them closer together through trade, regulatory, and other integration.

Americas Economy & Business

Report Jun 16, 2023

Accelerating digitalization and innovation in Latin America and the Caribbean

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. The private sector can improve infrastructure, foster skills, and promote adoption to help the region transform its digital potential into development gains.

Americas Economy & Business

Report Jun 20, 2023

Improving state governance, institutional capacity, and transparency

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. Technological, governance, and other cooperation between the public and private sectors can enhance institutional capacity, integrity, government service delivery, and regulatory quality in LAC.

Americas Inclusive Growth

Report Jun 26, 2023

Meaningfully advancing the green agenda

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. Private firms can help advance the green agenda by working to create green jobs, taking measures to promote a transition to a circular-economy model, and partaking in green finance.

Americas Climate Change & Climate Action

Online Event Thu, February 17, 2022 • 9:00 am ET

#ProactiveLAC: A digital future for regional prosperity

A virtual conversation on the role of public-private partnerships and policy actions in increasing digital connectivity across Latin America and the Caribbean.

Coronavirus Digital Policy Inclusive Growth Latin America

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1 Pepe Zhang and Peter Engelke, 2025 Post-Covid Scenarios: Latin America and the Caribbean, Atlantic Council, April 21, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-researchreports/2025-post-covid-scenarios-latin-america-and-the-caribbean.

2 Quentin Wodon and Benedicte de la Briere, “The Cost of Gender Inequality: Unrealized Potential: The High Cost of Gender Inequality in Earnings,” Canada, Children’s Investment Fund Foundation, Global Partnership for Education, and World Bank Group, May 2018, 2, “Human capital measured as the present value of the future earnings of the labor force,” https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/29865/126579-Public-on-5-30-18-WorldBank-GenderInequality-Brief-v13.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

The post Addressing multidimensional inequality appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Read Imran Khan’s full Atlantic Council interview on failed peace with India, Pakistan’s plight, and his own fate

Atlantic Council — Wed, 21 Jun 2023 02:27:35 +0000

On June 18, 2023, Wajahat S. Khan, a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Pakistan Initiative, spent nearly an hour interviewing former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan. Khan, who was ousted from power in April 2022, revealed new details about why efforts to achieve a historic peace with India collapsed and spoke to the worries he heard his army chief express about the state of Pakistani military readiness relative to India. He also lamented the steep decline of Pakistan’s economy and democracy and explained why he’s preparing himself for the possibility of being jailed or even assassinated.

Check out the transcript of the interview below, and Wajahat S. Khan’s analysis of the big takeaways from his conversation with the ex-Pakistani leader here.

Read the recap of this conversation

New Atlanticist

Jun 20, 2023

Imran Khan on the failed India-Pakistan thaw and why he’s ‘prepared for everything’—even death

By Wajahat Khan

The former Pakistani prime minister spoke with the Atlantic Council about unsuccessful plans to meet with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and much more.

Corruption Economy & Business

Watch the full interview

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Good morning, good afternoon, and a very good evening to you, wherever you may be. My name is Wajahat Saeed Khan, I’m the senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington. However, I am here in New York City with the chairman of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, Pakistan’s former prime minister, the one and only Imran Khan. Good evening, Khan Sahib. How are you doing?

IMRAN KHAN: As good as in the circumstances, living in interesting times.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Well, speaking of the times, is your famous exercise regime still in play considering your bullet injuries and considering your schedule these days with your 150-something court cases?

IMRAN KHAN: I still haven’t fully recovered from my bullet wound because it damaged my nerve in my right foot, so therefore, exercise is very limited. And then I have, well, almost 160 cases now, so my time is really spent from one courtroom to the other. Plus, I mean a lot of them are terrorism cases. I mean, I’m supposed to have committed terrorism, so about forty odd cases are related to terrorism.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Well, let’s start with that, let’s start with the big picture and go to the… Let’s time travel back to April 2022 when all of this started and begin with the so-called American connection with your ouster. A lot of people are interested, at least in this neck of the woods, about whether it was shortsighted of you to blame the US, target the Americans after your ouster, considering how you and your party are now hoping for their support. The State Department has just recently called you a private citizen and said that it’s not going to comment on your status. I see you smiling, interestingly, but do you think it was shortsighted to really tick off the Americans considering where you stand now regarding their support?

IMRAN KHAN: Well, let’s just break it up. First of all, the facts. What happened? I get a cipher—a cipher is this coded message—from my ambassador in Washington. He sends me this coded message, and now you tell me how should have I responded, I mean anyone, if they had got a message like that: prime minister of a country gets a message, an official meeting taking place between the undersecretary of state, US, and the Pakistan ambassador in Washington, and the message reads, here’s the prime minister reading the message that unless the Prime Minister, Imran Khan, is removed in a vote of no confidence, there’ll be consequences for Pakistan. There were other things in the cipher, but I mean imagine a prime minister of a country—elected prime minister of a country—reads this message that an American official is telling my ambassador that Pakistan should get rid of me, otherwise there’ll be consequences.

So, I took this to the cabinet because I thought this was deeply insulting for a country of 250 million people. I thought it was humiliating for anyone to write… Any official from any country writing a letter like that or sending a message like that to the prime minister—elected prime minister. Then I put it in front of the National Security Council, the National Security Council, which is headed by all the service chiefs, including the army chief. The National Security Council then gives a demarche to the US, protest that this is meddling in the internal affairs of Pakistan. But what happened was that after the cipher, the next day, the vote of [no] confidence is tabled in the National Assembly and within weeks my govern goes. So, I basically narrated the fact this is not anti-Americanism. This is a fact.

After my government goes, the government of Shehbaz Sharif, who was part of this conspiracy, they then hold a National Security Council meeting. They call the ambassador from the US, Asad Majeed, and they asked him, “Were the contents in the cipher true? Does he stand by them?” And he stood by them. He said, “This is exactly what happened.” So, I was basically narrating a fact. Now, when you… As subsequently things unfolded, it turns out that our ex-army chief, who was then the army chief, General Bajwa, he was actually campaigning through his lobbyist Husain Haqqani,¹ who was paid thirty thousand dollars by my government, he was lobbying with the US to say that Imran Khan was anti-American. He tweeted, “General Bajwa was pro-American, I was anti-American.” So therefore, what transpired later on was that actually my own army chief was campaigning against me, that I was anti-American and I think he was feeding them because that’s how this cipher must have come because I had perfectly good relationship with the Trump administration.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: So premised on that, I understand it’s a long arc, it’s a long narrative, but they say that your positions have been inconsistent. There was first, of course, the letter, then there wasn’t a letter, then there was the cipher, which was then admonished by the ambassador himself: Asad Majeed Khan. Then there was the Donald Lu² connection, the threat by Donald Lu, so to say. Then there was, of course, you premising all of this after the vote of confidence saying, “This is because I didn’t… I said, ‘absolutely not’ to their drone bases.” Then, of course, in all of this is compounded by you politicking, telling millions of Pakistanis almost on a nightly basis that there’s a clear American conspiracy for regime change, then comes the Haqqani connection where you said that, “He’s taken money and he’s convinced all of Washington against me.”

Then you finally put it down in the court of Bajwa, General Bajwa, the former army chief. The question is then I understand there was a lot happening, it was over months, but today the positioning is quite simple. You said it’s less the Americans, it’s more Bajwa. That was not where you were a year ago, fourteen months ago. And that has hurt your credibility, at least in this neck of the woods, in Washington. So, would you have done it differently?

IMRAN KHAN: Well, look, Wajahat, look, I used the word “unfolded,” as things unfolded. At the time, this is first week of March, I received this cipher, and so I didn’t immediately talk about the cipher because there was an OIC [Organization of Islamic Countries] conference in Pakistan and I didn’t want this thing to break before the OIC conference, which was about 22nd or 23rd of March. And so therefore after that, on the 28th of March, I first disclosed this. And at that time, I was convinced that… I mean, who would not be convinced reading that cipher? Who would not be convinced that the Americans are demanding that they get rid of the prime minister? I mean, what inference should I get from that? Clearly, it was clear. So, therefore, I did blame them that they were responsible. I never used the word “bases,” I never used what reasons.

All I give the facts that here is the cipher, this is what happened. The moment the cipher came, the vote of no confidence is tabled. And then those members of our back benches in our party, who we had knowledge that they were visiting the American embassy for the past two months before, and they were the first ones to jump ship. So, what am I supposed to gather from that? So therefore, that’s exactly what I said. Now, subsequently, how did we find out? Because I think FARA [Foreign Agents Registration Act], which is in the United States, you have to register, all lobbies have to register there. And FARA, then this thing came out that Husain Haqqani was on my government’s payroll, but then not hired by us, hired by Bajwa. And then there was a Haqqani tweet, which came in the end of March, which said that General Bajwa is pro-American and Imran Khan is anti-American.

So, then you put two and two together exactly what had happened because General Bajwa wanted the extension. So, that extension he wanted—he later on told the United States too. So, these things subsequently came out. Therefore, whatever I said was at the time exactly what I believed, and in the end, what was the conclusion? My conclusion was that General Bajwa had lobbied: he was lobbying for himself. He had deliberately campaigned against me to make me the bad guy because the conspiracy was then his, and as it unfolded.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: I’m with you about the unfolding bit and especially that it went over months and that you adjusted your positions accordingly, Khan Sahib. But again, in retrospect, was it shortsighted to have so much vitriol, so much venom, so much rhetoric on a daily basis, convincing millions of Pakistanis, angering them about the so-called American connection and thus alienating Washington, alienating the Biden administration, which today calls you a “private citizen” and won’t back you up, even though clearly you need that backing.

IMRAN KHAN: Listen, Wajahat, I don’t want any backing from anyone. Look, if the people of Pakistan decide that they want to elect me as the prime minister, fine. If they don’t, I don’t care. I mean, I’ve seen everything. I’ve been to the top. I mean, I have more love and respect in this country than anyone else, why would all the twelve parties together, including the military establishment, with one aim: somehow the whole policy is how to get rid of one man? The whole country’s democracy is being dismantled just to get rid of one man. So, I have more love and respect in this country. I don’t care whether I become the prime minister or not. But the truth is that this is exactly what happened. How humiliating is it for a country? How come the US thinks of me as anti-American? Why don’t they want to ask the question that how could their official make such an arrogant statement that a country should… an ambassador should give a message to get rid of the elected prime minister?

And you didn’t think that there should be any response because the US would be annoyed with me? I mean, I should shut up and allow this thing to happen? Well, if they are angry at me, so be it. I mean, all I want the US… I don’t want any backing for myself—they professed values, the Western values are democracy, human rights, rule of law. Whenever they have to whip up China in Hong Kong or in Uyghurs or the Russians, they use these things. All I want them to do is to say all these things are being violated in Pakistan; human rights, custodial torture going on, democracy being dismantled. They should talk about that. I don’t care if they say nothing about me, I’m quite happy being a private citizen.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: All right, well, when you were not a private citizen, when you were Pakistan’s prime minister, you were praised. Let’s go back to even further, forget last year. Let’s go back to your career. Let’s pivot to India. So, 2019, February, as you remember, there was a military escalation with India, Pakistan Air Force jets shot down Indian aircraft. You were praised globally in those tense, twenty-four, forty-eight hours for the stance you took against war. You deescalated what could have been a potential nuclear face-off between these two rivals. Again, I’m going to say it on the record because it needs to be said, you were quite responsible in your statements and praised globally, even in India. However, eventually the criticism is that you missed an opportunity to establish long-term peace with India.

General Bajwa—I know you’re not a fan—but General Bajwa came with a peace plan, which was constructed very delicately over years. There was a ceasefire, there were trade talks, there was a potential visit in the offing, and you rejected the trade talks, even though as commerce minister, which you wore that hat, you first approved the trade ties, but then as prime minister, you rejected them. It was quite awkward to see the same man, Imran Khan, the commerce minister saying, yes, peace with India, normalization with India, saying no as prime minister, no peace with India, no normalization with India. Well, what caused that irregularity? Was there ISI interference? Did you get a second reckoning? Why did you change your mind?

IMRAN KHAN: Look, I do not believe in settling issues through military action. I have always been anti-military settling of issues through war or through using arms. And this is not now. It’s been my view for three decades. Now, what happened was that when that happened, when the Pulwama [attack] happened and we returned the pilot [who was shot down], I mean, it was clear that it is unthinkable for two nuclear-armed countries to even think of escalation. I am worried about what’s happening in Ukraine right now and I worry that this could go out of hand. So as someone who is against nuclear arms and the idea of the world committing suicide through nuclear war…So what happened was that in [August] 2019, India took away the statehood of Kashmir unilaterally.

Now, we all know that there’s a United Nations Security Council, not one, two resolutions on Kashmir that Kashmir was a disputed territory between Pakistan and India, and through a plebiscite, it was to be decided. The people of Kashmir were supposed to decide. Now, that was the status. Suddenly, on 5th August 2019, India unilaterally got rid of that treaty and the UN resolutions and took away the statehood. What were we supposed to do? A hundred thousand Kashmiris have been martyred in their quest for independence, and so what was Pakistan supposed to do? Accept the fait accompli? Or actually stand with the people of Kashmir who had given such sacrifices? So that’s what we decided. And by the way, I tried my best before then to improve our relationship with India. In fact, my first statement was, “You come one step towards us, we’ll come two towards you.”

I mean, I tried everything, but I came across this brick wall, and I realized it’s something to do with the RSS-BJP mentality where they’ve cashed in on hostility with Pakistan. That’s all. But, frankly, it was never a question of being misled by anyone. And, Bajwa, I don’t know what he’s talking about because the idea which he was floating, it was that first India would give some concession, then we would invite them to Pakistan. The concession was that they would gradually take steps that would undo what they had done on 5th August. But that never happened. So, we had never moved forward. I don’t know what he is talking about because Bajwa keeps shifting his positions.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: So, what about the bit which your office did? Forget Bajwa. You accepted during all of this, during this potential breakthrough, when there was a ceasefire in place, when there was a visit by Prime Minister Modi in the offing where you would’ve hosted him, if I may… this is a Nobel Prize being presented to you and here you are as commerce minister, where you accept trade talks and then a few days later you reject your own trade talks. I’m trying to get to the bottom of, was it forces within the military? Was it the ISI? Did you get intelligence briefings from someone? What caused you to change your mind when you were almost there along with your chief in trying to repair ties, even convincing India to back off from Article 370?

IMRAN KHAN: Look, I don’t remember the trade talks. All I know is that there was supposed to be a quid pro quo. India was supposed to give some concession, give some sort of a roadmap to Kashmir, and I was going to then host Prime Minister Modi in Pakistan. But it never materialized. So, it never went further than that. That’s how it was.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Speaking of that era as well, it was around the same time, now recent reports have emerged, that General Bajwa went public at that time, he said it privately, he said it to a bunch of journalists, that Pakistan has lost military parity with India. Pakistan’s tanks are rusted, Pakistan doesn’t have the fuel to provide its forces to fight a war, and that’s why peace with India is inevitable because Pakistan can’t keep up. You’ve seen this in recent news items. Did that intelligence, did that briefing from your chief of army staff ever come to your office? Did he ever consult you or confront you with this data?

IMRAN KHAN: Look, even if that was the case, for an army chief to make these statement is so ridiculous. What army chief makes these foolish statements even if it is the case? So, number one, yes, General Bajwa would make these statements, but I mean for an army chief, he is basically saying, “We are just too weak.” You never make such a statement. But more to the point, who wants war with India? I mean, why would we want war with India? Why would anyone want to see a confrontation between the two countries? The thing is, like two civilized countries, we should solve our issues through dialogue, and if we can’t solve them through dialogue, we just keep talking. But war is never an option. So, firstly, war is not an option. Secondly, for an army chief to keep saying that, I can’t imagine an army chief saying such a stupid thing as that.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: But you were not privy to it? He did not inform you of this lack of security preparedness vis-à-vis India?

IMRAN KHAN: No, no. He used to talk about it frequently. All I’m saying is, why would he talk to journalists about this? This is supposed to be a secret. Would you disclose, if you have a problem with another country, and our problem is Kashmir, would you make a statement like that if you are the army chief? No, you wouldn’t say that. You would say, “We are ready to defend our country.” Even if you can’t, but you would say that. So, all I’m saying is for an army chief to make a statement, what more can I say?

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: So, moving on from India, let’s pivot back to our friends and allies. Now, of course, you had very warm ties with regional leadership, with [Former Prime Minister of Malaysia] Mahathir, of course, with [Turkish President Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan. You’ve made a lot of friends especially in the OIC community. But two or three things. Firstly, they say that the moment Imran Khan lost the Americans was the day after the Taliban took over when he went to a hotel in Islamabad and said, “Oh, the Afghans have broken the shackles of slavery.” I know that was rhetorical, you’ve commented on this before, but two days later… your words were in the Wall Street Journal and that’s how you were perceived. But moving beyond that, they also say here, there are assessments that you lost the confidence of the Chinese. You lost the confidence of the Saudis.

Early on in your tenure, Razak Dawood, your senior advisor, said, “We’re not happy with the lack of transparency with CPEC, nor is the Skipper.” He said that. Then he rolled that back. Then, of course, you miffed the Saudis for a quick minute when they refused to back up Pakistan with the OIC, admonishing Kashmir Article 370. You threatened the Saudis that, “I’m going to have my own OIC. I’m going to have my own meeting on Kashmir. Take a walk.” And the Saudis rolled back a bunch of loans, which they were going to [grant]. The larger question is: Imran Khan was on a rampage. He managed to upset the Americans. Of course, he’d shot down an Indian plane while he was at it. Those are the tasks of the job, hazards of the job, but also the Saudis and the Chinese? “Is there anyone,” they say, “that he didn’t miff?” How do you take that?

IMRAN KHAN: Well, first, the Americans. I mean, this thing was completely taken out of context. I was speaking in Urdu and then they translated it, and because the US was hurting at the time, that whole drama, which I actually don’t blame President Biden, because how was he expected to know that three hundred thousand Afghan troops would give up without a fight? And so, it collapsed so quickly, and when President Ghani left Kabul, the whole thing collapsed so there was chaos. So, I could see that the US, they were in shock and awe of what happened. They were taken by complete surprise, and they didn’t know how to react. So, I could see they were hurting, and this one comment would be misconstrued because I was talking about mental colonialism.

But the thing is, I mean, I was always right about Afghanistan. I kept saying for years that, look, firstly, your idea of victory no one quite understands. Is it either liberate Afghan women or bring democracy? I mean, such a vague idea of victory. But then there was never going to be a military solution. Anyone who knows Afghan history… So, I think that maybe they took that as anti-American, because if you are from a weaker country and you criticize the US foreign policy, you’re immediately dubbed as anti-American. I was just simply because anyone who knows the history of Afghanistan and we knew the whole Soviet adventure in Afghanistan, we knew where it was going to be headed. Anyway, I think the US was feeling very vulnerable and hurt and I think that’s why. But that’s not the reason why the US administration disliked me. I think there were other reasons.

They blamed me for going to Russia, for instance. Now, the Russian trip was organized by the foreign office. They’d been asking for months for my trip to Russia. They wanted to mend the relationship and the army chief wanted me to go there, the service chiefs, because they wanted to buy hardware from Russia. So how would I know that I arrived in Russia and the next morning they invaded Ukraine? I mean, how was I supposed to know? That was held against me.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: I mean, it was a pretty tenuous time.

IMRAN KHAN: Let me just be clear. This idea that Saudis were upset, the Chinese were upset, it is so ridiculous. Who says so? Because my government, the vote of [no] confidence came on the 7th or 8th of March. On the 20th or 21st of March, this was the second time Pakistan hosted a foreign minister’s OIC meeting—second time in four months. Before that, it was fourteen or fifteen years ago Pakistan had hosted a meeting. A meeting of the OIC cannot take place without the Saudis’ agreement. So why would they agree to, just before I’m leaving power in two months, three months, two OIC meetings? And, secondly, the Chinese foreign minister came as a special guest. Why would he come if the Chinese were not happy?

So, this whole myth that I had upset, who was behind this? Guess who was promoting these myths? Because compare the foreign policy in my time to what is happening right now, Pakistan today is totally isolated. I mean, it doesn’t even feature anywhere. In our time, Pakistan was being taken seriously. And I’m telling you, this relationship between Iran and Saudi, on behest of MBS, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, I went to Iran to speak to them. Remember, there were tensions at the time—some missile attack had taken place—so the Saudi prince sent me to Iran and he wanted me to bring down the tensions. And so I played my part. And even on Yemen, I mean, Yemen, we tried to end this war and play our role in it and this is because the Saudis and the Iranians asked us. So, this idea that we were isolated and I had upset friends is just total nonsense.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Right. Well, thanks for that. But the reports about your reservations about CPEC [China Pakistan Economic Corridor] precede all of this. They go way back. The reports about you threatening a secondary meeting, an alternative meeting, when the Saudis didn’t back you up on Kashmir after Article 370 via the OIC. You’re right about the fact that you have hosted… multiple meetings of the OIC. You’re right about the fact that you have hosted meetings, multiple meetings of the OIC. You did mend those fences, yes, I will give you that, eventually towards the end of your tenure.

But in the early part of your tenure, they said he was just being a cowboy. He was shooting from all cylinders and just going all out. And that may have been why some of these people are quite silent today about what’s going on with you, your party, and your country.

IMRAN KHAN: Countries never interfere. I know, I was in power for three and a half years. I know that countries never interfere in other countries’ businesses. Never. This hardly ever happens. Only thing they should talk about are human rights. But normally, I mean, it’s just not done. I mean, unless it is your country, which you don’t have good relationship with. So, the US would talk about Hong Kong or Uyghurs.

But I mean India, when they clearly violated international law in Kashmir and put them in a open prison, they basically put a curfew in Kashmir. I mean, did any of the big power, Western power, criticize India for it? No. No one said anything. Some UN human rights organizations spoke against it, but none of the Western countries said anything against India.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Let’s move on. Let’s take it in-house. We need to start wrapping up as well. But let’s be introspective about the famous “same page” with the military …. There are dozens of examples of the “same-pagedness” as it was called famously, from giving the military so much space in the affairs of the country, to even, I would say the highlight is really General Bajwa’s extension, number one. And then number two, allowing Nawaz Sharif to leave the country.

I’m assuming you’ve said this before, but I would like to hear you again. When did the “same page” change? When did the same page stop? When you were playing ball consistently, what was it that just the “same page” just ran out of space and you ran out of ink. What happened?

IMRAN KHAN: Look, first of all, let’s understand one thing. The military has been in power directly or indirectly for seventy-five years. So let there be no illusion about this. So, either they’re directly in power or indirectly.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Sure.

IMRAN KHAN: And they’re entrenched. So, they’re entrenched. Now, when I became the prime minister, it is wrong to say that the army supported me or they rigged the elections, because they actually rigged the election for Nawaz Sharif in 2013, when we asked for just four constituencies out of 133 to open them up, they refused. And when they were opened up, the election was rigged.

In our case, we offered from day one, I said, open the elections. So, the army didn’t oppose me, but they didn’t rig the elections for us. But I knew from day one that I had to work with them. And so for a while, the working relationship with army means army chief, really. There’s no democracy in the army. It’s just one man. So it worked well in the beginning. The problem started when I gave him the extension. And I admit it was the biggest blunder I made. I admit. And I was actually ambushed in this. I mean, it is a long story. But anyway…

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: I’d really like to hear it Khan… because this story is the story of our country at this point. Isn’t it? Well, Imran Khan comes in on a mandate where he can do pretty much everything he wants. And yet he gives a man of, well, limited reputation an extension, then allows his rival, Nawaz Sharif, his lifelong rival, to leave even though you came in on the platform of justice.

IMRAN KHAN: So let me clarify. We had just come in, I was due and the army as an institution is the only institution that works in Pakistan because it’s intact. All other institutions when I took power were in a terrible condition. I mean, they had been tampered with, politicized, they weren’t working properly. So, if you wanted things done, you got it done through the Army. I mean, I’m talking about, say for instance, COVID-19. We wanted logistics support. We wanted the whole country to—data from all the hospitals. I’m just giving an example. And the best way we could do was the army. It would immediately get us all the data.

So, in that sense, so it worked. It worked. We did well in the beginning. The only problem is after the extension what happened, there was a different General Bajwa. And so the problem, what I faced with them is that my whole platform was bringing the powerful under the law. So, rule of law is what I started off with twenty-seven years back. And when I tried to bring the powerful under the law, I discovered that unless General Bajwa wanted it, I couldn’t do it. So because NAB, the [national] accountability bureau was controlled by him. So, we had no control over what was going on. All these guys who are now in the government, they would blame me for their corruption cases. But we inherited all the corruption cases.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: But Khan-

IMRAN KHAN: But what was happening-

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Didn’t you let the fox into the house?

IMRAN KHAN: Let me first complete. So, because he controlled the accountability Bureau, I could not bring the powerful under the law because I was helpless, and he didn’t want to, because he was already dealing with them. So “one page” was good, it went on. And then I worked with him. I realized that if he didn’t want accountability, I was stuck. But our main thing, priority at the time was the economy.

Because we had two years of COVID everywhere the world, the impact of COVID-19 and the commodity super cycle. So, the whole concentration was there. And so as far as the economy went, we did the best economic performance in the last seventeen years. Our last two years we grew at almost 6 percent. But General Bajwa at some point decided to change horses. I didn’t betray him. He decided to change horses. And he is the one who pulled the rug [from] under my feet.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: But I’m personally shocked that for a man who used to threaten to walk away from his own team, if he wasn’t allowed to pick it, if he wasn’t allowed to literally pick his own men in his own cricket squad—they’ve written about this; you have written about this—someone who is so adamant about control, about his vision, about his strategy when it’s interfered with is now saying that he was new, he was inexperienced. And I understand the same page about COVID, I’ll give you that, for example, right.

But I don’t understand the “same page” about pretty much every contract going to the FWO or tons of generals going on as ambassadors or even a colonel running PTV. I mean you had the wherewithal, you had the manpower, you had the mandate, and yet you just kept on ceding them space and eventually ended up in a situation where you led the fox into the hen house. So, is there regret? Is there regret about your decision making?

IMRAN KHAN: Well, the only thing, when I look back, and I’ve said this before, if I had to go back again, I would not… Bearing in mind that I wanted to bring in reforms, main reform is rule of law. Bringing the powerful under the law, which has never happened in Pakistan’s history before. The powerful are above law and the masses have no access to justice. So that was my main theme. I discovered that unless you have a powerful mandate by the public, the public must give you a strong mandate. You must have a strong government. Only then can you implement your reform program. Unfortunately, I had a weak coalition government. So, the moment I used to go after the powerful, the problem used to be to keep my majority intact. And we could only keep our majority intact by telling the army, the ISI, look, you must make sure that they come, my members appear for voting.

This is what happened. With hindsight, I should have immediately called for elections and if I had not got a good enough mandate, I should have stayed out. Because it is not possible. If you want a reform program and to take on the big mafias, you cannot do it if you have a coalition with government, with a thin majority, you can’t do it. So that is the mistake I made. And that’s why I became more and more dependent on the army chief because he could get a budget passed because they have the clout. It’s exactly what’s happening right now. If the military withdraws support, this coalition would fall apart in days.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: So, speaking of current affairs, coalitions, electoral politics, Khan Sahib, leadership is the undergirding of all of this. And currently I see the PTI’s flag right behind you. And the PTI is a shadow today of what it was just a few weeks ago. People have left in droves. Just this morning you were kind enough to send me a story by the New York Times about how people are leaving in droves. They’re being forced to leave in droves. Some of your old school, old guard has stuck around. Most of your “electables,” of your new guard who you praised so highly, you gave them high office and appointments, they’ve left. And yet, this brings me to the question of leadership where again, a man who was famous for his captaincy in the cricket field, who used to claim that, “Listen, trust me, I can put together the right unit. This is what they pay me for. This is what I do”—today, has been left by much of his unit. Which then makes me compare the plight of the PTI today to the plight of, for example, the PML-N in the late 1990s where they were under pressure too after a military coup. But nobody left Nawaz Sharif in the droves, in the mass exodus that we are seeing with the PTI. Does that say something about your captaincy and your leadership? Or does that say something about the weak structure of the PTI?

IMRAN KHAN: Let me, let me first tell you exactly what happened because I was in the opposition in 2002. The entire PML-N became PML-Q. So, there were only ten members left. What are you talking about there? Nawaz Sharif was left by his entire party, which formed government under PML-Q. So, I mean, I’m just correcting you.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: They went through a couple of years of jail, some of them, not like a couple of weeks.

IMRAN KHAN: No, no, it’s not true. There were five or ten people who went to jail this time. I mean, what people have gone through now, they’ve been thrown in jails and they’ve been shut in these cells with a lot of people and dead cells. I mean, their businesses have been destroyed. They’ve been warned. I mean their families have been threatened. This has never happened in this country before. The way they have been making people leave my party, it’s unprecedented. But Wajahat, today PTI is stronger than ever in its history. PTI today is the strongest party in Pakistan’s history. Why? Because PTI has the biggest vote bank. It doesn’t matter if people leave you. If “electables” leave you, it doesn’t matter. I’ll just give you an example of Punjab. We gave almost four hundred tickets in the Punjab election. Punjab is 60 percent Pakistan’s population. So I gave four hundred tickets. Only forty people have left. And do you know what about the rest? They’re all hiding. None of them are staying in their houses. Their houses are broken in, the relatives are picked up, their businesses are shut. And yet out of four hundred, only forty people have left. Why aren’t they leaving? Because they all realize that the moment they leave the party, it’s the end of their politics. Because the people in this country have never stood with any party as they stand with PTI today. Which is why you have the whole government machinery, the whole intelligence agencies, all institutions [have] one-point agenda somehow to dismantle PTI. And they’re failing because the vote bank is growing rather than the vote bank shrinking. The vote bank of PTI is growing, which is why people are not leaving us.

The vote bank of PTI is growing, which is why people are not leaving us. You would imagine, it’s never happened here before. My sisters’ houses, the police has gone in there. They picked up the servants when the son was there. One sister has a huge corruption case thrown on her. She was not even in government. So, my house, my wife, they have cases against my wife. They’ve gone after everyone. So, they’re doing this to all ticket holders. Despite all that, people are not leaving the party. Only a few people you see have left.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: But Khan-Saab, they’re saying you tried to trigger a coup. They’re saying you’ve been in touch with the former army officers. They were saying you tried to divide the ranks of the world’s fifth-largest military. Which begs the question, have you been in touch with, for example, General Faiz? I know you were in touch with General Bajwa even after your ouster, and you said so accordingly. Which surprises me, by the way. The same man who kicks you out, you end up trying to negotiate with him. But are you in touch with General Faiz? Have you been in touch with military brass? Because that’s what they say. They say, “This man is trouble and he thinks the rules don’t apply to him. And his party tweets, that he’s a red line. Why can’t he turn up to court like everybody else has since Maulana Mohammad Ali Jauhar, Pakistani or Indian Muslim leaders have suffered court cases and have gone to jail. What’s so special about Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi?” That’s what they say.

IMRAN KHAN: Special…? I have 160 court cases, 160 cases against me, and I do nothing but most of my time is going from one court to the other to get bail. Tomorrow again, nineteen cases tomorrow, I’m trying to get bail. nineteen cases. It’s never happened in our history before. No political leader has ever had… At the age of seventy, he does not have one criminal case. And suddenly in the last few months, he has 170 cases, 160 cases. People have known me for fifty years. They’ve just slapped a murder case on me. People know me. So, I repeat. The only time I couldn’t go to attend the courts was when I was shot and I was housebound and they knew about it. They knew my reports. I had my leg broken, so therefore I couldn’t attend. But since I’ve been recovered, I attend every case.

Now, I have never, the only people I knew in the army, one was General Faiz, the other one was General Bajwa. Faiz because he was the ISI chief. I had to deal with him. General Bajwa because he was the army chief. I dealt with Bajwa after I was ousted only for the sake of Pakistan because I wanted to ask him, “Where are we heading? Because at the moment we are going nowhere.” The country is going into a black hole. They have no policy. The only policy is to get rid of Imran Khan. That’s no policy. I mean, what is the future of Pakistan? The only reason I met General Bajwa was look the only way ahead of free and fair elections, which will bring political stability and that then will bring economic stability. Right now, we have the worst economic indicators in our history.

The country’s going down, we are heading towards default. We already have 38 percent inflation. We are heading towards hyperinflation. So, my talks with only for the country and trying to make him understand that unless you have elections, you will not have political stability. General Faiz, I might have spoken to him three times since I left government and since he was not the army chief…I mean the ISI chief. This is all nonsense. They’re just trying to get rid of me because for some reason the current army chief has decided that whatever happens, I cannot come into power.

So, they’re throwing all these things on me. I mean, I go to be… army court. These military courts. The reason why these military courts have been set up is to try me because in civil courts there’s no way any of these bogus cases can throw me in jail. So that’s why all this is going on. These conspiracy theories, I don’t know anyone in the army. I don’t know any of the generals. I had no business for them. It was not my job to know—except the ones I was dealing with. I don’t know the other generals.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Khan-Saab, about the current army chief. You singled him out after you were released from prison. You-last

IMRAN KHAN: Last question please, Wajahat. I have to go. It’s eleven o’clock.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Sure, Khan-Saab. Thank you. So, then I’ll compound this question with another question. I’ll give you one and a half questions. One, you singled out the army chief. You said, “It’s not about the army, it’s about one man.” What’s the problem here with him? Was it because you sacked him when you were prime minister, when he was ISI Chief. Does it go back to that episode? That’s question number one. What’s the beef here between you and General Asim Munir? I’d like to know, because you’ve said that there’s beef, so that’s question one. And then question two, Khan-Saab before I let you go. What would you do differently? What would you do differently if you were in a time machine today, and you were allowed to go back to August 2018. What would Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi do differently?

IMRAN KHAN: Firstly, it’s not about me or General Asim. It’s about Pakistan. I mean, I have no personal thing against him. He clearly has something, I don’t know, which is why I offered to meet and hold dialogue and not now, since he came to power, since he became the army chief, I have been since then saying that, look, it’s about Pakistan, it’s not about us. So, I need to understand why this whole country is… “There’s only one mission, get rid of Imran. He should not come into power.”

So, what alternative have they got? I mean, maybe he can convince me that I’m so bad for the country, but there is some other plan which will be good for the country. At the moment, there is no other plan. There’s only one plan. So that’s why I wanted to meet him. And remember, it’s not about us. It’s not whether I like him or he likes me. It’s about the country. And the country is going down rapidly. People are losing hope in the country. Almost a million professionals, quality people, have left the country in the last few months. There’s a flight of capital. So that’s my point.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: But I must interject. Why did you fire him when he was ISI chief, Khan Sahib? What happened?

IMRAN KHAN: Well, there were issues. I had issues with him and so therefore I couldn’t work with him. But that’s in the past. I have no issue with him. So, I think right now it’s not about personal likes and dislikes. It’s about the country. Now, secondly, if I had to go back again to 2018, I would’ve called for elections. I would’ve dissolved the parliament and gone for general elections again and only taken power—

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: When you were asked for an extension, at that point, when would you have asked for elections again, I’m just trying to figure out—

IMRAN KHAN: No, straightforward, straightaway. I mean, had I known how difficult it was to implement your program… We inherited the biggest current account deficit in our history. So, the country was bankrupt. So, we inherited two big deficits, the fiscal deficit and the current account deficit. So, the economy was in shambles, and we were the first time in government. And here I had this ambitious program of rule of law to bringing the mafias under control. There was no way I could have done it with a coalition government with a thin majority. It was just not possible. So, with hindsight, I should have immediately called for elections and only taken government if I had a substantial majority.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: And moving on this week, you are faced with a lot of court charges. You’re going to Islamabad, you’re going to Baluchistan, a sensitive area, an insecure area. Do you still fear that you might be targeted, your life might be targeted, Imran Khan?

IMRAN KHAN: Yes, I do. Well, the government, I mean the interior minister has said my life is a danger. I mean, he said from foreign agencies, but, actually, it’s the government itself who were… I mean there were two assassination attempts on me. One was on the 3rd of November last year. One was on 18th of March in Islamabad. So, will there be another one? I think there’s a strong possibility because they would imagine that even if I am put in jail, which I just know that in the next two weeks they’ll find somewhere to put me in jail. So, they would worry that even if I’m in jail, my party would still win. So, I think they’d be thinking of the final solution. So mentally, I’m prepared—

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: I’m sorry-—

IMRAN KHAN: —that anything could happen.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Imran, did you just say that you’re mentally prepared to be killed? Is that what you just said to me?

IMRAN KHAN: No, I’m mentally prepared that anything could happen. I mean, someone who’s faced two assassination attempts is going to be prepared that there’s a possibility because the same reasons, the reasons are still there when they tried to kill me twice before. The reason is that the party’s popular will win the next election. So, as long as that reason is there, they could try again. So, in that sense, mentally, I mean I have overcome the fear of dying. I feel that I should be prepared for everything. But jail, I know in the next two weeks they’ll put me in jail because there’s so many cases. All they have to do is cancel one bail and I’ll be inside.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi—

IMRAN KHAN: Okay, Wajahat

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Good luck. Thank you, sir.

IMRAN KHAN: Thank you.

WAJAHAT SAEED KHAN: Stay safe.

IMRAN KHAN: Thank you. Okay.

Imran Khan on the failed India-Pakistan thaw and why he’s ‘prepared for everything’—even death

By Wajahat Khan

The former Pakistani prime minister spoke with the Atlantic Council about unsuccessful plans to meet with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and much more.

Corruption Economy & Business

SouthAsiaSource May 22, 2023

In Pakistan, populist Imran Khan faces the biggest challenge of his political career

By Roohan Ahmed

Imran Khan, Pakistan’s populist former prime minister, is facing the biggest test of his political career as he challenges the very same security establishment that accelerated his journey to power in the 2018 elections.

Corruption Elections

SouthAsiaSource May 10, 2023

Experts react: Former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s arrest and implications for Pakistan

By South Asia Center and other experts

On March 9, 2023, former Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan was arrested over corruption charges. We asked experts to react to this decision.

Corruption Elections

1 When asked for comment on these allegations, Haqqani told the Atlantic Council: “Like all conspiracy theorists and demagogues, Imran Khan does not feel the need to offer any evidence of allegations he makes.” Haqqani’s attorney has also issued a cease-and-desist letter to Khan for making “false and defamatory statements” about Haqqani.

2 In November 2022, when asked about Imran Khan’s allegations that US officials such as Donald Lu, the assistant secretary of state for the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, was involved in removing him from power, State Department Principal Deputy Spokesperson Vedant Patel said that “there is not and there has never been a truth to these allegations” and that “ultimately, we will not let propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation get in the way of any bilateral relationship, including our valued bilateral partner with Pakistan.”

The post Read Imran Khan’s full Atlantic Council interview on failed peace with India, Pakistan’s plight, and his own fate appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Imran Khan on the failed India-Pakistan thaw and why he’s ‘prepared for everything’—even death

Wajahat Khan — Wed, 21 Jun 2023 00:54:23 +0000

This article was updated on June 21.

Imran Khan, Pakistan’s former prime minister, has been on the warpath in the streets of Pakistan against the military-led establishment ever since he was voted out by parliament last year. Once seen as the military’s darling and reportedly assisted by the military and its intelligence agencies in the elections that brought him to power in 2018, he has now turned on the army and its chief. In an interview with the Atlantic Council this week, he also claimed that the former army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa told him “frequently” that the army was not equipped or prepared for a war with India.

In the interview, conducted June 18, Khan confirmed that there was indeed an opening for peace with India—despite New Delhi’s rescinding of disputed Jammu and Kashmir’s semi-autonomous status in 2019—and the Pakistani army chief favored it. (Bajwa had previously revealed this plan to reporters.) Normalizing trade between the two nuclear-armed countries was reportedly one of the steps that was to be taken before Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi could visit Pakistan.

Watch the full interview

However, despite successfully deescalating a military standoff in 2019, Khan couldn’t explain why he faltered on trade normalization with New Delhi after India changed its relationship with the disputed territory of Kashmir by removing its special status in the Indian union. Khan responded to India’s Kashmir move by closing the border for trade with India.

“I don’t remember the trade talks,” Khan said. “All I know is that there was supposed to be a quid pro quo. India was supposed to give some concession, give some sort of a roadmap to Kashmir, and I was going to then host Prime Minister Modi in Pakistan. But it never materialized.”

Bajwa’s plan, which included a ceasefire with Indian forces on the Line of Control in Kashmir, was a lost opportunity for establishing long-term peace with Pakistan’s archrival. “I tried everything, but I came across this brick wall,” Khan said. “And I realized it’s something to do with the RSS-BJP [the Modi-aligned ideological movement and political party] mentality where they’ve cashed in on hostility with Pakistan. That’s all.”

Transcript

Jun 20, 2023

Read Imran Khan’s full Atlantic Council interview on failed peace with India, Pakistan’s plight, and his own fate

By Atlantic Council

In an Atlantic Council conversation, former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan shared details about a potential peace plan with India and discussed the future economic and political prospects for Pakistan.

Economy & Business Elections

Currently, Khan says he is facing nearly 160 legal cases, ranging from terrorism to corruption to conspiracy against the state—a roster that keeps him busy court-hopping to secure bail or relief. The seventy-year-old former cricket champion-turned-populist firebrand spends his weekdays commuting from city to city in protective gear to attend court hearings. Every evening, he addresses his followers on YouTube from his residence in Lahore, which just last month was surrounded by security forces.

Khan said he fears that he may be incarcerated over the next two weeks but admitted that he’s “prepared for everything,” including the prospect of being assassinated. (Khan was wounded in an assassination attempt last November and claims to have survived another plot in March.)

Reviewing his performance as premier, Khan admitted to political blunders during his tenure, including granting an extension of service to Bajwa, who Khan claims was responsible for engineering his ouster. He did not elaborate on the exact reasons for their break-up.

Khan confessed that he was dependent on the military’s clout to push his reforms through parliament because he had a weak coalition government with a razor-thin majority. But this admission—needing the military to remain in power—runs counter to his claim that he didn’t need or get the military’s support to achieve power in the 2018 general elections.

“If you want a reform program and to take on the big mafias, you cannot do it if you have a coalition with government, with a thin majority, you can’t do it,” Khan said. “So that is the mistake I made. And that’s why I became more and more dependent on the army chief, because he could get a budget passed because they have the clout. It’s exactly what’s happening right now. If the military withdraws support, this coalition would fall apart in days.”

Crucially, Khan also said he sacked the current army chief, General Asim Munir, from his previous position as the director-general of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) because he “couldn’t work with him.” He did not explain why. Yet he went on to declare his willingness to talk to the all-powerful chief of army staff now—but not to his civilian counterparts—an unsustainable position in a multi-party parliamentary democracy that he wants to lead again. Claims by former members of Khan’s own party suggest that Khan sacked Munir because he had alleged that Khan’s wife was involved in corruption; Khan has denied these allegations.

While Khan defended his economic and foreign policy record and claimed that his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI, or Movement for Justice) is the most popular party in the country’s history, he also claimed that ceding further space to Pakistan’s all-powerful military while he was in power was the right thing to do—until it wasn’t.

But as Pakistan faces the prospect of economic default, and his quest for an immediate election seems to be waning, Khan stands isolated. Over one hundred of his party leaders, including many senior deputies, have left the PTI, through what he claims is coercion by the military. Thousands of party workers face trials over the riots of May 9, when many Pakistanis took to the streets to attack government and military installations while protesting what Khan says was his provocative detention, designed to trigger mass outrage.

“The country is going into a black hole,” he said. “The only policy is to get rid of Imran Khan. That’s no policy. I mean, what is the future of Pakistan?”

Meanwhile, the military-backed regime continues its legal and information crackdown against sections of the press and public who dare to support Khan on mainstream and social media. Also, as the military claims that Khan and the PTI leadership tried to sow dissent in the rank and file of the all-powerful army—treason by definition and law—Khan has denied that he has any active links to senior military leadership.

None of Pakistan’s foreign friends and allies have issued any statements in favor of Khan. The US State Department said last week that it would refrain from comment as Khan is a “private citizen”—a categorization that he shrugged off without expressing regrets about his bashing of the United States following his ouster. Khan continued to blame a senior US official for, as Khan claims, making his removal as prime minister a condition for US assistance and goodwill—a claim that he watered down earlier this year while blaming Bajwa for poisoning the US view of Khan through Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s former ambassador to Washington. (Haqqani has rejected Khan’s allegations as baseless and his attorney has issued a cease-and-desist notice to Khan, threatening legal action if Khan keeps on alleging Haqqani’s involvement in the former premier’s ouster. The US State Department has said that “there is not and there has never been a truth to” Khan’s claims that the United States was involved in removing him from power, adding that “we will not let propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation get in the way of any bilateral relationship, including our valued bilateral [partnership] with Pakistan.”)*

Further evidence of Khan’s shifting position is his party’s active support for lobbying efforts inside the United States, including letters from members of the US Congress admonishing the Pakistani military’s crackdown. Furthermore, not a single influential member of the fifty-seven-state Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), a grouping that Khan claims to have galvanized, has come out in support of him.

Khan has responded by saying that as long as he has the people of Pakistan behind him, he doesn’t need foreign help. How he will do this now is unclear considering that many of his party’s senior leaders have deserted him after having been arrested and released by the authorities. Khan claims they were coerced and has named new, younger members to replace them. He believes strongly that he is still the most popular political leader in Pakistan and this will help him yet again in the elections that currently are expected to be held in October or November.

Khan said that popularity is the reason why his enemies have tried to kill him. “As long as that reason is there, they could try again,” he said. “So, in that sense, mentally, I mean I have overcome the fear of dying. I feel that I should be prepared for everything.”

Wajahat S. Khan is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and an Emmy-nominated journalist and author. He is the former bureau chief in Kabul and Islamabad for NBC News.

This article was updated to include the US State Department’s denials of Khan’s allegations about US involvement in his ouster.

The post Imran Khan on the failed India-Pakistan thaw and why he’s ‘prepared for everything’—even death appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Improving state governance, institutional capacity, and transparency

Pepe Zhang — Tue, 20 Jun 2023 16:00:00 +0000

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

This is the 3rd installment of the Unlocking Economic Development in Latin America and the Caribbean report, which explores five vital opportunities for the private sector to drive socioeconomic progress in LAC, with sixteen corresponding recommendations private firms can consider as they take steps to support the region.

Improving state governance, institutional capacity, and transparency

The private sector has a strong opportunity to contribute to, and benefit from, a better business climate in LAC by partnering with governments to improve state governance, particularly in three areas: “regulation and institutional environment,” “political instability,” and “corruption.” Every survey respondent named at least one of these issues as a regional detriment, while 85 percent selected two, as seen in Figure 8. Several indices of governance, such as the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index, rank LAC below the OECD average for measures of accountability, political stability, and government effectiveness, among other indicators, and below the global average for rule of law.¹

SOURCE: Atlantic Council survey 2022

Quality of government and respect for the rule of law—including transparency, accountability, and enforceability—are instrumental in improving effective delivery of public services, as well as creating a business climate that incentivizes domestic and foreign investment and supports private-sector development.

Recommendations for the private sector

Businesses in LAC can assist governments in combating institutional capacity and governance challenges. Private-sector know-how and technology, including digital and cloud-based tools, can streamline government-service delivery and improve user experience. Public-private collaboration on information access and analytics, regulatory issues, and integrity mechanisms can help expose graft, boost transparency, and establish best practices, while keeping citizens informed. Together, these steps can help mitigate the region’s trust deficit, cultivate an attractive business climate, and boost economic growth.

Improving digital-government services: Private-sector technology and expertise should be leveraged to optimize the provision of government services and boost trust in government.
Promoting information access and analytics: Firms and citizens can examine and disseminate governments’ open data in ways that enforce transparency and accountability in the public sector (for example, in public procurement).
Improving integrity and regulatory quality: Commitment by the private sector (and the public sector) is critical to enhancing governance in LAC, from combating corruption to improving regulations.

About the author

Staff

Pepe Zhang

Senior Fellow

China Coronavirus

Report Jun 5, 2023

Enhancing market size, scalability, and regional integration in Latin America and the Caribbean

By Pepe Zhang

Americas Economy & Business

Report Jun 16, 2023

Accelerating digitalization and innovation in Latin America and the Caribbean

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. The private sector can improve infrastructure, foster skills, and promote adoption to help the region transform its digital potential into development gains.

Americas Economy & Business

Report Jun 22, 2023

Addressing multidimensional inequality

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. Private-sector actions to reduce gender inequality, like level the playing field between SMEs and large firms and narrow the urban-rural divide, can enable a more inclusive economy for LAC.

Americas Inclusive Growth

Report Jun 26, 2023

Meaningfully advancing the green agenda

By Pepe Zhang

To sustain the ongoing recovery against short-term headwinds and boost inclusive, productive, and sustainable development in the long term, governments cannot, and should not, act alone. Private firms can help advance the green agenda by working to create green jobs, taking measures to promote a transition to a circular-economy model, and partaking in green finance.

Americas Climate Change & Climate Action

Online Event Thu, February 17, 2022 • 9:00 am ET

#ProactiveLAC: A digital future for regional prosperity

A virtual conversation on the role of public-private partnerships and policy actions in increasing digital connectivity across Latin America and the Caribbean.

Coronavirus Digital Policy Inclusive Growth Latin America

1 “Worldwide Governance Indicators,” World Bank, last visited January 25, 2022, https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports. Results derived from the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index, available at: https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-index-2021/current-historical-data. LAC average: 0.523; global average: 0.557 (author’s calculations).

The post Improving state governance, institutional capacity, and transparency appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Beyond the battlefield: Why we should invest in Ukraine’s democratic future

Peter Erben, Gio Kobakhidze — Mon, 19 Jun 2023 12:31:50 +0000

With all eyes on Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive aimed at liberating the country from Russian occupation, there is also much talk throughout Ukraine and beyond on what happens next. This will be one of the main issues on the agenda at this year’s Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC), which the United Kingdom and Ukraine will host jointly in London in late June. The forthcoming conference will bring together leaders from the international community, international financial institutions, the private sector, and civil society to mobilize international support for Ukraine’s postwar economic and social stabilization.

International support will unquestionably continue to be critical for Ukraine’s ability to withstand and prevail in the face of Russia’s ongoing war of aggression, as it will be for Ukraine’s further recovery and reconstruction. In this vein, it is crucial to acknowledge that Ukraine’s commitment to democratic resilience, both during the war and in the post-war phase, is essential to maintaining and expanding these much-needed investments.

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Prior to the February 2022 full-scale invasion of their country, Ukrainians already had a long history of fighting hard for their rights and freedoms. During the decades following the Soviet collapse, independent Ukraine saw significant progress toward mostly free and fair elections and other basic human rights. The nation also decentralized political and budgetary powers, brought greater transparency to government spending, overhauled its banking sector, and made headway on improving the governance of state-owned enterprises, many of which are slated for privatization.

Despite the horrors of the Russian invasion, a number of current indications suggest Ukraine is ready for further progress. The Ukrainian military is now one of the most powerful in Europe. An influential civil society and a relatively free press are among the stronger pillars of this vibrant democracy. The technology sector is thriving and is helping to dismantle what had been a stifling bureaucracy, one of many hangovers from the Soviet Union. But much work remains.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Today, military victory is obviously Ukraine’s top national priority. At the same time, any Ukrainian will tell you that one of the many realities separating them from Russia is that Ukrainians have a clear military objective and, unlike Russia, know what they are fighting for: freedom. The steps needed to achieve this freedom will extend beyond the battlefield and will include further advances in decentralization, political pluralism, press freedoms, adherence to the rule of law, anti-corruption, human rights, and democratic elections.

It will, for example, be critical for Ukraine to ensure free and fair elections when the country returns to party politics following the end of armed hostilities with Russia. For this to happen, time will be needed to ensure that necessary legislative amendments are passed in an open manner; that political competitors have reasonable and equitable access to the media; that the electoral infrastructure is ready; that financial reporting for political contestants resumes; and that voter registration lists are up to date. As the international community gathers to plan support for Ukraine’s recovery, it is essential that Ukraine’s allies stand ready to support this critical aspect of the nation’s future.

Just as Ukraine has surpassed all expectations in its courageous fight against Russia’s full-scale invasion launched 16 months ago, the nation must also outperform reform expectations once it defeats Russia’s military. After all, this embodies what the nation is fighting for. Further reform measures are also critical as a means of securing continued and expanding support from the country’s international partners, including for recovery and reconstruction.

Ukraine’s heroic resistance to Russia’s war of aggression is the story of a progressing democracy’s resistance to autocracy. The free world is providing military, economic, and humanitarian support for Ukraine because most view Ukraine’s struggle as their own. In this sense, Russia’s full-scale invasion is not only a criminal assault against a sovereign country, but against democracy everywhere. The world needs to see Ukraine’s recovery in the same light as a chance to advance shared democratic values.

Peter Erben is Principal Advisor at the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) (global) and Senior Country Director at IFES Ukraine. Gio Kobakhidze is Deputy Country Director at IFES Ukraine.

Atlantic Council — Tue, 13 Jun 2023 17:46:15 +0000

Original source

The post Nawaz quoted in Nikkei Asia: Imran Khan takes on Pakistan’s powerful military establishment appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Fore! reasons why the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States won’t block the PGA Tour/LIV Golf merger

Sarah Bauerle Danzman — Tue, 13 Jun 2023 13:24:43 +0000

On June 6, the PGA Tour and LIV Golf announced their plans to merge. This surprise revelation set off a wave of anger from US politicians, professional golfers who had turned down lucrative offers from LIV Golf to play in their tournaments, and others who view the PGA Tour’s new association with the Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund (PIF), which owns LIV Golf, as unpatriotic and antithetical to democratic values.

The criticism stems from the kingdom’s connection to the 9/11 attacks, its track record on human rights, and the high-profile killing of US-based journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, very likely at the direction of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Some critics have started to search for potential regulatory tools to block the deal. Merger review, both in the United States and Europe, seems the most likely path. However, there are competing views on whether courts would be persuaded by anti-trust arguments given how highly concentrated professional golf already is and how most US professional sports leagues operate as de facto monopolies.

Several members of Congress, including Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR), Senator Mitt Romney (R-UT), and Congresswoman Maxine Waters (D-CA), have issued public calls for the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to review the deal. CFIUS is an interagency committee that evaluates the national security implications of foreign acquisitions of US businesses. If CFIUS finds a national security risk, it can negotiate mitigation agreements with transaction parties to restructure deals in ways that sufficiently reduce those risks. It can also recommend that the US president prohibit the transaction. CFIUS has traditionally been restrained in its approach; only seven transactions have been prohibited through the CFIUS process since 1975, though a good deal more were voluntarily abandoned by parties after realizing that CFIUS found a national security risk that it did not deem mitigable.

So is CFIUS the answer to the prayers of those who wish to stop the PGA Tour/LIV Golf merger? Probably not. To understand why CFIUS is likely not able to stop this deal, even if US lawmakers may view the deal as distasteful, it’s necessary to understand CFIUS’s jurisdiction—which it likely has over this deal—and the investment prohibition authorities that CFIUS provides the US president.

1. The committee is wary of overextending its authority

First, CFIUS has jurisdiction over any foreign acquisition of a controlling stake in a US business, regardless of the US business activity. It also has the ability to review non-controlling transactions that confer special rights—such as access to non-public technical information or board observer status—if foreign entities invest in critical technology, critical infrastructure, or sensitive personal data of US businesses. The cross-sectoral nature of CFIUS jurisdiction contrasts with the investment screening authorities of many other advanced economies, which often only allow review of transactions in specified sectors, such as critical infrastructure or defense materials.

Thus, as long as the merger deal—which apparently exists only conceptually at the moment—directly or indirectly confers a controlling stake of PGA Tour to PIF, CFIUS will be able to review the transaction. CFIUS likely would also be able to review even a non-controlling stake if the PGA Tour meets the definition of a sensitive personal data business. CFIUS operates mostly through a voluntary notification process, but it can also pull a concerning transaction into its orbit through a “non-notified” review.

Just because CFIUS has jurisdiction to review does not mean that it will block the transaction. CFIUS is designed to be a tool of last resort and to only intervene when national security is threatened. To act, the committee would have to find a risk arising from the transaction that threatened to impair US national security. While national security is not defined in the statute, the committee process is designed to be fact-based, deliberative, and restrained. Highly attenuated risk scenarios are unlikely to persuade the committee to recommend action.

Moreover, the committee is conscientious not to overextend its authority in order to retain process legitimacy, as it operates largely through the voluntary cooperation of transacting parties. It is careful to stay within its statutory authority to prevent legal risks that could narrow its ability to act in the future. And, as the United States is actively encouraging partners and allies to enact and strengthen their own investment screening mechanisms, it does not want to give the impression that broad use of such power is legitimate, for fear that doing so could lead to other countries harming US businesses operating abroad.

2. Data collection risks can be mitigated

The CFIUS process revolves around determining whether a transaction creates a national security risk, and if so, whether that risk can be adequately mitigated through a legal agreement with the parties. CFIUS evaluates the vulnerabilities to national security that a US business generates and the likelihood that the foreign entity will exploit those vulnerabilities or make it easier for a third party to do so.

One potential security vulnerability is the PGA Tour’s collection of fans’ data on its fans through ticket sales and its smartphone app. Since the 2018 legislative update to CFIUS, the committee has been increasingly concerned about how acquiring a US business could aid a threat actor in the collection, use, and sharing of sensitive personal data. Data collected on smartphone apps can be particularly concerning if the app allows for real-time geolocation of individuals and if the app’s data collection does not adequately protect vulnerable populations. However, these concerns can easily be mitigated by preventing PIF or its agents from having access to such data. It is highly unlikely that the business rationale for the merger depends on PIF or LIV Golf being able to access these data, so it is likely a mitigation term to which the parties would agree.

3. Real estate concerns can be mitigated, too

Another issue is the roughly thirty golf courses the PGA Tour owns and operates through its Tournament Players Club (TPC) network. Some of these golf courses are located close to sensitive US government sites such as military bases. CFIUS views such “co-location” as risky because it can create opportunities for surveillance. In 2012, for example, US President Barack Obama prohibited a Chinese investment in an Oregon wind farm over concerns that Beijing could use access to wind turbines to surveil a particularly sensitive military site close by. Again, however, the deal could easily be structured in a way in which PIF did not have access rights to these courses or the ability to choose venders to operate or maintain these locations.

4. Soft power is a soft argument

Some have argued that CFIUS should consider the “soft power” implications of golf tour ownership from which the Saudis could benefit. However, it is unlikely that CFIUS will be willing to make strong claims about national security risks on this basis. Nor should it. Soft power by its nature is diffuse. This means that the consequence of soft power on US national security is difficult to clearly express. A poorly articulated consequence reduces the ability of the committee to act. After all, the committee must find a “risk to national security arising from the transaction” to mitigate or recommend a presidential prohibition. Vague claims to “sportswashing” and generally burnishing a regime’s brand do not meet this threshold. If CFIUS could block transactions on bad vibes alone, then it could pretty much block anything. And that would undermine the argument that CFIUS is a fact-based, non-partisan committee that narrowly and soberly assesses national security risk. This would have substantial negative consequence for the legitimacy of the process in the eyes of business, the public, and allies and partners.

In sum, there are many reasons to be angered by, or at least uncomfortable with, the PGA Tour/LIV Golf merger. Anti-trust may represent a legitimate hurdle to its execution. But CFIUS is not a trump card to prohibit every problematic foreign transaction, and it certainly is not an appropriate tool for blocking this particular merger given what we know about it. Rule of law means the law is not just a tool but also a constraint. And here, the rule of law will likely bind the United States against using CFIUS to block a transaction some lawmakers are wary of but does not rise to the level of a clear national security risk.

Sarah Bauerle Danzman is a nonresident senior fellow with the GeoEconomics Center’s Economic Statecraft Initiative. She is also an associate professor of international studies at Indiana University Bloomington where she specializes in the political economy of international investment and finance.

The post Fore! reasons why the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States won’t block the PGA Tour/LIV Golf merger appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s failing Ukraine invasion is exposing Putin’s many weaknesses

Anders Åslund — Mon, 12 Jun 2023 00:29:11 +0000

Vladimir Putin’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine is exposing all of his personal weaknesses as a ruler. It is also casting an unforgiving light on the extensive damage he has done to Russia.

In the early 1990s, I encountered Putin several times at international meetings in St. Petersburg, but I never really met him. I talked to the city’s friendly mayor, Anatoly Sobchak, and his first deputy Alexei Kudrin, but Putin, whose background in the KGB was well known, hid on the sidelines and did not really talk to anybody. He was perceived as a secretive nuisance.

Based on this early impression of Putin, I have always been surprised by his remarkable rise to the pinnacle of Russian politics. My view is that he was simply lucky and owed his many promotions to a handful of people close to Russia’s first post-Soviet president, Boris Yeltsin. Putin’s main benefactors were Yeltsin’s daughter Tatyana and last two chiefs of staff, Valentin Yumashev and Alexander Voloshin, along with oligarchs Boris Berezovsky and Roman Abramovich, who trusted his loyalty while Yeltsin was too sick to rule in 1998-99.

Putin arrived at a table of increasing abundance laid by Yeltsin and his reformers; he was further helped by an extended period of rising global oil prices. He has had a surprisingly long run, but nobody can expect to be lucky forever. For more than two decades, Putin thrived on personal loyalty and relied on his slow, deliberate approach to decision-making. However, as the invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel, his many flaws and weaknesses are now coming to the fore.

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Despite being in power for more than two decades, Putin has never broadened his expert base. Instead, he has stuck to his former KGB colleagues and old St. Petersburg technocrats along with a small number of economists and lawyers. How can anybody seriously listen to Nikolai Patrushev or Yuri and Mikhail Kovalchuk? They are considered among Putin’s closest advisers but they are full of old-style Soviet conspiracy theories.

Putin himself has consistently refused to rely on any sources of information other than his own intelligence agencies. In his big media events, he has repeatedly shown that he believes in all manner of conspiracy theories. In other words, he has consciously chosen to remain poorly informed.

He has never been a fast decision maker or crisis manager and has always taken his time. For much of his reign this has not been a major issue, but that is no longer true in the current wartime environment. Putin’s obvious lack of skill as a crisis manager is presumably one of the reasons why so many important decisions related to the war in Ukraine are late and inconsistent.

Putin is also a micromanager who is reluctant to delegate and prone to over-centralizing. He has persistently gone far too deep into details. Much of the failure of the war in Ukraine seems to have been caused by Putin insisting on deciding too much himself, just like Hitler during World War II. Military decisions require detailed knowledge which Putin simply does not possess. He is also physically far from the battlefield due to his lack of personal courage.

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Since 2000, Putin has systematically destroyed Russia’s state institutions and imposed extreme repression. One consequence is that his regime has very little capacity to generate, receive, or utilize negative feedback. Everybody around him has learned that he only wants to hear good news. As a result, neither he nor his administration learn much from their mistakes.

Many biographers of Putin have been reluctant to discuss allegations that he has been deeply involved in organized crime and kleptocracy for much of his political career. Nevertheless, awareness of this kleptocracy is vital for anyone seeking to understand today’s Russia. Far-reaching criminal influence has made the Russian state rot from within. It can neither manage processes nor produce things effectively.

A peculiarity of the Putin regime is that the ruler actually offers two-way loyalty, unlike Stalin. Putin recognizes only one crime, disloyalty. If one of his underlings happens to steal a billion or two, it is not typically seen as a problem. Nor does Putin fire anybody because of incompetence. Instead, incompetent senior officials are forgiven for their frequent blunders as long as they remain personally loyal to Putin.

The invasion of Ukraine has exposed widespread corruption and incompetence throughout the Russian military and defense sector, but Putin’s old friends and allies remain in their posts. Rather than dismissing the many incompetent Russian generals, Putin prefers to circulate them. The most outstanding failures, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, have not lost their jobs despite their obvious and costly mistakes.

With the invasion of Ukraine now in its sixteenth month, Putin’s limitations as a leader have left Russia heading for an historic defeat. During the early years of his reign, he benefited from the hard work done before him by 1990s reformers and enjoyed favorable international conditions, but his many sins and shortcomings are now clearly catching up with him.

Anders Åslund is a senior fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum and author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

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The relaunch of Ukraine’s Supreme Court was one of the initial efforts to reform the country’s widely discredited judiciary in the initial aftermath of the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. However, it did not produce the desired results as a number of factors robbed the court of true independence. Unreformed judicial governance bodies were tasked with hiring Supreme Court judges, with civil society offered a superficial role in the selection process and Ukraine’s international partners largely standing aside. As a result, civil society observers assessed that around a quarter of all selected candidates were questionable.

The creation of the High Anti-Corruption Court in 2017-2019 was a more positive experience, with all candidates scrutinized by an independent panel composed of international experts. This paved the way for the cleansing of two judicial governance bodies, the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges, with foreign experts once more playing a crucial role.

In January 2023, Ukraine appointed eight new members to the country’s key judicial governance body, the High Council of Justice (HCJ), thereby enabling it to resume its work. On June 1, the HCJ appointed new members to the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ), which is another significant step forward. However, it is important to highlight that no agents of change from civil society were appointed, while two of the new members have questionable reputations. The next challenge is for the HQCJ to finish qualification assessments and hire judges to fill more than 2,500 vacancies. In addition, further measures are also expected in order to restore public trust in the Supreme Court.

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The next big issue on the path toward rule of law and EU accession is the selection procedure of Constitutional Court judges. EU candidate country status has opened up an historic opportunity to repair the Constitutional Court, which has long wielded effective veto power over any reform efforts in Ukraine. Reforming the Constitutional Court is widely seen as the most politically challenging element of judicial reform for the Ukrainian government to implement.

Additionally, some anti-corruption initiatives that were justifiably put on hold following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion must now be revived. This includes asset declarations for all state officials. The recent bribery charges brought against the head of the Supreme Court underline the urgency of a return to the asset declaration submission and verification process. Concerns regarding this issue have recently been voiced by the International Monetary Fund and EU Ambassador to Ukraine Matti Maasikas.

An independent judiciary and the rule of law have long been recognized as vital pillars for Ukraine’s future success. As the country looks toward the post-war recovery period, these factors are now more important than ever. During the rebuilding process, Ukraine’s partners will demand transparency and security for all state and private sector investments. Additionally, judicial reform has a central role to play in Ukraine’s further EU integration. Crucially, creating a fair legal environment free from corruption is also a key demand of Ukrainian society, including the hundreds of thousands currently defending the country against Russian invasion.

Olena Halushka is a board member at AntAC and co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory.

As these new ICC arrest warrants are under seal, only relevant Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) staff and law enforcement partners know details, such as the identity of the accused. The OTP has, however, requested the unsealing of all arrest warrants and judges are considering that request. While not possible to glean identities for certain, there are some indications that the targets may be high profile.

By way of context, the ICC does not have its own police to enforce its orders, relying on cooperation from states—meaning the law enforcement agencies of the ICC’s 123 states parties and other countries willing to assist—like all international tribunals do. As such, international prosecutors use the element of surprise provided by sealed warrants, where they believe an arrest in the not-so-distant future is feasible. It is possible that arrests are in the making, with authorities in Tripoli or Benghazi willing to arrest foes that enter their controlled territory. Police in Tunisia, an ICC state party, may assist, given that many travel from Libya to Tunis for leisure, business, or medical purposes.

Yet, there are compelling reasons to believe the OTP is targeting senior individuals. To unseal arrest warrants often indicate a belief that an arrest cannot be executed anytime soon. Unsealing is done primarily to isolate and delegitimize more senior—and often more well-protected—targets through the pressure that public indictments can generate. Most importantly, the ICC has limited resources for each of the seventeen countries it is involved in, meaning it often must focus on the most senior and/or most responsible individuals to make the greatest impact with the smallest investment possible. Adding six cases to its existing one Libyan case—Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, the son of Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi—means it is unlikely the OTP will have the wherewithal to open additional cases. So, assuming these arrest warrants are all the ICC can muster for the foreseeable future, the odds are that at least some of the accused individuals are well-known figures in Libya.

Recommendations for policymakers

It is all too common for ICC arrest warrants to be interpreted as panaceas for larger societal ills or organic harbingers of change rather than as external attempts to foster positive change. These new warrants are no different and will not magically resolve the situation. To support these arrest warrants specifically and nurture their general catalytic effect, policymakers focused on Libya should consider the following recommendations.

The Ukraine-Russia conflict changed the global landscape across different sectors and international criminal justice is no exception. Antiquated US law on the ICC was overhauled significantly—including allowing the US government to support the ICC financially—and done so by strong bipartisan support. However, these changes were primarily limited to Ukraine. Both advocates on Capitol Hill and in the Biden administration should push for further amendments to US law to allow for Libyan victims to receive the same level of support as Ukrainian victims. This includes underwriting US in-kind support of ICC activities in Libya and providing grants for non-governmental organizations to support the work of the ICC and accountability writ large in Libya.

Separately, the mandate of the United Nation’s Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya (FFM) was not renewed and closed operations on March 31. Last summer, actors pushing for the FFM to continue until conditions change on the ground—most acutely the United States, European countries, and Libyan civil society—failed to come to an agreement with Libya and its African and Middle East allies, resulting in an unprecedented “non-renewable” mandate extension until the end of March 2023. Its closure means there are no independent, intragovernmental human rights entities carrying out investigative work in Libya at present. While it maintains jurisdiction and there are preliminary discussions of opening a field office, the ICC’s mandate and resources mean its focus will remain solely on mass criminality and on only a sliver of those involved.

By contrast, United Nations (UN) investigative bodies have broader mandates that include, for example, issues of state responsibility and a wide range of human rights violations—such as attacks on human rights defenders, women’s rights, and rights of minorities—that do not meet the threshold of, for instance, crimes against humanity. Khan and the OTP also publicly praised the FFM for the tangible support provided to its criminal investigation, most recently at the UNSC briefing.

UN investigative bodies like the FFM are the vanguard of interactions with and between affected communities and governments, vetting numerous kinds of allegations and providing the world with a full picture of what is truly happening in the country. For instance, despite several internal and external challenges, the FFM generated six well-received reports—including two optional longer ones—covering numerous categories of violations.

On top of losing such thorough reporting, the negative repercussions of the FFM’s closure are compounded by the fact that there was and remains zero justifications on the ground for its closure; to the contrary, all indicators of future violence and armed conflict are present. The reality is that geopolitics between the West and the Middle East and North African states led to its closure, not circumstances on the ground. Rectifying this error would reaffirm the international community’s commitment to positive change in Libya.

Another relatively recent development in international criminal justice has been the advent of UN investigative mechanisms, which are non-prosecutorial bodies that conduct their own investigations and act as a clearinghouse of evidence collection and analysis. Unlike the UN investigative bodies that have quite broad mandates that include non-criminal work, the primary purpose of these mechanisms is to build prosecution-ready casefiles for domestic and international jurisdictions that may have the power to prosecute atrocity crimes and human rights abuses. Temporary mechanisms have been created for Syria, Myanmar, and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’s (ISIS) crimes in Iraq.

Yet, momentum is building to evolve this concept, just like the temporary international tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda led to the creation of the ICC. Calls to establish a global, standing investigative mechanism, with Libya as its first referral, have already been levied. Such a mechanism would not only enhance the global infrastructure on atrocity crimes accountability, but would also strengthen the prospects of justice across Libya by empowering both foreign courts with jurisdiction—e.g. European courts with authority over crimes committed in migration—and an international tribunal like the ICC, which relies on the support of such partners to augment their work.

One of the more striking findings by the FFM was that, unlike most other conflicts, Libyan judges and lawyers are trying to do their jobs in principled fashions. However, like most other conflicts, they experience significant repression from state and non-state actors. For example, the FFM interviewed many victims who had one or more judicial orders authorizing their release, which their captors ignored habitually, resulting in their brutal torture and detention in miserable conditions lasting for months, if not years. Additionally, judges and lawyers were regularly intimidated, punished, and/or subjected to violence for “unfavorable” judicial orders or for representing clients that authorities found undesirable. Policymakers should want to support these brave professionals through more robust rule of law projects in Libya, as well as through human rights defenders’ programs and advocacy campaigns.

Undoubtedly, these ICC arrest warrants are welcome developments. They help cement the importance of accountability in charting a better future for Libya and provide a glimmer of hope in a country currently possessing little of it. If well supported, these arrest warrants can serve as catalysts for the broader accountability and rule of law support needed across Libya. Yet, on their own, these arrest warrants will have a limited impact. If left unsupported, Libyan and international stakeholders will forsake this unique opportunity to change the culture of impunity that persists in the country’s East, West, and South. This must not be a case of another good opportunity in Libya going to waste.

Christopher “Kip” Hale has led investigations of atrocity crimes in conflict zones for the United Nations (UN) and a non-governmental organization, most recently as the Investigation Team Leader of the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya. Follow him on Twitter: @kiphale.

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Ukraine must reduce role of state in the economy to boost EU integration

David Clark — Sat, 27 May 2023 19:21:48 +0000

The European Commission’s Spring economic forecast for Ukraine, which was published last week, offered a more upbeat assessment of the country’s prospects than might have been expected given the devastating impact of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Despite contracting by nearly 30% in 2022, the Ukrainian economy has, according to the Commission, “demonstrated remarkable resilience” under unprecedented stress, with stabilization this year potentially paving the way for recovery in 2024, depending on the security context.

Moreover, the report makes clear that Ukraine’s fate remains, to a significant extent, in its own hands. Even in the face of ongoing Russian aggression, the country can begin reconstruction and make strides toward the goal of EU membership provided it is willing, finally, to confront problems of internal reform and governance that have held Ukraine back since independence.

The Commission forecast identifies a number of specific reform goals including reducing the much-increased role of the state in the economy, solving the endemic issue of corruption, improving the efficiency of the judiciary, and strengthening the enforceability of property rights. As anyone with experience of Ukraine’s previous reform efforts knows, these problems are deeply interconnected. The organized misappropriation of public resources for private gain is the product of a state that is simultaneously too pervasive in its reach, yet too institutionally weak to exercise its powers of regulatory and judicial oversight effectively and in the national interest. A successful reform program would be one that enabled the state to do less but do it better.

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To attract the huge volumes of investment, especially private capital, needed to kick start reconstruction and get the economy back on its feet, Ukraine will need to pivot away from war economy measures toward a strategy of private sector growth. The numerous emergency nationalizations that took place last year were understandable at a time when arms production and energy supply were the most urgent priorities. But in the battles that lie ahead, Ukraine’s survival will be determined as much by its economic strength as by its military prowess.

The role of the state was already outsized before Russia’s invasion, with more than 3,500 state-owned enterprises accounting for one-tenth of Ukraine’s output and about 18% of employment. The demands of war mobilization have created a public sector that is now far larger than in any existing EU member state. In the banking sector alone, the state’s share has reached nearly 60%, stifling competition to the point where the Ministry of Finance has been forced to acknowledge that there is currently no functioning financial services market.

Although the prewar target of reducing the state’s share to less than a quarter remains, the Ukrainian parliament is now debating a draft law intended to permit the nationalization of even more banks. The law is designed to deal with a single case, the proposed nationalization of the Sens Bank. However, it is drawn so broadly that critics fear it will give the state discretionary powers to take over almost any bank it wishes. This includes not only those banks that have been targeted with official state sanctions, but also those included on the “shame list” of businesses that continue to trade with Russia.

While it is perfectly understandable that Ukraine should wish to penalize businesses that have failed to cut their ties to Russia, the satisfaction of seizing their assets may come at a high cost if market confidence is undermined by the weakening of property rights. Some legal experts have also questioned whether these widely drawn powers are in line with the Ukrainian Constitution, and have argued that only the National Bank of Ukraine is empowered to approve the nationalization of a bank in cases of insolvency. Nationalizations pushed through by the government for political reasons are likely to be challenged successfully in the courts, according to legal observers.

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An additional consideration is that any increase in the state’s control of the economy is likely to fuel concern about corruption, which remains one of the main obstacles on the path to EU accession. The boundaries between political and economic power, which too often remain blurred in the characteristically post-Soviet style, need to be much more sharply delineated. As numerous scandals have shown, state-controlled banks and enterprises create huge opportunities for self-enrichment and abuses of power by those who control them ostensibly on the nation’s behalf, including kickbacks, nepotism, excessive salaries, and favoritism in the awarding of public contracts.

Instead of considering new measures to extend the state’s reach into the economy, the Ukrainian government should be thinking about how the state can divest itself of assets it has already acquired in a way that is fair, transparent, and most likely to foster the economic growth Ukraine badly needs.

If one of the few beneficial effects of the war has been to accelerate Ukraine’s deoligarchization, one of the emerging risks in its aftermath will be the danger of reoligarchization via privatizations that are opaque and marred by favoritism. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy must resist the temptation to use patronage to create a business class loyal to him. That would leave Ukraine looking less like an EU member-in-waiting and more like a miniature version of Putin’s crony capitalism. There would be no victory in such an outcome.

David Clark was Special Adviser on Europe at the UK Foreign Office 1997-2001 and now works as an independent analyst specializing in foreign policy and European affairs.

Mackinder’s ideas have long held a fascination for those inclined to deterministic and reductive interpretations of international history. For most serious historians and foreign policy practitioners, however, his ideas are far too simplistic and doctrinaire to explain the full gamut of reasons for events in the past, or to facilitate realistic policy formulation in the present.

Mackinder’s arguments were very much of their time, especially in respect of the early twentieth century’s pervasive imperial thinking. His conclusions also reflect the military technologies then available. Attitudes toward imperialism have radically altered since Mackinder was writing, and technological development has generally acted to undermine many of his core assumptions.

Moreover, with the establishment of the Warsaw Pact following World War II, Moscow did establish control over Mackinder’s Heartland, which it then enjoyed for several decades. However, this in no way enabled the Kremlin to dominate the rest of the world.

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Far from being a story of Euro-Atlantic sea power moving to dominate the Heartland, NATO enlargement since 1997 has overwhelmingly been a response to dynamic lobbying by former Warsaw Pact members. Some, such as Poland, immediately sought sanctuary without waiting to see what sort of country the new Russian Federation might become. Others made applications once Putin and the clan which captured the Russian state at the turn of the millennium revealed their intention to reverse rather than manage Russia’s imperial decline.

In most cases, applications were met with initial skepticism by existing NATO members. Yet Patrushev ignores this and wholly removes agency from what he terms as the small states of Eastern Europe when he implies that NATO membership was imposed on them.

Overtures toward Moscow at the end of the Cold War that might have been read as condoning a sphere of influence were made in the expectation that the Russian Federation would develop into a democratic and rule of law-based society. Indeed, many of the applications to join NATO by former Warsaw Pact nations would not have been made if Russia had evolved meaningfully in that direction. Instead, Russia’s unreconstructed imperial mindset has been instrumental in persuading countries in Central and Eastern Europe that NATO membership is the only way to guarantee their national security.

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Patrushev promotes a conspiracy-driven view of the world that is all-too-common in today’s Russia. In reality, strong international support for Ukraine derives not from outdated geopolitical dogmas or anti-Russian agendas, but from a principled and realistic assessment of what is at stake for democratic, rule of law-based societies around the world should Russia prevail in its aggression. In other words, it is the gallantry of Ukrainians in defending the principles they have chosen, not the space Ukraine occupies on the map, which begets such broad support.

Patrushev’s interview contained a number of other idiosyncratic and occasionally lunatic assertions, which any countries engaging with Russia would do well to take note of when deciding how to calibrate their relations with Russia and Ukraine. His arguments may often appear absurd, but similar claims are regularly repeated by other Russian officials when addressing both domestic and international audiences.

Broad-based support for Ukraine and its Euro-Atlantic integration is far more about ideas and values than about early twentieth century geopolitical abstractions or other obscure theories. Indeed, it is Ukraine’s adoption and defense of core democratic principles which lie at the heart of Moscow’s fear and loathing.

Richard Cashman is an Adjunct Fellow at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

Universal jurisdiction trials

One of the few accountability tools currently employed for Syria is the framework of universal jurisdiction, which enables domestic courts to try atrocity crimes committed outside of their borders based on the premise that the crime is so grave that it threatens the international community as a whole. Many countries only allow cases to proceed if a suspect is present within their borders, and thus there have been a limited number of cases on Syria. Many of these cases have focused on terrorism charges and only a few have been against Assad regime–linked perpetrators.

With normalization, Assad and his regime’s senior leadership may increasingly travel outside of Syria and the region. Any country wanting to support Syrians’ demands for accountability should ensure they have the laws and resources available to arrest, investigate, and prosecute any suspected war criminal who ends up on their soil.

Most perpetrators will likely avoid traveling to countries in Western Europe that oppose normalization and are known for bringing universal jurisdiction cases, such as Germany and France. However, universal jurisdiction laws extend outside of Western Europe, to Eastern Europe, Asia, South America, Africa, and even some countries in the Middle East. While most of these countries have rarely or even never used their universal jurisdiction laws, concerted advocacy by civil society in Syria and the relevant country, combined with support or resources from countries with more practice on universal jurisdiction cases, could help change the tide.

Where perpetrators are found in countries that fail to try them under universal jurisdiction frameworks, countries could also follow the example set by Belgium in seeking to prosecute former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture. This could include issuing arrest warrants under their universal jurisdiction laws, following up with extradition requests wherever perpetrators are found, and bringing cases at the International Court of Justice or other international tribunals to ultimately ensure trials.

Trials of senior leadership in national courts

While universal jurisdiction trials typically require the presence of a perpetrator, some civil law countries allow for certain trials to proceed in absentia, provided there are sufficient safeguards to protect a defendant’s fair trial rights. For example, France can hold in absentia trials when the victim is a national of that country. French authorities are using these laws to try three architects of the Assad regime’s detention and torture apparatus—Ali Mamlouk, Jamil Hassan, and Abdel Salam Mahmoud—for their alleged role in arbitrarily detaining, torturing, and killing a father and son who were French-Syrian dual nationals. This trial will not result in the imprisonment of the accused if they are found guilty, at least for now. It will, however, serve as a powerful moment for Syrian victims and lawyers to present evidence against those responsible for designing and ordering atrocity crimes in Syria.

To help close the justice gap for Syria, countries with authority to hold in absentia trials should explore opportunities that may be available and fill strategic gaps in the Syria accountability space. For example, this might include cases against high-level perpetrators who may be less likely to travel to countries with universal jurisdiction trials but whose cases may have significant symbolic importance for victims.

While universal jurisdiction trials are proceeding slowly for Syria, many countries have been eager to bring universal jurisdiction cases related to Ukraine. In the past year, Germany, Canada, and other countries have opened structural investigations to begin building universal jurisdiction cases against Russian perpetrators. These countries should proactively investigate links between the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria to ensure that any future trials related to Ukraine also incorporate relevant links to Syria. For example, a Russian commander responsible for atrocity crimes in Ukraine may have committed those same crimes in Syria. Officials liable for the use of Iranian drones to facilitate atrocity crimes in Ukraine may have done the same in Syria. Or Syrian soldiers reportedly recruited to Ukraine may have committed atrocity crimes in Syria.

Whenever an apprehended perpetrator is suspected of committing crimes in both Ukraine and Syria, both sets of crimes should feature in a universal jurisdiction trial.

Ensuring reparations for Syrian victims

One element of justice, in addition to trials determining legal responsibility for crimes, is reparations for victims to help them recover and rebuild their lives. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, countries have eagerly explored legal avenues to seize Russian assets and use the proceeds to ensure reparations and reconstruction in Ukraine. As recently as May 17, the Council of Europe established a register of damages for Ukraine as a first step toward ensuring compensation for Ukrainian victims. Lest countries want to support selective justice, they should explore the application of these legal tools to ensure that Syrian victims also receive reparations for the harm they have suffered.

Normalization will ensure that individuals connected to the Assad regime have increasing access to global financial markets. These perpetrators could attempt to purchase properties overseas or place their money in foreign banks. This, in turn, would increase legal pathways to seize assets and repurpose them as reparations for Syrian victims.

Countries could also fund reparations for Syrian victims using existing pools of funding obtained as a result of violations in Syria—for example, the $778 million judgment against the French industrial company Lafarge for violations in Syria, or proceeds from sanctions violations, or the assets of Bashar al-Assad’s uncle Rifaat al-Assad, which France seized after finding him guilty of corruption.

Cases at the International Criminal Court

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is not investigating crimes committed in Syria because Syria is not a member state of the ICC and because Russia and China vetoed a United Nations Security Council referral to the ICC. However, Syria does not fall entirely outside of the ICC’s jurisdiction. Using the precedent established for Myanmar in 2019, ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan could open an investigation into crimes committed in Syria that resulted in forced deportation to Jordan, an ICC member state.

The ICC is a particularly important accountability avenue to activate for Syria. An ICC investigation would, for example, make available additional resources to investigate and build cases. It would also send a message to Assad because the ICC can issue arrest warrants for and try sitting heads of state. National courts do not have this authority under international law. Thus, while Assad is still in power, the ICC is virtually the only avenue to secure his arrest and subsequent trial. And the modern era of accountability has seen relatively high success for ensuring that heads of state or major military forces who are subject to arrest warrants or indictments face accountability.

Khan has received multiple requests to open an investigation into Syria but has thus far failed to do so. A referral of Syria by an ICC member state would significantly increase the likelihood of an investigation. Dozens of countries were motivated last year to refer Ukraine to the ICC and should consider doing the same for Syria.

Cases at the International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) also can ensure accountability for Syria by hearing a case against the state (in contrast, the ICC tries cases against individual perpetrators). The Netherlands and Canada are preparing to bring the first ICJ case against Syria for violations of the Convention Against Torture.

Countries could bring other cases against Syria at the ICJ, for example, for violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Since Syria acceded to the convention in September 2013—a month after carrying out a sarin gas attack near Damascus that reportedly killed 1,300 people—the Assad regime has been accused of hundreds of chemical weapons attacks. Any member state of the Chemical Weapons Convention that wishes to support accountability could bring a case against Syria at the ICJ.

The trend towards normalizing relations with Assad was not inevitable. Normalization is happening now because states have failed to use existing accountability tools to bring Assad and his regime to justice. But the tools are still available, and some opportunities to use them may be increasing. Justice for the horrors experienced by millions of Syrians is long overdue, and more concerted efforts by countries to pursue justice may help counter the trend in normalization.

Elise Baker is a staff lawyer with the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project. Previously, she worked at the United Nations International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism on Syria and led Physicians for Human Rights’ Syria Mapping Project, which documented attacks on Syria’s health care system.

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The US needs to be proactive in order to break its escalatory cycle with Iran

C. Anthony Pfaff — Wed, 24 May 2023 15:49:44 +0000

Here we go again. On March 23, Iran-backed Iraqi militias launched a drone attack that killed an American contractor and wounded another, as well as twenty-four US military personnel. The attack feels very much like a repeat of the one in December 2019, which also killed a US contractor and led to an escalatory cycle, where a US strike killed Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander, Qasem Soleimani, and Kataib Hezbollah leader, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. The cycle ended when Iran fired missiles at US forces on the Iraqi base at Ain al-Asad. The missiles overshot the base, causing no casualties, thereby mitigating the need for a US response.

In response to the more recent attacks, the United States carried out strikes the next day against IRGC facilities, reportedly killing nineteen people, including three Syrian regime soldiers and sixteen members of Iran-backed militias operating in Syria. On March 25, militants responded with another attack on a base that houses US forces, but there were no casualties.

Iran-backed militias struck again at a base near the Conoco gas field, which caused some material damage, but it didn’t result in any casualties. The United States again responded with strikes and extended a carrier deployment in the Mediterranean Sea as further deterrence. Thus ended, it seems, another escalatory cycle where rockets were fired, drones were launched, and bombs were dropped.

However, the aforementioned tit-for-tat exchanges have not been the only ones. In fact, there have been almost eighty attacks against US forces since 2021. While the United States should respond when Iran and its proxies attack, it is not always clear how to do so in ways that do more good than harm.

In 2020, the US response also provoked widespread anti-US demonstrations that called for the expulsion of US forces and included an attack on the American embassy in Baghdad, forcing the evacuation of most of its staff. On the first anniversary of Soleimani’s death, the embassy was rocketed again, killing an Iraqi soldier guarding it.

This dynamic is the strategic version of a “coddiwomple,” which means to travel purposefully towards a vague destination. Doing so may be fine for certain lifestyles, but it is no way to run foreign policy. Tit-for-tat retaliation against Tehran-sponsored attacks may represent a way forward—it is just not clear to where.

The United States needs to be proactive—not reactive

Unlike in the past, the drone strike that killed the American contractor on March 23 was launched into Syria from Iraq. While the Iraqi government has been unable to constrain militia activity inside its borders, it has a strong interest in preventing its territory from being used as a base of operations. This concern is especially acute with Nujaba, which sees itself not just as an Iranian ally, but as part of Iran’s regional efforts to expand its influence.

Given the strong popular reaction to Iranian influence that triggered the October 2019 protests and, perhaps, most importantly, the election results in October 2021, the Iraqi government may be in a position to isolate Nujaba and pressure it to cease cross-border attacks on US forces without generating backlash from the other militias. In fact, other militias may benefit if Nujaba—which broke away from Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq in 2013—was diminished.

As noted above, under current conditions, not responding to attacks on US forces simply encourages more attacks. Thus, as a response such passivity invites escalation as much as a kinetic strike. At the moment, however, US retaliation is reactive, which allows Iran and its proxies to engage on their terms and, thus, manage their costs. While potentially escalatory, it may make sense to be more proactive in engaging militia and IRGC entities and their ability to conduct operations. Such efforts could include kinetic strikes on assets in Syria, where they pose the greatest threat, but should also consist of non-lethal efforts to disrupt regional communications and support systems through other means.

While maintaining a carrier presence in the Mediterranean makes sense in the short term, a longer-term solution could entail a more robust and continuous naval and air presence in the Persian Gulf, which the Iranians do not have an effective response to. While the US is sending additional forces to the region in response to the Iranian seizure of oil tankers, deploying these forces could be more effective if tied to a broader deterrent strategy rather than as an answer to an immediate crisis.

The recent normalization of relations brokered by China, as well as the ongoing Saudi-Iran dialogue hosted by Iraq, depend on regional stability for their success, which is undermined by these continuous escalatory cycles. Thus, it makes sense to enlist support from Saudi Arabia and even Beijing to pressure Iran to cease attacks against US forces. Of course, neither are likely in a mood to assist the United States; however, pointing out the link between normalization and stability is an appeal to their self-interest. To the extent that Iran is interested in relations with Saudi Arabia and China, it may be incentivized to cease attacks.

Taken together, these measures can create space where Iran remains relatively free to exert influence while constrained in the violence it sees fit to employ. It also bolsters US options to retaliate should these efforts fail. This path gives the United States more options to pressure Iran and its proxies while possibly bolstering the Iraqi government’s position relative to the militias. Such an equilibrium may not be ideal, but at least it could lower the temperature and decrease attacks against US forces. If reached, this could buy time for the United States and its partners to further leverage the thawing of Saudi-Iran relations—and Iraq’s role in it—to create better conditions for regional stability.

Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative and the research professor for Strategy, the Military Profession, and Ethics at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), US Army War College in Carlisle, PA. The Opinions expressed here are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the US government.

The post The US needs to be proactive in order to break its escalatory cycle with Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ahmad in Foreign Policy: It’s time to recognize the Taliban

Atlantic Council — Tue, 23 May 2023 15:40:00 +0000

Original Source

The post Ahmad in Foreign Policy: It’s time to recognize the Taliban appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In Pakistan, populist Imran Khan faces the biggest challenge of his political career

Roohan Ahmed — Mon, 22 May 2023 14:08:58 +0000

Earlier this month, Khan was arrested by Pakistan’s paramilitary Rangers during a hearing for a corruption case at the Islamabad High Court. This came after the country’s anti-corruption watchdog issued warrants for his arrest related to the case. Moments later, Khan’s supporters took to the streets in protest, setting ablaze public and private property. Amidst their anger, the violent protesters did something that no political party has done in decades: they set ablaze the official residence of a three-star general in the eastern city of Lahore, with some going so far as to enter military headquarters in Rawalpindi to vent their frustration.

Imran Khan and his political party (the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf, or PTI) have denied that their supporters were behind the violent protests, instead alleging that it was a conspiracy to squash the party and its followers. The former prime minister—now out on bail by the country’s Supreme Court—claims that General Asim Munir, Pakistan’s army chief, is leading a crackdown against Khan and his party.

However, the attacks on military installations brought a perhaps unintended but serious consequence—they gave Khan’s opponents a golden opportunity to dismantle the PTI. The military suggested that those who staged violent protests be tried under the Pakistan Army Act and the Official Secrets Act, a suggestion that has been approved by current Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s civilian government.

Thousands of Khan’s party workers have been arrested across Pakistan and over a dozen leaders and former lawmakers have left the party. Those who still remain loyal to the former prime minister are either in jail or on the run. The political turmoil that Pakistan has been going through since last year could further dent the country’s turbulent democracy, and Khan’s opponents are not the only ones behind it.

Imran Khan, unlike other politicians, does not believe in talks with his rivals to settle political disputes. Instead, he stages rallies and calls opponents “thieves” and “looters” in front of thousands of supporters. His arrogance and refusal to engage in political dialogue with rivals has brought Pakistan’s political scene to a point of no return.

As a result, the situation is unlikely to improve anytime soon.

Khan’s main rivals—the parties of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and former President Asif Ali Zardari—have been long active in the country’s politics. They, too, have experienced the wrath of the military establishment currently faced by the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf. Their governments were either thrown out of power or weakened because of the establishment’s meddling. In the end, though, their parties still exist and remain key civilian players in Pakistan’s politics. Likewise, attempting to dismantle Khan’s political party will not simply make his support base and influence disappear.

Democracy is about not the politicians, but the voters who send these men and women into the corridors of power. There is no denying that Imran Khan and the PTI have a support base in almost every city of the country. If his party is dismantled, his supporters may lose interest in politics and serve to strengthen undemocratic forces in Pakistan, a trend which has long plagued its political landscape.

Imran Khan, with all his faults, is a popular leader and should face the law as would any other politician. That said, attempts to break his party should not only be opposed by all the political parties, but especially by those who are in the current government. If Khan and his military backers’ undemocratic sidelining of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and former President Shehbaz Sharif’s party before the 2018 elections was indeed wrong, then the same rule must apply to the equally undemocratic crackdown against the PTI.

Democracy remains the only system that can save Pakistan from plunging into darkness. To strengthen it, all political parties need to come together and agree to the earliest date possible to hold countrywide elections in hopes of alleviating the political crisis. This fight is about power. Power comes from the people, and elections remain the only way to have their voice heard in government.

Roohan Ahmed is an independent journalist based in Islamabad covering politics and extremist groups in the region.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

In Pakistan, populist Imran Khan faces the biggest challenge of his political career” class=”gta-horizontal-featured–img” />

SouthAsiaSource May 10, 2023

Experts react: Former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s arrest and implications for Pakistan

By South Asia Center and other experts

On March 9, 2023, former Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan was arrested over corruption charges. We asked experts to react to this decision.

Corruption Elections

In Pakistan, populist Imran Khan faces the biggest challenge of his political career” class=”gta-horizontal-featured–img” />

SouthAsiaSource May 3, 2023

How Pakistani women use technology solutions to overcome barriers to entrepreneurship

By Fatimata Ndiaye, Ishani Srivastava, Estelle Thomas, and Yiran Zha

A field study of women entrepreneurs in urban Pakistan, commissioned by the South Asia Center in conjunction with Johns Hopkins University and the American Pakistan Foundation, revealed how technology solutions can support women to jumpstart their entrepreneurial ventures.

Entrepreneurship Pakistan

In Pakistan, populist Imran Khan faces the biggest challenge of his political career” class=”gta-horizontal-featured–img” />

SouthAsiaSource May 3, 2023

A conversation with Fawad Chaudhry, senior member of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf

By Fawad Chaudhry and Wajahat Khan

South Asia Center non-resident senior fellow Wajahat Khan interviewed Pakistan’s former Federal Information Minister for Broadcasting and senior member of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf Fawad Chaudhry.

Crisis Management Economy & Business

Ukraine’s European integration is the key to a sustainable peace

Stephen Nix, Zachary Popovich — Thu, 18 May 2023 21:14:09 +0000

On her first foreign trip since winning reelection in March, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas paid a highly symbolic visit to Ukraine. While in the country, the Estonian leader declared: “For peace in Europe, we need Ukraine in the EU and NATO.”

The people of Ukraine would certainly seem to agree. After over a year of defending their country against Russia’s war of aggression, Ukrainians are more committed than ever to a European future. According to recent polling data published by the International Republican Institute, 85% of Ukrainians want their country to join the EU and 82% wish to join NATO.

These trends represent a unique opportunity to integrate Kyiv within Europe’s institutional frameworks and pave the way for a sustainable peace. Ukraine’s trajectory as a free and modern European state would shore up the transatlantic community’s defense against Russian encroachment, and would also help to limit the scope for interference by Moscow’s autocratic ally in Beijing. An independent, European Ukraine not only denies Russia its delusional revanchist empire; it offers a path for Kyiv to secure freedom and prosperity centered around democratic values.

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In their quest for autocratic consolidation, Russia and China both seek to leverage economic and political vulnerabilities to expand their control over neighboring states. By building upon the support already directed to Ukraine and incorporating Kyiv within formal Western institutions, organizations like the EU and NATO would signal to other countries reliant on dominant regional powers like Russia and China that there is a better path forward.

Ukraine’s official membership status across European intrastate institutions would also provide protections from Chinese economic ambitions and expand opportunities for transatlantic states to strengthen economic and security relationships. In this sense, Ukraine’s further European integration is an imperative to safeguard Kyiv’s democratic progress along with US and European strategic interests.

Ukraine has already made considerable progress initiating the kind of institutional and political reforms necessary to formally join European institutions. After receiving official EU candidate country status in June 2022, Ukraine’s government moved quickly to adopt EU recommendations across various legislative and judicial sectors.

In 2022, the Ukrainian parliament confirmed Andriy Kostin as the new Prosecutor General, appointed Oleksandr Klymenko as the head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), and passed important reforms bolstering judicial oversight. SAPO and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) conducted almost 300 corruption investigations in the latter portion of 2022, underscoring Ukraine’s commitment to establishing transparent and accountable public institutions aligned with European ethical standards.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Europe’s collective support for Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 has built upon a growing technical relationship with Ukraine that significantly predates the current war. As recently as 2021, Ukrainian forces took part in joint military exercises with NATO colleagues. Since 2014, the Ukrainian military has implemented a wide range of NATO standards that many observers believe have helped pave the way for the remarkable successes achieved against Russia’s invading army over the past fifteen months.

Since February 2022, EU institutions have given Kyiv over $29 billion in financial aid, alongside the more than $26 billion provided by the United States. The US has been at the forefront of efforts to arm Ukraine and help the country to defend itself against Russian aggression. Countries like Germany, the UK, France, and Poland have provided growing quantities of sophisticated military assistance including fighter jets, modern battle tanks, and long-range cruise missiles.

After establishing the parliamentary Temporary Commission of Inquiry (TCI) on issues of monitoring the receipt and use of international material and technical aid during martial law, Ukraine continues to demonstrate it is equipped with both the security competencies and administrative procedures necessary to operate as a modern NATO ally.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s recent visits to Rome, Berlin, Paris, and London brought encouraging signs of a growing consensus regarding the necessity of Ukraine’s further integration. The time is now ripe for European leaders to formally include Ukraine within organizational frameworks.

Earlier strategic projects with Russia such as the Nordstream pipelines should be replaced with new long-term investments across Ukraine’s energy, tech, and agricultural sectors. Meanwhile, Ukraine must build upon the country’s recent successful institutional reforms and establish a robust reconstruction plan. Together, Ukrainians and their European partners have the potential to create not just a free Ukraine, but a better future for all of Europe.

Stephen Nix is Senior Director for Eurasia at the International Republican Institute. Zachary Popovich is a senior program associate at the International Republican Institute.

—Jason Marczak is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

It is very important to clarify that this movement by Lasso to activate the “muerte cruzada” is defined by Article 148 of Ecuador’s constitution. It will basically dissolve the National Assembly and call for new elections in six months’ time. This election includes the president and vice president positions. He will not acquire total governing powers. The only laws that he can expedite during these six months are executive decrees on economically urgent laws that have to be sanctioned by the constitutional court.

—Felipe Espinosa is the executive president of Cámara de Comercio Ecuatoriano Americana (AMCHAM).

The decision made by Lasso once again highlights the significant challenge of protecting democracy in Latin America. While the decision is in accordance with Ecuador’s constitution and a response to internal political complexity, the effective functioning of democracy relies on a balanced distribution of power. Governing through decrees diminishes one of the crucial checks on power—the National Assembly.

—Fernando Larraín is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

2. Is there anything Washington can or should do to respond?

Ecuador has become one of the United States’ closest partners in the hemisphere over the last few years. In December 2022, just days before Lasso met with US President Joe Biden at the White House, Congress approved the bipartisan United States-Ecuador Partnership Act—historic legislation given its singular focus on advancing the bilateral relationship in areas such as economic and commercial ties, the environment, and security. Congress has since then taken additional action. In March, Senators Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and James Risch (R-ID) have again led legislation focused on the bilateral partnership with the introduction of the Innovation and Development in Ecuador Act of 2023, which would include Ecuador in the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act.

The last six months have again reinforced the focus on Ecuador among many in Washington. What is needed now is continued support and vocal messages across the US political spectrum reinforcing the importance of the democratic process and for stability in Ecuador at a time in which the streets may erupt at any point.

—Jason Marczak

The United States should have a continuous policy toward the region to enhance democratic values and institutions. Only economic prosperity in the region will guarantee that the people there view the rule of law and other long-term institutions as the solution instead of populist offerings. Poverty and inequality are never good advisors, more so when you talk about values with people struggling to make a day-to-day living. This mandate requires a long-term commitment of the United States to its allies in Latin America, through economic and social programs and support for trade.

—Felipe Espinosa

3. How do you see Lasso’s “rule by decree” tenure playing out?

Lasso’s decision to govern by decree is poised to embark on a challenging journey, with its overall impact yet to be determined. Upon invoking Article 148 today, he also introduced his first decree law, effectively reducing taxes and offering much-needed relief to Ecuadorian families. Additionally, Lasso is likely to push forward with labor reform and investment reform, both of which have long been stalled in congress. These reforms have the potential to bring positive impacts to Ecuadorian families by addressing crucial aspects such as hourly employee compensation, part-time work, and fair wages. While these reforms are likely to take place, the road ahead will be tumultuous.

As expected, many members of congress do not align with Lasso’s decision to govern by decree, and it is likely that supporters of the impeachment will voice their discontent on the streets of Ecuador, potentially leading to protests similar to those witnessed in June and July of last year. The possibility of such protests, capable of paralyzing the Ecuadorian economy, adds complexity to Lasso’s governance under the “rule by decree” strategy. Navigating this challenging environment may overshadow the potential benefits these reforms can bring.

—Isabel Chiriboga is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

4. Why does this matter for the United States? What are the implications for broader hemispheric stability?

Ecuador’s stability matters far beyond the country’s borders given its role as an important US partner. Ecuador made a clear decision a few years ago to strengthen its relationship with the United States. The hemisphere is thus looking at how that decision affects the country’s trajectory at a time of growing competition with China.

—Jason Marczak

Over the years, Ecuador has emerged as a strong US partner in the hemisphere, maintaining a close alignment with the United States amid shifting government ideologies across the region. However, the ongoing political crisis in Ecuador, fueled by pressing concerns such as inequality, insecurity, and the government’s struggle to address the basic needs of its citizens, raises concerns about the relevance of the United States in the region. Once seen as an example of economic stability, Ecuador will now face uncertainty as it approaches presidential elections in six months. In general, the United States finds itself with diminishing influence in Latin America. This situation creates an opportunity for broader Chinese influence to gain traction in the region. As Ecuador’s political landscape evolves, it becomes crucial for the United States to reassess its approach and take meaningful steps to maintain and strengthen its ties with Latin American countries.

—Isabel Chiriboga

It is worth noting that Ecuador’s neighboring countries are grappling with greater internal political challenges, suggesting that the impact of this decision may not extend beyond Ecuador’s borders. Nevertheless, we can expect months of uncertainty, which will inevitably influence investment decisions and the financial market in Ecuador as governance dynamics are affected. In the upcoming months, Ecuador will undergo a political process where the focus may shift from addressing citizen concerns to matters of political power.

—Fernando Larraín

The post Ecuador’s president just invoked ‘mutual death’ to avoid impeachment. Here’s why it matters. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Chile’s right is in the driver’s seat for creating a new constitution. Can it succeed?

Ignacia Ulloa Peters — Tue, 16 May 2023 23:27:06 +0000

The clock is ticking for Chile’s new constitution—again. Chileans took to the polls this month to elect a constitutional council, a fifty-one-member group tasked with discussing and approving a new national charter. The council will have just five months to deliberate the document after it first convenes, presenting it publicly by November 7 and putting it up for a national plebiscite on December 17. But will it be able to create a constitution that voters will approve after the failed first attempt last September?

Despite many observers’ initial beliefs that the new constitution would align with the governing coalition’s left-leaning political ideologies, the final tally of the May 6 vote showed a strong swing to the right, with nearly two-thirds of the available seats going to center-right and far-right candidates.

The far-right Republican Party, led by former presidential candidate José Antonio Kast, secured twenty-three of the available seats, granting the party veto power over constitutional articles. Alongside the eleven seats won by traditional right and center-right parties, the collective influence of right-leaning council members exceeds the crucial threshold of thirty-one votes (or 60 percent) required for approving constitutional clauses. While an alliance between the Republican Party and other right-leaning factions remains uncertain, there is a strong likelihood of these groups working together.

So, will the council agree on a new constitution? Hopefully yes. But it will also need to deliver one that is then approved by the majority of voters. In short, it is in the Republican Party’s best interest that the draft constitution does not solely embody conservative values. Absolute veto power and the ability to approve clauses by allying with traditional and center-right members of the constitutional council means that the elected members could create the constitution they want. But if the document they produce ends up being rejected in December, the party loses its opportunity to lead the process, a prospect that is unlikely to happen again.

Moreover, voters are watching this closely as a test case for how Republicans might govern. The optics of the party successfully delivering a democratically accepted legal charter would grant the Republicans a distinct advantage over left-leaning parties and could be regarded as the cornerstone for their campaigns in the upcoming 2024 mayoral and 2026 presidential elections. These factors make it imperative that the Republican Party remains open to compromise.

The right-wing members of the new constitutional council have an opportunity that should not be missed.

The results of the election also present a dilemma for left-leaning Chilean President Gabriel Boric and his administration, particularly as their approval rating continues to decrease. How do they continue to govern considering the country’s legal charter will almost certainly be more right-leaning than they anticipated? Will they continue working to build alliances with the right or reinforce their existing posture?

In a region that is struggling with the challenges of polarization, democratic backsliding, corruption, and violence, Chile’s positive trajectory in the constitutional reform process demonstrates the importance of fostering consensus. The first attempt at reform by a left-leaning constitutional convention, deemed the world’s most progressive constitution, was rejected by voters. A shift toward unity would serve as a powerful testament to the strength of Chile’s institutions and Boric’s commitment to democracy, transparency, and representation. Failing to do so could stagnate the constitutional reform process and impede Chile’s advancement as a democratic and economic frontrunner in the region. Such a scenario would not only diminish investor confidence, but also foster distrust in the regulatory environment that has thus far enabled businesses to operate confidently in the country.

On the other hand, more than three years after the Estallido Social took to the streets, Chileans have become increasingly detached from the constitutional reform process. After the first attempt at reform was rejected in 2022, the Chilean Senate and Chamber of Deputies appointed a panel of experts to compose a revised proposal. This will next be reviewed and approved by the constitutional council, thus limiting the involvement of the general population in the document’s drafting process.

Similarly, the issues that Chileans identified as the country’s most pressing problems in 2019—such as pension and health care systems—have fallen off the radar in favor of crime, inflation, immigration, and drug trafficking. With these day-to-day issues taking the spotlight away from systemic concerns, people in Chile have shifted their attention away from the constitutional process.

The constitutional council will meet for the first time on June 7 and will begin discussing the fourteen-chapter draft proposal written by the expert commission. On December 17 the final document will once again be presented for a national plebiscite, enabling Chileans to cast their votes and determine the approval or rejection of the new constitution.

The right-wing members of the new constitutional council have an opportunity that should not be missed. Delivering a non-polarizing constitution that is approved in December is in everyone’s best interest but will not be achieved unless the majority members compromise on conservative values to create a constitution that works to the benefit of every member of society.

Ignacia Ulloa Peters is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Wagner chief’s rants highlight Russian infighting ahead of Ukraine offensive

Olivia Yanchik — Mon, 15 May 2023 13:51:14 +0000

The head of Russia’s Wagner mercenary group has launched a series of outspoken attacks on the country’s military leadership in recent weeks that point to mounting internal divisions within Putin’s invading army as it prepares to face a potentially decisive Ukrainian counteroffensive.

In one of his most recent rants, Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin mocked Russian Defense Ministry claims of a “redeployment to defensive positions” near to the hotly contested city of Bakhmut and warned that in reality, the front was in danger of collapsing. “The Defense Ministry’s attempts to cover up the situation will lead to a global tragedy for Russia,” he stated on May 12. “They must stop lying immediately.”

This was the latest in a series of public statements by Prigozhin accusing the Russian army and defense ministry of failing to provide his Wagner troops with sufficient front line support. He had earlier threatened to withdraw his forces from Bakhmut altogether due to alleged ammunition shortages.

In his many video addresses, Prigozhin has sought to burnish his own credentials as a straight-talking military man while attacking members of the Russian military establishment. Speaking in the wake of recent Russian retreats from the flanks around Bakhmut, he declared: “Soldiers should not die because of the absolute stupidity of their leadership.”

He also raised eyebrows last week by referring mockingly to a “happy grandpa,” which many assumed was a reference to Putin himself. This was clearly too much even for Prigozhin, who quickly released a new statement clarifying that the “grandpa” in question may have been a number of military leaders including chief of the Russian general staff Valery Gerasimov, but was most certainly not Putin.

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Prigozhin’s public attacks on Russia’s military leadership reflect his rising profile and growing swagger. The Wagner mercenary group he leads first came into being nine years ago during the initial stages of Russia’s military invasion of eastern Ukraine, at a time when the Kremlin was eager to maintain a degree of plausible deniability. Subsequent roles in Syria and Africa allowed Wagner to expand significantly, but it was the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 that transformed the fortunes of the mercenary force and thrust it into the international limelight.

Over the past fifteen months of the Ukraine invasion, Wagner has emerged as the only group within the Russian military to meet or surpass expectations. While units of the regular army have been decimated and forced into a series of humiliating retreats, Wagner has achieved numerous grinding advances in eastern Ukraine. This has given Prigozhin the confidence and the clout to name and shame his superiors for their alleged shortcomings. Such attacks have only added to his popularity among Russian audiences.

Prigozhin’s criticisms are in a sense hypocritical, given the notoriously high casualty rates among his own soldiers. Indeed, the brutal tactics adopted by Wagner forces in the Battle of Bakhmut have led many to describe the battle as a “meat grinder.” According to US officials, around half of the estimated 20,000 Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine since December 2022 have been Wagner troops fighting in and around Bakhmut.

Ukrainian sources have also questioned the credibility of Prigozhin’s efforts to praise the valor of his Wagner forces while accusing regular Russian troops of abandoning their positions. “The first soldiers to flee were Wagner,” a Ukrainian commander who took part in early May engagements near Bakhmut told CNN. This and other similar accounts may indicate that Prigozhin is lashing out at the army high command from a position of weakness as Wagner’s earlier exploits risk being overshadowed by more recent setbacks.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Why has Putin not intervened to end the increasingly bitter public feud between Prigozhin and Russia’s military leadership? Some see it as a sign of the Russian dictator’s own growing weakness, while others argue that it may be a deliberate ploy to position the likes of Defense Minister Shoigu and army chief Gerasimov as scapegoats for a coming defeat. At the very least, Prigozhin’s attacks on military commanders serve to deflect the blame for the failing invasion away from Putin himself.

While Prigozhin’s headline-grabbing rants may help to protect Putin from criticism on the domestic front, they also risk further undermining morale among Russian forces in Ukraine. The issue of demoralization is already posing major challenges for Russian commanders, with more cases of desertion recorded in Russian military courts in the first four months of the current year than during the whole of 2022. Recent months have also seen a sharp rise in video addresses posted to social media by Russian soldiers complaining of suicidal “human wave” tactics and catastrophic battlefield losses.

With Ukraine expected to launch a major counteroffensive in the coming weeks, Russian military morale will likely soon face its stiffest test since the invasion began in February 2022. Major question marks remain over the ability of Russian troops to stand their ground, particularly given the Kremlin’s growing reliance on poorly trained conscripts drafted into the military late last year as part of Russia’s first mobilization since World War II.

These mobilized troops proved highly ineffective during Russia’s failed winter offensive, suffering high casualties while making almost no progress. They must now prepare for defensive operations against a Ukrainian force that has been training for the coming offensive for the past six months. Russia has also been digging in and preparing sophisticated defenses, but morale will be a huge factor during what many observers predict will be some of the most intense battles of the entire war. Prigozhin’s frequent public criticism of Russian troops and commanders is unlikely to boost fighting spirit at this critical moment for Putin’s invasion.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – An in-depth conversation examining the ongoing anti-government protests in Iran following the murder of 22-year-old Mahsa Jina Amini, and the decades-long fight for gender equality and social justice in the country.

Human Rights Iran Middle East Women

The people of Iran have faced unprecedented violence from their own government in the eight months since protests arose after the death of a twenty-two-year-old Kurdish-Iranian woman at the hands of the so-called “morality police.”

But rather than let injustices ranging from beatings to executions quiet them, the Iranian people continue to showcase their bravery while speaking out against these abuses and others, with Iranian women and girls exhibiting particular courage.

As they do, Iranian women and girls not only tap into a more than century-old history of protest in Iran, but also show new resilience and creativity in their fight for change.

“This is full of energy. This is full of anger. This is different, but with some of what had been before,” Mehrangiz Kar, an Iranian women’s rights lawyer and writer, said at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on Thursday.

She, along with Iranian women’s rights advocate Azam Jangravi and Iranian actress/writer/activist Nazanin Nour, gathered in Washington to accept the Atlantic Council’s 2023 Distinguished Humanitarian Leadership Award on behalf of the women and girls of Iran who are fighting for freedom and equality.

Read on for more highlights of the discussion with Kar, Jangravi, and Nour, moderated by PBS NewsHour correspondent Ali Rogin, about the reality from the ground and how the world can support the Iranian people.

The ingenuity, and bravery, of protest

Amid the poisoning of thousands of schoolgirls and other threats of violence, Iran’s girls have made an undeniable mark while engaging in creative dissent, including recording themselves tearing and burning photos of Iran’s supreme leader—which typically mark the beginnings of their textbooks and the walls of their classrooms. “Gen Z is very adept at using TikTok and Instagram, and figuring out how to make things trend and go viral,” Jangravi said.

On International Women’s Day, five Iranian girls danced unveiled while participating in the “Calm Down” challenge that riffs on the hit song by Nigerian singer Rema and American artist Selena Gomez. The forty-second video gained global attention from mainstream outlets and garnered millions of views online. “We have never seen that level of social media activity to move a movement forward when it comes to Iran,” said Nour, who has used her own platform as an actress and writer to speak out about what’s happening in the country.

Taking their protest online has also underscored the risks Iranian women face as they speak out. In the case of the “Calm Down” video, the girls were later detained and made to give a forced apology. Many Iranians believe the schoolgirl poisonings have been at the very least tolerated by the Iranian government as punishment for their activism. “It’s very difficult for anybody to believe that a regime that uses facial recognition technology to send tickets to women who aren’t wearing their hijab properly cannot find out who is behind these poisonings,” Nour said.

It’s a reminder that, since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the women of Iran have put their lives on the line while seeking gender equality and basic human rights. “Women have used activist campaigns, NGOs, to protest the violation of their rights and demand justice and equality. However, they have paid a heavy price for their activism, including suppression, threats, imprisonment, and mental and physical torture,” Jangravi said.

Searching for new solidarity

All three women said more attention is necessary from the international community to force change from the Islamic Republic and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. “Now [the world] can understand that it’s not enough that human rights institutions work to remove gender discrimination in Iran. We can understand that all Western governments should work with human rights institutions,” Kar said.

Some four million Iranians now live abroad, and that diaspora has grown its economic, political, and social clout. “Now we have seen the diaspora rally around the people of Iran. I had never seen that level of unity,” said Nour, who is herself the daughter of Iranian immigrants and was born and lives in the United States.
Even the “smallest action,” such as female officials refusing to wear headscarves while meeting with Islamic Republic officials, helps. “Overall, the global community needs to condemn the actions of the Islamic Republic, not legitimize them,” Nour said, criticizing how the United Nations (UN) gave Iran a leadership role on at the UN Human Rights Council 2023 Social Forum on Wednesday: “It’s an absolute slap in the face to Iranians.”
That decision came just days after two men, including a dual Swedish-Iranian citizen, were executed for running a Telegram group criticizing Islam. “The government is trying to create real fear among the people through execution,” Jangravi said. The actions of those two men, and a number of Iranian women who have joined the protests, including choosing to wear shorts as a form of civil disobedience, showcases how people “from all levels of society” have come together to create change.

Nick Fouriezos is a writer with more than a decade of experience reporting around the globe.

The post Eight months into anti-regime protests, Iran’s women show creativity as they press on ‘full of anger’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Deciphering Vladimir Putin’s unspoken Victory Day message

Alexander Motyl — Thu, 11 May 2023 18:16:14 +0000

During the Cold War, Kremlinologists would famously attempt to decipher the mood within the Soviet elite by studying the seating plans on public holidays for hints of who was politically in favor and who was potentially on the way out.

This half-forgotten art is now once again in demand as analysts seek insights into the equally impenetrable Putin regime. A look at the seating arrangements during this week’s Victory Day parade in Moscow provides some indication that despite the military setbacks of the past fifteen months, Vladimir Putin is doubling down on his goal of subjugating Ukraine.

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At first glance, Russia’s annual Victory Day parade on May 9 was a non-event at best and an embarrassment at worst. Putin’s short speech held no surprises, while the presence of just one antique tank during the military parade itself could only be interpreted as evidence of the dire state of the Russian armed forces.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the event was the identity of the people selected to sit directly alongside Putin on the Red Square podium. While Victory Day marks the Soviet contribution to the defeat of Adolf Hitler, neither of the elderly gentlemen sitting alongside Putin actually fought against Nazi Germany. Instead, they were both veterans of the Soviet security services who had respectively participated in efforts to suppress Ukraine’s independence movement and crush Czechoslovakia’s 1960s anti-Soviet uprising.

To Putin’s right sat the 98-year-old Yuri Dvoikin, who volunteered for the Red Army during World War II but never actually made it to the front lines. Instead, after training as a sniper in 1944, he was dispatched by the Soviet secret police to Lviv in western Ukraine, where his job was to assist in the liquidation of the Ukrainian nationalist underground. The campaign against Ukraine’s independence movement was particularly brutal, with the Soviet authorities employing terror tactics and large-scale deportations. Although the Ukrainians were able to inflict significant casualties on Soviet forces, they were ultimately defeated by the early 1950s.

On Putin’s left sat the 88-year-old Gennady Zaitsev, who, like Dvoikin, never served in what Russia still refers to as the Great Patriotic War. He was drafted into the Red Army in 1953 and joined the KGB six years later after completing his military service. In 1968, he helped suppress the Prague Spring by, among other things, capturing the Czechoslovak Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the 1970s, KGB chief Yuri Andropov appointed Zaitsev to lead the elite Alfa anti-terrorist unit.

Eurasia Center events

Shuja Nawaz: Pakistan’s self-created vortex

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Putin did not have to sit between these two former secret policemen. Indeed, on Victory Day of all days, it would have been far more natural to appear alongside veterans of the war against Hitler’s Germany. It is therefore reasonable to assume that Putin’s choice of neighbors was a deliberate and symbolic move.

For many within the Russian and Ukrainian elites, Putin’s unspoken Victory Day message would have been crystal clear. The Russian dictator was signaling that despite widespread criticism of the Federal Security Service and its bungling role in the invasion of Ukraine, he continues to value his secret police and sees them as the linchpin of his authoritarian regime.

Putin was also signaling to Ukrainians and domestic critics of his invasion that he is willing to do whatever it takes to win. Soviet forces committed innumerable crimes in their suppression of the Ukrainian nationalist movement during the 1940s and 1950s. In 1968, they had no qualms about crushing a country that, like today’s Ukraine, sought to go its own way. By sitting alongside decorated veterans of these two criminal Soviet campaigns, Putin was indicating his approval of their actions and his readiness to embrace similar methods.

The good news is that Putin does not currently appear capable of replicating the bloody Soviet-era crackdowns in western Ukraine and Czechoslovakia. This was all too evident on Victory Day, with the lone T-34 tank rumbling across Red Square serving as the perfect metaphor for Russia’s reduced military might after suffering catastrophic losses in Ukraine. However, the Russian dictator remains defiant and is clearly keen to signal that he has no intention of backing down.

Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark.

Experts react: Former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s arrest and implications for Pakistan

South Asia Center and other experts — Wed, 10 May 2023 22:14:33 +0000

On May 9, 2023, former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan was arrested over corruption charges during his court visit in Islamabad. This sparked nationwide protests, leading to internet blockages across the country. The arrest follows longstanding tensions with and attempts to apprehend Khan, adding to Pakistan’s already escalating political and economic crises.

To offer insights about the implications of Khan’s arrest for Pakistan, the Atlantic Council’s Pakistan Initiative asked experts to react to recent developments below.

Kalsoom Lakhani: Pakistan has already been impacted by increasing political and economic instability, which will continue to exacerbate the funding challenges for startups

Ali Hasanain: Pakistan needs to finalize an IMF deal and sort out external financing if the country is to avoid default beyond June

Amber Rahim Shamsi: A Pakistani journalist’s guide to survival

To learn more about the arrest, tune in below with Pakistan Initiative Director Uzair Younus.

Pakistan’s self-created vortex

Just when one imagined Pakistan could not sink further into an economic and political morass, its leaders, civil and military, appear to have come up with yet another unnecessary crisis. The use of the military to arrest former Prime Minister Imran Khan in the sacrosanct confines of the Islamabad High Court reflects the inability of Pakistani political leaders to provide a coherent strategy to fight its economic and political woes. It also represents the inability of its military leaders to resist political engineering.

If the ultimate aim is to rid Pakistani politics of Imran Khan, then the storm that appears to have been unleashed may produce unintended and unmanageable consequences. The military’s calculations appear to hinge on expectations of a declining trend of Khan’s popularity and an inflated view of its own ability to ride out street unrest. What it may not have calculated is the cumulative effect of unrest on the national economy, currently gasping for air and heading toward hyperinflation and default, as well on its own rank and file. Will schisms emerge within the military? Or, will the unrest and mayhem serve as an excuse to postpone, perhaps indefinitely, the provincial and national elections ordained by the Constitution? Pakistan can ill afford a coup on the Egyptian model. If that were to occur, the country would struggle to survive an extended period of chaos as an economic and political pariah.

A fascinating picture of absences from Pakistan emerged this week. The prime minister had repaired to London for a coronation and extended his stay while Pakistan was burning. He returned to Pakistan and addressed the nation on May 10, 2023. The army chief was in the Gulf, if one could believe the information on FlightAware for his personal aircraft. The caretaker chief minister of the powerful Punjab province was also abroad when the drama unfolded.

Who was in charge? Who took the decision to allow a relatively small rampaging mob to break into and torch the Corps Commander House and the Governor’s House in Lahore? Where did their guards go? And where were the military guards that abandoned the gate leading to the army headquarters in Rawalpindi to the mob? Who allowed the mob to “liberate” the headquarters of the Frontier Corps at the Bala Hissar fort in Peshawar? Some pundits opined that this was a master plan of subterfuge that has yet to unfold. Social media had a field day adding to the confusion with colorful conspiracy theories till the pulling of the plug on the internet slowed their dissemination. But the images shared by hundreds of participants in the rioting created the impression that the military was being challenged with impunity by mobs of youth and angry women. Abandoned military check posts in some military cantonment areas remained a puzzle. Only a day later did the provincial authorities in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa seek military assistance in aid of civil power.

In one fell swoop, Pakistan has managed to hurt its stability more than any enemy action could have achieved. Will its leaders speak out now and take responsibility for the shambolic mess that unfolded on May 9, 2023? The silent majority of Pakistan that is suffering the effects of poor governance and secretive decision making deserves some quick and clear answers. So do Pakistan’s friends abroad, who want it to return to a path of stability and development.

Shuja Nawaz is a distinguished fellow and the founding director of the South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council, Washington DC. His latest book is The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood. Website: www.shujanawaz.com. On Twitter: @ShujaNawaz.

Pakistan has already been impacted by increasing political and economic instability, which will continue to exacerbate the funding challenges for startups

In the wake of the recent developments in Pakistan, the suspension of mobile broadband usage “indefinitely” by the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority as well as the restriction and blocking of social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube has an immediate and adverse effect on the country’s technology sector and startup ecosystem. Not only are Pakistani startups reliant on these platforms for new user acquisition and growth of their companies, but many Pakistanis are mobile first in how they engage with the digital economy, meaning their ability to leverage technology to access startups solutions for financial services, mobility, food, commerce, and other areas has been hindered and halted. Moreover, given that international perceptions of Pakistan have already been impacted by the country’s increasing political and economic instability, this will continue to drive a negative narrative of the country in the minds of investors globally, which will only exacerbate funding challenges for startups in Pakistan.

Kalsoom Lakhani is a non-resident senior fellow at the South Asia Center and co-founder and general partner of i2i Ventures. On Twitter: @kalsoom82.

Pakistan needs to finalize an IMF deal and sort out external financing if the country is to avoid default beyond June

Over the past eighteen months, every major power player in Pakistan has demonstrated a willingness to disregard the rule of law and national interest to strengthen its claim to power. This ugly fight has looked uglier as it has played out in lockstep with an economic meltdown that has led to 40 percent inflation this year. The country is seeing an endemic of personal tragedies played out over and over, triggered by normal citizens descending rapidly and seemingly hopelessly into poverty—from fathers killing children they cannot feed before taking their own lives, to stampedes in food lines.

Pakistan needs to finalize an International Monetary Fund (IMF) deal and sort out external financing if the country is to avoid default beyond June. For months, it has suffered not only from gross internal mismanagement, but a lack of coordination between its most important creditors—the IMF, the Chinese government, and its allies in the Middle East.

On May 6, 2023, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang put it bluntly while he was in Islamabad: “We sincerely hope the political forces in Pakistan will build consensus, uphold stability, and more effectively address domestic and external challenges so it can focus on growing the economy.”

Two days later, the wildly popular former Prime Minister Imran Khan has been jailed, bringing his followers into direct and physical conflict with Pakistan’s powerful military, which is seen as being behind Khan’s fall from office.

One can only wonder what Pakistan’s creditors in Beijing, Washington, Riyadh, and elsewhere must be thinking about this latest chapter in a sordid tale of economic mismanagement and intemperance in managing the country’s affairs.

Put bluntly, default appears near certain unless unprecedented corrections are embarked on over the next few days.

Ali Hasanain is an Associate Professor of Economics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) and a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. On Twitter: @AliHasanain

A Pakistani journalist’s guide to survival

Spare a thought for the journalist. Not the Whatsapp-as-a-source, vlog-from-the-basement kind of journalist, but the reporters, camerapersons, producers assignment editors, and desk editors who just want a normal country. It’s been a year since politics in Pakistan have been high on amphetamines with a generous sprinkling of LSD. They are exhausted, they are underpaid, and their stories are shaped by everything other than news value.

Just last Sunday, Sindh-based reporters were deployed to cover the local bodies elections. The stakes are high, particularly since these could offer control over Pakistan’s largest and richest city—Karachi—and as a bellwether for general elections. The local body polls have already been subject to intense legal contestation for several months. One reporter told me how his story on irregularities during polling in one station was dropped by his channel because it did not suit that channel’s agenda. Sometimes, reporters are asked to find evidence to fit a pre-determined verdict.

But what is a journalist to do when the biggest story after Khan’s arrest isn’t his first photograph in detention (yes, that’s a scoop, but a transient one), but the protests and riots that have erupted across Pakistan targeting military-owned property? I keep hearing the word “unprecedented” on international channels and social media, but only condemnation rather than nuanced context on local media. More glaringly, the visuals of protestors breaking into General Headquarters or marauding the guest house of the Lahore corps commander (that came to symbolize the post-Khan arrest reaction from his supporters) cannot be broadcasted.

I met a media manager the day after, his phone buzzing with calls from one of his bureau chiefs. “I asked him to divert the calls pressuring him to stop coverage to me,” he said, without naming who, although we both knew who he was referring to. It’s a code that doesn’t need deciphering any more. “We find ways to slip coverage into a show or a bulletin, and then run with it.”

Journalists have gotten really good at finding ways to cover the unnamed and unnameable in the last five years. For example, when one anchor couldn’t play clips of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif accusing the former army and intelligence chiefs of political manipulation, he read a carefully curated transcript on his show. Others have found solace, and subsequently legal and physical threats, through social media.

But the pockets of resistance are still small, given that political allegiance is safer and more lucrative than independent reporting. By and large, mainstream television—and to a lesser extent newspapers—have learned their lessons the hard way. On the day the press wing of the armed forces released a statement condemning Imran Khan’s accusation against a serving military officer, I was on a television show with other analysts. Two of the analysts knew their over-the-top sparring in favor of their preferred political parties would be great for ratings, so they kept at it for the bulk of the show. As soon as they were asked to comment on the military’s press statement, there was a pause, and suddenly it was hard to tell the two apart.

Amber Rahim Shamsi is the director of the Centre for Excellence in Journalism at IBA Karachi. On Twitter: @AmberRShamsi

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

SouthAsiaSource May 3, 2023

A conversation with Fawad Chaudhry, senior member of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf

By Fawad Chaudhry and Wajahat Khan

South Asia Center non-resident senior fellow Wajahat Khan interviewed Pakistan’s former Federal Information Minister for Broadcasting and senior member of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf Fawad Chaudhry.

Crisis Management Economy & Business

SouthAsiaSource Mar 22, 2023

Experts react: Elections postponed in Pakistan’s Punjab province

By South Asia Center and other experts

On March 22, 2023, the Election Commission of Pakistan announced a decision to delay elections in Punjab, the country’s most populous province. We asked experts to react to this decision.

Elections Pakistan

SouthAsiaSource Mar 6, 2023

Amid Pakistan’s political and economic turmoil, risks to curbs on digital freedoms grow

By Uzair Younus

Growing polarization and instability in Pakistan have increased the likelihood that as elections draw near, curbs on speech, largely limited thus far to television channels, may extend to internet platforms like YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter.

Civil Society Elections

Ukraine seeks more German support on Russia’s invasion and EU accession

Alyona Getmanchuk — Thu, 04 May 2023 16:16:31 +0000

Ukrainians have long admired Germany for its high standard of living and rule of law. However, for the past nine years, Berlin’s response to Russian aggression against Ukraine has often been a source of disappointment. With Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy expected to visit Berlin on May 13, many Ukrainians are hoping Germany will soon be doing more to defeat Russia’s invasion and advance their country’s European integration.

The first major milestone in Ukraine’s disillusionment with Germany was the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, when German Chancellor Angela Merkel was instrumental in vetoing a membership action plan for Ukraine. At the time, this was justified by the need to avoid provoking Russia. The mood of disappointment in Kyiv grew with Berlin’s subsequent support for the Nord Stream II gas pipeline, which appeared designed to bypass Ukraine and promised to leave the country exposed to the threat of increased Russian aggression. Germany defended this decision on purely economic grounds, but many Ukrainians argued that the economic benefits did not justify the geopolitical risks.

Germany’s involvement in the Minsk peace process from September 2014 further strengthened perceptions in Kyiv that Berlin’s priority was to avoid any decisive split with Moscow, with limited support for Ukraine often balanced by efforts to accommodate the Kremlin. For many Ukrainians, Germany’s position highlighted the inadequacy of the wider European response to Russian aggression. It was yet another example of the West’s reluctance to do anything that might be considered provocative by the Kremlin.

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With the benefit of hindsight, it is now painfully clear that policies designed to avoid provoking Putin are likely to do exactly that. The refusal to grant Ukraine a pathway to NATO in 2008 confirmed the country’s vulnerability, while Germany’s continued commitment to Nord Stream II following Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine reinforced the Kremlin’s conviction that hunger for profits outweighed any commitments to European values in Berlin. These developments helped set the stage for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Ukrainian frustration toward Germany has remained tangible since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, but has been tempered by Germany’s increasing willingness to cut ties with Russia and provide Kyiv with vital military aid. Berlin has faced significant criticism over the speed of weapons deliveries to Ukraine, but has emerged over the past fourteen months as a key partner. The early 2023 decision to provide Leopard tanks was a watershed moment in this process that reflected Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s talk of an historic “turning point” in relations with Russia almost one year earlier in the first days of the invasion.

In additional to military aid, Ukraine counts on German support in other areas. Post-war reconstruction is seen as a more straightforward issue for German involvement, with the Ukrainian authorities already expressing their gratitude for Germany’s readiness to contribute. However, any reconstruction requires a sustainable peace. This is simply not realistic until Ukraine defeats Russia militarily, which will not be possible without the expanded delivery of weapons from key Western partners such as Germany.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Kyiv officials would also like to see Berlin adopt a more supportive stance on the issue of future Ukrainian EU membership. Germany has previously played this role for other countries seeking to join the European Union, but is still regarded by many in Ukraine as being somewhat skeptical of the country’s EU ambitions and was among the last to back EU candidate nation status for Ukraine in summer 2022. This is unfortunate. After all, Ukraine’s EU membership bid has major geopolitical and security implications for the entire continent.

As part of the EU, Ukraine would no longer be viewed as a potential component part of a revived Russian Empire. Progress toward Ukrainian EU membership would also fit well with Germany’s stated objective of a post-war Ukraine with less corruption, greater rule of law, transparent business climate, and resilient institutions. I am therefore convinced that Germany will match recent statements in favor of Ukraine’s EU accession with practical support.

In addition, there are hopes in Kyiv that German attitudes toward Ukrainian NATO membership will also change. On the positive side, Chancellor Scholz and other German leaders now appear to recognize that Ukraine’s NATO aspirations were not the cause of the current Russian invasion. The challenge is to convince them that the threat of further Russian aggression will continue unless Ukraine receives security guarantees equivalent to NATO membership, regardless of whether Putin himself remains in the Kremlin.

Any lasting peace settlement must also include justice for the Ukrainian victims of Russian war crimes. Kyiv expects Germany to back the push for accountability. Key issues include the establishment of a special international tribunal and the use of seized Russian assets to help finance the reconstruction of Ukraine. It seems highly unfair for the international community to pay for damage caused by Russia. Instead, Russia should fund efforts to rebuild Ukraine.

Rebuilding Ukraine will be an historic undertaking. German companies can be expected to play a major role in what promises to be the largest European construction initiative since the years following World War II. Reconstruction will enable millions of Ukrainian refugees to return home, while creating opportunities for thousands of German businesses.

Despite the disappointments and frustrations of the past fifteen years, Germany remains a key partner for Ukraine with a critical role to play in the twin tasks of winning the war and achieving a sustainable peace. The immediate priority remains weapons; Ukraine desperately needs everything from anti-aircraft systems to tanks and ammunition in order to defeat Putin’s invasion. Looking ahead, Berlin’s backing will be vital as Ukraine seeks to rebuild, integrate further into the EU, and attain the kind of comprehensive security guarantees through NATO membership that can prevent any repeats of Russia’s current invasion.

Alyona Getmanchuk is director of New Europe Center think tank and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. An expanded German-language version of this article was originally published by Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ).

This issue brief delves into the politics of India’s evolving digital governance, focusing on the draft Digital Personal Data Protection Bill of 2022 (DPDPB). The DPDPB aims to balance the interests of Indian consumers seeking enhanced privacy and data security against the business need for unconstrained data flows. The government’s responsive approach to stakeholder feedback on previous versions of the bill indicates that achieving these goals is feasible. However, concerns persist about ambiguities surrounding data transfers and institutional arrangements that exempt the government from complying with the law in ways that may encourage surveillance and censorship of opposing viewpoints.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

Issue Brief Apr 17, 2023

Pakistan’s rapidly digitizing society requires clear policymaking

By Uzair Younus

This issue brief provides recommended steps that policymakers in Pakistan ought to take to address key concerns around free expression on the internet, and to generate momentum to catalyze higher levels of growth in Pakistan’s technology ecosystem.

Digital Policy Economy & Business

Issue Brief Mar 8, 2023

Inside Bangladesh’s new data protection laws

By Stephen Weymouth

Bangladesh Digital Policy

SouthAsiaSource Nov 23, 2022

India’s new data bill is a mixed bag for privacy

By Justin Sherman

India’s parliament has released its Digital Personal Data Protection Bill, offering a mixed bag for privacy.

Digital Policy Economy & Business

Holding the Islamic Republic of Iran accountable for atrocity crimes

Celeste Kmiotek, Alana Mitias, Nushin Sarkarati — Wed, 19 Apr 2023 13:01:49 +0000

With little to no prospect for accountability within Iran’s domestic courts, victims and survivors of serious violations of international law are turning toward an increasing number of foreign jurisdictions—most commonly in Europe and North America, but also in Latin America, Africa, and other regions—to pursue justice for human rights violations carried out by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, certain domestic justice systems allow prosecutions in national courts for crimes committed abroad, regardless of the victim’s or perpetrator’s nationality.

Universal jurisdiction stems from the concept that certain crimes are of such gravity that they harm the international community as a whole, so national courts outside the country where the violations took place may prosecute them to protect the international order. Although the crimes subject to universal jurisdiction provisions differ by state, they generally include crimes against humanity, torture, war crimes, and genocide. Limitations on universal jurisdiction also vary between states, however, as do the processes for filing complaints and procedures for investigations, trials, and appeals.

As was shown by the trial and conviction of Hamid Noury in Sweden for his involvement in the massacre of Iranian political prisoners in 1988, national prosecutions of international crimes can be a fruitful avenue to justice for victims of the Islamic Republic. To this end, the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project has compiled a guide to aid practitioners and independent investigators in navigating the legal systems of European states with the highest likelihood of prosecuting Iranian human rights violators. Focusing on five states—France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland—this manual outlines the crimes and violations subject to universal jurisdiction, best practices for investigating and documenting crimes, and processes for requesting investigations and participating in prosecutions as a victim, witness, or NGO. For information that is beyond the scope of this manual, the annex includes printed resources to consult and organizations to contact for additional assistance.

For media inquiries, please contact press@atlanticcouncil.org.

Report Dec 10, 2020

Closing the accountability gap on human rights violators in the Islamic Republic of Iran through global litigation strategies

By Gissou Nia

Gissou Nia presents recommendations for new laws, amendments to existing laws, and the creation of enforcement mechanisms to aid in the effort to combat impunity for the IRI’s human rights violations and atrocity crimes.

Human Rights International Norms

Issue Brief Jun 14, 2022

Attacks on hospitals from Syria to Ukraine: Improving prevention and accountability mechanisms

By Elise Baker, Gissou Nia

When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it soon began implementing one of its frequent—and criminal—tactics that it had already been using in its military intervention in Syria: bombing healthcare and medical facilities.

Europe & Eurasia Human Rights

New Atlanticist Mar 8, 2023

Gender persecution is happening in Iran. Targeted sanctions would be a step toward accountability.

By Celeste Kmiotek, Lisandra Novo

Designating the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, a principal institution behind the systematic oppression of women in Iran, would put its members on notice.

Corruption Human Rights

The post Holding the Islamic Republic of Iran accountable for atrocity crimes appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Vladimir Kara-Murza’s 25-year sentence is a verdict against all Russians

Arseniy Yatsenyuk — Tue, 18 Apr 2023 11:17:16 +0000

The Kremlin has sentenced Russian opposition activist Vladimir Kara-Murza to 25 years in jail for speaking the truth about the invasion of Ukraine. This is not the first long prison sentence handed out by the Kremlin authorities to opponents of the war, but it is by far the harshest act of retribution so far. The sentence represents another significant milestone in Russia’s retreat into Stalinism.

I know Vladimir Kara-Murza personally. He is a man of remarkable courage. He stood up against the criminal invasion of Ukraine knowing that his principled position would inevitably have grave consequences. At a time when the absence of anti-war protests in Russia shames the country, Vladimir Kara-Murza chose a different path.

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The verdict and sentencing of Vladimir Kara-Murza was not unexpected. On the contrary, modern Russia has been heading steadily in the direction of totalitarianism for many years. The list of regime victims is long and stretches back more than two decades to the very beginning of Putin’s reign. Some are familiar names whose deaths led to public outcry. Others are forgotten. Russia’s descent continued regardless.

The Russian people have now reached a new point in this grim journey. Almost seventy years since the death of the Soviet dictator, Stalinism has returned to Russia. The ruthless attacks on today’s political opponents and dissidents offer chilling echoes of the purges and show trials of the totalitarian Stalin era.

Even in this increasingly lawless climate, the 25-year sentence handed down to Kara-Murza stands out. It is a very deliberate and very public demonstration of the Kremlin’s determination to crush any sign of domestic dissent. The Putin regime is sending an unambiguous message to every single person in Russia that nobody and nothing is safe. From now on, the Kremlin will tear its opponents apart without any sense of restraint whatsoever.

Eurasia Center events

Russian army presses on in Bakhmut despite losses

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

By condemning Vladimir Kara-Murza to a quarter of a century in jail, the Kremlin has made clear that it no longer feels constrained and will freely trample on the last surviving vestiges of individual rights. Kara-Murza’s sentence is a verdict against all Russians.

There are virtually no anti-war protests in today’s Russia, despite widespread awareness of the monstrous crimes being committed in Ukraine. Everyone in Russia has seen the destruction of Mariupol, Bakhmut, and dozens of other Ukrainian cities, albeit through the distorting lens of Kremlin propaganda. They all know their president has been charged with war crimes by the International Criminal Court in The Hague. And yet only a relative handful of brave souls like Vladimir Kara-Murza dare to speak out.

With the sentencing of Kara-Murza, the Kremlin is now informing every single person in Russia that they are nothing. The Putin regime loves to spread fear among Russians. It wants more blood. I have no illusions that the Russian people will stand up for their freedoms. But they must now understand that unless they rise up to oppose the Kremlin, they will pay for it for the rest of their lives.

Arseniy Yatsenyuk is the former Prime Minister of Ukraine (2014-16). He currently serves as Chairman of the Kyiv Security Forum.

Russian War Report: Russian army presses on in Bakhmut despite losses

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 14 Apr 2023 17:34:44 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Security

Russia enacts “e-drafting” law

Drone imagery locates new burial site east of Soledar

Russian hackers target NATO websites and email addresses

Russian army presses on in Bakhmut despite losses

The General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces recorded fifty-eight attacks on Ukrainian troop positions on April 9 and 10. Of these attacks, more than thirty were in the direction of Bakhmut, and more than twenty were in the direction of Marinka and Avdiivka. Russian forces also attempted to advance toward Lyman, south of Dibrova.

Documented locations of fighting April 1-13, 2023; data gathered from open-source resources. (Source: Ukraine Control Map, with annotations by the DFRLab)

On April 10, Commander of the Eastern Group of Ukrainian Ground Forces Oleksandr Syrskyi said that Russian forces in Bakhmut increasingly rely on government special forces and paratroopers because Wagner units have suffered losses in the recent battles. Syrskyi visited Bakhmut on April 9 to inspect defense lines and troops deployed to the frontline. According to the United Kingdom’s April 10 military intelligence report, Russian troops are intensifying tank attacks on Marinka but are still struggling with minimal advances and heavy losses.

On April 13, Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of Ukrainian Forces Oleksiy Gromov said that Bakhmut remains the most challenging section on the frontline as Russian forces continue to storm the city center, trying to encircle it from the north and south through Ivanivske and Bohdanivka. According to Ukrainian estimates, during a two-week period, Russian army and Wagner Group losses in the battle for Bakhmut amounted to almost 4,500 people killed or wounded. To restore the offensive potential in Bakhmut, Russian units that were previously attacking in the direction of Avdiivka were transferred back to Bakhmut.

On April 8, Commander of the Ukrainian Air Forces Mykola Oleshchuk lobbied for Ukraine obtaining F-16 fighter jets. According to his statement, Ukrainian pilots are now “hostages of old technologies” that render all pilot missions “mortally dangerous.” Oleshchuk noted that American F-16 jets would help strengthen Ukraine’s air defense. Oleshchuk said that even with a proper number of aircraft and pilots, Ukrainian aviation, which is composed of Soviet aircraft and missiles, may be left without weapons at some point. He noted the F-16 has a huge arsenal of modern bombs and missiles. The commander also discussed the need for superiority in the air and control of the sea. Currently, Russian aviation is more technologically advanced and outnumbers Ukraine, meaning Ukraine cannot adequately protect its airspace. In order for the Ukrainian army to advance and re-capture territory occupied by Russia, it will require substantial deliveries of aviation and heavy equipment like tanks, howitzers, and shells.

April 10, Ukrainian forces reported they had spotted four Russian ships on combat duty in the Black Sea, including one armed with Kalibr missiles. Another Russian ship was spotted in the Sea of Azov, along with seven in the Mediterranean, including three Kalibr cruise missile carriers.

Meanwhile, according to Ukrainian military intelligence, Russia plans to produce Kh-50 cruise missiles in June. If confirmed, this could potentially lead to increased missile strikes against Ukraine in the fall. The Kh-50 missiles in the “715” configuration are intended to be universal, meaning they can be used by many Russian strategic bombers, including the Tu-22M3, Tu-95MS, and Tu-160.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia enacts “e-drafting” law

On April 11, the Russian State Duma approved a bill reading allowing for the online drafting of Russian citizens using the national social service portal Gosuslugi. One day later, the Russian Federal Council adopted the law. The new law enables military commissariats, or voenkomat, to send mobilization notices to anyone registered in the Gosuslugi portal. Contrary to the traditional in-person delivery of paper notices, the digital mobilization order will be enforced immediately upon being sent out to the user; ordinarily, men drafted for mobilization could dispute the reception of the notice during the twenty-one-day period after the notice was sent. As of 2020, 78 million users were reportedly registered in the Gosuslugi portal, nearly two-thirds of the Russian population.

Alongside the adoption of the digital mobilization notices are newly adopted restrictions regarding unresponsive citizens. Those who fail to appear at their local military commissariat in the twenty-day period following notice will be barred from leaving the country and banned from receiving new credit or driving a car. Of the 164 senators who took part in the vote, only one voted against the bill; Ludmila Narusova argued that the law had been adopted exceptionally hastily and that the punishments against “deviants” who do not respond to the notice are “inadequate.”

As explained by Riga-based Russian news outlet Meduza, the law also states that reserves could be populated with those who legally abstained from military service until the age of twenty-seven, due to an amendment in the bill that allows for personal data to be shared with the Russian defense ministry in order to establish “reasonable grounds” for mobilization notices to be sent out. Several institutions across the country will be subject to the data exchange, including the interior ministry, the federal tax office, the pension and social fund, local and federal institutions, and schools and universities.

–Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Drone imagery locates new burial site east of Soledar

Images released by Twitter user @externalPilot revealed a new burial site, located opposite a cemetery, in the village of Volodymyrivka, southeast of Soledar, Donetsk Oblast. The DFRLab collected aerial imagery and assessed that the burial site emerged during the last week of March and the first week of April. The city of Soledar has been under Russian control since mid-January. The burial site faces the Volodymyrivka town cemetery. Drone footage shows several tombs with no apparent orthodox crosses or ornaments. Analysis of the drone imagery indicates around seventy new graves have been dug on this site. A DFRLab assessment of satellite imagery estimates the surface area of the burial site amounts to around thirteen hectares.

Location of new burial site east of Soledar, Volodymyrivka, Donetsk Oblast. (Source: PlanetLab, with annotations by the DFRLab)

–Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Russian hackers target NATO websites and email addresses

On April 8, the pro-war Russian hacktivist movement Killnet announced they would target NATO in a hacking operation. On April 10, they said they had carried out the attack. The hacktivists claimed that “40% of NATO’s electronic infrastructure has been paralyzed.” They also claimed to have gained access to the e-mails of NATO staff and announced they had used the e-mails to create user accounts on LBGTQ+ dating sites for 150 NATO employees.

The hacktivists forwarded a Telegram post from the KillMilk channel showing screenshots of one NATO employee’s e-mail being used to register an account on the website GayFriendly.dating. The DFRLab searched the site for an account affiliated with the email but none was found.

Killnet also published a list of e-mails it claims to have hacked. The DFRLab cross-checked the e-mails against publicly available databases of compromised e-mails, like Have I been Pwned, Avast, Namescan, F-secure, and others. As of April 13, none of the e-mails had been linked to the Killnet hack, though this may change as the services update their datasets.

In addition, the DFRLab checked the downtime of the NATO websites that Killnet claims to have targeted with distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. According to IsItDownRightNow, eleven of the forty-four NATO-related websites (25 percent) were down at some point on April 10.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Resident Fellow, Riga, Latvia

The post Russian War Report: Russian army presses on in Bakhmut despite losses appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s Wagner Group is a feature not a bug of the Putin regime

Allen Maggard — Tue, 04 Apr 2023 19:57:07 +0000

Of the various parties embroiled in Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, few have attracted as much international attention as the paramilitary Wagner Group. Indeed, a veritable cottage industry has emerged dedicated to monitoring the Wagner network’s alleged involvement as unofficial agents of Russian foreign policy everywhere from Estonia to Sub-Saharan Africa.

The general consensus is that private military companies (PMCs) like Wagner Group must be countered because they advance Kremlin interests and help the Putin regime to project Russian power internationally. But a closer look suggests the Wagner Group and other Russian mercenary organizations may ultimately be liabilities and not assets for Putin.

For Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, 2023 already looks to be a tumultuous year. He has accused senior Russian military leaders of “treason” for allegedly holding up logistical and material support to Wagner mercenaries battling for control of Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine, and recently complained of being cut off altogether from the Kremlin.

Some commentators believe Prigozhin’s frequent jabs at members of the Russian elite could presage a contest for political power that may reach the heights of the Kremlin towers. Indeed, Prigozhin now says that he plans to remold Wagner into “an army with an ideology,” suggesting that he seeks to officially re-brand himself as an out-and-out political operator.

For all the speculation regarding the potential threat Prigozhin poses to the stability of the Putin regime, few have explored the Wagner leader’s relationship to the power structures that Putin himself depends upon for the perpetuation of his rule. In reality, the Wagner Group is as much a product of this system as it is a tool of Kremlin foreign and military policy. Western policymakers seeking to understand the role of Russian private paramilitaries should treat them as a symptom of the institutionalized corruption at the heart of Putin’s regime and not as just another instrument in Russia’s hybrid warfare toolbox.

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Prigozhin has managed to carve a niche for himself by leveraging opaque corporate networks to facilitate Russian hard and soft power projection in Ukraine, Syria, and various conflict zones across Africa. This appears to be profitable work; his companies have reportedly raked in hundreds of millions of dollars from mineral extraction alone. White House officials have even claimed in recent months that Prigozhin directed Wagner fighters to capture the Ukrainian town of Soledar in order to secure access to nearby salt and gypsum mines. The notion that Prigozhin personally benefits from enabling the Kremlin’s foreign policy adventures appears to be a feature rather than a bug of Putin’s particular approach to governance.

Political scientists generally characterize Putin’s rule as a corrupt patron-client system in which elites are compensated for their allegiance with access to resources. Vladimir Gel’man of the University of Helsinki contends that Putin accepts bad governance by trusted elites to cultivate a loyal, informal power base separate from those formal institutions which might challenge his authority. Russia analyst Mark Galeotti likens this arrangement to a public-private “adhocracy” in which informal networks of enterprising business and political elites, rather than formal institutions, end up taking the initiative in divining and executing official policy.

The Wagner phenomenon reflects a political ecosystem that rewards the stewards of government policy with official as well as illicit perks in exchange for loyalty. Wagner benefits Putin by providing deniable cover for a wide range of military operations outside of Russia. In exchange, Prigozhin is allowed to pursue commercial ventures in the countries where his forces are active.

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Prigozhin’s trajectory is an indication that the Russian state’s claim to a monopoly on violence may be the next frontier to be challenged by Kremlin elites. The Wagner Group’s example appears to have encouraged everyone from Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov to Russian natural gas giant Gazprom to organize PMCs of their own, a trend that some analysts argue could portend a “descent into warlordism.” Recent reports of a company owned by longtime Putin associate Gennadiy Timchenko hiring another PMC outfit not affiliated with Wagner to secure oil and gas infrastructure in Syria further suggest that Prigozhin is not the only person vying to supply PMC services to regime insiders.

International efforts to counter the Wagner network will require many of the same mechanisms used to combat corruption more generally. This will require governments to reflect on how their own institutions play into the interests of figures like Prigozhin, who has pursued journalists through the British courts despite being the subject of UK sanctions. Critics claim transnational imbalances in financial transparency that allow offshore jurisdictions to provide a veil of corporate secrecy to American and European nationals also help to obscure the Wagner network’s operations.

Efforts by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control to target Wagner-linked shell companies registered in tax havens are a step in the right direction. But Western governments should also aim to hold accountable those individuals responsible for managing the network of corporate entities behind Wagner’s more mundane business operations.

One may reasonably question why Ukraine and its allies should go after Russian PMCs at all if their continued presence has the potential to undo Putin. Why not let them multiply and further weaken the foundations of the Putin regime? While potentially tempting, such an approach would involve considerable risks. If and when Putin leaves office, this is likely to create a power vacuum in which Russia’s nascent PMC class would flourish. Such an outcome could return Russia to a state of lawlessness reminiscent of the “wild nineties,” a period characterized by a proliferation of organized crime groups whose mercenary enforcers were often veterans of military campaigns in Afghanistan and Chechnya.

Putin often invokes the chaos of the 1990s to justify his authoritarian rule. Tolerating the presence of PMCs like the Wagner Group in the hope that they could unseat Putin risks reducing Russia to new depths of disorder and thereby facilitating the rise of aspiring autocrats in the years to come. Combating Russia’s private paramilitaries is essential not just in order to contain Putin, but to preempt the empowerment of future Russian leaders molded in his likeness.

Allen Maggard is a Russia analyst and specialist in the intersection of Russian political economy and the defense industry at C4ADS.

In this context, Pakistan cannot afford complacency regarding its growing terrorism threat. The TTP’s operational capacity has grown significantly following the takeover of the Afghan Taliban next door, and it along with peer militant groups present an existential threat to Pakistan’s security and the stability of its neighborhood.

To understand how Islamabad should respond to this heightened threat, South Asia Center Distinguished Fellow Shuja Nawaz led a series of conversations with experts about fighting terrorism and militancy in Pakistan.

The interviews have been categorized into three segments:

State security, cross-border dynamics, and law enforcement, featuring Sen. Mushahid Hussain, Lt. Gen. Aamer Riaz, and IGP Naveed Khan.
Society, human security, and government-people social contract, featuring Dr. Farhat Taj, MP Mohsin Dawar, and Dr. Madiha Afzal.
A conversation with Inspector General Police Tariq Parvez, former inspector general of police and the first coordinator of the National Counter Terrorism Authority of Pakistan (NACTA).

Part I

State security, cross-border dynamics, and law enforcement

Featuring

Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed is a current Pakistani Senator and Chairman of the Senate Defence Committee. A graduate of the Georgetown Master of Science in Foreign Service (MSFS) program (Class of 1975), Senator Hussain Sayed has a distinguished career in the Pakistan public service as a four-time elected senator from the Islamabad Federal Capital. His public service career also includes positions as the Chairman of the Prime Minister’s Task Force on Central Asia (1992), Leader of Pakistan’s Delegation to the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva (1993), Special Assistant to the Prime Minister (handling relations with the U.S. & Central Asia) (1993), and Minister for Information, Culture & Tourism (1997-1999).

Lt. Gen. Aamer Riaz (Retd) was commissioned in the Pakistan Army in 1984. He commanded two corps, one on the western border and one on the eastern border and held various higher staff assignments, namely, Chief of Staff of a corps and Director, General Military Operations Directorate at GHQ. Lt. Gen. Riaz held instructional assignments at various military institutions and also remained president of National Defence University Islamabad. During his service, he remained engaged in military diplomacy to bring peace and stability in the region. Lt. Gen. Riaz has had speaking engagements at several civil and military institutions. Lt. Gen. Riaz is also a member of the board of governors of a newly established National University of Security Sciences, NUSS.

Inspector General Naveed Khan was born in Kohat, Pakistan in 1950. He graduated from Punjab University (Lahore) and joined the Police Service of Pakistan in 1972. Khan served as the Head of several district and divisional Police forces, provincial and federal intelligence agencies in KPK and as Commandant of Paramilitary force (Frontier Constabulary). He spent 5 years in the Middle East as a diplomat. His last posting before retirement in August 2010 was the Inspector General of Police, KPK province where he headed a 75,000 strong police force in the most difficult period during the height of Taliban militancy.

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Part II

Society, human security, and government-people social contract

Featuring

Dr. Farhat Taj has a Ph.D. degree in Sociology of Law. She is associate professor at the University of Tromso, Norway. She has also worked as Assistant Director, Colleges and as Planning Officer (education) in the government of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. She successfully led three field research projects (2011, 2011 and 2012) for the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, IDMC Geneva, on conflict-driven displacement in the northwest of Pakistan. Dr. Taj also conducted independent research funded by the Norwegian Writers Association and Fritt Ord. The research is reported in her books, Taliban and Anti-Taliban (2011) and The Real Pashtun Question (forthcoming 2016).

Mohsin Javed Dawar is a Member of the National Assembly of Pakistan from North Waziristan, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the National Assembly of Pakistan, and Central Chairman in the National Democratic Movement. He is the co-founder of the human rights movement Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM). He has formerly served as president of the National Youth Organisation (NYO) and the Pashtun Students Federation (PSF), the allied wings of the Awami National Party (ANP). From 11 to 14 March 2022, he was part of the Pashtun National Jirga, which was held in Bannu to discuss the critical issues faced by Pashtuns in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Dr. Madiha Afzal is a David M. Rubenstein Fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC. Her research lies at the intersection of political economy, development, and security, with a focus on Pakistan. She previously worked as an assistant professor of public policy at the University of Maryland, College Park. Dr. Afzal is the author of “Pakistan Under Siege: Extremism, Society, and the State,” published by the Brookings Institution Press in 2018. She has also published several journal articles, book chapters, policy reports, and essays.

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Part III

A conversation with Inspector General Police Tariq Parvez on the rise of terrorism and militancy in Pakistan

Tariq Parvez joined the Police Service of Pakistan in the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police in 1973 and retired in the rank of Inspector General of Police in 2008, from the post of Director General of Federal Investigation Agency, Pakistan. Terrorism in the name of religion started in Pakistan, on a sustained basis in 1990 from Punjab. Parvez dealt with the phenomenon indirectly as DIG of Gujranwala, Bahawalpur, and Lahore from 1993 to 1997. In 1997, he was posted as Executive Head of Counter Terrorism Department Punjab, thus dealing directly with extremism and terrorism. He was awarded Sitara e Imtiaz by the President of Pakistan in 2004 for services in the field of CT. Parvez was posted as the Director General of the Federal Investigation Agency from 2005 to 2008 and dealt with terrorism at the national level. After retirement he was tasked to establish the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) and appointed its first National Coordinator. Presently he is a member of NACTA’s committee of experts as well as President, Advisory Board, National Initiative against Organized Crime.

Shuja Nawaz: In light of the recent attack on the Peshawar mosque, the bombing that killed large numbers of people, I wanted to ask you whether you see a similarity in the way the government is approaching this incident, as it handled the nine-year-old incident when the army public school in Peshawar was attacked and many lives were lost. Subsequently, attacks took place in Balochistan also where up to sixty people in one attack were killed. Do you see a similarity?

Tariq Parvez: Before I respond to your question specifically, I would like to give a brief overview of the context. 2009 was the worst year ever in Pakistan in terms of terrorist attacks in a year. Ever since then, there was a consistent and significant decline in the number of terrorist attacks over 2009-2020. In fact, the number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan decreased by almost 95 percent during these years. Then in 2021, we witnessed a reversal in this trend. For the first time in ten years, the terrorist attacks in 2021 were more than the terrorist attacks in the preceding year, i.e., 2020. A cause for further concern was that during 2022 this trend continued and the realization that this was not a short-term development, but a more sustained trend.

I wasn’t surprised by this reversal of trend. Why? For two reasons. Number one, that while we got the short-term objectives right in countering terrorism, we erred in terms of formulating long-term policies and responses to the terrorist threat. The result was, that while we succeeded in effectively dealing with the terrorist threat in the short term, from 2009 to 2020, this effectiveness could not be sustained. The reasons were two-fold. One, the counter-terrorism effort was, primarily, military led, with the civilian institutions playing a secondary role. This was an ad-hoc approach because, for the long-term solution to succeed, you should let the civilian institutions, whose role it is to counter terrorism, play their role. That was one weak area in our earlier response. The second weak area was that our entire focus was on kinetic actions. Of course, eliminating these militant networks is required, and kinetic actions are a very important part of counter-terrorism, but that doesn’t mean that the non-dynamic part, the ideological part, the part that deals with the factors that breed terrorism, should be ignored. We chose only the kinetic approach. So while the TTP, the main terrorist organization in Pakistan, went down and was cleared from the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) it wasn’t eliminated. Its ideology continued to resonate with segments of our society, because we had ignored addressing the non-kinetic dimension. And as soon as it got an opportunity to come up, it did.

One important factor for the recent resurgence of terrorism by TTP in Pakistan was the change of its leadership. The TTP leader Mullah Fazlullah was killed in a reported drone attack in June 2018. He was succeeded by a leader from the Mehsud tribe again, Mufti Noor-Wali Mehsud. He focused on uniting the TTP factions. The TTP had become a fragmented organization with about twenty factions and they all were fighting each other. In fact, it was easier for the government to deal with factions, but now after two years of his efforts, he brought back all the factions and hence we are confronted with a united TTP once again. That is one factor, is important for the resurgence of terrorism, and more important than this unification is the takeover by the Taliban in Afghanistan which helped the TTP in two ways. One, it was a huge morale booster: the TTP morale had been low. They were down in the dumps. Suddenly they stood up and said, “well if the Taliban can defeat the American army and its allies, we can do it also.” Number two, their main safe haven was Afghanistan and so they got a very important sanctuary which was not there earlier. Now they can move freely, and they have active assistance also. That is the basic reason why we see the resurgence.

Coming back to your question on the response of the Pakistani state, one of the weak areas of the response now is the Pakistan state itself is in a very weak position compared with 2009. Today we have political instability, we have an economic meltdown, and we have these security issues.

Coming back to your question on the response of the Pakistani state, one of the weak areas of the response now is the Pakistan state itself is in a very weak position compared with 2009. Today we have political instability, we have an economic meltdown, and we have these security issues.

Unless the government is completely focused on dealing with the terrorism and is not consumed by these issues of economic survival, or political partisanship, the terrorists may survive for long. They take economic and political chaos in Pakistan as an opportunity. We need to act comprehensively against them, focusing equally on kinetic and non-kinetic measures, to defeat them in the long term. We have to drain the swamp that breeds them.

SN: What non-kinetic actions need to be taken?

TP: Non-kinetic actions means two or three things. Number one, countering the narrative of the TTP. Unless the narrative of the TTP resonates with the roots of the TTP and within their strongholds, they’re not likely to get volunteers. We didn’t do anything to counter that ideology. That is one area of a non-kinetic aspect that we ignored. A second area is that we took a very important decision of merging Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province with FATA districts. FATA was a stronghold of the terrorists. The feedback which I have gotten from the people there about the commitments made to the people of the FATA in terms of investments for their development were not fulfilled. So what has happened is that while we have formally and institutionally made former FATA part of the KP province, we did not follow up with the promises which we made, and the result of that is resentment amongst the local population which provides fertile ground for the TTP.

Another factor that I think was a policy decision to open negotiations with the TPP. I think that was an ill-advised move, not well thought out. It was probably not inclusive. By inclusive, I mean having all points of views of the local inhabitants contributing to it. It was confined to a very small group of people who decided to go ahead with it. I remember police officers in Swat told me they were informing the government that there were reports by the local inhabitants of sighting Taliban, although in small groups, in their villages. It was pointed out that it may be a planned return of the Taliban to their villages in Swat. No one paid any heed to these police reports. And then the Taliban told the locals that “we are coming here as the result of an agreement. We have been allowed to leave Afghanistan and come back to our homes in the villages in Pakistan.” They expressed their surprise that the local police were not told about this agreement. The police weren’t aware of it, the local people weren’t aware of it.

We were told by the decision makers that “they are Pakistanis, who had left their homes as a result of the military operations against the terrorists, and they have to come back to their country.” They are Pakistanis, certainly, but they are criminals, they are terrorists. I think we were in too much of a hurry or trying to be too generous in taking them back. But thank God, thank God the people of Swat protested in a very powerful way, against the return of these members of TTP back to their homes and villages. As a result of these massive public protests against the return of the TTP members, the government was forced to give up the repatriation and resettlement plan of these Afghanistan based TTP members.

SN: What are the ties between the TTP and Punjabi militant organizations?

TP: Before the TTP came into existence in 2007, we used to have two terrorist organizations based in Punjab, v.i.z. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, which was focused exclusively on targeting Shias, and Jaish-e-Mohammed, which was Punjab-based and with strong roots in South Punjab. In fact, that was the mother organization that fed other jihadist Islamist militant groups. After the emergence of the TTP, militancy in Pakistan became predominantly, if not primarily, a Pakhtun phenomenon. And the Punjabis slowly slid into the background. Maybe there are some factions which did fight in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban against the Coalition forces. But, I think the link now is much weaker than it was. In fact, this is a very important point that you raise. The TTP might be looking for ties in the Punjab, to expand its activities to the biggest province of Pakistan, instead of confining itself to Pakhtun communities.

The militant organizations which held anti-Shia agendas have gone into the background. But those elements of militancy in Afghanistan who are anti-Shia are looking for alternative sources of support.

Another important point I would like to highlight is the anti-Shia sentiment in Pakistan. The militant organizations which held anti-Shia agendas have gone into the background. But those elements of militancy in Afghanistan who are anti-Shia are looking for alternative sources of support. In Afghanistan, the Islamic State-Khorasan has a strongly anti-Shia agenda and is looking for allies in Pakistan. In the years ahead, we might witness a resurgence of sectarian terrorism in Punjab, through a liaison between the Afghanistan-based IS-K and anti-Shia militants, spread over into many religiously motivated terrorist organizations like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Mohammad, even TTP, because all these militant organizations belong to the Sunni subsect of Deobandis, which has streaks of anti-Shiaism.

SN: So, who needs to coordinate the fight against militancy and terrorism inside Pakistan? Will it be NACTA?

TP: Absolutely. In fact, that was the original rationale for NACTA. Based on my own experience, I found that one weak area of counter-terrorism was that the provinces were acting in silos. The federal government, its Intelligence Bureau (IB), and the provinces, were not in touch with each other. ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) and IB were not partnering or sharing information. There was no formal structure for collaboration. Whatever happened was sort of informal, on a friendly basis or whatever. That is why I proposed that there should be an organization which gives unity to the anti-terrorism effort, and that has to be a civilian institution. I remember people used to ask me, you are setting up NACTA, what if the military doesn’t cooperate? My reply was that the basic problem is the lack of coordination between the civilian agencies. Even the provinces are not talking to each other. So in the first place let the civilian intelligence bureau, and other civilian agencies share that information, and then after the ISI would also join in.

The main point that I want to make is that the need of NACTA is based on the fact that there is no oversight body to inform the government about the implementation of the various policy layers. I don’t know who is supposed to do it.

A twenty-point National Action Plan to counter terrorism was formally launched after the Peshawar public school incident in December 2014. It was expressly stated in the National Action Plan that for every point (twenty in all, I was a member of that committee so I know), specific action plans will be drawn up with specific measurable objectives. And for that the PM (prime minister) of Pakistan at that time, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, set up thirteen committees. But no follow-up occurred, because NACTA could not play an effective role due to various reasons.

Second, while the set of players for kinetic action are the military and the criminal justice system, for non-kinetic measures, a different set of players is needed, maybe headed by media experts, IT (information technology) specialists, development experts, religious leaders, youth leaders, education experts, etc. Carrying out the non-kinetic aspect of counter-terrorism through military or police is not likely to be effective, because it is not their expertise or field. So if there is a civilian organization that would give greater importance to this effort, then let us move forward with that.

A lot of initiatives to win the hearts and minds of youth are being taken in Balochistan, but when I meet the Baloch youth, they care about the disappearances.

A lot of initiatives to win the hearts and minds of youth are being taken in Balochistan, but when I meet the Baloch youth, they care about the disappearances. They forget the good part, but they remember that so-and-so’s brother was picked up, so-and-so has been killed. We have to take these views into account.

I think NACTA is the way forward, although at present I don’t think an all-powerful interior minister is going to let it go. But I remember the day you told me that the DG-ISI (director-general, Inter-Services Intelligence) had said to you that if NACTA reports to the prime minister, we will cooperate. I hope that comes to pass.

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Moderated by

Fellow

Shuja Nawaz

Distinguished Fellow

South Asia Center

Security & Defense Politics & Diplomacy

About Shuja Nawaz Other Pakistan Experts

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

The real definition of victory for Ukraine

Victor Pinchuk — Tue, 28 Mar 2023 12:51:16 +0000

For centuries, Ukrainians have fought for their independence. The current war is a continuation of this historic struggle. Today, Ukrainian heroes are dying for the cause of independence; it is this very cause that Russia is trying to deny and destroy.

How can we define independence? Of course, it means a country that is truly sovereign and controls all of its territory, but for Ukraine it means something more. For Ukraine, true independence will only be achieved when the country is secure and anchored in the West, its natural geographic, political, and strategic home. Genuine independence will only come with Ukraine as a member of the European Union and NATO.

EU and NATO membership are integral components of victory and must already become reality right at the moment the war ends. Ukraine’s international friends must provide sufficient weapons to create the circumstances where this becomes possible. But beyond military aid, they should also support Ukraine’s geopolitical goals. They must do so with a grand vision rather than incrementally. They must be ready for Ukrainian EU and NATO membership as soon as the fighting stops.

The terrible war we are currently experiencing is not primarily a fight over territory. This is true for both Russia and Ukraine. Russia’s main goal is not to take and annex a certain number of square miles from Ukraine. Russia wants to annihilate Ukraine as state; to make Ukrainians as a nation disappear.

For the Russian Empire, a free Ukraine poses an existential threat. Russia cannot tolerate the emergence of a post-Soviet, post-communist, Orthodox, Slavic country that is a successful, prosperous, free democracy and market economy. So the empire wants to drag us back to the past through war.

For Ukrainians, there is now a chance that their country will finally win its centuries-long fight for independence and become truly free. In past centuries, Ukrainians demonstrated the same bravery we see today, but they were alone in their fight against the empire. Today, the whole civilized world stands with Ukraine.

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In order to be independent, Ukraine’s territorial integrity must be restored in line with the country’s internationally recognized 1991 borders. A tribunal for war criminals and reparations must also be established. But this will not create a truly independent Ukraine. For that to happen, Ukraine requires two more key steps.

First, Ukraine must receive credible security guarantees from the West that will prevent Russia from attacking again. Without such guarantees, there will be no real end to the war and no victory, just a pause. The second vital step is the radical reform of Ukraine’s institutions. This means the rule of law, democracy, and independent institutions. Freeing Ukraine from Russian occupation will not bring victory unless the country is also freed from the bad practices of the past.

Let’s address these steps one by one. The war has demonstrated that Ukraine needs NATO membership. Therefore, Ukrainian NATO membership must be an integral element of any lasting settlement. It is possible that security guarantees similar to NATO membership could serve as a pathway to this goal, if provided either by NATO itself or a coalition of countries.

In order to place radical institutional reforms on an irreversible path, Ukraine needs the country’s EU membership to be finalized or imminent by the end of the war. EU membership is not a substitute for reforms, but a necessary incentive for them. It is for Ukrainians to conduct reforms, while the EU role is to assess them and decide on integration. Experience has shown that the EU accession process is a uniquely powerful tool for radical institutional reform. And EU membership is the best insurance against a return to bad practices.

If these two goals are achieved, financial resources will flow to Ukraine. This will not only be in the form of international assistance and reparations, but also in terms of private investment. A free and secure Ukraine will enjoy very strong growth that will benefit all involved.

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Many of Ukraine’s international friends agree the country’s security and institutional reforms are the first priority after victory. They acknowledge that EU and NATO membership should be on the agenda, but only after victory. I strongly disagree. These steps cannot wait until after victory; they are essential components of victory.

For Ukraine, true victory means security and reform. It means NATO and EU membership, or at the very least, iron-clad security guarantees along with key practical components of EU integration in place. Without these steps, there will be no victory.

The EU must strengthen its existing commitment to Ukrainian membership and implement it with unprecedented speed and political will. NATO accession must be on the agenda of the coming July 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius.

This will not be simple. Current EU and NATO regulations make speedy accession difficult. But at key moments in history, merely following the rules is insufficient. With the right political leadership, existing rules can be adjusted and new standards adopted to meet the needs of the moment.

Never in the history of the EU has a country served as such an inspiration for Europe or sacrificed so much for Europe. Never in the history of NATO has a country fought so bravely and sacrificed so many lives to defeat a deadly threat that also endangers NATO.

Now is not the time to ask yourself how much more can be done within the existing limits. Instead, the real question is: How do we get this right? If this is not the time to change existing practices and procedures, when is the right time?

My message to Western leaders is simple: If you get Ukraine right, you will not only save lives. You will also show the whole world that the Western alliance and the European Union are the future. And for you, too, this will be a real victory.

Victor Pinchuk is a businessman, philanthropist, and the founder and member of the board of Yalta European Strategy. He is also a member of the Atlantic Council’s International Advisory Board. The Victor Pinchuk Foundation is a donor to the Atlantic Council.

Episode Seven – Dr. Nasredeen Abudlbari

Atlantic Council — Mon, 27 Mar 2023 20:20:40 +0000

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Svetlova in Haaretz: Maidan, Bolotnaya, Tahrir – three things the protest must remember

Atlantic Council — Mon, 27 Mar 2023 17:14:15 +0000

Deputy Director of Foresight, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

The post Svetlova in Haaretz: Maidan, Bolotnaya, Tahrir – three things the protest must remember appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Maybe Putin should be worried: Most leaders facing international justice don’t get away free

Thomas S. Warrick — Thu, 23 Mar 2023 15:10:31 +0000

After the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 17, many observers quickly said there was “little prospect” he would face justice. But while past performance is often no guarantee of future results, modern international justice efforts actually are far more successful than what many believe. If modern history is a guide, the ICC arrest warrant has dramatically changed Putin’s fate.

The “modern” era of accountability for heads of state and heads of military forces for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes can be dated from United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) establishing the UN Commission of Experts on the Former Yugoslavia. This was a major step by the Security Council to hold senior officials to account, and led to the establishment of the first modern multilateral war crimes tribunal under the Council’s Chapter VII authority a year later.

Prior to the March 17 arrest warrant for Putin, some eighteen heads of state or heads of major military forces have been wanted by international justice—defined here, broadly, as serious multilateral efforts at accountability under customary international law or treaty law for genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious war crimes. This list includes officials wanted by international tribunals set up under the Chapter VII authority of the UN Security Council for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, by multilateral treaties such as the Rome Treaty that set up the International Criminal Court, by multilateral ad hoc courts set up for Sierra Leone and elsewhere, and by domestic courts set up with significant international support and assistance as in Cambodia and Iraq. Many of these courts also sought the arrest of subordinate officials, with mixed results, but heads of state and major political or military leaders wanted by international courts have faced justice far more often than not.

The preferred result of international justice advocates is a fair trial and a verdict under the rule of law. An accused who appears before an international court counts as a “win” even if the result is an acquittal. But practical realities sometimes intervene, dealing out “rough justice” where an accused reportedly commits suicide to avoid being handed over to a court, as happened with Pol Pot in 1998, or is killed out of vengeance by those who lost relatives and friends at the hands of a ruthless dictator, as happened with Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.

Working in the field of international justice in the early 1990s, my colleagues and I became accustomed to being told by diplomats and journalists that it was impossible that the former Yugoslavia’s Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić, or Ratko Mladić; or Iraq’s Saddam Hussein would ever face justice. In the end, they all did—and many others, as well. The atrocities get the headlines, while the work of activists, diplomats, investigators, prosecutors, and judges is slow, sometimes tedious, and always comes years later than it should. But the record of international justice in the modern era is one of history’s most striking if least-recognized successes.

To be sure, Putin is today the president of a nuclear-armed state that currently holds a veto in the UN Security Council. Thus, Putin has leverage that the eighteen other top officials on this list did not. Nevertheless, the political wheels in Russia may turn as they did for many of the officials on the list below.

The potentially surprising outcome facing Putin should be informed by these statistics:

Of the eighteen men—all are men—wanted prior to Putin:

Fifteen have faced justice of some kind before a judicial tribunal.
Two of the fifteen were acquitted for lack of evidence under less-than-ideal circumstances, but nevertheless appeared before judges of the ICC and saw the charges against them dismissed.
Two others of the eighteen faced rough justice and were killed or committed suicide before they could be turned over to an international tribunal.
Three of the eighteen turned themselves in voluntarily, of which two had the charges dismissed; the trial of the third is still underway.
Only one of the eighteen major figures on this list is still at large.

In percentage terms:

83 percent of all heads of state and senior military leaders wanted by international justice have faced justice.
94 percent have either received the judgment of an international tribunal, been killed, or committed suicide prior to being turned over for international trial.
17 percent turned themselves over voluntarily, and two of those three accused had the charges dropped and are now free; the trial of the third is underway.
17 percent were acquitted or had the charges dismissed.
Of the seven who have died, 0 percent died in their beds at home as free men.

Thomas Warrick is a senior fellow and director of the Future of DHS Project at the Atlantic Council. In 1993-1995, he was senior counsel to the chair of the UN Commission of Experts on the Former Yugoslavia. From 1997-2001, he was the first deputy in the US State Department Office of War Crimes Issues.

The author thanks David J. Scheffer of the Council on Foreign Relations and Celeste Kmiotek of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project for their assistance in filling out the entries in this table.

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Valencia, Spain: Decarbonization through innovative partnerships

Peter Engelke, Joseph Webster — Wed, 22 Mar 2023 13:00:00 +0000

Foreword
Valencia’s carbon footprint
Valencia’s decarbonization strategy
Valencia city
Valencia region and port
Remaining challenges
Authors
Acknowledgments

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As climate change has transitioned from abstract threat to tangible reality, cities have become increasingly aggressive in pursuing decarbonization solutions. By examining the decarbonization efforts of specific metropolitan areas as case studies, local, regional, and national leaders can gain a better understanding of what strategies might work in their own jurisdictions. This paper focuses on the decarbonization pathway of Valencia, Spain, a city of about eight hundred thousand inhabitants that is recognized as a global leader in sustainability.

Valencia has unique characteristics that shapes its efforts to lower its carbon footprint. The city has capitalized on the opportunities afforded by the compactness of its five-kilometer radius, and by a port with limited reach into the Spanish hinterland.

To decarbonize, Valencia is attempting to limit the use of personal cars; incentivize public transportation; improve energy efficiency in buildings; and use key technologies, such as hydrogen or ammonia, to reduce emissions of certain industrial sectors.

Similar to other cities that are working toward emissions reductions, Valencia faces obstacles to decarbonization that must be overcome. The primary challenges are related to measuring emissions, assigning responsibility for them, and incentivizing market actors to deploy capital for decarbonization. While every locale is unique, lessons learned from Valencia are likely to have great relevance for other cities looking to reduce emissions.

Valencia’s carbon footprint

Valencia is a unique city with a distinctive carbon profile. This Mediterranean city is one of Europe’s top tourist destinations; it’s also a major maritime transit hub. In 2021, the city hosted approximately 3.25 million overnight stays, down from pre-pandemic levels, but up by 90 percent compared to 2020.¹ Moreover, Valencia’s port handled 5.6 million twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) containers, or a little less than 6 percent of all European containers, while serving nearly 7,300 vessels.²

As shown in Figure 1, Valencia’s carbon emissions largely result from energy (excluding transportation) and transport, with these two categories contributing to 82 percent of the city’s emissions. Industrial processes add another 9 percent.

While industrial decarbonization is of critical importance for Europe, industry plays a smaller role in Valencia city’s direct emissions compared to industrial emissions in the surrounding region. Valencia region, rather than Valencia city, contains the bulk of industry in the area. Of this sector, the most important from an emissions standpoint are the ceramics and refineries industries, which are highly complex industries to decarbonize. The Valencia region’s high solar insolation is a contributing factor in the public and private sectors’ interest in commercial development of green hydrogen as a fuel source for the region’s industries and tourism sector, in particular, as a feedstock for sustainable aviation fuels. The Port of Valencia, which is owned by the national government, measures its carbon footprint by evaluating the amount of carbon emissions per ton of shipments handled.³

Valencia’s decarbonization strategy

Efforts to decarbonize Valencia involve strategies to tackle both the city’s primary contributors to carbon emissions and the region’s industrial emissions. The planned tactics are necessarily diverse in approach, interconnected, and inclusive, with stakeholders from the community, businesses, and organizations taking part in the conversation.

Valencia City

Since 2015, Valencia’s city government has emphasized sustainability and decarbonization through public engagement and innovative policy. In 2019, the city government coalesced various existing efforts under a vision document called “Missions Valencia 2030,” and shortly thereafter generated a climate-centric vision document, “Valencia 2030 Climate Mission.”⁴ In 2022, the city also released a “Valencia 2030 Urban Strategy,” designed to be a roadmap and tool for the city to achieve its goals, decarbonization included.⁵ These documents reflect the city government’s broader attempts to make Valencia a sustainability leader, including a history of meeting regularly with stakeholders across society (citizens, universities, business, etc.) to focus on urban decarbonization solutions. Its work has paid off: Valencia was chosen as the World Design Capital for 2022, which recognizes sustainable urban design, and the European Union has just given Valencia its European Green Capital award for 2024.⁶

Valencia city’s decarbonization efforts can be grouped into four pillars, which were stressed in Valencia’s European Green Capital application: energy efficiency, renewable energy, green infrastructure, and mobility.⁷ Each is designed to take advantage of and to preserve Valencia’s urban morphology: compact, dense, historic, and mixed use. All also are logically linked one to each other.

To achieve greater energy efficiency and deploy renewable energy, the city government sees an opportunity in upgrading the built environment. Valencia’s many flat roofs hold promise for rooftop solar, while the same aging buildings could be refurbished with energy-efficiency improvements. Valencia Climate and Energy, a municipal foundation, provides advice, training, and assistance on both fronts.⁸

For increasing climate-friendly infrastructure, the city has committed to preserving and even expanding a green belt, primarily farmland, that surrounds the city as part of a strategy to boost consumption of locally grown foods. Local stakeholders conveyed to the authors that Valencia faces a tradeoff between a desire to preserve the green belt’s primary function, which is to grow food for local consumption, and the need to find suitable surface areas for renewable energy production, specifically solar photovoltaics. Currently, the city’s preference is clearly toward landscape preservation.

The mobility pillar, specifically an emphasis upon switching from private automobile use to the “green” modes (walking, bicycling, and public transit), is the focus of much of Valencia’s decarbonization efforts. The city already has an edge on this front. Because it is a dense, flat city with a relatively small radius of five kilometers, Valencia is highly walkable and bikeable. Valencia also has few natural barriers, such as rivers, that would otherwise increase distances for pedestrians and cyclists. To further encourage walking and cycling, the city provides real-time traffic information via AppValencia, empties urban waste containers more frequently to make walking more desirable, and invests heavily in cycling-friendly infrastructure, such as bike lanes.⁹ Valencia stakeholders who were interviewed by the authors report that although Valencia’s residents at first were resistant to these changes—in particular, bike lanes and cycling—they now embrace them.

In addition to creating a more pedestrian- and bike-friendly environment, the city continues to build on its public-transit strategy. Over recent decades, the city has overseen substantial improvements to its metro system. The investments are already paying dividends, with ten lines in service and one hundred and thirty-eight stations servicing one hundred and fifty-six kilometers of network.¹⁰ Although Valencia, like other cities, is facing declining passenger volumes in the post-COVID era, the city remains committed to public transit.¹¹ Metrovalencia has invested 235 million euros to improve the frequency of trains.¹² Some areas will see an average frequency of 7.5 minutes, down from the current ten to twenty minutes.¹³AppValencia, a city-financed initiative, provides real-time information to users, encouraging mode switching.

The port of Valencia has lowered its overall emissions by reducing the carbon intensity of its handling activities.
Credit: Valenciaport

Valencia region and port

The Valencia region’s industrial decarbonization efforts, focused on ceramics and refining, are linked to the deployment of green hydrogen. Energy firms BP and Iberdrola are studying the feasibility of building the Valencia region’s largest green hydrogen plant for supply to BP’s Castellón refinery.¹⁴ Because refineries already use grey hydrogen (produced from natural gas), using green hydrogen would significantly lower industrial carbon output. Renewables-powered green hydrogen could quickly become a reality in this region, given excellent solar-generation capacity and even greater potential for even more capacity. Spain is Europe’s leader in green hydrogen and produces almost no natural gas.. Potential linkages with Morocco as an emerging green hydrogen export market further enhance the viability of this strategy. In addition to using green hydrogen via imports or indigenous production, Valencia may be able to access blue hydrogen from North African producers, such as Algeria.

Valencia port has made considerable progress in reducing the carbon intensity of its handling activities, as emissions fell from 3.19 kilograms (kg) of CO2 per ton handled in 2008 to 2.23 kg per ton in 2019.¹⁵ Fundación Valenciaport, the port authority’s research and innovation arm, has been a local leader in creating energy-efficiency and alternative-energy programs.¹⁶ Deep decarbonization of port activities will require the deployment and scaling of new technologies, such as ammonia for maritime transport and zero-carbon fuels for port operations.

The Valencia region, city government, port authority, private companies, and universities have been exploring ways to develop a local “hydrogen valley,” similar to those emerging across Europe (including elsewhere in Spain), to catalyze green hydrogen development through clustering supply and demand.¹⁷ In October 2021, Fundacion Valenciaport, the city, and regional entities led a proposal, dubbed “H2VLC Valencia Hydrogen Valley,” with the support of private-sector companies and academic research centers, to organize pilot projects in green hydrogen.¹⁸

Remaining challenges

Despite Valencia’s impressive successes, significant challenges remain. The city’s decarbonization efforts are subject to larger market forces. Renewables and other forms of clean generation, clean hydrogen for industrial use, and clean maritime shipping will all require multilateral solutions extending well beyond Valencia’s borders.

To continue momentum for Valencia’s decarbonization, city and regional leaders should focus on several priorities. First, the region, port, city, and private sector should strengthen their commitments to developing Valencia’s green hydrogen capabilities, given the region’s massive potential as a hub for this fuel. Second, the city should continue to prioritize its emphasis on buildings, through improving the energy efficiency of aging buildings, ensuring new construction meets high energy-efficiency standards, and prioritizing rooftop solar. Finally, the city and regional governments should continue to strengthen the connections between their decarbonization agendas and positive economic, social, and environmental transformation. Green hydrogen production, renewable energy programs, building efficiency programs, bicycling and transit investments, sustainable tourism, and more should continue to be part of a green and prosperous Valencia. One question that remains to be answered is whether the “green belt” surrounding the city should continue to be reserved primarily for food production (a substantial point of pride for the city) or if parts of it should be devoted to large-scale solar generation, which would immediately reduce the city’s emissions.

Despite the challenges Valencia faces in achieving its objectives, the odds favor continued progress. Valencia stakeholders interviewed by the authors were confident that the city’s political preconditions to implement swift transition policies will remain in place. Their argument is that the green transition is politically sustainable, given voter sentiment and increasing local evidence of climate change (hotter summers, in particular). For these reasons, although the political parties governing the region and city are not the same, the governments have not clashed on key policy questions. Whether this situation holds indefinitely will determine the extent to which Valencia’s leaders can realize their ambitious decarbonization goals for 2030 and beyond.

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AUTHORS

Staff

Peter Engelke

Global Energy Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Technology & Innovation Europe & Eurasia

Staff

Joseph Webster

Senior Fellow

Global Energy Center

Central Asia China

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Atlantic Council would like to thank BP for its support of this project.

This issue brief was written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on intellectual independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this issue brief’s conclusions.

The authors would like to thank Maia Sparkman, Elina Carpen, and Visit València Foundation for their assistance with this project. In addition, they would like to recognize workshop participants whose contributions helped inform this paper. The participants include the following:

Raul Cascajo Jimenez, Climate & Energy Committee, Valencia Port Authority
Debora Domingo Calabuig, Vice-rector for Sustainable Development of Campus, Universitat Politecnica de Valencia
María Vicente Gil Vila, Conselleria of Mobility, Generalitat Valencia
Juan Manuel Diez Orejas, Corporate Planning & Control, Port Authority of Valencia
Jaume Mata, Head of Sustainable Tourism, Visit Valencia
Carla Isabel Montagud Montalva, Director of the Chair, Energy Transition in Cities; Deputy Director, Sustainable Development, School of Industrial Engineering, Universidad Politécnica de Valencia
Josep Sanz Argent, R&D – Energy Transition, Fundación Valenciaport
Jose Villalba, Head of Climate Emergency Service & Energy Transition, City Council, Valencia

Putin the Pariah: War crimes arrest warrant deepens Russia’s isolation

Anders Åslund — Sun, 19 Mar 2023 16:46:03 +0000

On March 17, the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague indicted Russian President Vladimir Putin and issued an arrest warrant. This indictment is likely to have far-reaching consequences for Putin personally and for Russia.

The warrant states that Putin “is allegedly responsible for the war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. There are reasonable grounds to believe that Putin bears individual criminal responsibility for the aforementioned crimes.”

The ICC is a comparatively new international organization. It was created in July 1998 and formally established in 2002. At present, 123 countries have ratified its statute. They include all the countries of South America, all EU countries, most of Oceania, and roughly half of Africa. All these countries are now theoretically committed to arresting Putin. No sovereign immunity will shield him.

ICC indictments are rare. To date, the court has only indicted 52 people, but it aims to prosecute top culprits. Earlier indictments have targeted former presidents Omar al-Bashir of the Sudan and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. In this context, the indictment of Putin appears entirely natural.

Following their ICC indictments, al-Bashir and Gaddafi became international pariahs. Putin and his regime are not likely to fare any better. After this indictment, no serious politician or public figure will want to meet with or even talk to Putin. He cannot travel abroad without considering the possibility of arrest and extradition to The Hague.

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In light of his new status as an indicted war crimes suspect, Putin will likely find that he is no longer invited to international forums such as G20 or the United Nations General Assembly. Since all power in Russia is concentrated to Putin, this means Russia has effectively lost its voice on the international stage.

Another consequence of the indictment is that no democratic political leader who values their own reputation will want to have any further contact with Putin. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and French President Emanuel Macron will need to rethink their earlier policies of holding regular phone conversations with Putin. Likewise, there is no longer any realistic chance of a negotiated peace settlement between Putin’s Russia and Ukraine brokered by the international community. Meanwhile, Kremlin-friendly European politicians such as Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban will have to abandon their personal links with Putin.

There are limits to the impact of the ICC indictment, of course. Many influential countries in addition to Russia itself do not recognize the court, with the list including the United States, China, India, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. However, even those countries that have yet to sign and ratify the ICC statute will be well aware that continuing to maintain close ties with Putin could now hurt their international standing.

Chinese President Xi Jingping has just confirmed that he will visit Putin in Russia on March 20-22. While few expect him to alter his plans in light of the ICC arrest warrant, his visit is unlikely to be good for China’s reputation. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has had quite intense contacts with Putin in recent years. As the leader of a NATO member state, will he maintain this level of engagement after Putin’s indictment? I doubt it.

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The implications of the ICC arrest warrant are not limited to the international arena. It is also likely to impact Putin’s standing within Russia, undermining his absolute power and leaving him more isolated than ever.

Russian investigative journalists have recently revealed that the increasingly reclusive Putin now travels in armored trains between his three main residences in Valdai, Novo-Ogaryovo, and Sochi, with special railway stations constructed at each location for his personal security. He rarely dares to meet anyone in person, only physically convening Russia’s Security Council three times over the past year. Now a wanted man, Putin’s paranoia looks set to worsen.

With Putin unable to play his usual active role in international negotiations, his value as Russia’s national leader will be greatly diminished. This will have a significant negative impact on Russia’s international standing that will continue for as long as Putin remains in office. Putin’s domestic political position will be seriously undermined, with members of the Russian elite drawing the inevitable conclusion that he is now a liability.

The indictment against Putin sends a powerful message to other senior figures within the Russian establishment, leaving them in no doubt that they are also vulnerable to possible prosecution. If the Russian President can be charged, they may also be indicted for their participation in Putin’s alleged crimes against humanity. Loyalty to Putin was once seen as the only way to get ahead in modern Russia; it now looks increasingly like a dangerous dead end.

The Russian leader is unlikely to appear in The Hague any time soon. Nevertheless, the ICC decision to indict him for war crimes is a highly consequential step that will deepen Russia’s international isolation while significantly weakening Putin’s personal position both at home and abroad.

Anders Åslund is a Senior Fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum. He is co-author with Andrius Kubilius of the new book “Reconstruction, Reform, and EU Accession for Ukraine.”

Unfortunately, the ICC’s poor conviction record and its tendency to focus almost entirely on African countries has led to disaffection and undermined its legitimacy. This is why it is so significant that although Putin is only the third sitting head of state to be indicted by the ICC for war crimes, he is the first leader of a major power.

This is also why it matters that in the Ukraine case, the ICC received the largest ever state party referral to open an investigation. This unprecedented show of international resolve has the potential to revive the court’s authority. If states continue to provide it with the necessary logistical and material support, perhaps the ICC can begin to live up to its lofty aspirations to end impunity for atrocity crimes.

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It is also important that the ICC chose to make the warrants public instead of keeping them sealed. It did so because “the conduct addressed in the present situation is allegedly ongoing, and public awareness of the warrants may contribute to the prevention of the further commission of crimes.”

In other words, if not even Putin himself can escape the court’s notice, Russian soldiers all the way down the chain of command should also not expect to get away with war crimes. While there is unfortunately little evidence to suggest that international justice mechanisms like the ICC have been effective in deterring future atrocities, this does not mean that the ICC’s decision to name and shame Putin won’t have other important deterrent effects.

Perhaps most significantly, the warrant permanently isolates Putin and spells doom for lingering efforts to resume “business as usual” with today’s Russia. While some critics allege that the ICC warrant will provoke the accused and escalate conflict, the fact is that Putin has already become radicalized beyond redemption and was unlikely to show restraint in Ukraine anyway. Because the ICC’s warrant has no statute of limitations, either Putin will stand trial or the threat of it will haunt him until the end of his days.

Unless Putin is held accountable or loses power, there can never again be normalized relations with Russia. This signals to the many countries, particularly in the Global South but also in Europe, who have continued to hedge their bets over the war, that there is little point in doing so unless they want to risk their own reputations on the world stage. It also eliminates any diplomatic leverage Putin may have had in a peace process, because the ICC has made it clear that without accountability all the way to the very top, there can be no peace at all.

What remains unclear is how the ICC’s move will impact the thinking of the Russian elite, whose loyalty is critical for Putin’s survival. Many are hopeful, such as Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak, who described the warrants as “the beginning of the end for the Russian Federation in its current form on the world stage.”

The ICC’s high degree of scrutiny and willingness to go straight for Russia’s biggest fish may certainly make some of Putin’s supporters think twice, which could undermine the current regime and ultimately incentivize a future Russian government to hand the dictator over to The Hague. This is not beyond the realm of possibility. Indeed, it has already happened before with Slobodan Milosevic of the former Yugoslavia and Charles Taylor of Liberia. While it was once unimaginable that these war criminals would ever be handed over, they were both eventually extradited by their successors.

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Although it is impossible to predict, most observers agree that regime change is unlikely to happen anytime soon in Russia. It is therefore reasonable to assume that Putin is safe for now. Indeed, there is good reason to expect him to cling even harder to power, precisely to avoid the possibility that any successor would hand him over to the ICC. It is also worth remembering that Putin has successfully nurtured a revisionist, imperial mindset in the country and has made the Russian media heavily complicit in his crimes. This makes the possibility of a peaceful change of power something of a pipe dream.

Herein lies the main problem for those who long to see Putin in the dock. Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute, which established the ICC. In theory, if Putin sets foot in any one of the 123 countries which have ratified the Rome Statute, he would have to be arrested and sent straight to The Hague. Unfortunately, as the case of former Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir shows, states cannot always be counted on to live up to this obligation.

With this in mind, what can the ICC and the wider international community do to ensure the warrant for Putin’s arrest becomes a genuine step towards meaningful justice? The ICC has an important role to play outside of the courtroom, but it needs the logistical and material support to live up to it. While the Court documents atrocities and gives them a permanent place in the public record, it should also give victims a sense of ownership over the process by facilitating their participation in the trials themselves and through its own outreach to affected communities.

Given the unlikelihood of Ukrainians seeing Putin stand trial, it will be critical for the court and its supporters to nevertheless manage expectations and communicate what is happening and why the process still matters. The court must also work in partnership with Ukrainian civil society, without whom such extensive evidence on child deportations could never have been collected and acted upon in real time.

In this sense, it is crucial to remember that the ICC is meant to complement, not replace, Ukraine’s own judicial system in how it handles war crimes on its own territory. Ukraine’s courts are already overwhelmed by the size of the caseload, which only continues to grow. The international community must do everything it can to support Ukraine’s capacity to investigate and prosecute war crimes in a fair and impartial manner.

The international community should also create a broader framework in which to pursue justice and accountability. One immediate step is to establish clear mechanisms to help locate, trace, and reunite all separated Ukrainian children with their families and legal guardians. This means supporting Ukrainian civil society activists who not only facilitate family reunification but stand ready to provide the vast array of services Ukrainians will need for years to come in order to recover from the horrors of the war. Even when peace and the rule of law are restored in Ukraine, much will depend on how well the country can pursue a holistic, comprehensive form of justice.

To come full circle back to the question of whether the ICC’s arrest warrant for Putin is indeed “historic,” a cynical read would be that this moment ultimately highlights the most important gap in international law when it comes to Russia’s crimes in Ukraine. It remains impossible for the ICC to prosecute the crime of aggression if the states in question are not parties to the Rome Statute. Until there is a viable international mechanism to prosecute aggression and the collective political will to do so, the root causes of this war can never be fully addressed, rule of law will never be fully restored, and impunity will continue.

Danielle Johnson holds a PhD in Politics from Oxford University and is currently a Senior Ukraine Analyst at ACAPS.

John Herbst: This case will have geopolitical implications from the Global South to Washington

Nushin Sarkarati: The US Department of Defense must send evidence to the ICC

Celeste Kmiotek: Time for the United States to reconsider its stance on the ICC

Gissou Nia: Behind the warrants is evidence, a global campaign, and perhaps a strategy

Haydee Dijkstal: These warrants are a step toward justice and accountability, not just symbolism

Shelby Magid: A step forward in dismantling Lvova-Belova’s network

Rayhan Asat: This case is a message to human-rights violators around the world—including China

Kristina Hook: Any Russians committing crimes in Ukraine should consider themselves formally on notice

A moment of moral clarity

No one should expect Putin to be behind bars anytime soon, but that’s not the point of today’s ICC arrest warrant. No indictments have been issued yet, and the warrant is one of several provisional measures that the ICC is taking to develop its case for the prosecution of Russian officials for war crimes in Ukraine. The case against Putin is still in its preliminary stages, and today’s war-crimes charges are likely the first steps towards further charges of genocide and crimes against humanity.

However, the law is unambiguous, and the facts are increasingly undeniable. For example, Article II, paragraph (e) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, to which both Russia and Ukraine are parties, says that genocide includes “[f]orcibly transferring children of the group to another group” when done “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.” Russia has openly transferred Ukrainian children to Russian custody. Putin’s own statements going back to 2014, and the statements of other Russian officials and voices under Putin’s control, are available as evidence of the intent to erase Ukrainian identity.

Ukraine has invited the ICC to investigate crimes committed on Ukrainian territory. But Russia is not a party to the ICC treaty, so no one expects Putin to be turned over for trial right away. Still, former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic thought that he wouldn’t be turned over for trial when he was indicted by a different international tribunal, yet he died behind bars in The Hague.

Today’s arrest warrant will limit Putin’s diplomatic options, and it will make it harder for anyone to dismiss Russia’s aggression against Ukraine as a “territorial dispute.” The real point of today’s ICC arrest warrant is to bring the world to a moment of moral clarity that what Putin is ordering in Ukraine violates the law and moral values of civilized nations around the world.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice at the Atlantic Council. From 1997-2001, he was the deputy in the US State Department Office of War Crimes Issues.

Next, prosecute Russia’s attacks on hospitals

The ICC’s arrest warrant for Putin is a notable step in meting out justice for the atrocities he has led in Ukraine. However, this arrest warrant covers only a sliver of Russian crimes in Ukraine. The ICC and national justice actors in Ukraine and around the world must build cases reflecting the full range of any and all war crimes and crimes against humanity Russia can be charged with committing in Ukraine.

Chief among the crimes that should be prioritized are targeted attacks on medical facilities and personnel. In the first ten months of the war, Russian forces launched 707 attacks on Ukraine’s health care system, bombing and shelling hospitals and ambulances, killing and injuring medical workers, and threatening and imprisoning other health workers. Targeted attacks on medical facilities and personnel are war crimes. When carried out in a widespread or systematic manner, they amount to crimes against humanity.

Ukraine is not the first place Russia has perpetrated these crimes. After carrying out similar attacks in Chechnya in 2000 and in Georgia in 2008, Russian forces attacked ten medical facilities in Syria in the first month of its military intervention there, joining the Syrian government’s systematic assault on the country’s health care system that has killed 945 medical personnel and destroyed hundreds of medical facilities.

The continuation of attacks on medical facilities and personnel erodes international law and poses a global threat. Syrian and now Ukrainian health workers are suffering the deadly consequences of global inaction in the face of these crimes. International justice actors must prosecute attacks on health care as war crimes and crimes against humanity to reinforce these lifesaving laws and help prevent the spread of these attacks to yet another conflict.

—Elise Baker is a staff lawyer with the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project and previously documented attacks on Syria’s health care system with Physicians for Human Rights.

This case will have geopolitical implications from the Global South to Washington

The ICC indictment of Putin and Lvova-Belova for the alleged war crime of abducting children from Ukraine is a stunning development with wide implications. First, it is a huge black eye for the Kremlin as Putin gets ready to receive Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Moscow next week. This makes it harder for China to push its “peace plan” that could work to keep Moscow’s control over occupied Ukrainian territory. What would such control mean for Ukraine’s children? After all, Russia has not hidden this war crime.

This development will also have some impact in the Global South, where the Kremlin has had some success arguing that years of NATO enlargement are somehow responsible for Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine. What does kidnapping Ukrainian children have to do with protecting Moscow’s borders from the West? This point could be particularly useful in those parts of Europe that talk about a “Zeitenwende,” yet cannot muster the will to send Ukraine the means to stop Moscow’s aggression and war crimes there. It likewise raises uncomfortable questions for US politicians and “realists” who think that this war is simply a territorial dispute. Why is Moscow removing the younger inhabitants of the disputed territory to Russia? Is this Putin’s perverse version of family values?

Most importantly, it will have impact in Russia. For months, the Russian media has been talking about Western investigations of Russian war crimes. It will work like rust on the Putin regime as weaker-kneed Russian officials wonder what this means for them. It’s another bad day for the Russian war machine.

—John Herbst is the senior director of the Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine.

The US Department of Defense must send evidence to the ICC

The ICC’s issuance of arrest warrants today for Putin and Lvova-Belova puts greater urgency on the impasse between the Pentagon and the US State Department over the United States’ support of the ICC’s investigation on Ukraine. On March 8, the New York Times reported that the Pentagon is blocking the Biden administration from sharing evidence with the ICC about Russian atrocities in Ukraine. The information is reportedly related to Russian officials’ deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure, as well as the abduction of Ukrainian children from occupied territory—the very crime that Putin is accused of by the ICC.

While, generally, the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA) limits the United States’ ability to cooperate with the ICC, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 included amendments to ASPA that allowed for the United States to assist with “investigations and prosecutions of foreign nationals related to the Situation in Ukraine.”

If the reports are accurate, the Department of Defense’s refusal to provide evidence to the ICC that is directly related to the crimes under investigation undermines the United States’ continued support of Ukraine and the United States’ commitment to holding perpetrators of Russia’s crimes in Ukraine accountable. Today’s arrest warrants show the importance of supporting the ICC’s investigation into the situation in Ukraine, as the ICC is presently the only court willing and able to indict a sitting head of state—something US courts would not be able to do on their own.

—Nushin Sarkarati is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Program.

Time for the United States to reconsider its stance on the ICC

While there are plenty of significant accountability efforts moving forward for Ukraine, the legal and symbolic importance of today’s warrants cannot be overlooked. Putin is the head of state of a permanent United Nations Security Council member (otherwise known as a P5 country) and is scheduled to host another P5 president, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, next week. While the proposed Special Tribunal on the Crime of Aggression would likely also be able to issue a warrant for Putin’s arrest, no current standing court holds that power. Targeted sanctions already prevent Putin from traveling to many countries, but he now cannot travel to any of the 123 States Parties to the Rome Statute without risking arrest. This includes two other P5 members: the United Kingdom and France.

Today’s warrants highlight the power the ICC holds: the ability to stand up to leaders who perpetrate atrocities. Even before Putin stands trial, it has a practical effect, demonstrating the importance of accountability efforts within this conflict.

The United States has echoed the need for such accountability by strengthening its war crimes law so that it can domestically prosecute perpetrators who are not entitled to immunity, establishing Task Force KleptoCapture to target regime assets, and signing a memorandum of understanding with the Ukrainian prosecutor general to pursue accountability. But the United States is still not a party to the only court able to take action on Putin and other senior officials. Today’s news presents an opportunity for the United States to reconsider its stance and put meaningful action behind its rhetoric.

—Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Behind the warrants is evidence, a global campaign, and perhaps a strategy

With the issuance of arrest warrants against Putin and Lvova-Belova for alleged war crimes in Ukraine, the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor has shown it is going straight to the top. Putin and Lvova-Belova stand accused of the war crimes of unlawful deportation and the transfer of children from occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia. Russia is alleged to have committed a wide range of crimes in Ukraine, including the bombing of civilian infrastructure; the systematic and widespread use of torture, including shocking detainees with electricity and hanging them from the ceiling; indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians, including massacres in which hundreds of civilians were killed at once; and brutal sexual assaults as a weapon of war. Thus, it is notable that the ICC prosecutor has chosen to focus on crimes against children as an opening salvo for what will likely be the first of many arrest warrants to follow.

This is in part likely a function of the evidence—the Russian state has been very overt in acknowledging its child transfers and Lvova-Belova herself has even admitted to “adopting” a Ukrainian child—and in part a result of the growing global priority placed on protecting children’s rights in conflict. However, it may also reflect savvy strategy on the prosecutor’s part. Many members of the court from Latin America, Africa, and Asia feel disconnected from the West’s denunciation of Putin and call for the preservation of the international rules-based order when that order has been violated on so many occasions in their own regions, often aided by the direct actions or complicity of the West. By focusing its first arrest warrants on war crimes against children, the ICC made sure the bare and brutal truth of Putin’s war cannot be denied, even among those who bristle at Western hypocrisy. The allegations may also reflect an intention to later add charges of genocide, under Article 6(e) of the Rome Statute, since it will be a long road from the issuance of these arrest warrants to any confirmation of charges hearing in The Hague.

—Gissou Nia is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

A step forward in dismantling Lvova-Belova’s network

The announcement today from the ICC that arrest warrants have been issued for Putin and Lvova-Belova is significant legally and politically. Legally, the ICC is moving forward the pursuit of justice for one of the most heinous war crimes the Russian regime is committing. Politically and diplomatically, this can hopefully serve to increase pressure on Putin to cease the unlawful transfer and deportation of children, encourage others to cooperate with international organizations to share information about children who are now in Russia and Russian-occupied territories, and ultimately return Ukrainian children to Ukraine.

While this is only one of the many heinous crimes Putin and the Russian officials and forces are committing, it is a critical issue that needs more attention, which this ICC arrest warrant can help bring. Putin and Lvova-Belova are central to the systemic forced deportation of thousands of Ukrainian children to Russia and Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. Lvova-Belova, in serving as the commissioner for children’s rights, is a vital part of the Russian criminal enterprise of forcibly transferring and deporting Ukrainian children to a network of dozens of camps that serve a range of purposes including “re-education.” In addition to being allegedly guilty of running this policy and network, she also personally “adopted” a boy evacuated from Mariupol.

Ukrainian children in a variety of categories—including orphans, children with severe mental and physical disabilities who were in state-run homes, children of prisoners of war, and others—have been forcibly relocated by Russian forces since the beginning of the full-scale invasion last February. The true figures are unknown and are likely much higher, but as of now at least sixteen thousand children are reported as forcibly transferred, and only 308 have been returned. This is a clear violation of human rights and international law, and the ICC has taken a huge step forward in addressing this.

—Shelby Magid is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

These warrants are a step toward justice and accountability, not just symbolism

Today’s announcement by the ICC of the issuance of arrest warrants against Putin and Lvova-Belova signifies an important step toward justice and accountability for Ukrainian victims and a historic step by the court.

Importantly, the charges represent a focus by the Office of the Prosecutor on those who are consistently most vulnerable to harm during conflict—children—who were specifically targeted within this conflict. While the charges are narrowly focused on the war crime of unlawfully deporting and transferring children from Ukraine into Russia, the court has clarified that these charges represent a first step, and investigations by the prosecutor continue as to the many other alleged crimes. Notably, the deportation and/or transfer of children constitutes one of the underlying acts required to demonstrate the crime of genocide under the Rome Statute, and attention should be paid as to whether these initial charges might support a future allegation by the Office of the Prosecutor as to Russia’s intent to destroy, in whole or in part, Ukraine as a group.

While some commentators have questioned whether the arrest warrants should be viewed as primarily symbolic given that Russia is not a member state to the court, the significance of the arrest warrants go beyond mere symbolism to represent steps towards justice and accountability. The arrest warrants and charges are based on the investigations of the prosecutor and evidence collected, and the findings of the Pre-Trial Chamber that the evidence submitted in support of the arrest warrant application provided reasonable grounds to believe that Putin and Lvova-Belova bore individual criminal responsibility. The court said that its announcement of the arrest warrants also aims to deter further crimes through public awareness, even as the arrest warrant documents remain confidential.

In addition, the historic step of issuing an arrest warrant, for the first time, against a national leader of a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and calling on all ICC member states to arrest and transfer the accused to the court, is notable and could be viewed as a representation of the prosecutor’s commitment to accountability.

—Haydee Dijkstal is a nonresident senior fellow at the Strategic Litigation Project and a UK barrister representing victims before the ICC, including victims in the Ukraine Situation.

This case is a message to human-rights violators around the world—including China

It’s too premature to say whether Putin will be tried, but the ICC’s decision to issue an arrest warrant against him sends a strong message to human-rights violators and war criminals everywhere. This groundbreaking decision shows that no matter how powerful the architects of atrocity are within their own national borders, the ICC will work to bring them to justice. As we react to this decision, I urge observers to remember victims of heinous crimes no matter where they are, including those who have suffered crimes against humanity and genocide.

While Putin faces potential prosecution for his crime of forcibly deporting Ukrainian children, Chinese officials have been implicated in the same offense in Xinjiang. Parliaments and governments across the world have officially determined that the Chinese government’s actions and policies constitute genocide. In August, the United Nations’ Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights also concluded that China may have committed crimes against humanity. As we celebrate the ICC’s decision, we must remember the landmark case two Uyghur groups have brought before it, asking for the court to investigate China’s crimes. Today, more than a half-million Uyghur children have been forcibly separated from their parents in state orphanage camps. Chinese officials should take note of the court’s decision that no government, however powerful they may be, can commit atrocities with impunity. When they do, senior officials will bear personal responsibility.

—Rayhan Asat is a nonresident senior fellow at the Strategic Litigation Project and an international human-rights lawyer.

Any Russians committing crimes in Ukraine should consider themselves formally on notice

The ICC’s arrest warrant for Putin is a seismic moment for international law and judicial accountability. The Russian president now joins an exceedingly short list of world leaders formally charged with war crimes. In legal terms, reasonable grounds exist to believe that Putin himself bears individual criminal responsibility for the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukraine’s children.

To international human-rights watchers, the ICC’s historic announcement also indicates an increased scope of prosecution. The ICC does not (currently) have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in Ukraine, a charge focused on prosecuting a nation’s most senior leaders, which explains why different options for a special tribunal are being explored. Today’s warrant confirms that the ICC could not only pursue lower-level offenders but also Putin himself for additional charges.

The arrest warrant for Lvova-Belova, Russia’s so-named commissioner for children’s rights, is no less significant. By naming her along with Putin, the ICC is signaling that other officials and functionaries also bear criminal responsibility for the Russian Federation’s crimes against Ukrainian civilians. The ICC’s decision to publicly announce these arrest warrants is likely intended to have a deterring effect against Russian perpetrators committing atrocity crimes in Ukraine. Russian warfighters, cabinet members, security services involved in deporting Ukrainian children, and bureaucrats involved in their illegal adoption into Russian homes should consider themselves formally on notice.

The West and broader international community should now support international law by sanctioning a wider range of actors involved in Russian atrocity crimes, making it clear to these actors and their families that international opportunities for vacation, work, and education are closed for any involved in war crimes against Ukrainians.

Finally, today’s ICC arrest warrants highlight Russia’s premeditated and extreme cruelty through the mass trafficking of children, most of whom still languish away from their homes and loved ones in Russia. These particular war crimes are also direct violations of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, which prohibits “forcibly transferring children of the [victim] group to another group.” No nation or institution has ever fundamentally contested this legal definition or its mandate. Thus, the full gravity of Russian atrocities in Ukraine will continue to move through the legal system.

—Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University’s School of Conflict Management, Peacebuilding, and Development and a former US Fulbright scholar to Ukraine.

The post Experts react: The International Criminal Court just issued an arrest warrant for Putin. Will he wind up behind bars? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Gender persecution is happening in Iran. Targeted sanctions would be a step toward accountability.

Celeste Kmiotek, Lisandra Novo — Wed, 08 Mar 2023 17:09:19 +0000

This past year, the situation of women in Iran has increasingly come under international scrutiny. In September 2022, Mahsa Amini died from injuries sustained by the regime’s “morality police,” triggering a women-led protest movement that quickly transitioned from protests against compulsory hijab rules to protesting the Islamic Republic of Iran itself. Since then, more than five hundred protesters have been killed and almost twenty thousand arrested, among them many female journalists. Alarming reports of gender-based crimes, including sexual abuse and torture of protesters at the hands of Iranian security forces, have also come to light. As the journalist and activist Masih Alinejad and others have described it, women in Iran live under a severe and systematic form of oppression akin to “gender apartheid.” Now, schoolgirls across the country are falling ill in what many believe are deliberate poisonings to close girls’ schools in retaliation for their participation in the protests.

One of the principal institutions behind this systematic oppression of women is the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution (SCCR), an unelected body answerable only to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Indeed, it was the SCCR, under former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, that created the morality police in the first place. Months before Amini’s death, President Ebrahim Raisi, who was himself sanctioned by the United States in 2019 and who now heads the SCCR, ordered the morality police and government agencies across the country to enforce more strictly the compulsory hijab rules, a policy enacted and designed by the SCCR. Despite mounting evidence of abuses in the context of the protests, the SCCR reiterated its support for the compulsory hijab in January. That same month, a new secretary of the SCCR was appointed—one who personally used to fire a slingshot at women who he considered to be wearing their hijab improperly and, more recently, insisted that protesters should be shown “no mercy” and crucified.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to hold the SCCR accountable. It is an unelected body in a country that is beyond the reach of traditional accountability mechanisms such as international courts and routinely refuses to cooperate with specialized human rights mechanisms. The UN Human Rights Council recently established a fact-finding mission on Iran with a mandate to collect, consolidate, and analyze evidence of human rights violations stemming from the protests, but it does not have the power to initiate any legal proceedings itself. Given these limitations, sanctions—and specifically targeted sanctions—offer a way forward to address the ongoing gender persecution.

Governments use targeted sanctions to freeze perpetrators’ assets and ban them from obtaining visas. They are primarily used as a tool to incentivize behavior changes under the theory that perpetrators will abandon the sanctionable activities in order to reclaim their assets and ability to travel.

Targeted sanctions have been used since the 1990s. However, using them to target human rights violations and corruption first began in 2012 in response to the death of Russian whistleblower and tax lawyer Sergei Magnitsky in 2009. Magnitsky was tortured and died in Russian prison after uncovering an instance of massive Russian corruption. After Magnitsky’s death, his client Bill Browder began advocating for justice on his behalf. While Browder could not find paths for criminal accountability in Russia or overseas, he recognized the link between corruption and human rights abuses, and he noted that many architects of both spent their ill-gotten gains in Western countries. Jurisdictions including the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the European Union (EU), and Australia adopted measures, often referred to as Magnitsky-style sanctions, to prevent perpetrators of these crimes from enjoying those luxuries—even if they were otherwise untouchable.

Ideally, the United States, likeminded countries, and regional blocs such as the EU will all designate both the SCCR and its members. While entities often do not have overseas assets and, naturally, cannot receive visas, their members often do have international connections. Designations on entities do not automatically result in designations on members, but the relevant legislation is often worded such that any members would additionally meet the criteria.

Iranian regime officials are known to have considerable overseas wealth, as well as international connections (such as immediate family members living overseas) that would suggest they would want to maintain the ability to spend money and obtain visas in those locations. The children of high-ranking officials, sometimes called “aghazadehs,” are frequently criticized for their luxurious lifestyles, even prompting a hit television series in Iran focused on them. Targeted sanctions would freeze all assets in the officials’ names and would, in general, prevent them from engaging with banking systems based in the sanctioning countries (for example, to send money to family members) or from obtaining a visa (for example, to visit family members). Especially in light of reports of mass resignations among certain regime officials and members of the security forces, sanctions might incentivize SCCR members to resign from government positions, at the least.

Even if executed perfectly, targeted sanctions will not end gender persecution. Despite existing global sanctions (targeted and otherwise), the Iranian regime has not yet meaningfully changed its behavior. Designating an entity like the SCCR without known overseas assets and without designating individual members would have limited material effect. However, as recognized by the Netherlands, the symbolic value cannot be overlooked. The limited benefits are worth the effort—especially when it comes to gender-based crimes. First, it puts the SCCR’s members on notice that the international community is aware of their complicity and is paying attention. Second, it offers support to the victims of the SCCR’s policies—in this instance, women. Such support has been lacking in targeted sanctions to date, and groups such as Human Rights First have analyzed designations and found that in most instances jurisdictions did not recognize the gender of the victims, but when they did, they were more likely to identify men than women.

The United States has designated hundreds of Iranian officials across more than a dozen Iran-focused sanctions regimes. So far, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and the EU have imposed targeted sanctions on the morality police and on the security forces—but not yet on the SCCR. While the designations thus far have been a positive and welcome step to address the behaviors stemming from the SCCR’s policies, they fail to acknowledge the specific harms the SCCR has committed in building the architecture of Iran’s gender apartheid.

Experts from the Strategic Litigation Project have previously recommended that authorities designate the SCCR under relevant targeted sanctions regimes and have submitted supporting evidence and legal arguments. As important as designating human-rights-violating institutions such as the morality police has been, designating the SCCR is also critical for identifying and condemning the bodies responsible for facilitating the ongoing gender-related crimes and would add additional weight in support of their many victims. International Women’s Day offers an opportunity for countries and other jurisdictions with human rights sanctions regimes to designate those responsible for upholding regimes that discriminate against women and implement the policies designed to violate women’s rights—including the SCCR and its members.

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

The Strategic Litigation Project works on accountability efforts for atrocity crimes, human rights violations, and corruption offenses around the world.

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Inside Bangladesh’s new data protection laws

Stephen Weymouth — Wed, 08 Mar 2023 15:51:38 +0000

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The 2022 Draft Data Protection Act (DPA), which establishes new restrictions related to the processing, storage, and transfer of data, appears to move Bangladesh’s digital governance in a different direction. The DPA is the first data-privacy law to be proposed in Bangladesh; it follows in the wake of new digital-privacy laws passed around the world over the past several years. Provisions of the bill have been met with criticism due to the restrictions they place on digital business activity and the lack of constraints established over the government’s enforcement authority.

The expansion of the digital economy raises legitimate concerns about data privacy that governments need to address. Yet, blanket restrictions on information flows, coupled with vague enforcement provisions, are unlikely to buttress consumer protections; and they may instead erode human rights. Some fear that governments can suppress opposition through digital surveillance under the guise of data governance.

This policy brief examines Bangladesh’s draft Data Protection Act. Following a brief overview of the act, it provides a framework for understanding the political tradeoffs that governments face when implementing digital-economy regulations. The article then considers how the act may influence the trajectory of Bangladesh’s integration in global markets, and the country’s prospects for continued growth.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

Assessing risks to Hong Kong’s business conditions
Institutional changes in Hong Kong since 2019
One country, two currencies
Compliance: Sanctions and national security directives
The rule of law and judicial independence
Freedom of the press, transparency of information flows
Data security

Recommendations

About the author and acknowledgements

SouthAsiaSource Dec 5, 2022

India’s data localization pivot can revamp global digital diplomacy

By Anand Raghuraman

India’s stance on data localization constrained its ability to engage in digital diplomacy. With a new privacy bill, however, it has outlined a compromise option.

Digital Policy Economy & Business

SouthAsiaSource Nov 23, 2022

India’s new data bill is a mixed bag for privacy

By Justin Sherman

India’s parliament has released its Digital Personal Data Protection Bill, offering a mixed bag for privacy.

Digital Policy Economy & Business

SouthAsiaSource Sep 12, 2022

The international community must see the Bangladesh of 2022

By Mohammad A. Arafat

Though Bangladesh is not without fault, the international community has good reason to see it as a constructive, democratic partner in South Asia.

Bangladesh Economy & Business

Southasiasource Blog

The post Inside Bangladesh’s new data protection laws appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Fractured foundations: Assessing risks to Hong Kong’s business environment

Logan Wright — Tue, 07 Mar 2023 05:00:00 +0000

Executive summary

Rebranding Hong Kong
Welcome back
Objectives and methodology

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Executive summary

Hong Kong’s legal and institutional structure has changed fundamentally since the implementation of the National Security Law in 2020. When changes of this magnitude occur, it is difficult for anyone to know what shifts are transitory, and what adjustments will end up becoming permanent features of Hong Kong’s political and commercial environment.

Over the past three years in Hong Kong, a system based upon legal and institutional restrictions on government action founded on the Basic Law and British common law has shifted toward a system governed by political norms reinforced by the National Security Law. In that process, those dominant political norms have changed significantly from those that had governed the “one country, two systems” policy since the handover of sovereignty in 1997, and are increasingly driven by priorities in Beijing, rather than the previously dominant local leadership of Hong Kong. The National Security Law created a parallel system of authority operating both behind and above Hong Kong’s system of government established by the Basic Law and the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984. This new structure permits a broad interpretation of the definition of “national security,” leaving individuals and businesses with few options to challenge the law’s reach.

The National Security Law has been used to target multiple institutions seen as politically challenging to Beijing, including independent newspapers, media outlets, and pro-democracy politicians. It also has limited activities of the press, the publication and distribution of books and films, and the flow of information in other formats, including those essential to the operation of a modern commercial and financial system.

The bet for businesses operating in Hong Kong, and the financial industry in particular, is that they will continue to be viewed as essential for Hong Kong’s globally competitive position. Despite the widespread changes in the political and social landscape in Hong Kong, some argue that changes in the rest of Hong Kong’s operating environment will not influence their own businesses, because they will continue to enjoy some degree of special treatment.

This report attempts to provide an objective framework to assess the wager that business conditions for most firms operating in Hong Kong will remain unchanged, despite the dramatic changes that Hong Kong has seen within its legal and institutional infrastructure. The report analyzes in detail the risks to the commercial operating environment in Hong Kong that have emerged since the 2020 introduction of the National Security Law, including currency risks, compliance challenges, threats to judicial independence, access to accurate information, and data security.

While Western governments have already attempted to change their policies toward Hong Kong in the wake of the National Security Law, the business community needs a different set of strategies to maintain and protect its interests given these rising risks. While no strategy can completely eliminate these risks, lobbying collectively and maximizing the political relevance of Hong Kong’s self-declared status as an important international commercial and financial hub can be useful, and may have already generated some modest successes. Other recommendations include approaching outreach to Hong Kong authorities as a political campaign; communicating to Beijing the consequences of uncertainty over Hong Kong’s status; investing in compliance infrastructure and developing risk mitigation strategies; monitoring pro-Beijing media in Hong Kong and broader US-China political trends, as well as data concerning national security cases and outcomes, foreign participation, and outcomes within the legal system; and communicating the importance of independent media for Hong Kong’s future.

Rebranding Hong Kong

Under “one country, two systems” Hong Kong will continue to practice the capitalist system, and practice the common law system, an independent judiciary, a free flow of capital, no exchange control. Our dollar [the Hong Kong dollar] will continue to be pegged to the US dollar. So from investors’ perspective, indeed, Hong Kong will continue to function as a free international financial center with the best international regulatory regime and a trusted judicial system.
—Paul Chan, October 2022 remarks at Future Investment Initiative Forum

When conditions change rapidly, there is a natural tendency to seek certainty and stability. In that context, Hong Kong’s Financial Secretary Paul Chan knew his audience. Speaking at a financial forum in Saudi Arabia last October, he specified some of the exact fears that the global financial industry had developed concerning Hong Kong over the previous three years. Since the 2019 protests, the imposition of a sweeping National Security Law in July 2020, and the enforcement of strict COVID-19 restrictions and quarantine requirements in 2021 and early 2022, Hong Kong’s politics, media environment, legislative institutions, and business environment had changed fundamentally. But Chan’s audience in the financial industry was less concerned with what had already happened and more interested in what might come next. In very few words, he isolated some of the key components of Hong Kong’s attractiveness to international business, and argued forcefully that they would remain in place. The “capitalist system,” “common law,” an “independent judiciary,” the “free flow of capital,” and a credible peg of the Hong Kong dollar to the US dollar were exactly the pillars of Hong Kong’s operating environment that businesses valued.¹ The fact that Chan had to make this reassurance highlighted the rising perceptions that all were at risk. The financial industry in Hong Kong continues to operate on the assumption that the fundamental changes in Hong Kong’s political and legal institutional structures will not impact their business prospects specifically.

Chan’s mission was difficult. He was in the Middle East a week ahead of a summit of financial executives in Hong Kong meant to showcase that Hong Kong was reopening to the rest of the world and remained a viable place to do business. Even after the 2019 protests, Hong Kong had been largely closed off throughout the three years of the COVID-19 pandemic. With lengthy required quarantine periods for all travelers including Hong Kong residents, international travel was extremely unattractive and the volume of international flights declined sharply—on some days in 2022, fewer than one hundred people arrived at the Hong Kong international airport. The border between Hong Kong and the mainland remained similarly closed, with quarantines usually required to enter mainland China, even for those with permission. An exodus of both expatriates and Hong Kong residents also was underway, with the total population of Hong Kong declining by 216,300 people between June 2019 and June 2022, a drop of 2.9%.² Numerous media stories circulated about Singapore gaining new residents and investment at Hong Kong’s expense.³ Businesses in Hong Kong were facing problems retaining staff and recruiting new people to replace them.⁴

The aftermath of the 2019 protests created a far different and more expansive challenge for Hong Kong. The National Security Law enacted in July 2020 was Beijing’s response to the protests of the previous year. The measure was enacted through Annex III of Hong Kong’s Basic Law, which concerned security arrangements for Hong Kong and circumvented the usual legislative process of approval through Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The new law established parallel systems of authority to Hong Kong’s traditional institutions, while permitting interventions into those jurisdictions on issues related to national security, and potentially conflicting with the provisions of the Basic Law. Early cases indicated that the National Security Law was being used against behavior in 2019 that Beijing sought to prohibit in the future, including the routine political activities of the opposition or pro-democratic politicians in Hong Kong. The concern for the business community and for financial institutions was whether the National Security Law meaningfully imposed restraints on government action under the law, the extent of those restraints, and the lines that were being redrawn between national security and commercial activity.

This report aims to clarify what has changed within the business environment in Hong Kong over the past three years, and the significance of those changes for businesses and financial institutions operating in Hong Kong now and in the future. The report aims to step back from politicized rhetoric to evaluate actual changes in institutions and outcomes.

Welcome back

Hong Kong’s “Global Financial Leaders Investment Summit,” a financial forum held in early November 2022, was designed by Hong Kong’s government to demonstrate that the global financial industry remained committed to Hong Kong—despite all of the changes in the territory—and implicitly, to China’s markets. Hong Kong has always played a role linking China with the international marketplace, and historically has highlighted the effectiveness of Western legal and judicial institutions operating under Chinese sovereignty. Chief Executive John Lee summarized the case as, “Hong Kong remains the only place in the world where the global advantage and the China advantage come together in a single city.”⁵

The events surrounding the financial conference presented several confounding facts to the attendees and the international media, raising numerous questions about Hong Kong’s continued convergence with international norms and practices. The event started with a tour of M+, Hong Kong’s newly completed international art museum. Between the project’s groundbreaking ceremony and its eventual opening in 2021, the legal environment surrounding the display of some pieces of contemporary art by Chinese artists had shifted within Hong Kong, and the museum shelved certain exhibitions in 2021 and then removed some paintings that were seen as politically charged from the walls in 2022 (although they were still visible on the museum’s website).⁶

On the same day of the financial forum, a trial was being conducted of an independent media organization, Stand News, with Hong Kong authorities accusing its publications of being seditious. The organization and the editors and journalists involved were not being charged under the National Security Law but an old colonial law created in 1938 targeting sedition.⁷ However, no journalist or publication had been charged under the law since the 1960s, until the National Security Law was in place.⁸

One of the most notable differences between Hong Kong and other global financial centers over the past three years was the territory’s restrictive measures to contain COVID-19, which mirrored the mainland’s approach. Hong Kong’s coronavirus response became a visible manifestation of the broader changes in governance underway and Beijing’s growing influence, with political mandates taking precedence over technocratic or scientific guidance.

The financial conference was designed to highlight Hong Kong’s return to normalcy after COVID-19 restrictions were eased, but mainland Chinese officials did not travel to the forum, and instead appeared virtually. One Chinese official, Fang Xinghai of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, argued, “I would advise international investors to find out what’s really going on in China and what’s the real intention of our government by themselves. Don’t read too much of the international media.”⁹ Chan, the financial secretary, had his own problems after suddenly testing positive for COVID-19 in Saudi Arabia the week before. Under Hong Kong’s rules at the time, testing positive upon arrival in Hong Kong would have forced Chan to isolate for seven days. Instead, despite testing positive to a PCR test at the airport, Chan was declared to have recovered in time to attend the forum, where he appeared in person without a mask, while outdoor mask mandates were still enforced outside the conference. At the event venue, the Four Seasons hotel, delegates at the summit were given different rules to allow them to socialize with one another without the benefit of masks or the required isolation, unlike normal travelers to Hong Kong at the time. Chan later responded to the criticism in a press conference, claiming that, “The treatment that I have been given was the same as anyone. There’s no particular privilege at all.”¹⁰

The changes in Hong Kong’s political system following the 2019 protests impacted the territory’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic as well, which revealed the growing influence of Beijing’s political priorities. Following the mainland’s “zero COVID” approach led to Hong Kong pursuing a draconian policy of isolating individual cases and close contacts of cases—even if they had no symptoms. After the Hong Kong leadership declared in late 2021 that the objective was to open the border with the mainland before international travel,¹¹ restrictions on businesses and individuals became far more common, with the apparent rationale of bringing Hong Kong’s practices in COVID-19 containment more in line with those of the mainland, to smooth the opening of the border. Whether or not Beijing officials ever communicated specific requirements to Hong Kong’s health authorities that were necessary for opening the mainland border, however, remained unclear throughout the three years of the pandemic.

Ultimately, even these highly restrictive measures were ineffective at containing the virus. The Omicron variant of COVID-19 eventually spread into the population in early 2022, with some cases ironically emerging from quarantine hotels themselves. The spread quickly overwhelmed the hospital system. Photos of elderly patients sitting on hospital beds outside, exposed to the elements, dominated the local media.¹² Hong Kong experienced the highest death rate in the world per capita during its Omicron wave from February to April 2022, with over 10,770 COVID-19 deaths, or around 0.15 percent of the population.¹³ Even though Hong Kong had already faced a devastating wave of cases that had impacted most of the territory, it was only after Beijing abandoned its own restrictions that Hong Kong’s COVID-19 controls were scrapped, with the border finally reopened to quarantine-free travel in January 2023.

The financial forum organized in early November 2022 was meant to show that Hong Kong had finally moved beyond its strict quarantine requirements and restrictions, and was ready to rejoin the rest of the world. But the industry participants were still receiving treatment that differed from what prevailed for the rest of the population.¹⁴The executives who had agreed to participate in the Hong Kong summit also reciprocated the hospitality of their hosts, and said favorable things about Hong Kong’s position in the international financial system. Mary Callaghan Erdoes, head of JP Morgan’s asset and wealth management division, commented, “There hasn’t been a city in the East that has emerged in the same way that Hong Kong has . . . Hong Kong never left. I mean, it shouldn’t be so hard on itself. It never disappeared.”¹⁵

The event was a microcosm of the implied assumptions about the financial industry’s position and importance in Hong Kong: that the sector would always be exempt in some way from the broader changes taking place in the rest of Hong Kong’s legal and political system. This was despite the growing risk that compliance obligations and international sanctions from both China and the United States could force financial institutions to operate between legal jurisdictions, or to choose between compliance with one system or the other. These assumptions about the financial industry’s position within Hong Kong will be tested more directly in the years ahead.

As Hong Kong’s political and legal structure changed and COVID-19 restrictions intensified over the past three years, many people chose to leave the territory. Ultimately, changes in population, particularly within a territory of Hong Kong’s size, can be viewed as an indicator of societal health and political support. Hong Kong’s demographic challenges are significant. Birth rates have declined sharply, from 95,500 births in 2011 to 53,700 in 2018, and only 37,000 in 2021; meanwhile, death rates have climbed in recent years. This is consistent with broader regional trends in East Asian countries including Korea and Japan, but the declines have been particularly sharp in Hong Kong itself. The median age as of 2021 is 46.3 years old—one of the world’s highest.¹⁶ The natural trajectory of Hong Kong’s population will be to decline in the absence of new immigration, which historically has flowed from the mainland via “one-way permits” allowing long-term migration.

The exodus that has taken place since the implementation of the National Security Law and coronavirus restrictions is unprecedented in Hong Kong’s history. The proximate cause of the wave of migration—politics or disease control—remains debatable, but the fact of the wave of emigration is indisputable, and distinct from other countries in the region facing declining populations. Since the summer of 2019, Hong Kong’s population has declined by 2.9%. The British government’s 2021 offer of a five-year path to citizenship for Hong Kong holders of British nationals overseas (BNO) passports, meaning those born in the territory before the 1997 handover, had been taken up by thousands.“¹⁷ While there was a wave of outbound travel immediately after the National Security Law’s implementation in 2020, the fastest period of emigration occurred in 2022, presumably in response to COVID-19 restrictions.

These statistics may be understating the true level of outbound migration, in part because many people may have simply traveled abroad quickly without formally changing residence. After significant legal and institutional changes, the decision to “vote with one’s feet” was the last form of meaningful popular franchise still available in Hong Kong.

Objectives and methodology

The most fundamental change in Hong Kong over the past three years has been a shift from legal and institutional constraints on government actions to political and normative constraints. Specifically, a legal system founded on the Basic Law and British common law has shifted toward a system governed by political norms reinforced by the National Security Law. In that process, those political norms have changed significantly, and are driven more by priorities in Beijing than the previous local leadership of Hong Kong.

The report will evaluate changes and risks in Hong Kong’s business environment in five critical areas. First, the changes in Hong Kong’s institutional structure create new risks for the future of Hong Kong’s independent currency, the Hong Kong dollar, and its peg to the US dollar via the linked exchange rate system (LERS). The credibility of the Hong Kong dollar’s currency peg is intrinsically linked to the credibility of the “one country, two systems” policy as it is practiced in Hong Kong. Questions about the currency peg were always going to be raised after “one country, two systems” was scheduled to sunset in 2047—now, those questions are surfacing much earlier. Central to the nature of Hong Kong’s currency arrangement is the prospect for maintaining open capital flows between Hong Kong and the rest of the world.

Second, Hong Kong-based financial institutions are confronting new compliance-related risks tied to sanctions activity, from both Washington and Beijing. There are reasonable concerns that both sides may intensify the use of sanctions-related controls in the future, and may seek to prevent the enforcement of conflicting directives in Hong Kong. Global financial institutions will plausibly be asked to devote increasing efforts to balancing business and compliance risks, with rising political risk associated with their decisions.

Third, the report will discuss the nature of the legal environment in Hong Kong and risks to the continued independence of the judiciary, which is essential for Hong Kong to maintain its reputation and attractiveness as a center of international commerce, and for adjudication of disputes in financial and commercial transactions.

Fourth, there are rising risks related to press freedom and the free exchange of ideas and information in Hong Kong. Business and finance depend upon reliable and credible information. Hong Kong’s media environment was very liberal by global standards before the National Security Law was imposed in July 2020. The environment has tightened considerably since that time, and there are considerable risks to the business environment should that trend continue.

Fifth, data security in Hong Kong is a new uncertainty after the passage of the National Security Law. The use of new legal sources of authority to seize data and control of company information creates new risks for businesses managing both internal and customer data. China’s own data security and protection laws may also create new risks if they are applied to Hong Kong in the future.

The direction of the accumulated changes is important as a signal of future actions. There are few effective measures determining when legal and institutional constraints no longer bind powerful actors. If norms and practices are changing in conflicting directions, with some pointing to a liberalization of the media environment and others to rising censorship, the implications may be unclear. But if the vast majority of institutional changes point to centralization of authority and reduced autonomy in the public sphere, it is more reasonable to draw conclusions about the steps that will follow.

Most critical for global business and the financial industry at present is to separate the changes that are resulting from a security-driven political campaign from the lasting shifts in the operating environment for businesses in Hong Kong. But measures that appear transitory and tied to security-related priorities can become permanent features of the business environment as well.

Assessing risks to Hong Kong’s business conditions

Institutional changes in Hong Kong since 2019

The fact that the legal and institutional environment has changed in Hong Kong is not in dispute: the leadership in Beijing and Hong Kong have been trumpeting those changes as essential in restoring “law and order” in Hong Kong after the protest movements of 2019.¹⁸ Other governments—notably the United States and the United Kingdom—have used those legal and institutional changes in Hong Kong to make the case that changes in their own policies toward the territory are warranted. The US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) stopped treating Hong Kong as a separate destination under its own export controls following a December 2020 executive order.¹⁹ The United Kingdom has declared that Hong Kong’s changes to the Legislative Council election system represent a “state of ongoing noncompliance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration.²⁰

This section very briefly summarizes the most significant and fundamental changes in Hong Kong’s legal and institutional environment since the 2019 protests.

National Security Law and the National Security Committee

The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (aka, the National Security Law) was the most significant change in Hong Kong’s system of institutions following the 2019 protests. It was formally passed by Beijing’s National People’s Congress on June 30, 2020, and was applied to Hong Kong under Annex III of Hong Kong’s Basic Law, which consists of national laws in China that also apply in Hong Kong. The law did not enter the normal legislative process in Hong Kong, and most officials in the Hong Kong government were unaware of the contents of the law before it was implemented.²¹ The law formally designates four specific offenses related to national security, including secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign organizations. The National Security Law also can be applied to alleged offenses that occur outside of Hong Kong.²²

The National Security Law is enforced in Hong Kong using a parallel system of policing and enforcement to Hong Kong’s conventional system, including a newly established Office for Safeguarding National Security. For cases deemed to involve national security or the crimes designated under the law, this office may involve mainland courts or other aspects of the mainland legal system. The structure of the National Security Law and its parallel system raise questions about where Hong Kong’s Basic Law still applies and where the National Security Law circumvents and overrides the authority under the Basic Law. For cases in which this is in dispute, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee in Beijing has the authority to interpret the law.

Judges presiding over cases under the National Security Law are to be selected by Hong Kong’s chief executive, rather than through the conventional process of selecting judges for criminal cases in Hong Kong, through the Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission. It remains unclear at this point whether or not lawyers involved in national security cases must also be approved or selected by the chief executive, as a recent interpretation of the law from Beijing suggests the chief executive may be able to overrule the courts concerning such questions.²³ Hong Kong’s secretary of justice can similarly specify that cases related to the National Security Law be conducted without a jury. So far, no criminal cases tried under the National Security Law have involved a jury. Very few cases have been tried so far since the passage of the National Security Law, and not all of those arrested have been formally charged with offenses, but the conviction rate for all such cases under the National Security Law remains at 100 percent.

Legislative Council structure and elections

Hong Kong’s Legislative Council, the de facto legislature for the city established under the Basic Law, had previously consisted of seventy seats, with thirty-five elected via popular vote through a system of proportional representation involving multimember districts, and thirty-five elected through “functional constituencies,” or representatives of different occupational groups, guilds, and unions. The next election to be held under this system was scheduled for September 2020, but was delayed by then-Chief Executive Carrie Lam, citing the COVID-19 pandemic.

In January 2021, fifty-three members of the pan-democratic alliance of political parties in Hong Kong were arrested under the National Security Law based on their participation in a primary election for the upcoming Legislative Council race.“²⁴ Hong Kong’s Legislative Council electoral system was then changed in March 2021 by legislation passed through China’s National People’s Congress.

The new system expanded the overall number of seats to ninety, and reduced the number of seats that could be directly elected via popular vote to twenty. The change reduced the functional constituencies to thirty seats, and then authorized forty seats for an Election Committee consisting of the people that also elect the chief executive in Hong Kong.²⁵ The 2020 Legislative Council elections were eventually held in December 2021, and voter participation for the seats elected via geographic constituencies declined from 58 percent in 2016 to 30.2 percent.“²⁶ The majority of pro-democratic politicians (the “pan-democrats”) who had not been arrested did not choose to stand in the December 2021 elections.

The election process for the chief executive of Hong Kong was changed as well. The previous system under Annex I of the Basic Law provided for 1,200 members of the Election Committee, with 117 seats selected by the District Councils. The last District Council elections, which were held in November 2019, were won overwhelmingly by pro-democratic candidates. The National People’s Congress decision changing Hong Kong’s electoral system removed the potential influence of these pan-democratic votes by expanding the Election Committee to 1,500 members and increasing the number of seats named by the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and other organizations controlled by Beijing. While Lam received 777 of the 1,194 votes in the 2017 chief executive election, Lee was the only candidate in the 2022 chief executive election, receiving 99.4 percent of the vote in the new system.

Along with changes in the structure of legal and political institutions in Hong Kong, the COVID-19 pandemic prompted new legal restrictions on the business environment in Hong Kong over the past three years. Hong Kong’s public health restrictions have been applied under a law passed in 2008 as the Prevention and Control of Disease Ordinance, and applied through administrative changes and amendments, rather than the normal legislative process. These restrictions imposed have similarly interfered with provisions of the Basic Law, such as Article 31, which permits free movement into and out of Hong Kong by Hong Kong residents. While most of these controls have since been dismantled, as the mainland moved quickly to remove COVID-19 restrictions, it remains unclear whether or not these authorities will remain a permanent feature of Hong Kong’s legal and regulatory structure, to be reimposed in the future.

One country, two currencies?

One of the most significant risks to the business environment in Hong Kong is the possibility that the Hong Kong dollar’s peg to the US dollar might change, and with it, free capital flows in and out of Hong Kong. The currency peg, through LERS, has been in place since 1983 and has significantly reduced the risks of operating in Hong Kong, particularly for companies engaged in international trade. The challenge to the currency peg is that fixed exchange rate regimes inherently depend upon the credibility of the institutions and leadership that maintain them. Hong Kong’s currency was always going to confront a “2047 problem,” in that the status of the currency would be uncertain after the fifty years of “one country, two systems” ended on June 30, 2047. Given the dramatic changes in Hong Kong over the past three years, however, and uncertainties about the degree of change between now and 2047, many of the future concerns about Hong Kong’s currency have advanced into the present day. It is highly unusual in global finance for any one sovereign country to issue two separate currencies, and to run two separate monetary policies.

The fundamental question is how long such a “one country, two currencies” system can persist. Credibility and confidence in Hong Kong’s fixed exchange rate regime depends upon confidence in the “one country, two systems” policy framework itself. There is no reason that the current arrangement, with the Hong Kong dollar trading in a range of 7.75 to 7.85 per US dollar, necessarily needs to change. As long as Hong Kong is willing to accept the consequences of US monetary policy within its domestic economy (primarily felt through its property market), it is still very unlikely that capital outflows from Hong Kong will overwhelm the system and force an exchange rate adjustment. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), the central bank that operates the LERS maintaining the peg, is expected to continue emphasizing publicly that the system will remain unchanged. Paul Chan’s October comments clearly indicate that Hong Kong authorities, including those outside the HKMA, agree that the peg is highly significant for Hong Kong.

The risk to the Hong Kong dollar’s stability comes not from Hong Kong but from Beijing, or more specifically from market uncertainty about Beijing’s intentions. Should Beijing at some point offer a public opinion about the future of the Hong Kong dollar, those words are likely to carry greater weight in global markets relative to statements from the HKMA. After all, throughout the legal and institutional changes from 2019 to 2022, Beijing’s will typically prevailed over the preferences of Hong Kong’s local authorities, such as the changes in the Legislative Council which reduced the roles of even the local pro-Beijing parties, and requirements for loyalty oaths to the government from career civil servants.²⁷

The reason Beijing may start to see risks attached to the Hong Kong dollar itself stems from the leaks in China’s capital controls. One of the primary benefits of Hong Kong’s position to Beijing is the fact that the territory permits capital flows to and from mainland China, in a legal and institutional system more appealing and understandable to foreign investors and financial institutions. The free flow of capital carries benefits as well as risks for Beijing: capital outflows from China via Hong Kong to the rest of the world have tightened financial conditions in China in the past, and could endanger financial stability in China itself if these outflows accelerated. China’s domestic savings of households and corporations are extremely high by global standards, and China has the largest money supply of any country in the world, measured in US dollars, at $37 trillion. Most of China’s household and corporate savings is still invested in renminbi-denominated assets, at around 98 percent. That pool of savings could generate trillions of dollars in capital outflows should China’s capital controls ease or if there were sudden changes in China’s economy that would drive capital flight.

If China were facing considerable capital flight, Hong Kong’s environment of free capital flows could appear as a greater vulnerability than benefit to Beijing, and to China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). In early 2016 and January 2017, China’s central bank had already tried to shut down capital flight from China by intervening in Hong Kong’s market for the offshore renminbi (RMB) [labeled the CNH in currency trades to distinguish it from the onshore Chinese yuan or CNY], by tightening funding conditions for the offshore currency, making it more expensive to borrow and speculate on its depreciation. The actions supported the value of the offshore currency, but also introduced considerable new policy uncertainty, as the currency became far less attractive to hold as a result. Prior to this intervention, Hong Kong’s leadership was marketing the territory as a center for “RMB internationalization” and a market for offshore RMB-denominated financial instruments such as so-called “dim sum” bonds. The sudden squeeze in financing rates created significant obstacles to these financial markets developing within Hong Kong. But the priorities of Beijing in maintaining onshore financial stability clearly took precedence. If capital flight intensifies in the future, Beijing’s priorities could once again outweigh maintaining the conditions necessary to preserve Hong Kong’s currency peg and free capital flows.

The most likely alternative to the Hong Kong dollar’s peg to the US dollar is not a free float of the currency, allowing the market to set its price, but repegging the Hong Kong dollar to the renminbi. This would mean, in effect, that Hong Kong would be “importing” China’s own monetary policy rather than US monetary policy. The Hong Kong dollar would essentially transform into an offshore RMB. If there were any meaningful divergence between interest rates in Beijing and Hong Kong, capital would quickly flow toward the higher-yielding jurisdiction. As a result, such a change would place Beijing in a difficult position of needing to impose stricter capital controls between Beijing and Hong Kong or between Hong Kong and the rest of the world to prevent broader capital flight that would endanger the stability of China’s currency.

China’s own “managed float” against the US dollar would similarly face peril through broad-based capital flight and diversification of Chinese savings into foreign assets. China’s foreign exchange reserves are now only 8 percent of the money supply, down from 16 percent during the last period of aggressive capital flight, in 2015 and 2016.

Hong Kong needs free and open capital flows for its own survival as a global financial center, and for its benefits to Beijing. But any change to Hong Kong’s currency peg to the US dollar would create new questions about how long those capital flows would continue without new controls being imposed. Those fears alone could start to diminish Hong Kong’s attractiveness as a financial center.

China’s capital controls are porous, and Beijing is aware of that fact. If fundamental conditions point to China’s currency depreciating, the PBOC can only slow capital outflows to a limited extent. Often, these outflows show up under so-called “errors and omissions” in China’s balance of payments data. From 2015 to 2019, these cumulative outflows under errors and omissions were larger than China’s current account surplus, at $933 billion.²⁸As long as China’s current account for trade-related transactions remains open, capital flows are likely to take place, disguised as trade flows. This often occurs in China through overinvoicing or underinvoicing in trade transactions, to facilitate flows that would otherwise be permitted in developed financial systems. It also can occur through transactions designated as outbound tourism, in which individuals claim they need foreign exchange for travel, but may use it for any number of financial transactions instead. As a result of these porous controls, Beijing often experiments with tightening some of these channels when they see outflows intensify. The risk for Hong Kong is that those same incentives would start to apply in the territory itself.

One can easily argue that Beijing has no interest in changing the Hong Kong dollar’s peg to the US dollar, and that may be true. But most importantly, financial markets will start looking to Beijing to assess those preferences, rather than the words of the HKMA or other Hong Kong authorities. Regardless of how one assesses the probability of Beijing’s preferences changing, this is still a significant new risk that any company or financial institution operating in Hong Kong must consider and manage carefully.

Compliance: Sanctions and national security directives

One of the most significant new risks confronting businesses operating in Hong Kong, particularly for financial firms, is linked to compliance with international sanctions and the possibility of being caught between two different legal systems. Hong Kong represents China’s financial gateway to the rest of the world, which also means that the territory’s financial institutions must maintain access to US dollar financing channels, which involve transactions between banks that can be governed by the US legal system. Most of these transactions between banks involving US dollars use clearing accounts within the United States.

The risks arising from these compliance obligations are not theoretical. In July 2020, the US Congress passed the Hong Kong Autonomy Act,²⁹ and the Trump administration issued Exec. Order No. 13936, which included blocking sanctions for any individual involved in implementing the National Security Law in Hong Kong, as well as the use of the law for a number of other purposes, including censorship and “policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions in Hong Kong.”³⁰ The list of individuals sanctioned included several members of the Hong Kong government, including former Chief Executive Lam and the current Chief Executive Lee, who was then secretary for security.³¹

The Hong Kong Monetary Authority also issued a circular in August 2020 clarifying its own stance on foreign sanctions implemented in Hong Kong, arguing that “a distinction is made between targeted financial sanctions applicable under Hong Kong law and unilateral sanctions imposed by foreign governments.”³². The circular argued that these “unilateral sanctions” had “no legal status in Hong Kong.”³³

China has similarly retaliated against US sanctions by enacting its own Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law in June 2021, which permits Chinese institutions to freeze and seize assets of individuals and entities engaged in the creation or implementation of “discriminatory restrictive measures” against China’s interests.³⁴ As of now, the law has not been applied in Hong Kong, after an extensive lobbying campaign by the financial industry and Hong Kong authorities. However, China has administered its own sanctions against a list of US elected officials, private citizens, and organizations involved in government-related programs.“³⁵

Local security agencies in Hong Kong also are requesting that financial institutions make decisions which potentially conflict with their obligations to their clients and legal requirements in other countries. The request of the Hong Kong Police to freeze the accounts of Hong Kong activists, independent media, and civic groups put HSBC in the challenging position of suspending transactions in accounts of political figures in Hong Kong.³⁶

In addition, the National Security Law itself creates potential legal risks for financial institutions. Article 29 of the National Security Law specifies that if a person “engages in activities such as requesting, conspiring with, receiving instructions etc., from a foreign country” that they commit an offense under the law.³⁷ Simply by abiding by US sanctions policies, foreign financial institutions potentially invite legal risk within Hong Kong courts. No such cases have arisen so far, but the history of case law under the National Security Law remains a very short one. For the seventy-eight banks operating in Hong Kong, which are among the world’s top one hundred,³⁸ it will become increasingly difficult to thread the needle between obligations under US law and sanctions policies and Hong Kong’s changing governance.

Rising risks and compliance obligations

There is a growing risk that financial institutions operating in Hong Kong will be forced to make decisions related to sanctions compliance that invite regulatory scrutiny from either Beijing or Washington, and expose the institution to legal risks as well. Both Washington and Beijing are clearly attentive to the risks of sanctions compliance or noncompliance in Hong Kong, and as a result, financial institutions are at greater risk of potential secondary sanctions or additional compliance obligations in Hong Kong relative to other jurisdictions. On July 16, 2021, the US State, Treasury, Commerce, and Homeland Security Departments released a Hong Kong business advisory discussing several potential risks for businesses operating in Hong Kong under the National Security Law.“³⁹ The release of this advisory alongside updated lists of specially designated nationals (SDNs), including Chinese government officials in Hong Kong, highlighted the US government’s awareness and monitoring of Hong Kong-related sanctions efforts.

In November 2020, the United States government began to confront China’s use of dual-use technologies and firms by sanctioning the financing of specific companies contributing to the development and modernization of China’s military, intelligence, and security structures, and preventing US financial institutions from holding securities issued by those companies. Exec. Order No. 13959 provided a window between November 30, 2020, and January 11, 2021, for compliant firms to exit investments in the sanctioned entities.⁴⁰ The list of companies has continued to expand to include sixty-eight different entities. As these restrictions went into effect in January 2021, the shares of the affected firms sold off heavily in Hong Kong’s market, but were quickly purchased by mainland investors seeking bargains. The expanding list of restricted firms makes bundling assets and creating financial products less transparent, as selling the stock of restricted firms could also hypothetically be considered “receiving instructions from a foreign country” under the National Security Law. Navigating these limitations and exemptions increases compliance costs for financial institutions, particularly as these restrictions expand.

Hong Kong’s own position on enforcing foreign sanctions remains ambiguous as well. Most foreign financial institutions remain broadly in compliance with US blocking sanctions and those targeting specific individuals, in attempting to reduce their own legal exposure. However, in October 2022, Alexi Mordashov, a sanctioned Russian oligarch, was allowed to dock his yacht in Hong Kong, an act requiring approval from the Hong Kong Marine Department.⁴¹ In response, the Hong Kong government stated that it would only enforce sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council.

In response to the Russian sanctions after the invasion of Ukraine, China’s central bank and finance ministry convened a meeting of domestic and international banks to better understand the threat of the same types of sanctions being implemented against China.⁴² The consensus of that meeting, according to a Financial Times report citing people familiar with the discussion, was that China is highly exposed to the US dollar system and cannot effectively replace USD-denominated assets with other foreign exchange reserves.⁴³ The net result, if accurate, is that Hong Kong would remain in a critical position as a conduit of capital to China and the country’s critical link to the US dollar-denominated global financial system. It remains more likely that Beijing would attempt to tighten links between its own legal and political institutions and Hong Kong’s financial system, rather than allowing Hong Kong to strengthen legal and institutional ties to the rest of the world.

As strategic competition between the United States and China has intensified, Hong Kong’s location at the nexus of global finance and the Chinese political system has increased the risk of operating businesses within the territory. The continued escalation of financial restrictions from the United States and the enactment of the National Security Law in Hong Kong create additional compliance obligations and rising costs for firms.

These restrictions and requests can potentially create circumstances where abiding by one government’s laws places individual banks and financial institutions in violation of the other’s requirements. Navigating these dynamics presents a new set of challenges for banks offering a wide variety of services, as noncompliance by one branch of the bank could open the entire institution to restrictions.

While China serves as an attractive market for expanding financial services, the lack of clarity and broad reach of the National Security Law make future business operations in Hong Kong far more complex than in the recent past.

The rule of law and judicial independence

The National Security Law’s changes to Hong Kong’s legal and institutional framework have generated considerable uncertainty surrounding the continued operation of the rule of the law and the independence of Hong Kong’s judiciary, which have historically been cornerstones of the territory’s attractiveness to international business. The creation of a new system of authority under the National Security Committee leaves the jurisdiction of Hong Kong’s courts unclear in several matters that are relevant for commercial and financial transactions. Any loss of the transparency and predictability of the British common law system of jurisprudence creates significant problems for businesses and lawyers working within Hong Kong’s legal system.

Most significantly, under the National Security Law, Hong Kong courts cannot necessarily decide what falls within the definition of national security, even though they are granted jurisdiction over criminal national security-related cases.⁴⁴ This necessarily leaves the interpretation of national security to mainland law, which has historically interpreted the term expansively. Notably, Beijing’s conception of national security can include fields such as the economic interests of Chinese state-owned firms, food safety, and security of resources and energy, as well as “ideological security.”⁴⁵. In January 2023, Xia Baolong, the director of the mainland’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, commented that Hong Kong should amend its existing laws, given that the National People’s Congress had designated “overriding status to the national security law, which application should take priority [over other laws].”⁴⁶

In addition, while the National Security Law is clear in its treatment of criminal cases, it remains unclear how it could be applied in future civil cases, which are most relevant for business and financial institutions. In such civil proceedings, the boundary of where the Hong Kong courts’ jurisdiction ends and the authority of the National Security Committee begins is governed by political norms in Beijing, rather than legal restraints decided in Hong Kong. There are reasonable legal interpretations of the National Security Law that suggest Hong Kong courts lack any jurisdiction over civil cases involving national security-related matters, with the boundaries of “national security” decided by Beijing.⁴⁷

Since the 2019 protests and the passage of the National Security Law, public perceptions of the quality of Hong Kong’s legal system and its independence and fairness have plummeted, as the results of polling from the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute reveal.⁴⁸

Judges under the National Security Law

Under Article 85 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law, judicial independence is guaranteed.⁴⁹ Hong Kong has historically featured a high degree of judicial independence, with credibility reinforced through nominations of judges via an independent Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission and subsequent approval by the chief executive. Prior to the enactment of the National Security Law, the Hong Kong government did not influence the selection of judges involved in trying particular cases. The Hong Kong Bar Association and the Law Society of Hong Kong (for solicitors in the Hong Kong legal system) had operated independently from the government as well, as professional bodies regulating the professional conduct of their members.

Foreign lawyers and judges have played a significant role in Hong Kong’s legal system, as it is based upon British common law. When trials are being adjudicated by Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal, one nonpermanent judge from another common law jurisdiction is chosen to sit with three permanent judges and the chief justice. Foreign lawyers’ and judges’ participation in Hong Kong’s legal system is not essential for judicial independence, but their presence does help to provide legitimacy to the independence of the judiciary similar to principles in other common law jurisdictions.

The passage of the National Security Law has changed the process through which judges are appointed to individual national security cases, with Article 44 of the law stipulating that the chief executive chooses these judges specifically for a term of one year.⁵⁰ However, the list of appointed judges is not made publicly available by the Hong Kong government.⁵¹ The one-year appointment potentially introduces political influence into the selection of judges for national security cases, since the chief executive can arguably replace any judge seen as less favorable to the government’s positions.

Similarly, the question of which lawyers can serve on national security cases in Hong Kong remains in question. The highly publicized trial of media tycoon Jimmy Lai has introduced new uncertainties, given that Lai has requested that he be represented by King’s Counsel Timothy Owen, a British barrister. Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal rejected the Hong Kong government’s attempt to prevent Owen from acting as defense counsel for Lai in the national security case.⁵² However, rather than accepting that outcome, the Hong Kong government instead requested that China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) issue a ruling clarifying whether or not it was the intention of the National Security Law that foreign lawyers could serve in Hong Kong’s national security cases. While waiting for the NPCSC to rule, Hong Kong’s Immigration Department withheld Owen’s visa, preventing him from acting in Lai’s defense, and the trial was delayed.⁵³ When Beijing formally interpreted the law in late December 2022, it appeared to give the chief executive—rather than Hong Kong courts—the authority to decide whether or not foreign lawyers could appear in a national security-related trial, or to make other decisions related to national security cases, even if those decisions conflicted with those of the courts.⁵⁴ It remains unclear if a ban on foreign lawyers might eventually be applied within national security cases or the Hong Kong judicial system as a whole, with more authority over this question now seemingly vested in the hands of the chief executive.⁵⁵

In March 2022, both Lord Robert Reed and Lord Patrick Hodge, the president and deputy president of the UK Supreme Court, respectively, resigned from Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal. Lord Reed said upon resigning, “The judges of the Supreme Court cannot continue to sit in Hong Kong without appearing to endorse an administration which has departed from values of political freedom, and freedom of expression.”⁵⁶ Their resignations marked the end of twenty-five years of British judges sitting on the Court of Final Appeal. There are still nonpermanent judges serving on the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong as well. Many released statements which stated their intention to remain in their roles.⁵⁷ Of the ten remaining foreign judges, six are from the United Kingdom, three are from Australia, and one is from Canada.

Over the past three years, there has been a notable decline in the number of foreign lawyers practicing law within Hong Kong’s legal system. Since 2019, the number of registered foreign lawyers in Hong Kong declined by 15 percent, from 1,688 in 2019 to 1,442 as of December 2022.⁵⁸ The former chairman of the Hong Kong Bar Association, Philip Dykes, noted in 2020 that “a career at the Bar may not be so attractive to fresh law graduates because of the change in the legal atmosphere.”⁵⁹ Dykes went on to say that the plans of many barristers to leave Hong Kong would negatively impact the legal system’s ability to operate effectively.

The Hong Kong Bar Association (HKBA) has been subjected to political criticism as well. Paul Harris, the chairman of the HKBA, publicly suggested in early 2021 that the Hong Kong government propose some modifications to the National Security Law given apparent conflicts with the Basic Law. China’s State Council Hong Kong and Taiwan Affairs Office accused Harris of using “his British nationality to collude with foreign forces in interfering with Hong Kong affairs.”⁶⁰ Harris left Hong Kong in March 2022 only hours after being interviewed by the national security police.⁶¹ Reuters has reported upon a broader pattern of seemingly state-directed intimidation against prominent lawyers in Hong Kong, particularly those within the Hong Kong Bar Association or those making statements concerning the National Security Law.⁶² Recent statements by the HKBA later in 2022 have tended to be more supportive of the Hong Kong government’s official positions, including in the case of Lai’s request for representation by Owen.⁶³

Disposition of cases

The National Security Law is relatively new, and there have been only a small number of cases tried under the law so far. However, no defendant has yet been acquitted under the law, and no case tried under the National Security Law has involved a jury trial. It remains unclear whether or not this trend will change. An estimated 213 people have been arrested under the National Security Law and other national security-related statutes between July 2020 and October 2022, with an estimated 125 facing formal charges.⁶⁴

In terms of national security cases involving businesses, the most prominent examples have included the prosecution of Next Digital, which is the parent company of Apple Daily, and the use of a colonial sedition law to target the independent media organization Stand News. Both have since ceased publication and broadcasting after the arrests of key executives. Next Digital and Apple Daily were charged with collusion with foreign governments under the National Security Law. With its assets frozen (along with those of its subsidiaries), Apple Daily was unable to publish after its issue of June 24, 2021. Stand News and its parent company and executives were charged with sedition, under a 1938 crimes ordinance from British colonial times. The Court of Final Appeal ruled in December 2021 that some of the investigative powers of the National Security Law could be used in other cases involving national security, including sedition.⁶⁵ Stand News ceased distributing news on December 28, 2021, and police seized HK$61 million of the company’s assets.⁶⁶

The broader risk to businesses operating in Hong Kong is the expansive power of the National Security Committee to interpret the scope of “national security” within the Hong Kong legal system. In the cases of Apple Daily and Stand News, different laws were applied by authorities to achieve the same objective—the closure of these enterprises and the silencing of their editorial voices. While these cases are identified closely with the pro-democracy movement within Hong Kong politics and the 2019 demonstrations, there were few legal avenues through which these companies were able to challenge the charges in order to stay in business. The broader risk is that Beijing’s conception of national security will continue to expand and encompass activities related to individual businesses or financial transactions. In this regard, the recent experiences of Western companies subject to mainland propaganda campaigns (H&M, Nike, and others) reveal potential concerns about business activities becoming suddenly politically salient.⁶⁷ In addition, continued reinterpretations of the National Security Law by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee are unlikely to provide for more autonomy or judicial independence in Hong Kong in the future.

Freedom of the press, transparency of information flows

Prior to 2020, Hong Kong’s media environment was one of the most open and free from censorship in Asia, and comparable to those in Western democratic and pluralist political systems. The situation has changed significantly over the past decade, but the fastest change in practices has occurred since the introduction of the National Security Law. Free flows of information and access to reliable data are essential for the operation of an economy and financial markets. A media that is free to report on both macroeconomic developments, governance, and corporate performance and decision-making is a similarly essential ingredient within those markets. Establishing trust in media institutions and the credibility of information they provide requires time and a competitive landscape in which reliable information is rewarded and less trustworthy outlets are gradually ignored. Decisions based on the fundamentals or relative value of certain assets or securities depend upon the information underlying the valuations and the reporting of corporate and macroeconomic data.

Financial analysts in Hong Kong are now reportedly engaging in clandestine forms of communications, including private WeChat groups or “burner” telephones, in order to share views on the economy or individual securities with their clients.⁶⁸ Bloomberg reported recently on a significant level of self-censorship among financial analysts, even for reports within firms, out of concern about the vague lines of the National Security Law.“⁶⁹ Individual analysts in China have seen their own social media accounts removed for reporting negatively on China’s economic prospects, and analysts in Hong Kong now fear similar treatment, which has reduced the flow of financial information.⁷⁰

Some of the earliest prosecutions under the National Security Law have been focused on journalists and media organizations, notably Apple Daily and its parent company Next Digital, as well as Stand News, as discussed previously. Citizen News, a small online publication, also closed its doors early in 2022. Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) has also removed some of its content concerning local politics, including the show “Headliner,” following the introduction of new management at the station.⁷¹

Immediately after the implementation of the National Security Law, some books authored by individuals identified with the pro-democracy movement were removed from Hong Kong libraries, based on the need to review them for compliance with the law.⁷² Hong Kong’s Leisure and Cultural Services Department assembled a list of titles removed from libraries in breach of the law, but then authorities refused to make that list public in April 2022.⁷³ The university library at the University of Hong Kong is now requiring users to register in order to access some books alleged to be politically sensitive.⁷⁴

Even Beijing agrees that the media environment in Hong Kong has changed fundamentally. After the arrests of the officers of Stand News, a People’s Daily editorial argued that Western critics were ignoring the criminal acts of the journalists, claiming, “Ignoring right and wrong, these people have willfully misrepresented the lawful actions taken by the Hong Kong Police Force, vainly attempting to use press freedom as a shield for criminal acts and hamper the rule of law in Hong Kong through the straw-man trick.⁷⁵ Similarly, Lee argued that press freedom required support for the police’s actions, claiming in a letter to the Wall Street Journal that, “If you are genuinely interested in press freedom, you should support actions against people who have unlawfully exploited the media as a tool to pursue their political or personal gains.⁷⁶

However, measuring the extent of the changes involved and their magnitude remains a difficult exercise. One of the most objective tools available are surveys conducted about the environment for journalists, with opinions from both journalists themselves and consumers of media. In addition, external organizations conducting cross-country surveys of press freedom conditions can help to place the overall change in Hong Kong’s media environment in context.

The Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA) has conducted its own annual poll of press conditions since 2013. The results in 2022 showed the steepest decline in perceptions of the media environment ever recorded within this survey, both from the perceptions of journalists themselves and from public consumers of media. In 2022, a full 97 percent of survey respondents indicated that conditions for press freedom had become “much worse” over the year, and 53.5 percent of the public respondents agreed.⁷⁷ In addition, the HKJA reported a significant nonresponse problem in the survey, as several respondents refused to provide data, believing that the HKJA was under political scrutiny. Only 169 journalists or media industry employees provided answers to the survey of 737 journalists, a response rate of 23 percent, down from 83 percent in the previous year.⁷⁸ The chairman of the HKJA, Ronson Chan, was arrested in September 2022 and charged with obstructing a police officer. He was granted bail, and was not restricted in his travel to the United Kingdom for a fellowship later that month.⁷⁹

Other surveys of media conditions in Hong Kong help to place the environment within a global context, including those conducted by Reporters Without Borders. Hong Kong’s ranking within that organization’s Press Freedom Index fell from 73 in 2019 to 148 in 2022, between the Philippines and Turkey in the rankings.⁸⁰ In 2002, Hong Kong was ranked 18th globally, the highest score awarded within Asia.

Similarly, actions of journalists themselves point to a significant change in their perceptions of the space for free and open reporting. The Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club did not offer its annual Human Rights Press Awards in 2022, with the club president, Keith Richburg, citing “significant areas of uncertainty and we do not wish unintentionally to violate the law.”⁸¹

Changes in corporate registry practices in Hong Kong have also been underway since investigative reports have emerged concerning the wealth of mainland officials and their families, with some of the first changes proposed in 2013.⁸² The net result of these changes implemented since 2021 have made it more difficult for independent researchers and investors to identify shareholders of companies registered in Hong Kong. Some exceptions have now been granted for law firms and accounting firms in conducting due diligence and complying with know-your-customer policies for compliance purposes.⁸³

The next immediate threat to free information flows in Hong Kong is the consideration of a “fake news” law, discussed publicly by then-Chief Executive Lam in 2021, which would give the government broad powers to limit the publication of information it finds objectionable, or “misinformation, hatred, and lies.⁸⁴ Hong Kong authorities had reportedly hired a consultancy in order to examine potential options for the law.⁸⁵

The risks to the business environment and to the financial industry can be defined both narrowly and expansively. Narrowly, censorship in media and a limited publication of competing views can easily expand from political topics to economic and business media. More broadly, without a media environment in which journalists are able to work effectively within institutions protecting their right to report freely, all forms of reporting and information flows will be threatened, including those necessary for the operation of financial markets. In mainland China, investigators engaged in due diligence concerning firms’ potentially fraudulent disclosures have occasionally faced arrest and prosecution under state secrets, corruption, or defamation laws.⁸⁶ In Hong Kong, the media environment is already tightening and the scope for quality journalism is narrowing. There are growing risks that the reporting necessary for transparency in business or financial markets will be undertaken by fewer outlets and fewer journalists in the future. And beyond journalism, there are growing risks to the transparency and accessibility of broader flows of information required for operating a modern economy and financial system, including basic reporting of economic data and corporate financial results.

Data security

The National Security Law introduces new concerns for international businesses operating in Hong Kong concerning corporate data and intellectual property, in addition to potential duties to clients and customers to maintain privacy. The law permits Hong Kong authorities to conduct surveillance and intercept communications in cases related to national security, in addition to searching electronic devices or data servers.⁸⁷ Hong Kong authorities also can compel service providers to divulge information concerning their customers and clients in cases related to national security. The Implementation Rules of the National Security Law issued on July 6, 2020, outlined the police’s ability to search National Security Law suspects’ phones and online speech as well as freeze their assets without a warrant.⁸⁸ National security authorities can potentially compel the deletion of data or customer information.

The decision-making authority driving the selection of these cases remains the Committee for Safeguarding National Security—without any oversight or judicial review of its decisions.⁸⁹ The trend in data security is similar to the changes throughout Hong Kong, as political norms have replaced legal and institutional constraints on government authority.

There are obvious practical implications for businesses operating in Hong Kong, including financial service providers. Intellectual property and trade secrets are potentially at risk of disclosure. It is arguable whether these types of corporate information were “safe” before the promulgation of the National Security Law in Hong Kong. But the law itself now provides the legal framework in which such information can be accessed by Hong Kong authorities, even without the knowledge of the companies involved. Firms have few legal remedies to shield data from authorities under national security investigations when it is requested or compelled, and this marks a notable change from the previous legal framework in Hong Kong.

For international firms prioritizing their clients’ privacy and protection of personal information, the change in Hong Kong’s operating environment likely requires different measures to segment data storage in order to maintain commitments to customers and users. The extraterritorial nature of the law creates additional risks in that a company’s employees in Hong Kong could face criminal liability if they refused to provide data concerning a client or customer of the company in another country, if the powers of the National Security Law were invoked. There are clear risks for any information service provider. Shortly after the National Security Law was imposed, the New York Times, for example, relocated significant proportions of its digital news operations in Asia to Seoul from Hong Kong.⁹⁰

Furthermore, if a state-owned firm in China competing with international firms saw an advantage in accessing data held by a multinational firm in Hong Kong, the National Security Law would provide the legal authority with which to obtain that data, with potential criminal penalties for the firms attempting to protect it. Merely segmenting data services between Hong Kong and the rest of the world does not entirely reduce these risks for firms. Before the National Security Law was in effect, firms often stored data concerning their mainland operations in Hong Kong, before using it in regional or global offices.⁹¹ This effectively meant that any controls on data sharing between Hong Kong and the rest of the world were the most important consideration for foreign firms, and historically, these were limited. The National Security Law creates new reasons for firms to limit that cross-border data transmission to reduce legal and reputational risks.

The data security risks become even more complex when considering cross-border data flows between Hong Kong and mainland China, and the overlap of legal restrictions on data transfers. Simply put, multiple legal frameworks appear to be in place in Hong Kong regarding data security, and firms cannot easily know if they are in compliance with the law or not. China also passed a new Data Security Law in 2021, detailing several different standards for protection of data and preventing cross-border export of data according to these classifications, related to how they affect China’s own national security. Initial public offerings in Hong Kong of Chinese firms are presumably still subject to those same controls and reviews by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), before data concerning Chinese firms can be made public in the event of an initial public offering of equity.⁹² In addition, Beijing has passed a Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) in 2021, which is more expansive than Hong Kong’s own Personal Data Privacy Ordinance, which was implemented only in 1996. The controls on cross-border data flows in China’s Data Security Law have not been imposed in Hong Kong at this point, or between Hong Kong and the rest of the world, but similar restrictions on data exports are possible in the future.

The risks to firms’ data security in Hong Kong remain difficult to define, but should be viewed in the context of the broader changes in the legal and institutional structures in Hong Kong, with greater authority vested in national security-related institutions. Managing data in Hong Kong after the passage of the National Security Law requires monitoring overlapping legal risks from multiple jurisdictions, as well as reputational risks associated with management of client or customer information.

Most of the risks now facing businesses operating in Hong Kong have risen significantly since the National Security Law was implemented in June 2020. Most are related to the vague definition of “national security” and the newfound inability to challenge Hong Kong or mainland authorities’ interpretations of whether or not a particular action involves security risks to the Chinese state. Institutions that could limit government authority through independent oversight, independent press coverage, or via legal channels are facing new obstacles in operating in Hong Kong. And as the harsh implementation and rapid reversal of COVID-19 restrictions in Hong Kong demonstrates, changes in the political climate in Beijing have become the primary motivating force behind critical governance decisions in Hong Kong.

All of these changes leave businesses with a different set of political variables to assess and risks to manage in operating in Hong Kong now and in the future. As political norms in Beijing are increasingly important in shaping outcomes in Hong Kong, particularly in the expanding universe of security-related matters, businesses must consider avenues beyond Hong Kong’s traditional legal and institutional channels to defend their interests.

Recommendations

While governments have already taken some actions to respond to the legal and institutional changes in Hong Kong, the business community also has some agency in mitigating their own risks. The recommendations outlined here are not designed to pursue a particular policy agenda, but are offered as suggestions for how firms can manage some of the risks associated with changes in Hong Kong’s legal and institutional structures.

The business community should speak collectively, and approach outreach to Hong Kong authorities as a political campaign, rather than a more traditional government relations effort. One of the most significant elements of leverage foreign businesses hold over Hong Kong authorities and Beijing is the fact that Hong Kong must protect its own public image as a major global financial center. This means that the perception that foreign businesses are comfortable and successful operating in Hong Kong is a key part of the government’s public messaging: it was exactly the reason for the financial forum organized in Hong Kong in early November. In turn, this requires Hong Kong authorities to acknowledge the importance of the norms underpinning Hong Kong’s competitiveness: faith in the rule of law, judicial independence, and free capital flows. It also increases the importance of the number of foreign employees working in Hong Kong, as a declining trend shows how some professionals are voting with their feet. The shift in regional headquarters out of Hong Kong, for example, provides an illustration of the changes in the business environment that ultimately will require a response from the Hong Kong government.

Engaging the Hong Kong government using collective lobbying on the basis of the norms that Hong Kong’s authorities value can help to slow the pace of change in the legal and institutional environment. Pushback from the business community was already effective at preventing the application of China’s anti-sanctions law in Hong Kong, and was similarly effective at delaying the implementation of separate national security legislation under Article 23 of the Basic Law.⁹³

With political norms now dictating the restraints on government action in Hong Kong, there are few institutional obstacles in Hong Kong’s current legal environment to the continued erosion of the rule of law and judicial independence. The obstacles to further changes in Hong Kong’s environment will be political, and collective lobbying and public relations by the business and financial community can shape the political calculus in Hong Kong and Beijing.

Collectively communicate to Beijing the consequences of uncertainty over Hong Kong’s status. Consistent with the logic of speaking collectively and approaching lobbying as a political campaign, the business community should use opportunities to communicate the consequences of uncertainty in Hong Kong’s status directly to Beijing officials, when possible. Businesses can link specific decisions about new investment or employment within the territory to the risks that have emerged since the imposition of the National Security Law. The financial community can collectively describe the potential consequences, for example, of changes in Hong Kong’s peg to the US dollar or new capital controls. Reinforcing rhetorical support for Hong Kong’s existing institutions can help to introduce some degree of caution or risk aversion in Beijing about continued changes in Hong Kong’s legal and institutional framework. Using alternative channels such as track-two or informal dialogues may be useful to communicate these messages, in combination with a more direct public campaign.

Invest in compliance infrastructure and develop risk mitigation strategies. Companies and financial institutions operating in Hong Kong are exposed to a growing number of compliance challenges. Lists of restricted individuals and corporations make constructing funds, managing portfolios, buying securities, and selling securities more cumbersome. Each of these activities requires operational oversight and concern with regulatory compliance. While constructing funds, portfolio managers must continuously monitor the growing list of restricted stocks to avoid holding assets of firms sanctioned by the US government. Wealth managers must develop a deeper understanding of their clients’ relationships to avoid facilitating transactions with sanctioned individuals. Intermediaries facilitating trading of individual securities must also avoid trading restricted stocks or acting on behalf of restricted individuals.

Companies continuing to operate in Hong Kong should develop internal assessments of the costs and trade-offs between rising compliance-related risks and continued business opportunities, particularly concerning potential cross-border transfers of data, from Hong Kong to the rest of the world or between Hong Kong and mainland China. Financial institutions should develop contingency plans associated with high-risk clients becoming subject to sanctions by the United States or China, or certain firms potentially being targeted for disinvestment.⁹⁴

Monitor pro-Beijing media in Hong Kong and broader US-China political trends. Monitoring the political dynamics and expectations from both China and the United States regarding Hong Kong is of critical importance. Within Hong Kong, many of the political “targets” of national security investigations first appeared in Beijing-aligned media within Hong Kong, or were criticized as part of the paper’s editorial voice. The People’s Daily, the Communist Party’s newspaper, seldom discusses Hong Kong political issues directly, so when the territory is mentioned, it should assume outsized importance in terms of monitoring potential risks to any companies or individuals directly named. In the United States, policy changes targeting particular companies or intermediaries active in Hong Kong may be more transparent in some areas, but lists of targeted companies have still caught financial institutions by surprise, such as those designated for disinvestment due to links to the Chinese military.

More generally, monitoring the broader ebb and flow of the high-level diplomacy within the US-China relationship can be fruitful to understand when compliance and business-related risks may intensify. The timeframes before a high-level summit or multilateral conference may create less risk for companies operating in Hong Kong, because both sides will want to mitigate disruptions to the meetings themselves. Periods of higher tension in the relationship would also suggest higher risks to firms operating in Hong Kong and greater regulatory attention to their actions. These risks are obviously more acute when compliance requirements place businesses and financial institutions in awkward positions between sanctions or regulations in multiple jurisdictions. A more comprehensive politically minded risk-monitoring strategy can help business to scale resources accordingly.

Monitor key data concerning national security cases and outcomes, Hong Kong’s foreign population and participation, and outcomes within the legal system. Foreign participation is certainly not essential for Hong Kong’s legal and institutional environment to function effectively. But trends in foreign participation—those who can choose to enter or exit the system—are a meaningful indicator of changes in the operations of Hong Kong institutions. Similarly, the functions of Hong Kong’s legal system can be monitored objectively, in terms of the outcomes of cases where the government’s positions do not prevail, as well as the participation of foreign lawyers and judges within the legal system. These are data series that are easy to monitor and will continue to be reported, either by Hong Kong’s own statistical agencies or other external data providers (such as moving firms or professional associations). Any attempts to censor or remove certain data series from regular reporting by Hong Kong’s statistical agencies should similarly indicate a growing risk of expanding government authority in the areas covered by the data.

Similarly, trends in the frequency and targets of national security investigations are important indicators concerning the overall focus of Hong Kong’s law enforcement institutions and political authorities. Monitoring those trends is therefore essential to interpret potential changes in political norms in Beijing and Hong Kong. Declining investigations in certain areas or for certain types of offenses will likely indicate a change in authorities’ foci, and may provide more confidence that the political environment is easing. Similarly, a continued trend of prosecutions of cases spotlighted in pro-Beijing media in Hong Kong may be an indicator of a new political campaign that would generate new risks for businesses.

Emphasize the importance of independent media for Hong Kong’s future. In the course of lobbying and pushing back against further changes within Hong Kong’s legal and institutional structures under the National Security Law, the fates of independent media outlets assume outsized significance. Companies should emphasize that “fake news” laws or further crackdowns on media outlets would endanger the flow of information necessary to conduct commercial and financial transactions, and would create new difficulties for companies to respond appropriately to libel, slander, and disinformation. More generally, continued growth of the business community in Hong Kong invites and requires a growing pool of journalists and press outlets to monitor commercial, financial, and political activity in the city. Conversely, a shrinking pool of local and international journalists covering the city’s affairs will reflect the declining international significance of Hong Kong as a commercial and financial center. A shrinking scope for independent reporting will likely produce a shrinking financial industry in short order. And a recovering Hong Kong is inconsistent with a contracting public sphere for discussion, publication, and information flows.

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About the author

Logan Wright is a Partner at Rhodium Group and leads the firm’s China Markets Research work.

Logan is also a Senior Associate of the Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Previously, Logan was head of China research for Medley Global Advisors and a China analyst with Stone & McCarthy Research Associates, both in Beijing.

Logan’s research focuses on China’s financial system and credit conditions in shaping outcomes within China’s economy, as well as the policies of China’s central bank. Logan and the China Markets Research team monitor China’s real economic conditions, financial market developments, and future policy directions to gauge the influence of China’s economy on global financial markets. He is also the author of two reports on China’s financial system and the country’s longer-term economic trajectory, Credit and Credibility (2018) and The China Economic Risk Matrix (2020).

Logan holds a Ph.D. from the George Washington University, where his dissertation concerned the political factors shaping the reform of China’s exchange rate regime. He graduated with a Master’s degree in Security Studies and a Bachelor’s degree in Foreign Service from Georgetown University. He is based in Washington DC after living and working in Hong Kong and Beijing for more than two decades.

Acknowledgements

This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The author is solely responsible solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions.

The author wants to thank Rogan Quinn for valuable research assistance during this project as well as the the leadership and staff of the GeoEconomics Center and the Global China Hub including Josh Lipsky, David Shullman, Charles Lichfield, Colleen Cottle, Jeremy Mark, and Niels Graham for their guidance and support. This report was made possible in part by the support of the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong.

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1 Remarks by Paul Chan at Future Investment Initiative, Sixth Edition, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, October 25, 2022; see video of Chan’s remarks (starting at 3:20:00), https://www.youtube.com/live/x1n_kT-hAfw?feature=share&t=12003. For coverage of the event, see Mia Castagnone, “2023 Is ‘Year of Hope’ for Hong Kong, Says Financial Secretary Paul Chan, as City Vies to Reclaim Former Status,” South China Morning Post, October 25, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/3197221/2023-year-hope-hong-kong-says-financial-secretary-paul-chan-city-vies-reclaim-former-status.

2 Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, “Mid-Year Population for 2022,” August 11, 2022, https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/press_release_detail.html?id=5078.

3 Michelle Toe, “Hong Kong Expats Are Up In Arms About Quarantine. Singapore Stands to Gain,” CNN.com, September 27, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/22/business/hong-kong-singapore-business-covid-intl-hnk/index.html.

4 Reuters, “AmCham Survey Flags Potential Expatriate Exodus from Hong Kong,” May 11, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/amcham-survey-flags-potential-expatriate-exodus-hong-kong-2021-05-12/.

5 Selena Li, Kane Wu, and Xie Yu, “Hong Kong, Struggling to Revive Hub Status, Sells ‘China Advantage’ to Global Banks,” Reuters, November 2, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/hong-kongs-lee-pitches-china-advantage-rebuild-citys-image-financial-hub-2022-11-02/.

6 Vivienne Chow, “The M+ Museum Has Removed Three Political Paintings by Chinese Artists as Beijing Continues Its Clampdown on Hong Kong,” Artnet, April 21, 2022, https://news.artnet.com/art-world/political-chinese-paintings-removed-m-plus-hong-kong-2102659.

7 The 1938 Crimes Ordinance, with text here under Cap. 200, Crimes Ordinance, https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap200?xpid=ID_1438402821397_002.

8 For an explanation of past uses of the 1938 sedition law, see Candice Chau, “Explainer: Hong Kong’s Sedition Law – A Colonial Relic Revived After Half a Century,” Hong Kong Free Press, July 30, 2022, https://hongkongfp.com/2022/07/30/explainer-hong-kongs-sedition-law-a-colonial-relic-revived-after-half-a-century/.

9 Hudson Lockett et al., “Global Bankers ‘Very Pro-China,’ Says UBS Chair,” Financial Times, November 2, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/037cc9d0-b214-43a6-8bcb-43f76507f9c5.

10 Sammy Heung and Natalie Wong quoted Chan in their article, “Hong Kong Finance Chief Paul Chan Denies ‘Special Treatment’ After Attending Banking Summit despite Testing Positive for Covid-19,” South China Morning Post, November 2, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/article/3198111/hong-kong-finance-chief-paul-chans-pcr-test-covid-positive-upon-return-city-middle-east-viral-load.

11 Jessie Yeung, “Hong Kong Prioritized Opening to China Over the Rest of the World. Now it’s Stuck in Covid Limbo,” October 8, 2021, CNN, https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2021/10/08/china/hong-kong-china-covid-border-mic-intl-hnk/index.html.

12 Pheobe Sedgman, “Overflowing Hong Kong Hospitals Forced to Put COVID Beds Outside,” Bloomberg, February 17, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-17/overflowing-hong-kong-hospitals-forced-to-put-covid-beds-outside.

13 Data from Hong Kong University, School of Public Health, accessed December 2, 2022, https://covid19.sph.hku.hk/.

14 Radio Television Hong Kong (public broadcaster), “HKMA Outlines COVID Rules for Summit Guests,” October 24, 2022, https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1672495-20221024.htm?spTabChangeable=0.

15 Peggy Sito quoted Mary Callahan Erdoes in her article, “Hong Kong ‘Never Left,’ the City’s Status as Global Finance Hub Never Faltered during Pandemic, JPMorgan’s Wealth Chief Says,” South China Morning Post, November 1, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/3197896/hong-kong-never-left-citys-status-global-finance-hub-never-faltered-during-pandemic-says-jpmorgans.

16 Data from Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, “Demographics: Table 3: Vital Events,” https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/web_table.html?id=3#; among major countries, only Italy, Germany, and Japan have higher median ages.

17 Media Factsheet: Hong Kong BN(O) Visa Route,” United Kingdom Home Office, February 24, 2022, https://homeofficemedia.blog.gov.uk/2022/02/24/media-factsheet-hong-kong-bnos/.

18 Abigail Ng, “Hong Kong’s Leader Says National Security Law Has City ‘Back on the Right Track,’ ” CNBC.com, October 6, 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/06/hong-kongs-carrie-lam-says-national-security-law-has-curbed-chaos.html.

19 “Risks and Considerations for Businesses Operating in Hong Kong,” Hong Kong Business Advisory issued by US Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Homeland Security, July 16, 2021, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/HKBA-FOR-FINAL-RELEASE-16-JUL-21.pdf.

20 ”United Kingdom Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office and Dominic Raab, “Radical Changes to Hong Kong’s Electoral System: Foreign Secretary’s Statement,” March 13, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-statement-on-radical-changes-to-hong-kongs-electoral-system.

21 Iain Marlow and Natalie Lung, “Hong Kong Leader Says She Still Hasn’t Seen Draft Text of Security Law,” Time, June 23, 2020, https://time.com/5857735/hong-kong-draft-security-law-text/.

22 For more information, see this review of the law’s provisions from the Hong Kong Free Press, “Explainer: 10 Things to Know About Hong Kong’s National Security Law–New Crimes, Procedures and Agencies,” July 1, 2020, https://hongkongfp.com/2020/07/01/explainer-10-things-to-know-about-hong-kongs-national-security-law-new-crimes-procedures-and-agencies/.

23 Selena Cheng, “China Lets Hong Kong Leader Override Courts Over Jimmy Lai Lawyer,” Wall Street Journal, December 30, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-lets-hong-kong-leader-override-courts-over-jimmy-lai-lawyer-11672417546?st=si5xpi2ol8rcwrq&reflink=share_mobilewebshare.

24 53 Hong Kong Democrats, Activists Arrested under Security Law Over 2020 Legislative Primaries,” Hong Kong Free Press, January 6, 2021, https://hongkongfp.com/2021/01/06/breaking-over-50-hong-kong-democrats-arrested-under-security-law-over-2020-legislative-primaries/.

25 The Election Committee also had received six seats in the Legislative Council before these were abolished in 2004.

26 Hong Kong Elections: 30.2 Per Cent Turnout in First Legislative Council Poll Since Beijing Overhaul,” South China Morning Post, December 20, 2021.

27 Reuters, “Hong Kong Civil Servants Given Four Weeks to Pledge Loyalty to the Government,” January 15, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-security/hong-kong-civil-servants-given-four-weeks-to-pledge-loyalty-to-the-government-idUSKBN29K1HY.

28 Balance of payments data tables from China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange, https://www.safe.gov.cn/safe/2019/0627/13519.html.

29 Hong Kong Autonomy Act, US Pub. L. No. 116-149, https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ149/PLAW-116publ149.pdf.

30 US Exec. Order No. 13936, 85 Fed. Reg. 43413 (July 14, 2020), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-07-17/pdf/2020-15646.pdf.

31 US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Individuals for Undermining Hong Kong’s Autonomy,” August 7, 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1088.

32 Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), Circulars, “Financial Sanctions,” August 8, 2020, https://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-information/guidelines-and-circular/2020/20200808e1.pdf

33 HKMA, Circulars, “Financial Sanctions.”

34 Akin Gump, “The New PRC Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law,” law firm’s Asia Alert, July 2, 2021, https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/the-new-prc-anti-foreign-sanctions-law.html.

35 China Imposes Sanctions on US Officials,” BBC, July 23, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-57950720.

36 Sumeet Chatterjee and Clare Jim, “Hong Kong Bank Account Freezes Rekindle Asset Safety Fears,” Reuters, December 8, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/hongkong-security-banks/hong-kong-bank-account-freezes-rekindle-asset-safety-fears-idUSKBN28I1ZK.

37 Hong Kong Department of Justice, Statement by Secretary for Justice Teresa Cheng, “Article 29 of National Security Law,” February 2, 2021, https://www.doj.gov.hk/en/community_engagement/speeches/20210202_sj1.html.

38 Data from the Hong Kong Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau, “Hong Kong: The Facts: Financial Services,” July 2020, https://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/financial_services.pdf.

39 Risks and Considerations for Businesses Operating in Hong Kong,” Hong Kong Business Advisory issued by US agencies. July 16, 2021.

40 US Exec. Order No. 13959, 85 Fed. Reg. 73185 (November 12, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/11/17/2020-25459/addressing-the-threat-from-securities-investments-that-finance-communist-chinese-military-companies.

41 Hong Kong Marine Department, “Information Notes for Masters of Visiting Yachts/Pleasure Vessels,” accessed November 30, 2022, https://www.mardep.gov.hk/en/pub_services/ocean/notes_ymaster.html.

42 Sun Yu, “China Meets Banks to Discuss Protecting Assets from US Sanctions,” Financial Times, April 30, 2022.

43 Yu, “China Meets Banks to Discuss Protecting Assets.”

44 Dennis W. H. Kwok and Elizabeth Donkervoort, “The Risks for International Business under the Hong Kong National Security Law,” Harvard Kennedy School, Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, July 2021, https://ash.harvard.edu/files/ash/files/the_risks_for_international_business_under_the_hong_kong_national_security_law_7.7.21.pdf.

45 Jude Blanchette, “Ideological Security as National Security,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/ideological-security-national-security

46 Jeffie Lam, Chris Lau, and Lilian Cheng, “Top Beijing Official Urges Hong Kong Government to Amend City Laws to Align Them with ‘Overriding’ National Security Legislation,” South China Morning Post, January 13, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3206676/top-beijing-official-urges-hong-kong-government-actively-amend-local-laws-align-them-overriding.

47 Kwok and Donkervoort, “The Risks for International Business,“ 3.

48 Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute, “The Rule of Law, Fairness of the Judicial System, Impartiality of the Courts–Combined Charts,” data from June 1997 to November 2022, https://www.pori.hk/pop-poll/rule-law-indicators-en/g-combined.html?lang=en.

49 Basic Law, Article 85, “Members of the Judiciary Shall Be Immune from Legal Action in the Performance of Their Judicial Functions,” https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclaw/index.html.

50 Lydia Wong, Thomas Kellogg, and Eric Yanho Lai, “Hong Kong’s National Security Law and the Right to a Fair Trial,” Center for Asian Law at Georgetown University Law Center, June 28, 2021, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/law-asia/wp-content/uploads/sites/31/2021/06/HongKongNSLRightToFairTrial.pdf.

51 Wong, Kellogg, and Lai, “Hong Kong’s National Security Law,” 10.

52 James Pomfret and Greg Torode, “Hong Kong Leader Asks Beijing to Rule on ‘Blanket Ban’ on Foreign Lawyers in National Security Cases,” Reuters, November 28, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/hong-kongs-top-court-rejects-bid-block-british-lawyer-defending-democrat-jimmy-2022-11-28/.

53 Guardian staff and agencies, “Hong Kong Withholds British Lawyer’s Visa, Delaying Jimmy Lai Trial,” Guardian, December 1, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/01/hong-kong-jimmy-lai-british-lawyers-visa-withheld-trial-delay-timothy-owen.

54 Selina Cheng, Wall Street Journal, December 30, 2022.

55 Chris Lau and Jeffie Lam, “Legal Experts Predict Foreign Lawyers Will Be Barred from National Security Cases Involving Seized Assets if Beijing Interprets Law,” South China Morning Post, November 30, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3201461/legal-experts-predict-foreign-lawyers-will-be-barred-national-security-cases-involving-seized-assets?module=lead_hero_story&pgtype=homepage.

56 Haroon Siddique and Helen Davidson, “UK Judges Withdraw from Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal,” Guardian, March 30, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/30/uk-judges-withdraw-from-hong-kong-court-of-final-appeal.

57 “‘We Are Seeing the . . . Criminalising of Dissent’: British Official Explains Hong Kong Judge Resignations,” Law.com International (platform), April 1, 2022, https://www.law.com/international-edition/2022/04/01/we-are-seeing-the-criminalising-of-dissent-british-official-explains-hong-kong-judge-resignations/?slreturn=20221008135157.

58 “Defender of the Rule of Law Annual Report 2019,” Law Society of Hong Kong, 2019. 2022 data from the Law Society of Hong Kong, “Profile of the Profession,” https://www.hklawsoc.org.hk/en/About-the-Society/Profile-of-the-Profession, December 2022 monthly statistics, accessed February 5, 2023.

59 Philip Dykes, “Chairman’s Report 2020,” Hong Kong Bar Association, December 31, 2020.

60 Jeffie Lam, “National Security Law: ‘We Are Not a Political Organisation,’ Hong Kong Bar Association Says After New Chief Comes Under Fire from Beijing,” South China Morning Post, February 3, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3120423/national-security-law-we-are-not-political-organisation.

61 Hillary Leung, “Hong Kong Bar Assoc. Ex-Chief Paul Harris Reportedly Leaves City Hours After Meeting with National Security Police,” Hong Kong Free Press, March 2, 2022, https://hongkongfp.com/2022/03/02/hong-kong-bar-assoc-ex-chief-paul-harris-reportedly-leaves-city-hours-after-meeting-with-national-security-police/.

62 James Pomfret et al., “Lawyers Exit Hong Kong as They Face Campaign of Intimidation,” Reuters, December 29, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-lawyers-crackdown-exodus/.

63 See press releases for the Hong Kong Bar Association, https://www.hkba.org/events-publication/press-releases-coverage/2022; and specifically, “Statement of the Hong Kong Bar Association (“HKBA”)–the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the HKSAR (“NSL”) in Respect of Participation of Overseas Lawyers,” November 28, 2022, https://www.hkba.org/uploads/97f289d7-d89e-46ec-bf48-d86267ec1d9b.pdf.

64 Chinafile, “Tracking the Impact of Hong Kong’s National Security Law,” October 25, 2022, https://www.chinafile.com/tracking-impact-of-hong-kongs-national-security-law; and Kelly Ho, “Hong Kong National Security Arrests Exceed 200,” Hong Kong Free Press, July 25, 2022, https://hongkongfp.com/2022/07/25/hong-kong-national-security-arrests-exceed-200-deception-cases-soar-in-first-half-of-2022//.

65 Thomas Kellogg, “How a Ruling by Hong Kong’s Top Court Opens the Door to a More Intrusive Security Law,” Hong Kong Free Press, December 17, 2021, https://hongkongfp.com/2021/12/17/how-a-ruling-by-hong-kongs-top-court-opens-the-door-to-a-more-intrusive-security-law/.

66 Edmond Ng and James Pomfret, “Hong Kong Pro-Democracy Stand News Closes After Police Raids Condemned by U.N., Germany,” Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/hong-kong-police-arrest-6-current-or-former-staff-online-media-outlet-2021-12-28/.

67 British Broadcasting Corporation, “Nike, H&M Face China Fury Over Xinjiang Cotton ‘Concerns,’ ” March 25, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56519411.

68 “Secret World of China Market Research Emerges from Xi Crackdowns,” Bloomberg News, November 23, 2022.

69 Secret World of China Market Research,“ Bloomberg.

70 Ji Siqi, “Chinese Economists Censored, Removed from Social Media After Critical Takes on Zero-Covid Policy,” South China Morning Post, May 3, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3176388/chinese-economists-censored-removed-social-media-after.

71 “Dismantling a Free Society: Hong Kong One Year After the National Security Law,” Human Rights Watch, June 25, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/feature/2021/06/25/dismantling-free-society/hong-kong-one-year-after-national-security-law.

72 “Hong Kong Security Law: Pro-Democracy Books Pulled from Libraries,” BBC, July 5, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-53296810.

73 “‘Banned Book List’ Won’t Be Made Public: Home Affairs,” Standard (Hong Kong), April 6, 2022, https://www.thestandard.com.hk/breaking-news/section/4/188901/’Banned-book-list’-won’t-be-made-public:-home-affairs.

74 Candice Chau and Marie Brockling, “Exclusive: University of Hong Kong Makes Library Users Register to Access Some Politically Sensitive Books,” Hong Kong Free Press, October 31, 2022, https://hongkongfp.com/2022/10/31/exclusive-university-of-hong-kong-makes-library-users-register-to-access-some-politically-sensitive-books/.

75 ”People’s Daily article from January 2, 2022, quoted by Austin Ramzy in “How Beijing Has Muted Hong Kong’s Independent Media,” New York Times, January 3, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/article/hong-kong-media-muzzled.html.

76 ”People’s Daily as quoted by Ramzy, “How Beijing Has Muted Hong Kong’s Independent Media.”

77 Hillary Leung, “‘Shrinking News Industry’: Hong Kong Press Freedom Index Sinks to New Low as Media Outlets Disappear,” Hong Kong Free Press, September 24, 2022, https://hongkongfp.com/2022/09/24/shrinking-news-industry-hong-kong-press-freedom-index-sinks-to-new-low-as-media-outlets-disappear/.

78 Leung, “‘Shrinking News Industry.’ ”

79 Helen Davidson, “Hong Kong Journalist Allowed to Travel to UK After Court Grants Bail,” Guardian, September 22, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/22/ronson-chan-hong-kong-journalist-allowed-to-travel-to-uk-after-court-grants-bail.

80 Reporters Without Borders, World Press Freedom Index, https://rsf.org/en/index.

81 James Pomfret, “Hong Kong’s Foreign Correspondents’ Club Suspends Top Asian Human Rights Awards,” Reuters, April 25, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/hong-kongs-foreign-correspondents-club-suspends-top-asian-human-rights-awards-2022-04-25/.

82 Jennifer Ngo, “David Webb Takes Database with Directors’ ID Numbers Offline,” South China Morning Post, February 16, 2013, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1151195/david-webb-takes-database-directors-id-numbers-offline.

83 Candice Chau, “Hong Kong to Block Public Access to Private Company Information,” Hong Kong Free Press, March 30, 2021, https://hongkongfp.com/2021/03/30/hong-kong-blocks-public-access-to-private-company-information/.

84 ”Reuters, “Hong Kong Leader Flags ‘Fake News’ Laws as Worries Over Media Freedom Grow,” May 3, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/hong-kong-leader-flags-fake-news-laws-worries-over-media-freedom-grow-2021-05-04/.

85 Chris Lau, “Eight in 10 Journalists in Hong Kong against Fake News Law, Survey Finds, with Improved Media Literacy Education Seen as Best Way to Tackle Misinformation,” South China Morning Post, October 26, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3197361/eight-10-journalists-hong-kong-against-fake-news-law-survey-finds-improved-media-literacy-education.

86 Ana Swanson, “China’s Chilling Crackdown on Due-Diligence Companies,” Atlantic, October 23, 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/10/chinas-chilling-crackdown-on-due-diligence-companies/280787/; and Gwynn Guilford, “A Canadian Analyst’s Dire Fate Shows How Researching Chinese Companies Is a Dangerous Game,” Quartz, October 11, 2013, https://qz.com/134458/a-canadian-analysts-dire-fate-shows-how-researching-chinese-companies-is-a-dangerous-game.

87 Article 43, The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region G.N. (E.) 72 of 2020, https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/pdf/20202448e/egn2020244872.pdf.

88 Wong, Kellogg, and Lai, “Hong Kong’s National Security Law,” 4-5.

89 Gabriela Kennedy, “The Chamber of No Secrets: What Tech and Data/Content-Driven Companies Need to Know About the Hong Kong National Security Law,” Mayer Brown (law firm), July 28, 2020, https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2020/07/the-chamber-of-no-secrets-what-tech-and-data-content-driven-companies-need-to-know-about-the-hong-kong-national-security-law.

90 Michael Grynbaum, “New York Times Will Move Part of Hong Kong Office to Seoul,” New York Times, July 14, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/business/media/new-york-times-hong-kong.html.

91 Xinmei Shen, “Hong Kong Saw Itself as Asia’s Data Hub, but Beijing’s Strict Cybersecurity Rules Threaten That Status,” South China Morning Post, November 16, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/tech/policy/article/3156151/hong-kong-saw-itself-asias-data-hub-beijings-strict-cybersecurity-rules.

92 Dashveenjit Kaur, “How Will China’s New Data Security Law Affect Hong Kong IPOs?” Techwire Asia, December 8, 2021, https://techwireasia.com/2021/12/how-will-chinas-new-data-security-law-affect-hong-kong-ipos/.

93 Tony Cheung, “Hong Kong’s Own National Security Legislation Put on Hold for Further Research, Government Says,” South China Morning Post, October 10, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3195467/hong-kongs-own-national-security-legislation-put-hold.

94 See, for example, Sumeet Chaterjee et al., “Exclusive: Global Banks Scrutinize Their Hong Kong Clients for Pro-Democracy Ties,” Reuters, July 19, 2020.

The post Fractured foundations: Assessing risks to Hong Kong’s business environment appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Premature peace with Putin would be disastrous for international security

Peter Dickinson — Sat, 04 Mar 2023 00:55:59 +0000

For the past twelve months, Ukraine’s remarkable resistance to Russian aggression has captured the imagination of the watching world. The international community has been been amazed by the resilience of the Ukrainian people and inspired by their determination to defy the Russian colossus. At the same time, as the invasion enters its second year, calls are now mounting for some kind of compromise with the Kremlin that would end the fighting and effectively freeze the conflict.

Most advocates of a compromise peace argue that a complete Ukrainian victory is simply not realistic and insist that even a bad peace is better than more war. While often vague on details, they typically hint at some kind of land-for-peace deal that would involve Ukraine giving up part of its sovereign territory and condemning millions of Ukrainian civilians to permanent Russian occupation in exchange for an end to hostilities.

Such wishful thinking conveniently underestimates the extent of Vladimir Putin’s imperial ambitions while ignoring the grave implications for international security of anything less that a decisive Russian defeat in Ukraine. If Moscow is rewarded for the invasion of Ukraine with territorial gains, the world will become a far more dangerous place. Perhaps the best way to illustrate the perils of appeasing Putin is by imagining where we would be today if Ukraine had indeed fallen one year ago.

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Since the invasion began on February 24, 2022, a combination of captured documents, prisoner accounts, Russian propaganda messaging, and the conduct of the Russian military in occupied Ukrainian regions have made it possible to piece together a fairly comprehensive vision of Putin’s plans for a conquered Ukraine. The chilling picture that emerges is of a genocidal campaign to not only extinguish Ukrainian statehood but wipe out all traces of Ukrainian national identity.

If Putin’s initial invasion plan had succeeded and his troops had captured Kyiv in three days as anticipated, he would have deposed the government and installed a puppet regime drawn from Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin political forces. Much of the country would have quickly come under direct Russian military control and would have been subjected to months of mass arrests, summary executions, and forced deportations designed to break all resistance. Working with local collaborators across the country, the Russian occupation authorities would have targeted anyone viewed as a potential threat to the Kremlin.

This pattern of atrocities has been repeated systematically over the past year in every region of Ukraine occupied by Putin’s troops. International investigators have concluded that the crimes taking place in occupied regions are evidence of a “calculated plan” to destroy the Ukrainian nation. “Putin’s plan is to occupy Ukraine, subjugate the Ukrainian population to Russian rule, and destroy Ukrainian identity. This plan is becoming clearer as the evidence of war crimes proliferates and as our investigations progress,” commented British barrister Wayne Jordash, who leads the Mobile Justice Team of international lawyers investigating possible Russian crimes in Ukraine.

With less than 20 percent of Ukrainian territory currently occupied by Russia, the humanitarian consequences of the war have already been disastrous. Tens of thousands of civilians are feared dead and over a million have been subjected to forced deportation to the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, millions more have had to flee their homes and move elsewhere in Ukraine or cross the border into neighboring EU countries.

If Putin had managed to seize the whole of Ukraine, the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe would have been far greater. Tens of millions of Ukrainian refugees would have flooded into the European Union, while ongoing acts of resistance inside Ukraine would have led to a bloodbath of increasingly savage reprisals designed to terrorize the population into submission. Global audiences would have witnessed the previously unthinkable spectacle of a modern genocide unfolding methodically in the heart of Europe and livestreamed on social media.

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The negative implications of a Russian victory in Ukraine would not have been limited to the captive Ukrainian population, of course. On the contrary, the repercussions would have been felt far beyond the borders of Ukraine, shaping the geopolitical climate for years to come and destabilizing the entire world.

The most immediate consequence would have been additional Russian wars of aggression. Success in Ukraine would have encouraged Putin to continue, with Moldova and Kazakhstan among the most obvious next targets. Sooner or later, the emboldened Russian dictator would test NATO’s commitment to collective security. Would the likes of France and Germany really risk World War III in order to defend Estonia? If Russia is not stopped in Ukraine, that is a question all NATO members will probably have to answer in the not-too-distant future. At this stage, it seems reasonable to assume that Putin is far from convinced.

Nor would Russia be the only threat on the horizon. The fall of Ukraine would undermine the core principles of the global security order and inspire other authoritarian regimes around the world to engage in their own foreign policy adventures. In the wake of a successful Russian invasion of Ukraine, a Chinese assault on Taiwan would become far more likely, while autocrats everywhere would draw the logical conclusions for their own neighborhoods.

A Ukrainian defeat could also have sparked an unprecedented international scramble for nuclear weapons. Even before Putin’s full-scale invasion, the preceding eight years of Russian aggression against Ukraine had already highlighted the folly of the Ukrainian government’s 1994 decision to unilaterally hand over the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the US, and the UK. If Russia had achieved its goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood, many countries would have begun looking nervously at their neighbors, with some deciding that the only truly reliable security guarantee was a nuclear arsenal of their own.

The aftershocks of a successful Russian blitzkrieg in Ukraine would have proved hugely damaging for the future of democracy itself. Putin’s triumph would have discredited the democratic world and reinvigorated authoritarian regimes around the globe. From Central Asia to the Balkans, the often fragile democratic progress of recent decades would have given way to a fresh wave of authoritarianism drawing its legitimacy from the new geopolitical realities created by Russian victory in Ukraine. Populism would have reached new heights throughout the West, with the likes of Hungary’s Viktor Orban emerging as key beneficiaries.

This nightmare vision of a world marked by chronic international instability, wars of aggression, nuclear proliferation, and rising authoritarianism is still a very real possibility. Russia continues to commit genocide in those parts of Ukraine under its control, and remains as determined as ever to replace the rules-based international order with a system where great powers can dictate to their weaker neighbors. The only way to avoid this dystopian future is by ensuring that Putin’s attempt to destroy Ukraine ends in failure.

The many people currently proposing peace plans may well have good intentions, but they are delusional if they believe Putin will be satisfied with relatively modest territorial gains in eastern and southern Ukraine. In reality, any concessions will merely whet his imperial appetite while convincing him of the West’s fundamental weakness. The Russian dictator is already openly comparing his invasion to Czar Peter the Great’s eighteenth century wars of imperial conquest. If Putin is rewarded for his aggression in Ukraine, he will inevitably go further.

Rather than insisting on a premature peace, it would make far more sense to actually listen to Ukraine. Nobody wants peace more than the millions of Ukrainians who have seen their lives shattered and their country devastated by Russia’s criminal invasion. It is therefore particularly revealing that there is virtually zero support in today’s Ukraine for a negotiated settlement. Ukrainians are under no illusions over the difficulties of achieving victory. Nevertheless, they also understand the nature of the current Russian regime and recognize that unless Putin is decisively defeated, he will continue to wage war against their country and the wider democratic world.

Luckily, Ukrainians are ready to do the fighting themselves. Last year, their valor prevented the world from plunging into a new dark age of authoritarian aggression. All they ask now is for the international community to remain steadfast in their support and give Ukraine the tools to finish the job.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

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It has already been established that the International Criminal Court (ICC) at present and for the foreseeable future does not have jurisdiction over Russia’s use of aggression against Ukraine, so a special tribunal is needed. ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan appears to be an isolated voice disputing this consensus. He argues for reforms to address the gap at the ICC, but has not been able to advance any practical and timely solution, keeping in mind the principle that justice delayed is justice denied.

So far, three options for a special tribunal have crystallized. The first is the institution-based option, which envisages a tribunal established on the basis of a treaty between Ukraine and the UN, following the adoption of the relevant UN General Assembly resolution. If this scenario does not work out, a tribunal could be set up on the basis of another international organization such as the Council of Europe, EU, or G7, preferably still with the backing of the UN General Assembly.

Another option is the treaty-based approach. This would involve setting up a tribunal on the basis of a multilateral international treaty, which would potentially be open to any state. There is also a hybrid option, which could see a specialized court based on Ukrainian law and jurisdiction, with some type of international element. At this stage, the institution-based option involving the UN is widely seen as optimal.

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When the idea of a tribunal was first introduced, it was supported by international law experts, civil society, and opinion leaders, but not by individual governments. This began to change after the Ukrainian government elaborated on its initial concept and started working with expert groups to develop the possible format of a future tribunal. Towards the end of 2022 and during the first months of 2023, the debate advanced to the inter-governmental level.

The first breakthrough came in November 2022, when European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared that the EU was proposing “to set up a specialized court, backed by the United Nations, to investigate and prosecute Russia’s crime of aggression.” At the same time, the French Foreign Ministry announced that it had started “working with our European and Ukrainian partners on the proposal to establish a special tribunal on Russia’s crime of aggression against Ukraine.” Dutch officials also confirmed that the Netherlands would be willing to house a new UN-backed tribunal to try Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

In the first weeks of 2023, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock noted the “disastrous” limitations on the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression and called for a “special solution” to address what she termed as a gap in international law. Minister Baerbock also backed the immediate establishment of an investigating authority in The Hague to address Russian aggression.

Speaking in January, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte said he could not accept that the international community would let the Russian invasion of Ukraine go unpunished, and confirmed Dutch officials are working with their Ukrainian colleagues and others to set up an aggression tribunal, preferably in The Hague. Meanwhile, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani stated, “if a special tribunal is created, we are not against it.”

The European Parliament adopted a resolution in January 2023 backing the establishment of a special tribunal. Also in January, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) voted for a resolution which confirmed that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine meets the definition of international aggression and reiterated its call “to set up a special international criminal tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, which should be endorsed and supported by as many states and international organizations as possible, and in particular by the United Nations General Assembly.”

Recent months have witnessed further practical steps toward the establishment of a special tribunal. In early 2023, a core group of more than 20 countries was created to develop plans for a tribunal, with the first in-person meeting taking place on January 26 in Prague. On February 2, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that an international center for the prosecution of the crime of aggression in Ukraine would be set up in The Hague.

It is evident from recent developments that initial calls for a special tribunal are now evolving toward practical implementation, with the various legal options taking more concrete form and being evaluated in terms of preference. This process will continue in the coming months as inter-governmental engagement on the issue deepens.

Dr. Irina Paliashvili is Chair of the Legal Committee at the US-Ukraine Business Council (USUBC) and International Rule of Law Officer at the IBA Rule of Law Forum.

In Libya, this facade of democracy is used to signal Libya’s readiness for elections. In reality, the international community’s current formula for Libya is failing, not only because it prioritizes expediency over meaningful transformation, but also because it focuses on reconciling Libya’s corrupt and illegitimate political elite rather than empowering its citizens.

This empty electoral vision will not foster a transition to a stable and peaceful Libyan state.

Libyan civil society urgently needs the space to operate safely and freely in Libya. Instead, Libya’s political elite consistently and systematically continues to shrink the space for civil discourse, and to target activists legislatively, physically, and institutionally. Libyan activists, journalists, and public figures have been abducted, tortured, and disappeared, and face brutal security apparatuses reintroduced from the Gaddhafi regime.

To give Libyan civil society a meaningful role in Libya’s transition to democracy, the international community must hold Libya’s political elite accountable for its crackdown on civil society. It must make the participation of the elite in any new process conditional on its commitment to repeal restrictions on civil society and allow the space for citizens to operate freely. Fundamentally, it must ensure that the framework of any new process is designed in consultation with Libya’s civil society and invites citizens’ contributions.

Failure to do so will not only birth another empty political process but will further enshrine a culture of impunity for human rights violations and violence—bringing more harm to the Libyan people.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs at the Atlantic Council, focusing on the processes of change in North Africa.

Elham Saudi is cofounder and director of Lawyers for Justice in Libya, a leading organization working toward a Libya that embodies the values and principles of human rights and the rule of law, and a society committed to justice.

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How legal actions against Russian aggression in Ukraine can serve as a model for other conflicts

Celeste Kmiotek, Lisandra Novo — Fri, 24 Feb 2023 18:36:41 +0000

For international criminal lawyers, the global response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been a welcome anomaly. Experts have pointed to not just the unprecedented number of investigations and accountability efforts, but also improved ways of collaborating between jurisdictions and the ways that factors such as political will are overcoming expected obstacles to secure accountability. With this progress comes the opportunity to litigate legal issues (such as cyber operations) that, while not necessarily new to warfare, have not yet been tried in court—pushing international law further into the twenty-first century. However, these successes around the war in Ukraine also highlight just how unequal access to justice is for victims of international crimes.

The below efforts are undeniably victories for justice—and they demonstrate how much more must be done to ensure accountability for Ukraine and to respond to all other international atrocities.

Criminal prosecutions

The Ukrainian criminal code includes provisions on acts of aggression, violations of the rules of warfare, and genocide. As of February 17, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine had registered 70,180 war crimes and crimes of aggression and 16,882 crimes against national security, with eighty-six reported indictments and twenty-five convictions. While the Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office has faced staff shakeups stemming from allegations of treason, it is working with organizations such as the International Bar Association and the Council of Europe to strengthen its capacity.

However, with the office’s success and dedication, the international community has voiced some concerns about proceedings. These concerns primarily regard trials held in absentia—a somewhat controversial option that requires particular attention to fair trial rights for the accused under the European Convention on Human Rights—and the lack of an investigation into Ukrainian troops despite evidence that suggests possible violations (albeit on a significantly lower level). While Russia has launched domestic trials against Ukrainian soldiers, these trials “brazenly [undermine] fair trial rights” that are guaranteed for prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention, according to Amnesty International.

States not currently directly involved in the conflict have also opened investigations into international crimes under universal jurisdiction provisions. In Germany, the federal prosecutor launched a structural investigation, a tool allowing the office to gather evidence broadly without focusing on a particular suspect. Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, and Romania have further joined with Ukraine to form a joint investigation team. The US Department of Justice issued indictments related to Russia’s invasion, while Congress amended US war crime provisions to facilitate cases against Russian perpetrators.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide when a crime is committed by a national of or on the territory of a State Party to the Rome Statute of the ICC or if the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) refers a matter to the ICC. Neither Russia nor Ukraine is a State Party, and Russia would almost certainly use its veto to block a UNSC referral. However, Ukraine submitted declarations in 2014 and 2015 accepting the ICC’s jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed on its territory from November 21, 2013 onwards. On March 2, 2022 the ICC prosecutor, Karim Ahmad Khan, announced that he had opened an investigation into the situation in Ukraine based on what ultimately totaled forty-three states’ referrals. By April 25, Khan’s office had joined as a participant in the joint investigation team, and by June 17, Khan had visited Ukraine three times and announced plans to open a field office there. The ICC is a “court of last resort,” and Ukraine’s prosecutor general has indicated that his plan is to try “the overwhelming majority” of cases domestically, leaving the ICC to fill in the blanks. These blanks are likely to be cases against senior leaders who would be protected by personal immunities in domestic trials, as such immunities are generally considered inapplicable at international courts.

The ICC also has jurisdiction over the crime of aggression—the use of armed force by one state against another in violation of the United Nations Charter. However, it can only exercise that jurisdiction if both the aggressor state and the victim state have signed onto the Kampala Amendments, which added the crime of aggression to the Rome Statute, or if the UNSC referred the matter. Neither Russia nor Ukraine has signed these amendments, and it can again be assumed that Russia would veto a referral. Furthermore, because the criminalized acts under most definitions of aggression typically involve senior-level leaders, an international court is again needed to overcome personal immunities. As such, Ukraine has proposed the creation of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression focused on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This option continues to face considerable scrutiny—on principle, as it highlights double standards for Western countries (many of which have evaded responsibility for their own acts of aggression and bear responsibility for the difficulties in prosecuting the crime at the ICC), and pragmatically, given concerns about support and the feasibility of the proposed structure because of personal immunity concerns. Still, the special tribunal proposal seems to be gaining support.

Civil cases, sanctions, and more

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) allows states to bring complaints against other states for violations of various treaties. In February 2022, Ukraine filed an application against Russia under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, alleging both that Russia was erroneously accusing Ukraine of genocide and also that Russia was itself planning acts of genocide. A record number of third parties—over forty-one states and the European Union (EU)—filed declarations of intervention on the construction of the provisions. Even the United States filed a declaration of intervention, likely the first time it has ever done so before the ICJ. With the conflict in Ukraine as a backdrop, senior officials stressed at a recent UNSC debate that increased state consent to the ICJ’s jurisdiction as well as compliance with its decisions could strengthen the rule of law.

While there are not yet cases related to Russia’s 2022 invasion before the European Court of Human Rights, there are several cases against Russia relating to the 2014 invasion of Ukraine. At the court, cases regarding violations of the European Convention on Human Rights by states that have ratified it can be brought by individuals, companies, nongovernmental organizations, or other States Party. In a decision released on January 25, the court held both that states still must respect human-rights obligations under the Convention during armed conflicts and that Russia controlled the separatist regions in Eastern Ukraine from the outset of the 2014 invasion. This opens the way for cases related to human-rights violations, such as acts of torture and ill-treatment, committed last year between February and September 16, the day that Russia ceased to be a party to the Convention.

One of the most immediate and prolific quasi-judicial tools has been the use of targeted human-rights sanctions. Broadly speaking, these sanctions freeze assets of and deny visas to the designated person or entity. These gained popularity once it became clear that Kremlin-connected oligarchs were storing assets in the West. While the United States, the United Kingdom, the EU, Canada, and Australia are among the main jurisdictions with permanent sanctions regimes, many additional states designated Russians in the past year.

Because these sanctions only froze assets, additional efforts then went toward finding avenues to seize and repurpose these assets to support Ukraine. The United States and the EU set up Task Force KleptoCapture and the “Freeze and Seize” Taskforce, respectively, and Canada amended its targeted sanctions legislation to allow the seizing of assets in certain circumstances. In November 2022, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution recommending that member states work with Ukraine to create a “register of damage,” recording evidence and claims related to damages, loss, or injury caused by Russia’s wrongful acts. Then, a compensation mechanism would help pay out these claims with confiscated Russian assets.

Novel legal issues

The changing nature of conflict is particularly evident in this war, as the sides have engaged in significant cyber operations. Of particular concern are cyberattacks, in conjunction with kinetic attacks, against critical infrastructure and civilian targets. Targeting civilians and civilian objects in conflict is prohibited under international humanitarian law. Additionally, attacks against military objects are prohibited when they can be expected to result in excessive harm to civilians and/or civilian objects as compared to the anticipated military advantage. Furthermore, parties to the conflict are expected to take all feasible precautions when choosing their means and methods of warfare so as to avoid or minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects. Due to their novelty, however, cyberattacks are not included in the Geneva Conventions or even the Rome Statute. The recent request from Ukrainian officials to the ICC to investigate whether certain Russian cyberattacks constitute war crimes marks the first time a sovereign government has asked this of the court. A prior request was submitted by human-rights lawyers and investigators in March 2022 for the ICC to consider war crimes prosecutions for cyberattacks against Ukraine dating back to Russia’s 2014 invasion.

The participation of civilians in cyber operations, or cyber “hacktivism,” in support of both Russia and Ukraine raises important questions about rules and protections under international humanitarian law. On February 24 last year, for example, the hacker collective Anonymous announced it would engage in a cyberwar with Russia in retaliation for Russian cyberattacks against Ukraine. Two days later, Mykhailo Fedorov, minister of digital transformation of Ukraine, announced in a tweet the creation of a volunteer “IT army.” The tweet included a link to a Telegram channel with instructions for attacking Russian websites. As of March 2022, the Telegram channel had up to four hundred thousand members. With respect to Russia, reports suggest that pro-Russian hacktivists have been coordinating their actions with the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency. While civilians are protected from attack under international humanitarian law, this protection is lost “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” The determination of whether someone is a combatant or a civilian is crucial in assessing whether an attack directed against that person is a war crime or legally permissible.

What Ukraine’s example means for atrocities worldwide

There are several reasons why so many avenues are open to Ukraine and why it has pushed forward international law so quickly. Ukraine had already accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction and criminalized the relevant acts. Furthermore, the nature of the conflict—in which one state is clearly the aggressor—has given Ukraine an incentive to cooperate with all available authorities and to use its own. However, another factor appears to be in play: While not in the least a reflection on Ukraine, much of the Western news coverage, especially early on, expressed heightened horror at seeing atrocities in Europe, a striking contrast from the media’s approach to atrocities in other regions of the world—and one that was distinctly racist.

Other atrocities also face distinct practical hurdles. For example, repeated attempts to open a case on Syria at the ICC have so far remained fruitless, and Iran’s judiciary is currently being utilized as an instrument of repression against its own people. However, justice efforts for Ukraine have opened new avenues—fixing legislative gaps, establishing new task forces, and developing needed case law on modern issues—and have shown what political will and public support can accomplish when galvanized. As the one-year mark of Russia’s full-scale invasion arrives, this progress toward justice should be commended, but it should also be recognized as the standard that victims of all atrocities deserve.

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

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Cohen in Forbes: Russian energy-giant Gazprom is creating an army

Atlantic Council — Wed, 22 Feb 2023 19:37:30 +0000

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Shahid in foreign policy and security conference

Atlantic Council — Wed, 22 Feb 2023 18:37:00 +0000

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Rebuilding Ukraine: Private sector role can help counter corruption concerns

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti — Thu, 16 Feb 2023 20:03:04 +0000

Ukraine has been hit by a series of damaging corruption allegations in recent weeks. So far in 2023, a number of senior government figures including ministers, deputy ministers, and regional governors have all come under scrutiny. Some have resigned or been dismissed. The timing is particularly unfortunate for a besieged country that is currently reliant on foreign aid as it fights for survival against Russia’s ongoing invasion.

Alarm over potential corruption reflects Ukraine’s often troubling prior record, despite the country’s reform progress since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. Such scandals sow doubt among Ukraine’s international partners and could help convince some to hesitate before providing desperately needed financial support.

The problem with all of this, of course, is that Ukraine depends heavily on the continued support of Western governments and donors, who understandably tend to look askance at the mere suggestion that their donations could be misappropriated. Even if the current flurry of corruption allegations prove to be entirely or at least partially unfounded, the mere perception of corruption risk could alienate the very entities upon which Ukraine’s future recovery will hinge.

This is not a new problem. Ukraine has long been regarded as one of the world’s more corrupt countries and ranked 122nd of 180 countries on Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perception Index. In the present circumstances, Ukraine simply cannot afford to be seen as corrupt and must do everything possible to counter such negative perceptions.

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While confidence remains low in Ukraine’s state institutions, the country’s private sector does not appear to suffer from the same problem. On the contrary, Ukrainian businesses enjoy a growing international reputation as resilient, innovative, and cost-competitive. Many are noted for their skilled, modern, savvy, and hard-working talent. The uniquely challenging circumstances of the Russian invasion have served to highlight these positive characteristics.

Although the Russian invasion is now entering its second year, international companies have continued to look for investment opportunities in Ukraine. Even in the midst of Russia’s late 2022 bombing campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure, Sergiy Tsivkach of UkraineInvest, the country’s state investment promotion agency, reported that $5 billion of foreign private investment was in the pipeline for Ukraine’s manufacturing sector alone. “There are billions more across other sectors,” he noted. “Private investment in industry is the most important way to restore the Ukrainian economy and create new jobs.”

In a January 17 interview, Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi summed up why some foreign companies are excited about Ukraine despite the ongoing invasion. “I’m very optimistic,” he commented. “You really do see the spirit of the Ukrainian people here, the resilience. But even beyond that, you see the entrepreneurial energy here.”

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The contrast could hardly be starker between the global optimism surrounding Ukraine’s private sector and the spectacle of the United States sending inspectors to the country early this year to investigate whether foreign assistance funds are being misused or misplaced. This is a hint, a strong one, about the best way to approach the country’s future reconstruction.

Private companies seeking Western investment have to meet Western standards, requirements, and anti-corruption norms. Major international companies simply won’t invest unless they are comfortable that they are not exposing themselves to unnecessary risk, including the financial, criminal, and reputational risk of corruption scandals. Similarly, Ukrainian companies cannot reliably attract foreign investment unless they can demonstrate that these risks are at a minimum.

Even where there may not be specific legal consequences for corruption, there are certainly reputational and financial risks. This means private companies have obvious incentives to operate cleanly and transparently that are often limited or absent in the public sector.

International confidence in Ukraine’s private sector and its ability to weather the storms of the Russian invasion is pronounced. Ukraine should capitalize on this and seek to minimize concerns about public sector corruption by letting the private sector take the lead on national reconstruction.

This approach would make the West a shareholder in Ukraine’s future. Leaving the private sector to lead the way would also introduce numerous checks on corruption as each individual contract is signed, executed, and monitored with the Western oversight of foreign investors. Even if the government officials in question are doing absolutely nothing wrong, it seems beyond dispute that the international community would sooner trust Ukraine’s private sector than its scandal-plagued public sector. Trust, in turn, begets investment.

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Zakhar Tropin — Tue, 14 Feb 2023 16:16:46 +0000

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled on January 25 that cases brought by Ukraine and the Netherlands against Russia were admissible. This intermediate decision is a significant legal milestone in the quest for justice over Russian aggression against Ukraine, as it recognizes that parts of eastern Ukraine seized by so-called separatists in spring 2014 were in fact controlled by Russia. “The Court found that areas in eastern Ukraine in separatist hands were from May 11, 2014, and up to at least January 26, 2022, under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation,” the court stated.

This ruling confirms what had long been the world’s worst-kept secret. Ever since the appearance of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region in spring 2014, it was apparent that these nominally independent entities were in fact closely tied to Russia. Nevertheless, Moscow continued to officially deny any direct involvement in eastern Ukraine until the launch of Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022.

Russia’s blanket denials complicated the numerous international court proceedings initiated over alleged crimes committed in Ukraine following the outbreak of hostilities in 2014. The recent ECHR decision will have potentially wide-ranging implications in this context. It now paves the way for a series of international cases that had been put on hold pending a ruling over jurisdiction.

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The case in question at the ECHR relates to claims from both Ukraine and the Netherlands. The Ukrainian claims were brought against Russia in 2014, while later claims by the Netherlands are in connection with the shooting down of civilian airliner MH17 over eastern Ukraine, which resulted in the deaths of 298 people including 196 Dutch nationals.

One of the ECHR’s main conclusions was that Russia exercised effective control over the regions of eastern Ukraine nominally held by separatist forces. The court cited extensive evidence to support this conclusion including the presence of Russian military personnel in eastern Ukraine from April 2014 and the large-scale deployment of Russian troops from August 2014 at the very latest. Evidence was also provided to highlight the extensive provision of Russian weapons along with comprehensive political and economic support.

In political terms, the ECHR ruling is undoubtedly a victory for Ukraine. It confirms that the invasion of February 24, 2022, was actually a continuation of the war which began eight years earlier in 2014. It also debunks Russian attempts to depict the so-called separatist republics as legitimate representatives of the local population in eastern Ukraine. This exposes the absurdity of later Russian efforts to portray the current full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a response to appeals from their own puppet regimes.

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Looking ahead, the ECHR will now consider numerous human rights violations that have allegedly been committed by Russia in eastern Ukraine since 2014. The list of crimes is extensive and includes summary executions, torture, sexual violence, and the abduction of children. These offenses will be very familiar to the many Ukrainian human rights activists who are currently attempting to document alleged Russian war crimes in recently liberated parts of Ukraine such as Bucha, Kherson, and Izyum.

The ECHR decision is also an important step toward unlocking thousands of individual claims against Russia submitted to the ECHR as a result of Russian aggression in Ukraine. To date, there are more than 8000 such claims relating to gross violations of human rights in eastern Ukraine and Crimea following the Russian seizure of these Ukrainian regions.

Even though Russia is not currently a party to the European Convention on Human Rights, it is still responsible for all violations of this Convention committed until September 16, 2022, the date when Moscow terminated its participation. Nobody expects the current Russian authorities to comply with ECHR decisions or recognize the authority of the court. However, any future Russian government seeking to return to the international community will be obliged to do so. In the meantime, international human rights rulings against Russia are expected to deepen the Putin regime’s isolation and toxicity.

The recent European Court of Human Rights decision marks a new stage in the struggle to hold Russia accountable for its attack on Ukraine. However, it is important to stress that there remains a very long road ahead before justice is truly served. In parallel to the many ongoing cases against Russia relating to events dating back to 2014, discussions continue over the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, which could potentially see Russia’s political and military leadership put on trial for the current full-scale invasion. Additional war crimes probes are also underway.

These efforts are vital for the future of the international security system. Russia’s nine-year campaign of aggression against Ukraine represents an unprecedented challenge to the rules-based international order that cannot go unpunished. Thankfully, while the wheels of international justice turn slowly, they appear to be moving in the right direction.

Zakhar Tropin is a nonresident fellow at the Center for Defence Strategies in Kyiv.

Brazil is home to the largest portion of the Amazon and is an indispensable partner for the United States on climate and sustainability. As Biden prioritizes sustainable infrastructure and equitable clean energy domestically and more ambitious climate goals abroad, Brazil is an important ally in the hemisphere. Of Brazil’s available energy resources, around 80 percent are from renewables, and, as an agricultural powerhouse, it has the potential to be an even greater asset in solving the global food crisis. The US-Brazilian cooperation on climate and the environment is expected to deepen as the United States Special Envoy for Climate John Kerry plans to visit Brazil soon.

2. UN Security Council reforms are on the table

Lula has proposed to be a peace broker in Ukraine by pushing the rhetoric around the conflict to be about finding peace rather than continuing the war. He told reporters after the meeting that he and Biden discussed “the need to create a group of countries that are not involved directly or indirectly in the war with Russia in order to find a way to make peace.”

In this context, Lula also advocated for the need to reform the United Nations Security Council to become more representative of current geopolitical dynamics—a long-standing demand of the Brazilian president—to which Biden seemed to agree, Lula said.

3. Lula embraces progressive stardom

Lula met with prominent progressives on Friday morning before heading to the White House. With Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Lula discussed ways to increase international cooperation to protect the Amazon rainforest and preserve the environment for future generations. The Brazilian president also met with Reps. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY), Pramila Jayapal (D-WA), and Ro Khanna (D-CA). They discussed shared commitments to environmental, social, and economic justice—and US-Brazil cooperation to fight authoritarianism and strengthen relations between the two countries’ legislators. The meetings represent an important effort to extend cooperation beyond the executive level, but in order to be effective and long-lasting, this kind of outreach must be bipartisan.

4. The presidents have a small window for cooperation

Lula’s Washington visit opens a new chapter as he seeks to position Brazil as a critical player regionally and internationally. Next month, he will travel to China, and he is also planning a trip to Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa.

But both Lula and Biden face challenges at home, as expectations rise for Lula to deliver on key campaign promises and Biden prepares for the 2024 elections. The window of opportunity for furthering cooperation is slim, but the stage is set for both countries to capitalize on new momentum. Particularly on the environment, Friday’s visit was a promising start.

Caroline Arkalji is a Young Global Professional with the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Countering Russian threats to global financial security

Benton Coblentz — Thu, 09 Feb 2023 19:45:24 +0000

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has awoken the Western world to the threat posed by Kremlin aggression and Russian weaponization of global institutions. For years, the Kremlin and its proxies have exploited the rules-based global financial system for their personal gain and in service of Moscow’s geopolitical strategy. Following the invasion of Ukraine, there is now a growing impetus in the West to counter such activity.

The Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center is exploring the issue of Russian threats to global financial security, beginning with a virtual event on February 8 moderated by Ambassador John Herbst and featuring Ukrainian Minister of Finance Serhiy Marchenko along with a panel of international experts.

Minister Marchenko began the event by reminding viewers that “for too long, Russia has been allowed to undermine the system from inside.” Ignoring the challenges that Russia’s misuse of the rules-based international order pose will only make this problem worse, he warned.

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Since 2014, the West has sanctioned an expanding list of Russian industries and entities in response to violations of international law. Unprecedented additional sanctions were imposed following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. However, the available sanctions options are not yet exhausted. “Sanctions are having an impact on the Russian economy,” said panelist Brian O’Toole, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, “but there is still plenty more to be done.”

Russia has created an international network to avoid sanctions and flout the rules governing the global financial sector. This network includes not only Russia’s Wagner Group, which was recently sanctioned as an international criminal organization by the US State Department, but also “the Taliban, Hezbollah, [Syria’s] Assad regime, North Korea, and Iran,” said Marchenko.

“Countless investigations have uncovered Russia’s complicity in money laundering,” reported Marchenko. He noted that Russia’s dependence on illicit financial activity through its network of allies has only increased since the imposition of sanctions.

For Timothy Ash, senior sovereign strategist at Bluebay Asset Management, sanctions are just the beginning of the process of extricating Russian malign influence from global institutions. Moscow is “corrupting [global] systems from within,” while Moscow’s international partners help “regime money exit and then be deployed in Russian state interests,” said Ash.

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John Cusack, founder of the Global Coalition to Fight Financial Crime, noted that “Russia has been gaming the system for more than two decades.” In the case of one global institution, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which was set up to police international money laundering, he claimed Russia’s role has run directly counter to the goals of the institution. Cusack accused the Kremlin of weaponizing its standing in the FATF to “[go] after people they don’t like.”

To respond to Russia’s flagrant violations, FATF has the power to place Russia on a “blacklist” that calls on FATF member countries to apply greater due diligence on financial transactions involving Russia. Russia’s placement on the FATF blacklist would, according to Minister Marchenko, “dramatically increase the cost of doing business with Russia.”

O’Toole noted that sanctions are only one aspect of the overall strategy to counter Kremlin aggression in Ukraine and beyond. “Ukraine’s victory relies on the bravery of the Ukrainian people and military supplies from the West,” he commented. At the same time, O’Toole stressed that sanctions “are a complementary policy” limiting the ability of Russia to fund its aggression.

Olena Halushka, co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory, compared Russian atrocities in Ukraine to the actions of “ISIS, Al Qaeda, or Hezbollah” and called on Western countries to label Russia a terrorist state. Halushka observed that Russia’s blacklisting by the FATF can also help “to close the loophole through which Western-made main components [including] microchips are ending up in Russian or Iranian weapons.” There will be no end to Russian aggression if there is no accountability, warned Halushka.

The global financial system is based on rules, commented Minister Marchenko. “We have powerful mechanisms to enforce these rules,” he noted. “The time has come to use them.”

Benton Coblentz is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

What did Blinken accomplish in Israel? More stealth progress on Israeli-Arab normalization.

Daniel B. Shapiro — Thu, 02 Feb 2023 11:00:00 +0000

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Israel at the end of January was planned in one context, took place in another, and managed to move the ball on yet a third. The US-Israel agenda is broad these days, covering a range of crises, challenges, and opportunities. On this visit, some issues made headlines. Others, such as Israeli-Arab normalization, made progress behind the scenes.

Normalization did feature in the initial planing for the trip. As is traditional when a new Israeli prime minister takes office, preparations are underway for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to visit Washington in the coming weeks to meet with US President Joe Biden. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and CIA Director Bill Burns both vistited Israel in the days before Blinken arrived, also to help prepare for the Washington visit. The need to coordinate US and Israeli approaches on Iran and opportunities to expand the Abraham Accords were certainly on the agenda, along with Ukraine, China, and other matters.

But by the time Blinken’s plane touched down at Ben Gurion Airport on January 30, events had shifted the focus. First, Israel is in turmoil over its new governing coalition’s proposals to dramatically reshape the role of the judiciary in the Israeli government. Justice Minister Yariv Levin proposes to allow the Knesset to override Supreme Court decisions on a bare majority vote and further restrict the court’s ability to strike down laws. Opponents, including tens of thousands of protesters who have taken to the streets, charge that Levin’s plan would remove all checks and balances in the Israeli system, allowing a prime minister and his coalition to rule with no limits and, they claim, giving Netanyahu the ability to wriggle out of the corruption charges for which he is indicted and on trial.

The Israeli-Palestinian arena also heated up just ahead of Blinken’s arrival. On January 26, an Israel Defense Forces raid against Palestinian militants in the Jenin refugee camp left nine Palestinians dead, including at least one civilian. The Palestinian Authority promptly announced a cessation to its security coordination with Israel. Then on the evening of January 27, a Palestinian terrorist killed seven Israelis outside a Jerusalem synagogue, followed by a second attack the next day that wounded two more Israelis.

Crisis management is part of a secretary of state’s portfolio, particularly in the Middle East. With tempers high, and far-right members of Netanyahu’s cabinet calling for extreme measures against Palestinians and for the expansion of West Bank settlements in response to the attacks, Blinken sought to restore calm. He expressed sympathy for Israelis victimized by terrorist attacks and total support for Israel’s right of self-defense. He coaxed Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to ensure that at least some security cooperation continues. And he reminded both sides of the United States’ ongoing belief that only a two-state solution can end the conflict in a way the keeps Israel Jewish and democratic and meets Palestinians’ needs, warning against any unilateral steps that could bury that prospect.

On the domestic Israeli debate, Blinken treaded carefully but spoke clearly. While respecting internal Israeli affairs, he reminded Netanyahu of the common democratic values that have always formed the core of the US-Israel relationship. Blinken’s message was unmistakeable: The Israeli government should seek broad consensus for any far-reaching structural reforms to its democracy. Checks and balances and the protection of all citizens’ rights remain a crucial feature of democratic systems. And the United States has a stake in the outcome of these debates in Israel. As he frequently does, Blinken made time to meet civil society activists on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides, underscoring the importance of citizen involvement in public affairs.

While attention to these matters overshadowed other aspects of the visit, Blinken did not ignore the normalization agenda. For example, he emphasized the importance of the Negev Forum, made up of the United States, Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Bahrain, and Morocco. Blinken even noted that the forum’s working groups, which met three weeks ago in Abu Dhabi, represented the largest assemblage of Israeli and Arab officials since the Madrid peace conference over thirty years ago. He also pressed the need and opportunity for expanding and deepening the new relationships and the process of regional integration represented by the Abraham Accords and the Negev Forum, and for ensuring that these relationships bring benefits to the citizens of the countries involved.

Notably, Blinken’s first phone call upon leaving Israel was to Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita. It strongly suggests that, while working to dampen tensions between Israelis and Palestinians, he is also working to prevent them from impeding regional progress. He likely raised with Bourita the importance of scheduling the second annual Negev Summit meeting of foreign ministers on time in Morocco in March.

One important trend to watch: a gap may exist between US perceptions of how normalization can positively influence the Israeli-Palestinian arena, and how any of the regional parties do. From the US perspective, inclusion of Palestinians in regional gatherings such as the Negev Forum would be a natural way to try to break down Palestinian rejectionism on normalization and ensure Palestinians benefit from regional integration. It might also, from the US perspective, bring Arab states into a role of trying to assist Israelis and Palestinians in lowering tensions between them and resuming a path toward a resolution of their conflict.

But there has been little change so far in Palestinian leaders’ negativity on the normalization agreements, which they have described as a “betrayal.” Israeli leaders, while perhaps willing to invite Palestinians to attend some gatherings, tend to prefer to keep their new, warm relations with the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco unencumbered by fraught Israeli-Palestinian affairs, which may still resonate with the public in those Arab states. And Arab leaders have shown little enthusiasm for injecting themselves into this no-win arena.

So Blinken may yet have a big task ahead of him. Advancing regional integration and Israeli-Arab ties benefits US interests. Preserving prospects for a two-state solution that ends the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does, too. Can Blinken stitch these two areas into a mutually reinforcing whole?

Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, director of the Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative, and a former US ambassador to Israel.

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The N7 Initiative, a partnership between the Atlantic Council and Jeffrey M. Talpins Foundation, seeks to broaden and deepen normalization between Israel and Arab and Muslim countries. It works with governments to produce actionable recommendations to deliver tangible benefits to their peoples.

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What will it take to deter Iran from targeting opponents inside the US?

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 27 Jan 2023 23:57:10 +0000

On Friday, the Department of Justice unsealed charges against three members of an organized crime ring for an assassination attempt that prosecutors say was directed by the Iranian government against an American journalist who has been critical of the regime. For more on what was behind the plot and the ongoing threats from Iran, we turned to our experts on counterterrorism and the region to answer some critical questions.

1. What’s the back story on this assassination plot?

This was an escalation from a previously disrupted Iranian government plot to kidnap the same journalist, Masih Alinejad. What makes this case different is that, thanks to the efforts of the FBI and foreign partners, all three plotters are now in custody.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security.

While not named in the indictment, the journalist in question is Alinejad, a fierce critic of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its discriminatory gender-based policies. The events in the indictment relate to events in July, which predate the tragic killing of Mahsa Jina Amini—a twenty-two-year-old Kurdish Iranian woman who died in the custody of the Islamic Republic’s so-called “morality police” in September—which sparked nationwide protests in Iran that continue to this day.

There can be no mistake that the efforts of the Islamic Republic to surveil, harass, kidnap, and even kill Iranian dissidents outside of Iran will have only accelerated in recent months, given the ferocity of the opposition to the regime and the critical role of advocates outside of Iran to convince governments to support a foreign policy that supports the Iranian people, not the Islamic Republic. Hacked emails circulating on Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-controlled Telegram channels, videos of personal moments obtained through surveillance technology, and unwanted visits from hit men paid by the Islamic Republic are just some of the ways the Islamic Republic is seeking to intimidate and threaten those outside of Iran’s borders into submission and to quell the exercise of their freedom of speech, association, and assembly. Law enforcement around the world will be dealing with more and more requests to look into threats. Their ability to deal with the patterns inherent in this transnational repression will be key to the safety of regime opponents abroad.

—Gissou Nia is the director of the Strategic Litigation Project and a human-rights attorney.

2. What does this plot say about Iran’s capabilities and ambition when it comes to targeting regime opponents overseas?

Tehran funnels resources to the IRGC for a strategy that relies on geographic unpredictability and plausible deniability for both deterrence and offense: You don’t know when or where we’ll hit you. And when we do, you can’t prove it was us. The unpredictability still works in their favor, but plausible deniability proved fully eroded in 2019 at the United Nations General Assembly when European countries for the first time held Iran accountable for attacks, that time on Saudi oil facilities at Abqaiq. Since then, Western intelligence services beyond just the United States stepped up monitoring and collection and have foiled Tehran’s plots to strike abroad. However, the regime’s external strike ambition remains, and its strategy now seems to rely on luck and numbers: You may know when and where we wanted to hit you this time, but we just need to get lucky once to prove resilience.

—Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and former senior director for the Gulf on the US National Security Council.

As outrageous as this plot was, it is the latest in a long history of the current Iranian government’s willingness to commit murder on US soil. There was, for example, the 1979 murder of Ali Akbar Tabatabai in Bethesda, Maryland, and the 2011 plot to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States and others in a Washington restaurant.

—Thomas S. Warrick

3. How much of a threat is Iran to the US homeland, and what more can the United States do to stop it?

US administrations of both parties have understandably given top priority in recent years to radically different approaches to curtail Iran’s nuclear program. Iranian officials, the IRGC, and many state-owned and private businesses in Iran are under some of the world’s toughest economic sanctions, even though many of these sanctions are unilateral by the United States.

The fact that three individuals are now in custody for a plot to kill Alinejad is a welcome advancement. They will face justice. But today’s announcement also highlights that conventional thinking about deterrence—including even the occasional military reprisal, such as the 2020 strike killing Iranian General Qasem Soleimani—has failed to deter Iran from continuing to sponsor terrorist attacks on US soil. There are, however, other methods, including working closely with allies to isolate the Iranian regime, that have proven successful in changing Iranian behavior. Iran has vulnerabilities. The United States now needs to broaden its focus beyond just the nuclear program to build an alliance that can succeed in changing the behavior of the current Iranian government, even as Iran’s own citizens try to open up their society in ways that will end the need for arrests like the ones announced today.

—Thomas S. Warrick

Iran bungled its attempt to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States at Café Milano in Washington’s Georgetown neighborhood in 2011 and has not displayed the same ham-handedness in plots since. The United States nearly bungled its attempt to prevent that assassination and learned lessons about coordinating between intelligence services and processing gathered intelligence.

But since nothing in Iran’s nuclear, ballistic missile, cruise missile, or drone arsenals can reach the US homeland, Iran still relies on targeting individuals. Americans live and travel globally, so the globe is target-rich. The United States can’t round up all Americans into a homeland corral, so ways to reduce risk are to continue working with (and sometimes pressuring) other nations to make it tougher for Iranian operatives to travel outside of Iran, and to disincentivize these plots by revoking the visas that allow former plotters’ families to live safely in the West.

—Kirsten Fontenrose

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Wartime Ukraine must maintain course from Russian past to European future

Andrew D’Anieri — Tue, 24 Jan 2023 20:18:47 +0000

As Ukraine fights for its survival against invading Russian forces, the struggle for the country’s future is also unfolding far from the front lines. While Ukraine holds off Putin’s troops and endures Moscow’s terror campaign against civilians, efforts to modernize the country continue. By pursuing important reforms even in wartime, Kyiv is paving the way for a Euro-Atlantic future while distancing itself from the Soviet past.

Indications of Ukraine’s European trajectory remain evident despite the horrors of Russia’s ongoing invasion. The tiny state-owned Ust-Dunaisk port complex sits in an inlet in southwestern Ukraine where the Black Sea meets the Danube River, roughly thirty miles northwest of Snake Island. There are no roads traversing the small canals from the nearby village of Vylkove to the port, which serves as a key cargo loading point for transport between seafaring vessels in the Black Sea and river ships on the Danube.

In what was the first seaport privatization of its kind in Ukraine, the State Property Fund recently auctioned off the Ust-Dunaisk port and its Danube River berths in Vylkove and nearby Kiliya for $5.5 million. Ukrainian fertilizer company Elixir won the auction against seven other bidders, more than tripling the price from the $1.6 million opening bid.

The bidding war for Ust-Dunaisk points to a larger trend in Ukraine’s maritime exports. Russian forces currently occupy much of the Ukrainian coastline and have imposed a blockade of Ukrainian ports that has made maritime trade virtually impossible for almost a year. While a grain deal brokered by Turkey and the United Nations in summer 2022 partially opened Odesa’s major ports once again, the Russian Navy continues to harass commercial vessels entering and exiting Ukrainian waters.

As a result, shipping companies are increasingly turning to the Danube River to export Ukrainian grain. In 2022, grain shipments through the Danube grew 42 times year-on-year to 6.1 million tons, while overall cargo nearly tripled to 14.5 million tons, reaching the full capacity of Ukraine’s three Danube ports.

With demand growing rapidly, companies are now racing to build shipping capacity on the Danube. Ukrainian agribusiness company Nibulon, which has traditionally operated mainly out of Black Sea port Mykolaiv, is working to expand its Danube River capacity in the port of Izmail to be able to process 300,000 tons of grain per month. As Ukrainian companies adapt to wartime market conditions, so too have the government’s privatization authorities. Plans are underway to privatize the Bilhorod-Dnistrovskiy Seaport just up the coast from Ust-Dunaisk by the end of the winter season.

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Ukraine’s port privatization push is part of a broader initiative to renew privatization efforts following suspension in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s February 24, 2022 invasion. Rustem Umerov was appointed as the new head of Ukraine’s State Property Fund in September 2022. He has vowed to simplify the privatization process and make it more accessible to foreign investors. If successful, this should help the country to partially offset the catastrophic economic impact of the war while laying the foundations for a revival in the Ukrainian economy once the fighting is finally over.

At the same time, significant concerns remain regarding Ukraine’s commitment to privatization. Since the invasion began, the Ukrainian authorities have invoked wartime laws to nationalize a number of strategically important companies. While these measures reflect the gravity of the situation in the country, they also raise questions over Ukraine’s future economic direction.

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Even if the relaunched privatization push proves effective, huge challenges still lie ahead for Ukraine as the country looks to achieve a decisive break from the discredited past. Meaningful judicial reform is only just beginning to take shape and is vital for the country’s future. Encouragingly, President Zelenskyy now appears more willing to listen to calls from Ukraine’s international partners to clean out corrupt courts. With Ukraine heavily reliant on military and financial aid, these calls will certainly be more difficult to ignore in the months ahead. Ukraine’s partners will also be encouraged by the Zelenskyy administration’s response to recent corruption allegations, which led to a flurry of dismissals and resignations.

Post-war Ukraine will need to tackle a range of other major modernization tasks while dramatically reducing the state-owned share in the country’s banking sector. The list of necessary reforms is long and painfully familiar to anyone who has been engaged in Ukraine’s notoriously patchy efforts since the country’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity. Nevertheless, some veterans of Ukraine’s reform drive believe the incredible sacrifices of the past eleven months have made the prospect of further backsliding intolerable and opened a window of opportunity for once-in-a-lifetime progress. The Ukrainian authorities must not miss this chance.

We may never know exactly why Vladimir Putin chose to invade Ukraine, but fear of the country’s emergence as a fully-fledged European democracy was clearly a factor. Putin has long viewed Ukraine’s successful transformation as an existential threat and a potential catalyst for democratic change inside Russia itself. As Moscow continues its genocidal war to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and subjugate the Ukrainian people, it is more important than ever to maintain the commitment to a European future that so many Ukrainians are currently fighting for. This means implementing economic and governmental reforms whenever possible, even in the most trying of wartime circumstances.

Andrew D’Anieri is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Follow him on Twitter @andrew_danieri.

Kleptocratic regimes—kleptocracy means “rule by thieves”—have exploited the lax and uneven regulatory environments of the global financial system to hide their ill-gotten gains and interfere in politics abroad, especially in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. They are aided in this task by a large cast of professional enablers within these jurisdictions. The stronger these forces get, the more they erode the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Furthermore, the international sanctions regime imposed on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine has little hope of long-term success if the global financial system itself continues to weaken.

The West still has a long way to go to rein in the authoritarian kleptocrats who have thrived on the institutional dysfunction, regulatory failure, and bureaucratic weakness of the transatlantic community for far too long. We need to rethink not just how we combat kleptocracy, but also how we define it. Policy makers need to understand that authoritarian regimes that threaten transatlantic security are closely linked to illicit financial systems. As it stands, our thinking about how foreign corruption spreads is too constrained by stereotypes about kleptocratic goals and actions.

Outdated mental images of kleptocracy hobble the West’s response

Most transatlantic policy makers have in mind the first wave of kleptocracy, which primarily flourished in the late twentieth century. Its rise was intertwined with that of transatlantic offshore finance, which prompted a race to the bottom in financial regulation and a rise in baroque forms of corruption across the post-independence “Third World.”

The corrupt autocrats of the Cold War era flaunted the wealth they stole from their own people. These kleptocrats, many of whom are still spending large today, usually did not weaponize their corruption to influence the foreign policies of the United States or its allies. They were content to offshore their ill-gotten gains in US, UK, and EU jurisdictions with lax oversight over these types of transactions.

But this mental image of the kleptocrat is outdated: These kinds of kleptocratic leaders are not extinct, but they are curtailed. It is no longer a simple matter for first-wave kleptocrats to access the global financial system. Many of the regulatory loopholes exploited by these classic kleptocrats have either already been addressed or are in the process of being closed.

The second wave of kleptocracy, which emerged since the 2000s, is more sophisticated, authoritarian, and integrated into the global financial system than its predecessor. Second-wave kleptocrats intend to use the global financial system for strategic gains—either for self-gain and/or to reshape it in their image—instead of just hiding or securing the money they have stolen. Most notably, this evolution accelerated in Russia under President Vladimir Putin before February 2022, with the agendas of oligarchs and kleptocrats being subordinated to and intertwined with the plans of an ambitious state authoritarian.

Alongside this weaponized corruption, there has arisen in the West a coterie of enablers among the policy makers targeted by second-wave kleptocrats.

The second wave of kleptocracy is more sophisticated, more authoritarian—and more dangerous

Though our understanding of the threat posed by illicit finance has grown ever more sophisticated, our conception of a kleptocrat remains frozen in the mid-to-late 2000s: halfway between David Cronenberg’s 2007 London Russian gangster movie Eastern Promises, which depicted ties between the Russian state and overseas mafia groups, and the 2011 case of Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, vice president of Equatorial Guinea, in which the US Justice Department seized a Gulfstream jet, yachts, cars, and Michael Jackson memorabilia. Both depictions—one fictional, one real—describe the world of ten years ago, when the second wave of kleptocracy was still relatively new.

So what does kleptocracy look like today?

The natural resources tycoon

The tycoon is a figure who has “assimilated” into the global financial system and been recognized as a legitimate businessperson because they provide a consistent source of fossil fuels to the United States and its allies. They view the transatlantic world above all as a market, but they cannot deviate too far from loyalty to the regime in the country from which they extract natural resources. As a result, the kleptocrat as natural resources tycoon has a strongly supportive relationship with the regime, which turns a blind eye to their criminal techniques. These tycoons often “donate” parts of their revenue to leadership figures. Several Russian oligarchs would seem to fit this typology, such as Gennady Timchenko, if many of the allegations against him are true.

The private corporation subordinated to authoritarian objectives

Private corporations can be a vector for state-sponsored weaponized corruption, especially if the state is controlled by a one-party authoritarian regime at odds with the United States, its allies, and the liberal international order. US officials remain suspicious of one private corporation’s connections to the Chinese Communist Party. Even though the corporation is officially privately owned, 98.99 percent of this corporation’s stock is officially owned by a trade union committee representing employees (with the remainder held by the corporation’s founder). However, all trade unions in China are required to be part of a CCP-run labor federation. A British parliamentary inquiry into the potential security risks of Chinese technology companies noted that, even if they were not directly led by the CCP, they tended to maintain very strong links, including receiving billions of dollars’ worth of funding from the Chinese government.

The Western enablers

A respected mainstream democratic politician was the leader of a major bloc in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). In this capacity, he led other PACE members to vote down a resolution based on a 2013 Council of Europe report that condemned Azerbaijan’s human rights record. However, it was later revealed that the enabler’s actions had been influenced by extravagant bribes from Ilham Aliyev’s regime in Azerbaijan.

These cases of second-wave kleptocracy show why, despite a decade of transatlantic anti-corruption activism and the sanctions imposed on the Kremlin’s cronies and war chest, the kleptocrats are still winning even as their objectives have evolved.

Chronically underregulated industries fuel the problem

As regulations have caught up to the first wave of kleptocracy, foreign kleptocrats are increasingly switching to different channels for illicit finance.

Changes in US regulations since 2001

Oct ’01

USA PATRIOT Act passes into law and becomes effective. Title III greatly enhances AML regulations.

The Magnitsky Act is signed into law developing a sanctions mechanism against corruption and kleptocracy in Russia.

Dec ’12

Jul ’16

FinCEN implements GTOs for the first time.

The Global Magnitsky Act is signed into law, extending Magnitsky jurisdiction beyond Russia.

Dec ’16

Dec ’17

The Global Magnitsky Act goes into effect.

The 2020 AML Act passes, greatly extending AML regulations across multiple industries, and encompasses the Corporate Transparency Act.

Jan ’21

Dec ’21

The Biden Administration releases its national anticorruption strategy, outlining new defenses it aims to develop against weaponized corruption.

The US Depts of Justice and Treasury form the KleptoCapture unit as part of the G7 and Australia’s REPO task force to enact sanctions against the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine.

Mar ’22

Changes in UK regulations since 2001

Dec ’01

The European Parliament ratifies 2AMLD. Despite coinciding with the USA PATRIOT Act, it aims to strengthen the existing provisions of the 1991 1AMLD.

The European Parliament ratifies 3AMLD. The extension of AML regulations to money services businesses and other industries is part of reforms to the UK and EU’s AML regulatory landscape recommended by FATF.

Oct ’05

Oct ’13

The UK National Crime Agency (NCA) is formed. Economic Crime Command is the NCA branch that deals with financial crime.

The European Parliament ratifies 4AMLD. It introduces new reporting and CDD requirements.

May ’15

Apr ’17

Criminal Finances Act is passed in the UK parliament. It introduces UWOs as a new tool for law enforcement against foreign kleptocrats.

The European Parliament ratifies 5AMLD. Despite its eventual departure from the EU, Britain adopts matching legislation.

Jul ’18

Dec ’19

The Money Laundering (Amendment) is passed in the UK parliament. It extends greater CDD requirements into more industries, such as for crypto exchanges and arts trades.

The Economic Crime Bill passes in the UK parliament and a new kleptocracy cell is established in the NCA. These reforms are meant to assist with global sanctions against the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine.

Mar ’22

Changes in EU regulations since 2001

Dec ’01

The European Parliament ratifies 2AMLD. Despite coinciding with the USA PATRIOT Act, it aims to strengthen the existing provisions of the 1991 1AMLD.

The European Parliament ratifies 3AMLD. The extension of AML regulations to money services businesses and other industries is part of reforms to the UK and EU’s AML regulatory landscape recommended by FATF.

Oct ’05

Jan ’10

EUROPOL is reformed into an EU agency, extending some of its authority in investigating money laundering operations across the EU.

The European Parliament ratifies 4AMLD. It introduces new reporting and CDD requirements.

May ’15

Jul ’18

The European Parliament ratifies 5AMLD. Despite its eventual departure from the EU, Britain adopts matching legislation.

The European Union establishes the EU “freeze and seize” task force. The task force works with the G7 and Australia REPO task force to enact sanctions against the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine.

Mar ’22

Dec ’22

The European Parliament ratifies the European Magnitsky Act, granting the European Commission the power to place sanctions on human rights abusers and kleptocrats.

Central to both the failure of transatlantic regulation and the strategies of second-wave kleptocrats are chronically underregulated financial industries: private investment firms, art dealerships, real estate agents, and luxury goods providers. The global arts trade industry was estimated to be worth $65 billion in 2021, with the United States, the UK, and the EU accounting for at least 70 percent ($45.5 billion) of worldwide sales.

As of 2020, the total value of assets under management in the global private investment industry was estimated at $115 trillion, more than $89 trillion of which was in the US, UK, and EU.

In 2020, the global value of residential real estate was an estimated $258.5 trillion, with North America and Europe together composing at least 43 percent of that value (approximately $111.155 trillion).

The cryptocurrency market is the newest. It is also less stable than other financial industries, so its relative size and value fluctuates more dramatically.

Weaponized corruption in action

The 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal was the largest political scandal in Malaysian history and the most publicly known case of kleptocracy in the world before the release of the Panama Papers in 2016.

From 2009 to 2015 as much as $4.5 billion was stolen from Malaysia’s state-owned investment fund—designed to boost the country’s economic growth—into a variety of offshore accounts and shell companies.

The stolen funds were channeled through multiple jurisdictions, including in the British Virgin Islands and the Dutch Caribbean country of Curaçao, before being passed through US-based private investment firms.

The US Department of Justice believes the funds were “allegedly misappropriated by high-level officials of 1MDB and their associates, and Low Taek Jho (aka Jho Low).”

Instead of being used for economic development in Malaysia, the funds were used to buy real estate in California, New York, and London; paintings by Monet and Van Gogh; and stakes in luxury hotel projects in New York and California, as well as laundered into the film industry as funding for the 2013 film The Wolf of Wall Street.

The film’s production further resulted in the exchange of fine art purchased with dark money, such as pieces of art by Pablo Picasso and Jean-Michel Basquiat that were gifted to actor Leonardo DiCaprio because of his starring role in the film. (DiCaprio returned the paintings to US authorities upon learning how they were acquired.)

The scandal implicated Malaysia’s then-prime minister Najib Razak, alleged to have channeled approximately $700 million into his own personal bank accounts, along with several people close to him.

Photos: Reuters

A large amount of the stolen wealth remains in US real estate and fine art, which the Department of Justice is continuing to recover on behalf of Malaysia. As of August 2021, more than $1.2 billion had been recovered. Yet, given the number of private investment firms, real estate traders, film producers, and arts dealers that were involved in the 1MDB-related illicit finance, it is highly likely the stolen funds have been dispersed across a variety of industries. With better financial intelligence sharing between US, UK, and Dutch authorities, these suspicious dark money flows might have been identified before the money was moved across US financial institutions.

What needs to happen to take on the second-wave kleptocrats?

The US, UK, and EU need a more structured relationship to develop anti-corruption policies. We propose a new mechanism for the transatlantic community to harmonize its necessary response: a Transatlantic Anti-Corruption Council to coordinate anti-corruption policies between the United States, the UK, and the EU. It could connect the various US, UK, and EU agencies and directorates that work on corruption and kleptocracy-related issues, and organize them into expert groups focused on illicit finance, tax evasion, acquisition of luxury goods, and more. Recent cases of weaponized corruption have exploited the lack of regulatory coordination and financial intelligence sharing between transatlantic jurisdictions to evade detection and to corrupt transatlantic democratic and financial institutions. The TACC can work on closing these gaps—but it is only the beginning of a larger transatlantic strategy against weaponized corruption.

The anti-corruption policy to-do list

United States

In the United States, much of the problem stems from a lack of legislation enabling more comprehensive law enforcement and regulatory compliance within these underregulated industries. The United States should:

Follow through on the US legislative national anti-corruption strategy. Many of the existing flaws in the US regulatory sphere were correctly identified and should be addressed accordingly. This includes the strategy’s commitment to increasing regulation on the private investment industry, including on firms managing assets totaling less than $100 million.
FinCEN, the US FIU, is chronically understaffed, underbudgeted, and relies on outdated technology. Even if legislative reform was passed and/or executive action taken to extend BSA/AML obligations to more financial institutions, FinCEN would be hard-pressed to fully investigate reports it received and to enforce its authority in cases in which financial crime was present.

United Kingdom

The UK, on the other hand, already has much of the legislation it needs to address anti-money-laundering (AML) deficiencies and sanctions evasion occurring in its jurisdictions. It needs to implement that legislation—and address the close connections between the City of London and British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies. The UK should:

Share legalistic principles and good practices of unexplained wealth orders (UWOs) with allies. UWOs have already proven to be very effective in bringing more investigative power to bear on to foreign kleptocrats based in the United Kingdom
Reduce regulatory mismatches between the primary UK jurisdictions and the Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories, especially with beneficial ownership registries and sanctions compliance
Improve verification standards for companies registered in Companies House to identify shell companies
Fully implement and enforce existing transparency and national security laws, especially the National Security and Investment Act

European Union

Much like the UK, many of the EU’s problems stem less from a lack of legislation than from the implementation of those policies. The EU faces additional hurdles in ensuring that all its member states harmonize their AML policies. The EU should:

Increase compliance requirements for private investment firms managing assets totaling less than €100 million
Fully implement the 6th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (6AMLD) across EU jurisdictions. The establishment of an EU Anti-Money Laundering Authority will be essential for harmonizing regulations across the European Union (EU).

6AMLD measures should also be applied to overseas autonomous territories like Aruba.

Increase enforcement of laws that prohibit the spread of corruption in foreign territories, particularly for cases that involve spreading corruption to fellow EU member states

Transatlantic community

The transatlantic community should:

Work closely with the United States in its national anti-corruption strategy. The strategy’s success will be heavily dependent on the degree of cooperation between US allies and the Biden administration in its implementation.
Match regulatory legislation on both sides of the Atlantic. This will permit better coordination of sanctions between allies and reduce tensions between the United States and its allies when the United States relies on extraterritorial action.
Create channels for financial intelligence units and private sector actors in transatlantic jurisdictions to share information about suspicious clients, transactions, and transfers. The Europol Financial Intelligence Public Private Partnership (EFIPPP) may be a good platform for increased intelligence sharing.
Establish the Transatlantic Anti-Corruption Council (TACC). Its main purpose would be to coordinate legislation on improving anti-money laundering/Know Your Customer (AML/KYC) policies, share good governance policies (such as beneficial ownership registries) to harmonize regulations, crack down on sanctions evasion, and share financial intelligence on transnational financial criminals to shut down their operations.

The TACC should also regularly convene expert working groups on, at a minimum:

trade-based illicit finance,
market-based illicit finance,
bribery and other enabling forms of corruption,
acquisition of luxury goods by kleptocrats,
asset returns,
tax evasion,
terrorist financing, and
future threats.

Financial intelligence working groups should similarly cover individual cases of financial crime at the tactical level. At the executive level, primary stakeholders in the TACC should be

the Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice, and USAID on the US side,
the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO); His Majesty’s Treasury; and the Home Office on the UK side, and
the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs; Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union; and Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers on the EU side

The late United Nations secretary-general Kofi Annan once said: “If corruption is a disease, transparency is a central part of its treatment.” Annan spoke in a time before the crisis of weaponized corruption rose to prominence, but his words ring clearer now that foreign kleptocrats are spreading their malign influence by means of the money they stole from their own people. The United States and its allies must choose the partners with which it engages more carefully. Otherwise, it may find that some of its partners are in fact proxies for strategic competitors of the transatlantic community who will undermine the West’s security and the integrity of its democracies from the inside.

New Atlanticist Nov 9, 2021

How to get Biden’s democracy summit right

By Daniel Fried, Rose Jackson

Two of the Council’s democracy experts say the upcoming Summit for Democracy needs to take aim at autocrats’ tools by focusing on anti-corruption and tech standards, and elevating civil society.

Civil Society Corruption

New Atlanticist Apr 5, 2022

How the world’s parliaments can team up against Russian aggression

By Francis Shin and Riho Terras

An interparliamentary alliance against Kremlin aggression would maximize global efforts to coordinate sanctions and keep the pressure on Moscow.

Corruption Economic Sanctions

UkraineAlert Oct 26, 2022

The West needs a more united approach to sanctioning Putin’s elite

By David Clark

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine now in its ninth month, it is time for a coordinated approach to sanctioning Putin’s elite that reflects the seriousness of the threat they pose to global security, writes David Clark.

Conflict Corruption

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As Brazil investigates Bolsonaro’s role in anti-democratic riots, should the US kick him out?

Gissou Nia, Thomas S. Warrick — Wed, 18 Jan 2023 19:00:00 +0000

Brazil’s former president Jair Bolsonaro was more than three thousand miles away in Florida when his supporters rioted in Brazil’s capital on January 8, a week after his rival, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, replaced him as president. But Bolsonaro clearly stoked the thousand-plus rioters with his false, denialist rhetoric, and Brazilian prosecutors are investigating whether his role rises to the level of criminal conduct. If it does, it will be important that he be held legally accountable.

The Biden administration is under increasing pressure from progressive leaders in Latin America and the US Congress to compel Bolsonaro to leave the United States. While the Biden administration needs to demonstrate moral leadership in upholding democracy and the rule of law, acting too hastily could fuel the flames of Brazil’s increasingly polarized politics and do more damage to democracy in the long term. In order to navigate this politically sensitive situation, the US government must follow established legal processes and ensure Bolsonaro does not undermine Brazilian democracy from US soil.

Ideally, Bolsonaro—who may have entered the United States on a diplomatic visa, which would have expired when his successor was sworn in on January 1—would simply return to Brazil voluntarily. He has said he plans to accelerate his planned departure at the end of January, which would resolve the problem.

Should Bolsonaro not leave voluntarily, it may take years to compel his departure, as the history of high-profile extradition requests to the US government shows. However, today there is hope that Bolsonaro will be persuaded to leave the United States of his own accord because of the possibility that he could face years of shameful publicity trying to stave off the extradition the Brazilian government, when it decides the time is right, is almost sure to seek.

While Bolsonaro would have ample opportunity to challenge the evidence against him in US courts before any action is taken to extradite or remove him, the Brazilian government would have an equal opportunity to make the case for Bolsonaro’s responsibility for the riots before the world’s media. The US government also would have the opportunity under US law to provisionally arrest Bolsonaro for at least several months, an indignity he may prefer to avoid.

Since 1964, the United States and Brazil have agreed by extradition treaty that each country must “deliver up” those charged with or convicted of certain enumerated crimes—which include destroying government property, as happened in Brasília—when committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the requesting country and when criminalized in both countries.

While there are some exceptions for when the offense is of a “political character,” the treaty notes that “[c]riminal acts which constitute clear manifestations of anarchism or envisage the overthrow of the bases of all political organizations will not be classed as political crimes or offenses.” It is unlikely that a court would rule that the exception for acts of a “political character” would apply in Bolsonaro’s case, if he is found culpable, because the incitement resulted in violence.

To avoid getting mired in political sensitivities, the Biden administration would be wise to pursue three immediate priorities.

1. Follow the law—even if it moves slowly

First, the White House should demonstrate what the rule of law looks like. If Bolsonaro chooses to stay in the United States, the Biden administration should urge the Brazilian government to initiate a formal extradition request. While it could be appealing to swiftly end Bolsonaro’s presence in the United States by exercising the authority that the president and the secretary of state have to declare him persona non grata (if he actually entered on a diplomatic visa) or to revoke his visa and have the Department of Homeland Security remove him, Bolsonaro would still have the right to contest that in court. In the end, little time would be saved if Bolsonaro wants to delay his return.

The question over Bolsonaro brings to mind one faced by the Obama administration in 2016, when Turkey’s government requested the extradition of Fethullah Gülen, a Turkish religious leader living in Pennsylvania, following a failed coup against Turkey’s government by some of Gülen’s supporters. However, despite repeated urging (including from then-Vice President Joe Biden) and expert-level consultations in which the Department of Justice explained US extradition requirements to Turkish counterparts, the Turkish government never presented evidence sufficient to convince a US magistrate to turn Gülen over to Turkey for trial.

Insistence on following established legal processes in the Gülen matter allowed the US government to navigate a politically sensitive situation without eroding the rule of law, even under serious pressure from the Turkish government.

While a formal extradition process for Bolsonaro would take several years to unfold, starting with the issuing of a warrant and a hearing to establish whether sufficient evidence exists to sustain the charge, this would keep Bolsonaro out of Brazil and, perhaps, allow for restrictions on his access to media and electronics that could be used to incite supporters to further violence.

From there, the process involves several layers of preliminary review by the US Department of State and a probable cause determination by the US Department of Justice before the case is forwarded to the US attorney for the district where the individual is located. An extradition order is not appealable, but Bolsonaro could petition for a writ of habeas corpus to ensure that he gets a hearing. The US secretary of state then makes the final decision whether to extradite.

The Biden administration should be clear that the length of the process is not any indication of US government reluctance to turn Bolsonaro over or interest in delaying the process. Bolsonaro’s status as a former head of state does not privilege or penalize.

2. Provide US law enforcement and intelligence support to Brazil

Second, the Biden administration should also support efforts to hold those responsible for the January 8 attack accountable for their assault on democracy by promising total cooperation from US law enforcement and intelligence agencies to share what they know, including any information regarding Bolsonaro’s role in instigating, directing, or supporting it.

A public announcement of US law enforcement’s full cooperation would have a chilling effect on Bolsonaro’s capacity to machinate disruptions to Brazil’s democracy from his current location in Orlando, Florida, given the ability, and obligation, of US law enforcement and intelligence agencies to prevent acts of violence or crime emanating from a foreign national on US soil.

3. Allow civil cases to run their course

Third, Bolsonaro no longer holds any official position, so in the United States, he is subject to US laws for civil damages—and the Biden administration should not shield him from culpability. His assets can be tied down or even frozen while US courts decide whether he is liable for the January 8 riots and subsequent events. He could also be required to give depositions and provide evidence about his own actions even outside of any criminal or extradition proceedings.

Life in the United States could quickly look less and less attractive for Bolsonaro. The threat of being cut off from his supporters while under the watchful eye of US law enforcement agencies may be the deciding factor in whether Bolsonaro decides to stay in the United States or go home. Either way, he will face justice.

Gissou Nia is a human rights lawyer and director of the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council. Follow her on Twitter: @GissouNia.

Tom Warrick is a senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice at the Atlantic Council. He served in the Department of State from 1997 to 2007 and as a deputy assistant secretary in the Department of Homeland Security from 2008 to 2019. Follow him on Twitter: @TomWarrickAC.

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Dutch prime minister talks Leopard 2 tanks and other assistance to Ukraine: ‘The ask from Kyiv is completely clear’

Nick Fouriezos — Wed, 18 Jan 2023 14:30:26 +0000

The Netherlands is only the fifth-largest economy in the European Union, but it’s punching above its weight when it comes to aiding Ukraine’s fight against Russia, according to Prime Minister Mark Rutte.

Shortly after announcing in an Oval Office meeting with US President Joe Biden that the Netherlands intends to join the US and German effort to send Patriot anti-aircraft batteries to Ukraine, Rutte spoke at an Atlantic Council Front Page event where he cast his nation’s role in the war effort thusly: “We have tried from the start to do whatever we could—and also nudging others to do more.”

Ukraine has asked for nations to send Leopard 2 tanks to support the defense effort, but Rutte wasn’t yet willing to comment on whether the Netherlands, one of a handful of countries with those tanks in their stockpiles, would send them. “What I’ve realized the last ten months is that you are the most effective when you only talk about… decisions that have been taken,” Rutte said Tuesday afternoon on the Georgetown University campus. .

Rutte described frequent discussions, mostly at the defense minister level, among NATO allies about what Ukraine is asking for and how best to get the materiel to the front. “We are constantly dialoguing: What can we do?”

Below are more highlights from Rutte’s conversation with Amy Mackinnon, a national security and intelligence reporter for Foreign Policy magazine.

Arms and accountability

NATO defense chiefs will gather in Brussels this week, but Rutte said he was not sure if the meeting would produce more concrete movement on the Leopard 2—and it’s not just about Berlin. “Germany is producing the Leopard 2 tanks, but a decision like this has to be broader-based,” he said. “There are many pluses and minuses. So it is not that easy to predict what will happen. But the ask from Kyiv is completely clear.”
But this effort is not just about weapons deliveries. Rutte said that the Netherlands, which has a history of hosting international tribunals, is working with the Ukrainians and others to make sure Russia is held accountable. Rutte said he hopes The Hague will be the home of a future special tribunal for Russia. “Hopefully one day you will have this debate on the future relationship between the West and Russia,” Rutte said, “but you will also have the accountability issue to be taken care of.”

Putin is “directly running against our values, what we stand for: that you don’t colonize another country,” Rutte said, which is why he believes it’s essential for Europe to respond aggressively. “If we were to accept for one moment that Putin could be successful in Ukraine, that he would get Kyiv, that he would get the whole country, it won’t end there. History has taught us that.”

The future of Europe and NATO

The war, Rutte said, has only reinforced the importance of the Alliance to the United States. “My debates with [then US President Donald] Trump on why NATO was necessary was always along these lines,” Rutte said. “If Russia would be able to get a grip of Finland, of large parts of Europe, that would immediately impact the security and safety of the United States. … We have seen the same on a small scale when Hitler used Europe as a springboard to the [United Kingdom].”

Rutte said that no outside powers can decide whether or not Ukraine should enter into peace talks, comparing it to if Texas were invaded and he called up Biden to tell him to negotiate with the United States’ attackers. “It is only [President Volodymyr] Zelenskyy and his team who can decide when they will go engage in peace talks,” he said.

Russian use of cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns will continue to be a challenge for the international community, he added. “You have to cobble together many initiatives,” Rutte said, incorporating the business community, skilled scholars, national lawmakers, and NATO. It is a “capability issue” requiring coordination at all levels, he said, with cyberattacks now capable of shutting down physical infrastructure as well as digital infrastructure. “You really get very worried when you think about the possibilities.”

The global landscape

When asked about whether the Netherlands would restrict semiconductor exports to China, Rutte said it was a difficult balancing act between supporting supply chains for basic technological goods and making sure that some nations aren’t using those technologies for weapons systems. “It is a broader-based debate,” Rutte said, one he discussed with Biden at the White House. Rutte argued that any approach shouldn’t be aimed against just one country.

The kingdom of the Netherlands includes several Caribbean islands, such as Aruba, Curacao, and St. Maarten, that are autonomous but represent a legacy of colonialism—and Rutte discussed his recent apology for the Dutch role in the slave trade. “This is only the start of a dialogue,” he said, “not just saying sorry and now we continue. It is really taking time and reflecting.”
At the moment those islands are dealing with a flood of refugees from Venezuela. “I often say it’s not Germany that is our biggest neighbor, but Venezuela,” Rutte said, noting that the Netherlands is trying to help these refugees integrate into the local societies and find jobs. “It is not easy because this is not the richest part of the world… and it is step-by-step trying to help each other.”

Nick Fouriezos is a writer with more than a decade of journalism experience around the globe.

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Rebuilding Ukraine the right way

Stephen Blank — Sun, 08 Jan 2023 21:08:33 +0000

It is not too early to begin discussing Ukraine’s reconstruction. Indeed, various proposals, including estimates regarding the scale of the overall rebuilding project, are currently circulating. Moreover, it is already clear that getting this process right will prove critical for the future of both Ukrainian and European security. As well as funding reconstruction, the international community must also ensure the process actually strengthens Ukraine by revitalizing both its democratic and economic vibrancy.

The existential nature of the current war and the anticipated long-term scope of the post-war rebuilding challenge mean that the Ukrainian state is likely to enjoy wide-ranging regulatory powers for an extended period. Indeed, Kyiv has already reportedly invoked wartime laws to nationalize a number of strategically important companies including engine maker Motor Sich, energy companies Ukrnafta and Ukrtatnafta, vehicle maker AvtoKrAZ, and transformer producer Zaporizhtransformator. This is fueling speculation that we may soon witness further steps toward the wholesale nationalization of at the least the commanding heights of the Ukrainian economy.

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Admittedly, Ukraine’s recent nationalizations may be justified due to the exceptional circumstances created by Russia’s ongoing invasion. At the same time, it is also true that anti-oligarch policies adopted by the Ukrainian authorities before the war were inconsistent, despite President Zelenskyy’s claims that de-oligarchization is a major national priority.

There is no doubt that wartime nationalizations undermine the political power of the oligarchs while augmenting that of the state. One could thus argue that such takeovers serve a democratic as well as a military purpose. But if Ukraine is to strengthen its democracy and become fit for EU membership, it might be better to ultimately eschew ownership of energy providers and key companies in the defense, telecommunications, and media sectors.

In this context, it is important that wartime nationalizations take place as a last resort when all other legal means prove to be ineffective. Any nationalization that does take place must be transparent. Failure to meet such conditions could cost Ukraine dearly, not least when it comes to the distribution of recovery funding, which is likely to be released only on condition that Kyiv meets tough rule of law commitments.

There are also practical issues to consider. It is vital that any nationalizations do not exceed the state’s capacity to manage targeted companies effectively in both war and peacetime. It is true that many if not most European energy companies are state owned or managed. However, if the Ukrainian state is not able to govern effectively and manage these firms fully and impartially because the economy is in ruins due to the wanton destruction inflicted by Russia, then Ukraine runs the risk of falling back into oligarchic domination.

Since secure property rights are an essential pillar of both democracy and a genuine market economy, Ukraine must prioritize safeguarding these foundational rights. Furthermore, it may take a long time to restore state capacity to the point where it can effectively manage these kinds of large firms.

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Looking ahead, it might be wiser to encourage private and mixed public-private forms of ownership within the boundaries of a strong regulatory state and legislature. This approach could help consolidate democratic governance and the rule of law in post-war Ukraine. Coupled with Ukraine’s gradual compliance with EU membership requirements, such an approach would likely attract significantly more foreign investment and help generate faster economic growth.

At present, the temptation to nationalize key sectors of the economy is understandably great. But the authorities in Kyiv should also remember that once the war ends and the huge task of reconstruction gains pace, meeting the EU’s membership conditions will become equally urgent. In this light, the nationalization of key sectors of Ukraine’s economy could lead the country backwards to a lesser but still damagingly excessive role of the state in the economy. It could also provide opportunities for oligarchic penetration of the state and a revival of crony capitalism.

With the country’s continued existence still very much under threat, Ukraine’s leaders are currently focused on securing national survival and winning the war. Nevertheless, it is also vital to lay the foundations for a post-war recovery period that is likely to involve international investments amounting to trillions of dollars. This requires a deliberate approach to questions of nationalization and the right balance between public and private ownership in critical sectors.

It is crucial that decisions shaping Ukraine’s post-war revival are not based on purely partisan political grounds. Instead, they must take into account the necessity of consolidating democratic governance and creating the right conditions for a flourishing market economy based on the rule of law and secure property rights. This will invigorate Ukraine’s economy and strengthen the country’s security while also boosting the post-war process of European integration.

Stephen Blank is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Lauren D. Gilbert

Associate Director

Indo-Pacific Korea

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Digitalization and transparency are vital for Ukraine’s reconstruction

Oleksandra Azarkhina — Mon, 02 Jan 2023 18:47:43 +0000

When you have become used to constant power cuts, regular air raid alerts, and the empty evening streets of Kyiv, a business trip to the United States can feel like being transported to another dimension entirely. However, when I visited Washington DC in the final weeks of 2022, I soon found that the situation in Ukraine was high on the local agenda.

During my brief time in the US, I held over 30 meetings with government officials as well as representatives of the defense, financial, and non-profit sectors. All were deeply immersed in the challenges facing Ukraine and were ready to offer genuine support. Topics of discussion included efforts to boost Ukrainian food exports, strengthen the country’s air defense systems, and facilitate the future reconstruction of Ukraine.

Every conversation also featured an anti-corruption component. This is essential in order to build the kind of transparent and effective partnerships that will help Ukraine move forward. Success will depend on a combination of the right systems and suitably qualified personnel.

Digital tools can play a key role in this process. Ukraine’s reputation as a digital innovator is already recognized across the Atlantic. Two years ago, Ukraine became the world’s first country to grant legal status to electronic passports for domestic use. Hundreds of public services for private citizens and businesses can already be accessed online. More recently, Ukraine occupied second place in Europe for data openness in the 2022 Open Data Maturity ranking.

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Ukraine’s digital progress can serve as a solid basis for the country’s recovery. While in the US, I had the opportunity to present plans for a Digital Reconstruction Management System (DRMS), which will serve as a comprehensive online platform that will ensure successful simultaneous implementation of multiple projects across Ukraine. The DRMS will make it possible to manage every stage of Ukraine’s reconstruction projects while providing real-time online information including spending data.

The concept is based on the principle of maximum transparency and the publication of open data in accordance with international norms such as the Open Contracting Data Standard. This digital solution will drive the development of an entire ecosystem. It will create opportunities for businesses around the world to participate in procurement tenders for the reconstruction of Ukraine.

Additional tools will make it possible to monitor contractors, while NGOs will be able to analyze data and create risk indicators. This approach will make the coming reconstruction of Ukraine a model of open governance and open contracting for the entire world.

Ukraine’s digital reconstruction system is set to be launched in early 2023. This initiative is the result of cooperation between the Ukrainian authorities, civil society, and international institutions. It is being implemented together with RISE Ukraine, a coalition of international and Ukrainian NGOs.

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Personnel choices will also play a key role in the further evolution of Ukraine’s anti-corruption architecture. Appointing the right people will be critical to this process. In the months and years ahead, Ukraine should look to recruit from within the ranks of the country’s armed forces.

There are currently more people than ever in uniform defending Ukraine. This includes men and women from a variety of professional backgrounds, including many who took up arms following successful careers as civil servants and human rights defenders. According to my friends who are currently serving in the trenches, this experience fundamentally changes a person’s worldview and civic position.

Military veterans will be highly motivated to safeguard Ukraine’s development and the country’s democratic institutions. That is why it is so important for Ukraine to receive support from the US and other international partners for initiatives that will make it possible to integrate veterans into the country’s ongoing anti-corruption efforts.

The provisional idea is to select people with the relevant educational and professional background for training in the most effective approaches to combating corruption. Successful candidates can then join Ukrainian law enforcement and the country’s anti-corruption institutions.

I am confident that by combining digital transparency with a targeted approach to personnel, it will be possible to achieve historic change in Ukraine. This message clearly resonated with our American partners during my recent visit to the United States. Our pursuit of a common goal is a source of inspiration and one more reason to believe Ukraine will win the war.

Oleksandra Azarkhina is Ukraine’s Deputy Minister for Communities, Territories, and Infrastructure Development.

Slovakia risks becoming another Hungary-style EU spoiler. How should the West respond?

Petr Tůma — Fri, 23 Dec 2022 20:42:26 +0000

Slovakia’s center-right minority government fell on December 15 after narrowly losing a no-confidence vote. The country has reached a crossroads and is edging closer to a scenario that could allow former Prime Minister Robert Fico to return to power. This is not an appealing prospect for Slovakia, its neighbors, Europe, or transatlantic allies.

A nationalistic populist, Fico has repeatedly stressed that he would stop military aid for Ukraine if he enters office, echoing the opinion of an important part of his electoral base. If Fico returns to power, he will steer Slovakia closer to Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, with adverse implications for European Union (EU) and NATO cohesion.

Slovak politics can go either way from here. There’s still a chance that the liberal, pro-Western camp will handle the crisis to its advantage. But it is important to pay attention to what’s going on in Bratislava and eventually to motivate Fico’s opponents to get together to prevent a Slovak shift toward Hungary and Russia. Too much is at stake here for Europeans and the transatlantic community to remain passive.

What happened: blame Matovič

The no-confidence vote was called by the liberal conservatives of the Freedom and Solidarity party (SaS) of Richard Sulík. SaS was part of the governing coalition until September when the party left over long-term disputes with Minister of Finance Igor Matovič.

Matovič is a leader of the governing OLANO party and served as prime minister until he was forced to swap positions with party colleague Eduard Heger in March 2021 after coalition partners learned about a secret deal Matovič had struck with Russia to purchase Sputnik COVID-19 vaccines. However, the unpredictable Matovič has continued—as Slovaks call it—to throw political nukes.

When SaS members’ patience ran out, they signaled they would call a no-confidence vote if Matovič did not resign. He first agreed and went to the presidential palace to hand over his resignation letter. Then something awkward happened: He changed his mind when in the presidential palace and pulled his resignation. This was the final straw for SaS. Yet the fall of Heger’s government is no surprise. The ruling coalition was plagued by discord and had been paralyzed for some time.

What will happen: four options

Heger’s cabinet resigned before President Zuzana Čaputová on December 16. What will happen next is an open question. Here are four possibilities:

Čaputová could form a caretaker government that can stay in place until regular elections that are scheduled for the spring of 2024. However, there’s no tradition in Bratislava for this solution. The opposition has already objected, and Čaputová herself has said this is not her preferred choice. Nevertheless, she can still use it as a last resort option or as a threat to get the National Council (Slovak parliament) to explore other options.
Heger’s cabinet-in-demission could govern for a longer period with limited powers. But Slovakia needs strong leadership amid multiple crises (security, energy, health, inflation), and nobody seems to favor this alternative. It would also undermine parliament by effectively overruling the outcome of the vote of no confidence.
Čaputová could call for early elections. Yet not every parliamentarian is eager to see early elections. Some lawmakers are afraid of losing their jobs while political parties could lose vital access to financial resources. (Groups that make it into the National Council are reimbursed on an annual basis.) A bill to call for fresh elections would need the support of 60 percent of lawmakers, which simply isn’t there now.
At the same time, many lawmakers are exploring the option of a reformed center-right coalition without Matovič, as a “sine qua non” condition. Even Sulík—whose SaS party left the coalition—appears now to be on board. They would need a majority in parliament, not an easy task after the no-confidence vote. However, the first important signal that they can succeed in reforming the coalition is the December 22 agreement on Slovakia’s budget for next year. Heger’s government-in-demission reached a deal in cooperation with SaS. The gravity of the situation, where a provisory budget would limit the government’s ability to help people cope with skyrocketing energy prices, motivated them to compromise. Matovič’s removal on December 23 was part of the deal.

If elections were to be held today, the Voice–Social Democracy party led by Peter Pellegrini would likely win. The party split off from SMER–Social Democracy, run by Fico, who is currently polling in second place.

Pellegrini—whose party is sometimes dubbed Fico’s B team by critics—is not eager to work with his former boss. However, if it will be the only way for him to get back into power, Pellegrini could agree. Together with Fico, they’ll need another partner. They could turn to ultranationalist, neo-Nazi groups such as People’s Party Our Slovakia or the breakaway Republika party.

Realistically, a center-right coalition opposed to Fico could come to power if it gets enough votes in an election so that Pellegrini can form the government with them rather than joining Fico.

What to watch: Dark matter

Former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright once called Slovakia “the black hole of Europe” when in the mid-1990s then Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar—a forerunner of nationalistic populism in the region—did his best to disrupt the country’s move to join NATO and the EU.

Since then, Slovakia has often been praised as the region’s champion of liberal democracy. The 2019 election of Čaputová—a former environmental activist and liberal democrat—as president solidified that reputation. The coalition government that just fell could have added to that growing stature after Fico’s reign, which was marked by the erosion of rule of law and democracy.

Fico was forced to step down after the 2018 murder of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak, whose work exposed how deeply Slovak police, the justice system, and some politicians were colluding with criminals, including the Italian mafia. The investigation into those allegations is still ongoing, and critics argue that one of Fico’s motivations for his government’s comeback is to terminate it.

At the moment, when the country is preparing for the thirtieth anniversary of its independence on January 1, the mood among Slovak voters is one of deep frustration and apathy, which creates political space for populists and extremists.

Aside from euroskepticism, a government including Fico could add another challenge to NATO and EU efforts to maintain unity in support of Ukraine. In fact, since Fico was forced into the opposition, he has taken even more pro-Russian positions than Orbán.

In July, Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation (part of the National Security and Defense Council) listed Fico among the politicians spreading Russian propaganda. From his standpoint, what we see in Ukraine is a war between Russia and the United States, where both are to blame. He has repeatedly stated that he wouldn’t send a single bullet to Ukraine.

Unlike Italy’s new Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who transformed her country’s far-right politics by turning against Russian aggression, Slovak politicians are actually fighting for a slice of the country’s pro-Russian electorate. After former Russian intelligence agent Sergei Skripal and his daughter were poisoned in the British city of Salisbury in 2018, the unwillingness to alienate pro-Russian voters meant that Bratislava was the only EU capital other than Vienna that didn’t expel a single Russian diplomat.

Today, Slovakia hosts a multinational NATO battlegroup put together to strengthen the Alliance’s eastern flank. A significant portion of Fico’s voter base is against the foreign military presence in the country. If he returns to power, Czech, German, Dutch, Polish, and US military contingents currently present in Slovakia could come under scrutiny.

Segments of the Slovak population continue to perceive their country as a victim that suffered under the Austro-Hungarian Empire and later within Czechoslovakia. During the 1990s under Mečiar’s rule, anti-American sentiments started to rise. These further intensified after the NATO bombing of Serbia and later with the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Pan-Slavism and targeted disinformation campaigns have played a role in strengthening pro-Russian narratives as well.

What should be done: engage Slovaks

Currently, there’s no other country within the EU closer to forming such a hard-line nationalist government than Slovakia, especially if two minor neo-Nazi parties (People’s Party Our Slovakia and Republika) are in. It is important to mobilize efforts to stop such a scenario from unfolding.

Slovakia’s partners, including the United States, should do their best to convince those opposed to Fico to join forces. That is not an easy task given the deep divisions within Slovak politics, but there’s still time to do it.

Friends and allies of Slovakia should also talk to Pellegrini, offering him a mix of carrots and sticks to discourage him from cooperating with Fico and the far-right groups.

Last but not least, it is important for US and EU politicians and diplomats to maintain contact with Fico. As populist, pro-Russian, and mercurial as he has become, he also used to be a great political gambler, an opportunist, a pragmatist similar to Orbán or Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan who is capable of U-turns if they worked for him. Fico might have lost that aspect of his political personality, but if it can be revived with efforts to show that working with the West is a better bet than siding with Russia, it is worth a try.

Petr Tůma is a visiting fellow at the Europe Center and a Czech career diplomat with expertise on Europe, the Middle East, and transatlantic relations.

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Congress just passed a big change to war crimes law. Here’s what it means for Ukraine and beyond.

Gissou Nia — Fri, 23 Dec 2022 16:34:06 +0000

This week, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy made the rounds in Washington, Congress unanimously pushed through a critical piece of legislation designed to hold Russia accountable for its actions in Ukraine. Thursday’s US House passage of the Justice for Victims of War Crimes Act sends the bill to President Joe Biden’s desk. To learn more about the impact of the bill, we turned to Gissou Nia, a human-rights lawyer who leads the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Program—and who has been working behind the scenes to push the legislation through.

1. What has Congress just changed?

Congress has taken an important step to ensure accountability for war crimes. Under previous laws, authorities in the United States could only prosecute war crimes if the alleged perpetrator or victim were a US national. That meant that if a Russian soldier who committed war crimes against Ukrainian nationals came to the United States, they would be able to escape criminal prosecution for their crimes abroad. This week’s legal changes close that loophole. Now, US prosecutors can bring a prosecution for war crimes whenever the alleged perpetrator is on US soil, irrespective of where the crimes were committed or the nationality of the victims or alleged perpetrators.

2. Why did US lawmakers do this now?

Human-rights advocates have long been advocating for this legislative change, to ensure that US courts are equipped to support accountability for atrocity crimes committed globally. Government officials in the Department of Defense, State Department, and other government agencies have also long supported this change, as it brings US legislation in line with its obligations under the four Geneva Conventions. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine earlier this year brought renewed urgency to patching this legal gap, as more attention was paid to how the United States can support justice for Ukraine and ensure accountability for Russia’s unlawful actions. My team at the Strategic Litigation Project quickly started taking meetings on Capitol Hill to urge this change, and we were pleased to see Senators Dick Durbin (D-IL), Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Lindsey Graham (R-SC), and Patrick Leahy (D-VT), along with Representatives David Cicilline (D-RI) and Victoria Spartz (R-IN) introduce the bipartisan, bicameral legislation in May. This week’s passage—coinciding with Zelenskyy’s visit—is a clear demonstration of US support for Ukraine.

3. How is this different from International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecution for war crimes?

Although the ICC has jurisdiction over war crimes committed in Ukraine, it is still important to ensure that the United States and other nations can prosecute war crimes committed in Ukraine. The ICC has a limited mandate to prosecute the most serious crimes and high-level perpetrators, and only where national courts are not best suited to prosecute themselves. The potential cases that the United States could prosecute are more likely to be lower-level perpetrators who would not be on the ICC’s radar. These are perpetrators who would likely be coming to the United States to try to escape accountability for their actions abroad, evade scrutiny, and live a comfortable life. Closing this loophole will help prevent this from happening by ensuring that the United States will not be a safe haven for perpetrators of war crimes.

4. What might this mean for holding Russia accountable for its actions in Ukraine?

While this broadening of jurisdiction is important to ensure accountability, realistically it will not result in a substantial number of war crimes prosecutions for Russian actions in Ukraine. Prosecution could only happen if the alleged war criminal is physically present in the United States and if US prosecutors have sufficient evidence to support an indictment and proceed to trial. In addition, the legislation requires the attorney general’s office to approve that the prosecution is in the public interest and necessary to secure substantial justice. While the war crimes cases would be limited, this legislation can ensure that Russian war criminals who may end up in the United States in the future—on vacation or moving here to start a new life—cannot escape responsibility for their past crimes.

5. What might this mean beyond Russia?

The Justice for Victims of War Crimes Act applies worldwide and is not specific to Ukrainian victims of Russian crimes. The broadened jurisdiction will help ensure that any alleged perpetrator who arrives in the United States won’t escape accountability. The closure of this loophole will help ensure justice for victims of war crimes from the Central African Republic to Ethiopia to Syria and beyond.

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What might be ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2023? Take our ten-question poll and see how your answers stack up

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center — Tue, 20 Dec 2022 17:43:26 +0000

2023 might very well define the trajectory for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) over the next decade.

While many countries are still on the rebound from the COVID-19 pandemic, new crises—and their effects—are emerging, and are expected to continue into the next year. From global inflation to a costly energy crisis, and from food insecurity to new political shifts, how can the region meet changing dynamics head-on? And how might risks turn into opportunities as we enter a highly consequential 2023?

Join the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center as we look at some of the key questions that may shape the year ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean, then take our signature annual poll to see how your opinions shape up against our predictions.

How might new regional collaboration take shape across Latin America and the Caribbean with a wave of new leaders? What decision points might shape government policy? Will Bitcoin continue to see the light of day in El Salvador? Are the harmful economic effects of Russia’s war in Ukraine in the rearview mirror for the region, or is the worse yet to come? Will China’s new foreign policy ambition translate to closer relations with LAC?

Take our ten-question poll in less than five minutes!

Report Sep 27, 2022

The economic impact of a more efficient US-Mexico border: How reducing wait times at land ports of entry would promote commerce, resilience, and job creation

By Alejandro Brugués Rodríguez, John Byrd, Noé Arón Fuentes Flores, David Gaytan, John Gibson, Camila Hernández, Mayra Maldonado, Jason Marczak, Jorge Eduardo Mendoza Cota, Roberto Ransom, and Ignacia Ulloa

Improvements in border management and the adoption of new technologies at the US-Mexico border have the potential to enhance border security and generate economic benefits for the United States and Mexico through expedited flows of goods and people.

Economy & Business Latin America

Issue Brief Sep 20, 2022

PACC2030: Quick wins for a US-Caribbean partnership on climate and energy resilience

By Wazim Mowla, Riyad Insanally

PACC2030’s success is crucial for CARICOM countries and the United States, and it needs to deliver in the short term to generate confidence that the United States is committed to a sustainable partnership.

Caribbean Economy & Business

Experts react Nov 27, 2022

Experts react: As the US eases oil sanctions, is Venezuela coming in from the cold?

By Atlantic Council experts

With Chevron expanding operations and talks ongoing between the government and the opposition, what’s next for Venezuela? Our experts drill down on the details.

Economic Sanctions Economy & Business

The post What might be ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2023? Take our ten-question poll and see how your answers stack up appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Individual Russians must be held accountable for war crimes in Ukraine

Stanislav Aseyev — Thu, 15 Dec 2022 19:45:15 +0000

The broken windows theory of criminal justice holds that if comparatively minor instances of social disorder such as broken windows are not addressed, they will pave the way for more serious crimes. The same principle can also be applied to international relations and geopolitics.

In 2014, Russia began “breaking windows” in Crimea. When the world failed respond adequately, Russian aggression expanded into eastern Ukraine and escalated into armed hostilities that left more than 14,000 dead while forcing millions to flee their homes. Again, the international community did not react with sufficient decisiveness. This led directly to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine which began in February 2022.

For the past eight-and-a-half years, Russia has been permitted to slowly but steadily challenge and undermine the global security order established in the decades following World War II. For many in the West, this process has been unspectacular and has involved minor inconveniences such as rising food prices and mounting energy bills. Some even complain of “Ukraine fatigue,” seemingly oblivious to the fact that atrocities are being committed in Europe on a scale not seen since the days of Stalin and Hitler.

This leads us back to the broken window theory. In order to arrest this slide toward a dark future of international lawlessness, it is vital to hold Russians accountable for the crimes they are committing in Ukraine. And yet at present, the issue of war crimes is being addressed in vague terms without any real mechanisms in place to bring specific defendants to court.

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While there is general recognition within the international community that Russia is guilty of grave war crimes in Ukraine, we currently lack the tools to prosecute thousands of potential suspects. This could create a dangerous precedent for future conflicts and must change.

I have first-hand experience of Russian crimes in Ukraine. I previously spent two-and-a-half years as a prisoner in the notorious Izolyatsia prison in Russian-occupied Donetsk. I was subjected to torture during my incarceration and was eventually freed in a prisoner exchange. Following my release, I helped locate the commandant of the prison and contributed to his arrest.

I was able to do this thanks to the Justice Initiative Fund (JIF), an initiative I founded that seeks to identify and track down Russian war criminals. The JIF lists those who are officially suspected of war crimes and offers a reward for anyone who can provide information that will lead to their arrest.

This task is just beginning. Huge obstacles must yet be overcome before justice can be served. Today’s Russian war criminals are not like the Nazis after World War II, who were scattered around the world. On the contrary, they overwhelmingly live in Russia itself, and have no intention of leaving. Most are part of a vast Russian underclass with low incomes and even lower expectations that Putin has been careful to cultivate during his two decades in power.

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The first step toward justice is to identify war criminals. There is currently no single international organization that is willing or able to identify and search for large numbers of war crimes suspects around the world. The JIF seeks to expand its scope internationally in order to help meet this challenge. There is a logic to these ambitions. Many of the war crimes suspects in locations such as Africa and Syria are also sought in relation to atrocities committed in Ukraine.

The war crimes committed by the Russian military wherever it is deployed can be traced to the sense of impunity felt by the perpetrators. In order to bring this impunity to an end, it is vital to identify individual war criminals. This will require the combined efforts of the international community. Ukraine should be at the heart of such efforts.

Along with identification, the other key goal is bringing war crimes suspects to trial. The experience of recent decades indicates that only a handful of suspects ever actually make it to the courtroom, while thousands of actual perpetrators never face justice. I have personally participated in three war crimes trials relating to atrocities committed at the Izolyatsia prison, and only one of the three featured an actual defendant.

I would like to see the democratic world take the lead in developing new legal procedures for the transfer of war crimes suspects to the jurisdiction of the relevant international and national courts. Everyone is well aware that Russia will never hand over war crimes suspects within the framework of existing extradiction procedures. New mechanisms are required that will place war criminals on an equal footing with terrorism suspects, with all the legal consequences of this status.

Without these initiatives, there is a risk that all the current work being done to collect evidence of Russian war crimes in Ukraine will be futile. Unless we have the resources to identify the perpetrators and the tools to bring them to justice, exposing the atrocities committed in Ukraine will fail to prevent these crimes from being repeated.

Stanislav Aseyev is a Ukrainian author, journalist, and founder of the Justice initiative fund.

In line with current legislation, Ukrainian judges are responsible for appointing the largest quota of members to the HCJ. There are concerns that they will not do so by the end of January, which would prevent the HCJ from becoming operational for several months and make it impossible to impose disciplinary measures against judges accused of collaborating with the Russian occupation forces. Moreover, the judicial reform component of European integration would be postponed for at least a year.

Ukraine’s judges have a long and troubling history of sabotaging judicial reform, but civil society representatives complain that the government has yet to take this threat seriously. This could have far-reaching consequences. Once selected, the HCJ and HQCJ will be tasked with filling somewhere between 2500 and 3000 vacant positions, representing almost half of the Ukrainian judiciary. If these two bodies remain under the influence of vested interests within the judiciary, Ukraine’s rule of law problems will potentially persist for decades to come.

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The G7 Ambassadors to Ukraine have already called for clarity on the issue of judicial appointments. It is important for President Zelenskyy to address this issue as both a central pillar of Ukraine’s democratic transformation and a security measure to reduce opportunities for Russian influence in the country.

This fall, RFE/RL journalists reported that Bohdan Lvov, who heads the influential Commercial Court of Cassation within the Supreme Court of Ukraine, has held Russian citizenship since 1999. The President of the Supreme Court soon expelled Lvov from the Supreme Court. However, Lvov may be able to return to his position with the help of the controversial Kyiv District Administrative Court, a court with extensive jurisdiction that has long been accused of anti-Ukrainian rulings. Despite calls for President Zelenskyy to react, he has yet to do so.

There are similar concerns over the Kyiv District Administrative Court itself, whose president Pavlo Vovk was recently sanctioned by the US. Almost two years ago, Zelenskyy sent a draft law to parliament to disband the court. However, this draft law is gathering dust and has yet to be considered by MPs. This is particularly troubling as journalists and Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksii Danilov have claimed that the Kyiv District Administrative Court was engaged in February 2022 in efforts to create a legal framework for the return to power in Ukraine of fugitive ex-president Viktor Yanukovych.

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The latest challenge to Ukraine’s judicial reform comes from an unexpected source: the country’s international partners. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe recently issued an urgent opinion on the draft law for the reform of Ukraine’s Constitutional Court that some experts have attacked as potentially disastrous.

In its latest opinion, the Venice Commission has reversed a number of earlier recommendations. Previously, it had highlighted the problem of political appointments to the Constitutional Court and recommended that any appointments should take place only after the introduction of a transparent and competitive selection procedure. For this purpose, an independent commission should be created to check candidates for integrity and political impartiality.

However, the Venice Commission now states that the decisions of this monitoring body should not be binding. The Venice Commission also reversed its support for the participation of civil society representatives in the selection process. Instead, the Commission recognizes that including government representatives in the selection process may lead to politicization, but argues that this can be permitted in light of the “special circumstances” currently facing Ukraine. Without additional safeguards, this means that only government-friendly candidates can be appointed to the Constitutional Court.

Ukrainian MPs are now preparing to vote on a revised law that incorporates the Venice Commission’s latest recommendations. If passed, it will hand the current Ukrainian government instruments to potentially secure a majority of Constitutional Court judges for at least nine years.

Efforts to support Ukraine as it fights against Putin’s invasion are both welcome and necessary, but enabling any one political force to gain control of the Constitutional Court could seriously undermine the country’s democracy and future European integration. This can be seen in the negative experience of numerous Central European EU member states. In order to keep Ukraine’s judicial reforms on track, Ukraine’s international partners must push for a Constitutional Court selection process that will guarantee independent candidates. This is crucial in order to secure the kind of free and fair future Ukrainians are currently fighting for.

Defeating Russia on the battlefield will prove futile if post-war Ukraine remains stuck with the same corrupt system. While military matters are naturally the number one priority, it is also crucial to prevent backsliding on existing reforms in order to lay the foundations for a better Ukraine. The existential nature of the current conflict and the clear objective of European integration create greater leverage for historic reforms than at any other time in Ukrainian history. It is up to both the current authorities and Ukraine’s international partners to make sure this momentum is not lost.

Mykhailo Zhernakov is chair of the board of the DEJURE Foundation. Nestor Barchuk is international relations manager of the DEJURE Foundation. They tweet @DEJURE_UA.

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Zelenskyy’s initiative appears to be gaining international momentum. In recent days, France became the first major Western nation to publicly back the creation of a special tribunal. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also stated on November 30 that the European Union will try to set up a specialized court, backed by the United Nations, to “investigate and prosecute Russia’s crime of aggression” in Ukraine.

While the US has yet to adopt an official position on the issue, individual US politicians and commentators have spoken in favor of establishing a special tribunal. Speaking at this week’s Washington DC event, Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States Oksana Markarova noted growing support for the idea of a special tribunal both in the US and in Europe. The Ukrainian diplomat underlined the importance of the initiative for the future of international security. “We need this tribunal for Ukraine, but we also need it for the entire world,” commented Markarova. “If we can hold Putin accountable, we can prevent more wars.”

Fellow panelist Andriy Smyrnov, who serves as Deputy Head of Ukraine’s Office of the President, highlighted the legal barriers that currently prevent the International Criminal Court (ICC) from prosecuting Russia for crimes of aggression. At present, the ICC is only able to address the crime of aggression via referral from the UN Security Council, where Russia has a veto, or if both the aggressor and victim states have ratified the Kampala Amendments to the Rome Statute, which neither Russia nor Ukraine has done. “We have come to the conclusion that the only effective mechanism for holding the Russian Federation accountable for the crime of aggression is the creation of a special international tribunal,” Smyrnov commented.

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The exact structure of a possible future special tribunal has yet to be determined. However, most observers agree that in order to gain the confidence of the international community, it would need to involve the United Nations. Former US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues David Scheffer told fellow panelists this week that a UN role was “entirely feasible.” Scheffer has a wealth of personal experience to draw on, having participated in the creation of international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. He also headed the United States negotiating team during talks on the creation of the International Criminal Court.

Scheffer noted that a framework agreement to establish a special tribunal could be reached relatively quickly once the necessary support had been secured from the United Nations General Assembly. “You have to have political will at the UN, and right now you do have that political will,” he commented, pointing to the numerous UN General Assembly votes since the invasion began in February that have overwhelmingly condemned Russian aggression against Ukraine.

The creation of a UN-backed special tribunal may well be technically feasible, but many skeptics continue to argue that Russia’s status as a major world power makes it practically impossible to put senior Russian officials on trial. Ambassador John Herbst, who serves as Director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, acknowledged that most previous international war crimes trials have targeted comparatively smaller nations. He also noted that the only trials involving major powers took place following the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan at the end of World War II. While nobody envisages similar circumstances in relation to Putin’s Russia, Herbst said there were a number of reasons why the current push for a special tribunal is nevertheless worthwhile.

One of the most compelling arguments in favor of establishing a special tribunal is the role such an institution could play in exposing the invasion and ensuring Russia’s defeat in Ukraine. Herbst highlighted that in recent weeks, some of the Kremlin’s top propagandists have already begun publicly complaining that senior Russian officials are talking about the possibility of prosecution in The Hague. “This is helping to undermine the morale of the bad guys conducting this war and bringing it to the attention of the entire Russian people,” he commented. Herbst also noted that a special tribunal could create a legal framework to distribute hundreds of billions of dollars in frozen Russian assets to Ukraine as reparations for war damage.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

To those who have made the last eight years awesome, thank you.

Yevhen Hlibovytsky, my tutor, driver, fellow nosy social scientist, and beloved friend, your spirit infuses my work and love of country. I can’t wait to show you the eccentric parts of America. There are a lot of them! Duzhe, duzhe dyakuyu.

When I became the editor of UkraineAlert in 2015 I was woefully under-qualified. Dr. Alina Polyakova convinced John Herbst to hire me over a more pedigreed man. Peter Dickinson, Christian Caryl, Uri Friedman, Amanda Abrams, and Larry Luxner, you reshaped my underdeveloped stories and encouraged me countless times.

My co-conspirator, editor, and debating partner Jacob Heilbrunn makes every piece 1000 times better, but please do not tell him. And while we are on that subject, please don’t tell John Herbst that I didn’t write any of the titles that gave the communications team heartburn. That was my brilliant husband. Thank you, Daniel!

Ambassador John Herbst, you are the Atlantic Council to me. You made the fight fun, the debate delicious, and every conversation convivial, and you made me a better person. I will be in your debt until they bury me in Kyiv.

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Before I sally forth, I relish the chance to explain why Ukraine has captivated me for more than fifteen years.

It was not love at first sight. In 2006, I went to Ukraine as part of a disastrously organized election observation mission. I found Kyiv forbidding but was quickly put on a train to Crimea to observe in Simferopol, an ugly but otherwise unremarkable post-Soviet city. The leaders of our election team soon vanished and we were left with two older gentlemen from the Canadian diaspora, who graciously volunteered to hastily assemble maps and organize our mission.

I took the work seriously and I almost got into a fistfight as a result. When I saw violations, I duly noted them. At one polling station, a large man was voting outside of the ballot box. Voters have a right to privacy, and in a place like Crimea that overwhelmingly votes for one party, privacy is key.

As a diligent election observer, I took a picture of the man. He came at me demanding to know what I was doing. A crowd quickly gathered as the situation escalated. I insisted I had the right to take photographs and note violations. The head of the precinct, with the unnatural burgundy hair you only see in the former Soviet Union, called Kyiv for guidance. “Unfortunately, this young woman has the right to take pictures,” she announced with a scowl. The crowd heaved a disappointed sigh and dispersed. As we exited the polling station, I was shaken and scared the big man might be waiting for me. What a country.

I never intended to come back. At the time, I had landed a dream job at Freedom House. I was giving Saudi Arabia hell for its gross and innumerable human rights violations, but my boss was impossible and the task felt hopeless. I feared it would take Saudi Arabia decades to change.

Fast forward. My boyfriend at the time landed a Fulbright scholarship to Kyiv and was having the time of his life. I was miserable and decided to join him. I soon found a job in Ukraine teaching English. The initial Skype interview went swimmingly and the Ukrainian trainer was both charismatic and lovely. At first, I only intended to stay for six months and then enter boring middle-aged American life. Instead, I found my calling and have never looked back.

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Sergiy Gusovsky, one of Kyiv’s most beloved restaurateurs and among the finest people you could wish to meet, often remarks that once a Westerner falls for Ukraine, they are hooked for life. That’s exactly what happened to me.

In January 2007, I made the big move to Ukraine. It was beyond cold. Even with my ankle-length wool coat and eighteen Alaskan winters under my belt, I could barely take it.

The American English Center rented space in ordinary schools. I taught mostly college students daily from 4pm to 10pm. The beginner students couldn’t understand a word I said, but the advanced students got me and were soon demanding harder and harder words. Hour after hour, we talked about Ukraine’s social structures, the economy, the country’s endlessly frustrating politics, its painful history, and society’s ridiculous expectations of women. There was no subject that was off limits.

Within six months, I had decided I never wanted to leave. Kyiv is the world’s most underrated city. Not only is it extraordinarily beautiful, especially during the spring months, but the spontaneous and generous nature of everyday life also appealed to me. The Kyivite focus on the here and now is the inverse of Max Weber’s Protestant ethic which I had imbibed far too deeply by age 18. Being in the Ukrainian capital helped me rediscover by natural equilibrium.

Plus, it was dirt cheap. My $400 per month apartment overlooking the golden domes of Pechersk Lavra Monastery was a sensational place to live. Meanwhile, Kyiv’s location at the center of Europe enabled me to visit 10 countries in six months. Leaving wasn’t an option.

Although I did eventually move back to the US, I never really left. Ukraine has remained with me. For the past eight years, I have been privileged to lead and build the biggest, loudest, and most effective program on Ukraine in North America at the Atlantic Council together with Ambassador John Herbst.

I often find myself answering the same peculiar question: “Why are you, a girl with a German surname and no discernible connection to Eastern Europe, so taken with Ukraine?”

Normally I give a canned answer. I grew up in Kenai, a small village in Alaska with a Russian Orthodox Church. When I was in the sixth grade, the Berlin Wall fell and Russians poured into Alaska. Regional flights were set up between the Russian Far East and Alaska, and the local business community got very excited about linking the two frontier lands. Closer to home, Miss Tatiana appeared in my school and I began studying Russian. I became mesmerized by the language and by the sight of golden samovars.

Recently I’ve realized that the true answer to this question is actually deeper. Much deeper.

Ukraine’s unquenchable thirst for freedom and justice inspires me endlessly. Even when the picture there looks hopeless, which it often does, my courageous warrior friend Vitaliy Shabunin reminds me to take the long view. “There are thousands of people like me. We are going to change Ukraine. It’s only a matter of time,” he says. May it be so, Vitaliy, and may it be so soon!

Thank you for your love, your trust, and your support over the last eight years! Все буде Україна!

Melinda Haring is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. She tweets @melindaharing.

Criminal trials are generally limited to domestic courts, the ICC, or any relevant international tribunals. While several countries have universal-jurisdiction provisions for aggression, practitioners have raised legal and pragmatic concerns over whether the provisions can effectively be used in practice, for example noting the potential political ramifications and difficulties of accessing evidence containing classified information. Furthermore, aggression is considered a leadership crime, meaning that, for example according to the ICC’s Rome Statute, only those in a position to “exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State” are held liable. These leaders are usually in positions and roles that would benefit from immunities and so are shielded from prosecution.

These immunities are broadly considered not applicable at certain international criminal courts—which, for aggression, leaves only the ICC. However, the ICC can only try the crime of aggression with a referral from the United Nations (UN) Security Council (on which Russia holds veto power) or when both the aggressor and the victim state have ratified the Kampala Amendments, which added the crime of aggression to the Rome Statute—and neither Russia nor Ukraine has done so. Without any other viable options, the proposed tribunal creates a tailored solution.

Ironing out the legal details

As with any court, there is no guarantee that any given case of aggression at the proposed tribunal will succeed. For example, it remains possible that suspects will never travel outside Russia, and so the court will not be able to arrest them. In such instances, the court either will have to hold trials in absentia—a highly controversial option—or will not be able to conduct trials at all.

In the longer term, the tribunal’s limited mandate means that it would not extend to any similar issues. Out of 123 States Parties to the Rome Statute, only forty-four have ratified the Kampala amendments. Resorting to special tribunals each time aggression occurs raises concerns about issues like selectivity—wherein only certain states are likely to receive support for such an option—and the diversion of funds away from the ICC. A permanent court of aggression has also been suggested, but this again raises concerns that efforts and funds going into its establishment could instead be used for the ICC. For example, these could go toward advocacy to request that member states amend the Rome Statute to allow additional paths to try the crime of aggression, and the funds could go toward carrying out those prosecutions if successful.

According to details shared with me by the Ukrainian government, the proposed tribunal would be created through either a multilateral treaty between states (as with the ICC) or through an agreement between Ukraine and an international organization (as with the Special Court for Sierra Leone, established with the UN). A tribunal based on a multilateral treaty may still be endorsed by an international organization, such as the UN General Assembly. For a tribunal built on an agreement between Ukraine and an international organization, the organization could be the UN, but could also be the European Union (EU) or the Council of Europe. Afterward, according to the Ukrainian government, the tribunal’s jurisdiction and functions would be defined in a statute, which would then be included in an annex to the treaty or agreement.

Last week, the EU made its own similar proposal: a multilateral treaty-based special independent international tribunal and a specialized, hybrid court integrated into a national system.

Leading from behind

The United States has not yet given an official position on the creation of an international tribunal. It has vigorously supported Ukraine since the invasion, including backing the ICC investigation despite historic tensions with the court. However, leading the 2003 invasion of Iraq—coupled with a subsequent lack of accountability for its aggression—lost the United States considerable goodwill in the international justice space. Taking a leadership role with a tribunal centered on aggression risks claims of hypocrisy and could cost the court support and legitimacy. Instead, the United States may choose to support from behind with funding, as it did with the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.

At post-World War II trials in Nuremberg, Germany, crimes against peace were deemed the “mother of all crimes,” a phrase Ukrainian officials have frequently employed. Yet there have been no international criminal trials on aggression since Nuremberg. In advocating for this tribunal, Zelenskyy has highlighted the gravity of the crime of aggression, while also underscoring just how narrow the path for accountability remains. The proposed tribunal offers a path forward, but it demands further scrutiny as to how it will bring cases forward once established and how a long-term and sustainable path can be created for prosecuting other past and future instances of aggression.

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

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Vladimir Putin’s Ukrainian Genocide: Nobody can claim they did not know

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 01 Dec 2022 21:55:07 +0000

The liberation of Kherson in early November sparked a wave of euphoria as Ukrainians celebrated a landmark victory over Vladimir Putin’s invading army. Weeks later, this celebratory mood has now given way to all-too-familiar feelings of grief and fury as the Ukrainian authorities uncover evidence of war crimes committed during the city’s eight-month Russian occupation.

This grim process has already been repeated in hundreds of liberated villages, towns, and cities throughout northern and eastern Ukraine. On each occasion, retreating Russian troops have left behind a vast crime scene of mass graves, torture chambers, sexual violence, and deeply traumatized communities. Specific accounts of civilian suffering are strikingly similar from region to region, indicating that these crimes are the result of deliberate Kremlin policy rather than the rogue actions of individual Russian army units.

Wherever Russia establishes control, anyone regarded as posing a potential threat to the occupation authorities is at risk of abduction. This includes elected local officials, military veterans, civil society activists, journalists, and anyone suspected of overtly pro-Ukrainian sympathies. Many victims are subjected to torture and execution. Others simply disappear. Those who avoid abduction face the threat of forced deportation to the Russian Federation. Millions of Ukrainian civilians, including thousands of children, are believed to have been deported in this manner over the past nine months.

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The atrocities committed by Russian troops in occupied regions of Ukraine are only one part of a wider genocidal agenda that defines the invasion unleashed by Vladimir Putin on February 24. In areas of Ukraine occupied by the Kremlin, all symbols of Ukrainian statehood have been methodically removed and a new Russian imperial identity imposed on the civilian population. Teachers have been brought in from Russia to indoctrinate Ukrainian schoolchildren, while access to the Ukrainian media has been blocked and the Ukrainian language suppressed.

Putin’s intention to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and eradicate Ukrainian national identity was evident long before Russian tanks crossed the border in early 2022. His menacing statements have since been matched by the criminal actions of his army. Apologists had earlier been able to dismiss the Russian dictator’s genocidal rhetoric as mere political hyperbole, but that is no longer possible.

For years prior to the current invasion, Putin publicly denied Ukraine’s right to exist and insisted Ukrainians were actually Russians (“one people”) who had been artificially and unjustly separated from the motherland. In summer 2021, he took the highly unusual and revealing step of publishing a 5000-word treatise arguing the illegitimacy of Ukrainian statehood.

On the eve of the invasion, Putin lambasted today’s independent Ukrainian state as an intolerable “anti-Russia” and declared that Ukraine was an “inalienable part of Russia’s own history, culture, and spiritual space.” More recently, he has directly compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great and boasted that he is “returning historically Russian lands.” In late September, he illegally annexed four partially occupied Ukrainian provinces while proclaiming that they had joined the Russian Federation “forever.”

Other senior Kremlin officials and regime propagandists have been even more explicit in terms of the genocidal language they have employed to champion the invasion. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev recently described Ukrainians as “cockroaches” while dismissing the Ukrainian nation as “mythical.” Meanwhile, on Russia’s carefully curated state TV political talk shows, calls for genocide against Ukrainians have become completely normalized. Pundits dehumanize and demonize Ukrainians while routinely questioning the existence of a separate Ukrainian nation and casually discussing the necessity of destroying the Ukrainian state.

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The staggering quantity of genocidal statements coming out of Russia since the invasion of Ukraine began nine months ago makes it relatively easy to demonstrate the intent that is so crucial when identifying acts of genocide. The United Nations defines genocide as meaning any one of five acts “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.” The mass killings, systematic human rights abuses, forced deportations, and deliberate destruction of civilian infrastructure carried out by the Russian military mean that Moscow is arguably guilty of committing all five genocidal acts in Ukraine.

Despite widespread awareness of the war crimes taking place in Ukraine, many in the international community remain reluctant to speak explicitly about the genocidal objectives of Russia’s invasion. Instead, debate continues over the dangers of humiliating Putin and the need for a negotiated settlement. Numerous senior officials and prominent commentators insist on addressing the invasion as if it were a particularly unruly border dispute rather than an exercise in national extermination. In reality, any talk of compromising with the Kremlin is both absurd and obscene. Advocates of appeasement must recognize that there can be no middle ground between Russian genocide and Ukrainian national survival.

In the aftermath of World War II, post-war audiences looked back on the horrors of the Nazi regime and asked how crimes of such magnitude were allowed to happen. Many of those who lived through the war protested that they had been completely unaware of the atrocities taking place around them. Similar excuses will not work in the current situation. On the contrary, the overwhelming evidence of Russian war crimes and the openly genocidal intent on display in Moscow mean that when future generations look back at Putin’s Ukrainian Genocide, nobody can claim they did not know.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Is China facing another Tiananmen moment?

Atlantic Council — Mon, 28 Nov 2022 17:34:51 +0000

GET UP TO SPEED

They won’t be locked down. Protests against China’s zero-COVID policies have spread across the country, with some demonstrators even calling for Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping to step down. Today, police sought to more forcefully clamp down on protests in Beijing and Shanghai. How far could the protest movement go, what kind of threat does it pose to Xi’s government, and what should the world expect next? Our experts are on the case.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

John Culver (@JohnCulver689): Nonresident senior fellow at the Global China Hub and former US national intelligence officer for East Asia
Michael Schuman (@MichaelSchuman): Nonresident senior fellow at the Global China Hub and contributing writer for the Atlantic magazine
David Shullman (@DaveShullman): Senior director of the Global China Hub and former US intelligence official focused on East Asia

Man in a box

How did we get here? The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is “boxed in by its zero-COVID policy,” John tells us: It has tried to stamp out the spread of the disease with lockdowns and refused to import Western vaccines, and any change in course would be an unacceptable admission of defeat on those fronts.
But staying the course has resulted in unrest from “the brave tip of the iceberg” of protesters, numbering mostly in the hundreds, John says. “In some ways, this is the situation for which Xi and his predecessor built the hardened party-state. But like even the biggest bank, they can’t survive a run in the form of major, persistent protests everywhere all the time.”
It all adds up to “the greatest challenge to Xi’s power since he first claimed China’s helm a decade ago,” Michael says.
The protests also undermine Xi’s claims that China’s COVID management “has demonstrated the effectiveness of China’s authoritarian system in comparison to democracy,” Dave says, “and more broadly put the lie to the argument frequently (and increasingly) repeated by Chinese officials that the Chinese people overwhelmingly approve of Party rule and its approach to governance.”

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Crack down and shake up

A “practical course” for the CCP to pursue would be to carry out a “selective crackdown” now and ease it over time, John says. A date to watch is the Chinese New Year celebration in late January: “If they prevent travel on a large scale, their security nightmare will deepen, but travel could create superspreader events nationwide.”
Michael points out that the measures announced so far to ease—or “optimize,” as the regime calls it—the zero-COVID policy are generally tweaks to the existing system, such as reductions in certain quarantine periods. “I think the government is going to have to introduce more fundamental changes to really make a difference,” he says. “As long as the pandemic strategy relies on arbitrary detentions and business closures, people’s lives and livelihoods will continue to face disruptions, and public discontent could continue to rise. Furthermore, as long as the leadership demands infections must be kept at or near zero, local officials will still feel pressured to take whatever steps they can to suppress the virus on their watch. And that means continued abuses.”
In the videos of the protests that have leaked out so far, John sees only local police and health officials trying to quell the crowds—not the “huge anti-riot force” of the People’s Armed Police (PAP). “When we see the PAP in Beijing, Shanghai, or other major cities, that will demarcate an intensifying crisis.”

Shades of 1989

While Dave cautions that the protest activity “does not mean we are witnessing the beginning of the end of the Communist Party,” he says a crackdown by internal security forces including the PAP “would likely set the groundwork for even more repressive policies across the board as the Party-state’s rule becomes more brittle and reliant on the threat of brute force and information control to maintain power.”
We’re starting to see comparisons to the mass student protests of 1989 that led to leadership divisions in the Chinese government and the Tiananmen Square massacre. “If there’s going to be a major 1989-scale political crisis, it will have to start at the top, not from the grassroots,” John says, and there’s little appetite from elites to challenge Xi so soon after he solidified his power at the Party Congress in October.
“But there’s a perfect storm potential where the regime relies on the stick, doesn’t provide hope or a plan to get out of zero-COVID hell, and protests spread, build, and are sustained,” John adds. He cautions, though, that it will be hard for those outside China to gauge any political splits in Beijing beyond assessing who shows up for major events or spotting criticism dribbling out from former top Chinese leaders.
In such a scenario, the Chinese government could send in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as it did during the Tiananmen massacre. “If you see the PLA rolling into cities, that means the regime is ready to kill people to stay in power, but their initial goal would be to avoid that by cowing” the public, John says. “No competent regime pushes their military, no matter how loyal, into repeated confrontations with the people—it’s a card they can only play a few times before the guns could start to swing the other way.”

The post Is China facing another Tiananmen moment? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Presentation at Atlas Network’s Liberty Forum

jstoren — Mon, 21 Nov 2022 15:37:50 +0000

The Freedom and Prosperity Center spoke at the 2022 Liberty Forum in New York, New York. Hosted by the Atlas Network, a key financial partner of the Center, the Forum featured over five hundred activists and policymakers from around the world.

Senior Director Dan Negrea gave an overview of the Center’s goals and accomplishments since its launch in June 2022. Deputy Director Joseph Lemoine followed with an interactive presentation detailing the methodology and results of the inaugural Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, while Assistant Director Yomna Gaafar discussed the Freedom and Prosperity Reform Grants, given in partnership with the Atlas Network to innovative policymakers around the world.

The team presented their video on their 2022 Reform Grantees, produced in conjunction with Thinking Out Loud. Each grantee- Center for Development and Enterprises Great Lakes in Burundi, Centre for Civil Society in India, Foundation for Economic Freedom in Philippines, and COMEXI in Mexico- was featured in the video along with their reform project.

“These grants bring Burundi labor markets crucial resources for creating opportunity for all people living in this country.”
Manirakiza Aimable, Center for Development and Enterprises Great Lakes

The Center finished their presentation answering questions from the audience and inviting them to apply for the next round of reform grants.

The post Presentation at Atlas Network’s Liberty Forum appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bociurkiw in CNN Opinion: I was one of the first people at the MH17 crash site. This is what I saw.

Atlantic Council — Fri, 18 Nov 2022 17:42:00 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

The post Bociurkiw in CNN Opinion: I was one of the first people at the MH17 crash site. This is what I saw. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

US national interests are best served by stopping Vladimir Putin in Ukraine

Steven Pifer — Fri, 11 Nov 2022 00:34:34 +0000

Ukraine is the victim of an unprovoked and unjustified war launched by Vladimir Putin’s Russia more than eight years ago. The latest stage in this war is the ongoing full-scale invasion that began on February 24, 2022. US President Joe Biden has said the United States will support Ukraine “for as long as it takes.”

Some question this commitment in view of other US priorities and argue that Russia, given history and geography, has a greater interest in Ukraine than does the United States. That latter point may be true, but it ignores the Ukrainians, who hold understandably strong views on the future of their country and have shown that they are prepared to fight tenaciously to defend their freedom. With Russia’s full-scale invasion now in its ninth month, it is vital to recognize that continued US support for Ukraine in this war is both the morally correct position and serves key national interests of the United States.

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In 1994, Kyiv agreed to give up the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal, comprising some 1900 Soviet-era strategic nuclear warheads designed, built, and deployed to strike cities and other targets in the United States. Eliminating those weapons mattered a great deal to Washington. The Ukrainian government agreed to their elimination in large part because Russia, along with the United States and United Kingdom, committed in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence, and further committed not to use force or threaten to use force against Ukraine.

During the negotiations that preceded the signing of the Budapest Memorandum, Ukrainian officials asked what Washington would do if Russia were to violate its commitments. US officials said the United States would take an interest and support Ukraine.

Beginning with its seizure of Crimea in 2014 and continuing with this year’s invasion, Moscow has grossly violated the commitments it made in 1994. The morally correct response from the United States is to support Ukraine, as it has done with political measures and economic sanctions to punish Russia along with providing economic assistance, arms, and ammunition to Ukraine. Supporting Ukraine until its military drives Russian forces out of Ukrainian territory or, at a minimum, reaches a point where a negotiated settlement becomes possible on terms that Kyiv can accept, is not only morally the right thing to do. It is also very much in the US national interest.

First, the United States has had a vital national interest in a stable and secure Europe going back more than 70 years. This reflects the core security, political, and economic interests that provided the rationale for the formation of NATO in 1949. A Russian victory in the current war with Ukraine would have a major negative impact on stability and security in Europe. The countries of Europe, most of whom also support Ukraine, look to Washington for leadership. An insecure Europe would command more US resources, military power, and senior-level attention than would otherwise be the case.

Second, other countries are watching how Washington responds to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. China poses the largest strategic challenge facing the United States in the coming decades. If Putin succeeds in Ukraine, that could encourage President Xi Jinping to adopt a more hostile stance. Moreover, should Russia prevail, the resulting situation in Europe would mean that Washington has fewer resources, less military power, and less attention to devote to dealing with the China challenge.

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Third, the United States has a strong interest in preserving international norms and a rules-based international order. A key norm in Europe, dating back to the UN Charter and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, is that large states should not use force to take territory from smaller states. That is precisely what Putin is attempting now. If international norms break down, other autocratic states will likewise be emboldened. A “dog-eat-dog” world without such norms will be a much more difficult place in which to pursue a range of US political, security, and economic interests.

Moreover, respect for basic human rights is an important part of international norms. Russia has waged a brutal military campaign, committing wide-scale war crimes and atrocities such as the destruction of Mariupol. Russian occupation of Ukrainian towns and cities has meant torture chambers, mass arrests, summary executions, filtration camps, and deportations, including of children separated from their parents and sent to Russia for adoption by Russian families. The United States has an interest in opposing such grave human rights abuses and in supporting Kyiv’s efforts to hold those responsible to account.

Fourth, it is not clear that Putin’s ambitions end with Ukraine. In a June conversation with young Russian entrepreneurs, the Russian leader asserted that he was not taking Ukrainian territory but “returning” historic Russian lands to Moscow’s control. The Russian Empire once included the Baltic states, Finland, and part of Poland. If Putin were to prevail in Ukraine, would he be tempted to seek the “return” of other “historic Russian lands?”

In the case of Ukraine, the United States is contributing money and weapons. If Putin’s ambitions were to extend to one or more of the Baltic states, which are members of NATO, the United States would have to contribute money, weapons, and the lives of American soldiers. The United States has a strong interest in stopping Putin’s ambitions in Ukraine.

Steven Pifer is an affiliate of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a retired Foreign Service officer.

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Special pleading and political considerations seem to have played a part in creating some of these discrepancies. The ICPS report sees a political motive behind the UK’s failure to sanction Alexander Lebedev, a former KGB officer who has owned media and other assets in the UK and Russia. Former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson is reportedly a personal friend of Lebedev’s son, Evgeny, and even nominated him for a seat in the House of Lords in 2020 despite concerns from the British security services, according to media reports. Sanctioning his father would have created obvious embarrassment.

None of this prevented the Canadian government from putting Lebedev on its sanctions list in May 2022. Lebedev was sanctioned for having “directly enabled Vladimir Putin’s senseless war in Ukraine,” according to the Canadian government. For now, at least, the US and EU have stuck with the UK position on Lebedev.

The ICPS report has found that of the 100 richest Russians listed by Forbes magazine, more than two-thirds have not been sanctioned at all (32 have been sanctioned by the UK, 26 by the EU, and only 16 by the US). Among the top 10, exactly half are currently sanctions-free.

The report also names Dmitry Rybolovlev, the Russian fertilizer magnate, now resident in Monaco, where he has reportedly cultivated considerable local influence. Rybolovlev has avoided sanctions despite being among 96 oligarchs listed by the US Treasury in 2018 for their “closeness to the Russian regime.”

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These gaps need to be plugged, not least because a robust sanctions regime will almost certainly be necessary for the foreseeable future. Even though Russia currently appears to be losing its war in Ukraine, the Putin regime will remain an aggressive disrupter, hostile to Western interests and a threat to its neighbors, for as long as it survives. It will need to be contained and deterred.

The current ad hoc Western sanctions arrangements need to be replaced by a more coordinated approach to the task of targeting the Kremlin and its enablers. Greater coordination could involve joint analytical reports and sanctions recommendations to be adopted on a common basis.

If exceptions are to be made allowing for the removal of names from the list, these should be debated separately and transparently according to clear criteria. The conditions for removal should necessarily be tough: a complete break with the Putin regime, including all business and personal contact; unconditional public statements condemning the war and supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty, including over Crimea; and a willingness to support Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction financially.

The incremental approach that has guided Western sanctions policy since 2014 is not adequate to the task of confronting the threat posed by Putin’s Russia. The Western world is dealing with a system, not with an individual. With this in mind, the message should be that culpability for the Putin regime’s crimes is shared by everyone who has supported it, benefited from it, or acquiesced in it. It’s time for the severity of Western sanctions to match the seriousness of the challenge.

David Clark was Special Adviser on Europe at the UK Foreign Office 1997-2001 and now works as an independent analyst specializing in foreign policy and European affairs.

In the early days of the Russian invasion, President Zelenskyy signaled his intention to defy the Kremlin by officially applying for EU membership. This was an important gesture that helped to frame the war as a fight for independence against a resurgent Russia that refused to accept Ukraine’s departure from the Kremlin orbit.

While Moscow sought to crush Ukrainian statehood and reverse the verdict of 1991, Ukraine’s European aspirations symbolized the country’s resistance to Russian authoritarianism. This helped focus the minds of politicians across the continent. In June, Ukraine was duly granted official EU candidate nation status.

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The intensification of Ukraine’s relationship with the EU has reshaped the wider geopolitical landscape in a number of ways. For example, with Ukraine and Moldova now both recognized as EU candidate nations, the existing Eastern Partnership format comprising Ukraine and Moldova together with Georgia, Belarus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan no longer makes sense. As a result, Brussels is in the process of rethinking the EU’s entire Neighborhood Policy for the region.

The changes currently taking place create the potential for a more stable European neighborhood in the post-war period. This would be welcomed in both Brussels and Washington DC. Ukraine’s former position in the geopolitical gray zone on Europe’s eastern flank left it vulnerable to Russian imperial interference and made the country a constant source of instability. Clarifying Ukraine’s status as a member of the Western world is in EU and US interests. In addition to reducing the scope for future Russian aggression, a fully integrated Ukraine can make a meaningful contribution to the EU’s own security and defense policy.

The EU and US also share common goals when it comes to the reform agenda in Ukraine. Both seek to strengthen the rule of law and establish capable Ukrainian institutions while consolidating the country’s democracy. US support for Ukraine’s further EU integration can serve as a powerful engine for these reforms.

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The reforms anticipated by the EU and US are very much in line with the vision of a European future embraced by the vast majority of Ukrainians. Polls conducted since the start of the Russian invasion consistently show overwhelming Ukrainian public support for European integration and EU membership. This creates historic opportunities for change that can be seized with the help of Ukraine’s Western partners.

The United States can support Ukraine’s European integration by cooperating closely with the EU to develop joint policies toward Ukrainian reforms that provide consistency and avoid any overlaps or loopholes. This approach should include a range of incentives and potential costs that will help keep reform efforts on track and prevent backsliding.

US officials can also play an important advocacy role in Europe promoting the benefits of closer cooperation with Ukraine. While the war unleashed by Vladimir Putin has transformed perceptions of Ukraine and its place in Europe, there remains significant skepticism within the EU on the issue of Ukrainian integration. The United States can help shape this evolving debate by emphasizing the advantages of an integrated Ukraine for transatlantic ties and European security.

As Ukraine seeks to move from candidate country status to EU member state, it may also make sense for the United States to tailor financial and technical aid in order to enhance this process and aid integration. Likewise, monitoring policies can also focus on the reform road map developed to bring the country closer to EU standards. This approach would bring welcome clarity to the role of Ukraine’s international partners in the country’s reform process.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is by far the greatest threat to Europe since the end of the Cold War. Unless Vladimir Putin is decisively defeated, the consequences for European security will be grave. However, if Ukraine is able to secure a military victory, it could pave the way for a new era of European stability and prosperity. This is clearly in the interests of all EU member states, and it is also an attractive prospect for the United States.

Dmytro Lyvch is an advisor to the Prime Minister of Ukraine, Chair of EasyBusiness NGO, and Co-Founder of the Centre for Economic Recovery. Yuliia Shaipova is a Ukrainian parliamentary advisor and Team Lead at the Centre for Economic Recovery.

—Valentina Sader is an associate director and Brazil lead at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

What are the primary differences between the two candidates’ platforms?

We’ll know the night of October 30 who will be the next president of Brazil. Even though Lula received nearly 5 percentage points more votes tonight, that is by all means not an indication that he will have the same margins later this month. With a highly contentious electoral cycle, which will become even more polarizing in the next few weeks, Bolsonaro and Lula will each take extra steps to show differences in how they would govern.

On the economic front, Bolsonaro proposes a continuation of his economic priorities, doubling down on a business-friendly, open-market economy and diminishing the size of the state through privatizations. Lula’s campaign has focused on how he would bring back the prosperous economic times under his watch when in office. His economic approach will aim to tackle hunger and poverty levels.

For both, regardless of who wins on October 30, the priority should be on fostering economic growth and sustainable development, while also maintaining fiscal responsibility. Guaranteeing a stable political environment and an attractive business climate will be critical for attracting foreign investment and advancing long-term prosperity.

—Jason Marczak is the senior director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

How would each candidate likely work—or not work—with the United States, Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean once in office?

If the polarization that marked this electoral cycle is indicative of the next four years, what’s clear is the extremely different ways in which Bolsonaro and Lula would govern—and foreign policy is no exception. International affairs were not a central topic in this year’s debates, and the lack of attention to the implications of global developments is a testament to the inward gaze of Brazil in recent years. Don’t expect that to change as the campaigns dig in deeper for the second round.

Looking back to the prosperous economic times under his watch, Lula would again prioritize cooperation across the Global South and would work to regain the prominent role Brazil once had internationally. Lula would often prioritize a mutually beneficial relationship with the United States and Europe, but, as during his previous presidency, moments of tension are likely to arise. Common ground would certainly be found when it comes to adopting more ambitious climate commitments.

Bolsonaro would continue to lead Brazil’s foreign policy with an economic focus, prioritizing steps focused on an open-market economy. In Latin America and the Caribbean, where recent elections have shifted the political tendencies to the left, Bolsonaro’s right-leaning approach would be met with skepticism from some of the region’s newest leaders. Bolsonaro would have to either compromise to find common ground regionally or risk being an outlier. The next president must align his foreign policy to meet domestic demands and international challenges.

—Jason

Bolsonaro has already sowed seeds of doubt in Brazil’s electoral integrity. What can we expect to see from him during this runoff, and what does that say about Brazil’s democratic trajectory?

Bolsonaro’s questioning of the political system has ignited democratic institutions in Brazil to double down on their efforts to raise awareness and regain public confidence in their proper functioning. The United States and the international community have also recommitted their trust in Brazil’s electoral system and in the legitimacy of results. Sunday’s first round was a testament to how the Electoral Superior Court, among other institutions, have been getting ahead of any potential crisis by tackling disinformation and bringing in international observers at polling stations. These efforts will continue in the runoff. As democracies across the world experience declines in democratic freedoms and questioning of democratic principles even beyond elections, this is an opportunity for Brazil to strengthen its democratic institutions to ensure an even more robust democracy.

—Valentina

The post Lula vs. Bolsonaro: Your expert breakdown of Brazil’s presidential election runoff appeared first on Atlantic Council.

#BritainDebrief – What was the Queen’s diplomacy? | A Debrief from Professor Philip Murray

Ben Judah — Wed, 28 Sep 2022 23:45:07 +0000

What was the Queen’s diplomacy?

As the state funeral of Queen Elizabeth II draws to a close, Senior Fellow Ben Judah spoke with Professor Philip Murray, Director of History and Policy at the Institute for Historical Research, to discuss the legacy she leaves behind.

What role did the Queen play in the end of the British Empire? How did the Queen’s involvement shape the Commonwealth of Nations? What can we expect from King Charles III and his relationship with the Commonwealth?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

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The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

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The post #BritainDebrief – What was the Queen’s diplomacy? | A Debrief from Professor Philip Murray appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin threatens to increase attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure

Victor Kevluk — Tue, 27 Sep 2022 22:27:41 +0000

Russian President Vladimir Putin made global headlines on September 21 by threatening to use nuclear weapons if Ukrainians refuse to end their resistance to his invasion and continue to liberate Russian-occupied regions of their country. There has subsequently been much debate over whether Putin’s nuclear ultimatum is genuine or merely an attempt to intimidate the Western world into abandoning its support for Ukraine.

Many observers believe that a less publicized threat made one week earlier offers a clearer indication of Moscow’s likely next steps. Speaking on September 16 during a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Uzbekistan, Putin noted a recent series of Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and warned of more to come. “Just recently the Russian armed forces hit some sensitive targets. Let’s consider these to have been warning strikes. If the situation develops further in the current direction, our response will be more serious.”

The strikes Putin was referencing to included missile attacks on Ukrainian power stations in Kharkiv, Zmiiv, Pavlograd, and Kremenchug on September 11-12, which left parts of the Kharkiv, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia regions temporarily without water and electricity. Two days later on September 14, Russia struck a dam at the Karachuniv Reservoir close to Kryvyi Rih, causing fears over possible flooding and disruption to local water supplies.

Attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure are not new and have been taking place regularly since the Russian invasion began on February 24. Nevertheless, the coordinated nature of the recent airstrikes indicates a change in tactics. This can also be seen on Russia’s Kremlin-controlled federal TV channels, which have recently began to actively promote the idea of destroying Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure.

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Calls for a new campaign against civilian infrastructure targets across Ukraine have emerged following the Russian army’s humiliating retreat from Kharkiv Oblast in early September. The rapid pace of Ukraine’s advance and the comprehensive nature of Russia’s collapse sent shockwaves through Moscow. For the first time, many Russians began to understand that they may be witnessing the early stages of an historic defeat. This appears to have further radicalized opinion in the Kremlin, leading to open demands for war crimes targeting the Ukrainian civilian population.

Russia’s actions are in clear violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions that established international legal standards for humanitarian treatment in war. However, with UN investigators already confirming that Russia has committed war crimes in Ukraine, an isolated and cornered Putin seems ready to entertain increasingly drastic measures in order to prevent his faltering invasion from unraveling further.

A Russian campaign against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure would have thousands of potential targets to choose from including everything from power stations and energy supply networks to water, internet, rail, and transport hubs. Any attacks that succeeded in disrupting the supply of food or medicines could have a devastating impact on whole regions, especially if timed to coincide with the coldest periods of the coming winter season.

The targeting of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure poses obvious and significant challenges to the country’s population. While some elements of infrastructure are protected, many possible targets are highly vulnerable to attack. This could lead to significant loss of life and may also trigger a new wave of refugees as Ukrainians seek food and shelter in neighboring EU countries.

Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is thought to be particularly at risk from Russian attack. Russia is well aware of Ukraine’s excessive dependence on energy imports as well as the country’s issues with inefficient energy use. Attacks targeting energy supply could plunge entire cities into darkness and spark panic among the civilian population, with negative consequences for a whole series of different sectors.

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With the winter heating season fast approaching, the Ukrainian authorities and the country’s international partners must waste no time as they prepare for Russian attacks on every element of the country’s civilian infrastructure. Likewise, ordinary Ukrainians should take measures in anticipation of possible coming disruption to basic services in the months ahead.

In military terms, this means enhancing and expanding Ukraine’s air defense capabilities. The best way to thwart Russian attacks is by preventing missiles from reaching their targets. Ukrainian leaders have been consistently requesting more air defense systems since before the Russian invasion began. Putin’s stated plans to target civilian infrastructure should now add a sense of urgency to these calls.

Cyber security must also be strengthened. Russia has previously demonstrated that it can disable vital infrastructure via cyber attacks. Such tactics are likely to be used in conjunction with airstrikes.

Ukraine must seek to increase energy efficiency and find alternative sources of energy supply in anticipation of possible disruption. Strategic reserves should be built up and preparations put in place to repair any damage. Encouragingly, drills are already taking place at key energy infrastructure objects.

Local authorities should consider establishing well-stocked community hubs offering warmth, electricity, and access to basic supplies such as food, water, and medicines in the event of massive infrastructure failure. Individual Ukrainians can take similar precautionary measures for their own households, and may also wish to stock up on specific items including torches, candles, canned food, and warm winter clothing.

Attempts to destroy Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure represent the latest escalation in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Moscow is now prepared to openly attack both military and non-military targets in order to achieve its goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and erasing Ukrainian national identity. All the indications are that Ukraine will face an historically challenging winter of hardships as Russia seeks to break the country’s will to resist. It is vital that the necessary preparations are put in place without delay.

Victor Kevluk is an analyst at the Center for Defence Strategies in Kyiv.

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It is hard to overestimate the negative impact Putin has had on Russia and the wider international community. He has unleashed a series of unjustified wars and suppressed personal freedoms inside Russia itself; he has fostered a culture of xenophobia and cut Russians off from the developed world; he has stalled the Russian economy and ended the country’s modernization; and he has spread an information epidemic of fakes and falsehoods around the globe.

For Russians who dream of a return to imperial greatness, Putin’s biggest crime is his inept invasion of Ukraine. Russia is no stranger to humiliating military losses. In the past two centuries, four defeats stand out as particularly significant: the Crimean War (1853-56), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), World War I (1914-17), and the Afghanistan War (1979-88).

Encouragingly, all four defeats were followed by periods of liberalization. In the aftermath of the Crimean War, Czar Alexander II abolished serfdom throughout the Russian Empire. Defeat in the Russo-Japanese War led to the creation of the Duma, while Russia’s premature exit from World War I heralded the country’s first reasonably democratic elections. Meanwhile, the failure in Afghanistan was a significant factor in the collapse of the USSR. While pessimists predict that Putin will be followed by an even worse tyrant, the historical record suggests that military defeat is likely to lead to a relaxation of Russia’s authoritarian instincts.

It is difficult to see Putin surviving the war in Ukraine. The invasion he so recklessly ordered has devastated the Russian military and made his country a global pariah without achieving anything in return. The war has also led to a sharp deterioration on the domestic front. Echoing the worst excesses of Stalin and Hitler, Putin has normalized the genocide of Ukrainians and made it an everyday topic of discussion on Russian television. Meanwhile, as the excellent investigative journalists Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan have pointed out, his FSB security service has increasingly come to resemble the dreaded Soviet era NKVD.

Putin has had a highly negative impact on Russia’s international relations that goes far beyond the fallout from the invasion of Ukraine. His long record of broken promises and shameless dishonesty has made other world leaders increasingly wary of engaging. Some have persevered longer than others, but even the patient leaders of France and Germany appear to have now reached the conclusion that Putin’s words carry little weight.

The Russian ruler’s diminished status on the international stage was on display in Uzbekistan at the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. Putin was once notorious for keeping many of the world’s most prominent statesmen waiting. However, in Tashkent he was made to wait by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan. The only politicians who appear genuinely comfortable in his company are representatives of fellow pariah regimes such as Iran and North Korea.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Putin’s reign has also been bad for the Russian economy. During his first two presidential terms, lingering Gaidar-Yeltsin reforms and high energy prices created the false impression of sound economic management. This was an illusion. The Russian economy has stagnated since 2014 and is now sinking, with optimistic official forecasts predicting a six percent decline in 2022 and no recovery for a decade.

Russia’s unrivaled resource base is enough to make it the richest country on the planet. Instead, Putin has blocked modernization and left Russia completely dependent on the export of its natural resources. Even based on official figures, Russian real disposal income fell by ten percent between 2014 and 2020.

Rather than opening up the country and diversifying the economy, Putin has isolated Russia and scared away foreign businesses with his wars and his repressive domestic policies. This has led to a brain drain of Russia’s best minds, with official figures showing over 400,000 people leaving the country in the first half of 2022 alone. Many of those who vote with their feet are from the well-educated and entrepreneurial segments of society.

The only economic issue that seems to genuinely interest Putin is the wealth of his cronies and his family. He has made no effort to curb massive capital outflows from Russia, possibly because much of this outflow is linked to him or his allies. While salaries for ordinary Russians stagnate, members of Putin’s inner circle have acquired immense wealth. Although no official records exist, it has long been speculated that Putin himself is one of the world’s richest men.

The catastrophic consequences of Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine have helped cast an unforgiving light on the rest of his reign. He has caused enormous damage to the Russia while drastically undermining the country’s credibility in international affairs. Russia today is noticeably more isolated and less free than at the beginning of his rule over twenty years ago. It is a society trapped in a toxic vision of the past and openly hostile to much of the modern world. This is Putin’s legacy.

The one area where Putin has genuinely excelled is in the creation of a world-class propaganda machine. However, even this cannot disguise his shortcomings forever. If the war in Ukraine is indeed lost, it will only be a matter of time before the Russian public demands an end to the discredited Putin era.

Anders Åslund is the author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

Introduction

At the 2022 Summit for Democracy, President Joe Biden noted that democratic backsliding is the “defining challenge of our time.”¹

Democracy, as a system of government, is ever evolving. However, democratic freedoms have been waning worldwide for the past sixteen years.² In 2021, twice as many countries lost civil liberties and freedoms compared to those that improved them.³ Today, more than two-thirds of the world population lives in nondemocratic regimes, or in countries that have seen democratic backsliding in recent years.⁴

U.S. President Joe Biden convenes a virtual summit with leaders from democratic nations at the State Department’s Summit for Democracy, at the White House, in Washington, U.S. December 9, 2021. REUTERS/Leah Millis

This trend also holds true in Latin America and the Caribbean. Authoritarian regimes in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua have survived for years. Other countries in the region have seen a dramatic decline in civil liberties. According to 2021 data, half of the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are experiencing some degree of democratic erosion.⁵

Brazil is no exception to these global trends. The October elections offer an opportunity to begin addressing concerns about the resilience of its democracy. From the state to the national level, Brazilians will have an opportunity to choose the future trajectory of their democracy. The challenges that Brazilian democracy has confronted in recent years—beginning with the massive demonstrations of 2013 and continuing through questioning of the democratic model among some sectors in recent years—suggest that, regardless of which parties and politicians are elected, Brazilians must prioritize strengthening their democratic institutions now, and in the years to come.

The case of Brazil: A young, yet resilient democracy

As the world undergoes a wave of democratic questioning, and even backsliding, Brazilians head to the polls as the country is at a crossroads, making it important to shift its gaze from the headlines of the day to thinking about longer-term solutions to the country’s political crisis.

Brazil is a young democracy. It was not until 1989 that the country held its first direct presidential elections, after the end of the military dictatorship. Since then, Brazilian democracy has made great strides, establishing a well-regarded electoral system, overcoming hyperinflation and economic crises, and consolidating around a vibrant party system.

The October 2022 elections are a crucial test for Brazilian democracy. Although the elections will be another opportunity to see democracy in action, increasingly high levels of polarization and disinformation have contributed to extremist narratives, episodes of violence, and the questioning of democratic principles.

Workers from Electoral Court check performance of electronic voting urns in Curitiba, Brazil June 24, 2022. REUTERS/Rodolfo Buhrer

The Brazilian electoral process has been regarded as one of the fastest and most reliable in the world. But the turbulent run-up to the election has raised concerns that the transparency and fairness of democratic processes may be undermined, and that the resiliency of the electoral process and democratic institutions will be tested. Ensuring the integrity of this process, while also mitigating the risk of political violence, is imperative. Any action to further strengthen the resilience of Brazil’s democratic system is contingent upon an electoral process that fosters the proper function of institutions, and protects civil society and an independent media. This critical moment presents a unique opportunity for Brazil to further bolster its democratic system and public trust in its democracy in the years to come.

Over the past generation, Brazilian democracy has fluctuated between moments of high confidence in the democratic system and periods of political and institutional crisis, in which the strength and resilience of its democracy were in doubt. In recent years, Brazilian democratic institutions have risen to the challenge of recalibrating their capabilities to face new challenges.

Three examples illustrate their resilience. First, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Brazil was able to delay the electoral process and shift the date of municipal elections, all within the bounds of its constitution.⁶ Further, state and local governors adopted a variety of strategies to respond to the pandemic, with democratic federalism contributing to a panoply of experiments for addressing isolation and lockdown measures.⁷ Second, following antidemocratic protests in September 2021 that included messages threatening the Supreme Court and elections, a variety of representatives of democratic institutions (such as the Supreme Court, the House of Representatives, the Senate, civil-society organizations, and the media), came together to publicly condemn such proposals.⁸ The backlash forced President Jair Bolsonaro to change his tone and back down from his more extreme positions.⁹ Lastly, the manifestation of professors, jurists, students, civil-society representatives, business leaders, and former and current government officials, through a letter with more than nine hundred thousand signatories in favor of democracy in Brazil, is yet another example of the esteem for democratic principles and respect of civil liberties, especially when institutional credibility is questioned.¹⁰

Demonstrators take part in a protest for democracy and free elections and against Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro, at Paulista Avenue in Sao Paulo, Brazil, August 11, 2022. The sign reads “Democracy” REUTERS/Carla Carniel

Brazilian institutions are already taking concrete steps to fortify their capabilities ahead of, and beyond, the upcoming electoral cycle. Such efforts are, and will continue to be, important to ensure a healthy democracy. But as we look ahead, even beyond the October elections, what mechanisms are needed to prevent backsliding and foster the resilience of democratic institutions and the strength of Brazilian democracy in the coming years?

A stronger democracy in the long run

In July 2022, the Atlantic Council held individual consultations and convened a group of key Brazilian and international experts from civil-society organizations, the public and private sectors, academia, the press, and others to discuss concrete ways in which Brazil could further support its democratic system ahead of, and beyond, the upcoming elections. Below are actionable recommendations for next steps, including suggestions for the role the United States and the international community could play to support a prosperous Brazilian democracy in the long run.

Institutionalize unwritten democratic norms that ensure independence. In recent years, many unwritten democratic norms have been taken for granted and, in some cases, flaunted. One example is the nomination of the prosecutor general of the republic (PGR), the lead of the federal prosecutorial service (Ministério Público Federal, MPF). Constitutionally, the nomination of the PGR must follow a process that includes presidential nomination and approval by the Senate.¹¹ Customarily, however, since 2003 the president selects a name from a list of three names chosen by prosecutors. The benefit of this so-called lista tríplice is that it ensures some coherence within the MPF, as well as ensuring that the prosecutor general is more independent from the other branches of government.

To reinforce checks and balances, institutionalizing such norms and consolidating the autonomy of institutions with political oversight is imperative. The practice of selecting the PGR via a lista tríplice guaranteed an initial layer of independence to the prosecutor general’s role. This was especially important because the MPF should remain autonomous given its oversight role, including in the electoral process.¹² Thus, institutionalizing such norms would ensure the impartiality of the prosecutor general’s nomination and foster the autonomous role of the MPF within the political system, while also reaffirming the independence of the Brazilian judiciary and its prosecutors. Using the example of the lista tríplice for the MPF, instilling processes in other democratic organs—such as the Federal Police, the Federal Accountability Office (TCU), and the Comptroller General of Brazil (CGU)—could be internal mechanisms to guarantee checks and balances, and the appropriate indepence of these offices from established political forces and interested groups.

Address challenges for effective rule of law. To ensure a vibrant democracy, the rule of law must be effective. In Brazil, 17.6 people were killed daily by police forces in 2020, with such violence rarely leading to consequences.¹³ Data show that 28 percent of federal officeholders have been investigated or indicted for criminal behavior, while only a handful have been held accountable.¹⁴ In the case of the state of Rio de Janeiro, for example, members of militias and organized-crime groups also have ties to the political system.¹⁵ These data imply that strengthening the rule of law remains a key challenge. Better trainings for police forces to address abuses, reforms to oversight agencies to improve the accountability of Brazil’s judicial system, and fostering a lawfulness culture through the school system and civil-society activism could help ensure the effectiveness of the rule of law, while also targeting the younger generations as positive agents of change, and promoters of democracy and the rule of law.

Depoliticization of the armed forces. The armed forces are a state institution responsible for protecting the sovereignty of the state, the order of the democratic system, and the safety of citizens, while also guaranteeing the ability of the three branches of government to properly function.¹⁶ As such, the armed forces must remain impartial in politics. In recent years, active military officials have taken civil positions within the Brazilian political system. As a way of example is Minister Eduardo Pazuello, a three-star general, as Minister of Health.¹⁷ Even in the constitution, deepening and solidifying the impartiality of the armed forces is imperative for the proper control of powers within the democratic system. Congress should take a more active role in ensuring this impartiality, as it began to do with a bill introduced in 2021 that aims to clarify the role of the armed forces and active military in the political system.¹⁸ It is critical for the military, the police, and members of any state institutions to refrain from any interference in political and political party-based activities—including, but not limited to, the elections.

Ensure equitable political representation. There has been long-standing dissatisfaction with the lack of representativeness of the political system. Women represent more than 50 percent of the Brazilian population, yet account for only about 15 percent and 13 percent of representatives in the House and the Senate, respectively. The data are just as concerning for other groups. Ensuring better representation and equal participation in politics by women, indigenous communities, black Brazilians, and other marginalized groups would be a first step in having a better representation of Brazilian society at the decision-making table and, thus, more effective public policies to target their needs. More ambitious goals and affirmative action would help to move Brazil in that direction. However, enforcement is also imperative. Brazil has a gender quota requiring that women make up 30 percent of candidates for political parties. But lack of incentives for further engagement of women in politics, in addition to the high number of cases of violence against women in politics and structural imbalances, limit the potential for women’s equitable participation.¹⁹ New legislation that aims to punish violence against women in politics, in effect for the 2022 elections, is a first step in that direction.²⁰ Civil society has an important contribution to make in monitoring and denouncing cases of violence against women in politics, including those happening virtually. In addition to monitoring, electoral agencies should follow through on the enforcement of this legislation. Establishing the means through which more women could take on leadership positions in political bodies and parties could help push Brazilian politics toward more realistic representation and actual participation.

Safeguard a welcoming environment for a vibrant civil society. Among many actors in healthy and vibrant democracies, civil society and the media play key roles in ensuring a healthy public debate and a democratic political system. In Brazil, journalists and activists often face dangerous threats against their activities, and even their lives. Journalists Conrado Hubner and Patricia Campos Mello faced intimidation for criticizing political figures, while journalist Dom Phillips and activist Bruno Pereira were killed in 2022 during an excursion in the Brazilian Amazon, apparently for photographing illegal fishing in the area.²¹

Indigenous people attend a protest demanding justice for journalist Dom Phillips and indigenous expert Bruno Pereira, who were murdered in the Amazon, in Sao Paulo, Brazil June 23, 2022. REUTERS/Carla Carniel

In addition to further bolstering safeguards for press freedom, respect for and inclusion of perspectives from civil-society organizations, among other stakeholders, is imperative to promote effective public policies—and a democratic system that delivers to its citizens. Further cooperation among civil-society organizations, domestically and internationally, could boost the role and significance of these voices within Brazil. More coordinated efforts—from local associations to leading international civil-society organizations in country—would help promote a louder and more cohesive voice for civil society in Brazil. This was recently done through a letter with more than three thousand signatories, including former Supreme Court justices, actors, musicians, and even executives, expressing their support for democracy and trust in the Brazilian voting system.²² In addition, guaranteeing penalties for intimidation against civil-society representatives, as well as members of the media, is also imperative to safeguarding a prosperous environment for independent civil society and media.

Further strengthening institutional capabilities to manage the challenges of disinformation. Disinformation and misinformation are global challenges. As such, Brazil’s Electoral Supreme Court (TSE, in Portuguese) has prioritized disinformation as a challenge to the electoral processes in 2022 and beyond. Brazilian institutions, civil-society organizations, fact-checking bodies, and news outlets should work together to mitigate impact and risks. Based on the developments that unfolded after the US elections in 2020—including, but not limited to, January 6—as well as the role that disinformation played in Brazilian elections in 2018 and 2020, TSE established partnerships with social media and messaging platforms, creating a united front to mitigate risks and raise awareness to the known challenge of disinformation.²³ This is a proactive initiative to promote and endure the credibility of electoral bodies. To go one step forward, Brazilian news outlets could use already-established COVID-19 data-gathering strategies and go directly to local and state governments to identify disinformation and its sources. This strategy could facilitate and speed up the work of fact-checking institutions in explaining disinformation, of the media (and TSE itself) in countering and spreading it, and of social media platforms in removing it, as appropriate. Overall, having a more coordinated civil society and safeguarding an independent media will result in greater checks against authoritarian tendencies.

Re-establish trust in the political system and foster civic engagement beyond electoral cycles. In recent history, corruption cases among politicians, disinformation, misinformation, and other factors have exacerbated distrust in political institutions in Brazil.²⁴ Polarization has also deepened political and social divides. Regaining confidence in the democratic system is an uphill battle. However, in the long run, revigorated trust in the political system is imperative to foster civic engagement beyond electoral cycles. As a fundamental principle of democracy, broad and active civic engagement is essential to fortify an established and well-functioning democracy in Brazil. This educational effort must begin in schools, to educate the next generations to be active and engaged citizens, and to tackle the question of what democracy means.

17-year-old Vitoria Rodrigues de Oliveira takes a photo of a young woman to register her to vote for Brazil’s upcoming elections in Sao Joao de Meriti in Rio de Janeiro state, Brazil April 5, 2022. Picture taken April 5, 2022. REUTERS/Pilar Olivares

But developing a comprehensive awareness-raising campaign—led by government agencies, in coordination with civil-society organizations and other key actors—could be a first step in the right direction to clarify the roles and responsibilities of elected officials and other public figures, as well as individuals’ rights and duties. In a country where voting is mandatory (with a few exceptions), society must have the tools to make well-informed decisions about its political representatives. Most importantly, only a well-educated society with access to transparent and accurate information, and comprehension of the political game, can hold politicians and democratic institutions accountable.

The role of the United States and the international community

Support immediate recognition of results and quick confirmation of the legitimacy of the electoral process. Given Brazil’s electronic-voting system, electoral results are determined and announced on the same day elections are held. The agility of the system and the seal of credibility given by international recognition curbs potential unrest in the expectation of results. As such, the international community, represented by individual countries and international organizations, must be able to recognize the legitimacy of results immediately after their announcement.

Continuing the long tradition of welcoming international electoral-observation missions, the upcoming elections will include missions from the Organization of American States, Mercosur’s Parliament, and the Inter-American Union of Electoral Organizations (Uniore).²⁵ These missions should aim to release their verdicts on the freedom and fairness of the electoral process quickly, ideally no more than forty-eight hours following Election Day. Beyond the electoral cycle, countries should be explicit in recognizing the historical respect of Brazil toward its democratic system and principles, as well as efforts to improve their capabilities. The United States, for example, recently endorsed trust in the Brazilian electoral system, following questions about the legitimacy of this process.²⁶

Establish a US-Brazil high-level dialogue on democracy promotion. In the context of recent commitments made by both the United States and Brazil on the occasion of the Summit for Democracy, both countries restarted the US-Brazil Human Rights Working Group. This is one step forward in both countries’ efforts to strengthen their own democracies and promote the principles of a rules-based order globally. Given similarities and the strong, historic partnership between the United States and Brazil, both countries could benefit from a more direct dialogue in terms of best practices and lessons learned with regard to common challenges to democracy, and potential common solutions. More broadly, high-level cooperation on this front would safeguard principles of a rules-based democratic order, in addition to deepening the bilateral relationship and fostering similar practices across the hemisphere. Within this framework, further cooperation with the US Department of State, and even the US Departments of Justice and Defense, could help move the needle forward, while also including civil-society and private-sector representatives from both countries.

Conclusion

The next Brazilian government will face a critical moment to strengthen the country’s democracy and its institutions to prove effective in addressing citizens’ needs, especially in challenging times both economically and socially. A key ingredient for democratic crisis is the growing belief that democratic government does not serve citizens’ needs. Addressing this issue and rebuilding trust in the political system are vital for long-term domestic stability in Brazil.

This issue brief aimed to suggest a path forward to begin this task.

Beyond Brazil itself, the country’s democracy is a bellwether for democratic health in the Western Hemisphere. The polarization, concerns of electoral violence, marginalization of minority voices, and other patterns occurring in Brazil must be addressed and condemned. Only through systemic analysis and prevention can all stakeholders work to guarantee democratic health presently, and in the years to come.

Acknowledgements

Many of the ideas in this spotlight were informed by a July 27 strategy session organized by the Atlantic Council, which featured the participation of key Brazilian and international experts from civil-society organizations, the public and private sectors, academia, the press, and others. We thank the many participants in the strategy session, including those who gave permission to be publicly acknowledged: President Laura Chinchilla, Ambassador Michael McKinley, Ambassador Liliana Ayalde, Miriam Kornblith, Feliciano Guimarães, Patricia Campos Mello, Flávia Pellegrino, Guilherme Casarões, Bruno Brandão, Emilia Carvalho, Thiago Esteves, Cintia Hoskinson, and Francisco Brito. This document is also a product of independent research and consultations carried out by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. We thank those who took the time to share their insights with us, including Daniela Campello and Cesar Zucco. A special thank you also goes to our Brazil nonresident senior fellow, Ricardo Sennes, for the countless advice through the years and during the production of this publication. Isabel Bernhard provided invaluable writing and editorial support. Thank you to Jason Marczak, senior director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, and Maria Fernanda Bozmoski, deputy director for programs, for their guidance. Finally, the Atlantic Council would like to thank Action for Democracy for the partnership and generous support, as well as the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI) for its continued collaboration, as an institutional partner to this initiative.

About the author

Valentina Sader is associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she leads the center’s work on Brazil, gender equality, and diversity, and manages its advisory council. She has co-authored publications on the US-Brazil strategic partnership and coordinated events with high-level policymakers, business leaders, and civil-society members in both Brazil and the United States. Valentina provides regular commentary in English and Portuguese on political and economic issues in Brazil to major media outlets. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, Valentina worked at the Eurasia Group, the embassy of Brazil in Washington, DC, and the mission of Brazil to the Organization of American States (OAS). Valentina holds a bachelor’s degree in international studies from American University. Originally from Brazil, Valentina is a native Portuguese speaker, fluent in English, and proficient in Spanish.

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1 Joe Biden, “Remarks by President Biden at the Summit for Democracy Opening Session,” White House, December 9, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/12/09/remarks-by-president-biden-at-the-summit-for-democracy-opening-session/.

2 Sarah Repucci and Amy Slipowitz, “Freedom in the World 2022: The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule,” Freedom House, February 24, 2022, https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-authoritarian-rule-challenging-democracy-dominant-global-model.

3 Ibid.

4 “Global State of Democracy Report 2021: Building Resilience in a Pandemic Era,” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2021, https://www.idea.int/gsod/global-report.

5 “The Americas 2021: Democracy in Times of Crisis,” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2021, https://www.idea.int/gsod/las-americas-eng-0.

6 “Amendment enacted postponing Municipal Elections to November,” Agência Câmara de Notícias, July 2, 2020, https://www.camara.leg.br/noticias/673100-promulgada-emenda-que-adia-eleicoes-municipais-para-novembro/.

7 Márcio Falcão and Fernanda Vivas, “Supreme Court Decides that States and Municipalities Have Power to Set Rules on Isolation,” G1, April 15, 2020, https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/04/15/maioria-do-supremo-vota-a-favor-de-que-estados-e-municipios-editem-normas-sobre-isolamento.ghtml.

8 “Bolsonaro’s Threats in Speeches on September 7,” BBC Brasil, September 7, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-58479785; “STF, Chamber and Senate Respond to Bolsonaro’s Speech During September 7 Protests,” Canal Rural, September 8, 2021, https://www.canalrural.com.br/noticias/stf-camara-e-senado-repercutem-discurso-de-bolsonaro-durante-manifestacoes-de-7-de-setembro/.

9 Josette Goulart and Diego Gimenes, “Bolsonaro Retreats, Apologizes and Stock Market Shoots in the Same Second,” Veja, September 9, 2021, https://veja.abril.com.br/coluna/radar-economico/bolsonaro-recua-pede-desculpas-e-bolsa-dispara-no-mesmo-segundo/.

10 “Letter for Democracy is read at USP, and Act has a protest against Bolsonaro,” CNN Brasil, August 11, 2022, https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/politica/cartas-pela-democracia-sao-lidas-na-faculdade-de-direito-de-usp/.

11 Erick Mota, “Choice of the PGR: Understand how the MPF Triple List works,” Congresso em Foco, September 9, 2019, https://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/area/congresso-nacional/premio-incentiva-as-boas-praticas-politicas-afirma-conselho-federal-de-contabilidade/.

12 “About the MPF,” Ministério Público Federal, http://www.mpf.mp.br/o-mpf/sobre-o-mpf.

13 Leandro Machado, “’Police in Brazil Are Not Trained with the Idea of Protecting the Citizen,’ Says Researcher,” BBC Brasil, June 5, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-61601495.

14 Matthew M. Taylor, Decadent Developmentalism: The Political Economy of Democratic Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 151.

15 Joana Oliveira, “Rio’s militias increasingly articulate with city halls and legislatures, study points out,” Pais, October 26, 2020, https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2020-10-26/milicias-do-rio-se-articulam-cada-vez-mais-com-prefeituras-e-casas-legislativas-aponta-estudo.html.

16 “Estado-Maior Conjunto das Forças Armadas,” Governo do Brasil, Ministério da Defesa, last visited August 24, 2022, https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/assuntos/estado-maior-conjunto-das-forcas-armadas.

17 Giulia Granchi, “Jungmann: ‘Military Will Not Embark on Any Coup Adventure,’” BBC Brasil, August 19, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-62600301.

18 “Project Makes It Clear in the Law Nonpartisan Character of the Armed Forces,” Portal da Câmara dos Deputados, January 31, 2022, https://www.camara.leg.br/noticias/846116-projeto-deixa-claro-na-lei-carater-apartidario-das-forcas-armadas/.

19 Renata Galf and Paula Soprana, “Law on Political Violence Against Women Premieres with Up to 6 Years in Prison,” Folha de S. Paulo, July 30, 2022, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2022/07/lei-sobre-violencia-politica-contra-mulher-estreia-com-pena-de-ate-6-anos-de-prisao.shtml.

20 Ibid.

21 Paulo Roberto Netto, “Judge Rejects Aras’ Appeal in Case Against Conrado Hübner,” Poder360, October 21, 2021, https://www.poder360.com.br/justica/juiza-rejeita-recurso-de-aras-em-processo-contra-conrado-hubner/; “Brazil: Journalists Face Intimidation During Election Campaign,” ABRAJI, October 25, 2018, https://www.abraji.org.br/noticias/brasil-jornalistas-enfrentam-intimidacao-durante-campanha-eleitoral; Dom Phillips and Bruno Pereira, “Three Charged in Brazil with Murder of Dom Phillips and Bruno Pereira,” Guardian, July 22, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/22/three-charged-brazil-murder-dom-phillips-bruno-pereira.

22 Michael Pooler, “Brazil’s Civil Society Defends Democracy against Jair Bolsonaro Attacks,” Financial Times, July 27, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/858e34de-cd74-4902-bb02-8bbad747c286.

23 “Presidente Do Tse Institui Frente Nacional De Enfrentamento à Desinformação,” Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, March 30, 2022, https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2022/Marco/presidente-do-tse-institui-frente-nacional-de-enfrentamento-a-desinformacao.

24 “Confiança do Brasileiro Nas Instituições é a Mais Baixa Desde 2009,” Ibope Inteligência, August 9, 2018, http://www.ibopeinteligencia.com/noticias-e-pesquisas/confianca-do-brasileiro-nas-instituicoes-e-a-mais-baixa-desde-2009/.

25 “Eleições 2022: TSE Assina Acordo e Formaliza Missão de Observação da Uniore,” Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, August 2, 2022, https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2022/Agosto/eleicoes-2022-tse-assina-acordo-e-formaliza-missao-de-observacao-da-uniore.

26 “U.S. Again Defends Brazil’s Voting System Questioned by Bolsonaro,” Reuters, July 19, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-again-defends-brazils-voting-system-questioned-by-bolsonaro-2022-07-20/.

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#BritainDebrief – What did Gorbachev believe? | A Debrief from Dr. Vladislav Zubok

Ben Judah — Fri, 09 Sep 2022 22:34:52 +0000

What did Gorbachev believe?

Following Gorbachev’s passing, Senior Fellow Ben Judah spoke with Vladislav Zubok, Professor of International History at LSE and author of Collapse, on how Gorbachev saw Lenin, Europe and Ukraine. Did Gorbachev look to Lenin for inspiration? Was the Soviet collapse inevitable because Gorbachev was simply too naïve about economic management? What did Gorbachev feel about Ukraine and Putin’s foreign policy towards Kyiv?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

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The post #BritainDebrief – What did Gorbachev believe? | A Debrief from Dr. Vladislav Zubok appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine demands special international tribunal

Olena Khomenko — Fri, 09 Sep 2022 11:00:35 +0000

What did we do to stop Russian war crimes in Ukraine? This question inevitably comes to mind for anyone who visits the sites of recent Russian atrocities in places like Bucha and Irpin outside Kyiv.

The desire for justice is a fundamental expression of the human spirit, but the international community currently lacks the tools to hold Russia accountable. This is dangerous. If the world does not put an end to the sense of impunity fueling Russia’s genocidal invasion, we will inevitably witness further Russian crimes against humanity in Ukraine and beyond.

Over the past six months, international support has proved vital for the Ukrainian resistance. Weapons supplies have helped the Ukrainian military to stall the invasion and force Russia to retreat from large parts of the country, while financial aid has kept the Ukrainian economy afloat. It is now equally vital for the international community to make sure that Russians do not escape punishment for their war crimes in Ukraine and other flagrant violations of international law.

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American psychologist Philip Zimbardo has identified in his research that deindividualization and impunity are to a great extent responsible for mass crimes committed by soldiers in wars. This is why the inevitability of punishment has to be our guiding principle if we want to discourage new Russian atrocities in Ukraine and defend the basic human rights that form the foundation of the international security system.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a crime in itself that brutally violates the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force against the territorial integrity of nations. Nor did this criminality begin with the full-scale invasion of February 24, 2022. Russian aggression against Ukraine actually dates back to the February 2014 invasion of Crimea and has been gradually escalating ever since. Failure to respond decisively to Russia’s landmark breach of the international order eight years ago directly paved the way for what is now the largest European conflict since WWII.

Russia is already under investigation for war crimes in Ukraine. However, existing legal mechanisms such as the International Criminal Court in The Hague offer an agonizingly slow road to justice and are limited in their ability to hold the Russian Federation and individual Russian leaders fully accountable for their actions.

This is why it is so important to establish a special tribunal to prosecute Russia for the crime of aggression against Ukraine. Aggression is recognized as the “mother of all crimes” in international law as it sets the stage for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. A special tribunal focusing on the crime of aggression would make it possible to hold significant numbers of Russians individually accountable.

Charging Russian leaders with the crime of aggression would allow a special tribunal to prosecute suspects regardless of rank and effectively bypass the issue of immunity for the highest state and military officials. If we want to see Russia’s political leadership prosecuted for atrocities in Ukraine, we need to find them guilty of the crime of aggression.

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The idea of establishing a special tribunal to prosecute Russia for aggression against Ukraine was first voiced by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba in March 2022. Kuleba reiterated his call for a special tribunal on September 7 following Russian dictator Vladimir Putin’s latest incriminating comments on the war. “Putin has just publicly confessed to the crime of aggression against Ukraine: “We did it consciously”. I once again call on all states: back the creation of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression Against Ukraine. The crime is in plain sight. Justice must be served,” he tweeted.

A number of international organizations have already adopted resolutions supporting the idea of a special tribunal. The list currently includes the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. The Lithuanian parliament has passed a resolution backing a special tribunal. Other national parliaments are expected to follow suit in the coming months. Securing the support of more countries is a top priority.

A special tribunal would potentially be able to address the crime of aggression in a far more timely manner than the existing mechanisms for prosecuting war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. There is already ample evidence to demonstrate that Russia’s political leaders are guilty of the crime of aggression based on the definition for the act of aggression adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1974.

The jurisdiction of a future special tribunal should cover all events since the February 2014 invasion and seizure of Crimea, as this marked the beginning of Russian aggression against Ukraine. The tribunal would have a mandate to investigate and prosecute both the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation.

A special tribunal would seek to complement rather than hamper or replace the work of the ICC in Ukraine. The ICC is primarily focused on war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, but experience has demonstrated that it will be difficult and time-consuming in practice to pass guilty verdicts against senior Russians and establish their personal responsibility for specific atrocities committed in Ukraine such as the mass killings in Bucha.

The ICC also faces other potential obstacles in terms of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in relation to the situation in Ukraine. The existing rules do not allow the ICC to address Putin’s war of aggression as a crime because Russia has not ratified the Rome Statute and the relevant amendments. Meanwhile, any attempts to refer the issue to the United Nations Security Council would inevitably be vetoed by Russia.

It is only natural that some of Ukraine’s partners might be cautious about the idea of a special tribunal. This is particularly true of those Western leaders who remain under the illusion that constructive dialogue with Russia is still possible. Skeptics need to accept that Russia’s decision to launch a genocidal invasion on February 24 placed the country in direct opposition to the existing international order and the entire civilized world. It is not possible to be half-pregnant. The sooner the international community recognizes this grave reality, the better equipped we will all be to deal with it. The best way to do so is via the creation of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine.

Olena Khomenko is a member of the Ukrainian parliament with the Servant of the People party.

Alesia Rudnik — Wed, 17 Aug 2022 22:00:34 +0000

More than four hundred representatives of the Belarusian opposition gathered in Vilnius on August 8-9 for an event that highlighted a mood of increasing militancy as the movement responds to the new realities created by Russia’s ongoing invasion of neighboring Ukraine.

The conference in the Lithuanian capital was timed to mark the second anniversary of nationwide protests which rocked Belarus in the wake of the country’s August 2020 presidential election. With strong backing from Moscow, Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka was eventually able in suppress the 2020 protest movement. However, he now finds himself heavily dependent on the Kremlin and has been forced to play a supporting role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine that few Belarusians welcome.

Lukashenka’s status as junior partner in Putin’s Ukraine war has helped to reinvigorate the Belarusian opposition while also forcing its leaders to rethink strategy. The 2020 protests succeeded in attracting mass participation but the movement proved no match for the unprecedented repressive measures unleashed by Lukashenka. Despite the violence of the regime response, opposition leaders remained committed to peaceful and lawful protests.

Decisions taken recently in Vilnius highlight how Belarusian opposition leaders are now addressing the effectiveness of peaceful protests and exploring their options in light of the war in Ukraine. A key outcome of the conference was the formation of a transition cabinet including a number of more militant figures who had previously been relegated to the fringes of Belarus’s anti-Lukashenka movement.

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The new transition cabinet follows on from the creation of an anti-war movement to unite all Belarusians in support of Ukraine, which was announced by Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya during the first days of the Russian invasion. This initiative sought to unite Belarusians in Belarus itself with members of the diaspora and opposition figures in exile.

Others have already gone further in their opposition to Belarusian participation in Putin’s war. The most effective domestic opponents so far have been the railway partisans, a group of Belarusian activists who sabotaged the country’s rail network to prevent the transit of Russian troops and military equipment to Ukraine. Their activities proved hugely embarrassing for Lukashenka and led to legislative changes in late May that made attacks on rail infrastructure potentially subject to the death penalty.

Belarusian volunteers are also fighting for Ukraine in a number of units including the Belarusian Regiment of Kastus Kalinouski. Many of these volunteers believe a Ukrainian victory will open the way for a free Belarus. They also recognize that if Putin achieves his goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood, this would condemn their own country to a new era of Russian domination.

The growth of both the railway partisan movement and Belarusian volunteer participation in Ukraine has helped spark a broader debate over the need to embrace a more direct approach to opposing the Lukashenka regime. Other more militant groups such as the Supraciu (“Resistance”) movement and the ByPol organization of former Belarusian police officers have also seen their profiles rise in recent months against the backdrop of the Ukraine war. A recent independent opinion poll by Narodny Opros found that Belarusians view ByPol and the Belarusian Regiment as being five times more relevant for the opposition movement than recognized opposition leader Tsikhanouskaya.

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The recent shift within the ranks of the Belarus opposition towards a more militant stance was evident in the composition of the transition cabinet created in Vilnius, which will feature input from ByPol, Supraciu, Cyberpartisans, and the Pahonia Regiment. The cabinet member responsible for defense and security is Valery Sahashchyk, a former Belarusian army officer who is best known for a video address calling on members of the Belarusian military to change sides.

There is an understanding among members of the Belarusian opposition that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has placed their country’s fragile independence in grave danger. Lukashenka has already allowed Putin to invade Ukraine via Belarus. He has also permitted the use of his country as a platform for air raids and missile strikes against Ukrainian targets. Opponents of the Lukashenka regime now fear that Moscow may seek to officially consolidate its current informal control over Belarus.

As the Russian invasion of Ukraine approaches the six-month mark, it is clear that the war is having a profound impact on the political climate in neighboring Belarus. Members of the Belarusian opposition are rethinking their former commitment to exclusively non-violent protest and are now increasingly acknowledging the need to prepare for more active forms of resistance.

At present, this change in tone is most immediately evident in the activities of groups like the railway partisans and the volunteers who have travelled to Ukraine to fight against the Russian invasion. If the mood of militancy continues to spread to the wider opposition movement, it will likely be met with harsher domestic repression. Ultimately, the fate of the Lukashenka regime may hinge on the outcome of the war in Ukraine.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and a Research Fellow at Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

The Soviet authorities experienced almost no negative consequences as a result of this unparalleled slaughter. Indeed, just months after the peak of the famine, the United States granted the USSR official recognition. The outside world simply refused to listen to the handful of courageous voices such as British journalist Gareth Jones who attempted to shed light on the apocalyptic reality of the famine.

Instead of being celebrated for his revelations, Jones was shamefully attacked by his fellow international correspondents. The loudest voice was that of Walter Duranty, the Moscow bureau chief of the New York Times. It says much about how little has been learned that this disgraced genocide accomplice still holds a Pulitzer Prize despite calls for him to be posthumously stripped of the award.

Since regaining independence in 1991, Ukrainians have thrown off the shackles of Soviet censorship and chronicled the full extent of the Holodomor (“Death by Hunger”), as the famine is known in Ukraine. During the post-Soviet era, growing awareness of the Holodomor has been instrumental in bringing about a broader re-evaluation of the country’s totalitarian past.

The same cannot be said for modern Russia. Far from acknowledging the famine as an act of genocide, Moscow continues to downplay or deny Soviet crimes against humanity. Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin has sought to rehabilitate the entire Soviet era and has built modern Russian national identity around a cult-like veneration of the USSR’s role in the defeat of Nazi Germany. Attempts to condemn the mass murders of the Soviet regime are now routinely dismissed as unpatriotic and anti-Russian, while Stalin himself is once again openly celebrated as a great leader.

Given the complete failure to hold Russia accountable for the crimes of the past, it is hardly surprising that these crimes are now being repeated. As Lemkin feared, impunity has set the stage for a new era of atrocities.

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The ideological foundations for today’s genocide were first laid in the wake of Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution. This Ukrainian pro-democracy uprising was a watershed moment for the entire post-Soviet region. It was viewed with horror by many in Moscow, who saw it as the next stage in a Russian imperial retreat that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

Putin’s response was to enter into increasingly open confrontation with the West while seeking to reassert Russian authority throughout the post-Soviet region. In the years following the Orange Revolution, the Kremlin developed the concept of the “Russkiy Mir” (“Russian World”), meaning a community of people beyond the borders of modern Russia bound by common ties of language, culture and religion who owe their allegiance to Moscow.

As the concept of the Russian World evolved, state officials and regime proxies in Moscow began to directly question the legitimacy of the Soviet collapse and challenge the verdict of 1991. It became increasingly common to hear prominent figures publicly deny the sovereignty and national identity of former Soviet republics or reject the entire notion of an independent Ukraine.

This unashamedly imperial agenda was actively promoted for over a decade throughout the Russian information space via everything from blockbuster movies and TV documentaries to opinion pieces and public holidays. Kremlin troll factories seeded social media with revisionist historical narratives justifying Russian expansionism, while an endless parade of Kremlin-curated political talk shows primed the Russian public for the coming genocide.

A major landmark in these efforts came in summer 2021 with the publication of Putin’s personal essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians.” This historically illiterate 5000-word treatise was widely interpreted as a declaration of war against Ukrainian statehood. The Russian dictator used the article to reiterate his frequently voiced conviction that Russians and Ukrainians are “one people” while also claiming that much of modern-day Ukraine occupies historically Russian lands. He concluded with a thinly veiled threat, declaring, “I am confident that true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia.”

Despite these very public preparations for genocide, few observers were prepared for the atrocities that would come in the wake of Russia’s February 2022 invasion. In the weeks leading up to the invasion, reports emerged of detailed Russian plans for mass detentions, concentration camps, and priority kill lists. These warnings were widely dismissed as inconceivable but were to prove all too accurate.

The scale of Russia’s crimes over the past six months remains difficult to comprehend. Entire cities have been reduced to rubble. Thousands have been executed. Millions have been forcibly deported to Russia. The core infrastructure of the Ukrainian state has been methodically targeted for destruction, along with the country’s cultural heritage. In areas under Russian occupation, all national symbols and traces of Ukrainian identity are being eradicated. The entire world is witnessing a textbook example of genocide unfolding in real time on smartphone screens and social media threads.

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