Seventy-eight years after World War II, as facts fade and fewer survivors remain, the Holocaust risks being forgotten. This natural amnesia is compounded by widespread campaigns to revise or repress Holocaust history. International Holocaust Remembrance Day on January 27 and Holocaust Remembrance Day (Yom Hashoah) on April 17 are important annual observances to counter these trends, but much more needs to be done year-round. Surprisingly, the Arab world may soon become a world leader in rejecting denialism to reassert “Never again!”

Present events constantly reshape the perceptions of the past and, indirectly, future outcomes. There are people in every country around the world who claim that the Holocaust never took place. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, Holocaust denial is mainly a trend among the younger generation due to a lack of Holocaust education in schools and after-school activities. For decades, the Holocaust has been a taboo subject, politicized and conflated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in official discourse. Historical truth is clouded, if not overshadowed, by key actors in the Arab world who connect Israeli state policies and the Jewish people worldwide—past and present, using them interchangeably, as if they were one. Opposition to Israel becomes resistance to the reality of Jewish suffering and injustice done to Jews in the past.

As a result, the Holocaust was absent from public consciousness until 2009, when Morocco’s King Mohammed VI became the first Arab leader to recognize the Holocaust by addressing the matter in a message addressed to the launch event of the Aladdin Project at UNESCO in Paris.

“Amnesia has no effect on my understanding of the Holocaust, or that of my people,” said the king, adding, “We must together endeavor to reassert reason and the values which underpin the legitimacy of a space of co-existence where the words of dignity, justice, and freedom will express themselves in the same way and will coexist, with the same requirements, regardless of our origins, cultures or spiritual ties. This is our interpretation, in Morocco, of the duty of remembrance dictated by the Shoah.”

Speaking at international conferences and forums devoted to the Holocaust and intercultural dialogue, King Mohammed VI and representatives of the Moroccan government have frequently emphasized the significance of denouncing anti-Semitism, instilling togetherness, and religious coexistence in Moroccan society, learning from the lessons of the Holocaust, and highlighting the crucial role that education plays in this context.

Challenges for Holocaust education in the Arab world

Past efforts at Holocaust education in the Arab world have too often suffered from a lack of context-specific sensitivity. In contrast to the king’s speech, which expresses the values and ideals of the Moroccan tradition as the basis for affirming Holocaust remembrance, others have simply translated Euro-centric Holocaust materials into Arabic, mainly from fear by civil society actors they would be blamed for “normalizing” with Israel if they tried to teach about the Holocaust. To effectively use Holocaust education as a tool for genocide prevention, the content should be tailored to Arab audiences using relevant wording, metaphors, names, and historical events.

In contrast to other areas of the world, World War II battles were fought, and Jews of the MENA region, directly or indirectly, experienced the Holocaust. Employing this little-known history in creating educational content is essential to sparking children’s imagination.

On the other hand, if this would only be a requirement, rather than a shared process of mutual development, educators would not take ownership of these materials and will lack the motivation to use these materials towards the essential goal of developing Holocaust education within the Arab world.

The power of participation

Today, initiatives all over the Middle East and North Africa try to promote Holocaust education through standard education approaches. However, teacher-to-student Holocaust education, while powerful, cannot reach the vast audience in need of this vital information and perspective. There is an increasing need to use state-of-the-art media, including those that allow for online sharing of ideas. While the hateful have exploited the Internet to spread racism, Holocaust denial, and other destructive ideologies, it can also serve as a powerful tool to educate and empower those fighting hate.

In 2011, the Kivunim Institute and Mimouna Association organized the first conference on the Holocaust in the Arab world commemorating the actions of the late King Mohammed V at Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane. An article in the New York Times praised the event as a “first of its kind in an Arab or Muslim nation, and a sign of historical truth triumphing over conspiracy theories and anti-Semitic dogma.”

The Mimouna Association and United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) in 2017 jointly created the first Arabic-language Holocaust curriculum by and for Muslims. The Holocaust education material created was tailored to the specific context of the Arab and Muslim world.

The USHMM, which is celebrating its thirtieth anniversary this month, has prioritized promoting Holocaust education in the Arab world, for example, through Holocaust commemorations in Morocco in 2018 and 2022, and Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2022 and 2023. In 2022, the USHMM organized an important Holocaust commemoration in the UAE and Egypt.

In the Emirates, Ahmed Obaid Al Mansoori created in 2021 the first Holocaust memorial exhibition in the Arab world at the Crossroads of Civilization Museum in Dubai. This permanent exhibit is the first of its kind in the Arab world, and offers visitors a setting within which to begin to understand the Holocaust and fight the denial of this dark chapter of human history.

In Morocco this year, the Mimouna Association, in partnership with the Council of Jewish Communities in Morocco, the United Nations Information Centre, and the ASF, provided over 120 students from different Moroccan universities and institutes, Moroccan Muslim activists, and members of the Moroccan Jewish community with an opportunity to engage and learn more about the history of the Holocaust.

In the largest synagogue of Casablanca, 350 guests—including university students, Morocco’s Minister of Education Chakib Benmoussa, diplomats from the United States, Israel, France, Germany, Poland, The Vatican, and Spain, as well as representatives from Moroccan civil society and international organizations—packed the pews to honor King Mohammed V, savior of the Moroccan Jewish community.

Recognizing the deep convictions, moral approach, and brave policy of Sultan Mohammed V, the US ambassador to Morocco, Puneet Talwar, affirmed, “His Majesty King Mohammed V protected Morocco’s Jews from the Nazis. And His Majesty King Mohammed VI has carried on that legacy. He has spoken forcefully against the denial of the Holocaust.”

The Chief Rabbi of Casablanca, Rabbi Joseph Israel, said a customary Moroccan prayer honoring the king and his forefathers. The Muslim students also heard the Chapters of Psalms, Kaddish, Yizkor, and the Kel Malei Rachamim in memory of the Holocaust victims.

On the eve of Yom Hashoah, it is no longer considered taboo in the MENA region to promote Holocaust education and genocide prevention. The region’s youth are far more receptive to discussing the events of one of the darkest chapters of human history, despite the political, religious, and educational challenges shrouding this historic move that has been praised in some nations in the region and criticized in others.

El Mehdi Boudra is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Follow him on Twitter: @ElBoudra.

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The single created by multi-Grammy award-winning Moroccan-Swedish producer RedOne embodies the spirit with which the Moroccan team—against all odds—kept knocking out top contenders like Portugal, Spain, and Belgium and advancing through the competition. Thus far, the defeat-free journey of the Moroccan soccer national team, the Atlas Lions, is more than a simple sports score. It is an upheaval in soccer culture—a symbolic capital for Africans, Arabs, and Muslims everywhere and a historical revenge of subaltern dreamers from the global south.

A change in the culture of soccer

Modern soccer was codified in nineteenth-century Britain and soon became a European favorite. The collective sport turned into a global sensation with the creation of the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) and organization of the first World Cup in 1930 in Uruguay. Soccer remains a largely euro-centric sport today, supported by professional leagues, media, and capitals in the old continent with outliers in the Americas. Thus, soccer culture is linked to iconic players who built their careers in Spanish, British, Italian, and other European teams. It is also largely associated with ritualistic beer drinking, ultras chanting, and shots of beautiful white models featured on television screens.

The 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar—aside from its questionable human rights records and bribery allegations—has reconfigured the rites of the event and dictated new norms in synchronicity with its Arab and Islamic values despite western uproar and disapproval. Morocco, the North African dark horse-turned-favorite of the competition, also had a few lessons to convey.

Images of players prostrating to pray after each match, the celebration of family solidarity with players embracing their parents, and the waving of the Palestinian flag for every memorial picture are all acts of defiance of an essentially western-centric football culture and signals a more diverse and inclusive set of symbols that are epistemologically different from the usual World Cup glam. Likewise, the team’s fans have elected a new motto inspired by the religious teaching of the Arabic hashtag “trusting in God” (#ديروا_النية), which has been widely used on social media even by the newly appointed US ambassador to Morocco, Ambassador Puneet Talwar.

Shattering colonial complexes

The Moroccan team’s victories are hailed extensively by other global south countries, notably those who see the team’s resilience and combativity as a reflection of their own battle. Supporters across the African continent and the Arab and Muslim worlds spontaneously allied behind the Atlas Lions in defiance of their old Spanish, Portuguese, Belgian, French, and British colonizers. Metaphorically, each victory shattered old imperialist complexes that European coaches and teams are inherently superior. For Arab countries particularly, a new pan-Arab sentiment rose and erased decades of defeatist mentality.

For the host country, Morocco’s wins are, by extension, the continuation and channeling of the Qatari dreams in the competition—an avenue for all Arabs to keep dreaming. Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani made sure to showcase his favorite team loud and clear by waving Morocco’s red flag with a green star during its December 10 match with Portugal. As a result of the Atlas Lions’ rise to the semi-final against France on December 14, millions of Arab youth and children are redefining their soccer idols after the surreal sight of Portugal’s Cristiano Ronaldo leaving the pitch crying and finding new heroes in more self-identifiable players like Hakim Ziyech, Achraf Hakimi, and Yassine Bounou. In other words, representation matters.

The tale of Moroccan players is also that of first- and second-generation migrants who had mixed experiences of integration in Europe, where many were born and raised. It points to a larger story of how Europe may have provided the investment that these athletes didn’t find “back home,” but ultimately failed to build a genuine connection to their countries of birth that have often been the source of discrimination and mistreatment to their North African immigrant communities. In the end, fourteen out of twenty-six players chose to represent the red and green colors of their forefathers for the World Cup.

As the world order starts shifting anew towards multipolarity, the Qatar World Cup and the consecutive symbolic triumphs of the Moroccan team can be seen as an illustration of shifting powers and hybrid world narratives. The shifts in the poles of power and crumbling of western hegemony that mostly one-sided western media might have obscured found an auspicious opportunity to unfold before the eyes of world viewers avidly following the competition and pondering the uneasy question: When did the world change so much?

Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs. Follow her on Twitter @ZaaimiSarah.

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Political analysts often look with envy at historians due to their ability to analyze events long after they have occurred, with the luxury of distance and hindsight. To analyze human history and the political and economic developments in numerous states or regions over the period of 2011 to mid-2022 would surely benefit from ten or twenty years of distance and hindsight. Yet for those dealing with events occurring in the geographical dimension of North Africa there is an overwhelming perception of a continuous, often abrupt and contradictory, but increasingly faster evolution of relations between actors—whether small or big, global or regional. 

In fact, North African countries (namely Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Morocco) have witnessed an array of political, economic and social transformations which have all influenced geopolitical dynamics in the region. Egypt and Turkey, for example, have been at odds for the past decade due to rivaling political agendas, and in 2013 broke all diplomatic ties by calling back their respective ambassadors. Libya is entering its 11th year of civil war with rival factions contending power over the oil-rich nation through political maneuverings and violent clashes. Morocco and Algeria are still in open conflict over border disputes, opposing geopolitical alliances and an ever-growing arms race. Because of the Algeria-Morocco conflict, the Maghreb was never able to create an economic union trade agreement which would undoubtedly benefit all countries of the region. 

The purpose of this report is to identify a potential role for Italy and its diplomacy to play in North Africa, in full agreement and collaboration with the United States and the other main European actors, in resolving some of the thorniest crises in the area and fostering a climate of collaboration around the transatlantic alliance that could help it face the expanding ambitions of rival global powers.

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• The Overview of the Digital Silk Road Initiative of China
• The Role of Huawei in the Digital Silk Road Initiative of China in North Africa
• How Huawei is perceived by other countries as not being solely a commercial company
• Deep Chinese presence in North African countries
• What the North Africans think of China and its presence in the region
• Significant projects of Huawei and other Chinese tech giants in the region
• Thoughts about the relationship between China and North Africa

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[02:17] An Overview of the Digital Silk Road Initiative

[05:32] How Does Huawei fit in the DSRI of China

[08:37] Other Countries See Huawei as not a Commercial Company

[15:43] Deep Chinese Presence in Countries of North Africa

[18:44] What the North Africans thought of China

[24:31] Significant Projects of Huawei in the North Africa Region

[30:13] Some Tech Projects by Chinese Tech Giants in The Region

[35:04] North Africans Appetite in Cooperation with China

[38:58] Thoughts about the Relationship between China-North Africa

[41:16] Conclusion

Dr. Tin Hinane El Kadi
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Tin Hinane El Kadi is the co-founder and co-director of ISSRA. She is a political economy researcher, currently writing a PhD thesis at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), looking at China’s Digital Silk Road in North Africa. She is also an associate fellow in the MENA department at Chatham House. Her research interests include information, communications technology (ICT) and development, China’s presence in Africa and the Middle East, and contemporary Algerian politics.

China has been expanding its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) around the world, while also working on a new version of BRI that utilizes the digital space. The initiative was dubbed the Digital Silk Road Initiative, or DSRI, which is already in motion across the Middle East and North Africa, particularly in North Africa. Big Chinese tech companies like Huawei have been assisting North African countries in digitizing their economies to compete with First World countries. These can also lead to wonderful opportunities for North Africans since DSRI promises regional economic growth.

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The year 2020 marked a turning point for this sad chapter of history. On August 13, 2020, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain signed the Abraham Accords, officially recognizing the State of Israel. Other Arab and Muslim-majority countries soon followed suit. Months later, on December 10, 2020, Morocco signed a normalization agreement with Israel, becoming the second North African country—after Egypt in 1978 with the Camp David Accords—to recognize the Jewish State. Israel also signed an agreement with Sudan on October 23, 2020 as part of the accords.

While the Abraham Accords brought some Arab countries closer to the West and Israel, it undoubtedly created chasms with others. The agreement between Israel and Morocco sparked a series of chain events in neighboring North African countries that will likely have lasting consequences on the economic, security, and socio-political relations in the region.

Israel and Morocco: more than just a cordial relationship

Relations between Morocco and Israel have always been more than just cordial. Although Morocco did not formally recognize Israel until the Abraham Accords, it maintained informal ties with the Jewish State and, unlike many other Arab countries, allowed Israelis to visit the country. In 2020 alone, around seventy thousand Israelis visited Morocco.

Morocco is one of four Arab League countries to normalize relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords. Rabat allegedly did so on the premise that the United States would recognize the country’s claims over Western Sahara, a disputed territory which both Morocco and the Algerian-backed Polisario Front have contended to be theirs since 1975, when Spain withdrew from the territory.

The relationship between Morocco and Israel has strong historical roots. Morocco was home to the largest Jewish community in the Arab world, most of whom came from Spain after the 1491 expulsion by the Spanish Catholic monarchy. After the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, many Moroccan Jews were forced to emigrate to the country as a consequence of rising antisemitism in local cities across Morocco. Today, Israel is home to some one million Moroccan Jews and is strongly interconnected with the Kingdom.

As mentioned before, Israel and Morocco made their longstanding—albeit concealed—friendship official in December 2020 when they signed a normalization agreement that ensured “full diplomatic, peaceful, and friendly relations” under US patronage. While Morocco attempted to minimize the agreements back home, claiming that a full normalization with Israel was off the table, the international community perceived the signing of the accords as otherwise. It was clear from the beginning that the two countries had undergone a diplomatic rapprochement, strengthening bilateral ties and cooperation in the fields of trade, tourism, and defense. Even direct official flights between Tel Aviv and Marrakesh have commenced. In July, the two countries signed a formal cybersecurity agreement to share information, research, and development on cyber warfare. On August 11, Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid visited Morocco, signaling that his government is placing its relationship with Morocco high on its agenda.

Moroccan-Israeli ties and what they mean for North Africa

Reactions to Morocco’s normalization with Israel were mixed amongst other North African countries. Algeria wasted no time instrumenting the Abraham Accords by using aggressive, anti-Israel rhetoric to justify its disputes with Morocco. In December 2020, Algerian Prime Minister Abdelaziz Djera decried the agreement as a move to bring “the Zionist entity” closer to Algeria’s border. Algiers has also used the agreement as a scapegoat to explain the recent wildfires that have devastated the country, insisting Israel is behind them. On August 25, Algeria announced its decision to cut all diplomatic ties with Morocco in an effort to “totally eradicate” the Movement for Self-determination of Kabylie, which is a terrorist movement that “receives the support and aid of foreign parties…Morocco and the Zionist entity,” according to Algiers.  

As a result, Algeria has also strengthened its alignment with China and Russia. Algeria shares close bilateral relations with Russia, particularly in defense cooperation, and the two countries meet regularly through a joint economic commission to discuss partnership options. Algeria and China also share close ties, evidenced by the national development plans it signed with China under the Belt and Road Initiative to boost industrialization in the country, among other things. It comes as no surprise they were signed only six months after Morocco formalized the accords with Israel. In the coming years, Algeria will likely pursue closer bilateral ties with both Beijing and Moscow to counter what it perceives to be a Western-led, pro-Moroccan plot over Western Sahara via the Abraham Accords.

Egypt unsurprisingly responded positively to the normalization of ties between Morocco and Israel, having already a lukewarm relationship with the Jewish State. However, it is hard to predict where Cairo will turn to next. Egypt and Algeria have traditionally maintained good relations dating back to Egypt’s support of Algeria’s National Liberation Front during its war of independence against France between 1954 and 1962. Egypt is deeply interested in the events in neighboring Libya given its hope to see General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army prevail in the conflict, and has recently found common ground with Algeria on the Libya crisis over achieving greater “stability and security” in the country. Cairo’s agreement with Algiers over Libya may motivate Egypt to pit itself against Morocco in an effort to showcase its support to Algeria, thus, strengthening their alliance, given that Egypt has already backed the Polisario Front over the disputed Western Sahara. Cairo’s eagerness to have a stake in Libya’s future could pivot Egypt towards distancing itself from the US’s recognition of Morocco’s claims over Western Sahara.

Tunisia, like Libya, is too busy dealing with its domestic problems to focus its attention on the Abraham Accords. Tunisia is facing a potential constitutional crisis after President Kais Saied announced the indefinite freezing of parliament in late August and is attempting to centralize powers in his hands. In August, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi supported Saied’s actions, signaling an alignment between the two North African nations. It’s worth noting that Tunisia has never hidden its disapproval of the accords. Therefore, an anti-Morocco front consisting of Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt is not out of the question.

Morocco-Israel ties: What’s next?

The ongoing strengthening of ties between Israel and Morocco sheds light, once more, over just how tense the balance in North Africa really is. While the move to recognize Israel was part of a larger US-led strategy, with the potential to unite several Arab countries under a common front, the reality is far more complex. Morocco is set to strengthen its ties with Israel as demonstrated by its August announcement to open an embassy in Israel, but will also face the daunting task of explaining to the Palestinians that Morocco still supports their cause. Regardless, it is clear that Morocco is intent on increasing its strategic importance on the world stage, particularly in North Africa, and the Abraham Accords are the perfect place to start.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Alissa Pavia is assistant director for the North Africa Initiative within the Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. 

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As part of the deal, Trump said the United States will recognize “Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara,” a stretch of disputed land south of Morocco that is jointly claimed by the Moroccan government and the self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. The United Nations has attempted to negotiate a settlement on the dispute, but Trump’s announcement means the United States will be the first Western nation to officially endorse Morocco’s claims.

Atlantic Council experts react to the deal between Israel, Morocco, and the United States, and what it means for the wider MENA region:

Jump to an expert reaction:

Karim Mezran: Morocco can claim victory, but potential conflict looms

Nabeel Khoury: Deal will not bring region any closer to peace

Carmiel Arbit: Deal could give Moroccan king new leverage

Shalom Lipner: Another political win for Netanyahu before Biden takes over

Sina Azodi: Mideast deal making is one of Trump’s legacies

Borzou Daragahi: A great deal for Morocco, but complications remain

Mark Katz: Don’t expect any more deals soon

Jonathan Ferziger: A nightmare for Palestinians

Morocco can claim victory, but potential conflict looms

“The announcement of the normalization of relations between the Kingdom of Morocco and the state of Israel is another positive step toward decreasing tensions in the MENA region, at least on the surface. The quid pro quo in this latest case, nevertheless, casts doubt on the agreement’s ability to achieve de-escalation, since the terms might well ignite a new conflict. In fact, with his recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara territory, President Trump may provoke an armed reaction by the Polisario front in Western Sahara, and by its supporter, the Algerian state. Tensions in the area have been on the rise for some time, but this event may accelerate a renewed clash between the two Maghrebi states. In other words, this normalization in exchange for recognition of Moroccan claims over the Western Sahara will be a success for the Moroccan monarchy if it does not plunge it into a military confrontation with Algeria.”

Karim Mezran, director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs.

Deal will not bring region any closer to peace

“The agreement is yet another transactional deal that benefits the leaders of the United States, Israel, and Morocco over a piece of land that does not belong to them. Once again, Trump cedes territory (an executive action on his part without any debate in Congress) which he does not own without even a discussion with, let along an agreement from, the Sahrawi people who have fought long and hard for self-determination. In the end, the King of Morocco revived a diplomatic relationship that his father had established after the 1994 Casablanca conference.”

“Trump has once again disregarded three decades of US and UN diplomacy that sought via referendum and consultation to come to a peaceful resolution of the Western Sahara dispute. This decision was made on the day the world is supposed to celebrate international human rights. In the name of peace (inadequate though it may be) harm was done to yet another indigenous people, and it will not bring the people of the region any closer to genuine peace.”

Nabeel Khoury, nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

Deal could give Moroccan king new leverage

“Peace between Morocco and Israel is a welcome addition to the Abraham Accords. The announcement is not surprising: ties between Israel and Morocco have been relatively strong for decades. Morocco was a one-time hub of Jewish life in the region and the King has increasingly embraced Jewish Moroccan heritage, naming senior Jewish advisers to his government and, most recently, incorporating Moroccan Jewish history into school curricula. There is already more than $30 million in annual trade between the two countries, tens of thousands of Israelis travel to Morocco annually, and Israelis from Morocco can already retain Moroccan citizenship.”

“The deal is expected to also include US recognition of Moroccan control over the Western Sahara—which Morocco has sought for half a century.  After seven successive US presidents insisted on neutrality, such an offer from Trump, no matter how short-lived, is surely too great to pass up on.”

“The Palestinians will undoubtedly feel deeply betrayed by the announcement, particularly given widespread Moroccan support for the Palestinian cause. But Morocco has helped lead Arab peace initiatives with Israel in the past, and the King has used his seat as chair of the Al-Quds Committee of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to advocate for a Palestinian State in the past. The agreement could give the King further leverage to advance Palestinian issues—should he choose to use it.”

Carmiel Arbit, nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

Another political win for Netanyahu before Biden take over

“The announcement of Morocco’s plans to normalize its ties with Israel—with which it has a long history of “on again, off again” relations —comes on the heels of similar deals involving the UAE, Bahrain, and Sudan. It offers the latest representative example of President Donald Trump’s original paradigm for peace between Israel and the Arab world. Turning conventional wisdom on its head, Trump has refuted the previous assumption that Israel’s integration into the Middle East would be achieved only through resolution of its conflict with the Palestinians, instead employing the leverage of American largesse—e.g. sophisticated weaponry to Abu Dhabi, removal from the State Department’s list of terrorist sponsors for Khartoum and now, recognition of Rabat’s claim to Western Sahara—to incentivize Arab leaders into accepting Israel as their diplomatic partner. The success of this approach is self-evident.”

“Netanyahu, who has been a famous backer of Trump and (most of) his foreign policy initiatives, is reaping the fruits of his enthusiastic investment in the outgoing administration. The Israeli prime minister’s deferential attitude toward Trump—extending also to the Israeli government’s muted congratulations for President-elect Joe Biden and open criticism of his intention to reverse Trump’s rejection of the nuclear deal with Iran—continues now to deliver gains for Israel from the current president who, in the twilight of his tenure, is eager to add notches to his belt, most particularly ones which appeal to the conservative and religiously devout constituency upon whose support he would depend in mounting an anticipated bid to recapture the White House.”

“This window may be closing. With the Biden administration less likely to submit to these kinds of quid pro quos, and few among Israel’s center-right majority inclined toward compromise with the Palestinians, it remains to be seen whether conditions will induce other Arab nations to jump on the bandwagon of normalization with Israel after January 20.”

Shalom Lipner, nonresident fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.   

Mideast deal-making is one of Trump’s legacies

“The news should be analyzed in the context of Trump administration’s transactional foreign policy. Over the past few months, and having failed to achieve any success with regards to US policy toward North Korea or Iran,  the Trump administration seems to have focused itself on convincing Muslim majority countries with no democratic institutions to establish relations with Israel, in return for either weapons or more recognition from the United States. The Trump administration can sell this as a foreign policy achievement and, upon leaving office, can be viewed as his foreign policy legacy.”

Sina Azodi, nonresident fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.   

A great deal for Morocco, but complications remain

“The United States is recognizing Moroccan claims over the disputed territory of Western Sahara and weighing in on one of the longest-running frozen conflicts in the world in exchange for Rabat committing to normalize relations with a country with which it has never been at war and with which it has had secret relations for decades. Israeli passport holders have been able to visit Morocco for years, obtaining visas on arrival.”

“This is a great deal for Morocco, but one that complicates longstanding efforts to resolve the dispute over Western Sahara. It is also a deal that could easily damage relations between Washington and Morocco’s well-armed gas- and oil-rich neighbor, Algeria, which hosts the Sahrawi rebels of the Polisario Front. Many countries of the world recognize Sahrawi rule over at least part of the disputed phosphate-rich territory.”

Borzou Daragahi, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

Don’t expect any more deals soon

“As predicted in September, a normalization agreement has now been signed between Morocco and Israel. But there may not be many more such agreements. Governments strongly influenced by Iran (Iraq and Syria) and Hezbollah (Lebanon) will not normalize relations with Israel. Algeria probably would not have anyway, but it definitely will not do so now that the Trump administration has sided with its rival Morocco over Western Sahara. Such a move would also be difficult for Tunisia and Kuwait which are more constrained by public opinion than other Arab governments. King Salman has made it known that he opposes such a move by Saudi Arabia, and Qatar has indicated that it will not enter into such an agreement either. Oman seems to be the most likely prospect for normalizing relations with Israel, but it may be content with the current status quo of quiet cooperation with the Jewish state.”

Mark N. Katz, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

A nightmare for Palestinians

“For Palestinians, President Donald Trump’s departure from the White House can’t come soon enough. Morocco’s decision to restore and upgrade diplomatic relations with Israel showed that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’s nightmare hasn’t ended with the election of a far more sympathetic Joe Biden. Indeed Trump predicts more governments will soon break ranks with Abbas and join the wave of Arab states warming up to Israel.”

“Like the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Sudan, which have normalized ties with Israel since September, Morocco’s King Mohammed VI professed deep concern for the Palestinians and pledged to work harder for a comprehensive Middle East peace agreement. In Ramallah, they weren’t reassured. Former Palestinian negotiator Hanan Ashrawi condemned the deal in a tweet, saying: “Between bribery and blackmail, the Trump administration is in a mad scramble to extract concessions and benefits for Israel before the new administration takes over.”

“Even under Biden, Palestinians have slim hopes for getting what they want. While the president-elect may restore hundreds of millions in aid money that Trump cut off and allow Palestinians to reopen their shuttered representative office in Washington, the US Embassy that was moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem will stay put despite Palestinian protests over the city’s political status. To the Palestinians’ disappointment, Biden has praised the new willingness of Arab states to come to terms with Israel and will certainly encourage the trend as he takes over the reins of Middle East policy in Washington next month.”

Jonathan Ferziger, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

Further reading:

New Atlanticist Oct 23, 2020

Experts react: Sudan and Israel reach historic peace agreement

By Atlantic Council

Sudan became the latest country to normalize its relationship with Israel on October 23, as an agreement between the two countries ended the official status of war between them. Atlantic Council experts react to the normalization between Sudan and Israel, and analyze what it means for both countries and the wider region.

Democratic Transitions International Markets

New Atlanticist Aug 13, 2020

Will US-brokered agreement between UAE and Israel be a regional gamechanger?

By Atlantic Council

A US-brokered deal has seen Israel and the United Arab Emirates normalize relations for the first time in history. Atlantic Council experts discuss what the agreement means and what is next for the wider region:

Conflict Israel

MENASource Sep 11, 2020

Experts react: US brokers another deal in Middle East with Israel and Bahrain

By William F. Wechsler, Kirsten Fontenrose, Marc J. Sievers, Jonathan H. Ferziger, Barbara Slavin, Carmiel Arbit, Michel Duclos, Richard LeBaron, Mark N. Katz, Thomas S. Warrick, Sina Azodi, Joze Pelayo

Atlantic Council experts react to Bahrain agreement to normalize ties with Israel and what it means for the wider region.

Israel Middle East

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The Arab world was strangely quiet in the wake of the United Arab Emirates’ announcement of peace with Israel. But the announcement is a strategic victory for both Israel and the UAE, with the potential to impact Arab-Israeli relations as far afield as Morocco. Read Atlantic Council Board Director Ahmed Charai’s latest in the Jerusalem Post on the prospects for Arabs and Israelis to prosper together.

Ahmed Charai is a Moroccan publisher and an Atlantic Council Board Director. He is also an international counselor of the Center for a Strategic and International Studies and a member of the Advisory Board of The Center for the National Interest in Washington and the Advisory Board of Gatestone Institute in New York.

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In recent years, America has become a country engulfed in turmoil, withdrawn from the world, wanting for leadership. Yet, all over the world, people still wish for a revival of values-driven American leadership. Read Atlantic Council Board Director Ahmed Charai’s latest in the National Interest on the need for the United States to become a global role model again.

Ahmed Charai is a Moroccan publisher and an Atlantic Council Board Director. He is also an international counselor of the Center for a Strategic and International Studies and a member of the Advisory Board of The Center for the National Interest in Washington and the Advisory Board of Gatestone Institute in New York.

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Moroccans have learned that to reach the horizon beyond the deadly virus that they must address the equality gap among themselves. Read Atlantic Council Board Director Ahmed Charai’s latest in the National Interest on how Morocco is taking on the coronavirus.

Ahmed Charai is a Moroccan publisher and an Atlantic Council Board Director. He is also an international counselor of the Center for a Strategic and International Studies and a member of the Advisory Board of The Center for the National Interest in Washington and the Advisory Board of Gatestone Institute in New York.

The post Charai in the National Interest: How Morocco is taking on coronavirus appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It is important to monitor ­the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic, its effects on each system, and the debate between government elites and masses to better understand the situation in these countries and the long-term implications of the health crisis.

Egypt

Egypt is the worst-hit North African country with 495 coronavirus cases and at least 36 deaths confirmed deaths so far, according to the country’s health ministry. On March 23, the Egyptian Armed Forces announced that two senior generals died due to COVID-19, amid fears of possible infection in the army, which has around 920,000 personnel. In early March, Egyptian authorities started to recognize an outbreak on Nile River cruises, particularly in the city of Luxor—a popular tourist destination in upper Egypt. Several tourists returning to their home countries showed symptoms or tested positive for COVID-19, according to public health data and news reports, which suggested that there could be many more cases on the ground in Egypt. Despite the delayed reaction, the Egyptian government eventually announced a $6.4 billion fund to combat the contagion and implemented various containment measures against the pandemic, including a government-enforced lockdown. This includes the closure of schools, universities, cafes, and restaurants; a ban against travel, tourist activities, and major sporting events; and reduced work in the public sector, which employs over 5 million Egyptians. This was followed by the Awqaf ministry—in charge of religious endowments—and the Coptic Orthodox Church announcing on March 21 the closure of mosques and churches to tackle the outbreak. On March 24, the government took a further step and imposed a national curfew that requires Egyptians to stay inside their homes between the hours of 7 p.m. and 6 a.m.

Despite these measures, some have accused the Egyptian government of underreporting the actual number of coronavirus cases, which could be much higher than the official infection rates. At the end of February, a group of infectious disease specialists from the University of Toronto had raised alarms estimating the presence of at least 6,000 people infected, with the potential of an outbreak of 19,310 cases in Egypt. The gloomy picture described by this study led to a strong reaction by the interior ministry and Egypt’s State Information Service—the official media and public relations apparatus of the state—which, between March 15 – 17, arrested at least seven Egyptians on allegations of circulating false rumors about the coronavirus, on the basis it could alarm citizens and be harmful to national security. The Egyptian authorities also expelled a journalist for The Guardian who wrote a story challenging the official count of coronavirus cases, and censured a reporter for The New York Times who tweeted the story.

The latest crackdown on freedom of expression by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s regime suggests a possible aim of distracting public opinion regarding the country’s current crisis by pointing the finger at political opponents, especially the banned Muslim Brotherhood. The recent arrests added to the already high number of political prisoners, now at 60,000, that are currently staying in overcrowded prisons awaiting hearings. According to Human Rights Watch, the spread of the contagion among prisoners kept in inadequate medical care and unhygienic conditions is a serious and alarming threat. On March 21, Egyptian authorities released a few activists, including Egyptian-British novelist Ahdaf Serif, who called for the freeing of prisoners, stressing the possible risk of a disastrous spread of the virus within prisons. However, this is not the only concern. The spread of COVID-19 could bring the fragile Egyptian healthcare system to its knees, especially in light of the incessant demographic growth that led Egypt to recently reach 100 million inhabitants, 95 percent of whom live on roughly 5 percent of the country’s land—a serious challenge for practicing the recommended social distancing. Moreover, in the very short term, coronavirus could have hard economic consequences given the country’s dependence on trade and tourism which, due to the lockdown, have predicted a loss of income of $1 billion per month.

Libya

In the western region of Libya, the coronavirus pandemic is still in its initial phase. The country confirmed its first case on March 25, but the inability of journalists to freely operate in the eastern and southern parts of Libya make it hard to obtain reliable information about the real situation of COVID-19 on the ground. 

Surprising as it may be, it looks as though the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli has gotten its act together and organized a prompt and effective reaction to the outbreak of the virus, benefiting from the wealth of information coming out of countries that have already been overwhelmed by this highly infectious disease. The government in Tripoli has issued strict orders to the population to stay home, and most businesses have been closed with the exception of pharmacies and grocery stores. Police not only monitor the effective closure of stores, but also make sure that those authorized to remain open are all equipped with masks and gloves for employees and that no more than a few people are inside at a time. A project has been undertaken to collect the enormous amount of garbage that has been accumulating in the past month, due to public services shutting down as a result of the conflict in Tripoli, as well as cleaning and disinfecting the public streets. Showing a high sense of civic duty, most inhabitants of the city are respectful of the measures taken by the government.

Initially, it looked as though all actors in Libya’s conflict would prioritize the fight against coronavirus over the fight with each other, as the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftar paused their shelling of civilian zones of Tripoli. It seemed that perhaps international pressure to halt fighting amid COVID-19 concerns played a role in the cessation of attacks, which would be one of the few bright spots in an otherwise bleak picture. Unfortunately, on March 24, Haftar’s forces resumed their offensive, bombarding Tripoli with heavy shelling that killed at least five civilians on the first night, including women and children. Haftar has made it clearer than ever with this move that he is not interested in national unity and will prioritize military victory over all else.

Tunisia

As with most countries affected by the spread of coronavirus, the number of Tunisia’s confirmed cases keeps growing. As of March 27, 227 cases have been confirmed, including six deaths. 7,642 individuals remain under compulsory self-quarantine. In response to the accelerating contagion in Tunisia, the government has taken incremental measures to deal with the outbreak in the country and curb its spread.

Tunisia started screening arriving passengers with thermal cameras or frontal lasers at all ports of entry since late January, as part of a sanitary surveillance plan. Upon arrival, all passengers were required to complete a health questionnaire and observe a 14-day self-isolation period from the arrival date. Most of the first confirmed cases were visitors coming from countries heavily affected by COVID-19. Thus, the government on March 16 suspended international flights and closed maritime borders, with the exception of repatriation flights to and from Tunisia.

The health ministry is also taking the lead in other areas, including updating the public and raising awareness. The ministry provided 24-hour hotlines for urgent medical services related to coronavirus. Furthermore, to increase transparency and limit rumors that may cause public anxiety, the health ministry created a user-friendly website to disseminate real-time official information. This proactive approach was especially needed as the chronic lack of essential medical equipment in the health sector will make the response much more difficult than prevention.

The new measures included a general curfew from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m.; a ban on all public gatherings and travel between cities except for proven essential needs; and the closing of schools and universities. On March 20, Tunisian President Kais Saied convened his national security council and announced additional measures. Accordingly, all Tunisians must undergo self-isolation and limit themselves to essential movements only for absolute necessities like grocery stores and pharmacies. On March 23, President Saied ordered the army to enforce the lockdown. The government also announced several measures to tackle the economic recession the crisis will cause. In addition to allocating $850 million to combat the economic and social effects of the lockdown, the government has promised to delay tax debts, postpone taxes on small- and medium-sized businesses, delay repayment of low-income employee loans, and provide financial assistance to poor families.

In Tunisia, there is public agreement on the limits of the healthcare system. To help flatten the curve, the public called on the government to implement a general lockdown. Ironically, Tunisians even went as far as petitioning the government to apply a 24-hour curfew, something no one would have ever thought could happen given the populace’s wariness of government overreach since the ouster of the repressive Ben Ali regime. There has been mounting solidarity among Tunisians to support the health ministry in its efforts, especially through donations and volunteering.

Tunisians are also closely monitoring the situation in neighboring countries, particularly in Italy. The situation in Italy has had a significant impact on Tunisian public opinion, as Rome and Tunis historically have very close ties. In conversations between Tunisians and the authors, many expressed concern that if Italy is struggling so much, the Tunisian system would struggle even more so if Tunisians increasingly contracted the virus. As such, many are now actively complying with government measures, as there is a widespread perception that if they don’t, Tunisia could head for the worse.   

Algeria

Algeria is experiencing a growing number of coronavirus contractions with 367 cases and 25 deaths as of March 27. To contain the virus, the Algerian government gradually banned travel; canceled all large-scale events, closed schools, universities, mosques, and restaurants; and asked people to stay home. Then on March 23, officially declared a lockdown and curfew from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. The government has also enforced police patrols and blockades to control movement on the streets and dispatched the military to Algiers and Blida to enforce official directives. Most importantly, the government ordered the end of mass street protests that have taken place in the country for more than a year.

The demonstrations, which began in February 2019 after President Abdelaziz Bouteflika announced that he would run for a fifth term, lead to his resignation on April 2, but not the true overhaul of the elite political class that the movement has sought. Friday after Friday, people took to the streets to demand big structural changes, including the ousting of holdovers from Bouteflika’s regime and democratizing reforms. The election of President Abdelmadjid Tebboune in December 2019, prompted additional protests about his legitimacy and the inability of the regime to carry out the promised change in Algeria’s political system. Protests continued despite concerns about the spread of coronavirus.

On March 17, President Tebboune delivered an address announcing the “prohibition of rallies and marches whatever their form and their nature” in order to combat the contagion. On March 20, for the first time since it began, the street protest movement—commonly referred to as the Hirak—stopped what would have been the 57th consecutive week of protests against the political elite, leaving the streets to police vehicles parked along the main streets of the capital. Although these official measures designed to limit public gatherings have been mainly interpreted as an opportunistic attempt to muzzle the protest movement, several Hirak activists started to call for the temporary suspension of the marches, emphasizing the importance of this measure in order to stop the spread of COVID-19. But the persistent political and social instability could pose a challenge to countering the virus due to the government’s lack of political legitimacy and the serious mistrust between the population and authorities.

The announced political projects, such as the revision of the constitution by referendum and the anticipated parliamentary election, risk being postponed by the government due to the current health crisis. This emergency fits within the looming economic situation aggravated by the fall in oil prices due to Russia and Saudi Arabia’s oil price war. Petroleum revenues still represent the main source of government income. On March 10, Prime Minister Abdelaziz Djerad raised alarm by stating that the country is facing an unprecedented “multi-dimensional crisis” exacerbated by the oil price collapse. Together with the oil crisis, the coronavirus crisis could deliver the final blow to an already weakened system, leading to economic and political implosion, with effects spreading well beyond Algeria’s borders.

Morocco

On March 2, Morocco announced its first case of coronavirus. In response, the Moroccan authorities implemented several measures to control the spread of the virus. On March 13, the government began closing borders, suspending all international flights, cruises, and passenger ships, and enforcing restrictions on domestic flights.

Heeding World Health Organization guidelines and lessons learned from Italy, Morocco made tests available and free to all citizens. To finance the country’s coronavirus response, a special fund was created at King Mohammed VI’s instruction, so far bringing in $1.5 billion in donations from Moroccan corporations, banks, and even private individuals. Parliament, judiciary, and other government members have also donated their salary to support the Kingdom during these difficult times. Healthcare centers prepared 1,640 beds for coronavirus patients, including 250 beds reserved for life-threatening cases. On March 22, Morocco received from China a delivery of necessary medical aid to help halt the spread of COVID-19.

On March 19, the Kingdom issued a state of emergency, shutting down all schools, mosques, cafes and restaurants, sports and entertainment venues to combat the virus’ spread. To ease economic pain, Morocco will pay a stipend to people who lose their jobs and defer tax and debt payments from small businesses. Despite these measures, the Kingdom witnessed some public gatherings in violation of official guidelines. In response, the committee for the interior minister within the Moroccan parliament unanimously voted for a draft law to discipline violators and criminalize all actions that could jeopardize the country’s state of emergency and put the population at risk. Along these lines, Moroccan police have arrested at least a dozen people for reportedly spreading rumors about the coronavirus, including a woman who used her YouTube channel to claim the disease did not exist.

With 275 confirmed cases including 11 deaths as of March 27, Morocco is eager to stop the spread of COVID-19 by not only collaborating with all governmental and non-governmental institutions, but also by raising awareness among Moroccan citizens, whose participation will determine the success of the Kingdom’s response to the crisis.

Karim Mezran is a resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. Follow him on Twitter: @mezrank.

Alessia Melcangi is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and a tenure track assistant professor at La Sapienza University of Rome. Follow her on Twitter: @AlessiaMelcangi.

Emily Burchfield is an assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Zineb Riboua is an intern with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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The final text of the draft law has not yet been passed, but it has already generated confusion and debate from a concerned Moroccan population that wonders how mandatory military service will address festering economic and social issues that remain front and center priorities for Morocco’s youth. Official rhetoric about the pending military conscription largely frames the proposed law in terms of enhancing patriotism and citizenship among the youth. However, if this is the government’s answer, it must take steps to better communicate the purported benefits of conscription, and channel citizens’ concerns through the country’s institutionalized legal consultation mechanisms.

Should the conscription law indeed go into effect, it will face a challenging environment. Despite overall growth in the country, recent figures show that 29.3% of Moroccan youth between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four do not work, are not in school, and do not participate in any kind of training or professional development. The past two years have seen heightened tensions in Morocco as protests—many led by youth—over social and economic conditions spread in the northern Rif city of Al Hoceima and the mining town of Jerada. These figures, combined with the king’s speech demanding that economic and social programs produce better options for the youth, have set a tone and urgency in creating a better future for this demographic. Given this context, the new draft law appears tone-deaf—tackling tangential issues of patriotism and citizenship while avoiding the pressing matters of employment and basic opportunity.

In official statements, the government stressed that the conscription bill would enhance Moroccan youth’s sense of citizenship and responsibility to the nation, and allow them to contribute to the country’s development. This discourse is framed within the constitution’s Article 38 that tasks both men and women with defending the country and its territorial integrity. Service would last for twelve months and offer similar benefits as professional enlistment, including compensation, housing, and health insurance. Evasion is punishable by sentences of one to three months and fines of around $200 to $500. Exemptions include married citizens, individuals who are handicapped or have a physical illness, individuals who are financially responsible for their families, and youth who are serving a prison sentence of more than six months or have an active criminal record.

When the draft law was announced, there was confusion and alarm about whether citizens with dual nationality would have to serve. Since then, some officials have clarified that the duty only applies to Moroccans living within the country. Instead of answering questions about the draft law in a piecemeal format, these conversations should be held as part of a broader official dialogue.

The draft law is not Morocco’s first attempt at mandatory military service. On June 9, 1966, a royal decree introduced an eighteen-month mandatory military service—optional for women—which was later reduced to twelve months. In 2007, King Mohammed VI abolished mandatory military service on an “exceptional” basis, which some analysts speculated was a result of fears that terrorist groups would try to infiltrate the Moroccan army. Moreover, the conscription law was not adequately enforced due to limited government resources. These challenges could also plague the new draft law, with critics already pointing out that these funds could instead be allocated to the education system or jobs training, which could help instill the same values of discipline and responsibility as the military.

The approval of the bill at the government level was completed in an unprecedented time, without a public dialogue or consultations to discuss provisions, thus coming as a surprise to many. Without a final bill to examine, many have begun speculating about its contents. Perhaps the most fundamental point regarding the draft law is that soldiers are conscripted by the state and not enlisted voluntarily—a particularly risky initiative given the already fraught relationship between the youth and the state. Some also worry that obligating women to enlist in the military will raise the ire of Moroccan families who would not want their single daughters to serve alongside men. Other Moroccans are concerned that conscription will disproportionately impact individuals from lower social classes, and use slogans such as “the nation is for the rich and nationalism is for the poor.” A Facebook group called “Moroccans Rally Against Compulsory Military Service” was created, and members have already published a statement against draft law 44.18, arguing that the millions of dirhams (estimated at $300 million a year) that would be allocated for military training could instead be invested in the socio-economic development of youth. The group already has more than 15,000 members, and hundreds of posts in the past month alone.

Other Moroccans see the value in mandatory military service. Despite youth discontent, these individuals believe the bill is a commendable initiative that will provide young people with a meaningful career, skills, and opportunity to give back to the country. Article 6 of the draft law indicates that conscripts with technical or professional skills can be integrated into additional roles within the military for further career development. While the majority of the world’s countries have done away with mandatory military service, other states in the Arab world have returned to conscription in recent years, including the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait. While some conscripts enjoyed employment as part of the program, most of these initiatives in the Gulf were not created to directly address youth joblessness. The countries established conscription as part of national identity projects, and to increase nationalism and responsibility in young men who have grown up in rentier states.

However, Morocco is not an oil monarchy, and youth unemployment remains at the top of its priorities. While the government may acknowledge this fact, it has yet to reap benefits from existing economic and social programs targeted at youth. If the government wants to use conscription to empower youth with values and skills to become more able citizens and economic engines, then a fundamental first step would be to lead a multidisciplinary dialogue on the draft law with youth stakeholders and consultative groups. This dialogue would engage the bill’s target audience—Moroccan youth—on the bill’s potential to shape youth leadership and development, integrate youth into the military service, and tie into educational reform. As it stands, the draft bill does not specifically outline how the military fits within a coherent youth development strategy, and may instead further deteriorate the youth’s relationship with the government. If the reactions to the initial announcement are any indication of Moroccan public opinion, then the next iterations of the law would benefit from being more inclusive of youth views and responsive to their legitimate concerns about conscription.

Sarah Alaoui is a PhD candidate in the Middle East Studies department at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
Leila Hanafi holds a PhD in law from the UK,  is  an international lawyer in Washington DC, with the World Bank Group and founder and principal of international development law firm ARPA Dispute Resolution www.arpainternational.org 

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Tensions between Morocco and Iran over the Western Sahara dispute ignited in March 2017, when the Moroccan authorities arrested Lebanese Hezbollah financier Kassim Tajideen in Casablance, en route to Beirut from Guinea-Bissau. According to the US Treasury Department, Tajideen  provided funding for Hezbollah in cash bundles as large as $1 million. Following his arrest, he was extradited to the United States and prosecuted for terror-related charges. Tajideen’s arrest increased tensions between Hezbollah and Morocco, and some observers argue that it had the effect of drawing the Polisario Front and Hezbollah closer together. The groups had long been aware of each other and may have drawn inspiration from each other’s actions, as both are non-state actors conveying a political message against a perceived aggressor through asymmetrical warfare tactics. Their direct relationship appears to have begun in 2016, when Hezbollah formed a committee in Lebanon to support the people of Western Sahara.

Beyond the allegations of Hezbollah’s role, Morocco directly accuses Iran of destabilizing the Western Sahara region through its Embassy in Algiers.  Bourita points out that Iran’s Cultural Attaché in Algiers, Amir al Mussawi, assisted in smuggling Hezbollah weapons to the Polisario Front through Algeria. Al Mussawi previously held positions as Iran’s Vice-Minister of Defense and Director of the Iranian Center for Strategic Studies, a prominent research institution with close ties to the government. The Iranian diplomat has also been at the centerstage of a controversy in Algeria earlier this year, targeting the former Algerian First Lady, Anissa Boumediene. In a Facebook rant, al Mussawi criticized Boumediene for supporting an Iranian movement advocating regime-change in Iran.

A designed strategic tactic that further divides the Middle East

Morocco’s allegations were quickly denied by Iran, Hezbollah, Algeria, and representatives of the Polisario. In an official statement, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Bahram Qasimi declared that “Morocco has failed to provide any evidence to substantiate [these] allegations.” Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah echoed the Iranian response by denying any relation between Hezbollah and the Polisario Front.

However, Tehran’s denial of interfering in Western Sahara is cast into doubt by its activities elsewhere in the Middle East. Iran uses its influence with its proxies to gain ground in Arab countries such as Syria and Iraq, where it explicitly demonstrates its ambition to counter Western powers. In Syria, Iran’s hands reach beyond the scope of weapons supply, reconstruction, and military advising and training, as Iran increasingly seeks to become a permanent power within Syria—an aim which threatens the alliance between Russia, Turkey, and Iran as well as the future stability of Syria. And Iran’s well-documented investment in Hezbollah as a powerful instrument to exercise foreign influence in the region continues to pose a substantial threat to the stability of the region.

Morocco has not yet provided visual proof substantiating its claims against Iran and Hezbollah, but the claims may not be entirely baseless, considering Iran’s growing ambitions in the region.  However, Rabat’s allegations occurred in timely circumstances, as the diplomatic severing with Iran followed the US administration’s decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal. The increasingly hostile rhetoric of the US administration towards Tehran and the rapprochement of the United States with Gulf countries may have propelled Morocco, an Arab country, to pick a side. Morocco is mindful that backing the United States and its longstanding Gulf allies will eventually benefit its efforts to garner support at the United Nations for its Autonomy Plan in Western Sahara. Morocco may also seek to tie the Polisario Front to Hezbollah to cast it as a destabilizing actor unwilling to seek a peaceful settlement of the conflict and therefore an illegitimate party to negotiate with.

The Gulf countries welcomed Morocco’s decision to cut diplomatic ties with Iran—especially Saudi Arabia, as demonstrated by the Saudi Foreign Minister Adel bin Ahmed Al-Jubeir’s tweeting  his support for Morocco’s decision. Morocco seems determined to stand by its Gulf allies, with which it has historic relations, against Iran. Morocco is bound to side with Saudi Arabia in particular, as Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s recent reforms align with Morocco’s policy ambitions. Whatever the reasons behind Morocco’s decision, this latest episode in the rift between Arab monarchies and Iran further exacerbates the divide in the Middle East and reinforces the prospect of large-scale sectarian conflict.

Mariam Elatouabi is a Youth Delegate at the United Nations and chairwoman of ‘Josoor’ an NGO in the MENA region advocating for dialogue and cooperation in the Middle East through youth empowerment. She tweets @MariamElat.

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The main opposition to Moroccan governance is the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), a state apparatus of the Polisario that claims Western Sahara’s independence and runs its government out of Algeria. SADR also holds two offices in Spain: one in Madrid and another in Barcelona. According to a local source, SADR partisans took part in local Catalan demonstrations and raised the flag of the SADR movement, raising the profile of their campaign by visibly tying it to the Catalan referendum movement. 

SADR has a long tradition of lobbying in Madrid for independence from the Moroccan government. The Moroccan autonomy plan aims to grant a special autonomy status to the Western Sahara region but retain Moroccan sovereignty, an arrangement similar to that of the Catalan region in Spain. Spain is a vocal advocate of Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara, which is also supported by the United States and France. Following the Catalan referendum, Moroccan King Mohammed VI reiterated the state’s firm position to pursue the Moroccan autonomy plan for Western Sahara in a televised speech on November 6.

In contrast to the Spanish government’s support of Morocco and its autonomy plan for Western Sahara, Spain’s left-wing parties empathize with the Sahrawi nationalist movement. Catalan President Puigdemont’s Catalan European Democratic Party has long supported self-determination for Western Sahara, as well as movements  against the Moroccan government such as the Hirak—a movement resulting from the popular protests in the Moroccan Rif region. Moroccan officials refused to meet with the Catalan president earlier this year due to the support of the Catalan government for the Rif contestations. Additionally, in November 2016, the left-wing Podemos-Unidos, the third largest party in Spain, pushed for the Spanish government to come up with a strategy that would enable a referendum process in Western Sahara.

The efforts of pro-Catalan independence political actors in Spain to bolster their own position by encouraging similar movements could ultimately have an impact on Western Sahara’s separatist movement. It is unclear how a referendum in Western Sahara would move forward, but it could have the same destabilizing effect recently seen in Spain and Iraqi Kurdistan. The threat of regional unrest triggered by such a move could motivate the Moroccan government to more vigorously pursue peaceful negotiations with SADR.

Morocco could capitalize on the referendum-driven chaos in Spain to argue that its Western Sahara autonomy plan is the reasonable path forward, contrasted with an undeveloped self-determination movement. Sahrawi nationalists may also be discouraged by the failure of the referendum in Spain. At a time when the Moroccan government is scrutinized over its poor handling of the Rif contestations and its lack of strategy in providing sensible solutions for the grievances of the Moroccan population, it could take control of the dialogue by focusing on improving the situation in Western Sahara. To do so, the government will need to focus on open negotiations, in order to avoid a situation where the opposition sees no choice but to risk a referendum.

Mariam Elatouabi is a Youth Delegate at the United Nations and chairwoman of ‘Josoor’ an NGO in the MENA region advocating for dialogue and cooperation in the Middle East through youth empowerment. She tweets @MariamElat.

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Progressive trends in the written law

Morocco’s position as a Western ally and a regional leader in women’s rights is based on its legal protections for women. In recent years Morocco has taken substantial steps to establish parity between the sexes in constitutional, family, and criminal law on the books. Feminist civil society and non-governmental organizations, composed mainly of educated, urban women, have been at the forefront of organizing and lobbying in favor of these reforms.

The 2011 Constitution guarantees equal protection and enjoyment of its laws for both men and women. The country’s progressive Family Law (Moudawana) secured important rights for Moroccan women, including the right to self-guardianship, the right to divorce, and the right to child custody. The legal marriage age changed from 15 to 18 years of age, and women are no longer required to have a male guardian approve their marriage. The criminal code has taken strides against acts of gender based violence, cracking down on non-partner sexual assault and repealing the rape marriage law, which allowed a rapist to evade punishment by marrying his victim.

However, some legislative gaps persist with disparities between the laws on the books and in practice. Some protections afforded under the 2004 Moudawana are left open to interference by gaps in the legislation, notably the prohibition on early and forced marriage which may be permitted through judicial waiver. While non-partner sexual assault is effectively addressed, marital rape is still unrecognized. Sexual harassment in public spaces is largely unchecked, with the current law defining harassment only in terms of employer-employee exchanges.

Barriers to effective implementation

While feminist groups work to push legislative standards towards equality, conservatives in civil society organizations, judicial institutions, and society fight to limit the legislation and its effects.

Some of the key barriers to effective implementation include: judicial oversight and accountability; progressive legislation by formal and informal justice mechanisms; police enforcement; legal aid and information. Judges, particularly older judges and those in rural regions, use their discretion to permit waivers for early marriage and to restrict female-initiated divorces, among other new rights. If a women obtains a favorable resolution, there is no guarantee that the decision will be enforced.

Social and cultural barriers form other key barriers for women’s equality and inherent rights. Economic needs and social traditions tend to favor antiquated female roles as early brides and domestic workers. Education and literacy among girls is still not valued. The key informant interviews conducted for this context analysis revealed that there are many social pressures in Morocco to resist change in gender justice, and these pressures are greater in rural areas. There is a sharp social divide in Morocco whereby young urban women along with civil society organizations are using their newly afforded rights and pushing for greater equality, while older, religious, and conservative rural populations stand as a barrier to effective implementation.

Balancing domestic and international law

Despite Morocco being party to several international law conventions and acknowledging the precedence of international instruments over national legislation, the 2017 UPR Review by the UN Human Rights Council noted several problems in its evaluation of Morocco’s human rights record, partially because of gender bias.

Morocco is not only bound to adhere to international standards on gender equality based on its ratification of several treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Convention on the Elimination of Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), but also under domestic law.

For the first time, in its newly reformed 2011 Constitution, Morocco declared the country’s adherence to universally recognized human rights and affirmed the preeminence of international law over national legislation. As a monist state, international treaties are automatically part of domestic law, once published in the Official Bulletin, without requiring an implementing law. In accordance with its constitutional provisions, this makes all treaties to which Morocco is party the supreme law of the land.

Since ratification of CEDAW in 1993, the Moroccan Government has submitted progress reports on the Convention to the United Nations, each showing progress towards reforming the legal code and improving the status of women. Some reservations, such as to Article 9 of CEDAW, deal with the right of a mother to transmit her citizenship to her children, have already been abandoned, there remain apparent delays in enforcing these provisions nationally.

Morocco’s gradual change approach as currently applied is insufficient for genuine progress

Not only is the government legally obliged to protect women from discrimination, it also has the power to promote progressive social change. King Mohamed VI advocated a gradual approach for empowering women and, as such, supported the transformative power of the law.

The gradual change approach to implementing women’s rights laws employs ‘constrained legalism’, requiring that laws be deployed in a way that is ‘neither utopian in its hopes for legal reform nor rejectionist in its dismissal of legal avenues of transformation.’ The gradual change approach is an attempt to balance the split in the nation between those who emphasize the universality of human rights and those who call upon a more culturally specific, if not an ‘authentic’ approach to rights and freedoms.

Would applying a more rigid reading of the law disrespect and violate the will of the people? And would a more relativist reading of the law strip individuals of their rights? Currently, there is no clear consensus among the population on what they wish the law to be. This divide is played out between feminist groups, Islamists, and conservatives who seek to define the modern national identity.

Solutions

For Morocco to harness the transformative power of the legal reforms through a more universal application of the law, strengthening the formal justice system is key. Inadequacies within the justice sector need to be addressed including high costs, lengthy proceedings, and corruption. Improved record keeping and mechanisms for oversight can address several of these limitations. Legislators should also seek to close the gaps in the law that permit the extensive use of discretion that eliminate provisions or specific judicial bases. The government should also take significant steps to improve the training of judges and traditional leaders with regard to: basic principles of fair trials; the specific rights and obligations under national and international law; and the particular needs of women and other vulnerable groups.

However, without addressing the social and cultural barriers that keep women from seeking judicial remedies, even transformative legal reforms will not be sufficient to empower women. Implementing a program on legal literacy could have substantial benefits regarding women’s legal and social empowerment. To utilize the power of legal literacy, it must be implemented in a way that reaches all Moroccan women. Thus, awareness building in various locations in both Arabic and Amazigh dialects is needed. Consideration to the medium that is most effective at communicating information is required where basic literacy and access to technology vary substantially across geographic regions.

Legal aid is one way in which the government can address lack of information, legal literacy, and engagement with the legal system for women. On the legal aid front, successful pilot legal aid projects founded upon a strong partnership is key among the bar, the judiciary, social workers, CSOs, and universities. Law faculty and students serve as valuable civil legal assistance providers through clinical programs. Legal aid clinics constitute a highly effective, successful, and increasingly global means of combating the lack of access to justice for marginalized populations throughout the world.

Morocco has the ability and opportunity to improve the conditions of women, fulfill their international and domestic laws and values, and to nurture its beneficial alliance with the United States and the Western world, more generally. Through the transformative power of legal formalism, the implementation of the reforms at ground level has the capacity to empower women.

While social realities must be considered by legislators, the law has an educational function and sets norms for what society thinks is right and what’s wrong. Patriarchal gender relations are ripe to be addressed through this function of legal reform and must be addressed collectively by the government, the judiciary, local leaders, the media, civil society, and educators. Failure to do so hinders the law from affecting meaningful change.

Danielle Hites is a legal analyst for the Alliance for Rule of Law Promotion & Alternative Dispute Resolution and has a JD from Boston University School of Law.

Leila Hanafi is a Moroccan-American international development lawyer with the United Nations and the principal of the Alliance for Rule of Law Promotion & Alternative Dispute Resolution in Washington DC.  

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As with the infamous 2011 events in Tunisia, sparked by a peddler named Bouazizi immolating himself, it is the underlying poverty and sense of humiliation of a wide swath of Rif dwellers that has fuelled this more recent uprising. Civil society leaders are warning that after an initial period of political and economic reform the monarchy (or to be precise the deep state referred to as al-Makhzen in Morocco) is again turning defensive and resorting to repression and putting the brakes on steps towards democratization.

Politically, the positive step taken by the King after 2011, accepting to name a prime minister from the party that won the most seats in parliament, led to the appointment of the country’s first Islamist prime minister, head of the opposition Party of Justice and Development (PJD). Abdelillah Benkirane, prime minister until April 2017, was able to stay as long as he did in this post by toning down his Islamist rhetoric and accepting in advance the King’s veto power over any and all decisions made by him. In effect, the King remained the real power counseled by the same close advisors he had since acceding to power while Benkirane appeared, most of all to his supporters, as a paper Islamist and ineffective opposition leader.

Economically, Morocco retains a low ranking on indices of development, corruption, democracy and youth employment. Classified as partly free on the Freedom House democracy index, at forty-one percent the country remained in the lower half of the ranked world countries for 2016. Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index gave Morocco a score of 37 out of a possible score of 100 for 2016. On the human development index for the same year, Morocco was ranked 123 (out of 188) on the United Nation’s human development index (a composite of life expectancy, education and income per capita data). This puts Morocco in the lowest third of world economies, behind Palestine and the Philippines. World bank prognosis for the year ahead projects a healthy 3.8 percent growth, but given the level of corruption and dominance by a powerful business elite, the report concludes “Morocco’s already low labor participation rate keeps declining. Looking forward, Morocco continues to face the paramount challenges of promoting stronger private-sector-led growth and job creation, and increasing shared prosperity.”

Morocco’s years of lead ended with the release of remaining political prisoners in 1991. There followed a period of optimism, with the King’s allowing the formation of civil society groups, more political freedoms, and the formation of the country’s first opposition government in 1998. Another era of optimism began after Hassan II’s death and the ascendency to the throne of his son Mohammed VI in 1999. The sense of optimism was palpable as opposition leaders and former political prisoners spoke freely of a new era in Morocco and praised the young king for being “quite different from his father.”

The years of lead, or what some refer to as the Tazmamart era, in reference to the infamous prison in the desert where most of the disappeared were incarcerated, featured the repression of university students and young political activists from the late seventies and early eighties. While some belonged to left wing parties others were simply disgruntled youth desiring a genuine democracy in their country. The authorities were alarmed when demonstrations spilled outside university campuses and connected with city workers and residents of poverty belts around major cities like Casablanca. Incarceration included the isolation and torture (of both men and women) and some of the disappeared were never returned to their families.

To be sure, Morocco can never go back to the dark days of the years of lead. Political opposition is now too entrenched in the institutions of government, the courts are not totally under the thumb of the regime and civil society organizations are too active on social media to allow for disappearances and torture to go unnoticed, not just by Moroccans, but by the whole world. That said, events in Hoceima highlight the limits of progress in civil liberties and human rights and the disappointment of human rights activists after an initial optimism in the ability of Mohammed VI to bring about positive change.

Fouad Abdelmoumni, one of those civil society leaders who emerged from the dark days of Hassan II to fight for full democratization and economic rights for all Moroccans said in a conversation with the author, “The regime is pushing as much as it can towards the monopoly of decision, the emasculation of new elites, and the militarization of the street. The state obviously feels threatened by democratization but I am confident that social demand for it can only grow and that the inability of the regime to satisfy economic needs by depleting reserves will highlight the regime’s incompetence and the need for new elites.”

Dr. Nabeel Khoury is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. He served twice in Morocco, he was the Press Attache at the U.S. Embassy in Rabat from 1994-1997 and again as U.S. Consul General from 1998-2002.

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Well back in August 2014, I wrote here about “The Military Implications of Scottish and Catalonian Secession.” After this past weekend’s events in Catalonia, I thought that I should republish a slightly updated version of that essay, this time focusing on the Catalan question. It is important to remember, after all, that the secessionist government in Barcelona has indeed endorsed joining both the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Fairly, both organizations have warned that accession is not remotely automatic, depending rather on the agreement of every existing member state. Those are slightly different lists of 28 countries, and one must only remember the juvenile and endless exclusion of Macedonia by the Greeks—over a branding dispute—to understand how long a blackballing can last. As two of my Atlantic Council colleagues once questioned, the EU may not soon admit Catalonia, as some member states (particularly Belgium) have cause to fear further secessionist activity.
Even so, as ugly as the Spanish response appeared, the federal government in Madrid may not manage to block a determined move for self-determination. So, assuming that Catalonia was admitted to NATO, what would the newly independent country contribute? At the 2014 Strategic Foresight Forum at the Atlantic Council, Anne Marie Slaughter of the New America Foundation opined that an independent Catalonia would do a fine job of defending itself. After all, Catalonia is a country of over 7 million people, with more than $300 billion in GDP. Spending just 1.6% of that—well below the widely-ignored NATO threshold, of course—provides over $4.5 billion annually. That’s roughly the military budget of Denmark, which has well-regarded and efficient armed forces.

Catalonian military plans are somewhat vague, but when the issue arose back in 2014, they emphasized a navy. With excellent ports in Barcelona and Tarragona, Catalonia is well-positioned as a minor naval power, “with the Mediterranean as our strategic environment, and NATO as our framework,” as the nationalists’ think-tank on defense argued. The rough plans called for a littoral security group of a few hundred sailors at first. After a few years, Catalonia would assume responsibility as “a main actor in the Mediterranean,” with land-based maritime patrol aircraft and small surface combatants. Eventually, the nationalist ambition may include an expeditionary group with a light assault carrier and hundreds of marines, to take a serious role in collective security. That would be rather more helpful to the Alliance than Madrid’s focus on tanks and artillery to defend Ceuta and Melilla from a Moroccan invasion.

Of course, all these plans are subject to the vagaries of the country’s political process, but Catalonia’s ambitions are reasonable in part because they are restrained. If accurately characterized by the few white papers that have surfaced, the separatists’ position suggests a valuable and refreshing view of specialization in collective defense: build a navy that is comparatively focused on influencing events ashore. After all, in broad terms, the further one sits from Russia, the less important ground forces, and the more needed naval forces. By de-emphasizing the military forces that any landlocked country will have, and instead steering investments towards those it is comparatively positioned to provide, Catalonia could punch above its weight in European political affairs. There may be no further Álvaro de Bazáns in Barcelona, but there may be new littoral forces—flying the four bars of the Senyera—that NATO needs around the periphery of the Mediterranean.

In short, while NATO’s member states may not treat the eventuality lightly, I expect the Alliance need worry little about losing much through Catalonian independence. Indeed, there was only one clear loser after this past weekend’s events: the Spanish federal government. Brutalizing people going to the ballot box is never a winning argument.

James Hasík is a senior fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security.

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As Aubrey Hruby and I documented in a report last year, those countries that rely heavily on the export of one or two resources to drive their economic growth have suffered as a result of the emerging market downturn and its knock-on effects, both in terms of demand for their commodities and in availability of financing for their major infrastructure and other development projects.

Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and one which only emerged as the continent’s biggest economy three years ago, is bedeviled not only by low petroleum prices, but decreased production due to attacks by the militants in the oil-producing Niger Delta region—at one point last year, the amount of crude being pumped nearly reached the lowest point in three decades. The rest of the economy in the West African giant essentially stagnated, hammered both by the government’s maladroit management of the currency float and by the failure of President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration to make much headway in improving the country’s overall business climate, as witnessed by Nigeria’s abysmal 169^th place ranking among 190 countries analyzed in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2017 report. 

Angola nudged ahead of Nigeria early last year to become Africa’s biggest oil producer, thanks in part to the latter country’s problems with its militants, but the distinction means less in a world of depressed hydrocarbon prices. With inflation projected to have been around 45 percent in 2016, while the country’s currency, the kwanza, lost nearly 20 percent of its value during the same period, the country’s grim prospects heading into the new year add to the uncertainty with the announced plans of longtime President José Eduardo dos Santos to retire later this year (elections are scheduled for August).

Similarly, Algeria’s heavy dependence on energy exports caused the growth to slow down to an estimated 3.6 percent in 2016 with the World Bank estimating it will plunge further in the coming year. Low oil prices will continue to weigh on government finances as inflation and unemployment both increase; the dinar has nominally depreciated 20 percent over the last two years. The 2017 budget signed by the country’s octogenarian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in late December raises taxes to compensate for declining revenues from hydrocarbons, signaling that the heavy public spending that enabled the regime to weather the so-called Arab Spring is no longer an option.

While South Africa was spared an end-of-the-year downgrade by Standard & Poor’s of its sovereign credit—it remains at BBB-, one notch above “junk” status—Moody’s opened 2017 by placing the country on a downgrade review, a step which serves notice to investors, some of whom have fiduciary obligations barring them from doing business in places branded with “junk” status. Moreover, the numerous corruption scandals surrounding President Jacob Zuma have divided the ruling African National Congress, already reeling from unprecedented rebuff in the August 2016 local government and municipal elections, adding to the political volatility that undermines investor confidence just as the country regained its title as Africa’s largest economy.

Despite its wealth of natural resources, both in terms of extractives and in potential for renewable energy, to say nothing of the extraordinary human capital in its people, the Democratic Republic of the Congo will struggle economically in the coming year. Notwithstanding a rickety last-minute political deal pushed by the country’s influential Roman Catholic bishops that is supposed to lead to presidential elections before the end of 2017, President Joseph Kabila’s decision to violate the constitution and hold on to power despite the December 19, 2016, expiration of his final term casts a long shadow over the fourth most-populous country on the African continent and the largest country by area in Sub-Saharan Africa. As Sasha Lezhnev of the Enough Project pointed out recently, the political crisis is not without its connection to economic woes, past and present: “Corruption has increased and prices for the key commodities that Congo produces have plummeted in recent years, e.g. with the price of copper going down by nearly half over the past five years. Average Congolese people are bearing the brunt of this. The price of some foodstuffs is up as high as 80 percent; the Congolese Franc has lost 27 percent of its value in 2016; inflation has increased to nearly 6 percent; Central Bank foreign exchange reserves have decreased by nearly half (45 percent) over the past two years. The Congolese government is also slashing state services, with budget cuts of 22 percent and a further 14 percent, including a 90 percent cut in spending on healthcare equipment.”

If some of the bigger and resource-dependent economies in Africa are in the doldrums, some of the continent’s medium-sized and more diversified economies will make interesting watching in the new year.

Côte d’Ivoire may well be Africa’s new economic powerhouse, with a diversified economy and growth in 2016 expected to hit 8.5 percent, the second-highest in the world. While there are occasional hiccups like the mutiny this past weekend by some soldiers left over from the country’s civil war a decade ago, by and large President Alassane Ouattara, an economist and former International Monetary Fund (IMF) director, is widely credited with sound macroeconomic management. Overwhelmingly reelected to a second and final four-year term in 2015, he has laid out an ambitious National Development Plan with major structural reforms to consolidate the private sector as well as to achieve inclusive growth. The IMF’s most recent regional economic outlook projects Côte d’Ivoire’s real gross domestic product (GDP) to continue growing at roughly 8 percent annually over the next few years, while the median for Sub-Saharan Africa will be just shy of 4.5 percent. According to data from the Ivorian government’s Center for the Promotion of Investments in Côte d’Ivoire (CEPICI), through in the first nine months of 2016, some 5,720 new enterprises were started in the country, many drawn by the business-friendly regulatory environment.

Fresh off hosting the 22^nd Conference of Parties (COP22) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change two months ago in Marrakech, Morocco continues to forge a role as an African—and, indeed, a global—leader on renewable energy. The kingdom, which is on track to meet more than 40 percent of its needs through renewable energy, primarily solar and wind, by 2020—an extraordinary turnaround given that just a few years ago the country was, according to the World Bank, the Middle East’s largest energy importer, depending on fossil fuels for over 97 percent of its energy. Moreover, in pursuit of the goal of making Morocco the commercial gateway to Africa as well as Africa’s bridge to Europe, King Mohammed VI has been busy implementing his strategy of making Africa the “top priority” of his foreign policy, with a string of official visits across Africa, including recent forays to Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Nigeria, that have resulted in agreements for multibillion-dollar cross-investments in the agriculture, energy, and financial sectors, as well as the historic announcement last month of a Moroccan-Nigerian joint venture to build a gas pipeline to connect the two countries that will eventually link up to Europe. 

Senegal has long been a bastion of political stability in West Africa, a reputation consolidated in 2016 when voters in a constitutional referendum not only reaffirmed the two-term limit on the presidency, but cut the term of office itself down to five years from the current seven years, as well as enacted a raft of other measures to further good governance. President Macky Sall’s Plan for an Emerging Senegal, crafted with help from McKinsey consultants, includes twenty-seven flagship projects and seventeen major reforms, encompassing diverse sectors ranging from agriculture to energy to education to health to financial services to tourism. The objective of all this is to increase the West African country’s productivity in order to grow its GDP, create jobs, and facilitate industrialization. According to the year-end update to Ernst & Young’s Africa Attractiveness Index, Senegal—along with Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania—is expected to continue growing in the high single digits in 2017.

One possible bump in Senegal’s road to the future is that the country was counting on a second Millennium Challenge Compact from the United States to help address regional obstacles to economic growth. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) board selected the country a year ago, but the Senegalese government’s December 2016 decision to only vote for, but to actively co-sponsor, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334 on Israeli settlements not only in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), but also in the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem, may cause Congress to closely scrutinize of a major appropriation for Senegal like an MCC compact, given the broad bipartisan support in the House of Representatives last week—by a margin of 342 to 80 votes—for a measure condemning the UN resolution and the Obama administration’s abstention on it. 

A largely diversified economic base, Kenya has largely been resilient through the emerging markets downturn of the last year. While final numbers for 2016 are still being crunched, it looks like East Africa’s largest economy grew by at least the 5.9 percent forecasted by the World Bank and that may even approach the 6.8 percent growth the revised IMF prediction estimated in October. One of Kenya’s advantages has been its membership in the East African Community, which has evolved from a customs union to a common market and has long-term aspirations of a monetary union and a political federation. On the other hand, the country faces not-insignificant political, security, and economic uncertainty in 2017 with presidential, parliamentary, and local government elections scheduled for August; the ongoing threat posed by al-Shabaab terrorists operating out of neighboring Somalia (recall that 2016 began with more than 100 Kenyan soldiers killed when the al-Qaeda-linked militants overran a peacekeeping base in El Adde, Somalia); and yet-to-be-determined impact on private-sector credit following the signing last year by President Uhuru Kenyatta of legislation capping interest rates at 4 percent above the benchmark central bank rate.

If it can weather the political crises that have led to mass demonstrations and the declaration of a state of emergency in late 2016, Ethiopia will, according to IMF estimates, be positioned to overtake Kenya as East Africa’s largest economy sometime in the coming year, having posted 10.8 percent average annual growth over the last decade, before drought hit the core agricultural sector this year (and anti-government protests erupted). Nevertheless, investors continue to flock to there—some $500 million in new foreign direct investment entered in the last three months of 2016 and an additional $3.5 billion was being processed, according to one analysis—and its large internal market (Ethiopia is the 13^th most populous country in the world) and low labor costs make it an attractive location to manufacture fast-moving consumer goods. In addition, Ethiopia’s investment in hydropower—last month authorities inaugurated Africa’s tallest dam, the Gibe III dam on the Omo River, doubling the country’s electrical output—will not only give it a reliable source of energy, but provide electricity to the region, including Kenya, which has signed up to buy some of the power produced.   

African countries face many challenges in 2017, but, alongside these, there are the fundamentally positive dynamics of many of their economies, including a growing labor force, increased urbanization, and advances in technology, as I argued recently in a new Atlantic Council Strategy Paper, A Measured US Strategy for the New Africa. The 2016 Republican Party Platform affirmed: “We recognize Africa’s extraordinary potential. Both the United States and our many African allies will become stronger through investment, trade, and promotion of the democratic and free market principles that have brought prosperity around the world. We pledge to be the best partner of all African nations in their pursuit of economic freedom and human rights.” As a new US administration takes office in less than two weeks, it’s time to look for ways to fulfill that pledge so that American citizens and business can join their African counterparts in grasping the continent’s burgeoning opportunities.

J. Peter Pham is Vice President of the Atlantic Council and Director of its Africa Center. Follow the Africa Center on Twitter @ACAfricaCenter.

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• compounded stress on water resources facing significant strain from overexploitation and degradation at present and increased demand in the future, with drought stress exacerbated in drought-prone regions of Africa;
• reduced crop productivity associated with heat and drought stress, with strong adverse effects on regional, national, and household livelihood and food security, and given increased pest and disease damage and flood impacts on food system infrastructure;
• changes in the incidence and geographic range of vector- and water-borne diseases due to changes in the mean and variability of temperature and precipitation, particularly along the edges of their distribution.

Nowhere are the changes and their impact likely to be more dramatic than in rainfall patterns—annual precipitation is expected to decrease throughout Africa with the possible exception of the eastern part of the continent—and the resulting immediate consequence to the agricultural sector. The models in some studies have predicted mean annual rainfall to decrease by 20 percent along the Mediterranean coast, while winter rains in southern Africa will also decrease, by perhaps as much as 40 percent. Less precipitation will have a serious impact on agriculture, most of which is dependent upon on rainfall. The social, economic, and political fallout from such a decline cannot be underestimated, with some scientists warning of dramatic declines in crop yields and, consequently, net agricultural revenues, with small-scale farmers being the most vulnerable.

Broadly speaking, the challenges arising from access to water will only proliferate, with complex, but clear, linkages between environmental stress and ongoing conflicts. From the Nigeria’s Middle Belt and the Lake Chad Basin across the continent to the Horn of Africa, climate change, land degradation, and increased competition over scarcer resources among both the root causes of as well as the consequences of violence.

Nor are all of these potential conflicts will be relatively contained internal disputes involving various groups within a given country in the timeless struggle between sedentary farmers and nomadic pastoralists over limited arable land and declining water resources. Access by the countries of the Nile basin, for example, to the great river’s water—which is itself highly dependent on precipitation levels in the Great Lakes region as well as the highlands of Ethiopia—has long been contentious, with Egypt making greater use of the waters than all the other riparian states combined. How long the current state of affairs, whereby Egypt and Sudan have claimed the use of the bulk of the river’s waters, can last is anyone’s guess. However, with more than 90 million people to feed, Ethiopia, where Blue Nile rises from Lake Tana and which contributes nearly 90 percent of the water and over 95 percent of the sediment carried by the Nile proper, will likely be making increasingly assertive claims of its own right to the water resources. On the other hand, Egypt’s successive rulers have never made a secret of their own willingness to defend their claims. While the “declaration of principles” signed in early 2015 by President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn of Ethiopia, and President Umar al-Bashir of Sudan, has the potential to transform the longstanding dispute over the Nile into an opportunity for collaboration and development in a corner of the continent much in need of both, flashpoints remain.

Alongside water scarcity, encroaching deserts present another challenge, not just in terms of the impact on local communities and broader food security, but in terms of mass migrations which have the effect of redrawing the demographic maps of entire countries or regions and putting previously discrete populations in direct competition for the same resources which are possibly even scarcer now thanks to climate change. Even without the threat of Boko Haram, the drying up of Lake Chad, which straddles the borders of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, has caused large-scale displacements of the population as the once-large body of freshwater has shrunken to one-twentieth of its original size in the last fifty years, causing local lack of water, crop failures, livestock deaths, collapsed fisheries, soil salinity, and increasing poverty throughout the region.

While lack of water presents one set of problems, an excess of it lead to another. A rise in the sea-level poses significant risks to both populations and economies along Africa’s littorals. Highly productive ecosystems located in the coastal zone, including mangroves, estuaries, and deltas which form the basis for important economic activities such as tourism and fisheries come under threat from the rising oceans.

In short, climate change has the potential to impact virtually all aspects of development in Africa. Although it has contributed the least to climate change, Africa will be hardest hit by these effects. Not only will the scarcity of water resources and increased intensity and volatility of rainfall worsen livelihoods, these will increase the costs of providing basic infrastructure such as roads and sanitation. Climate change will also compromise the productivity of low-technology agriculture, on which the livelihoods of the majority of Africans, especially women, depend. The cost of doing business will similarly increase, further constraining much-needed growth.

Fortunately, there are two factors mitigating this otherwise alarming picture.

First, the recognition of Africa’s growing strategic importance on the global stage for a number of geopolitical and economic reasons has led other nations to appreciate that it is in their own self-interest to help African countries achieve stability and security for themselves and their peoples, an objective that cannot be divorced from efforts to help them cope with the effects of climate change. United States President Barack Obama, for example, used his final address to the United Nations General Assembly in September 2016, to not only warn of the consequences of failure to act on climate change, speaking direly of “mass migrations, and cities submerged and nations displaced, and food supplies decimated, and conflicts born of despair,” but also to call upon wealthy countries to “invest in research and provide market incentives to develop new technologies, and then make these technologies accessible and affordable for poorer countries.”

Second, and even more importantly, African countries are increasingly discovering within themselves a number of innovative solutions to the challenges they face. It is no accident that Morocco is hosting the COP22 summit. The kingdom, which is on track to meet more than 40 percent of its needs through renewable energy, primarily solar and wind, by 2020—an extraordinary turnaround given that just a few years ago the country was, according to the World Bank, the Middle East’s largest energy importer, depending on fossil fuels for over 97 percent of its energy. In fact, literally just down the N9 highway from the COP22 meetings in Marrakech, on the other side of the High Atlas is Ouarzazate, where earlier this year King Mohammed VI inaugurated the Noor complex that will be the world’s largest concentrated solar power plant. According to Climate Investment Funds, which has invested in the project along with the African Development Bank and others, the plant will produce enough energy to power over one million homes by 2018, reducing carbon emissions by an estimated 760,000 tons per year. Thus, Morocco’s extraordinary commitment to clean power—underscored by members of the COP22 Steering Committee who briefed an Atlantic Council audience recently—shows that a green agenda not only is the right thing to do in the face of greenhouse gas emissions and climate change, but can also pay handsome budgetary and diplomatic dividends.

A similar story can be told about South-South cooperation to promote agricultural development which, in many respects, is at the heart of both the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. As host of COP22, Morocco has been championing an Initiative for the Adaption of Agriculture in Africa to Climate Change (AAA), AAA is built around two pillars, advocacy to secure project financing and promoting innovative solutions, to facilitate projects to improve soil husbandry, agricultural-water control, climate-risk management, and financial-capacity building as a way to meet the challenges of climate change and food insecurity.

While Africans’ disproportionately modest carbon footprint places them among the least responsible for the massive negative impacts that their continent is experiencing because of climate change, there is no reason why the governments and people of Africa should not be taking an active role in positively shaping their own future—and that of the planet as a whole.

J. Peter Pham is Director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow the Africa Center on Twitter @ACAfricaCenter.

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At the outset of the political uprisings that began in North Africa in 2010, the four countries of Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia faced similar economic and political challenges. Over the past almost six years, the countries have adopted different approaches to address these problems, however the overall economic picture today is grim amid varied political environments. In Aftermath of the Arab Spring in North Africa, authors Mohsin Khan and Karim Mezran examine whether these four North African countries have been successful in meetings the demands of their populations as expressed in the 2010-11 uprisings and what challenges remain for them in the future. 

While the political situations in the four countries in 2010, as well as the causes of the uprisings, were similar to a large extent, Khan and Mezran closely examine the starkly different directions that the post-revolt political evolutions took. Tunisia embarked on a process of reforming its legal and political structures in order to transition to a more pluralistic and inclusive system. However, the country’s progress is threatened by growing insecurity and economic challenges. Both Algeria and Morocco prevented protests from becoming widespread and violent in 2011 by enacting some constitutional reforms. In Morocco, a political arrangement between the monarchy and the Islamists appears to have maintained stability while also allowing for a progressive, albeit slow, political opening. However, in Algeria, the political system continues to be run in the same opaque manner as always. The post-revolution elites in Libya were incapable of facing the country’s severe political and economic challenges, and made one mistake after another. Today, Libya has devolved into a de facto failed state, as UN-led negotiations failed to resolve the country’s civil strife and reunite the country under a single leadership.

On the economic front, Khan and Mezran explain that a relatively good macroeconomic picture in Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia in 2010 actually hid many deep structural fault lines in the four economies. These fault lines–including high rates of unemployment, particularly among youth–were exposed by the political upheavals that took place in 2010 and 2011. Following the upheavals, economic reforms were put on the back burner, as economic stability and growth were viewed as secondary to political stability. The overall economic picture today is still grim, as the economies of all four countries are in no better shape, and in some cases much worse shape, than they were in 2010. The authors argue that labor market reforms and improvements in the business climate are necessary to help the countries get out of a low-growth and high-unemployment trap.

Khan and Mezran conclude that the main lesson to be drawn in examining the post-2011 economic and political developments in these four countries is that in the search for a new social contract that establishes wider consensus-based political legitimacy, elites must be willing to simultaneously undertake openings and reforms in the political arena and adopt far-reaching economic reforms. The experiences of these North African countries over the past five years demonstrates that the postponement of economic reforms has the ability to threaten or even undo progress made on the political front. 

MENASource Jan 14, 2018

What’s next? Seven years after Tunisia’s spring

By Andrea Taylor and Elissa Miller

Seven years after the 2011 Arab uprisings, Tunisia remains the only country to have emerged from the sweeping changes that took hold in the region as a fledgling democracy. Since then-President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali stepped down from power of January 14, 2011, Tunisia has accomplished a number of major successes, including holding free and […]

Democratic Transitions North Africa

Report Oct 5, 2018

The arc of crisis in the MENA region: Fragmentation, decentralization, and Islamist opposition

By Karim Mezran and Arturo Varvelli

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is experiencing a time of great transformation and as well as tumult. Atlantic Council Senior Fellow Dr. Karim Mezran and Dr. Arturo Varvelli of the Italian Institute for International Political Studies gathered experts to explore decentralization and political Islam in six MENA countries in “The Arc of […]

Energy & Environment Middle East

Report Feb 3, 2016

Economic recovery and revitalization

By Middle East Strategy Task Force

Even as the specter of political instability weighs heavily on the region, the Middle East is quietly experiencing a technological and societal transformation that could hold the keys to a better future.

Economy & Business Education

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The PJD took control of the government following the parliamentary elections of November 2011, the first after a series of uprisings shook the region earlier that year. Morocco, while not impacted like its neighbors, did see protests that garnered nationwide crowds of tens of thousands, later identified as the February 20 movement. Bringing together diverse interests, one of the movement’s key demands was to reduce the Moroccan monarchy to a parliamentary one – an entirely symbolic role similar to the British or Spanish model. Their demands also included calls for an independent judiciary, freedom of the press, and an end to corruption.

The Constitutional Reform Process

In response to the protests, King Mohamed VI publicly called for comprehensive constitutional reform. He appointed a 19-member advisory commission made up of academics and human rights activists to lead the process. Political parties, labor unions, and civil society organizations were invited to present a memorandum outlining their position on various issues. The king also established a so-called mechanism to operate alongside the commission, including representatives from most political parties and major trade unions. The mechanism’s participation in the process was meant to give a popular stamp of approval to the text drafted by the advisory committee.

Despite these attempts to create a participatory environment, the process remained opaque. Neither the public nor members of parliament were consulted over the appointments to the bodies, both headed by royal advisors. The sessions were not publically broadcast and the debate over the final text took place behind closed doors. Ultimately, the final word on the reforms went neither to the advisory commission nor to the mechanism—both asked only to give recommendations—but rather to the palace. The result was a constitution that guaranteed many individual rights and expanded the powers of parliament, but took incomplete steps toward reducing the king’s powers.

What Did Constitutional Reforms Achieve?

Overall, the new constitution included several liberal reforms, among them eleven rights previously not included, such as the right of access to justice and the right to protection of privacy. The constitution also transferred certain powers from the king to the prime minister, including appointing government officials and dissolving parliament. The prime minister himself, while still appointed by the king, must hail from the majority party in parliament. The actual progress the constitution made toward introducing democratic checks and balances on the monarch, however, remain questionable. The king continues to set the parliamentary agenda each year, and the parliament still lacks the tools for legislative oversight over certain government sectors, such as security. It requires parliament to adopt legislation specifying the terms of the constitution’s promised rights, including freedom of the press. The constitution also places the king at the head of Council of Ministers—responsible for approving legislation—and continues to grant him sole right to amend the constitution.

The eighth in a long series of constitutional reforms, the process reflected for some a certain Moroccan “exceptionalism.” Unlike many of its Arab neighbors following the 2011 uprisings, Morocco had demonstrated that both reform and stability were possible. Even if the result had not fully met protestors’ demands, the adoption of this new constitution via referendum on July 1 (in which 73 percent of registered voters reportedly participated, 98.5 percent of whom voted “yes”) was indicative of the country’s proclivity for gradual, stable change. But with little changing and many flaws in the transparency of the process itself, the grievances of the February 20 movement—mainly corruption and absence of a fully democratic government—remain.

The PJD comes to power

The 2011 parliamentary elections brought the PJD into the governing majority for the first time. The PJD represented to many voters a “fresh alternative” to the established parties whose reputation had suffered. This victory for the party, in which it won 107 out of 395 seats, was also a positive outcome for the monarchy. By creating a chance for an opposition party to govern (the first time was in 1998 in connection with an earlier set of royal reforms meant to enhance democratic legitimacy), the election result allowed the monarchy to continue permitting multi-party politics and channeling political participation without undermining its own power. And, although Morocco does not have a history of Islamist repression like Tunisia or Egypt, the crown’s own authority rests in part on its historical religious legitimacy; the result thus gave the monarchy the appearance of increased tolerance for Islamists.

In spite of its campaign promises of economic and social reform, events during its tenure, including losing its partner party in its ruling coalition, weakened the PJD’s ability to pass key legislation. This, in turn, contributed to a restoration of the status quo in which parties can compete freely in elections, but are unable to realize much-needed structural reforms. In the run-up to this year’s election, the rivalry between the PJD and its main contender, the royally-backed PAM, has been characterized as “hollow” due to the largely superficial differences between their campaigns. Rather than differentiating themselves through their programs (both parties are proposing similar platforms based on long-term economic development), the two parties are focusing their rivalry on partisan accusations, while other parties campaign on unrealistic promises. Even if the PJD is successful in retaining the largest share of parliamentary seats (a likely outcome), the results will do little to change the current status quo.

Demonstrations of public anger toward and a lack of cohesion within the government, combined with the renewed strength of the king, also suggest the upcoming elections are a sideshow within a larger story of a lack of reform and continued corruption. Thousands marched against Prime Minister and PJD Secretary General Abdelilah Benkirane on September 18 in protests sparked by a series of leaks over corruption scandals. In the wake of a July report over Morocco’s importation of toxic waste from Italy, the Minster of Environment accused her rivals of trying to damage her reputation; meanwhile, in response to a leaked list of government officials receiving land at below-market value, the Ministers of Interior and Finance defended the purchases. All three implicated ministers were members of the PJD’s governing coalition.

The consequences of the 2011 Arab uprisings in Morocco, while certainly exceptional, are far from clear. The palace is continuing to convey the image that the country has found a “formula for stability” and is moving along a path of gradual democratic reform, while the promises of 2011 remain largely unfulfilled.

Sabina Henneberg is a PhD Candidate at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

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In their remarks, El Yazami and Mouline underscored Morocco’s successes in integrating renewable energy , which include a major solar power plant in the Sahara Desert and the world’s largest wind farm. Both speakers detailed the need for continued public-private partnerships in addressing climate change and its impact on women and children, as well as opportunities to better connect African civil society with international civil society networks for accreditation and support. The subsequent discussion highlighted Morocco’s leadership vis-a-vis exporting renewable energy technology across Africa, encouraging the participation of women in the renewable energy sector, and deepening economic cooperation across the continent.

Other participants included Mr. Driss Alaoui, chargé d’affaires, a.i. of the Embassy of the Kingdom on Morocco; Ms. Vivian Derryck, president and CEO of The Bridges Institute and former assistant administrator for Africa at the US Agency for International Development; Mr. David Koranyi, director of the Eurasian Energy Futures Initiative at the Atlantic Council; and Mr. Duncan Marsh, director of international climate policy at the Nature Conservancy.

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In contrast to the colonial powers which he contends “looted Africa’s resources, stifled the potential of its sons and daughters, mortgaged their future, impeded the continent’s development and sowed the seeds of discord and strife among African countries,” contributing to “the problems plaguing African peoples today, such as backwardness, poverty, migration, wars and conflicts, in addition to despair and succumbing to extremist and terrorist groups,” the king outlined a Moroccan commitment “never made with the intention of exploiting the continent’s assets and natural resources,” but based instead on “mutual benefit.”

In fact, Mohammed VI expresses his confidence that “Africa has the means to ensure its development and to take its destiny into its own hands, thanks to the resolve of African peoples and to the continent’s human and natural resources,” citing as evidence Moroccan contributions to human development, social services, and trade and investment across the region. Singled out for mention in the royal speech was the rehabilitation of Cocody Bay in Abidjan, the commercial capital of Côte d’Ivoire, where Morocco is largest source of foreign investment. The king hailed the nearly $200 million public-private partnership between the governments and businesses of the two countries to restore the ecosystem of the lagoon and develop the infrastructure of the littoral as “a unique model of cooperation.” One could also add, among many other examples, the livelihood project at Soumbedioune Bay, in Dakar, Senegal, which I highlighted last year; the ongoing efforts by Morocco’s OCP Group, which earlier this created a special subsidiary to promote the development of the African agricultural ecosystem, to ensure smallholder farmers affordable access to appropriate fertilizers specific to their crops and soils as well as a range of services and support to turn these inputs into larger crop yields and, consequently, higher incomes; the ambitious expansion across Africa of the three largest Moroccan bank groups—Attiwarijafa, Banque Centrale Populaire, and BMCE Bank of Africa—in quest to provide accessible financial services for the continent’s burgeoning middle class; and the double-digit growth of Maroc Telecom’s Sub-Saharan subsidiaries, whose 53 million customers already outnumber those in the home market.

Overall, Morocco is driving some 85 percent of its foreign direct investment into Africa, a benchmark that drew praise from African Development Bank President Akinwumi Adesina when he visited the country last month. As Mohammed VI had cause to boast at the India-Africa Summit in New Delhi in October 2015, “Morocco has become the top African investor in West Africa and the second biggest in the continent as a whole.” According to the most recent edition of the Global Financial Centres Index, published in March 2016, not only is Casablanca ranked the second business and financial hub in Africa, but it was the only center in the entire Middle East and Africa region to have increased its overall rating and rank since the last report. The Casablanca Finance City, launched in 2010 with an array of incentives for global-level multinational enterprises to establish their African headquarters there, is an example of the business-friendly ecosystem that Morocco has developed in recent years. The 2015 edition of the Ibrahim Index of African Governance ranks the kingdom as having the second-highest improvement in overall governance since 2011 (first place went to Côte d’Ivoire, which five years ago was in the midst of a civil war). In the category of ”sustainable economic opportunity,” Morocco scored the greatest improvement to rank third out of fifty-four countries in absolute terms (after longtime commercial stalwarts Mauritius and South Africa).

All of this, according to the monarch, “is not about goals and objectives,” because “dealing with Africa involves a commitment towards the African citizen, wherever he or she may be” because of the historical bonds which undergird the “sincere affection, appreciation, close human and spiritual relations as well as tangible solidarity” between Moroccans and other African peoples, it is nonetheless also true, as Mohammed VI freely acknowledged, that “Africa is the natural extension of Morocco and the embodiment of the country’s strategic depth.” This “should not come as a surprise since Morocco has always been at the forefront of advocates calling for the liberation of our continent… who believed in Africa, and who worked earnestly for the unity, openness and progress of its peoples.” Without mentioning it explicitly, the king’s speech hearkened to the “Casablanca Group” of pan-African-minded states in the early 1960s, a bloc in which his grandfather and father played major roles, alongside Gamal Abdel Nasser, Kwame Nkrumah, and others.  Consequently, “Morocco’s national responses [today] to many complex regional and international issues—such as development, migration and the fight against terrorism—are in line with a firm commitment to serve African peoples.”

The geopolitical and economic implications of this policy orientation are considerable.  I have repeatedly highlighted Morocco’s role both as a gateway to business in Africa given, inter alia, its free-trade agreement with the United States (the only African country to have one) and as a critical player in regional counterterrorism and security efforts (the country currently co-chairs, alongside the Netherlands, the Global Counterterrorism Forum and the king’s speech also had an important section on Morocco’s approach to countering extremism), to say nothing about its role in broader global diplomacy (the COP22 climate change conference will be hosted in Marrakech in November). Last year, in its updated National Security Strategy, the Obama administration rightly acknowledged the changing dynamic in America’s relationship with Africa: “For decades, American engagement with Africa was defined by aid to help Africans reduce insecurity, famine, and disease. In contrast, the partnerships we are forging today, and will expand in the coming years, aim to build upon the aspirations of Africans”—a stance that is the subject of rare agreement in both this year’s Republican and Democratic platforms.  To realize this important strategic objective going forward, however, US policymakers would do well to “triangulate”—or, at the very least, better coordinate—their efforts with those of African allies like Morocco that are already providing home-grown solutions to the challenges faced by the continent, its nations, and their peoples today.

J. Peter Pham is Director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow the Africa Center on Twitter @ACAfricaCenter.

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The ministry’s statement gives detailed responses to each of these cases, but the third case is illustrative of what aggravated the Moroccans. The State Department report cited the following as an example of Internet censorship:

“[O]n June 29, a Casablanca court sentenced Hamid El Mehdaoui, editor of the news website Badil, to a four-month suspended sentence for allegedly defaming the head of the General Directorate of National Security [DGSN], Abdellatif el Hammouchi. El Mehdaoui had published an article about the death of Karim Lachaqr, an activist who died in police custody in May 2014. The court ordered both him and his source (not a journalist) to pay combined damages of 100,000 dirhams ($10,050) or face imprisonment.”      

In reality, Hammouchi was only appointed head of the DGSN by King Mohammed VI on May 15, 2015, so he could not have been responsible for the alleged death in police custody the year before. Moreover, he had not yet assumed his post when the matter of Mehdaoui was disposed by the courts. In fact, it was the previous head of the security agency, Bouchaib Rmil, who, on June 4, 2014, filed the court case against the blogger for making false claims. That the writers of the report couldn’t get such basic facts right raises significant questions about either their competence or their good faith—if not both.

In fact, a closer examination of the report on Morocco shows just how much effort its writers put into it. It is rather telling that, of the 355 words in the executive summary for 2015, 272 are cut and pasted directly from the report drawn up for 2014—and 231 of the latter were lifted verbatim from the report for 2013. So much for providing the speaker of the House of Representatives and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with an up-to-date, “full and complete report regarding the status of internationally recognized human rights” for the preceding year as required by law.

Even more damning are the omissions. Somehow, the diplomats responsible for the Morocco report didn’t think it was worth noting that on July 1, 2015, a law passed by the Moroccan parliament and promulgated by the king took effect that banned the trial or referral of civilians to military tribunals. This was a reform long sought by human rights campaigners in the country and endorsed, since 2013, by Morocco’s National Council on Human Rights (CNDH). Instead of highlighting this advance, which drew praise from the International Commission of Jurists at the 28^th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in January of last year, the authors of the State Department report concerned themselves with bemoaning “the lack of citizens’ ability to change the constitutional provisions establishing the country’s monarchical form of government.” That the American authors identified that grievance as the first of “the most significant continuing human rights problems” in the country (followed by alleged corruption and disregard for the rule of law by security forces) may well have been a Freudian slip.

All this may seem like “technicalities” or “inside baseball” on the part of analysts from the much-maligned “foreign-policy establishment,” but it has real-world implications. Amid the upheaval that swept across the Arab world beginning in 2011, Morocco has stood out as an exception. Not only has the kingdom avoided the extremes of revolutionary tumult and violent repression, but while their neighbors were still struggling to come to terms with the Arab Spring, Moroccans accelerated a process of political and social renewal already underway, ratifying a new constitution and holding elections that resulted in a coalition government led by a moderate Islamist party. While authorities have responded swiftly and decisively to the few terrorist attacks that the country has suffered, the Moroccan government has emphasized a broader campaign of countering extremist influences at their roots, not only in their country, but also sharing their experience and intelligence with other countries, including in Europe—in the process, making Morocco an anchor for security and development in northwest Africa. Moreover, with the increasing recognition, as the US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa acknowledged, “Africa is more important than ever to the security and prosperity of the international community, and to the United States in particular,” Morocco plays a unique role as a gateway to business on the continent. These geopolitical and economic considerations don’t mean that the country gets a pass, but it deserves to have its friends confront it with the truth, not slapdash and spurious accusations.

I spoke on May 19 with the deputy foreign minister, Bourita, who told me: “The reason we are upset is not because we cannot accept criticism, but it has to be based on facts. We are not challenging your right to assess, even if we may disagree on the judgment, but your presumption to do so without the facts. The report seems to us to have had its conclusions written first and then ‘facts’ were sought to ‘prove’ those conclusions. And where the facts couldn’t be found, they were simply invented.” He went on to tell me that his government couldn’t just ignore the report because “our reputation and our national pursuit of stability through reform is all we have.” Consequently, he assured me, his government would spare no effort to refute what it viewed as falsehood. More will, undoubtedly, be forthcoming and it should: we shouldn’t expect less from a true friend.

J. Peter Pham is the Director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow the Africa Center on Twitter @ACAfricaCenter.

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The ministry’s statement gives detailed responses to each of these cases, but the third case is illustrative of what aggravated the Moroccans. The State Department report cited the following as an example of Internet censorship:

“[O]n June 29, a Casablanca court sentenced Hamid El Mehdaoui, editor of the news website Badil, to a four-month suspended sentence for allegedly defaming the head of the General Directorate of National Security [DGSN], Abdellatif el Hammouchi. El Mehdaoui had published an article about the death of Karim Lachaqr, an activist who died in police custody in May 2014. The court ordered both him and his source (not a journalist) to pay combined damages of 100,000 dirhams ($10,050) or face imprisonment.”      

In reality, Hammouchi was only appointed head of the DGSN by King Mohammed VI on May 15, 2015, so he could not have been responsible for the alleged death in police custody the year before. Moreover, he had not yet assumed his post when the matter of Mehdaoui was disposed by the courts. In fact, it was the previous head of the security agency, Bouchaib Rmil, who, on June 4, 2014, filed the court case against the blogger for making false claims. That the writers of the report couldn’t get such basic facts right raises significant questions about either their competence or their good faith—if not both.

In fact, a closer examination of the report on Morocco shows just how much effort its writers put into it. It is rather telling that, of the 355 words in the executive summary for 2015, 272 are cut and pasted directly from the report drawn up for 2014—and 231 of the latter were lifted verbatim from the report for 2013. So much for providing the speaker of the House of Representatives and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with an up-to-date, “full and complete report regarding the status of internationally recognized human rights” for the preceding year as required by law. 

Even more damning are the omissions. Somehow, the diplomats responsible for the Morocco report didn’t think it was worth noting that on July 1, 2015, a law passed by the Moroccan parliament and promulgated by the king took effect that banned the trial or referral of civilians to military tribunals. This was a reform long sought by human rights campaigners in the country and endorsed, since 2013, by Morocco’s National Council on Human Rights (CNDH). Instead of highlighting this advance, which drew praise from the International Commission of Jurists at the 28th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in January of last year, the authors of the State Department report concerned themselves with bemoaning “the lack of citizens’ ability to change the constitutional provisions establishing the country’s monarchical form of government.” That the American authors identified that grievance as the first of “the most significant continuing human rights problems” in the country (followed by alleged corruption and disregard for the rule of law by security forces) may well have been a Freudian slip.

All this may seem like “technicalities” or “inside baseball” on the part of analysts from the much-maligned “foreign-policy establishment,” but it has real-world implications. Amid the upheaval that swept across the Arab world beginning in 2011, Morocco has stood out as an exception. Not only has the kingdom avoided the extremes of revolutionary tumult and violent repression, but while their neighbors were still struggling to come to terms with the Arab Spring, Moroccans accelerated a process of political and social renewal already underway, ratifying a new constitution and holding elections that resulted in a coalition government led by a moderate Islamist party. While authorities have responded swiftly and decisively to the few terrorist attacks that the country has suffered, the Moroccan government has emphasized a broader campaign of countering extremist influences at their roots, not only in their country, but also sharing their experience and intelligence with other countries, including in Europe—in the process, making Morocco an anchor for security and development in northwest Africa. Moreover, with the increasing recognition, as the US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa acknowledged, “Africa is more important than ever to the security and prosperity of the international community, and to the United States in particular,” Morocco plays a unique role as a gateway to business on the continent. These geopolitical and economic considerations don’t mean that the country gets a pass, but it deserves to have its friends confront it with the truth, not slapdash and spurious accusations.

I spoke on May 19 with the deputy foreign minister, Bourita, who told me: “The reason we are upset is not because we cannot accept criticism, but it has to be based on facts. We are not challenging your right to assess, even if we may disagree on the judgment, but your presumption to do so without the facts. The report seems to us to have had its conclusions written first and then ‘facts’ were sought to ‘prove’ those conclusions. And where the facts couldn’t be found, they were simply invented.” He went on to tell me that his government couldn’t just ignore the report because “our reputation and our national pursuit of stability through reform is all we have.” Consequently, he assured me, his government would spare no effort to refute what it viewed as falsehood. More will, undoubtedly, be forthcoming and it should: we shouldn’t expect less from a true friend.

J. Peter Pham is the Director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow the Africa Center on Twitter @ACAfricaCenter.

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In her remarks, Bouaida outlined Morocco’s perspective on the ongoing instability, especially in Libya and in the Sahel. In particular, with regard to the crisis in Libya, in which Morocco has been hosting and facilitating talks between various parties, she stressed the importance for national domestic involvement in any negotiated political solution and underscored the need for increased bilateral, regional, and international cooperation on counterterrorism efforts. Bouiada also touched on her country’s bright economic prospects and suggested several avenues through which the country plans to bolster its role as a regional economic hub. Finally, Bouaida touched on the domestic political environment in Morocco and highlighted how internal regionalization can contribute to the continued consolidation of democracy.

Also in attendance and participating in the discussion was H.E. Rachad Bouhlal, Ambassador to the United States from the Kingdom of Morocco; Abderrahim Rahhaly, Deputy Chief of Mission from the Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco; the Honorable Bisa Williams, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (2013-2016); General William Ward, former Commander of US Africa Command.

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In their remarks, Rezrazi and Matsumoto outlined the findings of the 250-page report, focusing specifically on the demographics of those Moroccan citizens engaged in international terrorist activities, the success and value of Morocco’s unique approach to counterterrorism, and the future of international counterterrorism cooperation. In particular, the experts challenged the commonly assumed connection between poverty and terrorism and called for reframing of regional counterterrorism collaboration as an international obligation among states.

The original French version of the report was published last week; an updated English translation will be available shortly with new material relating to the November 13 attacks in Paris.

Atlantic Council Board Director the Honorable Mary Carlin Yates, former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for African Affairs at the National Security Council, also participated in the discussion, as did a number of Council Senior Fellows from the Africa Center, the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, and the Brent Scrowcroft Center on International Security.

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The Moroccan king is well loved, and has always been perceived as a monarch of the people. He enjoys driving himself around Casablanca and Rabat, and bestows jobs and other benefits to average people he meets on street corners. Indeed, the country has a long way to go to meet all the needs of its impoverished citizens, and this kind of random generosity might not solve problems long term. But Moroccans stand by their king and by their country’s territorial integrity. That’s not a sentiment that Western governments should overlook.

Following on the policies of his father King Hassan II, Mohamed VI has made a significant investment over the years in the socioeconomic affairs of the Moroccan Sahara. “As a result of these policies, the human development indicators in the region which, four decades ago, were lower than those in the rest of Morocco, are today much higher than the national average,” wrote J. Peter Pham, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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The legendary Sahara covers a vast stretch of northern Africa, and includes a 100,000-mile expanse that is the southern half of my homeland, the Kingdom of Morocco. Regrettably, this stretch of land is also home to one of the longest enduring, and perhaps the most uselessly destructive, conflicts on the continent. Forty years ago this week, 330,000 of my fellow citizens reclaimed the Moroccan Sahara from its Spanish occupiers, firmly but peacefully, in what has become known as the “Green March”: the only movement of national resistance against European imperialism to be waged successfully without a drop of blood. Alas, fascist Spain had already managed to sow the seeds of violence in the territory before its withdrawal.

In the latter years of its imperialist adventure, the Spanish government created a separatist movement of indigenous collaborators, the “Polisario,” to lay claim to every inch of the Moroccan Sahara. In 1975, the group initially eschewed any attempt to counter the “Green March.” But the military government in Algiers subsequently began to fund, train and arm a generation of Polisario fighters—aligned at the time with the Soviet Union and seeking to bleed pro-American Morocco, it found in the group a willing proxy. Polisario guerrillas fought a devastating 15-year war with Morocco, enabling oil- and gas-rich Algeria to weaken the oil-poor kingdom at little cost to itself.

Read the full article here.

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This Friday is the 40th anniversary of one of the defining moments of the post-colonial history of Morocco and, indeed, all of Africa. At dawn on Nov. 6, 1975, some 350,000 Moroccans armed only with flags and copies of the Quran crossed the border arbitrarily imposed by 19th-century European imperialists to peacefully take back a sparsely populated, wind-swept territory that Spain claimed in the wake of the Congress of Berlin in 1885 and over which it only managed to impose a modicum of control in the 1920s.

Amid the scramble for Africa, the ancient kingdom of Morocco, for more than a thousand years the only state between the Mediterranean and the Senegal River, was itself carved up by the colonial powers. Tangier was made an international zone under the joint administration of France, Spain, Britain, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and, even briefly, the United States; Spain occupied the far north and the far south of historic Morocco; and France occupied the remainder of the country with the exception of Ifni, which the Spanish took because of its position on the Atlantic coast across from the Canary Islands.

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In one of his Op-Eds published on the Congress blog, The Hill, Dr. J. Peter Pham the director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center wrote ” Morocco is an African country of serious political and economic clout, integral to the continent’s development and prepared to play a leading role in its future. For policymakers in Washington, Paris, and other Western capitals long in search of a reliable partner in Africa that can direct its own resources toward enhancing regional security and prosperity, it is a signal they have been looking for.”

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At first glance, the results of the municipal elections appear to show a different picture, with the PAM gaining the first position with 21.1 percent of the votes and Istiqlal the second with 16.2 percent. The PJD came third with 15.9 percent. In reality, however, even at the municipal level the success of the PJD is evident. The Islamist party has obtained an absolute majority in such key cities as Casablanca, Tangier, Kenitra, Meknes, and, with much surprise, Fes, until now the bastion of the Istiqlal Party and its populist leader Hamid Chabat. The PJD has also obtained the majority of seats in the municipal councils of Rabat and Marrakesh.

The results of the elections can be read in many ways, and all are going to be subject to change when more data are released and a more accurate analysis can be performed. For now, one can safely make a few observations. The first derives from the fact that there has not been the massive voter abstention that some feared. The turnout Friday saw about 54 percent of the total electorate cast their vote, a percentage similar to that of the last local elections in 2009. While not particularly impressive, the turnout nonetheless shows that a majority of Moroccans still believe in the validity of the electoral process to provide them with avenues of participation in the governance of their country. The argument that reforms—both constitutional and economic—were merely a façade put up by the regime to forestall the 2011 street demands, thus causing a sense of fatigue and dissatisfaction among the population after four years, has been rejected.

In their electoral campaigns, the opposition parties’ attempt to paint the elections as a referendum on the national government’s Islamist rule and on their version of Islam, rather than a step towards institutionalizing decentralized authority and power, backfired. Benkirane and most of the PJD’s candidates were careful to eschew radical doctrinal positions and always put forward their vision of religion as a determinant of social customs and values, not of political rules and regulations. They presented themselves as loyal to the monarchy and to the existing political system in the name of ensuring stability, peace, and order. Most of the Islamist candidates waged their campaign under the slogans of fighting corruption and unemployment, not for the imposition of sharia rule. If these elections prove one result, it is that of the definitive “normalization” of Islamist governance in Morocco. One has only to compare the fears and the objections raised in 2011 when Benkirane was appointed Prime Minister with today’s general acceptance of the Islamist party’s position by the establishment and the populace at large to recognize the PJD’s acquired legitimacy.

The election results suggest a bipolar political landscape in Morocco. The communal results in particular show the Islamist PJD dominating the majority of urban centers and the secular PAM dominating the countryside. This bipolarity, both geographical and ideological, is evidenced also by the meager results of the other main political formations: the National Coalition of Independents (RNI) with 13 percent of the votes in the regional elections and the Popular Movement (MP) with 8.5 percent. Notable is the collapse of the leftist party the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) with only 7 percent of the votes. Particularly painful for this leftist party, led by the combative Driss Lachgar, was the loss of its historical bastions of Rabat and Agadir. Only Istiqlal has held its ground, but it lacks the strength to assert itself as a third pole.

The PJD’s increase in popularity in the urban centers also shows the larger appeal that the Islamist party has acquired among the middle class. It demonstrates the PJD’s evolution toward further strengthening its adherence to the monarchy’s project, largely espoused by the Moroccan middle class, of slow and gradual progression toward economic and political reforms that widen the spaces for freedoms and participation without undermining order and stability.

These elections reveal the first steps in the direction of reforms as designed by the new constitution, which takes great care in creating a more decentralized political system closer to the citizens than the highly centralized and bureaucratic one in place so far. Islamists have shown their capacity to endure the difficulties of governing at the national level and their ability to expand their reach at the local level. Now they will have to prove their capacity to govern the regions and cities that they have won in these elections. If they succeed, their road to the next year’s national elections will be much easier—and much harder for the secular opposition. The latter will have to abandon its empty anti-Islamic slogans and define real, concrete programs that touch the interests and values of the wider population.

Karim Mezranis a Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, focusing on North Africa.

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Sitting, as the preamble of its 2011 reform constitution proclaims, at the crossroads where the Arab Islamic world converges with Europe and Africa—all of which are in various stages of ferment and even crisis—Morocco stands out as something of an oasis of stability.

Unlike other rulers in the region, Morocco’s King Mohammed VI has weathered the turbulence of recent years well. Today, in the 16th year since his accession, he enjoys widespread popularity at home, as I witnessed firsthand this past Friday when thousands of elected officials, community leaders, and ordinary Moroccans from across the North African country converged on the capital for the annual renewal of their loyalty to the monarch. (The King, in turn, reaffirmed his commitment to defending the rights of citizens, as well as the independence, territorial integrity, and welfare of the kingdom.) The enthusiasm on display was not surprising given the middle path Mohammed VI has managed to chart, steering the country clear of both revolutionary tumult and violent repression, while simultaneously avoiding the trap of religious extremism. As many of their neighbors continue to come to terms with the so-called Arab Spring, Moroccans have adopted a new constitution and elected a new government, one led for the first time in the country’s history by a (moderate) Islamist party; another election is schedule for September and is already shaping up to be highly competitive contest between a number of parties, both Islamist and secular-leaning.

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“The emergence of the economic power of Morocco, initiated under the leadership of HM King Mohammed VI since his accession to the throne, is a key element of the royal strategy to consolidate relations of cooperation and solidarity with African countries” said J. Peter Pham, Africa Center Director.

“Thanks to the vision of HM King Mohammed VI, Morocco leverage [sic] its emergence as an economic power to support the African strategy of the Kingdom”, explains the US expert.

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Last March, Rabat inaugurated the “Mohammed VI Institute” for the training of Imams — and the student body includes more than four hundred foreign nationals, emanating largely from Mali, Guinea, Conakry, Ivory Coast, and Gabon (not to mention Tunisia, France, Belgium, and even the Maldives.) This represents the institutionalization of a technique initially developed at the request of the new government in war torn Mali last year: five hundred imams were trained from that country, in order to counter the pro-Qaeda strand in religious leadership, which briefly occupied a piece of the country’s north the size of France.

Training for all these religious leadership figures takes down the warped interpretation of Islamic proof texts, which is the radicals’ stock in trade. It also stressed the salubrious role of women — including as leadership figures: Female imams, known as “murchidate” (“female guides”) learn to share in the administration of mosques and inculcation of their worshippers. J. Peter Pham, Vice President of the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa, has studied the Moroccan experience and described Morocco as a “model” and a “beacon” for Africa.

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As Dr. Peter Pham noted in his op-ed in The Hill, “King Mohammed VI not only declared that ‘Morocco fully assumes its African vocation,’ but also affirmed that ‘South/South cooperation should be at the heart of the economic relationships’ between African countries.” Dr. Pham lists a number of projects already underway, across East and West Africa, in which small businesses, including farmers and fishermen, will benefit from stronger ties with Morocco.

The benefits of these relationships are clear. Dr. Pham writes, “The organic emergence within Africa of such solutions to Africa’s development challenges is of utmost importance to the continent’s international partners, some of whom are beginning to recognize the potentially game-changing impact.” In other words, the collaboration between Morocco and African states is drawing the attention and support of bilateral and multilateral agencies, which are invested in broader regional development strategies in Africa.

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After an introduction by Africa Center Director J. Peter Pham, who noted the event was being held on the eve of the third US-Moroccan Strategic Dialogue, Bouaida spoke about Morocco’s experience with terrorism and its recent successes in combatting violence extremism. While the country has largely escaped the upheaval experienced in nearby Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, Morocco is not immune to terrorism: in 2003 and 2007, the country suffered two bombings in Casablanca.

H.E. Mbarka Bouaida, Minister-Delegate for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation for the Kingdom of Morocco, speaks at the Atlantic Council on April 8.

Bouaida called on the international community to share responsibility for preventing terrorism, noting a set of initiatives that Morocco has recently undertaken to this end. Under the leadership of King Mohamed VI, the country has for years trained imams in moderate, tolerant Islam. Three years ago, Morocco extended this program to foreign imams—Mali, Gabon, Guinea, and other countries in the region have benefitted.

Bouaida emphasized the importance of including women and youth in counter-radicalization efforts, remarking that the “human dimension” must be at the center of all counter terrorism efforts. And these efforts appear to be paying off: over the past twelve years, Bouaida reported that Morocco has disrupted and dismantled more than 130 terror cells.

Following Bouaida’s remarks, Abaddi gave an overview of the history and evolution of modern-day Islamism, noting that extremist groups such as the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria have “hijacked” Islam. To successfully combat such groups, passionate and learned advocates must counter the extremist narrative with principles of moderate Islam. To talk to extremist “tigers,” Abbadi said, “don’t send rabbits.” Rather, “tiger-trained” scholars are needed.

A panel discussion moderated by Pham followed. Abdo reiterated the value of training religious scholars in moderate Islam, Morocco’s success in reducing the number of foreign fighters traveling to Iraq and Syria, and her hope for a pan-Islamic “awakening.” She also noted the importance of pinpointing the efforts that have made Morocco successful in combatting extremism. Grand echoed Abdo, suggesting that lessons learned from Morocco’s experience should be exported and adapted to other countries facing similar challenges.

Abaddi and Abdo noted the pervasiveness of social media and its power to influence followers—particularly young people—toward or away from violent extremism. Abaddi suggested that governments should focus on empowering and building capacity among their citizens to provide a counter narrative to extremism, and noted that despite Morocco’s successes, the fight against extremism is not yet won.

Also in attendance at the discussion was H.E. Rachad Bouhlal, Ambassador of H.M. King of Morocco to the United States.

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Mazarei focused on the economic reforms and policies needed to stimulate growth in Morocco, emphasizing the need for inclusive growth. Mazarei said that despite progress in integration with Europe and an increase in foreign direct investment, poverty, gender inequality, and income distribution issues persist. He argued for policies that would increase participation of women and youth in the workforce, in part by appropriately reforming and funding social programs that improve education.

Commenting on the political scene in Morocco, Grant explained that the government had enacted a longer timeline of reforms than other regional states and that this reduced the prevalence of zero sum politics. Grant pointed to reforms aimed at increasing inclusion of women and youth in government and increasing the role of the parliament. However, she noted that these efforts have not empowered government institutions with more expansive roles or greater importance than the monarchy. Grant singled out corruption and interest groups, which often block or delay reforms, underscoring the prevalent patronage system. She also said that citizen participation needs to increase, especially among women and youth.

Turning to Morocco’s vision for the future, Khan explained that it needs to diversify its economy away from its dependence on agriculture and turn to higher value, more sustainable products. In his opinion, Morocco aims to have a similar economy as the smaller southern European states. However, the status quo constituencies will continue to resist the requisite reforms needed for Morocco to fully expand its economic and political potential. The panelists and participants also discussed the issues of subsidies, how to generate inclusive growth, and the need to equip Morocco’s labor force with skills in demand.

For an in-depth assessment and analysis of Morocco’s political and economic situation, please read Mezran and Khan’s latest publication here.

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While North African countries erupted in violent protests in January 2011 (…) Morocco has navigated its way out of the storm of the so-called Arab Spring without significant political upheaval or damage to its economy, the report, titled “Morocco’s Gradual Political and Economic Transition, said.

The process of progressive reforms was designed to address two primary goals: putting an end to human rights abuses and improving the status of women within both the family and society, pointed out the report carried out by Mohsin Khan and Karim Mezran, senior fellows at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.

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These trends and the need to define the objectives, challenges, and potential for success to support sustainable entrepreneurship in the Maghreb, brought more than 300 people to the Investment & Entrepreneurship Conference on March 5 in Tunis. Organized by the Partners for a New Beginning-North Africa Partnership for Economic Opportunity (PNB-NAPEO), the US State Department, and the Tunisian American Chamber of Commerce, business leaders, private and public sector representatives, and other critical stakeholders convened for a day of plenary and breakout sessions, networking, and group discussions.

Featuring special guests, including Madeline Albright and US Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker, attendees deliberated on the potential and challenges for growth in key regional economic sectors (including information and communications technology and renewable energy). Participants also examined how to develop an ecosystem that provides long-term support for entrepreneurs throughout North Africa and brainstormed on methods to close the skills gap in the Maghreb, among other deliberations.

This conference was an opportunity for these individuals to foster the partnerships that would drive the region’s transformational economic activity in the coming years.

Challenges and Opportunities for Entrepreneurial Success in Tunisia

The multitude of entrepreneurship-focused events held in Tunisia over the past four years highlights the critical need for economic reform to realize the goals of the revolution and overturn the economic damage created by the former regime. Now is the time to implement the reforms that have been a source of debate over the past few years.

Secretary Pritzker highlighted four key areas that Tunisia in particular needs to tackle under the new government: an investment code likened to a “byzantine maze;” a banking system in critical need of adjustment to avoid cronyism; an inefficient tax and customs system; and the lack of a public-private partnership law. These areas, according to Secretary Pritzker, are holdovers from the former regime and without reform would hinder financial transparency. By undertaking such initiatives, Tunisia “sends a signal to local and global investors that Tunisia is open for business” and can begin to overturn years of corruption in a system that allowed the “discretionary application of the rules.”

Other speakers highlighted the need to revamp an economic system that reinforces the status quo, limits opportunity, and stymies growth and employment rather than facilitating entrepreneurship and innovation. Badreddine Ouali of Vermeg noted that Tunisia’s real problem lies in its capacity of to absorb money, rather than the availability of money. If delays in payment, starting with the government, are reduced to acceptable levels (weeks rather than months) by law, it can significantly improve the overall ecosystem of growth and enable entrepreneurs to sustain their growth.

In addition to these structural reforms, the entrepreneurial ecosystem needs to be honed. For Tunisia to be a viable economic player, its entrepreneurs need better maneuverability between the idea and growth stage. They need to attract and utilize sufficient investment to expand their business operations. At present, many entrepreneurs remain stuck in the early stages of business development, their activities hampered by a highly risk averse investment community. Tunisian efforts for structural reform must accompany an effort supporting a culture of entrepreneurship, marked by collaboration and trust between economic actors. A set of best business practices gleaned through mentorship and conversations with economic success stories can facilitate a marketplace of ideas that could have positive knock-on effects in the Tunisian economy. In the face of such obstacles and the immense potential for economic success, Secretary Pritzker outlined the United States’ commitment to Tunisia’s economic growth.

“I Hope My Message Today is Crystal Clear: America is Your Partner”

Secretary Pritzker announced the creation of a private-public partnership that will promote greater linkages between the United States and Tunisia. It would include targeted programming ranging from pitch competitions with seed funding as the top prize, technical assistance and training for entrepreneurs, career centers, and a Business Reform and Competitiveness Project. Participation in these programs, including training on franchise finance, would encourage banks and investors to commit their capital to these new ventures.

The Regional Initiative to Support Entrepreneurship (RISE), a particularly game-changing new program, leverages partnerships in support of end-to-end entrepreneurial success. With access to finance, trainings, mentoring and other educational and reform components, RISE has the capacity to take US-funded programming to the next level. As the pilot participant, all eyes will fall on Tunisia to see how this program can be replicated in other economically transitioning countries.

What is notable about this project is the role of the Tunisian diaspora. Through this program—particularly through seed financing and mentorship—the diaspora can have a significant role as investors, mentors, and collaborators. With the support of the Tunisian American Young Professionals, the Tunisian diaspora community has the opportunity to share their own set of best business practices, provide a global view of entrepreneurship and market activity, and allow the diaspora to invest directly in new business ventures. Many Tunisian-Americans have found success on Wall Street and Silicon Valley and want to contribute to the development of a sustainable economy. Through RISE, they now have a direct pipeline to entrepreneurs who can most effectively utilize their expertise and business acumen.

By the end of the conference, the attendees, armed with new contacts, potential partners, and an inspiring speech by President Beji Caid Essebsi on the Tunisian path to economic sustainability, were prepared to act and contribute to the vision laid out over the course of the daylong event. It is in the interests of all involved for Tunisia to succeed, and critical stakeholders—both within Tunisia and abroad—are prepared to lead the country to the next stage of sociopolitical development. As Secretary Pritzker explained, reforms will not happen overnight. Regardless, there is much about which to be optimistic. In her words, “This is Tunisia’s moment.”

Mohamed Malouche is the Board Chairman of the Tunisian American Young Professionals (TAYP), a diaspora association seeking to increase economic cooperation, ties, and exchanges between Tunisia and the United States.

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In contrast to popular uprisings throughout the Middle East and North Africa in 2011, Morocco has emerged relatively unscathed, avoiding destabilizing political upheaval or economic impact. The case of Morocco has surprised many observers because its weak and problematic social, political, and economic indicators are much like those of the other transitioning countries.

In “Morocco’s Gradual Political and Economic Transition,” Mohsin Khan, a Nonresident Senior Fellow, and Karim Mezran, a Senior Fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, explain the factors defining the country’s unique situation, assessing King Mohammed VI’s legitimacy, the government’s quick efforts to draw up an economic plan with support from the international financial institutions, and the ruling elites’ cleverly managed socio-political reforms.

Morocco is exceptional in that it is the first North African country to have negotiated a program with the International Monetary Fund, and its subsequent policies have resulted in macroeconomic stability. On the political front, the King has implemented social reforms and national reconciliation measures and has endorsed constitutional revisions to transfer more authorities to an elected parliament.

Despite these positive steps that have saved Morocco from the deterioration of the economy, security, and order, Khan and Mezran assert there remains much to do to substantially open the political space and create economic growth. The authors put forth recommendations, such as creating channels for civic participation and reforming the labor market, to keep Morocco on a path toward a more pluralistic and economically viable country.

This is the third in a series of reports by Khan and Mezran on the economics and politics of North Africa. They have previously written on Algeria and Libya.

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Peter Pham has been saying that the way Morocco canvasses to thwart the religious extremism should be noted by the whole world. The American expert said that “Morocco’s experience in fighting violent extremism and promoting the values of moderate Islam is a model to follow not only for the Middle East and North Africa but also for the whole world.”

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Washington – Morocco’s experience in fighting violent extremism stands as a model to follow not only for the Middle East and North Africa but also for the whole world, Director of the Africa Center of the US think-tank Atlantic Council, Peter Pham said on Wednesday.

Morocco’s strategy to counter violent extremism stands as a model in the region and in the world as it is based on a comprehensive approach that addresses the root causes of extremism through social and economic programs along with the promotion of a moderated Islam, said Pham in a statement to MAP on the sidelines of the White House Summit on violent extremism held on February 18-20 in Washington.

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Mentoring and collaboration are critical to fostering an environment conducive to entrepreneurship. The summit gathered policymakers, government officials, and successful entrepreneurs to discuss what efforts prove effective for growing the economy and advancing entrepreneurship. Participants envisioned an educational system with an entrepreneurial and innovative approach where professors encourage aspiring entrepreneurs and teach them vocational skills that can help tackle the critical socioeconomic issues of today. They explored the possibilities of an education system in which innovators—with the right mindset and motivation, regardless of their age, gender, and socioeconomic status—can easily schedule meetings with Moroccan business leaders in their fields to provide them with the right tools, an important step that is needed to improve access to finance, education, mentoring, and networking possibilities. This shift can lead the aspiring entrepreneurs to develop a highly effective leadership skill set with the confidence and practical experience to be successful and in return help others as part of their educational career. However, the discussions must continue in the form of monthly open roundtables alongside government officials, educators, and business leaders to concretely identify the most effective role they can play to support this community of innovators.

The series of talks, meetings, and networking events highlighted the lack of empirical data to evaluate the progress and performance of entrepreneurs in the Arab world. One suggestion is to encourage research initiatives in collaboration with centers, governments, and local organizations to generate valuable data that can be used to shape policies aimed at better supporting the entrepreneurs and stimulating Morocco’s economic growth. Through interviews and focus groups, I am currently interviewing local entrepreneurs, reviewing literature and gathering data to expose the challenges entrepreneurs face and analyze the various business incubators and program types in order to gauge their impact and effectiveness in Morocco. One woman from Saudi Arabia revealed the challenges women in particular face in this field, suggesting that empowering women in the Middle East is critical for a sustainable economy. The challenges range from a lack of access to capital and international networks, to the difficulty to build credibility with successful business leaders, to the issue of mobility.

There are slow but steady efforts to address these gaps and challenges. In Morocco, programs such as Injaz, Endeavor, Startup Maroc, TechnoPark and OCP Foundation already help provide the resources, information, assistance and training necessary for success, yet the majority of entrepreneurs outside of the large cities do not have the privilege to access the same opportunities due to different cultures and lack of encouragement. In the past year, new innovative startups such as the Moroccan-based Startup Your Life, Ampion Bus, Hidden Founders, and New Work Lab have worked successfully to actively reach different communities and instill innovative thinking and a problem-solving mindset in entrepreneurs to engage them and help them achieve success. Therefore, the creation of more business incubators with a number of established mentors can be proficient auxiliary organizations to startups.

Another solution can be to expose different entrepreneurs around the globe to each other, fostering respect for diversity, exploring common ground, and sharing lessons learned to find substantive solutions to the underlying challenges facing societies in the Middle East and beyond.

As businesses, governments, and enterprises, we all have the responsibility to use technology to tackle economic inequality, and work together to create positive change. In this generation, we have more in common and share more traits and values than any precedent generation. With the right tools, news, and information from a global perspective, we can help solve global problems not only at a national, but also at an international level.

Yasmine El Baggari is a young Moroccan entrepreneur and founder of Voyaj, an online platform that matches and connects travelers and hosts across the globe to foster cultural immersion, educational exchange, and mutual understanding.

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“Morocco is especially well-positioned to serve as a hub for such an examination,” said the analysis presented on Monday in Washington and entitled: “Addressing the Food, Water, and Energy Nexus: Transatlantic Perspectives and Africa’s Great Chance.”

[…]

The report was presented mainly by Peter Engelke from the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Constance Berry Newman, former United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Robert Thompson, former Assistant Secretary for Economics at the U.S. Department of Agriculture as well as Peter Pham, Director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council.

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King Mohammed VI’s speech to the 69th UN General Assembly is, “beyond its strategic significance, one more eloquent piece of evidence of the leadership of the Sovereign in Africa, thanks to a pragmatic vision dedicated to sustainable development on the basis of win-win partnerships,” said Thursday in New York Peter Pham Director of the Africa Center, at the US think tank The Atlantic Council.

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