Democratic Transitions - Atlantic Council

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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Volodymyr Dubovyk, Associate Professor, Odesa Mechnikov National University: I did not have high expectations for the summit and did not think it was likely to become a breakthrough moment in Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership, so I cannot say I was particularly disappointed. At the same time, it is clear that the wording of the final communique was not good. It was reminiscent of the vague language used in Bucharest back in 2008, and reflected the widely acknowledged lack of agreement among NATO allies over Ukrainian membership. Some of the passages from the communique, such as the references to interoperability between Ukraine and the alliance, gave the impression that the dramatic events of the past year and a half had not happened at all.

Having said that, my main concern was that tension over the NATO membership issue could damage ongoing military, political, and financial support for Ukraine in its war of liberation. This did not happen. There was some evidence of emotions flying high, with President Zelenskyy’s angry tweet on the way to the summit provoking a defensive reaction from some allies, but the overall mood was one of constructive cooperation and partnership.

Iuliia Mendel, former press secretary to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy: Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians demonstrate their commitment to Ukrainian democracy and independence every day as they defend the country along the front lines of the war with Russia. This NATO summit was an opportunity to send a positive signal to them that their sacrifices are acknowledged and appreciated. Unfortunately, the summit communique was too vague to send a clear message.

Instead of decisive action, I saw a lot of bureaucratic discussion. This was frustrating, especially as an invitation would not have meant immediate Ukrainian accession to NATO. It would not have triggered Article 5 or plunged NATO into a war with Russia. Ukrainians find this approach hard to stomach. For us, NATO is a matter of national survival, not a box-ticking exercise.

There are two main reasons for the diplomatic compromises we witnessed in Vilnius. Firstly, some Western leaders are still concerned that issuing Ukraine with an invitation to join NATO could lead to an escalation and expansion of the current war. Secondly, there are also legitimate reservations over Ukraine’s readiness for membership, particularly in terms of the country’s domestic reform agenda.

Despite the disappointment of the Vilnius summit, I remain confident that Ukraine has earned the right to join NATO and will achieve membership sooner or later. Nevertheless, there is no denying that an important opportunity to demonstrate international support for Ukraine has been missed.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy traveled personally to Lithuania on Tuesday, but his last-minute intervention was unable to sway the doubters and secure the kind of unambiguous membership commitment Ukraine has long sought. “Today I embarked on a trip here with faith in decisions, with faith in partners, with faith in a strong NATO. In a NATO that does not hesitate, does not waste time, and does not look back at any aggressor,” he wrote in a carefully worded but emotionally charged post following publication of the summit declaration. “I would like this faith to become confidence; confidence in the decisions that all of us deserve and every warrior, every citizen, every mother, every child expects. Is that too much to expect?” In a social media commentary posted earlier on Tuesday, he was significantly more outspoken, criticizing NATO’s failure to state a specific membership timeline as “unprecedented and absurd.”

Others were in even less diplomatic mood. “No amount of spin will turn this into a “great” or “historic” summit. Best not even to start,” posted former Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves. Some fellow politicians in the Baltic region clearly agreed. “This is not leadership,” tweeted Lithuanian MP Zygimantas Pavilionis. “This is appeasement that normally leads to final defeat.” In Kyiv, Ukrainian Ambassador for Strategic Communications Olexander Scherba questioned the logic behind the apparent fear among some NATO members of provoking Putin. “The strategy of “not provoking Russia” is in reality a strategy of provoking Russia,” he wrote. “That’s how it goes with bullies. Will the West ever see it?”

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Meanwhile, many in Ukraine expressed anger at the apparent lack of urgency among the country’s international partners. These feelings of frustration were summed up in a powerful post by veteran Ukrainian anti-corruption activist Daria Kaleniuk: “Ukraine needs “strategic patience”. Should I patiently wait until a Russian missile strikes my apartment in Kyiv with my kids inside? Or should I patiently wait for my son to turn eighteen and go to fight in a war against the largest threat to NATO? Delays cost lives!”

Despite the undeniable mood of anti-climax in Ukraine, the country’s famed wartime spirit of resilience was also on display as Ukrainians reacted to news from Lithuania. “Disappointment but not discouragement. Next stop, Washington DC,” posted Alyona Getmanchuk, director of the Kyiv-based New Europe Center think tank and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, in reference to next year’s NATO summit, which is scheduled to take place in the US capital.

Ukrainian MP Oleksiy Goncharenko echoed this sentiment regarding the need to focus on securing a firm membership commitment at the 2024 summit, but warned that further delays could have grave consequences for public opinion in Ukraine. If there is no progress toward joining NATO by this time next year, he wrote, Ukrainians will ask: “So we are good enough to die for democracy and not good enough to live together with other free nations in one alliance?”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

According to a recent survey conducted across twenty-one cities, between 87% and 96% of Ukrainian residents wish to remain in their cities after the war, with 39% to 62% of respondents agreeing that local officials should decide reconstruction priorities. Clearly, leaders who have managed local response systems are well equipped to identify local needs and mobilize available resources for future targeted reconstruction projects.

For this reason, it is crucial that Ukraine’s nascent reconstruction strategies incorporate local leaders and mayors as primary actors charged with directing and managing redevelopment initiatives. Although any Ukrainian “Marshall Plan” will certainly prioritize financing redevelopment projects and infrastructure repair, Ukrainian officials and the country’s international partners should also work to establish new relationships that empower leaders at the local level.

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Numerous plans to address Ukraine’s future economic and political engagement with transatlantic and other recovery institutions are already underway. During the recent Ukraine Recovery Conference in London, public and private leaders from over 60 countries pledged significant financial resources to address humanitarian needs and outline investments in Ukraine’s battered economy.

Kyiv had earlier presented a draft Recovery and Development Plan at the 2022 Ukraine Recovery Conference in Lugano, Switzerland. This plan outlined the need for approximately 850 reconstruction projects set over ten years with total costs estimated at $750 billion dollars.

In January 2023, the European Commission also unveiled its Multi-Agency Donor Coordination Platform, which is designed to streamline future Ukrainian international recovery assistance and establish clear, transparent, and accountable financial standards. While such initiatives help secure much-needed funds, Ukraine and its allies must also seek to utilize these global opportunities and engage Ukraine’s local leaders as vital partners in their country’s recovery.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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Expanding on Ukraine’s decentralization experience is not only a pragmatic wartime imperative necessary for distributing equipment and supplies; it will also build upon established reforms necessary for Ukraine’s democratic consolidation. Beginning in 2014 as part of the many sweeping reforms enacted after the Euromaidan Revolution, political decentralization has been an important way of reducing Soviet-style centralization in Kyiv while combating corruption.

Over the past nine years, Ukraine’s mayors have started to gain experience developing and managing public policies and directly responding to constituent needs. Over this period, more than 10,000 informal local councils were merged into officially recognized municipalities and granted formal administrative oversight and financial regulatory powers. Up until Russia’s 2022 invasion, decentralized economic and political reforms introduced unprecedented positive changes in quality of life for millions of Ukrainians; the share of citizens living below subsistence levels fell from 52% to 23% between 2015 to 2019.

Ukraine’s continued success in creating resilient local governance systems will require cooperation with national political leaders with clear expectations outlined in legal commitments. Meanwhile, examples of renewed political centralization in response to wartime demands have highlighted possible fault lines between local and national figures. This trend threatens to exacerbate tensions if left unchecked.

In the city of Chernihiv, located approximately 90 miles north of Kyiv, Mayor Vladyslav Atroshenko was removed by courts following an investigation by Ukraine’s National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC) into the alleged use of a municipally-owned car by the mayor’s wife to evacuate from the city during the opening days of the war. Mayor Atroshenko himself stayed in Chernihiv to oversee the defense of the city which withstood a siege and partial occupation in spring 2022.

In the city of Rivne in western Ukraine, rumblings grow of Mayor Oleksandr Tretyak potentially being removed in relation to an NAPC investigation into the payment of bonuses to city officials in 2020. At the same time, Mayor Tretyak claims he has come under increasing pressure to move limited city budget money to the region’s civil military administration, something he has so far refused to do, claiming that the city has already fulfilled all budgetary support requirements. These examples have fueled speculation over the direction of wartime centralization and should give pause to local authorities and regional civic leaders.

Any future national reconstruction policy will be best served by building upon Ukraine’s localized leadership assets and incorporating local councils, mayors, and officials in decision-making processes. By directing incoming aid at the local level, global partners can help expand technical, strategic, and administrative capacities and ensure resources are used effectively across targeted issues. Ukraine’s dedication to continued decentralization reforms is not only necessary to achieve reconstruction goals but is also a critical component of the country’s mission to develop transparent democratic systems from the ground up moving forward.

Zachary Popovich is a senior program associate at the International Republican Institute. Michael Druckman is the resident program director for Ukraine at the International Republican Institute.

Atlantic Council — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 19:50:34 +0000

The post Pavia joins i24NEWS to discuss Europe’s approach towards Tunisia and the concerning democratic backsliding within the country. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The new Ukraine will be a country worthy of its heroes

Yulia Svyrydenko — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 01:22:19 +0000

People often talk about achieving strength through adversity. In Ukraine, this is the everyday reality for millions of people. Over the past sixteen months, Ukrainian courage has stunned the world. This is not just a matter of resilience; Ukrainians know that we face destruction if we do not win.

Thanks to Ukrainian bravery and determination, almost nobody now doubts our ability to survive the war and defeat Russia’s invasion. However, many international observers are now starting to ask a new question: What will Ukraine do next?

I was recently in my hometown of Chernihiv. Russia tried to seize it in the first weeks of the full-scale war. For a period, the city was surrounded. One year later, Chernihiv is humming with activity. Ruins are gradually being rebuilt and businesses are working. During my trip, I talked to a local entrepreneur, Andrii, who owns a small store. He donates half of his profits to the Ukrainian military. Andrii asked me: “Of course, we will win, but what happens next? How will the country develop?”

I answered him and I can answer the whole world. We have a clear vision of what Ukraine must become and how to achieve it. Our plan for Ukraine has three pillars: security, freedom, and drive.

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Security comes first. All other efforts will be futile without this key ingredient. Ukraine needs a strong army to ensure the safety of our people and our economy. This is also the only way to make sure NATO’s eastern border remains secure.

Freedom is the second pillar. This is a central aspect of Ukraine’s European identity. As a nation, we stand for human rights and against international aggression. The new Ukraine will be a place where citizens and businesses have the freedom to innovate and succeed. We aim to remove unnecessary barriers to business development while ensuring inclusion and equality through social policies.

The third pillar is drive, shaping our goal for dynamic growth. We want Ukraine to become a global competitor and contributor, not a state dependent on others. By attracting investment and promoting innovation, Ukraine will become a new engine of European economic growth.

Ultimately, Ukraine’s goal is to join the Trillion Dollar Club. We need to finance a strong army of 500,000 personnel and a highly developed defense sector, as well as social services, education, and healthcare. A GDP of $1 trillion will enable ample funding for these sectors without imposing a critical burden on the budget.

At present, we see an investment potential in the region of $500–900 billion toward the rebuilding of Ukraine over the next 20 years. Additionally, replacing Russian and Chinese exports to EU and G7 countries could generate very large volumes annually.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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The construction industry and infrastructure development are top priorities. Currently, the damage inflicted by Russia on Ukraine’s residential sector alone amounts to over $54 billion. Reconstruction will require a significantly larger investment, creating unprecedented challenges and opportunities for the entire sector. We envisage a generational infrastructure upgrade that moves Ukraine away from the post-Soviet model and toward a modern European approach.

In the longer term perspective, we intend to rely on sectors where Ukraine already has proven potential and can offer globally competitive solutions. This includes food security, green transition, high-end technology, and industry.

We are committed to participating in the green transition, which is essential for Europe. This will make it possible to replace Russian energy resources. Our understanding of the green transition goes beyond energy to include the development of green metallurgy and a shift toward green logistics. Furthermore, Ukraine’s large reserves of strategic minerals position us as a major player in the production of lithium-ion batteries and nuclear fuel. The availability of resources provides an opportunity for high-tech production, opening the way for the EU to replace supplies from China.

Industrial development will generate demand for technological solutions and innovation. We expect to see a new boom in the Ukrainian IT sector, as well as the emergence of sectoral R&D centers capable of meeting the needs of other industries and the digital economy.

We are focused on technological development, but we are also very much aware that 350 million people are currently facing starvation worldwide. We aim to boost food security and become a food provider for 600 million people globally.

None of the above would be possible without the people who will make it happen and for whom all of this is intended. We aim to create conditions for millions of Ukrainians to return home and to persuade others to relocate to Ukraine by implementing attractive social policies and citizenship rules.

Simultaneously, we need to do the same for investors. The task we face is enormous. Ukraine’s record annual foreign direct investment (FDI) total remains the $11 billion received in 2007. We must attract at least that amount every single year for the next two decades.

We understand that investors need to see tangible results not just ambitious plans. Key steps include reform of Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies and courts, along with the establishment of strong and independent regulators. If successfully implemented, this will provide an institutional framework to ensure fair play and anti-corruption policies.

Setting up a business in Ukraine will become easy. We will simplify and digitize all processes involved in the creation of a new business, from construction permits and environmental regulations to turnkey utilities connections. We will reform monetary, tax, and labor policies by revising rates and tariffs and liberalizing the labor market. Ukraine will become one of the most convenient places on the planet to do business.

Ukraine’s future goes beyond sectoral growth. We envision ourselves as an integral part of the European community and a driving force for global development. We will contribute to international security, propose solutions for shared challenges, and establish good governance practices.

Over the last 10 years, Ukraine has already made significant progress toward countering corruption. Further advances are crucial as we seek to become a NATO member to protect our nation, and as we pursue EU membership to open up new business opportunities and consolidate reforms.

There is no alternative for us. Ukrainians must turn these ambitions into reality to ensure the country’s future safety and preserve freedom. Otherwise, Russia will remain a threat and will inevitably make another attempt to destroy Ukraine.

We call on all Ukrainians to return home and invite the global community to join us on this transformative journey. We invite them to invest in our resilient nation and to become shareholders in the prosperity that Ukraine’s success will surely bring. This is more than a national task; it is a global call to action. It will show how ordinary people in extraordinary times can turn adversity into strength.

Yulia Svyrydenko is Ukraine’s First Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Development and Trade.

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Prior to the February 2022 full-scale invasion of their country, Ukrainians already had a long history of fighting hard for their rights and freedoms. During the decades following the Soviet collapse, independent Ukraine saw significant progress toward mostly free and fair elections and other basic human rights. The nation also decentralized political and budgetary powers, brought greater transparency to government spending, overhauled its banking sector, and made headway on improving the governance of state-owned enterprises, many of which are slated for privatization.

Despite the horrors of the Russian invasion, a number of current indications suggest Ukraine is ready for further progress. The Ukrainian military is now one of the most powerful in Europe. An influential civil society and a relatively free press are among the stronger pillars of this vibrant democracy. The technology sector is thriving and is helping to dismantle what had been a stifling bureaucracy, one of many hangovers from the Soviet Union. But much work remains.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Today, military victory is obviously Ukraine’s top national priority. At the same time, any Ukrainian will tell you that one of the many realities separating them from Russia is that Ukrainians have a clear military objective and, unlike Russia, know what they are fighting for: freedom. The steps needed to achieve this freedom will extend beyond the battlefield and will include further advances in decentralization, political pluralism, press freedoms, adherence to the rule of law, anti-corruption, human rights, and democratic elections.

It will, for example, be critical for Ukraine to ensure free and fair elections when the country returns to party politics following the end of armed hostilities with Russia. For this to happen, time will be needed to ensure that necessary legislative amendments are passed in an open manner; that political competitors have reasonable and equitable access to the media; that the electoral infrastructure is ready; that financial reporting for political contestants resumes; and that voter registration lists are up to date. As the international community gathers to plan support for Ukraine’s recovery, it is essential that Ukraine’s allies stand ready to support this critical aspect of the nation’s future.

Just as Ukraine has surpassed all expectations in its courageous fight against Russia’s full-scale invasion launched 16 months ago, the nation must also outperform reform expectations once it defeats Russia’s military. After all, this embodies what the nation is fighting for. Further reform measures are also critical as a means of securing continued and expanding support from the country’s international partners, including for recovery and reconstruction.

Ukraine’s heroic resistance to Russia’s war of aggression is the story of a progressing democracy’s resistance to autocracy. The free world is providing military, economic, and humanitarian support for Ukraine because most view Ukraine’s struggle as their own. In this sense, Russia’s full-scale invasion is not only a criminal assault against a sovereign country, but against democracy everywhere. The world needs to see Ukraine’s recovery in the same light as a chance to advance shared democratic values.

Peter Erben is Principal Advisor at the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) (global) and Senior Country Director at IFES Ukraine. Gio Kobakhidze is Deputy Country Director at IFES Ukraine.

The ignored history

To understand the current moment in India-Bangladesh relations, we must analyze the progression of the relationship between Bangladesh and India over the past fourteen years. The relationship, since the Awami League came into power in 2009, has been officially described as “the golden era,” but Bangladeshi analysts have expressed concerns that the relationship has perhaps become lopsided in favoring India. Under the Hasina regime, India has received Bangladesh’s support in rooting out insurgency in India’s Northeastern region, securing transit through Bangladesh, gaining permanent access to two main ports in the Bay of Bengal, signing an energy deal which ensures that Bangladesh buys electricity with the highest cost, inking an agreement which allows India to install a surveillance system in the Bay of Bengal, agreeing to a water-sharing deal which provides India control over the river Kushiyara and engaging in close defense cooperation to name but a few significant bilateral achievements. On the contrary, Bangladesh’s repeated request to sign a deal about Teesta River water sharing has been ignored; the India-Bangladesh border has become the most violent border as Indian Border Security Force (BSF) continue to kill Bangladeshis in large numbers; trade gaps between the two countries have increased over the years in favor of India; and Bangladesh has not received support from India dealing with the Rohingya refugee crisis. In 2018, responding to a question on whether she wants reciprocation from India, Hasina stated that India will remember forever what Bangladesh gave it. This unequal relationship has persisted because of India’s unqualified support to the Hasina government. In the wake of the 2014 election, the Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh visited Dhaka and allegedly pressured the Jatiya Party, led by General H.M. Ershad, to join the election which was boycotted by all opposition parties. In 2018, although it was evident to the Indian establishment that the Awami League has already “assiduously subverted democratic norms and institutions” and that in a fair election “the Awami League will be reduced to an embarrassing minority in the next Parliament,” India’s support to the Awami League was unflinching. Such actions contribute to a perception in Bangladesh that India’s support is vital for the survival of the Hasina government. Such suspicion was further cemented when Foreign Minister AK Abdul Momen said in 2022 that he had asked India to ensure the Hasina government’s survival at any cost.

The follies of Indian media coverage

Three follies are easily discerned in the arguments of Indian commentators:

While they are criticizing the United States for what they are describing as intrusion into Bangladesh’s domestic politics, they conveniently ignore how India has maintained its influence over the past decade and ironically call upon the Indian government to side with the incumbent Hasina regime disregarding their own stated concerns about sovereignty. While the United States has repeatedly reaffirmed that it is not favoring any party over the other but simply underscoring the need for a fair electoral process, the Indian media are asking it to interject on behalf of a specific political party.
They are implicitly suggesting that a fair election will deliver a victory to the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). This concern is difficult to square with their claims that Bangladesh has achieved remarkable economic and social successes in the past fourteen years and that Hasina has the support of most of the population.
The argument that a victory of BNP will reignite militancy disregards the global context of the rise of transnational and regional terrorist groups around the world and the changed circumstances. It is not a stretch to suggest that such an argument is nothing short of using Islamist bogeymen to justify undemocratic behavior.

How India assumed the commanding position

The enormous influence of India over Bangladesh’s domestic politics is a result of a geopolitical game in the region since 2001, and reflects the conspicuous absence of the United States. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States remained focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Iraq invasion diverted its attention from South Asia. A growing relationship between the United States and India gave the latter the opportunity to extend its sphere of influence. This was furthered by China’s assertive policy, which began after Xi Jinping became the leader, and South Asia became one of the battlegrounds. The United States had seen India as the antidote to China. As for the Bangladesh policy, despite Washington’s reliance on India, it disagreed with New Delhi on the course of Bangladesh’s democratic trajectory. In 2013-14, New Delhi and Washington went through several rounds of conversations about the need for an inclusive election in Dhaka. Then United States ambassador to Bangladesh, Dan Mozena, made several visits to New Delhi, but India took a firmer stand and rebuffed United States efforts. The United States backstepped, allowed India to do its bidding, and the Hasina government continued; however, the United States had not lost sight of the continued regression of human rights and democracy in Bangladesh as reflected in the annual human rights reports of the State Department.

The United States returns to Bangladesh

With the Presidency of Joe Biden, democracy and human rights once again are a professedly cornerstone of United States foreign policy. This has spurred a change in Bangladesh policy. The imposition of sanctions on Bangladesh’s elite police force, the Rapid Actions Battalion (RAB), and its seven officials in December 2021, and serious warnings through 2022 and early 2023, clearly revealed that Bangladesh is being closely watched by the United States administration. The growing influence of China on Bangladesh since 2016 and United States focus on the Indo-Pacific region enhance the geo-political significance of Bangladesh. As such, the United States seemed to adopt a carrot-and-stick policy towards Bangladesh. The United States donated the largest number of COVID-19 vaccines to Bangladesh, but such largesse was also accompanied by concerns regarding the erosion of democracy. These efforts, which didn’t go through New Delhi, showed that the “US is no longer watching Bangladesh through the Indian lens.”

Does the Indian government’s silence bear any message?

Despite the intense discussions in the media, there hasn’t been any official word from New Delhi regarding the new United States policy or the growing tension between the United States and Bangladesh. New Delhi has remained studiously silent. Unlike in 2014, India is leaving the US-Bangladesh issue out of its public posture. After the imposition of sanctions on RAB, India’s reaction was muted, although Bangladesh sought India’s help to reverse the decision. Many wondered whether New Delhi was consulted on the issue, and there is no indication that New Delhi ever raised the issue with Washington.

Three interpretations of India’s current lack of engagement are worth considering:

Despite United States actions demanding a reversal of democratic erosion, New Delhi is comfortable with the status quo. In the past year and a half, as US officials were sending strong messages to Bangladesh regarding the human rights situation and democracy, public messages from India were a show of support to Hasina. Visits of Indian Foreign Secretary Vinay Khatra in February this year and Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar in April and May, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s invitation to Hasina as an observer to the Group of Twenty to be held in New Delhi in September are cases in point. These give the impression that “New Delhi … wants Hasina to win by any means.” It bears watching if India will use its leverage with the United States to convince the Biden administration to soften its Bangladesh policy in the coming months.
India is not opposed to the United States pressure on Bangladesh, which it recognizes will make Hasina vulnerable and more dependent on India to act an interlocutor between Bangladesh and the United States and as a countervailing force to China. The more vulnerable the regime in Dhaka is, the more leverage New Delhi will hold.
Considering the high-stake geopolitical contestation between United States and China in the Asia-Pacific region and the increasing importance of Bangladesh in this tug-of-war, India is grudgingly accepting that it is becoming a secondary external actor in Bangladeshi politics as the United States no longer considers India a strong player.

What should the United States and India do?

India-US relations are complex. Both nations emphasize the strategic interdependence reflected in their close cooperation through several multilateral frameworks such as QUAD and Indo-Pacific strategy and bilateral engagement in defense and trade. However, India’s own democratic erosion has drawn attention in the United States in recent years. Additionally, some are raising questions about the reliability of India’s foreign policy and whether India is a safe bet for the United States against China.

Whether the Bangladesh issue will be included on the Biden-Modi summit agenda next week in Washington is an open question. Considering other pressing issues around the world, and several other issues of divergence between the United States and India, Bangladesh may seem less significant but larger geopolitical considerations pertaining to the Indo-Pacific region undoubtedly dictate that Bangladesh receive attention. It’s incumbent on the United States to let India know that they will follow through in its promise to defend Bangladesh’s democracy, and that its broader South Asia policy will not be shaped by its relationship with New Delhi. How India navigates the tension between its global aspirations and regional preferences will be revealing indeed.

Ali Riaz is a non-resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

SouthAsiaSource Jun 6, 2023

What the new US visa policy for Bangladesh means

By Ali Riaz

The US visa restrictions alone will not guarantee a free and fair election or restore democracy in Bangladesh. However, the new policy sends a loud and clear message.

Bangladesh Democratic Transitions

SouthAsiaSource Dec 16, 2021

US sanctions on Bangladesh’s RAB: What happened? What’s next?

By Ali Riaz

On December 10, the US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on Bangladesh’s elite paramilitary force, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), as well as seven of its current and former officers due to serious human rights violations. This has created a stir in Bangladesh.

Bangladesh Human Rights

New Atlanticist Jul 2, 2020

As the Sino-Indian rivalry heats up, watch Bangladesh carefully

By Ali Riaz

Undoubtedly rivalry between India and China will intensify in South Asia in coming months and years ahead. With its position between the two rivals, Bangladesh will be a primary arena to watch the future competition.

Bangladesh China

Younus in Al Jazeera: Who is Imran Khan?

Atlantic Council — Thu, 15 Jun 2023 14:00:51 +0000

The post Younus in Al Jazeera: Who is Imran Khan? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why Ukrainian NATO membership would actually be good for Russia

Leonid Gozman — Wed, 14 Jun 2023 07:42:05 +0000

Vladimir Putin claims one of the main goals of his Ukraine invasion is to prevent the country joining NATO. This objective may at first glance appear broadly reasonable, but on closer inspection, it actually goes directly against Russia’s own national interests.

The idea that Ukrainian NATO membership would pose a security threat to Russia ranks among Putin’s most enduring myths. In reality, however, no NATO member has ever threatened to attack Russia. On the contrary, Russia’s shared borders with NATO have always been strikingly calm and secure. Notably, this was also the case throughout the Soviet era and stands in contrast to some other Russian borders. If Ukraine joins NATO, it would significantly increase Russia’s own border security.

The interests of the Russian people are best served by a sustainable and lasting peace rather than wars of conquest. Ukraine’s NATO accession would strengthen the alliance and improve its ability to resist Russian aggression. This would greatly reduce the risk of a new war in Ukraine, as not even Putin is ready to enter into an open war with NATO. Instead, the Russian population would be much likelier to live peaceful lives.

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Crucially, Ukrainian NATO membership would mean an end to dreams of restoring the Russian Empire. This would be good news for all Russians, who have no need of an empire. In today’s world, imperial ambitions bring crushing economic and moral burdens that hamper the development of a country and lead to stagnation.

It is also inaccurate to assume, as many currently do, that a majority of Russians share the same imperial aspirations promoted by Putin himself. In fact, during the years of the Soviet collapse, there were literally zero rallies calling on Moscow to prevent the various Soviet republics from securing independence, despite the fact that protests were possible at that time. Indeed, following the tragic events of January 1991 in Vilnius, when Soviet troops killed 13 Lithuanians, around a million people attended a massive rally in central Moscow demanding recognition of Lithuanian independence. These people took to the streets not in defense of empire but in support of freedom.

Back then, nobody saw the fall of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” as Putin would later state. According to polling data, the Russian public only began showing signs of “imperial nostalgia” some 15 years later in the mid-2000s. This change in mood was due to official propaganda rather than any deep-seated notions of imperial identity.

Far from marking a regrettable retreat from empire, the collapse of the Soviet Union was an undeniably positive development for Russia. Similarly, the current revival of imperialism in Russia poses an existential threat to the country’s future. Ukrainian NATO membership would be a big step toward abandoning the idea of empire entirely, and that would be a positive development for all Russians.

It is clearly in Russia’s interests to have stable, predictable, and non-aggressive neighbors. NATO member states represent exactly this kind of neighbor. If Ukraine joins the alliance, this would go a long way to allaying fears within Russia over possible future Ukrainian revenge after the current war ends.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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Ukrainian accession to NATO would help raise living standards in the country by obliging the Ukrainian authorities to implement vital reforms. This would be particularly good news for Russia. Like any other country, Russia has an interest in the prosperity of neighboring states and stands to benefit from improved trade and other economic ties if Ukraine achieves a higher standard of living.

Joining NATO would also strengthen Ukraine’s democratic institutions. This would help demonstrate to the Russian public that democracy can thrive in the post-Soviet space. Russians are just as interested in personal freedoms and democratic values as anyone else, but they are bombarded with propaganda from the Kremlin convincing them that freedom and democracy are only possible in the West and will never take root inside Russia.

The Putin regime supports this incompatibility argument by pointing to various aspects of Russian society that allegedly make the country unsuitable for democracy, such as Russia’s dominant Slavic Orthodox culture. However, as a fellow predominantly Slavic Orthodox nation that many Russians view as extremely similar to their own country, Ukraine can debunk such arguments. Indeed, this is a key reason why the Kremlin views Ukrainian democracy as such a threat.

Unless Ukraine joins NATO, even the complete liberation of the country will not bring sustainable peace. Putin will not accept defeat and will inevitably attack again. This is exactly what Hitler would have done if the allies had not destroyed his criminal regime along with his war machine. Just as lasting peace was only possible after World War II due to the removal of the Nazi system, future peace in Eastern Europe will depend on the end of the Putin regime. This is clearly in the interests of the Russian people, and will be much more likely if Ukraine joins NATO. Membership of the alliance would provide Ukraine with long-term security, but the benefits to Russia itself would be no less profound.

Leonid Gozman is a Russian politician and commentator.

Nawaz quoted in Nikkei Asia: Imran Khan takes on Pakistan’s powerful military establishment

Atlantic Council — Tue, 13 Jun 2023 17:46:15 +0000

Original source

The post Nawaz quoted in Nikkei Asia: Imran Khan takes on Pakistan’s powerful military establishment appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Pavia quoted in La Repubblica on the visit of Italian Prime Minister, Meloni, to Tunisia.

mvahdati — Mon, 12 Jun 2023 18:07:54 +0000

The post Pavia quoted in La Repubblica on the visit of Italian Prime Minister, Meloni, to Tunisia. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Nooruddin in International Studies Review: The forum: Global challenges to democracy? Perspectives on democratic backsliding

Atlantic Council — Mon, 12 Jun 2023 13:35:28 +0000

The post Nooruddin in International Studies Review: The forum: Global challenges to democracy? Perspectives on democratic backsliding appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What the new US visa policy for Bangladesh means

Ali Riaz — Tue, 06 Jun 2023 14:01:51 +0000

The new US visa policy for Bangladeshi citizens, announced on May 24, 2023, has stirred intense discussion and debate in Bangladesh and has also drawn attention from international media. While the policy is unambiguous in its intention, there are questions about the modus operandi of its implementation and effectiveness in achieving the desired goal of protecting Bangladesh’s democratic institutions and freedom of expression.

Cognizant of the fact that the visa policy is in some ways a follow up to earlier measures such as sanctions on the country’s elite force and its officials, many are wondering whether harsher measures will follow.

What does the new policy say?

The purpose of the new visa policy is to support a fair election in Bangladesh as well as those trying to restore the democratic system. The election is scheduled to be held in January 2024. Under this new policy, the United States will be able to deny visas to those who obstruct the election process in Bangladesh.

The actions to be considered “obstructions” to the electoral process and those who will come under it are clearly laid out. Vote rigging, voter intimidation, the use of violence to prevent people from exercising their right to freedoms of association and peaceful assembly, and the use of measures designed to prevent political parties, voters, civil society, or the media from disseminating their views, are listed as acts of obstruction. Those who will come under the purview of the new policy include current and former Bangladeshi officials, members of pro-government and opposition political parties, and members of law enforcement, the judiciary, and security services.

State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller and US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu clarified that this policy is not only applicable to the government and its supporters, but to the opposition as well. Additionally, according to Lu, the restrictions would be applicable to those who give orders.

Implications

The announcement of the policy, though not overtly targeted towards the government, is a clear rejection of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s claim that an environment conducive to a free and fair election is prevailing in the country. This preemptive action is not a punitive measure, but the expansive scope of the policy sends a warning to everyone connected to the electoral process.

The broad scope of the policy shows that Washington is trying to be even-handed with the regime and the opposition, but it is also a reflection of the growing exasperation in Washington about governance in Bangladesh.

Warnings made, warnings ignored

US concerns regarding the deteriorating human rights situation in Bangladesh and overall democratic regression are not new. The United States had taken punitive actions against the elite police force Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) and seven current and former officials in December 2021. It also refrained from inviting Bangladesh to two Democracy Summits, held in December 2021 and in March 2023. These measures were followed by repeated calls and warnings that political development is on the radar of the US establishment. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister A.K. Abdul Momen in April 2023 that the world is watching Bangladesh’s upcoming election. In February 2023, US State Department Counsellor Derek Chollet said that erosion of democracy in any country, including Bangladesh, limits Washington’s ability to cooperate with that country. In March 2022, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland, while visiting Dhaka, underscored the issue of democracy as a key point in the relationship between these two countries. The United States also insisted that RAB reform remain a precondition for rescinding the sanctions.

Unfortunately, these calls and warnings fell on deaf ears. The Bangladeshi government continues to ignore US pressure, instead showing defiance. These calls were riddled with anti-American populist rhetoric such as by Prime Minister Hasina’s son Sajeeb Wazed Joy, describing the US State department as a ”bunch of hypocrites” and Hasina alleging that the United States is trying to topple her.

What prompted these developments?

Both domestic and foreign policy appear to have prompted US actions. Three domestic factors can be identified as influencing Washington’s decision.

The growing authoritarian tendency of the Hasina regime. Obstruction to peaceful opposition rallies and persecution of opposition leaders have intensified in recent months ahead of the election. The government and its supporters have continued with wanton use of draconian laws such as the 2018 Digital Security Act, taking an inflexible position despite criticisms at home and abroad. Additionally, it has made moves to introduce more restrictive laws such as the Data Protection Act (DPA). Introduction of the DPA will adversely impact US investment and businesses in Bangladesh and provide the government enormous regulatory authority.
A likely repeat of the unfree and unfair 2018 election, which was described by international media as “transparently fraudulent.” The government has continued to show indifference to the concerns of the opposition and members of civil society about the role of the election commission in ensuring an inclusive election.
The role of civil administration in local elections, boycotted by the major opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party. This was largely contested by ruling party leaders, but members of the civil administration appear to have shown support for candidates officially nominated by the ruling party.

Geopolitics at play

With the growing international importance of South Asia thanks to heightened competition between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region, US insistence on having a democratic system in Bangladesh is not devoid of geopolitical considerations. Although the US-Bangladesh relationship has expanded and become multifaceted in recent decades, there are concerns in Washington about China’s assertive posture in Bangladesh.

Besides buying two submarines from China in 2016, Bangladesh joined Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the same year. The BRI is not only a framework for infrastructure development and cooperation in different countries but is also a tool to expand China’s sphere of influence. Bangladesh-China cooperation is thus not limited to economic realms. Then-Chinese Ambassador to Dhaka Li Jiming’s warning in 2021 that Bangladesh’s relations with Beijing would be severely harmed if the country joins the US-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue showed the expectation of China.

In the past six months, three top Chinese foreign affairs officials have visited Bangladesh. Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang made a surprise stopover in Dhaka in the middle of the night just before Assistant Secretary Donald Lu’s visit to Bangladesh in January. Chinese Special Envoy to Myanmar Deng Xijun arrived in Dhaka in April just a day before Foreign Minister Momen was to visit Washington.

Further, amid the current tension in US-Bangladesh relations, Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Sun Weidong visited Dhaka for three days beginning May 26, 2023. Bangladesh is considering joining China’s Global Development Initiative. On the contrary, Dhaka’s response to the Indo-Pacific Strategy initiated by the United States did not seem encouraging and Bangladesh’s Indo-Pacific Outlook falls short of Western expectations.

As democracy and human rights are the purported centerpiece of US President Joseph R. Biden and his administration’s foreign policy, it is not surprising that the United States wants to make an example of Bangladesh.

Will it work?

Bangladesh is not the first country subjected to US visa restrictions as a tool to punish those who have subverted the democratic process. Previously, visa restrictions have been imposed on individuals from Nigeria, Somalia, Uganda, Nicaragua, and Belarus for undermining democracy and electoral processes under different laws. In most instances, these measures were adopted after the elections. However, to date, successes have been limited which raises questions as to whether it will have a different impact on Bangladesh.

Adopting such a measure at least seven months ahead of the election in Bangladesh is a positive sign, because Washington can take proactive actions to prevent rather than ex post facto measure. In addition, it is unclear how the US embassy in Dhaka will sort and decide on which cases to follow up and investigate. A former US diplomat with extensive experience at the US embassy has described this as a “daunting task for [a] handful of staff.”

Despite these challenges, the announcement is having an impact on those connected to the government who either aspire to visit the United States in the future or already have immediate family members residing there. This pressure will no doubt be felt among Bangladesh’s political and economic elites.

Looking ahead

The US visa restrictions alone will not guarantee a free and fair election or restore democracy in Bangladesh. However, the new policy sends a loud and clear message to Dhaka as much as to US allies about how Washington views the possible trajectory of Bangladeshi politics. In short, it signals a readiness to act. The desired goal of a free and inclusive election and a return to the democratic path will require a more concerted international effort on the one hand, and political engagement of the citizens of Bangladesh demanding a neutral administration on the other.

Ali Riaz is a non-resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

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Issue Brief May 8, 2023

Bangladesh draft data protection act 2023: Potential and pitfalls

By Christabel Randolph

The Bangladesh government’s updated draft data protection bill is a welcome revision of its 2022 attempt to address the country’s lack of a comprehensive data protection law, but there is still room for constructive change to heighten regulatory certainty.

Bangladesh Digital Policy

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Issue Brief Mar 8, 2023

Inside Bangladesh’s new data protection laws

By Stephen Weymouth

The 2022 Draft Data Protection Act (DPA), which establishes new restrictions related to the processing, storage, and transfer of data, appears to move Bangladesh’s digital governance in a different direction.

Bangladesh Digital Policy

What the new US visa policy for Bangladesh means” class=”gta-horizontal-featured–img” />

SouthAsiaSource Aug 5, 2022

Bangladesh’s economic crisis: How did we get here?

By Ali Riaz

Bangladesh’s economic and financial crisis was paved by the policies of the Hasina government and an unaccountable system of governance of the past decade.

Bangladesh Economy & Business

The fight against courtroom corruption continues in wartime Ukraine

Olena Halushka — Thu, 01 Jun 2023 15:30:28 +0000

The head of Ukraine’s Supreme Court, Vsevolod Kniaziev, was detained in mid-May on corruption charges based on an alleged $2.7 million bribe. The charges were brought by Ukraine’s leading anti-corruption bodies, the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) and National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU). This landmark case reflects the considerable progress made in Ukraine’s struggle against corruption within the judiciary, while also highlighting the key issues that must still be addressed in order to create a rule of law environment that will allow Ukraine to prosper.

The charges against Kniaziev are not entirely unprecedented. In the three-and-a-half years since the creation of Ukraine’s High Anti-Corruption Court, 23 judges have been convicted. Anti-corruption investigations have also led to changes in Ukraine’s judicial infrastructure, such as the liquidation of the controversial Kyiv District Administrative Court, which had long been a focus of major anti-corruption probes.

In summer 2022, Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts received a boost with the appointment of Oleksandr Klymenko as new head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office in line with Ukraine’s obligations regarding EU candidate country status. Klymenko’s appointment was widely seen as a watershed moment that signaled an end to the collective sense of impunity within the Ukrainian establishment. The recent arrest of the Supreme Court head has confirmed that earlier reform failures are not irreversible. It is now important to draw the right conclusions as Ukraine looks to finalize the reform of judicial governance bodies and repair the country’s Constitutional Court.

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The relaunch of Ukraine’s Supreme Court was one of the initial efforts to reform the country’s widely discredited judiciary in the initial aftermath of the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. However, it did not produce the desired results as a number of factors robbed the court of true independence. Unreformed judicial governance bodies were tasked with hiring Supreme Court judges, with civil society offered a superficial role in the selection process and Ukraine’s international partners largely standing aside. As a result, civil society observers assessed that around a quarter of all selected candidates were questionable.

The creation of the High Anti-Corruption Court in 2017-2019 was a more positive experience, with all candidates scrutinized by an independent panel composed of international experts. This paved the way for the cleansing of two judicial governance bodies, the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges, with foreign experts once more playing a crucial role.

In January 2023, Ukraine appointed eight new members to the country’s key judicial governance body, the High Council of Justice (HCJ), thereby enabling it to resume its work. On June 1, the HCJ appointed new members to the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ), which is another significant step forward. However, it is important to highlight that no agents of change from civil society were appointed, while two of the new members have questionable reputations. The next challenge is for the HQCJ to finish qualification assessments and hire judges to fill more than 2,500 vacancies. In addition, further measures are also expected in order to restore public trust in the Supreme Court.

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The next big issue on the path toward rule of law and EU accession is the selection procedure of Constitutional Court judges. EU candidate country status has opened up an historic opportunity to repair the Constitutional Court, which has long wielded effective veto power over any reform efforts in Ukraine. Reforming the Constitutional Court is widely seen as the most politically challenging element of judicial reform for the Ukrainian government to implement.

Additionally, some anti-corruption initiatives that were justifiably put on hold following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion must now be revived. This includes asset declarations for all state officials. The recent bribery charges brought against the head of the Supreme Court underline the urgency of a return to the asset declaration submission and verification process. Concerns regarding this issue have recently been voiced by the International Monetary Fund and EU Ambassador to Ukraine Matti Maasikas.

An independent judiciary and the rule of law have long been recognized as vital pillars for Ukraine’s future success. As the country looks toward the post-war recovery period, these factors are now more important than ever. During the rebuilding process, Ukraine’s partners will demand transparency and security for all state and private sector investments. Additionally, judicial reform has a central role to play in Ukraine’s further EU integration. Crucially, creating a fair legal environment free from corruption is also a key demand of Ukrainian society, including the hundreds of thousands currently defending the country against Russian invasion.

Olena Halushka is a board member at AntAC and co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory.

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To attract the huge volumes of investment, especially private capital, needed to kick start reconstruction and get the economy back on its feet, Ukraine will need to pivot away from war economy measures toward a strategy of private sector growth. The numerous emergency nationalizations that took place last year were understandable at a time when arms production and energy supply were the most urgent priorities. But in the battles that lie ahead, Ukraine’s survival will be determined as much by its economic strength as by its military prowess.

The role of the state was already outsized before Russia’s invasion, with more than 3,500 state-owned enterprises accounting for one-tenth of Ukraine’s output and about 18% of employment. The demands of war mobilization have created a public sector that is now far larger than in any existing EU member state. In the banking sector alone, the state’s share has reached nearly 60%, stifling competition to the point where the Ministry of Finance has been forced to acknowledge that there is currently no functioning financial services market.

Although the prewar target of reducing the state’s share to less than a quarter remains, the Ukrainian parliament is now debating a draft law intended to permit the nationalization of even more banks. The law is designed to deal with a single case, the proposed nationalization of the Sens Bank. However, it is drawn so broadly that critics fear it will give the state discretionary powers to take over almost any bank it wishes. This includes not only those banks that have been targeted with official state sanctions, but also those included on the “shame list” of businesses that continue to trade with Russia.

While it is perfectly understandable that Ukraine should wish to penalize businesses that have failed to cut their ties to Russia, the satisfaction of seizing their assets may come at a high cost if market confidence is undermined by the weakening of property rights. Some legal experts have also questioned whether these widely drawn powers are in line with the Ukrainian Constitution, and have argued that only the National Bank of Ukraine is empowered to approve the nationalization of a bank in cases of insolvency. Nationalizations pushed through by the government for political reasons are likely to be challenged successfully in the courts, according to legal observers.

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An additional consideration is that any increase in the state’s control of the economy is likely to fuel concern about corruption, which remains one of the main obstacles on the path to EU accession. The boundaries between political and economic power, which too often remain blurred in the characteristically post-Soviet style, need to be much more sharply delineated. As numerous scandals have shown, state-controlled banks and enterprises create huge opportunities for self-enrichment and abuses of power by those who control them ostensibly on the nation’s behalf, including kickbacks, nepotism, excessive salaries, and favoritism in the awarding of public contracts.

Instead of considering new measures to extend the state’s reach into the economy, the Ukrainian government should be thinking about how the state can divest itself of assets it has already acquired in a way that is fair, transparent, and most likely to foster the economic growth Ukraine badly needs.

If one of the few beneficial effects of the war has been to accelerate Ukraine’s deoligarchization, one of the emerging risks in its aftermath will be the danger of reoligarchization via privatizations that are opaque and marred by favoritism. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy must resist the temptation to use patronage to create a business class loyal to him. That would leave Ukraine looking less like an EU member-in-waiting and more like a miniature version of Putin’s crony capitalism. There would be no victory in such an outcome.

David Clark was Special Adviser on Europe at the UK Foreign Office 1997-2001 and now works as an independent analyst specializing in foreign policy and European affairs.

Mackinder’s ideas have long held a fascination for those inclined to deterministic and reductive interpretations of international history. For most serious historians and foreign policy practitioners, however, his ideas are far too simplistic and doctrinaire to explain the full gamut of reasons for events in the past, or to facilitate realistic policy formulation in the present.

Mackinder’s arguments were very much of their time, especially in respect of the early twentieth century’s pervasive imperial thinking. His conclusions also reflect the military technologies then available. Attitudes toward imperialism have radically altered since Mackinder was writing, and technological development has generally acted to undermine many of his core assumptions.

Moreover, with the establishment of the Warsaw Pact following World War II, Moscow did establish control over Mackinder’s Heartland, which it then enjoyed for several decades. However, this in no way enabled the Kremlin to dominate the rest of the world.

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Far from being a story of Euro-Atlantic sea power moving to dominate the Heartland, NATO enlargement since 1997 has overwhelmingly been a response to dynamic lobbying by former Warsaw Pact members. Some, such as Poland, immediately sought sanctuary without waiting to see what sort of country the new Russian Federation might become. Others made applications once Putin and the clan which captured the Russian state at the turn of the millennium revealed their intention to reverse rather than manage Russia’s imperial decline.

In most cases, applications were met with initial skepticism by existing NATO members. Yet Patrushev ignores this and wholly removes agency from what he terms as the small states of Eastern Europe when he implies that NATO membership was imposed on them.

Overtures toward Moscow at the end of the Cold War that might have been read as condoning a sphere of influence were made in the expectation that the Russian Federation would develop into a democratic and rule of law-based society. Indeed, many of the applications to join NATO by former Warsaw Pact nations would not have been made if Russia had evolved meaningfully in that direction. Instead, Russia’s unreconstructed imperial mindset has been instrumental in persuading countries in Central and Eastern Europe that NATO membership is the only way to guarantee their national security.

Eurasia Center events

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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Patrushev promotes a conspiracy-driven view of the world that is all-too-common in today’s Russia. In reality, strong international support for Ukraine derives not from outdated geopolitical dogmas or anti-Russian agendas, but from a principled and realistic assessment of what is at stake for democratic, rule of law-based societies around the world should Russia prevail in its aggression. In other words, it is the gallantry of Ukrainians in defending the principles they have chosen, not the space Ukraine occupies on the map, which begets such broad support.

Patrushev’s interview contained a number of other idiosyncratic and occasionally lunatic assertions, which any countries engaging with Russia would do well to take note of when deciding how to calibrate their relations with Russia and Ukraine. His arguments may often appear absurd, but similar claims are regularly repeated by other Russian officials when addressing both domestic and international audiences.

Broad-based support for Ukraine and its Euro-Atlantic integration is far more about ideas and values than about early twentieth century geopolitical abstractions or other obscure theories. Indeed, it is Ukraine’s adoption and defense of core democratic principles which lie at the heart of Moscow’s fear and loathing.

Richard Cashman is an Adjunct Fellow at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

Erdogan won a plurality, but not a majority, of votes, so it will go to a runoff election. But some of the voters for the now-eliminated candidates are likely to swing to Erdogan. If so, that will be too bad for Turkish institutions and also, potentially, for the NATO alliance… Let’s see how the runoff election goes. It’s not over until it’s over. But I think Washington will need to manage with several more years of Erdogan in power.

Matthew Kroenig

Erdogan’s victory will not be good for the Biden administration, though I’m less convinced it’s bad for the United States more generally. Erdogan has always been very transactional and self-interested; not the ideal ally, but you can work with him.

Emma Ashford

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

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Ahmad in Foreign Policy: It’s time to recognize the Taliban

Atlantic Council — Tue, 23 May 2023 15:40:00 +0000

The post Ahmad in Foreign Policy: It’s time to recognize the Taliban appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Quirk in Just Security on adapting the US strategy towards hybrid regimes

sodal — Fri, 19 May 2023 14:06:14 +0000

On May 17, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative Nonresident Senior Fellow Patrick Quirk co-authored a piece for Just Security on the importance of developing a US strategy towards hybrid regimes that promotes US interests whilst remaining steadfast in the US’ commitments to democratic values.

The authors go on to posit that prolonged engagements with hybrid regimes, in the long term, risks impeding upon the US’ global interests, as non-democratic regimes are less likely to uphold the US’ interests on the global stage, and may prove detrimental to the US’ posture in its strategic competition with China.

Failing to address the democratic deficiencies of hybrid regimes sets up the United States for long-term strategic failure and hinders American economic prosperity. To avoid these outcomes, the United States must carve out a new path forward that preserves near-term US interests while also pressing these States to make democratic progress.

Patrick Quirk

Fellow

Patrick Quirk

Freedom and Prosperity Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Civil Society Conflict

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To stop the fighting in Sudan, take away the generals’ money

Ernst Jan “EJ” Hogendoorn — Mon, 01 May 2023 13:25:35 +0000

International partners are scrambling to limit the humanitarian disaster created by the fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan that erupted on April 15 while the last steps of discussions leading to a civilian and democratic transition were expected. Now, it is not enough to simply call for a ceasefire and a return to negotiations because those outcomes could reestablish the fraught balance of power between the SAF and RSF that stymied the eighteen-month-long negotiations for a return to a civilian government—the type of government that most people in Sudan are demanding.

Rather, international partners must increase financial pressure on the RSF, former Bashir-era government officials, and the SAF to change their political calculations at the negotiation table.

Sudan cannot be stable if there are two armies and if former regime elites/Islamists are allowed to sow discord. International partners need to put coordinated financial pressure on RSF leaders to commit to integrating rapidly into the army and on former regime leaders to stop inciting violence; international partners should also put SAF generals on notice that they must honor their pledges to hand over power.

Sudan’s long-ruling former dictator, Omar al-Bashir, was able to stay in power for thirty years by fragmenting the security services and deftly playing them against each other to prevent any one of them from becoming powerful enough to launch a successful coup. In return for their obedience, military and political leaders were allowed to gain control over large parts of the economy and accumulate great wealth. Sustained protests led to Bashir’s April 2019 ouster, a brief period of military rule, and eventually a civilian-military transitional government nominally headed by then Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who governed in “partnership” with SAF General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, the chair and vice-chair respectively of the Transitional Sovereignty Council.

International partners acquiesced to the generals taking these positions of power, thinking that it would help prevent conflict from breaking out between the two rival forces—and that competition between the SAF and the RSF would keep either from dominating the country and would allow the heavily constrained Hamdok and his civilian ministers to implement at least some reforms. While the prime minister was able to introduce some difficult but necessary economic reforms, Burhan and Hemedti launched another coup on October 25, 2021, to block a planned transfer of the Transitional Sovereignty Council chair to a civilian.

The return of military rule was roundly rejected by the Sudanese people, who held frequent protests, and donors, who paused more than four billion dollars in planned economic assistance. The coup leaders came under enormous economic and diplomatic pressure to negotiate another transition, but they occupied irreconcilable positions on security-sector reform. Burhan and his hardline generals wanted the RSF to be rapidly subsumed into the SAF, while Hemedti (backed by his supporters from the periphery) wanted to keep his independent power base and played for time. As “negotiations” dragged on, the two leaders employed different tactics to try to strengthen their own position and weaken the other’s, including importing more weapons, arming communities, trying to splinter their rival’s forces, cutting off sources of funding, allying with civilian politicians, developing bonds with foreign leaders (including Russia), and—at least according to persistent chatter in Khartoum—planning coups in case these other efforts failed to change the balance of power. Tensions waxed and waned over the past one-and-a-half years, and external actors had to intercede a number of times to prevent combat from breaking out. Unfortunately this time, with the Islamists reportedly exacerbating strife and the political negotiations seemingly about to conclude, diplomats have been unable to avert a war.

Neither the SAF nor RSF is capable of a decisive victory, particularly given Sudan’s size and its fractured political landscape. Barring decisive intervention, the most likely scenario is a long and bloody multisided civil war and a staggering humanitarian disaster, like ones seen in Somalia, Syria, or Yemen. This disaster would not be limited to Sudan; it could also destabilize the greater region and drive tens of millions of Sudanese people to flee to neighboring states, the Middle East, and Europe.

That scenario needs to be prevented in a way that ensures the political and military calculations of Hemedti, Burhan, and their supporters change when serious negotiations to restore a civilian government resume. Simply calling for ceasefires or evenly applying diplomatic pressure is not enough. This would only preserve the rough parity of military power between the RSF and SAF. This is not to suggest that either Hemedti or Burhan is “better.” Both have failed the Sudanese people and should be encouraged to move on from power. However, international partners must aim to immediately stop the fighting, bring back negotiations for a transition to civilian government, and then ensure both generals honor their public pledges to hand over power.

Thus, international and regional leaders must, in coordination, begin to strategically apply pressure by freezing Sudanese bank accounts and temporarily blocking the business activities of Sudanese leaders and their forces. This cutoff in money and revenue will impact those actors’ abilities to pay their soldiers and allies to fight and resupply. More importantly, it will impact their calculations about their willingness to return to serious negotiations and to compromise. Given the RSF is unlikely to prevail against the SAF with its heavy weapons and support from Egypt, the least bad option to stop the fighting is to first apply pressure on Hemedti’s business empire, which funds the RSF—his soldiers are loyal because they are paid better, not for any ideological reason. External actors, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (where, because of past Western sanctions, most Sudanese have their bank accounts and base their businesses), should freeze known RSF and Hemedti-family bank accounts and business activities until RSF leaders commit to rapidly integrating their troops into the SAF. Some of the most important assets have been identified and others are known by the Emirati and Saudi governments. Similarly, international partners must quickly freeze the assets of known Bashir-regime/Islamist leaders who are inciting violence in an effort to return to power.

Finally, partners should identify foreign-held SAF assets and business interests for possible freezing and seizure in case the army does not honor its pledge to hand over power—or perpetuates the historic political and economic dominance of elites from Khartoum at the expense of Sudanese people living in the rest of the country. Only in this way is a sustainable ceasefire and peace possible.

Ernst Jan “EJ” Hogendoorn is a former senior advisor to the US special envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, and former deputy Africa Program director at the International Crisis Group.

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Charai in Al Jazeera

Atlantic Council — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 14:48:59 +0000

The first-ever criminal indictment of a former U.S president holds important lessons for the world and American allies.

Ahmed Charai, 2023

Ahmed Charai is a Moroccan publisher and an Atlantic Council Board Director. He is also an international counselor of the Center for a Strategic and International Studies, a board of trustees member of International Crisis Group, and a member of the Advisory Board of The Center for the National Interest in Washington and Global Board of Advisors at The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security in Jerusalem.

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Charai in The National Interest

Atlantic Council — Wed, 26 Apr 2023 19:59:57 +0000

The United States has left a vacuum in Africa and now its rivals have rushed in. It is not too late for America to offer the African continent what it really wants: peace, prosperity, recognition, and democracy.

The first-ever criminal indictment of a former U.S president holds important lessons for the world and American allies.

Ahmed Charai, 2023

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Nawaz in East Asia Forum: Pakistan’s political soap opera puts its economy on the ropes

Atlantic Council — Sun, 23 Apr 2023 18:40:00 +0000

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Russia’s Ukraine invasion is the latest stage in the unfinished Soviet collapse

Richard Cashman — Tue, 18 Apr 2023 17:43:46 +0000

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began just over one year ago, growing numbers of international commentators and policymakers have reached the conclusion that the invasion is an act of old-fashioned imperialism. Until recently, such characterizations of Putin’s Russia had been restricted to the fringes of the international debate, but they are now firmly established in the mainstream.

One reason for the erstwhile reluctance to describe Russian behavior as imperial was the implication that despite the fall of the USSR, the Russian Federation itself was still fundamentally an empire in terms of structure and mentality. This creates obvious policy and diplomatic complications for Western leaders seeking to engage with Moscow and integrate Russia into a common European security architecture. Added to this is the understandable fear of playing into Kremlin narratives about the West seeking to break up Russia.

It is perhaps for these reasons that recent use of the imperial label has most often been in the context of Moscow “re-acquiring” an imperial mindset under Vladimir Putin’s leadership. In reality, however, it makes more sense to view today’s Russia within the context of ongoing imperial decline.

This process of imperial retreat began in 1989 with the loss of the outer empire in Central and Eastern Europe, and has since led to violent efforts in Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine to preserve what Russia views as its inner empire. Recognizing modern Russia’s imperial identity will not make policy and diplomacy any easier, but it should lead to fewer illusions.

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When addressing today’s Russian Federation, the concept of “de-imperialization” probably has wider utility than “decolonization,” as it focuses on the core imperial issue of power without the need for agonized debate about the exact nature of a colony.

In respect of institutions and imperial organization, much about Russia has remained constant since the initial phase of decline in 1989-91. Within the Russian Federation, elected regional governors were short-lived phenomena and economic flows have continued to move overwhelmingly from the peripheries to the metropole. In the military sphere in Ukraine, which the Kremlin sees as integral to the core of its empire, ethnic minorities from the peripheries of the Russian Federation have been disproportionately mobilized in order to preserve favorable sentiment in major cities like Moscow and Saint Petersburg.

Beyond the Russian Federation, many imperial linkages have also remained. The Commonwealth of Independent States was swiftly established in 1991, while the non-Russian former Soviet republics became known as the “near abroad,” indicating Russian perceptions of partial sovereignty. Tellingly, Russia’s new internal security service, the FSB, was given the remit for these former Soviet republics rather than the Kremlin’s external service, the SVR.

While the 1989 revolutions in Central Europe and the 1991 Soviet collapse entailed an acknowledged loss of prestige, imperial attitudes in Russia’s metropolitan political, academic, cultural, and information spaces have remained largely devoid of self-examination. This has become abundantly clear from the bilious propaganda targeting Ukrainians (along with Kazakhs, Baltic peoples, and Georgians) over the last year.

Crucially, Russia did not suffer a decisive military defeat in the 1989-1991 period in the fashion that ended the other land-based European empires of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Ottoman Turkey. Even with strategic defeat in Ukraine, Russia is not going to be occupied and have a post-imperial reality imposed on it. And so, ultimately, it is only Russians who can carry themselves to that reality, as the maritime empires of Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal have substantially, though not entirely, managed to do following their respective military failures to sustain empire.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Despite the genuine security complications entailed by a contiguous imperial core and peripheries, a conscious process of de-imperialization still seems, in principle, a route open to Russia. It need not entail further territorial losses from Russia’s recognized 1991 borders, but should involve Russian federal institutions being reformed and the independence of neighbors being respected. This should include their right to join an alliance like NATO without threats of invasion, just as Finland and Norway have been able to do.

Indeed, this has latterly been the message from Russian opposition figures including Gary Kasparov, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and Alexei Navalny, who have outlined policies for continuing Russia’s process of de-imperialization. This does not necessarily have to be a hard sell to the Russian people. The metropoles of Europe’s maritime empires initially feared that the loss of empire would make them poorer; in fact, it made them richer.

In contrast, Putin and the clan which assumed power in Moscow at the turn of the millennium have coordinated all policy with the aim of reversing rather than managing Russia’s imperial decline. This has meant denial of the long-known problem of Russian chauvinism and further concealing rather than confronting of Russian and Soviet crimes committed in the name of empire.

The International Criminal Court’s issuing of an arrest warrant for Putin for war crimes means the process of delegitimizing his leadership is now underway. The logical concomitant policy step is building relationships with alternative Russian elites who already or might in future support further de-imperialization.

In addition to realistic policy-making at the state level, Western academics and journalists can contribute to “decolonizing” Russian, Eurasian, and Slavonic studies and associated cultural spaces, drawing on similar approaches to European and North American history.

Western governments and their cultural emanations can prioritize engaging with countries of the global south to debunk the absurd but successful Kremlin narrative portraying Russia as an anti-imperial center of power, both historically and still today. This might include developing university programs and organizing academic conferences and exchanges, but also via objective news, cinema, television, and social media. Facilitating messages from countries like Ukraine, as a former imperial subject, might also modify policy-making in these countries.

The process begun in 1989 certainly did not culminate in 1991. Renewed awareness of its ongoing nature is to be welcomed, but from that should flow realistic policy that supports rather than compromises Russia’s former imperial subjects, and empowers Russians working toward a post-imperial future.

Richard Cashman is an Adjunct Fellow at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

The struggle for reform

Sudan’s military has played a major role in the political landscape of the country since its independence in 1956. Omar al-Bashir came into power in a military coup and, following thirty years of autocratic rule, was removed in 2019 by another military coup. Following his ouster, civilian and pro-democracy leaders called for fundamental reforms of the security sector, but Sudan continues to struggle with attempts at reform.

During the transition to democracy since 2019, the SAF and RSF have both cooperated and competed with one another for power in the country. For example, in an October 2021 coup ousting Sudan’s civilian leadership led by then-Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdock, the SAF and RSF joined forces with an array of Sudan’s armed movements and marginalized groups. At the same time, the RSF and SAF compete with each other behind the scenes to retain as much economic and political power, influence, and control as possible.

Managing the tension between the SAF and RSF will be a paramount concern for Sudan’s leadership as it seeks to avoid future conflict between the security forces that could trigger greater violence. This is a key element to establishing peace, security, and sustainable development in the country while allowing for the development and modernization of Sudan’s security institutions.

Meaningful security sector reform must address the role of the SAF and the professionalization and integration of the RSF into the SAF. It must also place the security services firmly under civilian control and oversight. In the security sector, reforms to Sudan’s legal framework must include formally establishing the role of the security forces and a single national army trusted by local communities across Sudan, especially in the conflict areas of the country.

Another critical step is untangling the military institutions from the economy. This will be very difficult and will require careful planning, as the SAF and RSF currently dominate nearly all facets of political, economic, and media power in Sudan—and work to protect this influence. Civilian authorities should seize the moment and take steps to address the challenges of security sector reform in Sudan during the transition to civilian leadership. The Bashir regime created a vast array of expensive, corrupt, and ineffective security forces accused by critics of operating outside of the law, committing human-rights abuses, and creating an economy that directly benefits the security institutions—preventing more robust economic reform and development. To set the country on a better path, Sudan’s civilian leaders must enact reforms that begin to disentangle the military from the construction, telecommunication, aviation, and banking sectors.

Steps Sudan’s military and civilian leaders should take

In concert with the new civilian leadership, the military must commit to reform that helps modernize and develop the SAF. This includes ensuring that the SAF is tasked with protecting civilians and is accountable to the country’s civilian leadership. The SAF needs to be respected and not feared by those it is assigned to protect.

Civilian and military leaders must adopt legislation that addresses the specific gaps in Sudan’s transitional documents. Using the legal framework, civilian authorities should work with the military leadership to scale down the size of the SAF, find meaningful economic opportunities for former fighters, identify core priorities for its mission, and deploy a military that is able to meet the needs of the country. Sudan’s authorities should also identify funding to create and support a broad disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration strategy that avoids a sole focus on the reintegration of militia fighters and includes appropriate financial oversight.

Outside of these efforts, civilian authorities must look for ways to reform Sudan’s economy that help to disentangle the vast array of companies linked to the security services, create opportunity to improve the business environment, and send the signal to investors, banks, and credit rating agencies that Sudan is open for business. Civilian authorities must take steps to increase transparency and accountability in the illicit gold trade to disrupt illicit financial flows to Sudan’s militias, including the RSF.

As Sudan’s economy faces uncertainty due to elevated food, fuel, and transportation prices, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank must balance the need for economic reforms in the country with the imperative to not destabilize a new civilian-led government. This government will need to walk a difficult line to implement reforms that address economic mismanagement by the SAF, the rising cost of living, and stubbornly high prices for basic goods that have further complicated efforts to secure international funding and support for the economy.

Steps the United States should take

The United States can help Sudan’s transition to democracy and help facilitate security sector reform. The 2021 National Defense Authorization Act included the Sudan Democratic Transition, Accountability, and Fiscal Transparency Act of 2020, elevating Sudan on the foreign policy agenda and sending a signal to Sudan’s new leadership that the United States is ready to support Sudan as it enacts difficult reforms. This law is an effective messaging tool, encourages a coordinated US government response to support the civilian leadership, and can direct public reporting on sensitive issues, support a sanctions regime, and show the private sector that Sudan is not open for business as usual. Policymakers can use this legislation to support Sudan’s economic reforms, stability, and oversight of the security and intelligence services in the short term while seeking to hold human-rights abusers, spoilers to the transition, and those seeking to exploit Sudan’s natural resources accountable for their actions.

Working with other countries, the United States can also play a leading role to encourage international financial institutions to carefully leverage the approval of World Bank projects, consider withholding IMF disbursements, and institute public reporting to ensure that economic and security sector reforms remain on track. The diplomatic community must continue to apply coordinated pressure on Sudan’s authorities to ensure that they follow through on their verbal commitments and work with key external actors—including the United Arab Emirates and Egypt—to encourage them to be meaningful contributors to Sudan’s democratic progress.

Sudan’s transition to democratic leadership provides another critical opportunity for security sector reform in the country. As the transitional government moves forward, Sudan’s civilian leadership can show investors, banks, and its people that greater connectedness to the global economy, a modern security apparatus, and a commitment to fighting corruption is in its long-term interest. Doing so would solidify a path toward a peaceful and democratic Sudan.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously, he led US Treasury Department efforts to combat corruption, money laundering, terrorist financing, and financial crimes on the African continent.

The post As Sudan’s transition to democracy accelerates, reforming the security forces must be a top priority appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bayoumi in Foreign Policy discussing the need for a democracy-first approach in Haiti

sodal — Tue, 11 Apr 2023 20:45:39 +0000

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

On April 11, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative Assistant Director Imran Bayoumi authored an article for Foreign Policy commenting on the ongoing state of unrest and turmoil in Haiti. Bayoumi posits that achieving sustainable peace in the country necessitates a US strategy that prioritizes the promotion and cultivation of democracy over militarized interventions. To underscore his argument, Bayoumi references significant legislative measures such as the 2019 Global Fragility Act (GFA) and 2021 Montana Accord, which highlight the urgent requirement for a democracy-centered approach not only to Haiti but also to other fragile and volatile states worldwide.

The GFA strategy should shift its focus to the front foot – to first promoting a democratic transition rather than supporting a constantly deteriorating policing situation with no clear path to improvement. Announcing US support of the Montana Accord is a good start, but there are other actions the United States can take short of this step.

Imran Bayoumi

Staff

Imran Bayoumi

Assistant Director

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Will Finland’s political turn mean a course change on NATO too?

Rasmus Hindrén — Tue, 04 Apr 2023 15:22:42 +0000

Finland is undergoing two head-spinning political changes in the span of just a couple of days. First, on Sunday, Finland’s nail-biter parliamentary election resulted in the center-right National Coalition Party becoming the largest party in the new parliament. That gives the party and its chairman, Petteri Orpo, the right to be the first to try forming a coalition government.

In the international media there was a lot of surprise that Prime Minister Sanna Marin’s reign is coming to an end, given her high profile and popularity abroad. As is often the case, this election turned on domestic matters, even as its outcome will have far wider implications. Specifically, it was worries about the Finnish economy that seemed to give the decisive boost to the opposition. Marin’s center-left Social Democratic Party fell to third place, behind Orpo’s National Coalition and the populist Finns Party.

Then on Tuesday, Finland became the thirty-first member of NATO—officially ending the policy of military non-alignment. Finnish President Sauli Niinistö and key ministers traveled to Brussels for a flag-raising ceremony and to deposit the instruments of ratification. With the change of government, is there a reason to expect turbulence in Finland’s NATO path right after joining the Alliance?

Only by degrees, if at all. Security and defense policy have traditionally been areas of consensus in Finland. The decision to apply for NATO membership was backed by a strong majority of Finnish public opinion, and all the major parties in the new parliament are supportive of the accession. In fact, several outgoing members of parliament seem to have been voted out partially because of their anti-NATO sentiments. Finland is also set to continue its support to Ukraine in its defense against Russian aggression. Most members of parliament understand well that Ukraine is fighting for all of Europe, and it is Kyiv’s resistance against Moscow that gave Helsinki the time and space needed for a course correction in its defense policy, now culminating in the accession to NATO.

The fact that Finnish governments are always multi-party coalitions tends to be a moderating factor. The government program is a result of compromises. Continuity, especially in security policy, is always highly valued. While it is too early to surmise the exact composition of the new government, the continuity will be there. The president, with constitutional powers in the realm of foreign policy, will also represent continuity. Niinistö’s second and final term ends next year.

But some changes can be expected in the nuances of foreign and security policy. For example, the Finns Party tends to condone nationalist narratives and emphasizes the sovereignty of the country. This sometimes sits uneasily with the changes in the security environment calling for greater international cooperation across many policy areas, not least in security policy. While the Finns Party might still support greater cooperation in NATO since it is an intergovernmental organization and not a supranational one, issues like solidarity and multinational joint capabilities might put them in an uncomfortable situation. Of course, it is far from clear if the Finns Party will be in the next coalition government.

Meanwhile the National Coalition Party, which is likely to form the new government, is close to the Social Democrats when it comes to foreign and security policy but usually a bit more open to deepening cooperation with the United States.

It will also be interesting to watch the rhetoric of the incoming government. Marin gave a voice to the new generation of leaders who are accustomed to speaking their minds on issues of foreign and defense policy without mending their words. Most likely, there is no way of putting the genie back into the bottle and the discourse has changed for good. The other party leaders have in most cases embraced the new approach.

Other changes, brought on by NATO membership itself, will be much farther reaching over the long term. The technical interoperability between Finland and its new allies is at an excellent level, but that was always going to be the easy part. The challenge is in changing the culture surrounding Finnish policymaking to embrace mutual solidarity and open debate, and in fostering an understanding of Alliance dynamics and processes. Finland needs to know how to best leverage its policies, geopolitical position, and resources to drive its objectives in NATO. The new government will play a key role in this.

While the composition of the new government is still unknown, the other important question relates to the time needed to form the government. It might take weeks or months. In the meantime, the outgoing government will continue in a caretaker capacity. This will limit the possibilities for making major policy decisions, but it allows for running the daily business of government. The new government will hopefully be in place by summer. Absent an international crisis or a significant escalation of Russian activities against Finland, this transition period should pass smoothly. Even in a moment of massive change, Helsinki is doing its usual best to hold steady.

Rasmus Hindrén is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Head of International Relations at the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats.

The post Will Finland’s political turn mean a course change on NATO too? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Charai in The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune

Atlantic Council — Mon, 03 Apr 2023 14:22:50 +0000

Online Event Mon, March 27, 2023 • 1:30 pm ET

The first-ever criminal indictment of a former U.S president holds important lessons for the world and American allies.

America has both a written and an unwritten constitution. The written constitution, adopted in 1789, is interpreted and re-interpreted by the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, with the US Supreme Court having the final word on what the written words actually mean. The unwritten constitution is a much larger set of tacit precedents, understandings and balances struck to preserve peace.

The first-ever criminal indictment of a former U.S president holds important lessons for the world and American allies.

Ahmed Charai, 2023

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How can Latin America halt its democratic backsliding? And how can the US help?

Antonio Garrastazu and Casey Cagley — Wed, 29 Mar 2023 19:41:53 +0000

Democracy is under assault, and the problem is particularly acute in Latin America, which has suffered a greater democratic decline than any other region over the past twenty years. Even in relatively stable democracies such as Colombia, flaws within the system can be exacerbated by external shocks such as natural disasters or economic crises—and exploited by would-be autocrats.

Strengthening democratic institutions is critical to reversing the trend of democratic decline across the region. While these democracies struggle, international partners can help. That’s because the assistance these partners are already sending has an impact on each country’s democratic health. All aid either hinders or helps democratic development, and donors should be intentional about aligning all forms of assistance to make sure that the assistance supports countries’ democratic development. Thus, the United States and other democracies that send aid to Latin America and the Caribbean have a vital role to play in the region’s future. They must make a renewed push for assistance to the region.

Recently updated indexes and projects that summarize countless social, institutional, and political metrics across countries—including the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index, the Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2023, and the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2022—convey a clear message. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance’s Kevin Casas-Zamora sums it up best in the organization’s 2022 Global State of Democracy Report: “Democracy is under both literal and figurative assault around the world.”

As this week’s Summit for Democracy—which the United States is co-hosting with Costa Rica, the Netherlands, South Korea, and Zambia— gets underway, these reports highlight in increasingly urgent terms the regression of democratic governance around the world, including in most of Latin America.

For example, Colombia held three broadly free and fair electoral processes last year, and the rule of law is relatively strong. Many in Bogotá and other big cities have access to judicial, health, law-enforcement, and other state institutions. However, elsewhere in the country, the situation is different: Rural municipalities do not have the resources to provide the same level of education or health care as capital cities, and basic infrastructure is lacking. Public safety is even weaker. With its unequal application of democratic norms and protections, Colombia has been labeled a “flawed democracy” by the Economist Intelligence Unit. It’s not alone: Two-thirds of countries in the region (including Brazil and Mexico) qualify as flawed democracies or “hybrid regimes.” Only three are full democracies and the remaining four of the countries scored are fully authoritarian.

Across Latin America, weak institutions perpetuate corruption, inequality, poverty, and insecurity, and they standardize illicit economies. This provides a breeding ground for populist leaders on both the left and right to turn the situation to their advantage by exacerbating political polarization and popular distrust of the government. Weak rule of law is a constant trait of fragile democracies or hybrid regimes. Populist El Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, for example, suspended civil liberties and arrested thousands of suspected gangsters with no due process. In the presence of weak institutions, criminals and corrupt officials can buy their way out of accountability. Gangs can shake down business owners with impunity. A lack of leadership and inclusion, including political parties’ own undemocratic behavior, is also a constant regionwide.

The factors contributing to the region’s democratic decline are well-known. What is less acknowledged is how these democratic deficits undermine the quality of life for millions of citizens and how they hinder government responses to new challenges and crises. From COVID-19 to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, shocks have already tested the region’s governments, and they were found wanting. Three threats in particular have the potential to further destabilize Latin America’s democratic progress:

Climate change and natural disasters have already started to upend economic and social conditions. Much of southern South America has suffered from record heat waves this year, fueling record forest fires in parts of Chile. A heavy rainy season has exacerbated a major Dengue fever outbreak in eastern Bolivia and caused devastating floods in Brazil. Meanwhile, the Paraná River—a major transportation artery and irrigation source—has fallen to such a low level that shipping has struggled; and Uruguay declared a national emergency in October last year due to crop failures caused by drought. Poor environmental governance both contributes to these phenomena and hinders mitigation and adaptation efforts. Governments’ inabilities to respond effectively contribute to poverty, dislocation, and migration across the region. To strengthen their democracies, governments must be able to channel citizen demands more nimbly and mobilize resources to mitigate these environmental or climate shocks .
Latin America and the Caribbean struggle with food insecurity and price shocks. Energy prices and inflation add to severe cost-of-living pressures for many across the region. A new report from the Pan American Health Organization shows that over 22 percent of the Latin American and Caribbean population cannot afford a healthy diet, with rates reaching over 50 percent in the Caribbean. Many governments provide subsidies for certain foodstuffs, fuel, and other critical imports, but high inflation and soaring debt payments will challenge governments’ abilities to keep this up. This can rapidly lead to popular unrest: For example, in 2019, a simple public transportation fare hike triggered massive protests in Chile. A similar increase in gas prices in Panama resulted in over a week of protests over fuel, food, and medicine, and Suriname saw protests this month after the government announced it would cut electricity and fuel subsidies.
Most regional governments throughout Latin America and the Caribbean are also under extreme financial stress, which limits their abilities to respond to new crises. The resource boom—fueled by Chinese growth and consumption—that propelled massive social spending and slashed poverty around the region ended years ago. As budgets were tightening, COVID-19 struck the region harder than most others and forced governments to expand deficit spending as economies closed for months at a time. Several states ended the pandemic with bulging debts and lower credit ratings, meaning that they now have less flexibility when it comes to confronting the next shock. And while Latin America’s economy grew nearly 4 percent in 2022, that growth is projected to slow in 2023 as the US Federal Reserve continues to hike interest rates and the value of the dollar continues to rise, with damaging spillover effects for regional economies.

The most effective way to prepare for and mitigate against these external shocks is by strengthening democratic institutions—ensuring greater transparency, democratic participation, and government responsiveness. The United States and other democracies that help the region in dealing with these external shocks have a vital role to play in helping Latin America reverse the trend of democratic decline and prepare for coming challenges that could exacerbate democratic decay. This role extends to the diplomatic, development, and private sectors, which should support partners with best practices and resources that incentivize transparency, civic participation, free trade, and countering the influence of malign foreign actors such as China, Iran, and Russia. As US Agency for International Development Administrator Samantha Power recently wrote, “everywhere they provide assistance, democratic countries must be guided by and seek to promote democratic principles—including human rights, norms that counter corruption, and environmental and social safeguards.”

Voters have delivered major course corrections in Brazil, Colombia, and elsewhere in the past year, with newly installed leaders vowing to tackle inequality. But beyond these democratic processes, there’s more that governments will need to do to fully shore up vulnerable institutions. Investing in initiatives that strengthen civil society, political party systems, and open government will help give citizens a stake in the system, improve the function of institutions, and reduce the space for incursion by would-be autocrats.

Power has rightly called for a development strategy that “addresses the economic grievances that populists have so effectively exploited, that defangs so-called digital authoritarianism, and that reorients traditional democracy assistance to grapple with modern challenges.” As the United States and its partners convene for the Summit for Democracy, creating a vision for strengthening democracy in all US assistance to Latin America should figure among the Biden administration’s highest priorities.

Antonio Garrastazu is the senior director for Latin America and the Caribbean at the International Republican Institute.

Casey Cagley is a resident program director at the International Republican Institute.

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What to expect from the world’s democratic tech alliance as the Summit for Democracy unfolds

Katherine Walla — Wed, 29 Mar 2023 17:37:06 +0000

Watch the full event

Live from the Freedom Online Coalition: How the FOC works for people around the world

The DFRLab hosts the US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman along with civil society and industry experts for a discussion on the Freedom Online Coalition and how the world’s democratic tech alliance advances human rights online.

Africa East Asia Europe & Eurasia Indo-Pacific

Ahead of the Biden administration’s second Summit for Democracy, US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman gave a sneak peek at what to expect from the US government on its commitments to protecting online rights and freedoms.

The event, hosted by the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab on Monday, came on the same day that US President Joe Biden signed an executive order restricting the US government’s use of commercial spyware that may be abused by foreign governments or enable human-rights abuses overseas.

But there’s more in store for this week, Sherman said, as the United States settles into its role as chair of the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC)—a democratic tech alliance of thirty-six countries working together to support human rights online. As chair, the United States needs “to reinforce rules of the road for cyberspace that mirror and match the ideals of the rules-based international order,” said Sherman. She broke that down into four top priorities for the FOC:

Protecting fundamental freedoms online, especially for often-targeted human-rights defenders
Building resilience against digital authoritarians who use technology to achieve their aims
Building a consensus on policies designed to limit abuses of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI)
Expanding digital inclusion

“The FOC’s absolutely vital work can feel like a continuous game of catch-up,” said Sherman. But, she added, “we have to set standards that meet this moment… we have to address what we see in front of us and equip ourselves with the building blocks to tackle what we cannot predict.”

Below are more highlights from the event, during which a panel of stakeholders also outlined the FOC’s role in ensuring that the internet and emerging technologies—including AI—adhere to democratic principles.

Deepening fundamental freedoms

Sherman explained that the FOC will aim to combat government-initiated internet shutdowns and ensure that people can “keep using technology to advance the reach of freedom.”
Boye Adegoke, senior manager of grants and program strategy at the Paradigm Initiative, recounted how technology was supposed to help improve transparency in Nigeria’s recent elections. But instead, the election results came in inconsistently and after long periods of time. Meanwhile, the government triggered internet shutdowns around the election period. “Bad actors… manipulate technology to make sure that the opinions and the wishes of the people do not matter at the end of the day,” he said.
“It’s very important to continue to communicate the work that the FOC is doing… so that more and more people become aware” of internet shutdowns and can therefore prepare for the lapses in internet service and in freely flowing, accurate information, Adegoke said.
On a practical level, once industry partners expose where disruptions are taking place, the FOC offers a mechanism by which democratic “governments can work together to sort of pressure other governments to say these [actions] aren’t acceptable,” Starzak argued.
The FOC also provides a place for dialogue on human rights in the online space, said Alissa Starzak, vice president and global head of public policy at Cloudfare. Adegoke, who also serves in the FOC advisory network, stressed that “human rights [are] rarely at the center of the issues,” so the FOC offers an opportunity to mainstream that conversation into policymakers’ discussions on technology.

Building resilience against digital authoritarianism

“Where all of [us FOC countries] may strive to ensure technology delivers for our citizens, autocratic regimes are finding another means of expression,” Sherman explained, adding that those autocratic regimes are using technologies to “divide and disenfranchise; to censor and suppress; to limit freedoms, foment fear, and violate human dignity.” New technologies are essentially “an avenue of control” for authoritarians, she explained.
At the FOC, “we will focus on building resilience against the rise of digital authoritarianism,” Sherman said, which has “disproportionate and chilling impacts on journalists, activists, women, and LGBTI+ individuals” who are often directly targeted for challenging the government or expressing themselves.
One of the practices digital authoritarians often abuse is surveillance. Sherman said that as part of the Summit for Democracy, the FOC and other partners will lay out guiding principles for the responsible use of surveillance tech.
Adegoke recounted how officials in Nigeria justified their use of surveillance tech by saying that the United States also used the technology. “It’s very important to have some sort of guiding principle” from the United States, he said.
After Biden signed the spyware executive order, Juan Carlos Lara, executive director at Derechos Digitales, said he expects other countries “to follow suit and hopefully to expand the idea of bans on spyware or bans on surveillance technology” that inherently pose risks to human rights.

Addressing artificial intelligence

“The advent of AI is arriving with a level of speed and sophistication we haven’t witnessed before,” warned Sherman. “Who creates it, who controls it, [and] who manipulates it will help define the next phase of the intersection between technology and democracy.”
Some governments, Sherman pointed out, have used AI to automate their censorship and suppression practices. “FOC members must build a consensus around policies to limit these abuses,” she argued.
Speaking from an industry perspective, Starzak acknowledged that sometimes private companies and governments “are in two different lanes” when it comes to figuring out how they should use AI. But setting norms for both good and bad AI use, she explained, could help get industry and the public sector in the same lane, moving toward a world in which AI is used in compliance with democratic principles.
Lara, who also serves in the FOC advisory network, explained that the FOC has a task force to specifically determine those norms on government use of AI and to identify the ways in which AI contributes to the promise—or peril—of technology in societies worldwide.

Improving digital inclusion

“The internet should be open and secure for everyone,” said Sherman. That includes “closing the gender gap online” by “expanding digital literacy” and “promoting access to safe online spaces” that make robust civic participation possible for all. Sherman noted that the FOC will specifically focus on digital inclusion for women and girls, LGBTI+ people, and people with disabilities.
Starzak added that in the global effort to cultivate an internet that “builds prosperity,” access to the free flow of information for all is “good for the economy and good for the people.” Attaining that version of the internet will require a “set of controls” to protect people and their freedoms online, she added.
Ultimately, there are major benefits to be had from expanded connectivity. According to Sherman, it “can drive economic growth, raise standards of living, create jobs, and fuel innovative solutions” for global challenges such as climate change, food insecurity, and good governance.

Katherine Walla is an associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

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Putin’s plan for a new Russian Empire includes both Ukraine and Belarus

Taras Kuzio — Wed, 29 Mar 2023 14:45:58 +0000

Over the past year, Vladimir Putin has compared himself to empire-building eighteenth century Russian Czar Peter the Great, and has attempted to annex entire regions of Ukraine while declaring that he is “returning historically Russian lands.” A recently leaked document purportedly detailing Russian plans to absorb neighboring Belarus now provides further insight into the imperial ambitions that are also driving the invasion of Ukraine.

Allegedly produced by Putin’s Presidential Administration with input from the Russian intelligence services and armed forces, the 17-page internal strategy paper was made public in early 2023 by an international consortium of journalists. It serves as a comprehensive guide to the unofficial annexation of Belarus via a combination of economic, military, political, and social measures, with the objective of full absorption into a so-called “Union State” with Russia by 2030.

The Russian takeover of Belarus as outlined in the document appears to closely mirror Moscow’s plans for Ukraine, albeit by less direct means. “Russia’s goals with regard to Belarus are the same as with Ukraine. Only in Belarus, Russia relies on coercion rather than war. Its end goal is still wholesale incorporation,” commented Michael Carpenter, the US Ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, following publication of the leaked document.

The strategy document for Belarus envisions the comprehensive russification of Belarusian society along with a sharp reduction in the influence of nationalist and pro-Western forces, which are viewed by Russia as virtually indistinguishable in relation to both Belarus and Ukraine. The Belarusian political, financial, business, and education systems would be fully integrated into Russia, with a network of pro-Russian media, NGOs, and cultural institutions established to aid this integration process.

In the military sphere, the Belarusian army would become de facto part of the Russian military, with Belarus increasing the number of Russian bases in the country and allowing Moscow to dramatically expand its military presence. Putin’s recently announced intention to base Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus are an indication that this plan is already advancing.

The publication date of this alleged Russian blueprint for the takeover of Belarus is particularly interesting. It was reportedly produced in summer 2021 at a time when Putin’s mind seems to have been turning toward grand visions of imperial conquest. Increasingly isolated due to the Covid pandemic and surrounded by a shrinking circle of imperial hardliners and sycophants, Putin appears to have made the fateful decision in mid 2021 to extinguish Belarusian and Ukrainian independence once and for all.

Efforts to unofficially annex Belarus were well underway by this point. Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka was already heavily reliant on Russia following a Kremlin intervention to prop up his tottering regime in the wake of nationwide protests over the country’s rigged August 2020 presidential election.

As Kremlin officials were busy drawing up plans to incorporate Belarus, Putin himself was penning a 6000-word treatise outlining his denial of Ukraine’s right to statehood and his insistence that Ukrainians were really Russians (“one people”). Putin’s July 2021 essay was widely seen as a declaration of war against Ukrainian independence. His lengthy article laid the ideological foundations for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began seven months later.

Putin’s plans for a subjugated Ukraine share many common features with his vision for the takeover of Belarus. Following the anticipated military conquest of Ukraine, Russia intended to install a puppet ruler in Kyiv who would replace Zelenskyy and play the same role as Lukashenka in Belarus. For both countries, Moscow’s ultimate goal is the same: Complete absorption into a new Russian Empire.

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Putin’s dreams of a new Russian Empire have been evident since his first term in office but became more obvious following his formal return to the presidency in 2012. From this point onward, Putin began to openly embrace an imperialistic brand of nationalism that positioned him as the latest in a long line of Kremlin rulers celebrated as “gatherers of Russian lands.” In the contemporary context, this meant incorporating fellow East Slavic states Belarus and Ukraine into a new Russia-led union.

The idea of a union between Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine was not new and first gained prominence during the collapse of the USSR when promoted by Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn. East Slavic unity had both ideological and practical appeal for Putin. It would secure his place in Russian history while also creating a solid basis for the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Putin’s alternative to the EU.

Initially, Putin hoped to absorb Ukraine without a fight. Indeed, in 2012 and 2013, the Kremlin adopted many of the same tactics later used in Belarus to strengthen Russia’s grip on the country. However, post-Soviet Ukraine had a far stronger sense of national identity than Belarus, with a majority of Ukrainians seeing themselves as Europeans and embracing the country’s fledgling democratic traditions. This was to prove a major obstacle for Putin’s imperial project.

As Ukraine prepared to sign a long-anticipated Association Agreement with the European Union in last 2013, Moscow unleashed a trade war and began pressuring Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president Viktor Yanukovych to reject Brussels in favor of Moscow. When Yanukovych attempted to do so, mass protests erupted in Ukraine that escalated into a full-scale revolution in support of democracy and European integration. Within three months, Yanukovych found himself deserted by his allies and escaped to Russia.

Russia responded to the success of the Euromaidan Revolution by occupying Crimea and attempting to orchestrate uprisings throughout southern and eastern Ukraine. Targeted regions of Ukraine were rebranded by the Kremlin using the old Czarist-era imperial term of “Novorossiya” or “New Russia.” This strategy was only partially successful, with Kremlin-backed uprisings defeated in most major Ukrainian cities except for Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, where Kremlin control was secured with the assistance of the invading Russian army.

Over the next eight years, Putin attempted to rebuild Russia’s political influence inside Ukraine while pressuring the country to accept a Kremlin-friendly interpretation of the February 2015 Minsk Accords, which had brought the worst of the fighting to an end in eastern Ukraine without establishing a durable peace. Moscow’s vision for the implementation of the Minsk Accords would have transformed Ukraine into a dysfunctional Russian satellite, but this outcome met with resistance from successive Ukrainian presidents.

By early 2021, Putin had come to the conclusion that his strategy was failing and appears to have recognized that Ukraine was slipping irreparably out of the Russian orbit. At this point, he and other Kremlin leaders began referring to Ukraine as an “anti-Russia” and portraying the country as an intolerable outpost of NATO and US interests on Russia’s borders. The available evidence suggests that by the time Putin published his notorious essay in summer 2021, he was already fully committed to crushing Ukrainian independence by military means.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

In a clear echo of the strategy adopted for Belarus, Russia’s FSB security service was tasked in 2021 with preparing plans for the military occupation and pacification of Ukraine. However, a combination of FSB corruption, wishful thinking, and misplaced stereotypes about modern Ukraine resulted in a series of disastrous miscalculations.

Collaborators within the Ukrainian government told FSB agents what they wanted to hear with no regard for the realities on the ground, while the Kremlin’s networks of Ukrainian informants, NGOs, and other “experts” assured their Russian colleagues that the invading Russian army would be welcomed. Meanwhile, FSB officers confidently predicted that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy would soon be captured or forced to flee, with organized Ukrainian resistance unlikely to last longer than a few days.

These intelligence failures persuaded Putin to embark on the biggest gamble of his presidency with a wholly inadequate force of less than 200,000 troops. This was regarded as sufficient to install a pro-Russian regime and place Ukraine on the same path as Belarus toward absorption into the Russian Federation.

Captured documents, prisoner accounts, and the actions of the Russian occupation forces in regions of Ukraine under Kremlin control now make it possible to produce a comprehensive picture of Russia’s plans for the subjugation of the country. These plans share many features with Moscow’s approach to the creeping annexation of Belarus, while employing infinitely more direct and brutal methods.

The events of the past year make clear that Russia’s stated invasion objective of “de-Nazification” actually means the execution, imprisonment, deportation, or otherwise silencing of anyone deemed to be a Ukrainian patriot. Those targeted since the invasion began in February 2022 have included elected officials, civil society activists, educators, journalists, army veterans, and cultural figures.

The systematic suppression of Ukrainian national identity has been undertaken alongside intensive russification efforts, including the introduction of a Kremlin-approved Russian school curriculum and the promotion of an imperial identity. In parallel, local businesses have been forced to integrate into the Russian economy, with the wider population in occupied Ukraine obliged to accept Russian citizenship.

The obvious similarities between the Kremlin’s long-term Belarus strategy and the tactics being employed in occupied Ukraine undermine Russian efforts to portray the ongoing invasion as a defensive measure driven by valid security concerns. Instead, a picture emerges of Vladimir Putin’s overriding ambition to absorb both countries and secure his place in history as a “gatherer of Russian lands.”

While his approach to each country may currently differ in the details, Putin clearly aims to bring both Ukrainian and Belarusian independence to an end, and has placed these imperial ambitions at the heart of his entire reign. This makes a mockery of calls for a compromise with the Kremlin. Instead, Western leaders must recognize that peace in Europe will remain elusive until the Russian dictator is forced to abandon his dreams of empire.

Taras Kuzio is professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the newly published “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

The project produced a three-part report, titled Fostering a Fourth Democratic Wave: A Playbook for Countering the Authoritarian Threat, that:

Proposes new approaches and tools to support civil resistance movements
Advances a new international norm — the “Right to Assist” pro-democracy movements
Develops strategic and tactical options to constrain authoritarian regimes and drive up the cost of their repression

Introduction

The security of the United States, democratic allies, and humanity’s future depends significantly on the state of democracy worldwide.

Yet over the past seventeen years, authoritarianism has risen globally, while democracy shows alarming decline. Dictatorial regimes in China, Russia, Iran, Venezuela and many other countries have become more repressive. Meanwhile, democracies in all parts of the world have backslid, with some regressing completely into authoritarianism.

This playbook focuses on a key factor that can help reverse both of these trends. Popular civil resistance movements—using tactics such as strikes, boycotts, protests, and many other tactics of noncooperation—are historically one of the most powerful drivers of democracy worldwide. They can play a central role in transforming authoritarian regimes and countering democratic backsliding. We offer recommendations for how the United States and democratic allies can adeptly support and enable these movements.

The stakes in this contest over global governance could not be higher. A more authoritarian world is a world dangerous for democracies. As autocrats support each other, abuse their own populations, and undermine democratic states, they also perpetrate and create conditions for violent conflict, atrocities, humanitarian crises, the growth of violent non-state actors, subversion of multilateral institutions, and transnational corruption. These produce massive human suffering, and further exacerbate internal weaknesses of democratic governments, thereby creating a positive feedback loop that contributes greatly to the present-day autocratic wave.

Turning the tide now requires urgency, clear vision, strategy, collective action, discipline, and innovative tactics. Democracies must unify, strengthen their alliances, and go on offense because the future depends on it.

Yet this threat can be countered. Three previous global democratic waves have emerged from democratic troughs. Developing a strategy to catalyze a fourth wave begins with a clear-eyed look at the challenges we currently face. Externally, democracies confront an increasingly existential conflict waged against them, with authoritarian governments using democratic openness to enable them to spread corruption, undermine government institutions, influence economic decision-making, and manipulate the information environment. Simultaneously, many democracies are experiencing legitimacy crises due to long-standing failure to deliver adequately for their constituents. This core weakness has made them more vulnerable to populism, polarization, disruptive information technologies, external authoritarian attacks, and internal demagogues who now use a well-trod path to weaken democratic governance from the inside out. Past denial about the potency of these threats enabled them to grow. Turning the tide now requires urgency, clear vision, strategy, collective action, discipline, and innovative tactics. Democracies must unify, strengthen their alliances, and go on offense because the future depends on it.

Any strategy to counter authoritarianism will entail action on multiple fronts. By articulating in this playbook how to better support and create an enabling environment for pro-democracy civil resistance movements, we focus on one of the greatest foreign policy opportunities available today—engaging the power potential of populations worldwide who want to protect and advance human rights and democratic rule. Our allies are found not only in fellow governments and registered civil society organizations, but also among billions of people who live daily under either weakening democracies or the abuse of dictatorship.

Authors

Fellow

Hardy Merriman

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Civil Society Human Rights

Fellow

Patrick Quirk

Freedom and Prosperity Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Civil Society Conflict

Former staff

Ash Jain

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Europe & Eurasia Indo-Pacific

The post Fostering a Fourth Democratic Wave: A playbook for countering the authoritarian threat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bayoumi in The Diplomat discussing China’s meddling in Canada’s elections

sodal — Tue, 14 Mar 2023 13:27:53 +0000

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

On March 11, Imran Bayoumi authored an article for The Diplomat discussing reports that China meddled in Canada’s 2021 federal parliamentary elections. Bayoumi highlights China’s goals of preventing the election of candidates deemed unfriendly to China and limiting parliament’s ability to pass legislation, as well as emphasizes concerns surrounding the lack of an immediate Canadian response.

Reports that China interfered in Canada’s elections should raise concern for Americans about the potential for future cooperation with Canada to combat China… Canada’s policy missteps in responding to the threat posed by China are concerning, but a more pressing issue for U.S. policymakers is the comfort China has demonstrated in exploiting these shortcomings.

Imran Bayoumi

Staff

Imran Bayoumi

Assistant Director

The post Bayoumi in The Diplomat discussing China’s meddling in Canada’s elections appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Alden in The Wall Street Journal discussing Italian Prime Minister Meloni

sodal — Fri, 10 Mar 2023 19:08:42 +0000

On September 24, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative nonresident senior fellow Alexander Alden’s comments on then-candidate Giorgia Meloni were featured in The Wall Street Journal. Alden asserts that, unlike most European politicians and leaders, Meloni is unique in her unwavering support for the Atlantic alliance.

Unlike other European politicians riding the wave of popular discontent, [Giorgia Meloni] has been steadfast in supporting the Atlantic alliance. She is not Marine Le Pen.

Alexander Alden

Fellow

Alexander Alden

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Defense Policy English

The post Alden in The Wall Street Journal discussing Italian Prime Minister Meloni appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How Putin’s fear of democracy convinced him to invade Ukraine

Michael John Williams — Mon, 06 Mar 2023 20:22:59 +0000

Throughout the past year, the Kremlin has sought to blame the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on decades of post-Cold War NATO expansion. Many international commentators have accepted these Russian claims uncritically and have argued that the West must accept a high degree of responsibility for provoking what has become the largest European conflict since World War II.

In reality, Putin has always known that NATO poses no credible security threat to Russia itself. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO’s force posture and the US military presence in Europe have greatly declined, reducing any potential military threat to Russia. What really scares the Russian elite is the spread of democracy. Today’s war can be traced directly back to the pro-democracy revolutions that rocked the former Soviet neighborhood in the early 2000s, all of which were bottom-up political movements that called for more accountable government while demanding the rule of law.

The revolutions of the early twenty-first century were aftershocks of the democratization wave that began in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. As post-Soviet countries like Ukraine and Georgia struggled to establish more genuinely democratic forms of government in the early 2000s, Russia under Putin’s leadership was turning decisively away from democracy toward autocracy and illiberalism. This set the stage for an ideological struggle that would eventually lead to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine as Russia attempted to crush the growing democratic threat in its former imperial heartlands.

In the late 1980s, the Communist system in Eastern Europe began to crumble under the weight of its own internal contradictions and thanks to the role of civil society in Poland and other countries across the region. This democratization drive was people-centered and soon spread to the Soviet Union itself, which collapsed in 1991. A new wave of democratization emerged at the turn of the millennium with the Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia, the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan all taking place within the space of six years.

Each of these revolutions served as a potential model for neighboring populations that were also suffering from the same kind of chronic corruption and lack of political accountability. By studying and adopting the tactics of the activists who led these grassroots pro-democracy movements, they could push back against their own ineffective and autocratic political systems. This represented a serious threat to Putin’s increasingly authoritarian regime in Russia. The Kremlin responded by dubbing the uprisings “color revolutions” and attempting to discredit them as artificially orchestrated Western vehicles for regime change.

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The idea of revolutionary ideologies proving contagious is nothing new. Revolutions that succeed in changing the political order in one country have always had the potential to inspire calls for similar change among neighboring populations. In the nineteenth century, liberal revolutions were seen as a threat to the dominant conservative monarchical system of government across Europe. This led to the Concert of Europe, which saw the continent’s major powers cooperate to prevent the spread of the liberal revolutionary movement.

When Vladimir Putin looked west during the early years of his reign, it wasn’t NATO expansion that worried him. He was scared by the sight of ordinary people in Russia’s neighborhood attempting to topple their autocratic governments. As more countries in the region sought to liberalize, Putin instituted a set of laws to suppress Russian civil society and stifle any attempts to push for reforms on the domestic front.

The rising tide of democratization close to Russia’s borders in the 2000s was not only a threat to Russia’s internal stability; it also posed external challenges. This shift toward more democratic government across the region was helping to consolidate the rules-based system that had gradually begun to replace the old European balance of power in the decades following World War II.

This approach to international relations presented obvious challenges to Putin, who favored a world where great powers could dominate their weaker neighbors. The Russian dictator would have much preferred a return to the power dynamics of the nineteenth century Concert of Europe. Instead, he found himself confronted by a new “Concept of Europe,” meaning a system where all states are respected, regardless of strength or size. This directly undermined Putin’s vision of Russia’s privileged place in international relations as one of a handful of great powers with the right to a voice in global affairs.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Over the past two decades, concerns over the growing threat posed by a new wave of democratization fueled Putin’s growing obsession with Ukraine, which he came to regard as the key battlefield in the ideological struggle for the future of Europe. Viewed from the Kremlin, Ukraine was a contested space where Russian illiberalism was in direct confrontation with liberal democracy. The Russian dictator appears to have convinced himself that Ukraine’s embrace of European democracy could eventually prove fatal for Russia itself.

Crucially, Putin stubbornly refused to recognize the agency of the Ukrainian people. Instead, he continued to insist that the country’s two post-Soviet revolutions and subsequent reform movements were driven by external pressure from the United States and the European Union. This was wishful thinking to spare the blushes of a rejected Russia. While the West was indeed supportive of Ukraine’s transformation, the desire for change always came primarily from the Ukrainian people.

As the full-scale invasion of Ukraine enters its second year, this Ukrainian hunger for a democratic future is more evident than ever, as is the country’s wholesale rejection of Russian authoritarianism. The weapons provided by Ukraine’s international partners have helped inflict devastating casualties on Putin’s invading army, but they would be useless without the soldiers to operate them. Luckily for Ukraine, the country can count on hundreds of thousands of highly motivated men and women who are prepared to defend their country’s European choice against Russia’s brutal assault.

Putin hoped his invasion would deal a decisive blow to Ukraine’s dreams of European integration and force the country permanently back into the Kremlin orbit. He expected to conquer Kyiv in a matter of days and planned to extinguish Ukrainian independence entirely. Instead, he has achieved the exact opposite. Today’s Ukraine is more united than ever around the idea of a liberal democratic future as part of the Western world. As the Russian military now knows to its cost, this is a vision Ukrainians are ready to fight for.

Michael Williams is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative.

As has been pointed out hundreds of times over the past year, nobody is more personally responsible for the dramatic recent shifts in Ukrainian public opinion than Vladimir Putin and his backfiring policies of aggression. However, Ukraine’s turn toward the Western world is also part of a broader nation-building journey that has been underway since the country first regained independence from the collapsing Soviet Union in 1991.

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Prior to last year’s full-scale Russian invasion, Ukraine had underlined its growing sense of Western identity by repeatedly demonstrating a readiness to make meaningful contributions to both the European Union and NATO.

In April 2020, Ukraine showed solidarity with the European Union by announcing that the country would match the expansion of EU sanctions on the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell noted that by aligning its international approach on Syria, Ukraine had agreed to “ensure that their national policies conform” to the EU’s own position.

When the global spread of Covid-19 disrupted supply chains of personal protective equipment in 2020, Ukraine deployed its unique fleet of heavy-lift aircraft to unblock aid to the world. Ukraine’s Antonov-225 “Mriya” (“Dream’) was the largest plane of its kind in the world. It was soon making a series of medical supply runs to support neighboring Poland in the fight against the pandemic. Sadly, Russian forces destroyed the Mriya as they assaulted Hostomel Airport outside Kyiv during the early days of the invasion.

In addition to the Mriya, Ukraine also deployed its indispensable An-125 Ruslan heavy-lift cargo planes to support the NATO Strategic Air Lift Interim Solutions (SALIS) Program. NATO utilized the SALIS program to deliver medical equipment and supplies to member states during the pandemic.

In August 2021, as the US-led international presence in Afghanistan began to withdraw, the world watched chaotic scenes as thousands tried to flee Hamid Karzai International Airport. During this disastrous withdrawal, Ukrainian Special Forces troops landed in Kabul and went beyond the protective cordon surrounding the airport to rescue Afghan translators who had worked for the Canadian military. Those evacuated and others associated with the operation would later recount the heroism and professionalism of their Ukrainian rescuers. The Ukrainian military made dozens of additional rescue runs, eventually evacuating close to 700 Afghans and others.

At the time of these Kabul heroics, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba commented: “In these horrific circumstances, our military officers demonstrated bravery and exemplary professionalism.” After a year of Ukrainian resistance against Russian aggression, those words now seem particularly prophetic.

Eurasia Center events

Constance Berry Newman: The view from the ground: Where election administration fell short

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The events of the past year have radically altered international perceptions of Ukraine and helped to counter negative stereotypes that had earlier led many to doubt the country’s ability to withstand Russia’s military might. At the same time, the success of Ukraine’s nationwide resistance has not taken everyone by surprise. Indeed, many of the most striking aspects of Ukraine’s remarkable response to Russian aggression reflect trends that had long been evident to perceptive observers, particularly in the years following the country’s 2014 Euromaidan Revolution.

Those of us who witnessed the comprehensive transformation of Ukrainian governance, the decentralization of national authority to local communities, and the creation of an anti-corruption ecosystem, were well aware of Ukraine’s capabilities. Most of all, we knew the formidable fighting spirit of Ukraine’s civil society, the country’s independent media, and the Ukrainian military. Their resilience was never in question.

The watching world has now seen the strength and courage of Ukrainians for themselves. International audiences have witnessed a country defending itself against a military superpower while also reaffirming its commitment to human rights and democratic values. Western leaders should respond to this by seeking to create new routes for Ukraine’s further integration that reflect the high stakes and broader historic significance of the present conflict. In short, it is time for the West to welcome Ukraine home.

Michael Druckman is resident program director for Ukraine at the International Republican Institute.

What’s in store for Nigeria after a messy election

Atlantic Council — Thu, 02 Mar 2023 00:38:27 +0000

GET UP TO SPEED

It was a close call. Ruling party candidate Bola Tinubu was declared the narrow winner of Nigeria’s presidential election on Wednesday after balloting delays and scattered violence, with his two closest challengers saying they will dispute the results in court. Assuming Tinubu takes office as planned in May, he will lead a nation that is at once making big strides on the world stage and reeling from crises at home. Why was the election so rocky, and what should the new president’s priorities be? Our experts share their insights.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

Constance Berry Newman: Nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center, former US assistant secretary of state for African affairs, and official international observer of Nigeria’s 2023 elections
Rama Yade (@ramayade): Senior director of the Africa Center
Aubrey Hruby (@aubreyhruby): Nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center and co-founder of Tofino Capital

Notes from the ground

Constance, who monitored the elections as part of the joint International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute Observer Mission, says the government did many things right in administering the election, including technological improvements and getting all political parties to commit to using only peaceful, legal means to challenge the results.
But she says the government made several key mistakes, including long delays in opening polling sites. “This led to frustrated, often angry, voters, a limited number of whom left and a small number of whom engaged in violent activities,” Constance reports.
Another failure, she adds, was “a seemingly ineffective and late tabulation announcement process that raised concerns about the announced results.”
Constance attributes the surprisingly low voter turnout (27 percent) to “a belief that nothing will change anyway, a fear of violence and other intimidation factors, and a lack of an understanding of the voting procedures.”
But she comes away most impressed with the enthusiastic young people in a country where around 70 percent of the population is younger than age thirty. “Nigeria has reason to hope for a better future because many of the youth are really engaged and understand what is right and wrong for their country.”

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Tinubu’s agenda

While Peter Obi, an outsider candidate from the Labour Party, garnered a ton of international press and led in some polls, Rama tells us that Tinubu’s win is “not a surprise.”
That’s because Tinubu, 70, hails from the ruling All Progressives Congress party, “is Muslim from the Yoruba-speaking southwest, and even if he lost there, he has strong support in Lagos,” Rama adds.
But the fact that Tinubu lost Lagos—where he served as governor from 1999 to 2007—“demonstrates the power of the message” from Nigeria’s disaffected youth to their country’s political leaders, Aubrey says. Tinubu spoke directly to their concerns in his victory speech, referring to young people’s “pains, your yearnings for good governance, a functional economy, and a safe nation.”
It won’t be easy for him to deliver: Aubrey points to Nigeria’s 42.5 percent youth unemployment, rampant inflation, soaring debt burden, and plummeting oil production. Tech and entrepreneurship are “a bright spot” in the economy, but amid a brain drain that’s seeing fifty doctors leave per week to work overseas, she adds, “Tinubu will have to show quick results on the economic front to stem the tide.”

On the world stage

Tinubu will be immediately thrust into a leadership role on the continent. “The future of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the new Eco currency (which has been postponed to 2025), and the African Continental Free Trade Area (which needs to be accelerated) are in Nigeria’s hands,” Rama tells us.
And as Africa seeks a larger role in the G20 and Bretton Woods Institutions, “Nigeria will play an important role in this unprecedented dialogue,” Rama adds. “The expectations have never been so high.”

The post What’s in store for Nigeria after a messy election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: As the ruling party’s Tinubu wins a contested election, what’s next for Nigeria?

Atlantic Council experts — Wed, 01 Mar 2023 20:37:11 +0000

From kingmaker to king. Bola Tinubu, the ruling All Progressives Congress party presidential candidate and longtime political powerbroker, was declared the winner of Nigeria’s presidential election on Wednesday with about 37 percent of the vote. But Tinubu’s main challengers, outsider and former governor Peter Obi and former vice president Atiku Abubakar, said they would challenge the results in court. What do the results mean for Africa’s most populous country and its role in the region? What went wrong with the election administration? What can Tinubu do to win over his critics? Atlantic Council experts, one of whom served on the ground as an election monitor, weigh in below.

Aubrey Hruby: To win over his younger skeptics, Tinubu needs economic results—and fast

Rama Yade: Tinubu will play a pivotal role in the continent—and the world

The view from the ground: Where election administration fell short

On the ground, where I served in recent days as an election observer, it is about the Nigerian people—the voters, non-voters, youth, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and other government officials, political parties, media, and civil society. Around ninety-three million Nigerians were registered to vote, but only 26 percent of those registered turned out to vote. Those who voted were engaged, standing in lines sometimes for hours, staying for the final counts, saluting each announced winner in their polling site.

One puzzle not yet solved is: Why did so many more people decide not to vote than in previous elections? It’s probably all the same reasons Nigerians did not vote in the past—a belief that nothing will change anyway, a fear of violence and other intimidation factors, and a lack of an understanding of the voting procedures. However, the youth are amazing. We saw them at the polling sites, though exact turnout numbers are yet to be verified, and the National Youth Service Corps ran the election at the polling site level. My conversations with many of the youth led to an observation that Nigeria has reason to hope for a better future because many of the youth are really engaged and understand what is right and wrong for their country. There are mixed reviews regarding the role of the media, because there are barriers to media having the freedom to do its job, and parts of the media allow for and even provide misinformation and hate speech.

With regard to the civil-society participants, many are sophisticated in data collection and analysis, questioning government officials with facts, using media and social media in effective ways. However, neither they nor the government nor the political parties has been effective in getting the citizens to vote in any meaningful numbers. Also, the political parties have a long way to go in terms of improving inclusion for youth, women, persons with disabilities, and internally displaced persons in the political process.

With regard to the government’s role in the administration of the election, one can draw both positive and negative conclusions. On the positive side:

The Electoral Act of 2022 took steps to improve electoral integrity. However, conclusions are yet to be determined about the implementation of those steps across the board.
Preparations for the election started earlier than for previous elections, which should have resulted in improved Election Day activities at the polls and final reporting of the results.
Generally speaking, the technology worked, but it would have worked better had INEC pilot tested the technology on a national level prior to the February election. INEC piloted the key new systems in three off-cycle elections but never conducted a nationwide test.
The government secured signatures from the eighteen political parties to the 2023 Peace Accord. Therefore, each presidential candidate and the candidate’s party committed to accepting the outcome of the elections or seek legitimate means of remedy in the event of divergent viewpoints.

For the various governmental entities charged with playing a role in the election, currency and fuel shortages were a negative. Also, while some may argue that it is unfair to assign blame, the fact is that the government did not stop election violence such as the assassination of the Labour Party senatorial candidate for Enugu East.

Specially for INEC, there were three main negatives:

A lack of transparency, so voters and the general public did not understand why election data was published late, for example.
Very late openings of polling sites because of late transportation of materials, missing materials, and late arrival of staff. This led to frustrated, often angry, voters, a limited number of whom left and a small number of whom engaged in violent activities.
A seemingly ineffective and late tabulation announcement process that raised concerns about the announced results.

—Constance Berry Newman is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a former US assistant secretary of state for African affairs. She is a member of the joint International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute Observer Mission to Nigeria’s 2023 presidential and legislative elections.

To win over his younger skeptics, Tinubu needs economic results—and fast

After one of the closest elections in recent Nigerian history, Tinubu has called for an “era of renewed hope,” asking for peace, patience, and solidarity. He acknowledged the role that the youth have played in the elections and the need to address young people’s “pains, your yearnings for good governance, a functional economy, and a safe nation.” The fact that the “godfather of Lagos” lost his home city to Peter Obi demonstrates the power of the message Nigerian youth sent in this election.

In order to address the concerns of the youth, the septuagenarian Tinubu will need to turn his immediate attention to the economy. Food inflation, at a seventeen-year high, is up 28 percent year on year from 2021 to 2022, official youth unemployment hit 42.5 percent (according to the national bureau of statistics) and oil production has fallen to a forty-year low. Power is still expensive—Nigeria is home to sixty million diesel generators and fuel products are still imported—and the World Bank estimates that over 40 percent of Nigerians live below the poverty line. Borrowing on international markets to invest in infrastructure is not really an option for the new Tinubu administration, as Nigerian debt has nearly doubled since 2015 and is now over one hundred billion dollars.

In the campaign, Tinubu committed to removing the fuel subsidies that cost Nigeria more than ten billion dollars in 2022, but this is not the first time a president tried to take on this beast. Then President Goodluck Jonathan’s efforts to remove the fuel subsidies ended after nationwide protests in 2012. This time around also promises to be politically difficult given the financial hardships faced by Nigerians.

Tinubu will also be asking a lot of Nigerians who are dependent on day-to-day imports should he push for the free float of the naira. The central bank currently restricts access to foreign exchange and rations dollars to prop up the naira, which is now valued at half of what it was when outgoing President Muhammad Buhari was first elected in 2015, resulting in a large spread between the official and street exchange rates. By the time Tinubu officially takes office at the end of May, hopefully the current government will have rationalized the demonetization plan that has caused cash shortages and long lines at ATMs.

Despite all of these economic challenges, the Nigerian spirit has remained resilient. The informal economy (which, based on my experience doing business in the country for twenty years, is two-to-three times the size of the official economy) continues to absorb newcomers to the labor market, and there is a bright spot within Nigerian tech and entrepreneurship. The country is home to Africa’s largest venture capital and tech hub, and Nigerian companies such as Sabi, SeamlessHr, Moniepoint, and Moove are expanding to other economies in the region.

But Tinubu will have an uphill battle in renewing young people’s faith in Nigeria. Young Nigerians are leaving the country in record numbers—those going to the United Kingdom to work has quadrupled since 2019—and the Nigerian Medical Association says that at least fifty doctors are leaving every week to work abroad. Tinubu will have to show quick results on the economic front to stem the tide.

—Aubrey Hruby is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, a co-founder of Tofino Capital, and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University.

Tinubu will play a pivotal role in the continent—and the world

What we can say today is that even if the election was highly disputed, with Bola Tinubu, logic prevailed. Tinubu’s victory is not a surprise. He was running on behalf of the ruling All Progressives Congress. He is Muslim from the Yoruba-speaking southwest, and even if he lost there, he has strong support in Lagos. If the result is confirmed, the largest African democracy will have passed one of its most important tests since military rule ended in 1999. And it is not over: Beyond the presidential election, Nigerians are also electing their 469 representatives in the Senate and the House of Representatives. Democracy is a tough path.

This election is special, too, because Nigeria is transitioning to a new environment marked by an economic turning point and a changing continental and international context. The expectations have never been so high. Tinubu will lead a country that is expected to become the world’s third most populous by 2050. At the African level, Nigeria is a major actor whose economy represents 70 percent of the West African gross domestic product. The future of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the new Eco currency (which has been postponed to 2025), and the African Continental Free Trade Area (which needs to be accelerated) are in Nigeria’s hands. Even as it faces major shifts, it will tremendously impact the rest of the continent. At the global level, the African continent will negotiate its role in international bodies from the Bretton Woods system to the Group of Twenty (G20) nations, and Nigeria will play an important role in this unprecedented dialogue.

—Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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Putin’s invasion shatters the myth of Russian-Ukrainian brotherhood

Taras Kuzio — Thu, 16 Feb 2023 21:59:11 +0000

As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reaches the one-year mark, the war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 is still far from over. Nevertheless, it is already abundantly clear that Ukraine’s relations with Russia have fundamentally changed forever. After Mariupol, Bucha, and countless other Russian war crimes, there can be no more talk of a return to an earlier era of close ties and blurred borders.

The troubled history of Russian-Ukrainian relations stretches back centuries. It a story of unequal interaction shaped by the politics of Russian imperialism. During the post-Soviet era, the bilateral relationship has been particularly turbulent as Russia has sought to retain its dominant position while preventing Ukraine from asserting its independence. Throughout this period, the Kremlin’s heavy-handed and tone-deaf policies have consistently proved counter-productive, serving only to widen the divide separating today’s Russia and Ukraine.

The first major watershed moment in this unfolding geopolitical divorce came in 2004 with Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, which saw mass protests over a rigged presidential vote leading to the subsequent election of pro-European candidate Viktor Yushchenko in a rerun ballot. Prior to the vote, Putin personally visited Ukraine to support pro-Kremlin candidate Viktor Yanukovych. This hubris backfired spectacularly and was widely regarded as a key motivating factor behind the huge street protests that erupted weeks later.

The Kremlin-controlled Russian media responded to the Orange Revolution with a coordinated anti-Ukrainian propaganda campaign that set the tone for many years to come. Yushchenko and his American wife, First Lady Kateryna, were vilified, while Ukraine itself was dismissed as an artificial country and Ukrainians dehumanized as “fascists.” Within months of Ukraine’s popular uprising, Moscow launched the Russia Today TV channel (now RT) to take the information war to international audiences.

A furious and humiliated Putin regarded the Orange Revolution as an act of aggression against Russia and accused Western governments of orchestrating the protests. This was to prove a major turning point in his reign. Prior to the Orange Revolution, Putin had frequently spoken of integrating Russia into the club of leading democracies. After 2004, he turned sharply away from the West and began to court a more traditional form of Russian nationalism. This included the championing of the Russian Orthodox Church and the rehabilitation of early twentieth century White Russian emigre imperialist ideologies.

While Putin’s Russia lurched back toward the authoritarian past, Ukraine continued to consolidate its fledgling democracy. The Orange Revolution had succeeded in ending government censorship over the Ukrainian media, meaning that there was no centrally orchestrated anti-Russian campaign in Ukraine to match the Kremlin’s own poisonous anti-Ukrainian propaganda. Instead, many of Ukraine’s most popular TV channels continued to broadcast Russian-made content and adopt Russia-friendly editorial positions. This reflected the prevailing mood within Ukrainian society, with attitudes toward Russia remaining broadly positive.

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The second major watershed in the post-Soviet relationship between Russia and Ukraine was the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution. When Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president, Viktor Yanukovych, fled the country following the mass killing of protesters, Putin chose to intervene directly by occupying Crimea and sparking a war in eastern Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Russian media escalated the information war against Ukraine, branding the revolution a “putsch” while portraying Ukrainians “Nazis” and puppets of the West with no real agency of their own.

The onset of Russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2014 had a profound impact on Ukrainian public opinion. As Russian troops flooded into Kremlin-created “separatist republics” in the east of the country, polls showed a surge in negative Ukrainian attitudes toward Russia’s political leaders. Similar trends were evident among Russian audiences, with Ukraine rising to second place behind America in polls identifying hostile nations.

During the eight years after the 2014 crisis, Ukraine and Russia moved further apart as the undeclared war between the two countries in eastern Ukraine rumbled on. In a bid to reduce the Kremlin’s ability to wage information warfare, Ukraine banned Russian social media, newspapers, TV channels, and Moscow-made television content. Meanwhile, affirmative action policies led to a rise in Ukrainian-language TV, cinema, and pop music, while many Russian cultural figures found they were no longer welcome in Ukraine.

Attitudes toward the shared part also diverged. While the Putin regime rehabilitated the Soviet era and glorified the Red Army role in World War II, decommunization legislation adopted by the Ukrainian authorities in 2015 outlawed Soviet symbols and led to a wave of name changes across the country as cities, towns, villages, and individual streets ditched Soviet-era names. Once seen by some as virtually indivisible, the two countries were now on strikingly different trajectories.

The spring 2019 election of Volodymyr Zelenskyy as Ukraine’s new president sparked fresh hope for a revival in Russian influence, but this was short-lived. As a native Russian-speaker who had spent much of his showbiz career in Moscow prior to entering politics, Zelenskyy was seen by many Russians as a potentially pliable partner. However, he proved just as principled as his predecessor, refusing to implement a Kremlin-friendly interpretation of the Minsk peace plan to end the simmering war in eastern Ukraine and shutting down a series of TV channels linked to Russia’s unofficial representative in Ukraine, Viktor Medvedchuk. Zelenskyy also sought to revive international interest in the Russian occupation of Crimea, launching the Crimean Platform initiative in summer 2021.

With Russia’s soft power influence inside Ukraine in apparently terminal decline, the confrontation entered a dangerous new phase which saw the Kremlin adopting an increasingly radical stance. Russian officials and propagandists began questioning the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state, which was branded as an unnatural “anti-Russia” that sought to divide the “Russian people” and could no longer be tolerated.

In July 2021, Putin himself took the highly unusual step of publishing a long, rambling personal essay entitled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” that questioned Ukraine’s right to exist and was widely interpreted as a declaration of war against Ukrainian statehood. Seven months later, many of the core ideas from this essay would feature in a series of unhinged speeches that marked the launch of the current full-scale invasion. Earlier talk of brotherhood had given way to openly genocidal rhetoric.

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The brutality of Russia’s invasion has disproportionately affected the predominantly Russian-speaking populations of eastern and southern Ukraine, leading to an historic shift in attitudes toward Russia in what were previously the most pro-Russian regions of the country. Dozens of towns and cities in these regions have been reduced to rubble, with thousands of civilians killed and millions subjected to forced deportation. As a result, anti-Russian sentiments that were traditionally more prevalent in central and western Ukraine are now also widely embraced in the south and east. A recent poll conducted by the Rating Sociological Group found that 98% of Ukrainians believe the Russian military is guilty of war crimes, while 87% also hold Russian citizens accountable.

Ukrainians now overwhelmingly express negative attitudes toward the Russian population and have been horrified to witness the popularity of the war among ordinary Russians. They point to the consistently high levels of support identified by Russia’s most respected independent pollster, the Levada Center, and also note the almost complete absence of anti-war protests. Millions of Ukrainians with friends and family in Russia have learned from bitter personal experience that many Russians wholeheartedly back the war and refuse to acknowledge the atrocities taking place in Ukraine.

Amid the horrors of today’s full-scale war, the breakdown in relations between Russia and Ukraine has now reached the point of no return. Evidence of this historic shift can be seen throughout Ukrainian society. Large numbers of Ukrainians are switching their everyday language from Russian to Ukrainian. Derussification efforts have gained new grassroots momentum, with individual communities seeking to remove the last vestiges of the imperial past in both its Czarist and Soviet forms. Ukrainians are also deserting the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Orthodox Church in growing numbers and flocking to the independent Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

The current war has accelerated an ongoing deterioration in bilateral ties that has long reflected Russia’s misguided efforts to keep independent Ukraine in the Kremlin orbit. For decades, Russian leaders have been oblivious to the transformations taking place in post-Soviet Ukrainian society and have ignored Ukraine’s strengthening national identity. Their efforts to prevent Ukraine’s departure from the Russian sphere of influence have proved self-defeating and have resulted in deepening hostility along with a realization among Ukrainians that their country will never be truly free until it cuts all ties with Russia.

Many Russians remain in denial over the depth of the divide now separating them from their Ukrainian neighbors, preferring instead to blame everything on phantom fascists and meddling Westerners. This is wishful thinking. In reality, the two countries have never been further apart and the seeds of hatred sown by Putin’s invasion will continue to define the bilateral relationship long after Russia is defeated.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of “Fascism and Genocide: Russa’s War Against Ukrainians” published by Columbia University Press.

Fellow

Alexander Alden

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Defense Policy English

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Ellinas in Cyprus Mail: Analysis: The democracy index

mzandi — Sat, 11 Feb 2023 20:10:30 +0000

Original source

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What came out of the Lula-Biden meeting?

Caroline Arkalji — Sat, 11 Feb 2023 01:36:11 +0000

US President Joe Biden welcomed Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to the White House on Friday by noting that “both of our democracies have been tested of late.” As the two nations rekindled relations with Lula’s trip to Washington a little more than a month after he returned to the presidency, the January 8 riots in Brazil and their similarities to the US insurrection on January 6, 2021, topped the agenda. But the symbolism and the substance of this visit go beyond democracy. Here are four takeaways from Lula’s big day in Washington:

1. Lula pitches a global sustainability fund

Lula proposed the creation of a new global fund for sustainability, which would designate funds from developed nations to sustainable efforts across the world. There seems to be a willingness from the United States’ side to contribute to the existing Amazon Fund, joining Norway and Germany, on efforts to protect the Amazon rainforest.

Brazil is home to the largest portion of the Amazon and is an indispensable partner for the United States on climate and sustainability. As Biden prioritizes sustainable infrastructure and equitable clean energy domestically and more ambitious climate goals abroad, Brazil is an important ally in the hemisphere. Of Brazil’s available energy resources, around 80 percent are from renewables, and, as an agricultural powerhouse, it has the potential to be an even greater asset in solving the global food crisis. The US-Brazilian cooperation on climate and the environment is expected to deepen as the United States Special Envoy for Climate John Kerry plans to visit Brazil soon.

2. UN Security Council reforms are on the table

Lula has proposed to be a peace broker in Ukraine by pushing the rhetoric around the conflict to be about finding peace rather than continuing the war. He told reporters after the meeting that he and Biden discussed “the need to create a group of countries that are not involved directly or indirectly in the war with Russia in order to find a way to make peace.”

In this context, Lula also advocated for the need to reform the United Nations Security Council to become more representative of current geopolitical dynamics—a long-standing demand of the Brazilian president—to which Biden seemed to agree, Lula said.

3. Lula embraces progressive stardom

Lula met with prominent progressives on Friday morning before heading to the White House. With Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Lula discussed ways to increase international cooperation to protect the Amazon rainforest and preserve the environment for future generations. The Brazilian president also met with Reps. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY), Pramila Jayapal (D-WA), and Ro Khanna (D-CA). They discussed shared commitments to environmental, social, and economic justice—and US-Brazil cooperation to fight authoritarianism and strengthen relations between the two countries’ legislators. The meetings represent an important effort to extend cooperation beyond the executive level, but in order to be effective and long-lasting, this kind of outreach must be bipartisan.

4. The presidents have a small window for cooperation

Lula’s Washington visit opens a new chapter as he seeks to position Brazil as a critical player regionally and internationally. Next month, he will travel to China, and he is also planning a trip to Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa.

But both Lula and Biden face challenges at home, as expectations rise for Lula to deliver on key campaign promises and Biden prepares for the 2024 elections. The window of opportunity for furthering cooperation is slim, but the stage is set for both countries to capitalize on new momentum. Particularly on the environment, Friday’s visit was a promising start.

Caroline Arkalji is a Young Global Professional with the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Is Putin’s Russia heading for collapse like its Czarist and Soviet predecessors?

Taras Byk — Thu, 09 Feb 2023 22:04:09 +0000

On January 31, delegates gathered at the European Parliament in Brussels for a conference exploring the prospects for the “decolonization” of Russia. Organized by MEPs from the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) political group within the European Parliament, this event highlighted growing international recognition of modern Russia’s imperial identity and increasing awareness of the threats this poses to European security.

Participants included representatives of the indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation, many of whom have been working for some time within the framework of the Free Nations of Post-Russia Forum. They were joined by numerous Members of the European Parliament and a host of international experts.

An event on this scale would have been hard to imagine just one year ago. However, the invasion of Ukraine has thrust the topic of Russian imperialism firmly into the European mainstream. Over the past year, a steady stream of analytical articles and opinion pieces have appeared in respected international publications accusing Vladimir Putin of pursuing an imperial agenda in Ukraine and calling for the decolonization of Russia itself. While there is still no consensus on the desirability of a new Russian collapse, the topic is no longer taboo.

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The last big Russian collapse caught the world by surprise and was far from universally welcomed. Indeed, some in the West saw the looming 1991 disintegration of the USSR as hugely destabilizing from an international security perspective and sought to prevent it. Most notoriously, US President George H. W. Bush traveled to Kyiv just weeks before the August 1991 Ukrainian Declaration of Independence to warn members of Soviet Ukraine’s parliament against “suicidal nationalism.”

Critics argue that the international community has been equally accommodating of Vladimir Putin’s efforts to rebuild Russia’s imperial influence since the turn of the millennium. The Second Chechen War, the 2008 invasion of Georgia, and the 2014 invasion of Ukraine all failed to fundamentally disrupt relations between Russia and the West. Indeed, in areas such as the energy sector, cooperation continued to deepen even after Moscow had illegally annexed Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and sparked a war in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. These flourishing economic ties helped create the financial foundations for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

As the Putin regime has attempted to reassert its imperial influence in Ukraine, Georgia, and other countries that were formerly part of the Czarist and Soviet empires, Moscow has also been actively restricting the rights of the dozens of different national and ethnic groups within the boundaries of the modern Russian state. Despite calling itself the Russian Federation, today’s Russia is a highly centralized and increasingly authoritarian country. National minorities throughout Russia must contend with the colonial exploitation of natural resources in their homelands while also playing a disproportionately prominent role in the Kremlin’s wars of aggression.

Over the past year, Putin’s imperial ambitions have run into serious trouble in Ukraine. The Russian dictator expected a short, victorious war that would extinguish Ukrainian independence and force the country permanently back into the Kremlin orbit. Instead, his invading army has suffered catastrophic losses in both men and armor amid a series of battlefield defeats that have seriously damaged Russia’s reputation as a military superpower.

Despite these setbacks, Russian officials and Kremlin propagandists continue to promote an unapologetically imperialistic agenda. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently hinted that Moldova may face the same fate as Ukraine, while menacing statements directed at the Baltic states, Kazakhstan, and other Central Asian nations are routine features of the Kremlin-controlled Russian media. Until this imperial aggression is addressed, it will remain the greatest single threat to European security.

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There are various different perspectives on the problem of Russian imperialism. Some commentators advocate a reformed Russia existing as a genuinely federal and broadly democratic state within its current borders. Others argue that today’s Russia is an unrepentant empire and will remain so until it is broken up into a series of smaller countries.

This second and more radical option alarms many Western policymakers and commentators, who fear that the break-up of the Russian Federation would have disastrous consequences for nuclear proliferation and regional security. Gloomy forecasts anticipate a Russian collapse leading to a chaotic aftermath marked by the rise of nuclear-armed regional warlords and uncontrolled migration involving tens of millions of people.

In many ways, these fears mirror similar concerns at the time of the Soviet collapse. However, while the fall of the USSR brought considerable human misery for huge numbers of former Soviet citizens, this was accompanied by only a relatively small number of localized armed conflicts. Meanwhile, those nations that escaped the Soviet sphere of influence and were welcomed into NATO and the EU have gone on to prosper. Indeed, it is no coincidence that post-Soviet Russian aggression has focused on Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, all countries that the West hesitated to embrace after 1991.

The post-Soviet experience offers important lessons for today’s policymakers as they look ahead to the increasingly realistic possibility of a post-Russia world. While the collapse of the Russian Federation is a daunting prospect, it does not necessarily have to end in disaster.

In order to avoid the worst-case scenarios that many are currently predicting, it is vital to manage the process by engaging with democratically-minded people in all regions of Russia along with the country’s national minorities. In order to avoid being caught out, Western leaders need to accurately gauge the mood within Russia and assess the appetite for greater regional autonomy or independence.

Many in the West remain reluctant to take any steps that could be seen as promoting the idea of a new Russian collapse. Indeed, some argue that talk of decolonizing the Russian Federation risks legitimizing popular Kremlin propaganda narratives of a Western plot to destroy Russia. At the same time, there is no escaping the fact that Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine has put Russian imperialism at the top of the international security agenda while fueling serious discussion over the viability of the Russian state. In today’s highly volatile geopolitical climate, it makes sense to prepare for every eventuality.

Russian imperialism has proven deeply resistant to previous democratization efforts. Nevertheless, we may yet live to see the emergence of a democratic Russia as a productive and respected member of the international community. Alternatively, the Russian Federation may go the same way as the Czarist and Soviet empires and fragment into a number of smaller states, which could then develop into successful democracies. The only thing that can be said with any degree of certainty is that unless today’s Russia abandons its imperial identity, Europe will face more wars.

Taras Byk is a manager at Wooden Horse Strategies, LLC, a governmental-relations and strategic communications firm based in Kyiv.

Since the Russian retreat from northern Ukraine in late March and early April 2022, Belarus has continued to provide safe harbor to Russian soldiers while supplying Russia with weaponry and other military equipment. Lukashenka has also hosted joint military exercises and provided training facilities for mobilized Russians.

Belarus has helped to spread propaganda and disinformation about the war, often echoing Kremlin narratives defending Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade and backing his false justifications for the conflict. Indeed, the propaganda is so pervasive and the information space so controlled inside Belarus that many Belarusians still do not realize the true scale of the war. Instead, many view it as a “special military operation,” seemingly distant from Belarus.

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The Belarusian pro-democracy movement is fighting back, confident that Putin’s defeat in Ukraine will weaken Lukashenka’s ability to maintain his hegemony over his own people. By disrupting Russia’s war effort and exhausting its resources, the Belarusian pro-democracy movement is chipping away at the edifice of the Putin-Lukashenka axis and eroding the very resources Russia needs in order to prop up its dependent ally.

As Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya argues, there is a clear connection between the fate of Ukraine and the fate of Belarus. She contends that when the people of Ukraine prevail over Russia, Belarusians will see Putin’s feet of clay and will be inspired to reject the vassal status that Russia has imposed on their own country.

For this reason, Belarusian democratic activists are contributing to anti-war activities. The Cyber Partisans initiative has disrupted the Belarusian regime’s technical infrastructure, while the railway partisans movement complicated Belarusian logistical support for Russian forces during the early months of the war. Activists are also working to combat disinformation and propaganda by communicating the truth about the war to Belarusian citizens.

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It is imperative that Ukraine’s friends and allies in the West punish Lukashenka’s regime for its role in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Doing so will help support Ukraine’s defense by imposing greater costs on Belarus and forcing Minsk to think twice before carrying out instructions from Moscow. It will also help the Belarusian pro-democracy movement in the battle for the hearts and minds of the Belarusian people by exposing how Lukashenka’s support for the war is directly responsible for growing insecurity and economic hardship in Belarus.

To begin with, the US and other democratic partners should continue to provide robust support for the Belarusian democratic movement, which is making significant contributions to the anti-war effort in Belarus. Historically, resources to support the Belarusian democracy movement have come in peaks and valleys, often surging following key political events only to dwindle in subsequent periods. Support has remained strong since 2020, when a fraudulent presidential election brought hundreds of thousands of Belarusians to the streets in protest. Now that the country’s democratic forces have embarked upon a longer-term movement for change, consistent and strong financial support is all the more crucial.

This investment must be paired with a high-level diplomatic initiative to signal both to the Lukashenka regime and to the Belarusian democratic opposition that the US and EU commitment to a democratic Belarus will not waver and is linked directly to the defense of democracy throughout the region. To this end, the US should assign another Special Envoy for Belarus at the ambassadorial rank to continue the important work of former US Special Envoy to Belarus Ambassador Julie Fisher, who was a steadfast supporter of the democratic movement during her tenure from 2020-2022.

In light of the fact that the Belarusian authorities refused to renew the visa and accreditation of the EU’s former Head of Delegation to Belarus, Dirk Schuebel, the EU should consider appointing a remote-based Special Representative for Belarus instead. These new envoys would serve as crucial interlocutors between Washington, Brussels, and the leaders of the Belarusian opposition.

Targeted support should also be leveraged for Belarusian volunteers fighting against Russia in Ukraine. Greater material support for the more than 1,000 Belarusian volunteers fighting under Ukrainian military leadership would serve to strengthen their ability to aid in the defense of Ukraine at a time of increasing risk of further attacks from Belarusian territory. It would also show members of the Belarusian military that there is an alternative outlet to serve for those who recognize the risks posed to their country and do not wish to be dragged into an unjustified war against a peaceful neighbor.

As the specter of greater Belarusian involvement in the war grows, so too does the imperative for Washington and Brussels to act now to support the Belarusian democratic forces in undermining Belarusian support for Russia’s war machine, countering propaganda and disinformation, and joining Ukrainian forces on the frontline of democracy. The Belarusian democratic movement understands that their fate will now be decided on the battlefields of Ukraine. They have the will and capacity to aid their Ukrainian compatriots in securing victory as soon as possible. They just need the tools to do so.

Stephen Nix is the senior director for Eurasia at the International Republican Institute (IRI). Mark Dietzen is the IRI resident program director for Belarus, based in Vilnius, Lithuania.

Scholars and policymakers from around the world present their research and analysis on the relationship between freedom and prosperity.

Africa Corruption Democratic Transitions Eastern Europe

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speakers

Damon Wilson
President and CEO, National Endowment for Democracy

DAMON WILSON: I have to tell you, it is a real honor not to just be at the first annual Freedom and Prosperity Research Conference; to be back here at the Atlantic Council. It feels like home. And I just want to acknowledge I’m so proud that the Atlantic Council picked up on the ideas that Michael had and had the initiative to take this out and build this initiative. So kudos to you, Dan, Matt Kroenig, [and] others who made this a reality; to Fred for helping to really make this work; and [to] Michael for bringing this vision here.

I’m also—I was a champion of this at the very beginning when I—when I heard these ideas, and I’m really proud that at the National Endowment for Democracy, that many of the ideas that you’re working on here underpin much of our philosophy. And that’s why I’m delighted that Andrew Wilson and his team [are] here with the Center for International Private Enterprise, one of the core institutes within the NED family, that is premised on the idea that healthy democracies require healthy economies, entrepreneurs, a vibrant market that can work with rule of law. And delighted to have my own board members who are here as well, Kelly and others, who are joining as part of this conversation. I just saw you, Ambassador Currie.

And while I was present at some of the early creation, Dan, I’m almost embarrassed to be offering remarks at the opening because I’m here more to be your cheerleader for the concept and, frankly, more eager to learn from the research that you’re undertaking, particularly those of you who are participating here in the room and online, because I’m an enthusiastic believer in the premise of unlocking the potential of people. It’s a pretty simple concept, and yet it’s powerful. Whether it’s being effective in how to manage a young team of intellectual entrepreneurs in an organization like the Atlantic Council; the next generation of political leaders that are going to drive reform; or entrepreneurs that are going to be at the heart of jobs, growth, and innovation; and together to think about how democracy, rule of law, and prosperity, markets, are key to an effective war on poverty, I think that’s really compelling.

Now, to many of us, that case seemed obvious. You look at some of the infographics the Center’s already produced and they sort of intuitively knew this. We could look at North and South Korea and now we understand the data—fifty-one times larger per capita [gross domestic product] North to South. We sort of understood that looking at West and East Germany in the 1990s, three-and-a-half times the size; looking at what was a free Hong Kong and Taiwan compared to China. And it felt in the 1990s and decades after is that maybe this was—this obvious thing would accelerate and become sort of a norm.

But it’s not so obvious. Since then, we’ve seen a real challenge: a 2008 financial crisis that maybe originated on Wall Street but led to global shocks and a recession; periods of slow growth; really a backlash even from Iraq, a misconception of thinking of Iraq as democracy promotion and then undermining that concept; the legacy of a North-South divide coming to a head. And you lay on top of this the rise of the PRC, the rise of China, and which started to scratch as a model of autocratic capitalism. Hmm, millions out of poverty; what does that have to say?

And we’re here at a time when President Biden has framed a big global debate between democracy versus autocracy, but in some respects, it’s a little bit more nuanced. It’s a little bit broader. It is a test in models, with average people coming to conclusions—democratic capitalism or autocratic capitalism—and they see the PRC at the head of this autocratic-capitalist camp.

And the truth is, it’s the allure of a more effective, perhaps easier path to prosperity, without a lot of noise of debate that comes in a democratic society, like India, the partnership that comes, as you see in the United States, or compromise that’s required in democracies around the world. At first, it was reinforced even by this pandemic; the perception that maybe autocrats are managing this pandemic better.

But I think the truth really is that it’s a more attractive option not for people. It’s a more attractive path for autocratic rulers to hold onto power and get rich. It’s not about their people. It’s about autocratic elites who want to get rich and hold on to that power.

And so the result isn’t really autocratic capitalism. Autocratic capitalism’s result is really kleptocracy in which it’s taking money from their people. And this has bred a whole international phenomenon that our board member, Anne Applebaum, has written about with “Autocracy Inc.,” in which deals, not ideals, are driving sort of vested interests in autocratic societies to do business together, back each other up, use free societies to their own advantage, and strengthen their own hand on a global terrain. It’s a profound new challenge that we find ourselves in. And I won’t unpack the case here, but we’ve seen it from Russia, Iran, and China at the center of it.

And it’s led some, like Anne, to argue that are the bad guys winning now. Authoritarian resurgence around the world, coupled with democratic erosions, fueled by this profoundly changed landscape, emerging complex challenges, these interconnected trends. It feels like there’s a systemic challenge from autocracies to displace democracies as the leading form of governance. And we see this sharper repression, turbocharged by technology, twisted by a new information environment, the sharing of techniques across borders among autocrats, and helping cement kleptocratic rulers in countries around the world that are not serving the poor, that are not serving their people’s interests. And so you overlay this now on inflation, a food crisis, slow growth.

So what does this mean? Despite all that, you look around the world and you see how the demand for democracy is resilient. Madeleine Albright, before she passed away, is someone who’s really important to the Atlantic Council, [National Democratic Institute], the NED family. She argued that democracy was not a dying cause, but it was poised for a comeback, in her last big article she published, “The Coming Democratic Revival.” But it’s pretty apparent that things don’t just happen. They just aren’t on this automatic cycle. Especially in our world, democracy, it’s not a self-executing proposition.

And I’m really taken by something that Fred wrote in December in his “Inflection Points” newsletter. And he pointed out that at the start of [2022], autocrats from Xi Jinping hosting the Olympics, managing the pandemic, Vladimir Putin, troops around Ukraine, showing up in Beijing for no-limits partnership, the Ayatollah Khamenei in Iran feeling no pressure, that they started off [2022] feeling confident.

And now we see, through their own mistakes, underlying weaknesses in systems, systems that are hard to self-correct, mistakes that have led people to push back, whether it’s Ukrainians, whether it’s the… Russians that are arrested each day protesting war activity, whether it’s incredible courage that it took from Chinese in the white-paper movement to stand up to COVID restrictions, or the inspiration we see from courageous people across Iran arguing for women, life, freedom.

And so the key of your work here is actually—we don’t take that case for granted—how do you build the case [that] democracy is the best pathway for people, for prosperity, for the poor? And Dan, you’re right. I think having understanding this case has to be argued and built from voices, from countries around the world, voices from those in the developing world.

And the goal of the work is to underscore that this isn’t implanting ideas from the ivory tower, but how to support the aspirations of people around the world themselves and their voices, for what’s best for their people. After all, it’s the model of how the Endowment thinks about democracy support. We don’t promote a model, an American model. It’s about how do you support those that are courageous enough to struggle for freedom, understanding it’s their cause, and it’s our honor to support them with humility. So hats off to building in a grants program to what you’re doing.

And to ground it in this research and data, I think it’s so important. We’ve seen already, in the work coming out of the center, free versus unfree countries show that thirteen times wealthier if you live in a free country. But I like how you’ve mapped it out to show that societies are also healthier, happier, more inclusive based on these indexes that you’re tagging. And to be able to demonstrate with data that political, economic, and legal freedoms are crucial to prosperity, I think, is key to demonstrating how democracy can deliver for all of its citizens.

In fact, democracy is the best way to deliver for its citizens and this is ultimately built into the concept of democratic capitalism. To be effective there’s got to be accountability, transparency, a feedback loop from citizens, from consumers, self-correcting mechanisms, a possibility of making mistakes but incentives to fix them and this relentless pressure to be responsive to citizens, the consumers, relentless pressure to reform.

And so I’m really pleased to be here. I’m more excited to hear about the work that’s coming out of this. I really welcome this initiative. Dan had written about how to strip the emotions and politics so that data can do the talking and I think that’s powerful.

But I just want to close with saying the real world involves emotions and it’s a good thing. So how does this work show that results can actually harness or, better yet, unlock, unleash the yearning of the human spirit—that emotion—how people want to control their own destiny, empower principled leaders, innovative entrepreneurs, to prove that democracy can deliver for its citizens. How we invest in our people is this pathway.

So I want to close with—I just came back from Nigeria, thanks to some advice from Peter Pham, who’s with us, and it shows that without sources of prosperity control of government means control of resources and that can undermine democracy delivering, and we see where potential is unleashed where there’s no control and a Nigerian artistic scene, a tech scene in Lagos, things can flourish. That’s why an End SARS movement is now riling the election.

I spent time last fall with North Korean defectors in South Korea seeing incredible young people who weathered incredible hardships in North Korea after just a few short years in freedom in the south becoming extraordinarily productive, creative entrepreneurs and social entrepreneurs.

This is how to show how this applies in the real world. I’m really pleased you’ve got a minister here from Tunisia—I’m headed to Tunisia at the end of the month—because freedom without prosperity leads to trouble. We’ll hear from you about that, populism backsliding.

But we need to recognize that that’s a long journey. That’s why I’m proud of the work you’re doing. I’m excited about the work that the Center for International Private Enterprise is investing in. Without a healthy set of private-sector entrepreneurs, you don’t have a healthy democratic sector and that’s why I think this work is so important to show that freedom delivers prosperity. It helps democracy deliver.

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Europe’s last empire: Putin’s Ukraine war exposes Russia’s imperial identity

Botakoz Kassymbekova — Wed, 01 Feb 2023 11:26:20 +0000

Vladimir Putin insists Russians and Ukrainians are “one people” but his brutal invasion of Ukraine has revealed a remarkable lack of “brotherly” Russian empathy for Ukrainians. While many people in other former Soviet republics have identified with Ukraine’s suffering, relatively few Russian citizens have shown any sign of compassion or remorse for the genocidal violence being perpetrated in their name.

According to research conducted by Russia’s internationally respected independent pollster, the Levada Center, Russian public support for the war remained above 70% throughout 2022. Speaking to Germany publication Der Spiegel in early 2023, Levada Center scientific director Lev Gudkov observed that mounting evidence of the atrocities taking place in Ukraine had made virtually no impact on Russian public opinion. “The Russians have little compassion for the Ukrainians. Almost no one here talks about the fact that people are being killed in Ukraine.”

Much of the available evidence supports these poll findings and points to a remarkable absence of empathy. Millions of Ukrainians have friends and family in Russia. Many report being shocked by the lack of compassion they have encountered since the start of the invasion. Rather than sympathy or concern, they have been confronted by cold indifference, outright denials, or pro-Kremlin propaganda tropes.

The hundreds of thousands of Russians who fled the country over the past year have not staged any major anti-war rallies while in exile, despite no longer being subject to draconian Kremlin restrictions. Inside Russia itself, there have been no significant protests since the first weeks of the war. The contrast provided by mass anti-government rallies over the past twelve months in other repressive dictatorships such as China and Iran has cast the silence of the Russian population in an even more unfavorable light.

This apparent lack of empathy for the victims of Russian imperial aggression is nothing new. Many Russians displayed similar attitudes toward the two Chechen wars of the early post-Soviet era and the 2008 invasion of Georgia. More recently, the 2014 invasion of Crimea was widely cheered and remains arguably the most popular single event of Putin’s entire 23-year reign. Such thinking reflects the unapologetically imperial identity which the Russian Federation inherited from the Soviet and Czarist eras.

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Modern Russian national identity remains firmly rooted in notions of a sacred imperial mission that perceives Russia as being a unique civilization locked in an eternal struggle against various constructed foreign enemies. Hundreds of years ago, the messianic vision of the czars gave rise to the idea of Russia as the Third Rome and leader of Orthodox Christianity. In the twentieth century, this belief in imperial exceptionalism was harnessed to identify Russians as the nation that would save the world from capitalism and lead a global communist revolution.

Under Putin, the lyrics may have changed but the tune remains largely the same. Indeed, it is telling that while Soviet communism has long since been consigned to the ash heap of history, today’s Russia has seamlessly inherited the USSR’s Cold War-era animosity toward NATO, the United States, and the Western world in general.

The sense of imperial mission pervading modern Russian society has helped nurture values of sacrifice and obligation at the expense of individual human rights. Many Russians take it for granted that they are destined to rule over other nations and interpret their colonialism as fundamentally benevolent, even when it is obviously unwelcome. Russia’s victims must be liberated, whether they like it or not.

Whether driven by the Orthodox faith, the communist ideology, or Putin’s far vaguer notions of a “Russian world,” this highly paternalistic brand of imperialism grants Russians the right to speak on behalf of their subject peoples. Accordingly, there is no need to actually listen to these conquered peoples or empathize with them, even while proclaiming them as “brothers.” Those who oppose this holy crusade are logically understood to be representatives of evil. It is no coincidence that a whole host of senior Russian officials include Putin himself have sought to frame the invasion of Ukraine as a battle against Satanists.

While Russian opposition figures are often critical of the Putin regime, they are typically far less outspoken on the topic Russian colonialism, the root cause of the current genocidal Ukraine invasion. Instead, some seek to portray themselves as the real victims of the Kremlin while failing to make the obvious connection between the authoritarianism they claim to oppose and the imperialism they choose to ignore. By blaming everything on Putin, they embrace the same convenient victimhood that the Kremlin itself promotes when faced by the negative consequences of its imperial policies.

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How the international community can help restore Sudan’s democracy ” class=”gta-horizontal-featured–img” />

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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The national mythologies of today’s Russia and Ukraine could hardly be more different. While many Russians readily embrace their country’s imperial identity, imperial ideas do not resonate in Ukraine. Even before the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion one year ago, Ukrainians already tended to define their national identity in terms of resistance to the narrative of submission, while prioritizing personal freedoms over obligations to the state.

Since the early 1990s, Ukraine’s post-Soviet nation-building journey has been shaped by a struggle for true independence. This has led to the merging of civic and anti-colonial resistance movements, with the country’s two Maidan revolutions serving as important landmarks on the road toward internal and external freedom.

For almost two decades, Ukraine’s trajectory has been viewed with mounting anger and alarm in the Kremlin. Haunted by the Soviet collapse of the late twentieth century, the Putin regime regards Ukraine’s democratization as an existential threat to its own authoritarian model and a potential catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s imperial retreat.

For the time being, other post-Soviet states such as Belarus and Kazakhstan act as alternatives to Ukraine’s anti-colonial identity. In these countries, domestic democratic development has been stifled by Kremlin-backed regimes that have chosen not to break decisively with the imperial past. However, there are signs that the current status quo may not be as stable as Moscow would like to think.

Ukraine’s defiant resistance to Russia’s invasion is energizing civil society throughout the former USSR and fueling unprecedented debate over the role of Russian colonialism. On the international stage, the war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 has introduced contemporary global audiences to the realities of modern Russia’s imperial identity.

Commentators around the world are now actively discussing the practical implications of a post-colonial Russia. Such talk is no longer considered entirely fanciful. On the contrary, many now believe that defeat in Ukraine would deal a decisive blow to hopes of a new Russian Empire and transform the entire Eurasian political landscape. Ultimately, It is up to Russian society itself to dismantle the country’s imperial identity in order to reckon with the horrors of Russia’s past and address the crimes of the current genocidal war.

Botakoz Kassymbekova is Assistant Professor of Modern History at the University of Basel.

On October 25, 2021, however, a military coup upended that progress. Now, as the international community and domestic Sudanese actors, including the military and civilian groups, work toward a restoration of democracy, a number of challenges confront them. How they address them could either make or break the dreams of the young Sudanese behind the 2019 revolution.

A fresh start

The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), African Union, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development have helped restart dialogue and have initiated a road map for transition. On December 5, 2022, the army, FFC, other political forces, civil society organizations, and some youth resistance committees signed a framework agreement to establish a civilian government to manage a democratic transition for two years, ending with free and fair elections.

Planning for general elections after a short transitional period must incorporate creative arrangements that account for the multiple political, security, and economic crises that Sudan faces.

The prospects for elections in Sudan must be discussed within the framework of the transition process as a whole. A crucial decision to be made by the political actors is the timing and sequencing of the election in relation to other transitional tasks, including peace-making and implementation or revision of the JPA, transitional justice, dismantling the power structures of the previous regime, economic reform, and constitution-building.

The election dilemma

The relationship between elections and constitution-building is particularly important. If elections are to be held, the question is to what? There must be some body—with a defined constitutional structure, powers, roles, and terms of office—that is being elected, and which once elected can fulfil its mandate.

Holding credible elections means more than the elections themselves being free and fair. It also means that the parameters defining the body to be elected must be broadly accepted and legitimate. Without that, losers of the election will challenge the legitimacy of the elected institutions, while the winners will push their victory to extremes and potentially have no limits in power. It’s an invitation to instability.

There is no scope for elected institutions under the 2019 Constitutional Charter. In August 2022, the Steering Committee of the Sudanese Bar Association (SBA) proposed a new draft constitution as a framework for restoring the democratic path and regulating the procedures of the transitional period. This draft did not provide provisions for holding elections. All its institutions are appointed, not elected. This is because, until now, it has always been assumed that the transition will culminate with elections, rather than elections being part of a broader transitional process. The requirement for elections to be held at the end of the transitional period is specified in Article 13 of the JPA.

This is unusual. Often elections happen at some point in the middle of a transition process. In many cases, transitional institutions—such as a constituent assembly—are elected under a transitional constitution, and a final or permanent constitution is then developed by that elected body.

Elections or Constitution: What comes first?

The requirement that elections will happen only at the end of the transition places a huge burden on unelected transitional institutions to develop a permanent constitution before elections can take place.

Holding elections after the transitional period, and not in the middle of it, also means the transitional period has to be relatively short. Elections, which are vital to public legitimacy and to the establishment of normal institutionalized politics, cannot be postponed indefinitely. At some point the people of Sudan must decide on who and how they will be governed.

Yet there is reason to be concerned that there might not be enough time to develop a permanent constitution, based on a sufficient consensus, before the planned end of the transitional period.

There are only three (non-attractive) possible solutions:

Amend transitional constitutional documents, to allow for elections to transitional institutions, before the end of the transition process, with a permanent constitution to be developed after the election—although that is against Article 13 of the JPA.
Rush permanent constitution-building, to get a constitution in place before the scheduled end of the transition, with necessary compromises on the quality of document and on the extent to which the process can be fully inclusive.
Delay elections indefinitely until after the completion of permanent constitution-making, which may result in the ebbing away of the legitimacy of transitional institutions and raise the risk of extra-constitutional military intervention.

Whatever the case, the signatories to the Framework Agreement have begun to hold stakeholder conferences to discuss four fundamental issues necessary for signing the final political agreement: security sector reform, transitional justice issues, the regional case of eastern Sudan, and the issue of amending the JPA.

It is important to make use of these ongoing consultations to discuss extending the transitional period to accommodate institutional and legislative reforms and the necessary logistical preparations for elections. The international community, including UNITAMS, can help transfer technical expertise, international experiences, lessons learned, and resources to assist a democratic transition and plan elections, and to support sustainable peace and stability in Sudan.

Aside from the constitution, Articles 12 and 13 of the JPA establish other preconditions for the holding of credible elections. They include:

arrangements for international monitoring
implementation of the agreed-upon plan for the voluntary return of the displaced and refugees
the conduct of the population census, “in an effective and transparent manner before the end of the transitional period, with international support and oversight”
the enactment of a Political Parties Law
the formation of the Electoral Commission

Similar preconditions are also specified in the draft constitution presented by the SBA. Additionally, it is necessary to conduct a campaign to make voters aware of the new constitution and of the electoral system.

This is a lot to do, and Sudan is starting from a low baseline. If the transition period is to be just two years, Sudan will require considerable technical support, and investment of resources, to meet the requirements of the JPA and the SBA’s draft transitional constitution.

Role of the international community

Since the formation of the transitional government in August 2019, a broad international campaign has been launched to support the democratic transition in Sudan. My organization, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), has joined this effort by providing technical support to the transitional government, especially in supporting the formation of the Electoral Commission and the Constitution Making Commission, and in enacting laws related to these commissions. This support from international institutions must continue and be consistent with the political changes that occur.

There is a mandate for such support. Security Council Resolution 2425 of 2020, establishing UNITAMS, gave the UN mission in Sudan a mandate to provide assistance related to the transition and peace. Given the scale of the task and tight deadline, such financial and programmatic support must be provided urgently. Much of the preparatory work, both on elections and on the constitution, can be started now, for example the formation of working groups and technical committees.

There is also precedent for this support. The Electoral Assistance Mission in Iraq was formed within the larger Iraq mission, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution No. 2576 (2021), to provide advice, support, and technical assistance to Iraq in planning, preparing, and conducting elections and referendums. Similarly, the European Union delegation assisted Jordan (2016) and Lebanon (2022). The African Union deployed, in May 2019, a team of observers and a team of technical experts ahead of the elections in Malawi.

The threats that may result from holding elections amid challenging security conditions—including the weaknesses and divisions within the state’s security institutions—cannot be overlooked. In addition to financial and logistical assistance, an international assistance mission should provide a qualified, trained, and experienced security force.

No time to waste

It is necessary to start soon and move fast to help build political consensus around the design of the process and the sequencing of the transition.

Failure to reach a political agreement on the electoral processes, on the constitutional structures that give rise to elections, and on legal rules regulating elections, may cause political tension, which could disrupt the elections and undermine the democratic transition.

The opportunities currently available to the Sudanese people to discuss issues of democratization, including the issue of organizing free and credible elections, with the help of the international community, might not last forever.

The international community needs to provide substantial support for the coming elections in Sudan at the end of the transitional period. This is vital for security, peace, and political stability in Sudan and the Horn of Africa. Failure to do so would create security, political, and social risks that are difficult to count—or predict.

Sami A. Saeed is the head of the Sudan program at the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. He previously served at the United Nations as a legal advisor in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan from 2006–2020.

AfricaSource Apr 11, 2022

The days of elite deals in Sudan should be over

By Cameron Hudson

It is not too late for Washington to correct the course on Sudan and help stave off another democracy-delaying elite pact.

Africa Politics & Diplomacy

How the international community can help restore Sudan’s democracy ” class=”gta-horizontal-featured–img” />

AfricaSource Sep 27, 2022

Here’s what a Marshall Plan for the DRC could look like

By Jean-Paul Mvogo

The development progress the DRC witnessed in the 1970s is now lost. A massive economic assistance program equivalent to the Marshall Plan may be necessary to recover what’s been lost.

Africa Democratic Republic of the Congo

How the international community can help restore Sudan’s democracy ” class=”gta-horizontal-featured–img” />

AfricaSource Oct 7, 2022

How Niger’s safety net helps its most vulnerable citizens thrive amid crises

By Ouhoumoudou Mahamadou and Mamta Murthi

The World Bank’s Wadata Talaka safety-net partnership program with Niger aims to empower women in the country and protect its human-capital gains in the face of overlapping shocks.

Africa Climate Change & Climate Action

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Wartime Ukraine must maintain course from Russian past to European future

Andrew D’Anieri — Tue, 24 Jan 2023 20:18:47 +0000

As Ukraine fights for its survival against invading Russian forces, the struggle for the country’s future is also unfolding far from the front lines. While Ukraine holds off Putin’s troops and endures Moscow’s terror campaign against civilians, efforts to modernize the country continue. By pursuing important reforms even in wartime, Kyiv is paving the way for a Euro-Atlantic future while distancing itself from the Soviet past.

Indications of Ukraine’s European trajectory remain evident despite the horrors of Russia’s ongoing invasion. The tiny state-owned Ust-Dunaisk port complex sits in an inlet in southwestern Ukraine where the Black Sea meets the Danube River, roughly thirty miles northwest of Snake Island. There are no roads traversing the small canals from the nearby village of Vylkove to the port, which serves as a key cargo loading point for transport between seafaring vessels in the Black Sea and river ships on the Danube.

In what was the first seaport privatization of its kind in Ukraine, the State Property Fund recently auctioned off the Ust-Dunaisk port and its Danube River berths in Vylkove and nearby Kiliya for $5.5 million. Ukrainian fertilizer company Elixir won the auction against seven other bidders, more than tripling the price from the $1.6 million opening bid.

The bidding war for Ust-Dunaisk points to a larger trend in Ukraine’s maritime exports. Russian forces currently occupy much of the Ukrainian coastline and have imposed a blockade of Ukrainian ports that has made maritime trade virtually impossible for almost a year. While a grain deal brokered by Turkey and the United Nations in summer 2022 partially opened Odesa’s major ports once again, the Russian Navy continues to harass commercial vessels entering and exiting Ukrainian waters.

As a result, shipping companies are increasingly turning to the Danube River to export Ukrainian grain. In 2022, grain shipments through the Danube grew 42 times year-on-year to 6.1 million tons, while overall cargo nearly tripled to 14.5 million tons, reaching the full capacity of Ukraine’s three Danube ports.

With demand growing rapidly, companies are now racing to build shipping capacity on the Danube. Ukrainian agribusiness company Nibulon, which has traditionally operated mainly out of Black Sea port Mykolaiv, is working to expand its Danube River capacity in the port of Izmail to be able to process 300,000 tons of grain per month. As Ukrainian companies adapt to wartime market conditions, so too have the government’s privatization authorities. Plans are underway to privatize the Bilhorod-Dnistrovskiy Seaport just up the coast from Ust-Dunaisk by the end of the winter season.

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Ukraine’s port privatization push is part of a broader initiative to renew privatization efforts following suspension in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s February 24, 2022 invasion. Rustem Umerov was appointed as the new head of Ukraine’s State Property Fund in September 2022. He has vowed to simplify the privatization process and make it more accessible to foreign investors. If successful, this should help the country to partially offset the catastrophic economic impact of the war while laying the foundations for a revival in the Ukrainian economy once the fighting is finally over.

At the same time, significant concerns remain regarding Ukraine’s commitment to privatization. Since the invasion began, the Ukrainian authorities have invoked wartime laws to nationalize a number of strategically important companies. While these measures reflect the gravity of the situation in the country, they also raise questions over Ukraine’s future economic direction.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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Even if the relaunched privatization push proves effective, huge challenges still lie ahead for Ukraine as the country looks to achieve a decisive break from the discredited past. Meaningful judicial reform is only just beginning to take shape and is vital for the country’s future. Encouragingly, President Zelenskyy now appears more willing to listen to calls from Ukraine’s international partners to clean out corrupt courts. With Ukraine heavily reliant on military and financial aid, these calls will certainly be more difficult to ignore in the months ahead. Ukraine’s partners will also be encouraged by the Zelenskyy administration’s response to recent corruption allegations, which led to a flurry of dismissals and resignations.

Post-war Ukraine will need to tackle a range of other major modernization tasks while dramatically reducing the state-owned share in the country’s banking sector. The list of necessary reforms is long and painfully familiar to anyone who has been engaged in Ukraine’s notoriously patchy efforts since the country’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity. Nevertheless, some veterans of Ukraine’s reform drive believe the incredible sacrifices of the past eleven months have made the prospect of further backsliding intolerable and opened a window of opportunity for once-in-a-lifetime progress. The Ukrainian authorities must not miss this chance.

We may never know exactly why Vladimir Putin chose to invade Ukraine, but fear of the country’s emergence as a fully-fledged European democracy was clearly a factor. Putin has long viewed Ukraine’s successful transformation as an existential threat and a potential catalyst for democratic change inside Russia itself. As Moscow continues its genocidal war to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and subjugate the Ukrainian people, it is more important than ever to maintain the commitment to a European future that so many Ukrainians are currently fighting for. This means implementing economic and governmental reforms whenever possible, even in the most trying of wartime circumstances.

Andrew D’Anieri is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Follow him on Twitter @andrew_danieri.

But disagreements appear to have continued. A few days later, on January 15, a second coordinated tweet was published. It called for the international community to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization. This time, Esmaeilion didn’t join the coordinated message (he, however, tweeted separately about the subject). This was seen as a particular loss by proponents of opposition unity, since the grassroots activist has come to represent an important section of the opposition ranks.

In recent days, another online campaign has put the spotlight on one particular figure in the opposition: the former crown prince. It all started on January 13, when Pahlavi gave an interview to Manoto TV, a London-based broadcaster, long known for its sympathy for the ousted dynasty. Pahlavi once again defended a democratic vision that he has long advocated for: free elections to form a constituent assembly that could determine the future form of governance in Iran. When the anchor pressed Pahlavi on why he wasn’t playing a more leading role for the protesters, he said: “Whatever we want to do, we must have legitimacy from inside the country. If we are to negotiate in the international arena on behalf of our fellow Iranians, we have to be able to say that we are backed by political prisoners, civic activists, and political and intellectual currents inside the country who have enabled us to speak on their behalf.”

Responding to the comments, an Iranian journalist based in Germany published a video and declared that he considered Pahlavi to be speaking on his behalf. He used the hashtag #You_Represent_Me (#من_وکالت_میدهم). The hashtag was quickly picked up by thousands of other Iranians, inside and outside the country, who used it to declare their support for Pahlavi (Pahlavi and his supporters say this was a spontaneous online campaign, unbeknownst to them, while his opponents claim it was likely pre-coordinated with either himself or Manoto TV).

A petition on change.org declaring Pahlavi as “my representative” has been signed by more than 390,000 people so far. More importantly, many emphasized that they weren’t supporting Pahlavi to restore the fallen monarchy, but only backed him as an “interim figure” who could bring about a democratic transition away from the Islamic Republic.

One such supporter was Dariush Eghbali, one of the most popular singers in the history of modern Iran. Now based in Paris, Dariush is known for his left-wing sympathies, which landed him in jail during the rule of the former crown prince’s father, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The singer, who spent a total of twenty-six months in jail under the Shah, now declared that, since “the Iranian revolution has entered a new phase and requires new strategies,” he was backing Pahlavi as “a suitable option for representing the opposition abroad.”

Many other celebrities also declared their support for Pahlavi. Karimi, once known as the Maradona of Asia, said he was backing Pahlavi “for the period of transition…and toward organizing a free referendum for a free and prosperous Iran.” Other supporters included singer Ebi; Oscar-nominated actress Shohre Aghdasholoo; actor Hamid Farokhnejad, who left Iran only a few weeks ago; and activist singer Shahin Najafi. Another interesting case of support came from Kimia Alizadeh, a Taekwondo athlete who won bronze for the Islamic Republic at the 2016 Rio Olympics before defecting to protest mandatory hijab rules.

Support for Pahlavi isn’t limited to Iranians living abroad. Videos published on social media show Iranians in cities, such as Tehran and Izeh in southwestern Iran, shouting slogans like “Pahlavi, you are our representative” and “Pahlavi is our choice, the leader of our revolution.” Perhaps most touchingly, several relatives of those killed by security forces declared their support for Pahlavi, including Nasrin Shakarami, mother of Nika, a sixteen-year-old protester who was killed during the ongoing protests (Nika’s aunt, Atash Shakarami, meanwhile, voiced her opposition by declaring that “no one is my representative”); Manoucher Bakhtiari, whose son Pouya was killed during the November 2019 protests; and Peyman Qolipour, whose brother, Pejman, also killed in the 2019 protests (Peyman liked Dariush’s Instagram post.)

Many were reminded that some of the protesters recently executed by the regime, including Mohammad Hosseini, had also supported Pahlavi in their social media posts. Another such individual was Amirhossein Moradi, a protester and a former death row prisoner who was saved from execution after an advocacy movement united millions of Iranians in his support. Additionally, current political prisoners, such as Mohammad Daniali and Reza Norozi, have also declared their support.

To any fair observer of Iran, Pahlavi has a certain degree of support in Iranian society, although it is hard to discern just how wide this support is. In his analysis of the latest events, Khashayar Dayhimi, a respected intellectual based in Tehran, claimed: “I believe that, if there was a referendum today and Reza Pahlavi was on the ballot, he’d easily win because people don’t know anyone other than him.”

Benefiting from name recognition, Pahlavi’s support is also based on his espousal of broadly open and liberal democratic politics, although he has never denounced the authoritarian rule of his father and grandfather. In an often acrimonious political space, he never picks fights with other opposition figures and has managed to stay somewhat above the fray. Unlike some of his ultra-nationalist, right-wing, and harsh-sounding supporters, he often tries to build a big tent. He has refused to commit to the revival of the monarchy—but has not denounced the “prince” title most of his supporters use to address him with—even stating a preference for a republic. While some opponents of the regime blame Islam as a whole, Pahlavi affirms his Shia Muslim faith and has consistently called on “non-regime clerics” to join the people. He has extended a similar offer to members of the Iranian armed forces and IRGC who, he insists, must be part of the future of Iran.

Pahlavi has voiced support for such diverse and popular domestic-based figures as human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh and Sunni cleric Maulana Abdulhamid. His staunch support for Iranian territorial integrity has also proved attractive to many. Even opponents have, at times, praised his patriotism. Many recall that, as a young man who had just been thrown out of his country by the revolution in 1980, Pahlavi offered his services as a US-trained pilot to the armed forces of the Islamic Republic as they fought off an Iraqi invasion (the offer was denied.)

While this staunch patriotism has led to critiques by some supporters of ethnic minorities, Pahlavi has also had support from major ethnic-based parties, which, after all, mostly agree with him that Iran’s territorial integrity must be preserved. In his response to the recent campaign, Abdullah Mohtadi, leader of the left-wing Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan—an observer member party of the Socialist International—spoke of Pahlavi’s “political capital” and added that he should be part of an anti-regime coalition.

But the online campaign in support of Pahlavi also has many critics. In response to it, the hashtag #He_Is_Not_My_Representative (#من_وکالت_نمیدهم) has also been circulated by many, including in the form of graffiti—“No to shah, no to supreme leader, death to the oppressor”— and signs during protests—“Reza Pahlavi is not my representative”—in Iran. Some criticized the fact that a movement dedicated to “women, life, freedom” should now expect to follow a male leader. Others warned that the last time there was blind enthusiasm for an individual revolutionary leader—referring to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979—things didn’t end up so well.

Zia Nabavi, a student activist in Iran who has spent years in prison, said support for Pahlavi showed people were desperate to find a leader but criticized the pro-Pahlavi campaign for “asking us to give up our own agency.” Jafar Azimzadeh, a well-known trade unionist and leading figure of the Independent Iranian Workers Union (IIWU), criticized the campaign in support of Pahlavi as “an attempt to build an alternative above the heads of the peoples of Iran.”

Even some sympathetic to Pahlavi warned that the focus should be on forming an inclusive and broad coalition and not just one person. Toronto-based lawyer and activist Kaveh Shahrooz wrote: “You can’t do it without Pahlavi. But you also can’t do it with only Pahlavi…To create a unity that has the power to overthrow the Islamic Republic, we need people with various views, including Mr. Pahlavi, to work together.”

Many have voiced similar opinions. While Pahlavi has some popularity, only a broader front can successfully defeat the regime, and this campaign could be a distraction from building a united coalition.

Warning against divisions, Tehran-based activist Atena Daemi published a Twitter thread adorned with pictures of two signs from protests in Iran: one which voiced support for Pahlavi, using the hashtag #He_Is_My_Representative; another which declared support for a “coalition of political parties” and affirmed that “no one person can be a representative of the whole country.” She denounced fights inside the opposition ranks.

Pahlavi himself seems to continue to believe in that broader tent. In a statement on January 21, which welcomed the support given to him by the online campaign, Pahlavi reminded people of his fall 2020 call for “national solidarity.”

“I, once more, ask for the collaboration of all pro-democracy forces, including personalities, political parties, and groups,” Pahlavi said. “We must help Iran’s national revolution based on three minimum common principles: Iran’s territorial integrity, a secular democracy based on human rights, and people’s right to determine the form of political regime in free elections.”

All major pro-democracy political forces of the opposition agree with these three demands. If they can find the ability to overcome their many divisions and build a united front, the Islamic Republic will come to face something that it has avoided for decades: a truly united opposition with a clear alternative to its rule.

Arash Azizi is a writer and scholar based at New York University. He is the author of “The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US and Iran’s Global Ambitions.” Follow him on Twitter: @arash_tehran.

The post Can Reza Pahlavi help unite the Iranian opposition? A hashtag is suggesting so. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Younus in Dawn: The prime minister’s follies

Atlantic Council — Tue, 24 Jan 2023 16:20:15 +0000

Jason Marczak: January 6 comparisons are an oversimplification, but the US has a role to play now

The post Younus in Dawn: The prime minister’s follies appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How Brazil can respond to its democracy stress test

Atlantic Council — Mon, 09 Jan 2023 17:21:37 +0000

GET UP TO SPEED

It’s a shock to the system. One week after new Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was sworn into office, thousands of supporters backing former President Jair Bolsonaro—who falsely claimed that October’s election had been stolen from him—descended upon the country’s Congress, Supreme Court, and presidential palace, leaving shattered windows and overturned furniture in their wake. Now that authorities have cleared the protests and launched an investigation into security failures, our experts break down what’s to come.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

Jason Marczak (@jmarczak): Senior director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center
Iria Puyosa (@NSC): Senior research fellow at the Digital Forensic Research Lab
Valentina Sader (@valentinasader): Associate director and Brazil lead at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Failures abound

Brazil’s January 8 triggered comparisons to the United States’ January 6 attack. “But that is an oversimplification,” Jason says. “In Brazil, rioters were focused on absolute destruction of Brazil’s legislative, judicial, and executive buildings without the ability to disrupt the democratic order.”
Iria points out that Bolsonaro’s supporters had been planning publicly for days, and the call to action “was not made on fringe or secret sites but in public groups and channels” on TikTok, YouTube, Telegram, and WhatsApp. Security forces “had the chance to take preventive measures,” she says, calling it “inexplicable” that Brazilian authorities never “established strong security controls.”
Calls rose on Sunday for stronger regulation of social media, Iria tells us, even though Brazil has one of the more “vigorous” regulatory regimes in the region. One way Brazilian policymakers can tackle the problem, she says, is to improve intelligence agencies’ capabilities to monitor open-source data that provides “early warnings” about extremist threats—but in a way that doesn’t “limit freedom of expression and association of citizens.”
While Lula wasn’t even in Brasília at the time, Jason says that the riots are still a “wake-up call” for the Lula government because they highlight the risks that lie ahead for “the continued peaceful functioning of Brazil’s institutions.”

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Lula’s moment

“Democracy prevailed, but it’s cracked,” Valentina tells us. While Brazil’s democratic institutions have proven resilient, “they still must be strengthened.”
According to Valentina, the fact “that some police forces, officials, and financial backers appear to have enabled this anti-democratic vandalism underscores the danger to Brazil’s democratic system.”
But politicians from across the political spectrum have responded to the riot with an “eagerness to defend democracy,” a rare moment of “common ground,” Valentina says. “Lula must seize the opportunity to pacify the country and gain political power in Congress” to show the strength of democracy, punish wrongdoers, and enact key planks of his policy agenda.

Friends in need

US President Joe Biden quickly condemned the attack on Sunday. Jason tells us that next, his administration should “take action to reassure the new Lula government that US support will not be in statements alone.”
That could take the form of a Lula visit to Washington early this year. “That visit should be prioritized and scheduled as soon as possible,” Jason says, “to show Lula and allies around the hemisphere that the United States is here to help when partners are in need.”
Valentina says the United States can view January 8 as “yet another failed attempt by the extreme right to undermine democracy.” But “amid global trends of declining democratic freedoms and political instability across Latin America and the Caribbean, which country is the next target?”

The post How Brazil can respond to its democracy stress test appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: Brazil has suffered its own attack against democracy. Here’s what the government and its allies can do next.

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 09 Jan 2023 15:06:58 +0000

January 8: A new date of infamy. Supporters of right-wing former President Jair Bolsonaro who falsely allege last year’s election was stolen stormed Brazil’s Congress, Supreme Court, and Presidential Palace in Brasília on Sunday. The images were eerily similar to the January 6, 2021 assault on the US Capitol, though Congress was not in session and newly inaugurated President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was away. Police cleared the buildings and made hundreds of arrests. But as the tear gas clears, substantial questions remain about the state of Brazil’s democracy and institutions—and what the United States can do in response to the riot. Our experts are on the case.

Click to jump to an expert reaction:

Valentina Sader: It’s Lula’s time to show strength as democracy is challenged

Iria Puyosa: Brazilian intelligence agencies failed. Here’s what they can do now.

January 6 comparisons are an oversimplification, but the US has a role to play now

Brazil is a divided nation. But hopefully, unlike in the United States, those divisions do not play out in holding accountable those responsible for Sunday’s attacks. Leaders across the Brazilian political spectrum have condemned the violence; what is needed are swift actions to hold responsible those directly and indirectly complicit in the ransacking of Brazilian institutions. That started on Sunday with the arrest of hundreds of looters and the order by Supreme Federal Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes calling for the ninety-day removal of Federal District Governor Ibaneis Rocha following the absolute failure of Federal District security.

Comparisons will continue to be made to January 6. But that is an oversimplification of what happened in Brazil. The January 8 rioters took their cues from the United States, but, in Brazil, rioters were focused on absolute destruction of Brazil’s legislative, judicial, and executive buildings without the ability to disrupt the democratic order. Lula had taken office one week earlier and was not even in the capital city at the time. Still, for the Lula government, the Brasília violence is a wake-up call regarding the forces that will continue to undermine the continued peaceful functioning of Brazil’s institutions.

What should the United States do? Unlike the reaction to the recent self-coup in Peru, from left to right, governments across the Americas and Europe voiced a loud and resounding condemnation of the Brasília attacks. Multiple US officials, including President Joe Biden, forcefully spoke out. This is the moment for the United States to take action to reassure the new Lula government that US support will not be in statements alone. A potential Lula visit to Washington is in the cards for early in the year. That visit should be prioritized and scheduled as soon as possible to show Lula and allies around the hemisphere that the United States is here to help when partners are in need.

—Jason Marczak is the senior director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

It’s Lula’s time to show strength as democracy is challenged

January 8, 2023 will go down as an ugly day in Brazilian history. The past few months have been clouded by the fear that a January 6-like event would take place in Brazil, and that fear sadly came to fruition on Sunday. One week separates Lula’s inauguration, a celebratory moment for the democratic process and the peaceful transition of power, and this weekend’s violence.

Inspired by the United States’ January 6 riots, the attacks in Brasília targeted all three branches of government. The fact that some police forces, officials, and financial backers appear to have enabled this anti-democratic vandalism underscores the danger to Brazil’s democratic system. The repercussions of this day will be long-lasting.

The United States and the West should see what happened in Brazil as yet another failed attempt by the extreme right to undermine democracy. But amid global trends of declining democratic freedoms and political instability across Latin America and the Caribbean, which country is the next target?

In Brazil, democracy prevailed, but it’s cracked. The country proved that its democratic institutions are resilient, but they still must be strengthened. Lula has an even greater opportunity to do that now. The horror of the day and the eagerness to defend democracy pushed politicians from across the political spectrum to find common ground. That’s a rarity in Brazilian politics, and Lula must seize the opportunity to pacify the country and gain political power in Congress, backed by a pro-democracy front, to show the strength of his government and of Brazilian democracy, to punish those involved, and to move the needle forward on key policy priorities.

—Valentina Sader is the associate director and Brazil lead at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Brazilian intelligence agencies failed. Here’s what they can do now.

Brazil’s security and intelligence agencies failed to take effective measures to prevent the assault on the National Congress, the Federal Supreme Court, and the Presidential Palace. They are not the first security forces taken off guard by a popular uprising or an attempted coup d’état. But they had a chance to take preventive measures, given the amount of open-source data available.

Contrary to what typically occurs in attempted coup d’états, the assault on the Brazilian government was publicly announced. The call was not made on fringe or secret sites but in public groups and channels with thousands of followers. Videos, flyers, and texts indicating places and times of departure for Brasília, age requirements to participate, necessary supplies for the trip, and the objective of the mobilization circulated on TikTok, YouTube, public Telegram groups, and public WhatsApp groups for several days.

It is inexplicable that the Brazilian authorities have not investigated these calls and established strong security controls to prevent pro-Bolsonaro extremists from taking over the Square of the Three Powers.

On Sunday, calls began to rise for greater regulation of social media and messaging platforms, even as Brazil has been among the more vigorous countries in Latin America in restricting the circulation of misleading or polarizing content on messaging platforms. Policymakers should consider how intelligence agencies can activate resources for open-source monitoring that do not limit freedom of expression and association of citizens but provide early warnings about actual threats from extremist activities.

—Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

The post Experts react: Brazil has suffered its own attack against democracy. Here’s what the government and its allies can do next. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s nation-building progress spells doom for Putin’s Russian Empire

Dennis Soltys — Sun, 08 Jan 2023 23:32:18 +0000

Why did Vladimir Putin invade Ukraine? Most international commentators still insist on viewing the war through the parallel prisms of resurgent Russian imperialism and NATO’s post-Cold War expansion. However, neither of these factors gets to the true heart of the subject. In reality, the devastating invasion launched on February 24, 2022, was primarily a desperate Russian reaction to Ukraine’s historic nation-building progress.

The widespread habit of underestimating Ukrainian agency has led to misleading perceptions of today’s conflict and an over-emphasis on Great Power politics. Such thinking discounts the fact that the Ukrainian people are directly responsible for their country’s recent emergence from centuries of Russian domination and have consciously chosen a democratic, European future. This is the ultimate reason why Putin launched Europe’s largest armed conflict since World War II, and it will continue to reshape the geopolitical landscape long after Russia’s criminal invasion is over.

All countries are defined by common experiences that guide them as nations and determine their future destiny. In Ukraine’s case, it is possible to identify a number of key moments and prominent trends over the past three decades of independence that have placed the country firmly on a path toward democratic development and Euro-Atlantic integration.

This has brought post-Soviet Ukraine into ever more intense confrontation with Putin’s Russia, which views the current Ukrainian trajectory as an existential threat to its own brand of authoritarian imperialism. If the former imperial heartlands of Ukraine succeed in freeing themselves from the Kremlin, this would drastically undermine Russia’s influence over other neighbors such as Moldova and Belarus along with the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus. In a worst-case scenario, Ukraine’s integration into the Western world could serve as a catalyst for the collapse of the Russian Federation itself.

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Modern Ukraine’s civilizational split from authoritarian Russia began with the country’s December 1991 referendum, which produced a landslide vote in favor of Ukrainian independence. This momentous issue was decided not by violence but at the ballot box, following extensive public dialogue. The 1991 referendum set the political tone for independent Ukraine and established peaceful transfers of power via democratic means as a core principle for the newly independent country.

Ukraine’s political climate has not always been so orderly, of course. This is especially true of the numerous occasions when Russia has sought to interfere directly. Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution and 2014 Revolution of Dignity stand out as particularly important turning points in the unraveling relationship between post-Soviet Kyiv and Moscow. These revolutions highlighted the Ukrainian public’s determination to prevent Russia from derailing the country’s democratic development.

Crucially, both revolutions were grassroots movements sparked by Russian interventions seeking to prevent Ukraine’s European integration and steer the country back toward a more authoritarian form of government. On both occasions, ever-widening groups within Ukrainian civil society engaged with each other and learned to cooperate, often forging ties with other regions of the country.

These people power uprisings marked the consolidation of Ukrainian civil society and highlighted the country’s capacity for collective action. As a consequence, civil society now has a high sense of self-efficacy and social capital. Independent Ukraine’s two revolutions established the democratic principle of rule by the people not only in theory but also in practice, while highlighting the diverging political paths of post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine.

Another crucial turning point in Ukraine’s nation-building journey was the annexation by Russia of Crimea in 2014 and Moscow’s subsequent armed intervention in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. This did much to undermine pro-Russian sentiment and strengthen Ukrainian identity throughout the country.

Putin’s use of force in 2014 discredited Russia as a potential partner while serving to remove much of his traditional support base in Ukraine. With economic opportunities sharply reduced and the political climate turning decisively against Moscow, many Kremlin sympathizers in the occupied parts of the Donbas and elsewhere in Ukraine chose to relocate to Russia. Others soon became disillusioned with the realities of the Russian occupation.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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As relations with Russia have deteriorated, ties with the global Ukrainian diaspora have flourished. For decades, the Kremlin sought to portray the diaspora in dismissive terms as a reactionary force that was out of touch with contemporary Ukrainian realities. In recent years, diaspora Ukrainians have debunked these stereotypes and served as a vital bridge between the country and its international partners.

Deepening ties with Ukraine’s Western partners have played an important role in consolidating the country’s historic turn toward the democratic world. Much of the support Ukraine has received since 2014 has been conditional on social and economic reforms that have re-affirmed the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Civil society actors and government officials have come to recognize that these conditions lead to higher standards of living and a better quality of life in general. This is in stark contrast to relations with Russia, which even before the outbreak of hostilities in 2014 had long been associated with stagnation and inertia.

Since February 2022, Ukraine’s historic turn toward the West has been dramatically reinforced by the previously unimaginable horrors of Russia’s full-scale invasion. While Russian troops have killed thousands of civilians and destroyed entire Ukrainian cities, Ukraine’s Western partners have offered a wide range of essential aid and welcomed millions of Ukrainian refugees. For many Ukrainians, the experience of the past ten months has fundamentally altered perceptions of both Russia and the West. While they will long remember the Western response with immense gratitude, they will never forgive Russia.

The war has also fostered national integration within Ukraine by fueling unprecedented interaction among people from different regions of the country. This integration has been happening as Russian missiles and bombs fall equally on Ukrainian citizens regardless of their region, ethnicity, or worldview. With the ferocity of the Russian invasion forcing millions of citizens to flee their homes in the Donbas, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Kherson, and numerous other provinces, a massive cultural exchange is taking place as different segments of the population are brought together and united by a common cause.

This cultural exchange extends beyond Ukraine’s borders to the country’s European neighbors. Millions of Ukrainians have sought sanctuary in Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic States, and a host of other European countries. The support extended by these countries shows that they, in turn, all appreciate the sacrifices currently being made by Ukrainians in defense of European security.

The huge refugee wave since February 2022 has resulted in entirely new levels of interaction between Ukrainians and other Europeans. As a result, earlier misconceptions are being replaced by a more nuanced understanding of each other and an appreciation of how much Ukrainians have in common with the wider European community. The growing solidarity and engagement of the past ten months is laying the foundations for what promises to be decades of intensifying partnership and cooperation.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is still far from over, but it is already difficult to see how Putin can achieve his goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and forcing a Russified Ukraine back into the Kremlin’s exclusive sphere of influence. Instead, the war has dramatically accelerated long-term trends and widened the civilizational divide separating Moscow and Kyiv. A reduced Russia now looks destined to spend an extended period in international isolation, while Ukraine is firmly on track to cement its position as a valued member of the democratic world.

As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told the US Congress during his historic December 2022 address, “Your money is not charity. It is an investment in global security and democracy.” Indeed, at present it would appear that US support for Ukraine has been one of the most successful foreign policy investments in American history.

Dennis Soltys is a retired Canadian professor of comparative politics living in Almaty.

The need to focus on class issues more thoroughly

Yet, the coalition’s impact on domestic dynamics, especially the protest movement, is unclear. In particular, the challenge regarding a heavier involvement of the working class, whose strikes in key hydrocarbon sectors, if turned permanent, could help break the regime’s economic lifelines, remains. After all, the said coalition, upon its unofficial proclamation, does not include voices that are seen as representing the interests of Iran’s working classes, who disproportionately suffer from conditions in the Islamic Republic—although this does not necessarily mean the coalition members are oblivious to them. Such integration is especially crucial, since some labor activists have told me that their interests might not be necessarily guaranteed by an exiled opposition that may tend to neglect issues of class, and in the worst case, abandon them in a post-Islamic Republic system.

However, despite such potential shortcomings about the initial composition of the group, outright condemnation of it as a neoliberal or even right-wing project from allegedly detached figures is likely to be misplaced at this point. At the end of the day, arguably all social groups inside Iran, including the workers, suffer from the Islamic Republic’s prolonged rule and would fare much better in a democratic Iran.

Moreover, there is strong evidence that large parts of Iranian society have moved beyond the age of ideology and dogmatism—one that had dominated political debates in the run up to the 1979 revolution. Instead, the revolutionary movement’s insistence that women’s rights are inherently linked to human rights in general, as well as democracy, can indeed serve as a basis for the interests of various social groups to be guaranteed in a future Iran. Yet, given the Islamic Republic’s neglect of the Iranian population’s political as well as economic rights, the latter two should be discussed in tandem by those seeking positive change in Iran. Thus, taking labor rights seriously could embolden reluctant elements to fully join forces with the revolutionary movement.

Moreover, a political manifesto or program that would guarantee not only political but also economic rights, strategizing, and concrete coordinating steps for Iran’s protest movement— ideally coordinated with and primarily drafted by social forces inside Iran—would be indispensable to help what I call the revolutionary process in Iran take a significant step forward. These forces inside Iran would ideally include representatives from the three major components of Iranian civil society—namely the women, labor, and student movements—but also the youth and marginalized ethnic groups, which are the driving forces of the current protest wave, as well as professional associations (teachers, bus drivers, truck drivers, lawyers, doctors, and so forth).

For Iran’s revolutionary process to become successful, lessons ought to be learned from such processes in the Arab world. Here, the case of Sudan’s pre-revolution could serve as a model for Iran: the driving force of the revolutionary movement there was the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), an underground, grassroots civil society network of associations of teachers, journalists, doctors, lawyers, and other professions. Of course, the formation of such a civil society network in Iran is heavily hampered by the regime’s repression. However, this does not mean there will be no way to work around these immense challenges.

A coalition cognizant of the challenges ahead?

On New Year’s Day, a day after the coalition had announced its existence, London-based Iran International invited some of its members—namely Mohtadi, Alinejad, Esmaeilion, and Ebadi—to comment and offer reflections about the coalition and its purpose. The following perusal reflects the points made by them during the show, which can provide a first glance into their thinking in the context of that coalition:

Acknowledging their failure in omitting the protest’s main slogan: “Woman, life, freedom” in their initial announcement on New Year’s Eve.
The need to expand the coalition members’ diversity to also include figures inside Iran.
The need to be open and responsive to harsh criticism that is voiced against this coalition and its work, so that historical mistakes aren’t repeated when Iranian political entities may not have offered such open spaces for constructive criticism.
An understanding that this coalition is merely a beginning, not an end—a de facto work in progress.
That they are all unified against the Islamic Republic, for the creation of a secular democracy, the restoration of human dignity and equality among all citizens of Iran regardless of their gender, ethnicity, and beliefs. In other words, unity in diversity and the need to end various forms of discrimination.
That the coalition has no desire to assume power in Iran, but wants to work toward abolishing the Islamic Republic and the transition to democracy.
Stressing that legitimacy primarily emanates from the people inside Iran and not from the diaspora, albeit the latter is not seen as insignificant.
The need to forge a strategy and build structures to overcome the Islamic Republic and pave the way for a democratic Iran, while being organically linked to the people inside. This should include workers’ interests, which Ebadi explicitly mentioned the need to account for.

This long-awaited and unprecedented unity from prominent opposition figures abroad can be seen as primarily a consequence of the same kind of unity to be witnessed inside the country, at least since mid-September. The common denominator is the call for regime change in Iran by peaceful means and creating a democratic future for the multifaceted mosaic of the Iranian nation.

Dr. Ali Fathollah-Nejad is a political scientist and author of The Islamic Republic of Iran Four Decades On: The 2017/18 Protests Amid a Triple Crisis, where he suggested the start of a long-term revolutionary process in Iran. Follow him on Twitter: @AFathollahNejad.

The post An Iran opposition coalition was long overdue. It’s an important step forward on the rocky road to change. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Slovakia risks becoming another Hungary-style EU spoiler. How should the West respond?

Petr Tůma — Fri, 23 Dec 2022 20:42:26 +0000

Slovakia’s center-right minority government fell on December 15 after narrowly losing a no-confidence vote. The country has reached a crossroads and is edging closer to a scenario that could allow former Prime Minister Robert Fico to return to power. This is not an appealing prospect for Slovakia, its neighbors, Europe, or transatlantic allies.

A nationalistic populist, Fico has repeatedly stressed that he would stop military aid for Ukraine if he enters office, echoing the opinion of an important part of his electoral base. If Fico returns to power, he will steer Slovakia closer to Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, with adverse implications for European Union (EU) and NATO cohesion.

Slovak politics can go either way from here. There’s still a chance that the liberal, pro-Western camp will handle the crisis to its advantage. But it is important to pay attention to what’s going on in Bratislava and eventually to motivate Fico’s opponents to get together to prevent a Slovak shift toward Hungary and Russia. Too much is at stake here for Europeans and the transatlantic community to remain passive.

What happened: blame Matovič

The no-confidence vote was called by the liberal conservatives of the Freedom and Solidarity party (SaS) of Richard Sulík. SaS was part of the governing coalition until September when the party left over long-term disputes with Minister of Finance Igor Matovič.

Matovič is a leader of the governing OLANO party and served as prime minister until he was forced to swap positions with party colleague Eduard Heger in March 2021 after coalition partners learned about a secret deal Matovič had struck with Russia to purchase Sputnik COVID-19 vaccines. However, the unpredictable Matovič has continued—as Slovaks call it—to throw political nukes.

When SaS members’ patience ran out, they signaled they would call a no-confidence vote if Matovič did not resign. He first agreed and went to the presidential palace to hand over his resignation letter. Then something awkward happened: He changed his mind when in the presidential palace and pulled his resignation. This was the final straw for SaS. Yet the fall of Heger’s government is no surprise. The ruling coalition was plagued by discord and had been paralyzed for some time.

What will happen: four options

Heger’s cabinet resigned before President Zuzana Čaputová on December 16. What will happen next is an open question. Here are four possibilities:

Čaputová could form a caretaker government that can stay in place until regular elections that are scheduled for the spring of 2024. However, there’s no tradition in Bratislava for this solution. The opposition has already objected, and Čaputová herself has said this is not her preferred choice. Nevertheless, she can still use it as a last resort option or as a threat to get the National Council (Slovak parliament) to explore other options.
Heger’s cabinet-in-demission could govern for a longer period with limited powers. But Slovakia needs strong leadership amid multiple crises (security, energy, health, inflation), and nobody seems to favor this alternative. It would also undermine parliament by effectively overruling the outcome of the vote of no confidence.
Čaputová could call for early elections. Yet not every parliamentarian is eager to see early elections. Some lawmakers are afraid of losing their jobs while political parties could lose vital access to financial resources. (Groups that make it into the National Council are reimbursed on an annual basis.) A bill to call for fresh elections would need the support of 60 percent of lawmakers, which simply isn’t there now.
At the same time, many lawmakers are exploring the option of a reformed center-right coalition without Matovič, as a “sine qua non” condition. Even Sulík—whose SaS party left the coalition—appears now to be on board. They would need a majority in parliament, not an easy task after the no-confidence vote. However, the first important signal that they can succeed in reforming the coalition is the December 22 agreement on Slovakia’s budget for next year. Heger’s government-in-demission reached a deal in cooperation with SaS. The gravity of the situation, where a provisory budget would limit the government’s ability to help people cope with skyrocketing energy prices, motivated them to compromise. Matovič’s removal on December 23 was part of the deal.

If elections were to be held today, the Voice–Social Democracy party led by Peter Pellegrini would likely win. The party split off from SMER–Social Democracy, run by Fico, who is currently polling in second place.

Pellegrini—whose party is sometimes dubbed Fico’s B team by critics—is not eager to work with his former boss. However, if it will be the only way for him to get back into power, Pellegrini could agree. Together with Fico, they’ll need another partner. They could turn to ultranationalist, neo-Nazi groups such as People’s Party Our Slovakia or the breakaway Republika party.

Realistically, a center-right coalition opposed to Fico could come to power if it gets enough votes in an election so that Pellegrini can form the government with them rather than joining Fico.

What to watch: Dark matter

Former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright once called Slovakia “the black hole of Europe” when in the mid-1990s then Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar—a forerunner of nationalistic populism in the region—did his best to disrupt the country’s move to join NATO and the EU.

Since then, Slovakia has often been praised as the region’s champion of liberal democracy. The 2019 election of Čaputová—a former environmental activist and liberal democrat—as president solidified that reputation. The coalition government that just fell could have added to that growing stature after Fico’s reign, which was marked by the erosion of rule of law and democracy.

Fico was forced to step down after the 2018 murder of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak, whose work exposed how deeply Slovak police, the justice system, and some politicians were colluding with criminals, including the Italian mafia. The investigation into those allegations is still ongoing, and critics argue that one of Fico’s motivations for his government’s comeback is to terminate it.

At the moment, when the country is preparing for the thirtieth anniversary of its independence on January 1, the mood among Slovak voters is one of deep frustration and apathy, which creates political space for populists and extremists.

Aside from euroskepticism, a government including Fico could add another challenge to NATO and EU efforts to maintain unity in support of Ukraine. In fact, since Fico was forced into the opposition, he has taken even more pro-Russian positions than Orbán.

In July, Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation (part of the National Security and Defense Council) listed Fico among the politicians spreading Russian propaganda. From his standpoint, what we see in Ukraine is a war between Russia and the United States, where both are to blame. He has repeatedly stated that he wouldn’t send a single bullet to Ukraine.

Unlike Italy’s new Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who transformed her country’s far-right politics by turning against Russian aggression, Slovak politicians are actually fighting for a slice of the country’s pro-Russian electorate. After former Russian intelligence agent Sergei Skripal and his daughter were poisoned in the British city of Salisbury in 2018, the unwillingness to alienate pro-Russian voters meant that Bratislava was the only EU capital other than Vienna that didn’t expel a single Russian diplomat.

Today, Slovakia hosts a multinational NATO battlegroup put together to strengthen the Alliance’s eastern flank. A significant portion of Fico’s voter base is against the foreign military presence in the country. If he returns to power, Czech, German, Dutch, Polish, and US military contingents currently present in Slovakia could come under scrutiny.

Segments of the Slovak population continue to perceive their country as a victim that suffered under the Austro-Hungarian Empire and later within Czechoslovakia. During the 1990s under Mečiar’s rule, anti-American sentiments started to rise. These further intensified after the NATO bombing of Serbia and later with the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Pan-Slavism and targeted disinformation campaigns have played a role in strengthening pro-Russian narratives as well.

What should be done: engage Slovaks

Currently, there’s no other country within the EU closer to forming such a hard-line nationalist government than Slovakia, especially if two minor neo-Nazi parties (People’s Party Our Slovakia and Republika) are in. It is important to mobilize efforts to stop such a scenario from unfolding.

Slovakia’s partners, including the United States, should do their best to convince those opposed to Fico to join forces. That is not an easy task given the deep divisions within Slovak politics, but there’s still time to do it.

Friends and allies of Slovakia should also talk to Pellegrini, offering him a mix of carrots and sticks to discourage him from cooperating with Fico and the far-right groups.

Last but not least, it is important for US and EU politicians and diplomats to maintain contact with Fico. As populist, pro-Russian, and mercurial as he has become, he also used to be a great political gambler, an opportunist, a pragmatist similar to Orbán or Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan who is capable of U-turns if they worked for him. Fico might have lost that aspect of his political personality, but if it can be revived with efforts to show that working with the West is a better bet than siding with Russia, it is worth a try.

Petr Tůma is a visiting fellow at the Europe Center and a Czech career diplomat with expertise on Europe, the Middle East, and transatlantic relations.

The post Slovakia risks becoming another Hungary-style EU spoiler. How should the West respond? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Afghanistan and regional realignments since August 2021

South Asia Center — Thu, 22 Dec 2022 20:39:17 +0000

Published by the South Asia Center, the report “Afghanistan under the Taliban: Regional recalibrations, challenges and ways forward” broadly examines policy recalibrations at the regional level since the Taliban took power in August 2021.

The author, non-resident senior fellow Hameed Hakimi, makes two primary arguments—among others—to challenge what he calls reductionist approaches to analysis.

Afghanistan and the region have implications for each other that cannot be prevented through measures such as strengthening border security.
The US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 created a vacuum that remains today. The longer this vacuum remains void of Western leadership and clear policy thinking, the more likely it is that malign state or nonstate actors will fill it.

Meanwhile, earlier predictions of a regional cohesion and/or enthusiasm among non-Western hegemons, such as China, to proactively take steps to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan have proven untrue. While the overall situation in Afghanistan remains fluid and the global spotlight has moved to other challenges such as the war in Ukraine, Hakimi’s analysis points policymakers to a number of trends and factors that would remain crucial in determining the trajectory of events in Afghanistan and within the region around Afghanistan.

To launch the report, the South Asia Center convened a panel of esteemed experts along with the author to assess the report while reflecting on country-specific and wider implications. The expert panel held that the report makes a strong contribution to policy analysis and is likely to remain relevant for the foreseeable future.

The following is a brief highlight of points made in this interactive event, with the full discussion available to watch below.

“India has no strategic interests in Afghanistan” argued MP Manish Tewari of the Lok Sabha, while also acknowledging that he is one of few to hold this opinion. Only seriously concerned about the exportation of drugs and terrorism, Delhi’s strategy is to watch and wait. Tewari, a prominent Indian politician and currently a member of parliament, stated that the world should leave Afghanistan alone to find stability, and that those willing to test their luck will learn the lesson that the United States and the Soviet Union did in the past thirty years: Afghanistan is the “graveyard of empires”.

When it comes to Afghanistan’s western border, Iran’s internal struggles and lack of trust in the government may cause border problems and make it appear weak in the eyes of the Taliban leaders, argued the Middle East Institute’s Fatemeh Aman. The Taliban holds leverage over the Iranian government as it controls the flow of water, drug trafficking, and undocumented migrants to Iran which could lead to further instability within the country. Aman also underscored that the international community’s strategy of disengagement isn’t weakening the Taliban but making the regime stronger as it’s likely that they’ll find alternative partners.

A consensus in the report—expanded on by the University of Pittsburgh’s Dr. Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili—is that earlier predictions were incorrect on China’s involvement in Afghanistan following the US departure. Beijing never had transformational views of Afghanistan. Instead, China’s interest in Afghanistan is largely driven by security concerns. Doing what it can to secure its small shared border, Beijing is concerned about terrorism, spillover effects, and particularly Uighur militancy, especially with its increased skepticism of Russian troops stationed in Tajikistan.

On the subject of Central Asia, Murtazashvili was quick to counter Tewari’s point, arguing that neighbors—and Central Asia especially, due to the region’s landlocked nature—cannot simply leave Afghanistan alone. She asserted that neighboring countries are quietly pushing inclusivity as a means to promote regional stability. Uzbekistan sees Afghanistan as an opportunity for regional connectivity between South and Central Asia, yes, but is under no illusions with regards to the Taliban. While the security situation is unpredictable, the benefits of regional connectivity are tremendous and must not be forgotten.

Among Gulf states, there is no coherent or collaborative response to support stability or provide humanitarian relief in Afghanistan, according to Georgetown University, Qatar’s Zahra Babar. Gulf countries could play a constructive role in the future by using their success story of investing in girls’ education and women in the workforce as a model for the Taliban. By showing the Taliban that an Islamic and conservative country can successfully educate women, they might see more success in encouraging these reforms than the West.

When looking towards future solutions, there is no easy fix for Afghanistan. Any successful approach will have to be innovative, multi-dimensional, resilience-based, and focused on Afghans themselves. To this end, the report identifies a number of key issues, threats, and policy challenges that must be kept on the radar of the international community. It also makes recommendations aimed at Western countries and other stakeholders.

This program was recorded on December 1, 2022.

Featuring

H.E. Manish Tewari
Representative, Anandpur Sahib (Indian National Congress)
Lok Sabha

Dr. Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili
Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs
University of Pittsburgh

Zahra Babar
Associate Director for Research at CIRS
Georgetown University, Qatar

Fatemeh Aman
Non-Resident Senior Fellow
Middle East Institute

Hameed Hakimi
Non-Resident Senior Fellow
Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center

Moderated by

Irfan Nooruddin
Senior Director
Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

Afghanistan and regional realignments since August 2021” class=”gta-horizontal-featured–img” />

SouthAsiaSource Dec 6, 2022

A reframed engagement with Afghanistan

By Annie Pforzheimer

Some form of engagement is important to ensure that Afghanistan’s people are not forgotten and can sustainably recover from the economic shocks of drought, COVID-19, and lost international assistance associated with the NATO presence.

Afghanistan Human Rights

Afghanistan and regional realignments since August 2021” class=”gta-horizontal-featured–img” />

SouthAsiaSource Nov 17, 2022

Reflections on the 2022 Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan and regional security

By Nilofar Sakhi

The countries involved in the 2022 Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan have yet to address, let alone resolve, fundamental issues related to regional security and a political settlement for Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

Afghanistan and regional realignments since August 2021” class=”gta-horizontal-featured–img” />

Report Sep 27, 2022

Afghanistan under the Taliban: Regional recalibrations, challenges, and ways forward

By Hameed Hakimi

Despite the spectacular and unprecedented events following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, the global spotlight steadily shifted away from the country.

Afghanistan Economy & Business

Garlauskas, Gilbert, and Imai Featured in Air & Space Forces Magazine

everges — Thu, 22 Dec 2022 15:58:00 +0000

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On December 21, IPSI Nonresident Senior Fellow Markus Garlauskas, Associate Director Lauren Gilbert, and Program Assistant Kyoko Imai were quoted in the Air & Space Forces Magazine for their work, “A next-generation agenda for US-ROK-Japan cooperation.”

Staff

Markus Garlauskas

Director

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

Staff

Lauren D. Gilbert

Associate Director

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Indo-Pacific Korea

Staff

Kyoko Imai

Assistant Director

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Politics & Diplomacy Japanese

The post Garlauskas, Gilbert, and Imai Featured in Air & Space Forces Magazine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

2022 REVIEW: Russia’s invasion has united Ukraine

Taras Kuzio — Wed, 21 Dec 2022 17:05:20 +0000

Ever since Ukraine regained independence in 1991, Western coverage of the country has tended to exaggerate regional differences, creating the impression of a weak state with divided loyalties. Misleading portrayals of Ukraine as a nation split between pro-Russian east and pro-European west have had a profound impact on outside perceptions, leading many international observers to believe that much of the local population in eastern Ukraine would actively support Russia’s 2022 invasion or at least remain neutral.

Such thinking can be traced back to Russia, which has long promoted the idea of modern Ukraine as an artificial state with a large ethnic Russian minority in need of Moscow’s protection. For years, Vladimir Putin denied Ukraine’s right to statehood while insisting Ukrainians were really Russians (“one people”). He openly accused Ukrainians of occupying historically Russian lands and declared Ukraine to be “an inalienable part of Russia’s own history, culture, and spiritual space.”

These distorted perceptions of Ukraine’s history and national character meant that few expected the country to survive against the full might of the Russian military. On the eve of this year’s invasion, there was general agreement in Moscow and most Western capitals that Ukraine would be defeated within a matter of days. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was not seen as a credible wartime leader and was widely expected to abandon Kyiv. Likewise, the military prowess of the Ukrainian army and fighting spirit of the Ukrainian nation were also underestimated.

Inside the Kremlin, it appears that Putin’s decision to invade was influenced by a combination of faulty intelligence and over-consumption of his own anti-Ukrainian propaganda. The Russian dictator seems to have genuinely believed myths about an oppressed pro-Russian minority in Ukraine who would welcome his invasion and rise up in support of the advancing Russian army. Rarely in international affairs has anyone ever been so mistaken.

In fact, no Ukrainian region welcomed Putin’s invading army. While instances of collaboration have been recorded throughout the occupied regions of southern and eastern Ukraine, these have proved to be the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, the number of people prepared to collaborate has been dwarfed by the sheer scale of Ukraine’s resistance to the Russian occupation. Russian troops who were told they would be treated as liberators have been shocked and distressed to find themselves acting as occupiers in hostile territory. Meanwhile, Ukrainians from all regions have been brought together by the common cause of defeating Russia. An invasion that was meant to extinguish Ukrainian statehood has inadvertently united the country.

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Ukraine’s nation-building journey did not begin overnight with the advent of this year’s Russian invasion, of course. A modern Ukrainian national identity has been gradually evolving throughout the three decades following the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Key milestones in this journey include the 2004 Orange Revolution, the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution, and the shock waves caused by the subsequent Russian invasions of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Nevertheless, the significance of the changes that have taken place within Ukrainian society since February 24 cannot be overstated. Crucially, attitudes toward key issues of national identity and foreign policy have become aligned throughout the country.

The biggest changes have taken place among Russian-speaking Ukrainians living in regions of southern and eastern Ukraine that have suffered most from Russian aggression. It is one of the bitter ironies of the invasion that the devastation inflicted by Putin’s troops has fallen disproportionately on the regions of Ukraine that Moscow claims to be protecting. The Russian army has reduced dozens of towns and cities throughout southern and eastern Ukraine to rubble and killed thousands of civilians. Millions more have been subjected to a brutal occupation regime marked by executions, abductions, terror tactics, and forced deportations.

Until 2022, these Ukrainian regions had traditionally been more sympathetic to the Soviet past and tended to favor pro-Russian politicians. Many openly embraced Soviet myths of Russians and Ukrainians as “brotherly peoples.” However, the horrors of the invasion have forced a radical rethink and led to the widespread rejection of Russia.

The rift caused by the current invasion has moved beyond far politics. Following the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine, most Ukrainians expressed negative views of Russia’s leadership while remaining largely positive toward the Russian people. This is no longer the case. Ukrainians have noted that the vast majority of ordinary Russians appear to support the war or at least refrain from criticizing it. Millions of Ukrainians with Russian relatives have experienced this phenomenon for themselves in painful telephone conversations.

As a consequence, most Ukrainians no longer draw any meaningful distinction between the Russian state and the Russian people. An August 2022 poll conducted by Ukraine’s Rating Agency found that only 3% of Ukrainians held positive views of Russians while 81% regarded Russians negatively. This negative rating was almost double the 41% recorded just four months earlier. Ukrainian antipathy towards Russians will only deepen as the war takes a greater toll in civilian lives, military casualties, and physical destruction.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Ukraine’s fundamental break with Russia has impacted every aspect of the country’s social, cultural, and religious life. The Russian language is now noticeably in decline among Ukrainians because it is negatively viewed as the language of military aggression. Many Ukrainians who grew up predominantly speaking Russian are becoming bilingual or switching to speaking Ukrainian.

There is growing public support across the country for policies of de-Russification. Almost three-quarters of Ukrainians (73%) back the idea of renaming streets and public places commemorating Russian historical figures and events, including two-thirds of respondents in eastern Ukraine. By weaponizing Russian history and using it to justify the invasion of Ukraine, Putin has convinced millions of previously sympathetic Ukrainians to view symbols of the Russian imperial past as part of the Kremlin’s ongoing attack on Ukrainian statehood.

Support for the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine has also plummeted, with recent polling indicating that only 4% of Ukrainians currently identify as adherents. This is hardly surprising, given the role of the Russian Orthodox Church as one of the principal cheerleaders of Putin’s invasion. Recent searches of Russian Orthodox Church premises in Ukraine have netted an array of Russian passports, imperial symbols, and literature denying the existence of Ukraine and Ukrainians.

Converging Ukrainian attitudes toward Russia are immediately apparent in relation to the peace process and foreign policy. A Kyiv International Institute of Sociology survey conducted in July 2022 found almost no difference of opinion between Ukrainians who identified as Ukrainian-speaking or Russian-speaking on the issue of a potential land-for-peace deal to end the war, with 85% of Russian speakers opposed compared to 90% of Ukrainian speakers. Likewise, there was no longer any evidence of a significant regional split, with 83% in eastern Ukraine and 85% in the south opposing any territorial compromises with the Kremlin.

The same shift toward greater national consensus is evident on foreign policy matters. Regional differences over the country’s future geopolitical direction were long seen as the most obvious indication of a divided Ukraine. However, since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, successive surveys have found that clear majorities in all regions of Ukraine now support Ukrainian membership of NATO and the European Union. Meanwhile, enthusiasm for deeper integration with Russia or membership of the Moscow-led Eurasian Union has evaporated.

By invading Ukraine, Putin hoped to reverse the verdict of 1991 and bring Ukrainian independence to an end. Instead, Russia’s attack has backfired disastrously. The full-scale invasion which began on February 24 has served to accelerate Ukraine’s nation-building progress and unite the country in ways that would have been difficult to image just one year ago. The trauma and sacrifices of the past ten months mean that these changes are in all likelihood irreversible and will continue to shape Ukraine’s development for decades to come as the country strengthens its sovereignty and moves further away from Russia.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the forthcoming “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

In line with current legislation, Ukrainian judges are responsible for appointing the largest quota of members to the HCJ. There are concerns that they will not do so by the end of January, which would prevent the HCJ from becoming operational for several months and make it impossible to impose disciplinary measures against judges accused of collaborating with the Russian occupation forces. Moreover, the judicial reform component of European integration would be postponed for at least a year.

Ukraine’s judges have a long and troubling history of sabotaging judicial reform, but civil society representatives complain that the government has yet to take this threat seriously. This could have far-reaching consequences. Once selected, the HCJ and HQCJ will be tasked with filling somewhere between 2500 and 3000 vacant positions, representing almost half of the Ukrainian judiciary. If these two bodies remain under the influence of vested interests within the judiciary, Ukraine’s rule of law problems will potentially persist for decades to come.

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The G7 Ambassadors to Ukraine have already called for clarity on the issue of judicial appointments. It is important for President Zelenskyy to address this issue as both a central pillar of Ukraine’s democratic transformation and a security measure to reduce opportunities for Russian influence in the country.

This fall, RFE/RL journalists reported that Bohdan Lvov, who heads the influential Commercial Court of Cassation within the Supreme Court of Ukraine, has held Russian citizenship since 1999. The President of the Supreme Court soon expelled Lvov from the Supreme Court. However, Lvov may be able to return to his position with the help of the controversial Kyiv District Administrative Court, a court with extensive jurisdiction that has long been accused of anti-Ukrainian rulings. Despite calls for President Zelenskyy to react, he has yet to do so.

There are similar concerns over the Kyiv District Administrative Court itself, whose president Pavlo Vovk was recently sanctioned by the US. Almost two years ago, Zelenskyy sent a draft law to parliament to disband the court. However, this draft law is gathering dust and has yet to be considered by MPs. This is particularly troubling as journalists and Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksii Danilov have claimed that the Kyiv District Administrative Court was engaged in February 2022 in efforts to create a legal framework for the return to power in Ukraine of fugitive ex-president Viktor Yanukovych.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The latest challenge to Ukraine’s judicial reform comes from an unexpected source: the country’s international partners. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe recently issued an urgent opinion on the draft law for the reform of Ukraine’s Constitutional Court that some experts have attacked as potentially disastrous.

In its latest opinion, the Venice Commission has reversed a number of earlier recommendations. Previously, it had highlighted the problem of political appointments to the Constitutional Court and recommended that any appointments should take place only after the introduction of a transparent and competitive selection procedure. For this purpose, an independent commission should be created to check candidates for integrity and political impartiality.

However, the Venice Commission now states that the decisions of this monitoring body should not be binding. The Venice Commission also reversed its support for the participation of civil society representatives in the selection process. Instead, the Commission recognizes that including government representatives in the selection process may lead to politicization, but argues that this can be permitted in light of the “special circumstances” currently facing Ukraine. Without additional safeguards, this means that only government-friendly candidates can be appointed to the Constitutional Court.

Ukrainian MPs are now preparing to vote on a revised law that incorporates the Venice Commission’s latest recommendations. If passed, it will hand the current Ukrainian government instruments to potentially secure a majority of Constitutional Court judges for at least nine years.

Efforts to support Ukraine as it fights against Putin’s invasion are both welcome and necessary, but enabling any one political force to gain control of the Constitutional Court could seriously undermine the country’s democracy and future European integration. This can be seen in the negative experience of numerous Central European EU member states. In order to keep Ukraine’s judicial reforms on track, Ukraine’s international partners must push for a Constitutional Court selection process that will guarantee independent candidates. This is crucial in order to secure the kind of free and fair future Ukrainians are currently fighting for.

Defeating Russia on the battlefield will prove futile if post-war Ukraine remains stuck with the same corrupt system. While military matters are naturally the number one priority, it is also crucial to prevent backsliding on existing reforms in order to lay the foundations for a better Ukraine. The existential nature of the current conflict and the clear objective of European integration create greater leverage for historic reforms than at any other time in Ukrainian history. It is up to both the current authorities and Ukraine’s international partners to make sure this momentum is not lost.

Mykhailo Zhernakov is chair of the board of the DEJURE Foundation. Nestor Barchuk is international relations manager of the DEJURE Foundation. They tweet @DEJURE_UA.

Atlantic Council — Sun, 11 Dec 2022 20:51:00 +0000

Jason Marczak: Watch for more political uncertainty ahead

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Experts react: Peru’s president was removed from office after a failed power grab. Now what?

Atlantic Council experts — Thu, 08 Dec 2022 02:33:45 +0000

Peruvian President Pedro Castillo was removed from office by the country’s Congress on Wednesday, after he had announced a plan to dissolve Congress ahead of the impeachment vote. The judiciary, military, and police opposed the unpopular leftist president’s power grab, and Congress sent Castillo packing while elevating Vice President Dina Boluarte to the presidency. Castillo was later arrested.

Did the system succeed against a constitutional crisis? What’s next for the South American nation after the chaotic presidency of an untested political newcomer? Our Latin America experts break it all down.

Jump to an expert reaction

Hugo de Zela: Castillo misspent his energy clashing with Congress—instead of on real policy change

Érika Rodríguez: Peru’s top trends: Political instability and institutional degradation

María Fernanda Bozmoski: An unfortunate new low for Peru

Watch for more political uncertainty ahead

Castillo tried to play his hand today in the longstanding tradition of an autogolpe—a self-coup. His incompetence—seen throughout the chaos of his one and a half years as president—made it clear that he was not going to succeed. The rural teacher turned union leader also could not count on popular support, with an approval rating of just 19 percent in some cities. The ill-thought-out move to attempt to dissolve Congress rather than let Congress consider an impeachment motion against him thankfully backfired—symbolic of his short-lived presidency.

What else was part of the recipe for maintaining democratic order? The military and police vocally warning Castillo not to make his move, ministers resigning in the wake of his announcement, and Congress moving up its impeachment vote (which passed with the support of 101 of 130 legislators). Reaction from the region was tepid. Brazil’s president-elect, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, called the actions today “regrettable,” while Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador blamed Peru’s elite, saying their hostility toward Castillo led resulted in “an environment of confrontation and hostility has been maintained against him.” Colombia’s government said it “condemns any attack against democracy.”

Peru has been embroiled in political chaos for quite some time. It took four presidents to complete the last presidential term (from 2016 to 2021), and Peru is now on to its second president, its first female president, in this current five-year term. The fractious relationship between Congress and the president—and the ease with which Congress can call for impeachment—are some of the factors leading to such political uncertainty. Add to that the need for a revamping of a political structure that has lost the confidence of many Peruvians especially when many of its leaders are seen as corrupt.

What’s next? The new Peruvian president, Boluarte, called immediately for a dialogue among all political actors. That’s easier said than done. Boluarte does not belong to any political party after being expelled from the Perú Libre party last January. The last Peruvian president to not belong to a political party—Martín Vizcarra—was impeached by Congress in 2020, leading to a wave of protests.

—Jason Marczak is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Castillo misspent his energy clashing with Congress—instead of on real policy change

The ending of Castillo’s presidency was not totally surprising. His way of governing always gave a sense of improvisation and lack of planning.

Besides the obvious problems of widespread corruption scandals that plagued his government, one of the main issues was a nonworking government apparatus and a total lack of a strategic approach to find solutions to the country’s many problems.

At the same time, Castillo’s everyday confrontations with Congress drained the energy that could have been used to promote initiatives and to advance the policy changes promised during the electoral campaign. The result was an increasing and all-consuming confrontation with the parliamentarians and, in recent days, with the judiciary, the attorney general, and the constitutional court. A byproduct of that: accelerating decline in his popular support, even in the regions more prone to support him in the country’s south.

The recent avalanche of corruption allegations involving the president and his family and the increasing support for the impeachment process in Congress resulted in Castillo’s attempt to take absolute power, close the Congress, and reform the judiciary. But this once again amateurishly improvised attempt failed and resulted with Castillo in jail.

—Hugo de Zela served as Peru’s vice minister of foreign affairs from 2018 to 2019 and as Peru’s ambassador to the United States from 2019 to 2021. He has frequently spoken at the Atlantic Council.

Peru’s top trends: Political instability and institutional degradation

Peru is a dysfunctional democracy in which a coup was, for a short time, a plausible option given the precarious situation of the president who had lost the support of his parliamentary group and was only sheltered by a part of the opposition. However on this occasion, the Congress, a usual source of instability, has managed to save the situation. An impeachment with 101 votes in favor removed Castillo from power, and he was promptly detained. The presidency has been assumed by his vice president, Dina Boluarte.

Castillo’s decision to dissolve Congress, which Boluarte called a coup, is absurd. He was incompetent in filling his role, and his presidency was tainted by high-level corruption scandals. The former president had been investigated by Peru’s attorney general regarding allegations of “influence peddling” and “collusion.” In addition to that, prosecutors opened other criminal investigations against Castillo, including one for possibly “obstructing justice.” The prosecutor’s office had even opened a constitutional complaint in Congress against Castillo to determine whether he committed crimes as president.

By dissolving Congress, instead of allowing the Congress to proceed with a motion to move forward with the impeachment vote, Castillo created the situation that would end up, in a few hours, with him detained by security forces and taken to a police station. He did it alone; no one accompanied him in his most recent anti-democratic drift, not his cabinet, not the army, and not his supporters. For Peru, this is just another episode in a dramatic trend of political instability and institutional degradation. Nine out of the ten Peruvian presidents of the last three decades have ended up accused of corruption. The economy grows, but the country remains socially broken.

—Érika Rodríguez is a nonresident senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, a member of the Center’s Venezuela Working Group, and a special advisor for Latin American affairs to the high representative and vice president of the European Commission.

An unfortunate new low for Peru

After inaugurating four presidents in less than a year, Peru has reached an unfortunate new low in its political and institutional crisis. Castillo’s unilateral move to dissolve Congress received no support—a silver lining in the tragic denouement of Castillo’s short and unpopular sixteen-month administration. The initial reactions and condemnations of today’s actions in Peru from former cabinet members and other key actors is also a good omen for the democratic outlook of the country. Immediately, however, the constitutional crisis that the former president has unleashed will likely exacerbate longstanding political fatigue and social unrest in the country. The hours following are crucial and will determine whether trust in Congress and the country’s institutions will strengthen or erode. These institutions, with the support of the international community—including the business sector—have an important role in helping Boluarte navigate the next chapter of Peru.

—María Fernanda Bozmoski is the deputy director of programs at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

FAST THINKING: A political ‘wake-up call’ for Latin America

By Atlantic Council

Where will Pedro Castillo take Peru? What does his victory mean for the Latin American left and global investors? Our experts break down how the barefoot candidate will govern.

Democratic Transitions Elections

The post Experts react: Peru’s president was removed from office after a failed power grab. Now what? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Melinda Haring: Ukraine’s unquenchable thirst for freedom inspires me

Melinda Haring — Wed, 07 Dec 2022 20:58:24 +0000

“Does she ever write about anything other than Ukraine?” my sister-in-law secretly asked my husband. “It’s so obscure.”

Nope, and for good reason.

As I prepare to leave the Atlantic Council and join the Superhumans Center, a Ukrainian charity that will build the first prosthetics hospital in Ukraine, I owe hundreds of people money, dinner, and mostly eternal gratitude. Thousands more have trusted me with their secrets and stories. I hope I didn’t screw them up too much.

To those who have made the last eight years awesome, thank you.

Yevhen Hlibovytsky, my tutor, driver, fellow nosy social scientist, and beloved friend, your spirit infuses my work and love of country. I can’t wait to show you the eccentric parts of America. There are a lot of them! Duzhe, duzhe dyakuyu.

When I became the editor of UkraineAlert in 2015 I was woefully under-qualified. Dr. Alina Polyakova convinced John Herbst to hire me over a more pedigreed man. Peter Dickinson, Christian Caryl, Uri Friedman, Amanda Abrams, and Larry Luxner, you reshaped my underdeveloped stories and encouraged me countless times.

My co-conspirator, editor, and debating partner Jacob Heilbrunn makes every piece 1000 times better, but please do not tell him. And while we are on that subject, please don’t tell John Herbst that I didn’t write any of the titles that gave the communications team heartburn. That was my brilliant husband. Thank you, Daniel!

Ambassador John Herbst, you are the Atlantic Council to me. You made the fight fun, the debate delicious, and every conversation convivial, and you made me a better person. I will be in your debt until they bury me in Kyiv.

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Before I sally forth, I relish the chance to explain why Ukraine has captivated me for more than fifteen years.

It was not love at first sight. In 2006, I went to Ukraine as part of a disastrously organized election observation mission. I found Kyiv forbidding but was quickly put on a train to Crimea to observe in Simferopol, an ugly but otherwise unremarkable post-Soviet city. The leaders of our election team soon vanished and we were left with two older gentlemen from the Canadian diaspora, who graciously volunteered to hastily assemble maps and organize our mission.

I took the work seriously and I almost got into a fistfight as a result. When I saw violations, I duly noted them. At one polling station, a large man was voting outside of the ballot box. Voters have a right to privacy, and in a place like Crimea that overwhelmingly votes for one party, privacy is key.

As a diligent election observer, I took a picture of the man. He came at me demanding to know what I was doing. A crowd quickly gathered as the situation escalated. I insisted I had the right to take photographs and note violations. The head of the precinct, with the unnatural burgundy hair you only see in the former Soviet Union, called Kyiv for guidance. “Unfortunately, this young woman has the right to take pictures,” she announced with a scowl. The crowd heaved a disappointed sigh and dispersed. As we exited the polling station, I was shaken and scared the big man might be waiting for me. What a country.

I never intended to come back. At the time, I had landed a dream job at Freedom House. I was giving Saudi Arabia hell for its gross and innumerable human rights violations, but my boss was impossible and the task felt hopeless. I feared it would take Saudi Arabia decades to change.

Fast forward. My boyfriend at the time landed a Fulbright scholarship to Kyiv and was having the time of his life. I was miserable and decided to join him. I soon found a job in Ukraine teaching English. The initial Skype interview went swimmingly and the Ukrainian trainer was both charismatic and lovely. At first, I only intended to stay for six months and then enter boring middle-aged American life. Instead, I found my calling and have never looked back.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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Sergiy Gusovsky, one of Kyiv’s most beloved restaurateurs and among the finest people you could wish to meet, often remarks that once a Westerner falls for Ukraine, they are hooked for life. That’s exactly what happened to me.

In January 2007, I made the big move to Ukraine. It was beyond cold. Even with my ankle-length wool coat and eighteen Alaskan winters under my belt, I could barely take it.

The American English Center rented space in ordinary schools. I taught mostly college students daily from 4pm to 10pm. The beginner students couldn’t understand a word I said, but the advanced students got me and were soon demanding harder and harder words. Hour after hour, we talked about Ukraine’s social structures, the economy, the country’s endlessly frustrating politics, its painful history, and society’s ridiculous expectations of women. There was no subject that was off limits.

Within six months, I had decided I never wanted to leave. Kyiv is the world’s most underrated city. Not only is it extraordinarily beautiful, especially during the spring months, but the spontaneous and generous nature of everyday life also appealed to me. The Kyivite focus on the here and now is the inverse of Max Weber’s Protestant ethic which I had imbibed far too deeply by age 18. Being in the Ukrainian capital helped me rediscover by natural equilibrium.

Plus, it was dirt cheap. My $400 per month apartment overlooking the golden domes of Pechersk Lavra Monastery was a sensational place to live. Meanwhile, Kyiv’s location at the center of Europe enabled me to visit 10 countries in six months. Leaving wasn’t an option.

Although I did eventually move back to the US, I never really left. Ukraine has remained with me. For the past eight years, I have been privileged to lead and build the biggest, loudest, and most effective program on Ukraine in North America at the Atlantic Council together with Ambassador John Herbst.

I often find myself answering the same peculiar question: “Why are you, a girl with a German surname and no discernible connection to Eastern Europe, so taken with Ukraine?”

Normally I give a canned answer. I grew up in Kenai, a small village in Alaska with a Russian Orthodox Church. When I was in the sixth grade, the Berlin Wall fell and Russians poured into Alaska. Regional flights were set up between the Russian Far East and Alaska, and the local business community got very excited about linking the two frontier lands. Closer to home, Miss Tatiana appeared in my school and I began studying Russian. I became mesmerized by the language and by the sight of golden samovars.

Recently I’ve realized that the true answer to this question is actually deeper. Much deeper.

Ukraine’s unquenchable thirst for freedom and justice inspires me endlessly. Even when the picture there looks hopeless, which it often does, my courageous warrior friend Vitaliy Shabunin reminds me to take the long view. “There are thousands of people like me. We are going to change Ukraine. It’s only a matter of time,” he says. May it be so, Vitaliy, and may it be so soon!

Thank you for your love, your trust, and your support over the last eight years! Все буде Україна!

Melinda Haring is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. She tweets @melindaharing.

Despite the compelling economic data, the African growth story has not resulted in the concomitant boost in investment from global players. Investment into the region is made by the same long-time investors, including development finance institutions. Meanwhile, mainstream institutional investors remain on the sidelines.

Surveys have long documented the difference in risk perception between investors with established operations on the continent and those that are considering opportunities from afar. Those already invested in the region see Africa as the most attractive investment destination, while those that don’t have operations in African markets view it as the second-least attractive region. For funds and firms that have yet to enter African markets, a stubborn dichotomous view of African risk—one that oscillates between seeing the continent through a lens of foreign aid and another that embraces the high risk/high return view—creates confusion and causes hesitation. Furthermore, the mainstream investment strategy used by investors in developed markets—one that is data dependent and push-oriented—is ill-suited to the opportunities in African markets.

From data dependence to trend analysis

Developed markets are data rich. In North American or European economies, investing is governed by subsector experts who focus on niche industries and specialized asset classes. The accelerating financial complexity and sophistication of highly public markets in developed countries progressively made specialists critical to finding opportunities and delivering returns. The internet economy of the 2000s and the growing importance of real-time data has accelerated the specialization. Now, large data sets and artificial intelligence-powered analysis have become quantitative assets to specialist investors.

This was not always the case. Prior to the 1980s, top-level generalists who deeply understood political economy dynamics were successful investors. In the post-war era, international investors navigated domestic social change, reconstruction, decolonization, and oil shocks to build the continent’s first private equity firms and iconic multinational companies. Over the same period, the emerging computer revolution transformed economics from the study of human behavior in an environment of scarcity to a series of equations and advanced mathematical modelling. Economics as a science grew up alongside Masters of Business Administration (MBA) programs, resulting in a disconnect between economic and geopolitical analysis and an elevation of data in business decision-making.

In contrast to developed economies, African markets are defined by a lack of real-time, reliable data and strong interaction between political and economic realities, thus developed market analytical approaches will fall short. Cutting and pasting the data-dependent, specialist model in African markets leaves managers unable to understand and mitigate the operational, on-the-ground market risks. Country risk assessments, developed by economists at international financial institutions, tend to position geopolitical risk as a matter of insurance instead of being central to investment decision-making in projects and deals with medium-to-long-term returns horizons.

Taking a more intersectional perspective bringing together economic and geopolitical analysis requires an understanding of the trends currently reshaping the continent.

Most investors still operate on dated perceptions of African markets driven by oft-repeated factoids and the news cycle, failing to recognize the mutually reinforcing trends that have over the past twenty years restructured many African economies and enhanced their resilience. Coups grab headlines but day-to-day political stability makes for boring news. Despite the recent coups in Mali and Burkina Faso, the map of Africa is no longer a swath of autocratic regimes as it was in the 1980s but rather a mosaic with standout democracies such as Ghana and Senegal, which have—for the most part—been fortifying their institutions.

Regional powers such as Kenya and Nigeria, despite setbacks, have been on a trajectory of democratic progress. After the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya, the country reformed its electoral process and promulgated a new constitution in 2010 which devolved power. In Nigeria, the 2015 elections marked a turning point: the first time since the return of civilian rule in 1999 that an opposition party, the All Progressives Congress, won against the People’s Democratic Party that had ruled until then. In the 1990s, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) only identified three democratic countries in Africa. In 2020, the EIU ranked twenty African countries as hybrid or higher on a democratic scale, despite democratic backsliding globally (including in the United States).

Accompanying the increasing political stabilization, economic diversification has also shored up African economic resilience. The continent’s sustained growth cannot only be attributed to high commodity prices but also is the result of a progressive shift away from raw material export models toward services and middle-class-based consumption.

The “oil curse” that colors the conversation of African economic growth is proving to be less powerful even in major oil exporters such as Nigeria. The oil price collapses of 2008 and 2014-16 revealed a previously unrecognized level of resilience on the continent. When oil hit a low of twenty-six dollars a barrel in 2016, regional gross domestic product fell to 2.2 percent from 3.4 percent the previous year, but the continent did not become mired in stagnation as it did in the “lost decades” of the 1980s and 1990s. Instead, growth recovered in 2017, revealing structural improvements (particularly in Nigeria).

Diversification has been supported by increased investments made in infrastructure, deepening regional integration culminating in the creation of the African Continental Free Trade Area in 2019, and greater amounts of disposable income that have supported domestic markets for consumption. African countries have had greater choice in international partners. Over the past two decades, China has become Africa’s most significant trading partner and the largest financier of infrastructure in the region to the tune of twenty-three billion dollars between 2007 and 2020. Over seven billion dollars of that financing went to telecom infrastructure. Increasing mobile penetration and digitization accelerated by COVID-19 are undergirding an exponential growth in venture capital into African markets. In 2016, total venture capital flowing into the region was just above $350 million. Five years later, it crested four billion dollars, with the lion’s share going to Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa, and Kenya, and with over 60 percent of the capital coming from US-tied entities.

The interaction of political stabilization, better macroeconomic management, technological change, and young demographics will support the continent in returning to growth after the COVID-19 crisis. Just like in the case of the 2016 oil shock, African growth bounced back to 3.7 percent in 2021, showing unanticipated resilience after the continent’s economy contracted by 1.7 in 2020. By analyzing the trends and accepting that rapid growth is neither linear nor smooth, investors can find success in African markets.

Pull over push strategies

Understanding transformative macro trends is sine qua non, but not enough to guarantee successful ventures. It is also critical to employ a pull strategy rather than a push approach. The latter focuses on creating new consumer needs and desires and then pushing relevant products into the market. The former instead rests on identifying unserved market needs and then creating products to meet that latent demand. Push strategies work well in consumption-based economies supported by efficient capital markets such as the United States or Europe in which affluent consumers can be convinced that their want of the newest mobile phone is actually a need. African markets are best-suited for pull strategies.

Most large European and US investors have a self-referential bias whereby they consider African opportunities through the lens of their own market operating environments. Many of them are looking to simply add a high-risk premium to compensate for investing in African markets on top of their familiar underlying asset structures. Some seek short-term, liquid, and safe assets such as treasury bonds while others pursue high internal rates of return (IRRs) in a seven-year fund lifecycle. Some are looking for real assets with developed secondary markets to ensure liquidity, while others want to deploy billions of dollars through thematic strategies such as infrastructure or climate.

Each “push” strategy will be exposed to difficulties that can create Goldilocks-type scenarios: not enough market depth, too few “bankable” projects, too much volatility, not enough liquidity, too much risk, inadequate profitability, and other such conditions. The list of reasons not to invest therefore becomes overwhelming and results in the accumulation of dry powder.

Fundamentally, African market realities are different—liquidity more often than not comes with volatility due to systemic local currency risk on the continent. The days of making 20 percent IRR in relatively safe private equity (PE) environments are also long gone: The first and second vintage in the early 2000s of African PE funds invested in banks, telecoms, and other low-hanging fruit, leaving only difficult operational, consumer-facing firms for today’s investors to build. Reports from both the International Finance Corporation and the African Private Equity and Venture Capital Association—better known as AVCA—show returns of less than 10 percent in African PE due to currency fluctuations. High returns can be found in the African early-stage venture space, but those opportunities are often too small for institutional investors.

To gain access to the tremendous opportunities that African markets offer at scale, emerging market investing must be built on pull strategies based on intersectional approaches, incorporating an understanding of existing demand and working to find overlaps between the realities of African markets and the requirements of investors. For example, the billions flowing into climate and environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) funds can deliver good returns, strong developmental impact, and advancement of United Nations sustainable development goals if investors think beyond immediate climate resilience within today’s economic context and recognize that African countries have a dual imperative–stimulating rapid green growth and alleviating poverty.

On a continent where six hundred million people lack reliable access to electricity, additional generation capacity is a critical priority on which the green or digital revolutions depend. While climate investors rightfully eschew investments in coal, natural gas generation opportunities may prove a good opportunity as they can create the base power necessary for broad-based solar. Likewise, attractive carbon reduction opportunities can be found in agribusiness, so having the flexibility to invest outside the energy sector increases the potential for success.

A flexible and intersectional approach can also help asset managers wanting to deploy billions of dollars in the short term. By recognizing that market absorption capacities will limit their deployment, they can invest smaller amounts in the nascent private debt industry, which will grow rapidly in the next three to five years given the continuously growing financing gap in African markets.

If large asset managers want the diversification and returns that these markets can offer, they must accept the intrinsic trade-offs found in emerging markets. If liquidity is the priority, an investor can buy bonds in Cairo, Lagos, or Johannesburg but must accept the concomitant volatility and depreciation risk resulting from the underlying assets being valued in local currencies.

If predictability and stability are desired, then an investor must prepare for illiquidity. While investing in illiquid assets in the real economy offers opportunities ranging from infrastructure to agribusiness to renewable energy, exits are difficult to time. The classic high risk, high return investment profile does exist but is now concentrated in the emerging tech and creative industries.

With recession looming on the horizon in the United States and Europe, investors who want to participate in the next wave of growth and create wealth from—and in—fast-growing emerging and frontier markets in Africa and beyond need to adjust their approaches to invest along transformational trends, navigate political economy concerns, and tap latent demand.

Twenty years ago, the Economist dubbed Africa “the Hopeless Continent.” Today, the associated risks with investing in Africa are very different. Risk perception must be updated to reflect the increasing resilience, digitization, and integration that now are taking hold in African markets. Investors will succeed if they work to understand market realities instead of coming with pre-defined investment strategies, if they find the overlap between their internal requirements and market needs, and if they embrace flexibility and intersectional approaches. The geopolitical and economic dynamics of this post-COVID-19 world make looking at African markets not a niche option but rather a mainstream necessity.

Guillaume Arditti is founder of Belvedere Africa Partners and a lecturer in international relations at the Political Sciences Institute of Paris (Sciences Po).

Aubrey Hruby is a co-founder of Tofino Capital, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University.

An abbreviated version of this article also appears on LSE Business Review.

The post The Africa investment imperative: Diversification and resilience amid economic downturns appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Younus quoted in CNN: Pakistan names former spy chief as new head of army

Atlantic Council — Thu, 24 Nov 2022 18:56:00 +0000

The post Younus quoted in CNN: Pakistan names former spy chief as new head of army appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukrainian victory can deal a decisive blow to Russian imperialism

Danylo Lubkivsky — Thu, 17 Nov 2022 00:23:42 +0000

Almost nine months since his tanks first rolled across the border, it is now clear that Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is an old-fashioned colonial war complete with illegal annexations and the denial of Ukraine’s right to exist. This savage act of aggression reflects modern Russia’s refusal to abandon its imperial identity and Moscow’s readiness to employ military force as a foreign policy tool. Until this resurgent brand of Russian imperialism is decisively defeated, it will remain one of the greatest threats to global security.

Russia’s defeat may be closer at hand than many people currently appreciate. The invasion of Ukraine is rapidly unraveling, with Putin’s demoralized army consistently finding itself outfought and out-thought on the battlefield. Russia has already been forced to retreat from more than half of the territory occupied since the invasion began in February, with most observers expecting Ukraine’s highly motivated and battle-hardened military to liberate more of the country in the coming winter months.

The failure of Putin’s invasion is due in large part to his imperial arrogance and habit of underestimating the Ukrainian people. Throughout his political career, the Russian dictator has refused to recognize Ukraine as a separate and independent nation. Instead, he has insisted on dismissing Ukrainians as inferior Russians while dangerously downplaying the strength of Ukrainian national feeling.

Crucially, Putin has never acknowledged Ukrainian agency and has sought to blame each successive Russian failure in Ukraine on the meddling interference of foreign actors. In 2004, Putin’s clumsy attempts to rig Ukraine’s presidential election and install a pro-Russian candidate led directly to the Orange Revolution. Rather than admit his error, Putin accused the West of orchestrating Ukraine’s big pro-democracy breakthrough. Ten years later when millions of Ukrainians once again took to the streets in defense of their European choice, Putin repeated his earlier mistake and blamed the entire uprising on Western agents.

Putin’s ultimate blunder was his February 2022 decision to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He seems to have bought into his own propaganda and genuinely believed the invading Russian army would be welcomed as liberators. Instead, Putin has found himself at war with a nation of forty million Ukrainians who now view Russia as their sworn enemy. The escalating conflict has also had a disastrous impact on Russia’s international standing, with Putin himself now widely viewed as a pariah and even formerly friendly nations such as China and India looking to distance themselves from the Kremlin.

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While the war is far from over, even the most committed of Russian imperialists now recognize that the invasion can no longer hope to achieve its original goals of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and forcing Ukrainians to accept an imposed Russian identity. Confronted by the grim spectacle of retreat after retreat, they are gradually coming to terms with the previously unthinkable notion that Russia may have already lost the war.

This realization is sparking panic in Moscow. Regime officials and nationalist hardliners understand that losing the war in Ukraine would be an existential defeat that could bring about the collapse of Russian imperialism. So far, they have responded with bloodcurdling threats and nuclear blackmail, while raising the rhetorical stakes by ranting about holy wars against Satanists. The escalating campaign of Russian airstrikes against civilian Ukrainian targets is further evidence of Moscow’s fury and frustration over battlefield failures.

Western leaders must ignore Russia’s threats and remain steadfast in their support for Ukraine. The Kremlin is currently desperate to secure a ceasefire in order to rearm and rebuild its shattered military. In the interests of international security, it is vital that these efforts fail. The West currently has a rare window of opportunity to deal a decisive blow to Russian imperialism. If this moment is not seized, the price of countering the Kremlin will continue to rise.

Eurasia Center events

Amb. Robin Raphel: A prime minister picking someone that will be beholden to him/her is a fool’s errand

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

The defeat of Russian imperialism would bring a range of benefits that would be felt far beyond the borders of Ukraine. The most immediate effect would be an economic upswing as the negative impact of the war on the global economy is lifted.

Russia’s defeat would also pave the way for a transformation of the international security apparatus, including new approaches to preventing the crime of aggression, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Reforming the United Nations Security Council and rethinking the veto powers of permanent members would be high on the agenda. New security approaches for Eurasia would also be critical, with NATO and the EU both playing key roles.

The collapse of Russian imperialism would reinvigorate global democracy and serve as a powerful blow to the forces of autocracy. It would deter other authoritarian regimes from imposing themselves on smaller neighbors and encourage countries to embrace democratic values by demonstrating that they can expect to receive support from the democratic world.

Defeat in Ukraine would almost certainly lead to rising demands for independence among the many non-Russian nations within today’s Russian Federation. This would present a range of security challenges for the international community similar to the issues faced following the collapse of the USSR. As setbacks in Ukraine expose Moscow’s military weakness, the disintegration of Russia into a number of smaller nation states is no longer beyond the realms of possibility; the international community should begin preparing now for such an outcome.

Other countries in the post-Soviet region would also have the opportunity to abandon pro-Kremlin positions in the wake of a Russian imperial collapse. Belarus, which is currently under unofficial Russian occupation, would be of particular importance in this process. The liberation of Belarus would create the possibility of establishing a firm and geographically coherent border along Europe’s eastern flank.

Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is widely acknowledged as the biggest threat to the global security system since the end of the Cold War. The Russian dictator is seeking to rewrite the rule book and drag the international community back to a time of naked imperial aggression. If he succeeds, the whole world will enter a menacing new era of conflict and confrontation marked by escalating militarism and closed borders.

Luckily, there is an alternative. Ukraine has already destroyed the central imperial myth of Russian military invincibility and has demonstrated that it is more than capable of beating Putin’s forces on the battlefield. If the West maintains its support and provides Kyiv with the tools to finish the job, there is every reason to believe Ukraine can decisively defeat Russia.

This would be an historic victory for Ukraine itself, but it would also represent a hugely significant win for the wider international community. Defeat in Ukraine would leave Russia’s imperial ideology in tatters while paving the way for a lasting peace in Europe. It would help secure a rules-based geopolitical environment where smaller countries are free to determine their own fate and need not fear their larger neighbors. These goals are within reach. All that is required is unwavering support for Ukraine.

Danylo Lubkivsky is the director of the Kyiv Security Forum and former Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine.

Arifa Noor: Pakistan’s political instability and economic crisis make it difficult to predict what will follow the appointment of a new army chief

Mosharraf Zaidi: The new army chief will have three immediate challenges that his predecessors did not face: an image crisis, internal unhappiness, and temptation

Don’t repeat the past mistakes, prime minister!

The civil-military misalliance in Pakistan seems to be caught in a time warp. The current situation harkens back to the fraught 1990s when successive Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) governments tried to select an all-powerful army chief who might remain close to or become beholden to the prime minister making the choice. Wishful thinking at best. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif presides today as the front man for a (former Pakistani prime minister) Nawaz Sharif cabinet. Whatever decision emanates from the elder Sharif in London, it won’t take much time before Rawalpindi and Islamabad veer away from each other. The army chief’s loyalty is to Pakistan and the half-million men and women he commands, not to an individual politician. Nawaz Sharif learned that the hard way for all his choices.

So, the best choice the prime minister can make is a professional without baggage, especially without links to the Inter-Services Intelligence that creates a different mindset from what the army needs currently. The army needs to shake off the group think, publicity consciousness, and intellectual stasis of a second six-year chief in a decade plus. The choice should also not be constrained by sectarian concerns or the need to keep the rampant opposition leader Imran Khan in check. There are fine military professionals in the running, mostly from Seventy-Fifth Pakistan Military Academy Long Course, commissioned in 1985. The best candidate may well be one who is not campaigning for the post.

Shuja Nawaz is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and author of The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighborhood. On Twitter: @shujanawaz.

A prime minister picking someone that will be beholden to him/her is a fool’s errand

My strong view is that no one should try to convince General Bajwa to stay on, which he probably does not want to do in any case, for reasons that are well known. Shehbaz Sharif would be wise to simply pick the most senior general to be chief of army Staff and be done with it. That way, no one could complain that he was trying to pick a favorite, and Imran Khan would have no basis to oppose the choice. The idea of a prime minister picking someone further down the list on the assumption that person will be beholden to him/her in the future is a fool’s errand. Army chiefs are loyal first and foremost to the institution of the army. Prime ministers who have assumed otherwise have come to grief, like Nawaz Sharif and his choice of General (and, former president) Pervez Musharraf. Of course, a chief chosen strictly on merit will still have political influence whether he wants to or not, because the system is such that other power centers will look to the army chief for guidance and support in times of political turmoil—a chronic reality in today’s Pakistan. In any case, the new chief should work to accelerate efforts to finally extricate the army from politics once and for all, and thicken the army’s skin against legitimate public criticism.

Ambassador Robin Raphel is a Senior Associate for the Project on Prosperity and Development at the Center for Strategic & International Studies.

Pakistan’s political instability and economic crisis make it difficult to predict what will follow the appointment of a new army chief

Not since the last year of Pervez Musharraf as chief of army staff has the issue of the COAS’ appointment been this central to Pakistani politics and this controversial. And perhaps it can also be said the role of the military in Pakistani politics has also not been discussed and critiqued as much as this year. This is not just because of the political instability and the aggressive campaign by the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf, but also because of the economic crisis. This is why it is so hard to predict what will follow once a new army chief is appointed by the end of this year; the past shows us that at such moments, the military opts for a less visible political role to allow the institution to shore up its image and legitimacy in Pakistani society. General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani steered a similar tactical retreat when he succeeded Musharraf. But, General Qamar Javed Bajwa’s successor may not have it this easy. For one, the prevalence of social media means a tactical retreat while continuing to exercise power from behind the scenes may not be enough this time around. Secondly, and more importantly, the economic crisis will require more. Will the new army chief be aware of the need for a more stable government which can take long-term decisions rather than continuing an unwieldy coalition which is making economic decisions with an eye on the coming election? And, along with this, the military may also have to acknowledge the growing unrest because of the high inflation and taxation and its link to the growing censure against the institution. These are the key issues the new army chief will have to address, one of which is publicly discussed in Pakistan, and the other rarely mentioned.

Arifa Noor is a journalist and anchor at Dawn News. On Twitter: @arifanoor72.

The new army chief will have three immediate challenges that his predecessors did not face: an image crisis, internal unhappiness, and temptation

In addition to the sobering burdens all Pakistani army chiefs must bear, the new chief will have three immediate challenges that his predecessors did not face.

The first is an image crisis. The current COAS General Qamar Bajwa is said to have engineered Khan’s removal—but in doing so helped unleash unprecedented invective against the military’s habitual political interventions. The new chief has to restore the army’s standing in the public discourse—in a profoundly different ecosystem than the one previous new chiefs have had to do.

The second is internal unhappiness. Military officers are drawn from the same demographic where Khan is most popular. Claims of a cessation of political intervention by the army will need to be backed with demonstrable proof. But anything short of a return to office from Imran Khan might leave many military women and men deeply dissatisfied. The new chief will have to balance the demands of his own officers with the requirements of a genuine withdrawal of the military from politics.

The third is temptation. General Bajwa has expanded the job description of the army chief massively. When Beijing or Riyadh or Brussels or Washington want something in Pakistan, they call the COAS. This was always a problem, but under Bajwa, it’s become the norm. To truly extract itself from what I call the Pakistani polycrisis, the new COAS will need to eschew undermining Pakistan’s elected officials and diplomats. Given the performance and track records of some of those officials, any COAS may genuinely feel compelled to continue stepping into areas that are not his domain. How the new COAS evades such compulsion and resists the temptation of trying to be diplomat in chief, economist in chief, and peacemaker in chief will go a long way to setting Pakistan back on a path of genuine economic, political, and security normalcy and growth.

Mosharraf Zaidi is a founding partner at Tabadlab and a senior advisor at Albright Stonebridge Group. Twitter: @mosharrafzaidi.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

Public Event Mon, October 31, 2022 • 8:30 am ET

Conference on the future of the US-Pakistan relationship

In partnership with Engro Corporation, University of Lahore and Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center hosts a conference on the future of the US-Pakistan relationship. This 2 day conference runs from October 31-November 1, 2022.

Economy & Business Energy & Environment Pakistan Politics & Diplomacy

SouthAsiaSource Nov 7, 2022

What Pakistan can learn from Chinese growth

By Ali Hasanain

As the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor enters its second phase, each side needs to review how they can improve the program’s effectiveness for mutual benefit.

China Economy & Business

SouthAsiaSource Oct 25, 2022

State capacity and support for the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan

By Federico Masera & Hasin Yousaf

Violent, criminal, and terrorist organizations’ functioning and success often rely on the support of the population in which they operate. Some scholars have hypothesized that to gain and maintain this vital support, violent organizations engage in the provision of goods and services.

Extremism Pakistan

SouthAsiaSource Oct 24, 2022

US National Security Strategy: Takeaways for Pakistan

By Syed Ali Zia Jaffery

To ignore Washington’s new National Security Strategy just because it does not mention Pakistan would be incredibly shortsighted for Islamabad, primarily because whatever the United States plans to do—directly and indirectly—will affect it.

National Security Pakistan

Odesa rejects Catherine the Great as Putin’s invasion makes Russia toxic

Oleksiy Goncharenko — Tue, 15 Nov 2022 01:00:34 +0000

Preparations to dismantle Odesa’s controversial Catherine the Great monument began in early November, with the site cordoned off and the figure of the Russian empress covered in a decidedly undignified shroud of black plastic. While final confirmation of Catherine’s removal is still pending, her fate appears to be sealed. She has fallen victim to radical changes in public opinion as Vladimir Putin’s brutal invasion forces Ukrainians to re-evaluate attitudes toward their country’s imperial Russian past.

The Catherine the Great statue in Ukrainian Black Sea port city Odesa has long been one of the country’s most politically controversial monuments. It was unveiled in 2007 during an escalation in Ukraine’s post-Soviet memory wars following the country’s landmark 2004 Orange Revolution. While patriotic Ukrainians were busy erecting monuments to figures from the country’s formerly outlawed national liberation movement, Odesa’s decision to honor the Russian empress with a statue was widely viewed as a defiant and deliberate demonstration of pride in the imperial past.

In the wake of Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainian authorities passed a series of decommunization laws that led to the dismantling of thousands of Soviet era monuments across the country and the renaming of streets, villages, and entire cities. However, this legislation did not apply to the Czarist era and had no impact on the status of Odesa’s Catherine monument.

Although there were no legal grounds for the removal of Catherine, her continued presence often sparked political conflicts within Odesa society and on the national stage. This tension reflected growing demands to reassess the nature of Ukraine’s relationship with Russia as a new generation of Ukrainians increasingly questioned the imperial dogmas established by centuries of Czarist and Soviet official histories.

Many also objected specifically to Catherine and pointed to her personal role as a key figure in the subjugation of Ukraine. While the Russian empress is known internationally as Catherine the Great, significant numbers of Ukrainians object to this title and regard her instead as a notorious tyrant. They note that Catherine extinguished the broad autonomy of the Ukrainian Cossacks and oversaw the aggressive colonization of Ukraine.

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Catherine’s eighteenth century reign is closely associated with the imperial myths that now serve as historical justification for Vladimir Putin’s campaign to reconquer Ukraine and destroy Ukrainian statehood. Under Catherine, Russian imperial power expanded into southern Ukraine and Crimea, with the Czarist authorities posing as pioneers and founders of towns and cities such as Odesa that in reality had already existed in one form or another for centuries.

It was during this period that Catherine’s favorite, Grigory Potemkin, is said to have erected the infamous “Potemkin Villages” along the banks of Ukraine’s Dnipro River in order to create the false impression of a prosperous and happy colony for the visiting empress. Some historians now believe the legend of the Potemkin Villages may itself be a fabrication, but critics of Catherine nevertheless see it as fitting that her oppressive conquest of Ukraine is associated with one of history’s most notorious political deceptions. To them, she is anything but “great.”

Despite this challenging legacy, Odesa’s Catherine the Great monument was broadly popular among residents of the Black Sea port city until the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine began in early 2022. This popularity was not based on support for her actions against Ukrainian statehood or Cossack autonomy; instead, Catherine served as a symbol of the imperial identity that many in Odesa embraced following the Soviet collapse. She embodied the sense of pride Odesites felt over the prominent place occupied by their hometown in Russian imperial history.

Attitudes have changed dramatically since February 24. The shock and trauma of Russia’s invasion has convinced many Odesites to abandon their previous enthusiasm for the city’s Russian imperial heritage and has sparked a surge in public demands for the removal of Catherine.

It is not hard to see why. From the early days of the invasion, it has been clear that Odesa is one of the Russian army’s primary objectives. The city’s port has been blockaded by the Russian Black Sea fleet, with the nearby coastline fortified in anticipation of a possible Russian amphibious landing. Inside the city itself, Odesites have grown used to the daily terror of missile airstrikes and kamikaze drone attacks.

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For Putin, Odesa has enormous strategic and symbolic importance. Capturing the port city would allow him to cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea altogether and strangle the Ukrainian economy. Most analysts agree that without Odesa, Ukraine would no longer be economically viable as an independent state. The city could also serve as an excellent launch pad for the Russian occupation of Moldova.

Odesa’s place in the Russian imagination also makes it a particularly valuable prize. Many of Putin’s compatriots view Odesa as a sacred Russian city and bitterly resent its present status as the southern capital of independent Ukraine. They regard Odesa as even more deeply entwined in Russian national identity than Crimea or Kyiv and sincerely believe the city’s return to Kremlin rule would help correct the injustice of the post-Soviet settlement.

Crucially, Putin has harked back to Catherine the Great in his attempts to provide historical justification for the invasion of Ukraine and the capture of Odesa. Likewise, Kremlin officials and regime proxies have actively revived the term “Novorossiya” (“New Russia”), which was coined during Catherine’s reign to refer to her imperial possessions in southern Ukraine. In areas of Ukraine occupied by Russian forces, Catherine’s legacy has been used to legitimize the Kremlin’s claims. This is part of a conscious attempt to change the optics of the invasion and portray Russia as liberator rather than an aggressor.

Unfortunately for Putin, Odesites have shown little interest in being liberated by him or his soldiers. On the contrary, they have rallied to the defense of their city and have loudly condemned the Russian invasion. One of the many ways in which Odesites have expressed their opposition to Russia’s imperial aggression is by demanding the removal of the city’s Catherine the Great monument.

The Odesa authorities were initially hesitant to bow to public pressure, with Odesa City Council refusing in September to support a proposal to dismantle the Catherine monument. However, following an online public vote, Odesa Mayor Hennadiy Truhanov announced on November 5 that he would now back calls for the removal of the statue. On day later, the monument was fenced in and a notice from the municipal authorities appeared announcing that it would soon be dismantled.

Skeptics caution that the saga of Odesa’s Catherine the Great monument may still be far from over and warn that recent steps could simply be a stalling tactic to ease tensions and prevent further embarrassing acts of vandalism. However, the symbolism of Odesa’s boarded up Russian empress is already undeniable and reflects the city’s decisive turn away from the imperial myth-making that Putin has tried so hard to exploit.

The Kremlin has sought to win Odesites over with a highly sanitized and largely mythical version of history, but Moscow’s appeals to imperial nostalgia have clearly fallen flat. While Putin’s Russia remains trapped in the past, today’s Ukraine is building its identity around a compelling vision of the country’s future as an increasingly self-confident European democracy. This has proved far more persuasive to Odesites than the authoritarianism, isolation, and endless aggression offered by the Putin regime.

For decades, Odesa was arguably Ukraine’s most Russophile city. However, the current invasion has made Russia so toxic that even formerly sympathetic Odesites no longer want anything to do with Moscow’s imperial agenda. Putin claims to be waging war in order to return “historic Russian lands,” but in reality he has only succeeded in convincing Ukrainians that there is no place for Russia in their country’s future, and no place for Russian Empress Catherine the Great in a free Odesa.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a member of the Ukrainian parliament with the European Solidarity party.

Parting from more traditionally domestic-focused agendas, there has already been friction among governing coalition parties over Italy’s continued policy of support toward Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. In fact, two of the three parties in the ruling coalition are publicly and privately calling into question Italy’s support for Ukraine, and in doing so jeopardizing the governing alliance’s unity and the country’s response to continued hostilities.

At a time when the country and Europe at large are preparing for a difficult winter plagued by an energy crisis, Italy seems poised to plunge back to its historical pattern of political instability.

Meloni has gone to great lengths to paint herself as a leader who is a Brussels skeptic, but at the same time is pro-European and an anti-Vladimir Putin transatlanticist. Calling for Italy to exit the EU just years ago, she is now making public appearances arguing for Italy’s immovable role within the bloc and NATO. Last week she visited Brussels to meet EU leaders, and then this week she hosted NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at Chigi Palace. However, her coalition partners are her biggest weakness in this effort. And throughout the campaign, Meloni tied herself to these partners, presenting a unitary agenda and often making joint appearances at rallies.

Matteo Salvini, head of Italy’s The League party is positioning himself as a pacifist, calling for peace talks as the only possible end to the war. While pacifism is likely a political stunt, as Salvini has historically been close to Italy’s branches of the military and a firearms enthusiast, The League’s ties to Putin’s United Russia party are no secret. Salvini’s own party loyalists have been reported to have taken repeated secret meetings at the Kremlin for years. Salvini himself claimed to have secretly met with the Russian ambassador to Italy since the beginning of the war.

Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia party, the coalition’s other partner, has turned into Meloni’s biggest headache. Forza Italia’s second-in-command, Antonio Tajani, will become the country’s next minister of foreign affairs, but his appointment has been overshadowed by Berlusconi.

Since election day, Berlusconi—who is arguably the country’s most pro-Putin major public figure—has repeatedly gone on national television (on which he has a near-monopoly, controlling the country’s largest TV network, Mediaset, and having a say over the political appointment of the heads of the state-owned network, Rai) to amplify Kremlin propaganda. He has suggested that Ukraine brought the war upon itself. In secret recordings now made public, he has gone as far as to say his dear friend Putin is being treated unfairly and praised him for a recent birthday gift, while blaming Zelenskyy for escalating violence in the Donbas.

Now as prime minister, Meloni is forced to distance herself from Salvini’s and Berlusconi’s comments. Where they see in the war in Ukraine an opportunity to tap into Italians’ frustrations with rising costs of living and shift support away from Brothers of Italy for added leverage within the governing coalition, Meloni sees a path to swift recognition and support from the broader Western international establishment, just months after many feared her rise to power.

With no end in sight to the ongoing center-right coalition internal fights, Draghi’s time as prime minister makes one thing clear: The transatlantic alliance and Europe need a stable and constructive partner in Rome now more than ever. Yet as the bloc prepares to face what will surely be a difficult winter, with energy and geopolitical crises looming, Italy still lacks a unified government. With newly elected pro-Russian legislators and politicians known to have been soft on Russia now appointed to key ministries, Rome risks further emboldening a growing segment within European politics that is calling for disengagement from the conflict. Were this segment to succeed, it would shed light on the extent to which Russian narratives have infiltrated European politics over the past decade.

Draghi helped lead Europe’s response to the war in Ukraine and worked behind the scenes to mediate between France and Germany, as the two other main European powers continue clashing on their responses to the energy crisis. Now, Meloni faces the difficult task of trying to build on Draghi’s European legacy while being hobbled by alliance partners who don’t share her views on either the EU or Russia. There’s much at stake—and at risk—for Meloni, Italy, and Europe.

Nick O’Connell is assistant director for business development at the Atlantic Council. A native of Italy, he previously worked for Migrants of the Mediterranean, an Italy-based nonprofit focused on EU migration policy, and a number of political campaigns in Northern Italy.

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How the West can help build Kazakh democracy

Benton Coblentz — Tue, 08 Nov 2022 19:25:00 +0000

This month, Kazakhs head to the polls to vote in a snap presidential election. Although the eventual winner of that election is not in doubt, the global reaction to it will have repercussions far beyond election night.

The snap poll, which is intended to offer a semblance of progress toward a competitive political environment in Kazakhstan, is the latest step in President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s makeover of the country’s politics—an effort to both strengthen Kazakhstan’s position on the world stage and shore up the regime’s domestic foundations.

In January, protests over rising fuel prices quickly spilled into all the country’s major cities. The regime was only saved after Tokayev called in supporting forces from the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a Russian-led military alliance, and ordered the shooting and arrest of protesters whom he later denigrated as drug smugglers and terrorists.

Tokayev’s moves to establish a measured democratization in the wake of January’s unrest have staved off further large-scale protests. Leaders in Astana likely feel stuck: A return to greater authoritarianism would only cause the pre-January fissures in society to fester, while a rapid liberalization, they believe, would threaten an immediate reprisal of the chaos of January.

Since Kazakhstan became an independent state in 1991, it has been a target in the sights of Russian foreign policy. Kremlin aggression has been a consistent threat to Kazakhstan’s national sovereignty and even territorial integrity. But after the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Astana distanced itself from Moscow, refusing to recognize Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territory and harboring Russian citizens seeking to dodge the draft.

It is no coincidence that Tokayev is pursuing domestic liberalization at the same time. After the Kremlin invaded Ukraine, Western democracies have revealed themselves to be a competent counter to Moscow’s influence.

Ukraine secured Western support in no small part due to its burgeoning democratic institutions. Thus, authoritarian institutions have become a liability for Kazakhstan, jeopardizing Astana’s ability to leverage the West in opposing Moscow’s attempts to re-establish a sphere of influence in the region. As such, the liberalizing reforms of Tokayev are a step not only toward democracy but also toward the West and away from Russia.

Tokayev’s reforms carry symbolic weight because they promise to open a severely closed political system, but their practical effects are limited. The snap presidential election, for example, is supposed to be interpreted as the birth of a competitive political environment in Kazakhstan. In practice, however, the elections leave the opposition without time to organize and consolidate support, all but assuring Tokayev’s re-election and doing more to consolidate Tokayev’s authority than bring in any real competition.

If Tokayev’s reforms go no further, they risk falling short of their full potential as a geopolitical tool by alienating Western capitals, whose support is increasingly conditioned on serious democratic progress.

For leaders like Tokayev, close partnership with China presents an enticing counterbalance to both Russia and the West. The political model that China champions does not grant political freedom to the people, but it does preserve the elite in power and might unlock exponential economic growth.

China is also making efforts to court Kazakhstan, as Chinese leader Xi Jinping offered greater cooperation and support for Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity during his recent trip to the country.

In the process of exiting one imperial orbit, however, Astana does not seem eager to enter another. While Tokayev’s strategic ambiguity does not close the door to a closer alliance with Beijing—or a return to Moscow’s fold—it does open the window to Western alignment. But as long as Kazakhstan’s democratization stands incomplete, however, the West removing its support is an option; that would force Astana to choose between two autocratic spheres of influence.

Western engagement over the coming months and years is going to be crucial. After the snap presidential elections, Tokayev will find his domestic position stronger than ever. He’ll have the chance to halt or even reverse the changes he’s made to liberalize the country. But the West’s credibility and engagement provide a crucial incentive for Tokayev to continue his reforms and secure both democracy and sovereignty for Kazakhstan.

High-level visits to the country and economic partnerships could demonstrate Western interest in further engagement. Western countries can facilitate investment in the country and offer technical assistance for Kazakhstan’s leading private industries.

Western engagement should be Kazakhstan-specific and avoid viewing the country only through the lens of the wider Central Asian region. During that process, Western leaders should make clear what kind of democratic progress they would need to see in order to increase their engagement. Western diplomats should make clear that engagement is predicated on Kazakhstan’s reforms, and further partnership should be predicated on continued liberalization.

If Western attention is not forthcoming, the forces in Astana advocating for greater autocracy will only gain strength. They will argue that their fears have been realized, as elite power will be threatened by democratic forces without any geopolitical benefits to show for the effort.

It is up to Western leaders, then, to understand the situation that Kazakhstan’s leaders find themselves in and operate accordingly. They should support what nascent efforts exist and provide incentives to ensure continued liberalization. Western engagement and understanding with Kazakhstan will help to demonstrate the value of Tokayev’s moves, set clear expectations for what reforms are to accomplish, and spur the development of a Kazakh democracy.

The story of democracy in Kazakhstan has yet to be written, and at this critical moment, the West has a unique opportunity to determine whether Kazakhstan sees either the birth of a fledgling democracy or retrenchment to autocracy.

Benton Coblentz is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Riaz in The Daily Star: A constitution without constitutionalism?

Atlantic Council — Fri, 04 Nov 2022 20:52:00 +0000

The post Riaz in The Daily Star: A constitution without constitutionalism? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Younus in Dawn: The stakes could not be higher for Imran Khan, the establishment and Pakistan

Atlantic Council — Fri, 04 Nov 2022 20:27:36 +0000

Public Event Tue, October 25, 2022 • 9:00 am ET

The post Younus in Dawn: The stakes could not be higher for Imran Khan, the establishment and Pakistan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Turmoil and transition: Iraq twenty years after the invasion

Madeline Hart and Nour Alhajjeh — Thu, 03 Nov 2022 18:23:24 +0000

WATCH the sessions

The Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative held a two-day conference on “Turmoil and transition: Iraq twenty years after the invasion.” The event took place from Tuesday, October 25, through Wednesday, October 26, 2022. The conference brought together leading experts and senior-level American and Iraqi policymakers to explore Iraq’s past two decades and analyze the key challenges and opportunities confronting future generations in Iraq.

The conference presented a series of panel discussions, fireside chats, and keynote speeches. These explored questions on Iraq’s security landscape, its regional role in mediation and foreign policy in general, Iraq’s hydrocarbons sector and efforts to manage climate change and the challenges it has faced in its democratic transition.

DAY ONE

Highlights from Keynote Speech – Jennifer Gavito, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iraq, Iran, and Public Diplomacy, US Department of State

Gavito discussed President Biden’s efforts to seek a more integrated Middle East by accelerating support to regional partners, including Iraq.
She also discussed the fruitful US-Iraqi partnership and emphasized that Iraq has faced and overcome many challenges, but now faces new challenges, including unemployment and lack of electricity. She stressed that the onus is on the new government to enact policies that improve lives of citizens and decrease corruption.
Gavito emphasized that Iraq’s youth are its most valuable resource, as an estimated 60 percent of the population is under the age of twenty-five.

Iraq’s Armed Forces, Security, and Counterterrorism

Gen. Abdel-Wahab Al-Saadi, Head of Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service, Republic of Iraq stressed that Iraq’s security challenges are at the heart of all of Iraq’s problems, particularly since 2003, although he noted that the US has helped build the capabilities of the Iraqi Army. Gen. Al-Saadi said that the Army still needs significant improvements and is attempting to do so with the help of the Ministry of Interior and other governmental institutions.
Gen. Michael D. Barbero, US Army Lieutenant General (Ret.), United States of America, emphasized the importance of continuing US aid and assistance to Iraq that is conditioned on solving corruption and the malign influence of Iran, as well as continuing US intelligence on the ground to fight counterterrorism in the country. Gen. Barbero stressed Iraq must restrict and remove corruption in security institutions in Kurdistan Regional Government.

Fireside Chat – Mohamed Ali Al-Hakim, Former Foreign Minister, Republic of Iraq

Al-Hakim emphasized the importance of the Strategic Framework Agreement (FSA) between the US and Iraq, calling it the groundwork of Iraq and America’s bilateral relationship.
He mentioned Iraq’s need to balance its relationships with both Iran and the United States.
He recommended that Iraq bring in more private sector companies into the country, which will increase not only political dialogue with the US, but also develop the economy and security situation in Iraq.
Al-Hakim also stressed the importance of increasing renewable energy similar to Egypt, citing Iraq’s abundance of sun for solar energy.

Iraq in the Region

Abbas Kadhim, Director, Iraq Initiative, Atlantic Council discussed the legacy of former Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Kadhimi. Kadhim also stressed that internal weakness opens the door for foreign influence and meddling, and recommended that Iraq heal internally, focusing on healing civic divides, particularly on ethno-sectarian lines.
Manal Radwan, Counsellor, Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia mentioned that Iraq has regained trust in the region, particularly in Saudi Arabia, although Iranian proxies in Iraq are still a major issue that threatens regional and international peace and security. Radwan also discussed the need to strengthen Iraq’s institutions and said that Saudi Arabia should work with Iraqis and other international partners to strengthen Iraq.
Aydın Selcen, Former Consul General of Turkey in Erbil, Republic of Turkey mentioned the close relationship between Turkey and Iraq, particularly in terms of trade, and commented that Turkey is the way for all Iraqis to bridge toward the West.
Sanam Vakil, Deputy Director and Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House stated that Iran had a thirteen year head start on creating relationships with Iraq, and for that reason, Iran is the most important foreign player in Iraq today. Vakil emphasized that this relationship has heavily damaged Iraq’s internal stability, as Iran has used Iraq to assert its broader regional ambitions.

DAY TWO

Highlights from Welcoming Remarks – Olin Wethington, Board Director, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Asia Security Initiative, Atlantic Council; Chairman, Wethington International LLC

Wethington discussed Iraq’s unstable status and evolution, including past failures with possible solutions for various challenges such as employing constitutional reform.
He also emphasized that despite Iraq being an oil-dependent country, structural challenges remain present, adding entrepreneurship is still elusive, and opportunities in the private sector continue to be limited.
He suggested because of the widespread protests there will be public grievance and impatience, particularly among the youth and highlighted the country’s political fragility due to the inability to form a new government over a year since the last election.
He highlighted that the young generation in Iraq will shape the future of the country, stating “shaping the future is our primary collective task, hence the priority of this conference.”
Wethington stated, “the United States remains committed to a strategic partnership with the Iraqi people and their government and seeks to support a stable, prosperous, democratic, and unified Iraq.”

Energy, Economy, and the Environment

Majid Jafar, Chief Executive Officer, Crescent Petroleum, argued that the oil issue didn’t occur after the Ukraine war, or the pandemic, however, there has been a “structural chronic deficit in oil.” He added that because of the shortage of gas supply, Iraq must play a key role in supplying global markets after addressing its own needs.
Luay Al-Khateeb, Former Minister of Electricity, Republic of Iraq, examined the electrical interconnectivity, explaining that even though it provides a stable national grid and creates a competitive utility market within the MENA region, it will not resolve the electricity crisis in Iraq.
Sara Vakhshouri, Founder, SVB Energy International and SVB Green Access, said Iraq could have energy independence and decarbonization, stressing the importance of extracting its own natural gas and expanding oil production. She discussed that lack of investments in fossil fuels is a major reason for high energy prices and shortage in energy supplies. Further, she emphasized that energy production and security issues remain present due to problems with investment regulation which prevents Iraq from advancing domestically and globally.

Highlights from Keynote Speech – H.E. Hassan Nadhem, Minister of Culture, Republic of Iraq

His excellency highlighted Iraq’s cultural, educational, and technology, focusing on discussing the non-security centered issues.
His excellency mentioned that Iraq is determined to rebuild and renovate despite the existing challenges.
The minister stressed that Iraq has become a hub for agreement whereas in the past, it was for conflicts. Adding there has been change in the international and diplomatic relations but to see more effective transformation, this progress needs to be constant.
His excellency also emphasized Iraq’s clear improved relationship with United States regardless of the past and current challenges.

Iraq’s Democratic Experience

Feisal Al-Istrabadi, Founding Director, Center for the Study of the Middle East; McRobbie Professor in Global Strategic Studies, Indiana University, stressed the most difficult but important task for the new government in Iraq is to engender a sense of confidence in the Iraqi people and government. He also emphasized that corruption in Iraq would continue, and there will not be a significant reform.
Laith Kubba, Independent Advisor on Iraq, mentioned the previous protest movements and the impact they had on the Iraqi government. He emphasized the dysfunctional system failing to reform itself internally in Iraq. However, young individuals there are forcing an alliteration to this system.
Sarkawt Shamsuddin, Former Member of Iraqi Parliament, Republic of Iraq, emphasized that the political system in Iraq has a number of independent but inexperienced individual’s, which create inaccuracy in the process of decision-making in parliament. He added that the parliament is still truly controlled by the big political parties or “main players.” Highlighting the previous prime minister’s failure in conducting serious reforms including investments in securing the border, and his success in continuing mediation efforts with Gulf countries and Iran.
Shamiran Mako, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University, emphasized finding ways for the government to revive confidence by providing necessary institutional reforms and engaging in more conciliatory politics, even when there are many strategic alliances. Professor Mako also stressed that Iraq was not a functioning democracy, it was always an elite game in terms of how government operates.

Nour Alhajjeh and Madeline Hart are Young Global Professionals with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Recap the 2022 event

Turmoil and transition: Iraq twenty years after the invasion

A conference exploring Iraq’s past two decades of change and upheaval and the key challenges and opportunities confronting future generations in Iraq.

Economy & Business Energy & Environment Iraq Middle East

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Lula is back in Brazil. Here’s what’s coming.

Atlantic Council — Mon, 31 Oct 2022 03:56:36 +0000

JUST IN

It’s back to the future. Left-wing former Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva defeated right-wing President Jair Bolsonaro on Sunday in a closely contested runoff election that portends a huge policy shift for Latin America’s largest country on everything from protecting the Amazon rainforest to social justice. How will Brazil reposition itself on the world stage? Our experts peer into the future that awaits.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

Jason Marczak (@jmarczak): Senior director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center
Tatiana Prazeres: Director of trade and international relations for the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo and columnist for the Folha de São Paulo newspaper
Valentina Sader (@valentinasader): Associate director and Brazil lead at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Left turn?

Lula joins a growing set of left-leaning leaders across the continent, including Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico, Gabriel Boric in Chile, Gustavo Petro in Colombia, and Alberto Fernández in Argentina. But Jason says that “characterizing Lula’s election as part of a shift to the left in the region oversimplifies the state of regional politics.”
Instead, the voters’ verdict is about the need for leaders who can deliver. “People want leaders who they think will govern with a deeper interest in making the average person’s life better, especially as inflation and high food and energy prices take hold,” Jason adds. The “clear frustration in Brazilian society with the status quo”—reflected in the fact that Bolsonaro has now become the first president since Brazil transitioned to democracy to not win re-election— mirrors results “in democracies around the world.”

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Southern hospitality

When he was in office the first time, from 2003 to 2010, “Lula cast himself as the leader of the Global South,” Jason tells us, and we can expect a return of that brand of “South-South diplomacy.” But at the same time, look out for a Lula-led Brazil to deepen its partnerships with the United States and Europe “in the areas of trade and environmental cooperation,” he adds.
Tatiana predicts that Lula will see the BRICS grouping of emerging economies—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa—as “an important platform not only to improve dialogue among its participants but also to influence global discussions,” though she notes that “it is unclear how the new administration will see China’s push to expand BRICS and shape it as a counterweight to the West.”
While Tatiana expects more cooperation between Brasília and Beijing relative to the Bolsonaro years, she said the jury is out on whether Brazil will join China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): “Brazil could consider collaborating with or supporting BRI projects, including in other countries, without formally joining the initiative, in a [show of] somewhat hedged support.”
More broadly, “a key challenge for Lula is to leverage Chinese investments and technologies to help reinvigorate Brazilian industry,” Tatiana adds.

Sigh of relief—for now

While there were outbreaks of violence late in the campaign that had the world “on edge,” Jason notes that election day “passed without major incidents.”
And Valentina said the biggest winner may have been Brazil’s electronic voting system. “It allowed for confidence in the results being released within hours of voting sites closing, effectively constraining any credible questioning of the result,” she says.
The results showed that Lula won with about 51 percent of the vote, a margin of some two million votes, but as of this writing Bolsonaro had yet to concede—after intimating for months that he planned to challenge any loss at the ballot box.
US President Joe Biden issued a congratulatory statement within minutes of the election being called in Lula’s favor by the Superior Electoral Court, helping legitimize the result. It was, Jason tells us, “an important step” to “shore up the importance of US-Brazil ties.”
To seal the deal, Jason hopes that the Biden administration will “send a steady stream of high-level representatives” to meet with the incoming administration, just as it has done in Colombia.

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Experts react: Lula defeats Bolsonaro in Brazil. What should the region and the world expect?

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 31 Oct 2022 02:13:27 +0000

It’s back to the future. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the left-wing former president of Brazil, recorded a narrow victory over right-wing current president Jair Bolsonaro in a runoff election Sunday. Lula, as he is known, called the victory a “resurrection;” after he served two terms as president, he spent time in jail for corruption before the conviction was overturned. The new administration will initiate an abrupt policy shift for Latin America’s biggest country both at home and abroad—and the transition could be rocky, as Bolsonaro has sought to undermine the legitimacy of the vote. How will this all play out on the world stage? We turned to our Latin America experts for the answers.

This post will be updated as the news develops and more reactions come in.

Jump to an expert reaction

Jason Marczak: A critical moment to shore up US-Brazil ties

Tatiana Prazeres: Expect closer cooperation between Brazil and China

Valentina Sader: The biggest winner? Brazil’s electronic voting system

Abrão Neto: Lula’s environmental stance will bring closer US ties

A critical moment to shore up US-Brazil ties

Brazilians and the world were on edge on Sunday, uncertain of how voting would play out following violence and polarization during the campaign. While there were a few incidents—which included highway police making it difficult to get to the polls in certain Lula strongholds—the day passed without major problems.

Lula’s win by over two million votes is a major development for Brazil: Bolsonaro is now the first president in the democratic history of Brazil to not win re-election. The rejection of an incumbent president—although by smaller margins than expected—shows the clear frustration in Brazilian society with the status quo, which continues to play out in democracies around the world.

When Lula becomes president again on January 1, 2023, his third term will signal a likely return to the South-South diplomacy that characterized his previous terms, in which Lula cast himself as the leader of the Global South. It is expected that he will increase collaboration between Brazil and other governments with similar perspectives such as those in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Colombia. Characterizing Lula’s election as part of a shift to the left in the region oversimplifies the state of regional politics. Rather, the shift is a sign that people want leaders who they think will govern with a deeper interest in making the average person’s life better, especially as inflation and high food and energy prices take hold.

As in Colombia, the Biden administration will hopefully send a steady stream of high-level representatives to Brazil to meet with Lula and his team. It’s an essential moment to shore up the importance of US-Brazil ties. The White House took an important step in that direction with a quick statement congratulating Lula soon after he was declared the winner. With concerns about whether the results would be as expected, this was an important move by the United States; many European and Latin American governments have done the same. Lula has made it clear that he sees the United States and Europe as valuable partners for Brazil, especially in the areas of trade and environmental cooperation. In the next administration, Brazil’s engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean will depend on ideological affinity but also on pragmatic areas of collaboration.

—Jason Marczak is the senior director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Expect closer cooperation between Brazil and China

Under Lula, two new priorities are likely to emerge in Brazil’s foreign policy: sustainability, from a substantive standpoint, and South America, from a geographical one. Both priorities mark a departure from Bolsonaro’s worldview; both reflect Lula’s understanding that Brazil needs to rebuild its international reputation as well as its ability to influence global and regional discussions. Lula’s narrative is likely to put significant emphasis on restoring Brazil’s credibility abroad.

In addition, Lula is expected to take a different approach to China-Brazil relations, deepening bilateral relations in areas beyond the economy.

Despite negative rhetoric against China during the Bolsonaro administration, trade and investment between the two countries evolved largely undisturbed. However, the political noise generated by the anti-China discourse prevented the deepening of bilateral relations in other policy areas, such as science and technology. The strong economic relationship between the two countries does not match their less intense political relationship; this deepened in Bolsonaro’s years. Under Lula, we can expect Brazil and China to explore other areas for cooperation.

The future of the BRICS grouping of developing economies may also take a different turn under Lula. While Bolsonaro has never rejected fellow BRICS countries, his priorities focused elsewhere, particularly on promoting Brazil’s accession to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. It is unclear how the new administration will see China’s push to expand BRICS and shape it as a counterweight to the West. It is clear though that the Lula administration will see BRICS as an important platform not only to improve dialogue among its participants but also to influence global discussions.

Some analysts are betting that, under Lula, Brazil would join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It remains to be seen how far Lula would go in that regard. It may well be that Brazil takes a more positive approach toward the Chinese initiative. Having said that, Brazil could consider collaborating with or supporting BRI projects, including in other countries, without formally joining the initiative, in a somewhat hedged support.

Lula’s efforts to promote Brazil’s reindustrialization may cause some friction with China but, by and large, that should not derail bilateral relations, in part because of the powerful agribusiness sector. A key challenge for Lula is to leverage Chinese investments and technologies to help reinvigorate Brazilian industry. Sustainability also provides renewed opportunities for cooperation with China, which Lula would be keen to explore.

—Tatiana Prazeres is director of trade and international relations for the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo and a columnist for the Folha de São Paulo newspaper.

The biggest winner? Brazil’s electronic voting system

With a two-million-vote difference between Lula and Bolsonaro, Brazil is clearly split down the middle. The hyperpolarization that marked the months leading up to the election was reflected in tonight’s results. As such, the biggest winner tonight may not have been Lula, but Brazil’s electronic voting system. It allowed for confidence in the results being released within hours of voting sites closing, effectively constraining any credible questioning of the result. The once again newly elected President Lula will be tasked with uniting a country that is split in half, and he must confront much more difficult economic and political circumstances than he faced when he was first elected in 2002. But if there is anything Brazilians should appreciate tonight, it is the efficiency and reliability of their voting system.

—Valentina Sader is the associate director and Brazil lead at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Lula’s environmental stance will bring closer US ties

The election of Lula as president for a third term will lead, among other things, to a substantial change in Brazil’s environmental agenda. As a consequence, this is likely to benefit Brazil’s external image and improve its relationship with several countries, including the United States.

US-Brazil economic relations will continue to be driven by pragmatic mutual interests. The fact that bilateral trade and investment flows are so important to each of the countries is favorable for continuous and constructive engagement. A renewed stance from the Brazilian government on climate change and other environmental issues might offer an extended avenue for bilateral cooperation, with positive spillovers for the overall political and economic relationship between the United States and Brazil.

—Abrão Neto is a nonresident senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, executive vice president of Amcham Brasil, and former secretary of foreign trade of Brazil.

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Riaz in South Asian Voices: What’s next for Bangladeshi politics?

Atlantic Council — Thu, 27 Oct 2022 20:30:00 +0000

Livia Godaert: Sunak’s opportunity to reclaim UK international soft power

The post Riaz in South Asian Voices: What’s next for Bangladeshi politics? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What to expect from Rishi Sunak’s Britain

Atlantic Council — Mon, 24 Oct 2022 18:46:32 +0000

JUST IN

It’s no easy job. After one British prime minister resigned in scandal and another was forced out after six weeks in office, Rishi Sunak now takes the helm at 10 Downing Street—charged with the daunting task of calming the United Kingdom’s political and fiscal turmoil. Can Sunak steady the markets, the country, and the Conservative Party? How will minority communities in Britain view a history-making prime minister of Indian descent? Our experts leap into the fray.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

Livia Godaert (@liviagodaert): Nonresident fellow at the Europe Center
John M. Roberts: Nonresident senior fellow at the Global Energy Center
Hameed Hakimi (@hameedhakimi): Nonresident senior fellow at the South Asia Center

Breaking down the agenda

The 42-year-old Sunak, a former chancellor of the Exchequer, was the runner-up to Liz Truss in this summer’s Conservative Party leadership race. Livia says that based on Sunak’s record, we can expect “a pretty hard line on immigration and refugee policies,” combined with a “push for greater economic and trade diplomacy.”
Livia also predicts that Sunak’s United Kingdom will remain a stalwart NATO ally and keep up the support for Ukraine. But what’s “less predictable” is how he will handle the “dark-money problems” caused by Russians and other kleptocrats investing in London.
In the same vein, Livia adds, “Sunak took a hard line against China during the campaign this summer, but this geopolitical stance may conflict with a greater push for foreign investment and trade.”
Those challenges, however, pale in comparison to the country’s ongoing post-Brexit “identity crisis,” Livia says. She argues that the Sunak government’s long-term goal should be to clearly articulate its vision for Britain’s place in the world and invest in the country’s “soft power.” The country can be a player in global debates on climate change, technology, and more, she says, “but thought leaders and decision makers won’t engage with the United Kingdom if they think they won’t be heard, or if they don’t see the country as a serious partner.”

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First test

Expect Sunak to “push for a further decoupling from the single market and the European Union,” Livia tells us, including ditching the Northern Ireland protocol and instituting data reforms.
At the same time, John describes Sunak as an “economic and financial realist” who may try to improve trade relations with the continent but would face headwinds from the “wing of the Conservative Party that objects to anything other than a pure and total Brexit.”
The first test comes as early as tomorrow, when Parliament will debate a bill that would effectively reverse some 2,400 EU regulations at the end of next year—on matters ranging from workers’ rights to televising the Olympics.
“The UK business community is by and large horrified at the prospect of the chaos that dropping all these laws will mean,” John tells us. “Canceling the bill would obviously improve Britain’s trade prospects with the EU, but the hard-line right wing of the Conservative Party would block any such effort.”

Race and politics

People overseas may view the United Kingdom’s first prime minister of color as groundbreaking, but “the Asian and minority ethnic groups have a more complicated relationship with leaders such as Sunak,” Hameed tells us.
In recent years, a slew of British politicians from minority groups have risen through the ranks—including London Mayor Sadiq Khan, former Home Secretary Priti Patel, and former Chancellor of the Exchequer Kwasi Kwarteng—but there has been no real progress on solving the disparities in wealth and health faced by British people of color. “It is difficult to measure the significance of their rise beyond progressive optics,” Hameed says.
He adds that for Sunak, who attended Oxford and Stanford and married the daughter of an Indian billionaire, “his politics and leadership are likely to be defined more by his extremely privileged upbringing in Britain—and the collective wealth he enjoys with his wife—than by any presumed solidarity on the basis of his ethnic background.”

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Experts react: Rishi Sunak makes history as newest UK prime minister. Can he calm a country in chaos?

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 24 Oct 2022 15:38:49 +0000

His moment has arrived. Rishi Sunak, the former chancellor of the exchequer, was tapped as the United Kingdom’s newest prime minister on Monday after no other Conservative Party hopefuls garnered enough support among members of Parliament. Sunak, 42, who is of Indian descent, makes history as the first person of color to become prime minister and takes over for Liz Truss—the shortest-serving prime minister in UK history—amid political and financial turmoil. Can Sunak calm the markets and the country? What should the world expect from Great Britain’s new leader? Our experts are on the case.

Jump to an expert reaction:

John M. Roberts: Sunak’s financial realism will collide with Brexit realities

Hameed Hakimi: Sunak’s ascent shows that times are changing. But will his premiership do so too?

Sunak’s opportunity to reclaim UK international soft power

We don’t know much about Rishi Sunak’s position on Britain in the world. During the last leadership contest, his focus was on the cost of living crisis and its various consequences, but we did glean some insights. We can expect a pretty hard line on immigration and refugee policies, as he supported the controversial Rwanda asylum plan announced earlier this year and maintained his support during the campaign. Sunak will likely push for greater economic and trade diplomacy—during his tenure as chancellor, he helped negotiate the Group of Seven’s minimum global corporation tax agreement. On Brexit, he was also a prominent “Leave” campaigner who has maintained vocal support in the years since, and we can anticipate that he will push for a further decoupling from the single market and the EU—he will likely push for the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill and the data reform bill once he takes office, which both seek to disengage the United Kingdom from the EU’s regulatory frameworks.

The United Kingdom will remain a key NATO ally, on track to reach spending commitments and active in ongoing operations. We can expect the same government support for Ukraine as under Truss and Johnson, though it is less predictable how the former chancellor will address the dark-money problems London still faces. Similarly, Sunak took a hard line during the campaign this summer against China, but this geopolitical stance may conflict with a greater push for foreign investment and trade.

What is unknown is how Sunak will try to repair the reputational damage to the United Kingdom that the past week and month and year have brought. It’s an important project for the new government under Sunak to undertake—and it’s one that could also have an impact on the future general election. It’s an easy attack line for Labour: The Tory Party brought chaos and uncertainty, and they have damaged relationships with allies and partners.

But it’s also bigger than electoral politics. Soft power is an important tool in any country’s arsenal, and the United Kingdom will be party to some significant geopolitical challenges in which it will want to be perceived as a good faith, reliable partner for the sake of its citizens. Fights over climate policy, new movements in digital rights and data reform, and competition over science and technology advancement and investment are all on the docket, and the United Kingdom has the potential to convene and drive these debates and conversations. But thought leaders and decision makers won’t engage with the United Kingdom if they think they won’t be heard, or if they don’t see the country as a serious partner.

This is not a new challenge, but rather an exacerbated one. Since the Brexit referendum, the United Kingdom has faced an internal identity crisis: What sort of country does it wish to be, and what is its role in the world? That’s a debate that hasn’t been solved, and that the leadership has been ignoring in favor of responding to the plethora of political crises and own goals that have consumed British politics in recent years. The solution to their reputation problem is to reckon with what Global Britain actually means in practice and to do so publicly. Sweeping the scandals—so many in short succession that Wikipedia has created a disambiguation page for “2022 United Kingdom government crisis”—under the rug won’t work, nor will it answer this fundamental identity question, and we’ll continue to see more of the same chaos that has defined the past few years. Much of the United Kingdom’s foreign policy won’t change with this new government, but there is an opportunity to change the narrative and to re-invest in the United Kingdom’s soft power. After the bruising it’s taken in recent months, this will be an important long-term priority for Sunak’s government.

—Livia Godaert is a nonresident fellow at the Europe Center.

Sunak’s financial realism will collide with Brexit realities

Rishi Sunak is now set to become the United Kingdom’s third prime minister this year. But the five-day campaign that saw him shrug off challenges from former Prime Minister Boris Johnson and rival Conservative MP Penny Mordaunt revealed nothing new in terms of policy.

The mantra is stability—and that means sticking to the financial policy reversals announced by Chancellor of the Exchequer Jeremy Hunt seven days ago and, almost certainly, keeping Hunt himself on as chancellor in order to reassure the markets.

But beyond that, there is no indication how Sunak—who was himself chancellor until his July 5 resignation forced the collapse of the Johnson premiership—will switch from being the free-spending, debt-incurring figure who poured vast sums of cash into the British economy (to help get the country through the COVID-19 crisis) to a prime minister who now has to find savings after savings (or impose tax after tax) in order to balance the books.

He also faces a distinct problem in that there is increasing public debate concerning the damage that Brexit has done to the UK economy and the failure of Conservative governments to deliver anything that resembles what they call taking advantage of the benefits of Brexit.

Sunak is certainly an economic and financial realist, but his ability to maneuver to improve trade relations with Europe is strictly limited by a substantial wing of the Conservative Party that objects to anything other than a pure and total Brexit.

An early test may even come on Tuesday, when an omnibus bill to remove continued UK acceptance of European Union (EU) regulations—the retained EU law (revocation and reform) bill—is debated in Parliament. This bill would essentially reverse 2,400 laws passed in compliance with EU regulations covering a mass of subjects such as workers’ rights, aircraft safety standards, trafficking in illegal weapons, guaranteed access to free television showings of major sporting events like the Olympics, and wildlife habitat protection.

The UK business community is by and large horrified at the prospect of the chaos that dropping all these laws will mean. Canceling the bill would obviously improve Britain’s trade prospects with the EU, but the hard-line right wing of the Conservative Party would block any such effort.

—John M. Roberts is a nonresident senior fellow with the Global Energy Center and senior partner with energy consultancy Methinks Ltd.

Sunak’s ascent shows that times are changing. But will his premiership do so too?

Rishi Sunak won the contest to become the leader of the UK Conservative Party, the ruling party, and therefore he is set to become the first British prime minister who is Asian and a person of color. Sunak’s roots underscore the continued legacies of the Empire for modern British society: His parents of Indian descent migrated to the United Kingdom from East Africa in the 1960s. While internationally this might seem somewhat a momentous event because a leader of color is going to preside over what was once the seat of Winston Churchill, domestically the Asian and minority ethnic groups have a more complicated relationship with leaders such as Sunak. His politics and leadership are likely to be defined more by his extremely privileged upbringing in Britain—and the collective wealth he enjoys with his wife—than by any presumed solidarity on the basis of his ethnic background. Sunak is considered the wealthiest politician in Britain who has worked for major investment firms in the corporate sector and later for a right-leaning think tank.

The rise of politicians of color in the United Kingdom in recent years—both within the cabinet and outside—has had no tangible impact on alleviating the challenges facing ethnic minority groups in Britain, whether these challenges have been in the realms of socioeconomics, health, or societal relations. From Sadiq Khan, the current mayor of London; to Priti Patel, formerly home secretary; Nadhim Zahawi, currently the minister for intergovernmental relations and minister for equalities; Suella Braverman, formerly home secretary and the attorney general for England and Wales; and Kwasi Kwarteng, the former chancellor of the exchequer, it is difficult to measure the significance of their rise beyond progressive optics for the respective political parties in which they serve.

More importantly, Sunak is taking the helm at a historically challenging period for the British economy and the lack of trust in the political class. He is likely to dedicate considerable energy to party politics and rallying his Conservative colleagues at a time when the party is faring badly in the opinion polls and is most likely to lose a general election if held imminently. His ascent to power as the first British prime minister who is not white is certainly an indication of changing times, but we will have to wait and see if this symbolic representation will have any real impact on the dominant attitudes and dynamics around race in modern Britain.

—Hameed Hakimi is a nonresident senior fellow at the South Asia Center.

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Winning the peace through democratic progress in post-war Ukraine

Peter Erben, Gio Kobakhidze — Wed, 19 Oct 2022 17:02:12 +0000

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, punctuated recently by Ukrainian advances and Russian drone attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure far beyond the front lines, is not only a criminal assault against a sovereign country, but against democracy everywhere. Ukraine is unfortunately no stranger to Russian aggression and occupation, but this has not stopped the nation from moving closer to the European family of democracies.

Ukraine has long been an example for democratic progress in the wider region. This is perhaps Vladimir Putin’s greatest fear, lest the autocrat’s own misruled people notice the consolidation of Ukrainian democracy and seek similar change inside Russia itself. As Ukraine’s armed forces continue to liberate the country, it is critical that Ukraine’s military success is buttressed by continued democratic progress.

The legacy of the current war will be determined by Ukraine’s and the international community’s ability to honor the sacrifices of those Ukrainians killed in the war by accelerating the nation’s democratic development. Post-war democratic progress must be multifaceted and include further advances on decentralization, political pluralism, freedom of the press, adherence to the rule of law, anti-corruption, human rights, and democratic elections. These efforts will be key to realizing Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions and maintaining international support for critical economic and military assistance.

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Ukraine has rarely been out of the news in recent years, but the headlines seldom show that the country has made significant democratic strides since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. This was a watershed moment that drove Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych from power for his turn away from Ukraine’s European, democratic path.

Ukrainian democracy has advanced amid occupation and continued aggression by an authoritarian neighbor who fears that Ukraine’s progress will serve as a catalyst for similar demands inside Russia. Vladimir Putin sees democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and legitimate elections on his borders as existential threats to his own personal survival. Ukraine has come to embody all of these threats.

While Ukraine’s post-war democratic recovery and progress must indeed be multifaceted, one aspect will need particular attention: post-war elections. Competitive and honest elections are essential to democracies. For some nations, they are a means to a democratic transition. For others, they are a bellwether for the health of long-standing democratic traditions, systems, and institutions.

Ukraine’s most recent transitions of power, namely the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2019 and local elections in 2020, were regarded by international observation missions as demonstrating significant progress. Moreover, these elections and the electoral reforms that preceded them were recognized by the European Parliament, Freedom House, and the annual Democracy Index produced by The Economist as core indicators of the nation’s advancement. These achievements in political pluralism further enhanced Ukraine’s standing as an example of what is possible for the region and beyond.

While Ukraine should be commended, continued vigilance is essential to ensure that the nation can sustain and even expand its success after the war. Safeguarding, institutionalizing, and expanding Ukraine’s electoral progress is pivotal to realizing the nation’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions, and is a foundational prerequisite for all other democratic reforms. Progress in this area will strengthen international confidence in Ukraine and prove that democracy is sustainable even in wartime and during the post-war recovery period.

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Ukraine must not only win the war, but also win the peace. The integrity of its post-war elections will be closely watched for a range of performance indicators such as whether lawmakers advance pending electoral reforms in a timely and inclusive manner. These reforms include enhancements to the unified election code, a new political party law, and restoration of political party financial reporting, a key condition that previously led to Ukraine-EU visa liberalization.

Attention will also be paid to the level of transparency and timeliness around transitions from military to civil administrations throughout Ukraine, and the development of a mechanism along with clear and objective criteria for canceling elections due to security concerns. Likewise, it will be crucial to make sure any restrictions on individuals and groups running in elections and joining election commissions are reasonable, objective, and timely.

Post-war Ukraine must maintain the positive progress achieved following the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. This includes guaranteeing stability within the country’s independent electoral institutions and making sure the election management body is able to complete its full term. New election technologies must prioritize integrity and security, while the enfranchisement of Ukraine’s internally and externally displaced communities will also be important.

Ukraine faces a torrent of elections in the post-war period. The road ahead will be arduous, but Ukraine must not go it alone. Ukraine has reminded the free world of who we are and what we believe in. It has also reminded us of what we must fight for and what we must fight against. To achieve an even stronger Europe based on the rule of law, human rights, and democratic values, Ukraine’s partners must redouble support not only for Ukraine’s military goals, but also its democratic ambitions. This increased support must happen now in order to lay strong foundations for continued democratic progress after victory.

Opinion polls indicate that most Ukrainians share this sentiment and understand victory to mean the return of all occupied territories. In a June 2022 survey conducted by IRI, two-thirds of Ukrainians supported the liberation of eastern and southern Ukraine including Crimea. These poll results identified only minor regional differences ranging from 64% in the west and 67% in the south to 59% in the east. Meanwhile, just 5% of Ukrainians would be prepared to recognize Crimea as Russia and 2% would accept Moscow’s attempts to annex eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.

Ukraine’s complete liberation remains an ambitious goal but it is no longer confined to the realms of fantasy. Following a string of stunning counteroffensive advances in September and October, many now believe Ukraine could push Russia back to the front lines of February 24 by the end of this year and return the rest of the country to Ukrainian control by the middle of 2023.

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Vladimir Putin would be highly unlikely to survive the humiliation of a decisive Ukrainian victory. While it is impossible to predict exactly how his reign might end, it is equally hard to imagine the strongman Russian ruler surviving such a disastrous defeat. This is particularly true as the war is widely perceived within Russia as Putin’s personal project.

We can already say with some confidence that if Putin is ousted, his successor will not be a democrat. Modern Russia has no credible national democratic movement and lacks the pluralistic political traditions that made it possible for democracy to take root in post-Soviet Ukraine and the Baltic states. Given the political climate in Russia, any successor would almost certainly be a nationalist figure from within the ranks of the current elite. However, he (and yes, it would inevitably be a “he”) would probably be more pragmatic and therefore less prone to ranting about Ukraine.

In order to escape war guilt and bring sanctions to an end, he would seek to blame everything on Putin. This could help secure breathing space to repair Russia’s battered economy and armed forces. It would also give Ukraine some time to embark on a massive post-war reconstruction drive. At the same time, numerous major obstacles to a sustainable peace settlement would remain.

One of the most immediate challenges of the post-war period will be the quest for justice. In practice, this will mean attempting to charge the leaders of a nuclear power with war crimes. No successor regime will hand over Putin or any other senior Russian officials to an international tribunal, so it is reasonable to assume that war crimes prosecutions would have to take place in absentia. Nevertheless, it is vital for those guilty of war crimes to be held publicly accountable. Defendants should include a wide range of Russian politicians and military commanders along with the many regime propagandists who have provided the ideological foundations for Putin’s genocidal invasion.

Another urgent question will be how to make Russia pay for Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction. The obvious answer is to use the frozen Russian assets currently held by various Western nations. Work is already underway to create a legal framework for the reallocation of these frozen Russian assets, but this process could take years and will be fiercely contested by the Kremlin.

War crimes prosecutions and reparations can help undermine the sense of impunity within Russian society that helped make the current invasion possible. While most available evidence confirms overwhelming Russian public support for the war in Ukraine, Russia’s most respected independent pollster, the Levada Center, has found that a clear majority of Russians do not believe they are morally responsible for the deaths of Ukrainian civilians or the widespread destruction taking place in Ukraine.

Such attitudes are hardly surprising in an authoritarian society where nobody has ever been held accountable for the horrors of the Soviet era. Nevertheless, it is in everybody’s interests to end this cycle of impunity and encourage Russians to confront the crimes being committed in their name.

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Whatever form Ukrainian victory takes, it will not mark the end of the historic confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. Today’s war is part of a grim saga stretching back centuries that is rooted in Russia’s refusal to recognize Ukraine’s right to exist.

Putin himself has frequently claimed that modern Ukrainians are really Russians (“one people”) and has accused Ukraine of being an artificial “anti-Russia” that poses an existential threat to Russian statehood and cannot therefore be tolerated. This genocidal logic is widely embraced in today’s Russia and will not disappear overnight. In reality, it may take decades before a majority of Russians are finally able to accept that Ukraine is a separate and fully independent nation.

Any leader of a post-Putin Russia would almost certainly continue to regard Ukraine as a threat. While they may not necessarily share Putin’s highly emotional obsession with the country, they would likely view Ukraine’s consolidation as a European democracy as a potential catalyst for democratic change inside Russia. In order to prevent this nightmare scenario, they would seek to undermine Ukraine’s economic recovery and derail the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration.

In public at least, Russia’s new leaders could be expected to declare their commitment to peaceful coexistence with Ukraine. However, such politically convenient rhetoric would not stop them from continuing to wage a hybrid war against the country. This could include everything from cyber warfare and terrorist attacks to political assassinations, disinformation operations, infrastructure sabotage, and the funding of pro-Russian networks throughout Ukraine. It would only be a matter of time before Ukraine faced a renewed Russian military threat.

In order to prevent another Russian invasion, Ukraine must transform itself and become a European Israel. Ukraine’s defense spending was already in the region of 4-5% of GDP prior to the onset of the current full-scale invasion. This must remain the norm for the foreseeable future. Likewise, the international security support that Ukraine has received since February must continue beyond the end of the current hostilities. It is vital that the Ukrainian military maintain its technological and organizational edge over the Soviet-style Russian army. Ultimately, this is the only security guarantee that matters.

Ukraine’s leaders appear increasingly confident of victory but they are also under no illusions regarding the future of relations with Russia, regardless of who sits in the Kremlin. “Knowing what I know first-hand about the Russians, our victory will not be final,” Ukrainian commander-in-chief Valeriy Zaluzhny told TIME magazine in September. “Our victory will be an opportunity to take a breath and prepare for the next war.”

The current war is merely the latest chapter in Europe’s longest independence struggle. This struggle will only end when Russia finally accepts that Ukraine is a sovereign country and Ukrainians are not Russians.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the forthcoming book “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

In the early days of the Russian invasion, President Zelenskyy signaled his intention to defy the Kremlin by officially applying for EU membership. This was an important gesture that helped to frame the war as a fight for independence against a resurgent Russia that refused to accept Ukraine’s departure from the Kremlin orbit.

While Moscow sought to crush Ukrainian statehood and reverse the verdict of 1991, Ukraine’s European aspirations symbolized the country’s resistance to Russian authoritarianism. This helped focus the minds of politicians across the continent. In June, Ukraine was duly granted official EU candidate nation status.

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The intensification of Ukraine’s relationship with the EU has reshaped the wider geopolitical landscape in a number of ways. For example, with Ukraine and Moldova now both recognized as EU candidate nations, the existing Eastern Partnership format comprising Ukraine and Moldova together with Georgia, Belarus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan no longer makes sense. As a result, Brussels is in the process of rethinking the EU’s entire Neighborhood Policy for the region.

The changes currently taking place create the potential for a more stable European neighborhood in the post-war period. This would be welcomed in both Brussels and Washington DC. Ukraine’s former position in the geopolitical gray zone on Europe’s eastern flank left it vulnerable to Russian imperial interference and made the country a constant source of instability. Clarifying Ukraine’s status as a member of the Western world is in EU and US interests. In addition to reducing the scope for future Russian aggression, a fully integrated Ukraine can make a meaningful contribution to the EU’s own security and defense policy.

The EU and US also share common goals when it comes to the reform agenda in Ukraine. Both seek to strengthen the rule of law and establish capable Ukrainian institutions while consolidating the country’s democracy. US support for Ukraine’s further EU integration can serve as a powerful engine for these reforms.

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The reforms anticipated by the EU and US are very much in line with the vision of a European future embraced by the vast majority of Ukrainians. Polls conducted since the start of the Russian invasion consistently show overwhelming Ukrainian public support for European integration and EU membership. This creates historic opportunities for change that can be seized with the help of Ukraine’s Western partners.

The United States can support Ukraine’s European integration by cooperating closely with the EU to develop joint policies toward Ukrainian reforms that provide consistency and avoid any overlaps or loopholes. This approach should include a range of incentives and potential costs that will help keep reform efforts on track and prevent backsliding.

US officials can also play an important advocacy role in Europe promoting the benefits of closer cooperation with Ukraine. While the war unleashed by Vladimir Putin has transformed perceptions of Ukraine and its place in Europe, there remains significant skepticism within the EU on the issue of Ukrainian integration. The United States can help shape this evolving debate by emphasizing the advantages of an integrated Ukraine for transatlantic ties and European security.

As Ukraine seeks to move from candidate country status to EU member state, it may also make sense for the United States to tailor financial and technical aid in order to enhance this process and aid integration. Likewise, monitoring policies can also focus on the reform road map developed to bring the country closer to EU standards. This approach would bring welcome clarity to the role of Ukraine’s international partners in the country’s reform process.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is by far the greatest threat to Europe since the end of the Cold War. Unless Vladimir Putin is decisively defeated, the consequences for European security will be grave. However, if Ukraine is able to secure a military victory, it could pave the way for a new era of European stability and prosperity. This is clearly in the interests of all EU member states, and it is also an attractive prospect for the United States.

Dmytro Lyvch is an advisor to the Prime Minister of Ukraine, Chair of EasyBusiness NGO, and Co-Founder of the Centre for Economic Recovery. Yuliia Shaipova is a Ukrainian parliamentary advisor and Team Lead at the Centre for Economic Recovery.

Russia’s battlefield fortunes have continued to deteriorate ever since. Putin’s army was beaten in the Battle of Kyiv and forced to retreat entirely from northern Ukraine. The Ukrainian Armed Forces then fought his troops to a standstill in eastern Ukraine and have since achieved stunning counter-offensive successes on both the eastern and southern fronts. Moscow has suffered staggering losses including tens of thousands of soldiers and dozens of commanders. The once vaunted Russian military has become a laughing stock, its tanks towed away by Ukrainian tractors and its frequent retreats disguised as “goodwill gestures.”

This has taken a heavy toll on morale. Fleeing Russian troops have abandoned so many vehicles and arms depots that Moscow is now officially Ukraine’s main weapons supplier. With large numbers of Russian troops simply refusing to fight, Putin was recently forced to introduce draconian new penalties for deserters while also announcing Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. It not clear whether these desperate measures will enable Putin to stop the rot within his army. International sanctions make it difficult for Russia to replace the vast amounts of equipment lost or expended in Ukraine, while many question the military value is poorly trained and demoralized conscripts against the increasingly well-armed and superbly motivated Ukrainians.

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Putin’s woes are not limited to the battlefields of Ukraine. His rapidly unraveling invasion has also gravely undermined Russia’s international standing. Countries throughout Moscow’s traditional sphere of influence have been encouraged by the poor performance of the Russian military and are now openly defying the Kremlin.

Kazakhstan has sided with the West over the war and is at the same time drawing closer to China. In the southern Caucasus, Russia has been exposed as toothless amid a new flareup in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Baltic states have emerged as key champions of the Ukrainian cause and have imposed tough entry restrictions on all Russian citizens, while even Kremlin-dependent Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has resisted Russian pressure to join the invasion. At this stage, it looks like Ukraine will become the graveyard of Putin’s imperial ambitions.

The Russian dictator’s efforts to divide the West have also backfired. Transatlantic cooperation has been reinvigorated by the invasion of Ukraine, while Europe has responded to Moscow’s energy blackmail by slowly but surely moving to end its dependence on Russian oil and gas. Worst of all, NATO has expanded on Russia’s doorstep, with both Sweden and Finland abandoning decades of neutrality and applying for membership of the military alliance.

Even Putin’s traditional partners appear to be getting cold feet. The Chinese and Indian leaders have both recently expressed their concerns over the ongoing invasion of Ukraine, while only a handful of fellow pariah nations are currently prepared to stand with Russia during voting at the United Nations.

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Putin’s current plight is all the more striking as it is almost entirely self-inflicted. His well-documented obsession with Ukraine has clearly clouded his judgment and led him into a series of disastrous decisions that have undone the progress made during the early years of his reign. This obsession is rooted in Putin’s conviction that the emergence of a genuinely independent Ukraine is an historical aberration that poses an existential threat to Russia itself. Haunted by the Soviet collapse, he is convinced that the consolidation of a democratic and European Ukraine will act as a catalyst for the next chapter in Russia’s imperial retreat.

Despite his best efforts to contain the conflict within Ukraine, there are signs that instability is indeed coming to Putin’s Russia. For now, the Russian public is largely voting with its feet. An estimated 700,000 Russians fled the country in the first two weeks following the announcement of mobilization. However, there are also indications of a mounting protest mood, particularly in poorer regions such as Dagestan where ethnic minorities have already suffered disproportionate losses during the first seven months of the invasion.

More worryingly for Putin, there is growing evidence of infighting among the Kremlin elite. In recent days, key regime loyalists such as Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and the founder of the mercenary Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, have launched highly unusual public attacks on Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and the Russian military commanders leading the Ukraine invasion.

This rising tide of discontent is also evident on Russian state television. The carefully choreographed political talk shows that dominate Russia’s mainstream media are widely viewed as a barometer of the mood within the Kremlin. For months, the regime’s favorite propagandists remained upbeat about the war. However, the tone has become noticably darker in recent weeks following Russia’s bruising defeats in the Kharkiv and Kherson sectors. At present, the critics are focusing their fire on the military. However, if Moscow’s battlefield losses continue to mount, it is surely only a matter of time before the Russian public acknowledges that the problem is Putin himself.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

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Many veteran Kremlin observers commented that this was comfortably the most vitriolic public attack on the West ever delivered by the Russian leader. “I’ve watched a lot of Putin speeches over the last 10-15 years and this is the most anti-US one by a really long way,” tweeted Financial Times Moscow bureau chief Max Seddon.

Putin’s decision to focus his annexation address on the alleged injustices of modern Western imperialism was in part motivated by a desire to distract domestic attention away from Russia’s embarrassing battlefield defeats in Ukraine and place the war in a broader geopolitical context. But it also aimed to position Russia at the forefront of a new global coalition of anti-Western forces. At one point in his speech, the Russian leader spoke specifically of ending US hegemony through an “anti-colonial movement” to be led by Moscow.

This emphasis on anti-imperialism reflects Russia’s broader geopolitical realignment as the Kremlin comes to terms with the fallout from the disastrous invasion of Ukraine. Moscow now appears to recognize that there is little chance of repairing relations with Europe or the US. Instead, Russia will seek to mobilize global anti-Western sentiment and play the role of counter-weight to Western dominance in the international area.

It is far from clear whether this gambit will be successful. At present, few countries from the developing world seem ready to align themselves with Russia. Judging by voting habits at the United Nations, only a handful of global pariahs such as Syria and North Korea are currently prepared to side with the Kremlin. Meanwhile, both China and India have signaled in recent weeks that they are far from happy with the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

Nor are Putin’s anti-imperial credentials particularly convincing. While he has tried to blame the war in Ukraine on everything from NATO expansion to imaginary Ukrainian Nazis, it is now painfully obvious that the invasion is actually an old-fashioned war of imperial aggression. Putin himself admitted as much in summer 2022 when he compared the invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great. His decision to annex approximately 15% of Ukraine now removes any lingering doubts.

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Today’s speech should cure Western policymakers of any illusions regarding the possibility of a pragmatic relationship with Russia as long as Vladimir Putin remains in the Kremlin. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has already drawn the necessary conclusions and declared that there will be no more negotiations with Putin. Given the gravity of the situation, similar clarity from other Western leaders is now urgently needed. Putin has effectively declared war not only on the West but on the entire rules-based system of international relations. He is attempting to redraw the map of Europe by force and is holding the world hostage with the thinly-veiled threat of nuclear apocalypse.

It is crucial that the democratic world stands up to Russia’s nuclear blackmail. Failure to do so will have potentially catastrophic consequences for international security. Putin would be emboldened to repeat his nuclear ultimatums against new victims throughout the former Soviet Empire, while countries across the globe would soon scramble to protect themselves from this new reality by acquiring nuclear arsenals of their own. Decades of nuclear nonproliferation efforts would collapse and give way to a perilous new era of international instability.

Putin is not escalating from a position of strength. His fake referendums, absurd annexations, nuclear threats, and anti-Western rants all point to the fact that he is losing the war in Ukraine. This desperation makes him more dangerous than ever. The West must respond by demonstrating unwavering unity and resolve. This means tougher sanctions against Russia and accelerated military support for Ukraine. Today’s events make clear that Putin can no longer be reasoned with. He can only be defeated.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

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The West should not fear the prospect of a post-Putin Russia

Richard D. Hooker, Jr. — Mon, 26 Sep 2022 23:07:45 +0000

As the Ukrainian army continues to liberate land from Russian occupation, a new narrative is beginning to take hold. It argues that a Ukrainian victory may drive Vladimir Putin from power, and that a post-Putin Russia will be even worse. Projections for this future Russia run from a more Stalinist successor to civil war and the collapse of the Russian Federation itself.

Fears over the consequences of a Russian defeat are fueling support for the idea that we must not humiliate Putin and should instead seek to end the war via a negotiated settlement. There are many adherents to this approach at the highest levels of NATO. Such a settlement would, of course, leave Putin in possession of at least some Ukrainian territory, despite defeats and reverses on the battlefield. Paradoxically, Putin could lose and still win.

In fact, the most dire scenarios for a post-Putin Russia are not the most likely. Should Putin fall, whoever follows him would be forced to consider some hard realities.

A comprehensive defeat in Ukraine would argue strongly against continued revanchism and aggression by any successor, especially when such actions precipitated Putin’s downfall. Meanwhile, economic distress would prevent the rearming of the depleted and demoralized Russian military. With a GDP one-twentieth the size of NATO’s, Russia does not possess the resources to continue endlessly confronting the West.

Reaching out for help from China, Iran, or North Korea is also unlikely to help Putin’s successor. Iran and North Korea are economic lightweights whose defense sectors are a generation or more behind the West.

China has a long and difficult history with Russia in the Far East and, over the long term, is a much greater threat to Russian interests. Siberia is both thinly populated and endowed with enormous energy, timber, and mineral resources. China has long cast a covetous eye toward the region. Beijing is well aware that Moscow’s ability to defend its enormous borders is minimal, and that encouraging Russian dependence on Chinese economic and military assistance will lead to Chinese dominance and control.

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For any successor regime, sanctions relief and reestablishing a sound economy based on energy sales and commodities exports will be a top priority, not more war and crisis. Putin’s extraordinary aggression is driving Europe away from Russian energy and toward alternate sources, killing the golden goose that enabled Russia to escape from the economic weakness of the 1990s. Russia’s economic future lies in closer integration with the West and the international community, not deeper isolation. However attractive it may be to autocrats, the North Korean model will not appeal to the Russian people.

Inside Russia’s power vertical, elites will wish to move away from an environment where fear of imprisonment or assassination has become the rule. If Putin is removed from power, self-preservation on the part of Russia’s oligarchs, generals, and senior functionaries will be a primary driver. Few will want to return to an environment of fear and distrust. Any new leadership will be mindful of the reasons behind Putin’s fall and will likely take heed. Just as the Politburo moved to end the terror following Stalin’s death, a return to normalcy and stability will likely be a high priority in a post-Putin environment.

Because there is no obvious mechanism for a peaceful transition of power, there is potential for a power vacuum to develop in the event of Putin’s ouster. Russian leaders will certainly want to avoid state collapse or dismemberment, as happened after the fall of the Soviet Union. This argues for more power-sharing and a more balanced approach to government where ministries, courts, and parliament can check the tendency towards absolutism.

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While true Western-style democracy may not emerge in the short term, some liberalization would be likely in a post-Putin Russia. Even following a failed campaign in Ukraine, Russia enjoys numerous real advantages. There are no direct threats to Russian territory or sovereignty, while the country has a powerful nuclear arsenal, a huge land area with vast natural resources, an educated and enterprising population, and a strong and intact culture. Western leaders will be eager to embrace a reformed Russia posing no threat to its neighbors. Sensible Russian leaders will recognize and want to leverage these opportunities.

The emerging generation of Russians will also have a voice in a new Russia. Though effectively controlled and even repressed by Putin, many younger Russians are aware of the outside world, do not support the war in Ukraine, and want a more open and prosperous life. Social media provides a platform to organize and give voice to this generation that the state can only suppress with difficulty.

There is currently a tendency to see Russia and Russians as irredeemable. And there is clearly a strain in Russian history and culture that suggests imperialism and expansionism are embedded in the national DNA. But many states (Japan, Germany, South Korea, Spain, Portugal, and Greece all come to mind) have managed to throw off militarism and autocracy.

We should be careful to guard against the assumption that Putin’s successor will inevitably be worse than Putin himself. That logic drives us into the “don’t humiliate Putin” camp, which is shorthand for “don’t let Ukraine win.” That can’t be good for Ukraine, the West, or the wider world.

Richard D. Hooker Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. He previously served as Dean of the NATO Defense College and as Special Assistant to the US President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia with the National Security Council.

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Ukraine’s wartime diplomacy has already delivered numerous significant results. These include securing the largest military support for any ally since World War II, along with unprecedented sanctions against Russia and other measures to increase Moscow’s international isolation. With the war now in its eighth month, the broad alliance of international partnerships created and nurtured by Ukrainian diplomats shows no signs of weakening.

What has Ukrainian diplomacy been doing differently in support of the country’s strategic interests? Based on personal interaction with and observation of Ukrainian diplomats at work, several aspects of Ukraine’s new diplomacy are noteworthy.

One key feature is empowerment. I first met Dmytro Kuleba when he was an advisor to the Ukrainian President a few years before his 2020 appointment as the country’s Foreign Minister. At the time, he gave the impression of a thoroughly modern person. It was also clear that Kuleba feels entirely at home as a manager of issues, relationships, and teams. In concert with Ukraine’s Defense Ministry, he appears to be providing explicit direction to Ukraine’s diplomats in the form of specific, country-based military support goals. This approach is combined with an expectation of proactivity on the part of individual ambassadors.

Thirty years after Ukraine’s independence, Kuleba is presiding over the final dismantling of the inherited Soviet diplomatic corps, which was notoriously clunky, bureaucratic, and sometimes truly under-skilled. Amid the pressure and pace of a full-blown war, a new organizational culture is emerging at the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that includes self-belief, positivity, and an emphasis on initiative.

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Savvy communication is at the heart of Ukraine’s diplomatic progress. As part of their empowerment, Ukraine’s current generation of diplomats have strong license to communicate. Ministry officials in Kyiv and Ukrainian ambassadors around the world are now routinely using a wide array of contemporary channels including social media, traditional mass media, stakeholder relations, and cultural ties in order to build Ukraine’s image and articulate the country’s wartime needs. The innovative and often unorthodox use of social media by Ukrainian officials has won particular praise.

Ukraine’s clever communication is very sensitive to the cultural norms and expectations of individual audiences. Ukrainian Ambassador to Australia Vasyl Myroshnychenko noted recently that media skills are now central to successful diplomacy. “The impact of the full-scale Russian invasion on Ukraine’s diplomacy can be compared to the influence of COVID-19 on digital transformation,” he commented. “One of the key changes has been in the communications sphere. The ability of our ambassadors to provide compelling arguments for why a host nation should support Ukraine has played an important role in rallying military assistance. Being media savvy and fully proficient in the local language is no longer just an advantage. It is a must at times of war.”

Ukraine’s diplomatic engagement with partner governments and international audiences is particularly important in terms of the struggle against Russian disinformation. While Russian embassies often serve as hubs for anti-Ukrainian fakes and efforts to weaken Western unity, Ukraine’s diplomatic corps has framed its communication as accessible, reasonable, fact-based, and engagingly human. Today’s Ukrainian diplomats are not afraid to demonstrate a sense of humor or employ pop culture references in ways that would have shocked their stuffy Soviet predecessors.

This positive framing of Ukraine, Ukrainians, and their future is attractive and encourages international audiences to engage. Modern communications studies consistently show that how you communicate, especially in terms of tonality and timing, is as important as the actual message you are communicating. This is a lesson Ukrainian diplomats have clearly learned.

Ukraine’s wartime embrace of public diplomacy has been particularly striking. The country’s diplomats are now regularly in newspapers, on TV, at conferences, and in corporate boardrooms articulating their country’s needs and making the case for further support. This approach is designed to reach not only political partners, policy experts, and diplomatic representatives, but also the general public. Ukraine’s emphasis of public diplomacy reflects an awareness that public opinion in democracies is critical to maintaining policy support.

The success of Ukraine’s wartime diplomacy is rooted in the same progressive values that are helping the country to advance on the battlefield and as a young democracy. These values reflect a nation that feels increasingly at ease with itself and confident of its position as part of the wider democratic world. Ukrainian diplomats are winning because they have a winning story to tell and the skills to do so effectively. Their progress mirrors Ukraine’s historic coming of age over the past seven months and captures the spirit of a country that is finally finding its voice on the international stage.

Pete Shmigel is an Australian writer with a background in politics, mental health, and Ukrainian issues.

Atlantic Council — Sat, 10 Sep 2022 15:58:00 +0000

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#BritainDebrief – What did Gorbachev believe? | A Debrief from Dr. Vladislav Zubok

Ben Judah — Fri, 09 Sep 2022 22:34:52 +0000

What did Gorbachev believe?

Following Gorbachev’s passing, Senior Fellow Ben Judah spoke with Vladislav Zubok, Professor of International History at LSE and author of Collapse, on how Gorbachev saw Lenin, Europe and Ukraine. Did Gorbachev look to Lenin for inspiration? Was the Soviet collapse inevitable because Gorbachev was simply too naïve about economic management? What did Gorbachev feel about Ukraine and Putin’s foreign policy towards Kyiv?

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There can be no compromise between Russian genocide and Ukrainian freedom

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 08 Sep 2022 21:41:41 +0000

Ever since Vladimir Putin’s troops first crossed the Ukrainian border on February 24, there has been no shortage of Western commentators seeking to explain why Ukraine really has no choice but to offer Russia land in exchange for peace. Despite a series of Ukrainian military successes and mounting evidence that the Russian invasion has run out of steam, calls for a compromise peace continue.

The self-styled foreign policy realists behind these calls tend to overlook the fact that the land they are so eager to give away is actually home to millions of Ukrainians who would face a desperately bleak future under Russia’s genocidal occupation. Such arguments reflect a fundamental failure to grasp the unrepentant imperialism at the heart of modern Russian identity and the genocidal objectives underpinning the invasion of Ukraine.

Many in the realist camp remain convinced that the roots of the current conflict lie in NATO enlargement and Western encroachment into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. They typically approach today’s war as a wholly rational geopolitical dispute and insist that Putin’s actions, however brutal, are a more or less inevitable response to the West’s own provocative policies in the decades following the Soviet collapse.

This Kremlin-friendly narrative has never really stood up to serious scrutiny. After all, even the most rabid of Russian propagandists recognizes that the entire notion of a NATO attack on Russia is pure fantasy. Even if NATO did genuinely harbor plans to invade Russia, why would they not simply use the Baltic states, which offer the same geographical proximity as Ukraine and have been members of the alliance for almost two decades?

The events of the past six months have further undermined the credibility of Moscow’s NATO mythology. Senior Kremlin officials now freely acknowledge that the current Russian invasion would continue even if Ukraine were to rule out NATO membership altogether and officially embrace neutrality, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has suggested.

Meanwhile, Russia has accepted neighboring Finland’s recent decision to join NATO with barely a murmur. This meek response to the fast-tracked Finnish membership bid has made a complete mockery of the Kremlin’s earlier protestations over the unacceptability of a growing NATO presence on Russia’s borders.

In reality, of course, Putin understands perfectly well that NATO poses no security threat to Russia. He has simply used the issue to his advantage. The Russian dictator has exploited lingering Western divisions over the wisdom of the alliance’s post-1991 enlargement as a convenient way of disguising and legitimizing his own historic mission to destroy independent Ukraine.

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Putin is the latest in a long line of Russian rulers who have sought to eradicate Ukrainian identity and wipe Ukraine off the European map. This dark history provides essential context for anyone wishing to make sense of today’s war. Indeed, the current invasion is the latest link in an unbroken chain of imperial oppression stretching back for more than three hundred years.

For centuries, successive Russian regimes ruthlessly suppressed Ukraine’s independence aspirations while imposing wave upon wave of russification. Generations of Ukrainians were robbed of their past and banned from using their own language. The nadir was reached in the earlier 1930s when millions were starved to death in a genocidal famine engineered by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin to eradicate Ukrainian national identity in its rural heartlands.

While Ukraine officially achieved independence in 1991, Russia never came to terms with this separation. Instead, Moscow sought to keep independent Ukraine firmly within the Kremlin orbit and viewed Ukrainian efforts to embrace a democratic European future as an existential threat to authoritarian Russia that must be prevented at almost any cost.

Throughout his reign, the need to either control or crush Ukraine has dominated Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy thinking. His pivot from early cooperation with the West to Cold War-style confrontation came about as a direct response to Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution. Ten years later when millions of Ukrainians took to the streets once again in defense of their European choice and fledgling democracy, Putin went one step further and ordered his military to intervene. The 2014 seizure of Crimea and occupation of eastern Ukraine set the stage for this year’s full-scale invasion and illustrated Putin’s readiness to make remarkable sacrifices in order to resolve the Ukrainian question.

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While advocates of appeasement may well be genuinely unaware of Russia’s true intentions, Ukrainians are under no such illusions. They are painfully familiar with Russia’s deeply entrenched culture of denial regarding their country’s right to exist. They also noted how Russian rhetoric toward Ukraine grew increasingly radical in the months leading up to the invasion. Putin himself published an unhinged 5,000-word historical essay in July 2021 that many likened to a declaration of war on Ukrainian statehood.

As the outbreak of hostilities drew closer, Putin’s obsession with the destruction of Ukraine became increasingly obvious. He proclaimed Ukraine an inalienable part of Russia’s own history, culture, and spiritual space, while at the same time denouncing the present Ukrainian state as an illegitimate “anti-Russia” that could no longer be tolerated.

During the first six months of the invasion, Russia’s genocidal intentions have become even more explicit. Regime officials have routinely questioned Ukraine’s continued existence, while debates over the desirability of genocide in Ukraine has become an everyday feature of Kremlin-controlled Russian TV. Meanwhile, state media has helpfully clarified that Putin’s promised “de-Nazification” actually means the “de-Ukrainianization” of Ukraine.

These chilling words have been more than matched by deeds. The advancing Russian army has employed massive artillery bombardments to destroy entire Ukrainian towns and cities along with their civilian populations. Tens of thousands are believed to have been killed in Mariupol alone as Russian forces methodically destroyed the Ukrainian seaside city.

In regions under Russian occupation, Putin’s troops have systematically engaged in mass murder. Groups of victims have repeatedly been found in liberated areas with hands bound and showing signs of torture. Millions of Ukrainian civilians have been forcibly deported to Russia, including thousands of children. Those left behind are subject to terror tactics including abductions and hostage-taking. The Ukrainian language has been removed from every aspect of public life, while parents who refuse to subject their children to Russian indoctrination have been warned that they risk losing custody.

Given openness of Russia’s plans to extinguish the Ukrainian nation, it is hardly surprising that an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians firmly oppose any kind of land-for-peace deal with the Kremlin. They recognize that a negotiated settlement which cedes parts of Ukraine to Russian control would condemn the residents of those regions to genocide while paving the way for the next Russian invasion once Putin’s battered military regroups and rearms. Rather than accepting this dismal fate, there is a determination to continue fighting until a decisive victory can be secured. Faced with the destruction of their nation, most Ukrainians believe they have no other choice.

Media portrayals of the war in Ukraine often depict it as a struggle between Russia and the West but this geopolitical framing is misleading. What we are currently witnessing is actually the latest chapter in Europe’s longest independence struggle. As long ago as 1731, French thinker Voltaire was moved to write, “Ukraine has always aspired to be free.” This epic journey may now be entering its final stages.

Thanks to the remarkable courage and resilience demonstrated over the past six months, the Ukrainian nation is currently closer to securing true freedom than at any time in its long and troubled history. It is vital that the democratic world now remains united behind Ukraine as the war enters what is likely to be a decisive period. There should be no more talk of concessions or compromises. Partial genocide is not an option. Instead, the only way to achieve a lasting peace is by helping Ukraine to win the war.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 05 Sep 2022 11:54:43 +0000

JUST IN

British Conservative Party members tapped Foreign Secretary Liz Truss to become the United Kingdom’s next prime minister today. But while she may be celebrating, Boris Johnson’s successor now confronts economic crises at home and an escalating diplomatic standoff with the European Union over the Irish border. As Truss maps out her priorities, our experts weigh in on what to expect from London under her leadership.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

Peter Westmacott (@PeterWestmacott): Distinguished ambassadorial fellow at the Europe Center and a former British ambassador to the United States
Ben Judah (@b_judah): Director of the Europe Center’s Transform Europe Initiative and veteran British journalist
James Batchik: Assistant director at the Europe Center
Livia Godaert (@liviagodaert): Nonresident fellow at the Europe Center

Domestic doldrums

Peter tells us that Truss seized victory by throwing “plenty of red meat”—such as a promise to cut taxes—at the largely white, affluent, anti-European Conservative base that elected her party leader. But she might soon find less room for political posturing: “There may be a more considered approach,” Peter says, once Truss starts dealing with her country’s high inflation and energy shortages “and finds that she needs friends abroad.”
A longtime political “chameleon,” Truss will likely “immediately shift her politics to fit the view from Downing Street, with talk of a $100 billion package to tackle the energy crisis,” Ben notes.
For Truss to succeed, Ben adds, she will need to end the chameleon act and commit to “fixing her name to big, precise policies and sticking to them to face the magnitude of the crisis” facing the country.

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All cool on the continent?

The European Union, James says, will be watching to “see which version of Liz Truss it will get.” She’s occupied both sides of the Brexit debate in her political career. And now, “as prime minister, she finds herself at a crossroads with Europe again.”
Truss has threatened to unilaterally withdraw from parts of the Northern Ireland Protocol, the post-Brexit agreement over the Irish border, with the EU preparing retaliation if she follows through on that threat. But James points out that as foreign secretary, Truss worked well with Europe on issues such as support for Ukraine.
When it comes to the EU, Truss “may tread a middle ground, hoping to park but not resolve the Northern Ireland issue, or lean in on confrontation to score points at home and within her party,” James tells us. “Until then, expect relations with Brussels to be uncertain.”
Adding to the uncertainty, Truss “made Britain’s allies wonder what’s coming” when she declined to say whether French President Emmanuel Macron was a friend or foe of the United Kingdom, Peter notes.

In for a pound

As for the country’s standing in the world, its Global Britain initiative appears to be wavering just eighteen months after launch, Livia tells us, as economic woes and political scandals “have unsurprisingly pulled focus inward.”
That means Truss’s foreign-policy vision will be focused on boosting the British economy, Livia predicts: “We are going to see a turn to economic diplomacy as the priority through the G7 and aggressive trade-partnership negotiations, as well as a re-think of the UK’s traditional partners on the world stage, continuing a process that began with Brexit.”
“While she is committed to NATO, Truss is far less enthusiastic about partaking in broader European political processes,” Livia adds.
On security, Peter points out Truss’s penchant for tough talk during the campaign: “She advises the Ukrainians not to give an inch to Vladimir Putin, while asserting that she will soon designate China a threat to UK national security.”
In addition to those external challenges, Truss will be trying to keep the union together as Northern Ireland and Scotland threaten to break away, Livia notes. “The United Kingdom has the potential to facilitate transformational policy change through collaboration—with tech regulation representing one underappreciated area—but its allies and friends will need to put in the work to keep the new prime minister’s attention.”

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Experts react: The United Kingdom has a new prime minister. What should the world expect from Liz Truss?

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 05 Sep 2022 11:53:30 +0000

On Monday, UK Foreign Secretary Liz Truss was selected as her country’s newest prime minister, after triumphing over former Chancellor of the Exchequer Rishi Sunak in a vote by some 160,000 members of the Conservative Party.

Truss takes over for Boris Johnson at a momentous time: War has come to Europe, inflation is battering the British economy, and the United Kingdom’s messy divorce from the European Union (EU) is dragging on with a dispute over the Irish border. How will Truss, who joined the Atlantic Council in March to deliver the 2022 Christopher J. Makins Lecture, balance these challenges and deal with allies and foes abroad? We reached out to experts from the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center for their thoughts.

Jump to an expert reaction:

Sir Peter Westmacott: Expect a shift from campaign-trail rhetoric to governing reality

Ben Judah: The time for shape-shifting is over

James Batchik: Which road will Truss take with Europe?

Allies and friends will need to keep the new prime minister’s attention

Less than eighteen months after the launch of “Global Britain,” it’s hard not to see it as a troubled initiative. Rising energy bills and inflation rates, a summer of heatwaves and heated disagreements with labor unions, and dramatic scandals turned domestic political crises have unsurprisingly pulled the country’s focus inward.

With the new prime minister decided after a tumultuous summer and contentious leadership race, we might expect that the premiership of Liz Truss will think both globally and locally. As foreign secretary, Truss spoke of a “network of liberty” that the United Kingdom was building with allies and like-minded partners. The network included many of the same priorities outlined in the Integrated Review last year: strategic trade and investment, economic security, tech leadership, and protection of freedom and democracy.

However, I predict that we’re headed for a UK foreign-policy shift: We are going to see a turn to economic diplomacy as the priority through the Group of Seven (G7) and aggressive trade-partnership negotiations, as well as a re-think of the United Kingdom’s traditional partners on the world stage, continuing a process that began with Brexit.

While she is committed to NATO, Truss is far less enthusiastic about partaking in broader European political processes, exemplified by her wish to scrap pieces of the Northern Ireland protocol and her apparent frustration with French President Emmanuel Macron. She has also been described as skeptical of the “special relationship” between the United States and the United Kingdom.

Ultimately, Truss sees the United Kingdom as first among partners rather than one of the pack and is seeking out international commitments that sustain this. The “Global Britain” exercise was meant to be an honest examination of the United Kingdom’s place in the world—where it can be an effective leader, where it can be a successful facilitator and force multiplier, and where it should act in support of other key actors. Truss instead seems to be committed to Britain as a leader in a host of areas, whether or not they are where the country is most effective: support for Ukraine now and in the future, countering Russia and China, etc. But with rising challenges to the union from Scotland, new political winds in Northern Ireland, and fraying bonds in the commonwealth, her focus will be pulled in many directions beyond the domestic cost-of-living crisis. The United Kingdom has the potential to facilitate transformational policy change through collaboration—with tech regulation representing one underappreciated area—but its allies and friends will need to put in the work to keep the new prime minister’s attention.

—Livia Godaert is a nonresident fellow at the Europe Center.

Expect a shift from campaign-trail rhetoric to governing reality

Just 0.3 percent of the British electorate choose the leader of the Conservative Party and thus—in this case—the next prime minister of the United Kingdom. To defeat her rivals, Liz Truss threw plenty of red meat at this unrepresentative, mainly white, male, southern, prosperous, aging, and anti-European sample of the electorate. This included commitments to cut taxes that have been widely criticized by economists (and some fellow Tories) and subsequently modified. She also made Britain’s allies wonder what’s coming by declining to say that she thought the president of France—the democratically elected (which she is not) head of state of Britain’s closest neighbor and ally—was a friend of the United Kingdom. She advises the Ukrainians not to give an inch to Vladimir Putin, while asserting that she will soon designate China a threat to UK national security.

But recent leadership contests within both the Labour and Conservative parties have shown that what appeals to the membership doesn’t necessarily appeal to the general public or win general elections. Truss has a record of rapidly shifting her positions—on the monarchy, Brexit, economic policy, sending troops to Ukraine, and much else—when the need arises, and she did not win as big as the polls had predicted. So although she can be expected to continue blaming the EU for Britain’s economic ills and the self-inflicted problems caused by Brexit, there may be a more considered approach once the new prime minister gets her feet under the desk of 10 Downing Street, has to deal with the very real crises bequeathed to her by her predecessor, Boris Johnson, and finds that she needs friends abroad.

—Sir Peter Westmacott is a distinguished ambassadorial fellow with the Europe Center and a former British ambassador to the United States, France, and Turkey.

The time for shape-shifting is over

Liz Truss has risen like a chameleon through British politics—always trying to please her direct audience. She took her first steps in politics as a student activist for the third-party Liberal Democrats, advocating the legalization of cannabis and the abolition of the monarchy when she was at Oxford University, when that was a crowd-pleaser. She then turned into a Conservative MP who pushed for Britain to remain in the European Union when pro-EU politicians ran the party, before morphing into a strident Brexiteer. To win the leadership of her party she has run explicitly as a base-pleaser, making her pitch exactly what the aging, wealthy, and right-wing membership want to hear. This has taken her to the very top.

Truss will now, almost certainly, immediately shift her politics to fit the view from Downing Street, with talk of a one-hundred-billion-dollar package to tackle the energy crisis. The skills she will need now are the opposite of those that have taken her to this point. She will need to fix her name to big, precise policies and stick to them to face the magnitude of the crisis that confronts her country—and not shape-shift, which won’t help Britain, let alone Liz Truss if she has any hope of winning the next election.

—Ben Judah is the director of the Europe Center’s Transform Europe Initiative and a veteran British journalist.

Which road will Truss take with Europe?

The European Union will need to wait and see which version of Liz Truss it will get. Having campaigned as a Remainer in the 2016 Brexit referendum but since evolved into a Brexiteer, Truss has been both confrontational and cooperative with Europe. Now, as prime minister, she finds herself at a crossroads with Europe again.

On the one hand, Truss risks seriously damaging her relationship with the EU early in her premiership over the situation in Northern Ireland. Truss is a sponsor of a bill to allow ministers to violate the Northern Ireland Protocol, which imposes EU-mandated customs and border checks for goods shipped to Northern Ireland from the rest of the United Kingdom rather than on the border with the Republic of Ireland. She has already threatened to invoke Article 16 of the agreement, unilaterally suspending part of the Protocol. The EU, for its part, has rejected renegotiating the agreement, having already launched legal proceedings against London for failing to enforce EU rules. Brussels is also debating additional retaliatory measures such as lawsuits or fines—setting up a collision course with Truss. With sky-high inflation and energy shortages dominating the political agenda at home, there may be strong incentives for Truss to increase anti-Brussels rhetoric for domestic political gain.

On the other hand, Truss has found ways to work with Europe before. As foreign secretary, she attended the European Council’s Extraordinary Foreign Affairs Council following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, joining the United States, Canada, and the NATO secretary general to coordinate and show transatlantic resolve. The United Kingdom is a leading supporter of Ukraine among European countries and will be essential to the future of Europe’s security, as French President Emmanuel Macron’s inclusion of Britain in his proposal for a European political community suggests. The recognition on both sides of the Channel of Britain’s role is an opening for a more functional, forward-looking relationship.

Which option Truss will choose with Europe is unclear. She may tread a middle ground, hoping to park but not resolve the Northern Ireland issue, or lean in on confrontation to score points at home and within her party. Until then, expect relations with Brussels to be uncertain.

—James Batchik is an assistant director at the Europe Center.

The post Experts react: The United Kingdom has a new prime minister. What should the world expect from Liz Truss? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Death of Mikhail Gorbachev highlights Europe’s lingering memory divide

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 01 Sep 2022 19:15:03 +0000

Few would argue that former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who passed away this week aged 91, was a figure of huge historical significance. However, reactions to his death varied greatly across Europe, reflecting a memory divide that is also evident in contemporary European attitudes toward Vladimir Putin’s imperial agenda. While Western European commentators celebrated Gorbachev for his role in ending the Cold War, those who grew up behind the Iron Curtain were far more inclined to view him as a Kremlin tyrant wholly undeserving of praise for the collapse of a totalitarian empire he fought to preserve.

Many of the most generous tributes to Gorbachev came from European leaders. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen set the tone by tweeting, “Mikhail Gorbachev was a trusted and respected leader. He played a crucial role to end the Cold War and bring down the Iron Curtain. It opened the way for a free Europe. This legacy is one we will not forget.”

Such sentiments were widely echoed in Brussels and other Western European capitals, where Gorbachev has always enjoyed a remarkably benign reputation. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg lauded the former Kremlin ruler for “historic reforms that led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, helped end the Cold War, and opened the possibility of a partnership between Russia and NATO. His vision of a better world remains an example.”

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Reactions in Russia itself ranged from muted to hostile. While Russian President Vladimir Putin offered his condolences and acknowledged Gorbachev as “a politician and statesman who had a huge impact on the course of world history,” he also delivered a very public snub by confirming that he would not be attending the former Soviet leader’s funeral.

Others were more direct in their condemnation. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov took a swipe at the alleged naivety of Gorbachev’s efforts to reduce tensions with the Western world. “This romanticism did not materialize,” he noted. “There was no romantic period or honeymoon. The bloodthirstiness of our opponents has shown itself.”

The chilliness of this Russian response was entirely predictable. While Western audiences associate Gorbachev with the end of the Cold War, Russians blame him for the humiliations of the Soviet collapse and the bitter hardships of the 1990s. Since coming to power at the turn of the millennium, Putin has made it his mission to reverse the mistakes of the perestroika era and Gorbachev himself has become a symbol of national weakness.

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Some of the most powerful responses to Gorbachev’s death came from the countries of the former Eastern Bloc, with many declaring that they did not share the positive sentiments expressed in Western obituaries. There was tangible anger on social media as people voiced their dismay at sanitized portrayals of Gorbachev that whitewashed his role in bloody Soviet attempts to suppress independence movements throughout the USSR in the late 1980s. “Lithuanians will not glorify Gorbachev,” posted Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis. “We will never forget the simple fact that his army murdered civilians to prolong his regime’s occupation of our country. His soldiers fired on our unarmed protesters and crushed them under his tanks. That is how we will remember him.”

Some commentators from Central and Eastern Europe branded the overly enthusiastic appraisals of Gorbachev coming out of Western Europe as an example of “Westplaining,” meaning the tendency to lecture locals on regional issues in a condescending, overconfident, and often inaccurate manner. Former Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves spoke for many when he tweeted, “The hagiographic panegyrics to Gorbachev in Western Europe today are the perfect accompaniment to their position on visas: You people in the East of the EU don’t matter, your worries don’t matter, your issues don’t matter.”

The mood was similarly strident in Ukraine. While most government officials kept their counsel, many Ukrainians noted Gorbachev’s failed efforts to save the Soviet Empire and his personal responsibility for ordering hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians to take part in traditional May Day parades in the immediate aftermath of the 1986 Chornobyl nuclear disaster. They also pointed out that Gorbachev had repeatedly voiced his support for Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea and questioned why so many in the West continue to view him as a man of peace.

For many in Central and Eastern Europe, this week’s veneration of Gorbachev was one more example of Western Europeans failing to understand the true nature of Russian imperialism. While Gorbachev may appear comparatively benevolent when viewed alongside Josef Stalin or Vladimir Putin, he was nevertheless a totalitarian ruler with blood on his hands who owes his place in world history largely to the simple fact that he failed. As Anne Applebaum noted in a brilliant essay reflecting on Gorbachev’s legacy, “He presided over the end of a cruel and bloody empire, but without intending to do so. Almost nobody in history has ever had such a profound impact on his era, while at the same time understanding so little about it.”

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Amid his triptych of reforms to save the Soviet Union from itself—glasnost, perestroika, and uskoreniye, which old Moscow hands translated ironically as “open it up, shake it up, and speed it up”—Gorbachev could not have predicted that he would share in ending the nuclear suicide pact between Moscow and Washington. He never dreamed of the dissolution of the Soviet Union or the destruction of the Communist system. He remained a loyal party man and simply believed, wrongly, that the party could be fixed.

Perhaps it was Reagan’s initial hardline posture that brought Gorbachev around. Anyone who lived in or reported from Moscow in those years (as I did, for the Chicago Tribune) remembers keenly how the Kremlin propaganda machine went into overdrive denouncing Reagan’s weapons build-up as dangerous and destabilizing.

In truth, the Soviet leadership was less afraid of being bombed back to the stone age than of being outspent back to the stone age. The Soviet Union may have been able to produce a world-class attack helicopter, but it couldn’t pave the streets around the Kremlin or guarantee ample supplies of fresh fruit to its population year-round. Military de-escalation with Washington was an economic necessity if Gorbachev’s domestic reforms were to work.

When I asked him about the many obituaries of his former US adversary that included repeated accolades about Reagan winning the Cold War, Gorbachev paused, then spoke again in that recognizable (and sometimes caricatured) southern Russian accent of his native Stavropol.

“He had the foresight and the wisdom and the commitment to step over all of that, and start changing relations with the Soviet Union,” Gorbachev said. “We had the same wish, and we were able to do that.”

But, Gorbachev repeated, “He, himself, could not have changed the situation alone.”

The late Soviet leader was the essential partner, basing his new thinking on Soviet policy around the idea that cooperation with Washington, not confrontation, was the key to pushing ahead with his reforms at home. In the months before revolution swept Eastern Europe and the Berlin Wall came down, Gorbachev would not give his blessing to quashing protests with force. After all, cutting loose the increasingly unmanageable Warsaw Pact would ease a huge strain on the Soviet budget.

In the end, his decisions amounted to a strategic Kremlin retreat from Eastern Europe and led to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union itself. Gorbachev did that, not Reagan.

Now just imagine that the Kremlin’s negotiator with Reagan had been Vladimir Putin—a man who maintains that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the “greatest geopolitical tragedy of the century,” ignoring even the Holocaust. Collaboration to create a calmer global order, or a return to one, seems like it would have been impossible with him in power at the time.

Last week, Ukraine marked the thirty-first anniversary of its vote for independence, which came after Kremlin hardliners failed to topple Gorbachev in a coup. It was one of the most inspiring stories I ever covered. Today, Putin—who drives toward the future with one eye, and maybe both, on the rear-view mirror—is seeking through military force to rewrite that exact moment of history.

To Putin, and sadly to most Russians, Gorbachev’s legacy is not one of democratization, personal freedom, and a better life; it is chaos, collapse, and economic turmoil (catnip for an old-school Kremlin propagandist). To many Russians, the glasnost was not just half-empty, but completely empty of promises fulfilled.

In his interview with me, Gorbachev also offered a brilliant metric for assessing any negotiation.

Victory, success, and a positive outcome, he said, can only be found when all parties feel they have won something. Even if Reagan did claim victory in the Cold War, Gorbachev believed he’d bought time for his radical restructuring of Soviet society and the economy to take root.

Unfortunately, the course he charted toward a brighter, more democratic future was cut short. But while history may not have been kind to Gorbachev, our memories should be.

Thom Shanker is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the director of the Project for Media and National Security at George Washington University’s School of Media and Public Affairs. He served as Moscow correspondent for the Chicago Tribune, covering Gorbachev’s ascent to power through the collapse of the USSR, and later worked for the New York Times for twenty-four years as a national security reporter and editor.

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Russia’s Ukraine War is forcing the Belarus opposition to rethink strategy

Alesia Rudnik — Wed, 17 Aug 2022 22:00:34 +0000

More than four hundred representatives of the Belarusian opposition gathered in Vilnius on August 8-9 for an event that highlighted a mood of increasing militancy as the movement responds to the new realities created by Russia’s ongoing invasion of neighboring Ukraine.

The conference in the Lithuanian capital was timed to mark the second anniversary of nationwide protests which rocked Belarus in the wake of the country’s August 2020 presidential election. With strong backing from Moscow, Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka was eventually able in suppress the 2020 protest movement. However, he now finds himself heavily dependent on the Kremlin and has been forced to play a supporting role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine that few Belarusians welcome.

Lukashenka’s status as junior partner in Putin’s Ukraine war has helped to reinvigorate the Belarusian opposition while also forcing its leaders to rethink strategy. The 2020 protests succeeded in attracting mass participation but the movement proved no match for the unprecedented repressive measures unleashed by Lukashenka. Despite the violence of the regime response, opposition leaders remained committed to peaceful and lawful protests.

Decisions taken recently in Vilnius highlight how Belarusian opposition leaders are now addressing the effectiveness of peaceful protests and exploring their options in light of the war in Ukraine. A key outcome of the conference was the formation of a transition cabinet including a number of more militant figures who had previously been relegated to the fringes of Belarus’s anti-Lukashenka movement.

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The new transition cabinet follows on from the creation of an anti-war movement to unite all Belarusians in support of Ukraine, which was announced by Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya during the first days of the Russian invasion. This initiative sought to unite Belarusians in Belarus itself with members of the diaspora and opposition figures in exile.

Others have already gone further in their opposition to Belarusian participation in Putin’s war. The most effective domestic opponents so far have been the railway partisans, a group of Belarusian activists who sabotaged the country’s rail network to prevent the transit of Russian troops and military equipment to Ukraine. Their activities proved hugely embarrassing for Lukashenka and led to legislative changes in late May that made attacks on rail infrastructure potentially subject to the death penalty.

Belarusian volunteers are also fighting for Ukraine in a number of units including the Belarusian Regiment of Kastus Kalinouski. Many of these volunteers believe a Ukrainian victory will open the way for a free Belarus. They also recognize that if Putin achieves his goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood, this would condemn their own country to a new era of Russian domination.

The growth of both the railway partisan movement and Belarusian volunteer participation in Ukraine has helped spark a broader debate over the need to embrace a more direct approach to opposing the Lukashenka regime. Other more militant groups such as the Supraciu (“Resistance”) movement and the ByPol organization of former Belarusian police officers have also seen their profiles rise in recent months against the backdrop of the Ukraine war. A recent independent opinion poll by Narodny Opros found that Belarusians view ByPol and the Belarusian Regiment as being five times more relevant for the opposition movement than recognized opposition leader Tsikhanouskaya.

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